{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_18755/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_18755","id":"gutenberg_18755","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18755","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Catholic Church -- Doctrines -- Early works to 1800","Christianity","God -- Attributes -- Early works to 1800","God -- Omnipresence -- Early works to 1800","Theology, Doctrinal -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and\nsupplementation by David McClamrock\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSUMMA THEOLOGICA\n\nPART II-II (\"Secunda Secundae\")\n\nTranslated by\nFathers of the English Dominican Province\n\nBENZIGER BROTHERS\nNEW YORK\n________________________\n\nDEDICATION\n\nTo the Blessed Virgin\nMary Immaculate\nSeat of Wisdom\n________________________\n\nNOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION\n\nThe text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra\nK. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian\nClassics Ethereal Library <http://www.ccel.org>. I have eliminated\nunnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in\ntranscription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,\nPrologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they\nappeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.\nEach article is now designated by part, question number, and article\nnumber in brackets, like this:\n\n> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]\n\n> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?\n\nIn a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger\nBrothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text\nof the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in\nbrackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first\nsentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: \"Not only is it\nimpossible that anything should be created by God....\" By reference\nto the Latin, \"non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari\"\n(emphasis added), this has been corrected to \"Not only is it [not]\nimpossible that anything should be created by God....\"\n\nThis electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers\nedition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the\noriginal page numbers and headers):\n\n* The repetitive expression \"We proceed thus to the [next] Article\"\ndoes not appear directly below the title of each article.\n\n* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,\n_like this._ Quotations and other \"quotable\" matter, however, are\nordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this\nedition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they\nwere set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers\nedition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear\nin the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in\nparentheses.\n\n* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated\nby colons, like this: \"Dan. 7:10\"--not like this: \"Dan. vii. 10.\"\nSmall roman numerals have been retained where they appear in\ncitations to books other than the Bible.\n\n* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers\nedition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the\nfootnote mark appeared.\n\n* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.\n\n* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.\n\n* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and\nat certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line\nfor each topic.\n\n* Titles of questions are in all caps.\n\nAnything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to\nthe content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a\ndefect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).\n\n________________________\n\nCONTENTS\n\nSECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (QQ. 1-189)\n\nQuestion\n\n1.   Of Faith\n2.   Of the Act of Faith\n3.   Of the Outward Act of Faith\n4.   Of the Virtue Itself of Faith\n5.   Of Those Who Have Faith\n6.   Of the Cause of Faith\n7.   Of the Effects of Faith\n8.   Of the Gift of Understanding\n9.   Of the Gift of Knowledge\n10.  Of Unbelief in General\n11.  Of Heresy\n12.  Of Apostasy\n13.  Of the Sin of Blasphemy, in General\n14.  Of Blasphemy Against the Holy Ghost\n15.  Of the Vices Opposed to Knowledge and Understanding\n16.  Of the Precepts of Faith, Knowledge, and Understanding\n17.  Of Hope, Considered in Itself\n18.  Of the Subject of Hope\n19.  Of the Gift of Fear\n20.  Of Despair\n21.  Of Presumption\n22.  Of the Precepts Relating to Hope and Fear\n23.  Of Charity, Considered in Itself\n24.  Of the Subject of Charity\n25.  Of the Object of Charity\n26.  Of the Order of Charity\n27.  Of the Principal Act of Charity, Which Is to Love\n28.  Of Joy\n29.  Of Peace\n30.  Of Mercy\n31.  Of Beneficence\n32.  Of Almsdeeds\n33.  Of Fraternal Correction\n34.  Of Hatred\n35.  Of Sloth\n36.  Of Envy\n37.  Of Discord, Which Is Contrary to Peace\n38.  Of Contention\n39.  Of Schism\n40.  Of War\n41.  Of Strife\n42.  Of Sedition\n43.  Of Scandal\n44.  Of the Precepts of Charity\n45.  Of the Gift of Wisdom\n46.  Of Folly Which Is Opposed to Wisdom\n\nTREATISE ON PRUDENCE AND JUSTICE\n\n47.  Of Prudence Considered in Itself\n48.  Of the Parts of Prudence\n49.  Of Each Quasi-integral Part of Prudence\n50.  Of the Subjective Parts of Prudence\n51.  Of the Virtues Which Are Connected with Prudence\n52.  Of the Gift of Counsel\n53.  Of Imprudence\n54.  Of Negligence\n55.  Of Vices Opposed to Prudence by Way of Resemblance\n56.  Of the Precepts Relating to Prudence\n57.  Of Right\n58.  Of Justice\n59.  Of Injustice\n60.  Of Judgment\n61.  Of the Parts of Justice\n62.  Of Restitution\n63.  Of Respect of Persons\n64.  Of Murder\n65.  Of Injuries Committed on the Person\n66.  Of Theft and Robbery\n67.  Of the Injustice of a Judge, in Judging\n68.  Of Matters Concerning Unjust Accusation\n69.  Of Sins Committed Against Justice on the Part of the Defendant\n70.  Of Injustice with Regard to the Person of the Witness\n71.  Of Injustice in Judgment on the Part of Counsel\n72.  Of Reviling\n73.  Of Backbiting\n74.  Of Tale-Bearing\n75.  Of Derision\n76.  Of Cursing\n77.  Of Cheating, Which Is Committed in Buying and Selling\n78.  Of the Sin of Usury\n79.  Of the Quasi-integral Parts of Justice\n80.  Of the Potential Parts of Justice\n81.  Of Religion\n82.  Of Devotion\n83.  Of Prayer\n84.  Of Adoration\n85.  Of Sacrifice\n86.  Of Oblations and First-fruits\n87.  Of Tithes\n88.  Of Vows\n89.  Of Oaths\n90.  Of the Taking of God's Name by Way of Adjuration\n91.  Of Taking the Divine Name for the Purpose of Invoking It by\n       Means of Praise\n92.  Of Superstition\n93.  Of Superstition Consisting in Undue Worship of the True God\n94.  Of Idolatry\n95.  Of Superstition in Divinations\n96.  Of Superstition in Observances\n97.  Of the Temptation of God\n98.  Of Perjury\n99.  Of Sacrilege\n100. On Simony\n101. Of Piety\n102. Of Observance, Considered in Itself, and of Its Parts\n103. Of Dulia\n104. Of Obedience\n105. Of Disobedience\n106. Of Thankfulness or Gratitude\n107. Of Ingratitude\n108. Of Vengeance\n109. Of Truth\n110. Of the Vices Opposed to Truth, and First of Lying\n111. Of Dissimulation and Hypocrisy\n112. Of Boasting\n113. Of Irony\n114. Of the Friendliness Which Is Called Affability\n115. Of Flattery\n116. Of Quarreling\n117. Of Liberality\n118. Of the Vices Opposed to Liberality, and in the First Place,\n     of Covetousness\n119. Of Prodigality\n120. Of \"Epikeia\" or Equity\n121. Of Piety\n122. Of the Precepts of Justice\n\nTREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE\n\n123. Of Fortitude\n124. Of Martyrdom\n125. Of Fear\n126. Of Fearlessness\n127. Of Daring\n128. Of the Parts of Fortitude\n129. Of Magnanimity\n130. Of Presumption\n131. Of Ambition\n132. Of Vainglory\n133. Of Pusillanimity\n134. Of Magnificence\n135. Of Meanness\n136. Of Patience\n137. Of Perseverance\n138. Of the Vices Opposed to Perseverance\n139. Of the Gift of Fortitude\n140. Of the Precepts of Fortitude\n141. Of Temperance\n142. Of the Vices Opposed to Temperance\n143. Of the Parts of Temperance, in General\n144. Of Shamefacedness\n145. Of Honesty\n146. Of Abstinence\n147. Of Fasting\n148. Of Gluttony\n149. Of Sobriety\n150. Of Drunkenness\n151. Of Chastity\n152. Of Virginity\n153. Of Lust\n154. Of the Parts of Lust\n155. Of Continence\n156. Of Incontinence\n157. Of Clemency and Meekness\n158. Of Anger\n159. Of Cruelty\n160. Of Modesty\n161. Of Humility\n162. Of Pride\n163. Of the First Man's Sin\n164. Of the Punishments of the First Man's Sin\n165. Of Our First Parents' Temptation\n166. Of Studiousness\n167. Of Curiosity\n168. Of Modesty as Consisting in the Outward Movements of the Body\n169. Of Modesty in the Outward Apparel\n170. Of the Precepts of Temperance\n\nTREATISE ON ACTS WHICH PERTAIN ESPECIALLY TO CERTAIN MEN\n\n171. Of Prophecy\n172. Of the Cause of Prophecy\n173. Of the Manner in Which Prophetic Knowledge Is Conveyed\n174. Of the Division of Prophecy\n175. Of Rapture\n176. Of the Grace of Tongues\n177. Of the Gratuitous Grace Consisting in Words\n178. Of the Grace of Miracles\n179. Of the Division of Life into Active and Contemplative\n180. Of the Contemplative Life\n181. Of the Active Life\n182. Of the Active Life in Comparison with the Contemplative Life\n183. Of Man's Various Duties and States in General\n184. Of the State of Perfection in General\n185. Of Things Pertaining to the Episcopal State\n186. Of Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists\n187. Of Those Things That Are Competent to Religious\n188. Of the Different Kinds of Religious Life\n189. Of the Entrance into Religious Life\n_______________________\n\nSUMMA THEOLOGICA\n\nSECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART\n[\"II-II,\" \"Secunda Secundae\"]\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ. 1-46)\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 1\n\nOF FAITH (In Ten Articles)\n\nHaving to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with\nFaith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.\n\nThe treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of\nthe corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the\nopposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.\n\nAbout faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act;\n(3) the habit of faith.\n\nUnder the first head there are ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?\n\n(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex,\ni.e. whether it is a thing or a proposition?\n\n(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?\n\n(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?\n\n(5) Whether it can be anything known?\n\n(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a\ncertain number of articles?\n\n(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?\n\n(8) Of the number of articles;\n\n(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;\n\n(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Object of Faith Is the First Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First\nTruth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is\nproposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the\nGodhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but\nalso things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of\nthe Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of\nfaith is not only the First Truth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they\nare opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things\ncontained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is\nconsidered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things\ncontained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning\nman and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only\nthe First Truth, but also created truth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the\nsovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith\nis not only the First Truth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that \"faith is\nabout the simple and everlasting truth.\" Now this is the First Truth.\nTherefore the object of faith is the First Truth.\n\n_I answer that,_ The object of every cognitive habit includes two\nthings: first, that which is known materially, and is the material\nobject, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is\nthe formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the\nconclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of\nthe science is the mean of demonstration, through which the\nconclusions are known.\n\nAccordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the\nobject, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of\nwhich we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it\nis revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the\nDivine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which\nfaith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things,\nwhich, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as\nbearing some relation to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain\neffects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards\nthe enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the\nobject of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing\ncomes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of\nthe medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation\nto health.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the\nsacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under\nfaith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much\nas we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.\n\nThe same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all\nthings contained in Holy Writ.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so\nthat its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further\non (Q. 25, A. 1).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Object of Faith Is Something Complex, by Way of a\nProposition?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something\ncomplex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First\nTruth, as stated above (A. 1). Now the First Truth is something\nsimple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol.\nNow the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is\nnot stated therein that God is almighty, but: \"I believe in God . . .\nalmighty.\" Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a\nthing.\n\nObj. 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.\n13:12: \"We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to\nface. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known.\"\nBut the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is\nthe Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now\nthe mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science\nand opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise\nabout propositions; so that its object is something complex.\n\n_I answer that,_ The thing known is in the knower according to the\nmode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to\nknow the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the First Part\n(Q. 85, A. 5). Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known\nby the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the\nother hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity,\nthings that are complex in themselves.\n\nAccordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,\nas regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of\nfaith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we\nhave faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this\nrespect the object of faith is something complex by way of a\nproposition.\n\nHence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount\nof truth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers the object of faith on the part\nof the thing believed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in\nso far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is\nevident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the\nbeliever does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as\nin science we do not form propositions, except in order to have\nknowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the First\nTruth seen in itself, according to 1 John 3:2: \"We know that when He\nshall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He\nis\": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way\nof a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not\napprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison\nfails.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Anything False Can Come Under Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.\nFor faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can\ncome under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not\nobtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as\nbeing good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false\ncan be the object of faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,\naccording to John 8:56: \"Abraham your father rejoiced that he might\nsee My day: he saw it, and was glad.\" But after the time of Abraham,\nGod might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed\nthat He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have\nbeen false. Therefore the object of faith can be something false.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ,\nand many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of\nthe Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to\npreach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore\nsomething false can come under faith.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe\nthat the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the\naltar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly\nconsecrated, and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but\nonly bread. Therefore something false can come under faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No virtue that perfects the intellect is related\nto the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the\nPhilosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that\nperfects the intellect, as we shall show further on (Q. 4, AA. 2, 5).\nTherefore nothing false can come under it.\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by\nmeans of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen\nexcept by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save\nthrough the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (A. 1)\nthat the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so\nthat nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under\nthe First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can\nnon-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows\ntherefore that nothing false can come under faith.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of\nthe appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the\nintellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the\nnature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other\nhand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not\nentirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance\nwith justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what\none is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas\nhope and charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between\nthem fails.\n\nNevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man\nhopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would\nbe an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he\nperseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.\n\nIn like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;\nso that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual\nwhom we love for God's sake.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That \"God would not take flesh,\" considered in itself\nwas possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it stands in\nGod's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as\nexplained in the First Part (Q. 14, AA. 13, 15): and it is thus that\nit comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it\ncannot be false.\n\nReply Obj. 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to believe\nin Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time,\nwherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human\nconjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion\nthrough a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false\nopinion to be the outcome of faith.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such and\nsuch accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ\nis under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly\nconsecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not\nfollow that anything false comes under faith.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Object of Faith Can Be Something Seen?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something\nseen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (John 20:29): \"Because thou hast\nseen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed.\" Therefore vision and faith\nregard the same object.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of\nfaith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): \"We see now through a glass in a dark\nmanner.\" Therefore what is believed is seen.\n\nObj. 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen\nunder every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.\n\nObj. 4: Further, \"Every sense is a kind of sight,\" as Augustine\nstates (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,\naccording to Rom. 10:17: \"Faith . . . cometh by hearing.\" Therefore\nfaith is of things seen.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that \"faith is the\nevidence of things that appear not.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which\nis believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,\nthrough being moved to assent by its very object, which is known\neither by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held\nby the habit of understanding), or through something else already\nknown (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of\nscience). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through\nbeing sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but\nthrough an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side\nrather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear\nof the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be\ncertainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith.\n\nNow those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the\nintellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident\nthat neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the\nsenses or by the intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Thomas \"saw one thing, and believed another\" [*St.\nGregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to\nbe God, he made profession of his faith, saying: \"My Lord and my God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those things which come under faith can be considered\nin two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and\nbelieved at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that\nis, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are\nseen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the\nevidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to\nbe believed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For\njust as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is\nbecoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith,\nthe human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming\nto a right faith, and not to assent to others.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but\nnot of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not\nfollow that these things are seen.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Those Things That Are of Faith Can Be an Object of Science\n[*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through\nits demonstration]?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be\nan object of science. For where science is lacking there is\nignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not\nin ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of\nsuch things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: \"I did it\nignorantly in unbelief.\" Therefore things that are of faith can be an\nobject of science.\n\nObj. 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers\nemploy reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such\nthings can be an object of science.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of\nscience, since a \"demonstration is a syllogism that produces\nscience.\" Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the\nphilosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.\nTherefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.\n\nObj. 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since\nfaith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and\nscience can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster.\ni. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that \"when a\nthing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of\nperception.\" Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of\nperception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of\nperception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an\nobject of science.\n\n_I answer that,_ All science is derived from self-evident and\ntherefore \"seen\" principles; wherefore all objects of science must\nneeds be, in a fashion, seen.\n\nNow as stated above (A. 4), it is impossible that one and the same\nthing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is\nequally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of\nscience and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however,\nthat a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is\nbelieved by another: since we hope to see some day what we now\nbelieve about the Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: \"We see now\nthrough a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face\": which\nvision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see.\nIn like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or\nscientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer,\nis, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it\nby demonstration.\n\nNevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is\nequally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things\nwhich are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not\nabout the same things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of\nfaith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do\nthey know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know\nthem, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes\nthem see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A. 4, ad\n2, 3).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that\nare of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive\narguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not\nimpossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of\nfaith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares\n(Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well\nproved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from\nself-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology\nis a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (P. I, Q. 1, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are\nreckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed\nsimply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to\nmatters of faith, so that those who do not known them by\ndemonstration must know them first of all by faith.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), \"science and\nopinion about the same object can certainly be in different men,\" as\nwe have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for\none and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing\nrelatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same\nrespect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the\nsame object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like\nmanner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and,\nby faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man,\nabout the same object, and in the same respect, science is\nincompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons.\nBecause science is incompatible with opinion about the same object\nsimply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be\ndeemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to\nopinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise.\nYet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of\nfaith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why\nscience and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same\nrespect is because the object of science is something seen whereas\nthe object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Those Things That Are of Faith Should Be Divided into Certain\nArticles?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should\nnot be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in\nHoly Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their\nmultitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems\nsuperfluous to distinguish certain articles of faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely,\nand therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal\naspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above\n(A. 1), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be\ndistinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice\nshould be taken of a material division of matters of faith into\narticles.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre,\nSumma Aurea] that \"an article is an indivisible truth concerning God,\nexacting [arctans] our belief.\" Now belief is a voluntary act, since,\nas Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), \"no man believes against\nhis will.\" Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be\ndivided into articles.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says: \"An article is a glimpse of Divine\ntruth, tending thereto.\" Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth\nby way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in\nour intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into\narticles.\n\n_I answer that,_ the word \"article\" is apparently derived from the\nGreek; for the Greek _arthron_ [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea]\nwhich the Latin renders \"articulus,\" signifies a fitting together of\ndistinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit\ntogether are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the\nGreek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to\nwords to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric,\narticles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says\n(Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced\nsingly and separately, thus: \"Your passion, your voice, your look,\nhave struck terror into your foes.\"\n\nHence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct\narticles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together.\nNow the object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as\nstated above (A. 4). Consequently any matter that, for a special\nreason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters\nare known or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to\ndistinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in\nseeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again\nfrom the dead, wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct\nfrom the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was\nburied, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is\nnot difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one\narticle.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in\nthemselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but\nonly in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions\nare put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in\norder to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith\nconsists in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb.\n11:2: \"Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for,\" it follows\nthat those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly\nto eternal life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God\n[*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of\nGod, etc.], the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and\nthese are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain\nthings in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their\nown account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for\ninstance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at\nthe touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like, which are related in Holy\nWrit for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the\nIncarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct\narticles.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken\nin two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there\nis one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth:\nand from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.\nSecondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered\nfrom our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of\nfaith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view\nthere are various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This definition of an article is taken from an\netymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in\naccordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it\ndoes not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that\nalthough faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since\nbelief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of\nend, since \"he that cometh to God must believe that He is,\" and\n\"without faith it is impossible to please God,\" as the Apostle\ndeclares (Heb. 11:6).\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Articles of Faith Have Increased in Course of Time?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not\nincreased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb.\n11:1), \"faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.\" Now the\nsame things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all\ntimes, the same things are to be believed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised\nby man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered\nthem, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of\nfaith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as\nstated in Eph. 2:8: \"It is the gift of God.\" Since then there can be\nno lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of\nfaith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time\nwent on.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion\nno less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a\nbeginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii).\nTherefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with\nperfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver the\nfaith, knew it most perfectly.\n\nObj. 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us\nthrough the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of\nfaith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later,\naccording to Deut. 32:7: \"Ask thy father, and he will declare to\nthee.\" Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the\nmysteries, for \"they received them more fully than others, even as\nthey received them earlier,\" as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: \"Ourselves\nalso who have the first fruits of the Spirit.\" Therefore it seems\nthat knowledge of matters of faith has not increased as time went on.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that \"the\nknowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the\nnearer they were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they\nreceive the mysteries of salvation.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The articles of faith stand in the same relation to\nthe doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based\non natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order,\nso that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles\nare reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: \"The same\nthing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,\" as the\nPhilosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the\narticles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of\nfaith, such as God's existence, and His providence over the salvation\nof man, according to Heb. 11: \"He that cometh to God, must believe\nthat He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.\" For the\nexistence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God\neternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His\nprovidence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for\nman's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this\nway, again, some of those articles which follow from these are\ncontained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes\nbelief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.\n\nAccordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the\narticles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went\non: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was\ncontained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who\npreceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles\nbelieved explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some\nwere known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who\nlived before them. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2, 3): \"I am\nthe God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg.: 'I am\nthe Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and\nMy name Adonai I did not show them\": David also said (Ps. 118:100):\n\"I have had understanding above ancients\": and the Apostle says (Eph.\n3:5) that the mystery of Christ, \"in other generations was not known,\nas it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped for\nfrom Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through\nChrist, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time,\nthe further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the\nApostle says (Heb. 11:13): \"All these died according to faith, not\nhaving received the promises, but beholding them afar off.\" Now the\nfurther off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore\nthose who were nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge\nof the good things to be hoped for.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the\npart of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in\nknowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that\ntakes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the\nlearner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does\nnot deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for\nhe would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the\ndisciple's capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this\nway that men made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on.\nHence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament\nto childhood.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation can\ntake place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active\ncause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature\nmakes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not\nbrought to perfection, except by something perfect already in\nexistence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the\nimperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the\nimperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is\nthe active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while\nman is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action.\nHence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from\nimperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after\nthe manner of active causes, through being doctors of faith,\nnevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for\nthe common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of\nfaith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith,\nso far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the\npeople, either openly or in figures.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by\nChrist, wherefore the time of His coming is called the \"time of\nfulness [*Vulg.: 'fulness of time']\" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were\nnearest to Christ, whether before, like John the Baptist, or after,\nlike the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith;\nfor even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of\nmanhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more\nperfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his\nyouth.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Articles of Faith Are Suitably Formulated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably\nformulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do\nnot belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above\n(A. 5). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God;\nhence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many\nother philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that \"there\nis one God\" should not be set down as an article of faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should\nbelieve God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to\nbe \"all-knowing\" and \"provident for all,\" about both of which points\nsome have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention\nshould have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His\nomnipotence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know\nthe Son, according to John 14:9: \"He that seeth Me, seeth the Father\nalso.\" Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father\nand Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the\nPerson of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several\narticles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the\nPerson of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about\nthe Person of the Father.\n\nObj. 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of\nthe Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too\nis something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His\nGodhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work\nappropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work\nappropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that \"He spoke by the prophets.\"\nTherefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated\nto the Son in respect of His Godhead.\n\nObj. 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special\ndifficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should\nhave been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems\nthat there is not a sufficient number of articles.\n\nOn the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the\narticles thus.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 4, 6), to faith those things in\nthemselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life,\nand by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are\nproposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the\nGodhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of\nChrist's Incarnation, \"by Whom we have access\" to the glory of the\nsons of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (John 17:3):\n\"This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God,\nand Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.\" Wherefore the first\ndistinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of\nthe Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ's human\nnature, which is the \"mystery of godliness\" (1 Tim. 3:16).\n\nNow with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are\nproposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the\nfirst article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which\nthree articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and\nthirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers\nto the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the\ncreation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace,\nin relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man\nare included in one article; while the third refers to the order of\nglory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us\nconcerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus\nthere are seven articles referring to the Godhead.\n\nIn like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven\narticles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or\nconception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His\nPassion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the\nfifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh,\nto His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen\narticles.\n\nSome, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the\nGodhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the\nthree about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the\nthree Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of\nglorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the\nglory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity\ninto one article.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the\nphilosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance\nHis providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped,\nall of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching\nover things, as stated in the First Part (Q. 13, A. 8). Now in beings\nhaving an intellect, power does not work save by the will and\nknowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal\nknowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills\nin things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His\nprovidence over them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy\nGhost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article\nrefers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the\nrelations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way,\ninclude knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not\na Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of\nview, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one\narticle to the three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each\nPerson, certain points have to be observed, about which some happen\nto fall into error, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish\nthree articles about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the\nomnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son\nto be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for\nan article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point.\nIn like manner it was necessary to appoint a third article about the\nPerson of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way\nChrist's conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life\neverlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one\narticle, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from\nanother point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as\neach one separately presents a special difficulty.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to\nsanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be\nbelieved. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons\nof the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is\nnever sent, as we stated in the First Part (Q. 43, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its\nconsummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which\nis appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which\nis appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by\nappropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to\nthe Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the\nEucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this\nrespect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other\nis that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it\nis included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which\nare ascribed to God's almighty power.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 9]\n\nWhether It Is Suitable for the Articles of Faith to Be Embodied in a\nSymbol?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of\nfaith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of\nfaith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made,\nsince it is written (Deut. 4:2): \"You shall not add to the word that\nI speak to you, neither shall you take away from it.\" Therefore it\nwas unlawful to make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy\nWrit had once been published.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but\n\"one faith.\" Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it\nis not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the\nsymbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all\ncompetent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith.\nTherefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed\nin the words: \"I believe in one God.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of\nfaith, as stated above (A. 8). But the descent into hell is not\nmentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is\nexpressed inadequately.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the\npassage, \"You believe in God, believe also in Me\" (John 14:1) says:\n\"We believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God.\"\nSince then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems\nunfitting to say: \"In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.\"\n\nObj. 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith.\nNow a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly.\nTherefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be\nsung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of\nfaith in a symbol.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The universal Church cannot err, since she is\ngoverned by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was\nOur Lord's promise to His disciples (John 16:13): \"When He, the\nSpirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth.\" Now the\nsymbol is published by the authority of the universal Church.\nTherefore it contains nothing defective.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), \"he that cometh to\nGod, must believe that He is.\" Now a man cannot believe, unless the\ntruth be proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for\nthe truth of faith to be collected together, so that it might the more\neasily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth\nthrough ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of\nmaxims of faith that the symbol [*The Greek _symballein_] takes its\nname.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ,\ndiffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes\nobscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy\nWrit, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by\nall those who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have\nno time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was\nnecessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of\nHoly Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no\naddition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the\nsymbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about\nthe truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of\nsimple-minded persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave\nrise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise\ndiffer from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of\nheretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains\nimplicitly.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the\nperson, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by\nfaith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is\nthe faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only\noutwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is\nexpressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living\nfaith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they\nshould endeavor to acquire it.\n\nReply Obj. 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen among\nheretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that\npoint. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the\nFathers, but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the\nApostles. For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one;\nrather does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 5: If we say: \"'In' the holy Catholic Church,\" this must\nbe taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy\nGhost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: \"I believe in\nthe Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church.\" But it is better and more in\nkeeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, \"the\nholy Catholic Church,\" as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.]\nobserves.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of\nthe symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was\nalready spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it\nis sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the\nApostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the\nfaith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as\nthough it were against the darkness of past and future errors.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 10]\n\nWhether It Belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to Draw Up a Symbol of\nFaith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign\nPontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol\nbecomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as\nstated above (A. 9). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith\nwere more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth\nof faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as\nstated above (A. 7). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of\nthe New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more\nand more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the\nauthority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the\nsymbol.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under\npain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under\npain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of\nthe symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of\nEphesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that \"after the symbol of the Nicene council\nhad been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to\nutter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined\nby the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost,\" and\nthis under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by\nNicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as\nthe \"Latrocinium\" and condemned by the Pope.] The same was repeated\nin the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it\nseems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new\nedition of the symbol.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but\npatriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung\nin the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign\nPontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of\nthe symbol.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The symbol was drawn up by a general council. Now\nsuch a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of\nthe Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can.\n4, 5]. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff\nto draw up a symbol.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Obj. 1), a new edition of the\nsymbol becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may\narise. Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to\nthat authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally,\nso that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs\nto the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, \"to whom the more\nimportant and more difficult questions that arise in the Church are\nreferred,\" as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence\nour Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Luke 22:32):\n\"I have prayed for thee,\" Peter, \"that thy faith fail not, and thou,\nbeing once converted, confirm thy brethren.\" The reason of this is\nthat there should be but one faith of the whole Church, according to\n1 Cor. 1:10: \"That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no\nschisms among you\": and this could not be secured unless any question\nof faith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the whole\nChurch, so that the whole Church may hold firmly to his decision.\nConsequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign\nPontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other\nmatters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general\ncouncil and so forth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the\nteaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pet.\n3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic\nteaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction,\nit was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly\nagainst the errors which arose.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was\nintended for private individuals, who have no business to decide\nmatters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not\ntake away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new\nedition of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the\nsame faith with greater explicitness. For every council has taken\ninto account that a subsequent council would expound matters more\nfully than the preceding council, if this became necessary through\nsome heresy arising. Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign\nPontiff, by whose authority the council is convoked, and its\ndecision confirmed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under\nthe form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine,\nas appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly\nthe whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the\nSovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith. Since\nit contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the\nauthority of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule\nof faith.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 2\n\nOF THE ACT OF FAITH\n(In Ten Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act;\n(2) the external act.\n\nUnder the first head there are ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is \"to believe,\" which is the internal act of faith?\n\n(2) In how many ways is it expressed?\n\n(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything\nabove natural reason?\n\n(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are\nattainable by natural reason?\n\n(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things\nexplicitly?\n\n(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?\n\n(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for\nsalvation?\n\n(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity\nexplicitly?\n\n(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?\n\n(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 1]\n\nWhether to Believe Is to Think with Assent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with\nassent. Because the Latin word \"cogitatio\" [thought] implies a\nresearch, for \"cogitare\" [to think] seems to be equivalent to\n\"coagitare,\" i.e. \"to discuss together.\" Now Damascene says (De Fide\nOrth. iv) that faith is \"an assent without research.\" Therefore\nthinking has no place in the act of faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show\nfurther on (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to think is an act of the cogitative\npower, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the\nFirst Part (Q. 78, A. 4). Therefore thought has nothing to do with\nfaith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its\nobject is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect,\nbut of the will, even as consent is, as stated above (I-II, Q. 15, A.\n1, ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ This is how \"to believe\" is defined by Augustine\n(De Praedest. Sanct. ii).\n\n_I answer that,_ \"To think\" can be taken in three ways. First, in a\ngeneral way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as\nAugustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): \"By understanding I mean now\nthe faculty whereby we understand when thinking.\" Secondly, \"to\nthink\" is more strictly taken for that consideration of the\nintellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which\nprecedes the intellect's arrival at the stage of perfection that\ncomes with the certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine says (De\nTrin. xv, 16) that \"the Son of God is not called the Thought, but the\nWord of God. When our thought realizes what we know and takes form\ntherefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God must be\nunderstood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is\nnothing there that can take form, or be unformed.\" In this way\nthought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet\ndeliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth.\nSince, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of\ndeliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the\nintellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to\nthe sensitive part, hence it is that \"to think\" is taken secondly for\nan act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the\ncogitative power.\n\nAccordingly, if \"to think\" be understood broadly according to the\nfirst sense, then \"to think with assent,\" does not express completely\nwhat is meant by \"to believe\": since, in this way, a man thinks with\nassent even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is\ncertain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its\ndemonstration.], or understands. If, on the other hand, \"to think\" be\nunderstood in the second way, then this expresses completely the\nnature of the act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the\nintellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of thinking,\nas when a man considers the things that he knows by science, or\nunderstands, for this consideration is already formed. But some acts\nof the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent,\nwhether they incline to neither side, as in one who \"doubts\"; or\nincline to one side rather than the other, but on account of some\nslight motive, as in one who \"suspects\"; or incline to one side yet\nwith fear of the other, as in one who \"opines.\" But this act \"to\nbelieve,\" cleaves firmly to one side, in which respect belief has\nsomething in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge\ndoes not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with\ndoubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer to\nthink with assent: so that the act of believing is distinguished from\nall the other acts of the intellect, which are about the true or the\nfalse.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason which\ndemonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things\nwhereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things\nhave been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"To think\" is not taken here for the act of the\ncogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to one\nobject, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken\nhere for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the\nwill.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Act of Faith Is Suitably Distinguished As Believing God,\nBelieving in a God and Believing in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably\ndistinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in\nGod. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is\none virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three\nacts of faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not\nbe reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now \"to believe\nGod\" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the\nFirst Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from\ncertain other acts of faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be\ncalled an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a\nGod. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.\n\nObj. 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose\nobject is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the\nwill, but of the intellect. Therefore \"to believe in God,\" which\nimplies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species\nof that act.\n\n_On the contrary_ is the authority of Augustine who makes this\ndistinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi--Tract. xxix in Joan.).\n\n_I answer that,_ The act of any power or habit depends on the relation\nof that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be\nconsidered in three ways. For, since \"to believe\" is an act of the\nintellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above\n(A. 1, ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part\nof the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.\n\nIf it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can\nbe observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). One\nof these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of\nfaith is \"to believe in a God\"; because, as stated above (ibid.)\nnothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is\nreferred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it\nis the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point\nof faith; and thus an act of faith is \"to believe God,\" since, as\nstated above (ibid.) the formal object of faith is the First Truth,\nto Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to\nwhatever he believes.\n\nThirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the\nintellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is \"to believe in\nGod.\" For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the\naspect of an end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but\none and the same act having different relations to the object of\nfaith.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Unbelievers cannot be said \"to believe in a God\" as\nwe understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not\nbelieve that God exists under the conditions that faith determines;\nhence they do not truly imply believe in a God, since, as the\nPhilosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) \"to know simple things\ndefectively is not to know them at all.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: As stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 1) the will moves the\nintellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this\nrespect an act of faith is \"to believe in God.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 3]\n\nWhether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Anything Above the\nNatural Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe\nanything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of\na thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now\nmatters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things\nunseen as stated above (Q. 1, A. 4). Therefore to believe seems\nunnecessary for salvation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters,\nwherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true\nor false, according to Job 12:11: \"Doth not the ear discern words?\"\nNow a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith,\nsince he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our\njudgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such\nmatters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps.\n36:39: \"But the salvation of the just is from the Lord.\" Now \"the\ninvisible things\" of God \"are clearly seen, being understood by the\nthings that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity,\" according\nto Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the\nunderstanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not\nnecessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): \"Without faith it is\nimpossible to please God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we\nfind that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower\nnature, one of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement,\nwhile the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature.\nThus water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the\nearth), while according to the movement of the moon, it moves round\nthe centre by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their\nproper movements from west to east, while in accordance with the\nmovement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to west.\nNow the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to\nGod, since other creatures do not attain to the universal, but only\nto something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness\neither in _being_ only, as inanimate things, or also in _living,_ and\nin _knowing singulars,_ as plants and animals; whereas the rational\nnature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and\nbeing, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.\n\nConsequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not\nonly in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that\nwhich it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine\ngoodness. Hence it was said above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8) that man's\nultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which\nvision man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to\nJohn 6:45: \"Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned\ncometh to Me.\" Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed\nall at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his\nnature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order\nthat he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the\nPhilosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that \"it behooves a\nlearner to believe.\"\n\nHence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly\nhappiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes\nthe master who is teaching him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher nature,\nnatural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some\nsupernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural\nlight of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of\nvirtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this\nway, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to\nmatters of faith and not to those which are against faith.\nConsequently \"there is no\" danger or \"condemnation to them that are\nin Christ Jesus,\" and whom He has enlightened by faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things\nof God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God\nfrom His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): \"Many things\nare shown to thee above the understandings of man.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Necessary to Believe Those Things Which Can Be Proved\nby Natural Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which\ncan be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's\nworks, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is\nsuperfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.\nTherefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that\ncan be known by natural reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object\nof faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as\nstated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Since therefore all things that can be\nknown by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there\nis no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is\ncertain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its\ndemonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of\nthem are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the\nothers should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is\nnot necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural\nreason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is necessary to believe that God is one and\nincorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only\nthings which are above reason, but also those which can be known by\nreason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may\narrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the\nscience to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God,\nis the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it\npresupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late\nin life that man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second\nreason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general.\nFor many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either\nthrough dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations,\nand temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom\nwould be altogether deprived of the knowledge of God, unless Divine\nthings were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The\nthird reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason is very\ndeficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that\nphilosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into\nhuman affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among\nthemselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge\nof God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine\nmatters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them,\nas it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind\nfor the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved\nby reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and\nabout the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can\nbe an object of faith for another, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although all things that can be known by science are\nof one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to\nbeatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Man Is Bound to Believe Anything Explicitly?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything\nexplicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it\nis not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written\n(Rom. 10:14, 15): \"How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not\nheard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they\npreach unless they be sent?\" Therefore man is not bound to believe\nanything explicitly.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we\nby charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and\nit is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the\nprecept of Our Lord (Matt. 5:39): \"If one strike thee on one [Vulg.:\n'thy right'] cheek, turn to him also the other\"; and by others of the\nsame kind, according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in\nMonte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything\nexplicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God\nproposes to be believed.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according\nto Rom. 1:5: \"For obedience to the faith in all nations.\" Now the\nvirtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed\nprecepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according\nto Ps. 118:60: \"I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy\ncommandments.\" Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man\nshould be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his\nbelieving anything explicitly.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): \"He that cometh to God,\nmust believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to\nfulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining\nsalvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5)\ndepends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things\nmay be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is\nthe proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is\naccidental and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it\nbelongs properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the\ndangers of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself,\nfor the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be\narmed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to\nthe object of fortitude, but indirectly.\n\nAccordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of\na precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate\nin its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the\nfulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should\nterminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary\nrelation to the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in\ncertain places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the\ndirect object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the\nBlessed, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8): while the indirect and\nsecondary object comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy\nWrit, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son\nof Jesse, and so forth.\n\nTherefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is\nbound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to\nother points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly,\nbut only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he\nis prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine\nScriptures. Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly,\nwhen it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of\nfaith.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man's\npower, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound\nto do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing\ngrace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe\nthe articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for\nthis help \"to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully\ngiven; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a\npunishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin,\" as Augustine\nstates (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct.\nviii.]).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things\nwhich are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God\nand our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity\nwhich belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking,\nin the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority,\nsuffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper and\ndirect object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental\nor consequent to that proper and direct object.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 6]\n\nWhether All Are Equally Bound to Have Explicit Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have\nexplicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary\nfor salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is\nnecessary for salvation that certain things should be believed\nexplicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is\nnot bound to believe. But simple persons are sometimes tested in\nreference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are\nbound to believe everything explicitly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but\nonly implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith\nof the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the\nlearned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have\nexplicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have\nexplicit faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 1:14): \"The oxen were\nploughing, and the asses feeding beside them,\" because, as Gregory\nexpounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified\nby the asses, ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who\nare denoted by the oxen.\n\n_I answer that,_ The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of\nDivine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now\nDivine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are\nover them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the\nangels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius\nexplains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding\nof faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher\ndegree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those\nwho are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the\nlower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of\nhigher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under\nobligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to\nbelieve them more explicitly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally\nnecessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree,\nwhose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly\nmore things than others are.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test about\nsubtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been\ncorrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple\npeople in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are free\nfrom obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to\ntheir simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the\nlearned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine\nteaching. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): \"Be ye followers of\nme, as I also am of Christ.\" Hence it is not human knowledge, but the\nDivine truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned\nstray from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones,\nwho think that the learned believe aright; unless the simple hold\nobstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of the\nuniversal Church, which cannot err, since Our Lord said (Luke 22:32):\n\"I have prayed for thee,\" Peter, \"that thy faith fail not.\"\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 7]\n\nWhether It Is Necessary for the Salvation of All, That They Should\nBelieve Explicitly in the Mystery of Christ?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation\nof all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.\nFor man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are\nignorant about: since the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine\nrevelation, which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above\n(A. 6; I, Q. 111, A. 1). Now even the angels were in ignorance of the\nmystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the commentary of\nDionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who ask (Ps. 23:8): \"Who is\nthis king of glory?\" and (Isa. 63:1): \"Who is this that cometh from\nEdom?\" Therefore men were not bound to believe explicitly in the\nmystery of Christ's Incarnation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of the\nteachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (Matt. 11:11) that\n\"there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater\nthan\" he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the\nmystery of Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Matt. 11:3):\n\"Art Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?\" Therefore\neven the teachers were not bound to explicit faith in Christ.\n\nObj. 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the\nministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it\nwould seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith\nin Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that\nit was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly\nin the mystery of Christ.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc):\n\"Our faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is\ndelivered from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except\nby the one Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 1, A. 8), the object of\nfaith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man\nobtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and\nPassion is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written\n(Acts 4:12): \"There is no other name under heaven given to men,\nwhereby we must be saved.\" Therefore belief of some kind in the\nmystery of Christ's Incarnation was necessary at all times and for\nall persons, but this belief differed according to differences of\ntimes and persons. The reason of this is that before the state of\nsin, man believed, explicitly in Christ's Incarnation, in so far as\nit was intended for the consummation of glory, but not as it was\nintended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and Resurrection,\nsince man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however,\nseem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the\nfact that he said (Gen. 2:24): \"Wherefore a man shall leave father\nand mother, and shall cleave to his wife,\" of which the Apostle says\n(Eph. 5:32) that \"this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the\nChurch,\" and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about\nthis sacrament.\n\nBut after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the\nIncarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the\nhuman race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else,\nhave foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain sacrifices both before\nand after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the\nlearned explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those\nsacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to\nChrist's coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so\nto speak. And, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7), the nearer they were to\nChrist, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ's mysteries.\n\nAfter grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound\nto explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards\nthose which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly\nproclaimed, such as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of\nwhich we have spoken above (Q. 1, A. 8). As to other minute points in\nreference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to\nbelieve them more or less explicitly according to each one's state\nand office.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely\nhidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19),\nyet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ\nrevealed them to them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist\ninquired of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he had clearly\nprofessed his belief therein, saying: \"I saw, and I gave testimony,\nthat this is the Son of God\" (John 1:34). Hence he did not say: \"Art\nThou He that hast come?\" but \"Art Thou He that art to come?\" thus\nsaying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it is not to be\nbelieved that he was ignorant of Christ's future Passion, for he had\nalready said (John 1:39): \"Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who\ntaketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world,\" thus foretelling\nHis future immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as\nmay be seen especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with\nGregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this question, being in\nignorance as to whether Christ would descend into hell in His own\nPerson. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of Christ's\nPassion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo,\naccording to Zech. 9:11: \"Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament\nhast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no\nwater\"; nor was he bound to believe explicitly, before its\nfulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself.\n\nIt may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on\nLuke 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from\ndevotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he\ninquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his\ndisciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the\nlatter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing\nto the signs of His works.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Many of the gentiles received revelations of Christ, as\nis clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25): \"I know\nthat my Redeemer liveth.\" The Sibyl too foretold certain things about\nChrist, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we\nread in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine\nAugustus and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a\nman on whose breast was a golden plate with the inscription: \"Christ\nshall be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the\nlifetime of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again\" [*Cf.\nBaron, Annal., A.D. 780]. If, however, some were saved without\nreceiving any revelation, they were not saved without faith in a\nMediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they\ndid, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Divine\nprovidence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind in\nwhatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of\nthe Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: \"Who\nteacheth us more than the beasts of the earth.\"\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 8]\n\nWhether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Explicitly in the\nTrinity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to\nbelieve explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6):\n\"He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to\nthem that seek Him.\" Now one can believe this without believing in the\nTrinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the\nTrinity.\n\nObj. 2: Further our Lord said (John 17:5, 6): \"Father, I have\nmanifested Thy name to men,\" which words Augustine expounds (Tract.\ncvi) as follows: \"Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the\nname whereby Thou art called My Father,\" and further on he adds: \"In\nthat He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that He is\nnot to be worshipped together with false gods, 'God is known in\nJudea'; but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He\ntakes away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name\nof His, which hitherto they knew not.\" Therefore before the coming of\nChrist it was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the\nGodhead: and so the Trinity was not believed explicitly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God\nis the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly\nhappiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in\nGod, without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not\nnecessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is\nexpressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is\nwritten in manifestation of the Trinity: \"Let us make man to Our image\nand likeness\" (Gen. 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was\nnecessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible to believe explicitly in the\nmystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of\nChrist includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the\nworld through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was\nconceived by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the\nmystery of Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but\nimplicitly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was\nit with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace\nhad been revealed, all were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of\nthe Trinity: and all who are born again in Christ, have this bestowed\non them by the invocation of the Trinity, according to Matt. 28:19:\n\"Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of\nthe Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all\ntimes and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and\nfor all people.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden\nin the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles it\nwas shown to the world.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God's sovereign goodness as we understand it now\nthrough its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of\nPersons: but as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it\ncannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the\nmission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 9]\n\nWhether to Believe Is Meritorious?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to believe is not meritorious. For\nthe principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114,\nA. 4). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore,\njust as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by\nour natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific\nknowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known\n[*Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through\nits demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not\nmeritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is\nnot meritorious.\n\nObj. 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a\nsufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a\nsufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any\nmerit on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to\nbelieve: whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing,\nthis is a mark of levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: \"He that is\nhasty to give credit, is light of heart,\" so that, seemingly, he\ngains no merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means\nmeritorious.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints \"by\nfaith . . . obtained promises,\" which would not be the case if they\ndid not merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, AA. 3, 4), our\nactions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will\nmoved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from\nthe free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the\nact of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine\ntruth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that\nit is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently\nthe act of faith can be meritorious.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of\nmerit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as the\ndisposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that\nthe subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor\ncan a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after\nthe advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding\ndisposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle\nof action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial\nform of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without\ncharity, produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity,\nthe act of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of\nnature, and a natural act of the free-will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely the\nscientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that\nfact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because\nthe scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration,\nwherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual\nconsideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his\nfree-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider.\nHence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred\nto the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our\nneighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things\nare subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of\nfaith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no\nfirm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes\n(Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect\nact of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does\nnot appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the\nactual consideration.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for\nhe is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by\nmiracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine\ninvitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however,\nsufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose\nthe merit.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Reasons in Support of What We Believe Lessen the Merit of\nFaith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe\nlessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.)\nthat \"there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason.\" If,\ntherefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith\nis altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human\nreasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of\nbelieving.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens\nthe amount of merit, since \"happiness is the reward of virtue,\" as\nthe Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to\ndiminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential\nto faith to be about the unseen, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5).\nNow the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen.\nTherefore human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the\nmerit of faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an\ninducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether\nit consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a\nman to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so.\nTherefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): \"Being ready always to\nsatisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: 'Of\nthat hope which is in you.' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken\nfrom Bede.] and hope which is in you.\" Now the Apostle would not give\nthis advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith.\nTherefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9), the act of faith can be\nmeritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to\nthe use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of\nwhat we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the\nbeliever. First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance,\nwhen a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe,\nunless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason\ndiminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above\n(I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 77, A. 6, ad 2) that, in moral virtues,\na passion which precedes choice makes the virtuous act less\npraiseworthy. For just as a man ought to perform acts of moral\nvirtue, on account of the judgment of his reason, and not on account\nof a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not on account\nof human reason, but on account of the Divine authority. Secondly,\nhuman reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when\na man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he\nthinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support\nthereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of\nfaith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a\nconsequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words\nof the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: \"We\nnow believe, not for thy saying\" (John 4:42).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no\nwill to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons.\nBut when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the\nauthority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration\nof some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith\nis not, for that reason, lost or diminished.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support of\nthe authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring\nintellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not\ncease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing\nthat what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do\nnot diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand,\nthough demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith\n[*The Leonine Edition reads: 'in support of matters of faith which\nare however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,' etc.],\nbut not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith,\nsince they make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not\ndiminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready to\nbelieve them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit\nis not diminished.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist\nin a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit\nof faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm\nin believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through not\nrenouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have\ngreater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account\nof the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in\nopposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to\nfaith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe,\nand therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 3\n\nOF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith:\nunder which head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?\n\n(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Confession Is an Act of Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith.\nFor the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession\nbelongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act\nof faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of\nconfusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph.\n6:19) asks for prayers that it may be granted him \"with confidence,\nto make known the mystery of the gospel.\" Now it belongs to\nfortitude, which moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from\ndoing good on account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that\nconfession is not an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or\nconstancy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess one's\nfaith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good works,\nfor it is written (Gal. 5:6) that \"faith . . . worketh by charity.\"\nBut other external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore\nneither is confession an act of faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, \"and\nthe work of faith in power\" as referring to \"confession which is a\nwork proper to faith.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to\nwhose end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred\nspecifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh,\nand consequently it is an act of abstinence.\n\nNow confession of those things that are of faith is referred\nspecifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according\nto 2 Cor. 4:13: \"Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe,\nand therefore we speak also.\" For the outward utterance is intended\nto signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought\nof matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the\noutward confession of them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A threefold confession is commended by the Scriptures.\nOne is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a proper act\nof faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated above.\nAnother is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an\nact of \"latria,\" for its purpose is to give outward honor to God,\nwhich is the end of \"latria.\" The third is the confession of sins,\nwhich is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of\npenance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an\nindirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence\nfortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz.\nfear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession, but\nan indirect cause so to speak.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all\noutward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding,\nbut not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession\nas its proper act, without the help of any other virtue.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Confession of Faith Is Necessary for Salvation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary\nfor salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if\nit is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of\nfaith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can\nbe realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of\nfaith is not necessary for salvation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his\nfaith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have\nto instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple\nfolk are not bound to confess the faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb others,\nis not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:32):\n\"Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church\nof God.\" Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance among\nunbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): \"With the heart we\nbelieve unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto\nsalvation.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Things that are necessary for salvation come under\nthe precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is\nsomething affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept.\nHence its necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an\naffirmative precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 5, ad 3; I-II, Q. 88, A. 1, ad 2) do\nnot bind for always, although they are always binding; but they bind\nas to place and time according to other due circumstances, in respect\nof which human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of\nvirtue.\n\nThus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at\nall times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain\ntimes, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of\ndue honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him:\nfor instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to\nremain silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without\nfaith, or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from\nthe faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is\nnecessary for salvation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues, must\nbe referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and our\nneighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good\ndemand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to\nGod's truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger, every\none is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good\nexample and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check\nthe attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty\nof all the faithful to instruct others in the faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public\nconfession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among\nunbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the\nfaithful. Hence Our Lord said (Matt. 7:6): \"Give not that which is\nholy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest\nturning upon you, they tear you.\" Yet, if there is hope of profit to\nthe faith, or if there be urgency, a man should disregard the\ndisturbance of unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it\nis written (Matt. 15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord\nthat \"the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were scandalized,\" He\nanswered: \"Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 4\n\nOF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first\nplace, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the\ncause of faith; fourthly, its effects.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is faith?\n\n(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?\n\n(3) Whether its form is charity?\n\n(4) Whether living (_formata_) faith and lifeless (_informis_) faith\nare one identically?\n\n(5) Whether faith is a virtue?\n\n(6) Whether it is one virtue?\n\n(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;\n\n(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the\nintellectual virtues.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 1]\n\nWhether This Is a Fitting Definition of Faith: \"Faith Is the\nSubstance of Things to Be Hoped For, the Evidence of Things That\nAppear Not?\"\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting\ndefinition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: \"Faith is the substance\nof things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.\"\nFor no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it\nis a theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3).\nTherefore it is not a substance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things\nto be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be\nincluded in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.\n\nObj. 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope,\nsince charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on (A.\n3). Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing\nto be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different\ngenera. Now \"substance\" and \"evidence\" are different genera, and\nneither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to\nstate that faith is both \"substance\" and \"evidence.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which\nit is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is\nalready manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to\nspeak of \"evidence of things that appear not\": and so faith is\nunfittingly defined.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The authority of the Apostle suffices.\n\n_I answer that,_ Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are\nnot a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this\ndefinition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith\ncan be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the\nform of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles\nof the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.\n\nIn order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are\nknown by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit,\nshould be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object.\nNow the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 2, 3),\nwhich is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the\nwill's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object\nof the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the\nintellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a\ntheological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 2), has one same\nthing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be\nin proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q. 1,\nAA. 1, 4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and\nwhatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under\nthe aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the\nact of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to\nthe Apostle (Rom. 8:25): \"We hope for that which we see not\": because\nto see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has\nalready, but for what one has not, as stated above (I-II, Q. 67, A.\n4). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is\nthe object of the will, is indicated by the words: \"Faith is the\nsubstance of things to be hoped for.\" For we are wont to call by the\nname of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when\nthe whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first\nbeginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident\nprinciples are the substance of science, because, to wit, these\nprinciples are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of\nwhich is itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith\nis said to be the \"substance of things to be hoped for,\" for the\nreason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is\nbrought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all\nthings to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through\nseeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made\nevident when we were speaking of happiness (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8; I-II,\nQ. 4, A. 3).\n\nThe relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect,\nconsidered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words,\n\"evidence of things that appear not,\" where \"evidence\" is taken for\nthe result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere\nto a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the\nnon-apparent truth of faith is called \"evidence\" here. Hence another\nreading has \"conviction,\" because to wit, the intellect of the\nbeliever is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it\nsees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to\nthe form of a definition, he may say that \"faith is a habit of the\nmind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect\nassent to what is non-apparent.\"\n\nIn this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to\nthe intellect. For when we describe it as \"evidence,\" we distinguish\nit from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect\nadhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, \"of things that\nappear not,\" we distinguish it from science and understanding, the\nobject of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is \"the\nsubstance of things to be hoped for,\" we distinguish the virtue of\nfaith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the\nbeatitude we hope for.\n\nWhatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of\nthis one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in\nJoan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that \"faith is a virtue whereby we\nbelieve what we do not see,\" and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth.\niv, 11) that \"faith is an assent without research,\" and when others\nsay that \"faith is that certainty of the mind about absent things\nwhich surpasses opinion but falls short of science,\" these all amount\nto the same as the Apostle's words: \"Evidence of things that appear\nnot\"; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that \"faith is the solid\nfoundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing\nforth the truth in him,\" comes to the same as \"substance of things to\nbe hoped for.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"Substance\" here does not stand for the supreme genus\ncondivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance\nwhich is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus\ncontains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by\nthe will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of\nthose virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we\nshall prove further on (Q. 18, A. 1). For this reason the definition\nof faith includes the object of hope.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the\npresent and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so\nadapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of\nthe absent and the unseen.\n\nReply Obj. 4: \"Substance\" and \"evidence\" as included in the\ndefinition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor\ndifferent acts, but different relationships of one act to different\nobjects, as is clear from what has been said.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing,\nmake[s] it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority\ndoes not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence\nreferred to in the definition of faith.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Faith Resides in the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the\nintellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that \"faith\nresides in the believer's will.\" Now the will is a power distinct\nfrom the intellect. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds\nfrom the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its\npraise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is\nin the will, and not in the intellect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical.\nNow faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not\nconcerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in _De\nAnima_ iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas\n\"faith . . . worketh by charity\" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is\nit in the practical intellect, the object of which is some true,\ncontingent thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith\nis the Eternal Truth, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 1). Therefore\nfaith does not reside in the intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision,\naccording to 1 Cor. 13:12: \"We see now through a glass in a dark\nmanner; but then face to face.\" Now vision is in the intellect.\nTherefore faith is likewise.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be\nperfect. Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active\nprinciples, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not\npossible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the\nart, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the\nsoul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well\nis a habit, as stated above (I-II, Q. 49, A. 4, ad 1, 2, 3).\nWherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected\nby a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above\n(Q. 2, AA. 1, 2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch\nas the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will\nand the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be\nperfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be\nperfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the\nintellect: even as there needs to be the habit of prudence in the\nreason, besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty,\nin order that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is\nimmediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that act\nis \"the true,\" which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently\nfaith, which is the proper principle of that act, must needs reside\nin the intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is\ndescribed as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his\nintellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but\nalso the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of\nthe will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed\nin order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be a\nhabit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the\nassenting intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as\nevidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First\nTruth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves\n(De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as\n\"the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension\" (De Anima\niii, 10).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Charity Is the Form of Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith.\nFor each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two\nthings are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of\nthe other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of\na division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore\ncharity is not the form of faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in\none subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in the\nintellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the\nform of faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now\nobedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of\nbelieving, on the part of the will, according to Rom. 1:5: \"For\nobedience to the faith in all nations.\" Therefore obedience rather\nthan charity, is the form of faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Each thing works through its form. Now faith works\nthrough charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.\n\n_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (I-II, Q.\n1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), voluntary acts take their species from\ntheir end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing\nits species, is after the manner of a form in natural things.\nWherefore the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to\nwhich that act is directed, both because it takes its species\ntherefrom, and because the mode of an action should correspond\nproportionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been said\n(A. 1), that the act of faith is directed to the object of the will,\ni.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is the end of\nfaith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity.\nTherefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act\nof faith is perfected and formed by charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens\nthe act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by\ndifferent habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain\norder, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2)\nwhen we were treating of human acts in general.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is\nnot thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that it\nquickens the act of faith, as explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other\nvirtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as\nwe shall show further on (Q. 23, A. 8), and consequently charity is\nspoken of as the form of faith.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Lifeless Faith Can Become Living, or Living Faith, Lifeless?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become\nliving, or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10,\n\"when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be\ndone away.\" Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living\nfaith. Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done\naway, so that they are not one identical habit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now\nlifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: \"Faith without works\nis dead.\" Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a\nbeliever than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it\ncauses the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who\nhitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of\nfaith in him.\n\nObj. 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), \"accidents\ncannot be altered.\" Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same\nfaith cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words, \"Faith without works is dead\"\n(James 2:20) adds, \"by which it lives once more.\" Therefore faith\nwhich was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and\nliving.\n\n_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions on this question.\nFor some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that\nliving and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living\nfaith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner,\nwhen a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of\nlifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting\nthat grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and\nthat a gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal\nsin.\n\nConsequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have\nsaid that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but\nthat, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless\nfaith is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit\nof living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable\nthat the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person\nhaving living faith.\n\nWe must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are\none and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated\nby that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a\nperfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which\npertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not\npertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit\nof faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in\nrespect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in\nrespect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and\nlifeless faith are not distinct habits.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect\nthings from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the\nperfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the\nadvent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially\n\"of the things that appear not.\" When, however, imperfection is not\ninseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which\nwas imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man\nand consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes\na man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental\nthereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes\nliving.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an\nanimal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul:\nconsequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living\nand a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which\ngives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith.\nHence there is no comparison.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to\nbe in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said\nabove (I, Q. 104, A. 1; I-II, Q. 109, A. 9) that God is always\nworking man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting up\nthe air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a\nbeliever than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith\nin both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter\nby creating it anew.\n\nWe might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the\ndisposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one\nwho has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin\ndoes not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a\nprevious mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not\nchanged, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith\nwithout charity, and at another time, with charity.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Faith Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue\nis directed to the good, since \"it is virtue that makes its subject\ngood,\" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is\ndirected to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue.\nNow faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the\nacquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,\n3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as\nstated above (A. 4). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is\nnot connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living\nfaith a virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct\nfrom the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces\n(1 Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore\nfaith is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Man is justified by the virtues, since \"justice\nis all virtue,\" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is\njustified by faith according to Rom. 5:1: \"Being justified therefore\nby faith let us have peace,\" etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As shown above, it is by human virtue that human\nacts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle\nof a good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living\nfaith. For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to\nthe truth at the command of the will, two things are required that\nthis act may be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should\ninfallibly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other is\nthat the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, on\naccount of which it assents to the true: and both of these are to be\nfound in the act of living faith. For it belongs to the very essence\nof faith that the intellect should ever tend to the true, since\nnothing false can be the object of faith, as proved above (Q. 1, A.\n3): while the effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that\nthe soul ever has its will directed to a good end. Therefore living\nfaith is a virtue.\n\nOn the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though\nthe act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the\nintellect, it has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as\nif temperance be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the\nrational part, temperance is not a virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n65, A. 1), because the act of temperance requires both an act of\nreason, and an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of\nfaith requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it\nis its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some good\nin so far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it\nhas a relation to the good considered as the object of the will,\ninasmuch as it is formed by charity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on\nhuman reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity,\nfrom its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like\nfaith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are\nspeaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and\nconsequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of\nthis kind can be a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically,\nas though they belonged to different species. But they differ as\nperfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith,\nbeing imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue,\nfor \"virtue is a kind of perfection\" (Phys. vii, text. 18).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the\ngratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason,\nsince the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are\nnot common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle\nsays: \"There are diversities of graces,\" and again, \"To one is given\"\nthis grace and \"to another\" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all\nmembers of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its\nsubstance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must,\ntherefore, say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain\nexcellency of faith, for instance, \"constancy in faith,\" according\nto a gloss, or the \"word of faith.\"\n\nFaith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain\npleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss\non the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are\nenumerated, explains faith as being \"certainty about the unseen.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Faith Is One Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith\nis a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge\nare numbered among God's gifts according to Isa. 11:2. Now wisdom and\nknowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and\nknowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,\n14, 15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about\nsome temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but\ndivided into several parts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q.\n3, A. 1). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all:\nsince what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet\nto come, as appears from Isa. 7:14: \"Behold a virgin shall conceive.\"\nTherefore faith is not one.\n\nObj. 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one\naccident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one\nfaith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): \"One Lord, one faith.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in\ntwo ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one\nfaith. Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by\nadhering to which we believe whatever is contained in the faith.\nSecondly, on the part of the subject, and thus faith is\ndifferentiated according as it is in various subjects. Now it is\nevident that faith, just as any other habit, takes its species from\nthe formal aspect of its object, but is individualized by its\nsubject. Hence if we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it\nis one specifically, but differs numerically according to its various\nsubjects.\n\nIf, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed,\nthen, again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one\nsame thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in\nbelieving, be diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to\none.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do\nnot belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something\neternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Hence\nthere is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is\ndifferent with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and\neternal matters under their respective aspects.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This difference of past and future arises, not from\nany difference in the thing believed, but from the different\nrelationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we\nhave mentioned above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4; I-II, Q. 107, A. 1, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of faith.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Faith Is the First of the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues.\nFor a gloss on Luke 12:4, \"I say to you My friends,\" says that\nfortitude is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that\nwhich is founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the\nvirtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, \"Be not emulous,\" says that hope\n\"leads on to faith.\" Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further\non (Q. 17, A. 1). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it was stated above (A. 2) that the intellect of the\nbeliever is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of\nfaith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is not the\nfirst virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as\na gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.].\nNow faith is formed by charity, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it\nis owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is\nthe foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the\nfirst part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts.\nNow, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected by\ncharity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by\nfaith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity\nprecedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that \"faith is the\nsubstance of things to be hoped for.\" Now the substance of a thing is\nthat which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by\nits very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature,\nprecedes all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in\nmatters of action, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3; I-II, Q. 34,\nA. 4, ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last\nend, must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of\nnecessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the\nwill, since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far\nas it is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is\npresent in the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by\nfaith, the first of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith,\nbecause natural knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly\nbliss, which is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards\nHim.\n\nOn the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For\nan accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which\nremoves an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the\nPhilosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be\nsaid to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove\nobstacles to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that\nhinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to\nsubmit himself to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some\nother virtues, although there are no real virtues, unless faith be\npresupposed, as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot\nhope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible,\nsince hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n40, A. 1). It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to\npersevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this\nsense that hope is said to lead to faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the\ninclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way it\nis not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue;\nsince all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 2); and thus it is requisite for\nfaith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the\ncommandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a special\nvirtue, and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his\nsuperior when he obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby\nman knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey.\n\nReply Obj. 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come\nfirst, but also to be connected with the other parts of the building:\nsince the building would not be founded on it unless the other parts\nadhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is\ncharity, according to Col. 3:14: \"Above all . . . things have charity\nwhich is the bond of perfection.\" Consequently faith without charity\ncannot be the foundation: and yet it does not follow that charity\nprecedes faith.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Some act of the will is required before faith, but not\nan act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes\nfaith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless\nthe intellect possesses right faith about Him.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Faith Is More Certain Than Science and the Other Intellectual\nVirtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than\nscience and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to\ncertitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain,\nthrough being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less\nit has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also\nwisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the\nbeliever may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about\nmatters of faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the\nintellectual virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But \"faith is\nthrough hearing\" according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding,\nscience and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore\nscience and understanding are more certain than faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more\nperfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than\nfaith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another\nversion [*The Septuagint] of Isa. 7:9: \"If you will not believe, you\nshall not understand [Vulg.: 'continue']\": and Augustine says (De\nTrin. xiv, 1) that \"faith is strengthened by science.\" Therefore it\nseems that science or understanding is more certain than faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): \"When you had\nreceived of us the word of the hearing,\" i.e. by faith . . . \"you\nreceived it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word\nof God.\" Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore\nscience is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4, ad 2) two of the\nintellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and\nart; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of\nits matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change,\nwhereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science\n[*In English the corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and\nunderstanding, are about necessary things, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n57, A. 5, ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and\nunderstanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual\nvirtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2, 3); secondly,\nfor the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first\nway, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First,\non the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain\ncause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than\nthose three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth,\nwhereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason.\nSecondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and\nthus the more a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more\ncertain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of\nfaith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the\naforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged\nsimply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a\ndisposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more\ncertain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e.\nfor us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this\npresent life, they are related to faith as to their principle which\nthey presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith,\nbut on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith\nwith our intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than\nhearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear\ngreatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain\nthan sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what\nhe hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is\napparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man\ncertain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than\nabout what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more\nperfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater\nclearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the\nwhole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises\nfrom the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge\nof conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far\nas science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they\nare based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the\ncertitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 5\n\nOF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their\noriginal state?\n\n(2) Whether the demons have faith?\n\n(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in\nothers?\n\n(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Was Faith in the Angels, or in Man, in Their Original\nState?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the\nangels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh of S. Victor\nsays in his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that \"man cannot see God or\nthings that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation.\"\nNow the angels, in their original state, before they were either\nconfirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to\ncontemplation, since \"they saw things in the Word,\" according to\nAugustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the\nstate of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for\nHugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that \"in his original state\nman knew his Creator, not by the mere outward perception of hearing,\nbut by inward inspiration, not as now believers seek an absent God by\nfaith, but by seeing Him clearly present to their contemplation.\"\nTherefore there was no faith in the angels and man in their original\nstate.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure,\naccording to 1 Cor. 13:13: \"We see now through a glass in a dark\nmanner.\" Now in their original state there was not obscurity either\nin the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore\nthere could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original\nstate.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 10:17) that \"faith . . .\ncometh by hearing.\" Now this could not apply to angels and man in\ntheir original state; for then they could not hear anything from\nanother. Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man\nor in the angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): \"He that cometh to God,\nmust believe.\" Now the original state of angels and man was one of\napproach to God. Therefore they had need of faith.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some say that there was no faith in the angels before\nthey were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he\nsinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of\nDivine things. Since, however, \"faith is the evidence of things that\nappear not,\" according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since \"by faith\nwe believe what we see not,\" according to Augustine (Tract. xl in\nJoan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes\nfaith, which renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith.\nNow the principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of\nwhich gives the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith.\nConsequently, as the angels before their confirmation in grace, and\nman before sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in\nHis Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they possessed was not\nsuch as to exclude faith.\n\nIt follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be\nexplained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith.\nAnd if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as\nsome [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold\nthat there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in\ngrace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses\nnot only a man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God.\n\nSince, however, we stated in the First Part (Q. 62, A. 3; Q. 95, A.\n1) that man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we\nmust needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of\nhoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet\nconsummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and\ncharity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 7).\nConsequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were\nconfirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe\nthat in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were,\nnamely the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a\ncreature, and something material, namely, the thing to which we\nassent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard to the former,\nbefore obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who\nhave knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas with\nregard to the things which are proposed as the material object of\nfaith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another,\neven in the present state, as we have shown above (Q. 1, A. 5; Q. 2,\nA. 4, ad 2). In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels\nbefore being confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest\nknowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we\ncannot know except by believing them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the words of Hugh of S. Victor are those of a\nmaster, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that\nthe contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly\ncontemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence.\nNow the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were\nconfirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was\nof a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer\nto God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and\nmysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them\nso that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light\nof wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He\nwas not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of\nglory.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the\noriginal state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural\nobscurity in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every\ncreature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine\nlight: and this obscurity suffices for faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the original state there was no hearing anything\nfrom man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring\ninwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9:\n\"I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 2]\n\nWhether in the Demons There Is Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For\nAugustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that \"faith depends on the\nbeliever's will\": and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to\nbelieve in God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good,\nas stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2, ad 5), it seems that in the demons\nthere is no faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Eph.\n2:8: \"By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift\nof God.\" Now, according to a gloss on Osee 3:1, \"They look to strange\ngods, and love the husks of the grapes,\" the demons lost their gifts\nof grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons\nafter they sinned.\n\nObj. 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as\nAugustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on John 15:22, \"If I had\nnot come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they\nhave no excuse for their sin.\" Now the sin of unbelief is in some\nmen. Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty\nof a sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable.\nTherefore in the demons there is no faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:19): \"The devils . . .\nbelieve and tremble.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 4; Q. 2, A. 1), the\nbeliever's intellect assents to that which he believes, not because\nhe sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident\nprinciples, but because his will commands his intellect to assent.\nNow, that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two\ncauses. First, through the will being directed to the good, and in\nthis way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the\nintellect is convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though\nthat conviction is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a\nprophet, while preaching the word of God, were to foretell something,\nand were to give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the\nintellect of a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly\nthat God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing itself\nforetold would not be evident in itself, and consequently the essence\nof faith would not be removed.\n\nAccordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in\nthe faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons,\nbut only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby\nthey recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although\nthey do not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for\ninstance that there are three Persons in God, and so forth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the\nevidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their\nbelief.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to\nbelieve, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when\nthat faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have,\nis not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through\ntheir natural intellectual acumen.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident,\nthat the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so\nthat their malice is by no means diminished by their belief.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Man Who Disbelieves One Article of Faith, Can Have Lifeless\nFaith in the Other Articles?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article\nof faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the\nnatural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a\ncatholic. Now a catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of\nfaith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it\nseems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the\ngift of lifeless faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one\nscience, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may\npossess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions,\nand yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe\nsome articles of faith without believing the others.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of\nfaith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a\nman can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can\nbelieve some articles, and disbelieve others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is\ndisbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does\nnot remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does\nfaith, after a man disbelieves one article.\n\n _I answer that,_ Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a\nheretic who disbelieves one article of faith.\n\nThe reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the\nformal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit\ncannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as\nmanifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds\nfrom the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an\ninfallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which\nproceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the\nhabit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by\nfaith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion\nwithout knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but\nmerely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to\nthe teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to\nwhatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by\nthe Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he\nchooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church\nas to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident\nthat a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is\nnot prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but\nif he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error.\nTherefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article\nhas no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in\naccordance with his own will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith,\nabout which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful\ndoes, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order\nto do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds\nthe things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The various conclusions of a science have their\nrespective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without\nanother, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without\nknowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the\narticles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First\nTruth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the\nChurch who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever\nabandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred either\nto their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept\nwithout another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect\nobedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one\ncommandment, according to James 2:10: \"Whosoever shall . . . offend\nin one point is become guilty of all.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Faith Can Be Greater in One Man Than in Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man\nthan in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its\nobject. Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith,\nsince by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as\nstated above (A. 3). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater\nin one than in another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme\ncannot be \"more\" or \"less.\" Now faith consists in something supreme,\nbecause it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above\nall things. Therefore faith cannot be \"more\" or \"less.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding\nof principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith\nare the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above\n(Q. 1, A. 7). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in\nequal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree\nby all the faithful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Wherever we find great and little, there we find\nmore or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little,\nfor Our Lord said to Peter (Matt. 14:31): \"O thou of little faith,\nwhy didst thou doubt?\" And to the woman he said (Matt. 15: 28): \"O\nwoman, great is thy faith!\" Therefore faith can be greater in one\nthan in another.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 112,\nA. 4), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of\nview: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its\nparticipation by the subject.\n\nNow the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in\nrespect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material\nobject which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of\nfaith is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above (Q.\n1, A. 1). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among\nbelievers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above (Q. 4,\nA. 6). But the things which are proposed as the matter of our belief\nare many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this\nrespect one man can believe explicitly more things than another, so\nthat faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more\nexplicit.\n\nIf, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of\nits participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the\nact of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as\nstated above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2; Q. 4, A. 2). Consequently a man's faith\nmay be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his\nintellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in\nanother way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater\npromptitude, devotion, or confidence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of\nfaith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly\nbelieve all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In\nthis respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of\nthe object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the first\nplace to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to\nit with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way\nfaith is greater in one than in another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The understanding of principles results from man's very\nnature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from\nthe gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above\n(I-II, Q. 112, A. 4). Hence the comparison fails.\n\nNevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to\nanother, according to the greater capacity of intellect.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 6\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF FAITH\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are\ntwo points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?\n\n(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Faith Is Infused into Man by God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God.\nFor Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that \"science begets faith in us,\nand nourishes, defends and strengthens it.\" Now those things which\nscience begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused.\nTherefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing,\nseems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by\nseeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is\nwritten (John 4:53): \"The father . . . knew that it was at the same\nhour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed,\nand his whole house\"; and (Rom. 10:17) it is said that \"faith is\nthrough hearing.\" Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired\nby him. But \"faith depends on the believer's will,\" according to\nAugustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired\nby man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 2:8, 9): \"By grace you are\nsaved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man\nmay glory . . . for it is the gift of God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the\nthings which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is\nnecessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second\nthing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things\nwhich are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of\nthese, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are\nof faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man's\nknowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed\nby God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the\napostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in\nsending preachers of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: \"How shall\nthey preach, unless they be sent?\"\n\nAs regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of\nfaith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement,\nsuch as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace\nthe faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who\nsee the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and\nsome do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves\nman inwardly to assent to matters of faith.\n\nThe Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's\nfree-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is\nfrom ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready\nto assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of\nfaith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe.\nBut this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith,\nis raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some\nsupernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God.\nTherefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of\nfaith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of\nexternal persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper\ncause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument again refers to the cause that\nproposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to\nbelieve by words or deeds.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the\nbeliever: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in\norder that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as\nstated above (Q. 2, A. 3).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Lifeless Faith Is a Gift of God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God.\nFor it is written (Deut. 32:4) that \"the works of God are perfect.\" Now\nlifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of\nGod.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through\nlacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless (_informis_)\nwhen it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not\nfrom God, as stated above (I-II, Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore\nneither is lifeless faith from God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is\nwritten (John 7:23): \"If a man receive circumcision on the\nsabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry\nat Me because I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?\" Now\nfaith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God\nthe gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But\nthis is not done except by living faith. Therefore living faith alone\nis a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that \"the faith which\nlacks charity is a gift of God.\" Now this is lifeless faith.\nTherefore lifeless faith is a gift of God.\n\n_I answer that,_ Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted\nthat privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas\nsometimes it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of\nits proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the\nhumors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not\nessential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since,\ntherefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign\nthe cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it follows\nthat what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the\ncause of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential\nto its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness,\nsomething which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors:\nthough we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which\nis not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the\ndiaphanous body.\n\nNow the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of\nfaith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic\nform, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 4). Consequently the cause of lifeless\nfaith is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this\nis God, as stated above (A. 1). It follows, therefore, that\nlifeless faith is a gift of God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with\nthe perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a\nperfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The deformity of an act is essential to the act's\nspecies, considered as a moral act, as stated above (I, Q. 48, A. 1,\nad 2; I-II, Q. 18, A. 5): for an act is said to be deformed through\nbeing deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of\nthe act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of\na deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He\nis the cause of the act as such.\n\nWe may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a\ndue form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is\ncompared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the\ndeformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as\nlifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically,\nthough not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in\nsinners, are from God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who receives faith from God without charity, is\nhealed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous\nunbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing\nfrom committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that\na man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to\ndesist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the\ninstigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is\ngranted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the\ngift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given\nto some without charity.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 7\n\nOF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there\nare two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?\n\n(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Fear Is an Effect of Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For\nan effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it\nis written (Ecclus. 2:8): \"Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him.\"\nTherefore fear is not an effect of faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now\nfear and hope are contraries, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2):\nand faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on Matt. 1:2. Therefore\nfear is not an effect of faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the object\nof faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object of\nfear is an evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). Again, acts\ntake their species from the object, according to what was stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:19): \"The devils . . .\nbelieve and tremble.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 1). Now the principle of all appetitive\nmovements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the\nprinciple of fear and of every appetitive movement must be an\napprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension\nof certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the\nDivine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear\nwhereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear.\n\nIt is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be\nseparated from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to\nHim, and holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate\nGod as an unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the\ngreatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of\nthe first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while\nliving faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it\nmakes man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if\nwe knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and\npunishments, concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear\nHim. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain\narticles of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then\nreverential fear follows, the result of which is that man submits his\nintellect to God, so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence\nthe text quoted continues: \"And your reward shall not be made void.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be the\ncause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets\nhope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God\nawards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it\nmakes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on\nsinners.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the good\nwhich is the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes\nalso certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to\nsubmit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners will\nsuffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of\nfear.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Faith Has the Effect of Purifying the Heart?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For\npurity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith\nis in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying\nthe heart.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with\nimpurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be\nseen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not\npurify the heart.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way,\nit would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify\nthe intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge.\nTherefore faith nowise purifies the heart.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Peter said (Acts 15:9): \"Purifying their hearts by\nfaith.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is impure through being mixed with baser\nthings: for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which\nbetters it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that\nthe rational creature is more excellent than all transient and\ncorporeal creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting\nitself to transient things by loving them. From this impurity the\nrational creature is purified by means of a contrary movement,\nnamely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first\nbeginning of this movement is faith: since \"he that cometh to God\nmust believe that He is,\" according to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first\nbeginning of the heart's purifying is faith; and if this be perfected\nthrough being quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly\npurified thereby.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Things that are in the intellect are the principles of\nthose which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good\nmoves the appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which\nis contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the\nhuman intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself,\nthrough wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible\nobjects. But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible\nwith any kind of impurity, because \"charity covereth all sins\" (Prov.\n10:12).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity\nof sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect,\naccording to the present state of life.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 8\n\nOF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the gifts of understanding and knowledge, which\nrespond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of\nunderstanding there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?\n\n(2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person?\n\n(3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is\nonly speculative, or practical also?\n\n(4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of\nunderstanding?\n\n(5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace?\n\n(6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other\ngifts.\n\n(7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift?\n\n(8) Which of the fruits?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Understanding Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the\nHoly Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of\nnature, since they are given in addition to the latter. Now\nunderstanding is a natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident\nprinciples are known, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 6. Therefore it should\nnot be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according\nto their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now\nthe mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a\nsign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason),\nas Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge\nwhich is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather\nthan a gift of understanding.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is\ncondivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9, 10). Now no gift of the Holy\nGhost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost\nshould receive the name of understanding.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): \"The Spirit of the Lord\nshall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for\n\"intelligere\" [to understand] is the same as \"intus legere\" [to read\ninwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference\nbetween intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned\nwith external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge\npenetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the\nintellect is \"what a thing is,\" as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 6.\n\nNow there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find\nwhich human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under\nthe accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under\nwords lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the\ntruth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is\nenclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is\nperceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and\nvice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all\nthese things.\n\nSince, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things\nas it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the\nunderstanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things.\nNow the natural light of our understanding is of finite power;\nwherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently man\nneeds a supernatural light in order to penetrate further still so\nas to know what it cannot know by its natural light: and this\nsupernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of\nunderstanding.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests only\ncertain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man\nis ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q. 2, A. 3;\nI-II, Q. 3, A. 8), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for\nwhich he requires the gift of understanding.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an\nunderstanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by\nproceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of\nreason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we\nignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something\npreviously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the\nlight of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore\nthis addition is not called \"reason\" but \"understanding,\" since the\nadditional light is in comparison with what we know supernaturally,\nwhat the natural light is in regard to those things which we know\nfrom the first.\n\nReply Obj. 3: \"Will\" denotes simply a movement of the appetite\nwithout indicating any excellence; whereas \"understanding\" denotes a\ncertain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of\nthings. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding\nrather than after the will.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Gift of Understanding Is Compatible with Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is\nincompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15)\nthat \"the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension\nof him who understands it.\" But the thing which is believed is not\ncomprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians\n3:12: \"Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: 'attained'],\nor were already perfect.\" Therefore it seems that faith and\nunderstanding are incompatible in the same subject.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the understanding.\nBut faith is of things that appear not, as stated above (Q. 1, A.\n4; Q. 4, A. 1). Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding\nin the same subject.\n\nObj. 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But\nscience and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated\nabove (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Much less, therefore, can understanding\nand faith be in the same subject.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that \"understanding\nenlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard.\" Now one who\nhas faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard;\nthus it is written (Luke 24:27, 32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures\nto His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore\nunderstanding is compatible with faith.\n\n_I answer that,_ We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on\nthe side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.\n\nOn the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain\nthings, of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery\nto three Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son;\nwhereas other things come under faith, through being subordinate, in\none way or another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that\nis contained in the Divine Scriptures.\n\nOn the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that\nthere are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way,\nwe understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the\nessence of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in\nitself of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the\nstate of faith lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the\ndirect object of faith: although certain other things that are\nsubordinate to faith can be understood even in this way.\n\nIn another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of\na thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity\nor mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward\nappearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we\nunderstand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the\nsake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the\nstate of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those\nthings which are the direct object of faith.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three\nargue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to\nthe understanding of matters subordinate to faith.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Gift of Understanding Is Merely Speculative or Also\nPractical?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of\nthe Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according\nto Gregory (Moral. i, 32), \"understanding penetrates certain more\nexalted things.\" But the practical intellect is occupied, not with\nexalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions\nare concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not\npractical.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more\nexcellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the\nintellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but\nnecessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much\nmore, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but\nnecessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary\nthings, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and\nwhich may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of\nunderstanding is not practical.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in\nmatters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with\nwhich the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural\nreason, which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was\nmade clear above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 2; I-II, Q. 71, A. 6). Therefore\nthe gift of understanding is not practical.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 110:10): \"A good understanding\nto all that do it.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the gift of understanding is\nnot only about those things which come under faith first and\nprincipally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good\nactions have a certain relationship to faith: since \"faith worketh\nthrough charity,\" according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift\nof understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these\nwere its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions\nis the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by\nthe gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting\nit, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The things with which human actions are concerned are\nnot surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred\nto the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness,\nthey are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding consists\nprecisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only\nas they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is\nthe more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and the\neternal law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6). Now the eternal law\nsurpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as\nruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires\nthe supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Gift of Understanding Is in All Who Are in a State of\nGrace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in\nall who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49)\nthat \"the gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness\nof mind.\" Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of\nmind. Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a\nstate of grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge,\nfaith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith\nChrist dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift of\nunderstanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who\nhave faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says\n(De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not\nnecessary for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in\na state of grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a\nstate of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of\nunderstanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself\nprofitably, for, at times, \"when the mind is puffed up with\nunderstanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base\nand vile things,\" as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the\ngift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 81:5): \"They have not known or\nunderstood, they walk on in darkness.\" But no one who is in a state\nof grace walks in darkness, according to John 8:12: \"He that\nfolloweth Me, walketh not in darkness.\" Therefore no one who is in a\nstate of grace is without the gift of understanding.\n\n_I answer that,_ In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs\nbe rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good,\naccording to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will\ncannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some\nknowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good\nunderstood, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy\nGhost directs man's will by the gift of charity, so as to move it\ndirectly to some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of\nunderstanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some\nsupernatural truth, to which the right will needs to tend.\n\nTherefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have\nsanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of\nmind with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but\nwith regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are\nsufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 John 2:27:\n\"His unction teacheth you of all things.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully the\nthings that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that\nthey ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate\nfrom them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift\nof understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order\nthat they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes\nwith regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to\npenetrate all things clearly.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Gift of Understanding Is Found Also in Those Who Have Not\nSanctifying Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found\nalso in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in\nexpounding the words of Ps. 118:20: \"My soul hath coveted to long for\nThy justifications,\" says: \"Understanding flies ahead, and man's will\nis weak and slow to follow.\" But in all who have sanctifying grace,\nthe will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of\nunderstanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that \"there is need of\nunderstanding in a\" prophetic \"vision,\" so that, seemingly, there is\nno prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be\nprophecy without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Matt. 7:22, where\nthose who say: \"We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: 'Have we not\nprophesied in Thy name?'],\" are answered with the words: \"I never knew\nyou.\" Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying\ngrace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue\nof faith, according to Isa. 7:9, following another reading [*The\nSeptuagint]: \"If you will not believe you shall not understand.\"\nNow faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of\nunderstanding can be without it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 6:45): \"Every one that hath\nheard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.\" Now it is by\nthe intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn\nor understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of\nunderstanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without\nsanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be\nwithout sanctifying grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) the gifts of\nthe Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the\nmotion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of\ngrace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's\nunderstanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of\nwhich movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore\nunless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to\nhave a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of\nunderstanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in\nregard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.\n\nNow to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in\nerror about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest\ngood: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in\nmoral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit\nof virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without\nsanctifying grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of\nintellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions\nof a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a\nright estimate about the end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a\nkind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed\nto the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with\nregard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the\ngift of understanding.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but\nunderstanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which\nperception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard\nthe end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between\nunderstanding and faith.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Gift of Understanding Is Distinct from the Other Gifts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not\ndistinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between\nthings whose opposites are not distinct. Now \"wisdom is contrary to\nfolly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to\nrashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance,\" as Gregory states\n(Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between\nfolly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does\nunderstanding differ from the other gifts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs\nfrom the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be\nabout self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not\nabout any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first\nprinciples suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally\nself-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as\nare supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first\nprinciples in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7).\nTherefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other\nintellectual gifts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or\npractical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as\nstated above (A. 3). Therefore it is not distinct from the other\nintellectual gifts, but comprises them all.\n\n_On the contrary,_ When several things are enumerated together they\nmust be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction\nis the origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated\ntogether with the other gifts, as appears from Isa. 11:2. Therefore\nthe gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts.\n\n_I answer that,_ The difference between the gift of understanding and\nthree of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident,\nsince the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while\nthe three belong to the appetitive power.\n\nBut the difference between this gift of understanding and the\nremaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also\nbelong to the cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William\nof Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of\nunderstanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in\nthat these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of\nunderstanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that it differs\nfrom the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to speculative knowledge,\nin that wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding\nrenders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to\npenetrate into their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned\nthe number of the gifts, above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4).\n\nBut if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is\nconcerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters,\nas stated above (A. 3), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards\nboth matters, as we shall show further on (Q. 9, A. 3), and\nconsequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For\nall these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which,\nin us, takes its foundation from faith. Now \"faith is through\nhearing\" (Rom. 10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be\nbelieved by man, not as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by\nfaith. But faith, first and principally, is about the First Truth,\nsecondarily, about certain considerations concerning creatures, and\nfurthermore extends to the direction of human actions, in so far as\nit works through charity, as appears from what has been said above\n(Q. 4, A. 2, ad 3).\n\nAccordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief,\ntwo things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated\nor grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of\nunderstanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these\nthings aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these\nthings, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with\nregard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard\nto created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its\napplication to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts is\nclearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which\nGregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to\nsharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp,\nwhen it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are\nproposed to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind\nunable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a\nfool if he judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore\nfolly is properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright\nabout the universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind,\neven about any particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to\nknowledge, which gives man a right judgment about particular causes,\nviz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby\nman does not proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The gift of understanding is about the first principles\nof that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than\nfaith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it\nbelongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the\nthings that are said.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of\nknowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment,\nbut as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Sixth Beatitude, \"Blessed Are the Clean of Heart,\" etc.,\nResponds to the Gift of Understanding?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, \"Blessed are the\nclean of heart, for they shall see God,\" does not respond to the gift\nof understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly\nto the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the\nappetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the\naforesaid beatitude does not respond to the gift of understanding.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): \"Purifying their\nhearts by faith.\" Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart\nbeing purified. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to\nthe virtue of faith rather than to the gift of understanding.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the\npresent state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the\npresent life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8). Therefore the sixth beatitude\nwhich comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of\nunderstanding.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): \"The\nsixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to\nthe clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye\nhath not seen.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as\nalso in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the\nother by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 69, AA. 2, 4), and each of these, in some way, responds\nto the gift of understanding.\n\nFor cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to\nseeing God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate\naffections: and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and\ngifts belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart\nis a kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of\nthe mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the\ntruths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of\ncorporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations:\nand this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.\n\nAgain, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's\nEssence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not\nwhat God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more\nperfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He\nsurpasses all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God\nbelongs to the gift of understanding; the first, to the gift of\nunderstanding in its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the\nsecond, to the gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as\npossessed by wayfarers.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two\narguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers\nto the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in\nthis life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 69, A. 2).\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Faith, Among the Fruits, Responds to the Gift of\nUnderstanding?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not\nrespond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit\nof faith, since it is written (Isa. 7:9) according to another reading\n[*The Septuagint]: \"If you will not believe you shall not\nunderstand,\" where our version has: \"If you will not believe, you\nshall not continue.\" Therefore fruit is not the fruit of\nunderstanding.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what\nfollows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the\nfoundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above (Q. 4,\nAA. 1, 7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of understanding.\n\nObj. 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the\nappetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect;\nnamely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite.\nTherefore faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more\nthan to wisdom, knowledge or counsel.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of\nunderstanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith,\nwhich certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says\nthat the \"faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen.\"\nTherefore faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of\nunderstanding.\n\n_I answer that,_ The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n70, A. 1), when we were discussing them, are so called because they\nare something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of\nthe Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an\nend, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that\nwhich is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be,\nafter a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to\nthe other powers.\n\nAccordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a\npower, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same\npower; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will.\nIn this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to\nthe gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while\nthe fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the\nwill.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue.\nBut we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of\ncertitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it\nwould be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be\nbelieved, without understanding it in some way. However, the\nperfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which\nperfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty\nof faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that\nvery knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its own\nsake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand,\nspeculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is\nthe certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which\nbelongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of\nits own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge,\nwhich can belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one\ncorresponding fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith.\nThe reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive\nfaculty, is because, as already stated, the character of end, which\nthe word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the\nintellective part.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 9\n\nOF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?\n\n(2) Whether it is about Divine things?\n\n(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?\n\n(4) Which beatitude responds to it?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Knowledge Is a Gift?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the\ngifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge\nimplies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says\n(Poster. i, 2) that a \"demonstration is a syllogism which produces\nknowledge.\" Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy\npersons, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 4; I-II, Q. 68, A. 5). Now\nAugustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that \"many of the faithful lack\nknowledge though they have faith.\" Therefore knowledge is not a gift.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Therefore one gift suffices for\nthe perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds\nto the virtue of faith, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 2). Therefore the\ngift of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear\nto which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are\nperfections of virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2), it\nseems that knowledge is not a gift.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Isa.\n11:2).\n\n_I answer that,_ Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore,\ndoes not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature.\nNow, when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to\nsome truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth:\nfirst, because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure\njudgment on it.\n\nAccordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human\nintellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of\nthese is that he should have a sound grasp of the things that are\nproposed to be believed, and this pertains to the gift of\nunderstanding, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 6): while the other is that\nhe should have a sure and right judgment on them, so as to discern\nwhat is to be believed, from what is not to be believed, and for this\nthe gift of knowledge is required.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures,\naccording to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms\na sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his\nreason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative\nreasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of\ntruth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was\nstated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 7); wherefore God's knowledge is\nnot discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which\nthat knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it\nis a participated likeness thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief.\nOne is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning\nthings to be believed from things not to be believed: in this way\nknowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a\nknowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what\none ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to\ninduce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This\nknowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not\ngiven to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted,\nadds: \"It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to\nbelieve, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to the\ngodly, and to defend it against the ungodly.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and\nintellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the\ntheological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the\nperfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is\nnot unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological\nvirtue.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Gift of Knowledge Is About Divine Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine\nthings. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that \"knowledge begets,\nnourishes and strengthens faith.\" Now faith is about Divine things,\nbecause its object is the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).\nTherefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than\nacquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine\nthings, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore\nis the gift of knowledge about Divine things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Rom. 1:20, \"the invisible things of God\n. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are\nmade.\" If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems\nthat there is also knowledge of Divine things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): \"The knowledge\nof Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of\nhuman affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A sure judgment about a thing is formed chiefly from\nits cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the\norder of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the\nsecond, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed\nthrough the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first\ncause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed\nthrough the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.\n\nNow in those things where we find something most perfect, the common\nname of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short\nof the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most\nperfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of\nconvertible terms, that which signifies \"what a thing is,\" is given\nthe special name of \"definition,\" but the convertible terms which\nfall short of this, retain the common name, and are called \"proper\"\nterms.\n\nAccordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment\nas stated above (A. 1), if this certitude of the judgment is derived\nfrom the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is\nwisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows\nthe highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of\nall matters by that cause: and a wise man \"absolutely,\" is one who\nknows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the\nknowledge of Divine things is called \"wisdom,\" while the knowledge\nof human things is called \"knowledge,\" this being the common name\ndenoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment\nwhich is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we take\nknowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom,\nso that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet\nfaith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence\nto know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge,\nbut to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of\nunion with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of\nwisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic\nacceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special\ngift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through\ncreated things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), every cognitive habit\nregards formally the mean through which things are known, and\nmaterially, the things that are known through the mean. And since\nthat which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those\nsciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from\nmathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical\nsciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with\nphysical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in _Phys._  ii, 2\nthat they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God\nthrough His creatures, this seems to pertain to \"knowledge,\" to which\nit belongs formally, rather than to \"wisdom,\" to which it belongs\nmaterially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to\nDivine things, this pertains to \"wisdom\" rather than to \"knowledge.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Gift of Knowledge Is Practical Knowledge?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered\namong the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin.\nxii, 14) that \"knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we\nmake use of external things.\" But the knowledge which is concerned\nabout actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is\npractical.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): \"Knowledge is nought if\nit hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it\nlacks the discernment of knowledge.\" Now it follows from this\nauthority that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a\nspeculative science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not\nspeculative but practical.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the\nrighteous, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 5). But speculative knowledge\ncan be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: \"To\nhim . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a\nsin.\" Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but\npractical.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): \"Knowledge on her own\nday prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in\nthe mind.\" Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds\nof knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of\nknowledge is both speculative and practical.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 9, A. 8), the gift of knowledge,\nlike the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of\nfaith. Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation,\nin as much as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First\nTruth is also the last end for the sake of which our works are done,\nhence it is that faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6:\n\"Faith . . . worketh by charity.\"\n\nThe consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and\nprincipally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what\nhe ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works,\nsince we are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of\nfaith, and of conclusions drawn therefrom.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so\nfar as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet\nnot action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.\n\nHence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As we have already stated (Q. 8, A. 5) about the gift\nof understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of\nunderstanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace:\nand so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that\nthey alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters\nof faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never\nto wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of\nholy things, according to Wis. 10:10: \"She conducted the just . . .\nthrough the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy\nthings.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Third Beatitude, \"Blessed Are They That Mourn,\" etc.\nCorresponds to the Gift of Knowledge?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, \"Blessed are they\nthat mourn,\" does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even\nas evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy.\nNow knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter\nis known through evil: for \"the straight line rules both itself and\nthe crooked line\" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude\ndoes not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.\n\nObj. 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now\nthere is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there\njoy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): \"Her conversation hath no\nbitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness.\"\nTherefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with\nthe gift of knowledge.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation,\nbefore operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation,\nsorrow does not correspond to it, since \"the speculative intellect is\nnot concerned about things to be sought or avoided\" (De Anima iii,\n9). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to\ncorrespond with the gift of knowledge.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv):\n\"Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been\nmastered by the evil which he coveted as though it were good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to\nknowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God\nis occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: \"Creatures . . . are turned\nto an abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise,\" of\nthose, namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they\ndeem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing\ntheir last end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a\nright judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of\nwhich they may be the occasion), which judgment he exercises through\nthe gift of knowledge.\n\nHence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of\nknowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in\nso far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper\ncause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy\ncorrespond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of\nknowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past\nerrors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right\njudgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason\nsorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, and the\nresulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life,\nand is perfected in the life to come.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he\nmay sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers:\nit is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it\nconsists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in\nconsidering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude\ndoes consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in\nwell-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the\nbeatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is\nnot ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are\nabout Divine things.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 10\n\nOF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL\n(In Twelve Articles)\n\nIn due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief,\nwhich is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to\nconfession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which\nare contrary to knowledge and understanding.\n\nAs to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general;\n(2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith.\n\nUnder the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?\n\n(2) What is its subject?\n\n(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?\n\n(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?\n\n(5) Of the species of unbelief;\n\n(6) Of their comparison, one with another;\n\n(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?\n\n(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?\n\n(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?\n\n(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?\n\n(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?\n\n(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against\ntheir parents' will?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Unbelief Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin\nis contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now\nunbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De\nPraedest. Sanct. v) that \"to be capable to having faith, just as to be\ncapable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have\nfaith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.\"\nTherefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a\nsin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every\nsin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief,\nfor he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says\n(Rom. 10:14): \"How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not\nheard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?\" Therefore\nunbelief does not seem to be a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), there are seven\ncapital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not\nseem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a\nsin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue,\nand unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of\npure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because\nhe has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of\nopposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the\nfaith, or despises it, according to Isa. 53:1: \"Who hath believed our\nreport?\" It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is\nin this sense that unbelief is a sin.\n\nIf, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in\nthose who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character,\nnot of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine\nthings is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like\nunbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot\nbe taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of\nunbelief. Hence Our Lord said (John 15:22) \"If I had not come, and\nspoken to them, they would not have sin\"; which Augustine expounds\n(Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as \"referring to the sin whereby they\nbelieved not in Christ.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it\nis part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner\ninstinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way,\nunbelief is contrary to nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure\nnegation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride,\nthrough which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules\nof faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence\nGregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that \"presumptuous innovations arise\nfrom vainglory.\"\n\nIt might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not\nreduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices\nopposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital\nvices.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Unbelief Is in the Intellect As Its Subject?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as\nits subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De\nDuabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above (A. 1).\nTherefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching\nof the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief\nis in the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor.\n11:14 \"Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light,\" says\nthat if \"a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for\na good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does\nor says what is becoming to a good angel.\" This seems to be because\nof the rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel,\nsince his intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin\nof unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and,\nconsequently, it does not reside in the intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Things which are contrary to one another are in\nthe same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in\nthe intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2), sin is said\nto be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a\nsinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal\nprinciple, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will,\nbecause every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act\nis the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act:\nthus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust,\nwherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now\ndissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the\nintellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is.\n\nTherefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate\nsubject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which\nway every sin is said to be in the will.\n\nHence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's dissent,\nwhich completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief\nis in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does\nnot dissent from a matter of faith, because \"his bodily senses are\ndeceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right\njudgment\" as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But,\naccording to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to\ninvite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without\nsin.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Unbelief Is the Greatest of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins.\nFor Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): \"I should hesitate\nto decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a\nheretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact\nthat he is a heretic.\" But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we\nought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not,\nseemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes\nsin: for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12, 13): \"I . . . before was a\nblasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . .\nmercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.\" Therefore\nunbelief is not the greatest of sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment,\naccording to Deut. 25:2: \"According to the measure of the sin shall\nthe measure also of the stripes be.\" Now a greater punishment is due\nto believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: \"How much\nmore, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden\nunder foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the\ntestament unclean, by which he was sanctified?\" Therefore unbelief is\nnot the greatest of sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine, commenting on John 15:22, \"If I had not\ncome, and spoken to them, they would not have sin,\" says (Tract.\nlxxxix in Joan.): \"Under the general name, He refers to a singularly\ngreat sin. For this,\" viz. infidelity, \"is the sin to which all others\nmay be traced.\" Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3). Hence the more a\nsin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever\nseparated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true\nknowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not\napproach Him, but is severed from Him.\n\nNor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know\nHim in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.\nTherefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any\nsin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to\nthe sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall\nstate further on (Q. 20, A. 3; Q. 34, A. 2, ad 2; Q. 39, A. 2, ad 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus\nfrom being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence\nAugustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic\nnot sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more\ngrave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and\nconversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be\naggravated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory\nthereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter\nrespect it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this\nignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a\nman sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of\nunbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider\nthe kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery,\ncommitted by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other\nthings being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on\naccount of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account\nof the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and\nwhich he insults by committing sin.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Every Act of an Unbeliever Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin.\nBecause a gloss on Rom. 14:23, \"All that is not of faith is sin,\"\nsays: \"The whole life of unbelievers is a sin.\" Now the life of\nunbelievers consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an\nunbeliever is a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no\ngood save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among\nunbelievers, no action can be good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which\nfollows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of\nall the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in\nunbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action of\ntheirs.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever\n(Acts 10:4, 31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not\nevery action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are\ngood.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 85, AA. 2, 4) mortal sin\ntakes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of\nnature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are\nwithout grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them.\nConsequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works\nwhich proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a\ncertain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature\nsuffices.\n\nHence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but\nwhenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For\neven as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or\neven mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an\nunbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to\nthe end of his unbelief.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the\nlife of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is\ntaken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence\nthe same authority adds: \"Because every one that lives or acts\naccording to his unbelief, sins grievously.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the\nsupernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can\ndirect the intention in respect of a connatural good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in\nunbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them,\nwhereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With\nregard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not\nan unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God,\nwhom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the\ntruth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent\nto him to give him fuller instruction in the faith.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 5]\n\nWhether There Are Several Species of Unbelief?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of\nunbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,\nthey must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is\nthe First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter\ncontains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also\nis the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves\nare the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends\nnot on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not\nseveral species of unbelief, according to the various points which\nthe unbeliever disbelieves.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in\nan infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of\nunbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to\nfollow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and\nconsequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of\nour consideration.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different species.\nNow a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points\nof truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of\nspecies of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Several species of vice are opposed to each\nvirtue, because \"good happens in one way, but evil in many ways,\"\naccording to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,\n6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are\nopposed to it.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4; I-II, Q. 64, A.\n1), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge\nor operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter,\nwhereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices\nare opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are\nopposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with\nregard to their different relations to the virtue: and in this way\nthere are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to\na moral virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and\nanother, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of\nvices opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the\ncorruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. In\nthis way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g.\ntemperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in\nwhich the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that\nthe rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans\nheld evil to be infinite.\n\nAccordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison\nto faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in\nnumber. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the\nfaith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted\nbefore it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or\nheathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been\naccepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of\nthe Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is the\nunbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these\nthree as species of unbelief.\n\nIf, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to\nthe various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not\ndeterminate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied\nindefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two\nways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case\nthe thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin,\nand determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be\nconsidered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is\nthe formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its\nspecies from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must\ntherefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth\nconsidered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect,\nconsidered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that\nit follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives\nits various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it\nadheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of\nvice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by\nturning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various\ninordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through\nadhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of\nunbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers the various species of unbelief\naccording to various points in which errors occur.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many things\nin relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things,\nbe one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing\nhinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as\none man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily\ndiseases.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Unbelief of Pagans or Heathens Is Graver Than Other Kinds?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is\ngraver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver\naccording as it endangers the health of a more important member of\nthe body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed\nto that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which\nis most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which\nthe heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their\nunbelief is the gravest of all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which\ncontradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important\npoints: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more\ndetestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ\nfrom the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in\nmore numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since\nthey do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the\ngravest.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good\nin the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from\nGod, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New\nTestament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who\nreceive neither Testament.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): \"It had been better\nfor them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have\nknown it, to turn back.\" Now the heathens have not known the way of\njustice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing\nit in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), two things may be considered\nin unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this\npoint of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more\ngrievously against faith, than he who resists it without having\naccepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised,\nsins more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way\nthe unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and\nresist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that\nof the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since,\nhowever, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which\nthey corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more\ngrievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not\naccepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.\n\nThe second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of\nmatters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points\nthan Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of\nheathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of\nthe Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of\nthe Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens\ndo.\n\nOf these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point\nof view of guilt; since, as stated above (A. 1) unbelief has the\ncharacter of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the\nmere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated (A. 1) seems\nrather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking\nabsolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 7]\n\nWhether One Ought to Dispute with Unbelievers in Public?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with\nunbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): \"Contend\nnot in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the\nhearers.\" But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly\nwithout contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute\npublicly with unbelievers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the\ncanons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus:\n\"It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if\nanyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which\nhave once been judged and disposed of.\" Now all matters of faith have\nbeen decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the\ncouncils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public\nabout matters of faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments.\nBut an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter:\nwhereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be\na matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about\nmatters of faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 9:22, 29) that \"Saul\nincreased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews,\" and that\n\"he spoke . . . to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In disputing about the faith, two things must be\nobserved: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of\nhis hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his\nintention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about\nthe faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as\nthough he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would\nsin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other\nhand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to\nconfute errors, or for practice.\n\nOn the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear\nthe disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and\nwavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith,\nthere can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their\npresence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction;\nbecause either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for\ninstance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith\nin them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter,\nas in those countries where there are no unbelievers. In the first\ncase it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided\nthere be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting\nerrors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the\nfaith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive,\nwhile if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of\nfaith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory\nsays (Pastor. ii, 4): \"Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to\nerror, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might\nhave been instructed.\" On the other hand, in the second case it is\ndangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the presence of\nsimple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that\nthey have never heard anything differing from what they believe.\nHence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to\nsay against the faith.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but\nsuch as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than\nof sound speeches.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That law forbade those public disputations about the\nfaith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are\nfor the safeguarding thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as\nthough one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known,\nand to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is\nnecessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by\ndefending the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: \"Being ready always\nto satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith\nwhich is in you [*Vulg.: 'Of that hope which is in you'; St. Thomas'\nreading is apparently taken from Bede].\" Sometimes again, it is\nnecessary, in order to convince those who are in error, according to\nTitus 1:9: \"That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to\nconvince the gainsayers.\"\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Unbelievers Ought to Be Compelled to the Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be\ncompelled to the faith. For it is written (Matt. 13:28) that the\nservants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown,\nasked him: \"Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?\" and that he\nanswered: \"No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the\nwheat also together with it\": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom.\nxlvi in Matth.): \"Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of\nmen. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will\nnecessarily slay many innocent persons.\" Therefore it seems that for\nthe same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De\nJudaeis): \"The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that\nfor the future, none are to be compelled to believe.\" Therefore, in\nlike manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that \"it is\npossible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot\nbelieve unless he is willing.\" Therefore it seems that unbelievers\nought not to be compelled to the faith.\n\nObj. 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]): \"I\ndesire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: 'of him that dieth'].\" Now\nwe ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 19, AA. 9, 10). Therefore we should not even wish\nunbelievers to be put to death.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 14:23): \"Go out into the\nhighways and hedges; and compel them to come in.\" Now men enter into\nthe house of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some\nought to be compelled to the faith.\n\n_I answer that,_ Among unbelievers there are some who have never\nreceived the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are\nby no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may\nbelieve, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they\nshould be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so\nthat they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their\nevil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this\nreason that Christ's faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not\nindeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if\nthey were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still\nleave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent\nthem from hindering the faith of Christ.\n\nOn the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have\naccepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all\napostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that\nthey may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one\ntime, received.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid,\nnot the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from\nthe words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii)\nof himself: \"It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to\nunion with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with\narguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of\ncontradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law\nwas so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has\nbroken our chains asunder.\" Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's\nwords, \"Suffer both to grow until the harvest,\" must be gathered from\nthose which precede, \"lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root\nthe wheat also together with it.\" For, Augustine says (Contra Ep.\nParmen. iii, 2) \"these words show that when this is not to be feared,\nthat is to say, when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so\nhateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause\na schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought\nnot by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have\nreceived it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in\nthe same chapter.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a\nvow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter\nof the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received\nit, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled\nto keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep.\nclxxxv): \"What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We\nmay believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ\ncompel?' They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and\nafterwards taught Him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, \"none of us\nwishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve\nto have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war\nwhich he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church\ngathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the\nsorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations.\"\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 9]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Communicate with Unbelievers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with\nunbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): \"If any of them that\nbelieve not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything\nthat is set before you.\" And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad\nHeb.): \"If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without\nany reservation.\" Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate\nwith him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): \"What have I to do\nto judge them that are without?\" Now unbelievers are without. When,\ntherefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with\ncertain people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to\ncommunicate with unbelievers.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he\ncommunicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his\nservant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews,\nor pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully\ncommunicate with them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 7:2, 3): \"Thou shalt make no\nleague with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make\nmarriages with them\": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, \"The woman who at\nthe return of the month,\" etc. says: \"It is so necessary to shun\nidolatry, that we should not come in touch with idolaters or their\ndisciples, nor have any dealings with them.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Communication with a particular person is forbidden to\nthe faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with\nwhom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of\nthose who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can\nbe gathered from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had\npronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: \"Know\nyou not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?\" and afterwards\nhe adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the\nsentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): \"Do not you judge\nthem that are within?\"\n\nAccordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful\nto communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the\nChristian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the\nright to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal\njudgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are\nguilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some\ntemporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a\npunishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those\nunbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by\ncorrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the\nfaith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of\nexcommunication on both.\n\nWith regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish\naccording to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and\ntime. For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that\ntheir communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of\nthe latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.\nThese are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have\nnot received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be\nsome urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people\nand those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared\nas a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with\nunbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or\nto communicate with them without necessity.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against\nunbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them:\nbut she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of\ntemporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,\nfor certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication\nwith certain unbelievers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is more probability that a servant who is ruled\nby his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his\nmaster who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so\nthe faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If,\nhowever, the master were in danger, through communicating with such\na servant, he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command\n(Matt. 18:8): \"If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and\ncast it from thee.\"\n\nWith regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition\ngives this solution before the Reply Obj. 2] sense the reply is that\nthe Lord gave this command in reference to those nations into whose\nterritory the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined\nto idolatry, so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent\ndealings with those nations, they should be estranged from the faith:\nhence the text goes on (Deut. 7:4): \"For she will turn away thy son\nfrom following Me.\"\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Unbelievers May Have Authority or Dominion Over the Faithful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or\ndominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1):\n\"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters\nworthy of all honor\": and it is clear that he is speaking of\nunbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): \"But they that have believing\nmasters, let them not despise them.\" Moreover it is written (1 Pet.\n2:18): \"Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to\nthe good and gentle, but also to the froward.\" Now this command would\nnot be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could\nhave authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers\ncan have authority over the faithful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his\nsubjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving\nprinces' households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians\n(4:22): \"All the saints salute you, especially they that are of\nCaesar's household,\" referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever.\nTherefore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave\nis his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even\nas a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the\nworking of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject\nto an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore\nunbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment\non those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce\njudgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): \"Dare any\nof you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the\nunjust,\" i.e. unbelievers, \"and not before the saints?\" Therefore it\nseems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.\n\n_I answer that,_ That this question may be considered in two ways.\nFirst, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the\nfaithful as of a thing to be established for the first time. This\nought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and\nendanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their\nsuperiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of\ngreat virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they\nsee the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to\ngo to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether\nforbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have\nauthority over them in any capacity whatever.\n\nSecondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:\nand here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions\nof human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers\narises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of\ngrace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural\nreason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers,\nconsidered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of\nunbelievers over the faithful.\n\nNevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done\naway with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the\nauthority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief\ndeserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted\ninto children of God.\n\nThis the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those\nunbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church\nand her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew\nbecame a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without\npaying any price, if he should be a \"vernaculus,\" i.e. born in\nslavery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought\nfor his service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he\nshould be offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church\nharm them in this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to\nthe Church, she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular\nprinces have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in\nfavor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the\nabove law to those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her\nmembers, in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so:\nand this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Matt.\n17:25, 26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because\n\"the children are free,\" yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in\norder to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that\nservants should honor their masters, adds, \"lest the name of the\nLord and His doctrine be blasphemed.\"\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of\nfaithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the\nconversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that\nthere should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household,\nthat they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed\nSebastian encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and,\nthe while, remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace\nof Diocletian.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole\nlifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas\nthe craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special works.\nHence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or\nauthority over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to\nemploy them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to\nwork on the land of Jews, because this does not entail their living\ntogether with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send\nmaster workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6. Yet, if\nthere be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by such\ncommunications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 11]\n\nWhether the Rites of Unbelievers Ought to Be Tolerated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be\ntolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their\nrites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent\ntherein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: \"Not only they that do\nthem, but they also that consent to them that do them.\" Therefore it\nis a sin to tolerate their rites.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry,\nbecause a gloss on Gal. 5:1, \"Be not held again under the yoke of\nbondage,\" says: \"The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of\nidolatry.\" But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the\nrites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the\ntemples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as\nAugustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that\neven the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.\n\nObj. 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above\n(A. 3). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not\ntolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the\nrites of unbelievers to be tolerated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist.\nxlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: \"They should be\nallowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their\nfathers have for ages observed them.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Human government is derived from the Divine\ngovernment, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful\nand supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take\nplace in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them,\ngreater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly\nin human government also, those who are in authority, rightly\ntolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain\ngreater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): \"If\nyou do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust.\"\nHence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated,\neither on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of\nsome evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their\nrites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we\nhold, there follows this good--that our very enemies bear witness to\nour faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to\nspeak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their\nrites.\n\nOn the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither\ntruthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except\nperchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance\nthat might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if\nthey were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For\nthis reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of\nheretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 12]\n\nWhether the Children of Jews and Other Unbelievers Ought to Be\nBaptized Against Their Parents' Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other\nunbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the\nbond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority\nover children, since the right of parental authority can be made to\ncease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot\nbe severed by man, according to Matt. 19:6: \"What . . . God hath\njoined together let no man put asunder.\" And yet the marriage bond is\nbroken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15):\n\"If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is\nnot under servitude in such cases\": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima,\nand Idololatria, qu. i] says that \"if the unbelieving partner is\nunwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator,\nthen the other partner is not bound to cohabitation.\" Much more,\ntherefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents'\nauthority over their children: and consequently their children may be\nbaptized against their parents' will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger\nof everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death.\nNow it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death\nand failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and\nother unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be\nleft to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it\nseems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and\ninstructed in the faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen,\nand under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings\nand princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings\nand princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children.\nTherefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against\ntheir parents' wishes.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his\nsoul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore\nit is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents,\nand consecrated to God in Baptism.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching\ndoes, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt\nof punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue\nthrough not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach,\naccording to the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who \"sees the\nsword coming and sounds not the trumpet.\" Much more therefore, if\nJewish children are lost through not being baptized are they\naccounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would\nbe an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against\ntheir will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority\nover their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these\nshould not be baptized against their parents' will.\n\n_I answer that,_ The custom of the Church has very great authority\nand ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very\ndoctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church.\nHence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by\nthat of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it\nwas never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the\nJews against the will of their parents, although at times past there\nhave been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and\nTheodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly\nterms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius,\nwho would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if\nit had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat\nthis assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against\ntheir parents' wishes, in contradiction to the Church's custom\nobserved hitherto.\n\nThere are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger\nto the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of\nreason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be\npersuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly\nembraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.\n\nThe other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child\nis by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct\nfrom its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its\nmother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of\nits free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is\nlike a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason,\nhe differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a\nhorse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use\nthem when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the\nnatural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his\nfather's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a\nchild, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from\nits parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents'\nwish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its\nfree-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after\nitself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then\nit should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace\nthe faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even\nagainst its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of\nreason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that\nthey were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given\nto understand that it is the parents' duty to look after the\nsalvation of their children, especially before they come to the use\nof reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the\nuse of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the\nother's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes\nto the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child\nhas come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.\n\nReply Obj. 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against\nthe order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the\njudge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence:\nhence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a\nchild is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from\nthe danger of everlasting death.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which\ndoes not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can\nknow Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the\nnatural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason,\nunder whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose\nof the child in all matters relating to God.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching,\nthreatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching.\nHence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): \"I have made thee a\nwatchman to the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel.\" On the other\nhand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of\nunbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the\ndanger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their\nchildren fail to obtain salvation.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 11\n\nOF HERESY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?\n\n(2) Of the matter about which it is;\n\n(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?\n\n(4) Whether converts should be received?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Heresy Is a Species of Unbelief?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief.\nFor unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 2).\nNow heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather\nto the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf.\nDecretals xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] \"The works of the flesh are\nmanifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby\na man makes choice of that school which he deems best.\" But choice is\nan act of the appetitive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).\nTherefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.\n\nObj. 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that \"he who commits adultery that\nhe may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer.\" Now the end of\nheresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which\nbelong to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De\nUtil. Credendi i) that \"a heretic is one who either devises or\nfollows false and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit,\nespecially that he may lord and be honored above others.\" Therefore\nheresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would\nseem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of\nthe flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): \"The works of the flesh\nare manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness,\" and among the\nothers, he adds, \"dissensions, sects,\" which are the same as\nheresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is\none who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is\nopposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it\nis a species of unbelief.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word heresy as stated in the first objection\ndenotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3) is\nabout things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in\nmatters of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper\ngood, as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 3): wherefore that which is the\nchief truth, has the character of last end, while those which are\nsecondary truths, have the character of being directed to the end.\n\nNow, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every\nform of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to\nhold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by\nholding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place.\nConsequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his\nwill, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.\n\nAccordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the\nrectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to\nassent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in\nrespect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in\npagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to\nChrist, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents\nto Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the\nsuggestions of his own mind.\n\nTherefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who\nprofess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will\nregards faith, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Vices take their species from their proximate end,\nwhile, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus\nin the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the\nspecies of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the\nultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the\ntheft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a\nspecies under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts\nin general (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7). Wherefore, as to the case in point\nalso, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one's own false\nopinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end\nreveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing\n[*From the Greek _hairein_, to cut off], so does sect derive its name\nfrom its being a cutting off (_secando_), as Isidore states (Etym.\nviii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and each\nbelongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act\nitself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by reason\nof its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in which way\nit arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second\nobjection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to\nerror, as the Philosopher states in _Metaph._ iv; _Ed. Did._ iii, 5),\nfor this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as much\nas its act is independent on a bodily organ.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Heresy Is Properly About Matters of Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters\nof faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians,\nso were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes\n(Etym. viii, 3, 4, 5). Now their dissensions were not about matters\nof faith. Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though\nthey were its proper matter.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now\nheresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about\ninterpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that\n\"whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy\nGhost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he\nmay not have left the Church\": and elsewhere he says that \"heresies\nspring up from words spoken amiss.\" [*St. Thomas quotes this saying\nelsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13, and III, Q. 16, A. 8, but it is\nnot to be found in St. Jerome's works.] Therefore heresy is not\nproperly about the matter of faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about\nmatters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on\nthe question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet\nthis was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not\nproperly about the matter of faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ.\nDei xviii, 51]: \"In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold\nmischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may\nthink soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing\nto mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending\nthem.\" Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which\nare contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby \"the just man liveth\"\n(Rom. 1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its\nproper matter.\n\n_I answer that,_ We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a\ncorruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption\nof the Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that\nare not of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so\nforth, which cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a\nperson has a false opinion about things belonging to the faith.\n\nNow a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above (I, Q.\n32, A. 4; I-II, Q. 1, A. 6, ad 1; I-II, Q. 2, A. 5), in one way,\ndirectly and principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another way,\nindirectly and secondarily, e.g. those matters, the denial of which\nleads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may be\nheresy in either way, even as there can be faith.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were\nabout opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies\namong Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense\nthan that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning\nof Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has\nrevealed. Hence it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets:\n\"They have persisted to confirm what they have said,\" viz. by false\ninterpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by\nthe words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as\nstated above (Q. 3, A. 1). Wherefore inordinate words about matters\nof faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that\nPope Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: \"The\nenemies of Christ's cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so\nthat, if we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us\nmendaciously of agreeing with Nestorius.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated\nin the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): \"By no means\nshould we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse\ntheir opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek\nthe truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when\nthey have found the truth,\" because, to wit, they do not make a\nchoice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly,\ncertain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding\nof which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is\nconcerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined\nby the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after\nthey had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he\nwould be deemed a heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the\nSovereign Pontiff. For we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]:\n\"Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, that all our\nbrethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the matter to none other\nthan Peter, as being the source of their name and honor, against\nwhose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the holy\ndoctors defended their opinion.\" Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol\n[*Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): \"This, most blessed\nPope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic Church.\nIf anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed, we\nbeg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of\nPeter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment\nof your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself\nis ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Heretics Ought to Be Tolerated?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the\nApostle says (2 Tim. 2:24, 25): \"The servant of the Lord must not\nwrangle . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if\nperadventure God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they\nmay recover themselves from the snares of the devil.\" Now if heretics\nare not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of\nrepentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle's command.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be\ntolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle\nsays (1 Cor. 11:19): \"There must be . . . heresies, that they . . .\nwho are reproved, may be manifest among you.\" Therefore it seems that\nheretics should be tolerated.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Matt. 13:30) to\nsuffer the cockle \"to grow until the harvest,\" i.e. the end of the\nworld, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle\ndenotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Titus 3:10, 11): \"A man that is a\nheretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that\nhe, that is such an one, is subverted.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ With regard to heretics two points must be observed:\none, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On\ntheir own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be\nseparated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed\nfrom the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt\nthe faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which\nsupports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other\nevil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority,\nmuch more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted\nof heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.\n\nOn the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the\nconversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but\n\"after the first and second admonition,\" as the Apostle directs:\nafter that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for\nhis conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating\nhim and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him\nto the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by\ndeath. For Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, \"A little leaven,\" says:\n\"Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest\nthe whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock,\nburn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as\nthat spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by\nits flame.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should be\nadmonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to\nretract, he must be reckoned as already \"subverted,\" as we may gather\nfrom the words of the Apostle quoted above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the\nintention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the\nfaithful being put to the test, and \"makes us shake off our\nsluggishness, and search the Scriptures more carefully,\" as Augustine\nstates (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the\ncorruption of the faith, which is to inflict very great harm indeed.\nConsequently we should consider what they directly intend, and expel\nthem, rather than what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate\nthem.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can. Notandum),\n\"to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted.\" A man is\nexcommunicated, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his \"spirit may\nbe saved in the day of Our Lord.\" Yet if heretics be altogether\nuprooted by death, this is not contrary to Our Lord's command, which\nis to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot\nbe plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as we explained above\n(Q. 10, A. 8, ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Church Should Receive Those Who Return from Heresy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to\nreceive those who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in\nthe person of the Lord: \"Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers;\nnevertheless return to Me saith the Lord.\" Now the sentence of the\nChurch is God's sentence, according to Deut. 1:17: \"You shall hear the\nlittle as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man's\nperson, because it is the judgment of God.\" Therefore even those who\nare guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual\nprostitution, should be received all the same.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Matt. 18:22) to forgive\nhis offending brother \"not\" only \"till seven times, but till seventy\ntimes seven times,\" which Jerome expounds as meaning that \"a man\nshould be forgiven, as often as he has sinned.\" Therefore he ought to\nbe received by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back\ninto heresy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers\nwho wish to be converted are received by the Church. Therefore\nheretics also should be received.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix)\nsays that \"those who are found to have relapsed into the error which\nthey had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal.\"\nTherefore they should not be received by the Church.\n\n_I answer that,_ In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church\nextends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who\npersecute her, according to Matt. 5:44: \"Love your enemies; do good\nto them that hate you.\" Now it is part of charity that we should both\nwish and work our neighbor's good. Again, good is twofold: one is\nspiritual, namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the\nobject of charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for\none another. Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who\nreturn after falling no matter how often, are admitted by the Church\nto Penance whereby the way of salvation is opened to them.\n\nThe other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz.\ntemporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good\nrepute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by\ncharity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal\nsalvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of\nthese goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal\nsalvation in many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a\ngood to that person, rather should we desire him to be without it,\nboth because eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and\nbecause the good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one.\nNow if heretics were always received on their return, in order to\nsave their lives and other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial\nto the salvation of others, both because they would infect others if\nthey relapsed again, and because, if they escaped without punishment,\nothers would feel more assured in lapsing into heresy. For it is\nwritten (Eccles. 8:11): \"For because sentence is not speedily\npronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without\nany fear.\"\n\nFor this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who\nreturn from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their\nlives, and sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the\necclesiastical dignities which they may have had before, should their\nconversion appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently\nbeen done for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after\nhaving been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in\nfaith, wherefore when they return again, they are admitted to\nPenance, but are not delivered from the pain of death.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In God's tribunal, those who return are always\nreceived, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who\nreturn in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for\nshe presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are\nnot sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the\nway of salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence\nof death.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed\nagainst oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and\nspare our brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied\nto sins committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it is\nnot left to our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says\non Matt. 18:15, \"If thy brother shall offend against thee.\" Yet even\nin this matter the law prescribes limits according as God's honor or\nour neighbor's good demands.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received the\nfaith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy\nin faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 12\n\nOF APOSTASY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?\n\n(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are\nabsolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Apostasy Pertains to Unbelief?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to\nunbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins, does not,\nseemingly, pertain to unbelief, since many sins there are without\nunbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the origin of every sin, for it\nis written (Ecclus. 10:14): \"The beginning of the pride of man is\napostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God,\" and further on, (Ecclus.\n10:15): \"Pride is the beginning of all sin.\" Therefore apostasy\ndoes not pertain to unbelief.\n\nObj. 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas\napostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance,\nor even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov.\n6:12-14): \"A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh\nwith a perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the\nfoot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil,\nand at all times he soweth discord.\" Moreover if anyone were to have\nhimself circumcised, or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would\nbe deemed an apostate. Therefore apostasy does not pertain to\nunbelief.\n\nObj. 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a\ndeterminate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to\nunbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of\nunbelief, which does not seem to agree with what has been said\n(Q. 10, A. 5). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 6:67): \"Many of his disciples\nwent back,\" i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously\n(John 6:65): \"There are some of you that believe not.\" Therefore\napostasy pertains to unbelief.\n\n_I answer that,_ Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may\nhappen in various ways according to the different kinds of union\nbetween man and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by\nfaith; secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His\ncommandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to\nsupererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or\nHoly Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which\nprecedes, remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man\nmay apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to\nwhich he was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he\nhad received: and this is called \"apostasy from religious life\" or\n\"Orders.\" A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his\nmind against the Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize\nin both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.\n\nBut if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God\naltogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that\nwhereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called \"apostasy of\nperfidy.\" In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to\nunbelief.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy,\nwhich denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's\ncommandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart should\nbelieve, but also that external words and deeds should bear witness\nto the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this way\ntoo, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far\nas they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said\nitself to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be\nunderstood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies\nmost truly to an apostate from the faith. For since faith is the\nfirst foundation of things to be hoped for, and since, without faith\nit is \"impossible to please God\"; when once faith is removed, man\nretains nothing that may be useful for the obtaining of eternal\nsalvation, for which reason it is written (Prov. 6:12): \"A man that\nis an apostate, an unprofitable man\": because faith is the life of\nthe soul, according to Rom. 1:17: \"The just man liveth by faith.\"\nTherefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, man's\nevery member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of\njustice, which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all\nhis members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands\nrevealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of\nmovement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil. The result is\nthat \"he sows discord,\" endeavoring to sever others from the faith\neven as he severed himself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The species of a quality or form are not diversified by\nthe fact of its being the term _wherefrom_ or _whereto_ of movement:\non the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the\nterms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term _whereto_ of the\nmovement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not\nimply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance\nthereof, according to 2 Pet. 2:21: \"It had been better for them not\nto know the truth [Vulg.: 'the way of justice'], than after they had\nknown it, to turn back.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 2]\n\nWhether a Prince Forfeits His Dominion Over His Subjects, on Account\nof Apostasy from the Faith, So That They No Longer Owe Him Allegiance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his\ndominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith,\nthat they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine,\nSuper Ps. 124:3] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate,\nnevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to\nthem, \"Fall into line for the defense of the republic,\" were bound to\nobey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to\ntheir prince on account of his apostasy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we\nfind that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph\nserved Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served\nAssuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects\nfrom allegiance to their sovereign.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away\nfrom God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy\nfrom the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of\ntheir subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on\naccount of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we\nought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his\napostatizing from the faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): \"Holding to\nthe institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic\nauthority, absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or\nthrough the sacred bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated\npersons: and we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance\nto such persons, until these shall have made amends.\" Now apostates\nfrom the faith, like heretics, are excommunicated, according to the\nDecretal [*Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore\nprinces should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the\nfaith.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 10, A. 10), unbelief, in itself,\nis not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the\nlaw of nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction between\nbelievers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul\nhuman right. Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced\nto the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account\nof other sins.\n\nNow it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief\nin those who have never received the faith, according to the saying\nof the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): \"What have I to do to judge them that\nare without?\" She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the\nunbelief of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that\nthey should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their\nsubjects: for this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption\nof the faith, since, as was stated above (A. 1, Obj. 2), \"a man that\nis an apostate . . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . .\nsoweth discord,\" in order to sever others from the faith.\nConsequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a\nman on account of apostasy from the faith, his subjects are \"ipso\nfacto\" absolved from his authority and from the oath of allegiance\nwhereby they were bound to him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: At that time the Church was but recently instituted,\nand had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she\nallowed the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that\nwere not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet\ngreater danger.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated in the article, it is not a question of those\nunbelievers who have never received the faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether,\nas stated above (A. 1), which is not the case in any other sin.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 13\n\nOF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the\nconfession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy\nwhich is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?\n\n(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?\n\n(3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin?\n\n(4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Blasphemy Is Opposed to the Confession of Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the\nconfession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or\ninsult against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God\nrather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the\nconfession of faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, \"Let blasphemy . . . be put away from\nyou,\" a gloss says, \"that which is committed against God or the\nsaints.\" But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other\nthings than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith.\nTherefore blasphemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to some, there are three kinds of\nblasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed\nof God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and\nthe third, when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so\nthat, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His\ncreatures. Now the object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not\nopposed to confession of faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12, 13): \"I . . .\nbefore was a blasphemer and a persecutor,\" and afterwards, \"I did it\nignorantly in\" my \"unbelief.\" Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains\nto unbelief.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement\nof some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness.\nHence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does\nnot befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is\nHis Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting\nGod, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine\ngoodness.\n\nNow this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen\nmerely in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way\nthis opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections,\neven as, on the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him.\nAccordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in\nthe intellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought\nonly, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself\noutwardly in speech it is blasphemy of the tongue. It is in this\nsense that blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of\nreviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of\nthe falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness\nof his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due\nto God, and this is perfect blasphemy.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as\npraise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does\nblasphemy against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this\nway divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or\nto deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and\nnegation. For this diversity does not cause distinct species of\nhabits, since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made\nknown by the same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs\nin either way, since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according\nto Poster. i, 25. Again to ascribe to creatures things that are\nproper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something\nunfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and\nto ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to assert\nthat God is the same as a creature.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Blasphemy Is Always a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin.\nBecause a gloss on the words, \"Now lay you also all away,\" etc. (Col.\n3:8) says: \"After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins\":\nand yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy\nis comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts\nof the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of\nthem. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal:\nhence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the\ndeliberation of the reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 3,\n10). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the\nreason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 24:16): \"He that blasphemeth\nthe name of the Lord, dying let him die.\" Now the death punishment\nis not inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a\nmortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 5), a mortal sin\nis one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual\nlife, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever\nthings are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their\ngenus. Now blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity,\nbecause, as stated above (A. 1), it disparages the Divine goodness,\nwhich is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal\nsin, by reason of its genus.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all\nthe sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those\nmentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned\nafterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more\ngrievous sins are included.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since, as stated above (A. 1), blasphemy is contrary\nto the confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the\nprohibition of unbelief, expressed by the words: \"I am the Lord thy\nGod,\" etc. (Ex. 20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: \"Thou\nshalt not take the name of . . . God in vain\" (Ex. 20:7). Because he\nwho asserts something false about God, takes His name in vain even\nmore than he who uses the name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur\nunawares and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing\nto advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen\nthrough his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into\nwords suggested by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of\nthose words: this is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so\ncalled. In the second way, by adverting to the meaning of his words,\nand to their blasphemous nature: in which case he is not excused from\nmortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden movement of anger,\nkills one who is sitting beside him.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Sin of Blasphemy Is the Greatest Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the\ngreatest sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing\nis said to be evil because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since\nit destroys a man's life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy,\nwhich can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is more\ngrievous than that of blasphemy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood,\nand thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer\ngoes so far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more\ngrievous sin than blasphemy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, on Ps. 74:6, \"Lift not up your horn on high,\" a\ngloss says: \"To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all.\"\nTherefore blasphemy is not the greatest sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ On Isa. 18:2, \"To a terrible people,\" etc. a gloss\nsays: \"In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), blasphemy is opposed to the\nconfession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief:\nwhile the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added\nthereto, and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love\nand confession add to the praise of faith.\n\nTherefore, since, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 3), unbelief is the\ngreatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy\nalso is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as\nunbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the\nobjects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin\ncommitted directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a\nsin against one's neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in\nrespect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for\nmurder does more harm to one's neighbor, than blasphemy does to God.\nSince, however, the gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the\nevil will, rather than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above\n(I-II, Q. 73, A. 8), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do\nharm to God's honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously\nthat the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to\npunishment, among sins committed against our neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A gloss on the words, \"Let . . . blasphemy be put away\nfrom you\" (Eph. 4:31) says: \"Blasphemy is worse than perjury.\" The\nreason is that the perjurer does not say or think something false\nabout God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a\nfalsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as\nit were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that\naggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the\nmost grievous sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Damned Blaspheme?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because\nsome wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the\nfear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these\npunishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more\nare they restrained from blaspheming.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most\ndemeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting\nor demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that \"the tree . . . in\nwhat place soever it shall fall, there shall it be\": whence it\nclearly follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor\nsin, which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be\ndamned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore,\nwill they blaspheme in the life to come.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 16:9): \"The men were scorched\nwith great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power\nover these plagues,\" and a gloss on these words says that \"those who\nare in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will\nnevertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture them\nthus.\" Now this would be blasphemy in their present state: and\nconsequently it will also be in their future state.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), detestation of the Divine\ngoodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who are in\nhell retain their wicked will which is turned away from God's\njustice, since they love the things for which they are punished,\nwould wish to use them if they could, and hate the punishments\ninflicted on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins\nwhich they have committed, not because they hate them, but because\nthey are punished for them. Accordingly this detestation of the\nDivine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and\nit is credible that after the resurrection they will blaspheme God\nwith the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with their voices.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy\nthrough fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas,\nin hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they\nare borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer,\nwherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious.\nIn the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is\npart of their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned,\nevil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that\ndetests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in\nthis respect there can be blasphemy in him.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 14\n\nOF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost:\nunder which head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same\nas the sin committed through certain malice?\n\n(2) Of the species of this sin;\n\n(3) Whether it can be forgiven?\n\n(4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost\nbefore committing other sins?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Is the Same As the Sin\nCommitted Through Certain Malice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not\nthe same as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to Matt.\n12:32. But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of\nblasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be committed through\ncertain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the\nsame as the sin committed through certain malice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the sin committed through certain malice is\ncondivided with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed\nthrough weakness: whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is\ncondivided with the sin against the Son of Man (Matt. 12:32).\nTherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin\ncommitted through certain malice, since things whose opposites\ndiffer, are themselves different.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a generic\nsin, having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed\nthrough certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition\nor general circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at\nall. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the\nsin committed through certain malice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that \"to sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for\nits own sake.\" Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore\nit seems that the sin committed through certain malice is the same\nas the sin against the Holy Ghost.\n\n_I answer that,_ Three meanings have been given to the sin against\nthe Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super\nMatth. xii, 32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc.\nxii, 10), Jerome (Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in\nMatth.), say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to\nutter a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we\nunderstand the essential name applicable to the whole Trinity, each\nPerson of which is a Spirit and is holy, or the personal name of one\nof the Persons of the Trinity, in which sense blasphemy against the\nHoly Ghost is distinct from the blasphemy against the Son of Man\n(Matt. 12:32), for Christ did certain things in respect of His human\nnature, by eating, drinking, and such like actions, while He did\nothers in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils, raising the\ndead, and the like: which things He did both by the power of His own\nGodhead and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was full,\naccording to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking\nblasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Matt. 11:19) that\nHe was \"a glutton . . . a wine drinker,\" and a \"friend of publicans\":\nbut afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they\nascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ did by the\npower of His own Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy Ghost.\n\nAugustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy\nor the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence when, namely,\na man perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not\nconfined to utterance by word of mouth, but extends to words in\nthought and deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word,\nin this sense, is said to be uttered against the Holy Ghost, because\nit is contrary to the remission of sins, which is the work of the\nHoly Ghost, Who is the charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor\ndid Our Lord say this to the Jews, as though they had sinned against\nthe Holy Ghost, since they were not yet guilty of final impenitence,\nbut He warned them, lest by similar utterances they should come to\nsin against the Holy Ghost: and it is in this sense that we are to\nunderstand Mark 3:29, 30, where after Our Lord had said: \"But he that\nshall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost,\" etc. the Evangelist adds,\n\"because they said: He hath an unclean spirit.\"\n\nBut others understand it differently, and say that the sin of\nblasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against that\ngood which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is\nappropriated to the Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the\nFather, and wisdom to the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins\nthrough weakness, it is a sin \"against the Father\"; that when he sins\nthrough ignorance, it is a sin \"against the Son\"; and that when he\nsins through certain malice, i.e. through the very choosing of evil,\nas explained above (I-II, Q. 78, AA. 1, 3), it is a sin \"against the\nHoly Ghost.\"\n\nNow this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very\ninclination of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in this\nway, to sin through malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy\nGhost. In another way it happens that by reason of contempt, that\nwhich might have prevented the choosing of evil, is rejected or\nremoved; thus hope is removed by despair, and fear by presumption,\nand so on, as we shall explain further on (QQ. 20, 21). Now all these\nthings which prevent the choosing of sin are effects of the Holy\nGhost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin through malice is to sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as the confession of faith consists in a\nprotestation not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy\nagainst the Holy Ghost can be uttered in word, thought and deed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the third interpretation, blasphemy\nagainst the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son\nof Man, forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the \"power of\nGod and the wisdom of God\" (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense,\nthe sin against the Son of Man will be that which is committed\nthrough ignorance, or through weakness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sin committed through certain malice, in so far as it\nresults from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin, but a\ngeneral condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a\nspecial contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the\ncharacter of a special sin. According to this interpretation the sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according to\nthe first interpretation: whereas according to the second, it is not\na species of sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of\nany kind of sin.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Fitting to Distinguish Six Kinds of Sin Against the\nHoly Ghost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence,\nobstinacy, resisting the known truth, envy of our brother's spiritual\ngood, which are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny\nGod's justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man\nrejects God's mercy, and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each\nof these is a kind of unbelief rather than of the sin against the\nHoly Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while\nobstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not\ndiversify the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith\nwhereby we believe that Christ was born, and those of old believed\nthat He would be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not\nbe reckoned as two species of sin against the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"grace and truth came by Jesus Christ\" (John 1:17).\nTherefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy of a\nbrother's spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against the Son rather\nthan against the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that \"to\nrefuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost.\" Moreover a gloss on Lev.\n10:16, says that \"a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the\nHoly Ghost.\" Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to the\nHoly Ghost by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems\nthat the species of sins against the Holy Ghost are insufficiently\nenumerated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii)\nsays that \"those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without\nmerits presume on God's mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost,\" and\n(Enchiridion lxxxiii) that \"he who dies in a state of obstinacy is\nguilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost,\" and (De Verb. Dom., Serm.\nlxxi) that \"impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost,\" and (De\nSerm. Dom. in Monte xxii), that \"to resist fraternal goodness with\nthe brands of envy is to sin against the Holy Ghost,\" and in his book\nDe unico Baptismo (De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says that \"a man\nwho spurns the truth, is either envious of his brethren to whom the\ntruth is revealed, or ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the\nChurch is taught,\" and therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy\nGhost.\n\n_I answer that,_ The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are\ndistinguished in respect of the removal or contempt of those things\nwhereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These\nthings are either on the part of God's judgment, or on the part of\nHis gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the Divine\njudgment, wherein justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered\nfrom sinning through choice, both by hope, arising from the\nconsideration of the mercy that pardons sins and rewards good deeds,\nwhich hope is removed by \"despair\"; and by fear, arising from the\nconsideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins, which fear is\nremoved by \"presumption,\" when, namely, a man presumes that he can\nobtain glory without merits, or pardon without repentance.\n\nGod's gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the\nacknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the \"resistance of\nthe known truth,\" when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has\nacknowledged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the\nassistance of inward grace, against which there is \"envy of a\nbrother's spiritual good,\" when, namely, a man is envious not only of\nhis brother's person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the\nworld.\n\nOn the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man\ntherefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of the act, the\nconsideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the\nsin he has committed, and against this there is \"impenitence,\" not as\ndenoting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken\nabove (for thus it would not be a special sin, but a circumstance of\nsin), but as denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing\nis the smallness or brevity of the good which is sought in sin,\naccording to Rom. 6:21: \"What fruit had you therefore then in those\nthings, of which you are now ashamed?\" The consideration of this is\nwont to prevent man's will from being hardened in sin, and this is\nremoved by \"obstinacy,\" whereby man hardens his purpose by clinging\nto sin. Of these two it is written (Jer. 8:6): \"There is none that\ndoth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?\" as regards the\nfirst; and, \"They are all turned to their own course, as a horse\nrushing to the battle,\" as regards the second.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in\ndisbelieving in God's justice and mercy, but in contemning them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of\npast and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects\nby reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be\nconsidered in sin, as explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the\ngifts of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men.\n\nReply Obj. 4: To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a feigned\nrepentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a\nbrother's spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are\nunited together.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Can Be Forgiven?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be\nforgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): \"We should\ndespair of no man, so long as Our Lord's patience brings him back to\nrepentance.\" But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible\nto despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost\ncan be forgiven.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being\nhealed by God. But \"no disease is incurable to an all-powerful\nphysician,\" as a gloss says on Ps. 102:3, \"Who healeth all thy\ndiseases.\" Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or evil.\nNow, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any virtue,\nsince even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written (Job\n4:18, 19): \"In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall\nthey that dwell in houses of clay?\" Therefore, in like manner, a man\ncan return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 12:32): \"He that shall speak\nagainst the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this\nworld, nor in the world to come\": and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in\nMonte i, 22) that \"so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot\nsubmit to the humiliation of asking for pardon.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the various interpretations of the sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said\nthat it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost\nwe understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since\nin no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man\nperseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since\nit was not remitted by repentance in this life.\n\nAccording to the other two interpretations, it is said to be\nunpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because,\nconsidered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two\nways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that sins through\nignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins\nthrough certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his\npunishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man\nbefore His Godhead was revealed, could have some excuse, on account\nof the weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence,\nthey deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against\nHis very Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the Holy\nGhost, had no excuse in diminution of their punishment. Wherefore,\naccording to Chrysostom's commentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews\nare said not to be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in\nthe world to come, because they were punished for it, both in the\npresent life, through the Romans, and in the life to come, in the\npains of hell. Thus also Athanasius adduces the example of their\nforefathers who, first of all, wrangled with Moses on account of the\nshortage of water and bread; and this the Lord bore with patience,\nbecause they were to be excused on account of the weakness of the\nflesh: but afterwards they sinned more grievously when, by ascribing\nto an idol the favors bestowed by God Who had brought them out of\nEgypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against the Holy Ghost, saying\n(Ex. 32:4): \"These are thy gods, O Israel, that have brought thee out\nof the land of Egypt.\" Therefore the Lord both inflicted temporal\npunishment on them, since \"there were slain on that day about three\nand twenty thousand men\" (Ex. 32:28), and threatened them with\npunishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34): \"I, in the day\nof revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs.\"\n\nSecondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease\nis said to be incurable in respect of the nature of the disease, which\nremoves whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the\npower of nature, or causes loathing for food and medicine, although\nGod is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy\nGhost is said to be unpardonable, by reason of its nature, in so far\nas it removes those things which are a means towards the pardon of\nsins. This does not, however, close the way of forgiveness and healing\nto an all-powerful and merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so\nto speak, restores spiritual health to such men.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We should despair of no man in this life, considering\nGod's omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the circumstances of\nsin, some are called (Eph. 2:2) \"children of despair\" [*_Filios\ndiffidentiae,_ which the Douay version renders \"children of\nunbelief.\"].\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers the question on the part of\nGod's omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In this life the free-will does indeed ever remain\nsubject to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far as\nit is concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in itself\nthis sin is unpardonable, although God can pardon it.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Man Can Sin First of All Against the Holy Ghost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against\nthe Holy Ghost, without having previously committed other sins. For\nthe natural order requires that one should be moved to perfection from\nimperfection. This is evident as regards good things, according to\nProv. 4:18: \"The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards\nand increases even to perfect day.\" Now, in evil things, the perfect\nis the greatest evil, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. v, text. 21).\nSince then the sin against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it\nseems that man comes to commit this sin through committing lesser\nsins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through\ncertain malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until he has\nsinned many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6, 9) that\n\"although a man is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once\ndo them as an unjust man does,\" viz. from choice. Therefore it seems\nthat the sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be committed except after\nother sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same\nobject. But there is no repentance, except about past sins. Therefore\nthe same applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against\nthe Holy Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presupposes\nother sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to\nmake a poor man rich\" (Ecclus. 11:23). Therefore, conversely, it is\npossible for a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts\nhim, to be led to commit the most grievous of sins which is that\nagainst the Holy Ghost.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in one way, to sin against\nthe Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin\nthrough certain malice in two ways, as stated in the same place:\nfirst, through the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly\nspeaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to\ncommit this sin all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede\nso as to cause the habit that induces to sin. Secondly, one may sin\nthrough certain malice, by contemptuously rejecting the things\nwhereby a man is withdrawn from sin. This is, properly speaking, to\nsin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (A. 1); and this also,\nfor the most part, presupposes other sins, for it is written (Prov.\n18:3) that \"the wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins,\ncontemneth.\"\n\nNevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to\nsin against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account of his\nfree-will, and on account of the many previous dispositions, or\nagain, through being vehemently moved to evil, while but feebly\nattached to good. Hence never or scarcely ever does it happen that\nthe perfect sin all at once against the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen\nsays (Peri Archon. i, 3): \"I do not think that anyone who stands on\nthe highest step of perfection, can fail or fall suddenly; this can\nonly happen by degrees and bit by bit.\"\n\nThe same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally\nfor blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy as Our Lord\nspeaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice.\n\nIf, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand\nthe sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence, it does\nnot regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy\nGhost requires persistence in sin until the end of life.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Movement both in good and in evil is made, for the most\npart, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses in good\nor evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a greater\n(good or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from which a\nman begins can be perfect in good or evil according to its genus,\nalthough it may be imperfect as regards the series of good or evil\nactions whereby a man progresses in good or evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers the sin which is committed\nthrough certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a\nhabit.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If by impenitence we understand with Augustine (De\nVerb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is clear\nthat it presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we\ntake it for habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against\nthe Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is\npossible for a man who has never sinned to have the purpose either\nof repenting or of not repenting, if he should happen to sin.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 15\n\nOF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and\nunderstanding. Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which\nis opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins\n(I-II, Q. 76), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and\ndulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding;\nand under this head there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of\nmind?\n\n(3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Blindness of Mind Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin.\nBecause, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin.\nNow blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (John\n9:41): \"If you were blind, you should not have sin.\" Therefore\nblindness of mind is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind\nis a punishment as appears from Isa. 6:10, \"Blind the heart of this\npeople,\" for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it\nnot a punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De\nVera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as\nAugustine says (Confess. x), \"all love to know the resplendent\ntruth,\" and as we read in Eccles. 11:7, \"the light is sweet and it is\ndelightful for the eyes to see the sun.\" Therefore blindness of mind\nis not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of\nmind among the vices arising from lust.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the\nprinciple of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of\nthe principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a\nthreefold principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light,\nsince it pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never\nforfeit from the soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from\nexercising its proper act, through being hindered by the lower powers\nwhich the human intellect needs in order to understand, for instance\nin the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the First Part (Q.\n84, AA. 7, 8).\n\nAnother principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light\nsuperadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes\nforfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a\npunishment, in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a\npunishment. Hence it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): \"Their\nown malice blinded them.\"\n\nA third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle,\nthrough which a man understands other things; to which principle a\nman may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens\nin two ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man's will is\ndeliberately turned away from the consideration of that principle,\naccording to Ps. 35:4, \"He would not understand, that he might do\nwell\": whereas sometimes it is due to the mind being more busy about\nthings which it loves more, so as to be hindered thereby from\nconsidering this principle, according to Ps. 57:9, \"Fire,\" i.e. of\nconcupiscence, \"hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun.\"\nIn either of these ways blindness of mind is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The blindness that excuses from sin is that which\narises from the natural defect of one who cannot see.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers the second kind of blindness\nwhich is a punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all;\nand yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a\nman is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Dulness of Sense Is a Sin Distinct from Blindness of Mind?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin\nfrom blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now\ndulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory\n(Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding\ndenotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same\nas blindness of mind.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness\ndescribes it as \"dulness of sense in respect of understanding.\" Now\ndulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as\na defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind.\nTherefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the\nfact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above (A. 1),\nwhile dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is\nnot a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin,\nwhich is contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he\nreckons it among the sins arising from gluttony.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Different causes produce different effects. Now\nGregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from\ngluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these\nothers are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.\n\n_I answer that,_ Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be\nsharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through\nbeing obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of\nmetaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its\nobject from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to\nperceive the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence\nin corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they can\nperceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent,\nwhile on the other hand they are said to be dull, through being\nunable to perceive, except sensible objects that are near at hand, or\nof great power.\n\nNow, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in\nconnection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of\ncertain primals and extremes, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, even as the\nsenses are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of\nknowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does\nnot perceive its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but\nthrough certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a\nthing's essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its\neffect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in\nconnection with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a\nproperty or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the thing\nitself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details:\nwhereas a man is said to have a dull sense in connection with his\nunderstanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a\nthing, without many explanations; in which case, moreover, he is\nunable to obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the\nnature of that thing.\n\nAccordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes\na certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual\ngoods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the\nknowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of\nunderstanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending\nthem, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This\ndulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that\nis, in so far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to\nhis affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful\nconsideration of spiritual things.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Blindness of Mind and Dulness of Sense Arise from Sins of the\nFlesh?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of\nsense do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i,\n4) retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, \"God Who didst\nwish none but the clean to know the truth,\" and says that one might\nreply that \"many, even those who are unclean, know many truths.\" Now\nmen become unclean chiefly by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness\nof mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the flesh.\n\nObj. 2: Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects\nin connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas carnal\nsins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not\nact on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the\nflesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all things are more passive to what is near them\nthan to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than\ncarnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense\nare caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of\nsense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.\n\n_I answer that,_ The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in\nan abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man's\nintellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it\nbe able to consider things intelligible, and to set in order all\nthings sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to\nbe \"detached\" in order to command, and that the agent must have power\nover matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that\npleasure fixes a man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in:\nwherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4, 5) that we all do best\nthat which we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do\nthem either not at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.\n\nNow carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with\npleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most\nimpetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices\ncause man's attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so\nthat in consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things\nis weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as\nsexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore\nlust gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely\nthe knowledge of spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from\ngluttony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible\nthings. On the other hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and\nchastity, dispose man very much to the perfection of intellectual\noperation. Hence it is written (Dan. 1:17) that \"to these children\" on\naccount of their abstinence and continency, \"God gave knowledge and\nunderstanding in every book, and wisdom.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at\ntimes capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on\naccount of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit\nsuperadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures of the\nbody, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently\nwithdrawn from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can\nknow some truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by\naltering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid\nmanner.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are\nfurther removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's\nattention to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind's\ncontemplation all the more.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 16\n\nOF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and\nunder this head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) The precepts concerning faith;\n\n(2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 1]\n\nWhether in the Old Law There Should Have Been Given Precepts of Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have\nbeen given precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something due\nand necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should\nbelieve, according to Heb. 11:6, \"Without faith it is impossible to\nplease God.\" Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith\nto be given.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the\nreality in the figure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 107, A. 3). Now the\nNew Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance John\n14:1: \"You believe in God; believe also in Me.\" Therefore it seems\nthat some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law\nalso.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the same\nas to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many\nprecepts forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): \"Thou shalt not have\nstrange gods before Me,\" and (Deut. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to\nhear the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them\naway from their faith in God. Therefore precepts of faith should have\nbeen given in the Old Law also.\n\nObj. 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above\n(Q. 3, A. 1). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the confession\nand the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex. 12:27)\nthat, when their children should ask them, they should tell them the\nmeaning of the paschal observance, and (Deut. 13:9) they were\ncommanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith.\nTherefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.\n\nObj. 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained in\nthe Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (John 15:25) that it was written\nin the Law: \"They have hated Me without cause,\" although this is\nfound written in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): \"Ye\nthat fear the Lord, believe Him.\" Therefore the Old Law should have\ncontained precepts of faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the Old Law the \"law\nof works\" which he contrasts with the \"law of faith.\" Therefore the\nOld Law ought not to have contained precepts of faith.\n\n_I answer that,_ A master does not impose laws on others than his\nsubjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone\nwho receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the\nprimary subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6:\n\"He that cometh to God, must believe that He is.\" Hence faith is\npresupposed to the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2)\nthat which is of faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the\nwords, \"I am the Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of\nEgypt,\" and, likewise (Deut. 6:4), the words, \"Hear, O Israel, the\nLord thy [Vulg.: 'our'] God is one,\" precede the recording of the\nprecepts.\n\nSince, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith\nwhereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all\narticles of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 1, 7), it follows that,\nif we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to\nHim, it is possible for precepts to be given about other articles of\nfaith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: \"This is My commandment\"\n(John 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received\nmany precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of\nfaith were not to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing\ntheir faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the\nOld Law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual\nlife, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the Law.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of faith,\nnamely belief in one God, when He said: \"You believe in God,\" and\ncommanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one\nPerson is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith\nof the New Testament, wherefore He added: \"Believe also in Me.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which corrupt\nvirtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 18, A. 4, ad 3; I-II, Q. 19, A. 6, ad 1, A. 7, ad 3).\nTherefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts\nhad to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned off those\nparticular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also\npresuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law\ncould contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of\nfaith, rather than to faith itself.\n\nReply Obj. 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed whereby\nwe believe that God is; hence it begins, \"Ye that fear the Lord,\"\nwhich is not possible without faith. The words which follow--\"believe\nHim\"--must be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly\nto those things which God promises to them that obey Him, wherefore\nthe passage concludes--\"and your reward shall not be made void.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Precepts Referring to Knowledge and Understanding Were\nFittingly Set Down in the Old Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge\nand understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For\nknowledge and understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition\nprecedes and directs action. Therefore the precepts referring to\nknowledge and understanding should precede the precepts of the Law\nreferring to action. Since, then, the first precepts of the Law are\nthose of the decalogue, it seems that precepts of knowledge and\nunderstanding should have been given a place among the precepts of\nthe decalogue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn\nfrom another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains\nprecepts about teaching--both affirmative precepts as, for example,\n(Deut. 4:9), \"Thou shalt teach them to thy sons\"--and prohibitive\nprecepts, as, for instance, (Deut. 4:2), \"You shall not add to the\nword that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it.\"\nTherefore it seems that man ought to have been given also some\nprecepts directing him to learn.\n\nObj. 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary to a\npriest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): \"The\nlips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law\nat his mouth,\" and (Osee 4:6): \"Because thou hast rejected knowledge,\nI will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood\nto Me.\" Now the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law\n(Deut. 17:18, 19). Much more therefore should the Law have commanded\nthe priests to learn the Law.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on\nthings pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is\nhindered by extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly\ncommanded (Deut. 6:7): \"Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy\nhouse, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising.\" Therefore\nthe precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are unfittingly\nset down in the Law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:6): \"That, hearing all\nthese precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in relation to\nknowledge and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly,\nthe use; and thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of\nknowledge or understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and\nboth are prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Deut. 6:6): \"These\nwords which I command thee . . . shall be in thy heart.\" This refers\nto learning, since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to\nwhat is said, while the words that follow--\"and thou shalt tell them\nto thy children\"--refer to teaching.\n\nThe use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those\nthings which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text\ngoes on: \"thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house,\" etc.\n\nTheir preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this,\nthe text continues--\"and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand,\nand they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt\nwrite them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house.\" Thus the\ncontinual remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it\nis impossible for us to forget those things which are continually\nattracting the notice of our senses, whether by touch, as those\nthings we hold in our hands, or by sight, as those things which are\never before our eyes, or to which we are continually returning, for\ninstance, to the house door. Moreover it is clearly stated (Deut.\n4:9): \"Forget not the words that thy eyes have seen and let them\nnot go out of thy heart all the days of thy life.\"\n\nWe read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New\nTestament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the\napostles.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Deut. 4:6, \"this is your wisdom and\nunderstanding in the sight of the nations.\" By this we are given to\nunderstand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in\nGod consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the\nLaw had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know\nand understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid\nprecepts should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which\ntake the first place.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to\nlearning, as stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more\nexpressly than learning, because it concerned the learned, who were\nnot under any other authority, but were immediately under the law,\nand to them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other hand\nlearning concerned the people of lower degree, and these the\nprecepts of the Law have to reach through the learned.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with the\npriestly office that being charged with the office implies being\ncharged to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts\nto be given about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the\ndoctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office,\nbecause a king is placed over his people in temporal matters: hence\nit is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by the\npriests about things pertaining to the law of God.\n\nReply Obj. 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man should\nmeditate on God's law by sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that he\nshould meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep,\nbecause this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so\nfar as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of\nsleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we\nare commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not\nthat we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but\nthat we should regulate all our actions according to it.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 17\n\nOF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nAfter treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself;\n(2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding\nprecepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold\nconsideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether hope is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?\n\n(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's\nhappiness?\n\n(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?\n\n(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?\n\n(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?\n\n(7) Of its relation to faith;\n\n(8) Of its relation to charity.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Hope Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For \"no man\nmakes ill use of a virtue,\" as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii,\n18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope,\nlike the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore\nhope is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since \"God works\nvirtue in us without us,\" as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.\nxvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the\nMaster (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing\"\n(Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But hope is the disposition of an\nimperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have.\nTherefore hope is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three\ndaughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and\ncharity. Therefore hope is a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) \"the\nvirtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work\ngood likewise.\" Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it\nmust correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and\nruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say\nthat a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its\nproper measurement. But, as we stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad 3) human\nacts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz.\nthe reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God:\nwherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God\nHimself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For,\nas we have already stated (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1), when we were treating\nof the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good,\ndifficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in\ntwo ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as\nstated in _Ethic._ iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything\nas being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope\nattains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident\nthat hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to\nattain its due rule.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right\nreason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue.\nWherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's\nattaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot\nmake ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill\nuse of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus\nis to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we\nspeak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show\nfurther on (A. 5; Q. 18, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing\nhoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace\nand merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of\nhope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our\nmerits, but from grace alone.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that\nwhich he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in\nso far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help\nhe leans.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Eternal Happiness Is the Proper Object of Hope?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper\nobject of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses\nevery movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the\nsoul. Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human\nsoul, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not \"entered\ninto the heart of man.\" Therefore happiness is not the proper object\nof hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written\n(Ps. 36:5): \"Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He\nwill do it.\" Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for\neternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and\nspiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's\nPrayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal\nhappiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of\nhope.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many\nthings besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore\neternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope\n\"which entereth in,\" i.e. maketh us to enter . . . \"within the veil,\"\ni.e. into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of\na gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal\nhappiness.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the hope of which we speak\nnow, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped\nfor good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore\nthe good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is\nthe infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine\nhelper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an\ninfinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the\nenjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing\nless than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things\nto His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper\nand principal object of hope is eternal happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man\nperfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its\nnature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect\ngood, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in\nthis way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the\nApostle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope \"enters in, even within\nthe veil,\" because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to\nspeak.\n\nReply Obj. 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in\nreference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness\nchiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards\nsecondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith\nregards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are\nreferred to God, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser\nthings seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness,\nnothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although,\nas compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things\nbesides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such\nthings in reference to its principal object.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 3]\n\nWhether One Man May Hope for Another's Eternal Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal\nhappiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): \"Being confident of this\nvery thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect\nit unto the day of Jesus Christ.\" Now the perfection of that day will\nbe eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's\neternal happiness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him.\nBut we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to\nJames 5:16: \"Pray for one another that you may be saved.\" Therefore\nwe can hope for another's eternal happiness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it\nis possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine\nwould have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we\nshould not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can\nalso hope for another's eternal salvation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that \"hope is\nonly of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for\nthem.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We can hope for something in two ways: first,\nabsolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous\nand pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for\nsomething, through something else being presupposed, and in this way\nits object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to\nexplain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that\nlove denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a\nmovement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous\ngood. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can\ndirectly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love,\nlooking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always\ntowards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved.\nTherefore hope regards directly one's own good, and not that which\npertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with\nanother, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as\nfor himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another's eternal\nlife, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the\nsame virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his\nneighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes\nfor himself and for another.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Man Can Lawfully Hope in Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the\nobject of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain\neternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says\n(Dial. i, 8) that \"predestination is furthered by the saints'\nprayers.\" Therefore one may hope in man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not\nto be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in\nhim. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4:\n\"Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in\nany brother of his.\" Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above\n(A. 2, Obj. 2). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.\nTherefore it is lawful to trust in him.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 17:5): \"Cursed be the man that\ntrusteth in man.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Hope, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7),\nregards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the\nhelp by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes\nto obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which\none hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient\ncause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a\nsecondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the\nsecondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the\nprincipal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary\nefficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope\nregards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance\nas the first cause leading to happiness.\n\nAccordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save\nhappiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final\nhappiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any\ncreature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards\nhappiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as\nbeing the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped\nto obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way\nthat we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain\nthings; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be\ntrusted to give help.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Hope Is a Theological Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For\na theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has\nfor its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to\nobtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two\nvices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 4). But hope is a mean\nbetween presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a\nspecies of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it\nseems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it\nbelongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the\narduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith\nand charity, which are theological virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since specific differences, by their very nature,\ndivide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place\nhope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.\n\nNow it has been stated above (A. 1) that hope has the character of\nvirtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human\nactions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as\nmuch as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in\nas much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is\nevident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a\nvirtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one\nthat has God for its object, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 1), it\nis evident that hope is a theological virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it\nin reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause,\nas stated above (A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the\nmeasure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is\nexcess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the\nrule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.\nNow a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and\nthese things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to\nfollow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a\ntheological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by\nanother rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not\nproper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to\nfollow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with\nregard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus\nfaith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the\nFirst Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on\nthe part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for\ninstance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has\nno mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is\nimpossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may\nhave a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to\nobtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or\ndespairs of things of which he is capable.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of\nhope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to\nlonganimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether\nthat which we hope for be delayed or not.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of\nobtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper\nobject is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a\ntheological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by\nanother's help, as stated above (A. 1).\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Hope Is Distinct from the Other Theological Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other\ntheological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the object of hope is the\nsame as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not\ndistinct from the other theological virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession\nof faith, we say: \"I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life\nof the world to come.\" Now expectation of future happiness belongs to\nhope, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore hope is not distinct from\nfaith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly\nto charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ There cannot be number without distinction. Now\nhope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says\n(Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.\nTherefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ A virtue is said to be theological from having God\nfor the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in\ntwo ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else\nis attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for\nHis own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.\n\nOn the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a\nprinciple wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from\nGod both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.\nAccordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we\nderive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells\nus is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence\nwe derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to\nthe Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God is the object of these virtues under different\naspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object\nsuffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54,\nA. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as\nthough it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope\npresupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (A. 7).\nHence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained\nfinally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity,\nproperly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to\nHim, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Hope Precedes Faith?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss\non Ps. 36:3, \"Trust in the Lord, and do good,\" says: \"Hope is the\nentrance to faith and the beginning of salvation.\" But salvation is\nby faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should\nprecede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in\nthe definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): \"Faith is the substance of\nthings to be hoped for.\" Therefore hope precedes faith.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle\nsays (1 Cor. 9:10): \"He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to\nreceive fruit.\" But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope\nprecedes faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 1:2): \"Abraham begot Isaac,\"\ni.e. \"Faith begot hope,\" according to a gloss.\n\n_I answer that,_ Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the\nobject of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In\norder, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of\nhope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in\none way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine\nassistance, as explained above (A. 2; A. 6, ad 3): and both of these\nare proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able\nto obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine\nassistance is ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: \"He that cometh\nto God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek\nHim.\" Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the same gloss observes further on, \"hope\" is called\n\"the entrance\" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope\nwe enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called\nthe \"entrance to faith,\" because thereby man begins to be established\nand perfected in faith.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition\nof faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not\napparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a\ncircumlocution by something resulting from faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it\nsuffices for it to accompany or follow it.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Charity Precedes Hope?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose\nsays on Luke 27:6, \"If you had faith like to a grain of mustard\nseed,\" etc.: \"Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity.\" But\nfaith precedes charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that \"good\nemotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity.\" Now to\nhope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.\nTherefore it flows from charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope\nproceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but\nalso hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by\ncharity. Therefore charity precedes hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): \"The end of the\ncommandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience,\"\ni.e. \"from hope,\" according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes\ncharity.\n\n_I answer that,_ Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and\nof matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect:\nthe other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which\nthe perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first\norder hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that\nhope and all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 27, A. 4; I-II, Q. 28, A. 6, ad 2; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7)\nin the treatise on the passions.\n\nNow there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that\nwhereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person\nsome good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect\nlove is that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but\nthat he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he\ndesires. The first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to\nGod for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since\nhe that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself.\n\nHence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as\na man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for\nhis sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so\ntoo, hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be\nrewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments.\nOn the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally\nprecedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made\nmore perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this\nsense that Ambrose states (Obj. 1) that charity flows from hope: so\nthat this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from\nsome kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every\nkind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living\nhope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a\nfriend.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is\nnaturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 18\n\nOF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?\n\n(2) Whether it is in the blessed?\n\n(3) Whether it is in the damned?\n\n(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Hope Is in the Will As Its Subject?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its\nsubject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above\n(Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1). Now the arduous is the object, not\nof the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will\nbut in the irascible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another.\nNow charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the\nmost perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the\nsame time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things\nsimultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act\nof charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the\nwill, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power:\nso that, therefore, hope is not in the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The soul is not apprehensive of God save as\nregards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine\ndeclares (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Now hope is a theological virtue\nhaving God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the\nmemory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty,\nit follows that it is in the will as its subject.\n\n_I answer that,_ As shown above (I, Q. 87, A. 2), habits are known by\ntheir acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive\nfaculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold\nappetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into\nirascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called\nthe will, as stated in the First Part (Q. 82, A. 5), those movements\nwhich occur in the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in\nthe higher appetite are without passion, as shown above (I, Q. 87, A.\n2, ad 1; I-II, Q. 22, A. 3, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope\ncannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the\nprincipal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good.\nTherefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and\nnot in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible:\nwhereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible,\nor rather superintelligible.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to\none act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required\nin order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of\nhoping.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity are\nmutually related, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8). Hence there is no\nreason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the\nsame power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the\nsame time if they be related to one another, as stated in the First\nPart (Q. 85, A. 4).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 2]\n\nWhether in the Blessed There Is Hope?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For\nChrist was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His\nconception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words\nof Ps. 30:2, \"In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped,\" are said in His person.\nTherefore in the blessed there can be hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous\ngood, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men\nhope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can\nhope to continue in its possession.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness,\nnot only for himself, but also for others, as stated above (Q. 17, A.\n3). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of\nothers, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be\nhope in them.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory\nof the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints\nin heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10;\nAugustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can\nbe hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): \"What a man seeth,\nwhy doth he hope for?\" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God.\nTherefore hope has no place in them.\n\n_I answer that,_ If what gives a thing its species be removed, the\nspecies is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as\nwhen a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same\nspecifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object,\neven as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q. 17, AA. 5, 6;\nI-II, Q. 54, A. 2): and its principal object is eternal happiness as\nbeing possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above\n(Q. 17, A. 2).\n\nSince then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope\nexcept in so far as it is something future, it follows that when\nhappiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with\nthe virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in\nheaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore\nblessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same\ntime, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He\nwas still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the\nglory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to have the\nvirtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the\nbody but the enjoyment of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal life,\nbecause through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of\nGod's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of\nhappiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future.\nHence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness\n(for as regards this there is no future), but are in actual\npossession thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same\nhope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others.\nBut when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their\nown happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not\nby the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he\nthat has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor,\nwithout having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its\nobject, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists\nin the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover,\nalthough the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison\nwith human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the\nsoul; both because the glory of the body is a very small thing as\ncompared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the\nglory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of\nthe body.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Hope Is in the Damned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the\ndevil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Matt. 25:41:\n\"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared\nfor the devil and his angels.\" But the devil has hope, according to\nJob 40:28, \"Behold his hope shall fail him.\" Therefore it seems that\nthe damned have hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope.\nBut lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to\nJames 2:19: \"The devils . . . believe and tremble.\" Therefore it\nseems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.\n\nObj. 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit\nthat he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, \"If the tree fall\nto the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall,\nthere shall it be.\" Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and\nnever despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12,\n\"Rejoicing in hope.\" Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and\ngrief, according to Isa. 65:14, \"My servants shall praise for\njoyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall\nhowl for grief of spirit.\" Therefore no hope is in the damned.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will\nshould find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that\nwhat is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that\nwhich is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will:\nwherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could\nnot be perfectly happy in their first state before their\nconfirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no\nforeknowledge of what would happen to them. For perfect and true\nhappiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for\never, else the will would not rest.\n\nIn like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary\ncondition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly\npenal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible\nif they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation.\nHence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should\nknow that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain\nhappiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): \"He believeth not\nthat he may return from darkness to light.\" It is, therefore, evident\nthat they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither\ncan the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is\nno hope either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand,\nhope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory,\nbecause in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible\nthing.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the\ndevil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it\nbe understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby\nhe expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before\n(Job 40:18): \"He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth\":\nthis is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), \"faith is about\nthings, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or\nanother's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and\nconcerning oneself.\" Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in\nthe damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them\nfuture possible things, but far removed from them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their\ndemerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase\ntheir merit: but both these things are due to the change in their\nrespective states.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Is Certainty in the Hope of a Wayfarer?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of\na wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not\nto the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in\nhope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above\n(Q. 17, A. 1). Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain\nthat we are in a state of grace, as stated above (I-II, Q. 112, A.\n5). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail.\nNow many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore\nwayfarer's hope has no certainty.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"Hope is the certain expectation of future\nhappiness,\" as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be\ngathered from 2 Tim. 1:12, \"I know Whom I have believed, and I am\ncertain that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Certainty is found in a thing in two ways,\nessentially and by participation. It is found essentially in the\ncognitive power; by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to\nits end by the cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works\nwith certainty, since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves\neverything with certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral\nvirtues are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much\nas, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason:\nand thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing\nin the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received,\nbut on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not\ngrace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has\nfaith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is\ndue to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but\nnot to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places\nits trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 19\n\nOF THE GIFT OF FEAR\n(In Twelve Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God is to be feared?\n\n(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;\n\n(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?\n\n(4) Whether servile fear is good?\n\n(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?\n\n(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?\n\n(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?\n\n(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?\n\n(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?\n\n(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?\n\n(11) Whether it remains in heaven?\n\n(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God Can Be Feared?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object\nof fear is a future evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 41, AA. 2, 3).\nBut God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore\nGod cannot be feared.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God.\nTherefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), \"we fear\nthose things whence evil comes to us.\" But evil comes to us, not from\nGod, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: \"Destruction is thy\nown, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me.\" Therefore God is not to be\nfeared.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:7): \"Who shall not fear\nThee, O King of nations?\" and (Malachi 1:6): \"If I be a master, where\nis My fear?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the\nfuture good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is\nsomeone's help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes\nfor, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very\nevil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the\nevil may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness\nitself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear\nin the second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either\nfrom Him or in relation to Him.\n\nFrom Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not\nabsolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.\nBecause, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an\nend, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the\norder to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of\nfault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in\nso far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely\nspeaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.\n\nIn relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be\nseparated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection considers the object of fear as being\nthe evil which a man shuns.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of\nwhich He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which\nHe sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to\nfear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that,\naccordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under\ndifferent aspects.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author but\nfrom us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment\nis from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good,\nsince it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly;\nalthough originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is\nwritten (Wis. 1:13, 16): \"God made not death . . . but the wicked\nwith works and words have called it to them.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Fear Is Fittingly Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile and\nWorldly Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into\nfilial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De\nFide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. \"laziness,\nshamefacedness,\" etc. of which we have treated above (I-II, Q. 41, A.\n4), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.\nTherefore this division of fear seems unfitting.\n\nObj. 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But\nthere is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,\nsince it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, \"The devils . . .\nbelieve and tremble,\" nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to\nMk. 14:33, Jesus \"began to fear and be heavy.\" Therefore the\naforesaid division of fear is insufficient.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of\nwife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now\nfilial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father,\nis distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in\ncomparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be\nthat of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be\ndistinguished from all these other fears.\n\nObj. 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial\nand worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between\nthem.\n\nObj. 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear\nabout some evil. Now \"concupiscence of the eyes,\" which is the desire\nfor things of this world, is distinct from \"concupiscence of the\nflesh,\" which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore\n\"worldly fear,\" whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct\nfrom \"human fear,\" whereby one fears harm to one's own person.\n\nOn the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).\n\n_I answer that,_ We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes\nus turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object\nof fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man\nwithdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes,\non account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him.\nThis latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of\nfault.\n\nAccordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of\npunishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear\nof committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child\nto fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both,\nit will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to\nwhether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has\nbeen treated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 3) when we were considering the\npassion of fear.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:\nwhereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as\nexplained above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while\nmoral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all\nthe fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now\nnatural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not\nnumbered among these kinds of fear.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the power\nwhich the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the\ncontrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her\nhusband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he\nsubmits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to\nwhom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste\nfear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes\nour Father, according to Rom. 8:15, \"You have received the spirit of\nadoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)\"; and by this same\ncharity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, \"I have\nespoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste\nvirgin to Christ\": whereas servile fear has no connection with these,\nsince it does not include charity in its definition.\n\nReply Obj. 4: These three fears regard punishment but in different\nways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man\naway from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten:\nwhereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are\ndrawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile\nfear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it\nsecondarily.\n\nReply Obj. 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God\nthrough fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of\nforfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to\nthe body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although\nthey fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of\ndifferent goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,\nall of which alike however lead man away from God.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Worldly Fear Is Always Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.\nBecause regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are\nblamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge\nof whom we read (Luke 18:2) that he \"feared not God, nor regarded\nman.\" Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.\n\nObj. 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the\npunishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments\nincite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, \"Wilt thou not be\nafraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have\npraise from the same.\" Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil,\nsince our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to\nfear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby\nthe present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear\nis not always evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): \"Fear ye not them\nthat kill the body,\" thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but\nwhat is evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 1;\nI-II, Q. 54, A. 2) moral acts and habits take their name and species\nfrom their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement\nis the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement\nis both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were\nto describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account\nof covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the\ncovetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he\nseeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the\ndesire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly\nlove is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the\nworld as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is\nborn of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine\nstates (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises\nfrom worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear\nis always evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so\nfar as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of\ngrace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in\nthis way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one\nmay have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is\npraiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias\nor Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): \"In his days he feared not the prince.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to\nwithdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister, according to\nRom. 13:4, \"For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath\nupon him that doth evil.\" To fear the secular power in this way is\npart, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his\nown body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that\naccount is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds,\nwhich no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse\nthan to suffer any punishment whatever.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Servile Fear Is Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the\nuse of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of\nservile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, \"if a man\ndo anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well\ndone.\" Therefore servile fear is not good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile fear\ngrows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11, \"Why\ndid I not die in the womb?\" Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): \"When a man\ndreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer\nloves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of\npride, not of humility.\" Therefore servile fear is evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of\ncharity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But\nmercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear\nis from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, \"You have not\nreceived the spirit of bondage,\" etc. says: \"It is the one same spirit\nthat bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear.\" Therefore\nservile fear is not evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be\nevil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, \"what is free\nis cause of itself\" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as\ncause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever\ndoes a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it\nis by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is\ncontrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from\nlove. Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so\nthat if servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil\nsimply, even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it\ncontrary to charity belongs to its very species.\n\nThis servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile\nfear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless\nfaith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the\nobject. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by\naccident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary,\nis loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is\nfeared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid\nof charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and\nthat, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is\nthe case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not\ndestroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.\nConsequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is\nevil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who\ndoes something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not\njustice, and fears nothing but the punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride,\nbut its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to\nsubject his affections to the yoke of justice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the\nsake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity,\nso that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its\nsubstance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be\nfeared as the principal evil.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Servile Fear Is Substantially the Same As Filial Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the\nsame as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same\napparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is\naccompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and\nlifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and\nfilial fear are substantially the same.\n\nObj. 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the\nsame thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they\nboth fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially\nthe same.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors\nfrom Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished\nby Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to\nreceive other favors from Him, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 2, ad 2).\nTherefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the\nsame as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says\nthat there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.\n\n_I answer that,_ The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts\nand habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, Q.\n54, A. 2), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear\ncorrespond to different kinds of evil.\n\nNow the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs\nspecifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown\nabove (A. 2). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are\nnot the same substantially but differ specifically.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the\nobject, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in\nrespect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of\ncharity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand,\nservile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the\ncomparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God\nin the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the\ninfliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as\nthe active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks\nto be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz.\nGod, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural\nmovements differ specifically according to their different\nrelationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not\nspecifically the same as movement towards whiteness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of\nthe enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This\ncannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Servile Fear Remains with Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with\ncharity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that\n\"when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had\nprepared a place for it.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts,\nby the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us\" (Rom. 5:5). Now \"where the\nSpirit of the Lord is, there is liberty\" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then\nfreedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away\nwhen charity comes.\n\nObj. 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as\npunishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away\nself-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine\ntestifies (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that \"the love of God unto the\ncontempt of self builds up the city of God.\" Therefore it seems that\nservile fear is driven out when charity comes.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as\nstated above (A. 4). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not\nforfeited through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost\ndwells in us. Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity\ncomes.\n\n_I answer that,_ Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is\nfear of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the\nfear of punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as\nself-love is: because it comes to the same that a man love his own\ngood and that he fear to be deprived of it.\n\nNow self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In\none way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the\nlove of his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when\na man loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way,\nit is indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as\nwhen a man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet\nnot so as to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have\nanother special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity\nwhich is founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness,\nconsanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is\nreferable to charity.\n\nAccordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity,\nbecause separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns\nexceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it\nis contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that\nis opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in\nopposition to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear\nof punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of\npunishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when,\nto wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from\nGod, but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not\nplace his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil\nas being the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent\nwith charity; but it is not called servile, except when punishment is\ndreaded as a principal evil, as explained above (AA. 2, 4). Hence\nfear considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the\nsubstance of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love\ncan remain with charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile:\nand such is the sense of the two other objections.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Fear Is the Beginning of Wisdom?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.\nFor the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a\npart of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while\nwisdom is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the\nbeginning of wisdom.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. \"Now fear of the\nLord, that is wisdom,\" according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems\nthat fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is\nprior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that\nfear is not the beginning of wisdom.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Ps. 110:10: \"The fear of the\nLord is the beginning of wisdom.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two\nways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to\nits essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of\nan art as to its essence consists in the principles from which that\nart proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that\nwherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the\nbeginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is\nwhere the builder begins his work.\n\nNow, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall\nstate further on (Q. 45, A. 1), it is considered by us in one way,\nand in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is\nordained to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according\nto a participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through\ngrace, wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being\ncognizant of God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as\ndirecting human conduct; since this is directed not only by the human\nlaw, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii,\n14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists\nin the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in\nthis sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as\nregards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom\nbegins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet\nservile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For servile\nfear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in\nso far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is\nthus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27,\n\"The fear of the Lord driveth out sin.\" On the other hand, chaste or\nfilial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of\nwisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law\nbelongs to wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of\nall fear God and submit himself to Him: for the result will be that\nin all things he will be ruled by God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of\nwisdom as to the essence of wisdom.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life that\nis ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is\nwritten (Ecclus. 1:25): \"The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for\n[Vulg.: 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived.\" Consequently, as\nthe root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said\nto be wisdom.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of\nwisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus.\n25:16): \"The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning\nof faith is to be fast joined to it.\"\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Initial Fear Differs Substantially from Filial Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially\nfrom filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear\nis the beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, \"The fear of\nGod is the beginning of love.\" Therefore initial fear is distinct\nfrom filial fear.\n\nObj. 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object\nof servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to be\nthe same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore\ninitial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the\nextremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial\nfear. Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the\nsubstance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect\nof perfection and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In\nprim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ\nsubstantially from filial fear.\n\n_I answer that,_ Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning\n(_initium_). Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in\nsome way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way,\ninitial.\n\nIt is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial\nfear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in\nthe sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in\nwhom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning\nof charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial\nfear, because they have not yet attained to the perfection of\ncharity. Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to\nfilial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and\nimperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state.\nTherefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we understand it\nhere, does not differ essentially from filial fear.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear,\nwhich is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the\nthread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if\nit be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of\nlove, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper\nobject, but as having something of servile fear connected with it:\nfor this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with\ncharity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with\nimperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not\nonly through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment,\nthough this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which\n\"casteth out fear,\" according to 1 John 4:18.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear,\nnot as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is\na mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in\n_Metaph._ ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being,\nwhile it differs altogether from non-being.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Fear Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.\nFor no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also\nfrom the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to\nHimself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore\nfear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God for\nits object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is\nfeared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a\ntheological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue,\nbeing connected with the same matter, as it were.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that \"fear is bestowed\nas a remedy against pride.\" But the virtue of humility is opposed to\npride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since\nthey are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral.\nii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good,\nwhile fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not\nbe said that fear is a gift.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven\ngifts of the Holy Ghost (Isa. 11:3).\n\n_I answer that,_ Fear is of several kinds, as stated above (A. 2).\nNow it is not \"human fear,\" according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib.\nArb. xviii), \"that is a gift of God\"--for it was by this fear that\nPeter denied Christ--but that fear of which it was said (Matt.\n10:28): \"Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell.\"\n\nAgain servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the\nHoly Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De\nNat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas\nthe gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as\nthey are inseparable from charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A.\n5).\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among\nthe seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it\nwas stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 3) that the gifts of the Holy\nGhost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby\nthese are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as,\nby the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to\nthe motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of\na certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a\nnon-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the\nmovable subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what\nfilial or chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid\nseparating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De\nSerm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it\nwere, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and\nthe last place, in the descending order.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since\nthereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by\nGod's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore\nfilial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the evil\nshunned, and in this way, as stated above (A. 1), God cannot be an\nobject of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the\nother theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in\nGod's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to\nobtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies\nto the other theological virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does\nnot follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from charity\nwhich is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the\nemotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of\ndifferent emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is,\nbecause love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by\nreason of its own nature, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4);\nfor which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear\nprincipally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes,\nwherefore it is something less than a theological virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, \"the beginning of the pride\nof man is to fall off from God,\" that is to refuse submission to God,\nand this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts\noff the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy\nagainst pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the\nvirtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the\nHoly Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4), while the theological virtues are\nthe origin of the gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, A. 4, ad 3).\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Fear Decreases When Charity Increases?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For\nAugustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): \"The more charity\nincreases, the more fear decreases.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity\nincreases when hope increases, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 8).\nTherefore fear decreases when charity increases.\n\nObj. 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies separation.\nNow separation decreases when union increases. Therefore fear\ndecreases when the love of charity increases.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that \"the\nfear of God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love\nGod above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Fear is twofold, as stated above (AA. 2, 4); one is\nfilial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be\nseparated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears\npunishment.\n\nNow filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as\nan effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one\nloves a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated\nfrom him.\n\nOn the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely\ncast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains\nas to its substance, as stated above (A. 6). This fear decreases as\ncharity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man\nloves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks\nless of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly,\nbecause, the faster he clings, the more confident he is of the\nreward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope\nincreases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases,\nbecause the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by\nanother's help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated\nfrom him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God, but\nsubmission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet, in\na way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal\noneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be\nobserved even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than\nhimself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of\ncharity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of\nfear.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 11]\n\nWhether Fear Remains in Heaven?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For\nit is written (Prov. 1:33): \"He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without\nfear of evils,\" which is to be understood as referring to those who\nalready enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is\nabout some evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above\n(AA. 2, 5; I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). Therefore there will be no fear in\nheaven.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to\n1 John 3:2, \"When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him.\" But God\nfears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards\ngood, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore\nneither will there be fear in heaven.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:10): \"The fear of the Lord\nis holy, enduring for ever and ever.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no\nmeans be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security\nwhich is essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above (I-II,\nQ. 5, A. 4).\n\nBut with regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of\ncharity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in\nheaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.\n\nIn order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object\nof fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a\npossible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of\navoidance, fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for\nlittle evils inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its\nstaying in its own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its\norder. Again, the order of a rational creature is that it should be\nunder God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for\na rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too\nis it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, but presumptuously\nrevolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a\nrational creature considered as to its nature on account of the\nnatural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it\nbecomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory. Therefore\nthe avoidance of this evil that consists in non-subjection to God,\nand is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will\nbe in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil as\nof something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words\nof Job (26:11), \"The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His\nbeck,\" says (Moral. xvii, 29): \"The heavenly powers that gaze on Him\nwithout ceasing, tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it\nshould be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder,\"\nbecause, to wit, they wonder at God's supereminence and\nincomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) in this\nsense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the question\ndoubtful. \"If,\" he says, \"this chaste fear that endureth for ever and\never is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is\nafraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds\nfast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which\nwe have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is\nallowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because\nchaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we\navoid sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and\npossess ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no\nkind of fear is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for\never and ever, because that which fear will lead us to, will be\neverlasting.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear\nthat denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear\nwhich is accompanied by security.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) \"the same things are\nboth like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable\nimitation of the Inimitable\"--that is, because, so far as they can,\nthey imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly--\"they are unlike\nbecause they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short\ninfinitely and immeasurably.\" Hence, if there be no fear in God\n(since there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not\nfollow that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in\nperfect subjection to God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of\nhappiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear\nimplies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely\ndistant from God, and this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence\nfear will not be cast out altogether.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 12]\n\nWhether Poverty of Spirit Is the Beatitude Corresponding to the Gift\nof Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the\nbeatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the\nbeginning of the spiritual life, as explained above (A. 7): whereas\npoverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to\nMatt. 19:21, \"If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and\ngive to the poor.\" Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to\nthe gift of fear.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): \"Pierce Thou my flesh\nwith Thy fear,\" whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to\nrestrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong\nrather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of\nmourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude\nof poverty.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope,\nas stated above (A. 9, ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is,\n\"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children\nof God,\" seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to\nRom. 5:2, \"we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of\nGod.\" Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear,\nrather than poverty of spirit.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it was stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2) that the\nfruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits\ncorrespond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the\nbeatitudes.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): \"The\nfear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed\nare the poor in spirit.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear.\nBecause, since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and\nsubmission to God, whatever results from this submission belongs to\nthe gift of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to God,\nit follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in\nanother but seeks it only in God. For that would be inconsistent with\nperfect subjection to God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): \"Some\ntrust in chariots and some in horses; but we will call upon the name\nof . . . our God.\" It follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he\ndoes not, by pride, seek greatness either in himself or in external\ngoods, viz. honors and riches. In either case, this proceeds from\npoverty of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding\nof a puffed up and proud spirit, according to Augustine's\ninterpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation of\nworldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one's own will,\nthrough the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to the\nexpounding of Ambrose on Luke 6:20 and Jerome on Matt. 5:3.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the\nbeatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this\nperfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a\nperfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly\ngoods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts.\nPerfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of\ntemporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial\nfear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent\nwith the perfection of wisdom, as stated above (AA. 7, 10).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or in\nanother is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is\nthe result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in\nconsequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject\nto Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless,\npleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous\ncharacter of a thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of\npoverty corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning,\nconsequently.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of\ntendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation\nof withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the\nterm of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of\nultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal\nfrom external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly\ncorresponds to fear.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things\ncorrespond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of\ntemporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty,\ncontinency and chastity.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 20\n\nOF DESPAIR\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption.\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether despair is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?\n\n(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?\n\n(4) Whether it arises from sloth?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Despair Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin\nincludes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from\nthe immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But\ndespair includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not\na sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no\nsin, because \"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit\" (Matt.\n7:18). Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God,\nor from horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair\nis not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for\nthe damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault\nbut as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to\nwayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be\na sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the\nApostle says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): \"Who, despairing, have given\nthemselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness\nand [Vulg.: 'unto'] covetousness.\" Therefore despair is not only a\nsin but also the origin of other sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2)\naffirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to search and\navoidance in the appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect\ncorrespond to good and evil in the appetite. Consequently every\nappetitive movement which is conformed to a true intellect, is good\nin itself, while every appetitive movement which is conformed to a\nfalse intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of\nthe intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind,\nand pardon to sinners, according to Ezech. 18:23, \"I desire not the\ndeath of the sinner, but that he should be converted, and live\"\n[*Vulg.: 'Is it My will that a sinner should die . . . and not that\nhe should be converted and live?' Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while it is a\nfalse opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that\nHe does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore,\njust as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true\nopinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of\ndespair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is\nvicious and sinful.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion\nfrom the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not\nalways in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have\nGod for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as\nhatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion\nfrom the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to\na mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God,\nmust necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist\nprincipally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in\naversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not\nto depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which\nis that he departs from God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways:\nfirst, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act\nproceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a\nvirtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii,\n18, 19) that \"no man makes evil use of virtue.\" Secondly, a thing\nproceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and\nin this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus\nsometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, according to\nAugustine (Ep. ccxi): \"Pride lies in wait for good works that they\nmay die.\" In this way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may\nlead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of those good\nthings, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of\nthe impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed\nto them that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even\nso, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining that\nwhich he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due\nto be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to despair\nof healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever\nbecoming rich.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Can Be Despair Without Unbelief?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without\nunbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so\nlong as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a\nman cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his\nfaith be removed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and\ngoodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and so\nsavors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to\nthe Divine mercy and goodness, according to Gen. 4:13: \"My iniquity\nis greater than that I may deserve pardon.\" Therefore whoever\ndespairs, is an unbeliever.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an\nunbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned\nheresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon\nfor sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is\nan unbeliever.\n\n_On the contrary,_ If we remove that which follows, that which\nprecedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above (Q. 17, A.\n7). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not\neveryone who despairs, is an unbeliever.\n\n_I answer that,_ Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to\nthe appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the\nappetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the\nappetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in\nthemselves, are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while\nhaving a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as\nto his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a\nparticular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal\nopinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to\nhave a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is\nimpossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal\nproposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition.\nHence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal,\nfails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his\nparticular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as\nthe fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this\nparticular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter,\nalthough he retains the true universal estimate according to faith,\nviz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man while\nretaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that\nthere is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a\nmovement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state,\nthere is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a\nparticular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there\ncan be other mortal sins, without belief.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The effect is done away, not only when the first cause\nis removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the\nmovement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the\nuniversal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of\nthe certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular\nestimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's mercy\nis not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs\njudges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some\nparticular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.\n\nThe same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians\ndenied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Despair Is the Greatest of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins.\nFor there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above (A. 2).\nBut unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the\nfoundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the\ngreatest of sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than\nhope, according to 1 Cor. 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater\nsin than despair.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but\ninordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only\ninordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion.\nTherefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other\nsins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ An incurable sin seems to be most grievous,\naccording to Jer. 30:12: \"Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very\ngrievous.\" Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer.\n15:18: \"My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed.\" [*Vulg.:\n\"Why is my wound,\" etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Those sins which are contrary to the theological\nvirtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since\nthe theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are\nopposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now\nevery mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact\nof its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a\nmutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it\nwould not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its\nvery nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among\nmortal sins.\n\nNow unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the\ntheological virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and\nunbelief to despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in\nrespect of their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief\nis due to a man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of\nGod arises from man's will being opposed to God's goodness itself;\nwhereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of\nGod's goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are\nagainst God as He is in Himself, while despair is against Him,\naccording as His good is partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly\nspeaking it is a more grievous sin to disbelieve God's truth, or to\nhate God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him.\n\nIf, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point\nof view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from\nevils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is\ngiven up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good\nworks. Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10, \"If thou lose hope being\nweary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished,\"\nsays: \"Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it\nloses his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and,\nwhat is worse, in the battle of faith.\" And Isidore says (De Sum.\nBono ii, 14): \"To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair\nis to fall into hell.\"\n\n[And from this the response to the objections is evident.]\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Despair Arises from Sloth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth.\nBecause different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now\ndespair of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory\n(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth\ncontrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope,\naccording to Rom. 12:12, \"rejoicing in hope.\" Therefore sloth arises\nfrom despair, and not vice versa.\n\nObj. 3: Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope, the\ncontrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the consideration\nof Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De\nTrin. xiii, 10): \"Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than\nthat we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater proof\ncould we have of this than that God's Son should deign to unite\nHimself to our nature?\" Therefore despair arises rather from the\nneglect of the above consideration than from sloth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among\nthe effects of sloth.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1),\nthe object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by\noneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness\nmay be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not\ndeeming it an arduous good; secondly, through his deeming it\nimpossible to obtain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact\nthat spiritual goods taste good to us no more, or seem to be goods of\nno great account, is chiefly due to our affections being infected\nwith the love of bodily pleasures, among which, sexual pleasures hold\nthe first place: for the love of those pleasures leads man to have a\ndistaste for spiritual things, and not to hope for them as arduous\ngoods. In this way despair is caused by lust.\n\nOn the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good\nimpossible to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his\nbeing over downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his\naffections, it seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any\ngood. And since sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in\nthis way despair is born of sloth.\n\nNow this is the proper object of hope--that the thing is possible,\nbecause the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence\ndespair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise\nfrom lust, for the reason given above.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just as\nhope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope:\nand, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into\ndespair, according to 2 Cor. 2:7: \"Lest . . . such an one be\nswallowed up by overmuch sorrow.\" Yet, since the object of hope is\ngood, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not\nnaturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it\nfollows that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the\ncontrary despair is born of sorrow.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This very neglect to consider the Divine favors arises\nfrom sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he\nconsiders chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a\nman who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful\nthings, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his\nthoughts away from sadness.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 21\n\nOF PRESUMPTION\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider presumption, under which head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is the object in which presumption trusts?\n\n(2) Whether presumption is a sin?\n\n(3) To what is it opposed?\n\n(4) From what vice does it arise?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Presumption Trusts in God or in Our Own Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against\nthe Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the\nlesser the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it\ntoo much. But man's power is less than God's. Therefore it is a more\ngrievous sin to presume on human power than to presume on the power\nof God. Now the sin against the Holy Ghost is most grievous.\nTherefore presumption, which is reckoned a species of sin against the\nHoly Ghost, trusts to human rather than to Divine power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy\nGhost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which\nsins arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby\nman presumes on himself rather than from the presumption whereby he\npresumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to\nAugustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption\nwhich is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a\nmutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from\nturning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from\nturning to the power of God, which is an immutable good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Just as, through despair, a man despises the\nDivine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he\ndespises the Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice\nis in God even as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in\naversion from God, so presumption consists in inordinate conversion\nto Him.\n\n_I answer that,_ Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the\nobject of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible\nto a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power\nof God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption\nowing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on\nhis own power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though\nit were possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according\nto Judith 6:15: \"Thou humblest them that presume of themselves.\" This\npresumption is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to\nthe mean in this kind of hope.\n\nBut as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there\nmay be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends\nto some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of\nGod, whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to\nobtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This\npresumption is, properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to\nwit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of\nthe Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn from sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 20, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3) a sin\nwhich is against God is, in its genus, graver than other sins. Hence\npresumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a more\ngrievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one's own power,\nsince to rely on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to\nGod, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is\na graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate\none's own.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The presumption whereby a man presumes inordinately on\nGod, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good inordinately.\nFor when we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily procure\nit through others, even though we cannot.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Presumption on God's mercy implies both\nconversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an\ninordinate desire of one's own good, and aversion from the immutable\ngood, in as much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is\nunbecoming to it, for thus man turns away from God's power.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Presumption Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin\nis a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption\nsome are heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): \"Hear me a\npoor wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy.\"\nTherefore presumption on God's mercy is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there cannot\nbe excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and mercy are\ninfinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for\nthe Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that \"Adam sinned less, because he\nsinned in the hope of pardon,\" which seems to indicate presumption.\nTherefore presumption is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy\nGhost.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 20, A. 1) with regard to\ndespair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false\nintellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an\nappetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it\nis conformed to a false intellect, just as despair is: for just as it\nis false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not\nturn sinners to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness\nto those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to\nthose who cease from good works: and it is to this estimate that the\nmovement of presumption is conformed.\n\nConsequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair,\nsince, on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God\nto have mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes\nGod in Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because even the\nright hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it be\nmeasured according to man's estate: yet it is not, if we look at the\nimmensity of the goodness of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though\nman hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God\nsomething unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too little\nin Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated above\n(A. 1, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: To sin with the intention of persevering in sin and\nthrough the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does\nnot diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of\nobtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining from\nsin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin,\nbecause this seems to indicate a will less hardened in sin.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Presumption Is More Opposed to Fear Than to Hope?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear\nthan to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now\npresumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written\n(Wis. 17:10): \"A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay:\n'forecasteth'] grievous things,\" and (Wis. 17:11) that \"fear is a\nhelp to presumption [*Vulg.: 'Fear is nothing else but a yielding up\nof the succours from thought.'].\" Therefore presumption is opposed to\nfear rather than to hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now\npresumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because\npresumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas\nfear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary\nto fear rather than to hope.\n\nObj. 3: Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it\ndoes not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope.\nSince therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that\npresumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ When two vices are opposed to one another they are\ncontrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to\nfortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of\ndespair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that\npresumption also is more directly opposed to hope.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), \"every\nvirtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as\ntemerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice,\nalike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning\nis opposed to prudence.\" This agrees with the Philosopher who says\n(Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of\nthe contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with\ninsensibility, and fortitude with audacity.\n\nAccordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear,\nespecially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from\nGod's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a\nkind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes\nan inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed\nwhen they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to\ndifferent genera, it follows that presumption is more directly\nopposed to hope than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the\nsame object, hope inordinately, presumption inordinately.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and\nproperly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in\nthis way that inordinate fear is called presumption.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Contraries are things that are most distant from one\nanother within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a\nmovement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or\ninordinate. Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than\nto fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific\ndifference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is\nopposed to fear, in respect of its generic difference, which is the\nmovement of hope.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic\ncontrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety.\nHence presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas\nit does not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by\nexcluding its ordinateness.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Presumption Arises from Vainglory?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that presumption does not arise from\nvainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine\nmercy. Now mercy (_misericordia_) regards unhappiness (_miseriam_)\nwhich is contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from\nvainglory.\n\nObj. 2: Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair\narises from sorrow, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 4, ad 2). Since\ntherefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to\narise from pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which\ngive the most absorbing pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to some\nimpossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to\nignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible.\nTherefore presumption arises from ignorance rather than from\nvainglory.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that \"presumption\nof novelties is a daughter of vainglory.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), presumption is twofold; one\nwhereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something\nbeyond his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like\npresumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great\ndesire for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and\nespecially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory\nstates explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of\nvainglory.\n\nThe other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or\npower, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or\npardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise\ndirectly from pride, as though man thought so much of himself as to\nesteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory,\nhowever much he might be a sinner.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 22\n\nOF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under\nwhich head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) The precepts relating to hope;\n\n(2) The precepts relating to fear.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Should Be a Precept of Hope?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given relating\nto the virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured by\none cause, there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is\nsufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope for good.\nTherefore there is no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to\ndo this.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue, the\nchief precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the chief\nof all the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope,\nfaith and charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts of the Law are\nthose of the decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3), it seems that if any precept of hope were\ngiven, it should be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But it\nis not to be found there. Therefore it seems that the Law should\ncontain no precept of hope.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a\nprohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is to be\nfound forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it\nseems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says on John 15:12, \"This is My\ncommandment, that you love one another\" (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.):\n\"How many things are commanded us about faith! How many relating to\nhope!\" Therefore it is fitting that some precepts should be given\nabout hope.\n\n_I answer that,_ Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some\nbelong to the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law.\nThe preambles to the Law are those without which no law is possible:\nsuch are the precepts relating to the act of faith and the act of\nhope, because the act of faith inclines man's mind so that he\nbelieves the Author of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission,\nwhile, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the\nprecepts. The precepts that belong to the substance of the Law are\nthose which relate to right conduct and are imposed on man already\nsubject and ready to obey: wherefore when the Law was given these\nprecepts were set forth from the very outset under the form of a\ncommand.\n\nYet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the\nform of a command, since, unless man already believed and hoped, it\nwould be useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of\nfaith had to be given under the form of an announcement or reminder,\nas stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), so too, the precept of hope, in the\nfirst promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form of a\npromise. For he who promises rewards to them that obey him, by that\nvery fact, urges them to hope: hence all the promises contained in\nthe Law are incitements to hope.\n\nSince, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise\nman to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and\nmuch more, to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after\nthe first promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many\ninducements to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not\nmerely by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in the Ps.\n61:9: \"Hope [Douay: 'Trust'] in Him all ye congregation of the\npeople,\" and in many other passages of the Scriptures.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is\nproportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural\ngood he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly\nby promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there\nwas need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those\nthings to which natural reason inclines us, such as the acts of the\nmoral virtues, for sake of insuring a greater stability, especially\nsince the natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong to the\nfirst promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a precept\nof hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to\ninduce men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in the\ncase of the first and fourth commandments.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In those observances to which man is bound as under a\nduty, it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to what\nhe has to do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must\navoid doing: thus he is given a precept concerning the honor due to\nparents, but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by\nthe law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their parents.\nAnd since in order to be saved it is man's duty to hope in God, he\nhad to be induced to do so by one of the above ways, affirmatively,\nso to speak, wherein is implied the prohibition of the opposite.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Should Have Been Given a Precept of Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that, in the Law, there should not have\nbeen given a precept of fear. For the fear of God is about things\nwhich are a preamble to the Law, since it is the \"beginning of\nwisdom.\" Now things which are a preamble to the Law do not come under\na precept of the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in\nthe Law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect is also given. Now love\nis the cause of fear, since \"every fear proceeds from some kind of\nlove,\" as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the\nprecept of love, it would have been superfluous to command fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, presumption, in a way, is opposed to fear. But the\nLaw contains no prohibition against presumption. Therefore it seems\nthat neither should any precept of fear have been given.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 10:12): \"And now, Israel,\nwhat doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the\nLord thy God?\" But He requires of us that which He commands us to do.\nTherefore it is a matter of precept that man should fear God.\n\n_I answer that,_ Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now just as man\nis induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe precepts of law, so\ntoo is he induced thereto by the fear of punishment, which fear is\nservile.\n\nAnd just as according to what has been said (A. 1), in the\npromulgation of the Law there was no need for a precept of the act of\nhope, and men were to be induced thereto by promises, so neither was\nthere need for a precept, under form of command, of fear which\nregards punishment, and men were to be induced thereto by the threat\nof punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts of the\ndecalogue, and afterwards, in due sequence, in the secondary precepts\nof the Law.\n\nYet, just as wise men and the prophets who, consequently, strove to\nstrengthen man in the observance of the Law, delivered their teaching\nabout hope under the form of admonition or command, so too did they\nin the matter of fear.\n\nOn the other hand filial fear which shows reverence to God, is a sort\nof genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind of principle of\nall observances connected with reverence for God. Hence precepts of\nfilial fear are given in the Law, even as precepts of love, because\neach is a preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and to\nwhich the precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the passage\nquoted in the argument _On the contrary,_ man is required \"to have\nfear, to walk in God's ways,\" by worshipping Him, and \"to love Him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as though it\nwere extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the Law, just\nas love is. Hence precepts are given of both, since they are like\ngeneral principles of the whole Law.\n\nReply Obj. 2: From love proceeds filial fear as also other good works\nthat are done from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of\ncharity, precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the\nsame time precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just\nas, in demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down the first\nprinciples, unless the conclusions also are given which follow from\nthem proximately or remotely.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Inducement to fear suffices to exclude presumption,\neven as inducement to hope suffices to exclude despair, as stated\nabove (A. 1, ad 3).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 23\n\nOF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nIn proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself;\n(2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be\nfivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its\nacts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto.\n\nThe first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity,\nconsidered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation\nto its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether charity is friendship?\n\n(2) Whether it is something created in the soul?\n\n(3) Whether it is a virtue?\n\n(4) Whether it is a special virtue?\n\n(5) Whether it is one virtue?\n\n(6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?\n\n(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it?\n\n(8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Charity Is Friendship?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For\nnothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's\nfriend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is\nof man towards God and the angels, \"whose dwelling [Douay:\n'conversation'] is not with men\" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is\nnot friendship.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no friendship without return of love\n(Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies,\naccording to Matt. 5:44: \"Love your enemies.\" Therefore charity is\nnot friendship.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there\nare three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the\ndelightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the\nfriendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his\nletter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the\nBible: \"True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn\ntogether, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence,\nnot by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the\nstudy of the Divine Scriptures.\" No more is it friendship for the\nvirtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship\nbased on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii).\nTherefore charity is not friendship.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 15:15): \"I will not now call\nyou servants . . . but My friends.\" Now this was said to them by\nreason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2, 3) not\nevery love has the character of friendship, but that love which is\ntogether with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to\nwish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love,\nbut wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a\nhorse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of\nconcupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship\nfor wine or for a horse.\n\nYet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain\nmutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and\nfriend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of\ncommunication.\n\nAccordingly, since there is a communication between man and God,\ninasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of\nfriendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which\nit is written (1 Cor. 1:9): \"God is faithful: by Whom you are called\nunto the fellowship of His Son.\" The love which is based on this\ncommunication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is\nthe friendship of man for God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in\nrespect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to\nthis life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God\nor the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his\nmind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and\nboth God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of\nlife, wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): \"Our conversation is in\nheaven.\" But this \"conversation\" will be perfected in heaven, when\n\"His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face\" (Apoc.\n22:3, 4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected\nin heaven.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in\nrespect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to\none's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another,\nas, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he\nloves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected\nwith him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for\ntheir sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate\nus; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to\nour enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom\nthe friendship of charity is chiefly directed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The friendship that is based on the virtuous is\ndirected to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for\nhis sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not\nvirtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on\nthe virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for\nGod's sake.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in\nthe soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): \"He that loveth his\nneighbor, consequently, loveth love itself.\" Now God is love.\nTherefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he\nsays (De Trin. xv, 17): \"It was said: God is Charity, even as it was\nsaid: God is a Spirit.\" Therefore charity is not something created in\nthe soul, but is God Himself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the\nsoul is the life of the body, according to Deut. 30:20: \"He is thy\nlife.\" Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God\nquickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity,\naccording to 1 John 3:14: \"We know that we have passed from death to\nlife, because we love the brethren.\" Therefore God is charity itself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the\ncontrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed\nit is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings\nthe human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not\nsomething created in the soul.\n\nOn the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): \"By\ncharity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God\nfor His own sake.\" But a movement of the soul is something created in\nthe soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q.\n17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something\ncreated in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the\nmind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we\nlove God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from\nthe Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous\nacts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues,\nfor instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and\nthis he said on account of the excellence of charity.\n\nBut if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary,\ndetrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind\nthe movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a\nway that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle\nof this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive\npower. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose\nprinciple needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 6, A. 1):\nso that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which\ninvolves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an\nact of the will.\n\nLikewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will\nin such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an\ninstrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action,\nnevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again\nthe act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has\nbeen stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4) that the love of charity is\nthe root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy\nGhost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should\nbe the efficient cause of that act.\n\nNow no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be\nconnatural to that power by reason of some form which is the\nprinciple of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to\ntheir due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is\ninclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He\n\"ordereth all things sweetly\" (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the\nact of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so\nthat, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power,\ninclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect\nthan the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it\nbe easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue,\nsince no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity\nhas, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure.\nTherefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of\ncharity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the\nnatural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and\ncausing it to act with ease and pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is\nwisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with\nthe goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God\n(since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation\nof Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a\nshare of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love\nour neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of\nspeaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines\nAugustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to\nsome an occasion of error.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by\ncharity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the\nlife of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body.\nConsequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is\nimmediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form\ndepends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore\nit is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an\ninfinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God,\nthis proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of\ncharity.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Charity Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity\nis a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a\nvirtue, as may be gathered from _Ethic._ viii, 1; nor is it numbered\namong the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore,\nis charity a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"virtue is the ultimate limit of power\" (De Coelo et\nMundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies\nrather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a\nvirtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is\nnot an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the\nsoul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject.\nTherefore charity is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): \"Charity is\na virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us\nto God, for by it we love Him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Human acts are good according as they are regulated\nby their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the\nprinciple of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of\nhuman acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), viz.\nhuman reason and God.\n\nConsequently just as moral virtue is defined as being \"in accord with\nright reason,\" as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, so too, the nature of\nvirtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to\nfaith, (Q. 4, A. 5) and hope (Q. 17, A. 1). Wherefore, it follows\nthat charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites\nus to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that\nfriendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is \"either a virtue or\nwith a virtue.\" For we might say that it is a moral virtue about\nworks done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect\nfrom justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another\nperson, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship\nconsiders the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of\na gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13).\nNevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of\nitself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and\nvirtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit,\nas it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident\nfrom the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous,\nas in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore\nfriendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather\nthan a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it\nis not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the\ngoodness of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to\nrejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 25, A. 2) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love\nis reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love.\nAnd when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean\nthat it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of\nexcess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider\nits being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has\nits being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident\nwhich results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its\nsubject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an\naccident that results from a participation of some higher nature is\nsuperior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher\nnature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way\ncharity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation\nof the Holy Ghost.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Charity Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For\nJerome says: \"Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby\nwe love God\" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and\nAugustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that\n\"virtue is the order of love.\" Now no special virtue is included in\nthe definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a\nspecial virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be\na special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue,\naccording to 1 Cor. 13:4: \"Charity is patient, is kind,\" etc.; indeed\nit extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: \"Let all\nyour things be done in charity.\" Therefore charity is not a special\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now\nAugustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, \"Thou shalt love\"\nis \"a general commandment,\" and \"Thou shalt not covet,\" \"a general\nprohibition.\" Therefore charity is a general virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing general is enumerated together with what\nis special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues,\nviz. hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: \"And now there remain\nfaith, hope, charity, these three.\" Therefore charity is a special\nvirtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as\nshown above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper\nobject of love is the good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 1), so\nthat wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special\nkind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of\nhappiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of\ncharity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love.\nTherefore charity is a special virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue,\nnot as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue\ndepends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 8). In\nthis way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues,\nas explained in _Ethic._ ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on\nprudence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last\nend, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other\nends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of\nhorse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object\nthe last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows\nthat it extends to the acts of a man's whole life, by commanding\nthem, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The precept of love is said to be a general command,\nbecause all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end,\naccording to 1 Tim. 1:5: \"The end of the commandment is charity.\"\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Charity Is One Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits\nare distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of\ncharity--God and our neighbor--which are infinitely distant from one\nanother. Therefore charity is not one virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit,\neven though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q. 17, A.\n6; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which\nGod is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by\nreason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But\nthe Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii,\n3, 11, 12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into\na number of various species.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the\nobject of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of\nthe Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: \"One faith.\" Therefore\ncharity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine\ngoodness.\n\n_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (A. 1) is a kind of\nfriendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship\nare differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end,\nand in this way there are three species of friendship, namely\nfriendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous;\nsecondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which\nfriendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship\nbetween kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow\ntravellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter\non civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the\nPhilosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).\n\nNow charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its\nend is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of\neverlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also\none. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not\ndivided into several species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were\nequally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the\nprincipal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of\ncharity for God's sake.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore\ncharity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely\nGod's goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: \"Give\nglory to the Lord for He is good.\" Other reasons that inspire us with\nlove for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary\nand result from the first.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has\nvarious ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to\ncharity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Charity Is the Most Excellent of the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of\nthe virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as\nit has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will,\nsince it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the\nintellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the thing by which another works seems the less\nexcellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is\nbeneath his master. Now \"faith . . . worketh by charity,\" according\nto Gal. 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to\nbe the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something\nadditional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the\nobject of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent\nthan charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): \"The greater of\nthese is charity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since good, in human acts, depends on their being\nregulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which\nis a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human\nacts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above (A. 3),\nnamely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby,\neven human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological\nvirtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their\nobject is God, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual\nvirtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that\namong the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to\nthat which attains God most.\n\nNow that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by\nanother. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive\nfrom Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas\ncharity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that\nsomething may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent\nthan faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues,\njust as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent\nthan the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it\nappoints the mean in human operations or passions.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by the\nthing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the\nexcellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the\nmeasure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the\nwill and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of\nthe appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of\nthe appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is\nthe object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the\nsoul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves,\nbecause a thing is contained according to the mode of the container\n(De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul,\nare more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul.\nConsequently it is better to know than to love the things that are\nbeneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to\nthe intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7, 8):\nwhereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God,\nranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more\nexcellent than faith.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by\nhis servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not\nprove.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but\ncharity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance\ntherefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous,\nas hope does, since what is already united has not the character of\narduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Any True Virtue Is Possible Without Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without\ncharity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those\nwho have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the\nnaked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is\npossible without charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it\ncomes of \"an unfeigned faith,\" as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now,\nin unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their\nconcupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore\ntrue virtue is possible without charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to _Ethic._\nvi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore\ntrue virtue can be without charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): \"If I should\ndistribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body\nto be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.\" And yet\ntrue virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: \"She teacheth\ntemperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such\nthings as men can have nothing more profitable in life.\" Therefore no\ntrue virtue is possible without charity.\n\n_I answer that,_ Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things\ndirected to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the\nend. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the\nproximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and\nuniversal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and\nprincipal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps.\n72:28: \"It is good for me to adhere to God,\" and to this good man is\nordered by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good\nmay be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it\ncan be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while\nthe other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away\nfrom the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true\nvirtue is that which is directed to man's principal good; thus also\nthe Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that \"virtue is the\ndisposition of a perfect thing to that which is best\": and in this\nway no true virtue is possible without charity.\n\nIf, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end,\nthen we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as\nit is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good\nis not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is\nordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as\nAugustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), \"the prudence of the miser,\nwhereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the\nmiser's justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through\nfear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he\ncurbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude,\nwhereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he\ngoes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'\" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i,\n45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for\ninstance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a\ntrue virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final\nand perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible\nwithout charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one\nis in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something\nthat is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is\nalways evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the\nactions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always\nsinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and\ndirects it to his unbelief as end.\n\nThere is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in\naccordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his\npossession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even\nhis natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as\nstated above (Q. 10, A. 4; I-II, Q. 85, A. 2). In this way it is\npossible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not\nperfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the\nprinciple is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly\ntrue science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable\nprinciple be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or\nchastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by\ncharity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation\nto some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life,\nas do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 56, A. 3). Hence the comparison fails.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the\nvirtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential.\nNow charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it\nwould follow that the other virtues are of the same species as\ncharity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since\nthen it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way\nthe form of the virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their\nroot and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: \"Rooted and founded in\ncharity.\" Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the\nmatter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making.\nTherefore charity is not the form of the virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide\nwith one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the\nmother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that\ncharity is the form of the virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from\nthe end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is\nthe will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the\nform of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently,\nin morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs\ngive the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has\nbeen said (A. 7), that it is charity which directs the acts of all\nother virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives\nthe form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this\nsense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are\ncalled virtues in relation to \"informed\" acts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as\nbeing their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of\nefficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the\naforesaid manner.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far\nas all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom,\nand not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character\nof a material cause.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because\nit directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is\none who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called\nthe mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it\nconceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last\nend.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 24\n\nOF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY\n(In Twelve Articles)\n\nWe must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which\nhead there are twelve points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?\n\n(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine\ninfusion?\n\n(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural\ngifts?\n\n(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?\n\n(5) Whether it increases by addition?\n\n(6) Whether it increases by every act?\n\n(7) Whether it increases indefinitely?\n\n(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?\n\n(9) Of the various degrees of charity;\n\n(10) Whether charity can diminish?\n\n(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?\n\n(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Will Is the Subject of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of\ncharity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the\nPhilosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part.\nTherefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated\nabove (Q. 23, A. 6). But the reason is the subject of virtue.\nTherefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1\nCor. 16:14: \"Let all your things be done in charity.\" Now the\nprinciple of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that\ncharity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the\nwill.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The object of charity is the good, which is also\nthe object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its\nsubject.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since, as stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2),\nthe appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective\nwhich is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in\ndifferent ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good\napprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite\nor will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it\ncan be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not\na sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect\nalone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the\nintellective appetite, i.e. the will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of\nthe intellective appetite, as proved in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2):\nwherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of\nsensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good\nwhich is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the\nconcupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the\nwill also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from\nthe reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not\nby the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and\ntranscends the rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: \"The\ncharity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.\" Hence it is not\nin the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its\nrule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship\nof the will to the reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 4), the\nfree-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not\nin the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose.\nFor choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of\nthe end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the\nlast end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in\nthe free-will.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Charity Is Caused in Us by Infusion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not caused in us by\ninfusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man\nnaturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the \"Divine\ngood,\" which is the object of charity, \"is for all an object of\ndilection and love.\" Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by\ninfusion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love\nit. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good.\nTherefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no\ninfused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do\nwe need one in order to love God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): \"The end of the\ncommandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and\nan unfeigned faith.\" Now these three have reference to human acts.\nTherefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from\ninfusion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): \"The charity of God\nis poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), charity is a\nfriendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting\nhappiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of\ngratuitous gifts, for, according to Rom. 6:23, \"the grace of God is\nlife everlasting\": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural\nfacilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be\nnatural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect\ndoes not transcend its cause.\n\nTherefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through\nacquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy\nGhost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the\nparticipation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above (Q.\n23, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is\nfounded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all\nnaturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural\nfellowship, so the comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to\nus, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible\nthings, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He\nis the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in\nthis way, on account of the inclination of our appetite towards\nvisible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God above all\nthings in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused into our\nhearts.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When it is said that in us charity proceeds from \"a\npure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith,\" this must\nbe referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things.\nOr again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to\nreceive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the\nsaying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): \"Fear leads to\ncharity,\" and of a gloss on Matt. 1:2: \"Faith begets hope, and hope\ncharity.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Charity Is Infused According to the Capacity of Our Natural\nGifts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is infused according to the\ncapacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (Matt. 25:15) that\n\"He gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper\nability'].\" Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity,\nsince there is no virtue without charity, as stated above (Q. 23, A.\n7). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure\nof his natural virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, among things ordained towards one another, the\nsecond is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things\nthat the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous\ngifts, that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a\nperfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as\nsecond to first. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according\nto the capacity of nature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to the\nsame measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Matt.\n22:30 and Luke 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are\nbestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the\nMaster teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently\napplies to man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 3:8): \"The Spirit breatheth\nwhere He will,\" and (1 Cor. 12:11): \"All these things one and the\nsame Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will.\"\nTherefore charity is given, not according to our natural capacity,\nbut according as the Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.\n\n_I answer that,_ The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause\nof that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater\neffect. Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature,\nas stated above (A. 2) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on\nthe sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the\nquantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on\nthe capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy\nGhost Who \"divides\" His gifts \"according as He will.\" Hence the\nApostle says (Eph. 4:7): \"To every one of us is given grace according\nto the measure of the giving of Christ.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The virtue in accordance with which God gives His gifts\nto each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of\nthe one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this\ndisposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less,\naccording as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): \"Who\nhath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in\nlight.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The form does not surpass the proportion of the matter.\nIn like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for\ngrace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity\nand nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison\nfails.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is\nconsistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly\nwhithersoever he is borne, as stated in the First Part (Q. 61, A. 6).\nHence there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good\nin those who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and\nconsequently those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became\nbetter than the others, and those who fell became worse. But man's is\na rational nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in\npotentiality and sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily\nborne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater\nnatural gifts there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the\ncomparison fails.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Charity Can Increase?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing\nincreases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely\ndimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a\nspiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in\nrespect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest\ncharity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore\ncharity does not increase.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no\nincrease. But charity consists in something extreme, being the\ngreatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good.\nTherefore charity cannot increase.\n\nObj. 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever\nthere is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of\nessence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of\nessence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity\ncannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or\ncorrupted, which is unreasonable.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep.\nclxxxv.] that \"charity merits increase that by increase it may merit\nperfection.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are\ncalled wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the\nlast end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to\nGod, Who is approached, \"not by steps of the body but by the\naffections of the soul\" [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and\nthis approach is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to\nGod. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that\nit can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the\nway would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he\nsays (1 Cor. 12:31): \"I show unto you yet a more excellent way.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to\nvirtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of\nobjects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater\nexcellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a\nthing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual\nquantity of charity increases.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its\nobject, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it\nfollows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not\nevery charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the\nact.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in its\nessence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according\nto its fervor.\n\nBut these people did not know what they were talking about. For since\ncharity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an\nessential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet\nmore in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its\nsubject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to\nact, so that an essential increase of charity implies ability to\nproduce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases\nessentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject,\nas the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in\nits subject.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Charity Increases by Addition?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For\njust as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be\naccording to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity\nresults from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that\n\"increase is addition to pre-existing magnitude.\" Therefore the\nincrease of charity which is according to virtual quantity is by\naddition.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul,\naccording to 1 John 2:10: \"He that loveth his brother abideth in the\nlight.\" Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in\na house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also\nincreases in the soul by addition.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as the\ncausing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: \"He will increase the growth\nof the fruits of your justice.\" Now when God first infuses charity,\nHe puts something in the soul that was not there before. Therefore\nalso, when He increases charity, He puts something there which was\nnot there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater\nresults from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved\nin _Phys._ iii, text. 59, and _Metaph._ ii, 4. Therefore charity does\nnot increase by addition.\n\n_I answer that,_ Every addition is of something to something else: so\nthat in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things\nadded together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if\ncharity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as\ndistinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a\ndistinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For\nGod is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which\ndid not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which\nmagnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless\ncapable of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is\nadded. Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose\nthe distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.\n\nNow distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric.\nSpecific distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while\nnumeric distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a\nhabit may receive increase through extending to objects to which it\ndid not extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one\nwho acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored\nhitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest\ncharity extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the\naddition which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as\nthough the added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically\nfrom that to which it is added.\n\nIt follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must\npresuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a\ndistinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one\nwhite thing is added to another, although such an increase does not\nmake a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in\npoint, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational\nmind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place\nby one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible.\nMoreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater\nlover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity\ncan by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some\nhave held to be the case.\n\nAccordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of\ncharity more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of\nincrease in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a\nform consists wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently,\nsince the magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a\nform is greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject,\nand not that another form is added to it: for this would be the case\nif the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with\nits subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its\nsubject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not\nby charity being added to charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and\nsomething else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity,\nit is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this\nway we have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in\nanimals. But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is\ndistinguishable only in respect of its subject, and in this way it\nhas its proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of\nintensity in its subject, for instance in things subject to\nrarefaction, as is proved in _Phys._ iv, 9. In like manner science,\nas a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and accordingly it\nincreases by addition, when a man knows more things; and again, as an\naccidental form, it has a certain quantity through being in its\nsubject, and in this way it increases in a man who knows the same\nscientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same\nway charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that which it\nhas from its object, it does not increase, as stated above: hence it\nfollows that it increases solely by being intensified.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The addition of light to light can be understood\nthrough the light being intensified in the air on account of there\nbeing several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not\napply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding\nforth the light of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The infusion of charity denotes a change to the state\nof _having_ charity from the state of _not having it,_ so that\nsomething must needs come which was not there before. On the other\nhand, the increase of charity denotes a change to _more having_ from\n_less having,_ so that there is need, not for anything to be there\nthat was not there before, but for something to be more there that\npreviously was less there. This is what God does when He increases\ncharity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and\nthe likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by\nthe soul.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE\n\nWhether Charity Increases Through Every Act of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity increases through every act\nof charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less.\nBut every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more\nthan a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection\nof charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase\ncharity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are engendered\nby acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act of\ncharity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of virtue.\nTherefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase\nof charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.]\nsays that \"to stand still in the way to God is to go back.\" Now no\nman goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore\nwhoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God.\nTherefore charity increases through every act of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The effect does not surpass the power of its\ncause. But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or\nslackness. Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity,\nrather does it dispose one to a lower degree.\n\n_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like\nthe increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is\nnot a continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so\nmuch in so much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part\nof that time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space\nof time nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing\nany actual increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which\nit had disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In\nlike manner charity does not actually increase through every act of\ncharity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity,\nin so far as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again\naccording to charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out\ninto an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity,\nand then his charity increases actually.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Every act of charity merits everlasting life, which,\nhowever, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper\ntime. In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of\ncharity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we\nstrive for that increase.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered, each\nact does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces\ntowards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is\nthe most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it,\nreduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a\nstone.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man advances in the way to God, not merely by actual\nincrease of charity, but also by being disposed to that increase.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Charity Increases Indefinitely?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity does not increase\nindefinitely. For every movement is towards some end and term, as\nstated in _Metaph._ ii, text. 8, 9. But the increase of charity is a\nmovement. Therefore it tends to an end and term. Therefore charity\ndoes not increase indefinitely.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject. But\nthe capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity\nis finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase,\nattain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater,\nunless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the\nPhilosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an\nindefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them\nindefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite\nquantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we\nsubtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But\nthis does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need\nfor the second increase of charity to be less than the first, since\nrather is it probable that it would be equal or greater. As,\ntherefore, the charity of the blessed is something finite, if the\ncharity of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow\nthat the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is\nabsurd. Therefore the wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): \"Not as though I\nhad already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if\nI may, by any means apprehend,\" on which words a gloss says: \"Even if\nhe has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough.'\nFor whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his\ndestination.\" Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more\nand more.\n\n_I answer that,_ A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in\nthree ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed\nmeasure, and when this has been reached it is no longer possible to\ngo any further in that form, but if any further advance is made,\nanother form is attained. An example of this is paleness, the bounds\nof which may, by continual alteration, be passed, either so that\nwhiteness ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part\nof the agent, whose power does not extend to a further increase of\nthe form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which\nis not capable of ulterior perfection.\n\nNow, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of\nman's charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity\nitself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a\nparticipation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In\nlike manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is\npossessed of infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject,\nno limit to this increase can be determined, because whenever charity\nincreases, there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a\nfurther increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to\nfix any limits to the increase of charity in this life.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is\nnot in this, but in a future life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The capacity of the rational creature is increased by\ncharity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 2 Cor.\n6:11: \"Our heart is enlarged\"; so that it still remains capable of\nreceiving a further increase.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument holds good in those things which have the\nsame kind of quantity, but not in those which have different kinds:\nthus however much a line may increase it does not reach the quantity\nof a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity which\nfollows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the\nquantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision.\nHence the argument does not prove.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Charity Can Be Perfect in This Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this\nlife. For this would have been the case with the apostles before all\nothers. Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): \"Not\nas though I had already attained, or were already perfect.\" Therefore\ncharity cannot be perfect in this life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that \"whatever\nkindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect,\ncupidity is done away altogether.\" But this cannot be in this world,\nwherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 John\n1:8: \"If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.\" Now all\nsin arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be\nperfect in this life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any\nmore. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above\n(A. 7). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)\n\"Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been\nbrought to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to\nbe with Christ.'\" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case\nof Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.\n\n_I answer that,_ The perfection of charity may be understood in two\nways: first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to\nthe person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is\nperfect, if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is\nas lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He\nis infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since\nall created power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can\nbe perfect in this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He\nloves Himself.\n\nOn the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he\nloves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a\nman's whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the\nperfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this\nlife, wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is\nimpossible to think always actually of God, and to be moved by love\ntowards Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give\nhis time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except\nin so far as the needs of the present life demand. This is the\nperfection of charity that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not\ncommon to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his\nwhole heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring\nanything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common\nto all who have charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of\nheaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that \"he was a\nperfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which\nthe way leads.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are\ncontrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are\nincompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of\nheaven.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection simply,\nwherefore it can always increase.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Charity Is Rightly Distinguished into Three Degrees,\nBeginning,  Progress, and Perfection?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of\ncharity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many\ndegrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection.\nTherefore it is not right to put only one.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to\nbe. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as\nprogressing and as beginning.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity may\nbe, it can increase, as stated above (A. 7). Now for charity to\nincrease is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be\ndistinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees\nare unsuitably assigned to charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)\n\"As soon as charity is born it takes food,\" which refers to\nbeginners, \"after taking food, it waxes strong,\" which refers to\nthose who are progressing, \"and when it has become strong it is\nperfected,\" which refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three\ndegrees of charity.\n\n_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity may be considered\nin respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For\nalthough this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it\nhas certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or\npursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak\nof a man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after which\nwe distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to\nuse his reason, while there is again a third state, that of puberty\nwhen he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he\narrives at perfection.\n\nIn like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished\naccording to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the\nincrease of charity. For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy\nhimself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences,\nwhich move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in\nwhom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the\nsecond place man's chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and\nthis is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to\nstrengthen their charity by adding to it: while man's third pursuit\nis to aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to\nthe perfect who \"desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.\"\n\nIn like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is\nwithdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and\nthirdly, rest in this term.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in\nthe increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even\nas every division of continuous things is included in these\nthree--the beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher\nstates (De Coelo i, 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although those who are beginners in charity may\nprogress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins\nwhich disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they\ncome to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection\nwith greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the\nother holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr. 4:17 about those who\nbuilt up Jerusalem.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is\nnot their chief care, but their aim is principally directed towards\nunion with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek\nthis, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the\nbeginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing\nin virtue.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Charity Can Decrease?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries\nby their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease\nare contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above (A. 4),\nit seems that it can also decrease.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) \"He\nloves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee\": and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.\n36) he says that \"what kindles charity quenches cupidity.\" From this\nit seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity\nquenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides\nGod, can increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) \"God makes\nthe just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the man\nturns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine\noperation.\" From this we may gather that when God preserves charity\nin man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity\ninto him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less\ncharity into him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in\npreserving charity, He preserves less charity in him that prepares\nhimself less. Therefore charity can decrease.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In Scripture, charity is compared to fire,\naccording to Cant 8:6: \"The lamps thereof,\" i.e. of charity, \"are\nfire and flames.\" Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts.\nTherefore as long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot\ndescend, i.e. decrease.\n\n_I answer that,_ The quantity which charity has in comparison with\nits proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase,\nas stated above (A. 4, ad 2).\n\nSince, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in\ncomparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it\ncan decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be\neither through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true\nthat virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease\naltogether through cessation from act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 53,\nA. 3). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to friendship\n(Ethic. viii, 5) \"that want of intercourse,\" i.e. the neglect to call\nupon or speak with one's friends, \"has destroyed many a friendship.\"\nNow this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause,\nand the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when human acts\ncease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last ceases\naltogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is not the\nresult of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated above (A.\n2). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it does not for\nthis reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation\ninvolves a sin.\n\nThe consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except\neither by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by\nGod, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace\nin punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by\nway of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this\ndecrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But\nmortal sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but\ndestroys it entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is\ncontrary to charity, as we shall state further on (A. 12), and by way\nof merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against\ncharity, he deserves that God should withdraw charity from him.\n\nIn like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either\neffectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not\ntouch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial\nsin is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love\nfor the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act\nas regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people\nsometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to\ntheir diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false\nopinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the\ncertitude of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit\ndiminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he\ndoes not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For God does not\nturn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore he\nthat is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does\nnot deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to the\nlast end.\n\nThe consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we\nspeak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption\nmay be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are\nvenial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of\ncharity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that subject\nstands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal\nrelation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of\nincrease, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument\ndoes not prove.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in\ncreatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison,\nas Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e.\nless than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminishing\ncharity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must\nunderstand the saying: \"He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside\nThee,\" for he adds these words, \"which he loveth not for Thee.\" This\ndoes not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that\nwhich we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually\nthough not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin,\nwhich is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot\ndiminish charity, for the reason given above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the\ninfusion of charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 3). Wherefore\nthat which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces\ndispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the\nother hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the\nsafe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain in us while we\nsleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on\nthe part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 11]\n\nWhether We Can Lose Charity When Once We Have It?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we\nhave it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who\nhas charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 John 3:9): \"Whosoever is\nborn of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he\ncannot sin, because he is born of God.\" But none save the children of\nGod have charity, for it is this which distinguishes \"the children of\nGod from the children of perdition,\" as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,\n17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that \"if love be\nnot true, it should not be called love.\" Now, as he says again in a\nletter to Count Julian, \"charity which can fail was never true.\"\n[*The quotation is from _De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam\ncomitem,_ vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly\nknown as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was\nno charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot\nlose it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang.\nxxx) that \"God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to\nwork it is not charity.\" Now no man loses charity by doing great\nthings. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some\nmotive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning,\nboth self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity\ncannot be lost.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 2:4): \"I have somewhat\nagainst thee, because thou hast left thy first charity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown\nabove (A. 2; QQ. 23, 24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in\nthree ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul\nto love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin\nthrough the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He\nwills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true\nat the same time--that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain\nman to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose\ncharity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings\nof God whereby \"whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered,\"\nas Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De\nDono Persev. xiv).\n\nSecondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable\nof anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin\nat all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good,\nas Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).\n\nThirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which\nis changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be\ncompared with this subject, both from the general point of view of\nform in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view\nof habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be\nin its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not\nentirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the\nforms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such\nthings receives one form in such a way, that it retains the\npotentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not\ncompletely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be\nlost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a\ncelestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter,\nso that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form,\nis in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the\nblessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational\nmind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is\npossessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the\nwayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because\nthe latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is\nnot actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is\nlost.\n\nIt is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs\nto a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem\ngood, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste\njudges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human\nmind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual\ndisposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that \"such as\na man is, so does the end appear to him.\" Accordingly charity is\ninseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity\ncannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God\nis seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.\nTherefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity\nof the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence,\nwhich is the essence of goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the\npower of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills\nto move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no\ntrue charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only\nfor a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent\nwith true love. If, however, charity be lost through the\nchangeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity\nincluded in its act, this is not contrary to true charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The love of God ever works great things in its purpose,\nwhich is essential to charity; but it does not always work great\nthings in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for\nsinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting\nactually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for\nsinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 12]\n\nWhether Charity Is Lost Through One Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not lost through one\nmortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): \"When a man who has\nmounted to the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that\nhe will become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so\ngradually and by little and little.\" But man falls away by losing\ncharity. Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (lx) addresses\nPeter thus: \"Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not an\naverted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never\nfailed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the\nfount of charity.\" From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De\nNat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.] drew his assertion that \"charity in Peter\nwas not quenched, but cooled.\" But Peter sinned mortally in denying\nChrist. Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now a\nhabit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act.\nMuch less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor. Now,\nseemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of\nGod and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things\ndirected to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated\nabove (A. 10). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there\nbe a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal\ngood.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end.\nNow the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not\ndone away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless.\nTherefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin\nhas been committed.\n\n_On the contrary,_ By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal\ndeath, according to Rom. 6:23: \"The wages of sin is death.\" On the\nother hand whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it\nis written (John 14:21): \"He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My\nFather: and I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him,\" in\nwhich manifestation everlasting life consists, according to John\n17:3: \"This is eternal life; that they may know Thee the . . . true\nGod, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.\" Now no man can be worthy,\nat the same time, of eternal life and of eternal death. Therefore it\nis impossible for a man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore\ncharity is destroyed by one mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ That one contrary is removed by the other contrary\nsupervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very\nnature, which consists in man's loving God above all things, and\nsubjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to\nGod. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God\nas to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the\nrule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His\ncommandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its\nvery nature is capable of destroying charity.\n\nIf indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of\nits subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin,\nfor act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the\nendurance of a habit in its subject does not require the endurance of\nits act, so that when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is\nnot at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends\non the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the\ninfusion and safekeeping of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion\nof light in the air, as stated above (A. 10, Obj. 3). Consequently,\njust as the light would cease at once in the air, were an obstacle\nplaced to its being lit up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once\nto be in the soul through the placing of an obstacle to the\noutpouring of charity by God into the soul.\n\nNow it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to\nGod's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of\ncharity, since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to\nGod's friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it\nfollows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal\nsin. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that \"man is\nenlightened by God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's\nabsence, because distance from Him is effected not by change of place\nbut by aversion of the will.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This saying of Origen may be understood, in one way,\nthat a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go so\nfar as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some\nprevious negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be\ndispositions to mortal sin, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 3).\nNevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin\nif he commits it.\n\nSince, however, he adds: \"If some slight slip should occur, and he\nrecover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether,\" we\nmay reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied\nand falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin\nthrough malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly, by\nactual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity.\nSecondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity,\nthrough some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against\ncharity in this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered\nit.\n\nThe Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Not every inordinate affection for things directed to\nthe end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin, but only\nsuch as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the\ninordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope\ndo not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated\nabove (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every mortal sin is\ncontrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain\ndeterminate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even\nas charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that\ncharity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form\nregarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above (Q. 23, A.\n8).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 25\n\nOF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)\n\nWe must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will\nbe twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The\norder in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there\nare twelve points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we\nlove our neighbor also?\n\n(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?\n\n(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?\n\n(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?\n\n(5) Whether one's own body?\n\n(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?\n\n(7) Whether sinners love themselves?\n\n(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?\n\n(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?\n\n(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?\n\n(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?\n\n(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Love of Charity Stops at God, or Extends to Our Neighbor?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and\ndoes not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe\nHim fear, according Deut. 10:12: \"And now Israel, what doth the Lord\nthy God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?\" Now\nthe fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is\ndistinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either\nservile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q.\n10, A. 2). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is\ndistinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that \"to be\nloved is to be honored.\" Now the honor due to God, which is known as\n_latria,_ is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as\n_dulia._ Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct\nfrom that with which we love our neighbor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Matt. 1:2.\nNow hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man,\naccording to Jer. 17:5: \"Cursed be the man that trusteth in man.\"\nTherefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): \"This commandment we\nhave from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 6; Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q.\n54, A. 3) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of\ndifferent species. For every act of the one species belongs to the\nsame habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its\nobject, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity\nthat it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the\nobject, and that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is\nspecifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and\nwhereby we see the color under the aspect of light.\n\nNow the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since\nwhat we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence\nit is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God,\nand whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity\nextends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our\nneighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in\ntwo ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as\nwhen a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by\nreason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human\nfear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love.\nSecondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of\nGod; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising\nthe ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for\nits justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God,\nas neither is such like love.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the\nhonored person's own good, for it is given to a person in recognition\nof his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on\naccount of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so\nlong as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is\ndistinguished according to the good belonging to individuals.\nConsequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity,\nin so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which\nis God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according\nto each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular\nhonor of latria on account of His singular virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the\nprincipal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us\nministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man\nloved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he\nloved him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 2]\n\nWhether We Should Love Charity Out of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of\ncharity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in\nthe two precepts of charity (Matt. 22:37-39): and neither of them\nincludes charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor.\nTherefore charity need not be loved out of charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness,\nas stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). But charity cannot participate in\nhappiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above\n(Q. 23, A. 1). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an\naccident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is\nessential to friendship, as stated in _Ethic._ viii. Therefore\ncharity need not be loved out of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): \"He that loves\nhis neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself.\" But we love\nour neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also\nis loved out of charity.\n\n_I answer that,_ Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature\nof the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for\nsince the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the\naspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to\nwill is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the\nintellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands,\nbecause this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason\nof its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is\na spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore\nfrom the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.\n\nYet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as\nstated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two\nways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom\nwe wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend.\nIt is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved\nout of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all\nthose whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and\nto the other virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we are\nfriends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we\nlove both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and\nour neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life,\nwhereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which\nwe desire for all whom we love out of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to those\nwith whom we are friends.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Irrational Creatures Also Ought to Be Loved Out of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be\nloved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are\nconformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity,\nfor He loves \"all things that are\" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He\nloves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should\nlove irrational creatures out of charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends\nto other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational\ncreature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance\nof image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they\nbear the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. I, Q. 45, A. 7]. Therefore\ncharity extends also to irrational creatures.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the\nobject of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we\nbelieve that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes\nand birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that\nwalk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to\nirrational creatures.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The love of charity extends to none but God and\nour neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational\ncreatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational\nlife. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 13, A.\n1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is\ntwofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our\nfriendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which\nwe desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational\ncreature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of\nthese reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have\nan irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is\ntowards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we\ncannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not\ncompetent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to\nthe rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of\nits disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says\n(Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such\nlike things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship\nis based on some fellowship in life; since \"nothing is so proper to\nfriendship as to live together,\" as the Philosopher proves (Ethic.\nviii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human\nlife which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational\ncreatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third\nreason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship\nof everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot\nattain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an\nirrational creature.\n\nNevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we\nregard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far,\nto wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's\nuse; thus too does God love them out of charity.\n\nWherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the\ncapacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does:\nand so the comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true,\nwhereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have\na natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison\nfails.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Man Ought to Love Himself Out of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man is [not] bound to love himself\nout of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that\nthere \"can be no charity between less than two.\" Therefore no man has\ncharity towards himself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love\nand equality (Ethic. viii, 2, 7), which cannot be of one man towards\nhimself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q. 23,\nA. 1). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy,\nsince charity \"dealeth not perversely\" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now a man\ndeserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2 Tim.\n3:1, 2): \"In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be\nlovers of themselves.\" Therefore a man cannot love himself out of\ncharity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18): \"Thou shalt love thy\nfriend as thyself.\" Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore\nwe should love ourselves too out of charity.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated\nabove (Q. 23, A. 1), we may consider charity from two standpoints:\nfirst, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we\nmust hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself,\nbut something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"love is a unitive force,\" whereas\na man is one with himself which is more than being united to another.\nHence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with\nwhich a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if\nwe have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do\nunto ourselves, hence we read in _Ethic._ ix, 4, 8, that \"the origin\nof friendly relations with others lies in our relations to\nourselves.\" Thus too with regard to principles we have something\ngreater than science, namely understanding.\n\nSecondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature,\nnamely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and,\nconsequently, with the things of God, among which things is man\nhimself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he\nloves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also\nhimself out of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general\nnotion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the\nsame sense.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far\nas they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they\nhumor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's rational\nnature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to\nthe perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through\ncharity that a man loves himself.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 5]\n\nWhether a Man Ought to Love His Body Out of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out\nof charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to\nassociate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body,\naccording to Rom. 7:24: \"Who shall deliver me from the body of this\ndeath?\" and Phil. 1:23: \"Having a desire to be dissolved and to be\nwith Christ.\" Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship in\nthe enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that\nenjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is towards\nthose who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot love\nus out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23, 26) that\nthere are four things that we should love out of charity, and among\nthem he reckons our own body.\n\n_I answer that,_ Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in\nrespect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of\nsin and its punishment.\n\nNow the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as\nthe Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's\nservice, according to Rom. 6:13: \"Present . . . your members as\ninstruments of justice unto God.\" Consequently, out of the love of\ncharity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but\nwe ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of\npunishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for\nthe removal of such things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of his\nbody, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he\nwas loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: \"We would\nnot be unclothed, but clothed over.\" He did, however, wish to escape\nfrom the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from\nthe corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to\nhinder it from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: \"From the body of\nthis death.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by knowing\nand loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body, we are\nable to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the\nenjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the\nbody, viz., \"the flush of health and incorruption,\" as Augustine\nstates (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a\nfashion, a share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of\ncharity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is for\nanother, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in\nrespect of his soul, or in respect of his body.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 6]\n\nWhether We Ought to Love Sinners Out of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of\ncharity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): \"I have hated the unjust.\"\nBut David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated\nrather than loved, out of charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"love is proved by deeds\" as Gregory says in a\nhomily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the\nunjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of\nhate, according to Ps. 100:8: \"In the morning I put to death all the\nwicked of the land\": and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): \"Wizards thou\nshalt not suffer to live.\" Therefore sinners should not be loved out\nof charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire and\nwish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity,\ndesire evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: \"May the\nwicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V.: 'The wicked shall be,'\netc. See Reply to this Objection.].\" Therefore sinners should not be\nloved out of charity.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will the\nsame things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will, nor\nto rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore\nsinners should not be loved out of charity.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together,\naccording to _Ethic._ viii. But we ought not to associate with\nsinners, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: \"Go ye out from among them.\"\nTherefore we should not love sinners out of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that\n\"when it is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that\nwe ought to look upon every man as our neighbor.\" Now sinners do not\ncease to be men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought\nto love sinners out of charity.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the sinner: his\nnature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God,\nhe has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity\nis based, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), wherefore we ought\nto love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.\n\nOn the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle\nto happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are\nopposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or\nmother or kindred, according to Luke 12:26. For it is our duty to\nhate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his\nbeing a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of\ncharity, for God's sake.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object\nof his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred is\nperfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): \"I have hated them\nwith a perfect hatred.\" Now hatred of a person's evil is equivalent\nto love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to\ncharity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our\nfriends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of\nfriendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and\nwe ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover\nmoney, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than\nmoney to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great\nwickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them\nfriendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws\ncommand such like sinners to be put to death, because there is\ngreater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending\ntheir ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of\nhatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of\nwhich he prefers the public good to the life of the individual.\nMoreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he\nbe converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not\nconverted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the\nsinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any more.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in Holy\nWrit, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of prediction,\nnot by way of wish, so that the sense is: \"May the wicked be,\" that\nis, \"The wicked shall be, turned into hell.\" Secondly, by way of\nwish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the\nman's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to\nPs. 57:11: \"The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge,\"\nsince, according to Wis. 1:13, not even God \"hath pleasure in the\ndestruction of the wicked [Vulg.: 'living']\" when He punishes them,\nbut He rejoices in His justice, according to Ps. 10:8: \"The Lord is\njust and hath loved justice.\" Thirdly, so that this desire is\nreferred to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment itself,\nto the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the man\nmay live.\n\nReply Obj. 4: We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what\nthey will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make\nthem will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is\nwritten (Jer. 15:19): \"They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt\nnot to be turned to them.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on\naccount of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them.\nBut it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is\nno fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For\nthus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Matt.\n9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards\nfellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Cor. 6:17): \"Go out\nfrom among them . . . and touch not the unclean thing,\" i.e. by\nconsenting to sin.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Sinners Love Themselves?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that\nwhich is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love\nof self is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei\nxiv, 28) that it \"builds up the city of Babylon.\" Therefore sinners\nmost of all love themselves.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping\nwith nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even\nirrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance,\nthe preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love\nthemselves.\n\nObj. 3: Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div.\nNom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore\nmany sinners love themselves.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 10:6): \"He that loveth\niniquity, hateth his own soul.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Love of self is common to all, in one way; in\nanother way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to\nthe wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he\nthinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways:\nfirst, in respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all\nthink themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and\nbody. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love\nthemselves, in so far as they love their own preservation.\n\nSecondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some\npredominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the\nstate, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In\nthis way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the\nreasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive\nand corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the\nApostle calls the \"inward man,\" and the latter, the \"outward man\" (2\nCor. 4:16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the\ninward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way\nthey think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the\nwicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward\nman, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not\nthemselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what\nthey think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and\ntherefore truly love themselves.\n\nThe Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to\nfriendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to\nbe and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he\ndoes good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company;\nfifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in\nalmost the same things. In this way the good love themselves, as to\nthe inward man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its\nintegrity, they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods,\nindeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in\nentering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts\nin the present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good,\nall of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no\nclashing of wills, since their whole soul tends to one thing.\n\nOn the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the\nintegrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for\nhim, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in\ntheir own company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever\nthey find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor\ndo they agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of\nconscience, according to Ps. 49:21: \"I will reprove thee and set\nbefore thy face.\"\n\nIn the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves,\nas regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not\nlove themselves thus.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The love of self which is the principle of sin is that\nwhich is proper to the wicked, and reaches \"to the contempt of God,\"\nas stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire\nexternal goods as to despise spiritual goods.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although natural love is not altogether forfeited by\nwicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The wicked have some share of self-love, in so far as\nthey think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true but\napparent: and even this is not possible in those who are very wicked.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Charity Requires That We Should Love Our Enemies?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity does not require us to love\nour enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that \"this great\ngood,\" namely, the love of our enemies, is \"not so universal in its\napplication, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us\nour trespasses.\" Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity,\nbecause, according to Prov. 10:12, \"charity covereth all sins.\"\nTherefore charity does not require that we should love our enemies.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now\neverything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary,\nas a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not\nmake us love our enemies.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity \"doth nothing perversely\" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now\nit seems perverse to love one's enemies, as it would be to hate one's\nfriends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kings 19:6): \"Thou\nlovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee.\"\nTherefore charity does not make us love our enemies.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 4:44): \"Love your enemies.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Love of one's enemies may be understood in three\nways. First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is\nperverse, and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that\nwhich is evil in another.\n\nSecondly love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their\nnature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we\nshould love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor,\nwe should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor\nin general.\n\nThirdly, love of one's enemies may be considered as specially\ndirected to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of\nlove towards our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely,\nbecause it does not require that we should have a special movement of\nlove to every individual man, since this would be impossible.\nNevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our being\nprepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready to love our enemies\nindividually, if the necessity were to occur. That man should\nactually do so, and love his enemy for God's sake, without it being\nnecessary for him to do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For\nsince man loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God's sake, the\nmore he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and show love\ntowards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain man very much, we\nwould love his children though they were unfriendly towards us. This\nis the sense in which Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in the\nFirst Objection, the Reply to which is therefore evident.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now\nour enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself\nshould be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They\nare not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness:\nand it is as such that we are bound to love them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is wrong to love one's enemies as such: charity does\nnot do this, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 9]\n\nWhether It Is Necessary for Salvation That We Should Show Our Enemies\nthe Signs and Effects of Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his\nenemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 John 3:18):\n\"Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth.\"\nNow a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects\nof love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such\nsigns and effects of love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Matt. 5:44): \"Love\nyour enemies,\" and, \"Do good to them that hate you.\" Now charity\ndemands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we\nshould \"do good to them.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of\ncharity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx),\nthat \"love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great\nthings, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love.\" Hence\ncharity towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But\ncharity requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he\nbe an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and\neffects of love towards our enemies.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Matt. 5:44, \"Do good to them that hate\nyou,\" says: \"To do good to one's enemies is the height of perfection\"\n[*Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to\ndo that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not\nrequire us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.\n\n_I answer that,_ The effects and signs of charity are the result of\ninward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely\nnecessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly\nlove our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards\nthe mind being prepared to do so, as explained above (A. 8).\n\nWe must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and\nsigns of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to\nour neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or\nfor a whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole\ncommunity: and the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should\nshow such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we\ndid not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to\nwhat is written (Lev. 19:18): \"Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of\nthe injury of thy citizens.\" But there are other favors or signs of\nlove, which one shows to certain persons in particular: and it is not\nnecessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and\nsigns of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for\ninstance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency, according\nto Prov. 25:21: \"If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he\nthirst, give him . . . drink.\" Outside cases of urgency, to show such\nlike favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby\nwe not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil, but\nalso wish to overcome evil by good [*Rom. 12:21], which belongs to\nperfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on\naccount of the hurt done to us, but purpose to induce our enemy to\nlove us on account of our kindliness.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 10]\n\nWhether We Ought to Love the Angels Out of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels\nout of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity\nis a twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of\nthe angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are\ncreated substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of\nour neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species.\nTherefore we are not bound to love them out of charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the\nangels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do.\nBut we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above (A. 3).\nNeither, therefore, have we towards the angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship\nwith one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our\ncompanions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give\nthem the friendship of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): \"If the\nname of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those\nwho pity us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our\nneighbor includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many\nmerciful favors.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the friendship of\ncharity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in\nwhich men share in common with the angels. For it is written (Matt.\n22:30) that \"in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of\nGod in heaven.\" It is therefore evident that the friendship of\ncharity extends also to the angels.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a\ncommon species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the\nblessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter\nfellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate\ngenus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers\nof everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of\nour rational mind wherein we associate with the angels.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The companionship of the angels does not consist\nin outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive\nnature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in\nthis life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1).\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 11]\n\nWhether We Are Bound to Love the Demons Out of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of\ncharity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their\nfellowship with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in\nour fellowship thus, since natural gifts, such as life and\nunderstanding, remain in them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div.\nNom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the\nmatter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves\nthe sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also\nout of charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our\nneighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the\npassage of Augustine quoted above (A. 9). Now the demons are useful\nto us in many things, for \"by tempting us they work crowns for us,\"\nas Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love\nthe demons out of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 28:18): \"Your league with\ndeath shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not\nstand.\" Now the perfection of a peace and covenant is through\ncharity. Therefore we ought not to have charity for the demons who\nlive in hell and compass death.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), in the sinner, we are bound,\nout of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name\nof demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore\ndemons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying\nstress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called\ndemons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in\naccordance with the statement made above (AA. 2, 3), that a thing may\nbe loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as\nthe person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have\nthe friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential\npart of friendship that one should be a well-wisher towards one's\nfriend; and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the\ngood of everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those\nspirits whom God has condemned eternally, since this would be in\nopposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of His\njustice.\n\nSecondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be\nenduring as another's good. In this way we love irrational creatures\nout of charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory\nto God and be useful to man, as stated above (A. 3): and in this way\ntoo we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as\nmuch as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts,\nunto God's glory.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The possession of everlasting happiness is not\nimpossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon;\nconsequently the friendship of charity which is based on the\nfellowship of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of\nnature, is possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility\nof obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in\nhell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That the demons are useful to us is due not to\ntheir intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this\nleads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their\nperverse intention to our profit.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 12]\n\nWhether Four Things Are Rightly Reckoned As to Be Loved Out of\nCharity, Viz. God, Our Neighbor, Our Body and Ourselves?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly\nreckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor,\nour body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan.\nlxxxiii), \"he that loveth not God, loveth not himself.\" Hence love of\noneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is\nnot distinct from the love of God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole.\nBut our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be\ncondivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since\nthen the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from\nthe love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man\nloves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the love with\nwhich he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not\nrightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): \"There\nare four things to be loved; one which is above us,\" namely God,\n\"another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us,\" namely\nour neighbor, \"and a fourth which is beneath us,\" namely our own body.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), the friendship of\ncharity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this\nfellowship, one thing is considered as the principle from which\nhappiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes\nof happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which\nhappiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body.\n\nNow the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its\nbeing the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness,\ncan be an object of love for two reasons, either through being\nidentified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in\npartaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to\nbe loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his\nneighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The different relations between a lover and the various\nthings loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since\nthe relation between the human lover and God is different from his\nrelation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of\nlove, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other,\nso that the former love being removed the latter is taken away.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be\ncapable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach\ndirectly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable\nmind which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves\nhimself in one way, and his own body in another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to\nhis body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness. Wherefore,\non the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him;\nand our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object of love.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 26\n\nOF THE ORDER OF CHARITY\n(In Thirteen Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are\nthirteen points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is an order in charity?\n\n(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?\n\n(3) Whether more than himself?\n\n(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?\n\n(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?\n\n(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?\n\n(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one\nwho is more closely united to him?\n\n(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or\none who is united to him by other ties?\n\n(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his\nfather?\n\n(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?\n\n(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?\n\n(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those\nwhom we are kind to?\n\n(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Order in Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For\ncharity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues.\nNeither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so\nis the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is\nappointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither,\ntherefore, ought there to be any order in charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs,\nnot to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be\nascribed to charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Cant 2:4): \"He brought me into the\ncellar of wine, he set in order charity in me.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the\nterms \"before\" and \"after\" are used in reference to some principle.\nNow order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or\nafter. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also\norder of some kind. But it has been said above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25,\nA. 12) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of\nhappiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is\nbased. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved\nout of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of\nthat love, which is God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as last\nend: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (Q.\n23, A. 6). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of\nappetite and action, as was shown above (Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; I-II, A.\n1, ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First\nPrinciple, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order\nin reference to the First Principle.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation\ndepends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand,\ncharity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the\nsoul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things\nthemselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is\nmore appropriate to charity than to faith.\n\nAnd yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly\nabout God, and secondarily about things referred to God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and\nto the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in\nthis way that order is stated to be in charity.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Ought to Be Loved More Than Our Neighbor?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than\nour neighbor. For it is written (1 John 4:20): \"He that loveth not\nhis brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?\"\nWhence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more\nlovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to _Ethic._\nix, 5, 12. Now God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is\nless lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19:\n\"Every beast loveth its like.\" Now man bears more likeness to his\nneighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of\ncharity, more than he loves God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according\nto Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27). Now God is not greater in\nHimself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be\nloved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love\nGod more than our neighbor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to\nbe hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's\nsake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke\n14:26: \"If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother,\nand wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be\nMy disciple.\" Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more\nthan our neighbor.\n\n_I answer that,_ Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject\nin which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that\nfriendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler\nof the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends;\nhence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now\nthe friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness,\nwhich consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it\nflows to all who are capable of happiness.\n\nTherefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of\ncharity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our\nneighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness\nfrom Him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being\nthe reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since\neach thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a\nthing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way\nthat seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were\nlovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we\nare led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more\nvisible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with\nit before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's argument.\nFor, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first\nlovable object we meet with, because \"the soul learns, from those\nthings it knows, to love what it knows not,\" as Gregory says in a\nhomily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves\nnot his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor\nis more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our\nlove: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the\nlikeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we\nshare along with our neighbor in something received from God, we\nbecome like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we\nought to love God more than we love our neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Considered in His substance, God is equally in\nall, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in\nanything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God's goodness equally\nwith God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by\nparticipation.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Out of Charity, Man Is Bound to Love God More Than Himself?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to\nlove God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8)\nthat \"a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly\nrelations with himself.\" Now the cause is stronger than its effect.\nTherefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than his\nfriendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more\nthan God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good.\nNow the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself\nwhich is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the\nreason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves\nhimself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not\nlove God more than himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God.\nBut a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this\nis the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not\nbound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): \"If thou\noughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of\nHim in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take\noffense if him also thou lovest for God's sake.\" Now \"the cause of a\nthing being such is yet more so.\" Therefore man ought to love God\nmore than himself.\n\n_I answer that,_ The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of\nnature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods\nbestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of\nwhich not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves\nGod above all things and more than himself, but also every single\ncreature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by\na rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones\ndo, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each\npart naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own\nparticular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the\nprincipal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive\nto the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues\nwhereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own\nproperty and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much\nmore is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which\nis based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.\n\nTherefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common\ngood of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the\nuniversal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share\nof that happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations\ntowards another person in whom the good, which is the object of\nfriendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly\nrelations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as\nbecomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to\nitself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of\nGod which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of\nfriendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the\nDivine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying\nHim. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Out of Charity, Man Ought to Love Himself More Than His\nNeighbor?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to\nlove himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of\ncharity is God, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 25, AA. 1, 12). Now\nsometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are\nourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid\ninjuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his\nneighbor's sake, according to Prov. 12:26: \"He that neglecteth a loss\nfor the sake of a friend, is just.\" Therefore a man ought, out of\ncharity, to love his neighbor more than himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) \"charity seeketh not its\nown.\" Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most.\nTherefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his\nneighbor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39): \"Thou\nshalt love thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: 'friend') as thyself.\" Whence it\nseems to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love\nfor another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of\ncharity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two things in man, his spiritual nature\nand his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason\nof his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated\nabove (Q. 25, A. 7): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of\ncharity, to love himself more than he loves any other person.\n\nThis is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated\nabove (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12), God is loved as the principle of good, on\nwhich the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity,\nloves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid\ngood, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that\ngood. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain\nunion in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union,\nthe fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more\npotent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with\nhim in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love\nhimself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to\ngive way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of\nhappiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The love of charity takes its quantity not only from\nits object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that\nhas charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way\non the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to God,\nyet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man\nis to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his\nneighbor more than himself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend's\nsake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his\nspiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue,\nwhich is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought\nnot to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from\nsin, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying,\n\"'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common to the\nprivate good.\" Now the common good is always more lovable to the\nindividual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is\nmore lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as\nstated above (A. 3).\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 5]\n\nWhether a Man Ought to Love His Neighbor More Than His Own Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to love his\nneighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his\nneighbor's body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more\nthan his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor's\nbody more than his own.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his\nneighbor's, as stated above (A. 4). Now a man's own body is nearer to\nhis soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more\nthan our neighbor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake\nof what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own\nbody for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect,\naccording to John 15:13: \"Greater love than this no man hath, that a\nman lay down his life for his friends.\" Therefore a man is not bound,\nout of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that \"we\nought to love our neighbor more than our own body.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Out of charity we ought to love more that which has\nmore fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above\n(A. 2; Q. 25, A. 12). Now fellowship in the full participation of\nhappiness which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a greater\nreason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of\noverflow, which is the reason for loving one's own body. Therefore,\nas regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more\nthan our own body.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing\nseems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that\nwe ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to\nhis soul, which is his predominant part.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Our body is nearer to our soul than our\nneighbor, as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as\nregards the participation of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more\nclosely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every man is immediately concerned with the care\nof his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps\nin cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a\nman to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a\ncase where he is under obligation to do so; and if a man of his own\naccord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection\nof charity.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 6]\n\nWhether We Ought to Love One Neighbor More Than Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor\nmore than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): \"One\nought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to\nall, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time\nor any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely\nunited to us.\" Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than\nanother.\n\nObj. 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving\nseveral, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and\nthe same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God,\nas Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to\nlove all our neighbors equally.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the\nPhilosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an\nequal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our\nneighbors equally.\n\n_On the contrary,_ One's obligation to love a person is proportionate\nto the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love.\nNow it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain\nneighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment\n(Lev. 10:9), \"He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him\ndie,\" which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above.\nTherefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.\n\n_I answer that,_ There have been two opinions on this question: for\nsome have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our\nneighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the\noutward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood\nas applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who\nare connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and\nnot to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all\nincluding our enemies.\n\nBut this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the\ninclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite,\nwhich is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from\nDivine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural\ninclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement\nthat is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the\ninclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is\nbecoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination\nalso of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be\nproportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly,\nso that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards\nthose to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness.\n\nWe must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought\nto love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the\nprinciple of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be\nthat the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to\none or the other of those principles. For as we stated above (A. 1),\nwherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that\nprinciple.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of\nthe good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally\nout of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good,\nnamely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater\nthrough its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not\nto love all equally.\n\nOr we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two\nways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As\nregards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because\nwe cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not\nto be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some\nmore than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter\ninequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of\nbeneficence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some\nare nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we\nought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to\nHim.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the quantity of love on the\npart of the good which we wish our friends.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 7]\n\nWhether We Ought to Love Those Who Are Better More Than Those Who Are\nMore Closely United Us?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought to love those who are better\nmore than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is\nin no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for\nsome reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black\nmixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for\nsome reason, according to Luke 14:26: \"If any man come to Me, and\nhate not his father,\" etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful\nfor any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who\nare better more than those who are more closely connected with us.\n\nObj. 2: Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God\nloves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought\nto love the better man more than one who is more closely united to\nhim.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in every friendship, that ought to be loved most\nwhich has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by\nnatural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by\nnature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship\nof charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has\nmore to do with better men than with those who are more closely\nunited to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men\nmore than those who are more closely connected with us.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): \"If any man have not\ncare of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied\nthe faith, and is worse than an infidel.\" Now the inward affection of\ncharity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity\nregards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.\n\n_I answer that,_ Every act should be proportionate both to its object\nand to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while,\nfrom the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus\nmovement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the\nintensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved\nand the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from\nits object, but its intensity is due to the lover.\n\nNow the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover.\nTherefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance\nwith charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his\nrelation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater\ngood to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity\nwishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it\nhas various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it\nbelongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in\naccordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness.\nAnd this regards the species of love; for there are different species\nof love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom\nwe love.\n\nOn the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to\nthe man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more\nclosely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he\nwishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater\ngood he wishes for them.\n\nAgain a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors\nare connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which\ncannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are.\nBut the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come\nand go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 10,\n11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man\nwho is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so\nreach a higher degree of happiness.\n\nMoreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we\nlove more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love\nthem in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us\nwe have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are\nconnected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to\nthe way in which they are connected. Now since the good on which\nevery other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to\nits end, to the good on which charity is based, it follows that\ncharity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art\nwhich is about the end commands the art which is about the means.\nConsequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or\nconnected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any\nlike reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded\nby charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we\nlove in more ways those who are more nearly connected with us.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their\nkinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and\nGod. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according\nto Micah 7:6: \"A men's enemies are they of his own household.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making\nman comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what is\nHis. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to\nus which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10), when we were treating of the\ngoodness of the will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the\nobject, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is\nthat the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 8]\n\nWhether We Ought to Love More Those Who Are Connected with Us by Ties\nof Blood?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love more those who\nare more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written\n(Prov. 18:24): \"A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than\na brother.\" Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv\n7): \"The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to\nthe ties of blood.\" Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that\nas to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract\nthe former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we\nought not to love more than others those who are united to us by ties\nof blood.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): \"I love not less\nyou whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in\nwedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace.\" Surely we\nought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than\nthose who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not\nlove our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Love is proved by deeds,\" as Gregory states (Hom.\nin Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than\nour kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than\nhis father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of\nall.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The commandments of the decalogue contain a\nspecial precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12).\nTherefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us\nby ties of blood.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 7), we ought out of charity to\nlove those who are more closely united to us more, both because our\nlove for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for\nloving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and\nbeloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different\npersons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is\nmore loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of\nwhich he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should\ncompare one union with another. Accordingly we must say that\nfriendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by\nnatural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic\nfellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side\non the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to\nnature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning\nrelations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and\non the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. ix, 2) that \"it is our duty to render to each class of people\nsuch respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact the\nprinciple upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a\nwedding . . . It would seem to be a special duty to afford our\nparents the means of living . . . and to honor them.\"\n\nThe same applies to other kinds of friendship.\n\nIf however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union\narising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all\nothers, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas\nother unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the\nfriendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be\nstronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades originates\nthrough their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the\nlove of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for\ninstance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more\nstable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in\nmatters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in\nthe providing of necessaries.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors\nrespecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in\nthis matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom\nhe has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom\nhe is bound to support in bodily sustenance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer\nrather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not\nsimply [but] relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on\nfellowship in battle.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 9]\n\nWhether a Man Ought, Out of Charity, to Love His Children More Than\nHis Father?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his\nchildren more than his father. For we ought to love those more to\nwhom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good\nto our children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor.\n12:14): \"Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but\nthe parents for the children.\" Therefore a man ought to love his\nchildren more than his parents.\n\nObj. 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love\ntheir children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states\n(Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more\nthan his parents.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity.\nBut God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also\nought to love our children more than our parents.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: \"We\nought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, and\nlastly those of our household.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1; A. 7), the degrees of\nlove may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the\nobject. In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to\nGod, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love\nhis father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his\nfather as his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good\nand more like God.\n\nSecondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of\nthe lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more\nclosely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more\nlovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.\nviii). First, because parents love their children as being part of\nthemselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the\nlove of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for\nhimself. Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is\ntheir child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to\ntheir parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them\nto whom they stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because\nparents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at\nonce, whereas the child begins to love his father after a lapse of\ntime; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to\nEcclus. 9:14: \"Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be\nlike to him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of respect\nand honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and\ncare. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in\nhonor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of\ncare.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his children\nmore, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we\nconsider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his\nfather more.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves\nus for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is\nrelated to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to\nthe father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to\nbe provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless\nin cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received\nto provide for his parents before all.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 10]\n\nWhether a Man Ought to Love His Mother More Than His Father?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more\nthan his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i,\n20), \"the female produces the body in generation.\" Now man receives\nhis soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in\nthe First Part (Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 118). Therefore a man receives more\nfrom his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to\nlove her more than him.\n\nObj. 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due.\nNow a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that \"mothers have greater love for\ntheir children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she\nknows more surely than the father who are her children.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, love should be more fond towards those who have\nlabored for us more, according to Rom. 16:6: \"Salute Mary, who hath\nlabored much among you.\" Now the mother labors more than the father\nin giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written\n(Ecclus. 7:29): \"Forget not the groanings of thy mother.\" Therefore a\nman ought to love his mother more than his father.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that \"man ought to\nlove God the Father of all, and then his own father,\" and mentions\nthe mother afterwards.\n\n_I answer that,_ In making such comparisons as this, we must take the\nanswer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether\nthe father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as\nmother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference\nin such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed,\nas the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen,\nHom. ii in Cant.] says: \"Good servants should be preferred to wicked\nchildren.\"\n\nStrictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the\nmother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural\norigin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the\nmother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a\npassive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the\nfather is to be loved more.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the\nformless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through\nthe formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though\nthis power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the\nmatter of the body to receive that form.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This applies to another kind of love. For the\nfriendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the\nfriendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are\nspeaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother\nthrough being begotten of them.\n\nThe Reply to the Third Objection is evident.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 11]\n\nWhether a Man Ought to Love His Wife More Than His Father and Mother?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more\nthan his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another\nunless he love the latter more. Now it is written (Gen. 2:24) that \"a\nman shell leave father and mother\" on account of his wife. Therefore\na man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) that a husband should\n\"love his wife as himself.\" Now a man ought to love himself more than\nhis parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than his\nparents.\n\nObj. 2: Further, love should be greater where there are more reasons\nfor loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the friendship of\na man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12)\nthat \"in this friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure,\nand also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous.\" Therefore a\nman's love for his wife ought to be greater than his love for his\nparents.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to Eph. 5:28, \"men ought to love their\nwives as their own bodies.\" Now a man ought to love his body less\nthan his neighbor, as stated above (A. 5): and among his neighbors he\nshould love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents\nmore than his wife.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9), the degrees of love may be\ntaken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those\nwho love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man\nshould love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as\nhis principles and considered as a more exalted good.\n\nBut on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more,\nbecause she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to\nMatt. 19:6: \"Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh.\"\nConsequently a man loves his wife more intensely, but his parents\nwith greater reverence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A man does not in all respects leave his father and\nmother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought to\nsuccor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all\nhis kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal\nconnection and co-habitation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man ought\nto love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for\nhimself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with\nhim.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There are also several reasons for a man's love for his\nfather; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards good, are\nmore weighty than those for which a man loves his wife; although the\nlatter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union.\n\nAs to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in\nthe words quoted, the particle \"as\" denotes not equality of love but\nthe motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife\nis her being united to him in the flesh.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 12]\n\nWhether a Man Ought to Love More His Benefactor Than One He Has\nBenefited?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor\nmore than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud.\niv): \"Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love\nhim first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses\nto love, but declines to return love already given.\" Now a man's\nbenefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore\nwe ought to love our benefactors above all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man\nor by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a\nmore grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against\nhim, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly\nactions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those\nto whom we are kind.\n\nObj. 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and\nthen one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25].\nNow these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should\nbe loved above all others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that\n\"benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather\nthan vice versa.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 9, 11), a thing is loved more\nin two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent\ngood, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we\nought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle\nof good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more\nexcellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father (A. 9).\n\nIn the second way, however, we love those more who have received\nbenefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by\nfour arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the\nhandiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: \"He\nwas made by so and so.\" Now it is natural to a man to love his own\nwork (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): and\nthe reason is that we love _to be_ and _to live,_ and these are made\nmanifest in our _action._ Secondly, because we all naturally love\nthat in which we see our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor\nhas some good of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the\nrecipient some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his\nvirtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his useful\ngood in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure to see one's\nvirtuous good than one's useful good, both because it is more\nenduring,--for usefulness quickly flits by, and the pleasure of\ncalling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it\npresent--and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods\nthan the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it\nthe lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the\nbeloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so\nthat to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love\nis on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more\ndifficult to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of\nthings which have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what\ncomes easy to us.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the\nrecipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient,\nnot through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of\nhis own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do\nthrough another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more\nof a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other\nhand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more\nspontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents\nlove their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow\nthat we love all who have received good from us, more than any of our\nbenefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our parents,\nfrom whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we\nhave bestowed lesser benefits.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 13]\n\nWhether the Order of Charity Endures in Heaven?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the order of charity does not endure\nin heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): \"Perfect\ncharity consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods\nless.\" Now charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will\nlove those who are better more than either himself or those who are\nconnected with him.\n\nObj. 2: Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now\neach one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more\ngood, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's\nwill: and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in\nheaven each one loves more those who are better, and consequently he\nloves others more than himself, and one who is not connected with\nhim, more than one who is.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake, for\nthen will be fulfilled the words of 1 Cor. 15:28: \"That God may be\nall in all.\" Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so\nthat a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is\nnot connected with him, more than one who is.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory.\nNow the order of charity given above (AA. 2, 3, 4) is derived from\nnature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others.\nTherefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.\n\n_I answer that,_ The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as\nregards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized\nsimply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order\nbetween man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be\nnecessary, because, as we stated above (AA. 7, 9), the degrees of\nlove may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man\ndesires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In\nthe first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those\nwho are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the\nperfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the\nblessed will desire everyone to have what is due to him according to\nDivine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of\nmerit to a yet greater reward, as happens now while it is possible\nfor a man to desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man,\nwhereas then the will of each one will rest within the limits\ndetermined by God. But in the second way a man will love himself more\nthan even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of\nlove arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated above (AA.\n7, 9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed\nby God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his mind\nto God, and this pertains to a man's love for himself, and that, in\nthe second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and\neven work for that end according to his capacity.\n\nAs to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply\nlove those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because\nthe entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to\nGod, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with\nrespect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be\nnearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will\nno longer succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein\neach man has to succor those who are closely connected with him\nrather than those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their\ndistress: hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of\ncharity, loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he\nis under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of\ncharity. It will however be possible in heaven for a man to love in\nseveral ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of\nvirtuous love will not be banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet\nall these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken\nfrom nighness to God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument should be granted as to those who are\nconnected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love\nhimself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect,\nsince perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity\ndirects man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as\nstated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers the order of charity in respect\nof the degree of good one wills the person one loves.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his love,\nfor God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible\nsupposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's\nreason for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should\nlove himself more than all else after God.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 27\n\nOF THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of\ncharity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow\nfrom that act.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?\n\n(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as\ngoodwill?\n\n(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?\n\n(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?\n\n(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?\n\n(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?\n\n(7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy?\n\n(8) Which is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 1]\n\nWhether to Be Loved Is More Proper to Charity Than to Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be\nloved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those\nwho are themselves better. But those who are better should be more\nloved. Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to\nbe more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), \"many would rather be loved\nthan love, and lovers of flattery always abound.\" Therefore it is\nbetter to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in\nkeeping with charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"the cause of anything being such is yet more so.\"\nNow men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech.\nRud. iv) that \"nothing incites another more to love you than that you\nlove him first.\" Therefore charity consists in being loved rather\nthan in loving.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that\nfriendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity\nis a kind of friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than\nin being loved.\n\n_I answer that,_ To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since\ncharity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its\nproper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the\nperson loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent\nto him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as\nanother tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is\nclear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for\nthat which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more\ncompetent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of\nsomething else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the\nfact that friends are more commended for loving than for being loved,\nindeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly,\nbecause a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love\nthan to be loved: for \"some women,\" as the Philosopher observes\n(Ethic. viii, 8) \"entrust their children to a nurse; they do love\nthem indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not\nto be loved.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: A better man, through being better, is more lovable;\nbut through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more,\nhowever, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does\nnot love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved:\nwhereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much\nas he ought to be loved.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), \"men wish to\nbe loved in as much as they wish to be honored.\" For just as honor is\nbestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in\nhim, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good\nalone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored,\nfor the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good which is\nin the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek\nto love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good\nof charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good.\nHence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be\nloved.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be\nloved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way\nleading a man to love.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 2]\n\nWhether to Love Considered As an Act of Charity Is the Same As\nGoodwill?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of\ncharity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says\n(Rhet. ii, 4) that \"to love is to wish a person well\"; and this is\ngoodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit.\nNow the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above\n(Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the\nwill. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the\nact of charity is nothing else than goodwill.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to\nfriendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should\nwish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and\nto live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the\nfourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth,\nthat he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain\nto goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that \"goodwill\nis neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship.\" Now\ncharity is friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Therefore\ngoodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.\n\n_I answer that,_ Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will\nwhereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs\nfrom actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive\nappetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For\nthe love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every\npassion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of\nlove is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration\nof the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the\ndifference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says\n(Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire,\nthat is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the\nsole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again\nsuch like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill\nsometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a\nboxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win. But the love,\nwhich is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill,\nbecause it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover\nand the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as\nsomewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards\nhim. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby\nwe wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union\nof the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an\nact of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds\nunion of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5)\nthat \"goodwill is a beginning of friendship.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining \"to love,\" does not\ndescribe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in\nwhich the act of love is chiefly manifested.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the\ngood, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is\nnot denoted by goodwill.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to\nfriendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he\nsays in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in\nrespect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this\nbelongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Out of Charity God Ought to Be Loved for Himself?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for\nHimself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a\nhomily (In Evang. xi): \"The soul learns from the things it knows, to\nlove those it knows not,\" where by things unknown he means the\nintelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the\nobjects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of\nsomething else.\n\nObj. 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through\nsomething else, according to Rom. 1:20: \"The invisible things of God\nare clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.\"\nTherefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for\nHimself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"hope begets charity\" as a gloss says on Matt. 1:1,\nand \"fear leads to charity,\" according to Augustine in his commentary\non the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract.\nix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear\nshuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems\nthat God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some\nevil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to\nenjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now \"God is to be\nenjoyed\" as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved\nfor Himself.\n\n_I answer that,_ The preposition \"for\" denotes a relation of\ncausality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal,\nefficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to\nbe reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According\nto these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for\nanother. In respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for\ninstance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man\nfor his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good\nand therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love\ncertain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such\na father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the\ngenus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that\nwhich disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the favors\nreceived from him, although after we have begun to love our friend,\nwe no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue.\nAccordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for\nanything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything\nelse as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor\ndoes He require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very\nsubstance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other\ngood things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else,\nbut from Him to all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can\nbe loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain\nthings to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by\nHim, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the\npunishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love what\nit knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for\nits loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or\nefficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man\nto love the unknown.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other\nthings, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them,\nbut through Himself, according to John 4:42: \"We now believe, not for\nthy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is\nindeed the Saviour of the world.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain\ndisposition, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8; Q. 19, AA. 4, 7, 10).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 4]\n\nWhether God Can Be Loved Immediately in This Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in\nthis life. For the \"unknown cannot be loved\" as Augustine says (De\nTrin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since\n\"we see now through a glass, in a dark manner\" (1 Cor. 13:12).\nNeither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is\nmore. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since \"he who is\njoined\" to God by love, is \"one spirit with Him\" (1 Cor. 6:17). But\nman cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him\nimmediately.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Isa.\n59:2: \"Your iniquities have divided between you and your God.\" Now\nsin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is\nless able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said\nto be \"enigmatic,\" and \"falls away\" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor.\n13:12. But charity \"does not fall away\" as stated in the same passage\n(1 Cor. 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God\nimmediately.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 3; Q. 84, A. 7), the\nact of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the\nknower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the\nappetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows\nthat the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in\nrespect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power\nfollows the mode of the knower.\n\nNow in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable\nand lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness\nitself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to\nus, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things\nare knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term\nof knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.\n\nAccordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the\nappetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and\nflows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves\nGod immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand,\nwith regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God\nthrough other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by\nway of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.\nI, Q. 12, A. 12).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not\nfollow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love,\nsince love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin\nat once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is\nknown through another thing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since to love God is something greater than to know\nHim, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God\npresupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not\nrest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love\nbegins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular\nmovement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to\nGod, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to\ncreatures.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is\nremoved by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by\nloving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of\nspiritual union.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 5]\n\nWhether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q. 184, A. 2]\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love\nfollows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this\nwould imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved\nby us.\n\nObj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div.\nNom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God,\nbecause \"God is greater than our heart\" (1 John 3:20). Therefore God\ncannot be loved wholly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved\nwholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves\nHimself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly\nloved by a creature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): \"Thou shalt love the\nLord thy God with thy whole heart.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since love may be considered as something between\nlover and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the\nquestion may be understood in three ways, first so that the\nqualification \"wholly\" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God\nis to be loved wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.\n\nSecondly, it may be understood as though \"wholly\" qualified the\nlover: and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought\nto love God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love\nof God, according to Deut. 6:5: \"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God\nwith thy whole heart.\"\n\nThirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to\nthe thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the\nthing loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in\nproportion to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His\ngoodness is infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely,\nbecause all power of creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is\nfinite.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first\nthree objections consider the question in this third sense, while the\nlast takes it in the second sense.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 6]\n\nWhether in Loving God We Ought to Observe Any Mode?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in\nloving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and\norder, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love\nof God is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: \"Above\nall . . . things, have charity.\" Therefore there ought to be a\nmode of the love of God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): \"Prithee,\ntell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the\ndesire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought.\" But it would\nbe useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were\none. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), \"the measure\nwhich nature appoints to a thing, is its mode.\" Now the measure of\nthe human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore\njust as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the\nexterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: \"Your reasonable\nservice,\" so also the interior love of God requires a mode.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that \"God is the\ncause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above\n(Obj. 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which\ndetermination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing\nmeasured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure\nessentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and\nmodifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is\nfound relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure.\nHence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the\nthing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure,\nwhether by deficiency or by excess.\n\nNow in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end,\nbecause the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be\ntaken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9).\nTherefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their\nmode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the\nPhilosopher (Polit. i, 3), \"in every art, the desire for the end is\nendless and unlimited,\" whereas there is a limit to the means: thus\nthe physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect\nas he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not\ngive as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so\nthat if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be\nimmoderate.\n\nAgain, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of\nGod, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above\n(Q. 23, A. 6), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be\ntaken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little,\nbut as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where\nthe more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we\nlove God the better our love is.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence of\nthat which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the\nmeasure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the\ngoodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something\nelse; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands\nbefore the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, \"the measure of\nour love for God is to love Him with our whole heart,\" that is to\nlove Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode\nwhich is proper to the measure.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An affection, whose object is subject to\nreason's judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the\nDivine love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore\nit is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity\nbetween the interior act and external acts of charity. For the\ninterior act of charity has the character of an end, since man's\nultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to Ps.\n72:28: \"It is good for me to adhere to my God\"; whereas the exterior\nacts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both\naccording to charity and according to reason.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 7]\n\nWhether It Is More Meritorious to Love an Enemy Than to Love a Friend?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to\nlove a friend. For it is written (Matt. 5:46): \"If you love them that\nlove you, what reward shall you have?\" Therefore it is not deserving\nof reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves,\nto love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more\nmeritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding\nfrom a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God\nto love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity\nlove their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's\nenemy than to love one's friend.\n\nObj. 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to\nbe more merit, since \"every man shall receive his own reward\naccording to his own labor\" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a\ngreater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it\nis more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's\nenemy than to love one's friend.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The better an action is, the more meritorious it\nis. Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love\na better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy\nwho hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend\nthan to love one's enemy.\n\n_I answer that,_ God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of\ncharity, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). When therefore it is asked\nwhich is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or one's\nenemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the\npart of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the\nreason for which we love him.\n\nIn the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy,\nbecause a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so\nthat he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of\nlove that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its\nopposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.\n\nIn the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than\none's friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible\nto love one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the\nonly reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose\nthat both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the\nstronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are\nfurthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the\npower of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it\nthrows its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is\nproved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the\nthings we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so\nmuch the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable\nmatter.\n\nYet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near\nthan on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor\nthose who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in\nthis respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more\nardent and better than the love of one's enemy.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict\nsense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in God's\nsight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this\nwould seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way that\nwe love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is\nmeritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because\nthey are our friends.\n\nThe Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said\nin the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the\nreason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part\nof those who are loved.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 8]\n\nWhether It Is More Meritorious to Love One's Neighbor Than to Love\nGod?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's\nneighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem\nto be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love\nof our neighbor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: \"I wished\nmyself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren.\" Therefore it\nis more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious\nto love one's friend, as stated above (A. 7). Now God is our chief\nfriend, since \"He hath first loved us\" (1 John 4:10). Therefore it\nseems less meritorious to love God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous\nand meritorious since \"virtue is about that which is difficult and\ngood\" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one's\nneighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because\nthere is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's\nneighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor\nthan to love God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That on account of which a thing is such, is yet\nmore so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by\nreason of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God\nis more meritorious than the love of our neighbor.\n\n_I answer that,_ This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by\nconsidering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love\nof God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its\nown sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom\nthe movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to\nhim that loves God (John 14:21): \"He that loveth Me, shall be loved\nof My Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him.\" Secondly, the\ncomparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on\nthe one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the\nother. In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while\nlove of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the\ncomparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our\nneighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for \"this\ncommandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his\nbrother\" (1 John 4:21).\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire\nthis, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in\na state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state\nof unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.\n\nWe may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in\nEp. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his\nneighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For\nhe wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which\npertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in\nhis neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less\nmeritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall\nshort of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God.\nHence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit,\nbut is the entire reason for merit.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The _good_ has, more than the _difficult,_ to do\nwith the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that\nwhatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more\ndifficult, and at the same time better.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 28\n\nOF JOY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the effects which result from the principal act\nof charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the\nexterior effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered:\n(1) Joy, (2) Peace, (3) Mercy.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?\n\n(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?\n\n(3) Whether this joy can be full?\n\n(4) Whether it is a virtue?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Joy Is Effected in Us by Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity.\nFor the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But\nGod, Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in\nthis state of life, since \"while we are in the body, we are absent\nfrom the Lord\" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us\nrather than joy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit\nhappiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among\nthose things whereby we merit happiness, according to Matt. 5:5:\n\"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.\" Therefore\nsorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown\nabove (Q. 17, A. 6). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to Rom.\n12:12: \"Rejoicing in hope.\" Therefore it is not the effect of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:5): \"The charity of God is\npoured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.\"\nBut joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17:\n\"The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and\njoy in the Holy Ghost.\" Therefore charity is a cause of joy.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2, 3), when we\nwere treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but\nin contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the\npresence of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing\nloved exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in\nthe love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of\nhis friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from\nlove, either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the\nloved object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or\nafflicted with some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is\nunchangeable, since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that\nHe is loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent\neffect, according to 1 John 4:16: \"He that abideth in charity,\nabideth in God, and God in him.\" Therefore spiritual joy, which is\nabout God, is caused by charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be\n\"absent from the Lord,\" in comparison with that presence whereby He\nis present to some by the vision of \"sight\"; wherefore the Apostle\ngoes on to say (2 Cor. 5:6): \"For we walk by faith and not by sight.\"\nNevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him,\nby the indwelling of His grace.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about those\nthings that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the\nsame that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about\nGod, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to\ngrieve for things that are contrary to it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways.\nFirst, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself;\nsecondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us.\nThe former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly:\nwhile the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward\nto enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether\nperfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's\ncharity.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Spiritual Joy, Which Results from Charity, Is Compatible\nwith an Admixture of Sorrow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from\ncharity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to\ncharity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,\n6: \"Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the\ntruth.\" But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow,\naccording to Rom. 12:15: \"Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with\nthem that weep.\" Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible\nwith an admixture of sorrow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv),\n\"penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again\nthose we have deplored.\" But there is no true penance without\ncharity. Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with\nChrist according to Phil. 1:23: \"Having a desire to be dissolved and\nto be with Christ.\" Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain\nsadness, according to Ps. 119:5: \"Woe is me that my sojourning is\nprolonged!\" Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of\nsorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom.\nNow such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16:\n\"Her conversation hath no bitterness.\" Therefore the joy of charity\nis incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), a twofold joy in God\narises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity;\nand with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself.\nThis joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even\nas the good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of\nevil: hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): \"Rejoice in the Lord\nalways.\"\n\nThe other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good\nas participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything\ncontrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is\ncompatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves\nfor that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either\nin us or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some\nevil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign\ngood: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he\nis hindered from participating in the Divine good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to Isa.\n59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins,\nor for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from\nparticipating in the Divine good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a\nfashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the\nunhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in\nthe Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for\nthe delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a\nparticipation of the Divine good.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Spiritual Joy Which Proceeds from Charity, Can Be Filled?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from\ncharity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is\nour joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it\nis meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is\ninfinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy\nin God can never be filled.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the\njoy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is\ngreater than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a\ncreature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the\nfulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature\nis finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be\ncomprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God\ncan be filled.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said to His disciples (John 15:11): \"That\nMy joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first,\non the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as\nmuch as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy\nalone in Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is\ncondignly due to the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any\ncreature must needs be finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be\nunderstood on the part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared\nto desire, as rest to movement, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1,\n2), when we were treating of the passions: and rest is full when\nthere is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there remains\nnothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the\nmovement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains\npossible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown\nabove (Q. 24, AA. 4, 7). When once, however, perfect happiness has\nbeen attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there\nwill be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he\nhad desired, even with regard to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5:\n\"Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.\" Hence desire will be at\nrest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so that the\njoy of the blessed is full to perfection--indeed over-full, since\nthey will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for\n\"neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath\nprepared for them that love Him\" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant\nby the words of Luke 6:38: \"Good measure and pressed down, and shaken\ntogether, and running over shall they give into your bosom.\" Yet,\nsince no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it\nfollows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on\nthe contrary, man enters into it, according to Matt. 25:21: \"Enter\ninto the joy of thy Lord.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to\nthe thing in which we rejoice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the\nterm appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further\nwill remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term,\nsome will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy\nwill be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully\nset at rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account\nof a fuller participation of the Divine happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect\nof the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There\nis however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as\nwe have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): \"That you\nmay be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and\nspiritual understanding.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Joy Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary\nto virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth\nand envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which\nis _good,_ so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be\nvirtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.\nBut we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:\n\"Rejoice in the Lord always.\" Therefore joy is a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is not numbered among the theological virtues,\nnor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is\nevident from what has been said above (I-II, QQ. 57, 60, 62).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 2, 4), virtue is\nan operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an\ninclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same\nhabit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of\nwhich follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not\nproceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act,\nhence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that\npreceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the\nvirtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions\n(I-II, Q. 25, AA. 2, 4) that love is the first affection of the\nappetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the\nsame virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good,\nand to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these\nacts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but\nfrom love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct\nfrom charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it\nis numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate\nself-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of\nthe vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 77, A. 4); so that it was\nnecessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices,\nbecause they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On\nthe other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely\ncharity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated\nabove (here and A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but\nhope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.\n_difficult,_ and _possible to obtain;_ for which reason it is\naccounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love\nany special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of\ncharity, albeit not its first act.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 29\n\nOF PEACE (Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?\n\n(2) Whether all things desire peace?\n\n(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?\n\n(4) Whether peace is a virtue?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Peace Is the Same As Concord?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): \"Peace among men is well\nordered concord.\" Now we are speaking here of no other peace than\nthat of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.\n\nObj. 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace\nconsists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that\npeace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the\nsame as concord.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves\nidentical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace,\nviz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): \"God is not the\nGod of dissension but of peace.\" Therefore peace is the same as\nconcord.\n\n_On the contrary,_ There can be concord in evil between wicked men.\nBut \"there is no peace to the wicked\" (Isa. 48:22). Therefore peace\nis not the same as concord.\n\n_I answer that,_ Peace includes concord and adds something thereto.\nHence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace,\nwherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.\n\nFor concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so\nfar as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to\nthe same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to\ndiverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the\ndiverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends\nsometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite,\naccording to Gal. 5:17: \"The flesh lusteth against the spirit.\"\nSecondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to\ndiverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same\ntime: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the\nappetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace,\nbecause man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he\nwants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for\nhim to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other\nhand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord\ndenotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace\ndenotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even\nin one man.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is\nbetween one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord,\nnot indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered,\nthrough one man agreeing with another in respect of something\nbefitting to both of them. For if one man concord with another, not\nof his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear\nof some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace,\nbecause the order of each concordant is not observed, but is\ndisturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises\nthat \"peace is tranquillity of order,\" which tranquillity consists in\nall the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If one man consent to the same thing together with\nanother man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to\nhimself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in\nagreement.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely\ndissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man\nand another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 2]\n\nWhether All Things Desire Peace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,\naccording to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace \"unites consent.\" But\nthere cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of\nknowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the\nsame time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do\nnot desire peace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain\npeace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matt.\n10:34): \"I came not to send peace.\" Therefore all things do not\ndesire peace.\n\nObj. 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign\ngood which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it\nis attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command\n(Mk. 9:49): \"Have peace among you.\" Therefore all things do not\ndesire peace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12, 14) that \"all\nthings desire peace\": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).\n\n_I answer that,_ From the very fact that a man desires a certain\nthing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in\nconsequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining\nit. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by\na contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are\nremoved by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that\nwhoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires\nanything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance,\nto that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which\nAugustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) \"the tranquillity of order.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or\nrational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which\nconsent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence\nDionysius says that \"peace is the cause of consent and of\nconnaturalness,\" where \"consent\" denotes the union of appetites\nproceeding from knowledge, and \"connaturalness,\" the union of natural\nappetites.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing\nbut peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated\nabove, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter\nto what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to\nbreak this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that\nthey may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence\nall wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that\nwhich they had heretofore.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as\nthe appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good\napparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can\nbe no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is\ntruly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so\nas to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many\ndefects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed.\nHence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace\nof the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore\nit is written (Wis. 14:22): \"Whereas they lived in a great war of\nignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as the true\ngood is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is\na twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the\nperfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires\nby giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the\nrational creature, according to Ps. 147:3: \"Who hath placed peace in\nthy borders.\" The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this\nworld, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God,\nyet there are certain things within and without which disturb the\npeace.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Peace Is the Proper Effect of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of\ncharity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But\nsome have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens\nsometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its\ncontrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is\ncontrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even\nholy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of\ntheir opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from\none another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the\neffect of charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different\nthings. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Isa. 32:17:\n\"And the work of justice shall be peace.\" Therefore it is not the\neffect of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 118:165): \"Much peace have they\nthat love Thy Law.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above (A.\n1). The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to\none object; while the other results from one's own appetite being\nunited with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is\neffected by charity--the first, in so far as man loves God with his\nwhole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires\ntend to one object--the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as\nourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's\nwill as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of\nfriendship if people \"make choice of the same things\" (Ethic. ix, 4),\nand Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends \"like and dislike the same\nthings\" (Sallust, Catilin.)\n\nReply Obj. 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of\nsanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making\nhim place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not\ncleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good.\nHence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely\napparentapparent.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not\nagree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and\nespecially upon such as are important; because dissension in small\nmatters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those\nwho have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an\nobstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which\nprecedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if\nthere be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to\nsome that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such\na dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man\nthinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension,\nbelongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks\nthat it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight\nmatters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect\npeace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire\nfulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the\nwayfarer.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Peace is the \"work of justice\" indirectly, in so\nfar as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of\ncharity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes\npeace. For love is \"a unitive force\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):\nand peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Peace Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a\nmatter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are\nprecepts about keeping peace, for example: \"Have peace among you\"\n(Mk. 9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is\nmeritorious to keep peace, according to Matt. 5:9: \"Blessed are the\npeacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.\" Therefore\npeace is a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which\nare contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20).\nTherefore peace is a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto.\nBut peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei\nxix, 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), when a number of acts\nall proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other,\nthey all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue\nfrom which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For,\nthough fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not\ntwo powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction:\nand fire produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.\n\nSince then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God\nand of our neighbor, as shown above (A. 3), there is no other virtue\nexcept charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in\nreference to joy (Q. 28, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of\ncharity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is\nplaced among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 69, AA. 1, 3). It is also numbered among the\nfruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of\nits various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in\nrespect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect\nof joy, and dissension in respect of peace.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 30\n\nOF MERCY* [*The one Latin word \"misericordia\" signifies either pity\nor mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand\neither for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for\nthe virtue.]\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person\npitied?\n\n(2) To whom does it belong to pity?\n\n(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?\n\n(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Evil Is Properly the Motive of Mercy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the\nmotive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q. 19, A. 1; I-II, Q. 79, A. 1,\nad 4; I, Q. 48, A. 6), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now\nfault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not\nexcite mercy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now\nthe Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that \"harshness does not call for\npity but drives it away.\" Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive\nof mercy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of\nevils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8).\nTherefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is\na kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is\nthe motive of mercy.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is\nheartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him\nif we can. For mercy takes its name _misericordia_ from denoting a\nman's compassionate heart (_miserum cor_) for another's unhappiness.\nNow unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to\nbeatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for,\naccording to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), \"happy is he who has\nwhatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.\" Hence, on the other\nhand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he\nwishes not.\n\nNow a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural\nappetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a\nman wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a\nthing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat\nwhat is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.\n\nAccordingly the motive of _mercy,_ being something pertaining to\n_misery,_ is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's\nnatural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the\ncontrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher\nsays (Rhet. ii, 8) that \"pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether\ncorruptive or distressing.\" Secondly, such like evils are yet more\nprovocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice,\nwherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our\npity \"when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns\nout ill, whereas we hoped well of it.\" Thirdly, they cause yet\ngreater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil\nbefalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that \"we pity most the distress of one\nwho suffers undeservedly.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in\nthis respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since,\nhowever, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having\nsomething connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it\nmay, in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we\npity and commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in\nEvang. xxxiv) that \"true godliness is not disdainful but\ncompassionate,\" and again it is written (Matt. 9:36) that Jesus\n\"seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they were\ndistressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it is\ndirected, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself,\nexcept figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered\nto have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus.\n30:24): \"Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God\" [*Cf. Q. 106, A. 3,\nad 1].\n\nAccordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself,\nbut suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in\nourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to\nus, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents,\nwe do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in\nwhich sense the Philosopher says that \"harshness drives pity away.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of\ngood things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the\nrecollection of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are\npresent to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so\nfar as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Reason for Taking Pity Is a Defect in the Person Who Pities?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a\ndefect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be\nmerciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): \"His tender mercies\nare over all His works.\" But there is no defect in God. Therefore a\ndefect cannot be the reason for taking pity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in\nwhom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is\nfalse: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that \"those who are in\na desperate state are pitiless.\" Therefore it seems that the reason\nfor taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But\nthe Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that \"those who are disposed to\ncontumely are pitiless.\" Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not\na defect in the person who pities.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the\nreason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to\nsorrow more easily, as we shall say further on (Q. 35, A. 1, ad 2).\nTherefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since pity is grief for another's distress, as\nstated above (A. 1), from the very fact that a person takes pity on\nanyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since\nsorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for\nanother's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as\none's own.\n\nNow this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections,\nwhich is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks\nupon his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his\nown, so that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt\nhimself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons \"grieving with\none's friend\" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the\nApostle says (Rom. 12:15): \"Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with\nthem that weep.\"\n\nSecondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's\nevil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to\nthem, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may\nhappen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who\nconsider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and\ntimorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem\nthemselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no\ndanger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.\n\nAccordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either\nbecause one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being\nunited to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering\nin the same way.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as\nHe loves us as belonging to Him.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear\nto suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this\napplies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent\non their own passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of\nothers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through\nhaving been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are\nincited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the\nhuman spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think\nthat he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while\nthey are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov.\n27:4: \"Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth.\" For the\nsame reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others,\nand think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering\ndeservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.\nxxxiv) that \"false godliness,\" i.e. of the proud, \"is not\ncompassionate but disdainful.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Mercy Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief\npart of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).\nNow choice is \"the desire of what has been already counselled\"\n(Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called\na virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of\nSallust (Catilin.): \"All those that take counsel about matters of\ndoubt, should be free from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the\nmind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way.\"\nTherefore mercy is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But\nnemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,\n9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore\nmercy is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they\nresult from charity, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 4). Now\nmercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we\nweep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice.\nTherefore mercy is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is\nnot an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object,\nneither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral\nvirtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to\njustice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of\nthe twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7).\nTherefore mercy is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): \"Cicero in\npraising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at\nonce more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when\nhe says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful\nthan thy mercy.'\" Therefore mercy is a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now\nthis grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive\nappetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas,\nin another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective\nappetite, in as much as one person's evil is displeasing to another.\nThis movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in\naccordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of\nthe lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.\nDei ix, 5) that \"this movement of the mind\" (viz. mercy) \"obeys the\nreason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is\nsafeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant.\"\nAnd since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the\nsoul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 59,\nAA. 4, 5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying\nto the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it\nimpedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis,\nconsidered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one\nanother on the part of their respective estimation of another's\nevils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to\nsuffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it\nesteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well\nwith the undeserving: \"both of these are praiseworthy and come from\nthe same disposition of character\" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking,\nhowever, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state\nfurther on (Q. 36, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which\nis the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other\nvirtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect,\nnamely the misery of the person pitied.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue\nhaving relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called\nnemesis, because \"they both proceed from the same character\" (Rhet.\nii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but\nas passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet\nnothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in\nwhich case they assume the character of a virtue.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Mercy Is the Greatest of the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues.\nFor the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is\npreferred before the worship of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Matt.\n12:7: \"I have desired mercy and not sacrifice.\" Therefore mercy is\nthe greatest virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: \"Godliness is profitable\nto all things,\" a gloss says: \"The sum total of a Christian's rule of\nlife consists in mercy and godliness.\" Now the Christian rule of life\nembraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is\ncontained in mercy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Virtue is that which makes its subject good,\"\naccording to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man\nlike God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for\nbeing more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since\nof God is it said (Ps. 144:9) that \"His tender mercies are over all\nHis works,\" and (Luke 6:36) Our Lord said: \"Be ye . . . merciful, as\nyour Father also is merciful.\" Therefore mercy is the greatest of\nvirtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): \"Put ye\non . . . as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy,\" etc., adds\n(Col. 3:14): \"Above all things have charity.\" Therefore mercy is not\nthe greatest of virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways:\nfirst, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In\nitself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to\nmercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others\nin their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence\nmercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His\nomnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth\nSunday after Pentecost].\n\nOn the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the\ngreatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others,\nsurpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone\nabove him it is better to be united to that which is above than to\nsupply the defect of that which is beneath. [*\"The quality of mercy\nis not strained./'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The\nthroned monarch better than his crown.\" Merchant of Venice, Act IV,\nScene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity\nwhich unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies\nthe defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to\nour neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all\nothers, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply\nthe defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not\nfor His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For\nHe needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in\norder to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy,\nwhereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to\nHim, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being,\naccording to Heb. 13:16: \"Do not forget to do good and to impart, for\nby such sacrifices God's favor is obtained.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in\nmercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity,\nwhereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy\nfor our neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the\nbond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as\nregards similarity of works.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 31\n\nOF BENEFICENCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity,\n(1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence,\n(3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity?\n\n(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?\n\n(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more\nclosely united to us?\n\n(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Beneficence Is an Act of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity.\nFor charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God,\naccording to Job 35:7: \"What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He\nreceive of thy hand?\" Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But\nthis belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of\nliberality and not of charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or\nas not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice\nwhile a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this\nrespect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is\neither an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an\nact of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above\n(Q. 23, A. 1). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of\nfriendship (Ethic. ix, 1) \"doing good,\" i.e. being beneficent, \"to\none's friends.\" Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to\nothers.\n\n_I answer that,_ Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This\ngood may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of\ngood, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of\nfriendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love\nincludes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated\nabove (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 2). Now the will carries into effect if\npossible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of\nan act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore\nbeneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or\ncharity.\n\nBut if the good which one man does another, be considered under some\nspecial aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special\ncharacter and will belong to some special virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), \"love\nmoves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the\ninferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the\nsuperior to watch over the inferior:\" and in this respect beneficence\nis an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to\nhonor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to\nbestow good things on us.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of\ngifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward\npassion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to\nliberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive\ndesire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part\nwith his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet\ndesiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the\nother hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence\nbelongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract\nfrom a man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend\nsomething he would like to keep for himself; rather does this prove\nthe perfection of his friendship.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the\nbenefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see\ntherein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of\ndistress or defect.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]\n\nWhether We Ought to Do Good to All?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all.\nFor Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we \"are unable to\ndo good to everyone.\" Now virtue does not incline one to the\nimpossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) \"Give to the good, and\nreceive not a sinner.\" But many men are sinners. Therefore we need\nnot do good to all.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Charity dealeth not perversely\" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now\nto do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to\ndo good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to\nan excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding\ncommunion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of\ncharity, we ought not to do good to all.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): \"Whilst we have\ntime, let us work good to all men.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), beneficence is an\neffect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the\ninferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels,\nbecause men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior\nin one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since\nthe love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to\nall, but according as time and place require: because all acts of\nvirtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to\nevery single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be\nbound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds\nus, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind\nto do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a\ngood that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to\nall in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as\nfor the faithful.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his\nnature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the\nmaintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this\nwould be to do evil rather than good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal\nare deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them from\ndoing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor\nlest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in\ndanger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like\ndistress, unless this be according to the order of justice.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 3]\n\nWhether We Ought to Do Good to Those Rather Who Are More Closely\nUnited to Us?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to those\nrather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Luke\n14:12): \"When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends,\nnor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen.\" Now these are the most closely\nunited to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather\nwho are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to\nthose who are in want: hence the text goes on: \"But, when thou makest\na feast, call the poor, the maimed,\" etc.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very\ngreat goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a\nfellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe.\nTherefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the\npreference to those who are most closely united to us.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring\ngratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who\nhave been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our\nbenefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his\nchildren, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 9). Yet a man ought to be more\nbeneficent to his children, since \"neither ought the children to lay\nup for the parents,\" according to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are not\nbound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to\nus.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): \"Since\none cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by\nreason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance\nare more closely united to us.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which\nis established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that\nevery natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on\nthe things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next\nto it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first\nand most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as\nDionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is\nan act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most\nbeneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.\n\nNow one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to\nthe various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the\nintercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens\nis in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters,\nand so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various\nways according to these various connections, because we ought in\npreference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the\nmatter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with\nus. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of\ntime, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought,\nfor instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than\none's own father, if he is not in such urgent need.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our\nfriends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they\nmay invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity\nbut of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather\nto invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be\nunderstood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those\nrather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be\nmore closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not\npossible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to\nhelp rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want\nas well as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a\nprudent man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than the good\nof an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to\nendanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the\ntemporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage\ntogether in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the\nsoldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as\na private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country\nas a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be\npreferred to one who is a blood relation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which\nshould be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as\nbelonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may\nhave another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he\nhas stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in\ndeposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he\nowes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance\nthe case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take\nanother's property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet,\nagain, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress:\nin which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be\nweighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would\ntake into consideration, because, on account of the different\nparticular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is\nimpossible to lay down a general rule.\n\nThe other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the\ndebtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not\nbecause justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral\nequity, as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor\nconfers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his\nparents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give\nthe first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the\nother side, there be such weightier motives, as need or some other\ncircumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state. In\nother cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit\nreceived; and here again no general rule can laid down.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's love\ntends to conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to\nhonor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it\nwould be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents,\nto abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the\nobligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have\nreceived from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Beneficence Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For\nprecepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men\nvirtuous (Ethic. i 9, 13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are\nprescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written (Matt.\n4:44): \"Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you.\" Therefore\nbeneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are opposed\nto beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our\nneighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore\nbeneficence is a special virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is not divided into several species: whereas\nthere would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according to the\nvarious kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue\nfrom charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The internal and the external act do not require\ndifferent virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as\nexternal and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of\ngoodwill. Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from\ncharity, so neither is beneficence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Virtues differ according to the different aspects of\ntheir objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of\nbeneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect\nof good, as explained above (A. 1). Wherefore beneficence is not a\ndistinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but about acts of\nvirtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction, not of\nhabits, but of acts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor, if we\nconsider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced to\nlove, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are to\nbe traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things under\ncertain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to\ncertain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are\nvarious kinds of benefits.\n\nHence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 32\n\nOF ALMSDEEDS\n(In Ten Articles)\n\nWe must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?\n\n(2) Of the different kinds of alms;\n\n(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?\n\n(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?\n\n(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?\n\n(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?\n\n(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?\n\n(8) Who can give alms?\n\n(9) To whom should we give alms?\n\n(10) How should alms be given?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Almsgiving Is an Act of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity.\nFor without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible\nto give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: \"If I\nshould distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not\ncharity, it profiteth me nothing.\" Therefore almsgiving is not an act\nof charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction,\naccording to Dan. 4:24: \"Redeem thou thy sins with alms.\" Now\nsatisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of\njustice and not of charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of\nreligion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to\nHeb. 13:16: \"Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such\nsacrifices God's favor is obtained.\" Therefore almsgiving is not an\nact of charity, but of religion.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that to give for\na good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true\nof almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written 2 John 3:17: \"He that hath the\nsubstance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall\nput up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ External acts belong to that virtue which regards\nthe motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to\nrelieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being\n\"a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion\nand for God's sake,\" which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above\n(Q. 30, AA. 1, 2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly\nspeaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in\nGreek (_eleemosyne_) it is derived from having mercy (_eleein_) even\nas the Latin _miseratio_ is. And since mercy is an effect of charity,\nas shown above (Q. 30, A. 2, A. 3, Obj. 3), it follows that\nalmsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy.\n\nReply Obj. 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first\nmaterially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an\nact of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having\nthe habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of\nreason, or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak\nof a thing being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of\njustice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e.\nwith readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be\nwithout the virtue.\n\nAccordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give\nalms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and\naltogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue\nbeing commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing it\nto this other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is\nreckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in\ndistress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far\nas it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a\nsacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion.\n\nWherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as\nliberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from\nexcessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to\nthem more than one ought.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Different Kinds of Almsdeeds Are Suitably Enumerated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are\nunsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds,\nnamely, to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe\nthe naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the\ncaptive, to bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the\nfollowing verse: \"To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe,\nharbor or bury.\"\n\nAgain we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the\nignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to\nreprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who\ntrouble and annoy us, and to pray for all, which are all contained in\nthe following verse: \"To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon,\nforbear, and to pray,\" yet so that counsel includes both advice and\ninstruction.\n\nAnd it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.\nFor the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But a dead\nman profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have\nspoken truly when He said (Matt. 10:28): \"Be not afraid of them who\nkill the body, and after that have no more that they can do.\" [*The\nquotation is from Luke 12:4.] This explains why Our Lord, in\nenumerating the works of mercy, made no mention of the burial of the\ndead (Matt. 25:35, 36). Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are\nunsuitably enumerated.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1), the purpose of giving alms\nis to relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many needs of human\nlife other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind man\nneeds a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs\nriches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.\n\nObj. 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of\nthe wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy.\nTherefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.\n\nObj. 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a defect.\nBut no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or\nother. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who\nis ignorant of what he knows himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): \"Let him that\nhath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him\nthat hath abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful\nbounty; let him who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share\nhis skill and profit with his neighbor; let him who has an\nopportunity of speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned\nfor retaining his talent, if when he has the chance he plead not with\nhim the cause of the poor.\" Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are\nsuitably enumerated in respect of those things whereof men have\nabundance or insufficiency.\n\n_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably\ntaken from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect\nthe soul, and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others\naffect the body, and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal\nneed occurs either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs\nduring this life, it is either a common need in respect of things\nneeded by all, or it is a special need occurring through some\naccident supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal\nor external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid\nfood, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have _to feed the hungry;_\nwhile the other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, and in\nrespect of this we have _to give drink to the thirsty._ The common\nneed with regard to external help is twofold; one in respect of\nclothing, and as to this we have _to clothe the naked:_ while the\nother is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have _to\nharbor the harborless._ Again if the need be special, it is either\nthe result of an internal cause, like sickness, and then we have _to\nvisit the sick,_ or it results from an external cause, and then we\nhave _to ransom the captive._ After this life we give _burial to the\ndead._\n\nIn like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two\nways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have\n_prayer,_ whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human\nassistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a\ndeficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in\nthe speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by _instructing,_\nand if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by\n_counselling._ Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the\nappetitive power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by\n_comforting._ Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate\nact; and this may be the subject of a threefold consideration. First,\nin respect of the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his\ninordinate will, and thus the remedy takes the form of _reproof._\nSecondly, in respect of the person sinned against; and if the sin be\ncommitted against ourselves, we apply the remedy by _pardoning the\ninjury,_ while, if it be committed against God or our neighbor, it is\nnot in our power to pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii,\n15). Thirdly, in respect of the result of the inordinate act, on\naccount of which the sinner is an annoyance to those who live with\nhim, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy is applied\nby _bearing with him,_    especially with regard to those who sin out\nof weakness, according to Rom. 15:1: \"We that are stronger, ought to\nbear the infirmities of the weak,\" and not only as regards their\nbeing infirm and consequently troublesome on account of their unruly\nactions, but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them,\naccording to Gal. 6:2: \"Bear ye one another's burdens.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his body\ncould be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord\nsaid that those who kill the body \"have no more that they can do\";\nand for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with\nthe other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly\nnecessary. Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done\nwith his body: both that he may live in the memory of man whose\nrespect he forfeits if he remain without burial, and as regards a\nman's fondness for his own body while he was yet living, a fondness\nwhich kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus that\nsome are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and those who\nburied Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii).\n\nReply Obj. 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for blindness and\nlameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the blind, and to\nsupport the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick. In like\nmanner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an\nextrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the\nwealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the\npurpose of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason\nfor special mention of this particular need.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of the\nact of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as to\nthe intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the evil\nof sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to Prov.\n27:6: \"Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses\nof an enemy.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when it is\nabout what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to\nsupply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should\nobserve the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in\nother virtuous acts.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Corporal Alms Are of More Account Than Spiritual Alms?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account\nthan spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to\none who is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised\nbecause it relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is\nrelieved by corporal alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit\nwhich is relieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of\nmore account.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if the\nkindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Luke 14:12): \"When\nthou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are\nrich, lest perhaps they also invite thee again.\" Now there is always\ncompensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another,\nprofits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: \"My prayer shall be turned\ninto my bosom\": and he who teaches another, makes progress in\nknowledge, which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore\ncorporal almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is\ncomforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): \"If his sides\nhave not blessed me,\" and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7):\n\"The bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother.\" Now\na corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a\nspiritual alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than\nspiritual almsdeeds.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on\nthe words, \"Give to him that asketh of thee\" (Matt. 5:42): \"You\nshould give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when\nyou refuse what another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of\njustice, and send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what\nis better than what is asked for, if you reprove him that asks\nunjustly.\" Now reproof is a spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual\nalmsdeeds are preferable to corporal almsdeeds.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds.\nFirst, simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the\nfirst place, for three reasons. First, because the offering is more\nexcellent, since it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal\ngift, according to Prov. 4:2: \"I will give you a good gift, forsake\nnot My Law.\" Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the\nspirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as a man in\nlooking after himself, ought to look to his soul more than to his\nbody, so ought he in looking after his neighbor, whom he ought to\nlove as himself. Thirdly, as regards the acts themselves by which our\nneighbor is succored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than\ncorporal acts, which are, in a fashion, servile.\n\nSecondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case,\nwhen some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a\nman in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the\nPhilosopher observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man \"money is\nbetter than philosophy,\" although the latter is better simply.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater want,\nother things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better, and\nis in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is\nthus in the case in point.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and praise if\nit be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended, does not\ndetract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that \"the\nless he sought fame, the more he became famous\": and thus it is with\nspiritual almsdeeds.\n\nNevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not\ndetract from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in which the\nwill of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in which it\nrests when it is inordinate.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Corporal Almsdeeds Have a Spiritual Effect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a\nspiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual\ngoods exceed corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no\nspiritual effect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal\nfor the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one\nought not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect. If\ntherefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater\nthe alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what\nwe read (Luke 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the\ntreasury, and in Our Lord's own words \"cast in more than . . . all.\"\nTherefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): \"The alms of a man\n. . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.\nFirst, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have\nmerely a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's\ncorporal needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their\ncause, in so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God\nand his neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual\nfruit, according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: \"Lose thy money for thy\nbrother . . . place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most\nHigh, and it shall bring thee more profit than gold.\"\n\nThirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have\na spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a\ncorporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the\nabove text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): \"Shut up alms in the heart of the\npoor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their\nsubstance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He who gives an alms does not intend to buy a spiritual\nthing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual things\ninfinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a\nspiritual fruit through the love of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in\nproportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence\ncorporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Almsgiving Is a Matter of Precept?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of\nprecept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now\nalmsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: \"Let my\ncounsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: 'to thee, and'] redeem\nthou thy sins with alms.\" Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of\nprecept.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what is\nhis own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is\nlawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter\nof precept.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the\ntransgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because\npositive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if\nalmsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to\nsome fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave\nan alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can\nalways be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in\nsome other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be\nneedful to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it\nseems that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of\nthe Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.\nTherefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No man is punished eternally for omitting to do\nwhat is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for\nomitting to give alms, as is clear from Matt. 25:41-43. Therefore\nalmsgiving is a matter of precept.\n\n_I answer that,_ As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept,\nwhatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a\nmatter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that\nnot only should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his\nwell-doers, according to 1 John 3:18: \"Let us not love in word, nor\nin tongue, but in deed, and in truth.\" And in order to be a person's\nwell-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done\nby almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.\n\nSince, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that\nall almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is\nnecessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right\nreason. Now right reason demands that we should take into\nconsideration something on the part of the giver, and something on\nthe part of the recipient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted\nthat he should give of his surplus, according to Luke 11:41: \"That\nwhich remaineth, give alms.\" This surplus is to be taken in reference\nnot only to himself, so as to denote what is unnecessary to the\nindividual, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in\nwhich case we have the expression \"necessary to the person\" [*The\nofficial necessities of a person in position] taking the word\n\"person\" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must first of\nall look after himself and then after those over whom he has charge,\nand afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others. Thus\nnature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for the\nupkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the\nformation of another by the power of generation.\n\nOn the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in\nneed, else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it\nis not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we\nare not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who\ncould not be succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases\nthe words of Ambrose apply, \"Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou\nhast not fed him, thou hast slain him\" [*Cf. Canon _Pasce,_ dist.\nlxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are\nbound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose\nneed is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good,\nis a matter of counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to God's\nLaw, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he did\nnot profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been\nspeaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter\nof precept.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours as to\nthe ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us alone\nbut also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we have\nover and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii,\n18]: \"If you acknowledge them,\" viz. your temporal goods, \"as coming\nfrom God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are\nyou rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the\nmerit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the\nhungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you\nhave stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,\nthe money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you\ninjure as many as you might help.\" Ambrose expresses himself in the\nsame way.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit to give\nalms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is\nevident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored\notherwise--on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,\nwhich he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge\nwith probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly\noccur in the future, for this would be to think about the morrow,\nwhich Our Lord forbade us to do (Matt. 6:34), but he should judge\nwhat is superfluous and what necessary, according as things probably\nand generally occur.\n\nReply Obj. 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to the\nprecept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle\ninterpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: \"Dutifulness* [Douay:\n'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life\nthat now is, and of that which is to come,\" and he says this because\nthe precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, \"that\nthou mayest be longlived upon the land\" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness\ncomprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*_Pietas,_ whence our English\nword \"Piety.\" Cf. also inf. Q. 101, A. 2.]\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 6]\n\nWhether One Ought to Give Alms Out of What One Needs?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of\nwhat one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only\nas regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our\ninterior affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of\ncharity, because this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the\norder of charity requires that a man should love himself more than\nhis neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of\nwhat he needed, in order to succor his neighbor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself, squanders\nhis own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done.\nTherefore we should not give alms out of what we need.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): \"If any man have not\ncare of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied\nthe faith, and is worse than an infidel.\" Now if a man gives of what\nhe needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the\ncare he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems\nthat whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): \"If thou wilt be\nperfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor.\" Now he that\ngives all he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but\nalso what he needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he\nneeds.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because\nwithout it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to\ngive alms out of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance,\nif a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had\nmerely sufficient to support himself and his children, or others\nunder his charge, he would be throwing away his life and that of\nothers if he were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to\nhim. Yet I say this without prejudice to such a case as might happen,\nsupposing that by depriving himself of necessaries a man might help a\ngreat personage, and a support of the Church or State, since it would\nbe a praiseworthy act to endanger one's life and the lives of those\nwho are under our charge for the delivery of such a person, since the\ncommon good is to be preferred to one's own.\n\nSecondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it\nlive in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or\nthose of whom he has charge. The \"necessary\" considered thus is not\nan invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's\nproperty, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one\nmight take much from him, and he would still have sufficient for the\ndecencies of life in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is\ngood to give alms of this kind of \"necessary\"; and it is a matter not\nof precept but of counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive\noneself of one's own, in order to give to others to such an extent\nthat the residue would be insufficient for one to live in keeping\nwith one's station and the ordinary occurrences of life: for no man\nought to live unbecomingly. There are, however, three exceptions to\nthe above rule. The first is when a man changes his state of life,\nfor instance, by entering religion, for then he gives away all his\npossessions for Christ's sake, and does the deed of perfection by\ntransferring himself to another state. Secondly, when that which he\ndeprives himself of, though it be required for the decencies of life,\ncan nevertheless easily be recovered, so that he does not suffer\nextreme inconvenience. Thirdly, when he is in presence of extreme\nindigence in an individual, or great need on the part of the common\nweal. For in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the\nrequirements of one's station, in order to provide for a greater need.\n\nThe objections may be easily solved from what has been said.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 7]\n\nWhether One May Give Alms Out of Ill-gotten Goods?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten\ngoods. For it is written (Luke 16:9): \"Make unto you friends of the\nmammon of iniquity.\" Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is\nlawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of\nill-gotten riches.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the\nprofits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden\n(Deut. 23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God:\n\"Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house\nof . . . thy God.\" In like manner gains from games of chance are\nill-gotten, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), \"we take\nsuch like gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to give.\"\nAnd most of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby\nthe Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is\nlawful to give alms. Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten\ngoods.\n\nObj. 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser\nevils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to\ncommit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who\nis in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf.\nCanon _Pasce_ dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken):\n\"Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast\nslain him\". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of\nill-gotten goods.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): \"Give alms\nfrom your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not\nto hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from\ninterest and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the\nBody of Christ.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the\nfirst place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from\nwhom it is gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained\npossession of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of\nsuch things a man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.\n\nSecondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it,\nand yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it,\nbecause he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly.\nThis happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene\nthe justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not\nto the giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar\ncases of illegal giving and receiving.\n\nThirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful,\nbut because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case\nof a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so\ncalled, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the\nLaw of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in\ntaking the money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in\nalms what is thus acquired by an unlawful action.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), \"Some have\nmisunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's\nproperty and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are\nfulfilling the commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be\namended. Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in\n_De Quaest. Ev._ ii, 34, because \"riches are not unjust save for\nthose who are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or,\naccording to Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 16:9, \"Make unto\nyourselves friends,\" etc., \"He calls mammon unjust, because it draws\nour affections by the various allurements of wealth.\" Or, because\n\"among the many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one\nwho took the property of others unjustly, although you know nothing\nabout it,\" as Basil says in a homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all\nriches are styled riches \"of iniquity,\" i.e., of \"inequality,\"\nbecause they are not distributed equally among all, one being in\nneed, and another in affluence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: We have already explained how alms may be given out of\nthe profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made\ntherefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through\nreverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out of\nthe profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid,\nindeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of\nchance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary\nto the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his\nproperty, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with\nthe desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play,\nand wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to\nrestitution, and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms.\nThen again there would seem to be something unlawful as being against\nthe positive civil law, which altogether forbids any such profits.\nSince, however, a civil law does not bind all, but only those who are\nsubject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated through desuetude,\nit follows that all such as are bound by these laws are bound to make\nrestitution of such gains, unless perchance the contrary custom\nprevail, or unless a man win from one who enticed him to play, in\nwhich case he is not bound to restitution, because the loser does not\ndeserve to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has\nwon, so long as that positive law is in force, wherefore in this case\nhe ought to give it away in alms.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All things are common property in a case of extreme\nnecessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take another's\ngoods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who is\nwilling to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain\nwhat belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take\nsomething if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in\nneed. If however this be possible without danger, he must ask the\nowner's consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme\nnecessity.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 8]\n\nWhether One Who Is Under Another's Power Can Give Alms?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can\ngive alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to\nwhom they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to\ngive alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as\nAmbrose [*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index\nto ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim.\n4:8: \"'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things':\nThe sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty\nby all,\" and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.\nTherefore those who are in another's power can give alms.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gen. 3:16). But\na wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it is\nrelated of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge\nof her betrothed [*_Sponsus._ The matrimonial institutions of the\nRomans were so entirely different from ours that _sponsus_ is no\nlonger accurately rendered either \"husband\" or \"betrothed.\"]\nTherefore a person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under\nanother's power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is\nfounded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): \"Children,\nobey your parents in the Lord.\" But, apparently, children may give\nalms out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they\nare the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily\nuse, it seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to\nprofit their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can\ngive alms.\n\nObj. 4: Further, servants are under their master's power, according\nto Titus 2:9: \"Exhort servants to be obedient to their masters.\" Now\nthey may lawfully do anything that will profit their masters: and\nthis would be especially the case if they gave alms for them.\nTherefore those who are under another's power can give alms.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Alms should not be given out of another's\nproperty; and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his\nown labor as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who\nare subject to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of\nanother's property. Therefore those who are under another's power\ncannot give alms.\n\n_I answer that,_ Anyone who is under another's power must, as such,\nbe ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the\nnatural order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to\nits superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is\nsubject to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the\nsuperior's permission.\n\nAccordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of\nanything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in\nso far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has\nsomething in respect of which he is not under the power of his\nsuperior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being\nindependent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms\ntherefrom.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned by\nhis superior, he can give alms from the property of his monastery, in\naccordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such\ndispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms\nwithout his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some\nprobable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would\nbe lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor\ndoes it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated\nin _De Eccles. Dogm._ lxxi, \"it is a good thing to give one's\nproperty to the poor little by little, but it is better still to give\nall at once in order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to\nbe needy with Christ.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry which\nis for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that property\nbe gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means, can give\nalms, out of that property, without asking her husband's permission:\nyet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too much she\nimpoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms without\nthe express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases of\nnecessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply.\nFor though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet\nin matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the\nApostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a\nbetrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her\nmother's consent.\n\nReply Obj. 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the\nfather: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small\nquantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless,\nperchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any\nparticular property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to\nthe Fourth Objection is clear.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 9]\n\nWhether One Ought to Give Alms to Those Rather Who Are More Closely\nUnited to Us?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those\nrather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus.\n12:4, 6): \"Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do\ngood to the humble and give not to the ungodly.\" Now it happens\nsometimes that those who are closely united to us are sinful and\nungodly. Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to\nothers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an eternal\nreward in return, according to Matt. 6:18: \"And thy Father Who seeth\nin secret, will repay thee.\" Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly\nby the alms which are given to the saints, according to Luke 16:9:\n\"Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall\nfail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings,\" which passage\nAugustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): \"Who shall have\neverlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that\nshall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who\nsuccor them in their needs?\" Therefore alms should be given to the\nmore holy persons rather than to those who are more closely united to\nus.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man\ncannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound\nto give alms to those who are most closely united to us.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): \"If any man have\nnot care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath\ndenied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), \"it\nfalls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of\nthose who are more closely united to us.\" Nevertheless in this matter\nwe must employ discretion, according to the various degrees of\nconnection, holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one\nwho is much holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful\nto the common weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to\nus, especially if the latter be not very closely united, and has no\nspecial claim on our care then and there, and who is not in very\nurgent need.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by\nencouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an eternal\nreward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this respect\nan almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order of\ncharity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should, in\npreference, help those who are more closely connected with us.\nWherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): \"It is with commendable\nliberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be\nin need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own\nfamily, who would be ashamed to beg help from others.\" Secondly,\nalmsdeeds deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the\nrecipient, who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that\nAugustine is speaking.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man does\nnot, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of\ncomparison, as stated above (Q. 30, AA. 1, 2), so too, properly\nspeaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's\nperson; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take\nsomething for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when\nhe gives to others.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Alms Should Be Given in Abundance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in\nabundance. For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most\nclosely connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a\nway that they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says\n(De Officiis i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to\nothers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): \"We should not\nlavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by\ndegrees.\" But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms\nshould not be given in abundance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): \"Not that others\nshould be eased,\" i.e. should live on you without working themselves,\n\"and you burthened,\" i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result\nif alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms\nabundantly.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:93): \"If thou have much,\ngive abundantly.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Alms may be considered abundant in relation either\nto the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when\nthat which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give\nthus is praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Luke 21:3, 4) commended the\nwidow because \"of her want, she cast in all the living that she had.\"\nNevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down\nwhen we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods (A. 9).\n\nOn the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways;\nfirst, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is\npraiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than\nsufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to\ngive to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor.\n13:3): \"If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor,\" on which\nwords a gloss comments: \"Thus we are warned to be careful in giving\nalms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit\nmany.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as exceeding\nthe needs of the recipient.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on the\npart of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to\nlavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of\nlife, wherefore he goes on to say: \"Except we imitate Eliseus who\nslew his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household\ncares might keep him back\" (3 Kings 19:21).\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the passage quoted the words, \"not that others\nshould be eased or refreshed,\" refer to that abundance of alms which\nsurpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not\nthat he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief.\nNevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on\naccount of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more\ndaintily nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose\nsays (De Officiis i, 30): \"When you give an alms to a man, you should\ntake into consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the\nshame which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has\nfallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his own.\"\n\nWith regard to the words that follow, \"and you burdened,\" they refer\nto abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the\nsame passage, \"he says this, not because it would be better to give\nin abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes\nthem so to give that they lack not for themselves.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 33\n\nOF FRATERNAL CORRECTION\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are\neight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?\n\n(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?\n\n(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?\n\n(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?\n\n(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?\n\n(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through\nbeing corrected?\n\n(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?\n\n(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Fraternal Correction Is an Act of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of\ncharity. For a gloss on Matt. 18:15, \"If thy brother shall offend\nagainst thee,\" says that \"a man should reprove his brother out of\nzeal for justice.\" But justice is a distinct virtue from charity.\nTherefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of\njustice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret admonition.\nNow admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of prudence, for\na prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore\nfraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. Now\nit is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal. 6:2:\n\"Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of\nChrist,\" which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the\ncorrection of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with\nhim, is not an act of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed.\nBut almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 1).\nTherefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.\n\n_I answer that,_ The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which\nshould be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be\nconsidered in two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner,\nsecondly as conducing to the harm of others, by hurting or\nscandalizing them, or by being detrimental to the common good, the\njustice of which is disturbed by that man's sin.\n\nConsequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which\napplies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner\nhimself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is\ndirected to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's\nevil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's\ngood is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well.\nConsequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because\nthereby we drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of\nwhich pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external\nloss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of\nvirtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of\nexternal things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity\nrather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an\nexternal bodily need. There is another correction which applies a\nremedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to others,\nand especially to the common good. This correction is an act of\njustice, whose concern it is to safeguard the rectitude of justice\nbetween one man and another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction which is an\nact of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it\ntakes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further\non (Q. 58, A. 5), in which sense again all \"sin is iniquity\" (1 John\n3:4), through being contrary to justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence\nregulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things counsel\nand choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we\nperform some action aright which is directed to the end of some\nvirtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs chiefly\nto the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the\nadmonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the\nremoval of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is\nevident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which\nvirtue commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence,\nwhich executes and directs the action.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to forbearance with\nthe weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a man bears with a\nsinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him, and retains his\ngoodwill towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do\nbetter.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Fraternal Correction Is a Matter of Precept?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter\nof precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according\nto the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: \"Accursed\nbe he who says that God has commanded anything impossible.\" Now it is\nwritten (Eccles. 7:14): \"Consider the works of God, that no man can\ncorrect whom He hath despised.\" Therefore fraternal correction is not\na matter of precept.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to\nthe precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come\nunder any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of\nprecept.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin,\nwhich has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are\nfound to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei\ni, 9): \"Not only those of low degree, but also those of high\nposition, refrain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity,\nnot by the claims of charity.\" Therefore fraternal correction is not\na matter of precept.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due.\nIf, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due\nto our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man\nowes anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he\nmust not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek\nhim out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go\nseeking for those who need correction, in order that we might correct\nthem; which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great\nnumber of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice,\nand because religious would have to leave the cloister in order to\nreprove men, which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal\ncorrection is not a matter of precept.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): \"You become\nworse than the sinner if you fail to correct him.\" But this would not\nbe so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept.\nTherefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.\n\n_I answer that,_ Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must\nobserve, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid\nsinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now\nsinful acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter\nhow, or when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature\nthey are connected with an evil end, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6:\nwherefore negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the\nother hand, acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing\nthe due circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be\nvirtuous; namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be\ndone. And since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end\ndepends on the formal aspect of the end, the chief of these\ncircumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in\nthis case is the good of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be\nomitted from a virtuous act, as entirely takes away the good of\nvirtue, such an act is contrary to a precept. If, however, the\ncircumstance omitted from a virtuous act be such as not to destroy\nthe virtue altogether, though it does not perfectly attain the good\nof virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.\nii, 9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not\ncontrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the mean\nvirtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction is directed\nto a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of precept, in so\nfar as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we have to correct\nour erring brother at all places and times.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious\nwithout the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his\npower. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): \"Since we\nignore who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our\nfeelings, that we wish all to be saved.\" Consequently we ought to do\nour brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's\nhelp.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 32, A. 5, ad 4), all the precepts\nabout rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the precept\nabout the honor due to parents.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways.\n\nFirst, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct\nsomeone. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): \"If a man refrains\nfrom chiding and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable\ntime for so doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may\nbecome worse, or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others\nwho are weak and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and\nvirtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness, but to be\ncounselled by charity.\"\n\nSecondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one\ncommits a mortal sin, namely, \"when\" (as he says in the same passage)\n\"one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous\npain or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by\nsuch things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity.\"\nThis would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might\nprobably withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so,\nthrough fear or covetousness.\n\nThirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or\ncovetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet\nnot to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw\nhim from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or\ncovetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to\nthese things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to\ncorrect wrongdoers.\n\nReply Obj. 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to some fixed and\ncertain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good, without\nwaiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to find\nhim. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek\nhim, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he that\nhas spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in\norder to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound\nto seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any\ncertain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those\nfavors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow\nthem when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De\nDoctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance.\nFor this reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that \"Our Lord warns\nus not to be listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by\nbeing on the lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting\nwhat we see\": else we should become spies on the lives of others,\nwhich is against the saying of Prov. 24:19: \"Lie not in wait, nor\nseek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest.\"\nIt is evident from this that there is no need for religious to leave\ntheir cloister in order to rebuke evil-doers.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Fraternal Correction Belongs Only to Prelates?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to\nprelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: \"Let\npriests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother\nsin against thee,'\" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were\nusually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that\nfraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms. Now\ncorporal almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in\ntemporal matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction\nbelongs to those who are placed above others in spiritual matters,\ni.e. to prelates.\n\nObj. 3: Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his\nrebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is\nmoved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which\nfollows the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct\ninferiors.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam\nSacerdotes): \"Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be\nmost solicitous for those who perish, so that their reproof may\neither correct their sinful ways, or, if they be incorrigible, cut\nthem off from the Church.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), correction is twofold. One\nis an act of charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an\nerring brother by means of a simple warning: such like correction\nbelongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate.\n\nBut there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing\nthe common good, which is procured not only by warning one's brother,\nbut also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear,\ndesist from sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose\nbusiness it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of\npunishments.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even as regards that fraternal correction which is\ncommon to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei i, 9): \"for just as a man ought to bestow temporal\nfavors on those especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought\nhe to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the\nlike, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care.\" Therefore\nJerome does not mean that the precept of fraternal correction\nconcerns priests only, but that it concerns them chiefly.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as he who has the means wherewith to give corporal\nassistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is gifted with\na sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another's wrong-doing,\nis, in this respect, to be looked on as a superior.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even in the physical order certain things act mutually\non one another, through being in some respect higher than one\nanother, in so far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in\npotentiality with regard to another. In like manner one man can\ncorrect another in so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter\nwherein the other sins, though he is not his superior simply.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Man Is Bound to Correct His Prelate?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no man is bound to correct his\nprelate. For it is written (Ex. 19:12): \"The beast that shall touch\nthe mount shall be stoned,\" [*Vulg.: 'Everyone that shall touch the\nmount, dying he shall die.'] and (2 Kings 6:7) it is related that the\nLord struck Oza for touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark\nsignify our prelates. Therefore prelates should not be corrected by\ntheir subjects.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, \"I withstood him to the face,\"\nadds: \"as an equal.\" Therefore, since a subject is not equal to his\nprelate, he ought not to correct him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that \"one ought not\nto presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks\nbetter of oneself.\" But one ought not to think better of oneself than\nof one's prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one's prelate.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in his Rule: \"Show mercy not only\nto yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position\namong you, is therefore in greater danger.\" But fraternal correction\nis a work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.\n\n_I answer that,_ A subject is not competent to administer to his\nprelate the correction which is an act of justice through the\ncoercive nature of punishment: but the fraternal correction which is\nan act of charity is within the competency of everyone in respect of\nany person towards whom he is bound by charity, provided there be\nsomething in that person which requires correction.\n\nNow an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever\nis contained under the object of that power or habit: thus vision\nextends to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since,\nhowever, a virtuous act needs to be moderated by due circumstances,\nit follows that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do\nso in a becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness, but with\ngentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): \"An\nancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father.\" Wherefore\nDionysius finds fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for\nrebuking a priest with insolence, by striking and turning him out of\nthe church.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It would seem that a subject touches his prelate\ninordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when he\nspeaks ill of him: and this is signified by God's condemnation of\nthose who touched the mount and the ark.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of\nfraternal correction, and so Paul would not have withstood Peter\nthen, unless he were in some way his equal as regards the defense of\nthe faith. But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and\nrespectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colossians (4:17)\ntells them to admonish their prelate: \"Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy\nministry [*Vulg.: 'Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received\nin the Lord, that thou fulfil it.' Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5].\" It must be\nobserved, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought\nto rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence Paul, who was Peter's\nsubject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of\nscandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss of Augustine says on Gal.\n2:11, \"Peter gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they\nshould happen to stray from the straight path, they should not\ndisdain to be reproved by their subjects.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: To presume oneself to be simply better than one's\nprelate, would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no\npresumption in thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in\nthis life, no man is without some fault. We must also remember that\nwhen a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not follow that\nhe thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers his help to\none who, \"being in the higher position among you, is therefore in\ngreater danger,\" as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 5]\n\nWhether a Sinner Ought to Reprove a Wrongdoer?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a\nwrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having\ncommitted a sin. But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as\nstated above (A. 2). Therefore it seems that a man ought not to\nforbear from such like correction for the reason that he has\ncommitted a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than\ncorporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from\nadministering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account\nof a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (1 John 1:8): \"If we say that we have\nno sin, we deceive ourselves.\" Therefore if, on account of a sin, a\nman is hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none to\nreprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable:\ntherefore the former is also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): \"He that is\nsubject to vice should not correct the vices of others.\" Again it is\nwritten (Rom. 2:1): \"Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest\nthyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer\nbelongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with right\njudgment. Now sin, as stated above (I-II, Q. 85, AA. 1, 2), does not\ndestroy the good of nature so as to deprive the sinner's reason of\nall right judgment, and in this respect he may be competent to find\nfault with others for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin\nproves somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for three reasons.\nFirst because this previous sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke\nanother; and especially is he unworthy to correct another for a\nlesser sin, if he himself has committed a greater. Hence Jerome says\non the words, \"Why seest thou the mote?\" etc. (Matt. 7:3): \"He is\nspeaking of those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal\nsin, have no patience with the lesser sins of their brethren.\"\n\nSecondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the\nscandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin be well known,\nbecause it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more\nfor the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Matt. 7:4, \"How\nsayest thou to thy brother?\" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [*Hom.\nxvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]\nthus: \"That is--'With what object?' Out of charity, think you, that\nyou may save your neighbor?\" No, \"because you would look after your\nown salvation first. What you want is, not to save others, but to\nhide your evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by\nmen for your knowledge.\"\n\nThirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for instance, a man\nthinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets himself\nabove his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh severity, as\nthough he himself were a just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm.\nDom. in Monte ii, 19): \"To reprove the faults of others is the duty\nof good and kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke\nis the latter's acquittal.\" And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.\nin Monte ii, 19): \"When we have to find fault with anyone, we should\nthink whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must\nremember that we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that\nwe once had it on our conscience, but have it no longer: and then we\nshould bethink ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our\nreproof may be the outcome, not of hatred, but of pity. But if we\nfind that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but\ngroan with him, and invite him to repent with us.\" It follows from\nthis that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does not\nsin, nor does he bring a further condemnation on himself, although\nthereby he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his\nbrother's or in his own conscience, on account of his previous sin.\n\nHence the Replies to the Objections are clear.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 6]\n\nWhether One Ought to Forbear from Correcting Someone, Through Fear\nLest He Become Worse?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one ought not to forbear from\ncorrecting someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is\nweakness of the soul, according to Ps. 6:3: \"Have mercy on me, O\nLord, for I am weak.\" Now he that has charge of a sick person, must\nnot cease to take care of him, even if he be fractious or\ncontemptuous, because then the danger is greater, as in the case of\nmadmen. Much more, therefore should one correct a sinner, no matter\nhow badly he takes it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be\nforegone on account of scandal. Now God's commandments are vital\ntruths. Since, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of\nprecept, as stated above (A. 2), it seems that it should not be\nforegone for fear of scandalizing the person to be corrected.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 3:8) we should not do\nevil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good should\nnot be omitted lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good\nthing. Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person\ncorrected become worse.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 9:8): \"Rebuke not a scorner\nlest he hate thee,\" where a gloss remarks: \"You must not fear lest\nthe scorner insult you when you rebuke him: rather should you bear in\nmind that by making him hate you, you may make him worse.\" Therefore\none ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may\nmake a man worse.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) the correction of the\nwrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed\nto the common good, has coercive force. Such correction should not be\nomitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is\nunwilling to amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made to\ncease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible,\nthe common good is safeguarded in this way, since the order of\njustice is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an\nexample of. Hence a judge does not desist from pronouncing sentence\nof condemnation against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his\nfriends.\n\nThe other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the\nwrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes.\nConsequently when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take\nthe warning, and will become worse, such fraternal correction should\nbe foregone, because the means should be regulated according to the\nrequirements of the end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is\nunwilling to submit to his treatment; and this may be compared with\nthe correction administered by prelates, which has coercive power,\nbut not with simple fraternal correction.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in so far\nas it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so far as\nit is proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a\nhindrance to the end, for instance when a man becomes worse through\nit, it is longer a vital truth, nor is it a matter of precept.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whatever is directed to an end, becomes good through\nbeing directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction\nhinders the end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer\ngood, so that when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted\nlest evil should befall.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Precept of Fraternal Correction Demands That a Private\nAdmonition Should Precede Denunciation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction\ndoes not demand that a private admonition should precede\ndenunciation. For, in works of charity, we should above all follow\nthe example of God, according to Eph. 5:1, 2: \"Be ye followers of\nGod, as most dear children, and walk in love.\" Now God sometimes\npunishes a man for a sin, without previously warning him in secret.\nTherefore it seems that there is no need for a private admonition to\nprecede denunciation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn\nfrom the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the\ncommandments of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find\nthat a hidden sin is publicly denounced, without any previous\nadmonition in private. Thus we read (Gen. 37:2) that \"Joseph accused\nhis brethren to his father of a most wicked crime\": and (Acts 5:4, 9)\nthat Peter publicly denounced Ananias and Saphira who had secretly\n\"by fraud kept back the price of the land,\" without beforehand\nadmonishing them in private: nor do we read that Our Lord admonished\nJudas in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the precept does not\nrequire that secret admonition should precede public denunciation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce.\nNow one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without\npreviously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the\nDecretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that \"nothing else\nneed precede accusation except inscription.\" [*The accuser was bound\nby Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The\neffect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound\nhimself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same\npunishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.]\nTherefore it seems that the precept does not require that a secret\nadmonition should precede public denunciation.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs observed\nby religious in general are contrary to the precepts of Christ. Now\nit is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or that one\nfor a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore it\nseems that this admonition is not required by the precept.\n\nObj. 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a\nprelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in\nparticular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires\ncorrection. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them\nthis, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does\nnot require secret admonition before public denunciation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the\nwords, \"Rebuke him between thee and him alone\" (Matt. 18:15): \"Aiming\nat his amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from\nshame he might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to\nmake a better man, you make worse.\" Now we are bound by the precept\nof charity to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the\norder of fraternal correction comes under the precept.\n\n_I answer that,_ With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is\nnecessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or\nsecret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for\nthe sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know\nof his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should\nbe denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle (1\nTim. 5:20): \"Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may\nhave fear,\" which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as\nAugustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).\n\nOn the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord\nseem to apply (Matt. 18:15): \"If thy brother shall offend against\nthee,\" etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others,\nhe no longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he\ndisturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even at\nhis secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further\ndistinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor\neither in his body or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots\nsecretly to betray his country to its enemies, or when a heretic\nsecretly turns other men away from the faith. And since he that sins\nthus in secret, sins not only against you in particular, but also\nagainst others, it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at\nonce, in order to prevent him doing such harm, unless by chance you\nwere firmly persuaded that this evil result would be prevented by\nadmonishing him secretly. On the other hand there are other sins\nwhich injure none but the sinner, and the person sinned against,\neither because he alone is hurt by the sinner, or at least because he\nalone knows about his sin, and then our one purpose should be to\nsuccor our sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body\nrestores the sick man to health, if possible, without cutting off a\nlimb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb which is least\nindispensable, in order to preserve the life of the whole body, so\ntoo he who desires his brother's amendment should, if possible, so\namend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good name.\n\nFor a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not\nonly in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he\nlose his good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are\nrestrained from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man\nfinds his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome\nsays on Matt. 18:15: \"If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke\nhim in private, lest he persist in his sin if he should once become\nshameless or unabashed.\" Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning\nbrother's good name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the\ndishonor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad\npleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): \"When a few of those who bear a name for\nholiness are reported falsely or proved in truth to have done\nanything wrong, people will seek by busily repeating it to make it\nbelieved of all\": and also because when one man's sin is made public\nothers are incited to sin likewise.\n\nSince, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name,\nOur Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so\ndeliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his\ngood name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret\nadmonition to precede public denunciation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore hidden\nsins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to the\njudgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by\nsecretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration,\neither while they wake or while they sleep, according to Job\n33:15-17: \"By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth\nupon men . . . then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching\ninstructeth them in what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a\nman from the things he is doing.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though it were\npublic, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He did\nnot, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin\nof Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's\nexecutor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to\nJoseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture\ndoes not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to\nhis brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused\n\"his brethren.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: When there is danger to a great number of people, those\nwords of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not sin\nagainst thee alone.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of religious are\nabout little faults which do not affect a man's good name, wherefore\nthey are reminders of forgotten faults rather than accusations or\ndenunciations. If, however, they should be of such a nature as to\ninjure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to Our Lord's\nprecept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner.\n\nReply Obj. 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a Divine\nprecept, according to Acts 5:29: \"We ought to obey God rather then\nmen.\" Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything\nthat he knows to need correction, the command rightly understood\nsupports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal correction,\nwhether the command be addressed to all in general, or to some\nparticular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to issue\na command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our Lord,\nboth would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as\ndisobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be\nobeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God\nalone is, wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of\nhidden matters, except in so far as they are made known through\ncertain signs, as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a\nprelate can command just as a judge, whether secular or\necclesiastical, can bind a man under oath to tell the truth.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Before the Public Denunciation Witnesses Ought to Be Brought\nForward?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation\nwitnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not\nto be made known to others, because by so doing \"a man would betray\nhis brother's sins instead of correcting them,\" as Augustine says (De\nVerb. Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known\na brother's sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one\nought not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no man\nbrings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore\nought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our\nbrother.\n\nObj. 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something.\nBut witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is\nuseless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that \"before bringing it\nto the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the\nsuperior.\" Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to\ntell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward\nbefore the public denunciation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 18:16): \"Take with thee one\nor two more, that in the mouth of two,\" etc.\n\n_I answer that,_ The right way to go from one extreme to another is\nto pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning\nof fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects\nanother between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end\nto be public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church.\nConsequently it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be\nplaced between the two extremes, so that at first the brother's sin\nbe indicated to a few, who will be of use without being a hindrance,\nand thus his sin be amended without dishonoring him before the public.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some have understood the order of fraternal correction\nto demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother secretly,\nand that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and his sin\nbe altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in the\nmatter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of several\nby various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according to Our\nLord's command. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in his\nRule that \"we are bound to reveal\" a brother's sin, if it \"will cause\na worse corruption in the heart.\" Wherefore we must say otherwise\nthat when the secret admonition has been given once or several times,\nas long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we must continue\nto admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with\nany probability that the secret admonition is of no avail, we must\ntake further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call\nwitnesses, unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would\nnot conduce to our brother's amendment, and that he would become\nworse: because on that account one ought to abstain altogether from\ncorrecting him, as stated above (A. 6).\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his own sin:\nyet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's sin. Hence\nthe comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There may be three reasons for citing witnesses. First,\nto show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says: secondly,\nto prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine says (loc.\ncit.): thirdly, \"to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has\ndone what he could,\" as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to be made known\nto the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as the\nprelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than\nothers, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as\nholding the position of judge.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 34\n\nOF HATRED\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which\nis opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy\nof charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4)\noffense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal\ncorrection.\n\nUnder the first head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?\n\n(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?\n\n(3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?\n\n(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?\n\n(5) Whether it is a capital sin?\n\n(6) From what capital sin does it arise?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Possible for Anyone to Hate God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius\nsays (Div. Nom. iv) that \"the first good and beautiful is an object\nof love and dilection to all.\" But God is goodness and beauty itself.\nTherefore He is hated by none.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36, 39 it is\nwritten that \"all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well\nlike of her works.\" Now God is the very truth according to John 14:6.\nTherefore all love God, and none can hate Him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to\nDionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore\nnone can hate Him.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 73:23): \"The pride of them that\nhate Thee ascendeth continually,\" and (John 15:24): \"But now they\nhave both seen and hated both Me and My Father.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 29, A. 1), hatred is a\nmovement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion\nsave by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in\ntwo ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence;\nsecondly, in His effects, when, to wit, \"the invisible things\" of God\n. . . \"are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are\nmade\" (Rom. 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which\nno man can hate--for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is\nimpossible for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.\n\nMoreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be\ncontrary to the human will, since _to be, to live, to understand,_\nwhich are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore\nagain God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the\nAuthor of such like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are\ncontrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment,\nand the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are\nrepugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration\nof them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they\nlook upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument is true of those who see God's Essence,\nwhich is the very essence of goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended\nas the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among\nwhich are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the\nsource of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be\nlike God, Who is Being itself.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Hatred of God Is the Greatest of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of\nsins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost,\nsince it cannot be forgiven, according to Matt. 12:32. Now hatred of\nGod is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy\nGhost, as may be seen from what has been said above (Q. 14, A. 2).\nTherefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an\nunbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away\nfrom Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows\nHim. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the\nsin of hatred against God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those\nof His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is\npunishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin.\nTherefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The best is opposite to the worst, according to\nthe Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to\nthe love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God\nis man's worst sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God,\nas stated above (Q. 10, A. 3): and this aversion would not have the\ncharacter of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt\nconsists in a voluntary aversion from God.\n\nNow this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the\nhatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly.\nFor just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it\ndirectly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is\ndirectly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for\ninstance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in\nso far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which\naversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself,\nalways takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore\nhatred of God is more grievous than other sins.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), \"it is one thing\nnot to do good things, and another to hate the giver of good things,\neven as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin\ndeliberately.\" This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good\nthings, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy\nGhost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost\ndenotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the\nkinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found\nin every kind of that sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary:\nwherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it\nbecomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is\nproposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its\nsinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith;\nand hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of\nGod is a greater sin than unbelief.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the\nauthor of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on\nthem, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the\nDivine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God\ncommands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other\nhand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those\npunishments, is to hate God's very justice, and that is a most\ngrievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): \"Even as sometimes\nit is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked\nto hate justice than not to have done it.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 3]\n\nWhether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not\nalways a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according\nto Prov. 8:8: \"All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor\nperverse in them.\" Now, it is written (Luke 14:26): \"If any man come\nto Me, and hate not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My\ndisciple.\" Therefore hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it\nis in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is written\n(Rom. 1:30): \"Detractors, hateful to God.\" Therefore it is possible\nto hate certain people without committing a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a\n\"wandering away from what is according to nature,\" according to\nDamascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a\nthing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing.\nTherefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 2:9): \"He that . . . hateth\nhis brother, is in darkness.\" Now spiritual darkness is sin.\nTherefore there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n29, A. 2); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of\nthat thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of\nwhat he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not\nin respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in\nrespect of sin and lack of justice.\n\nConsequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and\nwhatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate\nour brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our\nlove for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in\nhim, since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his\nevil. Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it\nsimply, is always sinful.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must honor our\nparents--as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them\nin so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection\nof Divine justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his\nnature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which\nthey have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should\nlove them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show\nhostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we\nshould hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are\nhostile to us.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Hatred of Our Neighbor Is the Most Grievous Sin Against Our\nNeighbor?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most\ngrievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 3:15):\n\"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer.\" Now murder is the most\ngrievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give\nour neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to love.\nTherefore hatred is the worst.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as\nAugustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a\nman hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and\nadultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.\n\nMoreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely\nascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Matt. 5:19, \"He that\nshall break one of these least commandments,\" says: \"The commandments\nof Moses, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count\nfor little in their reward, but they count for much if they be\ndisobeyed. On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou\nshalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in\ntheir reward, but little in the transgression.\" Now hatred is an\ninternal movement like anger and desire. Therefore hatred of one's\nbrother is a less grievous sin than murder.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two\ncounts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins,\nsecondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned\nagainst. On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than\nexternal actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder\nof man's will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the\nroot of sin, so that if a man's outward actions were to be\ninordinate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be\nsinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ignorance or\nout of zeal for justice: and if there be anything sinful in a man's\noutward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his\ninward hatred.\n\nOn the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a\nman's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for\nthe Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Hatred Is a Capital Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred\nis directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the\nvirtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief\nof the capital sins, and the origin of all others.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of\nour passions, according to Rom. 7:5: \"The passions of sins . . . did\nwork in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.\" Now all other\npassions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown\nabove (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned\none of the capital sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more\nthan any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be\nreckoned a capital sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among\nthe seven capital sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital\nvice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is\ncontrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and\nwhen a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it\nis corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail\nin that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all\nin that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is\nfirst in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first\nand foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good,\nand especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.\nWherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but\nthe last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and\ntherefore it is not a capital vice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 18, \"the virtue of\na thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its\nnature.\" Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first\nand foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the\nforemost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be\nfirst among the vices, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's\nnatural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of\none's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be\nfirst, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of\nan already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason\nthat it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of\nsuch an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is,\nhowever, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,\nnamely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on\naccount of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil\nmust needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Hatred Arises from Envy?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy\nis sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow,\nfor, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.\nTherefore hatred does not arise from envy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor\nis referred to our love of God, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26,\nA. 2). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of\nGod. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy\nthose who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to\nbe near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred\ndoes not arise from envy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is\ncaused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that \"anger grows\ninto hatred.\" Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that \"out of envy\ncometh hatred.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), hatred of his neighbor is a\nman's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love\nwhich he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from\nthat which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which\nis naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally\navoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states\n(Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so\ndoes hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love\nwhatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it\nassumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever\ndispleases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the\naspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor's\ngood, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful to us, so\nthat \"out of envy cometh hatred.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive\npower, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of\ncircular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so\naccording to the first forward course of the appetitive movement,\nlove gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has\nobtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure\nin the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure\ncauses love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for the\nobject of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore\nlove is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor\nafterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place\nin God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been\nstated above (A. 1), that God is not an object of hatred, except in\nso far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and\nconsequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed\nto God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred\nof our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred\ntowards God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in\nvarious respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger\nand from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks\nupon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore\nhateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at\nfirst, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a\ncertain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of\nvengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes\nso far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is\npart of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy\nformally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by\nanger.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 35\n\nOF SLOTH\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy\nis either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or\nabout our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we\nmust consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether sloth is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special vice?\n\n(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(4) Whether it is a capital sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Sloth Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are\nneither praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a\nkind of sorrow, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as\nwe stated above (I-II, Q. 35, A. 8). Therefore sloth is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a\nsin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x,\n[*De Institutione Caenobiorum]): \"The monk is troubled with sloth\nchiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and\ninflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at\nregular and fixed intervals.\" Therefore sloth is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly,\nno sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian says (De\nInstit. Monast. x) that \"sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at\nbeing deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries\nand those which are a long way off are much better than the one we\ndwell in\": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore sloth\nis not a sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus. 21:2:\n\"Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent.\" Now Cassian says (De\nInstit. Monast. x): \"Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is\nnot to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance.\"\nTherefore sloth is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now\nsuch is sloth (_acedia_): for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): \"Bow down\nthy shoulder, and bear her,\" namely spiritual wisdom, \"and be not\ngrieved (_acedieris_) with her bands.\" Therefore sloth is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)\nis an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind,\nthat he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence\nsloth implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on\nPs. 106:18, \"Their soul abhorred all manner of meat,\" and from the\ndefinition of some who say that sloth is a \"sluggishness of the mind\nwhich neglects to begin good.\"\n\nNow this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its\neffect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is\napparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand,\npleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is,\nin truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth,\nsorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow\nalso which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so\noppresses man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the\nApostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be \"swallowed\nup with overmuch sorrow.\"\n\nAccordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow\nfor spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in\npoint of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an\nevil movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said\nabove (Q. 10, A. 2; I-II, Q. 74, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they are\nblameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just as\nthey deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.\nWherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame:\nwhereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for\ngood, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in\nthis sense that sloth is said to be a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may\neither be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal\nsin. And since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows\nthat on account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to\ncommit some particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may\nbecome more insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring\nat certain fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose\none to sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by\nsloth towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and\nto be parched by the sun's heat.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think\ntoo much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man\ncontemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from\nbeing a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such\nlike contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we\nreckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the\ngoods of others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have\nreceived ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of sin\nshould be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance;\nby flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin,\nas in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): \"Fly\nfornication\"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought\ndiminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some\ntrivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more\nwe think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us,\nand forthwith sloth dies away.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Sloth Is a Special Vice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that\nwhich is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of\nvice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite\nspiritual good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of\ncontinence, and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then\nsloth is sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above (A. 1), it seems\nthat sloth is not a special sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to\njoy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth\nshould not be reckoned a special vice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object,\nwhich virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special\nvirtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now\nnothing, seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this\nbe a special vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual\ngoods, is that they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of\nweariness: while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to\nbe due to the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing\nbut laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness is opposed to\ncarefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not\na special vice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from\nthe other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take\nspiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,\nbecause, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 1), every vice shuns the\nspiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that\nsloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as\ntoilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's\npleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,\nwhereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.\n\nWherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual\ngoods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each\nvirtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good,\nabout which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is\nproper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which\nconsists in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to\nhave that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In\nlike manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual\ngood which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special\nvice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which\ncharity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth.\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Sloth Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every\nmortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth\nseems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the\nprecepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous\nthan a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed\nfrom some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a\nmortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal\nsin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore\nsloth is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But\nsloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit.\nCaenob. x, l) that \"sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a\nmost vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit.\" Therefore sloth is\nnot always a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): \"The sorrow of the\nworld worketh death.\" But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow\n\"according to God,\" which is contrasted with sorrow of the world.\nTherefore it is a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 1, 2), mortal sin\nis so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the\neffect of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which\nby its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason\nof its genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity\nis joy in God, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1), while sloth is sorrow\nabout spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore\nsloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be\nobserved with regard to all sins that are mortal in respect of their\ngenus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their\nperfection. Because the consummation of sin is in the consent of\nreason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human\nacts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a\nmere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to\nthe consent of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the\nimperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the\nconcupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial\nsin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal\nsin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality\nalone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and\nthen it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason,\nwhich consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of the Divine\ngood, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In\nthis case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the\nSabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept,\nimplicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind\nabout the Divine good is contrary thereto.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual\ngood, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to\nadhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do\nacts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of\nsloth; but when he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in holy\nmen, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Sloth Should Be Accounted a Capital Vice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a\ncapital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful\nacts, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 5). Now sloth does not move one to\naction, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it\nshould not be accounted a capital sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are\nassigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to\nsloth, viz. \"malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness\nin regard to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful\nthings.\" Now these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For\n\"spite\" is, seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as\nstated above (Q. 34, A. 6); \"malice\" is a genus which contains all\nvices, and, in like manner, a \"wandering\" of the mind after unlawful\nthings is to be found in every vice; \"sluggishness\" about the\ncommandments seems to be the same as sloth, while \"faint-heartedness\"\nand \"despair\" may arise from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly\naccounted a capital sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the\nvice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man\nshirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is\nsorrow, and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth:\nand of sorrow he says that it gives rise to \"spite,\nfaint-heartedness, bitterness, despair,\" whereas he states that from\nsloth seven things arise, viz. \"idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of\nthe mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity,\ncuriosity.\" Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore has\nwrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with its daughters.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that\nsloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital\nvice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final\ncause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in\norder to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the\nimpulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow,\neither that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing\nsomething under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of\nsorrow, as stated above (A. 2; I-II, Q. 85, A. 8), it is fittingly\nreckoned a capital sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing\nthings that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do\ncertain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such\nas weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For\nsince, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5, 6) \"no man can\nbe a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant,\" it\nfollows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that\nman shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other\nthings that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in\nspiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of\nsorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant\nobjects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause\nsorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of\nsloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of\n\"despair,\" while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the\nend, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the\neffect of \"faint-heartedness,\" and in matters of common\nrighteousness, is the effect of \"sluggishness about the\ncommandments.\" The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow\nis sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is\ncalled \"spite\"; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods\nthemselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is\nproperly called \"malice.\" In so far as a man has recourse to eternal\nobjects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called \"wandering after\nunlawful things.\" From this it is clear how to reply to the\nobjections against each of the daughters: for \"malice\" does not\ndenote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be\nunderstood as explained. Nor is \"spite\" taken as synonymous with\nhatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same\napplies to the others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given\nby Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly\n(Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated\nabove (A. 2), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man\nshirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of\nany other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on\naccount of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to\nsloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine\ngood. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth\nand sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for\n\"bitterness\" which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an\neffect of \"spite.\" \"Idleness\" and \"drowsiness\" are reduced to\n\"sluggishness about the precepts\": for some are idle and omit them\naltogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence.\nAll the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to\nthe \"wandering of the mind after unlawful things.\" This tendency to\nwander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing\nafter various things without rhyme or reason, is called \"uneasiness\nof the mind,\" but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is\ncalled \"curiosity\"; if it affect the speech it is called \"loquacity\";\nand in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it is called\n\"restlessness of the body,\" when, to wit, a man shows the\nunsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of\nhis body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to\nanother, it is called \"instability\"; or \"instability\" may denote\nchangeableness of purpose.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 36\n\nOF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)\n\nWe must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) What is envy?\n\n(2) Whether it is a sin?\n\n(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Envy Is a Kind of Sorrow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the\nobject of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the\nenvious man that \"self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which\nis racked by the prosperity of another.\" Therefore envy is not a kind\nof sorrow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of\npleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says\n(Rhet. ii, 10): \"Men are envious of such as are like them in genus,\nin knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation.\" Therefore envy\nis not a kind of sorrow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who\nare in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n47, A. 3) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack\nlittle, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are\nenvious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy\nis not a kind of sorrow.\n\nObj. 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects\nhave not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of\ngoods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (I-II,\nQ. 32, A. 3) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of\nenvy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that \"we envy those who\nhave or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we\npossessed at some time.\" Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a\nspecies of sorrow, and says that \"envy is sorrow for another's good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it\nmay happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and\nin this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in\ntwo ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far\nas it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man\ngrieves for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some\nharm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as\nthe Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).\n\nSecondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in\nso far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or\nexcellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good:\nand consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name\nconsists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the\nPhilosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being\nreckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for\nsorrow to be about good, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far as it\ndiminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a man\nis envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in\nreputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed\nfrom one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors\nto rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a\ncommoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner\nwhom he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far\nremoved from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who\nare near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is\nagainst our will that these should be in better repute than we are,\nand that gives rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes\npleasure in so far as it is in agreement with the will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he\nis very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in\nsuch matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to\nhim that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;\nwherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation\nsurpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be\nhonored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are\nenvious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may\nbefall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in\nsomething great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): \"Envy slayeth the\nlittle one,\" and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that \"we can envy those\nonly whom we think better in some respect than ourselves.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had\nthem, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow;\nand in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above\nall, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says\n(Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much\nin order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending\nlittle, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that\nothers have acquired goods.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Envy Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to\nLaeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): \"Let her have\ncompanions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and\nbe nettled when they are praised.\" But no one should be advised to\ncommit a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin.\n\nObjection 2: Further, \"Envy is sorrow for another's good,\" as\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes\npraiseworthy: for it is written (Prov. 29:2): \"When the wicked shall\nbear rule, the people shall mourn.\" Therefore envy is not always a\nsin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good\nzeal, according to Ps. 68:10: \"The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me\nup.\" Therefore envy is not always a sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is a\nkind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): \"When the foul\nsore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself\nshows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes\nthe complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed,\nwhile the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is\ngnashing with the teeth.\" Therefore envy is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gal. 5:26): \"Let us not be made\ndesirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), envy is sorrow for another's\ngood. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man\ngrieves for another's good, through fear that it may cause harm\neither to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy,\nas stated above (A. 1), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says\n(Moral. xxii, 11): \"It very often happens that without charity being\nlost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and again his\nglory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we\nbelieve that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we\ndread lest many suffer unjustly.\"\n\nSecondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it,\nbut because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly\nspeaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this\nzeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor.\n14:1: \"Be zealous for spiritual gifts\": while, if it be about\ntemporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may\ngrieve over another's good, because he who happens to have that good\nis unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by\nvirtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher\nstates, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the\nworthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow _nemesis_ [*The\nnearest equivalent is \"indignation.\" The use of the word \"nemesis\" to\nsignify \"revenge\" does not represent the original Greek.], saying\nthat it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he\nconsidered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem\ngreat to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to\nthe teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are\nunworthy, are so disposed according to God's just ordinance, either\nfor the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such\ngoods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are\nprepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in\nHoly Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: \"Be not emulous of evil doers, nor\nenvy them that work iniquity,\" and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2, 3): \"My steps\nhad well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw\nthe prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion\nof the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners'].\" Fourthly, we\ngrieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses ours; this\nis envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the\nPhilosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over\nwhat should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to\nstrive to progress with those who are better than we are.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good in\nthe first sense given above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a\ncertain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 87, A. 2) when we were treating of sins.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Envy Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since\nenvy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.\nNow there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason,\nas Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 74, A. 4].\nTherefore envy is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can\nbe in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): \"I myself have seen and\nknown even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and\nlooked bitterly on its foster-brother.\" Therefore envy is not a\nmortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But\nenvy is contrary, not to a virtue but to _nemesis_, which is a\npassion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy\nis not a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:2): \"Envy slayeth the little\none.\" Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore\nenvy is a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For\nthe genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to\nthe aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul\nderives its spiritual life, according to 1 John 3:14: \"We know that\nwe have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren.\" Now\nthe object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by\ncontrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good,\nwhile envy grieves over it, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is\nevident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.\n\nNevertheless, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5, ad 1),\nin every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in\nthe sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of\nconcupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of\nanger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find\nsometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are\nvenial sins.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of\nthe sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the\nprinciple of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a\nmortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have\nnot the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is\nmanifest.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is\ncontrary both to _nemesis_ and to pity, but for different reasons.\nFor it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being\ncontrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his\nneighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's\nevil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same\npassage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is\ncontrary to _nemesis_ on the part of the man whose good grieves the\nenvious man, for _nemesis_ is sorrow for the good of the undeserving\naccording to Ps. 72:3: \"I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the\nprosperity of sinners\" [*Douay: \"because I had a zeal on occasion of\nthe wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners\"], whereas the envious\ngrieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is\nclear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now\npity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is\ncontrary to pity and charity.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Envy Is a Capital Vice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the\ncapital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the\ndaughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that\n\"those who love honor and glory are more envious.\" Therefore envy is\nnot a capital vice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the\nother vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,\n45): \"The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind\nunder some kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the\nsoul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild\noutcry.\" Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says\n(Moral. v, 46): \"Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom\nof our old enemy is infused into the heart of man, yet in this\nwickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges the bane\nof spite fitted to enter deep into the mind.\" Therefore envy is not a\ncapital sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly assigned\nby Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise \"hatred,\ntale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's misfortunes, and\ngrief for his prosperity.\" For joy at our neighbor's misfortunes and\ngrief for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears from\nwhat has been said above (A. 3). Therefore these should not be\nassigned as daughters of envy.\n\nOn the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who\nstates that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters\nthereto.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good,\nso envy is grief for our neighbor's good. Now it has been stated\nabove (Q. 35, A. 4) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that\nit incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of\navoiding sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is\naccounted a capital vice for the same reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), \"the capital vices\nare so closely akin to one another that one springs from the other.\nFor the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting\nthe mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for the power\nof an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should acquire\nthat power.\" Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not\nexclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it\nshould have some principal reason for being itself the origin of\nseveral kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly\narises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either\nby Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v, 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: It does not follow from the passage quoted that envy is\nthe greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he\nis enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as\nquoted further on in the same passage, \"by the envy of the devil,\ndeath came into the world\" (Wis. 2:24).\n\nThere is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most\ngrievous sins, viz. envy of another's spiritual good, which envy is a\nsorrow for the increase of God's grace, and not merely for our\nneighbor's good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost,\nbecause thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who\nis glorified in His works.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The number of envy's daughters may be understood for\nthe reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by\nway of beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way of\nterm. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another's\nreputation, and this either secretly, and then we have\n_tale-bearing,_ or openly, and then we have _detraction._ The middle\nconsists in the fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is\neither able to do so, and then we have _joy at another's misfortune,_\nor he is unable, and then we have _grief at another's prosperity._\nThe term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights causes\nlove, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 6).\nGrief at another's prosperity is in one way the very same as envy,\nwhen, to Wit, a man grieves over another's prosperity, in so far as\nit gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter\nof envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper\nnotwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, _joy at\nanother's misfortune_ is not directly the same as envy, but is a\nresult thereof, because grief over our neighbor's good which is envy,\ngives rise to joy in his evil.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 37\n\nOF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall\nconsider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is\non the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz.\nschism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there\nare two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether discord is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Discord Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to\ndisaccord with man is to sever oneself from another's will. But this\ndoes not seem to be a sin, because God's will alone, and not our\nneighbor's, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a\nsin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also himself.\nBut it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord, for it is\nwritten (Acts 23:6) that Paul, knowing that the one part were\nSadducees, and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council: \"Men\nbrethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope\nand resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had\nso said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the\nSadducees.\" Therefore discord is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in a\nholy man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for it is\nwritten (Acts 15:39): \"There arose a dissension\" between Paul and\nBarnabas, \"so that they departed one from another.\" Therefore discord\nis not a sin, and least of all a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"Dissensions,\" that is, discords, are reckoned\namong the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of which it is said\nafterwards (Gal. 5:21) that \"they who do such things shall not obtain\nthe kingdom of God.\" Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from\nthe kingdom of God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above\n(Q. 29, AA. 1, 3) concord results from charity, in as much as charity\ndirects many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the\nDivine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord\nis a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord.\n\nBut it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in\ntwo ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now, human acts\nand movements are said to be direct when they are according to one's\nintention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor,\nwhen he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and\nhis neighbor's good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal\nsin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity,\nalthough the first movements of such discord are venial sins by\nreason of their being imperfect acts.\n\nThe accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the\nintention. Hence when several intend a good pertaining to God's\nhonor, or our neighbor's profit, while one deems a certain thing\ngood, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case\naccidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our neighbor.\nSuch like discord is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be\naccompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by\nundue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above (Q. 29, AA. 1,\n3, ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity, is union of\nwills not of opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes\nthe sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which\nthe other knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both\nparties, as when each dissents from the other's good, and loves his\nown.\n\nReply Obj. 1: One man's will considered in itself is not the rule of\nanother man's will; but in so far as our neighbor's will adheres to\nGod's will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated according to\nits proper measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a\nwill, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Divine rule.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as a man's will that adheres to God is a right\nrule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man's will that is\nopposed to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good.\nHence to cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from\ncharity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is written (Prov.\n6:16): \"Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh\nHis soul detesteth,\" which seventh is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be \"him\nthat soweth discord among brethren.\" On the other hand, to arouse a\ndiscord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil will) is\ndestroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for\nsowing discord among those who concorded together in evil, because\nOur Lord also said of Himself (Matt. 10:34): \"I came not to send\npeace, but the sword.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental\nand not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought\none thing good, while the other thought something else, which was\nowing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not about things\nnecessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine\nprovidence, on account of the good which would ensue.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Discord Is a Daughter of Vainglory?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that discord is not a daughter of\nvainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord\nis apparently the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15:18: \"A\npassionate man stirreth up strifes.\" Therefore it is not a daughter\nof vainglory.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine expounding the words of John 7:39, \"As yet\nthe Spirit was not given,\" says (Tract. xxxii) \"Malice severs,\ncharity unites.\" Now discord is merely a separation of wills.\nTherefore discord arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from\nvainglory.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be\na capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on\nMatt. 12:25, \"Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made\ndesolate,\" says: \"Just as concord makes small things thrive, so\ndiscord brings the greatest things to ruin.\" Therefore discord should\nitself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of\nvainglory.\n\nOn the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).\n\n_I answer that,_ Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so\nfar, to wit, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the\nother man's will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will\nholds fast to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers\nwhat is his own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this\ninordinately, it is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord,\nwhereby a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from that\nof others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife consists\nin external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should arise from\nanger, which incites the mind to hurt one's neighbor; whereas discord\nconsists in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises from\npride or vainglory, for the reason given above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term\n_wherefrom,_ i.e. another's will from which we recede, and in this\nrespect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is\nthe term _whither,_ i.e. something of our own to which we cling, and\nin this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment\nthe term _whither_ is more important than the term _wherefrom_\n(because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is\naccounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may\narise from both for different reasons, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive, while\ndiscord brings the greatest to ruin, is because \"the more united a\nforce is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the\nweaker it becomes\" (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is\npart of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills,\nand in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as\nthough it were a capital vice.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 38\n\nOF CONTENTION\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 38, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Contention Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For\nthere is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be\nfound in them, according to Luke 22:24: \"And there was also a strife\namongst\" the disciples of Jesus, \"which of them should . . . be the\ngreatest.\" Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his\nneighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil. 1:17):\n\"Some out of contention preach Christ,\" and afterwards he says (Phil.\n1:18): \"In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.\" Therefore\ncontention is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts\nor in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a good\nintention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with\nheretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, \"It came to pass one day,\"\netc. says: \"Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless\nthey are first challenged to dispute.\" Therefore contention is not a\nmortal sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to\nJob 39:32: \"Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced?\"\nAnd yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him\n(Job 42:7): \"You have not spoken the thing that is right before me,\nas my servant Job hath.\" Therefore contention is not always a mortal\nsin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is against the precept of the Apostle who says\n(2 Tim. 2:14): \"Contend not in words.\" Moreover (Gal. 5:20)\ncontention is included among the works of the flesh, and as stated\nthere (Gal. 5:21) \"they who do such things shall not obtain the\nkingdom of God.\" Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God\nand is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a\nmortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore\njust as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention\nsignifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts\nvarious contrary things in a speech, this is called _contentio,_\nwhich Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren.\niv), where he says that \"it consists in developing a speech from\ncontrary things,\" for instance: \"Adulation has a pleasant beginning,\nand a most bitter end.\"\n\nNow contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with\nregard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with\nregard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must\nconsider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be\nblamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to\nthe manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in\nkeeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would\nbe praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that\n\"contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation\"--or\nwhether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute,\nin which case it is blameworthy.\n\nAccordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the\ntruth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose\n[*Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: \"Contention is a\ndisclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence.\" If, however,\ncontention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper\nmeasure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a\ndisavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be\na venial sin, unless the contention be conducted so inordinately, as\nto give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim.\n2:14): \"Contend not in words,\" adds, \"for it is to no profit, but to\nthe subverting of the hearers.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not with\nthe intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for\nwhat he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their\ncontention, because they contended about a matter which they ought\nnot to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were\nnot spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and\nfor this reason Our Lord checked them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who preached Christ \"out of contention,\" were to\nbe blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith,\nbut preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that\nthey thought they would \"raise affliction\" to the Apostle who was\npreaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their\ncontention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that\nChrist would be made known--since evil is sometimes the occasion of\ngood results.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in\ncontending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in\na disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense\nCatholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when,\nwhether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in\nrespect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job\nhad said (13:3): \"I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to\nreason with God\": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to\ndefend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be\ninordinate in mind or in speech.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 38, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Contention Is a Daughter of Vainglory?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of\nvainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1\nCor. 3:3): \"Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and\ncontention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men?\" Now zeal\npertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice.\nBut the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares\n(Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.\n\nObj. 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter\nof pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: \"Knowledge puffeth\nup.\" Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by\nknowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore\ncontention is not a daughter of vainglory.\n\nOn the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 37, A. 2), discord is a daughter\nof vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings to his\nown opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is proper\nto pride and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as people\nare discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts,\nso are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by words.\nConsequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the\nsame reason as discord.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so far as\na man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or with\nwhom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to\nsomething, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he\nclings to his own opinion, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The contention of which we are speaking puts on a loud\nvoice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not the\nchief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention\narises from the same source as the raising of the voice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by goods\neven those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is\nproud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does\nso not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one\ncontrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why\nthe _per se_ and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not\nresult from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of\npride.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 39\n\nOF SCHISM\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to\ndeeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first\nplace, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether schism is a special sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?\n\n(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;\n\n(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Schism Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For\n\"schism,\" as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat.),\n\"denotes a division.\" But every sin causes a division, according to\nIsa. 59: \"Your sins have divided between you and your God.\" Therefore\nschism is not a special sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys the\nChurch. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the\nChurch, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) \"is\ndisobedience against the heavenly commandments.\" Therefore every sin\nis a schism.\n\nObj. 3: Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of faith.\nIf, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem not\nto differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon.\nii, 4) distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a\n\"schismatic is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same\nworship, as others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the\ncommunity, whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that\nof the Catholic Church.\" Therefore schism is not a generic sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its\nname \"from being a scission of minds,\" and scission is opposed to\nunity. Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and\nessentially opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical\norder, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental.\nNow, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and\nthat which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental.\nHence the sin of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the\nreason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity\nwhich is the effect of charity: because charity unites not only one\nperson to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole\nChurch in unity of spirit.\n\nAccordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully\nand intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church;\nfor this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several\nindividuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the\nChurch, even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural\nbody is subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of\nthe Church consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection\nor communion of the members of the Church, and again in the\nsubordination of all the members of the Church to the one head,\naccording to Col. 2:18, 19: \"Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and\nnot holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands,\nbeing supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the\nincrease of God.\" Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent\nin the Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are\nthose who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold\ncommunion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his\nsupremacy.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The division between man and God that results from sin\nis not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention as a\nresult of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is\nnot schism properly so called.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously\ndisobeying the commandments: and I say \"rebelliously,\" since a\nschismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church,\nand refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do\nthis, wherefore not every sin is a schism.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those\nthings to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy\nis essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed\nto the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and\ncharity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks\ncharity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although\nwhoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This\nis what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians\n[*In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]: \"I consider the difference between schism\nand heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs\na man from the Church.\" Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is\nthe road to the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: \"From which\nthings,\" i.e. charity and the like, \"some going astray, are turned\naside into vain babbling,\" so too, schism is the road to heresy.\nWherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that \"at the outset it\nis possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference between\nschism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some\nheresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for\nseparating from the Church.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Schism Is a Graver Sin Than Unbelief?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.\nFor the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Deut.\n25:2: \"According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of\nthe stripes be.\" Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely\nthan even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. 32:28)\nthat some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of\nidolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16:30): \"If the\nLord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them\ndown, and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into\nhell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God.\"\nMoreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from\nthe rule of David were most severely punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore\nthe sin of schism is graver than the sin of unbelief.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"The good of the multitude is greater and more\ngodlike than the good of the individual,\" as the Philosopher states\n(Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude,\nnamely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the\nparticular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual.\nTherefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed\nto charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is\nopposed, as shown above (Q. 10, A. 2; Q. 23, A. 6). Therefore schism\nis a graver sin than unbelief.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That which results from an addition to something\nelse surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy\nresults from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt\ndoctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A. 1, ad\n3). Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief.\n\n_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways:\nfirst, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to\nits circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in\nnumber, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways:\nwherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the\ngraver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity\nderived from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is\ntaken from its object, as shown above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1; I-II, Q.\n73, A. 3). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is,\nin respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed\nagainst God is graver than a sin committed against one's neighbor.\n\nNow it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God\nHimself, according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith\nis founded; whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which\nis a participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore\nit is manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous\nthan the sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular\nschismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either\nbecause his contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of\ngreater danger, or for some similar reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It had already been declared to that people by the law\nwhich they had received that there was one God, and that no other God\nwas to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among\nthem by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those\nwho sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be\npunished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be\npunished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well\nknown among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it\nbehooved those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a\nmiraculous and unwonted manner.\n\nWe may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more\nseverely punished in that people, because they were inclined to\nseditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): \"This city\nsince days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and\nwars were raised therein [*Vulg.: 'This city is a rebellious city,\nand hurtful to the kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised\ntherein of old'].\" Now sometimes a more severe punishment is\ninflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above, I-II, Q. 105, A. 2,\nad 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep man away\nfrom sin: so that where there is greater proneness to sin, a more\nsevere punishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes,\nthey were punished not only for the sin of schism, but also for that\nof idolatry as stated in the passage quoted.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the\ngood of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic\ngood to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank\nin the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like\nmanner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed,\nis less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal object\nand is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is\nour neighbor's good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbor,\nare opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is\nless than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these\nsins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of\nGod, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object,\nis not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins\ncommitted by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem\nto be the greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of\nthe multitude.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Schismatics Have Any Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For\nAugustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): \"Just as those who come back to\nthe Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who\nreturn after being ordained, are not ordained again.\" Now Order is a\nkind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they\nretain their Orders.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra\nDonat. vi, 5]): \"One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as\nhe can have it.\" But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very\ngreat power. Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church,\nhave a spiritual power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf.\nCan. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: \"We command that persons\nconsecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to\nthe Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the\nRoman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders\nshould be acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church,\nprovided they be of commendable life and knowledge.\" But this would\nnot be so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics.\nTherefore schismatics have spiritual power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu.\n1, can. Novatianus): \"He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the\nconcord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church,\nand from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power\nor honor.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the\nother a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is\nconferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of\nthe Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as\nappears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated,\nis not consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently\nsuch a power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has\nreceived it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall\ninto schism or heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he\ncome back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however,\nthe lower power ought not to exercise its act, except in so far as it\nis moved by the higher power, as may be seen also in the physical\norder, it follows that such persons lose the use of their power, so\nthat it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this\npower has its effect in sacramental acts, because therein man acts\nonly as God's instrument, so that sacramental effects are not\nprecluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who confers\nthe sacrament.\n\nOn the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is\nconferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not\nadhere to the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in\nheretics and schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor\nexcommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and\nif they do, it is invalid.\n\nAccordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual\npower, it is to be understood as referring either to the second\npower, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to\nthe essence of the power, but to its lawful use.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Right That Schismatics Should Be Punished with\nExcommunication?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished\nwith excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a\nshare in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5)\nthat \"Baptism can be received from a schismatic.\" Therefore it seems\nthat excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back\nthose who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain\npersons (Ezech. 34:4): \"That which was driven away you have not\nbrought again, neither have you sought that which was lost.\" Now\nschismatics are more easily brought back by such as may hold\ncommunion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be\nexcommunicated.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and the\nsame sin, according to Nahum 1:9: \"God will not judge the same twice\"\n[*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment for the\nsin of schism, according to 23, qu. 5 [*Gratianus, Decretum, P. II,\ncausa XXIII, qu. 5, can. 44, Quali nos (RP I, 943)], where it is\nstated: \"Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who\nare severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must\nbe punished by the secular power.\" Therefore they ought not to be\npunished with excommunication.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 16:26): \"Depart from the tents\nof these wicked men,\" those, to wit, who had caused the schism, \"and\ntouch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to Wis. 11:11, \"By what things a man\nsinneth, by the same also he should be punished\" [Vulg.: 'he is\ntormented']. Now a schismatic, as shown above (A. 1), commits a\ntwofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the\nmembers of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment for\nschismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse\nsubmission to the head of the Church, wherefore, since they are\nunwilling to be controlled by the Church's spiritual power, it is\njust that they should be compelled by the secular power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a schismatic,\nsave in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit\nthis life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom he may\nreceive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that\nmark, which is bestowed in Baptism.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse whereby\na person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the\nChurch those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation\nbrings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their\nseparation, they are sometimes led to do penance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and\ntherefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man,\nanother is added: just as physicians employ several bod[il]y\nmedicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when\nexcommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs\nthe compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment\nsuffices, another should not be employed.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 40\n\nOF WAR\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider war, under which head there are four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?\n\n(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?\n\n(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Always Sinful to Wage War?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war.\nBecause punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who\nwage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to\nMatt. 26:52: \"All that take the sword shall perish with the sword.\"\nTherefore all wars are unlawful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin.\nBut war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Matt.\n5:39): \"But I say to you not to resist evil\"; and (Rom. 12:19): \"Not\nrevenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath.\"\nTherefore war is always sinful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of\nvirtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as\nis evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take\nplace in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are\nslain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial.\nTherefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the\ncenturion [*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: \"If the Christian Religion\nforbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the\nGospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms,\nand to give up soldiering altogether. _On the contrary,_ they were\ntold: 'Do violence to no man . . . and be content with your pay'\n[*Luke 3:14]. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he\ndid not forbid soldiering.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In order for a war to be just, three things are\nnecessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the\nwar is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private\nindividual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his\nrights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the\nbusiness of a private individual to summon together the people, which\nhas to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is\ncommitted to those who are in authority, it is their business to\nwatch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject\nto them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the\nsword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances,\nwhen they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle\n(Rom. 13:4): \"He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's\nminister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil\"; so\ntoo, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in\ndefending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said\nto those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): \"Rescue the poor: and\ndeliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner\"; and for this reason\nAugustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): \"The natural order conducive\nto peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel\nwar should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.\"\n\nSecondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are\nattacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of\nsome fault. Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super\nJos.): \"A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges\nwrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to\nmake amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore\nwhat it has seized unjustly.\"\n\nThirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful\nintention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the\navoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words\nquoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud.\nCaus. xxiii, qu. 1]): \"True religion looks upon as peaceful those\nwars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty,\nbut with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and\nof uplifting the good.\" For it may happen that the war is declared by\nthe legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered\nunlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra\nFaust. xxii, 74): \"The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst\nfor vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of\nrevolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are\nrightly condemned in war.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): \"To take\nthe sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone,\nwithout the command or permission of superior or lawful authority.\"\nOn the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private\nperson) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public\nperson) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak,\nof God, is not to \"take the sword,\" but to use it as commissioned by\nanother, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those\nwho make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword,\nyet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they\nrepent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm.\nDom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so\nthat we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from\nresistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes\nfor a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of\nthose with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad\nMarcellin. cxxxviii): \"Those whom we have to punish with a kindly\nseverity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will.\nFor when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good\nfor him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the\nhappiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil\nwill, like an internal enemy.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are\nnot opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord \"came\nnot to send upon earth\" (Matt. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad\nBonif. clxxxix): \"We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we\ngo to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring,\nso that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them\nto the prosperity of peace.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all\nforbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in\nslaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no\nsuch danger, and hence they were called \"exercises of arms\" or\n\"bloodless wars,\" as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference\nincorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for Clerics and Bishops to Fight?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight.\nFor, as stated above (A. 1), wars are lawful and just in so far as\nthey protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at\nthe hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of\nprelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): \"The wolf comes upon\nthe sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are\nfaithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and\nwas not, leaveth the sheep, and flieth, for he fears lest the wolf\nhurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice.\" Therefore it\nis lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur): \"As\nuntoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said\nthat the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and\ncovertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather\ntogether, and ordered them to go down to the seashore.\" Therefore it\nis lawful for bishops to fight.\n\nObj. 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does\na thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according\nto Rom. 1:32: \"They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not\nonly they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do\nthem.\" Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce\nothers to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce\nothers to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that\nCharles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of\nAdrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is\nlawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and\nmeritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni\ntimore) that if \"a man die for the true faith, or to save his\ncountry, or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly\nreward.\" Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It was said to Peter as representing bishops and\nclerics (Matt. 16:52): \"Put up again thy sword into the scabbard\n[Vulg.: 'its place'] [*\"Scabbard\" is the reading in John 18:11].\"\nTherefore it is not lawful for them to fight.\n\n_I answer that,_ Several things are requisite for the good of a human\nsociety: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a\nnumber of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i,\n1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another,\nthat they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore\nthose who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy\nthemselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human\nlaws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to\nengage in commerce [*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].\n\nNow warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a\nbishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general\none, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that\nthey hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine\nthings, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong\nto the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises\nare forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so\ntoo are warlike pursuits, according to 2 Tim. 2:4: \"No man being a\nsoldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business.\" The second\nreason is a special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are\ndirected to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ\nis represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: \"As often as\nyou shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the\ndeath of the Lord, until He come.\" Wherefore it is unbecoming for\nthem to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should\nbe ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed\nwhat they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been\ndecreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, become\nirregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully\ndo that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is\naltogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to\nthe shedding of blood.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who\nbrings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the\noppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse\nthemselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons,\naccording to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): \"The weapons of\nour warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God.\" Such are\nsalutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate,\nthe sentence of excommunication.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their\nsuperiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms\nthemselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight\njustly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual\nhelps. Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were\ncommanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this\npurpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the\nfront: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up\narms themselves.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 23, A. 4, ad 2) every power, art or\nvirtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to\nthe end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as\nhaving for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are\ndeputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel\nother men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up\narms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is\nunbecoming their personality.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war,\nnevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their\nbeing deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act\nmay be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who\nhave vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q., 40, Art. 3]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Lay Ambushes in War?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in\nwar. For it is written (Deut. 16:20): \"Thou shalt follow justly after\nthat which is just.\" But ambushes, since they are a kind of\ndeception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to\nlay ambushes even in a just war.\n\nObj. 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to\nfaithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith\nwith all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states\n(Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with\none's enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems\nthat it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:12): \"Whatsoever you would\nthat men should do to you, do you also to them\": and we ought to\nobserve this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is\nour neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions\nto be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on\nwar by laying ambushes.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos):\n\"Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be\ncarried on openly or by ambushes\": and he proves this by the\nauthority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the\ncity of Hai (Joshua 8:2).\n\n_I answer that,_ The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive\nthe enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two\nways. First, through being told something false, or through the\nbreaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to\ndeceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain \"rights of war\nand covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies,\" as\nAmbrose states (De Officiis i).\n\nSecondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do\nnot declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always\nbound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have\nto be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it,\naccording to Matt. 7:6: \"Give not that which is holy, to dogs.\"\nWherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the\nenemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn\nis the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's\nknowledge, as stated in the Book on _Strategy_ [*Stratagematum i, 1]\nby Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush\nwhich may be lawfully employed in a just war.\n\nNor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they\ncontrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have\nan inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide\nanything from him.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Fight on Holy Days?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy\ndays are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God.\nHence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex.\n20:8: for \"sabbath\" is interpreted \"rest.\" But wars are full of\nunrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.\n\nObj. 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Isa. 58:3) because\non fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of\nstrife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it\nunlawful to fight on holy days.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm.\nBut fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed.\nTherefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of\navoiding temporal harm.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews rightly\ndetermined . . . saying: \"Whosoever shall come up against us to fight\non the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those\nthings which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body.\nHence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (John 7:23): \"Are you\nangry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?\"\nHence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days.\nNow there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal\n(whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both\ntemporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an\nindividual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common\nweal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days,\nprovided there be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt\nGod, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain\nfrom fighting.\n\nHowever, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight\non a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the\nReplies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 41\n\nOF STRIFE\n(In Two Articles)\n[*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals]\n\nWe must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether strife is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 41, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Strife Is Always a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For\nstrife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that\nthe word \"rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu]\nof a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he\ndelights in brawling, and provokes contention.\" Now contention is not\nalways a sin. Neither, therefore, is strife.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is related (Gen. 26:21) that the servants of\nIsaac \"digged\" another well, \"and for that they quarrelled likewise.\"\nNow it is not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled\npublicly, without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin.\nTherefore strife is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But\nwar is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Strifes [*The Douay version has 'quarrels'] are\nreckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and \"they who do\nsuch things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.\" Therefore strifes\nare not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ While contention implies a contradiction of words,\nstrife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on\nGal. 5:20 says that \"strifes are when persons strike one another\nthrough anger.\" Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it\ntakes place between private persons, being declared not by public\nauthority, but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is\nalways sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks\nanother unjustly, for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts\nharm on another even if the deed be done by the hands. But in him who\ndefends himself, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve a\nvenial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his\nintention and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole\nintention be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend\nhimself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say\nproperly that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand,\nhis self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a\nsin. It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance\nobtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation in defending\nhimself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with\nthe fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on\nhim.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Strife is not just the same as contention: and there\nare three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express\nthe inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always\nready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, \"ever ready to\ncontradict,\" that is to say, whether the other man says or does well\nor ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the\npassage proceeds, \"and delights in brawling.\" Thirdly, \"he\" provokes\nothers to quarrel, wherefore it goes on, \"and provokes contention.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sense of the text is not that the servants of Isaac\nquarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled with\nthem: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore\nthe calumny [*Cf. Gen. 26:20].\n\nReply Obj. 3: In order for a war to be just it must be declared by\nauthority of the governing power, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1);\nwhereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or hatred.\nFor if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their\npublic authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it\nis not the former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who\nresist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in this\ncase who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend\nthemselves inordinately.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 41, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Strife Is a Daughter of Anger?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger.\nFor it is written (James 4:1): \"Whence are wars and contentions? Are\nthey not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members?\"\nBut anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a\ndaughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): \"He that boasteth and\npuffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels.\" Now strife is apparently\nthe same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of\npride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): \"The lips of a fool\nintermeddle with strife.\" Now folly differs from anger, for it is\nopposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife\nis not a daughter of anger.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): \"Hatred stirreth up\nstrifes.\" But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral.\nxxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): \"He that studieth\ndiscords, soweth [Vulg.: 'loveth'] quarrels.\" But discord is a\ndaughter of vainglory, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2). Therefore\nstrife is also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that \"anger gives\nrise to strife\"; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; 29:22): \"A\npassionate man stirreth up strifes.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), strife denotes an antagonism\nextending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there\nare two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In one way\nit is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which in\nthis case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is\ndirected to the hurt of one's enemy either openly or secretly. In\nanother way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands\nhis intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly\nto anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not\ncontent to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him\nto feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what\nhe has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the\npassion of anger (I-II, Q. 46, A. 6, ad 2). Therefore, properly\nspeaking, strife arises from anger.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2), all the\nirascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty, so\nthat whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from\nconcupiscence as from its first root.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of\nanger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional cause of\nquarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being\npreferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in\nquarrel and strife.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 48, A. 3) hinders the\njudgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to folly. Hence\nthey have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in the reason\nthat a man designs to hurt another inordinately.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not\nthe proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it is\nbeside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner,\nsince sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees\nhimself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel.\nBut to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the\nreason given above.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the hearts\nof those who are guilty of strife, and so he that \"studies,\" i.e.,\nintends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among\nthemselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by\ndirecting it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that\nstrife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 42\n\nOF SEDITION\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is a special sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Sedition Is a Special Sin Distinct from Other Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sedition is not a special sin\ndistinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), \"a\nseditious man is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets\ndiscord.\" Now, by provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no\nother kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems\nthat sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism\ntakes its name from scission, as stated above (Q. 39, A. 1).\nTherefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that\nof schism.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins,\nis either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now\nsedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those\nvices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where\nboth kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a\nspecial sin, distinct from other sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other\nsins (2 Cor. 12:20).\n\n_I answer that,_ Sedition is a special sin, having something in\ncommon with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has\nsomething in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain\nantagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because\nwar and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas\nsedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the\npreparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says\nthat \"seditions are tumults tending to fight,\" when, to wit, a number\nof people make preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly,\nthey differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against\nexternal foes, being as it were between one people and another,\nwhereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few\npeople on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its\nproper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as\nwhen one part of the state rises in tumult against another part.\nWherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good,\nnamely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition,\nand since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that a\nseditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but\nbetween the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only\nin him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one\nanother inordinately.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First,\nbecause schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude,\nviz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the\ntemporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or\nkingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a\nmaterial fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord,\nsince each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between\nthe parts of a multitude.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Sedition Is Always a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin.\nFor sedition denotes \"a tumult tending to fight,\" according to the\ngloss quoted above (A. 1). But fighting is not always a mortal sin,\nindeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q. 40, A.\n1). Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (A.\n1, ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes\nwithout any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a\ntyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some\ndissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to\nretain the tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore\nthere can be sedition without mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle forbids seditions together with other\nthings that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), sedition is contrary\nto the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom.\nNow Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that \"wise men understand the\nword people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly\nof those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and\nfor the common good.\" Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which\nsedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it\nfollows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common\ngood. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its\ngravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it\nassails surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.\n\nAccordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors,\nwho sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by\nthem to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the\ncommon good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves\nseditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because\nhe defends himself, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common\ngood, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1). But sedition runs counter to the\ncommon good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without\nsin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin:\nand sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity\nof the multitude, which is a manifest good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it is\ndirected, not to the common good, but to the private good of the\nruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; _Ethic._ viii, 10).\nConsequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this\nkind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately,\nthat his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance\nthan from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather\nthat is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition\namong his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for\nthis is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler,\nand to the injury of the multitude.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 43\n\nOF SCANDAL\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nIt remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to\nbeneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice,\nthose, to wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal\nseems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here\nconsider scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is scandal?\n\n(2) Whether scandal is a sin?\n\n(3) Whether it is a special sin?\n\n(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?\n\n(6) Whether they can give scandal?\n\n(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?\n\n(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Scandal Is Fittingly Defined As Being Something Less Rightly\nSaid or Done That Occasions Spiritual Downfall?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as\n\"something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual\ndownfall.\" For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on (A. 2).\nNow, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a\n\"word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God.\" Therefore the\ndefinition given above is insufficient, since it omits \"thought\" or\n\"desire.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more\nvirtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect\nrectitude would not seem to be a \"less\" right one. If, therefore,\nscandal is something \"less\" rightly said or done, it follows that\nevery virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing\naccidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the\nthing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say\nthat it is an \"occasion.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of another's\nspiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate.\nConsequently, if scandal is something that occasions another's\nspiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and this seems\nunreasonable.\n\nObj. 5: Further, a man occasions his neighbor's spiritual downfall\nwhen he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with\noffense and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): \"It is good\nnot to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy\nbrother is offended or scandalized, or weakened.\" Therefore the\naforesaid definition of scandal is unfitting.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome in expounding Matt. 15:12, \"Dost thou know\nthat the Pharisees, when they heard this word,\" etc. says: \"When we\nread 'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the sense is 'Whosoever shall, by\ndeed or word, occasion another's spiritual downfall.'\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Jerome observes the Greek _skandalon_ may be\nrendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For\nwhen a body, while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it\nmay happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such\nan obstacle is a _skandalon_.\n\nIn like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be\ndisposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed, in so\nfar, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example,\nmoves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.\n\nNow nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall,\nexcept that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly\nright, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his\ndownfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as \"something less\nrightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the heart,\nwherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle\nconducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come under the\nhead of scandal.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because something\nelse surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of\nrectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or\nthrough having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man\nwere to \"sit at meat in the idol's temple\" (1 Cor. 8:10), though this\nis not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention,\nyet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of\nworshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual\ndownfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 Thess. 5:22): \"From all\nappearance of evil refrain yourselves.\" Scandal is therefore\nfittingly described as something done \"less rightly,\" so as to\ncomprise both whatever is sinful in itself, and all that has an\nappearance of evil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 75, AA. 2, 3; I-II, Q. 80, A.\n1), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's spiritual downfall,\nwhich is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man's words or\ndeeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that\ndownfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but\nan occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental\ncause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions should not\nmake mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental\nto one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is\nmentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Another's words or deed may be the cause of another's\nsin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man\neither intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into\nsin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature\nas to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly\ncommits a sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In\nthis case he that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an\noccasion of another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called\n\"active scandal.\" One man's word or deed is the accidental cause of\nanother's sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does\nwhat is of a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one,\nthrough being ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy\nof another's good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not,\nso far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's\ndownfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion according\nto Rom. 7:8: \"Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me\nall manner of concupiscence.\" Wherefore this is \"passive,\" without\n\"active scandal,\" since he that acts rightly does not, for his own\npart, afford the occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes\ntherefore it happens that there is active scandal in the one together\nwith passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being\ninduced thereto by another; sometimes there is active without passive\nscandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to\nsin, and the latter does not consent; and sometimes there is passive\nwithout active scandal, as we have already said.\n\nReply Obj. 5: \"Weakness\" denotes proneness to scandal; while\n\"offense\" signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin,\nwhich resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and\n\"scandal\" is the stumbling that results in downfall.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Scandal Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not\noccur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2). Now it is written (Matt. 18:7): \"It must\nneeds be that scandals come.\" Therefore scandal is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness, because\n\"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit\" (Matt. 7:18). But scandal\nmay come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter\n(Matt. 16:23): \"Thou art a scandal unto Me,\" in reference to which\nwords Jerome says that \"the Apostle's error was due to his sense of\ndutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil.\" Therefore\nscandal is not always a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles\ndoes not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall,\ncan be without sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Scandal is \"something less rightly said or done.\"\nNow anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is\nalways with sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As already said (A. 1, ad 4), scandal is of two\nkinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal\nin the person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual\ndownfall. Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person\nscandalized; for he is not scandalized except in so far as he\nsuccumbs to a spiritual downfall, and that is a sin.\n\nYet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the\nperson whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when\na person is scandalized at another's good deed. In like manner active\nscandal is always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either\nwhat he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it\nshould always be left undone out of that love for our neighbor which\nbinds each one to be solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare;\nso that if he persist in doing it he acts against charity.\n\nYet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person\nscandalized, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4).\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words, \"It must needs be that scandals come,\" are\nto be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the conditional\nnecessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever\nGod foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken\nconjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the First Part\n(Q. 14, A. 13, ad 3; Q. 23, A. 6, ad 2).\n\nOr we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity\nof end, because they are useful in order that \"they . . . who are\nreproved may be made manifest\" (1 Cor. 11:19).\n\nOr scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails\nto shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man\npartaking of unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs\ninjure his health, which is to be understood on the condition that he\ndoes not change his diet. In like manner it must needs be that\nscandals come, so long as men fail to change their evil mode of\nliving.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of hindrance:\nfor Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion out of a sense of\ndutifulness towards Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept back\nsomewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a venial\nsin.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Scandal Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For\nscandal is \"something said or done less rightly.\" But this applies to\nevery kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and\nconsequently, scandal is not a special sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind of\ninjustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in\n_Ethic._ v, 3, 5. But scandal is not to be found separately from\nother sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something which\nspecifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in its\nbeing something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a sin\nbeing committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance,\ndoes not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal\nis not a special sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it.\nBut scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is\nwritten (Rom. 14:15): \"If, because of thy meat, thy brother be\ngrieved, thou walkest not now according to charity.\" Therefore\nscandal is a special sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), scandal is twofold, active\nand passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through\nanother's word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the\nfact that a man takes occasion to sin from another's word or deed,\ndoes not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply\na special deformity in opposition to a special virtue.\n\nOn the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways,\ndirectly and accidentally. The scandal is accidental when it is\nbeside the agent's intention, as when a man does not intend, by his\ninordinate deed or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall,\nbut merely to satisfy his own will. In such a case even active\nscandal is not a special sin, because a species is not constituted by\nthat which is accidental.\n\nActive scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word\nor deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind\nof sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because\nmoral actions take their species from their end, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6). Hence, just as theft and murder\nare special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention\nof doing a special injury to one's neighbor: so too, scandal is a\nspecial kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to\nhis neighbor, and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction,\nwhereby a man intends the removal of a special kind of harm.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but it may\nderive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended, as\nstated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other sins,\nas when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a sin\nin itself, but has an appearance of evil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin\nfrom the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end,\nas stated above.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Scandal Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every\nsin that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q.\n24, A. 12; Q. 35, A. 3). But scandal is contrary to charity, as\nstated above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment of\neternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal\ndamnation, according to Matt. 18:6: \"He that shall scandalize one of\nthese little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a\nmill-stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be\ndrowned in the depth of the sea.\" For, as Jerome says on this\npassage, \"it is much better to receive a brief punishment for a\nfault, than to await everlasting torments.\" Therefore scandal is a\nmortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin,\nbecause mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a\nsin against God, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): \"When you wound\nthe weak conscience of the brethren [*Vulg.: 'When you sin thus\nagainst the brethren and wound their weak conscience'], you sin\nagainst Christ.\" Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It may be a venial sin to lead a person into\nvenial sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal\nmay be a venial sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), scandal denotes a stumbling\nwhereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall. Consequently\npassive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it consists in a\nstumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person is disturbed\nby a movement of venial sin occasioned by another's inordinate word\nor deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the stumbling\nresults in a downfall, for instance, when a person goes so far as to\ncommit a mortal sin through another's inordinate word or deed.\n\nActive scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin;\nfor instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either\ncommits a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself,\nbut has some appearance of evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a\nmortal sin, either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because\nhe has such contempt for his neighbor's spiritual welfare that he\ndeclines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he\nwishes to do. But in the case of active direct scandal, as when a\nperson intends to lead another into sin, if he intends to lead him\ninto mortal sin, his own sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he\nintends by committing a mortal sin himself, to lead another into\nvenial sin; whereas if he intends, by committing a venial sin, to\nlead another into venial sin, there will be a venial sin of scandal.\n\nAnd this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Passive Scandal May Happen Even to the Perfect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to\nthe perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to\nPeter (Matt. 16:23): \"Thou art a scandal to Me.\" Much more therefore\ncan other perfect men suffer scandal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a\nperson's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their\nprogress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: \"We\nwould have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath\nhindered us.\" Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins,\naccording to 1 John 1:8: \"If we say that we have no sin, we deceive\nourselves.\" Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is\nsometimes venial, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore passive scandal\nmay be found in perfect men.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome, in commenting on Matt. 18:6, \"He that\nshall scandalize one of these little ones,\" says: \"Observe that it is\nthe little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take\nscandal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person\nwho takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man\ncan be unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The\nelders, i.e. the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is\nunchangeable, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do so\nonly in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16:\n\"Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.\" Wherefore, however\nmuch others may appear to them to conduct themselves ill in word or\ndeed, they themselves do not stray from their righteousness,\naccording to Ps. 124:1: \"They that trust in the Lord shall be as\nMount Sion: he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in\nJerusalem.\" Therefore scandal is not found in those who adhere to God\nperfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165: \"Much peace have they\nthat love Thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-block\n(_scandalum_).\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2, ad 2), in this passage, scandal\nis used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance. Hence Our\nLord said to Peter: \"Thou art a scandal to Me,\" because he was\nendeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of\nexternal actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of\nothers, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will,\naccording to Rom. 8:38, 39: \"Neither death, nor life . . . shall be\nable to separate us from the love of God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins through the\nweakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking scandal\nin its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although there\ncan be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: \"My\nfeet were almost moved.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Active Scandal Can Be Found in the Perfect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the\nperfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are\nscandalized passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according\nto Matt. 15:12: \"Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard\nthis word, were scandalized?\" Therefore active scandal can be found\nin the perfect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the\nstate of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for\nit is written (Gal. 2:14): \"When I saw that they walked not uprightly\nunto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas,\" i.e. Peter, \"before\nthem all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the\ngentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles\nto live as do the Jews?\" Therefore active scandal can be in the\nperfect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But venial\nsins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be in\nperfect men.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than\npassive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much\nless, therefore, can active scandal be in them.\n\n_I answer that,_ Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a\nman says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion\nanother's spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or\ndoes is inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all their\nactions according to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40:\n\"Let all things be done decently and according to order\"; and they\nare careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein not only\nwould they do wrong, but would also be to others an occasion of\nwrongdoing. And if indeed they fail in this moderation in such words\nor deeds as come to the knowledge of others, this has its origin in\nhuman weakness wherein they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not\nfall short so far as to stray far from the order of reason, but only\na little and in some slight matter: and this is not so grave that\nanyone can reasonably take therefrom an occasion for committing sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Passive scandal is always due to some active scandal;\nyet this active scandal is not always in another, but in the very\nperson who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes himself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl, lxxxii)\nand of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in withdrawing\nfrom the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because\nhe did this somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles who had been\nconverted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Peter's action\nwas not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient ground for\nscandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while there was\nno active scandal in Peter.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in\nsudden movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If,\nhowever, they commit any venial sins even in their external words or\ndeeds, these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to\ngive scandal.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Spiritual Goods Should Be Foregone on Account of Scandal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone\non account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2)\nteaches that \"punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of\nschism is feared.\" But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since\nit is an act of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone\non account of scandal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing. Yet\none ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according to\nMatt. 7:6: \"Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your\npearls before swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you.\"\nTherefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity, it\nis a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in\norder to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De\nCiv. Dei i, 9). Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on\naccount of scandal.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in Luc.\nxvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego\nwhatever it is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold\ntruth, i.e. \"the truth of life, of justice and of doctrine.\" Now the\nobservance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be\nomitted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else\nwhoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such\nthings are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works\nshould be omitted on account of scandal.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good, since\nany sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that one\nought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandalizing\none's neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially, one would\nprevent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because one is\nbound to hinder the damnation of one's neighbor as much as one can\nwithout prejudice to one's own salvation, which is not precluded by a\nvenial sin. Therefore one ought to forego a spiritual good in order\nto avoid scandal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): \"If people\nare scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of\nscandal, than to abandon the truth.\" Now spiritual goods belong,\nabove all others, to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not to\nbe foregone on account of scandal.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the\npresent question does not apply to active scandal, for since active\nscandal is \"something said or done less rightly,\" nothing ought to be\ndone that implies active scandal. The question does, however, apply\nto passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be\nforegone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must be made in\nspiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and\ncannot be foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man\nought to commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another from\nsinning, because according to the order of charity, a man ought to\nlove his own spiritual welfare more than another's. Therefore one\nought not to forego that which is necessary for salvation, in order\nto avoid giving scandal.\n\nAgain a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are\nnot necessary for salvation: because the scandal which arises from\nsuch things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man\nwishes to hinder those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This\nis the \"scandal of the Pharisees,\" who were scandalized at Our Lord's\nteaching: and Our Lord teaches (Matt. 15:14) that we ought to treat\nsuch like scandal with contempt. Sometimes scandal proceeds from\nweakness or ignorance, and such is the \"scandal of little ones.\" In\norder to avoid this kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be\neither concealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done\nwithout incurring immediate danger), until the matter being explained\nthe scandal cease. If, however, the scandal continue after the matter\nhas been explained, it would seem to be due to malice, and then it\nwould no longer be right to forego that spiritual good in order to\navoid such like scandal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the infliction of punishment it is not the\npunishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal\nproperties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the\nnature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident\nthat the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and\nmore grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will\nno longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is\nspeaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to\nbring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would be\ncontrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication.\n\nReply Obj. 2: With regard to a man's doctrine two points must be\nconsidered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of\nteaching. The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that\nhe whose duty it is to teach should not teach what is contrary to the\ntruth, and that he should teach the truth according to the\nrequirements of times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he\nto suppress the truth and teach error in order to avoid any scandal\nthat might ensue. But the act itself of teaching is one of the\nspiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2), and so the same\nis to be said of it as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall\nspeak further on (ad 4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 33, A. 1), fraternal correction\naims at the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be reckoned\namong spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained, which is\nnot the case if the brother be scandalized through being corrected.\nAnd so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal, no\nspiritual good is foregone.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice\ncomprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also\nwhatever is a means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according\nto 1 Cor. 12:31: \"Be zealous for the better gifts.\" Wherefore neither\nthe counsels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted\nin order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or\ndeferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated\nabove. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the\nfulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This\nmay be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels,\nand of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, either\nin temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual\nmatters (as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties arise\nfrom their being enjoined as in the case of prelates, or from the\nneed on the part of the person in want; and then the same applies to\nthese things as to others that are necessary for salvation.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Some have said that one ought to commit a venial sin in\norder to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since if it\nought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be\na matter of choice. It may happen however that, on account of some\ncircumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be were\nit not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a venial sin, when\nit is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable cause,\nit is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not deprive\na man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it\ndisposes him to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Temporal Goods Should Be Foregone on Account of Scandal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on\naccount of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor's spiritual\nwelfare which is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods\nwhatever. But we forego what we love less for the sake of what we\nlove more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in order to\navoid scandalizing our neighbor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Jerome's rule [*Cf. A. 7, Obj. 4],\nwhatever can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth,\nshould be omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can\nbe foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they\nshould be foregone in order to avoid scandal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But we\nought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according to Rom.\n14:15: \"Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died.\" Much\nmore therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on account\nof scandal.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and recovering\ntemporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful to have\nrecourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is written\n(Matt. 5:40): \"If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take\naway thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him\"; and (1 Cor. 6:7):\n\"Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have\nlawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? why do\nyou not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?\" Therefore it seems\nthat we ought to forego temporal goods on account of scandal.\n\nObj. 5: Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those\ntemporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet we\nought to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while\nsowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he\n\"should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ\" as we read 1 Cor.\n9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain\ncountries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we\nto forego other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the\nrestitution of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took\nscandal from his doing so.\n\n_I answer that,_ A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for\neither they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of\nthem for someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to\nprelates, and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such\npersons as have authority over the common weal. In this latter case\nthe care of such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves of\nnecessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore,\neven as other things that are necessary for salvation, they are not\nto be foregone on account of scandal. On the other hand, as regards\nthose temporalities of which we have the dominion, sometimes, on\naccount of scandal, we are bound to forego them, and sometimes we are\nnot so bound, whether we forego them by giving them up, if we have\nthem in our possession, or by omitting to claim them, if they are in\nthe possession of others. For if the scandal arise therefrom through\nthe ignorance or weakness of others (in which case, as stated above,\nA. 7, it is scandal of the little ones) we must either forego such\ntemporalities altogether, or the scandal must be abated by some other\nmeans, namely, by some kind of admonition. Hence Augustine says (De\nSerm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): \"Thou shouldst give so as to injure\nneither thyself nor another, as much as thou canst lend, and if thou\nrefusest what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou\nwilt give him something better than he asks, if thou reprove him that\nasks unjustly.\" Sometimes, however, scandal arises from malice. This\nis scandal of the Pharisees: and we ought not to forego temporal\ngoods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for\nthis would both be harmful to the common good, since it would give\nwicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious to the\nplunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they were\nin possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,\n13): \"Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our\ntemporalities, while sometimes we should resist them, as far as\nequity allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our\nproperty, but also lest those who take what is not theirs may lose\nthemselves.\"\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If it were permissible for wicked men to rob other\npeople of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the\ntruth of life and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to\nforego our temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Apostle had no intention of counselling total\nabstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare\nrequires that we should take food: but he intended to counsel\nabstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal,\naccording to 1 Cor. 8:13: \"I will never eat flesh, lest I should\nscandalize my brother.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19)\nthis precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of\nthe mind, namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to\nsuffer being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But\nsometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same\napplies to the saying of the Apostle.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from an\nerror of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it\nbehooved him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be\ntaught first of all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason\nthe Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it\nis not customary to pay them.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 44\n\nOF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are\neight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?\n\n(2) Whether there should be one or two?\n\n(3) Whether two suffice?\n\n(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, \"with\nthy whole heart\"?\n\n(5) Whether it is fittingly added: \"With thy whole mind,\" etc.?\n\n(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?\n\n(7) Of the precept: \"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself\";\n\n(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Any Precept Should Be Given About Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about\ncharity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it\nis the form of the virtues as stated above (Q. 23, A. 8), while the\nprecepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the\ncommon saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no\nprecepts should be given about charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity, which \"is poured forth in our hearts by the\nHoly Ghost\" (Rom. 5:5), makes us free, since \"where the Spirit of the\nLord is, there is liberty\" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that\narises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a\nnecessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to\nwhich the precepts are directed, as shown above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2;\nQ. 100, A. 9). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity,\nthey should have a place among the chief precepts which are those of\nthe decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts\nshould be given about charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever God requires of us is included in a\nprecept. Now God requires that man should love Him, according to\nDeut. 10:12. Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the\nlove of charity, which is the love of God.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 16, A. 1; I-II, Q. 99, A. 1), a\nprecept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a\nmatter of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is\ndue in two ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something\nelse. In every affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake,\nbecause it has the character of a good for its own sake: while that\nwhich is directed to the end is due for the sake of something else:\nthus for a physician, it is due for its own sake, that he should\nheal, while it is due for the sake of something else that he should\ngive a medicine in order to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life\nis that man be united to God, and this union is effected by charity,\nwhile all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained to\nthis union, as to their end. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5):\n\"The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good\nconscience, and an unfeigned faith.\" For all the virtues, about whose\nacts the precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of\nthe heart from the whirl of the passions--such are the virtues that\nregulate the passions--or at least to the possession of a good\nconscience--such are the virtues that regulate operations--or to the\nhaving of a right faith--such are those which pertain to the worship\nof God: and these three things are required of man that he may love\nGod. For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of\nthe passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience\ngives man a horror for God's justice, through fear of His\npunishments; and an untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue\nrepresentation of God, and separates him from the truth of God. Now\nin every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence of\nthat which is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept\nis that of charity, as stated in Matt. 22:39.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 10) when we were\ntreating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under\nthose precepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for\ninstance, this precept, \"Honor thy father and thy mother,\" does not\nprescribe that this should be done out of charity. The act of love\ndoes, however, fall under special precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty,\nexcept in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as\nmay be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But\nthe precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will,\nwherefore it is not opposed to charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the\nlove of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of\ncharity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue,\nsince they are included in all of them.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Should Have Been Given Two Precepts of Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two\nprecepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to\nvirtue, as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3). Now charity is one virtue, as\nshown above (Q. 33, A. 5). Therefore only one precept of charity\nshould have been given.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27),\ncharity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently\ndirected to love God by the precept, \"Thou shalt love the Lord thy\nGod.\" Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our\nneighbor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts.\nBut it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided\nwe put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Luke 15:26):\n\"If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he\ncannot be My disciple.\" Therefore the precept of the love of God is\nnot distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8): \"He that loveth his\nneighbor hath fulfilled the Law.\" But a law is not fulfilled unless\nall its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included\nin the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the\nlove of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two\nprecepts of charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): \"This commandment we\nhave from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 91, A. 3; Q. 94, A. 2)\nwhen we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the\nLaw what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these\nlatter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first\nprinciples. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire\nvirtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately\nbefore him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable\nto consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary,\nfor their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their\nprinciples. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law\ndirect us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above\n(Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; Q. 26, A. 1, ad 1): and the love of God is the\nend to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it\nbehooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also\nof the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less\nintelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these precepts\nis included in the other.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts,\none of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are\ngiven about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts\nof charity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in\nthat which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an\nexplicit precept about both, for the reason given above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The means derive their goodness from their relation to\nthe end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice\nfrom the same source and from no other.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end\nis included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each\nprecept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Two Precepts of Charity Suffice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not\nsuffice. For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are\ndistinguished by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love\nfour things out of charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and\nhis own body, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 12; Q. 26), it seems that\nthere ought to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not\nsufficient.\n\nObj. 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy,\npeace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of\nthe virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in\navoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good,\nand by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to\nhave been not only positive, but also negative precepts about\ncharity; and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): \"On these two\ncommandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), is a kind of\nfriendship. Now friendship is between one person and another,\nwherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): \"Charity is not possible\nbetween less than two\": and it has been explained how one may love\noneself out of charity (Q. 25, A. 4). Now since good is the object of\ndilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is\nfitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we\nare induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to\nlove our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), \"though\nfour things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a\nprecept as regards the second and fourth,\" i.e. love of oneself and\nof one's own body. \"For however much a man may stray from the truth,\nthe love of himself and of his own body always remains in him.\" And\nyet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that\nhe should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and\nthis is done by his loving God and his neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 3), the other\nacts of charity result from the act of love as effects from their\ncause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the precepts\nabout the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of the\nlaggards, special precepts were given about each act--about joy\n(Phil. 4:4): \"Rejoice in the Lord always\"--about peace (Heb. 12:14):\n\"Follow peace with all men\"--about beneficence (Gal. 6:10): \"Whilst\nwe have time, let us work good to all men\"--and Holy Writ contains\nprecepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by\nanyone who considers the matter carefully.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore\nthe positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts.\nNevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to\ncharity: for, against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): \"Thou shalt\nnot hate thy brother in thy heart\"; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): \"Be\nnot grieved with her bands\"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): \"Let us not be\nmade desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one\nanother\"; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10): \"That you all speak the same\nthing, and that there be no schisms among you\"; and against scandal\n(Rom. 14:13): \"That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in\nyour brother's way.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Fittingly Commanded That Man Should Love God with His\nWhole Heart?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man\nshould love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act\nis not a matter of precept, as shown above (A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 100,\nA. 9). Now the words \"with thy whole heart\" signify the mode of the\nlove of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should\nlove God with his whole heart.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing\"\n(Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that God be\nloved with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to\nthe love of God, acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins\nmortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God.\nTherefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to\nperfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64),\n\"to be whole is to be perfect.\" But that which belongs to perfection\nis not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we\nought not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): \"Thou shalt love the\nLord thy God with thy whole heart.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an\nact is a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now\nit is requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on\nits own matter, but also that it should be endued with its due\ncircumstances, whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be\nloved as the last end, to which all things are to be referred.\nTherefore some kind of totality was to be indicated in connection\nwith the precept of the love of God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does\nnot prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and\nhigher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its\nown proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words \"with thy\nwhole heart.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold\nsignification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always\nactually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly,\nin the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God,\nso that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this\nis the perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this\nlatter perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity,\nsince it does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the\nuse of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels are\ndirected, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding\nreply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible,\ntemporal things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the\nmind and hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 5]\n\nWhether to the Words, \"Thou Shalt Love the Lord Thy God with Thy\nWhole Heart,\" It Was Fitting to Add \"and with Thy Whole Soul, and\nwith Thy Whole Strength\"?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, \"Thou\nshalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart,\" to add, \"and with\nthy whole soul, and with thy whole strength\" (Deut. 6:5). For heart\ndoes not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a\nbodily action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual\nsense. Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself\nor part of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both\nheart and soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal\ndepends on the heart. Therefore after the words, \"Thou shalt love the\nLord thy God with thy whole heart,\" it was unnecessary to add, \"with\nall thy strength.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, in Matt. 22:37 we read: \"With all thy mind,\" which\nwords do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is\nunfittingly worded in Deut. 6.\n\nOn the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ This precept is differently worded in various\nplaces: for, as we said in the first objection, in Deut. 6 three\npoints are mentioned: \"with thy whole heart,\" and \"with thy whole\nsoul,\" and \"with thy whole strength.\" In Matt. 22 we find two of\nthese mentioned, viz. \"with thy whole heart\" and \"with thy whole\nsoul,\" while \"with thy whole strength\" is omitted, but \"with thy\nwhole mind\" is added. Yet in Mark 12 we find all four, viz. \"with thy\nwhole heart,\" and \"with thy whole soul,\" and \"with thy whole mind,\"\nand \"with thy whole force\" which is the same as \"strength.\" Moreover,\nthese four are indicated in Luke 10, where in place of \"strength\" or\n\"force\" we read \"with all thy might.\" [*St. Thomas is explaining the\nLatin text which reads \"ex tota fortitudine tua\" (Deut.), \"ex tota\nvirtue tua\" (Mk.), and \"ex omnibus viribus tuis\" (Luke), although the\nGreek in all three cases has _ex holes tes ischyos_, which the Douay\nrenders \"with thy whole strength.\"]\n\nAccordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one\nof them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We\nmust therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here\ndenoted by the \"heart,\" because just as the bodily heart is the\nprinciple of all the movements of the body, so too the will,\nespecially as regards the intention of the last end which is the\nobject of charity, is the principle of all the movements of the soul.\nNow there are three principles of action that are moved by the will,\nnamely, the intellect which is signified by \"the mind,\" the lower\nappetitive power, signified by \"the soul\"; and the exterior executive\npower signified by \"strength,\" \"force\" or \"might.\" Accordingly we are\ncommanded to direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified\nby the words \"with thy whole heart\"; to submit our intellect to God,\nand this is expressed in the words \"with thy whole mind\"; to regulate\nour appetite according to God, in the words \"with thy whole soul\";\nand to obey God in our external actions, and this is to love God with\nour whole \"strength,\" \"force\" or \"might.\"\n\nChrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished\nwork (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in\nChrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes \"heart\" and \"soul\" in\nthe contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers\n\"heart\" to the thought, \"soul\" to the manner of life, and \"mind\" to\nthe intellect. Again some explain \"with thy whole heart\" as denoting\nthe intellect, \"with thy whole soul\" as signifying the will, \"with\nthy mind\" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory\nof Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), \"heart\" signifies the vegetative soul,\n\"soul\" the sensitive, and \"mind\" the intellective soul, because our\nnourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by\nus to God.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 6]\n\nWhether It Is Possible in This Life to Fulfil This Precept of the\nLove of God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil\nthis precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius,\nExposit. Cath. Fid.] \"accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded\nanything impossible.\" But God gave this commandment, as is clear from\nDeut. 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this\nlife.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally,\nsince according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than\n\"a transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly\ncommandments.\" If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by\nwayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal\nsin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8):\n\"(Who also) will confirm you unto the end without crime,\" and (1 Tim.\n3:10): \"Let them minister, having no crime.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way\nof salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: \"The commandment of the Lord is\nlightsome, enlightening the eyes.\" Now it is useless to direct anyone\nto what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this\nprecept in this life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): \"In the\nfulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou\nshalt love the Lord thy God,\" etc. For as long as any carnal\nconcupiscence remains, that can be restrained by continence, man\ncannot love God with all his heart.\n\n_I answer that,_ A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly,\nand imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end\nintended by the author of the precept is reached; yet it is\nfulfilled, imperfectly however, when although the end intended by its\nauthor is not reached, nevertheless the order to that end is not\ndeparted from. Thus if the commander of an army order his soldiers to\nfight, his command will be perfectly obeyed by those who fight and\nconquer the foe, which is the commander's intention; yet it is\nfulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those who fight without gaining the\nvictory, provided they do nothing contrary to military discipline.\nNow God intends by this precept that man should be entirely united to\nHim, and this will be realized in heaven, when God will be \"all in\nall,\" according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence this precept will be observed\nfully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though\nimperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil\nit more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he\napproaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled\nafter a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without\nconquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too\nhe that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing\nagainst the love of God, does not sin mortally.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), \"why\nshould not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man\nattains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows\nwhither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it\nout.\"\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Precept of Love of Our Neighbor Is Fittingly Expressed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our\nneighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to\nall men, even to our enemies, as may be seen in Matt. 5:44. But the\nword \"neighbor\" denotes a kind of \"nighness\" which does not seem to\nexist towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is\nunfittingly expressed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) \"the\norigin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to\nourselves,\" whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin\nof one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than\nthat which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his\nneighbor as himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally.\nTherefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his\nneighbor as himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 22:39): \"The second\"\ncommandment \"is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as\nthyself.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ This precept is fittingly expressed, for it\nindicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason\nfor loving is indicated in the word \"neighbor,\" because the reason\nwhy we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh\nto us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity\nfor glory. Nor does it matter whether we say \"neighbor,\" or \"brother\"\naccording to 1 John 4:21, or \"friend,\" according to Lev. 19:18,\nbecause all these words express the same affinity.\n\nThe mode of love is indicated in the words \"as thyself.\" This does\nnot mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in\nlike manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the\nend, namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as\nhe loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is\na _holy_ love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a\nman should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good\nthings, even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so\nthat his love for his neighbor may be a _righteous_ love. Thirdly, as\nregards the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his\nneighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of\nwishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that\nhis love for his neighbor may be a _true_ love: since when a man\nloves his neighbor for his own profit or pleasure, he does not love\nhis neighbor truly, but loves himself.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Order of Charity Is Included in the Precept?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included\nin the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But\nif man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man\nmore, he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept.\nTherefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently\ndelivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was\ngiven above (Q. 26) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it\nis not included in the precept.\n\nObj. 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love\nof our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the words,\n\"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.\" Therefore the order of\ncharity is not included in the precept.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches\nus first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: \"I will give My\nLaw in their heart [*Vulg.: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in\ntheir heart'].\" Now God causes in us the order of charity, according\nto Cant. 2:4: \"He set in order charity in me.\" Therefore the order of\ncharity comes under the precept of the Law.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1), the mode which is\nessential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which\nprescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential\nto the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to the\nthing beloved, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 12; Q. 26, AA. 1, 2). It is\ntherefore evident that the order of charity must come under the\nprecept.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that\nif he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to\ngratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an\ninjustice to the one he ought to love more.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The order of those four things we have to love out of\ncharity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love\nGod with our \"whole heart,\" we are given to understand that we must\nlove Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor\n\"as ourselves,\" the love of self is set before love of our neighbor.\nIn like manner where we are commanded (1 John 3:16) \"to lay down our\nsouls,\" i.e. the life of our bodies, \"for the brethren,\" we are given\nto understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own\nbody; and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to \"work good . . .\nespecially to those who are of the household of the faith,\" and when\na man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he \"have not care of his own, and\nespecially of those of his house,\" it means that we ought to love\nmost those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely\nunited to us.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It follows from the very words, \"Thou shalt love thy\nneighbor\" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 45\n\nOF THE GIFT OF WISDOM\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity;\nand firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the\nfirst head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy\nGhost?\n\n(2) What is its subject?\n\n(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?\n\n(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?\n\n(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?\n\n(6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Wisdom Should Be Reckoned Among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among\nthe gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the\nvirtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now virtue is directed\nto the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19)\nthat \"no man makes bad use of the virtues.\" Much more therefore are\nthe gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is\ndirected to evil also, for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain\nwisdom is \"earthly, sensual, devilish.\" Therefore wisdom should not\nbe reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) \"wisdom is\nthe knowledge of Divine things.\" Now that knowledge of Divine things\nwhich man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the\nwisdom which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural\nknowledge of Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological\nvirtue, as explained above (Q. 4, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore\nwisdom should be called a virtue rather than a gift.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): \"Behold the fear of the\nLord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is\nunderstanding.\" And in this passage according to the rendering of the\nSeptuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we\nread: \"Behold piety, that is wisdom.\" Now both fear and piety are\ngifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned\namong the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as though it were distinct from\nthe others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): \"The Spirit of the Lord\nshall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it\nbelongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that\ncause we are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes,\nand according thereto all things should be set in order. Now the\nhighest cause may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some\nparticular genus. Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any\nparticular genus, and by its means is able to judge and set in order\nall the things that belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that\ngenus, for instance in medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor.\n3:10: \"As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation.\" On the other\nhand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest, which is\nGod, is said to be wise simply, because he is able to judge and set\nin order all things according to Divine rules.\n\nNow man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1\nCor. 2:15: \"The spiritual man judgeth all things,\" because as stated\nin the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), \"the Spirit searcheth all things,\nyea the deep things of God.\" Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a\ngift of the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the\nsense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind\nof likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or\na perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21).\nAnd just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find\na highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by\nknowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things\nsomething is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to\na last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing,\naccording to Jer. 4:22: \"They are wise to do evils, but to do good\nthey have no knowledge.\" Now whoever turns away from his due end,\nmust needs fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end.\nWherefore, if he fixes his end in external earthly things, his\n\"wisdom\" is called \"earthly,\" if in the goods of the body, it is\ncalled \"sensual wisdom,\" if in some excellence, it is called\n\"devilish wisdom\" because it imitates the devil's pride, of which it\nis written (Job 41:25): \"He is king over all the children of pride.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost,\ndiffers from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the\nlatter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is \"descending\nfrom above\" (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since\nfaith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to\nthe gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the\ngift of wisdom presupposes faith, because \"a man judges well what he\nknows\" (Ethic. i, 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of God is a\nmanifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by\nworshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason\npiety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason,\nbecause if a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a right\njudgment about Divine things.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Wisdom Is in the Intellect As Its Subject?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its\nsubject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that \"wisdom is the charity of\nGod.\" Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the\nintellect, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore wisdom is not in\nthe intellect as its subject.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): \"The wisdom of\ndoctrine is according to her name,\" for wisdom (_sapientia_) may be\ndescribed as \"sweet-tasting science (_sapida scientia_),\" and this\nwould seem to regard the appetite, to which it belongs to taste\nspiritual pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite\nrather than in the intellect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by\nthe gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two\nthings where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in\nthe intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that \"wisdom is\ncontrary to folly.\" But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom\nis also.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), wisdom denotes a certain\nrectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of\njudgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason,\nsecondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about\nwhich one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after\ninquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt\nthe science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges\nof such matters by a kind of connaturality.\n\nAccordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue\nto pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made\nits inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to\njudge aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that \"Hierotheus is perfect in Divine\nthings, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things.\"\n\nNow this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of\ncharity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: \"He who is\njoined to the Lord, is one spirit.\" Consequently wisdom which is a\ngift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has\nits essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 14, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence\nalso wisdom (_sapientia_) takes its name, in so far as it denotes a\ncertain sweetness (_saporem_). Hence the Reply to the Second\nObjection is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text\nquoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such an\nexposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom,\nwhereas it does not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other\nlanguages. Hence it would seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands\nfor the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised by all.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and\njudgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of\nwisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of\nknowledge, according to human ideas.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Wisdom Is Merely Speculative, or Practical Also?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely\nspeculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom\nwhich is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual\nvirtue, is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a\ngift, speculative and not practical.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of\noperation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things\nwhich are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that \"in contemplation\nwe seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we labor under a\nmighty bundle of wants.\" Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine\nthings, in which there is no toiling under a load, since according to\nWis. 8:16, \"her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any\ntediousness.\" Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not\npractical or active.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 4:5): \"Walk with wisdom\ntowards them that are without.\" Now this pertains to action.\nTherefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but also practical.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher\npart of the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is\nthe domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same\nauthority (De Trin. xii, 7) \"is intent on the consideration and\nconsultation of the heavenly,\" i.e. Divine, \"types\" [*Cf. I, Q. 79,\nA. 9; I-II, Q. 74, A. 7]; it considers them, in so far as it\ncontemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so\nfar as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human\nacts according to Divine rules.\n\nAccordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also\npractical.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of\nthings to which it extends, as stated in _De Causis,_ prop. x, xvii.\nWherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent\nthan wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more\nintimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to\ndirect us not only in contemplation but also in action.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in\nthemselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are\nthe subject-matter of human actions.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A thing is considered in itself before being compared\nwith something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all\ncontemplation which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards\nthe direction of human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from\nthe direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in\nhuman acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to make the\nbitter sweet, and labor a rest.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Wisdom Can Be Without Grace, and with Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with\nmortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are\nincompatible with mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: \"Our glory is\nthis, the testimony of our conscience.\" Now one ought not to glory in\none's wisdom, according to Jer. 9:23: \"Let not the wise man glory in\nhis wisdom.\" Therefore wisdom can be without grace and with mortal\nsin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as stated\nabove (A. 1). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of the Divine\ntruth, according to Rom. 1:18: \"(Those men that) detain the truth of\nGod in injustice.\" Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of\ncharity: \"Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that\ndivides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of\neternal perdition.\" But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it\ndoes not divide the children of the kingdom from the children of\nperdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 1:4): \"Wisdom will not enter\ninto a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as\nstated above (A. 1), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or\nof other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain\nconnaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of\ncharity, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 23, A. 5). Hence the wisdom of\nwhich we are speaking presupposes charity. Now charity is\nincompatible with mortal sin, as shown above (Q. 24, A. 12).\nTherefore it follows that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot\nbe together with mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words are to be understood as referring to\nworldly wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human\nreasons. In such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov.\n30:2: \"The wisdom of men is not with Me\": But they do glory in Divine\nwisdom according to 1 Cor. 1:30: \"(Who) of God is made unto us\nwisdom.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which we\nspeak but that which is acquired by the study and research of reason,\nand is compatible with mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it\npresupposes it, and for that very reason divides the children of\nperdition from the children of the kingdom.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Wisdom Is in All Who Have Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace.\nFor it is more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for\nthe perfect to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: \"We speak wisdom\namong the perfect.\" Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it\nseems that much less all who have grace have wisdom.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"The wise man sets things in order,\" as the\nPhilosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17)\nthat the wise man \"judges without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom\nthat is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without\ndissimulation']\". Now it is not for all that have grace, to judge, or\nput others in order, but only for those in authority. Therefore\nwisdom is not in all that have grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Wisdom is a remedy against folly,\" as Gregory says\n(Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish, for\ninstance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty of\nmortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that\nhave grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God;\nsince he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that\nlove Him (Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that \"God loveth\nnone but him that dwelleth with wisdom.\" Therefore wisdom is in all\nthose who have charity and are without mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above\n(A. 4), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the contemplation\nand consultation of Divine things, and as to both of these men obtain\nvarious degrees of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the\nmeasure of right judgment attained by some, whether in the\ncontemplation of Divine things or in directing human affairs\naccording to Divine rules, is no more than suffices for their\nsalvation. This measure is wanting to none who is without mortal sin\nthrough having sanctifying grace, since if nature does not fail in\nnecessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore it is written (1\nJohn 2:27): \"(His) unction teacheth you of all things.\"\n\nSome, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as\nto the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted\nmysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to\nthe direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being\nable to direct not only themselves but also others according to those\nrules). This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have\nsanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which\nthe Holy Ghost dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: \"To one\nindeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom,\" etc.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending\nto the hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2\nCor. 1:7): \"We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is\nhidden.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in\nauthority to direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to\ndirect and judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad\nDemophil.).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the\nhabit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not\nthe act, on account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of\nreason in them.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Seventh Beatitude Corresponds to the Gift of Wisdom?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond\nto the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: \"Blessed are the\npeacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.\" Now both\nthese things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps.\n118:165): \"Much peace have they that love Thy law,\" and, as the\nApostle says (Rom. 5:5), \"the charity of God is poured forth in our\nhearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us,\" and Who is \"the Spirit\nof adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]\" (Rom. 8:15).\nTherefore the seventh beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity\nrather than to wisdom.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect rather\nthan by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom seems\nto be charity, according to Wis. 7:27: \"Through nations she conveyeth\nherself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets\":\nwhereas peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote effects,\nsince they result from charity, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 3).\nTherefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be determined\nin respect of the love of charity rather than in respect of peace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): \"The wisdom, that is\nfrom above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to\nbe persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits,\njudging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'without judging, without\ndissimulation'].\" Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom\nshould not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of\nheavenly wisdom.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that\n\"wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of\nrebellion, but only obedience to reason.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the\ngift of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit\nis denoted in the words, \"Blessed are the peacemakers.\" Now a\npeacemaker is one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others:\nand in both cases this is the result of setting in due order those\nthings in which peace is established, for \"peace is the tranquillity\nof order,\" according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it\nbelongs to wisdom to set things in order, as the Philosopher declares\n(Metaph. i, 2), wherefore peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to\nwisdom. The reward is expressed in the words, \"they shall be called\nthe children of God.\" Now men are called the children of God in so\nfar as they participate in the likeness of the only-begotten and\nnatural Son of God, according to Rom. 8:29, \"Whom He foreknew . . .\nto be made conformable to the image of His Son,\" Who is Wisdom\nBegotten. Hence by participating in the gift of wisdom, man attains\nto the sonship of God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to\nwisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise the Holy\nGhost is called the \"Spirit of adoption\" in so far as we receive from\nHim the likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten Wisdom.\n\nReply Obj. 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which in the\nfirst place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and\nconsequently reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is\ninfused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the\ncause but the effect of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 3) it belongs to wisdom, as a gift,\nnot only to contemplate Divine things, but also to regulate human\nacts. Now the first thing to be effected in this direction of human\nacts is the removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is\nsaid to be \"the beginning of wisdom,\" because it makes us shun evil,\nwhile the last thing is like an end, whereby all things are reduced\nto their right order; and it is this that constitutes peace. Hence\nJames said with reason that \"the wisdom that is from above\" (and this\nis the gift of the Holy Ghost) \"first indeed is chaste,\" because it\navoids the corruption of sin, and \"then peaceable,\" wherein lies the\nultimate effect of wisdom, for which reason peace is numbered among\nthe beatitudes. As to the things that follow, they declare in\nbecoming order the means whereby wisdom leads to peace. For when a\nman, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin, the first thing he\nhas to do is, as far as he can, to be moderate in all things, and in\nthis respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly, in those matters\nin which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be guided by the\nadvice of others, and as to this we are told further that wisdom is\n\"easy to be persuaded.\" These two are conditions required that man\nmay be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at peace\nwith others it is furthermore required, first that he should not be\nopposed to their good; this is what is meant by \"consenting to the\ngood.\" Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies,\nsympathy in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted\nby the words \"full of mercy and good fruits.\" Thirdly, he should\nstrive in all charity to correct the sins of others, and this is\nindicated by the words \"judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The\nwisdom that is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without\ndissimulation',\" lest he should purpose to sate his hatred under\ncover of correction.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 46\n\nOF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this\nhead there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?\n\n(2) Whether folly is a sin?\n\n(3) To which capital sin is it reducible?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 46, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Folly Is Contrary to Wisdom?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For\nseemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not\nseem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about\nDivine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and human\nthings. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other.\nBut folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1 Cor.\n3:18): \"If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him\nbecome a fool, that he may be wise.\" Therefore folly is not opposed\nto wisdom.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But\nwisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer. 10:14): \"Every\nman is become a fool for knowledge,\" and wisdom is a kind of\nknowledge. Moreover, it is written (Isa. 47:10): \"Thy wisdom and thy\nknowledge, this hath deceived thee.\" Now it belongs to folly to be\ndeceived. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that \"a\nfool is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is\nunconcerned when he is injured.\" But this pertains to spiritual\nwisdom, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not\nopposed to wisdom.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that \"the gift of\nwisdom is given as a remedy against folly.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ _Stultitia (Folly)_ seems to take its name from\n_stupor;_ wherefore Isidore says (loc. cit.): \"A fool is one who\nthrough dullness (_stuporem_) remains unmoved.\" And folly differs\nfrom fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that\nfolly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while\nfatuity denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore\nfolly is fittingly opposed to wisdom.\n\nFor \"sapiens\" (_wise_) as Isidore says (Etym. x) \"is so named from\n_sapor_ (savor), because just as the taste is quick to distinguish\nbetween savors of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and\ncauses.\" Wherefore it is manifest that _folly_ is opposed to _wisdom_\nas its contrary, while _fatuity_ is opposed to it as a pure negation:\nsince the fatuous man lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has\nthe sense, though dulled, whereas the wise man has the sense acute\nand penetrating.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Isidore (Etym. x), \"unwisdom is contrary\nto wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense\"; so\nthat unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear\nto be a fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that\njudgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails\nin judgment about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason\ncalled a fool.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above (Q.\n45, A. 1, ad 1), called \"worldly wisdom,\" because it takes for the\nhighest cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a good\nfolly opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly\nthings: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes\nus foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words (1\nCor. 3:19).\n\nReply Obj. 4: To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due\nto the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for\nheavenly things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine\nwisdom, as Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is\nthe result of a man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be\nseen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious to them, and\nthis belongs to folly simply.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Folly Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises\nin us from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly is\nnot a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Every sin is voluntary,\" according to Augustine (De\nVera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary. Therefore it is not a\nsin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But folly\nis not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 1:32): \"The prosperity of\nfools shall destroy them.\" But no man is destroyed save for sin.\nTherefore folly is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Folly, as stated above (A. 1), denotes dullness of\nsense in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is\nthe last end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect\ncontract dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural\nindisposition, as in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no\nsin. Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his\nsense is rendered incapable of perceiving Divine things, according to\n1 Cor. 2:14, \"The sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of\nthe Spirit of God,\" even as sweet things have no savor for a man\nwhose taste is infected with an evil humor: and such like folly is a\nsin.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes those\nthings of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense\nfrom spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The same\nthing happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires\npleasure, without which there is no sin, although he does not desire\nsin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Folly is opposed to the precepts about the\ncontemplation of truth, of which we have spoken above (Q. 16) when\nwe were treating of knowledge and understanding.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 46, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Folly Is a Daughter of Lust?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For\nGregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among\nwhich however he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not\nproceed from lust.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19): \"The wisdom of this\nworld is foolishness with God.\" Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x,\n29) \"the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with\ncrafty devices;\" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a\ndaughter of duplicity rather than of lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in\nsome persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from\nanger rather than from lust.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 7:22): \"Immediately he\nfolloweth her,\" i.e. the harlot . . . \"not knowing that he is drawn\nlike a fool to bonds.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 2), folly, in so far as it is\na sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be\nincapable of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged\ninto earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of\npleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore\nthe folly which is a sin, arises chiefly from lust.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste\nfor God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust,\npertaining to folly, namely, \"hatred of God\" and \"despair of the life\nto come\"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.\n\nReply Obj. 2: These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not\ncausally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is\nfolly with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to\nworldly wisdom, is a cause of this folly.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 48, AA. 2, 3, 4), produces a great change in the nature\nof the body, wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which\nresults from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is\ncaused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into\nearthly things, arises chiefly from lust, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ. 47-170)\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 47\n\nOF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF\n(In Sixteen Articles)\n\nAfter treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence\nconsider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider\nprudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding\ngift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning\nprudence.\n\nUnder the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?\n\n(2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also\nin the speculative reason?\n\n(3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?\n\n(4) Whether it is virtue?\n\n(5) Whether it is a special virtue?\n\n(6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?\n\n(7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?\n\n(8) Whether its proper act is command?\n\n(9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?\n\n(10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?\n\n(11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same\nin species as that which regards the common good?\n\n(12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?\n\n(13) Whether prudence is in the wicked?\n\n(14) Whether prudence is in all good men?\n\n(15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?\n\n(16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Prudence Is in the Cognitive or in the Appetitive Faculty?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but\nin the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv):\n\"Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and\nthose that hinder.\" Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the\nappetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs\nto prudence \"to choose wisely.\" But choice is an act of the\nappetitive faculty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). Therefore\nprudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that \"in art it\nis better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case\nof prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse.\" Now the moral virtues,\nof which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas\nart is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather\nthan in the rational faculty.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): \"Prudence is\nthe knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x): \"A prudent man is one who\nsees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the\nevent of uncertainties.\" Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but\nto the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence\nbelongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty,\nbecause by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and\noffers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future\nfrom knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence,\nbelongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of\ncomparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is\nin the reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4) the will moves all the\nfaculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty\nis love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Accordingly\nprudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as\nlove moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say\nthat \"prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that\nwhich hinders us in tending to God.\" Now love is said to discern\nbecause it moves the reason to discern.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as\nthey tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at\nthe present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence\nconsiders stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end.\nNow of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in\nthe reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs\nmore properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,\n5, 7, 9) that a prudent man \"takes good counsel.\" But as choice\npresupposes counsel, since it is \"the desire for what has been\nalready counselled\" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also\nbe ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence\ndirects the choice by means of counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely,\nbut in its application to action, which is the end of the practical\nreason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to\nprudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it\nfollows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all.\nHence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is\n\"something more than a merely rational habit,\" such as art is, since,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4) it includes application to\naction, which application is an act of the will.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Prudence Belongs to the Practical Reason Alone or Also to\nthe Speculative Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the\npractical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written\n(Prov. 10:23): \"Wisdom is prudence to a man.\" Now wisdom consists\nchiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): \"Prudence is\nconcerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of\nfuller knowledge.\" Now this belongs to the speculative reason.\nTherefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same\npart of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical\nbut also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore\nprudence also is both practical and speculative.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence\nis right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the\npractical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) \"a\nprudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel.\" Now\ncounsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end:\nand the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the\npractical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in\nthe practical reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 45, AA. 1, 3), wisdom considers the\nabsolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest\ncause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in\nthe genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all\nhuman life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for\nthe realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be\nprudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare,\nso he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is\nsaid to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is\nwisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is\nnot about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good,\nand this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated\nsignificantly that \"prudence is wisdom for man,\" but not wisdom\nabsolutely.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the\nword prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether\nspeculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act\nitself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a\nmatter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently\ncomes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards\nits specification in relation to its object which is the \"necessary\ntrue,\" it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every application of right reason in the work of\nproduction belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the\napplication of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those\nwherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in\n_Ethic._ iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things such\nas syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows\ncertain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is\npossible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so\nwe find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative\nprudence.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Prudence Takes Cognizance of Singulars?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of\nsingulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).\nBut \"reason deals with universals,\" according to _Phys._ i, 5.\nTherefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.\n\nObj. 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason\ncannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence\nwhich is right reason, is not about singulars.\n\nObj. 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is\nnot in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are\ndevoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of\nsingulars.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that \"prudence\ndoes not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of\nsingulars also.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), to prudence belongs\nnot only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to\naction, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can\nconveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the\nthing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now\nactions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the\nprudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the\nsingulars about which actions are concerned.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals,\nand yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases:\nhence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also\nparticular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to\nmatter, as stated in _De Anima_ iii.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot\nbe comprehended by human reason, that \"our counsels are uncertain\"\n(Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of\nsingulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule,\nand the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does\nnot reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects,\nbut in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and\nexperience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not\nmean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its\nprincip[al] subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind\nof application it extends to this sense.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Prudence Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For\nAugustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that \"prudence is the science of\nwhat to desire and what to avoid.\" Now science is condivided with\nvirtue, as appears in the _Predicaments_ (vi). Therefore prudence is\nnot a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but \"there is a\nvirtue of art,\" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore\nart is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written\n(2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew \"to grave all sort\nof graving, and to devise ingeniously (_prudenter_) all that there\nmay be need of in the work.\" Therefore prudence is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is\nimmoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): \"Set bounds\nto thy prudence.\" Therefore prudence is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence,\ntemperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 56, A. 1)\nwhen we were treating of virtues in general, \"virtue is that which\nmakes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.\" Now good may\nbe understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing\nthat is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good,\nunder the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power.\nHence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without\nregarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature\nof a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say,\nto the thing which is good, but without considering it under the\naspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the\nrectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because\nthey consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in\nother words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of\ngood.\n\nNow it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3) to\napply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right\nappetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the\nother intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues\nhave it, among which virtues it is enumerated.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for\nany kind of right reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art,\nbecause art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in\norder that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a\nvirtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing\nto do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a\nparticular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet,\nby a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in\nmatters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the\nuncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for\ncounsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as\nstated in _Ethic._ iii, 3.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence\nitself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on\nother things according to prudence.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Prudence Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For\nno special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general,\nsince virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) \"an elective habit that\nfollows a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as\na wise man decides.\" Now right reason is reason in accordance with\nprudence, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a\nspecial virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that \"the\neffect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that\nof prudence, right action as regards the means.\" Now in every virtue\ncertain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore\nprudence is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence\nhas not a special object, for it is right reason \"applied to action\"\n(Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore\nprudence is not a special virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is distinct from and numbered among the other\nvirtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): \"She teacheth temperance and\nprudence, justice and fortitude.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since acts and habits take their species from their\nobjects, as shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2),\nany habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from\nother objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good\nhabit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special,\nnot merely according to the consideration of its matter, but rather\naccording to its formal aspect, as explained above (I-II, Q. 54, A.\n2, ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the\nacts of different habits, and also of different powers, according to\nits different formal aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object\nis requisite for a difference of powers than for a difference of\nhabits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 54, A. 1). Consequently any difference in the aspect\nof an object, that requires a difference of powers, will _a fortiori_\nrequire a difference of habits.\n\nAccordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as\nstated above (A. 2), it is differentiated from the other intellectual\nvirtues by a material difference of objects. _Wisdom,_    _knowledge_\nand _understanding_ are about necessary things, whereas _art_ and\n_prudence_ are about contingent things, art being concerned with\n_things made,_ that is, with things produced in external matter, such\nas a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with\n_things done,_ that is, with things that have their being in the doer\nhimself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4). On the other hand\nprudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a\nformal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power,\nwherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral\nvirtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue,\ndistinct from all other virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of\nmoral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an\nintellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in\ncommon with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral\nvirtue is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the\naspect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the\nvirtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove\nthat it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus\nfrom containing a species which is operative in every other species\nof that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so\nfar as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true:\nbut they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are\nthe object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Prudence Appoints the End to Moral Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral\nvirtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in\nthe appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral\nvirtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the\nappetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral\nvirtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but\nhe has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts\nof man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to\nirrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures,\naccording to _Polit._ i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are\ndirected to reason as to their end. But prudence is \"right reason\napplied to action,\" as stated above (A. 2). Therefore all actions are\ndirected to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the\nend to all moral virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is\nconcerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are\nconcerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral\nvirtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that \"moral\nvirtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while\nprudence ensures the rectitude of the means.\" Therefore it does not\nbelong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to\nregulate the means.\n\n_I answer that,_ The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good\nof the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius\ndeclares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of\nnecessity pre-exist in the reason.\n\nNow, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things\nnaturally known, about which is _understanding,_ and certain things\nof which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about\nwhich is _science,_ so in the practical reason, certain things\npre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of\nthe moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what\nprinciples are in speculative matters, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 7,\nad 2; I-II, Q. 13, A. 3); while certain things are in the practical\nreason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather\nfrom the ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies\nuniversal principles to the particular conclusions of practical\nmatters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the\nend to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Natural reason known by the name of _synderesis_\nappoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 12):\nbut prudence does not do this for the reason given above.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they\nappointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is\nappointed by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence,\nwhich prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it\nfollows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and\nmoves them: yet _synderesis_ moves prudence, just as the\nunderstanding of principles moves science.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 7]\n\nWhether It Belongs to Prudence to Find the Mean in Moral Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to\nfind the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is\nthe end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to\nmoral virtues, as shown above (A. 6). Therefore it does not find the\nmean in them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have\nno cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to\nhave being by reason of its cause. Now \"to follow the mean\" belongs\nto moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as\nshown above (A. 5, Obj. 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the\nmean in moral virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral\nvirtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as\nTully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), \"virtue is a habit like a\nsecond nature in accord with reason.\" Therefore prudence does not\nappoint the mean to moral virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In the foregoing definition of moral virtue\n(A. 5, Obj. 1) it is stated that it \"follows a mean appointed by\nreason . . . even as a wise man decides.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The proper end of each moral virtue consists\nprecisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends\nthat man should not stray from reason for the sake of his\nconcupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right\njudgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is\nappointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason\ndictates to each one that he should act according to reason.\n\nBut it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and\nby what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For\nthough the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet\nthis mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are\ndirected to the end.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in\nmatter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to\nbelong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and\noperations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong\nto virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends\nto attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in\nall matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of\nnature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this\npurpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Command Is the Chief Act of Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of\nprudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine\n(De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence \"to avoid\nambushes.\" Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that \"the\nprudent man takes good counsel.\" Now \"to take counsel\" and \"to\ncommand\" seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been\nsaid above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 6). Therefore command is not the chief\nact of prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to\nrule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other\npowers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the\nreason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that\n\"prudence commands.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Prudence is \"right reason applied to action,\" as\nstated above (A. 2). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in\nregard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there\nare three such acts. The first is _to take counsel,_ which belongs to\ndiscovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (I-II,\nQ. 14, A. 1). The second act is _to judge of what one has\ndiscovered,_ and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the\npractical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its\nthird act is _to command,_ which act consists in applying to action\nthe things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches\nnearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the\nchief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.\n\nIn confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists\nin judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily\nagainst his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so\ninvoluntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment,\nand the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the\nreverse in prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 5, for it is more\nimprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the\nchief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good\nand to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes \"the\navoidance of ambushes\" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an\nact of prudence that does not continue in heaven.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good things\ndiscovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to\nprudence which takes good counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes\nmotion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of\nthe reason, as stated above (I-II, Q. 17, A. 1).\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Solicitude Belongs to Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to\nprudence. For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says\n(Etym. x) that \"a solicitous man is a restless man.\" Now motion\nbelongs chiefly to the appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does\nalso. But prudence is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason,\nas stated above (A. 1). Therefore solicitude does not belong to\nprudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude,\nwherefore it is related (1 Kings 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: \"As\nfor the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous,\nbecause they are found.\" Now the certainty of truth belongs to\nprudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is\nin opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the \"magnanimous\nman is slow and leisurely.\" Now slowness is contrary to solicitude.\nSince then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for \"good is not\nopposed to good,\" as stated in the _Predicaments_ (viii) it would\nseem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 4:7): \"Be prudent . . . and\nwatch in prayers.\" But watchfulness is the same as solicitude.\nTherefore solicitude belongs to prudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be\nsolicitous through being shrewd (_solers_) and alert (_citus_), in so\nfar as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to\ndo whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief\nact is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in\nmatters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that\n\"one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in\ntaking counsel.\" Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to\nprudence, and for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv)\nthat \"prudence keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we\nbe deceived unawares by evil counsel.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the\nprinciple of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and\ncommand of reason, wherein solicitude consists.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), \"equal\ncertainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter\naccording to its proper mode.\" And since the matter of prudence is\nthe contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty\nof prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The magnanimous man is said to be \"slow and leisurely\"\nnot because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not\nover-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where\nhe ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for\nover-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since\nfear makes us take counsel, as stated above (I-II, Q. 44, A. 2) when\nwe were treating of the passion of fear.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Solicitude Belongs to Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the\ngoverning of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common\ngood is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore\nprudence is not directed to the common good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for\nhimself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own.\nTherefore they are not prudent.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance\nand fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only\nto a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 24:45): \"Who, thinkest thou,\nis a faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath\nappointed over his family?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some\nhave held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only\nto the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man\nis not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is\nopposed to charity, which \"seeketh not her own\" (1 Cor. 13:5):\nwherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): \"Not seeking\nthat which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be\nsaved.\" Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the\ncommon good to be better than the good of the individual.\n\nAccordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge,\nand command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is\nevident that prudence regards not only the private good of the\nindividual, but also the common good of the multitude.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now\njust as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is\ncalled \"legal\" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the\ncommon good is called \"political\" prudence, for the latter stands in\nthe same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to\nmoral virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in\nconsequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the\nindividual good is impossible without the common good of the family,\nstate, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict.\nMemor. iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that \"they would rather be poor\nin a rich empire than rich in a poor empire.\" Secondly, because,\nsince man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider\nwhat is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For\nthe good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole;\nthus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that \"any part which does not\nharmonize with its whole, is offensive.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the\ncommon good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as\nstated in _Ethic._ v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice,\nsince these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the\nuniversal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 11]\n\nWhether Prudence About One's Own Good Is Specifically the Same As\nThat Which Extends to the Common Good?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same\nspecifically as that which extends to the common good. For the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that \"political prudence, and\nprudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that \"virtue is\nthe same in a good man and in a good ruler.\" Now political prudence\nis chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were.\nSince then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence\nand political prudence are the same habit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by\nthings which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good,\nwhich belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the\ncommon good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence\nand political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"Political prudence,\" which is directed to the\ncommon good of the state, \"domestic economy\" which is of such things\nas relate to the common good of the household or family, and\n\"monastic economy\" which is concerned with things affecting the good\nof one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner\nthere are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above\ndifferences of matter.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), the\nspecies of habits differ according to the difference of object\nconsidered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things\ndirected to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above\n(I-II, Prolog.; Q. 102, A. 1), wherefore the species of habits differ\nby their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the\ngood of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are\ndifferent ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of\nprudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is\n\"prudence\" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good;\nanother, \"domestic prudence\" which is directed to the common good of\nthe home; and a third, \"political prudence,\" which is directed to the\ncommon good of the state or kingdom.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is\nsubstantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is\nthe same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This\nis called \"prudence\" in respect of the common notion of prudence,\ni.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called\n\"political,\" as being directed to the common good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), \"it\nbelongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well,\"\nwherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good\nruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs\nspecifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated\nby the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the\nother, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits\ndirected to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically\nalthough their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner,\nthough the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the\nmany, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits\ndiffer specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed\nto the last end is above the other habits and commands them.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 12]\n\nWhether Prudence Is in Subjects, or Only in Their Rulers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only\nin their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that\n\"prudence alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues\nare common to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is\nnot a virtue but a true opinion.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is stated in _Polit._ i, 5 that \"a slave is not\ncompetent to take counsel.\" But prudence makes a man take good\ncounsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or\nsubjects.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above (A. 8).\nBut command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only\nof rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are\ntwo kinds of political prudence, one of which is \"legislative\" and\nbelongs to rulers, while the other \"retains the common name\npolitical,\" and is about \"individual actions.\" Now it belongs also to\nsubjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is\nnot only in rulers but also in subjects.\n\n_I answer that,_ Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing\nbelong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to\nreason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and\ngoverning. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the\nslave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to\nbe ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a\nslave as slave, nor of a subject as subject.\n\nSince, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share\nin ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately\ncompetent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is\nin the ruler \"after the manner of a mastercraft\" (Ethic. vi, 8), but\nin the subjects, \"after the manner of a handicraft.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood\nstrictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as\nsuch.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as\nhe is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he\ndoes take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but also\nhimself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 13]\n\nWhether Prudence Can Be in Sinners?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For\nour Lord said (Luke 16:8): \"The children of this world are more\nprudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of\nlight.\" Now the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there\nbe prudence in sinners.\n\nObj. 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But\nthere can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vi, 7, \"we say that to be of\ngood counsel is the work of prudent man especially.\" Now many sinners\ncan take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that \"it\nis impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good.\" Now no sinner\nis a good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.\n\n_I answer that,_ Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence,\nwhich takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a\nprudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be\ndone for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are\nfitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he\ntakes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man\nis called \"a good robber,\" and in this way may speak of \"a prudent\nrobber,\" by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of\ncommitting robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle says\n(Rom. 8:6): \"The prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death,\"\nbecause, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of the\nflesh.\n\nThe second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises\nfitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a\ntwofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is\nnot the common end of all human life, but of some particular affair;\nthus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of\nsailing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent\nsailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as\nwhen a man takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even\nabout things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an\neffective command.\n\nThe third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel,\njudges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole\nlife: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in\nsinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while\nimperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that\nwhich is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since\nthat which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is\nonly in the wicked.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the\nfirst prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent\nabsolutely, but that they are prudent in \"their generation.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the\nappetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the\nother hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First\nbecause its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such\nends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue,\nwhich rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there\nis no prudence, as shown above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 5); secondly because\nprudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless the\nappetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object is\nmore excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is\nmore opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for\nsome particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for\nthe end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel\ninto effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good\nonly; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12)\nthere is \"cleverness,\" [*_deinotike_] i.e. natural diligence which\nmay be directed to both good and evil; or \"cunning,\" [*_panourgia_]\nwhich is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be\n\"false prudence\" or \"prudence of the flesh.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 14]\n\nWhether Prudence Is in All Who Have Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace.\nPrudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to\nbe done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore\nnot all who have grace have prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as\nstated above (A. 8, Obj. 2; A. 13, Obj. 3). Yet many have grace who do\nnot take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others.\nTherefore not all who have grace, have prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that \"young\npeople are not obviously prudent.\" Yet many young people have grace.\nTherefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man\ncan be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46)\nthat \"the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect\nprudently what they desire to accomplish.\" Therefore all who have\ngrace have prudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ The virtues must needs be connected together, so that\nwhoever has one has all, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Now\n whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the\nother virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above\n(A. 4), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient\nwith regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is\ngiven to all who have grace, whom \"His unction teacheth of all things\"\n(1 John 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than\nsufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself\nand for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also\nin all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is\nnot in all who have grace.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of\nothers, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves\nin this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and\ncan discern good from evil counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of\nacts, wherefore \"its acquisition demands experience and time\" (Ethic.\nii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act.\nOn the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion.\nWherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the\nuse of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even\nas in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it\nis also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This\nby practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the\nother virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that \"strong meat is\nfor the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to\nthe discerning of good and evil.\"\n_______________________\n\nFIFTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 15]\n\nWhether Prudence Is in Us by Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The\nPhilosopher says that things connected with prudence \"seem to be\nnatural,\" namely \"synesis, gnome\" [*_synesis_ and _gnome_, Cf. I-II,\nQ. 57, A. 6] and the like, but not those which are connected with\nspeculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the\nsame kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now\nprudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: \"In the ancient is\nwisdom, and in length of days prudence.\" Therefore prudence is\nnatural.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than\nwith that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain\nnatural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De\nHist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that\n\"intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it\ntherefore demands experience and time.\" Now prudence is an\nintellectual virtue, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore prudence is in\nus, not by nature, but by teaching and experience.\n\n_I answer that,_ As shown above (A. 3), prudence includes knowledge\nboth of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which\nprudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards\nthe knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of\nspeculative science, because the primary universal principles of\neither are known naturally, as shown above (A. 6): except that the\ncommon principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the\nPhilosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) \"the life which is according to the\nspeculative reason is better than that which is according to man\":\nwhereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the\nspeculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from\nnature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through\nteaching.\n\nOn the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are\nthe matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because\nthis matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now\nthe right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a\nnatural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 51, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1) that some, from a natural\ninclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right\nends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment\nabout such like ends.\n\nBut the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed,\nare of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and\naffairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to\nsomething fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man\nnaturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man\nhas a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it\nhappens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since\nthen prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated\nabove (A. 6; I-II, Q. 57, A. 5), it follows that prudence is not from\nnature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to\nprudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had\nsaid before (Ethic. vi, 5, 11) that \"they are the principles of the\n_ou heneka_\" [*Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)],\nnamely, the end; and so he does not mention _euboulia_ among them,\nbecause it takes counsel about the means.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their\nnatural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but\nalso because of their long experience.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining\nan end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species\nact in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his\nreason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently\nextends to an infinity of singulars.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 16]\n\nWhether Prudence Can Be Lost Through Forgetfulness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through\nforgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is\nmore certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of\naction. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is\nprudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) \"the same\nthings, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue.\" Now\nthe engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up \"of\nmany memories,\" as he states at the beginning of his _Metaphysics_\n(i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems\nthat prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of\nuniversals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through\nforgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that\n\"forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one\ncan forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because\nthey belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge\nalone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above\n(A. 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies\nthe knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation.\nHence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but\nrather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.\nvi, 5) that \"pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence\":\nwherefore it is written (Dan. 13:56): \"Beauty hath deceived thee, and\nlust hath subverted thy heart,\" and (Ex. 23:8): \"Neither shalt thou\ntake bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise'].\"\n\nNevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the\nlatter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison\nfails, as stated above [*Cf. I-II, Q. 53, A. 1].\n\nReply Obj. 2: The experience required by prudence results not from\nmemory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of\nuniversals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A. 3).\nWherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the\nprincipal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 48\n\nOF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE\n(In One Article)\n\nWe must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Which are the parts of prudence?\n\n(2) Of its integral parts;\n\n(3) Of its subjective parts;\n\n(4) Of its potential parts.\n_______________________\n\nARTICLE [II-II, Q. 48, Art.]\n\nWhether Three Parts of Prudence Are Fittingly Assigned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned\nunfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of\nprudence, namely, \"memory,\" \"understanding\" and \"foresight.\"\nMacrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus\nascribes to prudence six parts, namely, \"reasoning,\" \"understanding,\"\n\"circumspection,\" \"foresight,\" \"docility\" and \"caution.\" Aristotle\nsays (Ethic. vi, 9, 10, 11) that \"good counsel,\" \"synesis\" and\n\"gnome\" belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he\nmentions \"conjecture,\" \"shrewdness,\" \"sense\" and \"understanding.\" And\nanother Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 80, Obj. 4] says that\nten things are connected with prudence, namely, \"good counsel,\"\n\"shrewdness,\" \"foresight,\" \"regnative [*Regnativa],\" \"military,\"\n\"political\" and \"domestic prudence,\" \"dialectics,\" \"rhetoric\" and\n\"physics.\" Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is\neither excessive or deficient.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But\npolitics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore\nthey are not parts of prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the\nintellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility,\nbelong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits.\nTherefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence.\n\nObj. 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts\nof the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n16, A. 1). Therefore, just as \"eubulia\" which refers to counsel, is\nconnected with prudence, and \"synesis\" and \"gnome\" which refer to\njudgment, so also ought something to have been assigned corresponding\nto use.\n\nObj. 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above (Q.\n47, A. 9). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among\nthe parts of prudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Parts are of three kinds, namely, _integral,_ as\nwall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; _subjective,_ as ox\nand lion are parts of animal; and _potential,_ as the nutritive and\nsensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be\nassigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral\nparts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of\na virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of\nall the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of\nprudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of\na seventh, viz. _memory_ mentioned by Tully; and _eustochia_ or\n_shrewdness_ mentioned by Aristotle. For the _sense_ of prudence is\nalso called _understanding_: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.\nvi, 11): \"Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is\nunderstanding.\" Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a\ncognitive virtue, namely, _memory, reasoning, understanding,\n_docility_ and _shrewdness:_ while the three others belong thereto,\nas commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, _foresight,\ncircumspection_ and _caution._ The reason of their difference is seen\nfrom the fact that three things may be observed in reference to\nknowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of\nthe past, is called _memory,_ if of the present, whether contingent\nor necessary, is called _understanding_ or _intelligence._ Secondly,\nthe acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to\nwhich pertains _docility,_ or by _discovery,_ and to this belongs to\n_eustochia_, i.e. \"a happy conjecture,\" of which _shrewdness_ is a\npart, which is a \"quick conjecture of the middle term,\" as stated in\nPoster. i, 9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed\nfrom things known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this\nbelongs to _reasoning._ And the reason, in order to command aright,\nrequires to have three conditions. First, to order that which is\nbefitting the end, and this belongs to _foresight;_ secondly, to\nattend to the circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs\nto _circumspection;_ thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to\n_caution._\n\nThe subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way\nthe parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence\nwhereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a\nmultitude, which differ specifically as stated above (Q. 47, A. 11).\nAgain, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into\nvarious species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is\nthe multitude which is united together for some particular purpose;\nthus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that\ngoverns this is called _military._ There is also the multitude that\nis united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a\nhome or family, and this is ruled by _domestic prudence_: and such\nagain is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of\nwhich is _regnative prudence_ in the ruler, and _political prudence,_\nsimply so called, in the subjects.\n\nIf, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also\nspeculative knowledge, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 2) then its\nparts include _dialectics,_ _rhetoric_ and _physics,_ according to\nthree methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the\nattaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to _physics_ (if\nphysics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The\nsecond method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises,\nand this belongs to _dialectics._ The third method is to employ\nconjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade\nsomewhat, and this belongs to _rhetoric._ It may be said, however,\nthat these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it\nargues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from\nprobabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.\n\nThe potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it,\nwhich are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having,\nas it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the\nparts of prudence are _good counsel,_ which concerns counsel,\n_synesis,_ which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence,\nand _gnome,_ which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the\nlaw: while _prudence_ is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The various enumerations differ, either because\ndifferent kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is\nmentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another\nenumeration. Thus Tully includes \"caution\" and \"circumspection\" under\n\"foresight,\" and \"reasoning,\" \"docility\" and \"shrewdness\" under\n\"understanding.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as\nsciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply\nmay be gathered from what has been said.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by\ntaking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with\nthings pertaining to prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Right command and right use always go together, because\nthe reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the\nlower powers, which pertain to use.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 49\n\nOF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under\nthis head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Memory;\n\n(2) Understanding or Intelligence;\n\n(3) Docility;\n\n(4) Shrewdness;\n\n(5) Reason;\n\n(6) Foresight;\n\n(7) Circumspection;\n\n(8) Caution.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Memory Is a Part of Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For\nmemory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the\nsensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part\n(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience,\nwhereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part\nof prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards\nfuture matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated\nin _Ethic._ vi, 2, 7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory\namong the parts of prudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as\nstated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now in such like matters a man can be\ndirected, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true,\nbut by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles\nmust be proportionate to their conclusions, and \"like must be\nconcluded from like\" (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need\nexperience to discover what is true in the majority of cases:\nwherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that \"intellectual\nvirtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time.\" Now\nexperience is the result of many memories as stated in _Metaph._ i,\n1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence\nmemory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), prudence applies\nuniversal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence\nmany things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for\nprudence, and memory is one of them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while\nits perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says\nin his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16, 24], memory not\nonly arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.\n\nThere are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when\na man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet\nsomewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us\nmore, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the\nmind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we\nwere children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these\nillustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions\neasily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some\ncorporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on\nsensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive\npart of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his\nmemory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may\npass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says\n(De Memor. et Remin. ii): \"Sometimes a place brings memories back to\nus: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other.\"\nThirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to\nremember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less\nit is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric\n[*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that \"anxiety preserves the figures\nof images entire.\" Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we\nwish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that\n\"reflection preserves memories,\" because as he remarks (De Memoria\nii) \"custom is a second nature\": wherefore when we reflect on a thing\nfrequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one\nthing to another by a kind of natural order.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future\nfrom the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to\ntake good counsel for the future.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Understanding* Is a Part of Prudence?\n[*Otherwise intuition; Aristotle's word is _nous_]\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of\nprudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part\nof the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding\nand prudence, according to _Ethic._ vi, 3. Therefore understanding\nshould not be reckoned a part of prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the\nHoly Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q. 8, AA. 1,\n8). But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what\nhas been said above (Q. 4, A. 8; I-II, Q. 62, A. 2). Therefore\nunderstanding does not pertain to prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic.\nvi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and\nimmaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not\na part of prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts\n\"intelligence\" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i,\n8] mentions \"understanding,\" which comes to the same.\n\n_I answer that,_ Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual\npower, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is\ntaken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first\nprinciples of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds\nfrom certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every\nprocess of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding.\nTherefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole\nprocess of prudence must needs have its source in understanding.\nHence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a\nconclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated\nabove (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), it applies the knowledge of some universal\nprinciple. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a\nsingular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must\nproceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of\nuniversals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an\nintellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative\nprinciples, but also practical universal principles, such as \"One\nshould do evil to no man,\" as shown above (Q. 47, A. 6). The other\nunderstanding, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 11, is cognizant of an\nextreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical\nmatter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the\nsyllogism of prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6). Now this\nprimary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place.\nWherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right\nestimate of some particular end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is\na quick insight into divine things, as shown above (Q. 8, AA. 1, 2).\nIt is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as\nstated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The right estimate about a particular end is called\nboth \"understanding,\" in so far as its object is a principle, and\n\"sense,\" in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the\nPhilosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): \"Of such things we\nneed to have the sense, and this is understanding.\" But this is to be\nunderstood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know\nproper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a\nparticular.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Docility Should Be Accounted a Part of Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a\npart of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every\nintellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But\ndocility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it\nshould not be accounted a part of prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our\npower, since it is for things that are in our power that we are\npraised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this\nis befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it\nis not a part of prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since\nit makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also\ncalled \"preceptors.\" Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the\nopinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 1; Q. 47, A. 3) prudence\nis concerned with particular matters of action, and since such\nmatters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all\nsufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of\ntime. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of\nbeing taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a\nsane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): \"It is right to pay no less\nattention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such\npersons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to\ntheir demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into\nprinciples.\" Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): \"Lean not on thy own\nprudence,\" and (Ecclus. 6:35): \"Stand in the multitude of the\nancients\" (i.e. the old men), \"that are wise, and join thyself from\nthy heart to their wisdom.\" Now it is a mark of docility to be ready\nto be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part\nof prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although docility is useful for every intellectual\nvirtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for\nother things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for\nmuch towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must\ncarefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings\nof the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor\ndespising them through pride.\n\nReply Obj. 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but\nalso for himself, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 12, ad 3). Hence as\nstated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for\nprudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should\nbe docile in some respects, since no man is altogether\nself-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Shrewdness Is Part of Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence.\nFor shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for\ndemonstrations, as stated in _Poster._ i, 34. Now the reasoning of\nprudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies.\nTherefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to\n_Ethic._ vi, 5, 7, 9. Now there is no place in good counsel for\nshrewdness [*Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of\n_eustochia_, i.e. \"a happy conjecture\": for the latter is\n\"unreasoning and rapid,\" whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated\nin _Ethic._ vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a\npart of prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above (Q. 48) is a \"happy\nconjecture.\" Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of\nconjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to\nprudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): \"A solicitous man is one\nwho is shrewd and alert (_solers citus_).\" But solicitude belongs to\nprudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore shrewdness does\nalso.\n\n_I answer that,_ Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters\nof action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways,\nboth in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it\noneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility\nconsists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from\nanother man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right\nestimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for _eustochia_,\nof which it is a part. For _eustochia_ is a happy conjecture about\nany matter, while shrewdness is \"an easy and rapid conjecture in\nfinding the middle term\" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the\nphilosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 48, Obj. 1] who calls shrewdness a\npart of prudence, takes it for _eustochia_, in general, hence he\nsays: \"Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered\nrapidly.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the\nmiddle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical\nsyllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends\nthey are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher\nsays (Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9)\nto prove that _euboulia_, i.e. good counsel, is not _eustochia_,\nwhich is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a\nman may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing,\nand yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in\ntaking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for\ninstance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this\nreason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters,\nwherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric\nand prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the\nsense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable\nto all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Reason Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part\nof prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof.\nBut prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5).\nTherefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned\na part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be\nreckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason\nis necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom\nand science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason\nshould not be reckoned a part of prudence\n\nObj. 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from\nthe intelligence, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 8). If therefore\nintelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add\nreason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the\nopinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as\nstated in _Ethic._ vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from\ncertain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore\nit is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And\nsince the things required for the perfection of prudence are called\nrequisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason\nshould be numbered among these parts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its\ngood use.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet\nthe need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those\nthings in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need\nfor reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as\ndo God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of\naction, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of\nthings intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less\ncertain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are\nnevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there\nis no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in\n_Ethic._ iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual\nvirtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above\nall requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly\napply universals to particulars, which latter are various and\nuncertain.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although intelligence and reason are not different\npowers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence\ntakes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [*Cf.\nII-II, Q. 8, A. 1], while reason is so called from being inquisitive\nand discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained\nabove (A. 2; Q. 47, A. 2, 3).\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Foresight* Should Be Accounted a Part of Prudence?\n[*\"Providentia,\" which may be translated either \"providence\" or\n\"foresight.\"]\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a\npart of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems\nto be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x),\n\"a prudent man is one who sees from afar (_porro videns_)\": and this\nis also the derivation of _providentia_ (foresight), according to\nBoethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of\nprudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be\nalso speculative, because _seeing,_ whence we have the word \"to\nforesee,\" has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore\nforesight is not a part of prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its\nsecondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these\nseems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not\npart of prudence.\n\nOn the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who\nnumber foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Q. 48).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2, AA. 6, 13),\nprudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work\nis to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things\nare necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet\nnothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters\nof actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has\nbecome a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be\nundone. In like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity,\nsince it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.\n\nConsequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by\nman to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of\nthese things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the\nnotion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present\nhas to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of\nthem must needs be the principal to which all the others are\nsubordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and\npredominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the\nprincipal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is\nrequired for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular\nthing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very\nname of prudence is taken from foresight (_providentia_) as from its\nprincipal part.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary things,\nwhich, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and\nalways, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know\nthem. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but\nonly to practical matters.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Right order to an end which is included in the notion\nof foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command,\nwithout which no right order to the end is possible.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Circumspection Can Be a Part of Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of\nprudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's\nsurroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be\nconsidered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore\ncircumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral\nvirtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote\nnothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection\napparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see\nthings that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant\nthings. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part\nof prudence in addition to foresight.\n\nOn the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Q.\n48).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), it belongs to prudence\nchiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done\naright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.\n\nSince, however, prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 3) is about\nsingular matters of action, which contain many combinations of\ncircumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable\nto the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end,\nby reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of\nlove to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to\narouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise\nin his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence\nthe need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means\nwith the circumstances.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be\ninfinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment\nof reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few\nin number.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because\nprudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of\nmoral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing\nof circumstances.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that\nwhich is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to\ncircumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view\nof the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its\nown, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Caution Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part\nof prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required.\nNow no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib.\nArb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which\ndirects the virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same\nfaculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now\nit belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to\navoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of\nprudence, distinct from foresight.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no\nman can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore\ncaution does not belong to prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): \"See how you walk\ncautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly'].\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The things with which prudence is concerned, are\ncontingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with\ntrue, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety\nof these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil,\nand evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs\ncaution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on\nour guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of\nacts of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the\nopposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different\nin idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both\nbelong to the one virtue of prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of\nfrequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against\nthem caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether,\nor that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and\nby chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be\ngrasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them,\nalthough by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the\nsurprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 50\n\nOF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence.\nAnd since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man\nrules himself (Q. 47, seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species\nof prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?\n\n(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of\nprudence?\n\n(4) Whether military prudence is?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Species of Prudence Is Regnative?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a\nspecies of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the\npreservation of justice, since according to _Ethic._ v, 6 the prince\nis the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to\njustice rather than to prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a\nkingdom (_regnum_) is one of six species of government. But no\nspecies of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of\ngovernment, which are \"aristocracy,\" \"polity,\" also called\n\"timocracy\" [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 10], \"tyranny,\" \"oligarchy\" and\n\"democracy.\" Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed\nto a kingdom.\n\nObj. 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to\ncertain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according\nto Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a\npart of prudence to be \"legislative.\" Therefore it is not becoming to\nsubstitute regnative prudence in its place.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that\n\"prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince.\" Therefore a\nspecial kind of prudence is regnative.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 8, 10), it belongs to\nprudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we\nfind a special kind of governance and command, there must be a\nspecial kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special\nand perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only\nhimself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because\na government is the more perfect according as it is more universal,\nextends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in\nits special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged\nwith the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species\nof prudence is reckoned to be regnative.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to\nprudence as their guide, wherefore \"right reason in accord with\nprudence\" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated\nabove (Q. 47, A. 5, ad 1; I-II, Q. 58, A. 2, ad 4). For this reason\nalso the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the\ncommon good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance\nof prudence. Hence these two virtues--prudence and justice--belong\nmost properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: \"A king shall reign\nand shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the\nearth.\" Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and\nexecution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species\nof prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is\nexecutive.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in\n_Ethic._ viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be\ndenominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under\nregnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse\nforms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not\npertain to prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the\nprincipal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this\napplies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as\nthey have a share of kingly government.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Political Prudence Is Fittingly Accounted a Part of Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly\naccounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political\nprudence, as stated above (A. 1). But a part should not be reckoned a\nspecies with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be\nreckoned a part of prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their\nvarious objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as\nwhat the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as\nregards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence\ndistinct from regnative prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each\nindividual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence\ncommonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of\nprudence called political.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that \"of the\nprudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a\nmaster-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the\ncommon name political, and deals with individuals.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his\nruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate\nbeings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and\ninanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves\nin motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of\ntheir own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not\nin their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand,\nmen who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the\ncommands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their\nfree-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required\nin them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their\nsuperiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is\ncalled political.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species\nof prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of\nregnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence,\neven as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence\nof a thing retains the name of \"proper.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the\nspecies of a habit, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now the same\nactions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect,\nas by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various\ndepartments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political\nprudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in\nrelation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we\nspeak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Part of Prudence Should Be Reckoned to Be Domestic?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a\npart of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5)\n\"prudence is directed to a good life in general\": whereas domestic\nprudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to\n_Ethic._ i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13) prudence is only in\ngood people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people,\nsince many sinners are provident in governing their household.\nTherefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of\nprudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject,\nso also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political\nis a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to\nregnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither\nshould domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there\nare various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, \"one\nof which is domestic, another legislative, and another political.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Different aspects of an object, in respect of\nuniversality and particularity, or of totality and partiality,\ndiversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act\nof virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident\nthat a household is a mean between the individual and the city or\nkingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, so is\nthe household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as\nprudence commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct\nfrom political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from\nboth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as\nits last end, but as its instrument, as stated in _Polit. i, 3. On the\nother hand, the end of political prudence is \"a good life in general\"\nas regards the conduct of the household. In _Ethic._ i, 1 the\nPhilosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way\nof example and in accordance with the opinion of many.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters\nof detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in\nregard to \"a good life in general\" as regards the conduct of the\nhousehold, for which above all a virtuous life is required.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The father has in his household an authority\nlike that of a king, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10, but he has not the\nfull power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a\ndistinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Military Prudence Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be\nreckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art,\naccording to _Ethic._ vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the\nart of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8).\nTherefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of\nprudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as military business is contained under\npolitical affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of\ntradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of\nprudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither\ntherefore should any be assigned to military business.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in\nwarfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather\nthan to prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 24:6): \"War is managed by due\nordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels.\"\nNow it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great\nneed in warfare for that species of prudence which is called\n\"military.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Whatever things are done according to art or reason,\nshould be made to conform to those which are in accordance with\nnature, and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a\ntwofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to\nwithstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she\nhas provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby\nthey are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but\nalso with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an\nassailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance\nwith reason, there should be not only \"political\" prudence, which\ndisposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common\ngood, but also a \"military\" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are\nrepelled.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has\ncertain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as\narms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good,\nit belongs rather to prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the profit\nof individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the\nservice belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the\nentire common good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The execution of military service belongs to fortitude,\nbut the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the\ncommander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 51\n\nOF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nIn due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with\nprudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether _euboulia_ is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?\n\n(3) Whether _synesis_ is a special virtue?\n\n(4) Whether _gnome_ is a special virtue?\n\n[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of\ndeliberating well (_euboulia_), of judging well according to common\nlaw (_synesis_), and of judging well according to general law\n(_gnome_), respectively.]\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 1]\n\nWhether _Euboulia_ Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a virtue. For,\naccording to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19) \"no man makes evil\nuse of virtue.\" Now some make evil use of _euboulia_ or good counsel,\neither through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil\nends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good\nends, as those who rob that they may give alms. Therefore _euboulia_\nis not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to _Phys._ vii.\nBut _euboulia_ is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and\nresearch, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore _euboulia_\nis not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 65). Now _euboulia_ is not connected with the other\nvirtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men are\nslow in taking counsel. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9)\n_euboulia_ \"is a right counselling.\" Now the perfection of virtue\nconsists in right reason. Therefore _euboulia_ is a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 4) the nature of a human\nvirtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of\nman, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a\nresearch of the reason about the actions he has to perform and\nwhereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man,\nas stated in _Ethic._ x. But _euboulia_ signifies goodness of\ncounsel, for it is derived from the _eu_, good, and _boule_, counsel,\nbeing \"a good counsel\" or rather \"a disposition to take good\ncounsel.\" Hence it is evident that _euboulia_ is a human virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an\nevil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even\nas in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in\ncoming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from\nfalse premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence\nboth the aforesaid processes are contrary to _euboulia,_ as the\nPhilosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does\nnot follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies\nperfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his\nparts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which\ncounsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive\nappetite, which are still more imperfect.\n\nIt may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to\nthe mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with\ncertainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which\nare contingent.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In no sinner as such is _euboulia_ to be found: since\nall sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires\nnot only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also\nother circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither\ntoo slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking\ncounsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due\ncircumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the\nother hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things\nwhich are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not\ntake good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in\nmatters of trade, or warfare, or the like.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 2]\n\nWhether _Euboulia_ Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue\nfrom prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the\n\"prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel.\" Now this\nbelongs to _euboulia_ as stated above. Therefore _euboulia_ is not\ndistinct from prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are\nspecified chiefly by their end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q.\n18, AA. 4, 6). Now _euboulia_ and prudence are directed to the same\nend, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end,\nbut to the common end of all life. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a\ndistinct virtue from prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision\nbelong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to\nthe same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to\n_euboulia,_ while decision belongs to prudence. There _euboulia_ is\nnot a distinct virtue from prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Prudence is preceptive, according to _Ethic._ vi,\n10. But this does not apply to _euboulia_. Therefore _euboulia_ is a\ndistinct virtue from prudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), virtue is properly directed\nto an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ\naccording to different acts, especially when there is a different\nkind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same\nkind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the\ngoodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all\nthese belong to the same virtue of charity.\n\nNow acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor\nhave they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different\ncauses that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good\ncommand, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another.\nConsequently _euboulia_ which makes man take good counsel must needs\nbe a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And\nsince counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal,\nso _euboulia_ is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue,\nwithout which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the\nmoral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by\ncommanding it, to _euboulia_ by eliciting it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees to the\none end which is \"a good life in general\" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for\ncounsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The\nlast named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the\nother two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have\ncertain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the\ndiscovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty.\nHence this proves not that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue from\nprudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a\nprincipal virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science of\ndialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct\nfrom demonstrative science, which decides the truth.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 3]\n\nWhether _Synesis_ Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that _synesis_ is not a virtue. Virtues\nare not in us by nature, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1. But _synesis_\nis natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11).\nTherefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), _synesis_ is\nnothing but \"a faculty of judging.\" But judgment without command can\nbe even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it\nseems that _synesis_ is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be\na defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for\nit is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore _synesis_ be\nreckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is\nno need for any other virtue directed to good command: and\nconsequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable.\nTherefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But\n_euboulia_, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is\n_synesis_ a virtue, as being good judgment.\n\n_I answer that,_ _synesis_ signifies a right judgment, not indeed\nabout speculative matters, but about particular practical matters,\nabout which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of\n_synesis_ are said to be _synetoi,_ i.e. \"persons of sense,\" or\n_eusynetoi,_ i.e. \"men of good sense,\" just as on the other hand,\nthose who lack this virtue are called _asynetoi,_ i.e. \"senseless.\"\n\nNow, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must\ncorrespond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of\ncounsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause,\nfor many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to\njudge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at\nresearch, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing\nto another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of\nimagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such\npersons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in\nthe intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the\ncommon sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need,\nbesides _euboulia_, for another virtue, which judges well, and this\nis called _synesis._\n\nReply Obj. 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power\napprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the\nright disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well\ndisposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are,\nwhereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted\nand misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to\nreceive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to\nnature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift\nof grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the\ncognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with\ndistorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to _synesis_\nwhich in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly,\nthrough the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result\nbeing that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a\ngood judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but\nthis judgment is about the ends, whereas _synesis_ is rather about\nthe means.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a\nuniversal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the\nparticular matter of action, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or\nexecute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which\njudges aright there is a further need of a final and principal\nvirtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 4]\n\nWhether _Gnome_ Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that _gnome_ is not a special virtue\ndistinct from _synesis._ For a man is said, in respect of _synesis,_\nto have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment,\nunless he judge aright in all things. Therefore _synesis_ extends to\nall matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of\ngood judgment called _gnome._\n\nObj. 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now\nthere is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. _euboulia,_ and only\none virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only\none virtue of good judgment, viz. _synesis._\n\nObj. 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart\nfrom the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and\nwith such things reason is not concerned, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 5.\nNow all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore\nthere is no intellectual virtue about such matters.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that\n_gnome_ is a special virtue.\n\n_I answer that_ cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower\nprinciples: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher\nprinciples than science does, and consequently is distinguished from\nit; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident\nthat what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is\nsometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus\nmonstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active\nseminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher\nprinciple, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine\nProvidence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could\nnot pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is\npossible if we consider Divine Providence.\n\nNow it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not\ncovered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of\nthe enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back\nhis deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to\njudge of such matters according to higher principles than the common\nlaws, according to which _synesis_ judges: and corresponding to such\nhigher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of\njudgment, which is called _gnome,_ and which denotes a certain\ndiscrimination in judgment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: _Synesis_ judges rightly about all actions that are\ncovered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged\nbeside these common rules, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper\nprinciples thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common\nprinciples. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which\naims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration\nwhich tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence\n_euboulia_ to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all,\nbut not so _synesis_ whose act is judicial. Command considers in all\nmatters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all\nthings that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand,\namong men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of\nsuch things by his reason: this belongs to _gnome,_ which denotes a\ncertain discrimination in judgment.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 52\n\nOF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to\nprudence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the\nHoly Ghost?\n\n(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?\n\n(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?\n\n(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, \"Blessed are the merciful,\" etc.\ncorresponds to the gift of counsel?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Counsel Should Be Reckoned Among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among\nthe gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as\na help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for\nthe purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the\nvirtue of prudence, or even of _euboulia_, as is evident from what\nhas been said (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 51, AA. 1, 2). Therefore counsel\nshould not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy\nGhost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not\ngiven to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts\nof the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But\ncounsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy\nGhost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65:\n\"Behold . . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel.\" Therefore\ncounsel should be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than\namong the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:14): \"Whosoever are led by the\nSpirit of God, they are the sons of God.\" But counselling is not\nconsistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the\nHoly Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who \"have received\nthe spirit of adoption of sons,\" it would seem that counsel should\nnot be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): \"(The Spirit of the\nLord) shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of\nfortitude.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts of\nthe Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable\nto the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according\nto the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature\nthrough time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but\nnot through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22).\nAgain, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the\nresearch of reason to perform any particular action, and this\nresearch is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the\nrational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned\namong the gifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Prudence or _euboulia_, whether acquired or infused,\ndirects man in the research of counsel according to principles that\nthe reason can grasp; hence prudence or _euboulia_ makes man take\ngood counsel either for himself or for another. Since, however, human\nreason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which\nmay occur, the result is that \"the thoughts of mortal men are\nfearful, and our counsels uncertain\" (Wis. 9:14). Hence in the\nresearch of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who\ncomprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel,\nwhereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human\naffairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek\ncounsel from those who are wiser.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel\nothers, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be\ncounselled by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for\nsalvation is common to all holy persons.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost\naccording to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which\nis the \"faculty of will and reason\" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly\nthe gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the\nreason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Gift of Counsel Corresponds to the Virtue of Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not\nfittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For \"the highest\npoint of that which is underneath touches that which is above,\" as\nDionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact\nwith the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are\ninferior to the gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Since,\nthen, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while command\nis its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the\ngift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of\njudgment or command.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the\nhigher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in _De Causis._ Now\nprudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only\nspeculative but also practical, as shown above (Q. 9, A. 3).\nTherefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of\nprudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated\nabove (Q. 47, A. 8). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man\nshould be directed by God, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the gift\nof counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The gift of counsel is about what has to be done\nfor the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter.\nTherefore they correspond to one another.\n\n_I answer that,_ A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and\nis perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement,\nas a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the\nrectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a\nlower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the\nsupreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which\ndenotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through\nbeing ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift\nof counsel, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the gift of counsel\ncorresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved,\nbut to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost,\nthe position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a\nmover, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), it follows that it\nwould be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the\nname of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is\npossible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another\ncounselling it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to\nprudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of\nextension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel\ncorresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the\nsame things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being moved.\nHence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the\nHoly Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Gift of Counsel Remains in Heaven?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain\nin heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of\nan end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an\nend, since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of\ncounsel is not in heaven.\n\nObj. 2: Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take\ncounsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes\n(Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there\nis no counsel in heaven.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God,\naccording to 1 John 3:2, \"When He shall appear, we shall be like to\nHim.\" But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Rom. 11:34,\n\"Who hath been His counsellor?\" Therefore neither to the saints in\nheaven is the gift of counsel becoming.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): \"When either the\nguilt or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate\nof the heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have\nwon in the conflict, or not to have won.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2; I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts\nof the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational\ncreature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion\nof the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which\nis moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when\nit is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle\nof the movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the\nmover ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached\nthe term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases\nbeing built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is\ncause not only of the movement, but also of the form to which the\nmovement tends, then the action of the mover does not cease even\nafter the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even\nafter it is lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us virtue and\nknowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as\nwe persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a\nknowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant,\nbut by continuing that knowledge in them.\n\nNevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or\nmen, do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but\nconcern the government of things according to Divine Providence. As\nregards these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God\nmoves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the\nwayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in\nmatters of action, by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt;\nwhereas there is simple nescience in the mind of the blessed as\nregards the things they do not know. From this nescience the angel's\nmind is cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does\nthere precede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn to\nGod; and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen.\nad lit. v, 19) \"the angels take counsel of God about things beneath\nthem\": wherefore the instruction which they receive from God in such\nmatters is called \"counsel.\"\n\nAccordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God\npreserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them\nin their nescience of what has to be done.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end,\nor resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as\nthe acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which\nthey themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the\nangels, and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of\ncounsel finds a place in them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state\nof life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven. Even so\nneither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as\non the way thither.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it:\nand the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the\nsource whence they receive.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Fifth Beatitude, Which Is That of Mercy, Corresponds to\nthe Gift of Counsel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of\nmercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the\nbeatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, A. 1).\nNow we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the\nfifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel.\n\nObj. 2: Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for\nsalvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not\nnecessary for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation,\naccording to James 2:13, \"Judgment without mercy to him that hath not\ndone mercy.\" On the other hand poverty is not necessary for\nsalvation, but belongs to the life of perfection, according to Matt.\n19:21. Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift of\ncounsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they\ndenote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of\nvirtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as\nappears from Gal. 5:22, 23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of\nmercy correspond to the gift of counsel.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): \"Counsel is\nbefitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered\nfrom evils so great, to pardon, and to give.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Counsel is properly about things useful for an end.\nHence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all\ncorrespond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1\nTim. 4:8, \"Godliness [*_Pietas,_ whence our English word _pity,_\nwhich is the same as mercy; see note on II-II, Q. 30, A. 1] is\nprofitable to all things.\" Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially\ncorresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing\nmercy.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although counsel directs in all the acts of\nvirtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason\ngiven above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost\nguides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life\nwhether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work\nof mercy is necessary for salvation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the\nultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an\naction which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical\nknowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as\npertain to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among\nthese we find \"goodness\" and \"benignity\" which correspond to mercy.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 53\n\nOF IMPRUDENCE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine\nsays (Contra Julian. iv, 3): \"There are vices opposed to every\nvirtue, not only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as\ntemerity is opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of\nkinship and not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in\nopposition to prudence we have craftiness.\"\n\nAccordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in\nevident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a\ndefect either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for\nprudence, and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to\nprudence, those namely which are due to abuse of the things required\nfor prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of\nthese considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of\nnegligence which is opposed to solicitude.\n\nUnder the first head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special sin?\n\n(3) Of precipitation or temerity;\n\n(4) Of thoughtlessness;\n\n(5) Of inconstancy;\n\n(6) Concerning the origin of these vices.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Imprudence Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every\nsin is voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv];\nwhereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be\nimprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth.\nBut imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are\nimprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to\noriginal justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But\nimprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is\nnot a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away\nsave by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Prov.\n21:20, \"There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of\nthe just, and the imprudent [Douay: 'foolish'] man shall spend it.\"\nTherefore imprudence is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a\nprivation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken\nas a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for\nthis can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes\nlack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this\nsense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving\nto have prudence.\n\nImprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act\nof reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the\nright reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man\ndespises counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which\nrequire consideration in the act of prudence. In this way imprudence\nis a sin in respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect,\nsince it is not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by\ninfringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends.\nWherefore, if this should happen through aversion from the Divine\nLaw, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately\nthrough contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching: whereas if he\nact beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to\nthings necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the\nrash man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act\nprecipitately. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that \"he who\nsins willingly against prudence is less to be commended.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense.\nIt must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other\nvirtue is included in the lack of original justice which perfected\nthe entire soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed\nto original sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack\nof this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as to\nthe habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly\nspeaking the sin of imprudence consists.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Imprudence Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For\nwhoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But\nimprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above (A.\n1). Therefore imprudence is not a special sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge\nis. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of\nthe general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be\nreckoned among those causes.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances\nof virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"evil results\nfrom each single defect.\" Now many things are requisite for prudence;\nfor instance, reason, intelligence, docility, and so on, as stated\nabove (QQ. 48, 49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence,\nso that it is not a special sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above\n(A. 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is\none special vice.\n\n_I answer that,_ A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways;\nfirst, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all\nsins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices,\nwhich are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be\ngeneral on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated\nof all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as\nneither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with\nspecial acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by\nparticipation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just\nas all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs\nthem, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no\nsin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason,\nwhich defect belongs to imprudence.\n\nIf, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in\nsome particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin,\nthen imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in\nthree ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of\nprudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the\nindividual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above\n(Q. 48; Q. 50, A. 7), so also we distinguish various kinds of\nimprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of\nprudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the\nseveral acts of reason. Thus, by defect of \"counsel\" to which\n_euboulia_ corresponds, \"precipitation\" or \"temerity\" is a species of\nimprudence; by defect of \"judgment,\" to which _synesis_ (judging well\naccording to common law) and _gnome_ (judging well according to\ngeneral law) refer, there is \"thoughtlessness\"; while \"inconstancy\"\nand \"negligence\" correspond to the \"command\" which is the proper act\nof prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things\nwhich are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts\nof prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the\ndirection of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all\nthe opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above.\nThus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in\n\"thoughtlessness\"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable\nto \"precipitation\"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of\nshrewdness, belong to \"negligence\" and \"inconstancy.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers generality by participation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since knowledge is further removed from morality than\nprudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows\nthat ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on\naccount either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent\nresult, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes\nof sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a\nmoral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for the\nsame motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same\nspecies of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and\nwhen one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are\nvarious species: for instance, if one man were to take another's\nproperty from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this\nwould constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were\nto take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust\nof possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack\nof those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute\na diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to\ndifferent acts of reason, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Precipitation Is a Sin Included in Imprudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included\nin imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence;\nwhereas precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to\nGregory, who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of \"counsel is given\nas a remedy to precipitation.\" Therefore precipitation is not a sin\ncontained under imprudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now\nrashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore\nprecipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now\nsin happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but also\nthrough being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes\nby, and through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in\n_Ethic._ vi, 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning\nprecipitation as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than\nslowness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordinate\ncounsel.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:19): \"The way of the wicked\nis darksome, they know not where they fall.\" Now the darksome ways of\nungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to\nfall or to be precipitate.\n\n_I answer that,_ Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of\nthe soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is\nsaid to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is\nbrought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement or\nof another's, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit\nof the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in the action\nperformed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one\nought to descend in orderly fashion are _memory_ of the past,\n_intelligence_ of the present, _shrewdness_ in considering the future\noutcome, _reasoning_ which compares one thing with another,\n_docility_ in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes counsel\ndescends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into\naction by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking\nthese steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then\ninordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the\nvice of precipitation is contained under imprudence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and\nto the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above\n(Q. 52, A. 2), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Things are said to be done rashly when they are not\ndirected by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through\nthe impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of\nthe directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly\nspeaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride,\nwhich refuses to submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers\nto both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although\nprecipitation refers rather to the first.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Many things have to be considered in the research of\nreason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that \"one\nshould be slow in taking counsel.\" Hence precipitation is more\ndirectly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for\nthe latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Thoughtlessness Is a Special Sin Included in Imprudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin\nincluded in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any\nsin, according to Ps. 18:8, \"The law of the Lord is unspotted\"; and\nyet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Matt. 10:19, \"Take\nno thought how or what to speak.\" Therefore thoughtlessness is not a\nsin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to\nmany things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and\ntherefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is\ncontained under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is\nnot a special sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason,\nviz. _counsel,_ _judgment_ about what has been counselled, and\n_command_ [*Cf. Q. 47, A. 8]. Now thought precedes all these acts,\nsince it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore\nthoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:25): \"Let thy eyes look\nstraight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps.\" Now this\npertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness.\nTherefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Thought signifies the act of the intellect in\nconsidering the truth about something. Now just as research belongs\nto the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in\nspeculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise\njudgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research\nby tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles.\nHence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack\nof right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far,\nto wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of\nthose things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore\nevident that thoughtlessness is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we\nhave the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the\nwords quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no\nopportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or\nthrough a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God\nalone, because \"as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes\nto God,\" according to 2 Paral. 20:12: else if man, instead of doing\nwhat he can, were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he\nwould seem to tempt God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All thought about those things of which counsel takes\ncognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment,\nwherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently\nthoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a\ndeterminate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things\nhave to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in\nspeculative matters, because actions are about singulars.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Inconstancy Is a Vice Contained Under Imprudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained\nunder imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of\nperseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult\nmatters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to\nfortitude rather than to prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): \"Where jealousy [Douay:\n'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil\nwork.\" But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains\nnot to imprudence but to envy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to\npersevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of\n\"incontinency\" in pleasurable matters, and of \"effeminacy\" or\n\"squeamishness\" in unpleasant matters, according to _Ethic._ vii, 1.\nTherefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good\nto the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to\nimprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to\nimprudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good\npurpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a\nman does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account\nof something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this\nwithdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is\ndeceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since\nit can resist the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it\nis due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has\nconceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a\ndefect in the reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical\nreason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack of that\nrectitude belongs to imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its\ncompletion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due\nto a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in\nthe act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act\nof command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason\nfails in commanding what has been counselled and judged.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the moral\nvirtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral\nvirtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater\nimpulse to the contrary.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of contention,\ncause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the\norigin of inconstancy is due, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the\nappetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers\nevil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows\n(which points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands\nfirm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the\npersevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance\nseem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this\npower inconstancy pertains also.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Aforesaid Vices Arise from Lust?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from\nlust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2).\nBut envy is a distinct vice from lust.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): \"A double-minded man is\ninconstant in all his ways.\" Now duplicity does not seem to pertain\nto lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of\ncovetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the\naforesaid vices do not arise from lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect\nof reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than\ncarnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual\nvices rather than from carnal vices.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the\naforesaid vices arise from lust.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) \"pleasure\nabove all corrupts the estimate of prudence,\" and chiefly sexual\npleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight.\nNow the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue\nconsists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the\naforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical\nreason, as stated above (AA. 2, 5), it follows that they arise\nchiefly from lust.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the\nreason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by\ndestroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. vii, 6) that \"the man who is incontinent through anger\nlistens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent\nthrough lust does not listen to it at all.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just\nas inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the\nmind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1,\nsc. 1) that \"love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the\nmore as they lead us away from reason.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 54\n\nOF NEGLIGENCE\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must now consider negligence, under which head there are three\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether negligence is a special sin?\n\n(2) To which virtue is it opposed?\n\n(3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Negligence Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For\nnegligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in\nevery virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special\nsin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins\nneglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in\nsin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not\na special sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every special sin has a determinate matter. But\nnegligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither\nabout evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence\nif he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done\nnegligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that\nnegligence is not a special vice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Sins committed through negligence, are\ndistinguished from those which are committed through contempt.\n\n_I answer that,_ Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every\nlack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence\nis a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin\naccording as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain\nsins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is\nabout sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of\ntheir having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of\nmatter, and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since\nevery act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then\nsolicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9),\nit follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a\nspecial sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because\nthe more we love (_diligimus_) a thing the more solicitous are we\nabout it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for\nevery virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every\nvirtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an\nact of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence\njust as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of\nreason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in\nany kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the\nlack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is\nfound more or less in all sins.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good\nthat one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done\nnegligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of\ngoodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of\nsolicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Negligence Is Opposed to Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that negligence is not opposed to\nprudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or\nlaziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi,\n45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated\nabove (Q. 35, A. 3). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence.\nBut sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the\nexecutive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to\nprudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But\nnegligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is\n_precipitation,_ nor a defect of judgment, since that is\n_thoughtlessness,_ nor a defect of command, because that is\n_inconstancy._ Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): \"He that feareth God,\nneglecteth nothing.\" But every sin is excluded by the opposite\nvirtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to\nprudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): \"A babbler and a\nfool (_imprudens_) will regard no time.\" Now this is due to\nnegligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now\nsolicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to\nprudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to\nimprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore\nobserves (Etym. x) \"a negligent man is one who fails to choose (_nec\neligens_)\": and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence.\nTherefore negligence pertains to imprudence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to\nwhich choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote\nslowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in\nsetting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the\nexecution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from\nsloth, which is \"an oppressive sorrow,\" i.e. hindering, the mind from\naction [*Cf. Q. 35, A. 1; I-II, Q. 35, A. 8].\n\nReply Obj. 2: Omission regards the external act, for it\nconsists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is\nopposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the\nexecution of a just deed is the effect of right reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Negligence regards the act of command, which\nsolicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this\nact otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in\ncommanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the\nnegligent man fails through lack of a prompt will.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because\naccording to Prov. 15:27, \"by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth\nfrom evil.\" Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though\nnegligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites\nman to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (I-II,\nQ. 44, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions, that \"fear makes\nus take counsel.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Negligence Can Be a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin.\nFor a gloss of Gregory [*Moral. ix. 34] on Job 9:28, \"I feared all my\nworks,\" etc. says that \"too little love of God aggravates the\nformer,\" viz. negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love\nof God is done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a\nmortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, \"For thy negligences purify\nthyself with a few,\" says: \"Though the offering be small it cleanses\nthe negligences of many sins.\" Now this would not be, if negligence\nwere a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for\nmortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice\nwas prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal\nsin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 19:16): \"He that neglecteth\nhis own life [Vulg.: 'way'] shall die.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 3), negligence arises out\nof a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of\nsolicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should\ncommand, or as it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen\nto be a mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is\nomitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a\ncircumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin.\nSecondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be so remiss about\nDivine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of God,\nsuch negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when\nnegligence is due to contempt.\n\nBut if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance\nthat is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial\nsin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some\nlack of fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First\nthrough lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence\nthat is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in\nwhich sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a\nmerely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal\nsin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the same authority (gloss), a small\noffering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man\nnot only from venial but also from mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When negligence consists in the omission of that which\nis necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest\ngenus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are\nmore hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them\nin the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public\nconfession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in\npublic.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 55\n\nOF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a\nresemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?\n\n(4) Of guile;\n\n(5) Of fraud;\n\n(6) Of solicitude about temporal things;\n\n(7) Of solicitude about the future;\n\n(8) Of the origin of these vices.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Prudence of the Flesh Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin.\nFor prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it\ngoverns them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither\ntherefore is any prudence a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it\nis lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, \"for no man\never hated his own flesh\" (Eph. 5:29). Therefore prudence of the\nflesh is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he\ntempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or\nof the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any\nprudence of the flesh be accounted among sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness\naccording to Wis. 14:9, \"To God the wicked and his wickedness are\nhateful alike.\" Now it is written (Rom. 8:7): \"The prudence [Vulg.:\n'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God.\" Therefore prudence of the\nflesh is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 13), prudence regards\nthings which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence\nprudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who\nlooks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is\nevident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man\nwith respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of\nthe body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 2, A. 5). Therefore prudence of\nthe flesh is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Justice and temperance include in their very nature\nthat which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the\ncurbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense.\nOn the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing\n(_providendo_), as stated above (Q. 47, A. 1; Q. 49, A. 6), which can\nextend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken\nsimply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken\nin a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to\nbe a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on\naccount of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal\nagent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the\ngood of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in\na good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it\nis thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the\nflesh.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The devil tempts us, not through the good of the\nappetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence\nimplies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of \"prudence\nof the devil,\" as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is\nthe aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as\nworldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak\nof \"carnal\" and again of \"worldly\" prudence, according to Luke 16:8,\n\"The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in\ntheir generation,\" etc. The Apostle includes all in the \"prudence of\nthe flesh,\" because we covet the external things of the world on\naccount of the flesh.\n\nWe may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called\n\"wisdom,\" as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1), we may distinguish a\nthreefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation.\nHence it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is\n\"earthly, sensual and devilish,\" as explained above (Q. 45, A. 1, ad\n1), when we were treating of wisdom.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Prudence of the Flesh Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal\nsin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since\nthis implies contempt of God. Now \"the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of\nthe flesh . . . is not subject to the law of God\" (Rom. 8:7).\nTherefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin.\nNow prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost,\nfor \"it cannot be subject to the law of God\" (Rom. 8:7), and so it\nseems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against\nthe Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good,\nas stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed\nto that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore\nprudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is\nitself a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the\nnature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining\nto the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence,\ndiminishes sin [*Cf. Prov. 6:30]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has\nnot of itself the nature of a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1; A. 13), a man is\nsaid to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to\nthe end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to\nsome particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or\nsomething else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be\ntaken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so\nthat a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the\nflesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so\ndoing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above (I-II,\nQ. 1, A. 5).\n\nIf, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as\ncorresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it\nhappens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some\npleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by a mortal sin;\nin which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal\npleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin\nand pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers\nthe care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about\none's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence\nof the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means\nto an end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby\na man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and\nthis is a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the\nHoly Ghost. For when it is stated that \"it cannot be subject to the\nlaw of God,\" this does not mean that he who has prudence of the\nflesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but that\ncarnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as\nneither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is\nhot may become cold.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is\nshared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed\nto prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in\nsome very grave matter.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Craftiness Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For\nthe words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they\ninduce us to be crafty, according to Prov. 1:4, \"To give craftiness\n[Douay: 'subtlety'] to little ones.\" Therefore craftiness is not a\nsin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): \"The crafty [Douay:\n'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel.\" Therefore, he does so\neither for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no\nsin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to\ncarnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin\ndistinct from prudence of the flesh.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, \"The\nsimplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn,\" says (Moral. x, 29):\n\"The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to\nconceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make\nout the truth to be false,\" and further on he adds: \"This prudence is\nacquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children.\" Now the\nabove things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not\ndistinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems\nnot to be a special sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): \"We renounce the\nhidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor\nadulterating the word of God.\" Therefore craftiness is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Prudence is _right reason applied to action,_ just\nas science is _right reason applied to knowledge._ In speculative\nmatters one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in\none way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to\nbe true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises,\nthat appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion.\nEven so a sin may be against prudence, through having some\nresemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the\nreason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in\nappearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly,\nwhen, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man\nuses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this\nbelongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed\nto prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as\nprudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is\ncraftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of\ntheir mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is\ntaken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in _Ethic._ vi, 12.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for\nan evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false\nand counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if\nit be directed to a good end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Under \"worldly prudence\" Gregory included everything\nthat can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness\nalso.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Guile Is a Sin Pertaining to Craftiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to\ncraftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men.\nYet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Cor.\n12:16, \"Being crafty I caught you by guile.\" Therefore guile is not\nalways a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue,\naccording to Ps. 5:11, \"They dealt deceitfully with their tongues.\"\nNow craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore\nguile does not pertain to craftiness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20): \"Guile [Douay:\n'Deceit'] is in the heart of them that think evil things.\" But the\nthought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness.\nTherefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to\nEph. 4:14, \"By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to\ndeceive\": and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to\ncraftiness.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to craftiness to\nadopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in\norder to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of\nsuch ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as\nregards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly\nto craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs\nto prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be\nconsidered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it\nbelongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain execution of\ncraftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense,\nand improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the\nexecution of craftiness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The execution of craftiness with the purpose of\ndeceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the\nchief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to\nanother man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence\nguile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in\ndeeds, according to Ps. 104:25, \"And to deal deceitfully with his\nservants.\" Guile is also in the heart, according to Ecclus. 19:23,\n\"His interior is full of deceit,\" but this is to devise deceits,\naccording to Ps. 37:13: \"They studied deceits all the day long.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs\ndevise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part\nhe devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end.\nNevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by\nviolence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult,\nit is of less frequent occurrence.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Fraud Pertains to Craftiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness.\nFor a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be\ndeceived, which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves\npraise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1,\n\"Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?\" Therefore\nfraud does not belong to craftiness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or\nreceiving external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that \"a\ncertain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of\nland, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land.\" Now it\npertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain\nexternal things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to\ncraftiness which is opposed to prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the\nfrauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Prov. 1:18)\nconcerning some \"that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits'] against\ntheir own souls.\" Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The object of fraud is to deceive, according to\nJob 13:9, \"Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent\n[Douay: 'deceitful'] dealings?\" Now craftiness is directed to the\nsame object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as _guile_ consists in the execution of\ncraftiness, so also does _fraud._ But they seem to differ in the fact\nthat _guile_ belongs in general to the execution of craftiness,\nwhether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas _fraud_\nbelongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be\ndeceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of\nbeing deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The execution of craftiness may be carried out\nby another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and\naccordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or\nilliberality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against\nthemselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment that\nwhat they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to\nPs. 7:16, \"He is fallen into the hole he made.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 6]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Be Solicitous About Temporal Matters?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal\nmatters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects,\naccording to Rom. 12:8, \"He that ruleth, with solicitude.\" Now\naccording to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things,\naccording to Ps. 8:8, \"Thou hast subjected all things under his\nfeet,\" etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he\nworks. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things\nwhereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10):\n\"If any man will not work, neither let him eat.\" Therefore it is\nlawful to be solicitous about temporal things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy,\naccording to 2 Tim. 1:17, \"When he was come to Rome, he carefully\nsought me.\" Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes\nconnected with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous\nto watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore\nsolicitude about temporal things is not unlawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:31): \"Be not\nsolicitous . . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink,\nor wherewith shall we be clothed?\" And yet such things are very\nnecessary.\n\n_I answer that,_ Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain\nsomething. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when\nthere is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when\nsuccess is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may\nbe unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of\nsolicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence\nAugustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): \"When Our Lord said: 'Be\nnot solicitous, ' etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to\nmake such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do\nwhatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel.\"\nSecondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through\ntoo much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the\nresult being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which\nought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written\n(Matt. 13:22) that \"the care of this world . . . chokes up the word.\"\nThirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack\nnecessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives\nthree motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the\nyet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his\nsolicitude, viz. his body and soul (Matt. 6:26); secondly, on account\nof the care with which God watches over animals and plants without\nthe assistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature;\nthirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the\ngentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others.\nConsequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all\nabout spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted\nus according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use\nthem according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them\nand be over solicitous about them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily\nlabor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on\nMatt. 6:31, \"Be not solicitous,\" that \"labor is necessary, but\nsolicitude must be banished,\" namely superfluous solicitude which\nunsettles the mind.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things\nis directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful,\nunless it be superfluous.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 7]\n\nWhether We Should Be Solicitous About the Future?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we should be solicitous about the\nfuture. For it is written (Prov. 6:6-8): \"Go to the ant, O sluggard,\nand consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no\nguide, nor master . . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer,\nand gathereth her food in the harvest.\" Now this is to be solicitous\nabout the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is\npraiseworthy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is\nchiefly about the future, since its principal part is _foresight of\nfuture things,_ as stated above (Q. 49, A. 6, ad 1). Therefore it is\nvirtuous to be solicitous about the future.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for\nthe morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (John 12:6)\nthat Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and\n(Acts 4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which\nhad been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous\nabout the future.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:34): \"Be not . . .\nsolicitous for tomorrow\"; where \"tomorrow\" stands for the future, as\nJerome says in his commentary on this passage.\n\n_I answer that,_ No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with\nits due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to\nEccles. 8:6, \"There is a time and opportunity for every business\";\nwhich applies not only to external deeds but also to internal\nsolicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude;\nthus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and\nsolicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a\nman were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be\nneedlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time.\nHence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying:\n\"Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow,\" wherefore He adds, \"for the\nmorrow will be solicitous for itself,\" that is to say, the morrow\nwill have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the\nsoul. This is what He means by adding: \"Sufficient for the day is\nthe evil thereof,\" namely, the burden of solicitude.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is\nthis that is proposed for our example.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it\nwould be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a\nman were to seek temporal things, to which the terms \"past\" and\n\"future\" apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the\nneeds of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for\nsolicitude.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17),\n\"when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these\nneedful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the\nmorrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse,\nand we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the\nnecessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a\nthreatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who\naccording to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but\nthose who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things.\"\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 8]\n\nWhether These Vices Arise from Covetousness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from\ncovetousness. As stated above (Q. 43, A. 6) lust is the chief cause\nof lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to\nright reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from\nlust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that\n\"Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored\" and that \"he\nwho is incontinent in desire acts with cunning.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence,\nas stated above (Q. 47, A. 13). Now, since prudence is in the reason,\nthe more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride\nand vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride\nrather than from covetousness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold\nof other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of\nwhich pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use\nof stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the\naforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a\ndaughter of covetousness.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 47, A. 13), carnal\nprudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain\nresemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among\nall the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason\nappears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the\nundue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice,\nthe chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices\narise chiefly from covetousness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of\nconcupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising\nits act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason,\nalbeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust.\nWhen the Philosopher says that \"Venus is full of guile,\" he is\nreferring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away\nsuddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means\nof craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and\npleasure; wherefore he adds that \"Venus doth cozen the wits of the\nwisest man\" [*Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217].\n\nReply Obj. 2: To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to\npusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or\napes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use\nof fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from\ncovetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by\nexcellence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with\nprecipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the\naforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use\nstratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from\nhatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the\nPhilosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2, 3) [*Cf. _Ethic._ vii, 6].\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 56\n\nOF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which\nhead there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) The precepts of prudence;\n\n(2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 56, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Precepts of the Decalogue Should Have Included a Precept\nof Prudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should\nhave included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should\ninclude a precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are\nthose of the decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief of the moral\nvirtues, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have\nincluded a precept of prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law\nespecially with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the\nteaching of the Gospel contains a precept of prudence (Matt. 10:16):\n\"Be ye . . . prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents.\" Therefore the\nprecepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are directed\nto the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written (Malach.\n4:4): \"Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in\nHoreb.\" Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include precepts\nof prudence; for instance (Prov. 3:5): \"Lean not upon thy own\nprudence\"; and further on (Prov. 4:25): \"Let thine eyelids go before\nthy steps.\" Therefore the Law also should have contained a precept of\nprudence, especially among the precepts of the decalogue.\n\nThe contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts\nof the decalogue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3; A. 5, ad 1)\nwhen we were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue\nbeing given to the whole people, are a matter of common knowledge to\nall, as coming under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost\namong the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of human\nlife, which are to the practical order what naturally known\nprinciples are to the speculative order, as shown above (Q. 47, A.\n6). Now prudence is not about the end, but about the means, as stated\nabove (Q. 47, A. 6). Hence it was not fitting that the precepts of\nthe decalogue should include a precept relating directly to prudence.\nAnd yet all the precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence, in\nso far as it directs all virtuous acts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although prudence is simply foremost among all the\nmoral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its\nobject under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary\ncondition for a precept, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1; I-II, Q. 99,\nAA. 1, 5). Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are\nthose of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than to prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of\nperfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all\nmatters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore\nit behooved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament\nis directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so it\nbehooved man to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old\nTestament about the act of prudence which is directed to the means.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 56, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Prohibitive Precepts Relating to the Vices Opposed to\nPrudence Are Fittingly Propounded in the Old Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to\nthe vices opposed to prudence are unfittingly propounded in the Old\nLaw. For such vices as imprudence and its parts which are directly\nopposed to prudence are not less opposed thereto, than those which\nbear a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices\nconnected with it. Now the latter vices are forbidden in the Law: for\nit is written (Lev. 19:13): \"Thou shalt not calumniate thy neighbor,\"\nand (Deut. 25:13): \"Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a\ngreater and a less.\" Therefore there should have also been\nprohibitive precepts about the vices directly opposed to prudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in\nbuying and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud\nsolely in buying and selling.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of\nvirtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts of\nprudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any\ncontrary vices have been forbidden in the Law.\n\nThe contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are\nquoted in the first objection.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), justice, above all, regards\nthe aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a\nprecept, because justice tends to render that which is due to\nanother, as we shall state further on (Q. 58, A. 2). Now craftiness,\nas to its execution, is committed chiefly in matters of justice, as\nstated above (Q. 55, A. 8): and so it was fitting that the Law should\ncontain precepts forbidding the execution of craftiness, in so far as\nthis pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and fraud in\ncalumniating another or in stealing his goods.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those vices that are manifestly opposed to prudence, do\nnot pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution of\ncraftiness, and so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and\nguile are, which latter pertain to injustice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All guile and fraud committed in matters of injustice,\ncan be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of calumny (Lev.\n19:13). Yet fraud and guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in\nbuying and selling, according to Ecclus. 26:28, \"A huckster shall not\nbe justified from the sins of the lips\": and it is for this reason\nthat the Law contained a special precept forbidding fraudulent buying\nand selling.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts of\njustice pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts\nprohibitive of stealing, calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to\nthe execution of craftiness.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 57\n\nOF RIGHT\n(In Four Articles)\n\nAfter considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice,\nthe consideration of which will be fourfold:\n\n(1) Of justice;\n\n(2) Of its parts;\n\n(3) Of the corresponding gift;\n\n(4) Of the precepts relating to justice.\n\nFour points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2)\nJustice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether right is the object of justice?\n\n(2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive\nright?\n\n(3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right?\n\n(4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Right Is the Object of Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice.\nFor the jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that\n\"right is the art of goodness and equality.\" Now art is not the\nobject of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore\nright is not the object of justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Law,\" according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), \"is a kind\nof right.\" Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence,\nwherefore the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons \"legislative\" as\none of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of\njustice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for\nAugustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that \"justice is love serving\nGod alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to\nman.\" Now right (_jus_) does not pertain to Divine things, but only\nto human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that \"_fas_ is the\nDivine law, and _jus,_ the human law.\" Therefore right is not the\nobject of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that \"_jus_ (right) is\nso called because it is just.\" Now the _just_ is the object of\njustice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that \"all are\nagreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men\ncapable of doing just actions.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is proper to justice, as compared with the other\nvirtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it\ndenotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are\nwont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for\nequality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other\nhand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit\nhim in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the\nworks of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue\ntends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent\nonly, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to\nthe agent, is set up by its relation to others. Because a man's work\nis said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some\nkind of equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a\nservice rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having the\nrectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice,\nwithout taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent:\nwhereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be right unless\nit is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason justice has\nits own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and\nthis object is called the just, which is the same as _right._ Hence\nit is evident that right is the object of justice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from their\noriginal signification so as to mean something else: thus the word\n\"medicine\" was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a\nsick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this\nis done. In like manner the word _jus_ (right) was first of all used\nto denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to\ndesignate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to\ndenote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to\nappear _in jure_ [*In English we speak of a court of law, a barrister\nat law, etc.], and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the\noffice of exercising justice, administers the _jus_ even if his\nsentence be unjust.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman\nan expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which\nexpression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists\nin the mind an expression of the particular just work which the\nreason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this\nrule be expressed in writing it is called a \"law,\" which according to\nIsidore (Etym. v, 1) is \"a written decree\": and so law is not the\nsame as right, but an expression of right.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot\noffer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a\nperfectly just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not\nproperly called _jus_ but _fas,_ because, to wit, God is satisfied if\nwe accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man\nrepay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Right Is Fittingly Divided into Natural Right and Positive\nRight?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into\nnatural right and positive right. For that which is natural is\nunchangeable, and is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to\nbe found in human affairs, since all the rules of human right fail in\ncertain cases, nor do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there\nis no such thing as natural right.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing is called \"positive\" when it proceeds from\nthe human will. But a thing is not just, simply because it proceeds\nfrom the human will, else a man's will could not be unjust. Since\nthen the \"just\" and the \"right\" are the same, it seems that there is\nno positive right.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Divine right is not natural right, since it\ntranscends human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive\nright, since it is based not on human, but on Divine authority.\nTherefore right is unfittingly divided into natural and positive.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that \"political\njustice is partly natural and partly legal,\" i.e. established by law.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) the \"right\" or the \"just\" is\na work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of\nequality. Now a thing can be adjusted to a man in two ways: first by\nits very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive\nequal value in return, and this is called \"natural right.\" In another\nway a thing is adjusted or commensurated to another person, by\nagreement, or by common consent, when, to wit, a man deems himself\nsatisfied, if he receive so much. This can be done in two ways: first\nby private agreement, as that which is confirmed by an agreement\nbetween private individuals; secondly, by public agreement, as when\nthe whole community agrees that something should be deemed as though\nit were adjusted and commensurated to another person, or when this is\ndecreed by the prince who is placed over the people, and acts in its\nstead, and this is called \"positive right.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: That which is natural to one whose nature is\nunchangeable, must needs be such always and everywhere. But man's\nnature is changeable, wherefore that which is natural to man may\nsometimes fail. Thus the restitution of a deposit to the depositor is\nin accordance with natural equality, and if human nature were always\nright, this would always have to be observed; but since it happens\nsometimes that man's will is unrighteous there are cases in which a\ndeposit should not be restored, lest a man of unrighteous will make\nevil use of the thing deposited: as when a madman or an enemy of the\ncommon weal demands the return of his weapons.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The human will can, by common agreement, make a thing\nto be just provided it be not, of itself, contrary to natural\njustice, and it is in such matters that positive right has its place.\nHence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that \"in the case of the\nlegal just, it does not matter in the first instance whether it takes\none form or another, it only matters when once it is laid down.\" If,\nhowever, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human\nwill cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful\nto steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is written (Isa. 10:1): \"Woe\nto them that make wicked laws.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Divine right is that which is promulgated by God.\nSuch things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their\njustice is hidden to man, and partly are made just by God's decree.\nHence also Divine right may be divided in respect of these two\nthings, even as human right is. For the Divine law commands certain\nthings because they are good, and forbids others, because they are\nevil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others\nevil because they are forbidden.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Right of Nations Is the Same As the Natural Right?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the right of nations is the same as\nthe natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is\nnatural to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the\njurist [*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] \"the right of\nnations is that which is in use among all nations.\" Therefore the\nright of nations is the natural right.\n\nObj. 2: Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally\nslaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now \"slavery\nbelongs to the right of nations,\" as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4).\nTherefore the right of nations is a natural right.\n\nObj. 3: Further, right as stated above (A. 2) is divided into natural\nand positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since\nall nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement.\nTherefore the right of nations is a natural right.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that \"right is either\nnatural, or civil, or right of nations,\" and consequently the right\nof nations is distinct from natural right.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the natural right or just is\nthat which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with\nanother person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as\nit is considered absolutely: thus a male by [his] very nature is\ncommensurate with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent\nis commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is\nnaturally commensurate with another person, not according as it is\nconsidered absolutely, but according to something resultant from it,\nfor instance the possession of property. For if a particular piece of\nland be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should\nbelong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in\nrespect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of\nthe land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one\nand not of another man, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2).\n\nNow it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend\na thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is\ncommon to us and other animals according to the first kind of\ncommensuration. But the right of nations falls short of natural right\nin this sense, as the jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says\nbecause \"the latter is common to all animals, while the former is\ncommon to men only.\" On the other hand to consider a thing by\ncomparing it with what results from it, is proper to reason,\nwherefore this same is natural to man in respect of natural reason\nwhich dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De\nJust. et Jure i, 9): \"whatever natural reason decrees among all men,\nis observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations.\" This\nsuffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular\nman should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on\nnatural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful\nto this man to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be\nhelped by the former, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2).\nWherefore slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in\nthe second way, but not in the first.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since natural reason dictates matters which are\naccording to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality,\nit follows that they need no special institution, for they are\ninstituted by natural reason itself, as stated by the authority\nquoted above.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Paternal Right and Right of Dominion Should Be Distinguished\nAs Special Species?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that \"paternal right\" and \"right of\ndominion\" should not be distinguished as special species. For it\nbelongs to justice to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose\nstates (De Offic. i, 24). Now right is the object of justice, as\nstated above (A. 1). Therefore right belongs to each one equally; and\nwe ought not to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as\ndistinct species.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as stated\nabove (A. 1, ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a city or\nkingdom, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), but not to the private\ngood of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no\nneed for a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the\nmaster and the father pertain to a household, as stated in _Polit._\ni, 2.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there are many other differences of degrees among\nmen, for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are\nprinces. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to\nthem.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right\nof dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil\nright.\n\n_I answer that,_ Right or just depends on commensuration with another\nperson. Now \"another\" has a twofold signification. First, it may\ndenote something that is other simply, as that which is altogether\ndistinct; as, for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the\nother, and both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and\nbetween these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is the\n\"just\" simply. Secondly a thing is said to be other from something\nelse, not simply, but as belonging in some way to that something\nelse: and in this way, as regards human affairs, a son belongs to his\nfather, since he is part of him somewhat, as stated in _Ethic._ viii,\n12, and a slave belongs to his master, because he is his instrument,\nas stated in _Polit._ i, 2 [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 11]. Hence a father\nis not compared to his son as to another simply, and so between them\nthere is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called \"paternal.\"\nIn like manner neither is there the just simply, between master and\nservant, but that which is called \"dominative.\" A wife, though she is\nsomething belonging to the husband, since she stands related to him\nas to her own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28), is\nnevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his\nfather, or a slave from his master: for she is received into a kind\nof social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice between\nhusband and wife than between father and son, or master and slave,\nbecause, as husband and wife have an immediate relation to the\ncommunity of the household, as stated in _Polit._ i, 2, 5, it follows\nthat between them there is \"domestic justice\" rather than \"civic.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one his right,\nthe distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man\ngives himself his due, this is not strictly called \"just.\" And since\nwhat belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs to the\nslave is his master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not\njustice of father to son, or of master to slave.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as\nsuch, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is\nsomething having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence\nin so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in\na way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the\nrelations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in\nso far as each is something belonging to another, the perfect idea of\n\"right\" or \"just\" is wanting to them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All other differences between one person and another in\na state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state and\nto its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect\nsense of justice. This \"just\" however is distinguished according to\nvarious offices, hence when we speak of \"military,\" or \"magisterial,\"\nor \"priestly\" right, it is not as though such rights fell short of\nthe simply right, as when we speak of \"paternal\" right, or right of\n\"dominion,\" but for the reason that something proper is due to each\nclass of person in respect of his particular office.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 58\n\nOF JUSTICE\n(In Twelve Articles)\n\nWe must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) What is justice?\n\n(2) Whether justice is always towards another?\n\n(3) Whether it is a virtue?\n\n(4) Whether it is in the will as its subject?\n\n(5) Whether it is a general virtue?\n\n(6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every\nvirtue?\n\n(7) Whether there is a particular justice?\n\n(8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own?\n\n(9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only?\n\n(10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?\n\n(11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own?\n\n(12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Justice Is Fittingly Defined As Being the Perpetual and\nConstant Will to Render to Each One His Right?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined\njustice as being \"the perpetual and constant will to render to each\none his right\" [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according\nto the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a\nman \"capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and\nin intention.\" Now \"will\" denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore\njustice is unfittingly defined as being a will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the\nwill were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is\nunrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is\nrectitude. Therefore justice is not the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore\njustice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is\nunchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say\nthat it is both \"perpetual\" and \"constant.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his\nright. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows\nthat it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd.\n\nObj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that \"justice\nis love serving God alone.\" Therefore it does not render to each one\nhis right.\n\n_I answer that,_ The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if\nunderstood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the\nprinciple of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of\nthe good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the\nproper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our\nintercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (A. 2).\nHence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object\nis indicated in the words, \"Rendering to each one his right,\" since,\nas Isidore says (Etym. x), \"a man is said to be just because he\nrespects the rights (_jus_) of others.\"\n\nNow in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be\nvirtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be\nvirtuous it needs first of all to be done \"knowingly,\" secondly to be\ndone \"by choice,\" and \"for a due end,\" thirdly to be done\n\"immovably.\" Now the first of these is included in the second, since\n\"what is done through ignorance is involuntary\" (Ethic. iii, 1).\nHence the definition of justice mentions first the \"will,\" in order\nto show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is\nmade afterwards of its \"constancy\" and \"perpetuity\" in order to\nindicate the firmness of the act.\n\nAccordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the\nact is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from\nthat act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would\nreduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that\n\"justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a\nconstant and perpetual will\": and this is about the same definition\nas that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that \"justice\nis a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions\nin accordance with his choice.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is\ncustomary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus\nAugustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that \"faith is to believe what\none sees not.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but\ncausally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on\nthe part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's\nwill alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject,\nbecause, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always, and this\nis a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the\nconditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some\nparticular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find\na man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that\none should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all\ncases.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Since \"perpetual\" does not imply perpetuity of the act\nof the will, it is not superfluous to add \"constant\": for while the\n\"perpetual will\" denotes the purpose of observing justice always,\n\"constant\" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.\n\nReply Obj. 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way\nof command and direction, because a judge is the \"personification of\njustice,\" and \"the sovereign is its guardian\" (Ethic. v, 4). On the\nother hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by\nway of execution.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as\nstated above (Q. 25, A. 1), so too the service of God includes\nrendering to each one his due.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Justice Is Always Towards Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards\nanother. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that \"the justice of God is\nby faith of Jesus Christ.\" Now faith does not concern the dealings of\none man with another. Neither therefore does justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), \"it\nbelongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his\nauthority over the things that are subject to him.\" Now the sensitive\nappetite is subject to man, according to Gen. 4:7, where it is\nwritten: \"The lust thereof,\" viz. of sin, \"shall be under thee, and\nthou shalt have dominion over it.\" Therefore it belongs to justice to\nhave dominion over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards\noneself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is\nco-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards\nanother.\n\nObj. 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no\nless than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified\nby justice, according to Prov. 11:5, \"The justice of the upright\nshall make his way prosperous.\" Therefore justice is about our\ndealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that \"the object of\njustice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse.\"\nNow this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore\njustice is concerned only about our dealings with others.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 57, A. 1) since justice by its\nname implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another,\nfor a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as\nit belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q. 57,\nA. 1; I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) this otherness which justice demands must\nneeds be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to\nsupposits [*Cf. I, Q. 29, A. 2] and wholes and, properly speaking,\nnot to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the\nhand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing\nhot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed\nmetaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a\ndistinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards\nanother. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak\nmetaphorically of his various principles of action such as the\nreason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so\nmany agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is\nsaid to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and\nconcupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to\neach part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this \"metaphorical justice.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby\nthe ungodly is justified: it consists in the due coordination of the\nparts of the soul, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) where we were\ntreating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to\nmetaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all\nby himself.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God's justice is from eternity in respect of the\neternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice\nconsists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since\nnothing is co-eternal with God.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified\nby the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But\nhis dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in\nrelation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom\nthey are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special\nvirtue, and this is justice.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Justice Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is\nwritten (Luke 17:10): \"When you shall have done all these things that\nare commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done\nthat which we ought to do.\" Now it is not unprofitable to do a\nvirtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): \"We look to a\nprofit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition\nof godliness.\" Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a\nvirtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is\nnot a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious.\nBut to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is\nof necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous\nactions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now\nthose things which are wrought externally are not things concerning\nbehavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher\n(Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to\njustice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems\nthat justice is not a moral virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that \"the entire\nstructure of good works is built on four virtues,\" viz. temperance,\nprudence, fortitude and justice.\n\n_I answer that,_ A human virtue is one \"which renders a human act and\nman himself good\" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice.\nFor a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason,\nwhich is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since\njustice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders\nman's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7),\ngood men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he\nsays again (De Officiis i, 7) \"the luster of virtue appears above all\nin justice.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the\nperson to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing\nhim a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what\nhe ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously.\nHence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom \"teacheth\ntemperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such\nthings as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in\nlife.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from _constraint,_ and\nthis removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other\narises from the obligation of a _command,_ or from the necessity of\nobtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of\nvirtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does\nnot remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary\nin this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation,\naccording to 1 Cor. 9:16, \"If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to\nme, for a necessity lieth upon me.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by\nmaking them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings\nwith other men.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Justice Is in the Will As Its Subject?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its\nsubject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in\nthe will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will\nas its subject.\n\nObj. 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it\nbelongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another.\nTherefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is\nnot directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral\nvirtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is\n\"rational by participation,\" viz. the irascible and the\nconcupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore\njustice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and\nconcupiscible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that \"justice is\nrectitude of the will observed for its own sake.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that\nvirtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an\nact of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through\nknowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the\nintellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said\nto be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate\nprinciple of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in\nsome appetitive power as its subject.\n\nNow the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason\nand the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension,\nand is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in\nthe First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Again the act of rendering his due to\neach man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because\nsensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider\nthe relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the\nreason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible\nas its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic.\nv, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (A.\n1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since the will is the rational appetite, when the\nrectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the\nwill on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains\nthe name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the\nname of truth.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on\nthe apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one\nthing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation\nto another, and this belongs to justice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are\n_rational by participation,_ but the entire _appetitive_ faculty, as\nstated in _Ethic._ i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason.\nNow the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can\nbe the subject of moral virtue.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Justice Is a General Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For\njustice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7,\n\"She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude.\"\nNow the \"general\" is not specified or reckoned together with the\nspecies contained under the same \"general.\" Therefore justice is not\na general virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are\ntemperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is\nreckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in\nany way be reckoned a general virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above\n(A. 2). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a\ngeneral sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against\noneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that \"justice\nis every virtue.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Justice, as stated above (A. 2) directs man in his\nrelations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as\nregards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his\nrelations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a\ncommunity, serves all those who are included in that community.\nAccordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to\nanother in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are\nincluded in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts\nto a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that\nwhatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the\nwhole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such\nvirtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain\nother individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which\njustice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice,\nin so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense\nthat justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the\nlaw to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A.\n2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general,\nis called \"legal justice,\" because thereby man is in harmony with the\nlaw which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other\nvirtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state\nfurther on (AA. 7, 12).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite,\nviz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are\nappetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are\ncognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the\nintellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal\ngood as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence\njustice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to\nanother, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal\njustice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a\ngeneral virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general\nsin; hence it is written (1 John 3:4) that all \"sin is iniquity.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Justice, As a General Virtue, Is Essentially the Same As All\nVirtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is\nessentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.\nv, 1) that \"virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but\ndiffer in their mode of being.\" Now things that differ merely in\ntheir mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore\njustice is essentially the same as every virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all\nvirtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to\nthe Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) \"is not a part but the whole of\nvirtue.\" Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as\nall virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that\nvirtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of\ntemperance remains essentially the same even though its act be\ndirected to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the\nacts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the\ncommon good of the multitude, which transcends the good of one single\nindividual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of\nthe whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without\nuse or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be\nso. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that\ndoes not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good;\nand so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all\nvirtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that \"many are\nable to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable\nto be virtuous in matters relating to others,\" and (Polit. iii, 2)\nthat \"the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the\nvirtue of the good citizen.\" Now the virtue of a good citizen is\ngeneral justice, whereby a man is directed to the common good.\nTherefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and\nit is possible to have one without the other.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be \"general\" in two ways. First,\nby _predication:_ thus \"animal\" is general in relation to man and\nhorse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must\nneeds be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it\nis general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of\nthe species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is\nsaid to be general _virtually;_ thus a universal cause is general in\nrelation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to\nall bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in\nthis sense there is no need for that which is \"general\" to be\nessentially the same as those things in relation to which it is\ngeneral, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it\nis in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (A. 5),\nlegal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as\nit directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is\nto move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may\nbe called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all\nthe virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as\nit directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.\nAccordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its\nproper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too\nlegal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so\nfar as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it\nis in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it\nis secondarily and administratively in his subjects.\n\nHowever the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so\nfar as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid\nlegal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless\nvirtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially\nthe same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in\nthis sense that the Philosopher speaks.\n\nWherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the\nvirtue commanded by legal justice.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act\nto that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a\nfurther end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue\nconsidered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to\nthat end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially\ndistinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the\ncommon good; and this virtue is legal justice.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 7]\n\nWhether There Is a Particular Besides a General Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a\ngeneral justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as\nneither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man\nsufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is\nno need for a particular justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to\n\"one\" and \"many.\" But legal justice directs one man to another in\nmatters relating to the multitude, as shown above (AA. 5, 6).\nTherefore there is not another species of justice directing one man\nto another in matters relating to the individual.\n\nObj. 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands\nthe household community. Consequently, if in addition to general\njustice there is a particular justice corresponding to the\nindividual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice\ndirecting man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not\nthe case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a\nlegal justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom in his commentary on Matt. 5:6,\n\"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,\" says (Hom.\nxv in Matth.): \"By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or\nthe particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), legal justice is not\nessentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which\ndirects man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other\nvirtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular\ngoods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another\nindividual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice\nthere is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to\nhimself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal\njustice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his\nrelations to other individuals.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in\nhis relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so\nimmediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so\nmediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a\nman immediately to the good of another individual.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of\nthe individual differ not only in respect of the _many_ and the\n_few,_ but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the _common_\ngood differs from the aspect of the _individual_ good, even as the\naspect of _whole_ differs from that of _part._ Wherefore the\nPhilosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that \"they are wrong who maintain that\nthe State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and\nnot specifically.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher\n(Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely\n\"of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave,\" in each of\nwhich one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between\nsuch persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice,\nviz. _domestic_ justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 6.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Particular Justice Has a Special Matter?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special\nmatter. Because a gloss on Gen. 2:14, \"The fourth river is\nEuphrates,\" says: \"Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated\nthrough what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the\nparts of the soul.\" Now this would not be the case, if justice had a\nspecial matter, since every special matter belongs to a special\npower. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that \"the soul\nhas four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz.\ntemperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;\" and he says that \"the\nfourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues.\" Therefore\nparticular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no\nspecial matter.\n\nObj. 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating\nto others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters\nrelating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and\nnot special.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular\njustice to be specially about those things which belong to social\nlife.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of\nmoral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can\nrectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external\nactions, and also those external things of which man can make use.\nAnd yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by\nmeans of which men can communicate with one another, that the\nrelation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in\nrespect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in\nhimself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not\nabout the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external\nactions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in\nso far as one man is related to another through them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part\nof the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will\nwhich moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and\naccordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not\ndirectly but by a kind of diffusion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the cardinal\nvirtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each\nhaving a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of\nvirtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted:\nfor he says that \"prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and\navoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures,\nfortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice\nis the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues,\nthat is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between\none man and another.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: A man's internal passions which are a part of moral\nmatter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs\nto the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external\nactions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently\nit does not follow that the matter of justice is general.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Justice Is About the Passions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that justice is about the passions. For\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that \"moral virtue is about\npleasure and pain.\" Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions,\nas stated above [*I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1] when\nwe were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral\nvirtue, is about the passions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's\noperations in relation to another man. Now such like operations\ncannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is\nowing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the\naforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and\novermuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs\nbe about the passions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another person\nso is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it\nwould not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently\nabout the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is\nabout operations.\n\n_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question may be gathered\nfrom a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from\nthe will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 59, A. 4), for it is only the sensitive\nappetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not\nabout the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the\nirascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the\nmatter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we\nare not directed immediately to another by the internal passions.\nTherefore justice is not about the passions.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as\nits proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but\nevery moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be\nacquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), \"pleasure\nand pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this\nis an evil, and that a good\": and in this way too they belong to\njustice, since \"a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions\"\n(Ethic. i, 8).\n\nReply Obj. 2: External operations are as it were between external\nthings, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are\ntheir origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one\nof these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may\nsteal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing,\nbut through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet\nanother's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the\ndirecting of operations in so far as they tend towards external\nthings, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the\npassions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the\npassions. Hence justice hinders theft of another's property, in so\nfar as stealing is contrary to the equality that should be maintained\nin external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an\nimmoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations\ntake their species, not from the internal passions but from external\nthings as being their objects, it follows that, external operations\nare essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral\nvirtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The common good is the end of each individual\nmember of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of\neach part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end\nof another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to\nthe common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions\nwhereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than\nparticular justice which is directed to the good of another\nindividual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in\nthe point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as \"the law\ncommands us to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the\nactions of a temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle\nperson\" (Ethic. v, 5).\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 10]\n\nWhether the Mean of Justice Is the Real Mean?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real\nmean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now\nmoral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be \"an elective habit which\nobserves the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason.\" Therefore justice\nobserves the rational and not the real mean.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither\nexcess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is\nclearly the case with the virtues, according to _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now\njustice is about things that are good simply, as stated in _Ethic._\nv. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe\nthe rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean\nvaries according to different persons, since what is too much for one\nis too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case\nin justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same\npunishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice\nalso observes, not the real, but the rational mean.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the\nmean of justice is to be taken according to \"arithmetical\"\nproportion, so that it is the real mean.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9; I-II, Q. 59, A. 4), the other\nmoral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation\nof which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is\nthe subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are\nvested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such\nlike virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to\nanother, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so\nthat with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our\nregard.\n\nOn the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so\nfar as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly\nproportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice\nconsists in a certain proportion of equality between the external\nthing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between\ngreater and less, as stated in _Metaph._ x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf.\n_Ethic._ v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore\njustice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways.\nFirst a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good;\nand there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply\nin this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through\nbeing good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil\nthrough being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it\nis possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who\ncan use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is\nabout things that are good simply.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a\nprince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each\ninjury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and\nthis implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 11]\n\nWhether the Act of Justice Is to Render to Each One His Own?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render\nto each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to\njustice the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we\ngive them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice\ndoes not consist in rendering to each one his own.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that \"beneficence which\nwe may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice.\" Now it\npertains to liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what\nis his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to\neach one his own.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things\nduly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery\nand so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to\nbelong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of\njustice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in\nrendering to each one his own.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): \"It is justice\nthat renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's\nproperty; it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the\ncommon equity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 8, 10), the matter of justice\nis an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use\nby it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are\nrelated by justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him\naccording to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of\njustice is nothing else than to render to each one his own.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary\nvirtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with\nit, as we shall state further on (Q. 80, A. 1). Wherefore to succor\nthe needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally\nbeneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction\nascribed to justice as to their principal virtue.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of\njustice, the name of \"profit\" is extended to whatever is excessive,\nand whatever is deficient is called \"loss.\" The reason for this is\nthat justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary\ninterchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those\nexpressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to\nall other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to\neach one of what is his own.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 12]\n\nWhether Justice Stands Foremost Among All Moral Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among\nall the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to\neach one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of\none's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a\ngreater virtue than justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than\nitself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all\nthe virtues, according to _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is\nmore excellent than justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, virtue is about that which is \"difficult\" and\n\"good,\" as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3. But fortitude is about more\ndifficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death,\naccording to _Ethic._ iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent\nthan justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): \"Justice is the most\nresplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it\nstands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the\ncommon good transcends the individual good of one person. In this\nsense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that \"the most excellent\nof the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than\neither the evening or the morning star.\" But, even if we speak of\nparticular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two\nreasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because\njustice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational\nappetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the\nsensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the\nmatter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from\nthe object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of\nthe sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is\npraiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed\ntowards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another\nperson, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.\ni, 9): \"The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most\nprofitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing\ngood to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the\nbrave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and\njustice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does\nso in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own\nvirtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through\nconsideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed\ntowards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again\nliberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby\none renders to each man what is his.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the\nlatter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a\nvirtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult things,\nit is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas\njustice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 59\n\nOF INJUSTICE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether injustice is a special vice?\n\n(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?\n\n(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?\n\n(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Injustice Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For\nit is written (1 John 3:4): \"All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'Whosoever\ncommitteth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity'].\" Now\niniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a\nkind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as\ninequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But\ninjustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it\nis opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness,\nand in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is\nnot a special sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the\nwill. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus\nAnim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a\nspecial virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.\n\n_I answer that,_ Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal\ninjustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially\na special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the\ncommon good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as\nregards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to\nall kinds of sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the\ncommon good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose\nfrom injustice, in accord with what has been said above about justice\n(Q. 58, AA. 5, 6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an\ninequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to\nhave more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such\nas toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a\nparticular vice opposed to particular justice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human\ncommon good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to\nwhich all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be\niniquity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to\nall the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both\nto justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways\nas stated above (Q. 58, A. 9, ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral\nmatters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to\nanother person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in\nthe point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and\nthe same applies to injustice.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 2]\n\nWhether a Man Is Called Unjust Through Doing an Unjust Thing?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing\nan unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper object of justice is the\njust, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a\nman should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust\nthrough doing an unjust thing.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they\nhold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do\nsuddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of\ndoing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not\nbe false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is\nunjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he\ndoes an unjust thing.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper\nact, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does\nwhat is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever\ndoes an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that \"a man may\ndo an unjust thing without being unjust.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Even as the object of justice is something equal in\nexternal things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal,\nthrough more or less being assigned to some person than is due to\nhim. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of\nits proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may\nhappen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not\nunjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the\noperation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species\nand name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in\nthings directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and\nthe indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that\nwhich is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for\ninstance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is\nunjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but\nonly indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is\nunjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly,\nthis may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the\noperation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a\npassion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice,\nfor instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's\ncomplacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a\nhabit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit\nis, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust\nintentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which\nsense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man\nmay do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without\nhaving the habit of injustice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct and\nformal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from\nchoice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the\nsake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as\nthe Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The object of temperance is not something established\nexternally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance,\ni.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man\nhimself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be\nsaid to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner\nneither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there is\ndissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as\nregards the proportion between operation and habit, there is\nsimilarity in all respects.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 3]\n\nWhether We Can Suffer Injustice Willingly?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly.\nFor injustice is inequality, as stated above (A. 2). Now a man by\ninjuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another.\nTherefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another.\nBut whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily.\nTherefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be\ninflicted by himself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for\nhaving committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished\naccording to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable\nburial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man\ncan do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a\nman suffers injustice voluntarily.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers\nthat injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one\nwho wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it\nis worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice\nvoluntarily.\n\n_On the contrary,_ To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are\ncontraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore\non the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.\n\n_I answer that,_ Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent,\nwhereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in\nthe same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in\n_Phys._ iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is\nthe will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does\nvoluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he\nsuffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a\nprinciple in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather\nthan passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly\nspeaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an\ninjustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so\nto speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to\nbe done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally),\nor to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to\nanother more than he owes him).\n\nReply Obj. 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he\ndoes not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a\nman's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if\nhe forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by\nanother's action.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An individual person may be considered in two ways.\nFirst, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on\nhimself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin,\nintemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because\ninjustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person.\nSecondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the\nState as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and\nimage; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to\nhimself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in\naccordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle\ndeclares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): \"If any man\nviolate the temple of God, him shall God destroy.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now\nin the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is\nthat which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above\n(A. 2), and the formal and essential element is on the part of\nthe will of agent and patient, as stated above (A. 2).\nAccordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and\ninjustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the\nmaterial sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an\ninjustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other\nman does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and\non the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an\ninjustice against his will, while the man who does the injury\nunknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Whoever Does an Injustice Sins Mortally?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice\nsins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is\nsometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: \"Whatever they\ndo not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter.\"\nTherefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs\nbut slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and\nshould be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher\ndeclares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an\ninjustice sins mortally.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is the \"mother of all the virtues\" [*Peter\nLombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto\nthat a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the\nother virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin\nto do an injustice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal\nsin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the\nlaw of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to\nmurder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (Q.\n64, seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 12, A. 5), when we were\ntreating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is\ncontrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury\ninflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which\nmoves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always\nconsists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that\nto do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be\nunderstood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls\n\"ignorance of particular circumstances\" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which\ndeserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not\nexcuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no\ninjustice except accidentally, as stated above (A. 2)\n\nReply Obj. 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls\nshort of the perfection of an unjust deed, in so far as what he does\nmay be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who\nsuffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such\nthing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter\nis not hurt or displeased.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues\nare not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder\naffecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 60\n\nOF JUDGMENT\n(In Six Articles)\n\nIn due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are\nsix points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?\n\n(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?\n\n(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?\n\n(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written\nlaw?\n\n(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Judgment Is an Act of Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice.\nThe Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that \"everyone judges well of what\nhe knows,\" so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive\nfaculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence.\nTherefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which\nis in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4).\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): \"The spiritual man\njudgeth all things.\" Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue\nof charity, which \"is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost\nWho is given to us\" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity\nrather than to justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its\nproper matter, because \"the virtuous man is the rule and measure in\neverything,\" according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore\njudgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral\nvirtues.\n\nObj. 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But\nthe act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then\njudges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the\nproper act of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 93:15): \"Until justice be\nturned into judgment.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as\nsuch. Now a judge (_judex_) is so called because he asserts the right\n(_jus dicens_) and right is the object of justice, as stated above\n(Q. 57, A. 1). Consequently the original meaning of the word\n\"judgment\" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to\ndecide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from\nthe virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about\nmatters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a\nright decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For\nthis reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that \"men have\nrecourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The word \"judgment,\" from its original meaning of a\nright decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a\nright decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a\nright judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the\nvirtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is\nan act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or\ndefine. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which\ndepends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of\njustice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of\nfortitude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act\nof justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of\nprudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore\n_synesis_ which belongs to prudence is said to \"judge rightly,\" as\nstated above (Q. 51, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity,\nhas an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the\nDivine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces\njudgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces\njudgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling\nof the law.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas\njustice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above (Q.\n58, A. 2). Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in\nmatters relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are\nin question, there is no need for judgment other than that of a\nvirtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as explained\nabove (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further need for\nthe judgment of a superior, who is \"able to reprove both, and to put\nhis hand between both\" [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more\nspecifically to justice than to any other virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. Q.\n58, A. 6], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in\nthe subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence\njudgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to\njustice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Judge?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished\nexcept what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with\npunishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Matt.\n7:1, \"Judge not, and ye shall not be judged.\" Therefore it is\nunlawful to judge.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): \"Who art thou that\njudgest another man's servant[?] To his own lord he standeth or\nfalleth.\" Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it\nlawful to judge.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 John 1:8, \"If we\nsay that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.\" Now it is unlawful\nfor a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, \"Thou art inexcusable,\nO man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest\nanother, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which\nthou judgest.\" Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 16:18): \"Thou shalt appoint\njudges and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the\npeople with just judgment.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of\njustice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (A. 1, ad 1,\n3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of\njustice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice;\nsecondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it\nbe pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one\nof these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First,\nwhen it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is\ncalled \"perverted\" or \"unjust\": secondly, when a man judges about\nmatters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment \"by\nusurpation\": thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man,\nwithout any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden\nmatter, and then it is called judgment by \"suspicion\" or \"rash\"\njudgment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is\nabout the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine\nstates (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment\nabout Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe,\nsince they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on\nMatt. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in\nthe Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], He\nforbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from\nbitterness of heart.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is\nwritten (Deut. 1:16): \"Judge that which is just,\" and further on\n(Deut. 1:17), \"because it is the judgment of God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not\njudge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom\n[*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Matt. 7:1, \"Judge not.\" Above all\ndoes this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an\noccasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they\nare not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the\njudge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove\nor judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.\nin Monte ii, 19): \"If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as\nanother man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to\nstrive against it together with us.\" And yet it is not through acting\nthus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned\nonce again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be\nequally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 3]\n\nWhether It Is Unlawful to Form a Judgment from Suspicions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment\nfrom suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion\nabout an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that\nsuspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible\nto have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars.\nSince then human judgment is about human acts, which are about\nsingular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be\nlawful, if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him\nunlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a\nman's opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the\ninjury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not\nunlawful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an\ninjustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (A.\n1). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus,\nas stated above (Q. 59, A. 4). Therefore a judgment based on\nsuspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this\nis false, because \"we cannot avoid suspicions,\" according to a gloss\nof Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, \"Judge not before\nthe time.\" Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to\nbe unlawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus\nImperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] in comment on\nthe words of Matt. 7:1, \"Judge not,\" etc., says: \"By this commandment\nour Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly\nmotives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his\nown righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part\non mere suspicion.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion\ndenotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to\nthree causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this\nvery fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to\nthink evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, \"The fool when he\nwalketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men\nfools.\" Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards\nanother: for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with\nor envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of\nhim, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this\nis due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,\n13) that \"old people are very suspicious, for they have often\nexperienced the faults of others.\" The first two causes of suspicion\nevidently connote perversity of the affections, while the third\ndiminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to\ncertainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently\nsuspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes,\nthe more vicious it is.\n\nNow there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a\nman begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications.\nThis is a venial and a light sin; for \"it belongs to human temptation\nwithout which no man can go through this life,\" according to a gloss\non 1 Cor. 4:5, \"Judge not before the time.\" The second degree is when\na man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as\ncertain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since\nit cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss\ngoes on to say: \"If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are\nhuman, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from\nforming a definite and fixed opinion.\" The third degree is when a\njudge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains\ndirectly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not\nindeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the\nmatter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable\nwitnesses.\n\nReply Obj. 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another\nwithout sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does\nhim an injury.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since justice and injustice are about external\noperations, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 8, 10, 11; Q. 59, A. 1, ad\n3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it\nis betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as\nstated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as\nit is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the\nexternal act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or\nanger to murder.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Doubts Should Be Interpreted for the Best?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for\nthe best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most\npart. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since \"the\nnumber of fools is infinite\" (Eccles. 1:15), \"for the imagination and\nthought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth\" (Gen. 8:21).\nTherefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for\nthe best.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that \"he\nleads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things,\nand turns neither to this side nor to that.\" Now he who interprets a\ndoubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should\nnot be done.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with\nregard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the\nworst, according to Job 9:28, \"I feared all my works.\" Therefore it\nseems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be\ninterpreted for the worst.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 14:3, \"He that eateth not, let him\nnot judge him that eateth,\" says: \"Doubts should be interpreted in\nthe best sense.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), from the very fact\nthat a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures\nand despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure\nanother man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have\nevident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him\ngood, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may\nhappen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err\nfrequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less\nfrequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in\nthe latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge\nof men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good\nor evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take\nno harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there\nis question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly,\nand of his evil if he judge falsely because \"the true is the good of\nthe intellect, and the false is its evil,\" as stated in _Ethic._ vi,\n2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with\nthings as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good\nand evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the\nperson about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy\nof honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and\ndeserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we\nought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless\nthere is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge\nfalsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our\ngood feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither\ndoes it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of\ncontingent singulars in themselves.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the\nbest in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we\nhave to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in\norder for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure,\nit is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be\nefficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against\na lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or\nfor the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when\njudging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as\nit is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best\nas stated above.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 5]\n\nWhether We Should Always Judge According to the Written Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge\naccording to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging\nunjustly. But written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to\nIsa. 10:1, \"Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write,\nwrite injustice.\" Therefore we ought not always to judge according to\nthe written law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual\nhappenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual\nhappening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it\nseems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written\nlaw.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's\nintention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if\nthe lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore\nwe ought not always to judge according to the written law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): \"In these\nearthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them,\nwhen once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no\nlonger of them, but according to them.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), judgment is nothing else but\na decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes just\nin two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is called\n\"natural right,\" secondly by some agreement between men, and this is\ncalled \"positive right,\" as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2). Now laws are\nwritten for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but in\ndifferent ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural\nright, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its\nforce, not from the law but from nature: whereas the written law both\ncontains positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of\nauthority.\n\nHence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else\njudgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive\nright.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as the written law does not give force to the\nnatural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, because\nneither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law\ncontains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has\nno binding force. For positive right has no place except where \"it\nmatters not,\" according to the natural right, \"whether a thing be\ndone in one way or in another\"; as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2, ad 2).\nWherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather\ncorruptions of law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 95, A. 2): and\nconsequently judgment should not be delivered according to them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either\nalways or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so too\nlaws that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they\nwere observed they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore\nin such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the\nletter of the law, but according to equity which the lawgiver has in\nview. Hence the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque\nconsult. 25]: \"By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it\nallowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those\nuseful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man.\" In\nsuch cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise; and if\nhe had foreseen the case, he might have provided for it by law.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Judgment Is Rendered Perverse by Being Usurped?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by\nbeing usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now\ntruth is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from\nthe person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses\nnothing, no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is\nmeant by judgment.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is\nrelated to the praise of some that they punished sins without having\nauthority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the\nEgyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri\nthe son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and \"it was reputed to him unto\njustice\" (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not\nto injustice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now\nprelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters\nconcerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not\nunlawful.\n\nObj. 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to\njudge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown\nabove (A. 1, ad 1, 3; A. 2). But a judgment is not described as\nunjust, if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge\nof the law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by\nusurpation, i.e. without authority.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 14:4): \"Who art thou that\njudgest another man's servant?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since judgment should be pronounced according to the\nwritten law, as stated above (A. 5), he that pronounces judgment,\ninterprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some\nparticular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to\ninterpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by\npublic authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by\npublic authority, which extends over those who are subject to the\ncommunity. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force\nanother to observe a law that was not approved by public authority,\nso too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment\nthat is pronounced by other than the public authority.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation to\naccept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes.\nOn the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is\nunjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority\nreceived as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from\nActs 7:24, 25, where it is said that \"striking the Egyptian . . . he\nthought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save\nIsrael [Vulg.: 'them'].\" Or it may be replied that Moses slew the\nEgyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked,\nwithout himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence.\nWherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that \"whoever does not ward\noff a blow from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the\nstriker\"; and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with\nAugustine (QQ. Exod. qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just\nas \"the soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs\nbefore the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful\nalthough it gave a sign of great fertility,\" in so far, to wit, as it\nwas a sign of the power whereby he was to deliver his people.\n\nWith regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for\nGod by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest,\nhe was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his\nconcern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex.\n22:20; Lev. 20; Deut. 13, 17].\n\nReply Obj. 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as\nthe body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not\nusurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal\nmatters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have\nbeen committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of\nthe individual, and consequently their absence does not make a\njudgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority which\ngives a judgment its coercive force.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 61\n\nOF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts,\nwhich are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative\njustice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts,\ni.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will\nbe twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And\nsince restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we\nmust consider (1) the distinction between commutative and\ndistributive justice; (2) restitution.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and\ncommutative?\n\n(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?\n\n(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?\n\n(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as\ncounter-passion?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Two Species of Justice Are Suitably Assigned, Viz.\nCommutative and Distributive?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are\nunsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is\nhurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is\ndirected to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of\nthe many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many,\nboth because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and\nbecause the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De\nOffic. ii, 15): \"He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to\nexpect that he will receive again.\" Therefore distribution does not\nbelong to any species of justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is\nhis own, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 2). But when things are\ndistributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes\npossessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore\nthis does not pertain to justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in\nthe subject, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 6). But it belongs\nexclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution\ndoes not always belong to justice.\n\nObj. 4: Further, \"Distributive justice regards common goods\" (Ethic.\nv, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice.\nTherefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of\nlegal justice.\n\nObj. 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a\nvirtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to\none person, while distributive justice consists in giving something\nto many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and\nsays (Ethic. v, 2) that \"one directs distributions, the other,\ncommutations.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 7, 8), particular\njustice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the\ncommunity as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be\nconsidered in relation to a part. In the first place there is the\norder of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one\nprivate individual to another. This order is directed by commutative\njustice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two\npersons. In the second place there is the order of the whole towards\nthe parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to\nthe community in relation to each single person. This order is\ndirected by distributive justice, which distributes common goods\nproportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive\nand commutative.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as a private individual is praised for moderation\nin his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation\nto be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein\ndistributive justice directs.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too\nthat which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also:\nso that when the goods of the community are distributed among a\nnumber of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his\nown.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The act of distributing the goods of the community,\nbelongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods;\nand yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those\ngoods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just\ndistribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made\nnot to the state but to the members of a family, and such\ndistribution can be made by authority of a private individual.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Movement takes its species from the term\n_whereunto._ Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common\ngood those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the\ncontrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to\nparticular individuals by way of distribution.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not\nonly in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of\ndifferent kinds of due: because common property is due to an\nindividual in one way, and his personal property in another way.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Mean Is to Be Observed in the Same Way in Distributive As\nin Commutative Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is\nto be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of\nthese is a kind of particular justice, as stated above (A. 1). Now\nthe mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or\nfortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way\nin both distributive and commutative justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the\nmean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one\nvirtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the\nsame.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice\nwe have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person's\ndeserts are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in\npunishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than\none who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is observed\nin the same way in both kinds of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3, 4) that the\nmean in distributive justice is observed according to \"geometrical\nproportion,\" whereas in commutative justice it follows \"arithmetical\nproportion.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in distributive justice\nsomething is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs\nto the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is\nproportionate to the importance of the position of that part in\nrespect of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person\nreceives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a\nmore prominent position in the community. This prominence in an\naristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy\naccording to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in\nvarious ways according to various forms of community. Hence in\ndistributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality\nbetween thing and thing, but according to proportion between things\nand persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another,\nso that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted\nto another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3, 4) that the mean\nin the latter case follows \"geometrical proportion,\" wherein equality\ndepends not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6\nis to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals\n11/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half:\nwhereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6\nexceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.\n\nOn the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual\non account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen\nchiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is\nfound primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing,\nso that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as\nhe has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The\nresult of this will be equality according to the \"arithmetical mean\"\nwhich is gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the\nmean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by\nthe former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5,\nand one of them receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one\nthat is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4:\nand so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1\nbeing taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for\nthen both will have 5 which is the mean.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real\nmean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore\nthe mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Equality is the general form of justice, wherein\ndistributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find\nequality of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find\nequality of arithmetical proportion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In actions and passions a person's station affects the\nquantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince\nthan a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's\nstation is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is\nconsidered in so far as it causes a diversity of things.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Is a Different Matter for Both Kinds of Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for\nboth kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of\nvirtue, as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if\ndistributive and commutative justice have different matters, it would\nseem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive\njustice is one of \"wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be\ndistributed among the members of the community\" (Ethic. v, 2), which\nvery things are the subject matter of commutations between one person\nand another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the\nmatters of distributive and commutative justice are not distinct.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from\nthat of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ\nspecifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to\nbe no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons\ncommutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of\nmatter. Therefore the matter of these species of justice is,\nseemingly, not of many kinds.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ v, 2 that \"one kind of\njustice directs distributions, and another commutations.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 51, AA. 8, 10), justice is about\ncertain external operations, namely distribution and commutation.\nThese consist in the use of certain externals, whether things,\npersons or even works: of things, as when one man takes from or\nrestores to another that which is his; of persons, as when a man does\nan injury to the very person of another, for instance by striking or\ninsulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of works, as\nwhen a man justly exacts a work of another, or does a work for him.\nAccordingly, if we take for the matter of each kind of justice the\nthings themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of\ndistributive and commutative justice is the same, since things can be\ndistributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the\nsubject of commutation between one person and another; and again\nthere is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works.\n\nIf, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the\nprincipal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things,\nand works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For\ndistributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice\ndirects commutations that can take place between two persons. Of\nthese some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when\nanyone uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will,\nand this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In\neither case the offence may be committed against the other man's\nchattel or person, or against a person connected with him. If the\noffence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it is\ncalled \"theft,\" if openly, it is called \"robbery.\" If it be against\nanother man's person, it may affect either the very substance of his\nperson, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his person,\na man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain, struck or\npoisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or\nmaimed. If it be against his personal dignity, a man is injured\nsecretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is\ndeprived of his good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of\nlaw, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a\nman is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most\npart) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be\ninduced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly.\nThe same applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury\nmay be committed against the principal, may be committed against them\nalso. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master are\nproperly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave\nis his master's chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations\nare when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person.\nAnd if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as\nin the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality.\nA voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the\nnotion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First when one man\nsimply transfers his thing to another in exchange for another thing,\nas happens in selling and buying. Secondly when a man transfers his\nthing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with the\nobligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the use of a\nthing gratuitously, it is called \"usufruct\" in things that bear\nfruit; and simply \"borrowing\" on \"loan\" in things that bear no fruit,\nsuch as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is granted\ngratis, it is called \"letting\" or \"hiring.\" Thirdly, a man transfers\nhis thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the purpose of\nits use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a \"deposit,\" or under\nsome obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one man\nstands security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary\nor involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the\nequality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same\nspecies of justice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for\nthe Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Just Is Absolutely the Same As Retaliation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as\nretaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the\njudgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with\nhis deeds, according to Matt. 7:2: \"With what measure you judge, you\nshall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured\nto you again.\" Therefore the just is absolutely the same as\nretaliation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given to\nsomeone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this\nequality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly\non what a person has done for the good of the community; while in\ncommutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has\nsuffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation\nin respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the\njust is absolutely the same as retaliation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on\nthe difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who\ndoes an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary\nand involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the\nmean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on\nus. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as\nretaliation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just\nis not always the same as retaliation.\n\n_I answer that,_ Retaliation (_contrapassum_) denotes equal passion\nrepaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly\nto injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of\nhis neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back.\nThis kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23, 24): \"He shall\nrender life for life, eye for eye,\" etc. And since also to take away\nwhat belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that\nsecondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes\nloss to another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss\nis also found in the Law (Ex. 22:1): \"If any man steal an ox or a\nsheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and\nfour sheep for one sheep.\" Thirdly retaliation is transferred to\nvoluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides,\nalthough voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated\nabove (Q. 59, A. 3).\n\nIn all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of\nequality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely\nthat the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not\nalways be equality if passion were in the same species as the action.\nBecause, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one\nwho is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species\nthat he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not\nonly struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner\nwhen a man despoils another of his property against the latter's\nwill, the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of\nthat thing, because the man who caused another's loss, himself would\nlose nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several\ntimes over, because not only did he injure a private individual, but\nalso the common weal, the security of whose protection he has\ninfringed. Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary\ncommutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another\nman's, because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much\ngreater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize\npassion and action in commutations according to a certain\nproportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented.\nHence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but\nthere is no place for it in distributive justice, because in\ndistributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing\nand thing or between passion and action (whence the expression\n_contrapassum_), but according to proportion between things and\npersons, as stated above (A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with\nthe conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are\napportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When a man who has served the community is paid for his\nservices, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive,\njustice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not\nbetween the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing\nreceived by one person and the thing received by another according to\nthe respective conditions of those persons.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is\naggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence\nit requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a\ndifference, not on our part, but on the part of the thing.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 62\n\nOF RESTITUTION\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Of what is it an act?\n\n(2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what\none has taken away?\n\n(3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away?\n\n(4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away?\n\n(5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from\nwhom something has been taken?\n\n(6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to\nrestore it?\n\n(7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution?\n\n(8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Restitution Is an Act of Commutative Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that restitution is not an act of\ncommutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due.\nNow one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due.\nTherefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be\nrestored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and\npassions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution\nwould not seem to be the act of a part of justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away.\nNow something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation,\nbut also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man\nless than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of\ncommutative than of distributive justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is\nan act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another.\nTherefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs\ncommutations.\n\n_I answer that,_ To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a\nperson in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in\nrestitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment\nof one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice.\nHence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one\nperson having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for\ninstance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or\ntheft.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That which is not due to another is not his properly\nspeaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is\na mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another\nwhat is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution,\nsince the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same\nin respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that\nthing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not\nrestitution properly so called.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes something\ndone over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem\noriginally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass\nfrom one person to another, since they remain the same both\nsubstantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as\nthe term \"commutation\" has passed from such like things to those\nactions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit\non another person, so too the term \"restitution\" is applied, to\nthings which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in\ntheir effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt\nby being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or\ndishonored by injurious words.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to\nwhom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing,\nwhen the latter receives so much the more according as he received\nless than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative\njustice.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Restitution of What Has Been Taken Away Is Necessary for\nSalvation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what\nhas been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary\nfor salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has\nbeen taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does\nnot seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from\nanother.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for\nsalvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is\nimpossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one\nhas taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it\nis not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from\nanother.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man\nloses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that\nwhich has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it\nis not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.\n\nObj. 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is\nseemingly the same as to take it away from him, since \"to lack little\nis almost the same as to lack nothing at all,\" as the Philosopher\nsays (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a\nbenefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the\nbenefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is\nnot necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): \"Unless a\nman restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Restitution as stated above (A. 1) is an act of\ncommutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore\nrestitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it\nis by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it\nbe taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no\nneed for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since\ntherefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it\nfollows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been\ntaken unjustly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it\nsuffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God\nand our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14).\nWherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in\nequivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible: for\ninstance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make\ncompensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either\nparty being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There are three ways in which one may take away\nanother's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly,\nas when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order\nof so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by\nsaying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore\nthat man's good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly,\nby saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's\nsin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound\nto restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an\nuntruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed\nhim unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must\ncompensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above\n(ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be\nundone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its\neffect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the\nopinion of other men.\n\nReply Obj. 4: There are several ways of preventing a man from\nobtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view\nthe honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being\nconferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation\nwhatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if\nthe intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through\nhatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has\nbeen definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred\non a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one\nis bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the\ncircumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a\nprudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man\nhad not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many\nways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had\nalready been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue\ncause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had\ndeprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would\nbe bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his\nmeans.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 3]\n\nWhether It Suffices to Restore the Exact Amount Taken?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the\nexact amount taken. For it is written (Ex. 22:1): \"If a man shall\nsteal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five\noxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.\" Now everyone is bound\nto keep the commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is\nbound to restore four- or fivefold.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"What things soever were written, were written for\nour learning\" (Rom. 15:4). Now Zachaeus said (Luke 19:8) to our Lord:\n\"If I have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold.\"\nTherefore a man is bound to restore several times over the amount he\nhas taken unjustly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not\nbound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the\namount of his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is\nbound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the\nexact amount.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Restitution re-establishes equality where an\nunjust taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by\nrepaying the exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to\nrestore more than the exact amount taken.\n\n_I answer that,_ When a man takes another's thing unjustly, two\nthings must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the\nthing, which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the\ncase in loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent\nwith equality on the part of the thing, as when a person intends to\nuse violence but fails.\n\nAs regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution,\nsince thereby equality is re-established; and for this it is enough\nthat a man restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But\nas regards the sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the\ninfliction of which belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is\ncondemned by the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took,\nbut when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty.\n\nHence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law\nfixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this\ncommandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man\nis bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n104, A. 3). Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law,\nand then the same answer would apply.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than he was\nbound to do; hence he had said already: \"Behold . . . the half of my\ngoods I give to the poor.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more\nby way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Man Is Bound to Restore What He Has Not Taken?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has\nnot taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to\nremove that loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is\ngreater than the thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man's\nseeds, you inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest,\nand thus you would seem to be bound to make restitution accordingly.\nTherefore a man is bound to restore what he has not taken.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he who retains his creditor's money beyond the\nstated time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible\nprofits from that money, and yet he does not really take them.\nTherefore it seems that a man is bound to restore what he did not\ntake.\n\nObj. 3: Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now a\nman is bound to restore to God more than he has received from Him,\naccording to Matt. 25:26, \"Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not,\nand gather where I have not strewed.\" Therefore it is just that one\nshould restore to a man also, something that one has not taken.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Restitution belongs to justice, because it\nre-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not\ntake, there would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make\nsuch a restitution.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whoever brings a loss upon another person,\nseemingly, takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to\nthe Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having\n_less_* than his due. [*The derivation is more apparent in English\nthan in Latin, where _damnum_ stands for _loss,_ and _minus_ for\n_less._ Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own is\ncalled \"gain,\" and to have less than you started with is called\n\"loss.\"] Therefore a man is bound to make restitution according to\nthe loss he has brought upon another.\n\nNow a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of\nwhat he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always to be made\ngood by repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies\nanother by destroying his house he is bound to pay him the value of\nthe house. Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from\nobtaining what he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need\nnot be made good in equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is\nless than to have it actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing\nis to have it merely virtually or potentially, and so were he to be\nindemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not\nthe exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not necessary\nfor salvation, as stated above. However he is bound to make some\ncompensation, according to the condition of persons and things.\n\nFrom this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections:\nbecause the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, not\nactually but only virtually. In like manner he that has money has the\nprofit not yet actually but only virtually: and both may be hindered\nin many ways.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God requires nothing from us but what He Himself has\nsown in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing\neither the shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he\nhad received nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects\nfrom us the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us,\nalthough the gifts themselves are from God without us.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Restitution Must Always Be Made to the Person from Whom a\nThing Has Been Taken?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that restitution need not always be made\nto the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful\nto injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man\nhimself, or to others, were one to restore to him what has been taken\nfrom him; if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword.\nTherefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom\na thing has been taken.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not\ndeserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that\nwhich another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and\nreceiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always\nnecessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken\nsomething.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is\nsometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a\nthing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too\nfar away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need\nnot always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.\n\nObj. 4: Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have\nreceived a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from\nothers (our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor.\nTherefore sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than\nmake restitution to one from whom we have taken something.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to\nthe restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken\nsomething from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it\nreverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the Church's\nproperty. Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom\nhe has taken: and so restitution should not always be made to the\nperson from whom something has been taken away.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 13:7): \"Render . . . to all\nmen their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom\ncustom.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Restitution re-establishes the equality of\ncommutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of\nthing to thing, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 58, A. 10). Now this\nequalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his\ndue receive what is lacking to him: and for this to be done,\nrestitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been\ntaken.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously\ninjurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some\nother, it should not be restored to him there and then, because\nrestitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made,\nsince all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who\nretains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either\nreserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over\nto another to keep it more securely.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First\nthrough the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is\nthe case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves\nto lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to\nhim: and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he\nmust not retain the price, but must use it for some pious object.\nSecondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful\npurpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman\nreceives payment for fornication: wherefore she may keep what she has\nreceived. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit,\nshe would be bound to restitution.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown\naltogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance\nby giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or\nliving): but not without previously making a careful inquiry about\nhis person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead,\nrestitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one\nwith him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent\nto him, especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent:\nelse it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and\nthe owner should be advised of the fact.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his\nparents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but he\nought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others;\nand he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is\ndue to another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for\nthen he could and should even take what belongs to another in order\nto succor a parent.\n\nReply Obj. 5: There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the\nChurch of her property. First by laying hands on Church property\nwhich is committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a\nbishop appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case it is\nclear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those\nwho are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person\n(for instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed to\nhimself: in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and\nhave it under his own care, so as to hand it over to his successor.\nThirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in\nintention, when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his\nown and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must make\nrestitution by renouncing his intention.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 6]\n\nWhether He That Has Taken a Thing Is Always Bound to Restitution?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not\nalways bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality\nof justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him\nthat has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that\nwhich belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed\ninto another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the\nperson that took it, but by the one that has it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by\nmaking restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the\ncase of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always\nbound to restitution.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several times.\nNow sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one\nof them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing\nis not always bound to restitution.\n\n_On the contrary,_ He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now\nrestitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a\nthing is bound to restore it.\n\n_I answer that,_ With regard to a man who has taken another's\nproperty, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the\ntaking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as\nlong as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in\naddition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to\nhim who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the\nother hand, the taking of the thing that is another's property, may\nbe threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of\nthe owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound\nto restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of\nthe injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his\npossession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain\nnothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person, so too he\nthat is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for\nthe loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in addition he\nmust be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes\nanother's property for his own profit but without committing an\ninjury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan:\nand then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of\nthe thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the\nthing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a\nfavor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose\nthereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's property without injury to\nthe latter or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit;\nwherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account\nof the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but he is bound\nto restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this\nthing be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not\nbound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the\nthing through a grievous fault on his part.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has\nmore than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than\nhis due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for\nrestitution in those things which one man may receive from another\nwithout loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from\nanother's candle. Consequently although he that has taken something\nfrom another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having\ntransferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what\nis his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on\naccount of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of\nthe thing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to\nother men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so\nhe may make restitution of another's property through the priest to\nwhom he confesses.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since restitution is chiefly directed to the\ncompensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing\nhas been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has\nreceived sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound\nto any further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund\nthe person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse\nthem from so doing.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Restitution Is Binding on Those Who Have Not Taken?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that restitution is not binding on those\nwho have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now\nnone should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are\nbound to restitution save the one who has taken.\n\nObj. 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's\nproperty. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who\ntakes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way\nwhatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the\ngainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over,\nand because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken\naway from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore\nthe others are not bound to restitution.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in\norder to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would\nexpose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or\nwithstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not\nbetraying or withstanding a thief.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:32): \"They who do such\nthings are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also\nthey that consent to them that do them.\" Therefore in like manner\nthey that consent are bound to restitution.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), a person is bound to\nrestitution not only on account of someone else's property which he\nhas taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever\nis cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in\ntwo ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces\nanother to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the\ntaking, by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel,\nor consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving.\nSecondly, on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any\nother kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by\ntaking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer.\nIndirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing\n(provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omitting\nthe command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or\nrobbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by\nsheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows:\n\n\"By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by\nparticipation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing.\"\n\nIt must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the\ncooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of\ncommand: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is\nbound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent;\nnamely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place.\nThirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver\nof thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of\nparticipation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty.\nFifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do\nso; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard\njustice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their neglect\nthieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of\ntheir preserving justice here below.\n\nIn the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to\nrestitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the\nefficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is\nbound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability\nthat the unjust taking resulted from such causes.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the\nsin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by\ncounselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the\nprincipal in the deed; first of all, the _commander;_ secondly, the\n_executor,_ and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of\nthem make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to\nthe same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who\ntook possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have\nalready made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that\ndoes not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is\nchiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly\ninjured.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand\nor reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he\nis obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of\nearthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they\nare invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain\njustice.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 8]\n\nWhether a Man Is Bound to Immediate Restitution, or May He Put It Off?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate\nrestitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative\nprecepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making\nrestitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a\nman is not bound to immediate restitution.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is\nsometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man is\nbound to immediate restitution.\n\nObj. 3: Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice.\nNow time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts.\nSince then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of\nvirtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it\nseems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a\nman be bound to restore at once.\n\n_On the contrary,_ All matters of restitution seem to come under one\nhead. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not\ndelay compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, \"The wages of him\nthat hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the\nmorning.\" Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of\nrestitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once.\n\n_I answer that,_ Even as it is a sin against justice to take\nanother's property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold\nthe property of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him\nof the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is\nclear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and\none is bound to renounce one's sin at once, according to Ecclus.\n21:2, \"Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent.\" Consequently one\nis bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a\nrespite from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the\nthing.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the precept about the making of restitution is\naffirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to\nwithhold another's property.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When one is unable to restore at once, this very\ninability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is\naltogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable\nto make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another\nto ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a\nremission or a respite.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to\nvirtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we\nare bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a\nsin of unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands\nto reason that the time is determinate in the point of restitution\nbeing immediate.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 63\n\nOF RESPECT OF PERSONS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of\njustice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed\nto distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed\nto commutative justice.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether respect of persons is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities?\n\n(3) Whether it takes place in showing honor?\n\n(4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Respect of Persons Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For\nthe word \"person\" includes a reference to personal dignity [*Cf. I,\nQ. 29, A. 3, ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to\nconsider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than\nthings, since things are for the benefit of persons and not\nconversely. But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore,\nis respect of persons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to\nrespect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes\nupraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to\nMatt. 24:40: \"Two shall be in a bed [Vulg.: 'field'] [*'Bed' is the\nreading of Luke 17:34], one shall be taken, and one shall be left.\"\nTherefore respect of persons is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law.\nNow respect of persons is forbidden, Deut. 1:17: \"Neither shall you\nrespect any man's person.\" Therefore respect of persons is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Respect of persons is opposed to distributive\njustice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in\nallotting various things to various persons in proportion to their\npersonal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal\nproperty by reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person\nis due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause.\nHence a gloss on Eph. 6:9, \"There is no respect of persons with God\n[Vulg.: 'Him'],\" says that \"a just judge regards causes, not\npersons.\" For instance if you promote a man to a professorship on\naccount of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due\ncause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on someone,\nyou consider in him not the fact that what you give him is\nproportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular\nman (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person,\nsince you give him something not for some cause that renders him\nworthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any\ncircumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy\nof this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man\npromote someone to a prelacy or a professorship, because he is rich\nor because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may\nhappen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as\nregards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity\nmakes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be\nchosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore\nconsideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to\nrespect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows,\naccordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive\njustice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but\nsin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In distributive justice we consider those circumstances\nof a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of\npersons we consider circumstances that do not so result.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of\nthings which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things\npertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions\nought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the\npersons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though\nit were; and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy,\nabsolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is a twofold giving. One belongs to justice, and\noccurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of\npersons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one\ngives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the bestowal of\nthe gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such a\ngiving there is no place for respect of persons, because anyone may,\nwithout injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he\nwill, according to Matt. 20:14, 15, \"Is it not lawful for me to do\nwhat I will? . . . Take what is thine, and go thy way.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Respect of Persons Takes Place in the Dispensation of\nSpiritual Goods?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take\nplace in the dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to\nsavor of respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity\nor benefice on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a\ncause whereby a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice.\nYet this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are\nwont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does not take\nplace in the conferring of spiritual goods.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a\npoor man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James\n2:2, 3. Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees\nare more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others.\nTherefore the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in\nthe dispensation of spiritual goods.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to jurists [*Cap. Cum dilectus.] it\nsuffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one\nchoose the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of\npersons to choose one who is less good for a higher position.\nTherefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.\n\nObj. 4: Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum\ndilectus.) the person to be chosen should be \"a member of the flock.\"\nNow this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more\ncompetent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of\npersons is not a sin in spiritual matters.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:1): \"Have not the faith of\nour Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons.\" On these words\na gloss of Augustine says: \"Who is there that would tolerate the\npromotion of a rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the\nexclusion of a poor man more learned and holier?\" [*Augustine, Ep. ad\nHieron. clxvii.]\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), respect of persons is a sin,\nin so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in\nwhich justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that,\nspiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of\npersons is a more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in\ndispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when\nsomething is allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts,\nit must be observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in\ntwo ways. First, simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who\nabounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy.\nSecondly, in relation to the common good; for it happens at times\nthat the less holy and less learned man may conduce more to the\ncommon good, on account of worldly authority or activity, or\nsomething of the kind. And since the dispensation of spiritualities\nis directed chiefly to the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7,\n\"The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,\"\nit follows that in the dispensation of spiritualities the simply less\ngood are sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of\npersons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on the less\nworthy.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's\nkinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely\nspeaking, and in relation to the common good: and then if they are\npreferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in\nthe dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical\nsuperior is not the owner, with power to give them away as he will,\nbut the dispenser, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, \"Let a man so account of\nus as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries\nof God.\" Sometimes however the prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as\nothers, and then without respect of persons he can lawfully give\npreference to his kindred since there is at least this advantage,\nthat he can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in\nconducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have to forego so\ndoing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example from him\nand give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard to\ntheir deserts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use\nfor the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more\nnecessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so\nthat there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more\nreadily to such persons.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of\nlaw, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect\nthe better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw.\nBut as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect\none who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the\ncommon good. For if it is possible to have one who is more competent\nfor a post, and yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have\nsome cause for this. If this cause have anything to do with the\nmatter in point, he who is elected will, in this respect, be more\ncompetent; and if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do\nwith the matter, it will clearly be respect of persons.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The man who is taken from among the members of a\nparticular Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the\ncommon good, since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought\nup. For this reason it was commanded (Deut. 17:15): \"Thou mayest not\nmake a man of another nation king, who is not thy brother.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Respect of Persons Takes Place in Showing Honor and Respect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take\nplace in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing\nelse than \"reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue,\"\nas the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes\nshould be honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of\nwhom it is written (Ex. 20:12): \"Honor thy father and thy mother.\"\nAgain masters, though they be wicked, should be honored by their\nservants, according to 1 Tim. 6:1: \"Whoever are servants under the\nyoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor.\" Therefore it\nseems that it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32): \"Rise up before the\nhoary head, and, honor the person of the aged man.\" But this seems to\nsavor of respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not\nvirtuous; according to Dan. 13:5: \"Iniquity came out from the\nancients of the people [*Vulg.: 'Iniquity came out of Babylon from\nthe ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people.'].\" Therefore\nit is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, on the words of James 2:1, \"Have not the faith . . .\nwith respect of persons,\" a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. ad Hieron.\nclxvii.] says: \"If the saying of James, 'If there shall come into\nyour assembly a man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily\nmeetings, who sins not here, if however he sin at all?\" Yet it is\nrespect of persons to honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory\nsays in a homily (xxviii in Evang.): \"Our pride is blunted, since in\nmen we honor, not the nature wherein they are made to God's image,\nbut wealth,\" so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor, this\nwill savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to\nrespect persons in showing honor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on James 2:1, says: \"Whoever honors the\nrich for their riches, sins,\" and in like manner, if a man be honored\nfor other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this\nsavors of respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect\npersons in showing honor.\n\n_I answer that,_ To honor a person is to recognize him as having\nvirtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being\nhonored. Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not\nonly for his own virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and\nprelates, although they be wicked, are honored as standing in God's\nplace, and as representing the community over which they are placed,\naccording to Prov. 26:8, \"As he that casteth a stone into the heap of\nMercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool.\" For, since the\ngentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to Mercury, \"the heap of\nMercury\" signifies the casting up of an account, when a merchant\nsometimes substitutes a pebble [*_Lapillus_ or _calculus_ whence the\nEnglish word 'calculate'] for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool\nhonored if he stand in God's place or represent the whole community:\nand in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account\nof their having a share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and\nLord of all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of\nvirtue, though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wis.\n4:8, 9, \"venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by\nthe number of years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs,\nand a spotless life is old age.\" The rich ought to be honored by\nreason of their occupying a higher position in the community: but if\nthey be honored merely for their wealth, it will be the sin of\nrespect of persons.\n\nHence the Replies to the Objections are clear.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Sin of Respect of Persons Takes Place in Judicial\nSentences?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does\nnot take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is\nopposed to distributive justice, as stated above (A. 1): whereas\njudicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice.\nTherefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial\nsentences.\n\nObj. 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now\nit is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a\nheavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a\nprince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore\nrespect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): \"In judging be\nmerciful to the fatherless.\" But this seems to imply respect of the\nperson of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of\npersons is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 18:5): \"It is not good to\naccept the person in judgment [*Vulg.: 'It is not good to accept the\nperson of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.'].\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 60, A. 1), judgment is an act of\njustice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice,\nthose things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of\npersons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is\nallotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the\nequality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment\nis rendered corrupt by respect of persons.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view\nof the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to\ncommutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by\njudgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and\nhow one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him.\nSecondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as\nmuch as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and\ngives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. In this\nway respect of persons may take place in any judgment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When a person is more severely punished on account of a\ncrime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of\npersons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case,\na diversity of things, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 10, ad 3; Q. 61, A.\n2, ad 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy\nas far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying\nof Ex. 23:3 would apply: \"Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in\njudgment.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 64\n\nOF MURDER\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nIn due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative\njustice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in\nrelation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed\nwith regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation\nto involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor\nagainst his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or\nby word. By deed when one's neighbor is injured either in his own\nperson, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions.\n\nWe must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the\nfirst place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the\ngreatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner?\n\n(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public\nperson only?\n\n(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?\n\n(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?\n\n(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?\n\n(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?\n\n(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Unlawful to Kill Any Living Thing?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the\nApostle says (Rom. 13:2): \"They that resist the ordinance of God\npurchase to themselves damnation [*Vulg.: 'He that resisteth the\npower, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase\nthemselves damnation.'].\" Now Divine providence has ordained that all\nliving things should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8, 9, \"Who\nmaketh grass to grow on the mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts\ntheir food.\" Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any\nliving thing.\n\nObj. 2: Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life.\nNow life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same\nreason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not\nappointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be\ninflicted, according to the Divine law, on one who killed another\nman's ox or sheep (Ex. 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals\nis a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): \"When we hear\nit said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to\ntrees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because\nthey have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words,\n'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for\nwhich it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are\nfor the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds\nfrom imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the\ngeneration of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal,\nand lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely have\nlife, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man.\nWherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of\nanimals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states\n(Polit. i, 3).\n\nNow the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that\nanimals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be\ndone unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to\ntake life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for\nthe use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of\nGod Himself: for it is written (Gen. 1:29, 30): \"Behold I have given\nyou every herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your meat, and to all\nbeasts of the earth\": and again (Gen. 9:3): \"Everything that moveth\nand liveth shall be meat to you.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals\nand plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), \"by a most just ordinance of the\nCreator, both their life and their death are subject to our use.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of\nreason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it\nwere by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is\nthat they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of\nothers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing\nthe ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore\nthis is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or\nrobbery.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Kill Sinners?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For\nour Lord in the parable (Matt. 13) forbade the uprooting of the\ncockle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is\nforbidden by God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.\n\nObj. 2: Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now\naccording to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance,\naccording to Ezech. 33:11, \"I desire not the death of the wicked, but\nthat the wicked turn from his way and live.\" Therefore it seems\naltogether unjust to kill sinners.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do\nthat which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac.\nvii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in\nitself, since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and \"we\nwish our friends to live and to exist,\" according to _Ethic._ ix, 4.\nTherefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:18): \"Wizards thou shalt not\nsuffer to live\"; and (Ps. 100:8): \"In the morning I put to death all\nthe wicked of the land.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it is lawful to kill dumb\nanimals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as\nthe imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed\nto the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is\nnaturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that\nif the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member,\nthrough its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will\nbe both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every\nindividual person is compared to the whole community, as part to\nwhole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the\ncommunity, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and\nadvantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good,\nsince \"a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump\" (1 Cor. 5:6).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the\ncockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when\nthe wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them,\neither because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they\nhave many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to\nthe good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our\nLord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that\nvengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that\nthe good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the\ngood incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the\nslaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes\nslays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas\nsometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what\nis expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate\naccording to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous\nto others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin\nwithout grievously harming others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and\nconsequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as\nhe is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the\nslavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is\nuseful to others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: \"Man, when he was\nin honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless\nbeasts, and made like to them,\" and Prov. 11:29: \"The fool shall\nserve the wise.\" Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man\nso long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man\nwho has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse\nthan a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit.\ni, 1 and _Ethic._ vii, 6).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 3]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for a Private Individual to Kill a Man Who Has\nSinned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a\nman who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine\nlaw. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded\n(Ex. 32:27): \"Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and\nneighbor.\" Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a\nsinner.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3), man, on account of\nsin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private\nindividual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful.\nTherefore for the same reason, it is lawful for any private\nindividual to kill a man who has sinned.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise\nfor doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of\nevildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above (A. 2).\nTherefore it is deserving of praise if even private individuals kill\nevil-doers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque\npercutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: \"A man who, without exercising public\nauthority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and\nall the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not\ngiven him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it is lawful to kill an\nevildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole\ncommunity, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the\ncommunity's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a\ndecayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health\nof the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to\npersons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and\nnot private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The person by whose authority a thing is done really\ndoes the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence\naccording to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), \"He slays not who owes\nhis service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the\ninstrument to him that wields it.\" Wherefore those who, at the Lord's\ncommand, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem not to have\ndone this themselves, but rather He by whose authority they acted\nthus: just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his\nsovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the authority of\nthe judge.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in\nthe case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill\nit; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is\nrequired, not for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. On\nthe other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from\ngood men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn\nhim to death for the common good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is lawful for any private individual to do anything\nfor the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to\nsome other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of\nthe person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the\nparts for the welfare of the whole.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for Clerics to Kill Evil-doers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For\nclerics especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle (1 Cor.\n4:16): \"Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ,\" whereby we are\ncalled upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we\nworship puts evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, \"Who smote\nEgypt with their firstborn.\" Again Moses made the Levites slay\ntwenty-three thousand men on account of the worship of the calf (Ex.\n32), the priest Phinees slew the Israelite who went in to the woman\nof Madian (Num. 25), Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec (1 Kings 15),\nElias slew the priests of Baal (3 Kings 18), Mathathias killed the\nman who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Mac. 2); and, in the New\nTestament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira (Acts 5). Therefore it\nseems that even clerics may kill evil-doers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is\nmore united to God. Now the secular power as \"God's minister\"\nlawfully puts evil-doers to death, according to Rom. 13:4. Much more\ntherefore may clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual\npower, put evil-doers to death.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully\nexercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely\noffice to slay evildoers, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore those\nclerics who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 3:2, 3): \"It behooveth . . .\na bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is\nthe reading in Tit. 1:7] . . . not given to wine, no striker.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons.\nFirst, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon\nis represented the Passion of Christ slain \"Who, when He was struck\ndid not strike [Vulg.: 'When He suffered, He threatened not']\" (1\nPet. 2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for\nministers should imitate their master, according to Ecclus. 10:2, \"As\nthe judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers.\" The\nother reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of\nthe New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is\nappointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order\nthat they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God works in all things without exception whatever is\nright, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone\nshould imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him. Hence,\nthough God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that\nall should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put\nAnanias and Saphira to death by his own authority or with his own\nhand, but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The\nPriests or Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old\nLaw, which appointed corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for\nthem to slay with their own hands.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things\nthan corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual\nwelfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor\nmatters.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly\nprinces, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but\nthat this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their\nauthority.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 5]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Kill Oneself?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For\nmurder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man\ncan do an injustice to himself, as is proved in _Ethic._ v, 11.\nTherefore no man sins by killing himself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public\nauthority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority\nis sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a\nlesser danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a\nman to cut off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his\nwhole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater\nevil, for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a\nman may kill himself.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and\nyet he is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful\nfor a man to kill himself.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it is related (2 Mac. 14:42) that a certain Razias\nkilled himself, \"choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the\nhands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble\nbirth.\" Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful.\nTherefore suicide is not unlawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): \"Hence it\nfollows that the words 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of\na man--not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills\nhimself, kills nothing else than a man.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three\nreasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result\nbeing that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists\ncorruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the\ninclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love\nhimself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to\nthe natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as\nsuch, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community,\nand so, as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing\nhimself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.\nv, 11). Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to\nHis power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own\nlife, sins against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins\nagainst that slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment\nof a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to\npronounce sentence of death and life, according to Deut. 32:39, \"I\nwill kill and I will make to live.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to\njustice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should\nhave towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to\noneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by\nreason also of its opposition to justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to\ndeath an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is\njudge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises\npublic authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever:\nalthough he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man is made master of himself through his free-will:\nwherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters\nwhich pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the\npassage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to\nman's free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for\nman to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that\nhe may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because\nthe ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon\noneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to\nadopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is\nunlawful to take one's own life on account of one's having committed\na sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a very great injury,\nby depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because\nit is not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the\npublic authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself\nlest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the\nvery great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sin of another. For\nshe commits no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not\nconsent, since \"without consent of the mind there is no stain on the\nbody,\" as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that\nfornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's,\nespecially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous,\nbecause one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love.\nMoreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to\nexpiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for anyone to take\nhis own life for fear he should consent to sin, because \"evil must\nnot be done that good may come\" (Rom. 3:8) or that evil may be\navoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain\nevent, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time\nconsent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under any\ntemptation whatever.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), \"not even Samson\nis to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies\nunder the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought\nmany wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to do this.\" He\nassigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the\ntime of persecution took their own lives, and who are commemorated by\nthe Church.\n\nReply Obj. 5: It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from\nbeing slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that\nhe may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid\npenal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason\nsome, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act\nfrom fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a weakness\nof soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,\n7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22, 23) declare.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 6]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Kill the Innocent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill\nthe innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on\nthe contrary \"the fear of the Lord driveth out sin\" (Ecclus. 1:27).\nNow Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was\nwilling to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin,\nkill an innocent person.\n\nObj. 2: Further, among those sins that are committed against one's\nneighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous\ninjury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is\na greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the\nlatter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life\nto the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to\nkill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a\nrighteous person.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is\nnot a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of\njustice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who\nis bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man\nwhom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses;\nand again the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to\ndeath the man who has been unjustly sentenced.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 23:7): \"The innocent and just\nperson thou shalt not put to death.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ An individual man may be considered in two ways:\nfirst, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we\nconsider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in\nevery man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God\nhas made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as\nstated above (A. 2) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in\nrelation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other\nhand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common\ngood, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is\nin no way lawful to slay the innocent.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both\nthe sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills\nan innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he\nexecutes: indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he\nfears Him.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the\nessential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just\nman, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first,\nbecause he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in\nopposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a\nman who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to\njustice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater\ngood: fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Luke\n10:16, \"He that despiseth you despiseth Me.\" On the other hand it is\naccidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be\nreceived by God into glory.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If the judge knows that a man who has been convicted by\nfalse witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the\nwitnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the\ninnocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment\nby a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if\nhe pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not\nhe that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be\nguilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has\ncondemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable\nerror, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the\nexecutions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest\ninjustice, he does not sin by carrying out the sentence, because he\nhas no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he\nwho slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Kill a Man in Self-defense?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in\nself-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): \"I do not\nagree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by\nhim; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one\ndoes it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so,\nprovided it be in keeping with one's person.\" Now he who kills a man\nin self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this\nwould seem to be unlawful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): \"How are they free from\nsin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's\nlife for the sake of these contemptible things?\" Now among\ncontemptible things he reckons \"those which men may forfeit\nunwillingly,\" as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and\nthe chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful\nfor any man to take another's life for the sake of the life of his\nown body.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his\nclericis] says in the Decretals: \"Concerning the clerics about whom\nyou have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in\nself-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they\nmay return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know\nthat in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any\ncircumstances whatever.\" Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to\nobserve the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen\nto kill anyone in self-defense.\n\nObj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or\nadultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or\nadultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since\nthe spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body.\nTherefore no man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in\norder to save his own life.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to\nMatt. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according\nto Rom. 12:19: \"Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my\ndearly beloved.\" Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man,\nis also unlawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:2): \"If a thief be found\nbreaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die;\nhe that slew him shall not be guilty of blood.\" Now it is much more\nlawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a\nman guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing hinders one act from having two effects,\nonly one of which is intended, while the other is beside the\nintention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is\nintended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since\nthis is accidental as explained above (Q. 43, A. 3; I-II, Q. 12, A.\n1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is\nthe saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor.\nTherefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life,\nis not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep\nitself in _being,_ as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding\nfrom a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out\nof proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses\nmore than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he\nrepel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because\naccording to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel\ncasual.], \"it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does\nnot exceed the limits of a blameless defense.\" Nor is it necessary\nfor salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in\norder to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more\ncare of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to\ntake a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the\ncommon good, as stated above (A. 3), it is not lawful for a man to\nintend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public\nauthority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer\nthis to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against\nthe foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers,\nalthough even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when\none man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The\npassage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the\nsame sense. Hence he says pointedly, \"for the sake of these things,\"\nwhereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to\nthe Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of\ntaking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly\ncondemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a\nman in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him,\nbut to defend himself.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily\ndirected to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence\nsometimes results the taking of a man's life.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which\ncomes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: \"Not defending\nyourselves--that is, not striking your enemy back.\"\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 8]\n\nWhether One Is Guilty of Murder Through Killing Someone by Chance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through\nkilling someone by chance. For we read (Gen. 4:23, 24) that Lamech\nslew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does\nnot say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gen.\n4:23], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one\nincurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): \"If . . . one strike a\nwoman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue\nthereupon, he shall render life for life.\" Yet this may happen\nwithout any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty\nof murder through killing someone by chance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons\nprescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not\ndue save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs\nthe guilt of murder.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): \"When we\ndo a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we\nunintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be\nimputed to us.\" Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is\nkilled as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore\nthe person who did it is not accounted guilty.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) \"chance\nis a cause that acts beside one's intention.\" Hence chance\nhappenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary.\nAnd since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera\nRelig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.\n\nNevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly\nvoluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally,\naccording as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental\ncause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide\nresults whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of\nvoluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes\nanother's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which\nhe ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care.\nHence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and\ntake due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is\nnot guilty of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied with\nsomething unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due\ncare, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action\nresults in someone's death.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a\nman's life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something\nunlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or\nof the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide,\nespecially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to the canons a penalty is inflicted on those\nwho cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or\nfailing to take sufficient care.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 65\n\nOF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person.\nUnder this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) The mutilation of members;\n\n(2) Blows;\n\n(3) Imprisonment;\n\n(4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries\nare aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with\nothers?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 1]\n\nWhether in Some Cases It May Be Lawful to Maim Anyone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim\nanyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that \"sin consists\nin departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is\ncontrary to nature.\" Now according to nature it is appointed by God\nthat a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary\nto nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems\nthat it is always a sin to maim a person.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the\nparts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it\nis unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by\npublic authority. Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone,\nexcept perhaps by public authority.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the\nwelfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself\nfor the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P.\nI, sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they\nmight preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other\nreason to maim a person.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 21:24): \"Eye for eye, tooth for\ntooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since a member is part of the whole human body, it\nis for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence\na member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is\nexpedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself\nuseful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen\nto be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to\nthe whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and\nretains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury\nto the whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end\nto the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above\n(Q. 61, A. 1; Q. 64, AA. 2, 5), it may happen that although the\nremoval of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may\nnevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as\nit is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of\nrestraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is\nlawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more\nheinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain\nlesser sins. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even\nwith the consent of the owner of the member, because this would\ninvolve an injury to the community, to whom the man and all his parts\nbelong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of\ncorruption to the whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of\nthe owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of\nthe whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own\nwelfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the\nperson whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who\nhas a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim\nanyone.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular\nnature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and\ncorruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular\nnature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with\nuniversal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to\nthe particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is\nnevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common\ngood.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to something\nbelonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed\nto his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take\nanyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted\nthe procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be\ndirected to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases\ncan pertain to him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of the\nbodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to\nfurther the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further\none's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member,\nbecause sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no\ncase is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever.\nHence Chrysostom, in his exposition on Matt. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in\nMatth.), \"There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the\nkingdom of heaven,\" says: \"Not by maiming themselves, but by\ndestroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself,\nsince they are murderers who do such things.\" And further on he says:\n\"Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more\nimportunate, for the seed springs in us from other sources, and\nchiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and\ntemptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by\ncurbing one's thoughts.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for Parents to Strike Their Children, or\nMasters Their Slaves?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their\nchildren, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4):\n\"You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger\"; and further on\n(Eph. 9:6): \"And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves\n[Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing threatenings.\" Now some are provoked to\nanger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened.\nTherefore neither should parents strike their children, nor masters\ntheir slaves.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that \"a father's\nwords are admonitory and not coercive.\" Now blows are a kind of\ncoercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their\nchildren.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this\nbelongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2).\nIf, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for\nthe sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any\nperson to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same\nconclusion follows.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 13:24): \"He that spareth the\nrod hateth his son,\" and further on (Prov. 23:13): \"Withhold not\ncorrection from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he\nshall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul\nfrom hell.\" Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): \"Torture and fetters\nare for a malicious slave.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as\nwhen it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while\na blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much\nless harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a\nperson a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice.\nAgain, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to\nhis jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike\nanother, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And\nsince the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave\nto the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child,\nand a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused\nchiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher\nstates (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their\nchildren to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their\nchildren for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on\nthem without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from\nthreatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that\nthey should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation\nof correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their\nthreats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness\ntemper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The greater power should exercise the greater coercion.\nNow just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city\nhas perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable\npunishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the\nfather and the master who preside over the family household, which is\nan imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is\nexercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows,\nwhich do not inflict irreparable harm.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a\nwilling subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to\nthose only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by\nblows.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 3]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Imprison a Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which\ndeals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above (I-II,\nQ. 18, A. 2). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter for\nimprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is\nunlawful to imprison a man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now\naccording to Ecclus. 15:14, \"God left man in the hand of his own\ncounsel.\" Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by\nchains or prisons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from\ndoing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from\ndoing this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order\nto restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put\na man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same\nconclusion follows.\n\n_On the contrary,_ We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for\nthe sin of blasphemy.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the goods of the body three things may be\nconsidered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the\nbody, and this is injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or\nrest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a sense\nof pain is opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and\nthis is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.\n\nTherefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man,\nunless it be done according to the order of justice, either in\npunishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to\nlose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of\nhis members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the order of His wisdom God\nsometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to\nJob 5:12: \"Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so\nthat their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes\nHe allows them to do what they will.\" In like manner, according to\nhuman justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain\nones.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a\ntime from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man\nprevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from\nstriking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in\ngeneral of the actions and of the life of another does it belong\nprimarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him\nfrom doing not only evil but also good deeds.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Sin Is Aggravated by the Fact That the Aforesaid Injuries\nAre Perpetrated on Those Who Are Connected with Others?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact\nthat the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are\nconnected with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character\nfrom inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil\ninflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that\nwhich is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an\ninjury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries\nto orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17): \"He will\nnot despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she\npoureth out her complaint.\" Now the widow and the orphan are not\nconnected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated\nthrough an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own\njust as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary\nfor him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the\ncase of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now\nthese injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary\ncommutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 28:32) as though indicating\nan aggravating circumstance: \"Thy sons and thy daughters shall be\ngiven to another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: 'May thy sons\nand thy daughters be given,' etc.].\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Other things being equal, an injury is a more\ngrievous sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is\nthat it is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in\nauthority than a private individual, because it conduces to the\ninjury of the whole community, as stated above (I-II, Q. 73, A. 9).\nNow when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way\nwith another, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things\nbeing equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen,\nhowever, that in view of certain circumstances, a sin committed\nagainst one who is not connected with any other person, is more\ngrievous, on account of either the dignity of the person, or the\ngreatness of the injury.\n\nReply Obj. 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with others\nis less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it\nwere perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it\nis a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the\nperson with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man\nis guilty through injuring the other one in himself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted\nupon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same\ninjury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have\nno one to turn to for relief.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the\nadultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is\nconcerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed\nher by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her\nhusband, since \"the wife hath not power of her own body; but the\nhusband\" (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. Of\nadultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to\nchastity, we shall speak in the treatise on Temperance (Q. 154, A. 8).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 66\n\nOF THEFT AND ROBBERY\n(In Nine Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man\ninjures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.\n\nUnder this head there are nine points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?\n\n(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property?\n\n(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?\n\n(5) Whether every theft is a sin?\n\n(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?\n\n(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?\n\n(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?\n\n(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Natural for Man to Possess External Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess\nexternal things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is\nGod's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God,\naccording to Ps. 23:1, \"The earth is the Lord's,\" etc. Therefore it\nis not natural for man to possess external things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Luke\n12:18), \"I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my\ngoods,\" says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: \"Tell me: which are thine?\nwhere did you take them from and bring them into being?\" Now whatever\nman possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man\ndoes not naturally possess external things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad\nGratianum, i, 1]) \"dominion denotes power.\" But man has no power over\nexternal things, since he can work no change in their nature.\nTherefore the possession of external things is not natural to man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 8:8): \"Thou hast subjected all\nthings under his feet.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ External things can be considered in two ways.\nFirst, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power\nof man, but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey.\nSecondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural\ndominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is\nable to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his\naccount: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as\nstated above (Q. 64, A. 1). It is by this argument that the\nPhilosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external\nthings is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over\nother creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason\nwherein God's image resides, is shown forth in man's creation (Gen.\n1:26) by the words: \"Let us make man to our image and likeness: and\nlet him have dominion over the fishes of the sea,\" etc.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and\nHe, according to His providence, directed certain things to the\nsustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion\nover things, as regards the power to make use of them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external\nthings to belong to him principally, as though he had not received\nthem from another, namely from God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the dominion over\nexternal things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to\nGod alone, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for a Man to Possess a Thing As His Own?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as\nhis own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now\naccording to the natural law all things are common property: and the\npossession of property is contrary to this community of goods.\nTherefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external\nthing to himself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted\nabove (A. 1, Obj. 2), says: \"The rich who deem as their own property\nthe common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by\ngoing beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and\nappropriate to themselves what is intended for common use.\" Now it\nwould be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of\ncommon goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what\nbelongs to the community.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words\nare quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: \"Let no\nman call his own that which is common property\": and by \"common\" he\nmeans external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it\nseems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): \"The\n'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given\nthemselves that name, because they do not admit into their communion\npersons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as\nboth monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in\nthe Catholic Church.\" Now the reason why these people are heretics\nwas because severing themselves from the Church, they think that\nthose who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves\nlack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to\nmaintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things are competent to man in respect of\nexterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and\nin this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover\nthis is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because\nevery man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than\nthat which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk\nthe labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as\nhappens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because\nhuman affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is\ncharged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas\nthere would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing\nindeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to\nman if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed\nthat quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the\nthings possessed.\n\nThe second thing that is competent to man with regard to external\nthings is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external\nthings, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready\nto communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says\n(1 Tim. 6:17, 18): \"Charge the rich of this world . . . to give\neasily, to communicate to others,\" etc.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not\nthat the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in\ncommon and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because\nthe division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but\nrather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as\nstated above (Q. 57, AA. 2, 3). Hence the ownership of possessions is\nnot contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by\nhuman reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand\nto the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if\nby so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man\ndoes not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking\npossession of something which at first was common property, and gives\nothers a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately\nfrom using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): \"Why are you\nrich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit\nof a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: When Ambrose says: \"Let no man call his own that which\nis common,\" he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he\nadds: \"He who spends too much is a robber.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Essence of Theft Consists in Taking Another's Thing\nSecretly?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take\nanother's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not,\napparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends\nto diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as\nindicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Isa. 3:9):\n\"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not\nhid it.\" Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should\nconsist in taking another's thing secretly.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A. 2, Obj. 3,\nCan. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals [*Dist.\nxlvii]: \"It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to\nrefuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off.\" Therefore\njust as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist\nin keeping it back.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that\nwhich is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with\nanother, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it\nis not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's\nthing secretly.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): \"_Fur_ (thief) is derived\nfrom _furvus_ and so from _fuscus_ (dark), because he takes advantage\nof the night.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Three things combine together to constitute theft.\nThe first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives\nto each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take\npossession of what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as\ndistinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such\nas murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be\nabout a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as\na possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or\nas a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his\ndaughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft.\nThe third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and\nconsists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it\nbelongs properly to theft that it consists in \"taking another's thing\nsecretly.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man\nemploys secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and\nguile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a\nspecies of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is\nmerely a circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both\nbecause it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same\nkind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust\ndetention is included in an unjust taking.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person\nsimply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit\nbelongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is\nthe depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply,\nbut as regards its custody.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Theft and Robbery Are Sins of Different Species?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of\ndifferent species. For theft and robbery differ as \"secret\" and\n\"manifest\": because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery\nis to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of\nsins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically.\nTherefore theft and robbery are not different species of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). Now theft and robbery\nare directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another's\nproperty. Therefore they do not differ specifically.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of\npossession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore\nIsidore says (Etym. x) that \"he who commits a rape is called a\ncorrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted.\" Now\nit is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or\nsecretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by\nforce, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and\nrobbery do not differ.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft\nfrom robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that\nrobbery is done openly.\n\n_I answer that,_ Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in\nas much as one man does another an injustice. Now \"no man suffers an\ninjustice willingly,\" as stated in _Ethic._ v, 9. Wherefore theft and\nrobbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being\ninvoluntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken.\nNow the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through\nignorance, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect\nof robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ\nspecifically.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is not\nderived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to\njustice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there\nis a different species of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same. But\nthis is not enough for identity of species, because there is a\ndifference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing\nby his own power, but the thief, by cunning.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the part of\nthe woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as regards the\nothers from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the\npart of the woman to whom violence is done.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Theft Is Always a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin\nis commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): \"He hath\ncommanded no man to do wickedly.\" Yet we find that God commanded\ntheft, for it is written (Ex. 12:35, 36): \"And the children of Israel\ndid as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: 'as Moses had\ncommanded']. . . and they stripped the Egyptians.\" Therefore theft is\nnot always a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes it,\nhe seems to commit a theft, for he takes another's property. Yet this\nseems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold. [*See\nloc. cit. in Reply.] Therefore it seems that theft is not always a\nsin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to sin,\nbecause he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy\nits equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his\nown property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another.\nTherefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 20:15): \"Thou shalt not steal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will\nfind that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its\nopposition to justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that\nfor this reason theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking\nof what belongs to another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud\ncommitted by the thief, by laying hands on another's property\nsecretly and cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a\nsin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is no theft for a man to take another's property\neither secretly or openly by order of a judge who has commanded him\nto do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact that it is\nadjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was\nit a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the\nEgyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on\naccount of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians\nwithout any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis.\n10:19): \"The just took the spoils of the wicked.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must be\nmade. For some there are that were never in anyone's possession, for\ninstance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such\nthe finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst.\nII, i, De rerum divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden\nunderground long since and belonging to no man, except that according\nto civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the\nland, if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst.\nII, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the\nGospel (Matt. 13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden\nin a field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to\nacquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land\nthe treasure-trove may be nearly in someone's possession: and then if\nanyone take it with the intention, not of keeping it but of returning\nit to the owner who does not look upon such things as unappropriated,\nhe is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing found appears\nto be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it to be so,\nalthough he keep it, he does not commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47].\nIn any other case the sin of theft is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De\nacquirend. rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48]: wherefore Augustine\nsays in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. Apost.): \"If thou hast\nfound a thing and not returned it, thou hast stolen it\" (Dig. xiv, 5,\ncan. Si quid invenisti).\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is\ndeposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound\neither to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is\nclearly guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his\nburden. On the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property,\nif this be unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not\nbecause he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to\nrestitution or compensation: but he sins against general justice by\ndisregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning\nhis own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor\nto allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting\nthis way.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Theft Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is\nwritten (Prov. 6:30): \"The fault is not so great when a man hath\nstolen.\" But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is\nnot a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death. But\nin the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity, according\nto Ex. 22:1, \"If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he shall\nrestore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.\"\nTherefore theft is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great\nthings. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with\neternal death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a\nquill. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save\nfor a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to\nZech. 5:3, \"This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the\nearth; for every thief shall be judged as is there written.\"\nTherefore theft is a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5), a\nmortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life\nof the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and\nsecondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our\nwishing and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our\nneighbor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another\nhabitually, human society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being\nopposed to charity, is a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is in\nview of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through\nnecessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we\nshall show further on (A. 7). Hence the text continues: \"For he\nstealeth to fill his hungry soul.\" Secondly, theft is stated not to\nbe a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is\npunished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that\n\"if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an\nadulterer . . . shall destroy his own soul.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than\nretributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which\nis pronounced against sinners \"according to truth\" (Rom. 2:2).\nWherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death\npunishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such\nas inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some\nhorrible deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain\nof death is not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an\nirreparable harm, except when it is aggravated by some grave\ncircumstance, as in the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a\nsacred thing, of peculation, which is theft of common property, as\nAugustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which is\nstealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted (Ex. 21:16).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little: so\nthat a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters:\nand the person who takes such things can presume that this is not\nagainst the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very\nlittle things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet\nif his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a\nmortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be\nthrough consent in a mere thought.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 7]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Steal Through Stress of Need?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need.\nFor penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is\nstated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): \"If anyone, through stress\nof hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do\npenance for three weeks.\" Therefore it is not lawful to steal through\nstress of need.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that \"there are\nsome actions whose very name implies wickedness,\" and among these he\nreckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for\na good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy\na need.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now,\naccording to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal\nin order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore\nneither is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's own needs.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In cases of need all things are common property,\nso that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property,\nfor need has made it common.\n\n_I answer that,_ Things which are of human right cannot derogate from\nnatural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order\nestablished by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for\nthe purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the\ndivision and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do\nnot preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means\nof these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in\nsuperabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring\nthe poor. For this reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A. 2, Obj. 3] says,\nand his words are embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut\nii): \"It is the hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's\ncloak that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth is\nthe price of the poor man's ransom and freedom.\"\n\nSince, however, there are many who are in need, while it is\nimpossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each\none is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out\nof them he may come to the aid of those who are in need.\nNevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is\nevident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be\nat hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and\nthere is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to\nsuccor his own need by means of another's property, by taking it\neither openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or\nrobbery.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent\nneed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly\nand use another's property in a case of extreme need: because that\nwhich he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property\nby reason of that need.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly\nanother's property in order to succor his neighbor in need.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Robbery May Be Committed Without Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin.\nFor spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the\nessence of robbery, according to what has been said (A. 4). Now it is\nlawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch.\n4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): \"When the conqueror has taken possession of\nthe spoils, military discipline demands that all should be reserved\nfor the sovereign,\" in order, to wit, that he may distribute them.\nTherefore in certain cases robbery is lawful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his. Now\nthe things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine says\n(Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii.): \"You falsely call things your own,\nfor you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of\nearthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them.\" Therefore it seems\nthat one may lawfully rob unbelievers.\n\nObj. 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from\ntheir subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem\na grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that\ncase nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases\nrobbery is lawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God\nin sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds\nof robbery, according to Isa. 61:8, \"I am the Lord that love\njudgment, and hate robbery in a holocaust.\" Therefore it is not\nlawful to take anything by robbery.\n\n_I answer that,_ Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion\nemployed in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in\nhuman society no man can exercise coercion except through public\nauthority: and, consequently, if a private individual not having\npublic authority takes another's property by violence, he acts\nunlawfully and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes,\nthe public power is entrusted to them that they may be the guardians\nof justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence or\ncoercion, save within the bounds of justice--either by fighting\nagainst the enemy, or against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers:\nand whatever is taken by violence of this kind is not the spoils of\nrobbery, since it is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to\ntake other people's property violently and against justice, in the\nexercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be guilty\nof robbery; and whoever does so is bound to restitution.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A distinction must be made in the matter of spoils. For\nif they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just war, such\nthings as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no\nrobbery, so that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless even\nthey who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through\ncupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit, they fight\nchiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augustine says (De Verb.\nDom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that \"it is a sin to fight for booty.\" If,\nhowever, those who take the spoil, are waging an unjust war, they are\nguilty of robbery, and are bound to restitution.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so far as\nthey are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those\ngoods. Hence these may be taken violently from them, not by private\nbut by public authority.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is no robbery if princes exact from their subjects\nthat which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good,\neven if they use violence in so doing: but if they extort something\nunduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): \"If justice be disregarded, what\nis a king but a mighty robber? since what is a robber but a little\nking?\" And it is written (Ezech. 22:27): \"Her princes in the midst of\nher, are like wolves ravening the prey.\" Wherefore they are bound to\nrestitution, just as robbers are, and by so much do they sin more\ngrievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with greater\nand more universal danger to public justice whose wardens they are.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Theft Is a More Grievous Sin Than Robbery?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that theft is a more grievous sin than\nrobbery. For theft adds fraud and guile to the taking of another's\nproperty: and these things are not found in robbery. Now fraud and\nguile are sinful in themselves, as stated above (Q. 55, AA. 4, 5).\nTherefore theft is a more grievous sin than robbery.\n\nObj. 2: Further, shame is fear about a wicked deed, as stated in\n_Ethic._ iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed of theft than of robbery.\nTherefore theft is more wicked than robbery.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more persons a sin injures the more grievous it\nwould seem to be. Now the great and the lowly may be injured by\ntheft: whereas only the weak can be injured by robbery, since it is\npossible to use violence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft\nseems to be more grievous than the sin of robbery.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to the laws robbery is more severely\npunished than theft.\n\n_I answer that,_ Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated above (AA.\n4, 6), on account of the involuntariness on the part of the person\nfrom whom something is taken: yet so that in theft the\ninvoluntariness is due to ignorance, whereas in robbery it is due to\nviolence. Now a thing is more involuntary through violence than\nthrough ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the\nwill than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous sin than\ntheft. There is also another reason, since robbery not only inflicts\na loss on a person in his things, but also conduces to the ignominy\nand injury of his person, and this is of graver import than fraud or\nguile which belong to theft. Hence the Reply to the First Objection\nis evident.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Men who adhere to sensible things think more of\nexternal strength which is evidenced in robbery, than of internal\nvirtue which is forfeit through sin: wherefore they are less ashamed\nof robbery than of theft.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although more persons may be injured by theft than by\nrobbery, yet more grievous injuries may be inflicted by robbery than\nby theft: for which reason also robbery is more odious.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 67\n\nOF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice,\nthat consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider\n(1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and\n(2) injurious words uttered extra-judicially.\n\nUnder the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The\ninjustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor\nin accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself;\n(4) The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The\ninjustice of the advocate in defending.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to\ndeliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him?\n\n(3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused?\n\n(4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Man Can Justly Judge One Who Is Not Subject to His\nJurisdiction?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not\nsubject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel\nsentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness.\nBut these ancients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were\njudges of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is\nnot subject to his jurisdiction.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He was \"King of\nkings and Lord of lords\" (Apoc. 19:16). Yet He submitted to the\njudgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge\none that is not subject to his jurisdiction.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro\nComp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his kind of\noffense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man\nwhose business it is to judge in that particular place, for instance\nwhen the defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore\nit seems that a man may judge one that is not his subject.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on\nDeut. 23:25, \"If thou go into thy friend's corn,\" etc. says: \"Thou\nmayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted\nto another.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A judge's sentence is like a particular law\nregarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law\nshould have coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9),\nso too the sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby\neither party is compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else\nthe judgment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not\nexercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public authority:\nand those who have this authority are accounted the superiors of\nthose over whom they preside whether by ordinary or by delegated\nauthority. Hence it is evident that no man can judge others than his\nsubjects and this in virtue either of delegated or of ordinary\nauthority.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an\nauthority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where\nit is said (Dan. 13:45) that \"the Lord raised up the . . . spirit of a\nyoung boy.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to\nthe judgment of others although these be not his superiors, an\nexample of which is when parties agree to a settlement by\narbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be\nupheld by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising\nauthority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion.\nAccordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human\njudgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo IV] submit to the judgment\nof the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7].\n\nReply Obj. 3: The bishop of the defendant's diocese becomes\nthe latter's superior as regards the fault committed, even though he\nbe exempt: unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt\nfrom the bishop's authority, for instance in administering the\nproperty of an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a\ntheft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the\nordinary.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for a Judge to Pronounce Judgment Against the\nTruth That He Knows, on Account of Evidence to the Contrary?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment\nagainst the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the\ncontrary. For it is written (Deut. 17:9): \"Thou shalt come to the\npriests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that\ntime; and thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth\nof the judgment.\" Now sometimes certain things are alleged against\nthe truth, as when something is proved by means of false witnesses.\nTherefore it is unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment according\nto what is alleged and proved in opposition to the truth which he\nknows.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform to the\nDivine judgment, since \"it is the judgment of God\" (Deut. 1:17). Now\n\"the judgment of God is according to the truth\" (Rom. 2:2), and it\nwas foretold of Christ (Isa. 11:3, 4): \"He shall not judge according\nto the sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the\nears. But He shall judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove\nwith equity for the meek of the earth.\" Therefore the judge ought not\nto pronounce judgment according to the evidence before him if it be\ncontrary to what he knows himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the reason why evidence is required in a court of\nlaw, is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth of the\nmatter, wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no need of\njudicial procedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, \"Some men's sins are\nmanifest, going before to judgment.\" Consequently, if the judge by\nhis personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he should pay no heed\nto the evidence, but should pronounce sentence according to the truth\nwhich he knows.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the word \"conscience\" denotes application of\nknowledge to a matter of action as stated in the First Part (Q. 79,\nA. 13). Now it is a sin to act contrary to one's knowledge. Therefore\na judge sins if he pronounces sentence according to the evidence but\nagainst his conscience of the truth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20] says\nin his commentary on the Psalter: \"A good judge does nothing\naccording to his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to\nthe law and the right.\" Now this is to pronounce judgment according\nto what is alleged and proved in court. Therefore a judge ought to\npronounce judgment in accordance with these things, and not according\nto his private opinion.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 60, AA. 2, 6) it is the\nduty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he exercises\npublic authority, wherefore his judgment should be based on\ninformation acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a private\nindividual, but from what he knows as a public person. Now the latter\nknowledge comes to him both in general and in particular--in general\nthrough the public laws, whether Divine or human, and he should admit\nno evidence that conflicts therewith--in some particular matter,\nthrough documents and witnesses, and other legal means of\ninformation, which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow\nrather than the information he has acquired as a private individual.\nAnd yet this same information may be of use to him, so that he can\nmore rigorously sift the evidence brought forward, and discover its\nweak points. If, however, he is unable to reject that evidence\njuridically, he must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing\nsentence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The reason why, in the passage quoted, it is stated\nthat the judges should first of all be asked their reasons, is to\nmake it clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in accordance\nwith the evidence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power:\nwherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He Himself knows,\nand not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is to be said of\nChrist, Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do not\njudge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no comparison.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Apostle refers to the case where something is well\nknown not to the judge alone, but both to him and to others, so that\nthe guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in the case of\nnotorious criminals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of\nthe fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, but\nnot to others, or to others, but not to the judge, then it is\nnecessary for the judge to sift the evidence.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In matters touching his own person, a man must form his\nconscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the\npublic authority, he must form his conscience in accordance with the\nknowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Judge May Condemn a Man Who Is Not Accused?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man\nwho is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice.\nNow God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore\nit seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even\nthough there be no accuser.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in\norder that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the\ncrime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation;\nfor instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the\njudge himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a\nman without there being an accuser.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy Writ,\nas models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time the\naccuser and the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it\nis not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while\nbeing at the same time his accuser.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2,\nexpounding the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that \"a\njudge should not condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not\nbanish Judas, who was a thief, yet was not accused.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), \"men have recourse to a judge as\nto one who is the personification of justice.\" Now, as stated above\n(Q. 58, A. 2), justice is not between a man and himself but between\none man and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two\nparties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor, and the other\nthe defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the judge cannot sentence\na man unless the latter has an accuser, according to Acts 25:16: \"It\nis not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he\nwho is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to make\nhis answer, to clear himself of the crimes\" of which he is accused.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner's conscience as\nhis accuser, according to Rom. 2:15, \"Their thoughts between\nthemselves accusing, or also defending one another\"; or again, He\ntakes the evidence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according\nto Gen. 4:10, \"The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the\nearth.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser. Hence a\ngloss on Gen. 4:10, \"The voice of thy brother's blood,\" etc. says:\n\"There is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is\nnotorious.\" In a case of denunciation, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 7),\nthe amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended:\nwherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is done against\nhim, but for him, so that no accuser is required. The punishment that\nis inflicted is on account of his rebellion against the Church, and\nsince this rebellion is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser.\nThe fact that the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not\nauthorize him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the\norder of judicial procedure.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own knowledge of\nthe truth, whereas man does not, as stated above (A. 2). Hence a man\ncannot be accuser, witness and judge at the same time, as God is.\nDaniel was at once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of\nthe sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as stated above\n(A. 1, ad 1).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Judge Can Lawfully Remit the Punishment?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the judge can lawfully remit the\npunishment. For it is written (James 2:13): \"Judgment without mercy\"\nshall be done \"to him that hath not done mercy.\" Now no man is\npunished for not doing what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any\njudge can lawfully do mercy by remitting the punishment.\n\nObj. 2: Further, human judgment should imitate the Divine judgment.\nNow God remits the punishment to sinners, because He desires not the\ndeath of the sinner, according to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a human\njudge also may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is lawful for anyone to do what is profitable to\nsome one and harmful to none. Now the remission of his punishment\nprofits the guilty man and harms nobody. Therefore the judge can\nlawfully loose a guilty man from his punishment.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 13:8, 9) concerning anyone\nwho would persuade a man to serve strange gods: \"Neither let thy eye\nspare him to pity and conceal him, but thou shalt presently put him\nto death\": and of the murderer it is written (Deut. 19:12, 13): \"He\nshall die. Thou shalt not pity him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said (AA. 2,\n3), with regard to the question in point, two things may be observed\nin connection with a judge. One is that he has to judge between\naccuser and defendant, while the other is that he pronounces the\njudicial sentence, in virtue of his power, not as a private\nindividual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts a judge\nis hindered from loosing a guilty person from his punishment. First\non the part of the accuser, whose right it sometimes is that the\nguilty party should be punished--for instance on account of some\ninjury committed against the accuser--because it is not in the power\nof a judge to remit such punishment, since every judge is bound to\ngive each man his right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part\nof the commonwealth, whose power he exercises, and to whose good it\nbelongs that evil-doers should be punished.\n\nNevertheless in this respect there is a difference between judges of\nlower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. the sovereign, to whom the\nentire public authority is entrusted. For the inferior judge has no\npower to exempt a guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed\non him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting on John\n19:11, \"Thou shouldst not have any power against Me,\" says (Tract.\ncxvi in Joan.): \"The power which God gave Pilate was such that he was\nunder the power of Caesar, so that he was by no means free to acquit\nthe person accused.\" On the other hand the sovereign who has full\nauthority in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit the punishment to a\nguilty person, provided the injured party consent to the remission,\nand that this do not seem detrimental to the public good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is a place for the judge's mercy in matters that\nare left to the judge's discretion, because in like matters a good\nman is slow to punish as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But\nin matters that are determined in accordance with Divine or human\nlaws, it is not left to him to show mercy.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God has supreme power of judging, and it concerns Him\nwhatever is done sinfully against anyone. Therefore He is free to\nremit the punishment, especially since punishment is due to sin\nchiefly because it is done against Him. He does not, however, remit\nthe punishment, except in so far as it becomes His goodness, which is\nthe source of all laws.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If the judge were to remit punishment inordinately, he\nwould inflict an injury on the community, for whose good it behooves\nill-deeds to be punished, in order that men may avoid sin. Hence the\ntext, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, adds (Deut.\n13:11): \"That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do no more\nanything like this.\" He would also inflict harm on the injured\nperson; who is compensated by having his honor restored in the\npunishment of the man who has injured him.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 68\n\nOF MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under\nthis head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether a man is bound to accuse?\n\n(2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing?\n\n(3) How is an accusation vitiated?\n\n(4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Man Is Bound to Accuse?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no\nman is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept,\nsince he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are\ndisqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of\nevil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet\nproved to be innocent [*1 Tim. 1:5]. Therefore a man is not bound by\na Divine precept to accuse.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every duty depends on charity which is \"the end of\nthe precept\" [*Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1]:\nwherefore it is written (Rom. 13:8): \"Owe no man anything, but to\nlove one another.\" Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that\nman owes to all both of high and of low degree, both superiors and\ninferiors. Since therefore subjects should not accuse their\nsuperiors, nor persons of lower degree, those of a higher degree, as\nshown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu. vii), it seems that it is\nno man's duty to accuse.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which he\nowes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he would\nnot have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary\nto the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov.\n11:13): \"He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that\nis faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend.\"\nTherefore a man is not bound to accuse.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 5:1): \"If any one sin, and\nhear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he\nhimself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall\nbear his iniquity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 33, AA. 6, 7; Q. 67, A. 3, ad\n2), the difference between denunciation and accusation is that in\ndenunciation we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas in accusation\nwe intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this\nlife are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the\nfinal time of retribution, but in their character of medicine,\nconducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of\nthe commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of\nevil-doers. The former of these is intended in denunciation, as\nstated, whereas the second regards properly accusation. Hence in the\ncase of a crime that conduces to the injury of the commonwealth, a\nman is bound to accusation, provided he can offer sufficient proof,\nsince it is the accuser's duty to prove: as, for example, when\nanyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the\ncommunity. If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the\ncommunity, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not bound\nto attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly\naccomplish.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing\nwhat men are under an obligation to do: for instance from meriting\neternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor\ndoes a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to fail\nto do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections of\nman.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors,\n\"if it is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that\nleads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors\"\n[*Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7]--or again if\nthe subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of\ncrime [*Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. Otherwise, provided\nthey be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful for\nsubjects to accuse their superiors out of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets\nto the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of\nthe community, which should always be preferred to a private good.\nHence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common\ngood: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient\nwitnesses to prove it.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Necessary for the Accusation to Be Made in Writing?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made\nin writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory of\nthe past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the\naccusation needs not to be made in writing.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per\nscripta) that \"no man may accuse or be accused in his absence.\" Now\nwriting seems to be useful in the fact that it is a means of\nnotifying something to one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De\nTrin. x, 1). Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all\nthe more that the canon declares that \"no accusation in writing\nshould be accepted.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man's crime is made known by denunciation, even as\nby accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore\nit is seemingly unnecessary in accusation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can.\nAccusatorum) that \"the role of accuser must never be sanctioned\nwithout the accusation be in writing.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 67, A. 3), when the process in a\ncriminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the\nposition of a party, so that the judge stands between the accuser and\nthe accused for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it\nbehooves one to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since\nhowever verbal utterances are apt to escape one's memory, the judge\nwould be unable to know for certain what had been said and with what\nqualifications, when he comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were\ndrawn up in writing. Hence it has with reason been established that\nthe accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure,\nshould be put into writing.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Words are so many and so various that it is difficult\nto remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a number of\npeople who have heard the same words be asked what was said, they\nwill not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And since\na slight difference of words changes the sense, even though the\njudge's sentence may have to be pronounced soon afterwards, the\ncertainty of judgment requires that the accusation be drawn up in\nwriting.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Writing is needed not only on account of the absence of\nthe person who has something to notify, or of the person to whom\nsomething is notified, but also on account of the delay of time as\nstated above (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, \"Let no accusation be\naccepted in writing\" it refers to the sending of an accusation by one\nwho is absent: but it does not exclude the necessity of writing when\nthe accuser is present.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs:\nwherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this\nreason writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that\nthe denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in\nvirtue of her office, to the correction of the brother.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 3]\n\nWhether an Accusation Is Rendered Unjust by Calumny, Collusion or\nEvasion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust\nby calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu.\niii [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], \"calumny consists\nin falsely charging a person with a crime.\" Now sometimes one man\nfalsely accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which\nexcuses him. Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always\nrendered unjust through being slanderous.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is stated by the same authority that \"collusion\nconsists in hiding the truth about a crime.\" But seemingly this is\nnot unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as\nstated above (A. 1; Q. 33, A. 7). Therefore it seems that an\naccusation is not rendered unjust by collusion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is stated by the same authority that \"evasion\nconsists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation.\" But this can\nbe done without injustice: for it is stated there also: \"If a man\nrepent of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a\nmatter which he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the\ninnocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one another.\"\n[*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the\nwrit of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was\nthat the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation,\nto suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if\nproved guilty.] Therefore evasion does not render an accusation\nunjust.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated by the same authority: \"The rashness\nof accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of\ncalumny, or of collusion, or of evasion.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), accusation is ordered for\nthe common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of\nthe crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to\npromote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when\nmaking an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the\naccused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e.\nby calumniating him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose\ngood is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked\nintent hinders a sin being punished. This again happens in two ways:\nfirst by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This\nbelongs to collusion (_prevaricatio_) for \"he that is guilty of\ncollusion is like one who rides astraddle (_varicator_), because he\nhelps the other party, and betrays his own side\" [*Append. Grat. ad\ncan. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from\nthe accusation. This is evasion (_tergiversatio_) for by desisting\nfrom what he had begun he seems to turn his back (_tergum vertere_).\n\nReply Obj. 1: A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he\nis quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet\nhe who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator\nunless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it\nhappens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to\naccuse someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and\nthis pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man\nis led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is\nnot to blame. All these things must be weighed according to the\njudge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of\ncalumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not\nto be blamed has uttered a false accusation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is\nguilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter\nabout which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant,\ndissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the\naccusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but\ninordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly\ndesist from accusing without committing a sin--in one way, in the\nvery process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the\nmatter of his accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the\naccuser and the defendant acquit one another--in another way, if the\naccusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of\nthe common good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 4]\n\nWhether an Accuser Who Fails to Prove His Indictment Is Bound to the\nPunishment of Retaliation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his\nindictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For\nsometimes a man is led by a just error to make an accusation, in\nwhich case the judge acquit the accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu.\niii. [*Append. Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit.] Therefore the\naccuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the\npunishment of retaliation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be\ninflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account of\nthe injury he has done to someone--but not on account of any injury\ndone to the person of the accused, for in that case the sovereign\ncould not remit this punishment, nor on account of an injury to the\ncommonwealth, because then the accused could not acquit him.\nTherefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one who has\nfailed to prove his accusation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold\npunishment, according to Nahum 1:9 [*Septuagint version]: \"God shall\nnot judge the same thing a second time.\" But he who fails to prove\nhis accusation, incurs the punishment due to defamation [*Can.\nInfames, caus. vi, qu. 1], which punishment even the Pope seemingly\ncannot remit, according to a statement of Pope Gelasius [*Callist. I,\nEpist. ad omn. Gall. episc.]: \"Although we are able to save souls by\nPenance, we are unable to remove the defamation.\" Therefore he is not\nbound to suffer the punishment of retaliation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): \"He that fails to\nprove his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his\naccusation inferred.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), in a case, where the\nprocedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of\na party aiming at the punishment of the accused. Now the duty of the\njudge is to establish the equality of justice between them: and the\nequality of justice requires that a man should himself suffer\nwhatever harm he has intended to be inflicted on another, according\nto Ex. 21:24, \"Eye for eye, tooth for tooth.\" Consequently it is just\nthat he who by accusing a man has put him in danger of being punished\nseverely, should himself suffer a like punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice does not\nalways require counterpassion, because it matters considerably\nwhether a man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury\ndeserves punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when the\njudge becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with\na mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just\nerror, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person\nof the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished\non both counts. This is the meaning of what is written (Deut.\n19:18-20): \"And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find\nthat the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: they\nshall render to him as he meant to do to his brother,\" and this\nrefers to the injury done to the person: and afterwards, referring to\nthe injury done to the commonwealth, the text continues: \"And thou\nshalt take away the evil out of the midst of thee, that others\nhearing may fear, and may not dare to do such things.\" Specially,\nhowever, does he injure the person of the accused, if he accuse him\nfalsely. Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the injury\ndone to himself, particularly if the accusation were made not\ncalumniously but out of levity of mind. But if the accuser desist\nfrom accusing an innocent man, through collusion with the latter's\nadversary, he inflicts an injury on the commonwealth: and this cannot\nbe condoned by the accused, although it can be remitted by the\nsovereign, who has charge of the commonwealth.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The accuser deserves the punishment of retaliation in\ncompensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his neighbor: but\nthe punishment of disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in\naccusing another man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits the\npunishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he removes the\ndisgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can remove this disgrace. When\nPope Gelasius says: \"We cannot remove the disgrace,\" he may mean\neither the disgrace attaching to the deed (_infamia facti_), or that\nsometimes it is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be\nreferring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian\nstates (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 69\n\nOF SINS COMMITTED AGAINST JUSTICE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider those sins which are committed against justice\non the part of the defendant. Under this head there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to\none's condemnation?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful to defend oneself with calumnies?\n\n(3) Whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing?\n\n(4) Whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend\nhimself by violence if he be able to do so?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 1]\n\nWhether One Can, Without a Mortal Sin, Deny the Truth Which Would\nLead to One's Condemnation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem one can, without a mortal sin, deny the\ntruth which would lead to one's condemnation. For Chrysostom says\n(Hom. xxxi super Ep. ad Heb.): \"I do not say that you should lay bare\nyour guilt publicly, nor accuse yourself before others.\" Now if the\naccused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay bare his\nguilt and be his own accuser. Therefore he is not bound to tell the\ntruth: and so he does not sin mortally if he tell a lie in court.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a lie\nin order to rescue another man from death, so is it an officious lie\nwhen one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one\nis more bound towards oneself than towards another. Now an officious\nlie is considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the\naccused denies the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does\nnot sin mortally.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated\nabove (Q. 24, A. 12). But that the accused lie by denying himself to\nbe guilty of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to charity,\nneither as regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our\nneighbor. Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a\nmortal sin, because we are bound by precept to \"do all to the glory\nof God\" (1 Cor. 10:31). Now it is to the glory of God that the\naccused confess that which is alleged against him, as appears from\nthe words of Josue to Achan, \"My son, give glory to the Lord God of\nIsrael, and confess and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not\"\n(Joshua 7:19). Therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in order to cover\none's guilt.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whoever acts against the due order of justice, sins\nmortally, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4). Now it belongs to the order\nof justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters to\nwhich the rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated\nabove (Q. 67, A. 1), is the superior in relation to the person whom\nhe judges. Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge\nthe truth which the latter exacts from him according to the form of\nlaw. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he is under\nobligation to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it, he sins mortally.\nIf, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot ask\nin accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to\nsatisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise:\nbut it is not lawful for him to lie.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When a man is examined by the judge according to the\norder of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt\nis unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed\non him by one whom he is bound to obey.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To lie, with injury to another person, in order to\nrescue a man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an\nadmixture of the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court in\norder to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound\nto obey, since he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who lies in court by denying his guilt, acts both\nagainst the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the\nlove of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom\nhe refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished\nif he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Ps. 140:4):\n\"Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins\": on\nwhich words a gloss says: \"Shameless men are wont by lying to deny\ntheir guilt when they have been found out.\" And Gregory in expounding\nJob 31:33, \"If as a man I have hid my sin,\" says (Moral. xxii, 15):\n\"It is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to hide\nthe sin that has been committed, and when convicted to aggravate the\nsin by defending oneself.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for the Accused to Defend Himself with\nCalumnies?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself\nwith calumnies. Because, according to civil law (Cod. II, iv, De\ntransact. 18), when a man is on trial for his life it is lawful for\nhim to bribe his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending\noneself with calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his\nlife does not sin if he defend himself with calumnies.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the\naccused, is punishable by law (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem\npoenit.). Yet no punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion\nwith the accuser. Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to\ndefend himself with calumnies.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 14:16): \"A wise man feareth and\ndeclineth from evil, the fool leapeth over and is confident.\" Now\nwhat is done wisely is no sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines\nfrom evil, he does not sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In criminal cases an oath has to be taken against\ncalumnious allegations (Extra, De juramento calumniae, cap.\nInhaerentes): and this would not be the case if it were lawful to\ndefend oneself with calumnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the\naccused to defend himself with calumnies.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another\nto utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is\nnot bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and\nmust require of him according to the order of justice; as, for\ninstance, when the accused is already disgraced through the\ncommission of some crime, or certain indications of his guilt have\nalready been discovered, or again when his guilt is already more or\nless proven. On the other hand it is never lawful to make a false\ndeclaration.\n\nAs regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful\nmeans, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which belongs to\nprudence; or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed\nend, and this belongs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and\nguile, as shown above (Q. 55, AA. 3, seqq.). His conduct in the\nformer case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Accordingly it is\nlawful for the accused to defend himself by withholding the truth\nthat he is not bound to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not\nanswering such questions as he is not bound to answer. This is not to\ndefend himself with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is\nunlawful for him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth\nthat he is bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, because fraud\nand guile have the force of a lie, and so to use them would be to\ndefend oneself with calumnies.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Human laws leave many things unpunished, which\naccording to the Divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple\nfornication; because human law does not exact perfect virtue from\nman, for such virtue belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a\nnumber of people as human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes\nunwilling to commit a sin in order to escape from the death of the\nbody, the danger of which threatens the accused who is on trial for\nhis life, is an act of perfect virtue, since \"death is the most\nfearful of all temporal things\" (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore if the\naccused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins\nindeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does\nnot punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the accused\nand the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is evident\nthat he sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or\nto take part in a sin in any way--for the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32),\nthat \"they . . . are worthy of death . . . that consent\" to those who\nsin--it is evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty of\ncollusion with his adversary. Nevertheless according to human laws no\npunishment is inflicted on him, for the reason given above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The wise man hides himself not by slandering others but\nby exercising prudence.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 3]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for the Accused to Escape Judgment by Appealing?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape\njudgment by appealing. The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): \"Let every soul\nbe subject to the higher powers.\" Now the accused by appealing\nrefuses to be subject to a higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he\ncommits a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, ordinary authority is more binding than that which\nwe choose for ourselves. Now according to the Decretals (II, qu. vi,\ncap. A judicibus) it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by\ncommon consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from\nordinary judges.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it is\nnot lawful to appeal after the tenth day [*Can. Anteriorum, caus. ii,\nqu. 6], nor a third time on the same point [*Can. Si autem, caus. ii,\nqu. 6]. Therefore it would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25).\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two motives for which a man appeals. First\nthrough confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is\nunjustly oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to\nappeal, because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid\ndown (Decret. II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): \"All those who are\noppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judgment of the\npriests, and no man may stand in their way.\" Secondly, a man appeals\nin order to cause a delay, lest a just sentence be pronounced against\nhim. This is to defend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful as\nstated above (A. 2). For he inflicts an injury both on the judge,\nwhom he hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary,\nwhose justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is laid down\n(II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): \"Without doubt a man should be\npunished if his appeal be declared unjust.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: A man should submit to the lower authority in so far as\nthe latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower\nauthority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to\nsubmit to it, for instance \"if the proconsul order one thing and the\nemperor another,\" according to a gloss on Rom. 13:2. Now when a judge\noppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order\nof the higher authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence\nit is lawful for a man who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to\nthe authority of the higher power, by appealing either before or\nafter sentence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed\nthat there is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is\nunlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, according\nto Decret. II, qu. vi, can. _Catholicus:_ \"The Catholic who appeals\nto the decision of a judge of another faith shall be excommunicated,\nwhether his case be just or unjust.\" Hence the Apostle also rebuked\nthose who went to law before unbelievers (1 Cor. 6:6).\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is due to a man's own fault or neglect that, of his\nown accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice he has\nno confidence. Moreover it would seem to point to levity of mind for\na man not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is with\nreason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the\ndecision of judges of our own choice, who have no power save by\nvirtue of the consent of the litigants. On the other hand the\nauthority of an ordinary judge depends, not on the consent of those\nwho are subject to his judgment, but on the authority of the king or\nprince who appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust\noppression, the law allows one to have recourse to appeal, so that\neven if the judge be at the same time ordinary and chosen by the\nlitigants, it is lawful to appeal from his decision, since seemingly\nhis ordinary authority occasioned his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor\nis it to be imputed as a fault to the man who consented to his being\narbitrator, without adverting to the fact that he was appointed\nordinary judge by the prince.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The equity of the law so guards the interests of\nthe one party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days\nfor appeal to be made, this being considered sufficient time for\ndeliberating on the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand\nthere were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of\njudgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other party would\nsuffer an injury. The reason why it is not allowed to appeal a third\ntime on the same point, is that it is not probable that the judges\nwould fail to judge justly so many times.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Man Who Is Condemned to Death May Lawfully Defend Himself\nIf He Can?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man who is condemned to death may\nlawfully defend himself if he can. For it is always lawful to do that\nto which nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak.\nNow, to resist corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men\nand animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he can\ndo so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully resist being put\nto death.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as a man, by resistance, escapes the death to\nwhich he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now it is lawful\nseemingly to escape death by flight, according to Ecclus. 9:18, \"Keep\nthee far from the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]\"\n[*The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate]. Therefore it is\nalso lawful for the accused to resist.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 24:11): \"Deliver them that are\nled to death: and those that are drawn to death forbear not to\ndeliver.\" Now a man is under greater obligation to himself than to\nanother. Therefore it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself\nfrom being put to death.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): \"He that resisteth\nthe power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist,\npurchase to themselves damnation.\" Now a condemned man, by defending\nhimself, resists the power in the point of its being ordained by God\n\"for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good\"\n[*1 Pet. 2:14]. Therefore he sins in defending himself.\n\n_I answer that,_ A man may be condemned to death in two ways. First\njustly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend\nhimself, because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance\nby force, so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently\nwithout any doubt he sins.\n\nSecondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such a sentence is like the\nviolence of robbers, according to Ezech. 22:21, \"Her princes in the\nmidst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood.\"\nWherefore even as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in\na like case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to\navoid scandal, whence some grave disturbance might be feared to arise.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reason was given to man that he might ensue those\nthings to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in\naccordance with the order of reason. Hence not all self-defense is\nlawful, but only such as is accomplished with due moderation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill\nhimself, but to suffer death: wherefore he is not bound to do\nanything from which death would result, such as to stay in the place\nwhence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who\nlead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for\nhim to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he\ndoes not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, because\nto refrain from taking it would be to kill himself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not direct that one\nshould deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of\njustice: wherefore neither should a man deliver himself from death by\nresisting against justice.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 70\n\nOF INJUSTICE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON OF THE WITNESS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the\nwitness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether a man is bound to give evidence?\n\n(2) Whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices?\n\n(3) Whether a man's evidence may be rejected without any fault on his\npart?\n\n(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Man Is Bound to Give Evidence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to give evidence.\nAugustine says (QQ. Gen. 1:26) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 33, 34],\nthat when Abraham said of his wife (Gen. 20:2), \"She is my sister,\"\nhe wished the truth to be concealed and not a lie be told. Now, by\nhiding the truth a man abstains from giving evidence. Therefore a man\nis not bound to give evidence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no man is bound to act deceitfully. Now it is\nwritten (Prov. 11:13): \"He that walketh deceitfully revealeth\nsecrets, but he that is faithful concealeth the thing committed to\nhim by his friend.\" Therefore a man is not always bound to give\nevidence, especially on matters committed to him as a secret by a\nfriend.\n\nObj. 3: Further, clerics and priests, more than others, are bound to\nthose things that are necessary for salvation. Yet clerics and\npriests are forbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for his\nlife. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to give evidence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap.\nFalsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55] says: \"Both he who\nconceals the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the former\nbecause he is unwilling to do good, the latter because he desires to\nhurt.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We must make a distinction in the matter of giving\nevidence: because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary,\nand sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject\nto a superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to\nobey, without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points\nwhich are required of him in accordance with the order of justice,\nfor instance on manifest things or when ill-report has preceded. If\nhowever he is required to give evidence on other points, for instance\nsecret matters, and those of which no ill-report has preceded, he is\nnot bound to give evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be\nrequired by authority of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must\nmake a distinction: because if his evidence is required in order to\ndeliver a man from an unjust death or any other penalty, or from\nfalse defamation, or some loss, in such cases he is bound to give\nevidence. Even if his evidence is not demanded, he is bound to do\nwhat he can to declare the truth to someone who may profit thereby.\nFor it is written (Ps. 81:4): \"Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy\nfrom the hand of the sinner\"; and (Prov. 24:11): \"Deliver them that\nare led to death\"; and (Rom. 1:32): \"They are worthy of death, not\nonly they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do\nthem,\" on which words a gloss says: \"To be silent when one can\ndisprove is to consent.\" In matters pertaining to a man's\ncondemnation, one is not bound to give evidence, except when one is\nconstrained by a superior in accordance with the order of justice;\nsince if the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular\ninjury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the\naccuser, it matters not since he risked the danger of his own accord:\nwhereas it is different with the accused, who incurs the danger\nagainst his will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of concealment of the truth in a\ncase when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority to\ndeclare the truth, and when such concealment is not specially\ninjurious to any person.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man should by no means give evidence on\nmatters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such\nthings, not as man but as God's minister: and the sacrament is more\nbinding than any human precept. But as regards matters committed to\nman in some other way under secrecy, we must make a distinction.\nSometimes they are of such a nature that one is bound to make them\nknown as soon as they come to our knowledge, for instance if they\nconduce to the spiritual or corporal corruption of the community, or\nto some grave personal injury, in short any like matter that a man is\nbound to make known either by giving evidence or by denouncing it.\nAgainst such a duty a man cannot be obliged to act on the plea that\nthe matter is committed to him under secrecy, for he would break the\nfaith he owes to another. On the other hand sometimes they are such as\none is not bound to make known, so that one may be under obligation\nnot to do so on account of their being committed to one under secrecy.\nIn such a case one is by no means bound to make them known, even if\nthe superior should command; because to keep faith is of natural\nright, and a man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to natural\nright.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar to\nslay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as stated above\n(Q. 64, A. 4); hence according to the order of justice they\ncannot be compelled to give evidence when a man is on trial for his\nlife.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Evidence of Two or Three Persons Suffices?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons\nis not sufficient. For judgment requires certitude. Now certitude of\nthe truth is not obtained by the assertions of two or three\nwitnesses, for we read that Naboth was unjustly condemned on the\nevidence of two witnesses (3 Kings 21). Therefore the evidence of two\nor three witnesses does not suffice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in order for evidence to be credible it must agree.\nBut frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some point.\nTherefore it is of no use for proving the truth in court.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. iv, can. Praesul.):\n\"A bishop shall not be condemned save on the evidence of seventy-two\nwitnesses; nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church, unless there be\nsixty-four witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church,\nunless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon, an acolyte,\nan exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without seven witnesses.\" Now\nthe sin of one who is of higher dignity is more grievous, and\nconsequently should be treated more severely. Therefore neither is\nthe evidence of two or three witnesses sufficient for the\ncondemnation of other persons.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 17:6): \"By the mouth of two\nor three witnesses shall he die that is to be slain,\" and further on\n(Deut. 19:15): \"In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word\nshall stand.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), \"we must\nnot expect to find certitude equally in every matter.\" For in human\nacts, on which judgments are passed and evidence required, it is\nimpossible to have demonstrative certitude, because they are about\nthings contingent and variable. Hence the certitude of probability\nsuffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater number of cases,\nalthough it fail in the minority. Now it is probable that the\nassertion of several witnesses contains the truth rather than the\nassertion of one: and since the accused is the only one who denies,\nwhile several witness affirm the same as the prosecutor, it is\nreasonably established both by Divine and by human law, that the\nassertion of several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude is\ncomprised of three elements, the beginning, the middle and the end.\nWherefore, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 1), \"we reckon\n'all' and 'whole' to consist of three parts.\" Now we have a triple\nvoucher when two agree with the prosecutor: hence two witnesses are\nrequired; or for the sake of greater certitude three, which is the\nperfect number. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 4:12): \"A threefold\ncord is not easily broken\": and Augustine, commenting on John 8:17,\n\"The testimony of two men is true,\" says (Tract. xxxvi) that \"there\nis here a mystery by which we are given to understand that Trinity\nwherein is perpetual stability of truth.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: No matter how great a number of witnesses may be\ndetermined, the evidence might sometimes be unjust, since is written\n(Ex. 23:2): \"Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil.\" And yet\nthe fact that in so many it is not possible to have certitude without\nfear of error, is no reason why we should reject the certitude which\ncan probably be had through two or three witnesses, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If the witnesses disagree in certain principal\ncircumstances which change the substance of the fact, for instance in\ntime, place, or persons, which are chiefly in question, their\nevidence is of no weight, because if they disagree in such things,\neach one would seem to be giving distinct evidence and to be speaking\nof different facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing\nhappened at such and such a time or place, while another says it\nhappened at another time or place, they seem not to be speaking of\nthe same event. The evidence is not weakened if one witness says that\nhe does not remember, while the other attests to a determinate time\nor place. And if on such points as these the witness for prosecution\nand defense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number on\neither side, and of equal standing, the accused should have the\nbenefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to be more inclined to\nacquit than to condemn, except perhaps in favorable suits, such as a\npleading for liberty and the like. If, however, the witnesses for the\nsame side disagree, the judge ought to use his own discretion in\ndiscerning which side to favor, by considering either the number of\nwitnesses, or their standing, or the favorableness of the suit, or\nthe nature of the business and of the evidence.\n\nMuch more ought the evidence of one witness to be rejected if he\ncontradict himself when questioned about what he has seen and about\nwhat he knows; not, however, if he contradict himself when questioned\nabout matters of opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer\ndifferently according to the different things he has seen and heard.\n\nOn the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence in\ncircumstances not touching the substance of the fact, for instance,\nwhether the weather were cloudy or fine, whether the house were\npainted or not, or such like matters, such discrepancy does not\nweaken the evidence, because men are not wont to take much notice of\nsuch things, wherefore they easily forget them. Indeed, a discrepancy\nof this kind renders the evidence more credible, as Chrysostom states\n(Hom. i in Matth.), because if the witnesses agreed in every point,\neven in the minutest of details, they would seem to have conspired\ntogether to say the same thing: but this must be left to the prudent\ndiscernment of the judge.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This passage refers specially to the bishops, priests,\ndeacons and clerics of the Roman Church, on account of its dignity:\nand this for three reasons. First because in that Church those men\nought to be promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more\nweight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have\nto judge other men, often have many opponents on account of their\njustice, wherefore those who give evidence against them should not be\nbelieved indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly,\nbecause the condemnation of any one of them would detract in public\nopinion from the dignity and authority of that Church, a result which\nwould be more fraught with danger than if one were to tolerate a\nsinner in that same Church, unless he were very notorious and\nmanifest, so that a grave scandal would arise if he were tolerated.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Man's Evidence Can Be Rejected Without Any Fault of His?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man's evidence ought not to be\nrejected except on account of some fault. For it is inflicted as a\npenalty on some that their evidence is inadmissible, as in the case\nof those who are branded with infamy. Now a penalty must not be\ninflicted save for a fault. Therefore it would seem that no man's\nevidence ought to be rejected save on account of a fault.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Good is to be presumed of every one, unless the\ncontrary appear\" [*Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt.]. Now it pertains to a\nman's goodness that he should give true evidence. Since therefore\nthere can be no proof of the contrary, unless there be some fault of\nhis, it would seem that no man's evidence should be rejected save for\nsome fault.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no man is rendered unfit for things necessary for\nsalvation except by some sin. But it is necessary for salvation to\ngive true evidence, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore no man should\nbe excluded from giving evidence save for some fault.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): \"As to the bishop\nwho is said to have been accused by his servants, you are to know\nthat they should by no means have been heard\": which words are\nembodied in the Decretals (II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the authority of evidence is\nnot infallible but probable; and consequently the evidence for one\nside is weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the\nother. Now the reliability of a person's evidence is weakened,\nsometimes indeed on account of some fault of his, as in the case of\nunbelievers and persons of evil repute, as well as those who are\nguilty of a public crime and who are not allowed even to accuse;\nsometimes, without any fault on his part, and this owing either to a\ndefect in the reason, as in the case of children, imbeciles and\nwomen, or to personal feeling, as in the case of enemies, or persons\nunited by family or household ties, or again owing to some external\ncondition, as in the case of poor people, slaves, and those who are\nunder authority, concerning whom it is to be presumed that they might\neasily be induced to give evidence against the truth.\n\nThus it is manifest that a person's evidence may be rejected either\nwith or without some fault of his.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If a person is disqualified from giving evidence this\nis done as a precaution against false evidence rather than as a\npunishment. Hence the argument does not prove.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Good is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary\nappear, provided this does not threaten injury to another: because,\nin that case, one ought to be careful not to believe everyone\nreadily, according to 1 John 4:1: \"Believe not every spirit.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: To give evidence is necessary for salvation, provided\nthe witness be competent, and the order of justice observed. Hence\nnothing hinders certain persons being excused from giving evidence,\nif they be considered unfit according to law.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Always a Mortal Sin to Give False Evidence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not always a mortal sin to give\nfalse evidence. For a person may happen to give false evidence,\nthrough ignorance of fact. Now such ignorance excuses from mortal\nsin. Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal\nsin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a lie that benefits someone and hurts no man is\nofficious, and this is not a mortal sin. Now sometimes a lie of this\nkind occurs in false evidence, as when a person gives false evidence\nin order to save a man from death, or from an unjust sentence which\nthreatens him through other false witnesses or a perverse judge.\nTherefore in such cases it is not a mortal sin to give false evidence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a witness is required to take an oath in order that\nhe may fear to commit a mortal sin of perjury. But this would not be\nnecessary, if it were already a mortal sin to give false evidence.\nTherefore the giving of false evidence is not always mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 19:5): \"A false witness shall\nnot be unpunished.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ False evidence has a threefold deformity. The first\nis owing to perjury, since witnesses are admitted only on oath and on\nthis count it is always a mortal sin. Secondly, owing to the\nviolation of justice, and on this account it is a mortal sin\ngenerically, even as any kind of injustice. Hence the prohibition of\nfalse evidence by the precept of the decalogue is expressed in this\nform when it is said (Ex. 20:16), \"Thou shalt not bear false witness\nagainst thy neighbor.\" For one does nothing against a man by\npreventing him from doing someone an injury, but only by taking away\nhis justice. Thirdly, owing to the falsehood itself, by reason of\nwhich every lie is a sin: on this account, the giving of false\nevidence is not always a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In giving evidence a man ought not to affirm as\ncertain, as though he knew it, that about which he is not certain;\nand he should confess his doubt in doubtful terms, and that which he\nis certain about, in terms of certainty. Owing however to the frailty\nof the human memory, a man sometimes thinks he is certain about\nsomething that is not true; and then if after thinking over the\nmatter with due care he deems himself certain about that false thing,\nhe does not sin mortally if he asserts it, because the evidence which\nhe gives is not directly and intentionally, but accidentally contrary\nto what he intends.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An unjust judgment is not a judgment, wherefore the\nfalse evidence given in an unjust judgment, in order to prevent\ninjustice is not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment, but only by\nreason of the oath violated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Men abhor chiefly those sins that are against God, as\nbeing most grievous; and among them is perjury: whereas they do not\nabhor so much sins against their neighbor. Consequently, for the\ngreater certitude of evidence, the witness is required to take a oath.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 71\n\nOF INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF COUNSEL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on\nthe part of counsel, and under this head there are four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?\n\n(2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the\noffice of advocate?\n\n(3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?\n\n(4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 1]\n\nWhether an Advocate Is Bound to Defend the Suits of the Poor?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the\nsuits of the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5): \"If thou see the ass\nof him that hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not\npass by, but shall lift him up with him.\" Now no less a danger\nthreatens the poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than\nif his ass were to lie underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate\nis bound to defend the suits of the poor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): \"Let him\nthat hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let\nhim that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful\nbounty; let him who is a servant to art share his skill with his\nneighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy\nplead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift you have received\nwill be reputed a talent.\" Now every man is bound, not to hide but\nfaithfully to dispense the talent committed to him; as evidenced by\nthe punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Matt.\n25:30). Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being\naffirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is\nchiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the\nsuit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in\nsuch a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ He that lacks food is no less in need than he that\nlacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always\nbound to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always\nbound to defend the suits of the poor.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since defense of the poor man's suit belongs to the\nworks of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one\ngiven above with regard to the other works of mercy (Q. 32, AA. 5,\n9). Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those\nwho need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28),\n\"since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly\nwho by reason of place, time, or any other circumstance, by a kind of\nchance are more closely united to us.\" He says \"by reason of place,\"\nbecause one is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy\nthat one may succor them; and it suffices to do works of mercy to\nthose one meets with. Hence it is written (Ex. 23:4): \"If thou meet\nthy enemy's ass going astray, bring it back to him.\" He says also \"by\nreason of time,\" because one is not bound to provide for the future\nneeds of others, and it suffices to succor present needs. Hence it is\nwritten (1 John 3:17): \"He that . . . shall see his brother in need,\nand shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God\nabide in him?\" Lastly he says, \"or any other circumstance,\" because\none ought to show kindness to those especially who are by any tie\nwhatever united to us, according to 1 Tim. 5:8, \"If any man have not\ncare of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied\nthe faith and is worse than an infidel.\"\n\nIt may happen however that these circumstances concur, and then we\nhave to consider whether this particular man stands in such a need\nthat it is not easy to see how he can be succored otherwise, and then\none is bound to bestow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is\neasy to see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself, or\nby some other person still more closely united to him, or in a better\nposition to help him, one is not bound so strictly to help the one in\nneed that it would be a sin not to do so: although it would be\npraiseworthy to do so where one is not bound to. Therefore an\nadvocate is not always bound to defend the suits of the poor, but\nonly when the aforesaid circumstances concur, else he would have to\nput aside all other business, and occupy himself entirely in\ndefending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a physician\nwith regard to attendance on the sick.\n\nReply Obj. 1: So long as the ass lies under the burden, there is no\nmeans of help in this case, unless those who are passing along come\nto the man's aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they\nwould not be so bound if help were possible from another quarter.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man is bound to make good use of the talent bestowed\non him, according to the opportunities afforded by time, place, and\nother circumstances, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not every need is such that it is one's duty to remedy\nit, but only such as we have stated above.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Fitting That the Law Should Debar Certain Persons from\nthe Office of Advocate?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain\npersons from the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred\nfrom doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to\ndefend a man's suit, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore no man should\nbe debarred from this office.\n\nObj. 2: Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same\neffect. Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about sin\nare contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some\nshould be debarred from the office of advocate, on account of\nreligion, as monks and clerics, while others are debarred on account\nof sin, as persons of ill-repute and heretics.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now it is\na duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause. Therefore\nit is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading\nthe cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own\ncause.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to Decret. III, qu. vii, can. _Infames,_\nmany persons are debarred from the office of advocate.\n\n_I answer that,_ In two ways a person is debarred from performing a\ncertain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because\nit is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act\nis impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom\nan act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may\ndo away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some are debarred from\nthe office of advocate because it is impossible to them through lack\nof sense--either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors--or\nexterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs\nto have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the\njustice of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, that he\nmay speak and hear what is said to him. Consequently those who are\ndefective in these points, are altogether debarred from being\nadvocates either in their own or in another's cause. The becomingness\nof exercising this office is removed in two ways. First, through a\nman being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting that\nmonks or priests should be advocates in any cause whatever, or that\nclerics should plead in a secular court, because such persons are\nengaged in Divine things. Secondly, on account of some personal\ndefect, either of body (for instance a blind man whose attendance in\na court of justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill\nbecomes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead for the\njustice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill\nrepute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of grievous\ncrimes should be advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is\noutweighed by necessity: and for this reason such persons can plead\neither their own cause or that of persons closely connected with\nthem. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of their own\nchurch, and monks in the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot\ndirect them to do so.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Certain persons are sometimes debarred by\nunbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of\nmercy: for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons:\nthus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by \"too much\" and \"too\nlittle,\" so does a person become incompetent by \"more\" and \"less.\"\nFor this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from\npleading in causes, because they are above such an office; and others\nbecause they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons\nof ill-repute and unbelievers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not\nso pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because\nothers are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison\nfails.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 3]\n\nWhether an Advocate Sins by Defending an Unjust Cause?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending\nan unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing\na desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can\ndefend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a\ndesperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but\nought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin.\nYet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II,\nqu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by\ndefending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to\nuse unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false\nwitnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause,\nsince the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the\nmatter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make\nuse of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to\nlay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate\ndoes not sin by defending an unjust cause.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): \"Thou helpest the\nungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the\nLord.\" Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause, helps the\nungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by\ncounseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or\nassist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says (Rom.\n1:32) that \"they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do\" a\nsin, \"but they also that consent to them that do\" it. Hence it was\nstated above (Q. 62, A. 7), that all such are bound to restitution.\nNow it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and\ncounsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he\ndefends an unjust cause, without doubt he sins grievously, and is\nbound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other party\nby reason of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he defends\nan unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused\naccording to the measure in which ignorance is excusable.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a\ndesperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an\nunjust cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads\nunjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to\ndeserve praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by\nreason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil\nend.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause\nis just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that\nit is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to\nhelp the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to\nthe other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his\nclient to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the\nopposing party.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 40, A. 3), it is lawful for a\nsoldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently\nconcealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent\nfalsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says\n(De offic. iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending\nhis case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue,\nbut it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for an Advocate to Take a Fee for Pleading?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for\npleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human\nremuneration, according to Luke 14:12, \"When thou makest a dinner or\na supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich:\nlest perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to\nthee.\" Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated\nabove (A. 1). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take\npayment in money for pleading.\n\nObj. 2: Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with\ntemporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a\nspiritual good since it consists in using one's knowledge of law.\nTherefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs towards\nthe pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the judge and\nof the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.),\n\"the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true\nevidence.\" Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that \"an\nadvocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A man may justly receive payment for granting what\nhe is not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not\nalways bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's\ncauses. Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act\nagainst justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a\nsick person to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however,\nthey take a moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the\nmatter in hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the\ncountry. If, however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they\nsin against justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.)\nthat \"it is customary to demand from them restitution of what they\nhave extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them\nin accordance with a commendable custom.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he\ncan do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell\nanything, since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when\na man does give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but\na Divine reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads\nthe cause of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a Divine\nmeed; and yet he is not always bound to give his services\ngratuitously.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Though knowledge of law is something spiritual, the use\nof that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body: hence it\nis lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no craftsman\nwould be allowed to make profit by his art.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The judge and witnesses are common to either\nparty, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the\nwitness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to\none side rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive out\nof the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive\ntheir expenses (not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for\ntheir labor) either from both parties or from the party by whom they\nare adduced, because no man \"serveth as a soldier at any time at his\nown charge [*Vulg.: 'Who serveth as a soldier,']\" (1 Cor. 9:7). On the\nother hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully\naccept fee from the party he assists.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 72\n\nOF REVILING\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered\nextrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting,\n(3) tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is reviling?\n\n(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?\n\n(3) Whether one ought to check revilers?\n\n(4) Of the origin of reviling.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Reviling Consists in Words?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words.\nReviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is\na kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's\nneighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore\nreviling does not consist in words.\n\nObj. 2: Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be\ndishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it\nseems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or\na taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt.\nTherefore reviling does not consist in words.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing.\nNow reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jer. 20:10, \"I\nheard reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side.\" Therefore\nreviling consists in words.\n\n_I answer that,_ Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and\nthis happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence,\none person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the\nexcellence for which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed,\nwhereof we have spoken above (Q. 64, seqq.). Secondly, when a man\npublishes something against another's honor, thus bringing it to the\nknowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling properly so\ncalled, and is done by some kind of signs. Now, according to\nAugustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), \"compared with words all other\nsigns are very few, for words have obtained the chief place among men\nfor the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives.\" Hence\nreviling, properly speaking, consists in words: wherefore, Isidore\nsays (Etym. x) that a reviler (_contumeliosus_) \"is hasty and bursts\nout (_tumet_) in injurious words.\" Since, however, things are also\nsignified by deeds, which on this account have the same significance\nas words, it follows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to\ndeeds. Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30, \"contumelious, proud,\" says:\n\"The contumelious are those who by word or deed revile and shame\nothers.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e.\nas audible sounds, injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the\near, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs\nconveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many\nkinds of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his\nhonor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling\nis greater if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and\nyet there may still be reviling if he reproach him by himself, in so\nfar as the speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the\nhearer.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One man slights another by deeds in so far as such\ndeeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's honor.\nIn the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some other\nkind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ. 64, 65, 66):\nwhere as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds\nhave the significant force of words.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling,\nbecause by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the detriment of\nhis honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault\nof guilt, which is exposed by _reviling_ words. Secondly, there is\nthe fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by _taunts_\n(_convicium_), because _vice_ is commonly spoken of in connection\nwith not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man says\nspitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile\nhim: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but\nalso reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his\ninferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for\nany kind of excellence. This is done by _upbraiding_ words, and\nproperly speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one\nhas succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Ecclus.\n20:15): \"He will give a few things and upbraid much.\" Nevertheless\nthese terms are sometimes employed one for the other.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Reviling or Railing Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal\nsin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of\na virtue, viz. of wittiness (_eutrapelia_) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 60, A. 5]\nto which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and\nyet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the\nApostle says (Gal. 3:1): \"O senseless Galatians!,\" and our Lord said\n(Luke 24:25): \"O foolish and slow of heart to believe!\" Therefore\nrailing or reviling is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of its\ngenus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its genus\ncannot become venial, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 4, 6). Hence\nif by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to\nrailing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin.\nBut this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who\nutters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger.\nTherefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its\ngenus.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal\npunishment of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment\nof hell, according to Matt. 5:22, \"Whosoever shall say to his brother\n. . . Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire.\" Therefore railing\nor reviling is a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), words are injurious to other\npersons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends\non the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems\nthat we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered.\nSince then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, if\nthe intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this is\nproperly and essentially to give utterance to railing or reviling:\nand this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since a man\nloves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other hand,\na man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the\nintention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting\nhim or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not\nformally and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far\nto wit as he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence\nthis may be sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at\nall. Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and\none should use such words with moderation, because the railing might\nbe so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the\nperson against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit\na mortal sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other\nman: just as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by\nstriking him in fun, he would not be without blame.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery,\nnot with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of\nthe mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and this may\nbe without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. On the other\nhand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of\nhis witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful,\nas stated in the passage quoted.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or damnify him\nin his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too, for the\npurpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person whom\none has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples\n\"foolish,\" and the Apostle called the Galatians \"senseless.\" Yet, as\nAugustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), \"seldom and only when\nit is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then\nso as to urge God's service, not our own.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the\nintention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it be\na slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be\nuttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the\nfixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by\nsuch a word to give but little pain.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 3]\n\nWhether One Ought to Suffer Oneself to Be Reviled?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be\nreviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the\nreviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to\nsuffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now one\nought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written\n(Prov. 26:10): \"He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger.\"\nTherefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it is\nsaid: \"Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay\" [*Heb. 10:30]. Now by\nsubmitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to\nChrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): \"If thou wilt be revenged, be\nsilent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow.\" Therefore one ought not by\nsilence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 37:13): \"They that sought evils\nto me spoke vain things,\" and afterwards (Ps. 37:14) he says: \"But I\nas a deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as we need patience in things done against us,\nso do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of\npatience in those things done against us refer to the preparedness of\nthe mind, according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19)\nexposition on our Lord's precept, \"If one strike thee on thy right\ncheek, turn to him also the other\" [*The words as quoted by St.\nThomas are a blending of Matt. 5:39 and Luke 6:29]: that is to say, a\nman ought to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always\nbound to do this actually: since not even did our Lord do so, for\nwhen He received a blow, He said: \"Why strikest thou Me?\" (John\n18:23). Consequently the same applies to the reviling words that are\nsaid against us. For we are bound to hold our minds prepared to\nsubmit to be reviled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it\nsometimes behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this\nchiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; namely,\nthat his daring may be checked, and that he may not repeat the\nattempt, according to Prov. 26:5, \"Answer a fool according to his\nfolly, lest he imagine himself to be wise.\" Secondly, for the good of\nmany who would be prevented from progressing in virtue on account of\nour being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.): \"Those\nwho are so placed that their life should be an example to others,\nought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their preaching\nbe not heard by those who could have heard it, and they continue\ntheir evil conduct through contempt of a good life.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The daring of the railing reviler should be checked\nwith moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through lust for\none's own honor. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:4): \"Answer not a fool\naccording to his folly, lest thou be like him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: When one man prevents another from being reviled there\nis not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a man\ndefends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to\nproceed from a sense of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the\nintention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be\npraiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it\nis written (Ecclus. 8:4): \"Strive not with a man that is full of\ntongue, and heap not wood upon his fire.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Reviling Arises from Anger?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger.\nFor it is written (Prov. 11:2): \"Where pride is, there shall also be\nreviling [Douay: 'reproach'].\" But anger is a vice distinct from\npride. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): \"All fools are meddling\nwith revilings [Douay: 'reproaches'].\" Now folly is a vice opposed to\nwisdom, as stated above (Q. 46, A. 1); whereas anger is opposed to\nmeekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of\nreviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it\nis a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger.\nTherefore reviling does not arise from anger.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that \"anger gives\nrise to revilings.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ While one sin may arise from various causes, it is\nnevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which\nit is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected\nwith its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end,\nwhich is revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take\nrevenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises\nchiefly from anger.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is\nexcellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride.\nNevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who\nthink themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and\ninflict injuries on them, because they are more easily angered,\nthrough deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done\nagainst their will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6)\n\"anger listens imperfectly to reason\": wherefore an angry man suffers\na defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence\nreviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with\nanger.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) \"an\nangry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about\nthis.\" Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger\nrather than to hatred.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 73\n\nOF BACKBITING [*Or detraction]\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is backbiting?\n\n(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(3) Of its comparison with other sins;\n\n(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Backbiting Is Suitably Defined As the Blackening of Another's\nCharacter by Secret Words?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some\n[*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], \"the blackening of\nanother's good name by words uttered in secret.\" For \"secretly\" and\n\"openly\" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a\nsin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by\nfew. Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does\nnot belong to its essence, and should not be included in its\ndefinition. Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting\nthat it should be done by secret words.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known to\nthe public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by\nbackbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered\nopenly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish something\nalready existing. But sometimes a man's good name is blackened, even\nwithout subtracting from the truth: for instance, when one reveals\nthe crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every\nblackening of a good name is backbiting.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 10:11): \"If a serpent bite\nin silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as one man injures another by deed in two\nways--openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence--and\nsecretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures\nanother by words in two ways--in one way, openly, and this is done by\nreviling him, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 1)--and in another way\nsecretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one\nman openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think\nlittle of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that\nreviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the\nother hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect\nrather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor\nbut his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he,\nfor his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the\nperson against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends\nand aims at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting\ndiffers from reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the\nwords are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and\nthe backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i.e. as\nregards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the\nbackbiter injuring his good name.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced all\ninjuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the\nkind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances \"secretly\" and\n\"openly,\" because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence\nand by ignorance, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 4; I-II, Q. 6, AA. 5, 8).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not\naltogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said,\nbecause they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On\nthe other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face.\nWherefore if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several,\nit is a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he\nalone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent person to\none man alone, he destroys his good name not altogether but partly.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A man is said to backbite (_detrahere_) another, not\nbecause he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good\nname. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly.\nDirectly, in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about\nhim; secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly,\nby revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his\ngood deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by\ngainsaying his good, or by maliciously concealing it, or by\ndiminishing it.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Backbiting Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For\nno act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin,\nwhich pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), is an act\nof the virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin\nin order that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby\na man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, \"Have nothing to do with\ndetractors,\" says: \"The whole human race is in peril from this vice.\"\nBut no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many\nrefrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found\nin all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine in a homily _on the Fire of Purgatory_\n[*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a\nslight sin \"to speak ill without hesitation or forethought.\" But this\npertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:30): \"Backbiters, hateful to\nGod,\" which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, \"lest it be\ndeemed a slight sin because it consists in words.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 72, A. 2), sins of word should\nbe judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting\nby its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore,\nproperly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in\norder to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to\nblacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's\ngood name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is\nhindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written\n(Ecclus. 41:15): \"Take care of a good name, for this shall continue\nwith thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great.\"\nTherefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.\nNevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby\nsomeone's good name is tarnished, and yet he does not intend this,\nbut something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally\nspeaking, but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if\nsuch defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good,\nand with attention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and\ncannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of lightness\nof heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal sin,\nunless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to\ncause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters\npertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of\nthe words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a\nman his good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from\nhim, in the manner stated above (Q. 62, A. 2) when we were treating\nof restitution.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a man's\nhidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or\naccuse him for the good of public justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to\nbe found throughout the whole of mankind, but \"almost,\" both because\n\"the number of fools is infinite,\" [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they\nthat walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Matt. 7:14] and because there\nare few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of\nheart, so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly, for it\nis written (James 3:2): \"If any man offend not in word, the same is a\nperfect man.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man\nutters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but\nthrough lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Backbiting Is the Gravest of All Sins Committed Against One's\nNeighbor?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins\ncommitted against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4,\n\"Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me,\" a gloss\nsays: \"Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of\nfuture believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that\nwas soon to rise again.\" From this it seems to follow that backbiting\nis by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to\nkill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the\nother sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore\nbackbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling,\nbecause a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret backbiting.\nNow backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because\nadultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs\nutterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more grievous\nthan adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against his\nneighbor, adultery is most grave.\n\nObj. 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting arises\nfrom envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a\ngraver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than\nreviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of\nthe defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous\ndefect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2):\n\"What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt\ninto their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the\nless they see of the truth?\" Therefore backbiting is the most\ngrievous sin committed against one's neighbor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word.\nBut backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft\nare sins of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other\nsins committed against one's neighbor.\n\n_I answer that,_ The essential gravity of sins committed against\none's neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him,\nsince it is thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the\ngreater the good taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's\ngood is threefold, namely the good of his soul, the good of his body,\nand the good of external things; the good of the soul, which is the\ngreatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save as an\noccasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, which does not\ninduce necessity. On the other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the\nbody and of external things, can be taken away by violence. Since,\nhowever, the goods of the body excel the goods of external things,\nthose sins which injure a man's body are more grievous than those\nwhich injure his external things. Consequently, among other sins\ncommitted against one's neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since\nit deprives man of the life which he already possesses: after this\ncomes adultery, which is contrary to the right order of human\ngeneration, whereby man enters upon life. In the last place come\nexternal goods, among which a man's good name takes precedence of\nwealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is\nwritten (Prov. 22:1): \"A good name is better than great riches.\"\nTherefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin\nthan theft, but is less grievous than murder or adultery.\nNevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or\nextenuating circumstances.\n\nThe accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to\nthe sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if\nhe sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of\nword have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur\nthrough a slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of His\nmembers, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our faith.\nWherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting, in as\nmuch as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as\nrobbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 9).\nYet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the\ngravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of\nbodies, but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the\nreviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man,\nbut is only the occasional cause of division among those who were\nunited, in so far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he\nfor his own part severs that man from the friendship of other men,\nthough they are not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a\nbackbiter is a murderer _occasionally,_ since by his words he gives\nanother man an occasion for hating or despising his neighbor. For\nthis reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i]\nthat \"backbiters are murderers,\" i.e. occasionally; because \"he that\nhateth his brother is a murderer\" (1 John 3:15).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher\nstates (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in\nsecret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of\nenvy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory.\nNor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than\nreviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just as\nanger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin\ndepends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the\nsin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away\nfrom.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Since \"a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth\"\n(Prov. 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and\nbelieves what he says, and consequently more and more hates his\nneighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less.\nThis effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to\nhate of one's neighbor.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is a Grave Sin for the Listener to Suffer the Backbiter?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter\ndoes not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations\nto others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer\nhis own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): \"Just as\nwe ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so\nought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited\nby their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater.\"\nTherefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who\nbackbite others.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): \"In no wise speak\nagainst the truth.\" Now sometimes a person tells the truth while\nbackbiting, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore it seems that one\nis not always bound to withstand a backbiter.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to others.\nNow backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten: for\nPope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi,\nqu. 1]: \"Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good\npersons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted\nthrough the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are\nhumbled by backbiting.\" Therefore one ought not to withstand\nbackbiters.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): \"Take care not to\nhave an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract\nothers nor listen to backbiters.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), they \"are\nworthy of death . . . not only they that\" commit sins, \"but they also\nthat consent to them that do them.\" Now this happens in two ways.\nFirst, directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or\nwhen the sin is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he\ndoes not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens\nsometimes, not because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of\nsome human fear.\n\nAccordingly we must say that if a man listens to backbiting without\nresisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he\nbecomes a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite,\nor at least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his\nhatred of the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor,\nand sometimes more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): \"It\nis difficult to say which is the more to be condemned[:] the\nbackbiter or he that listens to backbiting.\" If however the sin is\nnot pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the backbiter, through\nfear, negligence, or even shame, he sins indeed, but much less than\nthe backbiter, and, as a rule venially. Sometimes too this may be a\nmortal sin, either because it is his official duty to correct the\nbackbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of\nthe radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal\nsin, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a man is\nspoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly\nspeaking, but reviling, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Yet it is\npossible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his\nknowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his\ndiscretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name,\nunless this endanger the good of others, as stated above (Q. 72, A.\n3). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as he\nsuffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is not left to his\ndiscretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name,\nhence he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for\nthe same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass\nlying \"underneath his burden,\" as commanded in Deut. 21:4 [*Ex. 23:5].\n\nReply Obj. 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by\nendeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows\nthat he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with\nwords, for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our\npained demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting,\nbecause according to Prov. 25:23, \"the north wind driveth away rain,\nas doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is due,\nnot to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God\nWho produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less\nwithstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even\nthough the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 74\n\nOF TALE-BEARING\n[*_Susurratio,_ i.e. whispering]\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?\n\n(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 74, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Tale-bearing Is a Sin Distinct from Backbiting?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin\nfrom backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): \"The _susurro_ (tale-bearer)\ntakes his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks\ndisparagingly not to the face but into the ear.\" But to speak of\nanother disparagingly belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing\nis not a distinct sin from backbiting.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): \"Thou shalt not be an\ninformer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay:\n'whisperer'] among the people.\" But an informer is apparently the\nsame as a backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from\nbackbiting.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): \"The tale-bearer\n[Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed.\" But a\ndouble-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a\nbackbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with\nanother in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a\nbackbiter.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 1:29, 30, \"Tale-bearers,\nbackbiters [Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']\" says: \"Tale-bearers sow\ndiscord among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others' good\npoints.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter,\nand also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil\nsecretly of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are\nsometimes used one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, \"Be\nnot called a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']\" says: \"i.e. a\nbackbiter.\" They differ however in end, because the backbiter intends\nto blacken his neighbor's good name, wherefore he brings forward\nthose evils especially about his neighbor which are likely to defame\nhim, or at least to depreciate his good name: whereas a tale-bearer\nintends to sever friendship, as appears from the gloss quoted above\nand from the saying of Prov. 26:20, \"Where the tale-bearer is taken\naway, contentions shall cease.\" Hence it is that a tale-bearer speaks\nsuch ill about his neighbors as may stir his hearer's mind against\nthem, according to Ecclus. 28:11, \"A sinful man will trouble his\nfriends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as he\nspeaks ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he\nintends not to speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir\none man against another, though it be good simply, and yet has a\nsemblance of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a backbiter,\nfor an informer is one who charges others publicly with crimes,\neither by accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to a\nbackbiter or tale-bearer.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A double-tongued person is properly speaking a\ntale-bearer. For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer\nstrives to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double\ntongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other:\nwherefore it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): \"The tale-bearer [Douay:\n'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed,\" and then it is\nadded, \"for he hath troubled many that were peace.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 74, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Backbiting Is a Graver Sin Than Tale-bearing?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than\ntale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a\nbackbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for\nsuch things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name:\nwhereas a tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently\nevil, because to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore\nbackbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he that deprives a man of his good name, deprives\nhim not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is minded\nto scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is\nreproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip.\n19:2): \"Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord.\"\nBut tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore\nbackbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): \"He that backbiteth\n[Douay: 'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law,\" and\nconsequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of\nbackbiting seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as\nstated above (Q. 20, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3). On the other hand the\nsin of tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of\nbackbiting is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): \"An evil mark of\ndisgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay:\n'whisperer'] hatred, and enmity, and reproach.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 73, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 8),\nsins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they\ninflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the\ngreater, according to the greatness of the good which it takes away.\nNow of all one's external goods a friend takes the first place, since\n\"no man can live without friends,\" as the Philosopher declares\n(Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): \"Nothing can be\ncompared to a faithful friend.\" Again, a man's good name whereof\nbackbiting deprives him, is most necessary to him that he may be\nfitted for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than\nbackbiting or even reviling, because a friend is better than honor,\nand to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. viii).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the end\nrather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its end,\ntale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the\nbackbiter says worse things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and a bad\nname is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short of\nthe thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to a\ndisposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what\nconduces directly to enmity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract the\nlaw, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's neighbor:\nwhile he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly\nagainst this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against\nGod, because \"God is charity\" (1 John 4:16), and for this reason it\nis written (Prov. 6:16): \"Six things there are, which the Lord\nhateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth,\" and the seventh is \"he\n(Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 75\n\nOF DERISION\n[*Or mockery]\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins\nwhereby one's neighbor is injured by words?\n\n(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 75, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Derision Is a Special Sin Distinct from Those Already\nMentioned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin\ndistinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is\napparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to\nreviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible\nwhich puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to\na person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts\nto backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct\nfrom the foregoing vices.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury\nthey inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by\nderision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is\ndetrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin\ndistinct from the foregoing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is\ndescribed as \"making fun.\" Now all the foregoing are done seriously\nand not in jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 72, A. 2), sins of word should\nbe weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these\nsins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those\nwho speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure\nthe honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good\nname, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider\nintends to shame the person he derides. And since this end is\ndistinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is\ndistinct from the foregoing sins.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but\ndiffer in mode, because derision is done with the \"mouth,\" i.e. by\nwords and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the\nnose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, \"He that dwelleth in heaven shall\nlaugh at them\": and such a distinction does not differentiate the\nspecies. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs\nfrom being dishonored: for to be ashamed is \"to fear dishonor,\" as\nDamascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).\n\nReply Obj. 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect\nand a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory\nof a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, \"Our glory is this,\nthe testimony of our conscience.\" Hence, on the other hand, for doing\na reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and\ngood name in the eyes of others--and for this purpose the reviler and\nthe backbiter speak of another person--while in his own eyes, he\nloses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed\nat reprehensible deeds being imputed to him--and for this purpose the\nderider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision\nagrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to\nthe end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according\nto Prov. 15:15, \"A secure mind is like a continual feast.\" Wherefore\nhe that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a\nspecial injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 75, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Derision Can Be a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin.\nEvery mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem\ncontrary to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among\nfriends, wherefore it is known as \"making fun.\" Therefore derision\ncannot be a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which\nis done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal sin\nwhen it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to\nrelapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says\n(De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that \"he who continues to do what he has\nrepented of, is a derider and not a penitent.\" It would likewise\nfollow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to\nGregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) \"the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who\nderides the horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. God.\"\nTherefore derision is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than\nderision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest.\nBut not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less\ntherefore is derision a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 3:34): \"He derideth [Vulg.:\n'shall scorn'] the scorners.\" But God's derision is eternal\npunishment for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, \"He\nthat dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them.\" Therefore derision is a\nmortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ The object of derision is always some evil or\ndefect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but\nseriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule\n(whence the terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is\nconsidered to be slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight\nin two ways: first, in itself, secondly, in relation to the person.\nWhen anyone makes game or fun of another's evil or defect, because it\nis a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its\ngenus. On the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight\nevil in relation to the person, just as we are wont to think little\nof the defects of children and imbeciles: and then to make game or\nfun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and to think him so\ndespicable that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held\nas an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal sin, and\nmore grievous than reviling, which is also done openly: because the\nreviler would seem to take another's evil seriously; whereas the\nderider does so in fun, and so would seem the more to despise and\ndishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a\ngrievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a greater\nrespect is due to the person derided.\n\nConsequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the\nthings of God, according to Isa. 37:23, \"Whom hast thou reproached,\nand whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy\nvoice?\" and he replies: \"Against the Holy One of Israel.\" In the\nsecond place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written\n(Prov. 30:17): \"The eye that mocketh at his father, and that\ndespiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of\nthe brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it.\" Further, the\nderision of good persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of\nvirtue, and against this it is written (Job 12:4): \"The simplicity of\nthe just man is laughed to scorn.\" Such like derision does very much\nharm: because it turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory\n(Moral. xx, 14), \"Who when they perceive any good points appearing in\nthe acts of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a\nmischievous reviling.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation\nto the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against\ncharity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on\naccount of contempt, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has\nrepented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly, in\nso far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that\nto commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but\nonly dispositively and imperfectly.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous than\nbackbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest.\nSometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as\nstated above, and then it is a grave sin.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 76\n\nOF CURSING\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?\n\n(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?\n\n(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?\n\n(4) Of its comparison with other sins.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Curse Anyone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is\nunlawful to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ\nspoke, according to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14),\n\"Bless and curse not.\" Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan. 3:82,\n\"O ye sons of men, bless the Lord.\" Now the same mouth cannot both\nbless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James.\nTherefore no man may lawfully curse another man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some\nevil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be a\nkind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone,\nindeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil.\nTherefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his\nobstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it\nlawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): \"While\nthe ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul.\" Much less\ntherefore is it lawful to curse a man.\n\nObj. 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, \"How shall I curse whom God\nhath not cursed?\" says: \"There cannot be a just cause for cursing a\nsinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments.\" Now one man cannot know\nanother man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore\nno man may lawfully curse another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 27:26): \"Cursed be he that\nabideth not in the words of this law.\" Moreover Eliseus cursed the\nlittle boys who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24).\n\n_I answer that,_ To curse (_maledicere_) is the same as to speak ill\n(_malum dicere_). Now \"speaking\" has a threefold relation to the\nthing spoken. First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is\nexpressed in the indicative mood: in this way _maledicere_ signifies\nsimply to tell someone of another's evil, and this pertains to\nbackbiting, wherefore tellers of evil (_maledici_) are sometimes\ncalled backbiters. Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken,\nby way of cause, and this belongs to God first and foremost, since He\nmade all things by His word, according to Ps. 32:9, \"He spoke and\nthey were made\"; while secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his\nword, commands others and thus moves them to do something: it is for\nthis purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly,\n\"speaking\" is related to the thing spoken by expressing the\nsentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words; and\nfor this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood.\n\nAccordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by\nway of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds.\nAnd here we must observe that to do something and to will it are\nconsequent on one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness,\nas shown above (I-II, Q. 20, A. 3). Hence in these two ways of evil\nspeaking, by way of command and by way of desire, there is the same\naspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or\ndesires another's evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself,\nthen evil speaking will be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is\nmeant by cursing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires\nanother's evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it may be\ncalled cursing, not strictly speaking, but accidentally, because the\nchief intention of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good.\n\nNow evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the\naspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and\nthus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just\npenalty: thus too the Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the\nsame way the prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on\nsinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice, although\nsuch like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes\nevil is spoken under the aspect of useful, as when one wishes a\nsinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind, either that he\nmay himself reform, or at least that he may cease from harming others.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an\nevil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is\nnot opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in\nfact rather is it in conformity therewith.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered.\nHis nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse\nit. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed,\naccording to Job 3:8, \"Let them curse it who curse the day.\" Yet when\na sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same\nreason he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he\nis said to curse his own soul.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be perceived in\nthemselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which\nhas to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom\nGod curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to know\nwho is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Curse an Irrational Creature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational\ncreature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to\npunishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects\neither of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse\nthem.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the\nnature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the\ndevil, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse\nan irrational creature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as bodies,\nor transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral. iv,\n2), \"it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to curse\nwhat exists.\" Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational\ncreature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Matt.\n21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.\n\n_I answer that,_ Benediction and malediction, properly speaking,\nregard things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational\ncreatures: while good and evil are said to happen to irrational\ncreatures in relation to the rational creature for whose sake they\nare. Now they are related to the rational creature in several ways.\nFirst by way of ministration, in so far as irrational creatures\nminister to the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man\n(Gen. 3:17): \"Cursed is the earth in thy work,\" so that its\nbarrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David cursed the\nmountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding (Moral. iv,\n3). Again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature\nby way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in\nsignification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is related\nto rational creatures as something containing them, namely by way of\ntime or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account\nof the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on account of\nthe consequent penalties. In this sense also we may understand David\nto have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in 2 Kings 1:21,\nnamely on account of the people slaughtered there.\n\nBut to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a\nsin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is\nidle and vain and consequently unlawful.\n\nFrom this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Cursing Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For\nAugustine in a homily _on the Fire of Purgatory_ [*Serm. civ in the\nappendix of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins.\nBut such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a\nvenial Sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the\nmind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing\nsometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a\nmortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil deeds\nare not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a mortal\nsin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the\nkingdom of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God,\naccording to 1 Cor. 6:10, \"Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor\nextortioners shall possess the kingdom of God.\" Therefore cursing is\na mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ The evil words of which we are speaking now are\nthose whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or\ndesire. Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil\nby commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby\nwe love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a\nmortal sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the\nperson whom we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect.\nHence it is written (Lev. 20:9): \"He that curseth his father, or\nmother, dying let him die.\"\n\nIt may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial\nsin either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in\ncursing him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters\nthe curse; because he may say such words through some slight\nmovement, or in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word\nshould be weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention, as\nstated above (Q. 72, A. 2).\n\nFrom this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Cursing Is a Graver Sin Than Backbiting?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than\nbackbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied\nin the canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that\n\"when Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended\nabout the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment\nof blasphemy [Douay: 'railing speech'],\" where blasphemy stands for\ncursing, according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than\nbackbiting. Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting.\n\nObj. 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as stated\nabove (Q. 73, A. 3). But cursing is on a par with the sin of murder;\nfor Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth.): \"When thou sayest:\n'Curse him down with his house, away with everything,' you are no\nbetter than a murderer.\" Therefore cursing is graver than backbiting.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But the\ncurser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely\nsignifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more\ngrievously than the backbiter.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas\ncursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what\nhas been said (A. 1). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5), evil is\ntwofold, evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil\nof fault is the worse (I, Q. 48, A. 6). Hence to speak evil of fault\nis worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of\nspeaking be the same. Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the\ntale-bearer, the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault,\nwhereas it belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to\nspeak evil of punishment, and not evil of fault except under the\naspect of punishment. But the mode of speaking is not the same, for\nin the case of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is\nspoken by way of assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of\npunishment is spoken, either by causing it in the form of a command,\nor by wishing it. Now the utterance itself of a person's fault is a\nsin, in as much as it inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, and it is\nmore grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other\nthings being equal.\n\nHence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin\nthan the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing\nwhich is expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a\ncause, will be more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it\ninflicts an injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man's\ngood name. Moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices\nconsidered in their essential aspects: for other accidental points\nmight be taken into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate\nthe aforesaid vices.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God, and thus\naccidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one curse a\ncreature on account of its fault: and the same applies to backbiting.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 3), cursing, in one way, includes\nthe desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil of another's\nviolent death, he does not differ, in desire, from a murderer, but he\ndiffers from him in so far as the external act adds something to the\nact of the will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers cursing by way of command.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 77\n\nOF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary\ncommutations. First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed\nin buying and selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which\noccurs in loans. In connection with the other voluntary commutations\nno special kind of sin is to be found distinct from rapine and theft.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is\nlawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?\n\n(2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;\n\n(3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?\n\n(4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price\nthan was paid for it?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing for More Than Its Worth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more\nthan its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws\ndetermine that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just\nfor buyer and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De\nRescind. Vend. 8, 15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing\nfor more than its worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than\nits worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its\nworth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be natural\nand not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a certain\njester was accepted by all, \"You wish to buy for a song and to sell\nat a premium,\" which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, \"It is\nnaught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away,\nthen he will boast.\" Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more\nthan its worth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty\ndemands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on\nutility, the amount of the recompense for a favor received should\ndepend on the utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility\nsometimes is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the\nreceiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the purpose of\navoiding a danger, or of deriving some particular benefit. Therefore,\nin contracts of buying and selling, it is lawful to give a thing in\nreturn for more than its worth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 7:12): \"All things . . .\nwhatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them.\"\nBut no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore\nno man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit\nin order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this\nis to deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says\n(De Offic. iii, 15): \"Contracts should be entirely free from\ndouble-dealing: the seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the\nbuyer upon one that bids against him.\"\n\nBut, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two\nways. First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of\nview, buying and selling seem to be established for the common\nadvantage of both parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to\nthe other, and vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).\nNow whatever is established for the common advantage, should not be\nmore of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all\ncontracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing.\nAgain, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured\nby the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented, as\nstated in _Ethic._ v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the\nquantity of the thing's worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the\nprice, there is no longer the equality of justice: and consequently,\nto sell a thing for more than its worth, or to buy it for less than\nits worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful.\n\nSecondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as\naccidentally tending to the advantage of one party, and to the\ndisadvantage of the other: for instance, when a man has great need of\na certain thing, while another man will suffer if he be without it.\nIn such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing sold,\nbut on the loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will\nbe lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though\nthe price paid be not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the\none man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other\nman's property, and the seller be not at a loss through being without\nthat thing, the latter ought not to raise the price, because the\nadvantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a\ncircumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not\nhis, though he may charge for the loss he suffers.\n\nOn the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from\nsomething he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller\nsomething over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 2) human law is given\nto the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not\ngiven to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all\nthat is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit\nwhatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats other\nmatters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but by\nnot punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the\nseller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer\nobtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as\nlicit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be\ntoo great, because then even human law demands restitution to be\nmade, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half\nthe amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind.\nVend. 2, 8].\n\nOn the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is\ncontrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is\nreckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in\nbuying and selling: and he who has received more than he ought must\nmake compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be\nconsiderable. I add this condition, because the just price of things\nis not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of\nestimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to\ndestroy the equality of justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says \"this jester, either by looking into\nhimself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are\ninclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since\nin reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that\njustice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination.\" And\nthen he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book\nto a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is\nevident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice,\nwherefore it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real\nequality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we\nconsider equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend\non the usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to\nthe thing bought.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 2]\n\nWhether a Sale Is Rendered Unlawful Through a Fault in the Thing Sold?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and\nunlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should\nbe taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its\nsubstance. Yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered\nunlawful through a fault in its substance: for instance, if a man\nsell instead of the real metal, silver or gold produced by some\nchemical process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which\nsilver and gold are necessary, for instance in the making of vessels\nand the like. Much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the\nthing be defective in other ways.\n\nObj. 2: Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity,\nwould seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in\nequality. Now quantity is known by being measured: and the measures\nof things that come into human use are not fixed, but in some places\nare greater, in others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7).\nTherefore just as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of\nthe thing sold, it seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through\nthe thing sold being defective.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a\nfitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, much\nknowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a\nsale is not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold).\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): \"It is\nmanifestly a rule of justice that a good man should not depart from\nthe truth, nor inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any\nconnection with fraud.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the\nthing which is sold. One, in respect of the thing's substance: and if\nthe seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is\nguilty of a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful.\nHence we find it written against certain people (Isa. 1:22), \"Thy\nsilver is turned into dross, thy wine is mingled with water\": because\nthat which is mixed is defective in its substance.\n\nAnother defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being\nmeasured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure\nin selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it\nis written (Deut. 25:13, 14): \"Thou shalt not have divers weights in\nthy bag, a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a\ngreater bushel and a less,\" and further on (Deut. 25:16): \"For the\nLord . . . abhorreth him that doth these things, and He hateth all\ninjustice.\"\n\nA third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man\nsell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and if anyone do\nthis knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in\nconsequence, is illicit.\n\nIn all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale,\nbut he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the foregoing\ndefects be in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the\nseller does not sin, because he does that which is unjust materially,\nnor is his deed unjust, as shown above (Q. 59, A. 2). Nevertheless he\nis bound to compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his\nknowledge. Moreover what has been said of the seller applies equally\nto the buyer. For sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his\ngoods to be specifically of lower value, as when a man sells gold\ninstead of copper, and then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it\nunjustly and is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a\ndefect in quantity as to a defect in quality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gold and silver are costly not only on account of the\nusefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but\nalso on account of the excellence and purity of their substance.\nHence if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true\nspecific nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent\nand unjust, especially as real gold and silver can produce certain\nresults by their natural action, which the counterfeit gold and\nsilver of alchemists cannot produce. Thus the true metal has the\nproperty of making people joyful, and is helpful medicinally against\ncertain maladies. Moreover real gold can be employed more frequently,\nand lasts longer in its condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If\nhowever real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it would not be\nunlawful to sell it for the genuine article, for nothing prevents art\nfrom employing certain natural causes for the production of natural\nand true effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things\nproduced by the art of the demons.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The measures of salable commodities must needs be\ndifferent in different places, on account of the difference of\nsupply: because where there is greater abundance, the measures are\nwont to be larger. However in each place those who govern the state\nmust determine the just measures of things salable, with due\nconsideration for the conditions of place and time. Hence it is not\nlawful to disregard such measures as are established by public\nauthority or custom.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price of\nthings salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at\ntimes a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on\ntheir usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or\nbuyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but\nonly of such as render the thing adapted to man's use, for instance,\nthat the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such qualities the\nseller and buyer can easily discover.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Seller Is Bound to State the Defects of the Thing Sold?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the\ndefects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer\nto buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods\noffered for sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that\nthing belong to the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable\nto the seller if the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be\nhurried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its\ncondition.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him\ncarrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods\nhe has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic.\niii, 13) pictures a man as saying: \"Could anything be more absurd\nthan for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer\nthis unhealthy horse for sale?'\" Therefore the seller is not bound to\nstate the defects of the thing sold.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to\nknow the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to\noffer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters\npertaining to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is\nfalse. Much less therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of\nwhat he offers for sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one\noffers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now\nsometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without\nany defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat\nto a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will\ncome after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they\nwould give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the\nbuyer this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he\ntell him the faults of the goods he is selling.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): \"In all\ncontracts the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and\nunless the seller make them known, although the buyer has already\nacquired a right to them, the contract is voided on account of the\nfraudulent action.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of\ndanger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help\nor counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in\ncertain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or\nwhen he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers\ngoods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the\nvery fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may\noccasion loss or danger to the buyer--loss, if, by reason of this\ndefect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the\nprice on that account--danger, if this defect either hinder the use\nof the goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a\nlame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or\npoisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be\nhidden, and the seller does not make them known, the sale will be\nillicit and fraudulent, and the seller will be bound to compensation\nfor the loss incurred.\n\nOn the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse\nhave but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be\nuseful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought\nfrom the price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods,\nsince perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to\nallow a greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to\nhis own indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is manifest:\nfor \"a man judges of what he knows\" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the\ndefects of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is\nnot sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made\nknown to him. The case would be different if the defects were\nmanifest.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There is no need to publish beforehand by the public\ncrier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because if\nhe were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be\nfrightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that might\nrender the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated\nto each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be able to\ncompare the various points one with the other, the good with the bad:\nfor nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being\nuseful in many others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to tell\neveryone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is so\nbound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would\nendanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this\ncase.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now than\nit seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to be\nof less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other\nmerchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the\nseller, since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him,\ndoes not seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is\ngoing to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his\nprice, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does\nnot seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 4]\n\nWhether, in Trading, It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing at a Higher Price\nThan What Was Paid for It?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell\na thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom.\nxxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John\nChrysostom] says on Matt. 21:12: \"He that buys a thing in order that\nhe may sell it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who\nis cast out of God's temple.\" Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in\nhis commentary on Ps. 70:15, \"Because I have not known learning, or\ntrading\" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: \"What is\ntrade,\" says he, \"but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of\nretailing at a higher price?\" and he adds: \"Such were the tradesmen\nwhom Our Lord cast out of the temple.\" Now no man is cast out of the\ntemple except for a sin. Therefore such like trading is sinful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a higher\nprice than their worth, or to buy them for less than their value, as\nshown above (A. 1). Now if you sell a thing for a higher price than\nyou paid for it, you must either have bought it for less than its\nvalue, or sell it for more than its value. Therefore this cannot be\ndone without sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): \"Shun, as you would\nthe plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, or who,\nfrom being a nobody has become a celebrity.\" Now trading would net\nseem to be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness.\nTherefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell\nat a higher price.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:15, \"Because I have\nnot known learning,\" [*Cf. Obj. 1] says: \"The greedy tradesman\nblasphemes over his losses; he lies and perjures himself over the\nprice of his wares. But these are vices of the man, not of the craft,\nwhich can be exercised without these vices.\" Therefore trading is not\nin itself unlawful.\n\n_I answer that,_ A tradesman is one whose business consists in the\nexchange of things. According to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3),\nexchange of things is twofold; one, natural as it were, and\nnecessary, whereby one commodity is exchanged for another, or money\ntaken in exchange for a commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of\nlife. Such like trading, properly speaking, does not belong to\ntradesmen, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants who have to\nprovide the household or the state with the necessaries of life. The\nother kind of exchange is either that of money for money, or of any\ncommodity for money, not on account of the necessities of life, but\nfor profit, and this kind of exchange, properly speaking, regards\ntradesmen, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3). The former\nkind of exchange is commendable because it supplies a natural need:\nbut the latter is justly deserving of blame, because, considered in\nitself, it satisfies the greed for gain, which knows no limit and\ntends to infinity. Hence trading, considered in itself, has a certain\ndebasement attaching thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it\ndoes not imply a virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain which\nis the end of trading, though not implying, by its nature, anything\nvirtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful\nor contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain from being\ndirected to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading\nbecomes lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate\ngain which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his\nhousehold, or for the assistance of the needy: or again, a man may\ntake to trade for some public advantage, for instance, lest his\ncountry lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end,\nbut as payment for his labor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saying of Chrysostom refers to the trading which\nseeks gain as a last end. This is especially the case where a man\nsells something at a higher price without its undergoing any change.\nFor if he sells at a higher price something that has changed for the\nbetter, he would seem to receive the reward of his labor.\nNevertheless the gain itself may be lawfully intended, not as a last\nend, but for the sake of some other end which is necessary or\nvirtuous, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not everyone that sells at a higher price than he\nbought is a tradesman, but only he who buys that he may sell at a\nprofit. If, on the contrary, he buys not for sale but for possession,\nand afterwards, for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade\ntransaction even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this,\neither because he has bettered the thing, or because the value of the\nthing has changed with the change of place or time, or on account of\nthe danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to\nanother, or again in having it carried by another. In this sense\nneither buying nor selling is unjust.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Clerics should abstain not only from things that are\nevil in themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of\nevil. This happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly\ngain, which clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so\nmany vices, since \"a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips\"\n[*'A merchant is hardly free from negligence, and a huckster shall\nnot be justified from the sins of the lips'] (Ecclus. 26:28). There\nis also another reason, because trading engages the mind too much\nwith worldly cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual\ncares; wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:4): \"No man being a\nsoldier to God entangleth himself with secular businesses.\"\nNevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in the first\nmentioned kind of exchange, which is directed to supply the\nnecessaries of life, either by buying or by selling.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 78\n\nOF THE SIN OF USURY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans:\nand under this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent,\nwhich is to receive usury?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of\nconsideration, by way of payment for the loan?\n\n(3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money\ntaken in usury?\n\n(4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is a Sin to Take Usury for Money Lent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for\nmoney lent. For no man sins through following the example of Christ.\nBut Our Lord said of Himself (Luke 19:23): \"At My coming I might have\nexacted it,\" i.e. the money lent, \"with usury.\" Therefore it is not a\nsin to take usury for lending money.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Ps. 18:8, \"The law of the Lord is\nunspotted,\" because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is\nallowed in the Divine law, according to Deut. 23:19, 20: \"Thou shalt\nnot fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but\nto the stranger\": nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the\nobservance of the Law, according to Deut. 28:12: \"Thou shalt\nfenerate* to many nations, and shalt not borrow of any one.\"\n[*_Faeneraberis_--'Thou shalt lend upon usury.' The Douay version has\nsimply 'lend.' The objection lays stress on the word _faeneraberis:_\nhence the necessity of rendering it by 'fenerate.'] Therefore it is\nnot a sin to take usury.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil\nlaws. Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to\nbe lawful.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But, among\nother counsels we find (Luke 6:35): \"Lend, hoping for nothing\nthereby.\" Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a\nprice for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is\nnot bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is\nlawful for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.\n\nObj. 6: Further, silver made into coins does not differ specifically\nfrom silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price\nfor the loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to\naccept a price for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not\nin itself a sin.\n\nObj. 7: Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner\nfreely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the\nusury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:25): \"If thou lend money to\nany of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt\nnot be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with\nusuries.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself,\nbecause this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads\nto inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this\nevident, we must observe that there are certain things the use of\nwhich consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use\nit for drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore\nin such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart\nfrom the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing,\nis granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend things of\nthis kind is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted\nto sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling\nthe same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist,\nwherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. In like\nmanner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for\ndouble payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in equal measure,\nthe other, the price of the use, which is called usury.\n\nOn the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist\nin their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to\ndestroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for\ninstance, one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house\nwhile reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa,\nhe may grant the use of the house, while retaining the ownership. For\nthis reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his\nhouse, and, besides this, revendicate the house from the person to\nwhom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a\nhouse.\n\nNow money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3)\nwas invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently\nthe proper and principal use of money is its consumption or\nalienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very\nnature unlawful to take payment for the use of money lent, which\npayment is known as usury: and just as a man is bound to restore\nother ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money which he\nhas taken in usury.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for\nthe increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He\nwishes us ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and\nthis is for our own profit not for His.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their\nbrethren, i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand\nthat to take usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to\ntreat every man as our neighbor and brother, especially in the state\nof the Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said without any\ndistinction in Ps. 14:5: \"He that hath not put out his money to\nusury,\" and (Ezech. 18:8): \"Who hath not taken usury [*Vulg.: 'If a\nman . . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase . . . he\nis just.'].\" They were permitted, however, to take usury from\nforeigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to avoid a\ngreater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which they were prone\naccording to Isa. 56:11, they should take usury from the Jews who\nwere worshippers of God.\n\nWhere we find it promised to them as a reward, \"Thou shalt fenerate\nto many nations,\" etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense\nfor lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10, where we read: \"Many have refused\nto fenerate, not out of wickedness,\" i.e. they would not lend.\nAccordingly the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth,\nso that they would be able to lend to others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account\nof the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be\ndeprived of many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and\npunishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted\nusury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but\nlest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence it is that in\ncivil law [*Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu] it is stated that \"those\nthings according to natural reason and civil law which are consumed\nby being used, do not admit of usufruct,\" and that \"the senate did\nnot (nor could it) appoint a usufruct to such things, but established\na quasi-usufruct,\" namely by permitting usury. Moreover the\nPhilosopher, led by natural reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that \"to make\nmoney by usury is exceedingly unnatural.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: A man is not always bound to lend, and for this reason\nit is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept not to\nseek profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of counsel\nin comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some kinds\nof usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a matter of\ncounsel. Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain,\nbut of the hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do\nany good deed through hope in man, but only through hope in God.\n\nReply Obj. 5: He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for\nwhat he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid\naccording to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent.\nWherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no\nother use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of\nsomething non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.\n\nReply Obj. 6: The principal use of a silver vessel is not its\nconsumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining\none's ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver\nmoney is sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its\nuse and at the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent.\nIt must be observed, however, that the secondary use of silver\nvessels may be an exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. In\nlike manner there may be some secondary use of silver money; for\ninstance, a man might lend coins for show, or to be used as security.\n\nReply Obj. 7: He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply,\nbut under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow money\nwhich the owner is unwilling to lend without usury.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Ask for Any Other Kind of Consideration for\nMoney Lent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of\nconsideration for money lent. For everyone may lawfully seek to\nindemnify himself. Now sometimes a man suffers loss through lending\nmoney. Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact something else\nbesides the money lent.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 5, one is in duty bound by\na point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a favor. Now to\nlend money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he\nshould be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a\nnatural debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to\nbind oneself to an obligation of the natural law. Therefore it is not\nunlawful, in lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of\ncompensation as condition of the loan.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as there is real remuneration, so is there\nverbal remuneration, and remuneration by service, as a gloss says on\nIsa. 33:15, \"Blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes\n[*Vulg.: 'Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . .\nHe that shaketh his hands from all bribes.'].\" Now it is lawful to\naccept service or praise from one to whom one has lent money.\nTherefore in like manner it is lawful to accept any other kind of\nremuneration.\n\nObj. 4: Further, seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the same\nas of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money given.\nTherefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a\nloan granted.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the lender, by transferring his ownership of a sum\nof money removes the money further from himself than he who entrusts\nit to a merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest\nfor money entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it is also\nlawful to receive interest for money lent.\n\nObj. 6: Further, a man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of\nwhich pledge he might sell for a price: as when a man mortgages his\nland or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to\nreceive interest for money lent.\n\nObj. 7: Further, it sometimes happens that a man raises the price of\nhis goods under guise of loan, or buys another's goods at a low\nfigure; or raises his price through delay in being paid, and lowers\nhis price that he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these cases\nthere seems to be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to\nbe manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or\nexact some consideration for money lent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Among other conditions requisite in a just man it\nis stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he \"hath not taken usury and increase.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing\nis reckoned as money \"if its value can be measured by money.\"\nConsequently, just as it is a sin against justice, to take money, by\ntacit or express agreement, in return for lending money or anything\nelse that is consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin, by\ntacit or express agreement to receive anything whose price can be\nmeasured by money. Yet there would be no sin in receiving something\nof the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as though it were due on\naccount of some agreement tacit or expressed, but as a gratuity:\nsince, even before lending the money, one could accept a gratuity,\nnor is one in a worse condition through lending.\n\nOn the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in\nrespect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure of money,\nfor instance, benevolence, and love for the lender, and so forth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the\nborrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he\nought to have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid\na loss. It may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss\nthan the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender\nwith what he has gained. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for\ncompensation, through the fact that he makes no profit out of his\nmoney: because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be\nprevented in many ways from having.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In one\nway, as a debt of justice; and to such a debt a man may be bound by a\nfixed contract; and its amount is measured according to the favor\nreceived. Wherefore the borrower of money or any such thing the use\nof which is its consumption is not bound to repay more than he\nreceived in loan: and consequently it is against justice if he be\nobliged to pay back more. In another way a man's obligation to\nrepayment for favor received is based on a debt of friendship, and\nthe nature of this debt depends more on the feeling with which the\nfavor was conferred than on the greatness of the favor itself. This\ndebt does not carry with it a civil obligation, involving a kind of\nnecessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature of such a\nrepayment.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If a man were, in return for money lent, as though\nthere had been an agreement tacit or expressed, to expect or exact\nrepayment in the shape of some remuneration of service or words, it\nwould be the same as if he expected or exacted some real\nremuneration, because both can be priced at a money value, as may be\nseen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which they\nexercise by work or by tongue. If on the other hand the remuneration\nby service or words be given not as an obligation, but as a favor,\nwhich is not to be appreciated at a money value, it is lawful to\ntake, exact, and expect it.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount\nlent, which has to be paid back: nor should the loan be made with a\ndemand or expectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence\nwhich cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which can be the\nbasis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in return at\nsome future time is repugnant to such a feeling, because again an\nobligation of this kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is\nlawful for the lender to borrow something else at the same time, but\nit is unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant him a loan at\nsome future time.\n\nReply Obj. 5: He who lends money transfers the ownership of the money\nto the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own risk\nand is bound to pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact\nmore. On the other hand he that entrusts his money to a merchant or\ncraftsman so as to form a kind of society, does not transfer the\nownership of his money to them, for it remains his, so that at his\nrisk the merchant speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it for\nhis craft, and consequently he may lawfully demand as something\nbelonging to him, part of the profits derived from his money.\n\nReply Obj. 6: If a man in return for money lent to him pledges\nsomething that can be valued at a price, the lender must allow for\nthe use of that thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he\nwishes the gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment, it\nis the same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury,\nunless perhaps it were such a thing as friends are wont to lend to\none another gratis, as in the case of the loan of a book.\n\nReply Obj. 7: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than\nthat which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is\nmanifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of\nthe price has the character of a loan, so that whatever he demands\nbeyond the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price\nfor a loan, which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes\nto buy goods at a lower price than what is just, for the reason that\nhe pays for the goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of\nusury; because again this anticipated payment of money has the\ncharacter of a loan, the price of which is the rebate on the just\nprice of the goods sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow a\nrebate on the just price in order that he may have his money sooner,\nhe is not guilty of the sin of usury.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Man Is Bound to Restore Whatever Profits He Has Made Out of\nMoney Gotten by Usury?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever\nprofits he has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle\nsays (Rom. 11:16): \"If the root be holy, so are the branches.\"\nTherefore likewise if the root be rotten so are the branches. But the\nroot was infected with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made\ntherefrom is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal:\n'Cum tu sicut asseris'): \"Property accruing from usury must be sold,\nand the price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was\nextorted.\" Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired from\nusurious money must be restored.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is\ndue to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore he has no\nmore right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he\nwas bound to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he is\nalso bound to restore what he acquired with it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully\nacquired. Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is\nsometimes lawfully acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), there are certain things\nwhose use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct,\naccording to law (ibid., ad 3). Wherefore if such like things be\nextorted by means of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so\nforth, the lender is not bound to restore more than he received\n(since what is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing\nbut of human industry), unless indeed the other party by losing some\nof his own goods be injured through the lender retaining them: for\nthen he is bound to make good the loss.\n\nOn the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their\nconsumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance house or\nland property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted\nfrom another his house or land, he is bound to restore not only the\nhouse or land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since\nthey are the fruits of things owned by another man and consequently\nare due to him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The root has not only the character of matter, as money\nmade by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an active\ncause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the comparison\nfails.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Further, Property acquired from usury does not belong\nto the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet he\nthat paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has\non the other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that\nsuch property should be assigned to the persons who paid usury, since\nthe property is perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but\nit is commanded that the property be sold, and the price be restored,\nof course according to the amount taken in usury.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the\nperson who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as\ninstrumental cause, but on account of his own industry as principal\ncause. Wherefore he has more right to the goods acquired with\nusurious money than to the usurious money itself.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Borrow Money Under a Condition of Usury?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money\nunder a condition of usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that\nthey \"are worthy of death . . . not only they that do\" these sins,\n\"but they also that consent to them that do them.\" Now he that\nborrows money under a condition of usury consents in the sin of the\nusurer, and gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give another\nan occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active scandal,\nwhich is always sinful, as stated above (Q. 43, A. 2). Now he that\nseeks to borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore\nhe is not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit\none's money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems\naltogether unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it\nwould be unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman, a maiden with\na libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful\nto borrow from a usurer.\n\n_On the contrary,_ He that suffers injury does not sin, according to\nthe Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean\nbetween two vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer\nsins by doing an injury to the person who borrows from him under a\ncondition of usury. Therefore he that accepts a loan under a\ncondition of usury does not sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet\nit is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end, since even\nGod uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every\nevil as stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked\nwhether it were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing\nby false gods (which is a manifest sin, for he gives Divine honor to\nthem) Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad\nbut for a good purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false gods,\nis a party, not to his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good\ncompact whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce him to\nswear by false gods, he would sin.\n\nAccordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is\nby no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of\nusury: yet it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready\nto do so and is a usurer by profession; provided the borrower have a\ngood end in view, such as the relief of his own or another's need.\nThus too it is lawful for a man who has fallen among thieves to point\nout his property to them (which they sin in taking) in order to save\nhis life, after the example of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jer.\n41:8): \"Kill us not: for we have stores in the field.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: He who borrows for usury does not consent to the\nusurer's sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance\nof usury that pleases him, but his lending, which is good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion,\nnot for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds an\noccasion of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive\nscandal on his part, while there is no active scandal on the part of\nthe person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a reason\nwhy the other person should desist from borrowing if he is in need,\nsince this passive scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance but\nfrom malice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking\nother means of practising usury; or with the intention of making a\ngreater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one would be\ngiving a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a participator\nin his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one entrusts\none's money has other means of practising usury, there is no sin in\nentrusting it to him that it may be in safer keeping, since this is\nto use a sinner for a good purpose.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 79\n\nOF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are\n_to do good,_ and _to decline from evil,_ and the opposite vices.\nUnder this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether these two are parts of justice?\n\n(2) Whether transgression is a special sin?\n\n(3) Whether omission is a special sin?\n\n(4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 1]\n\nWhether to Decline from Evil and to Do Good Are Parts of Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good\nare not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a\ngood deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the\nwhole. Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be\nreckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, \"Turn away from evil and do\ngood,\" says: \"The former,\" i.e. to turn away from evil, \"avoids sin,\nthe latter,\" i.e. to do good, \"deserves the life and the palm.\" But\nany part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to\ndecline from evil is not a part of justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things that are so related that one implies the\nother, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining\nfrom evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good\nat the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing good are\nnot parts of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that\n\"declining from evil and doing good\" belong to the justice of the law.\n\n_I answer that,_ If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs\nto every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they\ncannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the\nsense of \"all virtue\" [*Cf. Q. 58, A. 5]. And yet even if justice be\ntaken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good;\nnamely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.\n\nOn the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good\nas due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special\njustice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid\nthe opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor;\nwhile it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the\ncommunity or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.\n\nNow these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of\nspecial justice, because each is required for the perfect act of\njustice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our\nrelations with others, as shown above (Q. 58, A. 2): and it pertains\nto the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it has\nestablished. Now a person establishes the equality of justice by\ndoing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves\nthe already established equality of justice by declining from evil,\nthat is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Good and evil are here considered under a special\naspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why\nthese two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of\ngood and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral\nvirtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the\npassions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same\nas to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding\nevil come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other\nhand justice is concerned with operations and external things,\nwherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the\nequality established is another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice,\ndoes not denote a pure negation, viz. \"not to do evil\"; for this does\nnot deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies\na movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term\n\"decline\" shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person\nresists against an instigation to do evil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the\nprincipal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more\nimperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a\nmaterial part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the\nformal and completive part.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Transgression Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin.\nFor no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now\ntransgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose\nsays (De Parad. viii) that sin is \"a transgression of the Divine\nlaw.\" Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But\ntransgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a \"word,\ndeed or desire against the law of God,\" according to Augustine\n(Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature,\nor custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no species contains all the parts into which its\ngenus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the\ncapital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed.\nTherefore transgression is not a special sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.\n\n_I answer that,_ The term transgression is derived from bodily\nmovement and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to\ntransgress in bodily movement, when he steps (_graditur_) beyond\n(_trans_) a fixed boundary--and it is a negative precept that fixes\nthe boundary that man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore\nto transgress, properly speaking, is to act against a negative\nprecept.\n\nNow materially considered this may be common to all the species of\nsin, because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of\nmortal sin. But if we consider it formally, namely under its special\naspect of an act against a negative precept, it is a special sin in\ntwo ways. First, in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin\nthat are opposed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs\nproperly to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it\nbelongs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as an\nobject of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct from\nomission which is opposed to an affirmative precept.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even as legal justice is \"all virtue\" (Q. 58, A. 5) as\nregards its subject and matter, so legal injustice is materially \"all\nsin.\" It is in this way that Ambrose defined sin, considering it from\nthe point of view of legal injustice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The natural inclination concerns the precepts of the\nnatural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept;\nsince as Augustine says in an epistle _on the Fast of the Sabbath_\n(Ep. xxxvi), \"a custom of God's people should be looked upon as law.\"\nHence both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and\nagainst a natural inclination.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All these species of sin may include transgression, if\nwe consider them not under their proper aspects, but under a special\naspect, as stated above. The sin of omission, however, is altogether\ndistinct from the sin of transgression.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Omission Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that omission is not a special sin. For\nevery sin is either original or actual. Now omission is not original\nsin, for it is not contracted through origin; nor is it actual sin,\nfor it may be altogether without act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71,\nA. 5) when we were treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is\nnot a special sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every sin is voluntary. Now omission sometimes is\nnot voluntary but necessary, as when a woman is violated after taking\na vow of virginity, or when one lose that which one is under an\nobligation to restore, or when a priest is bound to say Mass, and is\nprevented from doing so. Therefore omission is not always a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time when any special sin\nbegins. But this is not possible in the case of omission, since one\nis not altered by not doing a thing, no matter when the omission\noccurs, and yet the omission is not always sinful. Therefore omission\nis not a special sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue.\nBut it is not possible to assign any special virtue to which omission\nis opposed, both because the good of any virtue can be omitted, and\nbecause justice to which it would seem more particularly opposed,\nalways requires an act, even in declining from evil, as stated above\n(A. 1, ad 2), while omission may be altogether without act. Therefore\nomission is not a special sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 4:17): \"To him . . . who\nknoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ omission signifies the non-fulfilment of a good, not\nindeed of any good, but of a good that is due. Now good under the\naspect of due belongs properly to justice; to legal justice, if the\nthing due depends on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the\ndue is something in relation to one's neighbor. Wherefore, in the\nsame way as justice is a special virtue, as stated above (Q. 58, AA.\n6, 7), omission is a special sin distinct from the sins which are\nopposed to the other virtues; and just as doing good, which is the\nopposite of omitting it, is a special part of justice, distinct from\navoiding evil, to which transgression is opposed, so too is omission\ndistinct from transgression.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Omission is not original but actual sin, not as though\nit had some act essential to it, but for as much as the negation of\nan act is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense non-action\nis a kind of action, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Omission, as stated above, is only of such good as is\ndue and to which one is bound. Now no man is bound to the impossible:\nwherefore no man sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot.\nAccordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is guilty of\nan omission, not through not having virginity, but through not\nrepenting of her past sin, or through not doing what she can to\nfulfil her vow by observing continence. Again a priest is not bound\nto say Mass, except he have a suitable opportunity, and if this be\nlacking, there is no omission. And in like manner, a person is bound\nto restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has not and\ncannot have it, he is not guilty of an omission, provided he does\nwhat he can. The same applies to other similar cases.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as the sin of transgression is opposed to negative\nprecepts which regard the avoidance of evil, so the sin of omission\nis opposed to affirmative precepts, which regard the doing of good.\nNow affirmative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed time,\nand at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may happen that\nthen one is unable to do what one ought, and if this inability is\nwithout any fault on his part, he does not omit his duty, as stated\nabove (ad 2; I-II, Q. 71, A. 5). On the other hand if this inability\nis due to some previous fault of his (for instance, if a man gets\ndrunk at night, and cannot get up for matins, as he ought to), some\nsay that the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action that\nis illicit and incompatible with the act to which he is bound. But\nthis does not seem to be true, for supposing one were to rouse him by\nviolence and that he went to matins, he would not omit to go, so\nthat, evidently, the previous drunkenness was not an omission, but\nthe cause of an omission. Consequently, we must say that the omission\nbegins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time comes for the\naction; and yet this is on account of a preceding cause by reason of\nwhich the subsequent omission becomes voluntary.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Omission is directly opposed to justice, as stated\nabove; because it is a non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but only\nunder the aspect of due, which pertains to justice. Now more is\nrequired for an act to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to be\nsinful and demeritorious, because \"good results from an entire cause,\nwhereas evil arises from each single defect\" [*Dionysius, De Div.\nNom. iv]. Wherefore the merit of justice requires an act, whereas an\nomission does not.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Sin of Omission Is More Grievous Than a Sin of\nTransgression?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous\nthan a sin of transgression. For _delictum_ would seem to signify the\nsame as _derelictum_ [*Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and\ntherefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But _delictum_\ndenotes a more grievous offence than transgression, because it\ndeserves more expiation as appears from Lev. 5. Therefore the sin of\nomission is more grievous than the sin of transgression.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as\nthe Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is a more\nexcellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which\ntransgression is opposed, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore\nomission is a graver sin than transgression.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or\nmortal. But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are\nopposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to\nbe a graver sin than transgression.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of\nseeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater\npunishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of\ntransgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now\npunishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission\nis graver than the sin of transgression.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to\naccomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain\nfrom an evil deed, i.e. _to transgress,_ than not to accomplish a\ngood deed, which is _to omit._\n\n_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from\nvirtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to\n_Metaph._ x [*Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further removed\nfrom its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is\nfurther removed from white than not-white is, since every black is\nnot-white, but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression\nis contrary to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation\nthereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give\none's parents due reverence, while it is a sin of transgression to\nrevile them or injure them in any way. Hence it is evident that,\nsimply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a graver sin than\nomission, although a particular omission may be graver than a\nparticular transgression.\n\nReply Obj. 1: _Delictum_ in its widest sense denotes any kind of\nomission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of\nsomething concerning God, or for a man's intentional and as it were\ncontemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity,\nfor which reason it demands a greater expiation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The opposite of _doing good_ is both _not doing good,_\nwhich is an omission, and _doing evil,_ which is a transgression: but\nthe first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety,\nwhich implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more\ngrievous sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, so\nis transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore both,\nstrictly speaking, have the character of mortal sin. Transgression\nand omission, however, may be taken broadly for any infringement of\nan affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of such\nprecept: and so taking both in a broad sense they may be venial sins.\n\nReply Obj. 4: To the sin of transgression there correspond both the\npain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of\nsense, on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In\nlike manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the\npain of sense, according to Matt. 7:19, \"Every tree that bringeth not\nforth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire\";\nand this on account of the root from which it grows, although it does\nnot necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 80\n\nOF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE\n(In One Article)\n\nWe must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the\nvirtues annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of\nconsideration:\n\n(1) What virtues are annexed to justice?\n\n(2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.\n_______________________\n\nARTICLE [II-II, Q. 80, Art.]\n\nWhether the Virtues Annexed to Justice Are Suitably Enumerated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are\nunsuitably enumerated. Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz.\n\"religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth.\" Now revenge\nis seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is\ntaken for injuries inflicted, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 4).\nTherefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to\njustice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven,\nviz. \"innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection,\nhumanity,\" several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the\nvirtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.\n\nObj. 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz.\n\"obedience\" in respect of one's superiors, \"discipline\" with regard\nto inferiors, \"equity\" as regards equals, \"fidelity\" and\n\"truthfulness\" towards all; and of these \"truthfulness\" alone is\nmentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated\ninsufficiently the virtues annexed to justice.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons\nnine parts annexed to justice viz. \"liberality, kindliness, revenge,\ncommonsense, [*_eugnomosyne_] piety, gratitude, holiness, just\nexchange\" and \"just lawgiving\"; and of all these it is evident that\nTully mentions none but \"revenge.\" Therefore he would appear to have\nmade an incomplete enumeration.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions _epieikeia_ as\nbeing annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any\nof the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to\njustice are insufficiently enumerated.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two points must be observed about the virtues\nannexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have\nsomething in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that\nin some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue.\nAccordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above\n(Q. 58, A. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person\nmay by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the\nessential character of justice consists in rendering to another his\ndue according to equality, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 11). Wherefore\nin two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the\nperfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of\nequality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For\ncertain virtues there are which render another his due, but are\nunable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man\nrenders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered\nto God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, \"What shall I\nrender to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?\"\nIn this respect _religion_ is annexed to justice since, according to\nTully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and\nceremonial rites or worship to \"some superior nature that men call\ndivine.\" Secondly, it is not possible to make to one's parents an\nequal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares\n(Ethic. viii, 14); and thus _piety_ is annexed to justice, for\nthereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man \"renders service\nand constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his\ncountry.\" Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man\nis unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus _observance_ is\nannexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53)\nin the \"deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth.\"\n\nA falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a\ntwofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,\n13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which\none is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due\nis chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On\nthe other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in\nrespect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies\nnecessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so\nnecessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this\nhas more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered\nfrom the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to\nthis kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he\nis, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed _truth,_\nwhereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future\nthings are told without perversion. It may also be considered from\nthe point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the\nreward he receives with what he has done--sometimes in good things;\nand then annexed to justice we have _gratitude_ which \"consists in\nrecollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in\ndesiring to pay them back,\" as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)--and\nsometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed _revenge,_\nwhereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), \"we resist force,\ninjury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense.\"\n[*St. Thomas read _obscurum,_ and explains it as meaning\n_derogatory,_ infra Q. 108, A. 2. Cicero, however, wrote _obfuturum,_\ni.e. _hurtful._]\n\nThere is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces\nto greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured.\nThis due is the concern of _liberality,_ _affability_ or\n_friendship,_ or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid\nenumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in\nthem.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in\naccordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice:\nwhereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though\nnot against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge,\nbelongs to the virtue annexed to justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral\nparts of justice, namely, _declining from evil,_ to which _innocence_\nbelongs, and _doing good,_ to which the six others belong. Of these,\ntwo would seem to regard relations between equals, namely,\n_friendship_ in the external conduct and _concord_ internally; two\nregard our relations toward superiors, namely, _piety_ to parents,\nand _religion_ to God; while two regard our relations towards\ninferiors, namely, _condescension,_ in so far as their good pleases\nus, and _humanity,_ whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore\nsays (Etym. x) that a man is said to be \"humane, through having a\nfeeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity\nwhereby we uphold one another.\" In this sense _friendship_ is\nunderstood as directing our external conduct towards others, from\nwhich point of view the Philosopher treats of it in _Ethic._ iv, 6.\n_Friendship_ may also be taken as regarding properly the affections,\nand as the Philosopher describes it in _Ethic._ viii and ix. In this\nsense three things pertain to friendship, namely, _benevolence_ which\nis here called _affection_; _concord,_ and _beneficence_ which is\nhere called _humanity._ These three, however, are omitted by Tully,\nbecause, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.\n\nReply Obj. 3: _Obedience_ is included in observance, which Tully\nmentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to\npersons who excel. \"Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his\nwords\" [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in\n_truthfulness_ as to the observance of one's promises: yet\n_truthfulness_ covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on\n(Q. 109, AA. 1, 3). _Discipline_ is not due as a necessary duty,\nbecause one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a\nsuperior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors,\naccording to Matt. 24:45, \"A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord\nhath appointed over his family\": and for this reason it is omitted by\nTully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by\nMacrobius; and equity under _epieikeia_ or under _friendship._\n\nReply Obj. 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true\njustice. To particular justice belongs _justice of exchange,_ which\nhe describes as \"the habit of observing equality in commutations.\" To\nlegal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes\n_legislative justice,_ which he describes as \"the science of\npolitical commutations relating to the community.\" As regards things\nwhich have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he\nmentions _common sense_ or _good judgment,_* which is our guide in\nsuch like matters, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 4) in the treatise on\nprudence: wherefore he says that it is a \"voluntary justification,\"\nbecause by his own free will man observes what is just according to\nhis judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas\nindicates the Greek derivation: _eugnomosyne_ quasi 'bona _gnome_.']\nThese two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice\nas their executor. _Eusebeia_ (piety) means _good worship_ and\nconsequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is\nthe science of \"the service of God\" (he speaks after the manner of\nSocrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences') [*Aristotle,\n_Ethic._ vi, 13]: and _holiness_ comes to the same, as we shall state\nfurther on (Q. 81, A. 8). _Eucharistia_ (gratitude) means \"good\nthanksgiving,\" and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says\n(Etym. x) that \"a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to\ndo good, and is of gentle speech\": and Andronicus too says that\n\"kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence.\" _Liberality_ would\nseem to pertain to _humanity._\n\nReply Obj. 5: _Epieikeia_ is annexed, not to particular but to legal\njustice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of\n_eugnomosyne_ (common sense).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 81\n\nOF RELIGION\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as\nour present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety,\n(3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship,\n(8) liberality, (9) _epieikeia_. Of the other virtues that have been\nmentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of\nconcord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for\ninstance, of right commutations and of innocence. Of legislative\njustice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.\n\nReligion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in\nitself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?\n\n(2) Whether religion is a virtue?\n\n(3) Whether religion is one virtue?\n\n(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?\n\n(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?\n\n(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?\n\n(7) Whether religion has any external actions?\n\n(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Religion Directs Man to God Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God\nalone. It is written (James 1:27): \"Religion clean and undefiled\nbefore God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows\nin their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world.\"\nNow \"to visit the fatherless and widows\" indicates an order between\noneself and one's neighbor, and \"to keep oneself unspotted from this\nworld\" belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore\nreligion does not imply order to God alone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that \"since in\nspeaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere\nwont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred\nand relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of\ntie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of\nDivine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that\nreligion is nothing else but the worship of God.\" Therefore religion\nsignifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred.\n\nObj. 3: Further, seemingly _latria_ pertains to religion. Now\n\"_latria_ signifies servitude,\" as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x,\n1). And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor,\naccording to Gal. 5:13, \"By charity of the spirit serve one another.\"\nTherefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also.\n\nObj. 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to\nworship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying\nof Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], \"Worship thy parents.\"\nTherefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to\nGod.\n\nObj. 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject\nto God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious,\nbut only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances,\nand to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does\nnot denote a relation of subjection of man to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that \"religion consists\nin offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that\nmen call divine.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ as Isidore says (Etym. x), \"according to Cicero, a\nman is said to be religious from _religio,_ because he often ponders\nover, and, as it were, reads again (_relegit_), the things which\npertain to the worship of God,\" so that religion would seem to take\nits name from reading over those things which belong to Divine\nworship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our\nhearts, according to Prov. 3:6, \"In all thy ways think on Him.\"\nAccording to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name\nfrom the fact that \"we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by\nour neglect\" [*St. Augustine plays on the words _reeligere,_ i.e. to\nchoose over again, and _negligere,_ to neglect or despise.]. Or\nagain, religion may be derived from _religare_ (to bind together),\nwherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): \"May religion bind us\nto the one Almighty God.\" However, whether religion take its name\nfrom frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been\nlost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a\nrelation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our\nunfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely\ndirected as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by\nsin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and\nimmediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God\nalone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has\nother acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which\nit commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue\nwhich is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are\nconcerned with the means. Accordingly \"to visit the fatherless and\nwidows in their tribulation\" is an act of religion as commanding, and\nan act of mercy as eliciting; and \"to keep oneself unspotted from\nthis world\" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or\nof some similar virtue as eliciting.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to\none's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense,\nbut not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the\npassage quoted, Augustine says: \"In a stricter sense religion seems\nto denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever\nthere is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special\nkind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a\nspecial and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme\ndominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to\nHim, which is known as _latria_ in Greek; and therefore it belongs to\nreligion.\n\nReply Obj. 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to\ncultivate [*In the Latin the same word _colere_ stands for \"worship\"\nand \"cultivate\"] a man's memory or presence: we even speak of\ncultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer (_agricola_) is\none who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant (_incola_) is one who\ncultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor\nis due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is\ndue a special kind of worship, which in Greek is _Eusebeia_ or\n_Theosebeia_, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).\n\nReply Obj. 5: Although the name \"religious\" may be given to all in\ngeneral who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who\nconsecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing\nfrom human affairs. Thus also the term \"contemplative\" is applied,\nnot to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole\nlives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for\nman's sake but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle\n(Gal. 4:14), \"You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as\nChrist Jesus.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Religion Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly\nit belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an\nact of fear which is a gift, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 9). Therefore\nreligion is not a virtue but a gift.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will,\nwherefore it is described as an \"elective\" or voluntary \"habit\"\n[*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3) _latria_ belongs\nto religion, and _latria_ denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore\nreligion is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is\nin us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the\ndictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion \"to offer\nceremonial worship to the Godhead\" [*Cf. A. 1], and ceremonial\nmatters, as stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 3, ad 2; Q. 101), do not\nbelong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a\nvirtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is enumerated with the other virtues, as\nappears from what has been said above (Q. 80).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, A. 3; I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4)\n\"a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good\nlikewise,\" wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to\na virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the\naspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes\nsuitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a\nbecoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good, just as\nmode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since\nthen it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to\nGod, it is evident that religion is a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of\nfear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through\nreverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as\nthe gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more\nexcellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as\nstated above (Q. 9, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 8).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his\nmaster, and so \"he makes a virtue of necessity\" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad\nFuriam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due\nservice to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so\nvoluntarily.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that\nman should do something through reverence for God. But that he should\ndo this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of\nnatural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Religion Is One Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion\ndirects us to God, as stated above (A. 1). Now in God there are three\nPersons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically\nfrom one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for\na difference of virtue, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 2, ad 2).\nTherefore religion is not one virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since\nhabits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of\nreligion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to\nsacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid\nto images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God Himself.\nSince, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would\nseem that religion is not one virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 4:5): \"One God [Vulg.:\n'Lord'], one faith.\" Now true religion professes faith in one God.\nTherefore religion is one virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), habits\nare differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now\nit belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect,\nnamely, as the first principle of the creation and government of\nthings. Wherefore He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): \"If . . . I be a\nfather, where is My honor?\" For it belongs to a father to beget and\nto govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the\ncreation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one\nreligion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the\naspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and\ngoverns them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore\nreligion is one virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By the one same act man both serves and worships God,\nfor worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due:\nwhile service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is\nunder an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong\nall acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears\nwitness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God,\neither by offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The worship of religion is paid to images, not as\nconsidered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to\nGod incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the\nimage, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither _latria_\nnor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that\nreligious worship is paid to the images of Christ.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Religion Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from the Others?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religion is not a special virtue\ndistinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): \"Any\naction whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true\nsacrifice.\" But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every\nvirtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a\nspecial virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): \"Do all to the\nglory of God.\" Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence\nof God, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2). Therefore religion is not\na special virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from\nthe charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to _Ethic._\n viii, 8 \"to be honored is almost to be loved.\" Therefore the\nreligion whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from\nobservance, or _dulia,_ or piety whereby we honor our neighbor.\nTherefore religion is not a special virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from\nthe other parts.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there\nis a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the\ngood to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God.\nAgain, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to\nGod a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses\nall things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special\nhonor due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is\ndue to different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father,\nanother to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is\na special virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so\nfar as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove\nthat religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other\nvirtues, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's honor,\nbelongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong\nto religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by\nreason of their specific character.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of honor\nand reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is\ncommunicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is\nnot. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the\ncharity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby\nGod is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our\nneighbor.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Religion Is a Theological Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue.\nAugustine says (Enchiridion iii) that \"God is worshiped by faith,\nhope and charity,\" which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to\nreligion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its\nobject. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to\nGod alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore religion is a\ntheological virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual,\nor moral, as is clear from what has been said (I-II, QQ. 57, 58, 62).\nNow it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue,\nbecause its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth:\nnor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the\nmean between too much and too little, for one cannot worship God too\nmuch, according to Ecclus. 43:33, \"Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as\nmuch as you can; for He is above all praise.\" Therefore it remains\nthat it is a theological virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral\nvirtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4) religion pays due worship to\nGod. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that\nwhich it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter\nand object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered,\nviz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is\nworshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we\nreach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q. 1,\nAA. 1, 2, 4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we\nbelieve in a God, but because we believe God.\n\nNow due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God\nis worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are\ndone out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is\nrelated to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and\nconsequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the\nlast end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred\nto the end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an end,\nmoves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with\nmatters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith,\nhope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper\nobject: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion,\nwhich performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says\nthat God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but as\nits end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual,\nbut a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a\nmean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by\nestablishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say \"equality,\" I\ndo not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God\nas much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability\nand God's acceptance.\n\nAnd it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the\nDivine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as\nregards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom\nit is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some\nother circumstance.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Religion Should Be Preferred to the Other Moral Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to\nthe other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in\nits observing the mean, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. But religion\nfails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an\nabsolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than\nthe other moral virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more\npraiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater\nneed: wherefore it is written (Isa. 57:7): \"Deal thy bread to the\nhungry.\" But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to\nPs. 15:2, \"I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my\ngoods.\" Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the\nother virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the greater the obligation to do a thing, the less\npraise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, \"If I preach the\nGospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me.\" Now the\nmore a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since,\nthen, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him,\nit would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human\nvirtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The precepts pertaining to religion are given\nprecedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of\nprecepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts\nof the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief\nof the moral virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness\nfrom being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end\nthe better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (A. 5; Q. 4, A.\n7), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And\nreligion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so\nfar as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor\nof God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of\nthe ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is\nthe mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no\nless praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its\nusefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the\noffering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God\nnot on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His\nglory, and on account of its usefulness to us.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the\nluster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be\ndone voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Religion Has an External Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religion has not an external act. It\nis written (John 4:24): \"God is a spirit, and they that adore Him,\nmust adore Him in spirit and in truth.\" Now external acts pertain,\nnot to the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which\nadoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and\nhonor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one\nwere to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since\nthen whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed\nproperly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of\ninferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in\nshowing reverence to God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for\nfinding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are\nwont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals\nis unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to\nthe true God, Who is \"exalted above all gods\" [*Ps. 94:3]. Therefore\nit would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore\nreligion has no bodily actions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 83:3): \"My heart and my flesh\nhave rejoiced in the living God.\" Now just as internal actions belong\nto the heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the\nflesh. Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by\ninternal but also by external actions.\n\n_I answer that,_ We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake\n(because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add\nanything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we\nrevere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its\nperfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to\nits superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened\nby the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the\nhuman mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the\nsensible world, since \"invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being\nunderstood by the things that are made,\" as the Apostle says (Rom.\n1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of\ncorporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by\nsigns, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God.\nTherefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others\nand belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are\nsecondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important\nand directly intended in the worship of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: These external things are offered to God, not as though\nHe stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, \"Shall I eat the\nflesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?\" but as signs\nof the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves\nacceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): \"The\nvisible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible\nsacrifice.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things\npertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual\nthings, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the\nidols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Religion Is the Same As Sanctity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity.\nReligion is a special virtue, as stated above (A. 4): whereas\nsanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and\nfulfil our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus [*De\nAffectibus]. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that \"sanctity is free from all\nuncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity.\" Now\npurity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels\nbodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would\nseem that sanctity is not the same as religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division are\nnot identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above\n(Q. 80, ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as\ndistinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as\nreligion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 1:74, 75): \"That . . . we may\nserve Him . . . in holiness and justice.\" Now, \"to serve God\" belongs\nto religion, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3, ad 2). Therefore\nreligion is the same as sanctity.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word \"sanctity\" seems to have two\nsignifications. In one way it denotes purity; and this signification\nfits in with the Greek, for _hagios_ means \"unsoiled.\" In another way\nit denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term \"sancta\" was\napplied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be\nviolated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred (_sancitum_) when it is\nratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word _sanctus_ may be\nconnected with purity, if it be resolved into _sanguine tinctus,_\n\"since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were\nsprinkled with the victim's blood,\" according to Isidore (Etym. x).\nIn either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to\nthose things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only\nmen, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be\nsanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is\nnecessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human\nmind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things\ndepreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by\nbeing mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the\nSupreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it\nis that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore\nit is written (Heb. 12:14): \"Follow peace with all men, and holiness,\nwithout which no man shall see God.\" Again, firmness is required for\nthe mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last\nend and first beginning, and such things must needs be most\nimmovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38, 39): \"I am sure that\nneither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [*Vulg.: 'shall be\nable to separate us'] from the love of God.\"\n\nAccordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and\nits acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but\nonly logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it\ngives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine\nworship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is\ncalled sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but\nalso the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of\ncertain good works disposes himself to the worship of God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence;\nand in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it\nhas a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the\nacts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is\nsaid to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all\nthe virtues to the common good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the\ncharacter of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of\nvirginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that \"it is honored\nnot for what it is, but for being consecrated to God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not\nreally but logically.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 82\n\nOF DEVOTION\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider\nthe interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts;\nsecondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary.\nThe interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer.\nAccordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of\nprayer.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether devotion is a special act?\n\n(2) Whether it is an act of religion?\n\n(3) Of the cause of devotion?\n\n(4) Of its effect?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Devotion Is a Special Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That\nwhich qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now\ndevotion seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip.\n29:31): \"All the multitude offered victims, and praises, and\nholocausts with a devout mind.\" Therefore devotion is not a special\nact.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various genera\nof acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely,\ncorporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate\ndevoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a\nspecial act.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive or\nto a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as\nmay be seen by going through the various species of acts of either\nfaculty, as enumerated above (I, QQ. 78, seqq.; I-II, Q. 23, A. 4).\nTherefore devotion is not a special act.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (I-II,\nQ. 21, AA. 34). But devotion has a special reason for merit.\nTherefore devotion is a special act.\n\n_I answer that,_ Devotion is derived from \"devote\" [*The Latin\n_devovere_ means \"to vow\"]; wherefore those persons are said to be\n\"devout\" who, in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject\nthemselves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a\ndevotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety\nof his army, as Livy relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x,\n28). Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give\noneself readily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it\nis written (Ex. 35:20, 21) that \"the multitude of the children of\nIsrael . . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and\ndevout mind.\" Now it is evident that the will to do readily what\nconcerns the service of God is a special kind of act. Therefore\ndevotion is a special act of the will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the\nthing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their\nacts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both\nitself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n9, A. 3). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a\nman offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it\nfollows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they\nbe acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts\nof the other powers that are moved by the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not\nas a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found\nvirtually in the movements of the things moved.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul,\nand is a movement of the will, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Devotion Is an Act of Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion.\nDevotion, as stated above (A. 1), consists in giving oneself up to\nGod. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to\nDionysius (Div. Nom. iv) \"the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it\ntakes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved.\"\nTherefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to\nprecede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by\nfire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of\nfire [*Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6]. Therefore devotion is not an act of\nreligion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as stated\nabove (Q. 81, A. 1). But devotion is directed also to men; for we\nspeak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects are\nsaid to be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm. viii,\nDe Pass. Dom.] that the Jews \"out of devotion to the Roman laws,\"\nsaid: \"We have no king but Caesar.\" Therefore devotion is not an act\nof religion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Devotion is derived from _devovere,_ as stated\n(A. 1). But a vow is an act of religion. Therefore devotion is also\nan act of religion.\n\n_I answer that,_ It belongs to the same virtue, to will to do\nsomething, and to have the will ready to do it, because both acts\nhave the same object. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,\n1): \"It is justice whereby men both will end do just actions.\" Now it\nis evident that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God,\nbelongs properly to religion, as stated above (Q. 81). Wherefore it\nbelongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such things, and\nthis is to be devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of\nreligion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs immediately to charity that man should give\nhimself to God, adhering to Him by a union of the spirit; but it\nbelongs immediately to religion, and, through the medium of religion,\nto charity which is the principle of religion, that man should give\nhimself to God for certain works of Divine worship.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in the\nprocess of digestion, and at the same time the natural heat thrives,\nas it were, on this fatness. In like manner charity both causes\ndevotion (inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's friend) and\nfeeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded and\nincreased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Devotion to God's holy ones, dead or living, does not\nterminate in them, but passes on to God, in so far as we honor God in\nHis servants. But the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters\nis of another kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from\nthe service of God.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Contemplation or Meditation Is the Cause of Devotion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not\nthe cause of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle\nconsiderations about abstract matters are often a hindrance to\ndevotion. Therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of\ndevotion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if contemplation were the proper and essential cause\nof devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse greater\ndevotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged\nto greater devotion by considering Christ's Passion and other\nmysteries of His humanity than by considering the greatness of His\nGodhead. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of devotion,\nit would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation, are\nalso most apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for\ndevotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the\nfemale sex, who are defective in contemplation. Therefore\ncontemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 38:4): \"In my meditation a fire\nshall flame out.\" But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore\nmeditation is the cause of devotion.\n\n_I answer that,_ The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of\nWhom Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:55, says that \"God calls whom He\ndeigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane\nSamaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout.\" But the\nintrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or\ncontemplation. For it was stated above (A. 1) that devotion is an act\nof the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the\nservice of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some\nconsideration, since the object of the will is a good understood.\nWherefore Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that \"the will\narises from the intelligence.\" Consequently meditation must needs be\nthe cause of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives\nthe thought of surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a\ntwofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration\nof God's goodness and loving kindness, according to Ps. 72:28, \"It is\ngood for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God\": and\nthis consideration wakens love [*_Dilectio,_ the interior act of\ncharity; cf. Q. 27] which is the proximate cause of devotion. The\nother consideration is that of man's own shortcomings, on account of\nwhich he needs to lean on God, according to Ps. 120:1, 2, \"I have\nlifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to\nme: my help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth\"; and this\nconsideration shuts out presumption whereby man is hindered from\nsubmitting to God, because he leans on His strength.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The consideration of such things as are of a nature to\nawaken our love [*Ibid.] of God, causes devotion; whereas the\nconsideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such\nthings is a hindrance to devotion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the\nstrongest incentive to love [*Ibid.] and consequently to devotion,\nbecause God is supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the\nhuman mind that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge,\nbut also to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible\nobjects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ,\naccording to the words of the Preface [*Preface for Christmastide],\n\"that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of\nthings invisible.\" Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity\nare the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding\nhand, although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning\nthe Godhead.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to\nman an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly\nsurrender himself to God. The result is that such like things\nsometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and\nwomen devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man\nperfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this\nvery fact his devotion is increased.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Joy Is an Effect of Devotion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As\nstated above (A. 3, ad 2), Christ's Passion is the chief incentive to\ndevotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the\nsoul, according to Lam. 3:19, \"Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood\nand the gall,\" which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam.\n3:20) it is said: \"I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall\nlanguish within me.\" Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of\ndevotion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice\nof the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): \"A sacrifice to God is\nan afflicted spirit.\" Therefore affliction is the effect of devotion\nrather than gladness or joy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) [*Orat.\nfunebr. de Placilla Imp.] that \"just as laughter proceeds from joy,\nso tears and groans are signs of sorrow.\" But devotion makes some\npeople shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of\ndevotion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ We say in the Collect [*Thursday after fourth\nSunday of Lent]: \"That we who are punished by fasting may be\ncomforted by a holy devotion.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The direct and principal effect of devotion is the\nspiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and\nindirect effect. For it has been stated (A. 3) that devotion is\ncaused by a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of\nGod's goodness, because this consideration belongs to the term, as it\nwere, of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and\nthe direct result of this consideration is joy, according to Ps.\n76:4, \"I remembered God, and was delighted\"; but accidentally this\nconsideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy\nGod fully, according to Ps. 41:3, \"My soul hath thirsted after the\nstrong living God,\" and afterwards it is said (Ps. 41:4): \"My tears\nhave been my bread,\" etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated\n(A. 3), by the consideration of one's own failings; for this\nconsideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the\nmovement of his devout will, in that he trusts not in himself, but\nsubjects himself to God. This consideration has an opposite tendency\nto the first: for it is of a nature to cause sorrow directly (when\none thinks over one's own failings), and joy accidentally, namely,\nthrough hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident that\nthe first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary\nand accidental effect is that \"sorrow which is according to God\" [*2\nCor. 7:10].\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the consideration of Christ's Passion there is\nsomething that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal\nof which made it necessary for Christ to suffer [*Luke 24:25]; and\nthere is something that causes joy, namely, God's loving-kindness to\nus in giving us such a deliverance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on\naccount of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is\nrejoiced, by the consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of\nthe Divine help.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also\nthrough a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one\nconsiders something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont\nto shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their\nchildren or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this way\ntears arise from devotion.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 83\n\nOF PRAYER (In Seventeen Articles)\n\nWe must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive\npower?\n\n(2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God?\n\n(3) Whether prayer is an act of religion?\n\n(4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone?\n\n(5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?\n\n(6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray?\n\n(7) Whether we ought to pray for others?\n\n(8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?\n\n(9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer;\n\n(10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?\n\n(11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?\n\n(12) Whether prayer should be vocal?\n\n(13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer?\n\n(14) Whether prayer should last a long time?\n\n(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]\n\n(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Art.\n15]\n\n(17) of the different kinds of prayer.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Prayer Is an Act of the Appetitive Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive\npower. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is\nheard by God, according to Ps. 9:38, \"The Lord hath heard the desire\nof the poor.\" Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the\nappetitive power: and therefore prayer is also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): \"It is useful to\nbegin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves\nto God and unite ourselves to Him.\" Now union with God is effected by\nlove which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs\nto the appetitive power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there\nare two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is\n\"the understanding of indivisibles,\" by which operation we apprehend\nwhat a thing is: while the second is \"synthesis\" and \"analysis,\"\nwhereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may\nbe added, namely, \"reasoning,\" whereby we proceed from the known to\nthe unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations.\nTherefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the\nappetitive power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that \"to pray is to speak.\"\nNow speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not\nof the appetitive, but of the intellective power.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to Cassiodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13]\n\"prayer (_oratio_) is spoken reason (_oris ratio_).\" Now the\nspeculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative\nmerely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only\napprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two\nways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this\nhappens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause;\nsecondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the\nreason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the\ncause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things\nin two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs\nto reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of\nthe body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by\ncommanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way,\ndisposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to\nbe done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or\nits superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or\nbeseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something\nto be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the\nreason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the \"reason exhorts us to do\nwhat is best.\"\n\nNow in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last\nparagraph refers to the Latin word _oratio_ (prayer) which originally\nsignified a speech, being derived in the first instance from _os,_\n_oris_ (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which\nsense Augustine [*Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.)\nthat \"prayer is a petition,\" and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii,\n24) that \"to pray is to ask becoming things of God.\" Accordingly it\nis evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either\nbecause desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is\nlike the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily\nthey are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God\nhears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of\nIsa. 65:24, \"And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will\nhear.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1, ad\n3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders\nthe act of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an\nend such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends to God\nthrough being moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in\ntwo ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition, because\nwhen we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God,\naccording to Ps. 26:4, \"One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will\nI seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days\nof my life.\" Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to\napproach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he\npetitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that \"when we call upon God in our\nprayers, we unveil our mind in His presence\": and in the same sense\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that \"prayer is the raising up\nof the mind to God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but\nto the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by\nway of command or of petition, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Becoming to Pray?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer\nseems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to\nthe person to whom we pray. But according to Matt. 6:32, \"Your Father\nknoweth that you have need of all these things.\" Therefore it is not\nbecoming to pray to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we\npray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind is\nunchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, \"But the\nTriumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to\nrepentance.\" Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not,\nthan to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii,\n1), \"nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers.\"\nBut God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to\npray to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 18:1): \"We ought always to\npray, and not to faint.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Among the ancients there was a threefold error\nconcerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by\nDivine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray\nand to worship God at all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14):\n\"You have said: He laboreth in vain that serveth God.\" Another\nopinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen of\nnecessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine\nprovidence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on\naccount of the connection of causes: and this opinion also excluded\nthe utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held\nthat human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that\nthey do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of\nDivine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed by prayers\nand other things pertaining to the worship of God. All these opinions\nwere disproved in the First Part (Q. 19, AA. 7, 8; Q. 22, AA. 2, 4;\nQ. 115, A. 6; Q. 116). Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the\nutility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs\nsubject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part\nof the Divine disposition.\n\nIn order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine\nprovidence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also\nfrom what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now\namong other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects.\nWherefore it must be that men do certain actions, not that thereby\nthey may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions\nthey may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine\ndisposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is\nit with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the\nDivine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has\ndisposed to be fulfilled by our prayers, in other words \"that by\nasking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity\nhas disposed to give,\" as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8).\n\nReply Obj. 1: We need to pray to God, not in order to make known to\nHim our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the\nnecessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above, our motive in praying is, not that we\nmay change the Divine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may\nobtain what God has appointed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God bestows many things on us out of His liberality,\neven without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow\ncertain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good,\nnamely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and\nthat we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence\nChrysostom says [*Implicitly (Hom. ii, de Orat.; Hom. xxx in Genes.;\nCf. Caten. Aur. on Luke 18)]: \"Think what happiness is granted thee,\nwhat honor bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer,\nwhen thou talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt,\nwhatever thou desirest.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Prayer Is an Act of Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion.\nSince religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its\nsubject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above\n(A. 1). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of\nthe gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the act of _latria_ falls under a necessity of\nprecept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of\nprecept, but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else\nthan a petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not\nan act of religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to religion that one \"offers\nworship and ceremonial rites to the Godhead\" [*Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53].\nBut prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to ask to obtain\nsomething from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 140:2): \"Let my prayer be\ndirected as incense in Thy sight\": and a gloss on the passage says\nthat \"it was to signify this that under the Old Law incense was said\nto be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord.\" Now this belongs to\nreligion. Therefore prayer is an act of religion.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, AA. 2, 4), it belongs\nproperly to religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things\nthrough which reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man\nshows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects\nhimself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the\nAuthor of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an\nact of religion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end,\nas stated above (Q. 82, A. 1, ad 1), and therefore religion, which is\nin the will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of\nGod. Now among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the\nhighest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion\nwhich belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective\npart is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it religion\ndirects man's intellect to God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask\nfor what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to\ndesire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a\nprecept of religion, which precept is expressed in Matt. 7:7, where\nit is said: \"Ask and ye shall receive\" [*Vulg.: 'Ask and it shall be\ngiven you.'].\n\nReply Obj. 3: By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since he\nsubjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to\nHim, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A. 1, Obj.\n2). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, whether\nbodily members, or those external things that are employed for God's\nservice, so too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 4]\n\nWhether We Ought to Pray to God Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer\nis an act of religion, as stated above (A. 3). But God alone is to be\nworshiped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the\nprayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer, both\nbecause frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God\nalone knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the\nApostle (1 Cor. 14:15), \"I will pray with the spirit, I will pray\nalso with the understanding\": and again because, as Augustine says\n(De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the \"dead, even the saints, know not what\nthe living, even their own children, are doing.\" Therefore we ought\nto pray to God alone.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only\nbecause they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or\neven some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace,\nand yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to\nthe saints who are in Paradise.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:1), \"Call . . . if there be\nany that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as\nto be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In\nthe first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers\nought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God\nalone gives, according to Ps. 83:12, \"The Lord will give grace and\nglory.\" But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels\nor men, not that God may through them know our petitions, but that\nour prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence\nit is written (Apoc. 8:4) that \"the smoke of the incense,\" namely\n\"the prayers of the saints ascended up before God.\" This is also\nclear from the very style employed by the Church in praying: since we\nbeseech the Blessed Trinity \"to have mercy on us,\" while we ask any\nof the saints \"to pray for us.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: To Him alone do we offer religious worship when\npraying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so\ndoing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those\nwhom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do\nnot know what takes place in this world, especially the interior\nmovements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral.\nxii, 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what\nhappens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart,\nis made known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their\nexalted position that they should know the petitions we make to them\nby word or thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to\nthem are known to them through Divine manifestation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do not yet\nenjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think\nor say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them,\nbut ask it of the living by speaking to them.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 5]\n\nWhether We Ought to Ask for Something Definite When We Pray?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything\ndefinite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth.\niii, 24), \"to pray is to ask becoming things of God\"; wherefore it is\nuseless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, \"You\nask, and receive not: because you ask amiss.\" Now according to Rom.\n8:26, \"we know not what we should pray for as we ought.\" Therefore we\nought not to ask for anything definite when we pray.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those who ask another person for something definite\nstrive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. But we\nought not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the contrary,\nwe ought to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Ps.\n32:1, \"Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just.\" Therefore we ought not to ask\nGod for anything definite when we pray.\n\nObj. 3: Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as to\ngood things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless\nto ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we\nought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ our Lord (Matt. 6 and Luke 11) taught His\ndisciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in\nthe petitions of the Lord's Prayer.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to Valerius Maximus [*Fact. et Dict.\nMemor. vii, 2], \"Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods\nfor nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because\nthey at any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray\nwe frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain.\"\nThis opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which\nmay have an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as\n\"riches, by which,\" as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict.\nMemor. vii, 2), \"many have come to an evil end; honors, which have\nruined many; power, of which we frequently witness the unhappy\nresults; splendid marriages, which sometimes bring about the total\nwreck of a family.\" Nevertheless there are certain goods which man\ncannot ill use, because they cannot have an evil result. Such are\nthose which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it: and\nthese the saints seek absolutely when they pray, as in Ps. 79:4,\n\"Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved,\" and again in Ps. 118:35,\n\"Lead me into the path of Thy commandments.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although man cannot by himself know what he ought to\npray for, \"the Spirit,\" as stated in the same passage, \"helpeth our\ninfirmity,\" since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask\nfor what is right. Hence our Lord said (John 4:24) that true adorers\n\"must adore . . . in spirit and in truth.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: When in our prayers we ask for things concerning our\nsalvation, we conform our will to God's, of Whom it is written (1\nTim. 2:4) that \"He will have all men to be saved.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: God so invites us to take good things, that we may\napproach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires\nand devout prayers.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Man Ought to Ask God for Temporal Things When He Prays?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal\nthings when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we\nshould not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Matt. 6:33):\n\"Seek ye . . . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all\nthese things shall be added unto you,\" that is to say, temporal\nthings, which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to\nwhat we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in\nprayer.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous\nabout. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things,\naccording to the saying of Matt. 6:25, \"Be not solicitous for your\nlife, what you shall eat.\" Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal\nthings when we pray.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God. But\nby asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it,\nagainst the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18), \"While we look not\nat the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen.\nFor the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are\nnot seen are eternal.\" Therefore man ought not to ask God for\ntemporal things when he prays.\n\nObj. 4: Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and\nuseful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are\nharmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense.\nTherefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 30:8): \"Give me only the\nnecessaries of life.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep.\ncxxx, 12): \"It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire.\"\nNow it is lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally,\nby placing our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in\ntending towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means\nof supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as\ninstruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher\nstates (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the same to Proba (ad\nProbam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6, 7) when he states that \"it is\nnot unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no\nmore; for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for\nthe welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a\nway befitting one's station, so as not to be out of keeping with\nthose among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that\nwe may keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not,\nthat we may gain possession of them.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: We should seek temporal things not in the first but in\nthe second place. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,\n16): \"When He says that this\" (i.e. the kingdom of God) \"is to be\nsought first, He implies that the other\" (i.e. temporal goods) \"is to\nbe sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being\nour good, the other as our need.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden,\nbut that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated above (Q. 55,\nA. 6).\n\nReply Obj. 3: When our mind is intent on temporal things in order\nthat it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is\nintent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not\nlowered by them, but raises them to a higher level.\n\nReply Obj. 4: From the very fact that we ask for temporal things not\nas the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate to\nsomething else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be\ngranted to us in so far as they are expedient for salvation.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 7]\n\nWhether We Ought to Pray for Others?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. In\npraying we ought to conform to the pattern given by our Lord. Now in\nthe Lord's Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others;\nthus we say: \"Give us this day our daily bread,\" etc. Therefore we\nshould not pray for others.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one of\nthe conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that one\npray for oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on John 16:23,\n\"If you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you,\" says\n(Tract. cii): \"Everyone is heard when he prays for himself, not when\nhe prays for all; wherefore He does not say simply 'He will give it,'\nbut 'He will give it you.'\" Therefore it would seem that we ought not\nto pray for others, but only for ourselves.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we are forbidden to pray for others, if they are\nwicked, according to Jer. 7:16, \"Therefore do not then pray for this\npeople . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee.\" On\nthe other hand we are not bound to pray for the good, since they are\nheard when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we\nought not to pray for others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 5:16): \"Pray one for another,\nthat you may be saved.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), when we pray we ought to ask\nfor what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not\nonly for ourselves, but also for others: for this is essential to the\nlove which we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12;\nQ. 27, A. 2; Q. 31, A. 1). Therefore charity requires us to pray for\nothers. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.) [*Opus\nImperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: \"Necessity\nbinds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray\nfor others: and the prayer that fraternal charity proffers is sweeter\nto God than that which is the outcome of necessity.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Cyprian says (De orat. Dom.), \"We say 'Our Father'\nand not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because the Master\nof unity did not wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves\nalone, for He wished each one to pray for all, even as He Himself\nbore all in one.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is a condition of prayer that one pray for oneself:\nnot as though it were necessary in order that prayer be meritorious,\nbut as being necessary in order that prayer may not fail in its\neffect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray for\nanother with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to\nhis salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some obstacle\non the part of the person we are praying for, according to Jer. 15:1,\n\"If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards\nthis people.\" And yet the prayer will be meritorious for the person\nwho prays thus out of charity, according to Ps. 34:13, \"My prayer\nshall be turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I am\nnot deprived of my reward,\" as the gloss expounds it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may be\nconverted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in\nholiness. Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for\nsome: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who\nare foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the\nbrethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate,\naccording to Eccles. 7:14, \"No man can correct whom God hath\ndespised.\" Hence it is written (1 John 5:16): \"He that knoweth his\nbrother to sin a sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life\nshall be given to him, who sinneth not to death.\" Now just as the\nbenefit of correction must not be refused to any man so long as he\nlives here below, because we cannot distinguish the predestined from\nthe reprobate, as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xv), so too no\nman should be denied the help of prayer.\n\nWe ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: First, because\nthe prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore a gloss\non Rom. 15:30, \"Help me in your prayers,\" says: \"The Apostle rightly\ntells the lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if\nthey be united together in one mind, become great, and it is\nimpossible for the prayers of a multitude not to obtain\" that which\nis possible to be obtained by prayer. Secondly, that many may thank\nGod for the graces conferred on the just, which graces conduce to the\nprofit of many, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:11). Thirdly, that\nthe more perfect may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they\nneed the prayers of the less perfect.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 8]\n\nWhether We Ought to Pray for Our Enemies?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies.\nAccording to Rom. 15:4, \"what things soever were written, were\nwritten for our learning.\" Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations\nagainst enemies; thus it is written (Ps. 6:11): \"Let all my enemies\nbe ashamed and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled\nvery speedily [*Vulg.: 'Let them be turned back and be ashamed.'].\"\nTherefore we too should pray against rather than for our enemies.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to them.\nBut holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to Apoc. 6:10,\n\"How long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them that\ndwell on earth?\" Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their\nenemies, according to Ps. 57:11, \"The just shall rejoice when he\nshall see the revenge.\" Therefore we should not pray for our enemies,\nbut against them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man's deed should not be contrary to his prayer. Now\nsometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars would be\nunlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above (Q. 40, A. 1).\nTherefore we should not pray for our enemies.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:44): \"Pray for them that\npersecute and calumniate you.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated\nabove (A. 7). Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in the\nsame manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained above\nin the treatise on charity (Q. 25, AA. 8, 9), how we are bound to\nlove our enemies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not\ntheir sin, and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of\nprecept, while to love them in the individual is not a matter of\nprecept, except in the preparedness of the mind, so that a man must\nbe prepared to love his enemy even in the individual and to help him\nin a case of necessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness.\nBut to love one's enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist\nthem, is an act of perfection.\n\nIn like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not\nexclude our enemies from the general prayers which we offer up for\nothers: but it is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to\npray for them individually, except in certain special cases.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be\nunderstood in four ways. First, according to the custom of the\nprophets \"to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation,\"\nas Augustine states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21]. Secondly, in the\nsense that certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on\nthe wicked for their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood\nto be pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the\nkingdom of sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the\ncorrection of men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our will to the\nDivine justice with regard to the damnation of those who are\nobstinate in sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine states in the same book (De Serm. Dom. in\nMonte i, 22), \"the martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom\nof sin, because they suffered so much while it reigned\": or as he\nsays again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), \"their prayer for\nvengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds, even as the\nblood of Abel cried from the earth.\" They rejoice in vengeance not\nfor its own sake, but for the sake of Divine justice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they may be\nrestrained from sin: and this is for their own good and for the good\nof others. Consequently it is even lawful in praying to ask that\ntemporal evils be inflicted on our enemies in order that they may\nmend their ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one\nanother.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 9]\n\nWhether the Seven Petitions of the Lord's Prayer Are Fittingly\nAssigned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the seven petitions of the Lord's\nPrayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to\nbe hallowed which is always holy. But the name of God is always holy,\naccording to Luke 1:49, \"Holy is His name.\" Again, His kingdom is\neverlasting, according to Ps. 144:13, \"Thy kingdom is a kingdom of\nall ages.\" Again, God's will is always fulfilled, according to Isa\n46:10, \"All My will shall be done.\" Therefore it is useless to ask\nfor \"the name of God to be hallowed,\" for \"His kingdom to come,\" and\nfor \"His will to be done.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, one must withdraw from evil before attaining good.\nTherefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the\nattainment of good to be set forth before those relating to the\nremoval of evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one asks for a thing that it may be given to one.\nNow the chief gift of God is the Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we\nreceive through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly\nassigned, since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 4: Further, according to Luke, only five petitions are mentioned\nin the Lord's Prayer, as appears from the eleventh chapter. Therefore\nit was superfluous for Matthew to mention seven.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it seems useless to seek to win the benevolence of\none who forestalls us by his benevolence. Now God forestalls us by\nHis benevolence, since \"He first hath loved us\" ( 1 John 4:19).\nTherefore it is useless to preface the petitions with the words our\n\"Father Who art in heaven,\" which seem to indicate a desire to win\nGod's benevolence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The authority of Christ, who composed this prayer,\nsuffices.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Lord's Prayer is most perfect, because, as\nAugustine says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), \"if we pray rightly and\nfittingly, we can say nothing else but what is contained in this\nprayer of our Lord.\" For since prayer interprets our desires, as it\nwere, before God, then alone is it right to ask for something in our\nprayers when it is right that we should desire it. Now in the Lord's\nPrayer not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but\nalso in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that this\nprayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our\naffections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be the object\nof our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed to the\nend. Now our end is God towards Whom our affections tend in two ways:\nfirst, by our willing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to enjoy\nHis glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God in\nHimself, while the second belongs to the love whereby we love\nourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is expressed thus:\n\"Hallowed be Thy name,\" and the second thus: \"Thy kingdom come,\" by\nwhich we ask to come to the glory of His kingdom.\n\nTo this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its\nvery nature, in another way, accidentally. Of its very nature the\ngood which is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing\nis useful in two ways to that end which is beatitude: in one way,\ndirectly and principally, according to the merit whereby we merit\nbeatitude by obeying God, and in this respect we ask: \"Thy will be\ndone on earth as it is in heaven\"; in another way instrumentally, and\nas it were helping us to merit, and in this respect we say: \"Give us\nthis day our daily bread,\" whether we understand this of the\nsacramental Bread, the daily use of which is profitable to man, and\nin which all the other sacraments are contained, or of the bread of\nthe body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augustine\nsays (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since the Eucharist is the chief\nsacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus in the Gospel of Matthew\nwe read, \"supersubstantial,\" i.e. \"principal,\" as Jerome expounds it.\n\nWe are directed to beatitude accidentally by the removal of\nobstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of\nbeatitude. First, there is sin, which directly excludes a man from\nthe kingdom, according to 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, \"Neither fornicators, nor\nidolaters, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God\"; and to this refer\nthe words, \"Forgive us our trespasses.\" Secondly, there is temptation\nwhich hinders us from keeping God's will, and to this we refer when\nwe say: \"And lead us not into temptation,\" whereby we do not ask not\nto be tempted, but not to be conquered by temptation, which is to be\nled into temptation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which\nis a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency of life, and to this we refer\nin the words, \"Deliver us from evil.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when\nwe say, \"Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean that God's name is not\nholy, but we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing,\" and this\npertains to the diffusion of God's glory among men. When we say, \"Thy\nkingdom come, we do not imply that God is not reigning now,\" but \"we\nexcite in ourselves the desire for that kingdom, that it may come to\nus, and that we may reign therein,\" as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep.\ncxxx, 11). The words, \"Thy will be done\" rightly signify, \"'May Thy\ncommandments be obeyed' on earth as in heaven, i.e. by men as well as\nby angels\" (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three\npetitions will be perfectly fulfilled in the life to come; while the\nother four, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the\nneeds of the present life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the order of\nthe petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution, but of\ndesire or intention, where the end precedes the things that are\ndirected to the end, and attainment of good precedes removal of evil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts the\nseven petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: \"If it is fear\nof God whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God's\nname be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby\nblessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that\nwe become meek and no longer resist Him. If it is knowledge whereby\nblessed are they that mourn, let us pray that His will be done, for\nthus we shall mourn no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere\nthey that hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If\nit is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the\ntrespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If it is\nunderstanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let us pray lest\nwe have a double heart by seeking after worldly things which ere the\noccasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the\npeacemakers for they shall be called the children of God, let us pray\nto be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that\nvery fact become the free children of God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Enchiridion cxvi), \"Luke\nincluded not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by\nomitting it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition\nof the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it\";\nbecause, to wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this--that we come\nto the knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with Him.\nAgain the last petition mentioned by Matthew, \"Deliver us from evil,\"\nis omitted by Luke, so that each one may know himself to be delivered\nfrom evil if he be not led into temptation.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend Him,\nbut that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which\nconfidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His\ncharity in our regard, whereby he wills our good--wherefore we say:\n\"Our Father\"; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil\nit--wherefore we say: \"Who art in heaven.\"\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Prayer Is Proper to the Rational Creature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational\ncreature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject.\nBut receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and\nHoly Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son\nsaid (John 14:16): \"I will ask My [Vulg.: 'the'] Father,\" and the\nApostle says of the Holy Ghost (Rom. 8:26): \"The Spirit . . . asketh\nfor us.\"\n\nObj. 2: Angels are above rational creatures, since they are\nintellectual substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels,\nwherefore we read in the Ps. 96:7: \"Adore Him, all you His angels.\"\nTherefore prayer is not proper to the rational creature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted to\ncall upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb\nanimals are fitted to call upon God, according to Ps. 146:9, \"Who\ngiveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon\nHim.\" Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creatures.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above (A.\n1). But the rational creature is so called from his reason. Therefore\nprayer is proper to the rational creature.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) prayer is an act of reason,\nand consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of\nreason, whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordingly\nprayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have\nreason, and a superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the\nDivine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore\nprayer is unbecoming both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it\nis proper to the rational creature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of\ntheir nature, whereas prayer belongs to one who receives through\ngrace. The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e.\nHis human, nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and the Holy\nGhost is said to ask, because He makes us ask.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 8), intellect\nand reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the\nperfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual creatures which are\nthe angels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are\nincluded under them. In this sense prayer is said to be proper to the\nrational creature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The young ravens are said to call upon God, on account\nof the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire\nto attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey\nGod, on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by God.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 11]\n\nWhether the Saints in Heaven Pray for Us?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for\nus. A man's action is more meritorious for himself than for others.\nBut the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they\npray for themselves, since they are already established in the term.\nNeither therefore do they pray for us.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the saints conform their will to God perfectly, so\nthat they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always\nfulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for\nus.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the saints in heaven are above, so are those\nin Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory do\nnot pray for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither\ndo the saints in heaven pray for us.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers of\nthe higher saints would be more efficacious; and so we ought not to\nimplore the help of the lower saints' prayers but only of those of\nthe higher saints.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the\nsouls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from\ntheir bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul,\nto pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints\ntherefore do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): \"This is . . . he\nthat prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias\nthe prophet of God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), the error of\nVigilantius consisted in saying that \"while we live, we can pray one\nfor another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for\nothers can be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs' prayers are\ngranted when they pray for their blood to be avenged.\" But this is\nabsolutely false, because, since prayers offered for others proceed\nfrom charity, as stated above (AA. 7, 8), the greater the charity of\nthe saints in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers, since the\nlatter can be helped by prayers: and the more closely they are united\nto God, the more are their prayers efficacious: for the Divine order\nis such that lower beings receive an overflow of the excellence of\nthe higher, even as the air receives the brightness of the sun.\nWherefore it is said of Christ (Heb. 7:25): \"Going to God by His own\npower . . . to make intercession for us\" [*Vulg.: 'He is able to save\nfor ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make\nintercession for us.']. Hence Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): \"If\nthe apostles and martyrs while yet in the body and having to be\nsolicitous for themselves, can pray for others, how much more now\nthat they have the crown of victory and triumph.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saints in heaven, since they are blessed, have no\nlack of bliss, save that of the body's glory, and for this they pray.\nBut they pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and\ntheir prayers are efficacious in impetrating through their previous\nmerits and through God's acceptance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The saints impetrate what ever God wishes to take place\nthrough their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem will be\ngranted through their prayers according to God's will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those who are in Purgatory though they are above us on\naccount of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains\nwhich they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a condition to\npray, but rather in a condition that requires us to pray for them.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It is God's will that inferior beings should be helped\nby all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not only\nto the higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to\nimplore the mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime that\nprayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious,\neither because he is implored with greater devotion, or because God\nwishes to make known his sanctity.\n\nReply Obj. 5: It is because the saints while living merited to pray\nfor us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were known\nin this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also in\norder to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the\nsaying of Ex. 3:6, \"I am the God of Abraham,\" etc.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 12]\n\nWhether Prayer Should Be Vocal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As\nstated above (A. 4), prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God\nknows the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ\nvocal prayer.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prayer should lift man's mind to God, as stated\nabove (A. 1, ad 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent\nman from ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not\nuse words in our prayers.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prayer should be offered to God in secret, according\nto Matt. 6:6, \"But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy\nchamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret.\" But\nprayer loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer\nshould not be vocal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 141:2): \"I cried to the Lord\nwith my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common\nprayer is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church\nrepresenting the body of the faithful: wherefore such like prayer\nshould come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is\noffered: and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer.\nTherefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of the Church\nshould say these prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come\nto the knowledge of all.\n\nOn the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any\nsingle person, whether he pray for himself or for others; and it is\nnot essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the\nvoice is employed in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in\norder to excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person\npraying is raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether\nof words or of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards\napprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections. Hence\nAugustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that \"by means of words and\nother signs we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase of\nholy desires.\" Hence then alone should we use words and such like\nsigns when they help to excite the mind internally. But if they\ndistract or in any way impede the mind we should abstain from them;\nand this happens chiefly to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared\nfor devotion without having recourse to those signs. Wherefore the\nPsalmist (Ps. 26:8) said: \"My heart hath said to Thee: 'My face hath\nsought Thee,'\" and we read of Anna (1 Kings 1:13) that \"she spoke in\nher heart.\" Secondly, the voice is used in praying as though to pay a\ndebt, so that man may serve God with all that he has from God, that\nis to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and this\napplies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory. Hence it is\nwritten (Osee 14:3): \"Take away all iniquity, and receive the good:\nand we will render the calves of our lips.\" Thirdly, we have recourse\nto vocal prayer, through a certain overflow from the soul into the\nbody, through excess of feeling, according to Ps. 15:9, \"My heart\nhath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell God\nsomething He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the\nperson praying or of other persons to God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Words about other matters distract the mind and hinder\nthe devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object of\ndevotion lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum\nfalsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], \"Our Lord forbids one to\npray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by others.\nHence when you pray, do nothing strange to draw men's attention,\neither by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking\nthe heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many. And yet,\naccording to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), \"it is not\nwrong to be seen by men, but to do this or that in order to be seen\nby men.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 13]\n\nWhether Attention Is a Necessary Condition of Prayer?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of\nprayer. It is written (John 4:24): \"God is a spirit, and they that\nadore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth.\" But prayer is not\nin spirit unless it be attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary\ncondition of prayer.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prayer is \"the ascent of the mind to God\"\n[*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24]. But the mind does not ascend to\nGod if the prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary\ncondition of prayer.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is a necessary condition of prayer that it should\nbe altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander while\npraying he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God;\neven as if he were to speak to another man without attending to what\nhe was saying. Hence Basil says [*De Constit. Monach. i] that the\n\"Divine assistance is to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind\nwandering hither and thither: because he that prays thus not only\nwill not obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to\nanger.\" Therefore it would seem a necessary condition of prayer that\nit should be attentive.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of\nthe mind when they pray, according to Ps. 39:13, \"My heart hath\nforsaken me.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer.\nAccordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways.\nFirst, a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better\nobtained: and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer.\nSecondly, a thing is said to be necessary when without it something\ncannot obtain its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The\nfirst is an effect which is common to all acts quickened by charity,\nand this is merit. In order to realize this effect, it is not\nnecessary that prayer should be attentive throughout; because the\nforce of the original intention with which one sets about praying\nrenders the whole prayer meritorious, as is the case with other\nmeritorious acts. The second effect of prayer is proper thereto, and\nconsists in impetration: and again the original intention, to which\nGod looks chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the\noriginal intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit and\nimpetration: because, as Gregory [*Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S.\nAug. iii] says, \"God hears not the prayer of those who pay no\nattention to their prayer.\" The third effect of prayer is that which\nit produces at once; this is the spiritual refreshment of the mind,\nand for this effect attention is a necessary condition: wherefore it\nis written (1 Cor. 14:14): \"If I pray in a tongue . . . my\nunderstanding is without fruit.\"\n\nIt must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention\nthat can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends to the words,\nlest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the\nwords, and a third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God,\nand to the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is\nmost necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this\nattention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong\nthat the mind forgets all other things, as Hugh of St. Victor states\n[*De Modo Orandi ii].\n\nReply Obj. 1: To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about praying\nthrough the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards the\nmind wander through weakness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long on\naccount of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs down\nthe soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when,\nwhile praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a sudden\nit wanders off through weakness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer is\nsinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this\nthat Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): \"When you pray God with\npsalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips\npronounce.\" But to wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive\nprayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit. Monach. i): \"If\nyou are so truly weakened by sin that you are unable to pray\nattentively, strive as much as you can to curb yourself, and God will\npardon you, seeing that you are unable to stand in His presence in a\nbecoming manner, not through negligence but through frailty.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 14]\n\nWhether Prayer Should Last a Long Time?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is\nwritten (Matt. 6:7): \"When you are praying, speak not much.\" Now one\nwho prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal\nprayer. Therefore prayer should not last a long time.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all the\nholier according as it is centered on one thing, according to Ps.\n26:4, \"One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after.\"\nTherefore the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits fixed\nby God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship, according to\nEx. 19:21: \"Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass\nthe limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them should\nperish.\" But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by instituting\nthe Lord's Prayer (Matt. 6). Therefore it is not right to prolong our\nprayer beyond its limits.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It would seem that we ought to pray\ncontinually. For our Lord said (Luke 18:1): \"We ought always to pray,\nand not to faint\": and it is written (1 Thess. 5:17): \"Pray without\nceasing.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by\nconsidering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause.\nThe cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought\nto arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either\nactually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in\nwhatever we do out of charity; and we ought to \"do all things to the\nglory of God\" (1 Cor. 10:31). From this point of view prayer ought to\nbe continual: wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9):\n\"Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual\nlonging.\" But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual,\nbecause we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine says\n(ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), \"we pray to God with our lips at certain\nintervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of\nsuch like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that\ndesire, and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof.\"\nNow the quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for\ninstance the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health.\nAnd so it is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse\nthe fervor of the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure,\nso that it cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness,\nit should be discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep.\ncxxx): \"It is said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent but very\nshort prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and\nerect attention which is so necessary in prayer slacken and languish,\nthrough the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it\nsufficiently clear not only that this attention must not be forced if\nwe are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to\ncontinue, it should not be broken off too soon.\" And just as we must\njudge of this in private prayers by considering the attention of the\nperson praying, so too, in public prayers we must judge of it by\nconsidering the devotion of the people.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), \"to pray with\nmany words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one\nthing, to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord\npassed the whole night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in\norder to set us an example.\" Further on he says: \"When praying say\nlittle, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to\nsay much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words: whereas\nto pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the\ncontinuous and devout clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is\nfrequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather\nthan with speech.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Length of prayer consists, not in praying for many\nthings, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one thing.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we might use\nno other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might have\nnone but these things in view, no matter how we express them or think\nof them.\n\nReply Obj. 4: One may pray continually, either through having a\ncontinual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain\nfixed times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect,\nwhether in the person who prays--because he remains more devout even\nafter praying, or in some other person--as when by his kindness a man\nincites another to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased\npraying.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 15]\n\nWhether Prayer Is Meritorious?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit\nproceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace is\nobtained by means of prayer according to Luke 11:13, \"(How much more)\nwill your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask\nHim!\" Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be\nchiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always\nmerit this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not\nheard; thus Paul was not heard when he besought the sting of the\nflesh to be removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious\nact.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to James\n1:6, \"But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering.\" Now faith is not\nsufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless faith.\nTherefore prayer is not a meritorious act.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words of Ps. 34:13, \"My prayer\nshall be turned into my bosom,\" explains them as meaning, \"if my\nprayer does not profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my\nreward.\" Now reward is not due save to merit. Therefore prayer is\nmeritorious.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 13) prayer, besides causing\nspiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy\nin respect of a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and\nefficacy in impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is\nefficacious in meriting, because it proceeds from charity as its\nroot, the proper object of which is the eternal good that we merit to\nenjoy. Yet prayer proceeds from charity through the medium of\nreligion, of which prayer is an act, as stated above (A. 3), and with\nthe concurrence of other virtues requisite for the goodness of\nprayer, viz. humility and faith. For the offering of prayer itself to\nGod belongs to religion, while the desire for the thing that we pray\nto be accomplished belongs to charity. Faith is necessary in\nreference to God to Whom we pray; that is, we need to believe that we\ncan obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary on the part\nof the person praying, because he recognizes his neediness. Devotion\ntoo is necessary: but this belongs to religion, for it is its first\nact and a necessary condition of all its secondary acts, as stated\nabove (Q. 82, AA. 1, 2).\n\nAs to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace\nof God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. Wherefore\nAugustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cv, 1): \"He would not urge us to\nask, unless He were willing to give\"; and Chrysostom [*Cf. Catena\nAurea of St. Thomas on Luke 18. The words as quoted are not to be\nfound in the words of Chrysostom] says: \"He never refuses to grant\nour prayers, since in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in\npraying.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is\nmeritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which\nimpetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a\ngratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is \"a gift of God,\" as\nAugustine states (De Persever. xxiii).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly something\ndistinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief object of\nmerit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition of\nprayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above\n(AA. 6, 7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves\nbe not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and sometimes by\nasking for and desiring such things we lose merit for instance if we\nask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would be an impious\nprayer. And sometimes it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet\nmanifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit\neternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he asks\nfor. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii): \"He\nwho faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both\nmercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows\nbetter than the sick man what is good for the disease.\" For this\nreason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the removal of the\nsting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we\npray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being\nconducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by\ndoing other good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what\nwe ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: \"since certain things\nare not denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a\nsuitable time,\" according to Augustine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and\nagain this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it.\nWherefore Basil says (De Constit. Monast. i): \"The reason why\nsometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast\nasked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because thou hast\nasked for what was not good for thee, or because thou hast ceased\nasking.\" Since, however, a man cannot condignly merit eternal life\nfor another, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 6), it follows that\nsometimes one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain\nto eternal life. For this reason we are not always heard when we pray\nfor others, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2, 3). Hence it is that four\nconditions are laid down; namely, to ask--\"for ourselves--things\nnecessary for salvation--piously--perseveringly\"; when all these four\nconcur, we always obtain what we ask for.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its efficacy\nin meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but for its\nefficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man comes\nto know of God's omnipotence and mercy, which are the source whence\nprayer impetrates what it asks for.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 16]\n\nWhether Sinners Impetrate Anything from God by Their Prayers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by\ntheir prayers. It is written (John 9:31): \"We know that God doth not\nhear sinners\"; and this agrees with the saying of Prov. 28:9, \"He\nthat turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be\nan abomination.\" Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from\nGod. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the just impetrate from God what they merit, as\nstated above (A. 15, ad 2). But sinners cannot merit anything since\nthey lack grace and charity which is the \"power of godliness,\"\naccording to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, \"Having an appearance indeed of\ngodliness, but denying the power thereof.\" and so their prayer is\nimpious, and yet piety is required in order that prayer may be\nimpetrative, as stated above (A. 15, ad 2). Therefore sinners\nimpetrate nothing by their prayers.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum\nfalsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: \"The Father is\nunwilling to hear the prayer which the Son has not inspired.\" Now in\nthe prayer inspired by Christ we say: \"Forgive us our trespasses as\nwe forgive them that trespass against us\": and sinners do not fulfil\nthis. Therefore either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy\nto be heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because\nthey do not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan.): \"If God\nwere not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord,\nbe merciful to me a sinner\"; and Chrysostom [*Hom. xviii of the same\nOpus Imperfectum] says: \"Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is\nto say whether he be righteous or sinful.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In the sinner, two things are to be considered: his\nnature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when\na sinner prays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with a\nsinful desire, God hears him not through mercy but sometimes through\nvengeance when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For\n\"God refuses in mercy what He grants in anger,\" as Augustine declares\n(Tract. lxxiii in Joan.). On the other hand God hears the sinner's\nprayer if it proceed from a good natural desire, not out of justice,\nbecause the sinner does not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy\n[*Cf. A. 15, ad 1], provided however he fulfil the four conditions\ngiven above, namely, that he beseech for himself things necessary for\nsalvation, piously and perseveringly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan.), these\nwords were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i.e.\nperfectly enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there\nis truth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which\nsense also the sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer as\nthough his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his\nprayer may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to\ngodliness. Even so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to\nwill something just, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 2). And though his\nprayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit\ndepends on justice, whereas impetration rests on grace.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 7, ad 1) the Lord's Prayer is\npronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone\nsay the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's\ntrespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him\npersonally: for they are true as referred to the person of the\nChurch, from which he is excluded by merit, and consequently he is\ndeprived of the fruit of his prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is\nprepared to forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore\nhis prayers are heard, according to Ecclus. 28:2, \"Forgive thy\nneighbor if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to\nthee when thou prayest.\"\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 17]\n\nWhether the Parts of Prayer Are Fittingly Described As Supplications,\nPrayers, Intercessions, and Thanksgivings?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly\ndescribed as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and\nthanksgivings. Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration.\nYet, according to Origen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), \"a man who\nwishes to live according to the gospel need not adjure another, for\nif it be unlawful to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure.\" Therefore\nsupplication is unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), \"to\npray is to ask becoming things of God.\" Therefore it is unfitting to\ndistinguish \"prayers\" from \"intercessions.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others\nregard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore\nthanksgivings are unfittingly placed after the others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ suffices the authority of the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:1).\n\n_I answer that,_ Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First,\nthat the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is\nsignified in the word \"prayer,\" because prayer is \"the raising up of\none's mind to God.\" The second is that there should be a petition,\nand this is signified in the word \"intercession.\" In this case\nsometimes one asks for something definite, and then some say it is\n\"intercession\" properly so called, or we may ask for some thing\nindefinitely, for instance to be helped by God, or we may simply\nindicate a fact, as in John 11:3, \"Behold, he whom Thou lovest is\nsick,\" and then they call it \"insinuation.\" The third condition is\nthe reason for impetrating what we ask for: and this either on the\npart of God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of\nimpetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account of which\nwe ask to be heard, according to Dan. 9:17, 18, \"For Thy own sake,\nincline, O God, Thy ear\"; and to this pertains \"supplication\"\n(_obsecratio_) which means a pleading through sacred things, as when\nwe say, \"Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord.\" The reason for\nimpetration on the part of the person who asks is \"thanksgiving\";\nsince \"through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to\nreceive yet greater benefits,\" as we say in the collect [*Ember\nFriday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor\nBishop]. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:1 says that \"in the Mass, the\nconsecration is preceded by supplication,\" in which certain sacred\nthings are called to mind; that \"prayers are in the consecration\nitself,\" in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and\nthat \"intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and\nthanksgivings at the end.\"\n\nWe may notice these four things in several of the Church's collects.\nThus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, \"Almighty eternal\nGod\" belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, \"Who hast\ngiven to Thy servants,\" etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words,\n\"grant, we beseech Thee,\" belong to intercession; and the words at\nthe end, \"Through Our Lord,\" etc. belong to supplication.\n\nIn the _Conferences of the Fathers_ (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read:\n\"Supplication is bewailing one's sins; prayer is vowing something to\nGod; intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by\nthe mind to God in ineffable ecstasy.\" The first explanation,\nhowever, is the better.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"Supplication\" is an adjuration not for the purpose of\ncompelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"Prayer\" in the general sense includes all the things\nmentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes\nproperly the ascent to God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Among things that are diverse the past precedes the\nfuture; but the one and same thing is future before it is past. Hence\nthanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one and\nthe same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been\nreceived, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer\nwhereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer is preceded by\nsupplication, whereby through the consideration of God's goodness we\ndare approach Him.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 84\n\nOF ADORATION (In Three Articles)\n\nIn due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in\nthe first place, adoration whereby one uses one's body to reverence\nGod; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to\nGod; thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is\nassumed.\n\nUnder the first head there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether adoration is an act of latria?\n\n(2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act?\n\n(3) Whether adoration requires a definite place?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Adoration Is an Act of Latria or Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that adoration is not an act of latria or\nreligion. The worship of religion is due to God alone. But adoration\nis not due to God alone: since we read (Gen. 18:2) that Abraham\nadored the angels; and (3 Kings 1:23) that the prophet Nathan, when\nhe was come in to king David, \"worshiped him bowing down to the\nground.\" Therefore adoration is not an act of religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the worship of religion is due to God as the object\nof beatitude, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas\nadoration is due to Him by reason of His majesty, since a gloss on\nPs. 28:2, \"Adore ye the Lord in His holy court,\" says: \"We pass from\nthese courts into the court where we adore His majesty.\" Therefore\nadoration is not an act of latria.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the worship of one same religion is due to the three\nPersons. But we do not adore the three Persons with one adoration,\nfor we genuflect at each separate invocation of Them [*At the\nadoration of the Cross, on Good Friday]. Therefore adoration is nol\nan act of latria.\n\n_On the contrary,_ are the words quoted Matt. 4:10: \"The Lord thy God\nshalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person\nadored. Now it is evident from what we have said (Q. 81, AA. 2, 4)\nthat it is proper to religion to show reverence to God. Hence the\nadoration whereby we adore God is an act of religion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reverence is due to God on account of His excellence,\nwhich is communicated to certain creatures not in equal measure, but\naccording to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence which we\npay to God, and which belongs to latria, differs from the reverence\nwhich we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs to dulia,\nand we shall speak of it further on (Q. 103). And since external\nactions are signs of internal reverence, certain external tokens\nsignificative of reverence are offered to creatures of excellence,\nand among these tokens the chief is adoration: yet there is one thing\nwhich is offered to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei x, 4): \"Many tokens of Divine worship are employed\nin doing honor to men, either through excessive humility, or through\npernicious flattery; yet so that those to whom these honors are given\nare recognized as being men to whom we owe esteem and reverence and\neven adoration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his\nduty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he either knew or deemed\nor pretended to be a God?\" Accordingly it was with the reverence due\nto an excellent creature that Nathan adored David; while it was the\nreverence due to God with which Mardochai refused to adore Aman\nfearing \"lest he should transfer the honor of his God to a man\"\n(Esther 13:14).\n\nAgain with the reverence due to an excellent creature Abraham adored\nthe angels, as did also Josue (Jos. 5:15): though we may understand\nthem to have adored, with the adoration of latria, God Who appeared\nand spoke to them in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence\ndue to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc. 22:9),\nboth to indicate the dignity which he had acquired through Christ,\nwhereby man is made equal to an angel: wherefore the same text goes\non: \"I am thy fellow-servant and of thy brethren\"; as also to exclude\nany occasion of idolatry, wherefore the text continues: \"Adore God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every Divine excellency is included in His majesty: to\nwhich it pertains that we should be made happy in Him as in the\nsovereign good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since there is one excellence of the three\nDivine Persons, one honor and reverence is due to them and\nconsequently one adoration. It is to represent this that where it is\nrelated (Gen. 18:2) that three men appeared to Abraham, we are told\nthat he addressed one, saying: \"Lord, if I have found favor in thy\nsight,\" etc. The triple genuflection represents the Trinity of\nPersons, not a difference of adoration.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Adoration Denotes an Action of the Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that adoration does not denote an act of\nthe body. It is written (John 4:23): \"The true adorers shall adore\nthe Father in spirit and in truth.\" Now what is done in spirit has\nnothing to do with an act of the body. Therefore adoration does not\ndenote an act of the body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the word adoration is taken from _oratio_ (prayer).\nBut prayer consists chiefly in an interior act, according to 1 Cor.\n14:15, \"I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the\nunderstanding.\" Therefore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act.\n\nObj. 3: Further, acts of the body pertain to sensible knowledge:\nwhereas we approach God not by bodily but by spiritual sense.\nTherefore adoration does not denote an act of the body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ex. 20:5, \"Thou shalt not adore them,\nnor serve them,\" says: \"Thou shalt neither worship them in mind, nor\nadore them outwardly.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 12), since we\nare composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer\nGod a twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in\nthe internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which\nconsists in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts\nof latria that which is without is referred to that which is within\nas being of greater import, it follows that exterior adoration is\noffered on account of interior adoration, in other words we exhibit\nsigns of humility in our bodies in order to incite our affections to\nsubmit to God, since it is connatural to us to proceed from the\nsensible to the intelligible.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even bodily adoration is done in spirit, in so far as\nit proceeds from and is directed to spiritual devotion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as prayer is primarily in the mind, and\nsecondarily expressed in words, as stated above (Q. 83, A. 12), so\ntoo adoration consists chiefly in an interior reverence of God, but\nsecondarily in certain bodily signs of humility; thus when we\ngenuflect we signify our weakness in comparison with God, and when we\nprostrate ourselves we profess that we are nothing of ourselves.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Though we cannot reach God with the senses, our mind is\nurged by sensible signs to approach God.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Adoration Requires a Definite Place?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that adoration does not require a definite\nplace. It is written (John 4:21): \"The hour cometh, when you shall\nneither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father\"; and\nthe same reason seems to apply to other places. Therefore a definite\nplace is not necessary for adoration.\n\nObj. 2: Further, exterior adoration is directed to interior\nadoration. But interior adoration is shown to God as existing\neverywhere. Therefore exterior adoration does not require a definite\nplace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same God is adored in the New as in the Old\nTestament. Now in the Old Testament they adored towards the west,\nbecause the door of the Tabernacle looked to the east (Ex. 26:18\nseqq.). Therefore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards\nthe west, if any definite place be requisite for adoration.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 56:7): \"My house shall be\ncalled the house of prayer,\" which words are also quoted (John 2:16).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the chief part of adoration\nis the internal devotion of the mind, while the secondary part is\nsomething external pertaining to bodily signs. Now the mind\ninternally apprehends God as not comprised in a place; while bodily\nsigns must of necessity be in some definite place and position. Hence\na definite place is required for adoration, not chiefly, as though it\nwere essential thereto, but by reason of a certain fittingness, like\nother bodily signs.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By these words our Lord foretold the cessation of\nadoration, both according to the rite of the Jews who adored in\nJerusalem, and according to the rite of the Samaritans who adored on\nMount Garizim. For both these rites ceased with the advent of the\nspiritual truth of the Gospel, according to which \"a sacrifice is\noffered to God in every place,\" as stated in Malach. 1:11.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A definite place is chosen for adoration, not on\naccount of God Who is adored, as though He were enclosed in a place,\nbut on account of the adorers; and this for three reasons. First,\nbecause the place is consecrated, so that those who pray there\nconceive a greater devotion and are more likely to be heard, as may\nbe seen in the prayer of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Secondly, on account of\nthe sacred mysteries and other signs of holiness contained therein.\nThirdly, on account of the concourse of many adorers, by reason of\nwhich their prayer is more likely to be heard, according to Matt.\n18:20, \"Where there are two or three gathered together in My name,\nthere am I in the midst of them.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is a certain fittingness in adoring towards the\neast. First, because the Divine majesty is indicated in the movement\nof the heavens which is from the east. Secondly, because Paradise was\nsituated in the east according to the Septuagint version of Gen. 2:8,\nand so we signify our desire to return to Paradise. Thirdly, on\naccount of Christ Who is \"the light of the world\" [*John 8:12; 9:5],\nand is called \"the Orient\" (Zech. 6:12); \"Who mounteth above the\nheaven of heavens to the east\" (Ps. 67:34), and is expected to come\nfrom the east, according to Matt. 24:27, \"As lightning cometh out of\nthe east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the coming\nof the Son of Man be.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 85\n\nOF SACRIFICE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nIn due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things\nare offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration:\n(1) Of things given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby\nsomething is promised to Him.\n\nUnder the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations,\nfirst-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?\n\n(2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?\n\n(3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue?\n\n(4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Offering a Sacrifice to God Is of the Law of Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of\nthe natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among\nall men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of\nsome, e.g. Melchisedech (Gen. 14:18), offering bread and wine in\nsacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and others\nby others. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural\nlaw.\n\nObj. 2: Further, things that are of the natural law were observed by\nall just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor\nthat Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that\nwisdom \"brought him out of his sin.\" Therefore the offering of\nsacrifice is not of the natural law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5, 19) that\nsacrifices are offered in signification of something. Now words which\nare chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3),\n\"signify, not by nature but by convention,\" according to the\nPhilosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the\nnatural law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ At all times and among all nations there has\nalways been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by\nall is seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of\nthe natural law.\n\n_I answer that,_ Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a\nhigher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in\nhimself, and in which he needs help and direction from someone above\nhim: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all\nunder the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are\nnaturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural\nreason in accordance with man's natural inclination that he should\ntender submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is\nabove man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ\nsensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his\nknowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason\nthat man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in\nsign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make\ncertain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now\nthis is what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of\nsacrifice is of the natural law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 95, A. 2), certain things\nbelong generically to the natural law, while their determination\nbelongs to the positive law; thus the natural law requires that\nevildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should\nbe inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like\nmanner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural\nlaw, and consequently all are agreed on this point, but the\ndetermination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this\nis the reason for their difference.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God\nin a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to\nGregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was\nremitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture\nmention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have\nsomething special connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read\nof no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of\nsin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be\nrepresented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being\nhimself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should\nbe represented as offering a sacrifice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but\nthe determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Sacrifice Should Be Offered to God Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to\nthe most high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God,\nit would seem that it ought to be offered to all such as are\npartakers of the Godhead. Now holy men are made \"partakers of the\nDivine nature,\"    according to 2 Pet. 1:4; wherefore of them is it\nwritten (Ps. 81:6): \"I have said, You are gods\": and angels too are\ncalled \"sons of God,\"    according to Job 1:6. Thus sacrifice should\nbe offered to all these.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the greater a person is the greater the honor due to\nhim from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than any\nearthly princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much\ngreater honor, by prostrating before them, and offering them gifts,\nthan is implied by offering an animal or any other thing in\nsacrifice. Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the angels\nand saints.\n\nObj. 3: Further, temples and altars are raised for the offering of\nsacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints.\nTherefore sacrifices also may be offered to them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:20): \"He that sacrificeth to\ngods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a sacrifice is offered in\norder that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is\noffered outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby\nthe soul offers itself to God according to Ps. 50:19, \"A sacrifice to\nGod is an afflicted spirit,\" since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 7; Q.\n84, A. 2), the outward acts of religion are directed to the inward\nacts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as its\nbeginning by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to\nthe true faith God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in\nthe First Part (QQ. 90, A. 3; 118, A. 2), while in Him alone the\nbeatitude of our soul consists, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 8; Q.\n2, A. 8; Q. 3, AA. 1, 7, 8). Wherefore just as to God alone ought we\nto offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward\nsacrifices to Him alone: even so \"in our prayers and praises we\nproffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the\nthings which we designate thereby,\" as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei\nx, 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to\nshow the sovereign ruler some special sign of honor, and that if this\nbe shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in\nthe Divine law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer\nDivine honor to another than God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain\nones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is\nequal honor due to them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the\nvalue of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done\nin honor of the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore, as\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), \"the demons rejoice, not in the\nstench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), \"we do not\nraise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but\ntheir God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer\nsacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their\ntriumphs, and urge ourselves to imitate them.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Offering of Sacrifice Is a Special Act of Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a\nspecial act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): \"A true\nsacrifice is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy\nfellowship.\" But not every good work is a special act of some\ndefinite virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special\nact of a definite virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs to\nabstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs\nto fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the\noffering of sacrifice, according to Rom. 12:1, \"Present your bodies a\nliving sacrifice.\" Again the Apostle says (Heb. 13:16): \"Do not\nforget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor\nis obtained.\" Now it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do\ngood and to impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a\nspecial act of a definite virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God.\nNow many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes,\nfirst-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not\nappear to be a special act of a definite virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The law contains special precepts about\nsacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviticus.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7), where an\nact of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it\npartakes somewhat of its species; thus when a man thieves in order to\ncommit fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of\nfornication, so that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it\nwould be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to\nfornication. Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of\npraise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this\nreason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it happens\nthat the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence of\nGod, as when a man gives alms of his own things for God's sake, or\nwhen a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence\nfor God; and in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called\nsacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving\nof praise save through being done out of reverence for God: such acts\nare properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a\nspiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently\nthe act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through\nbeing done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man's good is threefold. There is first his soul's good\nwhich is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion,\nprayer and other like interior acts: and this is the principal\nsacrifice. The second is his body's good, which is, so to speak,\noffered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third\nis the good which consists of external things: and of these we offer\na sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possession to God\nimmediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbor for\nGod's sake.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A \"sacrifice,\" properly speaking, requires that\nsomething be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance\nanimals were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed.\nThe very word signifies this, since \"sacrifice\" is so called because\na man does something sacred (_facit sacrum_). On the other hand an\n\"oblation\" is properly the offering of something to God even if\nnothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at\nthe altar, and yet nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is\nan oblation, but not conversely. \"First-fruits\" are oblations,\nbecause they were offered to God, according to Deut. 26, but they are\nnot a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done to them. \"Tithes,\"\nhowever, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, properly speaking,\nbecause they are not offered immediately to God, but to the ministers\nof Divine worship.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 4]\n\nWhether All Are Bound to Offer Sacrifices?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all are not bound to offer\nsacrifices. The Apostle says (Rom. 3:19): \"What things soever the Law\nspeaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the Law.\" Now the law of\nsacrifices was not given to all, but only to the Hebrew people.\nTherefore all are not bound to offer sacrifices.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify\nsomething. But not everyone is capable of understanding these\nsignifications. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.\n\nObj. 3: Further, priests [*_Sacerdotes:_ Those who give or administer\nsacred things (_sacra dantes_): cf. 1 Cor. 4:1] are so called because\nthey offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not\nall are bound to offer sacrifices.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The offering of sacrifices of is of the natural\nlaw, as stated above (A. 1). Now all are bound to do that which is of\nthe natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above (A. 2). The\nfirst and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to\noffer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other\nis the outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a\nsacrifice which is deserving of praise merely through being offered\nto God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation\nof offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New\nor the Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those\nwho are under the Law are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices\naccording to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not\nunder the Law were bound to perform certain outward actions in God's\nhonor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to\nthis or that action. The other outward sacrifice is when the outward\nactions of the other virtues are performed out of reverence for God;\nsome of which are a matter of precept; and to these all are bound,\nwhile others are works of supererogation, and to these all are not\nbound.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All were not bound to offer those particular\nsacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to\nsome sacrifices inward or outward, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Though all do not know explicitly the power of\nthe sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit\nfaith, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 6, 7).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The priests offer those sacrifices which are\nspecially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but\nalso for others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can\noffer to God for himself as explained above (AA. 2, 3).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 86\n\nOF OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUITS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept?\n\n(2) To whom are oblations due?\n\n(3) of what things they should be made?\n\n(4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer\nthem?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Men Are Under a Necessity of Precept to Make Oblations?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to make\noblations. Men are not bound, at the time of the Gospel, to observe\nthe ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n103, AA. 3, 4). Now the offering of oblations is one of the\nceremonial precepts of the Old Law, since it is written (Ex. 23:14):\n\"Three times every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me,\" and\nfurther on (Ex. 23:15): \"Thou shalt not appear empty before Me.\"\nTherefore men are not now under a necessity of precept to make\noblations.\n\nObj. 2: Further, before they are made, oblations depend on man's\nwill, as appears from our Lord's saying (Matt. 5:23), \"If . . . thou\noffer thy gift at the altar,\" as though this were left to the choice\nof the offerer: and when once oblations have been made, there is no\nway of offering them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a\nnecessity of precept to make oblations.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if anyone is bound to give a certain thing to the\nChurch, and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by being\ndeprived of the Church's sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to\nrefuse the sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make\noblations according to a decree of the sixth council [*Can. Trullan,\nxxiii, quoted I, qu. i, can. Nullus]: \"Let none who dispense Holy\nCommunion exact anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything\nlet them be deposed.\" Therefore it is not necessary that men should\nmake oblations.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says [*Gregory VII; Concil. Roman. v, can.\nxii]: \"Let every Christian take care that he offer something to God\nat the celebration of Mass.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 85, A. 3, ad 3), the term\n\"oblation\" is common to all things offered for the Divine worship, so\nthat if a thing be offered to be destroyed in worship of God, as\nthough it were being made into something holy, it is both an oblation\nand a sacrifice. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 29:18): \"Thou shalt\noffer the whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an\noblation to the Lord, a most sweet savor of the victim of the Lord\";\nand (Lev. 2:1): \"When anyone shall offer an oblation of sacrifice to\nthe Lord, his offering shall be of fine flour.\" If, on the other\nhand, it be offered with a view to its remaining entire and being\ndeputed to the worship of God or to the use of His ministers, it will\nbe an oblation and not a sacrifice. Accordingly it is essential to\noblations of this kind that they be offered voluntarily, according to\nEx. 25:2, of \"every man that offereth of his own accord you shall\ntake them.\" Nevertheless it may happen in four ways that one is bound\nto make oblations. First, on account of a previous agreement: as when\na person is granted a portion of Church land, that he may make\ncertain oblations at fixed times, although this has the character of\nrent. Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment or promise; as\nwhen a man offers a gift among the living, or by will bequeaths to\nthe Church something whether movable or immovable to be delivered at\nsome future time. Thirdly, on account of the need of the Church, for\ninstance if her ministers were without means of support. Fourthly, on\naccount of custom; for the faithful are bound at certain solemn\nfeasts to make certain customary oblations. In the last two cases,\nhowever, the oblation remains voluntary, as regards, to wit, the\nquantity or kind of the thing offered.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Under the New Law men are not bound to make oblations\non account of legal solemnities, as stated in Exodus, but on account\nof certain other reasons, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some are bound to make oblations, both before making\nthem, as in the first, third, and fourth cases, and after they have\nmade them by assignment or promise: for they are bound to offer in\nreality that which has been already offered to the Church by way of\nassignment.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those who do not make the oblations they are\nbound to make may be punished by being deprived of the sacraments, not\nby the priest himself to whom the oblations should be made, lest he\nseem to exact, something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone\nsuperior to him.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Oblations Are Due to Priests Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that oblations are not due to priests\nalone. For chief among oblations would seem to be those that are\ndeputed to the sacrifices of victims. Now whatever is given to the\npoor is called a \"victim\" in Scripture according to Heb. 13:16, \"Do\nnot forget to do good and to impart, for by such victims [Douay:\n'sacrifices'] God's favor is obtained.\" Much more therefore are\noblations due to the poor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in many parishes monks have a share in the\noblations. Now \"the case of clerics is distinct from the case of\nmonks,\" as Jerome states [*Ep. xiv, ad Heliod.]. Therefore oblations\nart not due to priests alone.\n\nObj. 3: Further, lay people with the consent of the Church buy\noblations such as loaves and so forth, and they do so for no other\nreason than that they may make use thereof themselves. Therefore\noblations may have reference to the laity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A canon of Pope Damasus [*Damasus I] quoted X, qu.\ni [*Can. Hanc consuetudinem], says: \"None but the priests whom day by\nday we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the oblations which\nare offered within the precincts of the Holy Church: because in the\nOld Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the\nsacred loaves, with the exception of Aaron and his sons\" (Lev. 24:8,\n9).\n\n_I answer that,_ The priest is appointed mediator and stands, so to\nspeak, _between_ the people and God, as we read of Moses (Deut. 5:5),\nwherefore it belongs to him to set forth the Divine teachings and\nsacraments before the people; and besides to offer to the Lord things\nappertaining to the people, their prayers, for instance, their\nsacrifices and oblations. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): \"Every\nhigh priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things\nthat appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for\nsins.\" Hence the oblations which the people offer to God concern the\npriests, not only as regards their turning them to their own use, but\nalso as regards the faithful dispensation thereof, by spending them\npartly on things appertaining to the Divine worship, partly on things\ntouching their own livelihood (since they that serve the altar\npartake with the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13), and partly for the\ngood of the poor, who, as far as possible, should be supported from\nthe possessions of the Church: for our Lord had a purse for the use\nof the poor, as Jerome observes on Matt. 17:26, \"That we may not\nscandalize them.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Whatever is given to the poor is not a sacrifice\nproperly speaking; yet it is called a sacrifice in so far as it is\ngiven to them for God's sake. In like manner, and for the same\nreason, it can be called an oblation, though not properly speaking,\nsince it is not given immediately to God. Oblations properly so\ncalled fall to the use of the poor, not by the dispensation of the\nofferers, but by the dispensation of the priests.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Monks or other religious may receive oblations under\nthree counts. First, as poor, either by the dispensation of the\npriests, or by ordination of the Church; secondly, through being\nministers of the altar, and then they can accept oblations that are\nfreely offered; thirdly, if the parishes belong to them, and they can\naccept oblations, having a right to them as rectors of the Church.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Oblations when once they are consecrated, such\nas sacred vessels and vestments, cannot be granted to the use of the\nlaity: and this is the meaning of the words of Pope Damasus. But those\nwhich are unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by\npermission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by way of sale.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Man May Make Oblations of Whatever He Lawfully Possesses?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man may not make oblations of\nwhatever he lawfully possesses. According to human law [*Dig. xii, v,\nde Condict. ob. turp. vel iniust. caus. 4] \"the whore's is a shameful\ntrade in what she does but not in what she takes,\" and consequently\nwhat she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for her\nto make an oblation with her gains, according to Deut. 23:18, \"Thou\nshalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of the Lord\nthy God.\" Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever\none possesses lawfully.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the same passage it is forbidden to offer \"the\nprice of a dog\" in the house of God. But it is evident that a man\npossesses lawfully the price of a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore\nit is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Malachi 1:8): \"If you offer the lame\nand the sick, is it not evil?\" Yet an animal though lame or sick is a\nlawful possession. Therefore it would seem that not of every lawful\npossession may one make an oblation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 3:9): \"Honor the Lord with\nthy substance.\" Now whatever a man possesses lawfully belongs to his\nsubstance. Therefore he may make oblations of whatever he possesses\nlawfully.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. cxiii),\n\"shouldst thou plunder one weaker than thyself and give some of the\nspoil to the judge, if he should pronounce in thy favor, such is the\nforce of justice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him: and\nif this should not please thee, neither does it please thy God.\"\nHence it is written (Ecclus. 34:21): \"The offering of him that\nsacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten is stained.\" Therefore it is\nevident that an oblation must not be made of things unjustly acquired\nor possessed. In the Old Law, however, wherein the figure was\npredominant, certain things were reckoned unclean on account of their\nsignification, and it was forbidden to offer them. But in the New Law\nall God's creatures are looked upon as clean, as stated in Titus\n1:15: and consequently anything that is lawfully possessed,\nconsidered in itself, may be offered in oblation. But it may happen\naccidentally that one may not make an oblation of what one possesses\nlawfully; for instance if it be detrimental to another person, as in\nthe case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting his\nfather (which our Lord condemns, Matt. 15:5), or if it give rise to\nscandal or contempt, or the like.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the Old Law it was forbidden to make an offering of\nthe hire of a strumpet on account of its uncleanness, and in the New\nLaw, on account of scandal, lest the Church seem to favor sin if she\naccept oblations from the profits of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Law, a dog was deemed an unclean\nanimal. Yet other unclean animals were redeemed and their price could\nbe offered, according to Lev. 27:27, \"If it be an unclean animal, he\nthat offereth it shall redeem it.\" But a dog was neither offered nor\nredeemed, both because idolaters used dogs in sacrifices to their\nidols, and because they signify robbery, the proceeds of which cannot\nbe offered in oblation. However, this prohibition ceased under the\nNew Law.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The oblation of a blind or lame animal was declared\nunlawful for three reasons. First, on account of the purpose for\nwhich it was offered, wherefore it is written (Malach. 1:8): \"If you\noffer the blind in sacrifice, is it not evil?\" and it behooved\nsacrifices to be without blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt,\nwherefore the same text goes on (Malach. 1:12): \"You have profaned\"\nMy name, \"in that you say: The table of the Lord is defiled and that\nwhich is laid thereupon is contemptible.\" Thirdly, on account of a\nprevious vow, whereby a man has bound himself to offer without\nblemish whatever he has vowed: hence the same text says further on\n(Malach. 1:14): \"Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock a\nmale, and making a vow offereth in sacrifice that which is feeble to\nthe Lord.\" The same reasons avail still in the New Law, but when they\ndo not apply the unlawfulness ceases.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Men Are Bound to Pay First-fruits?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to pay\nfirst-fruits. After giving the law of the first-born the text\ncontinues (Ex. 13:9): \"It shall be as a sign in thy hand,\" so that,\napparently, it is a ceremonial precept. But ceremonial precepts are\nnot to be observed in the New Law. Neither therefore ought\nfirst-fruits to be paid.\n\nObj. 2: Further, first-fruits were offered to the Lord for a special\nfavor conferred on that people, wherefore it is written (Deut. 26:2,\n3): \"Thou shalt take the first of all thy fruits . . . and thou shalt\ngo to the priest that shall be in those days, and say to him: I\nprofess this day before the Lord thy God, that I am come into the\nland, for which He swore to our fathers, that He would give it us.\"\nTherefore other nations are not bound to pay first-fruits.\n\nObj. 3: That which one is bound to do should be something definite.\nBut neither in the New Law nor in the Old do we find mention of a\ndefinite amount of first-fruits. Therefore one is not bound of\nnecessity to pay them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is laid down (16, qu. vii, can. Decimas): \"We\nconfirm the right of priests to tithes and first-fruits, and\neverybody must pay them.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ First-fruits are a kind of oblation, because they\nare offered to God with a certain profession (Deut. 26); where the\nsame passage continues: \"The priest taking the basket containing the\nfirst-fruits from the hand of him that bringeth the first-fruits,\nshall set it before the altar of the Lord thy God,\" and further on\n(Deut. 26:10) he is commanded to say: \"Therefore now I offer the\nfirst-fruits of the land, which the Lord hath given me.\" Now the\nfirst-fruits were offered for a special reason, namely, in\nrecognition of the divine favor, as though man acknowledged that he\nhad received the fruits of the earth from God, and that he ought to\noffer something to God in return, according to 1 Paral 29:14, \"We\nhave given Thee what we received of Thy hand.\" And since what we\noffer God ought to be something special, hence it is that man was\ncommanded to offer God his first-fruits, as being a special part of\nthe fruits of the earth: and since a priest is \"ordained for the\npeople in the things that appertain to God\" (Heb. 5:1), the\nfirst-fruits offered by the people were granted to the priest's use.\nWherefore it is written (Num. 18:8): \"The Lord said to Aaron: Behold\nI have given thee the charge of My first-fruits.\" Now it is a point\nof natural law that man should make an offering in God's honor out of\nthe things he has received from God, but that the offering should be\nmade to any particular person, or out of his first-fruits, or in such\nor such a quantity, was indeed determined in the Old Law by divine\ncommand; but in the New Law it is fixed by the declaration of the\nChurch, in virtue of which men are bound to pay first-fruits\naccording to the custom of their country and the needs of the\nChurch's ministers.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The ceremonial observances were properly speaking signs\nof the future, and consequently they ceased when the foreshadowed\ntruth was actually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for\na sign of a past favor, whence arises the duty of acknowledgment in\naccordance with the dictate of natural reason. Hence taken in a\ngeneral sense this obligation remains.\n\nReply Obj. 2: First-fruits were offered in the Old Law, not only on\naccount of the favor of the promised land given by God, but also on\naccount of the favor of the fruits of the earth, which were given by\nGod. Hence it is written (Deut. 26:10): \"I offer the first-fruits of\nthe land which the Lord hath given me,\" which second motive is common\namong all people. We may also reply that just as God granted the land\nof promise to the Jews by a special favor, so by a general favor He\nbestowed the lordship of the earth on the whole of mankind, according\nto Ps. 113:24, \"The earth He has given to the children of men.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezech. 45:13, 14; cf. Cap.\nDecimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat.]: \"According to the tradition of\nthe ancients the custom arose for those who had most to give the\npriests a fortieth part, and those who had least, one sixtieth, in\nlieu of first-fruits.\" Hence it would seem that first-fruits should\nvary between these limits according to the custom of one's country.\nAnd it was reasonable that the amount of first-fruits should not be\nfixed by law, since, as stated above, first-fruits are offered by way\nof oblation, a condition of which is that it should be voluntary.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 87\n\nOF TITHES\n(In Four Articles)\n\nNext we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes?\n\n(2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid?\n\n(3) To whom ought they to be paid?\n\n(4) Who ought to pay tithes?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Men Are Bound to Pay Tithes Under a Necessity of Precept?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to pay\ntithes. The commandment to pay tithes is contained in the Old Law\n(Lev. 27:30), \"All tithes of the land, whether of corn or of the\nfruits of trees, are the Lord's,\" and further on (Lev. 27:32): \"Of\nall the tithes of oxen and sheep and goats, that pass under the\nshepherd's rod, every tenth that cometh shall be sanctified to the\nLord.\" This cannot be reckoned among the moral precepts, because\nnatural reason does not dictate that one ought to give a tenth part,\nrather than a ninth or eleventh. Therefore it is either a judicial or\na ceremonial precept. Now, as stated above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 3; Q.\n104, A. 3), during the time of grace men are hound neither to the\nceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the Old Law. Therefore men\nare not bound now to pay tithes.\n\nObj. 2: Further, during the time of grace men are bound only to those\nthings which were commanded by Christ through the Apostles, according\nto Matt. 28:20, \"Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I\nhave commanded you\"; and Paul says (Acts 20:27): \"I have not spared\nto declare unto you all the counsel of God.\" Now neither in the\nteaching of Christ nor in that of the apostles is there any mention\nof the paying of tithes: for the saying of our Lord about tithes\n(Matt. 23:23), \"These things you ought to have done\" seems to refer\nto the past time of legal observance: thus Hilary says (Super Matth.\ncan. xxiv): \"The tithing of herbs, which was useful in foreshadowing\nthe future, was not to be omitted.\" Therefore during the time of\ngrace men are not bound to pay tithes.\n\nObj. 3: Further, during the time of grace, men are not more bound to\nthe legal observances than before the Law. But before the Law tithes\nwere given, by reason not of a precept but of a vow. For we read\n(Gen. 28:20, 22) that Jacob \"made a vow\" saying: \"If God shall be\nwith me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk . . . of all\nthe things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee.\"\nNeither, therefore, during the time of grace are men bound to pay\ntithes.\n\nObj. 4: Further, in the Old Law men were bound to pay three kinds of\ntithe. For it is written (Num. 18:23, 24): \"The sons of Levi . . .\nshall . . . be content with the oblation of tithes, which I have\nseparated for their uses and necessities.\" Again, there were other\ntithes of which we read (Deut. 14:22, 23): \"Every year thou shalt set\naside the tithes of all thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth\nyear by year; and thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God in the place\nwhich He shall choose.\" And there were yet other tithes, of which it\nis written (Deut. 14:28): \"The third year thou shalt separate another\ntithe of all things that grow to thee at that time, and shalt lay it\nup within thy gates. And the Levite that hath no other part nor\npossession with thee, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the\nwidow, that are within thy gates, shall . . . eat and be filled.\" Now\nduring the time of grace men are not bound to pay the second and\nthird tithes. Neither therefore are they bound to pay the first.\n\nObj. 5: Further, a debt that is due without any time being fixed for\nits payment, must be paid at once under pain of sin. Accordingly if\nduring the time of grace men are bound, under necessity of precept,\nto pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they\nwould all be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the\nministers of the Church for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable.\nTherefore during the time of grace men are not bound under necessity\nof precept to pay tithes.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Append. Serm. cclxxcii], whose words\nare quoted 16, qu. i [*Can. Decimae], says: \"It is a duty to pay\ntithes, and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to\nanother.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance\nof the ministers of God. Hence it is written (Malach. 3:10): \"Bring\nall the tithes into My [Vulg.: 'the'] store-house that there may be\nmeat in My house.\" Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was\npartly moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly\njudicial, deriving its force from its divine institution. Because\nnatural reason dictates that the people should administer the\nnecessaries of life to those who minister the divine worship for the\nwelfare of the whole people even as it is the people's duty to\nprovide a livelihood for their rulers and soldiers and so forth.\nHence the Apostle proves this from human custom, saying (1 Cor. 9:7):\n\"Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge? Who planteth\na vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof?\" But the fixing of\nthe proportion to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does\nnot belong to the natural law, but was determined by divine\ninstitution, in accordance with the condition of that people to whom\nthe law was being given. For they were divided into twelve tribes,\nand the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was engaged exclusively\nin the divine ministry and had no possessions whence to derive a\nlivelihood: and so it was becomingly ordained that the remaining\neleven tribes should give one-tenth part of their revenues to the\nLevites [*Num. 18:21] that the latter might live respectably; and\nalso because some, through negligence, would disregard this precept.\nHence, so far as the tenth part was fixed, the precept was judicial,\nsince all institutions established among this people for the special\npurpose of preserving equality among men, in accordance with this\npeople's condition, are called \"judicial precepts.\" Nevertheless by\nway of consequence these institutions foreshadowed something in the\nfuture, even as everything else connected with them, according to 1\nCor. 12, \"All these things happened to them in figure.\" In this\nrespect they had something in common with the _ceremonial precepts,_\nwhich were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of the future.\nHence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed something in the\nfuture. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number (being the first\nnumerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond ten but begin\nover again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth, which is\nthe sign of perfection, reserving the nine other parts for himself,\nacknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and that the\nperfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped for from\nGod. Yet this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial\nprecept, as stated above.\n\nThere is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts\nof the Law, as we stated above (I-II, Q. 104, A. 3), that it is\nunlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New\nLaw, whereas there is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during\nthe time of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are\nbound to be observed by some, if they be ordained by the authority of\nthose who have power to make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of\nthe Old Law that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex.\n22:1), and if any king were to order this to be done his subjects\nwould be bound to obey. In like manner during the time of the New Law\nthe authority of the Church has established the payment of tithe;\nthus showing a certain kindliness, lest the people of the New Law\nshould give less to the ministers of the New Testament than did the\npeople of the Old Law to the ministers of the Old Testament; for the\npeople of the New Law are under greater obligations, according to\nMatt. 5:20, \"Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes\nand Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven,\" and,\nmoreover, the ministers of the New Testament are of greater dignity\nthan the ministers of the Old Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor.\n3:7, 8).\n\nAccordingly it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithes arises\npartly from natural law, partly from the institution of the Church;\nwho, nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and\npersons might ordain the payment of some other proportion.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it was a\nmoral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said\n(Matt. 10:10) [*The words as quoted are from Luke 10:7: Matthew has\n'meat' instead of 'hire']: \"The workman is worthy of his hire,\" and\nthe Apostle says the same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq.). But the fixing of the\nparticular proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of the\ndivine worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although\nit is stated that the first-born were priests, and that they received\na double portion. For this very reason no particular portion was\ndirected to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when\nthey met with one, each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed\nright. Thus Abraham by a kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes to\nMelchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, according to Gen.\n14:20, and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes [*Gen. 28:20],\nalthough he appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to\nministers, but for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance\nfor the fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: \"I\nwill offer tithes to Thee.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for the\noffering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the legal\nvictims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to eat\nwith the poor, is increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded us\nto give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus,\naccording to Luke 11:41: \"That which remaineth, give alms.\" Moreover\nthe tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be\ndispensed by them for the use of the poor.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The ministers of the Church ought to be more\nsolicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for\nthe amassing of temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to\nmake use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his\nlivelihood from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should\noccasion a hindrance to the Gospel of Christ [*1 Cor. 9:12]. Nor did\nthey sin who did not contribute to his upkeep, else the Apostle would\nnot have omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the\nChurch rightly refrain from demanding the Church's tithes, when they\ncould not demand them without scandal, on account of their having\nfallen into desuetude, or for some other reason. Nevertheless those\nwho do not give tithes in places where the Church does not demand them\nare not in a state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and\nunwilling to pay even if tithes were demanded of them.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Men Are Bound to Pay Tithes of All Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of\nall things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the\nOld Law. Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes,\nviz. those that are payable on property acquired by one's own act,\nfor instance by commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to\npay tithes on such things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is not right to make oblations of that which is\nill-gotten, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Now oblations, being\noffered to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected with\nthe divine worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers.\nTherefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus (30, 32) the\nprecept of paying tithes refers only to \"corn, fruits of trees\" and\nanimals \"that pass under the shepherd's rod.\" But man derives a\nrevenue from other smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his\ngarden and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound\nto pay tithes.\n\nObj. 4: Further, man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a\nman does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land\nand stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery;\nsometimes they are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes\nthey are due to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and\nwages due to workmen. Therefore one ought not to pay tithes on such\nlike things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 28:22): \"Of all things that\nThou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In judging about a thing we should look to its\nprinciple. Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt\nwhereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things,\naccording to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), \"If we have\nsown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your\ncarnal things?\" [thus implying that on the contrary \"it is no great\nmatter if we reap your carnal things\"] [*The phrase in the brackets\nis omitted in the Leonine edition]. For this debt is the principle on\nwhich is based the commandment of the Church about the payment of\ntithes. Now whatever man possesses comes under the designation of\ncarnal things. Therefore tithes must be paid on whatever one\npossesses.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In accordance with the condition of that people there\nwas a special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept about\npersonal tithes; because, to wit, all the other tribes had certain\npossessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient\nlivelihood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not\nforbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations as the\nother Jews did. On the other hand the people of the New Law are\nspread abroad throughout the world, and many of them have no\npossessions, but live by trade, and these would contribute nothing to\nthe support of God's ministers if they did not pay tithes on their\ntrade profits. Moreover the ministers of the New Law are more\nstrictly forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades,\naccording to 2 Tim. 2:4, \"No man being a soldier to God, entangleth\nhimself with secular business.\" Wherefore in the New Law men are\nbound to pay personal tithes, according to the custom of their\ncountry and the needs of the ministers: hence Augustine, whose words\nare quoted 16, qu. 1, cap. Decimae, says [*Append. Serm. cclxxvii]:\n\"Tithes must be paid on the profits of soldiering, trade or craft.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because the\ngetting itself was unjust: such, for instance, are things gotten by\nrobbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not\nto pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the\nprofits of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce,\nbecause the latter is not gotten usuriously but given by God. On the\nother hand certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are\ngotten of a shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or\nstage-playing, and the like. Such things a man is not bound to\nrestore, and consequently he is bound to pay tithes on them in the\nsame way as other personal tithes. Nevertheless the Church must not\naccept the tithe so long as those persons remain in sin, lest she\nappear to have a share in their sins: but when they have done\npenance, tithes may be accepted from them on these things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Things directed to an end must be judged according to\ntheir fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is due not\nfor its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity\nit is unbecoming that they should demand minute things with careful\nexactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not order the payment of tithes\non such like minute things, but left it to the judgment of those who\nare willing to pay, because minute things are counted as nothing.\nWherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect\njustice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: nor are\nthey reproved by our Lord on that account, but only because they\ndespised greater, i.e. spiritual, precepts; and rather did He show\nthem to be deserving of praise in this particular, when He said\n(Matt. 23:23): \"These things you ought to have done,\" i.e. during the\ntime of the Law, according to Chrysostom's [*Hom. xliv in the Opus\nImperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commentary. This\nalso seems to denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore\nnow too men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, except\nperhaps by reason of the custom of one's country.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has lost by\ntheft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he has\nincurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the\nChurch ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat\nthat has not been tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to\nher, both from the buyer who has a thing due to the Church, and from\nthe seller, because so far as he is concerned he has defrauded the\nChurch: yet if one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on\nthe fruits of the earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of\nGod. Wherefore tithes do not come under a tax, nor are they subject\nto workmen's wages. Hence it is not right to deduct one's taxes and\nthe wages paid to workmen, before paying tithes: but tithes must be\npaid before anything else on one's entire produce.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Tithes Should Be Paid to the Clergy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that tithes should not be paid to the\nclergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because\nthey had no portion in the people's possessions, according to Num.\n18:23, 24. But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions not\nonly ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they\nreceive first-fruits, and oblations for the living and the dead.\nTherefore it is unnecessary to pay tithes to them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it sometimes happens that a man dwells in one\nparish, and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within\nthe bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the\nbounds of another parish during the other part of the year; or he may\nhave his sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in another. Now\nin all these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to which\nclergy the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no\nfixed tithe ought to be paid to the clergy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is the general custom in certain countries for\nthe soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain\nreligious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only\nto those of the clergy who have care of souls.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 18:21): \"I have given to the\nsons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the\nministry wherewith they serve Me in the Tabernacle.\" Now the clergy\nare the successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament.\nTherefore tithes are due to the clergy alone.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered with regard to\ntithes: namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in\nthe name of tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing,\nfor it arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the\naltar have a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal\nthings are due to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns\nnone but the clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are\ncompetent to have this right.\n\nOn the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are\nmaterial, wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it\nis that they fall into the hands of the laity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the Old Law, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4), special\ntithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in the New\nLaw the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own\nsupport, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor.\nHence they are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and\nfirst-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this same\npurpose.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Personal tithes are due to the church in whose parish a\nman dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to belong to\nthe church within whose bounds the land is situated. The law,\nhowever, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained\nfor a long time must be observed [*Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad\napostolicae, de Decimis, etc.]. The shepherd who grazes his flock at\ndifferent seasons in two parishes, should pay tithe proportionately\nto both churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from\nthe pasture, the tithe of the flock is due to the church in whose\nlands the flock grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the\nfold is situated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the things\nshe receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him to\nreceive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being\nreserved to the ministers of the Church. The motive may be either the\nneed of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers\nthrough being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it may be the\nsuccoring of the poor; thus certain tithes have been granted by way\nof alms to certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of\nsouls. Some religious, however, are competent to receive tithes,\nbecause they have care of souls.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Clergy Also Are Bound to Pay Tithes?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes.\nBy common law [*Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc.] the parish church\nshould receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory.\nNow it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their\nown on the territory of some parish church, or that one church has\necclesiastical property on the territory of another. Therefore it\nwould seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes.\n\nObj. 2: Further, some religious are clerics; and yet they are bound\nto pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they\ncultivate even with their own hands [*Cap. Ex parte, and Cap.\nNuper.]. Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune from\nthe payment of tithes.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26, 28), it is\nprescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the\npeople, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the\nhigh-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the\nSovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to\nthe clergy.\n\nObj. 4: Further, tithes should serve not only for the support of the\nclergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, if the\nclergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the\nlatter is not true. Therefore the former is false.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: \"It\nis a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the\nclergy\" [*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.].\n\n_I answer that,_ The cause of giving cannot be the cause of\nreceiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of\npassion; yet it happens that one and the same person is giver and\nreceiver, even as agent and patient, on account of different causes\nand from different points of view. Now tithes are due to the clergy\nas being ministers of the altar and sowers of spiritual things among\nthe people. Wherefore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as\nhaving ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay tithes; whereas\nfrom some other cause through holding property in their own right,\neither by inheriting it from their kindred, or by purchase, or in any\nother similar manner, they are bound to the payment of tithes.\n\nHence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy\nlike anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the\nparish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church,\nbecause to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same\nas possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even\nthough they be within the boundaries of another parish.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls,\nand dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay\ntithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other\nreligious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the\npeople; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay\ntithes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions\ngranted by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad\naudientiam, de Decimis, etc.].\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the priests,\nand tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below the\npriests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the\nhigh-priest \"the tenth part of the tenth\" [*Num. 18:26] instead of\nfirst-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now\nto pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For\nnatural reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate\nof a multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be\nable to carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Tithes should be employed for the assistance of the\npoor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no\nreason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 88\n\nOF VOWS\n(In Twelve Articles)\n\nWe must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God.\nUnder this head there are twelve points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is a vow?\n\n(2) What is the matter of a vow?\n\n(3) Of the obligation of vows;\n\n(4) Of the use of taking vows;\n\n(5) Of what virtue is it an act?\n\n(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than\nwithout a vow?\n\n(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;\n\n(8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows?\n\n(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?\n\n(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?\n\n(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of\ncontinence?\n\n(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a\ndispensation from a vow?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Vow Consists in a Mere Purpose of the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a\npurpose of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.\nAur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], \"a vow is\na conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind,\nwhereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain\nthing.\" But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may\nconsist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a\nmere purpose of the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from\n_voluntas_ (will), for one is said to do a thing _proprio voto_ (by\none's own vow) when one does it voluntarily. Now to _purpose_ is an\nact of the will, while to _promise_ is an act of the reason.\nTherefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Luke 9:62): \"No man putting his hand\nto the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.\" Now\nfrom the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts\nhis hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting\nfrom his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God.\nTherefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even\nwithout making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow\nconsists in a mere purpose of the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3): \"If thou hast vowed\nanything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish\npromise displeaseth Him.\" Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow\nis a promise.\n\n_I answer that,_ A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some\nparticular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a\npromise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to\ndirect. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a\nfashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs\nwhat he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and\nman can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs;\nwhereas a promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought,\nsince according to 1 Kings 16:7, \"Man seeth those things that appear,\nbut the Lord beholdeth the heart.\" Yet we express words outwardly\nsometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with\nregard to prayer (Q. 83, A. 12), or to call others to witness, so\nthat one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of\nGod, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome\nfrom a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes\ndeliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly\nthree things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation; the\nsecond is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein\nis completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other\nthings are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely,\npronouncement by word of mouth, according to Ps. 65:13, \"I will pay\nThee my vows which my lips have uttered\"; and the witnessing of\nothers. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is \"the\nwitnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and\nabout things relating to God\": although the \"witnessing\" may strictly\nrefer to the inward protestation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by\nthe deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a\npromise.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something\nrelating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from\nthe will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does something\nalready; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing\nso far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing,\nalthough he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts\nhis hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches\nout his hand for the purpose of ploughing.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 2]\n\nWhether a Vow Should Always Be About a Better Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a\nbetter good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation.\nBut vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about\nmatters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil\nand his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps.\n75:12, \"Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God\"; and Jacob vowed (Gen.\n28:21) that the Lord should be his God. Now this above all is\nnecessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better\ngood.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32).\nYet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges\n11). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better\ngood, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not\nonly about a better good, but also about something unlawful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or\nthat are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good.\nYet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which\ntend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent\nmatters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not\nalways about a better good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 23:22): \"If thou wilt not\npromise thou shalt be without sin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to\nGod. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for\nsomeone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say\nthat one would do something against someone. In like manner it would\nbe futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore,\nas every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God\nunless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or\nindifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a\nvow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity\nexcludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to\nbe or not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be\nfoolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly.\n\nOn the other hand, if a thing be necessary, not absolutely but on the\nsupposition of an end--for instance if salvation be unattainable\nwithout it--it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done\nvoluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it.\nBut that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the\nsupposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most\nproperly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good\nin comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation.\nTherefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the faith of\nChrist are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things\nare done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The\nsame answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be explained\nthat Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by giving\nHim a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance\nby offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same\npassage.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such\nare acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter\nof a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those\nthings which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the\nmatter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and\nas such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result,\nin which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of\nJephte, who as related in Judges 11:30, 31, \"made a vow to the Lord,\nsaying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands,\nwhosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and\nshall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a\nholocaust to the Lord.\" For this could have an evil result if, as\nindeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be\nunlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome\nsays [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii:\nComment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist.\nScholast.]: \"In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion,\nand in keeping his vow he was wicked.\" Yet it is premised (Judges\n11:29) that \"the Spirit of the Lord came upon him,\" because his faith\nand devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy\nGhost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also\nby reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is\nprobable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless\nforeshadowed something good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance by\nvigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it\nis an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due\ndiscretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without\noverburdening nature. On this condition such things may be the matter\nof a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), \"Present your\nbodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God,\" adds, \"your\nreasonable service.\" Since, however, man is easily mistaken in\njudging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these are more\nfittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a\nsuperior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is\nseriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to\nappeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about\nvain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 3]\n\nWhether All Vows Are Binding?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man\nneeds things that are done by another, more than God does, since He\nhas no need for our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the\nprescription of human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple\npromise made to a man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed\non account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding\ntherefore is a simple promise made to God, which we call a vow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now\nsometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him,\neither because it depends on another's decision, as when, for\ninstance, a man vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse\nto receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance\nwhen a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a\nman vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a\nvow is not always binding.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at\nonce. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it\nbe taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a\nvow is not always binding.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3, 4): \"Whatsoever thou\nhast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a\nvow not to perform the things promised.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's\npromises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. xxxii, 2: De\nMendac. xx] faith takes its name \"from a man's deed agreeing with his\nword\" [*_Fides . . . fiunt dicta._ Cicero gives the same etymology\n(De Offic. i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all,\nboth on account of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he\nhas received from God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the\nvows he has made to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes\nto God. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of\ninfidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be\npaid to God, because \"an unfaithful . . . promise displeaseth Him\"\n[*Eccles. 5:3].\n\nReply Obj. 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he\nmakes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural\nlaw. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise\nhe has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God needs\nnot our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so that\na vow made to Him is most binding.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible\nto him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that\nhe have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has\nvowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power\nto be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself\nto enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this\nparticular form of religious life, or this place, as being most\nagreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received\nthere, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal\nintention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious\nlife, or to this particular place, because the one or the other\npleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another\nreligious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into this\nparticular one. On the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of\nfulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above\nto do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity\nand is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is\nin her power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what\nshe has lost by sinning.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own\nwill and intention, wherefore it is written (Deut. 23:23): \"That which\nis once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou\nhast promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will\nand with thy own mouth.\" Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's\nintention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound\nto fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain\ntime, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate\nfulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to\nbind oneself, for it is written (Deut. 23:21): \"When thou hast made a\nvow to the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the\nLord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed\nto thee for a sin.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Expedient to Take Vows?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It\nis not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God\nhas given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man\nis liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity\nimplicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to\ntake vows.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever\ntakes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before\ntaking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of\ndanger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence\nAugustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): \"Since thou hast\nvowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou\ndost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have\nbeen hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less\ngreat, not less good: whereas now if thou breakest faith with God\n(which God forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have\nbeen happier, hadst thou kept thy vow.\" Therefore it is not expedient\nto take vows.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): \"Be ye followers of\nme, as I also am of Christ.\" But we do not read that either Christ or\nthe Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to\ntake vows.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 75:12): \"Vow ye and pay to the\nLord your God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made\nto God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God\nunder another. Because we promise something to a man for his own\nprofit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and\nthat we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that\nservice: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own\nprofit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): \"He\nis a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our\npayments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him.\" And just as\nwhat we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since \"what is given\nHim is added to the giver,\" as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment.\net Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does\nnot conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but\nit conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills\nimmovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient\nto take vows.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being\nunable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly\nfixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God and\nthe blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a\ncertain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence,\nAugustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that \"happy is\nthe necessity that compels us to do the better things.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is\nnot expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering\nbridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed,\nthe latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to\nmount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the\nhorse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that\nmay become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles.\n11:4): \"He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that\nconsidereth the clouds shall never reap.\" Now a man incurs danger,\nnot from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind\nby breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et\nPaulin.): \"Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that\nthou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy\ndetriment.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to\ntake a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man, His will\nwas firmly fixed on the good, since He was a _comprehensor._ By a\nkind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26):\n\"I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him,\" when He is\nspeaking of His body, which is the Church.\n\nThe apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the\nstate of perfection when \"they left all things and followed Christ.\"\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 5]\n\nWhether a Vow Is an Act of Latria or Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or\nreligion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem\nto pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it.\nTherefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to\nreligion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes\na vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it.\nTherefore, a vow is not an act of religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, religious worship should be offered to none but God.\nBut a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to\none's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their\nprofession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 19:21): \"(The Egyptians) shall\nworship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to\nthe Lord, and perform them.\" Now, the worship of God is properly the\nact of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or\nreligion.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1), every act of\nvirtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as\nit is directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of\nlatria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to\nthe commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore\nthe direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the\nproper act of latria.\n\nNow, it is evident from what has been said above (AA. 1, 2) that a\nvow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than\na directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise\nis made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship\nor service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is\nproperly an act of latria or religion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another\nvirtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency;\nwhile sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or\npraying. But promising either of them to God belongs to religion, for\nthe reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to\nreligion by reason only of the promise made to God, which is the\nessence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason also of the\nthing promised, which is the matter of the vow.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He who promises something gives it already in as far as\nhe binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when\nits cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its\ncause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who\npromises to give.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be\nmade to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is made to a\nman, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous\nact. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something\nto the saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the\nsaints or to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as\none vows to God to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or\none's superiors.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 6]\n\nWhether It Is More Praiseworthy and Meritorious to Do Something in\nFulfilment of a Vow, Than Without a Vow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and\nmeritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow.\nProsper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): \"We should abstain or fast\nwithout putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that\nwhich we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly.\"\nNow he who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fasting.\nTherefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): \"Everyone as he hath\ndetermined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for God\nloveth a cheerful giver.\" Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have\nvowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the\nvow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to _Metaph._ v\n[*Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a\nvow, than in fulfilment of a vow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the\nwill on that which is vowed, as stated above (A. 4). But the will\ncannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that\nthing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow\nthan without a vow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, \"Vow ye and\npay,\"    says: \"Vows are counseled to the will.\" But a counsel is\nabout none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in\nfulfilment of a vow than without a vow: since he that does it without\na vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he\nthat does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to\nvow and the counsel to do it.\n\n_I answer that,_ For three reasons it is better and more meritorious\nto do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because\nto vow, as stated above (A. 5) is an act of religion which is the\nchief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the\nbetter and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an\ninferior virtue is the better and more meritorious for being\ncommanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being\ncommanded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be\ncommanded by charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for\ninstance, fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being\ncontinent, which is an act of chastity) are better and more\nmeritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they\nbelong to the divine worship, being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore\nAugustine says (De Virg. viii) that \"not even is virginity honorable\nas such, but only when it is consecrated to God, and cherished by\ngodly continence.\"\n\nSecondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects\nhimself to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects\nhimself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power,\nsince in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more\nwho gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only,\nas Anselm [*Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we\nthank even those who promise, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2).\n\nThirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do\nanything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the\nperfection of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4),\njust as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is\ncalled a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted should be understood as referring to\nnecessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and\nexcludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: \"Lest that which we are\nfree to do be done without devotion and unwillingly.\" On the other\nhand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility\nof the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases\ndevotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in\nso far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity\nresulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it\nstrengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine says\n(Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): \"Repent not of thy vow: thou\nshouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou\nmightest lawfully have done to thy detriment.\" If, however, the very\ndeed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and\ninvoluntary after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it\nremaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done\nwithout the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion\nwhich is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who does something without having vowed it has an\nimmovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at\nthe time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether\nfixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow:\nfor the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did\nthat particular deed, and perchance to do it many times.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 7]\n\nWhether a Vow Is Solemnized by the Reception of Holy Orders, and by\nthe Profession of a Certain Rule?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the\nreception of holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As\nstated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now external\nactions pertaining to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but\nto men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and\nconsequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper\ncircumstance of a vow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing, would\nseem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many\nthings may be the subject of a vow, which have no connection either\nwith holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows a\npilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization\nthat takes place in the reception of holy orders or in the profession\nof a certain rule does not belong to the condition of a vow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow.\nNow many other vows may be made in public besides that which is\npronounced in receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule;\nwhich latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only\nthese vows are solemn.\n\n_On the contrary,_ These vows alone are an impediment to the contract\nof marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the\neffect of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third\nPart of this work [*Suppl., Q. 53, A. 2].\n\n_I answer that,_ The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on\nits nature (_conditio_): thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes\nthe fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and\narms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in\nanother way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the\ngathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God:\nwherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual\npertaining to God; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration\nwhich, in accordance with the institution of the apostles, is given\nwhen a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the\nsecond degree after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states\n(Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemnization is not\nwont to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to\nsome particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only\nwhen the marriage is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom\nmutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like\nmanner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine\nministry by receiving holy orders, or embraces the state of\nperfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession\nof a certain rule.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This kind of solemnization regards not only men but\nalso God in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration\nor blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister,\naccording to Num. 6:27, \"They shall invoke My name upon the children\nof Israel, and I will bless them.\" Hence a solemn vow is more binding\nwith God than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more\ngrievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than\na solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either\ncommits a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but\nthe embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man\nvows particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast,\nsuch a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the\nvow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or\nservice: and yet many particular works are included under this vow as\nunder a universal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Through being pronounced in public vows may have a\ncertain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as\nthe aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few\npersons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Those Who Are Subject to Another's Power Are Hindered from\nTaking Vows?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's\npower are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed\nby the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a\nlesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God.\nTherefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered\nfrom taking vows.\n\nObj. 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet\nchildren may make religious profession even without the consent of\ntheir parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows,\nthrough being subject to another's power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are\nunder the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to\nsay some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore\nseemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But\nsubjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this\nforbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that \"if a woman vow\nany thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in\nage,\" she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the\nsame is said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband.\nTherefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another's\npower cannot bind themselves by vow.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to\nGod. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in\nanother's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power.\nNow whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is\nsubject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it\ndepends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent\nof his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those\nmatters wherein he is subject to another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a\npromise made to God, as stated above (A. 2). Now it is contrary to\nvirtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as\nstated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow\nare not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power\nvows that which is in that other's power, except under the condition\nthat he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is\nin his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance\nwith regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with\nregard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as\nregards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters\nhe cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his\nfather.\n\nA slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his\npersonal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since\nthis would withdraw him from his master's service.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his\nactions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even\nthough one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not\nbeing occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there\nis no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow\nof a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither\ndoes the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his\nconsent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to another's\npower does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is\nsubject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to\ncontain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior\napprove or do not gainsay it.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Children Can Bind Themselves by Vow to Enter Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by\nvow to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind,\nit is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason.\nBut this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen.\nTherefore just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to\nanything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves\nby vow to enter religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be\nannulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or\ngirl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or\nguardian (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or\ngirl cannot validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch. 58]\nand a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to those\nwho enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of\nthe vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation,\nfor children to be bound by vow to enter religion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That which is not done aright is invalid without\nbeing annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even\nbefore attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled\nby her parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore\neven before attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be\nbound by a vow to enter religion.\n\n_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said above (A.\n7), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in\nthe same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual\nblessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the\nChurch, it follows that it comes under the Church's dispensation. Now\na simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind,\nwhereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an\nobligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through\ndefect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind\nthemselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or\nimbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to\nanother's power, as stated above (A. 8). Now these two circumstances\nconcur in children before the age of puberty, because in most\ninstances they are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under\nthe care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents:\nwherefore in both events their vows are without force. It happens,\nhowever, through a natural disposition which is not subject to human\nlaws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who\non this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are\nnot, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their\nparents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into\naccount that which is of most frequent occurrence.\n\nAccordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the\nyears of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise\nbind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use\nof reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their\nown part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by\ntheir parents, under whose care they are still subject.\n\nYet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of\npuberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account\nof the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et\ntranseunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But\nafter the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind\nthemselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent\nof their parents.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of children who have\nnot yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are invalid,\nas stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The vows of persons subject to another's power contain\nan implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the\nsuperior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be\nfulfilled, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which\nare taken in profession.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Vows Admit of Dispensation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation.\nIt is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping\nit. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9, 10, \"A\nbeast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall\nbe holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a\nworse for a better.\" Much less, therefore, do vows admit of\ndispensation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters\nconcerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially\nthose of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of\nGod, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a\nvow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine\nlaw, as shown above (A. 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First\nTable since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of\ndispensation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity\nwhich a man owes to God, as stated above (A. 3). But no man can\ndispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one\ngrant a dispensation from a vow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That which proceeds from the common will of many\nhas apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the\nindividual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its\nforce from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore\nit seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.\n\n_I answer that,_ The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the\nsame sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law\nbecause, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), a law is\nmade with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances.\nBut since in certain cases this is not good, there is need for\nsomeone to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be\nobserved. This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: for a\ndispensation would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or\napplication of some common thing to those that are contained under\nit, in the same way as a person is said to dispense food to a\nhousehold.\n\nIn like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it\nwere, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the\nmajority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some\nparticular case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a\ngreater good: and this is essentially contrary to that which is the\nmatter of a vow, as is clear from what has been said above (A. 2).\nTherefore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is\nnot to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular\nvow is not to be observed, this is called a \"dispensation\" from that\nvow; but if some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which\nwas to have been observed, the vow is said to be \"commuted.\" Hence it\nis less to commute a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however,\nare in the power of the Church.\n\nReply Obj. 1: An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed\nholy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow, being, as\nit were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason it\ncould not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for\nsomething better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be\nalready consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an\nanimal that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful\nmatter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law\nrequires. Even so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has\nintervened.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine precept\nto fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to obey\nthe law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed\nfrom keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that\nhuman law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the\nDivine command; but it amounts to this--that what was law is not law\nin this particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a\ndispensation, that which was contained under a vow is by his\nauthority no longer so contained, in so far as he decides that in\nthis case such and such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow.\nConsequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a\nvow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural\nor of the Divine law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to\nwhich a man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was\nunable to consider every circumstance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fidelity we owe to God does not require that we\nfulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which would\nbe an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from\nthat vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not\ncontrary to the fidelity due to God.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 11]\n\nWhether It Is Possible to Be Dispensed from a Solemn Vow of\nContinency?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a\nsolemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a\ndispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good.\nBut a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle\nto a greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the\ngood of an individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to\nthe good of the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if\ncertain persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of\ntheir country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is\npossible to be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency.\n\nObj. 2: Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than chastity.\nNow if a man vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice to God\nhe can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he be\ndispensed from the vow of continency which is about an act of\nchastity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may be\na source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a\nvow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be\ndispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body.\nTherefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of\ncontinency.\n\nObj. 4: Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the\nreligious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the\nvows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed\nfrom the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who\nare appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems\nthat it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): \"No price is worthy\nof a continent soul.\"\n\nFurther, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of the Decretal, _Cum\nad Monasterium,_ it is stated that the \"renouncing of property, like\nthe keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that\nnot even the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of\ncontinency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency;\nsecondly, the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds\nhimself by vow to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the\nsolemnity of the vow. Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.\nAur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5] say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter\nof dispensation, on account of the continency itself for which no\nworthy price can be found, as is stated by the authority quoted\nabove. The reason for this is assigned by some to the fact that by\ncontinency man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that by\ncontinency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in respect of purity\nof both body and soul. But this reason does not seem to be cogent\nsince the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, far\nsurpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to God, and\nyet one may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation.\nTherefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason\nwhy the solemn vow thereof cannot be a matter of dispensation;\nespecially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:34) exhorts us to be\ncontinent on account of contemplation, when he says that the\nunmarried woman . . . \"thinketh on the things of God [Vulg.: 'the\nLord'],\" and since the end is of more account than the means.\n\nConsequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the\nreason for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For\nthey assert that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by\nsomething altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any\nvow. But this is evidently false, because just as the practice of\ncarnal intercourse is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or\ndrinking wine contrary to abstinence from such things, and yet these\nlatter vows may be a matter for dispensation.\n\nFor this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain\nthat one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for\nthe sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the\nexample given above (Obj. 1), of a country being restored to peace\nthrough a certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal\nquoted says explicitly that \"not even the Sovereign Pontiff can\ndispense a monk from keeping chastity,\" it follows seemingly, that we\nmust maintain that, as stated above (A. 10, ad 1; cf. Lev. 27:9, 10,\n28), whatsoever has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to\nany other use. For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is\nsanctified to lose its consecration, not even though it be something\ninanimate, for instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated,\nso long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate\nmake a man that is consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so\nlong as he lives. Now the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of\nconsecration or blessing of the person who takes the vow, as stated\nabove (A. 7). Hence no prelate of the Church can make a man, who has\npronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he was\nconsecrated, e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest no more,\nalthough a prelate may, for some particular reason, inhibit him from\nexercising his order. In like manner the Pope cannot make a man who\nhas made his religious profession cease to be a religious, although\ncertain jurists have ignorantly held the contrary.\n\nWe must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up\nwith the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. Because if not, the\nsolemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of\ncontinency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that\nfor which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing\ncontinency is connected with Holy Orders, not essentially but by the\ninstitution of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can\ngrant a dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the\nreception of Holy Orders. On the other hand the obligation of\nobserving continency is an essential condition of the religious\nstate, whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself wholly to\nGod's service, for this is incompatible with matrimony, in which\nstate a man is under the obligation of taking to himself a wife, of\nbegetting children, of looking after his household, and of procuring\nwhatever is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says\n(1 Cor. 7:33) that \"he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the\nthings of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided.\"\nHence the \"monk\" takes his name from \"unity\" [*The Greek _monos_] in\ncontrast with this division. For this reason the Church cannot\ndispense from a vow solemnized by the religious profession; and the\nreason assigned by the Decretal is because \"chastity is bound up with\nthe monastic rule.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Perils occasioned by human affairs should be obviated\nby human means, not by turning divine things to a human use. Now a\nprofessed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so he\nmust not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any human\ncontingency.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of\ndispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal\nabstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a\nvow of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being\nan act of chastity, but because through the religious profession it\nis already an act of religion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person,\ntherefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to\nthe person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of\ndispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly\nordered to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore\nto abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the\nperson. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the\nperson, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance\nby abstinence, or other corporal remedies.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A religious who is made a bishop is no more absolved\nfrom his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since he\nmust have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the\ndispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither\nis he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he\nis not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a\nmonastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of\nobedience.\n\nThe passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary\nsense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of\nthe flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency,\nwhich is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares\n(De Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly \"of a\ncontinent soul,\" not \"of a continent body.\"\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 12]\n\nWhether the Authority of a Prelate Is Required for the Commutation or\nthe Dispensation of a Vow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not\nrequired for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may\nenter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by\nentering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world,\neven from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap.\nScripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.]. Therefore the commutation or\ndispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior\nprelate.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in\ndeciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the\nprelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does\nnot seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a\ndispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows,\nas stated above (A. 10, ad 2; A. 11). Likewise, when anyone rightly\ndetermines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be\nkept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if\nit have an evil result (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a\nprelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant\ndispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all\nprelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow.\nTherefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense\nfrom vows.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A vow binds one to do something, even as a law\ndoes. Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation\nfrom a precept of the law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97,\nA. 4). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made\nto God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise\nsomething to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what\nyou promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place.\nTherefore a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the\nauthority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable\nto God, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: \"For [I] . . . have pardoned . . .\nfor your sakes . . . in the person of Christ.\" And he says\nsignificantly \"for your sakes,\" since whenever we ask a prelate for a\ndispensation we should do so to honor Christ in Whose person he\ndispenses, or to promote the interests of the Church which is His\nBody.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All other vows are about some particular works, whereas\nby the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's\nservice. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a\nDecretal [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that \"a\nman is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for\nthe perpetual service of religion.\" And yet a man who enters religion\nis not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or\nthe like, which he made when in the world, because by entering\nreligion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the\nreligious life that each one should have his own observances, and\nbecause the burden of religion is onerous enough without requiring\nthe addition of other burdens.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at\ntheir will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a condition\nthat the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above (A. 8)\nthat the vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this\ncondition, if \"the father or master consent,\" or \"does not dissent.\"\nAnd thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse of\nconscience, whenever his superior tells him to.\n\nBut this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual\nprelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given\n\"unto edification, not for destruction\" (2 Cor. 10:8), and\nconsequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself\ndispleasing to God, namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in\nitself pleasing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely\nspeaking man can vow them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide\nwhat is the more virtuous and the more acceptable to God.\nConsequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's\ndispensation would not excuse one from sin: for instance, if a\nprelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious\nlife, without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his\nvow. But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to\ndoubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation\nor of dispensation. He could not, however, follow his own judgment in\nthe matter, because he does not stand in the place of God; except\nperhaps in the case when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful,\nand he is unable to have recourse to the prelate.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ\nthroughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of\ndispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and\ninferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those\nvows that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in\norder that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows\nof pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.), fasting\nand the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the\nSovereign Pontiff [*Cap. Ex multa].\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 89\n\nOF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES)\n\nWe must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby\nsomething Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or\nthe Name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament\nwill be in the Third Part of this work: of the taking of God's Name\nwe shall treat now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways.\nFirst, by way oath in order to confirm one's own assertion: secondly,\nby way of adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of\ninvocation for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must\nfirst treat of oaths: and under this head there are ten points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) What is an oath?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful?\n\n(3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath?\n\n(4) Of what virtue is it an act?\n\n(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as\nsomething useful and good?\n\n(6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature?\n\n(7) Whether an oath is binding?\n\n(8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow?\n\n(9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation?\n\n(10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 1]\n\nWhether to Swear Is to Call God to Witness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to swear is not to call God to\nwitness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to\nwitness, since it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if\nto swear is to call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of\nHoly Writ would swear. But this is false. Therefore the antecedent is\nfalse also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling him\nto witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it is\nwritten (Matt. 5:33): \"Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to\nthe Lord\"; and Augustine says [*Serm. clxxx] that to swear (_jurare_)\nis \"to pay the right (_jus reddere_) of truth to God.\" Therefore to\nswear is not to call God to witness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a\nwitness, as shown above (QQ. 67, 70). Now sometimes a man, by\nswearing, implores the Divine judgment, according to Ps. 7:5, \"If I\nhave rendered to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall\nempty before my enemies.\" Therefore to swear is not to call God to\nwitness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm.\nclxxx): \"When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that\nGod is his witness?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths are taken for\nthe purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive\nconfirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known\nnaturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts\nregarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore\npropositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by\nwitnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such\nmatters for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth,\nfor many give way to lying, according to Ps. 16:10, \"Their mouth hath\nspoken lies [Vulg.: 'proudly'].\" Secondly, on account of [his] lack\nof knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret\nthoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things,\nand our everyday life requires that we should have some certitude\nabout them. Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for\nneither can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God\nto witness is named _jurare_ (to swear) because it is established as\nthough it were a principle of law (_jure_) that what a man asserts\nunder the invocation of God as His witness should be accepted as\ntrue. Now sometimes God is called to witness when we assert present\nor past events, and this is termed a \"declaratory oath\"; while\nsometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something\nfuture, and this is termed a \"promissory oath.\" But oaths are not\nemployed in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come\nunder the investigation of reason; for it would seem absurd in a\nscientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is one thing to employ a Divine witness already\ngiven, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and\nanother to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he\nperforms what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he\ncalls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal\nknowledge and unerring truth.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A person is called to give witness, in order that he\nmay make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two\nways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or\nnot. In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward\ninspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what\nwas hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness,\nand then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar\nHe makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple\ncontestation of God, as when a man says \"God is my witness,\" or, \"I\nspeak before God,\" or, \"By God,\" which has the same meaning, as\nAugustine states [*See argument On the contrary]; the other is by\ncursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to\npunishment if what is alleged be not true.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Swear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing\nforbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden\n(Matt. 5:34), \"But I say to you not to swear at all\"; and (James\n5:12), \"Above all things, my brethren, swear not.\" Therefore swearing\nis unlawful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful,\nbecause according to Matt. 7:18, \"neither can an evil tree bring\nforth good fruit.\" Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written\n(Matt. 5:37): \"But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that\nwhich is over and above these is of evil.\" Therefore swearing is\napparently unlawful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt God,\nand this is altogether unlawful, according to Deut. 6:16, \"Thou shalt\nnot tempt the Lord thy God.\" Now he that swears seems to seek a sign\nof Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this\nmust be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is\naltogether unlawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:13): \"Thou shalt fear the\nLord thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and\nyet becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof\nunbecomingly: thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that\nreceives it \"unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself\" (1\nCor. 11:29). Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must\nbe stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is\nproved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, because\nswearing owes its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that\nGod possesses unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of\nall things: and from its end, since oaths are employed in order to\njustify men, and to put an end to controversy (Heb. 6:16).\n\nYet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of\nit, that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if\na man calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would\nseemingly prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he\nwould not treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in\ndanger of committing perjury, because man easily offends in words,\naccording to James 3:2, \"If any man offend not in word, the same is a\nperfect man.\" Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:9): \"Let not thy\nmouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Jerome, commenting on Matt. 5:34, says: \"Observe that\nour Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth.\nFor it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing\nby the elements.\" Yet this answer does not suffice, because James\nadds, \"nor by any other oath.\" Wherefore we must reply that, as\nAugustine states (De Mendacio xv), \"when the Apostle employs an oath\nin his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, 'I say\nto you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear\neasily and from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from\nswearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he\nswore only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids\nhasty words.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17):\n\"If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the\ninfirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an\nevil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is\nevil,' but 'is of evil.' For you do no evil; since you make good use\nof swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes\nof the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to\nswear.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without\nusefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine assistance.\nMoreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling\nto bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness at\nsome future time, when He \"will bring to light the hidden things of\ndarkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts\" (1 Cor.\n4:5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither\nfor nor against him.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Three Accompanying Conditions of an Oath Are Suitably\nAssigned, Namely, Justice, Judgment, and Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are\nunsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things\nshould not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the\nother. Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a\npart of justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and\njudgment is an act of justice, as stated above (Q. 60, A. 1).\nTherefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably\nassigned.\n\nObj. 2: Further, many other things are required for an oath, namely,\ndevotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all things and\ncannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are\ninsufficiently enumerated.\n\nObj. 3: Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed: since\nhe ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without\njudgment, according to 1 Tim. 5:21, \"Do nothing without prejudice,\"\ni.e. without previous judgment [*Vulg.: 'Observe these things without\nprejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.']. Therefore\nthese three should not be associated with an oath any more than with\nother human actions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 4:2): \"Thou shalt swear: As\nthe Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice\": which\nwords Jerome expounds, saying: \"Observe that an oath must be\naccompanied by these conditions, truth, judgment and justice.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), an oath is not good except\nfor one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for\nthe good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous,\nbut for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires\njudgment or discretion on the part of the person who swears.\nSecondly, as regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be\nneither false, nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that\none employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, and justice, so\nthat one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false\noath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Judgment does not signify here the execution of\njustice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is\ntruth here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition\nof speech.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for the\nright manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two\nregard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that\njustice regards the reason for swearing.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is great danger in swearing, both on account of\nthe greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and on\naccount of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are\nconfirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an\noath than for other human actions.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 4]\n\nWhether an Oath Is an Act of Religion, or Latria?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or\nlatria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths\nare employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle\ndeclares (Heb. 6:16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or\nlatria.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as\nTully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers\nnothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing\nis not an act of religion or latria.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the end of religion or latria is to show reverence\nto God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the\nconfirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of\nreligion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:13): \"Thou shalt fear the\nLord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His\nname.\" Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore\nswearing is an act of religion.\n\n_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (A. 1), he\nthat swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now\nnothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more powerful.\nTherefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges\nGod to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth and His\nuniversal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For\nthis reason the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16) that \"men swear by one\ngreater than themselves,\" and Jerome commenting on Matt. 5:34, says\nthat \"he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he\nswears.\" The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that \"to swear\nis to give very great honor.\" Now to show reverence to God belongs to\nreligion or latria. Wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of\nreligion or latria.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness\nadduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or that\nwhich makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human.\nAccordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and\nnot of the latter.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the very fact that a man takes God as witness by way\nof an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains to\nthe reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God,\nnamely, reverence and honor.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of God:\nwherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man, we\nshow reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in\nGod's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God\nalso works for His own glory and for our good.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Oaths Are Desirable and to Be Used Frequently As Something\nUseful and Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used\nfrequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of\nreligion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious\nto do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated\nabove (Q. 88, A. 5). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a\nthing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are\ndesirable as being good essentially.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Jerome, commenting on Matt. 5:34, says that \"he who\nswears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears.\" Now\nreverence and love of God are desirable as something good\nessentially. Therefore swearing is also.\n\nObj. 3: Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or\nassuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion.\nTherefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 23:12): \"A man that\nsweareth much shall be filled with iniquity\": and Augustine says (De\nMendacio xv) that \"the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your\nown part you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking\noccasions of swearing, as though it were a good thing.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an\ninfirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are\ndesirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary:\nthis is clear in the case of medicine which is required as a remedy\nfor sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect,\nnamely, some man's lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath\nis not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their\nown sake, but among those that are necessary for this life; and such\nthings are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of\nnecessity. For this reason Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i,\n17): \"He who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good\nthing,\" i.e. desirable for its own sake, \"restrains himself as far as\nhe can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent need.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because\nby a vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for this\nvery reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an\noath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a\npromise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason,\nbecome an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from\nthe end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or\nlove for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct\nhis oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something\nelse that is necessary for the present life.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the\nstronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so\ntoo an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the\ngreater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it\nbe employed aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. 23:13), \"if he\nmake it void,\" i.e. if he deceive his brother, \"his sin shall be upon\nhim: and if he dissemble it,\" by swearing falsely, and with\ndissimulation, \"he offendeth double,\" (because, to wit, \"pretended\nequity is a twofold iniquity,\" as Augustine [*Enarr. in Ps. lxiii, 7]\ndeclares): \"and if he swear in vain,\" i.e. without due cause and\nnecessity, \"he shall not be justified.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 6]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Swear by Creatures?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by\ncreatures. It is written (Matt. 5:34-36): \"I say to you not to swear\nat all, neither by heaven . . . nor by the earth . . . nor by\nJerusalem . . . nor by thy head\": and Jerome, expounding these words,\nsays: \"Observe that the Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but\nby heaven and earth,\" etc.\n\nObj. 2: Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a\npunishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is\nwritten (22, qu. i, can. Clericum): \"If a cleric swears by creatures\nhe must be very severely rebuked: and if he shall persist in this\nvicious habit we wish that he be excommunicated.\" Therefore it is\nunlawful to swear by creatures.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an oath is an act of religion, as stated above (A.\n4). But religious worship is not due to any creature, according to\nRom. 1:23, 25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Joseph swore \"by the health of Pharaoh\" (Gen.\n42:16). Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics,\nand by the saints.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), there are two kinds of\noath. One is uttered as a simple contestation or calling God as\nwitness: and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth.\nNow faith is essentially and chiefly about God Who is the very truth,\nand secondarily about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as\nstated above (Q. 1, A. 1). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred\nto God Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an appeal by oath\nis made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but as\nreflecting the Divine truth. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God\nWhose truth is made known in the Gospel; and by the saints who\nbelieved this truth and kept it.\n\nThe other way of swearing is by cursing and in this kind of oath a\ncreature is adduced that the judgment of God may be wrought therein.\nThus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some\nother thing that he loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. 1:23),\nsaying: \"I call God to witness upon my soul.\"\n\nAs to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh this may be understood\nin both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharao's\nhealth to God; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to\nthe truth of God's justice which the princes of the earth are\nappointed to execute.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as to give\nthem the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds that \"the Jews,\nthrough swearing by the angels and the like, worshipped creatures\nwith a Divine honor.\"\n\nIn the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (22,\nqu. i, can. Clericum, Obj. 2), for swearing by a creature, for this\nsavors of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter, it is\nsaid: \"If any one swears by God's hair or head, or otherwise utter\nblasphemy against God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be\ndegraded.\"\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony is\ninvoked by oath: hence the prohibition (Ex. 23:13): \"By the name of\nstrange gods you shall not swear.\" But religious worship is not given\nto creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 7]\n\nWhether an Oath Has a Binding Force?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath\nis employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a\nperson makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true,\nthough it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. 1:15,\nseqq.) though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Cor.\n16:5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii, 22).\nNow an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above (A. 4). But it would\nsometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were\nto fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance, if one were to\nswear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action.\nTherefore an oath is not always binding.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to\npromise something under oath. Now, \"such a person is loosed by the\nRoman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath\" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap.\nVerum in ea quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.\n\nObj. 4: Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet\nsometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears have\nopposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:33): \"Thou shalt perform\nthy oaths to the Lord.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ An obligation implies something to be done or\nomitted; so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath\n(which is about something present or past), nor such oaths as are\nabout something to be effected by some other cause (as, for example,\nif one were to swear that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as\nare about things to be done by the person who swears.\n\nNow just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the\npresent, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is\nabout something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a\ndifference: since, in the oath that is about the past or present,\nthis obligation affects, not the thing that already has been or is,\nbut the action of the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what\nis or was already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is\nmade about something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the\nthing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has\nsworn, else his oath lacks truth.\n\nNow if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is\nlacking in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what was possible\nwhen he swore become impossible to him through some mishap, as when a\nman swore to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him\nby force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from\nfulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do what he can, as, in\nfact, we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow\n(Q. 88, A. 3, ad 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he\ncan do, but ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or\nbecause it is a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in\njustice: wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or\na hindrance to good. For in either case \"its result is evil\" [*Cf.\nBede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.]\n\nAccordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is\nbound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always\nthat the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely,\njudgment and justice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is not the same with a simple assertion, and with an\noath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for the\ntruth of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do,\nsince it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the\ndoer. But an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about\nwhich one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an\noath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn,\nthrough reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to\nan evil result, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First,\nbecause from the very outset it has an evil result, either through\nbeing evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit\nadultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a\nman were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric,\nor that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing it would be\nexpedient for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this\nkind are unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if\na man swear to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in\nkeeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater\ngood, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in swearing\n(through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer\nof good purposes), yet he does not sin in keeping his oath, though he\ndoes much better if he does not keep it.\n\nSecondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and\nunforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to\nthe damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she\nwould ask of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset,\nsupposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the\ndamsel asked what it was right to grant, but the fulfilment of the\noath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): \"Sometimes\nit is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who\ngranted the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is a twofold obligation in the oath which\na man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the\nperson to whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled\nby the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the\npromise made to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation\nwhereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue of which he is bound to\nfulfil what he has promised in His name. This obligation is not\nremoved in the tribunal of conscience, because that man ought rather\nto suffer temporal loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek\nin a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or denounce the\nmatter to his superior even if he has sworn to the contrary, because\nsuch an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to\npublic justice. The Roman Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of\nthis kind, did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed\nthe obligation for some just cause.\n\nReply Obj. 4: When the intention of the swearer is not the\nsame as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due\nto the swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the\nsound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence\nIsidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): \"However artful a man may be in\nwording his oath, God Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as\nunderstood by the person to whom it is made.\" And that this refers to\nthe deceitful oath is clear from what follows: \"He is doubly guilty\nwho both takes God's name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by guile.\"\nIf, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with\nhis own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): \"The human\near takes such like words in their natural outward sense, but the\nDivine judgment interprets them according to our inward intention.\"\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 8]\n\nWhether an Oath Is More Binding Than a Vow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A\nvow is a simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise,\nan appeal to God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a\nvow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger.\nNow a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is\nstronger than a vow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation\nof the mind, a stated above (Q. 88, A. 1); while the obligation of an\noath results from the truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since\ntherefore God's truth is something greater than human deliberation,\nit seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes\nbinds one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore\na vow is more binding than an oath.\n\n_I answer that,_ The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises\nfrom something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a\nvow arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our\npromises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises\nfrom the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we\npromise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an\nirreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject\nto his lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by\nits very nature is more binding than an oath.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to\nGod; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An oath is added to a vow not because it is more\nstable, but because greater stability results from \"two immutable\nthings\" [*Heb. 6:18].\n\nReply Obj. 3: Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on\nthe part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause\nof stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is offered.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Anyone Can Dispense from an Oath?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath.\nJust as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the\npast or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath,\nwhich is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from\nswearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither\ncan anyone dispense a man from making truth that which he has\npromised by oath to do in the future.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the\nperson to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot\nrelease the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the\nreverence of God. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this\noath be granted by anyone.\n\nObj. 3: Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow,\nexcept certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above (Q.\n88, A. 12, ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of\ndispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly\nthis is to be against the law [*Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem,\nseqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would seem that an\noath does not admit of dispensation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated\nabove (A. 8). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath\ndoes also.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 10), the necessity of a\ndispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact\nthat something which is useful and morally good in itself and\nconsidered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of\nsome particular emergency: and such a case comes under neither law\nnor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with\nthe matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to\njustice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore\nan oath likewise admits of dispensation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission\nto do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the\nkeeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit\nof dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath\nno longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just\nas we have said with regard to vows (Q. 88, A. 10, ad 2). Now the\nmatter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or\npresent, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become\nunchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter\nbut the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be\ndirectly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the\nmatter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of\nchange, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful\nor hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a\npromissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation\nregards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine\nprecept about the keeping of oaths.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One man may promise something under oath to another in\ntwo ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for\ninstance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from\nsuch a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it:\nfor he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he\nacts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises\nanother something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit of\nothers: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he\nwill enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this case\nthe person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made\nthe promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God:\nunless perchance it included some condition, for instance, \"provided\nhe give his consent\" or some such like condition.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory\noath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as\nwhen a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to\na greater good, as when a man swears not to enter religion: and such\nan oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is\nbound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for\nhim to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2).\nSometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong,\nuseful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. In\nthis case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is\npromised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of\nthis kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation,\nwhen there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in\nwhich case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of\nthe Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute\nrelaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all\nmatters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus\nit is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his\nsubjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a\nfather may annul his daughter's oath, and a husband his wife's (Num.\n30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (Q. 88, AA. 8, 9).\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 10]\n\nWhether an Oath Is Voided by a Condition of Person or Time?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition\nof person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is\nemployed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to\nanyone to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would\nseem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the\nGospels: wherefore Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum\nfalsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: \"If there is a reason\nfor swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great\nthing to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be\nsaid: Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for God's sake, not God for\nthe sake of the Scriptures.\" Now men of all conditions and at all\ntimes are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to\nswear by the Gospels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary\ncauses, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are\ndebarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children,\nfor instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have\nalready committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person\nought not to be debarred from swearing either on account of his\ndignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of the time.\n\nObj. 4: Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity to\nan angel: for it is written (Matt. 11:11) that \"he that is the lesser\nin the kingdom of heaven is greater than he,\" namely than John the\nBaptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it\nis written (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel \"swore by Him that liveth for\never and ever.\" Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing,\non account of his dignity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter):\n\"Let a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of\nbeing put on his oath\": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): \"Let no one in\necclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is\non the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect\nwe should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason\nchildren before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths\n[*Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear,\nbecause they have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as\nto be able to take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are\ndebarred from taking an oath, because it is presumed from their\nantecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due\nto it. For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated\nwith due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Honestum): \"It is\nbecoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so\nfasting, with all propriety and fear of God.\"\n\nThe other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose\nassertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs no\nconfirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates\nfrom a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what\nhe says, wherefore \"it becomes not persons of great dignity to\nswear.\" For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis\npresbyter) that \"priests should not swear for trifling reasons.\"\nNevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if there be need for it,\nor if great good may result therefrom. Especially is this the case in\nspiritual affairs, when moreover it is becoming that they should take\noath on days of solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves\nto spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths\ntemporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave necessity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some are unable to confirm their own assertions on\naccount of their own defect: and some there are whose words should be\nso certain that they need no confirmation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more\nbinding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad\nPublic., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly it is a graver matter to swear\nby God than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account\nof the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might\nbe taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God\nfrivolously and without deliberation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of\ncontrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this\nway that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great\nauthority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are\nof such little authority that their oaths have no standing.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The angel's oath is adduced not on account of any\ndefect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word,\nbut in order to show that the statement made issues from God's\ninfallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by\nScripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His\nword, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 90\n\nOF THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the taking of God's name by way of adjuration:\nunder which head there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?\n\n(3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Adjure a Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man.\nOrigen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth.): \"I deem that a man who wishes\nto live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For\nif, according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to\nswear, it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and\nconsequently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully adjured\nJesus by the living God.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion.\nBut it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore\nseemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it\nbelongs to man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior\nimposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure\ntheir superiors.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain\nholy things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful \"by the mercy\nof God\" (Rom. 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration.\nTherefore it is lawful to adjure.\n\n_I answer that,_ A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his\nreverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of\nhis promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so\norders himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man\ncan order himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others,\nby beseeching his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as\nstated above (Q. 83, A. 1). Accordingly when either of these\norderings is confirmed by something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet\nthere is this difference between them, that man is master of his own\nactions but not of those of others; wherefore he can put himself\nunder an obligation by invoking the Divine name, whereas he cannot\nput others under such an obligation unless they be his subjects, whom\nhe can compel on the strength of the oath they have taken.\n\nTherefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing,\nintends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an\nobligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind\nhimself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps\nover another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their\ninferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it.\n\nIf, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name\nor of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without\nputting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully\nemployed in respect of anyone.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man\nintends to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he\nwould bind himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to\nadjure our Lord Jesus Christ [*Matt. 26:63].\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers the adjuration which imposes an\nobligation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to\nemploy terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a\ncertain thing.\n\nMoreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we\nadjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence\nfor a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of\nGod Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through\nHis eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Adjure the Demons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says\n(Tract. xxxv, super Matth.): \"To adjure the demons is not accordance\nwith the power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice.\"\nNow rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the\npower given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the\ndemons.\n\nObj. 2: Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when\ninvoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration.\nTherefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make\nuse of necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore\nthe antecedent is false also.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact\nassociates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship\nwith the demons, according to 1 Cor. 10:20, \"I would not that you\nshould be made partakers with devils.\" Therefore it is not lawful to\nadjure the demons.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Mk. 16:17): \"In My name they shall\ncast out devils.\" Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the\nsake of God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the\ndemons.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in the preceding article, there are two\nways of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through\nreverence of some holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the\nfirst way it is not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way\nseems to savor of benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to\nbear towards the demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which\nis by compulsion, we may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not\nfor others. For during the course of this life the demons are our\nadversaries: and their actions are not subject to our disposal but to\nthat of God and the holy angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin.\niii, 4), \"the rebel spirit is ruled by the just spirit.\" Accordingly\nwe may repulse the demons, as being our enemies, by adjuring them\nthrough the power of God's name, lest they do us harm of soul or\nbody, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ, as recorded by\nLuke 10:19: \"Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents\nand scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing shall\nhurt you.\"\n\nIt is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning\nsomething from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this\nwould amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when\ncertain holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use\nof the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we\nread of the Blessed James [*the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist.\nCertam. Apost. vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to\nhim, by the instrumentality of the demons.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not\nauthoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly\nappeal.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to\nobtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as stated\nabove. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to the\nunclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), \"Speak no more, and go out of the man,\"\nsays: \"A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the\ndemons, however much they speak the truth.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the adjuration whereby the\ndemon's help is besought in doing or learning something: for this\nsavors of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the\ndemons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 3]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Adjure an Irrational Creature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.\nAn adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to\none that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore\nit is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible,\nswearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an\nirrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ\nadjuration towards one.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained above\n(AA. 1, 2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be employed\ntowards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of their own\nactions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and,\nseemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because we\nhave not the power to command irrational creatures, but only He of\nWhom it was said (Matt. 8:27): \"For the winds and the sea obey Him.\"\nTherefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure irrational\ncreatures.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons\nand to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the\napocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.]\n\n_I answer that,_ Irrational creatures are directed to their own\nactions by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and\nmoved is also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement\nof the arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation\nof the irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and\nchiefly to God, Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also\nascribed to the devil, who, by God's permission, makes use of\nirrational creatures in order to inflict harm on man.\n\nAccordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two\nkinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational\ncreature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an\nirrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director\nand mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of\nthis kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to\nGod, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God:\nsecondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses\nthe irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration\nused in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons\nis expelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to\nadjure the demons by beseeching them to help us.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 91\n\nOF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF\nPRAISE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of\ninvoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken\n(Q. 83). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there\nare two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?\n\n(2) Whether God should be praised with song?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 91, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God Should Be Praised with the Lips?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with the\nlips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1, 12): \"The best of men ere\naccorded not praise, but something greater.\" But God transcends the\nvery best of all things. Therefore God ought to be given, not praise,\nbut something greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus.\n43:33) to be \"above all praise.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it is\nan act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather than\nwith the lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the\nwords of Isa. 29:13, \"This people . . . honors [Vulg.: 'glorifies']\nMe with their lips, but their heart is far from Me.\" Therefore the\npraise of God lies in the heart rather than on the lips.\n\nObj. 3: Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be\nencouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked\nproud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is\nwritten (Prov. 27:21): \"As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so\na man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth.\" But God is not\nincited to better things by man's words, both because He is\nunchangeable, and because He is supremely good, and it is not\npossible for Him to grow better. Therefore God should not be praised\nwith the lips.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 62:6): \"My mouth shall praise\nThee with joyful lips.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason,\nand in speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man\nwe use words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to\nhim. Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or\nothers may learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in\nconsequence we may incite him to yet better things; and that we may\ninduce others, who hear him praised, to think well of him, to\nreverence him, and to imitate him. On the other hand we employ words,\nin speaking to God, not indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who\nis the searcher of hearts, but that we may bring ourselves and our\nhearers to reverence Him.\n\nConsequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His\nsake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is\naroused towards Him, according to Ps. 49:23: \"The sacrifice of praise\nshall glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the\nsalvation of God.\" And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in\nhis affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed\nto God, according to Isa. 48:9, \"For My praise I will bridle thee\nlest thou shouldst perish.\" The praise of the lips is also profitable\nto others by inciting their affections towards God, wherefore it is\nwritten (Ps. 33:2): \"His praise shall always be in my mouth,\" and\nfarther on: \"Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with\nme.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: We may speak of God in two ways. First, with regard to\nHis essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and ineffable, He\nis above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence and the\nhonor of latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in his\nPsalter [*Translated from the Hebrew]: \"Praise to Thee is speechless,\nO God,\" as regards the first, and as to the second, \"A vow shall be\npaid to Thee.\" Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects which\nare ordained for our good. In this respect we owe Him praise;\nwherefore it is written (Isa. 63:7): \"I will remember the tender\nmercies of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things that\nthe Lord hath bestowed upon us.\" Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1):\n\"Thou wilt find that all the sacred hymns,\" i.e. divine praises \"of\nthe sacred writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed\nProcessions of the Thearchy,\" i.e. of the Godhead, \"showing forth and\npraising the names of God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one\npraise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when it\nfervently recalls \"the glorious things of His works\" [*Cf. Ecclus.\n17:7, 8]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the\ninward fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise\nGod, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours as\nstated.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 91, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Should Be Praised with Song?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with song.\nFor the Apostle says (Col. 3:16): \"Teaching and admonishing one\nanother in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles.\" Now we should\nemploy nothing in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on\nthe authority of Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising\nGod, we should employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, \"Singing and\nmaking melody in your hearts to the Lord,\" says: \"Listen, young men\nwhose duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung\nnot with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like\nplay-actors, ease your throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the\nchurch resound with theatrical measures and airs.\" Therefore God\nshould not be praised with song.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the praise of God is competent to little and great,\naccording to Apoc. 14, \"Give praise to our God, all ye His servants;\nand you that fear Him, little and great.\" But the great, who are in\nthe church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44):\n\"I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred altar\nmust not sing\" (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta Romana\nEcclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises.\n\nObj. 4: Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical\ninstruments and human song, according to Ps. 32:2, 3: \"Give praise to\nthe Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument\nof ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle.\" But the Church does not\nmake use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the\ndivine praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in\nlike manner neither should song be used in the divine praises.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than the\npraise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by\nsinging, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from\nthe consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all\ntheir attention to the chant, and because others are less able to\nunderstand the things that are sung than if they were recited without\nchant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church\nof Milan, as Augustine relates (Confess. ix).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the praise of the voice is\nnecessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore\nwhatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted\nin the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved\nin various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the\nPhilosopher state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica,\nprologue). Hence the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary\ninstitution, that the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more\nincited to devotion. Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): \"I am\ninclined to approve of the usage of singing in the church, that so by\nthe delight of the ears the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of\ndevotion\": and he says of himself (Confess. ix, 6): \"I wept in Thy\nhymns and canticles, touched to the quick by the voices of Thy\nsweet-attuned Church.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not only to\nthose that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that are\nsung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse\nspiritual devotion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but\nreproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse\ndevotion, but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence\nAugustine says (Confess. x, 33): \"When it befalls me to be more moved\nby the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned\npenally, and then had rather not hear the singer.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and preaching is\na more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates,\nwhom it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by means of\npreaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, lest\nthereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says\n(Regist. iv, ep. 44): \"It is a most discreditable custom for those\nwho have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it\nbehooves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and\nto taking charge of the alms.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6), \"Teaching\nshould not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial instrument\nsuch as the harp or anything else of this kind: but only with such\nthings as make good hearers.\" For such like musical instruments move\nthe soul to pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it.\nIn the Old Testament instruments of this description were employed,\nboth because the people were more coarse and carnal--so that they\nneeded to be aroused by such instruments as also by earthly\npromises--and because these material instruments were figures of\nsomething else.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by a\nchant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the\nsinger chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what\nhe says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as\nAugustine remarks (Confess. x, 33), \"each affection of our spirit,\naccording to its variety, has its own appropriate measure in the\nvoice, and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is\nstirred.\" The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them\nunderstand not what is sung, yet they understand why it is sung,\nnamely, for God's glory: and this is enough to arouse their devotion.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 92\n\nOF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)\n\nIn due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to\nreligion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in\ngiving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which\nare manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those\nthings that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the\nhead of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly\nwe must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and\nafterwards irreligion and its parts.\n\nUnder the first head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?\n\n(2) Whether it has several parts or species?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Superstition Is a Vice Contrary to Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary\nto religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the\nother. But religion is included in the definition of superstition:\nfor the latter is defined as being \"immoderate observance of\nreligion,\" according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, \"Which things have\nindeed a show of wisdom in superstition.\" Therefore superstition is\nnot a vice contrary to religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): \"Cicero [*De Natura Deorum\nii, 28] states that the superstitious were so called because they\nspent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children\nmight survive (_superstites_) them.\" But this may be done even in\naccordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is not\na vice opposed to religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion\nadmits of no excess, since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 5, ad 3),\nthere is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal\nof what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to\nreligion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): \"Thou\nstrikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of\nsuperstition hath fallen.\" Now the worship of one God belongs to\nreligion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5), religion is a moral\nvirtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral\nvirtue; one by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again,\nthe mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the\ncircumstance called \"how much,\" but also with regard to other\ncircumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and\nmagnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to\nsomething greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less,\nand yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to\nwhom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as\nregards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,\n2, 3).\n\nAccordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess,\nnot that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but\nbecause it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a\nmanner it ought not.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil\nthings--thus we speak of a good thief--so too sometimes the names of\nthe virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus\nprudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke\n16:8, \"The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser']\nin their generation than the children of light.\" It is in this way\nthat superstition is described as religion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For\nits etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of\nsignification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it\nis applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ\nsometimes: for \"lapis\" (a stone) takes its name from hurting the foot\n(_laedere pedem_), but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it\nhurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow\nthat \"superstition\" means that from which the word is derived.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of\nabsolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of\nproportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done\nin divine worship that ought not to be done.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Are Various Species of Superstition?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of\nsuperstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), \"if one\ncontrary includes many kinds, so does the other.\" Now religion, to\nwhich superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but\nall its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has\nsuperstition various species.\n\nObj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to\nwhich superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are\ndirected to God, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Therefore\nsuperstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified\naccording to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances\nof certain human actions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, \"Which things have . . . a\nshow of wisdom in superstition,\" adds: \"that is to say in a\nhypocritical religion.\" Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a\nspecies of superstition.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine assigns the various species of\nsuperstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above, sins against religion consist in\ngoing beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances\n(A. 1). For as we have stated (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9), not every\ndiversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a\nsin, but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse\nends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified\nspecifically, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 2, 6).\n\nAccordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on\nthe part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the\ndivine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given,\nnamely, to the true God, but _in an undue mode,_ and this is the\nfirst species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given,\nnamely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of\nsuperstition, divided into many species in respect of the various\nends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first\nplace to give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species\nof this genus is _idolatry,_ which unduly gives divine honor to a\ncreature. The second end of religion is that man may be taught by God\nWhom he worships; and to this must be referred _divinatory_\nsuperstition, which consults the demons through compacts made with\nthem, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship\nis a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of God\nthe object of that worship: and to this must be referred the\nsuperstition of certain _observances._\n\nAugustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he\nsays that \"anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols\nis superstitious,\" and this refers to the first species. Then he goes\non to say, \"or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the\npurpose of consultation and of compact by tokens,\" which refers to\nthe second species; and a little further on he adds: \"To this kind\nbelong all sorts of amulets and such like,\" and this refers to the\nthird species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), \"good results from a\ncause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single\ndefect.\" Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated\nabove (A. 1; Q. 10, A. 5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of\nopposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Divinations and certain observances come under the head\nof superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the\ndemons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for\n\"religion as applied to human observances,\" as the gloss goes on to\nexplain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than\nworship given to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man\nwere, in the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the\nrite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the\ngloss speaks literally.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 93\n\nOF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1)\nOf the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true\nGod; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory\nsuperstition; (4) of the superstition of observances.\n\nUnder the first head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the\ntrue God?\n\n(2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 93, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Can Be Anything Pernicious in the Worship of the True\nGod?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious\nin the worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): \"Everyone\nthat shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.\" Now\nwhoever worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of\nGod is conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just in\nany age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just\nworshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing\nmortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special\nkind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no\nworship of God is pernicious.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet\nthe Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore\nGregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi,\nep. 64), who stated that there existed in the churches various\ncustoms in the celebration of Mass, wrote: \"I wish you to choose\ncarefully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God,\nwhether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in\nany part of the Church.\" Therefore no way of worshiping God is\npernicious.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp.\nAugust. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted\nin a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says that \"after the Gospel truth had been\npreached the legal observances became deadly,\" and yet these\nobservances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be\nsomething deadly in the divine worship.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), \"a most\npernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to\nChristian religion.\" Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that\nwhich is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by\nword, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that\nthe outward worship of religion consists, as shown above (Q. 81, A.\n7). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship,\nthis worship will be pernicious.\n\nNow this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the\npart of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something\ndiscordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law,\nthe mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious\nto make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of\nChrist were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be\npernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In\nthe second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of\nthe worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by\nministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be\nguilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer\nthings that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the\nguilt of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to\nGod contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine\nauthority, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose\n[*Comment. in 1 ad1 Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard]\nsays: \"He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than\nChrist delivered it.\" For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says\nthat superstition is \"the use of human observances under the name of\nreligion.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship Him in\nspirit and truth, according to John 4:23. Hence a worship that\ncontains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by\nan inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and others\nfollowed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts\nabout this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine worship\nare in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them,\nand to disregard them is unlawful.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 93, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Can Be Any Excess in the Worship of God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship\nof God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): \"Glorify the Lord as much as\never you can, for He will yet far exceed.\" Now the divine worship is\ndirected to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no\nexcess in it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward worship,\n\"whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity,\" as\nAugustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in\nfaith, hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the\nworship of God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what we\nhave received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God.\nTherefore if we do all that we possibly can for God's honor, there\nwill be no excess in the divine worship.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) \"that\nthe good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies from\nHoly Writ.\" But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there\ncan be superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First,\nwith regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be\nexcess in the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than\nhe owes God. Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity\nof proportion, through not being proportionate to its end. Now the\nend of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit\nto Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do\nconducing to God's glory, and subjecting his mind to God, and his\nbody, too, by a moderate curbing of the concupiscences, is not\nexcessive in the divine worship, provided it be in accordance with\nthe commandments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the\ncustoms of those among whom he lives.\n\nOn the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive\nto God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate\nconcupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the\ncommandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the\ngeneral custom--which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep.\nxxxvi], \"has the force of law\"--all this must be reckoned excessive\nand superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals,\nit has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence\nAugustine (De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Luke 17:21, \"The\nkingdom of God is within you,\" against the \"superstitious,\" those, to\nwit, who pay more attention to externals.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The glorification of God implies that what is done is\ndone for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by\nsuperstition.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so\nthat there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with\nexternal acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute\nquantity.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 94\n\nOF IDOLATRY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?\n\n(2) Whether it is a sin?\n\n(3) Whether it is the gravest sin?\n\n(4) Of the cause of this sin.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Idolatry Is Rightly Reckoned a Species of Superstition?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a\nspecies of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are\nidolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above (Q.\n11, A. 1). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not\nof superstition.\n\nObj. 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which\nsuperstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally\napplied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion.\nFor just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and\nof the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak\nunivocally of the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry,\nand of the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true\nreligion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any\ngenus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says (1\nCor. 8:4): \"We know that an idol is nothing in the world,\" and\nfurther on (1 Cor. 10:19): \"What then? Do I say that what is offered\nin sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?\"\nimplying an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols\nbelongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to\nnothing, it cannot be a species of superstition.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to\nwhom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just\nas it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are\nreproached (Rom. 1:25) for that they \"worshipped and served the\ncreature rather than the Creator.\" Therefore this species of\nsuperstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be\nnamed \"worship of creatures.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited\nSilas and Timothy at Athens, \"his spirit was stirred within him\nseeing the whole city given to idolatry,\" and further on (Acts 17:22)\nhe says: \"Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too\nsuperstitious.\" Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), it belongs to\nsuperstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is\ndone chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be\ngiven. Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone,\nas stated above (Q. 81, A. 1) when we were treating of religion.\nTherefore it is superstition to give worship to any creature\nwhatsoever.\n\nNow just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by\nmeans of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so\ntoo was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or\nshape, which is called an \"idol.\" Yet divine worship was given to\nidols in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art,\nconstructed images which produced certain effects by the power of the\ndemons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained\nsomething God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to\nthem. This was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum,\nad Asclep.], as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others\ngave divine worship not to the images, but to the creatures\nrepresented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. 1:23,\n25). For, as regards the former, he says: \"They changed the glory of\nthe incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible\nman, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping\nthings,\" and of the latter he says: \"Who worshipped and served the\ncreature rather than the Creator.\"\n\nThese latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain\nmen to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those\nmen: for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again\ndeemed the whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material\nsubstance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God,\nfor they held God to be nothing else than a soul governing the world\nby movement and reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect\nnot of his body but of his soul. Hence they thought that divine\nworship ought to be given to the whole world and to all its parts,\nheaven, air, water, and to all such things: and to these they\nreferred the names of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine\nrelates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists,\nsaid that there is one supreme god, the cause of all things. After\nhim they placed certain spiritual substances created by the supreme\ngod. These they called \"gods,\" on account of their having a share of\nthe godhead; but we call them \"angels.\" After these they placed the\nsouls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these the demons which they\nstated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these\nagain they placed human souls, which they believed to be taken up\ninto the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the\nmerit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as\nAugustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).\n\nThe last two opinions were held to belong to \"natural theology\" which\nthe philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in\nthe schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was\nsaid to belong to \"mythical theology\" which was wont to be\nrepresented on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The\nremaining opinion relating to images was held to belong to \"civil\ntheology,\" which was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De\nCiv. Dei vi, 5].\n\nNow all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry.\nWherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): \"Anything\ninvented by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving\nDivine worship to a creature or any part of a creature, is\nsuperstitious.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of\nfaith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief\nby external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term\nidolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false\nopinion. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a\nspecies of superstition.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The term latria may be taken in two senses. In one\nsense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and\nthen its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown,\nbecause, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not\nincluded in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally,\nwhether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax\nis univocally the same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false\nking. In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then,\nsince it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine worship be\ngiven to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied\nequivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as\nprudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and\nto that which is carnal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The saying of the Apostle that \"an idol is nothing in\nthe world\" means that those images which were called idols, were not\nanimated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as\nthough they were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we\nmust understand the saying that \"what is offered in sacrifice to\nidols is not anything,\" because by being thus sacrificed the\nsacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles\nthought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles\nof worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the\nterm \"idolatry\" was used to signify any worship of a creature, even\nwithout the use of images.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Idolatry Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a\nsin that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true\nfaith employs images for the divine worship: since both in the\nTabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25,\nand in the Church are images set up which the faithful worship.\nTherefore idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the\nangels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it\nwill be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the\nlike.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward\nworship, according to John 4:24, \"God . . . they must adore . . . in\nspirit and in truth\": and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that \"God\nis worshipped by faith, hope and charity.\" Now a man may happen to\nworship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith\ninwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly\nwithout prejudice to the divine worship.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 20:5): \"Thou shalt not adore\nthem,\" i.e. outwardly, \"nor serve them,\" i.e. inwardly, as a gloss\nexplains it: and it is a question of graven things and images.\nTherefore it is a sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.\n\n_I answer that,_ There has been a twofold error in this matter. For\nsome [*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and\nother things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the\nothers aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that\ndivine honor should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer\nto God. But this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all\nsuperiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and\nsomething special is due to the most high God Who excels all in a\nsingular manner: and this is the worship of latria.\n\nNor can it be said, as some have maintained, that \"these visible\nsacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the\nmost high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices,\nnamely, the service of a pure mind, should be offered\" [*Augustine,\nas quoted below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei\nx, 19), \"external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible\nwords are signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we\nutter significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the\nthings they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize\nthat we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him\nWhose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts.\"\n\nOthers held that the outward worship of latria should be given to\nidols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but\nas being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ.\nDei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: \"We shall adore,\" says he, \"in\nsuch a way as to remember that our worship is in accordance with\ncustom rather than with the reality\": and (De Vera Relig. v)\nAugustine says that \"we must not seek religion from the philosophers,\nwho accepted the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave\nutterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about the\nnature of their gods, and the sovereign good.\" This error was\nembraced also by certain heretics [*The Helcesaitae], who affirmed\nthat it is not wrong for one who is seized in time of persecution to\nworship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart.\n\nBut this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of\nthe inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary\nof what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked\nfalsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the\nsentiments of one's heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De\nCiv. Dei vi, 10) in that \"his worship of idols was so much the more\ninfamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by\nhim that the people believed him to act honestly.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor\nagain now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria\nmay be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order\nthat belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed\nand confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of\nChrist, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we\nshall state in the Third Part (Q. 25, A. 3).\n\nThe Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what\nhas been said above.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Idolatry Is the Gravest of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins.\nThe worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior\nworship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than\nexternal worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God,\nwhich are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry,\nwhich is opposed to external worship.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it\nis. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by\nblaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to\nanother, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial\nof the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater\nevils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against\nnature, as stated in Rom. 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a\ngraver sin than idolatry.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): \"Neither do we\nsay that you,\" viz. the Manichees, \"are pagans, or a sect of pagans,\nbut that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many\ngods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship\nthings that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you\nworship things that exist not at all.\" Therefore the vice of\nheretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry.\n\nObj. 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, \"How turn you again\nto the weak and needy elements?\" says: \"The observance of the Law, to\nwhich they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship\nof idols, to which they had been given before their conversion.\"\nTherefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the\nuncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: \"Every\nsin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways.\nFirst, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most\ngrievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly\ncommonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to\nanother than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he\ndisturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are\ncommitted against God, which indeed are the greater sins, the\ngreatest of all seems to be for a man to give God's honor to a\ncreature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up another God in\nthe world, and lessens the divine sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity\nof a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin of\none that sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that\nsins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders heretics, if\nthey knowingly corrupt the faith which they have received, from\nsinning more grievously than idolaters who sin through ignorance.\nFurthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater\ncontempt on the part of the sinner.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it\nadds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without\ninternal unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated\nabove (A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it\ndeprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith\nby deeds.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be against\nthe will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more\nmanifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself\nand to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this\nway the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry.\nBut since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment\nof the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the\norder of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer\nconfusion from the abuse of his own nature.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy\nis more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more\nderogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in\nopposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies\nabout God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their\nbelief in one God and worship Him alone.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The observance of the Law during the time of grace is\nnot quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost\nequal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Cause of Idolatry Was on the Part of Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the\npart of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or\nguilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's\nnature, since rather does man's natural reason dictate that there is\none God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to\ninanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in\nman on the part of virtue, since \"a good tree cannot bring forth evil\nfruit,\" according to Matt. 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of\nguilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, \"the worship of abominable\nidols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil.\" Therefore\nidolatry has no cause on the part of man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found\namong men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated\n[*Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated\neither by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire,\nor by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped.\nAmong the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus\nwas the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael\nwas the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a\ngreat extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the\npart of man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): \"It was not\npossible to learn, for the first time, except from their\" (i.e. the\ndemons') \"teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by\nwhat name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic\narts and their professors\": and the same observation seems to apply\nto idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 14:14): \"By the vanity of men\nthey,\" i.e. idols, \"came into the world.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive\ncause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on\naccount of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men\ndivine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This\ncause is assigned (Wis. 14:15): \"A father being afflicted with bitter\ngrief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken\naway: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a\ngod.\" The same passage goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that \"men serving\neither their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name\n[Vulg.: 'names'],\" i.e. of the Godhead, \"to stones and wood.\"\nSecondly, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as\nthe Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the\nuncultured man saw human images skillfully fashioned by the diligence\nof the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written\n(Wis. 13:11-17): \"If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree,\nproper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of his art\nfashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and then\nmaketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his\nchildren, or his marriage.\" Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of\nthe true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence\nmen gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their\nbeauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1, 2): \"All\nmen . . . neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was\nthe workman, but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the\nswift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun\nand the moon, to be the gods that rule the world.\"\n\nThe other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part\nof the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by\ngiving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed\nmarvelous. Hence it is written (Ps. 95:5): \"All the gods of the\nGentiles are devils.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of\nman, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect,\nor disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to\nguilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end\nof all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not\nproduce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin by\ncausing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a\nbeginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in\nthe worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth.\nNevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man\nthereto.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the\nrecent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still\nretained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age\nidolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who\ntriumphed over the devil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of\nidolatry.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 95\n\nOF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head\nthere are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether divination is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a species of superstition?\n\n(3) Of the species of divination;\n\n(4) Of divination by means of demons;\n\n(5) Of divination by the stars;\n\n(6) Of divination by dreams;\n\n(7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;\n\n(8) Of divination by lots.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Divination Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination\nis derived from something _divine:_ and things that are divine\npertain to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that\ndivination is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): \"Who dares to\nsay that learning is an evil?\" and again: \"I could nowise admit that\nintelligence can be an evil.\" But some arts are divinatory, as the\nPhilosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to\npertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems\nthat divination is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because\nnature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek\nto foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore\ndivination is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): \"Neither let\nthere be found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic\nspirits, or fortune tellers\": and it is stated in the Decretals (26,\nqu. v, can. Qui divinationes): \"Those who seek for divinations shall\nbe liable to a penance of five years' duration, according to the\nfixed grades of penance.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The\nfuture may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in\nitself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce\ntheir effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects\ncan be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their\ncauses, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes\nproduce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most\npart, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future\neffects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of\nconjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow\nand foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians,\nconcerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in\nthemselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the\nrational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to\nthe Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 2, 5, 8]. Such like effects, as also\nthose which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority\nof instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their\ncauses, because these causes have no determinate inclination to\nproduce these effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be\nforeknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot\nconsider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as\nwhen he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such\nthings in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in\nHis eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in\nthe First Part (Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 57, A. 3; Q. 86, A. 4). Hence it is\nwritten (Isa. 41:23): \"Show the things that are to come hereafter,\nand we shall know that ye are gods.\" Therefore if anyone presume to\nforeknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever,\nexcept by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to\nGod. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines:\nwherefore Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): \"They are called divines, as\nthough they were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the\nGodhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men.\"\n\nAccordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things\nthat happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the\nlike can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows\nother contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then\nhe does not divine, i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives\nsomething divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps\nto himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and\nthis is manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin;\nand for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq.\nthat \"divination is always taken in an evil sense.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered\nshare of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as\nstated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future\nevents that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not\npertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the\nknowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the\ndevil's deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future by\nhuman means, but not by the undue means of divination.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Divination Is a Species of Superstition?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of\nsuperstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera.\nNow divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to\nAugustine (De Vera Relig. xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,\n24; De Divin. Daem. 3]. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of\nsuperstition.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is superstition\nundue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue\nworship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.\n\nObj. 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true\nreligion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to\ndivination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is\nfrom his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: \"There is an\noperation of the demons in the administering of foreknowledge,\ncomprised, seemingly, under the head of certain arts exercised by\nthose who have enslaved themselves to the demons, by means of lots,\nomens, or the observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these\nthings are done by the operation of the demons.\" Now, according to\nAugustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20, 23), \"whatever results from\nfellowship between demons and men is superstitious.\" Therefore\ndivination is a species of superstition.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; QQ. 92, 94), superstition\ndenotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of\nGod in two ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a\nsacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it\nis something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to\nan oath (Q. 89, A. 4, ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only\nidolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the\nhelp of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But\nall divination results from the demons' operation, either because the\ndemons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or\nbecause the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the\nfuture, in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this\nkind of vanity it is written (Ps. 39:5): \"Who hath not regard to\nvanities and lying follies.\" Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the\nfuture, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be\nforeknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of\nsuperstition.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the\nend in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind\nof superstition as regards the mode of operation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the\ndemons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with\nthe demons.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the New Law man's mind is restrained from solicitude\nabout temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution\nfor the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the\nother hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, there\nwere consultations about the future in connection with religious\nmatters. Hence where it is written (Isa. 8:19): \"And when they shall\nsay to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their\nenchantments,\" it is added by way of answer: \"Should not the people\nseek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg.:\n'seek of their God, for the living of the dead?']\"\n\nIn the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit\nof prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 3]\n\nWhether We Ought to Distinguish Several Species of Divination?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several\nspecies of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there\nare not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality\nof sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into\ncompact with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there\nare not several species of divination.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a human act takes its species from its end, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). But all divination is\ndirected to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore\nall divinations are of one species.\n\nObj. 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether\none detracts by word, writing or gestures, it is the same species of\nsin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the various\nsigns whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore\nthere are not several species of divination.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore enumerates various species of divination\n(Etym. viii, 9).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), all divinations seek to\nacquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and\nhelp of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his\nhelp, or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell\ncertain future things unknown to men, but known to him in such\nmanners as have been explained in the First Part (Q. 57, A. 3). When\ndemons are expressly invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in\nmany ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to human sight and hearing\nby mock apparitions in order to foretell the future: and this species\nis called \"prestigiation\" because man's eyes are blindfolded\n(_praestringuntur_). Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is\ncalled \"divination by dreams\": sometimes they employ apparitions or\nutterances of the dead, and this species is called \"necromancy,\" for\nas Isidore observes (Etym. viii) in Greek, \"_nekron_ means dead, and\n_manteia_ divination, because after certain incantations and the\nsprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and to\nanswer questions.\" Sometimes they foretell the future through living\nmen, as in the case of those who are possessed: this is divination by\n\"pythons,\" of whom Isidore says that \"pythons are so called from\nPythius Apollo, who was said to be the inventor of divination.\"\nSometimes they foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which\nappear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some earthly\nbody such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called \"geomancy,\"\nif in water \"hydromancy,\" if in the air \"aeromancy,\" if in fire\n\"pyromancy,\" if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the altars\nof demons, \"aruspicy.\"\n\nThe divination which is practiced without express invocation of the\ndemons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain\nknowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of\ncertain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the\nposition and movements of the stars, this belongs to \"astrologers,\"\nwho are also called \"genethliacs,\" because they take note of the days\non which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of\nbirds or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden\nmovements of limbs, this belongs in general to \"augury,\" which is so\ncalled from the chattering of birds (_avium garritu_), just as\n\"auspice\" is derived from watching birds (_avium inspectione_). These\nare chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the ear, the\nlatter by the eye. If, however, these observations have for their\nobject men's words uttered unintentionally, which someone twist so as\nto apply to the future that he wishes to foreknow, then it is called\nan \"omen\": and as Valerius Maximus [*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5]\nremarks, \"the observing of omens has a touch of religion mingled with\nit, for it is believed to be founded not on a chance movement, but on\ndivine providence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliberating\nwhether they would change their position, a centurion happened to\nexclaim at the time: 'Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best\nstand here': and on hearing these words they took them as an omen,\nand abandoned their intention of advancing further.\" If, however, the\nobservation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of\nfigures in certain bodies, there will be another species of\ndivination: for the divination that is taken from observing the lines\nof the hand is called \"chiromancy,\" i.e. divination of the hand\n(because _cheir_ is the Greek for hand): while the divination which\nis taken from signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is\ncalled \"spatulamancy.\"\n\nTo this second species of divination, which is without express\ninvocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by\nobserving certain things done seriously by men in the research of the\noccult, whether by drawing lots, which is called \"geomancy\"; or by\nobserving the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or\nby observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without\nwriting upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out\nseveral unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the\nlesser, or by throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest\nscore; or by observing what catches the eye when one opens a book,\nall of which are named \"sortilege.\"\n\nAccordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The\nfirst is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the\nhead of \"necromancy\"; the second is merely an observation of the\ndisposition or movement of some other being, and this belongs to\n\"augury\"; while the third consists in doing something in order to\ndiscover the occult; and this belongs to \"sortilege.\" Under each of\nthese many others are contained, as explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In all the aforesaid there is the same general, but not\nthe same special, character of sin: for it is much more grievous to\ninvoke the demons than to do things that deserve the demons'\ninterference.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the\nultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the\nvarious species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters,\naccording as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The things observed by diviners are considered by them,\nnot as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in\ndetraction, but as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that\ndiversity of principles diversifies the species, even in\ndemonstrative sciences.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Divination Practiced by Invoking the Demons Is Unlawful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the\ndemons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1\nPet. 2:22, \"Who did no sin.\" Yet our Lord asked the demon: \"What is\nthy name?\" and the latter replied: \"My name is Legion, for we are\nmany\" (Mk. 5:9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons\nabout the occult.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those who\nask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired\nof the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the\ncoming war (1 Kings 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that\nconsists in questioning demons is not unlawful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who\nknows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know\nwhat is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in\nthe discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons\nis not unlawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): \"Neither let there\nthere be found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . .\nnor . . . that consulteth pythonic spirits.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for\ntwo reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination,\nwhich is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of\ninvoking him. This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written\nagainst certain persons (Isa. 28:15): \"You have said: We have entered\ninto a league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell.\" And\nstill more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or\nreverence paid to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered\nfrom the result. For the demon who intends man's perdition endeavors,\nby his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom\nmen to believe him, and so to lead him on to something prejudicial to\nthe salvation of mankind. Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words\nof Luke 4:35, \"He rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace,\" says:\n\"Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his\nspeech, lest together with the truth he should publish his wickedness\nand accustom us to care little for such things, however much he may\nseem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the divine\nScriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Bede's commentary on Luke 8:30, \"Our Lord\ninquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which\nhe tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might shine\nforth more graciously.\" Now it is one thing to question a demon who\ncomes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for\nthe good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power\nof God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to\ngain from him knowledge of things hidden from us.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3), \"there is\nnothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being\nabout to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to\nappear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some\noccult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or\nelse the spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest,\nbut some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the\ndevil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the\nimages of things are wont to be called by the names of those things.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: No temporal utility can compare with the harm to\nspiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by\ninvoking the demon.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Divination by the Stars Is Unlawful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that divination by the stars is not\nunlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes:\nthus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease.\nNow the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the\nworld, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by\nthe stars is not unlawful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, human science originates from experiments, according\nto the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered through\nmany experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby\nsome future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would seem\nnot unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.\n\nObj. 3: Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far as\nit is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the\nstars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of\nGod's creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of\ndivination is not unlawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): \"Those\nastrologers whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without\nscruple; because they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any\nspirit for their divinations which art, however, Christian and true\npiety rejects and condemns.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the operation of the\ndemon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false\nand vain opinions, in order that man's mind may become entangled in\nvanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion\nif, by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that\ncannot be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what\nthings can be foreknown by observing the stars: and it is evident\nthat those things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this\nmeans: even so astrologers forecast a future eclipse.\n\nHowever, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired\nby observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some\nhave stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things\nforetold by means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable\nstatement: since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that\nfor which it stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused),\nor it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause,\nin consequence it signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a\nsign of fair weather, in so far as its cause is the cause of fair\nweather). Now it cannot be said that the dispositions and movements\nof the heavenly bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can\nthey be ascribed to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature,\nalthough they are referable to a common higher cause, which is divine\nprovidence. On the contrary the appointment of the movements and\npositions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a\ndifferent principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future\ncontingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of\nnecessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the\nlatter are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the\nmanner of their occurrence is variable. Consequently it is impossible\nto acquire foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the\nstars, except in so far as effects can be foreknown from their causes.\n\nNow two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In\nthe first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human\naffairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in _Metaph._\nvi [*Ed. Did. v, 3], an accidental being has no cause, least of all a\nnatural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what\noccurs accidentally, neither is a _being_ properly speaking, nor is\n_one_--for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or\nthat a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave--for these and\nlike occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several things.\nWhereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its\nterm, just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form\nof a natural thing.\n\nIn the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of\nwill and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the\nintellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and\nconsequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the\nPhilosopher shows (De Anima iii, 4, 9). Now no body can make an\nimpression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible for\nheavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and\nwill: for this would be to deny the difference between intellect and\nsense, with which position Aristotle reproaches (De Anima iii, 3)\nthose who held that \"such is the will of man, as is the day which the\nfather of men and of gods,\" i.e. the sun or the heavens, \"brings on\"\n[*Odyssey xviii, 135].\n\nHence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the\nfree-will's operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause\nof an inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an\nimpression on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive\npowers which are acts of bodily organs having an inclination for\nhuman acts. Since, however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the\nPhilosopher shows (De Anima iii, 11; _Ethic._ i, 13), this does not\nimpose any necessity on the free-will, and man is able, by his\nreason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly bodies.\n\nAccordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to\nforeknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with\ncertitude future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and\nvain opinion; and so the operation of the demon introduces itself\ntherein, wherefore it will be a superstitious and unlawful\ndivination. On the other hand if one were to apply the observation of\nthe stars in order to foreknow those future things that are caused by\nheavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will\nbe neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination.\n\nWherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by\nobserving the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a\ngreat number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their\nactions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the\ninclination of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, the\nwise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The\nresult is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth,\nespecially in public occurrences which depend on the multitude.\nSecondly, because of the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine\nsays (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17): \"When astrologers tell the truth, it must\nbe allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies\nhidden in his mind. And since this happens through the action of\nunclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for they are\npermitted to know certain things about temporal affairs.\" Wherefore\nhe concludes: \"Thus a good Christian should beware of astrologers,\nand of all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth,\nlest his soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of of\npartnership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship.\"\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Divination by Dreams Is Unlawful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful.\nIt is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are\ninstructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15, 16): \"By a\ndream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and\nthey are sleeping in their beds, then He,\" God to wit, \"openeth the\nears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to\nlearn.\" Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by\ndreams.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make\nuse of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting\ndreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of\nhis chief baker (Gen. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the\nking of Babylon (Dan. 2, 4). Therefore divination by dreams is not\nunlawful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of\nmen. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of\nthe future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams\nfor the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10): \"Neither let there be\nfound among you any one that . . . observeth dreams.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 6), divination is\nsuperstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion.\nWherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing\nthe future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future\noccurrences; for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious\nthrough what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do\nsomething or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are signs of\nfuture happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common\ncause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the\nfuture is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what\nis the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future\noccurrences, or be cognizant of them.\n\nAccordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is\nsometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams\nis twofold: one regards the soul, in so far as those things which\nhave occupied a man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to\nhis imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a\ncause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related\naccidentally to future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it\nwill be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards\nthe body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the\nformation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that\ndisposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humors\ndreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason\nphysicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to\ndiscover internal dispositions.\n\nIn like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and\nspiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper's imagination is\naffected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a\nheavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in\nkeeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual\ncause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to\nmen in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Num.\n12:6, \"If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to\nhim in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.\" Sometimes,\nhowever, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images\nappear to persons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times,\nreveal certain future things to those who have entered into an\nunlawful compact with them.\n\nAccordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in\nmaking use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as\nthose dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause\ninward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends.\nBut it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be\ncaused by a revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been\nmade, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose,\nor implicit, through the divination extending beyond its possible\nlimits.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Divination by Auguries, Omens, and by Like Observations of\nExternal Things Is Unlawful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by\nlike observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were\nunlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph\nthat he paid attention to auguries, for it is related (Gen. 44:5)\nthat Joseph's steward said: \"The cup which you have stolen is that in\nwhich my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to divine\n(_augurari_)\": and he himself afterwards said to his brethren (Gen.\n44:15): \"Know you not that there is no one like me in the science of\ndivining?\" Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of this kind of\ndivination.\n\nObj. 2: Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding future\noccurrences of the seasons, according to Jer. 8:7, \"The kite in the\nair hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have\nobserved the time of their coming.\" Now natural knowledge is\ninfallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to\nmake use of the birds' knowledge in order to know the future, and\nthis is divination by augury.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11:32).\nYet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and\ninterpreting of a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham's\nservant, acted in like manner (Gen. 24). Therefore it seems that this\nkind of divination is not unlawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10): \"Neither let there be\nfound among you anyone . . . that observeth omens.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The movements or cries of birds, and whatever\ndispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the\ncause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known\ntherefrom as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything\nfuture can be known from them, it will be because the causes from\nwhich they proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are\ncognizant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals' actions is a\ncertain instinct whereby they are inclined by a natural movement, for\nthey are not masters of their actions. This instinct may proceed from\na twofold cause. In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause.\nFor since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, every power\nof which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is subject to the\ndisposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that of the\nheavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from\nbeing signs of the future, in so far as they are conformed to the\ndispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to\nwhich certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must\nobserve two things: first, that such observations must not be applied\nto the foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be\nforeknown from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above (AA.\n5, 6): secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those\nwhich in some way may have reference to these animals (since they\nacquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and\ninstinct about things necessary for their life--such as changes\nresulting from rain and wind and so forth).\n\nIn the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause,\nnamely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon\nChrist, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and\nvomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb\nanimals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems\nto be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words\nwhich are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the\nstars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and\nsometimes according to the action of the demons.\n\nAccordingly we must say that all such like divinations are\nsuperstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set\naccording to the order of nature or of divine providence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv], when\nJoseph said that there was no one like him in the science of\ndivining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to\nthe common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds\nhave about things concerning them; and in order to know these things\nit is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from\nthe frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a\ndream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his\ninstruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words,\nhaving previously prayed to God.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Divination by Drawing Lots Is Unlawful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not\nunlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, \"My lots are in\nThy hands,\" says: \"It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of\nascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt.\"\n\nObj. 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances\nwhich the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both\nin the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the\ncasting of lots. For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at\nthe Lord's command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had\nstolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing lots, found that his\nson Jonathan had eaten honey (1 Kings 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when\nfleeing from the face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the\nsea (Jonah 1:7, sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense\n(Luke 1:9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the\napostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would seem that divination by\nlots is not unlawful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or \"monomachy,\" i.e. single\ncombat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are called\n\"popular\" trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because\nsomething unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem\nto be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single\ncombat with the Philistine (1 Kings 17:32, sqq.). Therefore it would\nseem that divination by lot is not unlawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can.\nSortes): \"We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make\nup your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have\ncondemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason\nwe wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be\nmentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under\npain of anathema.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), sortilege consists, properly\nspeaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may\ncome to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one\nseeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a\npossession, an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or\nother, it is called \"sortilege of allotment\"; if one seeks to know\nwhat ought to be done, it is called \"sortilege of consultation\"; if\none seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called \"sortilege of\ndivination.\" Now the actions of man that are required for sortilege\nand their results are not subject to the dispositions of the stars.\nWherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so minded as though the\nhuman acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result on the\ndispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and false, and\nconsequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that\na divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful.\n\nApart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must\nneeds be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If\nwe ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in \"sortilege\nof allotment,\" it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity,\nas in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the\ndivision of something or other, are willing to draw lots for its\ndivision, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.\n\nIf, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual\ncause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech.\n21:21) that \"the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of\ntwo ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the\nidols, and consulted entrails\": sortilege of this kind is unlawful,\nand forbidden by the canons.\n\nSometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov.\n16:33, \"Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the\nLord\": sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine\ndeclares [*Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. Obj.[1]].\n\nYet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have\nrecourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount\nto tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Luke 1:8,\nsays: \"He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men.\"\nSecondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to\nlots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says\n(Super Act. Apost. i): \"But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks\nthat he ought, after the apostles' example, to consult God by casting\nlots, let him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so,\nexcept after calling together the assembly of the brethren and\npouring forth prayer to God.\" Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be\nmisapplied to earthly business. Hence Augustine says (ad inquisit.\nJanuar. ii; Ep. lv): \"Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages,\nthough it is to be hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to\nconsulting the demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that\nanyone should wish to apply the Divine oracles to worldly matters and\nto the vain things of this life.\" Fourthly, if anyone resort to the\ndrawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried\nout by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says\n(Super Act. Apost. i): \"Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias\nwas decided by lot,\" because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was\nnot yet poured forth into the Church: \"whereas the same deacons were\nordained not by lot but by the choice of the disciples.\" It is\ndifferent with earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of\nearthly things: in elections of this kind men frequently have\nrecourse to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions.\n\nIf, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the\ndivine judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed.\nHence Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), \"If, at a time of\npersecution, the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is\nto remain at his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to\nflee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, should there be no\nother means of coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must\nbe chosen by lot.\" Again he says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): \"If thou\naboundest in that which it behooves thee to give to him who hath not,\nand which cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of\nwhom surpasses the other either in need or in some claim on thee,\nthou couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou\nshalt give that which thou canst not give to both.\"\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to\nthe investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of something done\nby a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so\nfar as a miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses the\ncommon generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered\nunlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of the occult,\nwhich is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such like\ntrials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a\ndecree of Pope Stephen V [*II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i]: \"The\nsacred canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by\nmeans of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one must\npresume, by a superstitious innovation, to practice what is not\nsanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable\nthat public crimes should be judged by our authority, after the\nculprit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been\napproved, with due regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown\ncrimes must be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children\nof men.\" The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels,\nsave that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since\nno miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be\nvery unequal in strength or skill.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 96\n\nOF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider superstition in observances, under which head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by\nthe magic art;\n\n(2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies;\n\n(3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling;\n\n(4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Be Unlawful to Practice the Observances of the Magic Art?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the\nobservances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two\nways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft:\nsecondly, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person\ngives an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the\nmagic art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist\nin certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a\ngood end, namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not\nunlawful to practice these observances.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that \"to the children\" who\nabstained, \"God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and\nwisdom.\" Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain\nfasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its\nresults through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice\nit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, seemingly, as stated above (A. 1), the reason why it\nis wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because\nthey have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet\nthe demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about things\nnecessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human\nknowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of\nkeener intellect, as Augustine says [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin.\nDaemon. 3, 4]. Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic\nart, even though it achieve its result through the demons.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): \"Neither let\nthere be found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth\nfrom the dead\": which search relies on the demons' help. Now through\nthe observances of the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought\n\"by means of certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demons\"\n[*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above Q. 92, A. 2].\nTherefore it is unlawful to practice the notary art.\n\n_I answer that,_ The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is\nunlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have\nnot in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do\nin gazing certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so\nforth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as\ncauses, but as signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are\nthe sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty\nsigns, and consequently a kind of \"agreement or covenant made with\nthe demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens\"\n[*Ibid.]. Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and\navoided by Christians, even as other arts of vain and noxious\nsuperstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). This\nart is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is\nnot intended by means of this art to acquire science in a manner\nconnatural to man, namely, by discovery and instruction, the\nconsequence is that this effect is expected either from God or from\nthe demons. Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and\nscience infused into them by God, as related of Solomon (3 Kings 3\nand 2 Paralip. 1). Moreover, our Lord said to His disciples (Luke\n21:15): \"I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your\nadversaries shall not be able to resist and gainsay.\" However, this\ngift is not granted to all, or in connection with any particular\nobservance, but according to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in\n1 Cor. 12:8, \"To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of\nwisdom, to another the word of knowledge, according to the same\nSpirit,\" and afterwards it is said (1 Cor. 12:11): \"All these things\none and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He\nwill.\" On the other hand it does not belong to the demons to\nenlighten the intellect, as stated in the First Part (Q. 109, A. 3).\nNow the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is effected by the\nenlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did anyone acquire\nknowledge by means of the demons. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei\nx, 9): \"Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way\ncleansed by theurgic inventions,\" i.e. the operations \"of the demons,\nso as to be fitted to see its God, and discern what is true,\" such as\nare all scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be able by\nspeaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the\nsciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it\nis not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that\nthe magic art tends.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The abstinence of these children was not in\naccordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to\nthe authority of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the\nmeat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they received\nknowledge from God, according to Ps. 118:100, \"I have had\nunderstanding above the ancients, because I have sought Thy\ncommandments.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: To seek knowledge of the future from the demons\nis a sin not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on\naccount of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies\nto the case in point.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Observances Directed to the Alteration of Bodies, As for the\nPurpose of Acquiring Health or the Like, Are Unlawful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the\nalteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the\nlike, are lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of\nbodies in order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical\norder things have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is\nunable to assign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and\nmany like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei\nxxi, 5, 7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ such like forces\nfor the alteration of bodies.\n\nObj. 2: Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly\nbodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire\ncertain occult forces resulting from their species through the\ninfluence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g.\nimages, also acquire from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force\nfor the production of certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful\nto make use of them and of such like things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many\nways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8, 9). But their power is\nfrom God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the\npurpose of producing these alterations.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that \"to\nsuperstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and\nnostrums condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of\nincantations or of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of\nany kind of thing worn or fastened on.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In things done for the purpose of producing some\nbodily effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that\neffect naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since\nit is lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their\nproper effects. But, if they seem unable to produce those effects\nnaturally, it follows that they are employed for the purpose of\nproducing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that\nthey come under the head of \"compact by tokens entered into with the\ndemons\" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see above Q. 92, A. 2].\nWherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): \"The demons are\nallured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them, but by\nGod. They are enticed by various objects differing according to the\nvarious things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as\nspirits by signs, such as are to each one's liking, by means of\nvarious kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing\nnatural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such\nas they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in\naddition there be employed certain characters, words, or any other\nvain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be\nsuperstitious and unlawful.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The natural forces of natural bodies result from their\nsubstantial forms which they acquire through the influence of\nheavenly bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire\ncertain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial\nbodies result from the conception of the craftsman; and since they\nare nothing else but composition, order and shape, as stated in\n_Phys._ i, 5, they cannot have a natural active force. Consequently,\nno force accrues to them from the influence of heavenly bodies, in so\nfar as they are artificial, but only in respect of their natural\nmatter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine\n(De Civ. Dei x, 11), that \"by herbs, stones, animals, certain\nparticular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again by certain\nmovements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens it is\npossible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying into\neffect the various dispositions of the stars,\" as though the results\nof the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly\nbodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), \"all these\nthings are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that\nare subject to them.\"\n\nWherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy\nfrom the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is\nrequisite to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce\nto any effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural\naction. Yet astronomical images differ from necromantic images in\nthis, that the latter include certain explicit invocations and\ntrickery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agreements\nmade with the demons: whereas in the other images there are tacit\nagreements by means of tokens in certain shapes or characters.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom\nthe demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever\npurpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the\ndemons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the\ncontrary, it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons.\nHence in no way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons' help\nby compacts either tacit or express.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Observances Directed to the Purpose of Fortune-telling Are\nUnlawful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the purpose\nof fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the\nmisfortunes that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by\ncertain symptoms, which the physician observes. Therefore it seems\nnot unlawful to observe such like signs.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly\neverybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain\ntimes, or places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or\nanimals, uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to\ncome. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine\nprovidence in a certain order: and this order seems to require that\nprecedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences:\nwherefore, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that\nhappened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in\nour time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds\nfrom divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to\nobserve these presages.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that \"a\nthousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts\nentered into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb;\na stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together;\nkicking the door-post when anyone passes in front of one's house; to\ngo back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes;\nto return home if you trip when going forth; when the rats have\ngnawed a hole in your clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil\nrather than to regret the actual damage.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Men attend to all these observances, not as causes\nbut as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them\nas signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on\ndivine authority, but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of\nthe malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men's minds with\nsuch like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all these\nobservances are superstitious and unlawful: they are apparently\nremains of idolatry, which authorized the observance of auguries, of\nlucky and unlucky days which is allied to divination by the stars, in\nrespect of which one day is differentiated from another: except that\nthese observances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore they are\nyet more vain and superstitious.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they\nproduce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully\nobserve. Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future\nevents as proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging\nwhen he sees his master's anger. Possibly the same might be said if\none were to fear for child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of\nwhich we have spoken in the First Part (Q. 117, A. 3, ad 2). But this\ndoes not apply to this kind of observances.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That men have at first experienced a certain degree of\ntruth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a\nman begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many\nthings occur in connection with them through the trickery of the\ndemons, \"so that men, through being entangled in these observances,\nbecome yet more curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold\nsnares of a pernicious error,\" as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.\nii, 23).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born,\nnot only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states\n(Contra Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply\nthose deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all\nthings, however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so\nas to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Unlawful to Wear Divine Words at the Neck?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine\nwords at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written\nthan when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the\npurpose of producing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal\nthe sick), such as the \"Our Father\" or the \"Hail Mary,\" or in any way\nwhatever to call on the Lord's name, according to Mk. 16:17, 18, \"In\nMy name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new\ntongues, they shall take up serpents.\" Therefore it seems to be\nlawful to wear sacred words at one's neck, as a remedy for sickness\nor for any kind of distress.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sacred words are no less efficacious on the human\nbody than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain\nincantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing\ncertain other animals: wherefore it is written (Ps. 57:5): \"Their\nmadness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp\nthat stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the\ncharmers, nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely.\" Therefore it is\nlawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God's word is no less holy than the relics of the\nsaints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. Hom. xxvi) that \"God's word\nis of no less account than the Body of Christ.\" Now it is lawful for\none to wear the relics of the saints at one's neck, or to carry them\nabout one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it\nis equally lawful to have recourse to the words of Holy Writ, whether\nuttered or written, for one's protection.\n\nObj. 4: On the other hand, Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.)\n[*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's\nworks, and falsely ascribed to him]: \"Some wear round their necks a\npassage in writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in\nchurch and heard by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good\nto have the Gospels in his ears, will he find salvation by wearing\nthem round his neck? Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In\nthe shapes of the letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in\nthe shapes, you do well to wear them round your neck; if in the\nunderstanding, you will then do better to bear them in your heart\nthan to wear them round your neck.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In every incantation or wearing of written words,\ntwo points seem to demand caution. The first is the thing said or\nwritten, because if it is connected with invocation of the demons it\nis clearly superstitious and unlawful. In like manner it seems that\none should beware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they\nconceal something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says [*Cf. the Opus\nImperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, falsely\nascribed to him] that \"many now after the example of the Pharisees\nwho enlarged their fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels,\nand fasten them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those\nwho do not understand them.\" Again, one should take care lest it\ncontain anything false, because in that case also the effect could\nnot be ascribed to God, Who does not bear witness to a falsehood.\n\nIn the second place, one should beware lest besides the sacred words\nit contain something vain, for instance certain written characters,\nexcept the sign of the Cross; or if hope be placed in the manner of\nwriting or fastening, or in any like vanity, having no connection\nwith reverence for God, because this would be pronounced\nsuperstitious: otherwise, however, it is lawful. Hence it is written\nin the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): \"In\nblending together medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make use of\nobservances or incantations, other than the divine symbol, or the\nLord's Prayer, so as to give honor to none but God the Creator of\nall.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or to\ninvoke the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honor God alone,\nfrom Whom the result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in\nconnection with any vain observance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even in the case of incantations of serpents or any\nanimals whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred words\nand to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like\nincantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and rely\non the demons for their result, especially in the case of serpents,\nbecause the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil in\norder to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says: \"Note\nthat Scripture does not commend everything whence it draws its\ncomparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely heard\nthe widow's request.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if they\nbe worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics they\nare, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this\nmatter of some vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be\nthree-cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence due\nto God and the saints), it would be superstitious and unlawful.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Chrysostom is speaking of the case in which more\nattention is paid the written characters than to the understanding of\nthe words.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 97\n\nOF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through\nlack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that\nthey come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which\npertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things.\nAccordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to\nirreverence for God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy\nthings. With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation\nwhereby God is tempted, and perjury, whereby God's name is taken with\nirreverence. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) In what the temptation of God consists;\n\n(2) Whether it is a sin?\n\n(3) To what virtue it is opposed;\n\n(4) Of its comparison with other vices.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Temptation of God Consists in Certain Deeds, Wherein the\nExpected Result Is Ascribed to the Power of God Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God does not\nconsist in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the\npower of God alone. Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted\nby God, man, and demons. But when man is tempted the result is not\nalways expected from his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when\nthe result is expected from His power alone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the divine\nname look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, if the\ntemptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles\nwould tempt God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to man's perfection that he\nshould put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence\nAmbrose, commenting on Luke 9:3, \"Take nothing for your journey,\"\netc. says: \"The Gospel precept points out what is required of him\nthat announces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend\non worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he\nshould hold himself to be the more able to provide for himself, the\nless he seeks these things.\" And the Blessed Agatha said: \"I have\nnever treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus\nChrist, Who restores all things by His mere word.\" [*Office of St.\nAgatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican Breviary).] But the temptation\nof God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfection.\nTherefore the temptation of God does not consist in such like deeds,\nwherein the help of God alone is expected.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 36): \"Christ\nwho gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet\nnot allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him,\nnevertheless by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest\nit should dare to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that\nwhich it needs to avoid.\" From this it would seem that the temptation\nof God consists in omitting to do what one can in order to escape\nfrom danger, and relying on the assistance of God alone.\n\n_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person\ntempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By\nwords, that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether\nhe can and will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe\nanother's prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in two\nways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter: thus\nSamson (Judges 14:12) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order\nto tempt them. In the second place it may be done with cunning and by\nstealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Matt. 22:15,\nsqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends,\nby word or deed, to put some person to the test; and sometimes\nimplicitly, when, to wit, though he does not intend to test a person,\nyet that which he does or says can seemingly have no other purpose\nthan putting him to a test.\n\nAccordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds.\nNow we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a man tempts God\nexplicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the\nintention of probing God's knowledge, power or will. He tempts God\nexplicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to\nexperiment on God's power, good will or wisdom. But He will tempt God\nimplicitly, if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on\nGod, yet he asks for or does something which has no other use than to\nprove God's power, goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his\nhorse to gallop in order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving\nthe horse a trial: but if he make the horse gallop with out any\nuseful purpose, it seems to be nothing else than a trial of the\nhorse's speed; and the same applies to all other things. Accordingly\nwhen a man in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine\nassistance for some urgent or useful motive, this is not to tempt\nGod: for it is written (2 Paralip 20:12): \"As we know not what to do,\nwe can only turn our eyes to Thee.\" But if this be done without any\nuseful or urgent motive, this is to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a\ngloss on Deut. 6:16, \"Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God,\" says:\n\"A man tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason he\nchooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by\nGod.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds, to\ntest his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same\ndeeds.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are\nmoved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is\nan effect of the divine power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The preachers of God's kingdom dispense with temporal\naids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God:\nwherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they\ntempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without any\nuseful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine\n(Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that \"Paul fled, not through ceasing to\nbelieve in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee\nwhen he had the means of flight.\" The Blessed Agatha had experience\nof God's kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such\nsickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself\nsuddenly cured by God.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is a Sin to Tempt God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God\nhas not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the\nsame as to tempt, Him: for it is written (Malach. 3:10): \"Bring all\nthe tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house;\nand try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the\nflood-gates of heaven.\" Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt\nGod.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his\nknowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will.\nNow it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is\nwritten (Ps. 33:9): \"O taste and see that the Lord is sweet,\" and\n(Rom. 12:2): \"That you may prove what is the good, and the\nacceptable, and the perfect will of God.\" Therefore it is not a sin\nto tempt God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin,\nbut rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when the\nLord said: \"Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God,\" he replied: \"I will\nnot ask, and I will not tempt the Lord,\" and then it was said to him:\n\"Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are\ngrievous to my God also?\" (Isa. 7:11-13). And we read of Abraham\n(Gen. 15:8) that he said to the Lord: \"Whereby may I know that I\nshall possess it?\" namely, the land which God had promised him. Again\nGedeon asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judges\n6:36, sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is\nnot a sin to tempt God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is forbidden in God's Law, for it is written\n(Deut. 6:10): \"Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), to tempt a person is to put\nhim to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain.\nWherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt,\neither in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its\nqualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove\nit to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it\nis a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God's\nperfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in\norder that the tempter himself may know God's power.\n\nOn the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the\ndivine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it\nto others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of\nurgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite\nconditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might\nbe wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in\norder, to wit, that Christ's power might be made manifest to\nunbelievers.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as\nstated above (Q. 87, A. 1). Hence there was a motive of urgency to\npay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of\nusefulness, as stated in the text quoted--\"that there may be meat in\nGod's house\": wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The\nwords that follow, \"and try Me,\" are not to be understood causally,\nas though they had to pay tithes in order to try if \"God would open\nthe flood-gates of heaven,\" but consecutively, because, to wit, if\nthey paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which\nGod would shower upon them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or will.\nOne is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to\nprove whether God's will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other\nknowledge of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental and\nthereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness,\nand complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div.\nNom. ii) that \"he learnt divine things through experience of them.\"\nIt is in this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste\nHis sweetness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone,\nbut for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved\nbecause, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common\nwelfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because he\nwould have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it\nwas a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign\nthrough the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to\nhave asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to\nbe excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in\nsaying to the angel (Luke 1:18): \"Whereby shall I know this?\" so that\nhe was punished for his unbelief.\n\nIt must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God\nfor a sign: first in order to test God's power or the truth of His\nword, and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God.\nSecondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God's pleasure in\nsome particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of\ntemptation of God.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Temptation of God Is Opposed to the Virtue of Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed\nto the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a\nman doubts God, as stated above (A. 2). Now doubt about God comes\nunder the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore\ntemptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): \"Before prayer\nprepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man,\"\nthat is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, \"prays for what\nGod taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him\nto do.\" Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope.\nTherefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, \"And they tempted God in their\nhearts,\" says that \"to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully, with\nsimplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts.\" Now deceit is\nopposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is\nopposed, not to religion, but to truth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to the gloss quoted above \"to tempt God\nis to pray to Him inordinately.\" Now to pray to God becomingly is an\nact of religion as stated above (Q. 83, A. 15). Therefore to tempt\nGod is a sin opposed to religion.\n\n_I answer that,_ As clearly shown above (Q. 81, A. 5), the end of\nreligion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains\ndirectly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is\nevident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since\nno one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it\nis manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 7), it belongs to religion\nto declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of reverence\ntowards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that, through\ndoubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence towards\nGod. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of\nirreligion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He that prepares not his soul before prayer by\nforgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way\ndisposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by\nGod, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this\nimplicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or\nindiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and\nwithout due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence\ntowards Him. For it is written (1 Pet. 5:6): \"Be you humbled . . .\nunder the mighty hand of God,\" and (2 Tim. 2:15): \"Carefully study to\npresent thyself approved unto God.\" Therefore also this kind of\ntemptation is a species of irreligion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to\nGod, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man.\nWherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and\nconsequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed\nto the truth.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Temptation of God Is a Graver Sin Than Superstition?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin\nthan superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment.\nNow the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews\nthan was the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of\nsuperstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of\ntheir number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28 [*Septuagint\nversion. The Vulgate has \"twenty-three thousand.\"], whereas for the\nsin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert,\nand entered not into the land of promise, according to Ps. 94:9,\n\"Your fathers tempted Me,\" and further on, \"so I swore in My wrath\nthat they should not enter into My rest.\" Therefore to tempt God is a\ngraver sin than superstition.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it\nwould seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a\nspecies, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition\nwhich bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a\ngraver sin than superstition.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave\ndisrespectfully to one's parents, than to pay others the respect we\nowe to our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the Father of\nall (Malach. 1:6). Therefore, temptation of God whereby we behave\nirreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby\nwe give to a creature the honor we owe to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Deut. 17:2, \"When there shall be found\namong you,\" etc. says: \"The Law detests error and idolatry above all:\nfor it is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that\nbelongs to the Creator.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is\nthat which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is\nless opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine\nexcellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For\njust as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his\nerror, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more\nagainst the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an\nerror contrary to the divine excellence, than if he expresses a\ndoubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error, as shown above\n(Q. 94, A. 1, ad 1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds\nexpresses a doubt of the divine excellence, as stated above (A. 2).\nTherefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting\nGod.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above\nmanner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more\nsevere punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is\nwritten (Ex. 32:34): \"And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this\nsin also of theirs.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as regards\nthe material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as regards\nthe end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God,\nsince it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it\nis singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence\nto another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine\nexcellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents,\nwhich can without sin be given to others.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 98\n\nOF PERJURY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?\n\n(2) Whether perjury is always a sin?\n\n(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?\n\n(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Necessary for Perjury That the Statement Confirmed on\nOath Be False?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that\nthe statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above (Q. 89, A.\n3), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less\nthan by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of\ntruth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one\nswears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears\nto something unjust.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing\nconfirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty\nthan the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is confirmed by\ncalling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in\nswearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human\nstatement which is confirmed on oath.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm.\nclxxx): \"Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are\ndeceived themselves\"; and he gives three examples. The first is:\n\"Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true,\nwhereas it is false\"; the second is: \"Take the instance of another\nwho knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it\nwere true\"; and the third is: \"Take another, who thinks his statement\nfalse, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true,\" of\nwhom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a\nperjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not\nnecessary for perjury.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Perjury is defined \"a falsehood confirmed by oath\"\n[*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), moral acts take their\nspecies from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of\na human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since\nan assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this\ncannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls\nthe end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing,\nwhich is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood.\nConsequently falsehood is essential to perjury.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, \"whichever of these three\nbe lacking, there is perjury,\" but in different order. For first and\nchiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in\nthe Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for\nin whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very\nreason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to\ndo the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking,\nsince by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the\ndanger of lapsing into falsehood.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since\nthey are in the position of active principle, as stated in _Phys._\nii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than\nthe active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man\nswears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from\nthat kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its\nend, by swearing what is false.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the\napprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it\nwill be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will.\nIf something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both\nmaterially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as\nfalse, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each\nof these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in\nsome way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however,\nthat which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that\nwhich is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is\nnot so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it\nfalse. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): \"It\ndepends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is\nnot guilty except the mind be guilty.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 2]\n\nWhether All Perjury Is Sinful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever\ndoes not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a\nperjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful\n(adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a\nsin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it\nwould follow that he is perplexed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by\ncommitting a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not\nto enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore\nnot all perjury is sinful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to be\nguilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that\nhe sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter\norder him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore\nseemingly not all perjury is sinful.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a\ndeclaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the\nobligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus\na state may swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other\ncitizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may\nswear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new\nstatutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does\nnot sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm.\ncxxx), in speaking of perjury: \"See how you should detest this\nhorrible beast and exterminate it from all human business.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 89, A. 1), to swear is to call\nGod as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to\nwitness to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that\nGod ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a\nfalsehood. Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion,\nto which it belongs to show reverence to God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty\nof perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his\noath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which\nhe swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to\ngive an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of\njudgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of\nperjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is\ndoing could not be a matter of an oath.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When one man swears or promises to do another's will,\nthere is to be understood this requisite condition--that the thing\ncommanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate.\n\nReply Obj. 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a\ncitizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever\nthe state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the\nnature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the\nstate's burdens if he takes a share of its goods.\n\nThe canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some\nparticular \"college\" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be\nmade in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all,\npast and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of\nthe statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 4).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 3]\n\nWhether All Perjury Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It\nis laid down (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum): \"Referring to the\nquestion whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in\norder to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind\nthan that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have\nhad, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their\noath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to\navoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to\nkeep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for\nthis reason to be punished as for a mortal sin.\" Therefore not all\nperjury is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on\nSt. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, \"it is a\ngreater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels.\" Now it is not\nalways a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance,\nif we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue\nin the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it\nalways a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on\nthe Gospels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through\ncommitting perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that\ninfamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is\nprescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury\n[*Cap. Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all\nperjury is a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is\na mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is\nwritten (Lev. 19:12): \"Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name.\"\nTherefore it is a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the teaching of the Philosopher\n(Poster. i, 2), \"that which causes a thing to be such is yet more\nso.\" Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very\nnature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be\ndone out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that of its nature,\nimplies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very\nnature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above (A. 2), the\nreason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence\ntowards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its very\nnature, is a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 89, A. 7, ad 3), coercion does not\ndeprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which\ncan be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which\nhe took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally.\nNevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a\nman from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter\nshould have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as\nmay overcome a high-principled man.\n\nWhen, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished\nas for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of\nmortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent\nto God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not\nexcused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue,\nif he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is\nswearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as\nneither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not\nadvert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and\nconsequently is excused from the sin of perjury.\n\nIt is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels,\nthan to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of\nscandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we\nconsider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more\ngrievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the\nGospels.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the\nlaw. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath\nbe not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so\ndeclared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he\nhas not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy\nrather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he\nstill has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his\noath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 4]\n\nWhether He Sins Who Demands an Oath of a Perjurer?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer\ncommits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that\nhe swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for\nhim to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for\nhis own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should\none enjoin an oath on another person.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to\nimpose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath\nfrom a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then\nseem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful\nto impose an oath on one who swears falsely.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): \"If anyone sin, and hear\nthe voice of one swearing falsely [*'Falsely' is not in the Vulgate],\nand is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to\nit: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity.\" Hence it\nwould seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he\nis bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an\noath of such a man.\n\nObj. 4: On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is\nit to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an\noath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad\nPublic. Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one\nwho swears falsely.\n\n_I answer that,_ As regards a person who demands an oath from\nanother, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he\ndemands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he\ndemands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If\na man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we\nmust make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm.\nclxxx): \"For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and\nsays to him accordingly: 'Swear to me' in order that he may be\ncredited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation\" (because, to\nwit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will\nspeak the truth). \"This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Matt.\n5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he\nknows the man to have done so,\" i.e. the contrary of what he swears\nto, \"and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other\ndestroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of\nthe slayer.\"\n\nIf, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in\naccordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a\nthird person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath\nof a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly,\nbecause seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at\nwhose instance he demands it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of one who demands an\noath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other\nwill swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the\nfact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an\noath in order that he may be more certain.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), \"though we\nare forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the\nHoly Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others.\" Hence he\nthat accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own\naccord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the\npassage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce\nanother's perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter\nhad to be denounced \"to those who would do the perjurer good rather\nthan harm.\" Again, neither did he state in what order the\ndenunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order\nshould be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden,\nespecially when it does not tend to another person's injury: because\nif it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated\nabove (Q. 33, A. 7; Q. 68, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of\ngood, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil.\nConsequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to\nswear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by\nfalse gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who\nswears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks\nthe good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who\nswears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii).\nHence when a man swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to\nlack any good that one may use lawfully.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 99\n\nOF SACRILEGE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion,\nwhereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall\nconsider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is sacrilege?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special sin?\n\n(3) Of the species of sacrilege;\n\n(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Sacrilege Is the Violation of a Sacred Thing?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a\nsacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can.\nSi quis suadente]): \"They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about\nthe sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the\nsovereign be worthy of honor.\" Now this seems to have no connection\nwith anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the\nviolation of something sacred.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can.\nConstituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public\noffices, \"he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege.\"\nYet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore\nit seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred\nthing.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things\nreceive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be\nviolated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the\nviolation of a sacred thing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that \"a man is said to be\nsacrilegious because he selects,\" i.e. steals, \"sacred things.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5; I-II, Q. 101, A. 4), a\nthing is called \"sacred\" through being deputed to the divine worship.\nNow just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed\nto a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through\nbeing deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is\ndue to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever\npertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and\ncomes under the head of sacrilege.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common\ngood of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the\nrulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers\nof divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, \"Being ministers of His\nkingdom, you have not judged rightly.\" Hence by an extension of the\nterm, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as\ndisputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow\nit, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments\nof Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, \"But you are washed, but you are\nsanctified.\" Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): \"You are a chosen\ngeneration, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people.\"\nTherefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance\nthat unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an\nirreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or\ndishonor. Now as \"honor is in the person who honors and not in the\none who is honored\" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the\nperson who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the\nobject of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates\nthe sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Sacrilege Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not a special sin. It is\nstated (XVII, qu. iv) \"They are guilty of sacrilege who through\nignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it\nby their negligence.\" But this is done in every sin, because sin is\n\"a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God,\" according to\nAugustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general\nsin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of\nsin. Now sacrilege is comprised under different kinds of sin, for\ninstance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the\nviolation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place\nunder theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not\na special sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins\nas the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v,\n11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other\nsins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as\nstated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That which is opposed to a special virtue is a\nspecial sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely\nreligion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things.\nTherefore sacrilege is a special sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity,\nthere must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is\nderived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or\nsubject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity,\nnamely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently.\nHence it is a special sin.\n\nMoreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De\nFide Orth. iv, 3), \"When the purple has been made into a royal robe,\nwe pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned\nto death,\" as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man\nviolate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the\nreverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the\ndivine law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do.\nThese are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of\nsacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found\nin various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are\ndirected to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of\nvirtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin\na man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a\nsacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin\nmaterially.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins,\nthrough its act having no other deformity than the violation of a\nsacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a\nsacred place, for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Species of Sacrilege Are Distinguished According to the\nSacred Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not\ndistinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does\nnot differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now\nthere would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all\nviolations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of\nmatter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished\nthereby.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to\nthe same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now\nmurder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of\nsin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of\nsacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege\nare distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and\nnot according to the various sacred things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If,\ntherefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a\nsacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred\nperson is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the\nsinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according\nto the sacred things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Acts and habits are distinguished by their\nobjects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated\nabove (A. 1). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished\naccording to the sacred things.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the sin of sacrilege\nconsists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence\nis due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently\nthe species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the\ndifferent aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated\nirreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred\nthing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.\n\nNow holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those\nwho are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places\nand to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is\ndirected to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place.\nFor it is written (2 Macc. 5:19): \"God did not choose the people for\nthe place's sake, but the place for the people's sake.\" Hence\nsacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that\nwhich is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species\nthere are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of\nsacred persons and places.\n\nIn like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed\nagainst other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the\ndifferences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs\nto the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the\nsacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore\nthe sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest\nof all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the\nvessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also\nsacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons\nof the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these\ncome things connected with the apparel of the Church and its\nministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are\ndeputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any\none of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the\naforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a\nmaterial, but also a formal difference.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one\nspecies in one respect, and to different species in another respect.\nThus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, \"animal,\" but\ndiffer in the species \"colored thing,\" if one be white and the other\nblack. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ\nspecifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same\nspecies as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance,\nthe violation of a nun by blows or by copulation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege\nmaterially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation\nis from St. Bernard, De Consideration. ii, 13] says that \"a trifle on\na priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy.\" But formally and\nproperly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege\nonly when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a\nvirgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is\nto be said of other instances.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Punishment of Sacrilege Should Be Pecuniary?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should\nnot be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted\nfor a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it\nis punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii,\n13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not\nbe awarded a pecuniary punishment.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment,\naccording to Nahum 1:9, \"There shall not rise a double affliction.\"\nBut sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major\nexcommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or\ndestroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges.\nTherefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5): \"Neither have we\ntaken an occasion of covetousness.\" But it seems to involve an\noccasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be\nexacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not\nseem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis\ncontumax]: \"If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force\nan escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine\nhundred soldi\": and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis\ninventus, can. 21): \"Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay\nthirty pounds of tried purest silver.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In the award of punishments two points must be\nconsidered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just,\nand that \"by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be\ntormented\" (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of\none guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred\nthing, is excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis\ncontumax, quoted above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him.\nThe second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are\ninflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist\nfrom sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences\nnot sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by\nsacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them.\nWherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital\npunishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does\nnot inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is\ninflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least\nby temporal punishments.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but\nexcommunication in its stead.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man\nfrom sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was\nnecessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to\nthe punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who\ndespise spiritual things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this\nwould seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is\nexacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest\nutility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 100\n\nON SIMONY\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) What is simony?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments?\n\n(3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions?\n\n(4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals?\n\n(5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or\nalso oral remuneration or remuneration by service?\n\n(6) Of the punishment of simony.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Simony Is an Intentional Will to Buy or Sell Something\nSpiritual or Connected with a Spiritual Thing?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that simony is not \"an express will to buy\nor sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing.\"\nSimony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per\npecunias]): \"The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with\nhim impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who\nare guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained\nthat the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of\nGod, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own\nslave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether\nit be his slave or any other of his possessions.\" But unbelief, like\nfaith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above\n(Q. 10, A. 2). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of\nthe will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and\nthis is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an\nintentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of\nheaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory\nsays in a homily (v, in Ev.): \"The kingdom of heaven is worth as much\nas you possess.\" Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy\nsomething spiritual.\n\nObj. 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of\nwhom we read (Acts 8:18, 19) that \"he offered the apostles money\"\nthat he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, \"that on\nwhomsoever he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost.\"\nBut we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony\nis not the will to sell a spiritual thing.\n\nObj. 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides\nbuying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind of\nlegal compromise--Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that\nsimony is defined insufficiently.\n\nObj. 6: Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself\nspiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add \"or connected with\nspiritual things.\"\n\nObj. 7: Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony:\nyet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not\nthe will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a\nspiritual thing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus. I, qu. i, can.\nPresbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): \"None of the faithful is ignorant\nthat buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the\nheresy of simony.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2) an act is evil\ngenerically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is\nundue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because\na spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as\nit is said concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), \"she is more precious than\nall riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared\nwith her\": and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of\nSimon in its very source, said (Acts 8:20): \"Keep thy money to\nthyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift\nof God may be purchased with money.\"\n\nSecondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor\nis not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted (Obj.\n1). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of\nspiritual things, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, \"Let a man so account of\nus as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers\nof God.\"\n\nThirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things,\nsince they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord\nsaid (Matt. 10:8): \"Freely have you received, freely give.\"\n\nTherefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God\nand divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of\nirreligion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of\nfaith, without, sometimes, faith being in one's heart, so too the\nvices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief\nwithout, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is\nsaid to be a \"heresy,\" as regards the outward protestation, since by\nselling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way, that he is\nthe owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It must,\nhowever, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles\nto sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world\nwas not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states\n(Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are reckoned with\nother heretics, as appears from Augustine's book on heretics.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 58, A. 4), justice, with all its\nparts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its\nsubject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the\nwill. This act is furthermore described as \"express,\" in order to\nsignify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part\nin virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that\nsins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of\nthose things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated\nabove (Q. 14, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man\ngives what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term\n\"buying\" in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it\nreach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither\n\"the sufferings of this time,\" nor any gift or deed of ours, \"are\nworthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed\nin us\" (Rom. 8:18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an\noutward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in\norder that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii\n[*Can. Salvator]), that \"Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of\nthe Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling the\nsigns to be wrought by him.\" Hence those who sell spiritual things\nare likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish\nto buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate,\nin act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kings\n5:20-24) that he received money from the leper who was healed:\nwherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only\n\"simoniacs\" but also \"giezites.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: The terms \"buying\" and \"selling\" cover all kinds of\nnon-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange\nor agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by\nauthority of the parties concerned without danger of committing\nsimony, as laid down by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.;\ncap. Super, de Transact.]. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of\nhis office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or\nnecessary reasons.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives\nthrough being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are\nspiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while\nothers are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence\n(I, qu. iii, cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that \"spiritual\nthings do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has\nno bodily life without the body.\"\n\nReply Obj. 7: The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any\nother man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous is his\nsin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as\ndispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore,\nwere he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for\na spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of\nsimony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a\nlayman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Always Unlawful to Give Money for the Sacraments?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give\nmoney for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as\nwe shall state in the Third Part (Q. 68, A. 6; Q. 73, A. 3). But\nseemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism,\nfor instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child\nwithout being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or\nsell the sacraments.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist,\nwhich is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend\nor money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy\nor sell the other sacraments.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament\nconsisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money\nwhen absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always\nunlawful to buy or sell a sacrament.\n\nObj. 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be\nnot sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that \"it was\nno crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom.\" Now it\nis the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of\nbishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange\nfor the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that\nit is not unlawful.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously\nhinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But\nit is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is\nlawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a\nlike ecclesiastical dignity.\n\nObj. 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is\ngiven for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]):\n\"Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from\nthe priesthood.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most\nspiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on\nwhich no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with\na non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the\nministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support,\naccording to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), \"Know you not,\nthat they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the\nholy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?\"\n\nAccordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual\ngrace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be\nexcused by any custom whatever, since \"custom does not prevail over\nnatural or divine law\" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. I-II, Q.\n97, A. 3]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a\npecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the\nother hand, to receive anything for the support of those who\nadminister the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the\nChurch and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it\nis received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need.\nHence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, \"Let the priests that rule\nwell,\" says: \"They should look to the people for a supply to their\nneed, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since\nnowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize\nwithout being paid, one must act as though there were no priest\navailable for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the\nchild can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be\nbaptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water\nfrom the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it\nwere an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the\npriest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if\npossible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have\nrecourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and\nshould rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism\nof desire would supply the lack of the sacrament.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for\nconsecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would\nbe simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not the\nprice of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a\npunishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As stated above, \"custom does not prevail over natural\nor divine law\" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if\nsuch there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual\nthing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly\nsimoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling\nto pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized\nby custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention of\nbuying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and\nespecially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these\ncases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of\nsimony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess.\n5:22), \"From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of\none's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any\ndignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since\nthis would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing.\nBut it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust\nopposition, after one has already acquired that right.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia]\nsay that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace is\nconferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state\nin the Third Part of the work [* Supp., Q. 42, A. 3]. Wherefore we\nmust reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but\nalso an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for\nMatrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be\nconsidered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law\n[*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand\nanything for the Nuptial Blessing.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 3]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Give and Receive Money for Spiritual Actions?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for\nspiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But\nsomething used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears\nfrom 1 Kings 9:7, 8, and 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that\nit is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual\nactions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the\nassistance of their prayers, according to Luke 16:9, \"Make unto you\nfriends of the mammon of iniquity.\" To preachers also, who sow\nspiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1\nCor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the\ndivine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions:\nand sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is\nlawful to receive something for spiritual actions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is\nlawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may\nsell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a\nmaster the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it\nwould seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of\nhis spiritual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and\nso forth.\n\nObj. 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now\nin certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are\nreceived there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for\nspiritual things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid\ninvisibilis]): \"It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what\nis acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by\ndemanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever.\" Now all\nthese spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace.\nTherefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because\nthey confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are\ncalled spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose\nthereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of\nmen, according to 1 Cor. 9:7, \"Who serveth as a soldier at any time\nat his own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk\nof the flock?\" Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is\nspiritual in such like actions; but to receive or give something for\nthe support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with\nthe statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in\nsuch wise that there be no intention of buying or selling, and that\nno pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by\nwithholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then\nthere would be an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual\nthings have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary\nofferings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling\nbut able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, certain\ngifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood,\nbut not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked\nprophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from\nthem the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of\nbuying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the\npoor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity.\nTemporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not\nas a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11,\n\"Let the priests that rule well,\" says: \"Their need allows them to\nreceive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be\ngiven to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood\nthe object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they\nsell a great thing for a contemptible price.\" In like manner temporal\nthings are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine\noffice whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as\na means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms\nare received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal\nto do such things by contract, or with the intention of buying or\nselling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed\nin any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless\na certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would\npreclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The\nordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed\nthat this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms,\nbecause this would not preclude its being granted to others.\nMoreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction,\nwhereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is\nbound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him\nin dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory\npayment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood.\nTherefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his\nspiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which\nhe is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has\naccepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this\nreason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing\nwhatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for\ncorrecting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the\nother hand it is lawful for him to receive \"procurations,\" when he\nvisits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a\nmeans of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having\ntaken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of\nothers can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since\nthis is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on\nthe other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would\namount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin\ngrievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed\nto instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and\nare in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not\nallowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for\ncelebrating or omitting any feasts.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price\nfor entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that\nare unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance\nto the monastery is free, to accept something for the support of\nthose who are about to be received into the monastery, if its\nrevenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier\nin admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for\nthat monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other\nhand, it is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by\nmeans of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced\nto enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or\nreceive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam\npio).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Receive Money for Things Annexed to Spiritual\nThings?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed\nto spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to\nspiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the\nsake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what\nis annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything\ntemporal, and this is clearly false.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual\nthings than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice\nfor the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28).\nTherefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of\nburial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right\nof the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised\nthe priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham\nbought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gen. 23:8,\nsqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gen.\n25:31, sqq.). Again the right of patronage is transferred with the\nproperty sold, and is granted \"in fee.\" Tithes are granted to certain\nsoldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for\nthemselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the\npresentation, although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual\nthing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual\nthings.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii,\ncap. Si quis objecerit): \"Whoever sells one of two such things, that\nthe one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold.\nWherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything\necclesiastical.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two\nways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have\necclesiastical benefices is said to be annexed to spiritual things,\nbecause it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office.\nHence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things.\nConsequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because\nthe sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things\nare annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto, for\ninstance the right of patronage, which is directed to the\npresentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred\nvessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore\nsuch things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede\nthem in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not\nas annexed to spiritual things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as\nto their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but\ntheir relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful\nsale.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as\nto their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their\nmaterial can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor\nprovided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them,\nsince when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred\nvessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made out\nof the same material they would have to be consecrated again.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We have no authority for supposing that the double cave\nwhich Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that\npurpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used\nfor burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be\nlawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even\na church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places\nare looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price\nas payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham\ndid not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary\nplot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell\nor buy land on which there has previously been a church, as we have\nalso said with regard to sacred vessels (Reply Obj. 2). Or again,\nAbraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a\ngrievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for\nnothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without\nprejudice to himself.\n\nThe right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's\nchoice, according to Malach. 1:2, 3, \"I have loved Jacob, but have\nhated Esau.\" Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet\nJacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed\nhimself of his grievance.\n\nThe right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can\nit be granted \"in fee,\" but is transferred with the property sold or\ngranted.\n\nThe spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk,\nbut merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of\ntithe, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 3).\n\nWith regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be\nobserved, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a\nperson to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of\nthe revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some\npious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of\nthe revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary,\nit would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he\nwould not escape the guilt of simony.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 5]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Grant Spiritual Things in Return for an\nEquivalent of Service, or for an Oral Remuneration?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual\nthings in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral\nremuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): \"It is right that\nthose who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded.\" Now\nan equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church.\nTherefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for\nservices received.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service\nreceived seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so\non account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal\nsince it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the\nformer simoniacal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is done only at another's request would\nseem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve\nsimony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration\ndenotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's\nrequest. Therefore this is not simoniacal.\n\nObj. 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that\nthey may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral\nremuneration: and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony.\nTherefore oral remuneration does not entail simony.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says:\n\"Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the\npurpose for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in\nconsideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service\nrendered or money received, is guilty of simony.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the term \"money\" denotes\n\"anything that can have a pecuniary value.\" Now it is evident that a\nman's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a\npecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage.\nTherefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be\nrendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or\npromised, at which that service could be valued. Likewise, to grant a\nperson's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to\nsome kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just\nas a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any\nexternal thing which comes under the head of \"real remuneration,\" so\ntoo does he contract it, by receiving \"oral remuneration\" or an\n\"equivalent in service rendered.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service,\ndirected to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or\nbenefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical\nbenefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the\nservice, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is\nnot a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has\nin mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things\n(e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his\nkindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a\ncase of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by\nreason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal,\nbut not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it\ndoes not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is\nbased. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the\nunderstanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred from the\nrevenue is manifest simony.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that\npertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby\nman's favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend\nthis chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an\nunworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention\nwherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made\nfor a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is\nbased on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is\ngranted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there\nmay be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of\nthe person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for\nhimself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption\nrenders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy\nperson. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an\necclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for\nthe sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false\npretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that\nseemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Those Who Are Guilty of Simony Are Fittingly Punished by\nBeing Deprived of What They Have Acquired by Simony?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are\nnot fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired\nby simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in\nreturn for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be\nlost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by\na consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person\nto be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the\nepiscopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from\nhim: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church\ntolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the\npower to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power,\nif he has acquired it by simony.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done without\nhis knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is\nvoluntary, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2; Q. 77, A. 7).\nNow it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual,\nwhich others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent.\nTherefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has\nbeen bestowed on him.\n\nObj. 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a\nperson who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to\nrestore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit\nof those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate\nand his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that\nwhich has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.\n\nObj. 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery\nby simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one\nshould be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he\nhas committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic\nstate which he has acquired by simony.\n\nObj. 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted\nfor the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the\njudge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will,\nwherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above (A.\n1, ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he\nhas acquired by simony.\n\nObj. 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than\nto retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those\nwho are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater\ndignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they\nhave received.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus):\n\"He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination\nor promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit\nthe dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ No one can lawfully retain that which he has\nacquired against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to\ngive some of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will\nand orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received.\nNow Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of\nchurches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, according to\nMatt. 10:8, \"Freely have you received, freely give.\" Wherefore\nwhosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration\ncannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who are guilty of\nsimony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as\nthose who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments,\nnamely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and\nexcommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis\nEpiscopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].\n\nReply Obj. 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally,\nreceives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the\nsacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the\nOrder, because he has received the character by stealth as it were,\nand against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended,\nby virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should\nnot busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others,\nnamely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his\nOrder, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the\nmoney which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains\nit.\n\nAgain, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders\nsimoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a\nbenefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal\ntransaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of\nthe law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in\nsecret he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself\nalone, and not as regards others.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows\nto have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command\nor for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from\nhim do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are\nignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a\ndispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive\nOrders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be\nguilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order\nwithout a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement,\nbecause no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with\nhim in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law,\nsuspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders\nunlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with him, by\nreceiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be\nnot certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another's\nsin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from\nhim. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a\nsimoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive\nOrders from him because he is not suspended as regards others, but\nonly as regards himself, as stated above (ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not only the\npunishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring\nunjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it.\nWherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or\nan ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of\nwhat he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and\nresigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in\naddition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy.\nMoreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually\nacquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful\npossessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits,\nallowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits),\nexcepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the\nChurch.\n\nOn the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by\nothers, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise\nof his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together\nwith fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits\nwhich he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith.\nException must be made in the case when his promotion has been\ndeceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes\nthe transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless\nsubsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must\nbe restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer,\nnotwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter\nof that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers\nby his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the\nguilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire\nchapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of\nsuperior authority, either to the poor or to some other church.\n\nReply Obj. 5: If there are any persons who have been simoniacally\nadmitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was\ncommitted with their knowledge since the holding of the General\nCouncil [*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III],\nthey must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return,\nand do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of\nthe same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this\ntook place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of\nthe same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into\nmonasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they\nwander about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former\nrank, and must be assigned a lower place.\n\nOn the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their\nknowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting\nthey may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of\nsimony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is\nnot punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound\nto repent of his evil intention.\n\nReply Obj. 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has\nknowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the\nbishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all\nrenounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive\neither the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the\nlaity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to\nretain his order in some other Church; or again a greater\ndispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor\norders; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the\nmajor orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 101\n\nOF PIETY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nAfter religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which\nwill render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of\ninquiry arise with regard to piety:\n\n(1) To whom does piety extend?\n\n(2) What does piety make one offer a person?\n\n(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?\n\n(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of\nreligion?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Piety Extends to Particular Human Individuals?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human\nindividuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes,\nproperly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by\nthe term _eusebeia_. But the worship of God does not denote relation\nto man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely\nto certain human individuals.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): \"Piety, on her day,\nprovides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the\nheart with works of mercy.\" Now the works of mercy are to be done to\nall, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety\ndoes not extend definitely to certain special persons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual\nrelations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11, 12), and on each of them is\nfounded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of\npiety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, \"Having an appearance\nindeed of piety [Douay: 'godliness'].\" Therefore piety extends not\nonly to one's kindred and fellow-citizens.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that \"it is by\npiety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our\ncountry and render them faithful service.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways,\naccording to their various excellence and the various benefits\nreceived from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is\nsupremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and\ngovernment. In the second place, the principles of our being and\ngovernment are our parents and our country, that have given us birth\nand nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents\nand his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion\nto give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second\nplace, to give worship to one's parents and one's country.\n\nThe worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our\nkindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same\nparents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship\ngiven to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and\nto all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to\nthese.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship\ndue to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular.\nHence it is written (Malach. 1:6): \"If I be a father, where is My\nhonor?\" Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine\nworship.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), \"the term piety is\noften used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the\ncommon people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that\nGod Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him\nthan sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word\n'pious' to God Himself.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and\nfellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being\nthan other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to\nthem.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Piety Provides Support for Our Parents?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our\nparents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, \"Honor thy\nfather and mother,\" belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the\ngiving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide\nsupport for one's parents.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound\nto support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), \"neither\nought the children to lay up for the parents.\" Therefore piety does\nnot oblige them to support their parents.\n\nObj. 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also to\nother kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above (A. 1).\nBut one is not bound to support all one's kindred and\nfellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's\nparents.\n\n_On the contrary,_ our Lord (Matt. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for\nhindering children from supporting their parents.\n\n_I answer that,_ We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is\nto say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially\nthat which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's\nsuperior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes\nhim reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father,\nwhich it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to\nhim, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children\nshould visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting\nthat they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of\nwhich come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De\nInvent. Rhet. ii) that \"piety gives both duty and homage\": \"duty\"\nreferring to service, and \"homage\" to reverence or honor, because, as\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei x), \"we are said to give homage to those\nwhose memory or presence we honor.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Matt. 15:3-6)\nthe honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them;\nand the reason for this is that support is given to one's father\nbecause it is due to him as to one greater.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and\nhis son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is\nessentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently\nhe is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life,\nand this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow\nsomething on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary\nnecessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as\nfor a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the\nsuccessors of their children, but children of their parents.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), \"we offer homage\nand duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country\";\nnot, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to\nothers according to our means and their personal claims.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Piety Is a Special Virtue Distinct from Other Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct\nfrom other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone\nproceeds from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a\ndistinct virtue from charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God. But\npiety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei\nx). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty,\nseems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common\ngood. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as\na part of justice.\n\n_I answer that,_ A special virtue is one that regards an object under\na special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in\nrendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect\nof something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing\nis indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural\nprinciple of being and government. And piety regards this principle,\ninasmuch as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and\nto those who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope and\ncharity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is\na protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God is the principle of our being and government in a\nfar more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence\nreligion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from\npiety, which pays homage to our parents and country. But things\nrelating to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of\nexcellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore,\nby way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as\nGod, by way of excellence, is called \"Our Father.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is\nfor us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the good of\nour country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal justice\nhas more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Duties of Piety Towards One's Parents Should Be Omitted\nfor the Sake of Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents\nshould be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Luke\n14:26): \"If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother,\nand wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own\nlife also, he cannot be My disciple.\" Hence it is said in praise of\nJames and John (Matt. 4:22) that they left \"their nets and father,\nand followed\" Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites\n(Deut. 33:9): \"Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do\nnot know you; and to his brethren: I know you not; and their own\nchildren they have not known. These have kept Thy word.\" Now a man\nwho knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even hates them,\nmust needs omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety\nshould be omitted for the sake of religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Luke 9:59, 60) that in answer to him\nwho said: \"Suffer me first to go and bury my father,\" Our Lord\nreplied: \"Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the\nkingdom of God.\" Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a\nduty of piety to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should\nbe omitted for the sake of religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God is called \"Our Father\" by excellence. Now just\nas we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do we\nworship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be\nomitted for the sake of the worship of religion.\n\nObj. 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not\nbreak to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with\nthose observances they are hindered from supporting their parents,\nboth on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own,\nand on the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister\nwithout the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of\npiety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of\nreligion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Matt. 15:3-6) who\ntaught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying\none's parents the honor we owe them.\n\n_I answer that,_ Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is\nopposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his\nbook on the Categories (Cap. De oppos.), \"good is not opposed to\ngood.\" Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually\nhinder one another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of\nthe other. Now, as stated above (I-II, Q. 7, A. 2; Q. 18, A. 3), the\nact of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and\nif it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of\nvice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's\nparents according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that\nman should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as\nAmbrose says on Luke 12:52, \"the piety of divine religion takes\nprecedence of the claims of kindred.\"\n\nAccordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the\nworship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship\nto one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad\nHeliod.): \"Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy\nmother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of\nthe cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this\nmatter.\" Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's\nparents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives\nto God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we\nare not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of\npiety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of\nreligion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom.\nxxxvii in Ev.) that \"when we find our parents to be a hindrance in\nour way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them.\"\nFor if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service\nof God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is\nin this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their\nkindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the\nidolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their\nparents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to\nevil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another\nmeans of livelihood, if they followed Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father\nbecause, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), \"Our Lord\nby so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and\nworries and other things that one anticipates under these\ncircumstances. For after the burial the will had to be read, the\nestate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because there\nwere others who could see to the funeral.\" Or, according to Cyril's\ncommentary on Luke 9, \"this disciple's request was, not that he might\nbury a dead father, but that he might support a yet living father in\nthe latter's old age, until at length he should bury him. This is\nwhat Our Lord did not grant, because there were others, bound by the\nduties of kindred, to take care of him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred\nby us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform with\nregard to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to Matt.\n25:40: \"As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you did\nit to Me.\" Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our\nassistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided\nthey incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for\nthe sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their\nservice without sin, or if they can be supported without our\nassistance, it is lawful to forego their service, so as to give more\ntime to religion.\n\nReply Obj. 4: We must speak differently of one who is yet in the\nworld, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he\nthat is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support\nwithout him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he\nwould be breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of\nparents. Some say, however, that even then he might abandon them, and\nleave them in God's care. But this, considered aright, would be to\ntempt God: since, while having human means at hand, he would be\nexposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's assistance. On\nthe other hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood without\nhim, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter religion, because\nchildren are not bound to support their parents except in cases of\nnecessity, as stated above. He that has already made his profession\nin religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: wherefore he\nought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the\ncloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more\nwith worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience\nto his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make points\nefforts for his parents' support.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 102\n\nOF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of\nwhich will manifest the contrary vices.\n\nUnder the head of observance there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other\nvirtues?\n\n(2) What does observance offer?\n\n(3) Of its comparison with piety.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Observance Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Other Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue,\ndistinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their\nobjects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object\nof piety: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that \"it is by\nobservance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some\nkind of dignity.\" But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our\nparents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct\nvirtue from piety.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are\nin a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in\nscience and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay\nhonor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore\nobservance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in\ndignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a\nposition of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law,\naccording to Rom. 13:7, \"Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute\nto whom tribute is due,\" etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements\nof the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice.\nTherefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from\nother virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance\nalong with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ As explained above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 3; Q. 80),\naccording to the various excellences of those persons to whom\nsomething is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of\nvirtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes\nof the character of principle in a particular way, which character is\nfound in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way,\nexercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of\nfather in a particular way, since a father is the principle of\ngeneration, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the\nperfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of\ndignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain\nthings: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the\ncommander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of\nlearning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are\ndesignated as \"fathers,\" on account of their being charged with like\ncares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4 Kings 5:13):\n\"Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing,\" etc.\n\nTherefore, just as, in a manner, beneath religion, whereby worship is\ngiven to God, we find piety, whereby we worship our parents; so under\npiety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to\npersons in positions of dignity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 3, ad 2), religion goes by\nthe name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so\ncalled is distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be\ncalled observance by way of excellence, although observance properly\nspeaking is distinct from piety.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a\nman not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain\npower of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should\nbe considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of\nothers. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of\nscience and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in\nrelation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself.\nWherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship\nand honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as\nscience, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of\ndignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any\nexcellence whatever belongs to the same virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to\npay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot\nbe done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their\nposition of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our\nparents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and\nnot to special justice, which is a principal virtue.\n\nLegal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above\n(Q. 58, A. 6).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Belongs to Observance to Pay Worship and Honor to Those\nWho Are in Positions of Dignity?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay\nworship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according\nto Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons\nwhom we hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the\nsame. Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying\nworship and honor to persons in positions of dignity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe:\nwherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of\njustice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in\npositions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us.\nTherefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and\nhonor to all.\n\nObj. 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who\nare placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of\nremuneration, according to Rom. 13:7, \"Render . . . to all men their\ndues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to\nwhom fear; honor to whom honor.\" Moreover, we owe them reverence and\nsubjection, according to Heb. 13:17, \"Obey your prelates, and be\nsubject to them.\" Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as\npaying worship and honor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that \"it is by\nobservance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some\nkind of dignity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to\ngovern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due\nend: thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every\nmover has a certain excellence and power over that which is moved.\nWherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold\nconsideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position,\ntogether with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the\nexercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due\nto him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence;\nand in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him\nworship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his\ncommands, and by repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the\nbenefits we received from him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever\nother suitable actions are connected with the relations between man\nand man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 80), debt is twofold. One is legal\ndebt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor\nand worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed\nover him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a\ncertain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to\npersons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions\nof dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to\nthem on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise\nof their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are\nmoved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a\nrepayment of their labor.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Observance Is a Greater Virtue Than Piety?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety.\nFor the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a\nfather who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular\ngovernor; because the household which a father governs is part of the\nstate which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is\ngreater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance\nis a greater virtue than piety.\n\nObj. 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the\ncommon good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we\nought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy\nto expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common\ngood. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in\npositions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays\nworship to one's kindred.\n\nObj. 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the\nfirst place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the\nvirtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3).\nTherefore observance takes the first place after religion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue.\nNow, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the\nfirst table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers\nto piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the\norder of excellence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Something may be paid to persons in positions of\ndignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when\none serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state.\nThis no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays\nworship not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland.\nSecondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity\nrefers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this\nbelongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in\ncomparing observance with piety we must needs take into consideration\nthe different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves,\nwhich relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the\npersons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin\nto us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and\neducation, which originate in the father, belong more to one's\nsubstance than external government, the principle of which is seated\nin those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes\nprecedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more\nakin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The prince is compared to the father as a universal to\na particular power, as regards external government, but not as\nregards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way\nthe father should be compared with the divine power from which all\nthings derive their being.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are\nrelated to the common good, their worship does not pertain to\nobservance, but to piety, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be\nproportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered\nin himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore,\nthough virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of\nhonor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a\ngreater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received\nfrom their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay\nworship and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are\nnot of their kindred.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 103\n\nOF DULIA\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider\n(1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto\nto those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey\ntheir commands.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?\n\n(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?\n\n(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are\nabove us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?\n\n(4) Whether it contains several species?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Honor Denotes Something Corporal?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal.\nFor honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be\ngathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is\nsomething spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated\nabove (Q. 81, A. 2, ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), \"honor\nis the reward of virtue.\" Now, since virtue consists chiefly of\nspiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the\nreward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not\nconsist of corporal things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from glory.\nNow praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor\nconsists of things internal and spiritual.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, \"Honor\nwidows that are widows indeed,\" and (1 Tim. 5:17), \"let the priests\nthat rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor\" etc. says (Ep. ad\nAgeruch.): \"Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for\nremuneration.\" Now both of these pertain to [corporal] things.\nTherefore honor consists of corporal things.\n\n_I answer that,_ Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence.\nTherefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their\nexcellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now\nwitness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is\nthe searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices.\nwherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere\ninternal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges\neither God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But,\nas regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs,\neither by words, as when one proclaims another's excellence by word\nof mouth, or by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so\nforth, or by external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues,\nand the like. Accordingly honor consists of signs, external and\ncorporal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand\nit is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one man\nhonors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other\nhand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in\norder that he may be held in reverence by others.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is\nnot a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal\nthings can be greater than honor, since these corporal things\nthemselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling\nvirtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they\nmay be made known, according to Matt. 5:15, \"Neither do men light a\ncandle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it\nmay shine to all that are in the house.\" In this sense honor is said\nto be the reward of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways.\nFirst, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor\nconsists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor.\nSecondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a\nperson's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we\nbear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise\none that works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even\nto the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived\nat the end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).\n\nGlory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our\nbearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes\nclear to the knowledge of many. The word \"glory\" signifies this, for\n\"glory\" is the same as _kleria_, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on\nRom. 16:27 observes that glory is \"clear knowledge together with\npraise.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Honor Is Properly Due to Those Who Are Above Us?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are\nabove us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to\nMatt. 11:11, \"He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater\nthan John the Baptist.\" Yet an angel forbade John when the latter\nwished to honor him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to\nthose who are above us.\n\nObj. 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his\nvirtue, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 63, A. 3). But sometimes those who\nare above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as\nneither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the\norder of nature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10): \"With honor\npreventing one another,\" and we read (1 Pet. 2:17): \"Honor all men.\"\nBut this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are\nabove us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above\nus.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias \"had ten\ntalents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king\": and\nwe read (Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered\nit to be proclaimed in his presence: \"This honor is he worthy of whom\nthe king hath a mind to honor.\" Therefore honor is paid to those also\nwho are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not\ndue properly to those who are above us.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that \"honor is\ndue to the best.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), honor is nothing but an\nacknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's\nexcellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor\nhim, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in\nitself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is\nalways due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.\n\nFor the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those\nwho honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some\nothers, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in\nsome respect and not simply.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of\nhonor, but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God. Or\nagain, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate\nthe dignity of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to the\nangels \"according to the hope of glory of the children of God\":\nwherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he were superior\nto him.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of\nhis virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and because\nthe honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he\npresides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and\nshould be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In every man is to be found something that makes it\npossible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3,\n\"In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves,\" and\nthus, too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not\nthat they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of\nsome excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and\nMardochaeus were honored by kings.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Dulia Is a Special Virtue Distinct from Latria?\n\nObjection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct\nfrom latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, \"O Lord my God, in Thee have I\nput my trust,\" says: \"Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due;\nGod by creation, to Whom we owe latria.\" Now the virtue directed to\nGod as Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as\nGod. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), \"to\nbe loved is like being honored.\" Now the charity with which we love\nGod is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia\nwhereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria\nwith which we honor God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image\nis the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing\nrepresented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made\nto the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. 2:22, 23)\nthat \"they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man\nincorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him.\"\nTherefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is\nhonored.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that \"the homage\ndue to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to\nobey their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct\nfrom latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of\nGod.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 101, A.\n3), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there\nmust needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude\nis due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is\ncompetent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has\nabsolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly,\nwhich is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a\ncertain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a\nparticular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which\npays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria,\nwhich pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a\nspecies of observance, because by observance we honor all those who\nexcel in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of\nservants for their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence,\ninasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria\nis called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by\nway of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to\ncreate by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss\ndrew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of\ncreation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in\nrespect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that\nwhich we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore\nthe charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we\nlove our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from\ncharity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In\nlike manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another\nfor serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and\ndulia are not the same virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to the\nthing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an\nimage is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes\nthe movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to\nthe thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of\ndulia regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in\nrespect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God,\nyet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this\nto God actually.\n\nOr we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a\nfashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need\nnot be towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the\nimage of God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the\nreverence that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to\nHis image.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Dulia Has Various Species?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we\nshow honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under\ndifferent aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in\nthe object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia\nis divided into specifically different virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes, as\npale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a\nmean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures\nhaving a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin\nas being the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are\ndifferent species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other\nhyperdulia.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image\nof God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational\ncreature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted\nby an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we\nmust distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the\nmore since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for\ninstance, to the wood of the Holy Cross.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not\ndivided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.\n\n_I answer that,_ Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be\ntaken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account\nof any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and\nobservance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards\na man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically\nfrom one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as\ndenoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies\nservitude, as stated above (A. 3). Taken in this sense it is not\ndivided into different species, but is one of the species of\nobservance, mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason\nthat a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his\ncommanding officer under another, the disciple his master under\nanother, and so on in similar cases.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a\nwide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a\nman by reason of his having an affinity to God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational\ncreature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are\nnaturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay\nto it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's\nrobe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to\nDamascene (De Fide Orth. iv).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 104\n\nOF OBEDIENCE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?\n\n(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?\n\n(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;\n\n(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?\n\n(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?\n\n(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 1]\n\nWhether One Man Is Bound to Obey Another?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For\nnothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has\nso ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus.\n15:14, \"God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of\nhis own counsel.\" Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have\nto look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule\nof conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule of\nhuman conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it\nacceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous.\nTherefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good\ndeeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less\nacceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is\nnot bound to obey another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): \"Obey your prelates\nand be subject to them.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as the actions of natural things proceed from\nnatural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In\nnatural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their\nactions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by\nGod: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by\ntheir will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move\nby reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the\ndivinely established natural order the lower natural things need to\nbe subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in\nvirtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to\nobey their superiors.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as\nthough it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because,\nunlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity\nto do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding\nfrom his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own\ncounsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying\nhis superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), \"When we humbly give\nway to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational\nwills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than\nanother, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of\nthe one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will\nof this other man who obeys him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one\nway on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound\nto do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it\nof his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy\nand meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will.\nWherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt\nwill, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially\nbefore God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward\nwill.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q, 104, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Obedience Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For\ndisobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general\nsin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that \"sin is to disobey\nthe divine law.\" Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral.\nBut obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised\nunder faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does\nnot hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more\nobedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a\nspecial virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience is the\nmore meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own.\" But\nevery special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its\nown, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as\nstated in _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their\nobjects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of\na superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there\nare degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue,\ncomprising many special virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of\njustice, as stated above (Q. 80).\n\n_I answer that,_ A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that\nhave a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to\nrender a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance\nwith the divinely established order of things, as shown above (A. 1),\nand therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and\norder, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. First Part, Q.\n5, A. 5]. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by\nreason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations\ntowards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their\ncommands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience\nis a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or\nexpress, because the superior's will, however it become known, is a\ntacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt,\nforasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as\nhe understands his superior's will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object from\nadmitting two special aspects to which two special virtues\ncorrespond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils\nboth an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good\nend, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord.\nAccordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs\nin acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all\nacts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96,\nA. 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept,\nand pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not\nevil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be\ntaken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally\nthe aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience\na special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that\none perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the\nintention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one\ntreat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if\nobedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action\nthat may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of\nthat action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a\ngeneral virtue, and disobedience a general sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct\nobject is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed\nor inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his\nwill, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to\nTitus 3:1, \"Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a\nword,\" etc.\n\nIt is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it\nobserves the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is\nmeasured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in\nso far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein\nhe ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q.\n92, A. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the\nperson who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person\nwho does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,\n4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of\nhim who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds\nin fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the\nsuperior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way\nobedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was\nstated above concerning justice (Q. 58, A. 10).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Obedience, like every virtue, requires the will to be\nprompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is\nrepugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and\nthis proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience makes a man's\nwill prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of\nthe precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for\nits own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable\nmatters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to\ncomply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own\nwill. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own\nsake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as\nhappens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is\nnot fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says\n(Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds\nits own in agreeable matters,\" because, to wit, one's own will seems\nto tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to\nthe fulfilment of one's own desire; but that \"it increases in\ndisagreeable or difficult matters,\" because there one's own will\ntends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as\nregards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the\njudgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in\nagreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless\npraiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less\ndevotedly [*Cf. Q. 82, A. 2] to the fulfilment of the precept.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Reverence regards directly the person that excels:\nwherefore it admits a various species according to the various\naspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the\nprecept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one\naspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account\nof reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one\nspecies, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Obedience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues.\nFor it is written (1 Kings 15:22): \"Obedience is better than\nsacrifices.\" Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion,\nwhich is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above (Q. 81, A.\n6). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience is the\nonly virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when\ningrafted.\" Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore\nobedience is greater than all the virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"evil should never\nbe done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we\nshould lay aside the good we are doing.\" Now one does not lay aside a\nthing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose\nsake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other\nvirtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from\ncharity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience should be\npracticed, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not\nthrough fear of punishment, but through love of justice.\" Therefore\ncharity is a greater virtue than obedience.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as sin consists in man contemning God and\nadhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists\nin man contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now\nthe end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore\nif a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God,\nhis virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from\nhis contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological,\nvirtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the\nmoral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in\norder to adhere to God.\n\nAmong the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns\nthat he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are\nthree kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The\nlowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the\nmiddle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among\nthese the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will,\nman makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the\nvirtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake,\nis more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn\nother goods for the sake of God.\n\nHence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience is rightly preferred\nto sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas\nby obedience we slay our own will.\" Wherefore even any other acts of\nvirtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of\nobedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to\ngive all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to\nthe fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to\nobedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if\nthey were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from\nobedience. For it is written (1 John 2:4, 5): \"He who saith that he\nknoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he\nthat keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is\nperfected\": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship\nand honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under\ndifferent virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the\naspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far\nas it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a\nway, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence\nfor one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it\nproceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and\npertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion.\nWherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God\nthan to offer sacrifice, as well as because, \"in a sacrifice we slay\nanother's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will,\" as\nGregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel\nspoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer\nin sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the\ncommandment of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a\nprecept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue\nact causally or dispositively towards their generation and\npreservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues.\nAnd yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all\nvirtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of\nvirtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of\nvirtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if\nthere be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept,\nthat virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue\nis faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine\nauthority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to\nGod. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede,\neven in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience\nis not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to\nwhich we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so\nforth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of\nobedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of\nnecessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake\nof obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to\ndo good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), \"he\nwho forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many\nothers, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from\nstarvation, through being deprived of every good.\" Thus the loss of\none good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 4]\n\nWhether God Ought to Be Obeyed in All Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For\nit is written (Matt. 9:30, 31) that our Lord after healing the two\nblind men commanded them, saying: \"See that no man know this. But\nthey going out spread His fame abroad in all that country.\" Yet they\nare not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound\nto obey God in all things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue.\nNow we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue:\nthus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. 22); and the\nJews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which things\nare contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was\nan adulteress (Osee 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore\nGod is not to be obeyed in all things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine\nwill even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things\nto conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey\nGod in all things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 24:7): \"All things that the\nLord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), he who obeys is moved by the\ncommand of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by\ntheir motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things\nthat are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills,\nas shown above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 6). Therefore just as all natural\nthings are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too\nall wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the\ndivine command.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the\nmiracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine\nprecept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), \"gave an example to His\nservants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and\nyet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that\nothers might profit by their example.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since \"the\nnature of a thing is what God does therein,\" according to a gloss on\nRom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course\nof nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue since\nvirtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with\nGod's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to\nthe wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to\nAbraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since\nGod is the author of life and death. Nor again was it contrary to\njustice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the\nEgyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He\nwill. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take\nan adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human\ngeneration, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that\nwhich He appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons aforesaid did\nnot sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey Him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God wills,\nyet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes\nto man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man is\nbound to obey God's commands in all things.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Subjects Are Bound to Obey Their Superiors in All Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors\nin all things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): \"Children, obey your\nparents in all things,\" and farther on (Col. 3:22): \"Servants, obey\nin all things your masters according to the flesh.\" Therefore in like\nmanner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects,\naccording to Deut. 5:5, \"I was the mediator and stood between the\nLord and you at that time, to show you His words.\" Now there is no\ngoing from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands\nbetween. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the\ncommands of God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): \"You . . .\nreceived me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus\" and (1 Thess.\n2:13): \"When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God,\nyou received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the\nword of God.\" Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so\nis he bound to obey his superiors.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take\nvows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a\nreligious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things.\nTherefore he is also bound to obey in all things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 5:29): \"We ought to obey God\nrather than men.\" Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior\nare against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all\nthings.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 4), he who obeys is moved at\nthe bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of\njustice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its\nmover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by\nits mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance\narising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not\nburnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly,\nthrough lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since,\nthough it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is\nnot subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes\nsubject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as\nregards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two\nreasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in\nall things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as\na gloss says on Rom. 13:2, \"They that resist [Vulg.: 'He that\nresisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of God\" (cf. St.\nAugustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). \"If a commissioner issue an order,\nare you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul?\nAgain if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another,\nwill you hesitate to disregard the former and serve the latter?\nTherefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must\ndisregard the former and obey God.\" Secondly, a subject is not bound\nto obey his superior if the latter command him to do something\nwherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis\niii): \"It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man:\nfor the better part of him is excepted.\" His body is subjected and\nassigned to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in\nmatters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound\nto obey his fellow-man, but God alone.\n\nNevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have\nto be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature\nall men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters\ntouching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to\nthe support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore\nservants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their\nparents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in\nthe state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the\ndisposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his\nsuperior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier\nmust obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his\nmaster in matters touching the execution of the duties of his\nservice, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his\nlife and the care of the household; and so forth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When the Apostle says \"in all things,\" he refers to\nmatters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all things,\nboth internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all\nthings. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their\nsuperiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a\nparticular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God\nand his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is\nimmediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or\nby the written law.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of\nlife, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors:\nwherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may\nbelong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for\nsalvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this\nwill belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however,\nsuch things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for\nobedience in this case would be unlawful.\n\nAccordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient\nfor salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey:\nsecondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful:\nthirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Christians Are Bound to Obey the Secular Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the\nsecular power. For a gloss on Matt. 17:25, \"Then the children are\nfree,\" says: \"If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds\nsway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King,\nunder Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom.\"\nNow Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of God,\naccording to John 1:12: \"He gave them power to be made the sons of\nGod, to them that believe in His name.\" Therefore they are not bound\nto obey the secular power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): \"You . . . are become dead\nto the law by the body of Christ,\" and the law mentioned here is the\ndivine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are\nsubject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law\nof the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become\nmembers of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection,\nwhereby they were under the power of secular princes.\n\nObj. 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them\nwith violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): \"Without\njustice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?\" Since therefore\nthe authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with\ninjustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems\nthat Christians ought not to obey secular princes.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Titus 3:1): \"Admonish them to be\nsubject to princes and powers,\" and (1 Pet. 2:13, 14): \"Be ye subject\n. . . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the\nking as excelling, or to governors as sent by him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice,\naccording to Rom. 3:22, \"The justice of God by faith of Jesus\nChrist:\" wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of\njustice, but strengthens it. Now the order of justice requires that\nsubjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs\nwould cease. Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from\nthe obligation of obeying secular princes.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 5), subjection whereby one man is\nbound to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its\nliberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of\nChrist from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as\nthe Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that in his\nmind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin.\nWherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from\nthe spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage,\nwhereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes\non 1 Tim. 6:1, \"Whosoever are servants under the yoke,\" etc.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and\ntherefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison\nwith human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to\nanother. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this\nis required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority\nis not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his\nsubjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in\norder to avoid scandal or danger.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 105\n\nOF DISOBEDIENCE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 105, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Disobedience Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For\nevery sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition\ngiven above (Q. 104, A. 2, Obj. 1). Therefore if disobedience were a\nmortal sin, every sin would be mortal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is born\nof vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is\ndisobedience.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not\nfulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many\ncommands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them.\nTherefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man\ncannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is\nnot a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned\n(Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5;\nI-II, Q. 88, A. 1), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity\nwhich is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and\nour neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His\ncommandments, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). Therefore to be\ndisobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is\ncontrary to the love of God.\n\nAgain, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to\nsuperiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior\nis a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to\nRom. 13:2, \"He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of\nGod.\" It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it\nwithdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is\nhis due.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin,\nwhich has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not\ndisobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it.\nNor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially,\nbut only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their\nspecies from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept,\nnot in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is\nnot a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to\nanother species of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it\nseems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to\nanother's command, it follows that disobedience arises from\nvainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out\nof venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a\nsuperior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so\nthat they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin.\nWherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of\nprecepts.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 105, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Disobedience Is the Most Grievous of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins.\nFor it is written (1 Kings 15:23): \"It is like the sin of witchcraft\nto rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey.\" But\nidolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above (Q. 94, A. 3).\nTherefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes\nthe obstacles of sin, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2). Now disobedience\nmakes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a\nman from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy\nGhost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that \"by the\ndisobedience of one man, many were made sinners.\" Now the cause is\nseemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be\na more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin\nthan contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very\nperson of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore\ndisobedience is not the most grievous of sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one\ndisobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the\npart of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take\nevery care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a\nhigher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a\nlower authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a\nhigher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands,\nthe more grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous\nto disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things\ncommanded. For the person commanding does not equally desire the\nfulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above\nall the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore\ndisobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled\ncommandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to\nthe commandments of God, it is evident that the greater the good\ncommanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment,\nbecause since God's will is essentially directed to the good, the\ngreater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled.\nConsequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins\nmore grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of\nour neighbor. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to\nthe greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man,\na sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but\nthrough setting aside that which is more in the intention of the\nperson commanding.\n\nAccordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with\nthe various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which\nthere is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of\ndisobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man,\napart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this\nbecause whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's\ncommandment. And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver\nmatter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that\ncontains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin\nwhich contemns the man who made the precept, because reverence for\nthe person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command.\nIn like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as\nblasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally\nseparate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving\ncontempt of God's commandment alone.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but\nof likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God\njust as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost,\nbut only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of\nany obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else\nthe contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since\nany good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the\nHoly Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which lead\ndirectly to repentance and the remission of sins.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was\ntransmitted to all men, was not disobedience considered as a special\nsin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the\nApostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to\nevery sin.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 106\n\nOF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude.\nConcerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other\nvirtues?\n\n(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?\n\n(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?\n\n(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?\n\n(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor\nreceived or the disposition of the giver?\n\n(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Thankfulness Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Other\nVirtues?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue,\ndistinct from other virtues. For we have received the greatest\nbenefits from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay\nto God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor\nwith which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety.\nTherefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other\nvirtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative\njustice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose\nof giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5, 4). Therefore thanksgiving,\nwhich belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude\nis not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for\nthe preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.\nviii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues,\nsince they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore\nthankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors\nreceived, is not a special virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of\njustice (De Invent. Rhet. ii).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 3), the nature of\nthe debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes\ngiving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the\nlesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God,\nin that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is\nfound in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our\nbegetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that\nexcels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is\nfound in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and\nprivate favors, on account of which we are under particular\nobligation to him.\n\nAccordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person\nexcelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor\nfrom whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that\nafter religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we\nworship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons\nexcelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we\ngive thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing\nvirtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that\nprecedes, as falling short thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it\nexcelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God\nwas reckoned above (Q. 83, A. 17) among things pertaining to religion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice,\nwhen it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted\nthat so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to\nthe virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt,\nand is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when\ncompelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever\nthere is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship,\nand whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In\nthis way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although\nrepayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Innocent Is More Bound to Give Thanks to God Than the\nPenitent?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks\nto God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received\nfrom God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of\ninnocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it\nseems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the\npenitent.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes\nhim gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): \"What man, weighing\nhis own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to\nhis own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had\nless needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn\nto Thee?\" And farther on he says: \"And for this let him love Thee as\nmuch, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered\nfrom such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been\nfrom the like torpor of sin preserved.\" Therefore the innocent is\nalso more bound to give thanks than the penitent.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the\ngreater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is\nmore continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine\nsays (Confess. iii): \"To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy,\nthat Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I\nascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not\nhave done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both\nwhat evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance\ncommitted not.\" Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks\nthan the penitent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 7:43): \"To whom more is\nforgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: 'To whom less is forgiven, he\nloveth less' Luke 7:47].\" Therefore for the same reason he is bound\nto greater thanksgiving.\n\n_I answer that,_ Thanksgiving (_gratiarum actio_) in the recipient\ncorresponds to the favor (_gratia_) of the giver: so that when there\nis greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on\nthe part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed\n_gratis:_ wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater\non two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and\nin this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he\nreceives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more\ncontinuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be\nsaid to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in\nthis sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the\ninnocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously\ngiven: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received\ngrace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is,\nconsidered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent\nis greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a\npoor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And\nsince actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to\ntake note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such\nabsolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of\nthe voluntary and the involuntary.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Man Is Bound to Give Thanks to Every Benefactor?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that a man is not bound to give thanks to every\nbenefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm\nhimself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, \"He that is evil to himself, to\nwhom will he be good?\" But a man cannot thank himself, since\nthanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore\nthanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But\nsome favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and\ngrudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a\nbenefactor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own\nprofit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit.\nTherefore thanks are not due to them.\n\nObj. 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is\nbelongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his\nmaster. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor.\n\nObj. 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably\nand advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is\nvery well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid\nfor a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the\nbenefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would\nnot seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be\na poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man\nis not always bound to repayment for favors received.\n\nObj. 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is\ninexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that\nrepayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person\nrepaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): \"In all things give\nthanks.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that \"God turns all things to Himself\nbecause He is the cause of all\": for the effect must needs always be\ndirected to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a\nbenefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural\norder requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying\nthe favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And,\nas stated above with regard to a father (Q. 31, A. 3; Q. 101, A. 2),\na man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the\nlatter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally\nhe owes him assistance or support, if he need it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), \"just as a man is\nliberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who\nforgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by\nhis own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor\non himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves\nhim to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable.\"\nWherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for\ngratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing\nexcept by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken\nof in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to\noneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11),\nin so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as\nthough they were various persons.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good\nrather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as\nhe ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that\nreason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the\nfavor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for,\nas Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) \"promptness enhances, delay\ndiscounts a favor.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), \"it matters much\nwhether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours,\nor for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and\nbenefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a\nman who seeks fodder for his cattle.\" And farther on: \"If he has done\nit for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am\nungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was\nprofitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of\nmalevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has\nbeen the loser thereby.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), \"when a slave does\nwhat is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service:\nwhen he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as\nsoon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that\nbe his motive, it is no longer called service.\" Wherefore gratitude\nis due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.\n\nReply Obj. 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what\nhe can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the\ndeed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says\n(De Benef. ii): \"Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun\nto pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should\nbe shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but\neverywhere.\" From this it is evident that however well off a man may\nbe, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him\nreverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,\n14): \"He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want\nshould be repaid with money\": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi):\n\"There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we\nhappen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable\nand pleasant conversation without flattery.\" Therefore there is no\nneed for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor\nbefore repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi),\n\"it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no\nfavor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made\nyou his debtor!\"\n\nIf, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he\nshould be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue\nif possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart\nhas changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as\nheretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness\nhe has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.\nix, 3).\n\nReply Obj. 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor\ndepends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment\nshould be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If,\nhowever, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental\nto him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca\nobserves (De Benef. vii): \"It is my duty to repay, and not to keep\nback and safeguard my repayment.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Man Is Bound to Repay a Favor at Once?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once.\nFor we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be\nfixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors,\nand yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore a\nman is bound to repay a favor at once.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more\npraiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now\nearnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay.\nTherefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that \"it is proper to a\nbenefactor to act freely and quickly.\" Now repayment ought to equal\nthe favor received. Therefore it should be done at once.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Benef. iv): \"He that hastens to\nrepay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of\nindebtedness.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be\nconsidered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also\nmust these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the\naffection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore\nSeneca says (De Benef. ii): \"Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it\ngraciously.\" As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time\nas will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of\nchoosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for\nfavor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained\nrepayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), \"he that wishes to\nrepay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is\nungrateful.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of\njustice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property\nwithout his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the\ndebtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as\nthe rectitude of virtue demands.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be\nregulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall\nthe proper time through earnestness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time\nand one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and\nthe same is to be observed in repaying favors.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 5]\n\nWhether in Giving Thanks We Should Look at the Benefactor's\nDisposition or at the Deed?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at\nthe benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to\nbeneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself\ndenotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of\njustice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking.\nTherefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather\nthan the disposition of the benefactor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God\nalone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to\nrepay a favor according to the benefactor's disposition.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Benef. i): \"We are sometimes under\na greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart,\nand has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The repayment of a favor may belong to three\nvirtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to\njustice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a\nloan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according\nto the quantity received.\n\nOn the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different\nways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it\nhas the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship\nwe have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the\nfriendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made\naccording to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in\nthe friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard\nfor the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief\nrequisite of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 13. And likewise,\nsince gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis,\nand this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that\nrepayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver\nthan on the effect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly\naction, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of\ngratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and\nchiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): \"A kindly\naction consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the\ngiver or doer.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species\nis part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of\njustice, as stated above (Q. 80). Hence it does not follow that we\nshall find the same kind of debt in both virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but in so\nfar as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus\nthat a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does\nthe kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and\nreadily.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Repayment of Gratitude Should Surpass the Favor Received?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of\ngratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to\nmake even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as\nthe Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt\nthe impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to\nsomething yet greater.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has\nreceived by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his\nturn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor\nwhich in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that\nfirst conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and\nso on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite,\nsince \"the indefinite removes the nature of good\" (Metaph. ii, text.\n8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor\nreceived.\n\nObj. 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But \"more\" is excess\nof equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it\nseems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and\nopposed to justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): \"We should\nrepay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them\nreturn,\" and this is done by repaying more than we have received.\nTherefore gratitude should incline to do something greater.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), gratitude regards the favor\nreceived according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be\ndeserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis\nwithout being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a\nmoral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does\nnot seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity\nof the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an\nequivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return\nwhat he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as\npossible, to pay back something more.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, ad 5; A. 5), in repaying favors\nwe must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly,\nif we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from\nhis parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal\nrepayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we\nconsider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is\npossible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as\nSeneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do\nso, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the\nmore it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, \"Owe no\nman anything, but to love one another.\" Wherefore it is not\nunreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we\nconsider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of\nwills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will\ngave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the\nbeneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 107\n\nOF INGRATITUDE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?\n\n(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?\n\n(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?\n\n(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Ingratitude Is Always a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For\nSeneca says (De Benef. iii) that \"he who does not repay a favor is\nungrateful.\" But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without\nsinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin.\nTherefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems\nthat ingratitude is not always a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits\nit: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i),\n\"no man sins in what he cannot avoid.\" Now sometimes it is not in the\npower of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has\nnot the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power,\nand yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that \"to forget a kindness is\nthe height of ingratitude.\" Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being\nunwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), \"Owe\nno man anything.\" Yet \"an unwilling debtor is ungrateful,\" as Seneca\ndeclares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim.\n3:2), where it is written: \"Disobedient to parents, ungrateful,\nwicked.\" etc.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 106, A. 4, ad 1, A. 6) a debt of\ngratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin\nfrom the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is\nevident that every ingratitude is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that helps\nanother to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and so no\nthanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will,\nsupposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him\nin doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the\nrepayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin,\nbecause this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is\ncontrary to gratitude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to\nrepay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the\nrepayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6, ad\n1).\n\nForgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed\nthe forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not\nsubject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as\nSeneca observes (De Benef. iii), \"when forgetfulness of favors lays\nhold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their\nrepayment.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and\nfrom the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone\nshould owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for\nhis benefactor.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Ingratitude Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For\nwhoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this\npertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of\nsin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin,\nfor instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed\nagainst a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): \"It is ungrateful to\ntake no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but\nit is the height of ingratitude to forget it.\" Now these do not seem\nto belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a\nspecial sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or\nthankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special\nsin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of\nvirtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus\nilliberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a\nvice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for\ninstance if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude\nis not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 4).\nBut still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency\nof gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above (Q.\n106, A. 6), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude\nis properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now\nevery deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite\nhabit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference\nof sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is\none special virtue, so also is ingratitude one special sin.\n\nIt has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the\nthings required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the\nfavor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks,\nand the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time\naccording to one's means. And since what is last in the order of\ngeneration is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the\nfirst degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the\nsecond when he declines to notice or indicate that he has received a\nfavor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to\nrecognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in\nany other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation includes\nnegation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of\ningratitude to return evil for good, to the second to find fault with\na favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it\nwere unkindness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to God,\ninasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But\nformal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this is\na special sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin\nfrom being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way\nthe aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These three are not different species but different\ndegrees of one special sin.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Ingratitude Is Always a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For\none ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful\nto God by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of\ningratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity,\nas stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). But ingratitude is contrary to\ncharity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that virtue, as\nstated above (Q. 106, A. 1, ad 3; A. 6, ad 2). Therefore ingratitude\nis always a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): \"Between the giver and\nthe receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should\nforthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget\nhaving received.\" Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should\nforget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should\nthe latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that\nif ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a\nmortal sin.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ No one should be put in the way of\ncommitting a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii),\n\"sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives\nassistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he\nhas received.\" But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of\ningratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As appears from what we have said above (A. 2), a\nman may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for\ninstance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express\nhis appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not\nalways a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6), the\ndebt of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which,\nhowever, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he\ndoes not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it\narises either from some kind of negligence or from some\ndisinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may\nhappen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward contempt, or of\nthe kind of thing withheld, this being needful to the benefactor,\neither simply, or in some case of necessity.\n\nSecondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay\nthe debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes\na mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing\nthat is done.\n\nIt must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a\nmortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it\narises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to God\nto the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but\nthere is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it\nremoves a virtuous act of obedience to God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not contrary to,\nbut beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity,\nbut excludes some act thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): \"When we say that a\nman after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake\nto suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing\nso very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we mean\nthat he must not publish it abroad and boast about it.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not\nungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so\nif he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object\nof a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid\nvainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly,\nwishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the\ngreater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on\nwhom he is conferring the favor.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Favors Should Be Withheld from the Ungrateful?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the\nungrateful. For it is written (Wis. 16:29): \"The hope of the\nunthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice.\" But this hope would\nnot melt away unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors\nshould be withheld from the ungrateful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of\ncommitting sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an\noccasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on\nthe ungrateful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he\nis tormented\" (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he\nreceives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be\ndeprived of the favor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 6:35) that \"the Highest . . .\nis kind to the unthankful, and to the evil.\" Now we should prove\nourselves His children by imitating Him (Luke 6:36). Therefore we\nshould not withhold favors from the ungrateful.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two points to be considered with regard to\nan ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and\nthus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The\nsecond is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he\nshould not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca\nremarks (De Benef. iii), \"a man is often grateful although he repays\nnot,\" because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of\nrepaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness\ninto gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him\nonce, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he\nrepeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes,\nhe should cease from bestowing his favors upon him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man\ndeserves to suffer.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords\nhim an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the\nrecipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to\nbe imputed to the bestower.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part\nof a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician,\nby healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 108\n\nOF VENGEANCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether vengeance is lawful?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special virtue?\n\n(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;\n\n(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Vengeance Is Lawful?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever\nusurps what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is\nwritten (Deut. 32:35, Rom. 12:19): \"Revenge to Me, and I will repay.\"\nTherefore all vengeance is unlawful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with\nhim. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant. 2:2,\n\"As the lily among the thorns,\" says: \"He is not a good man that\ncannot bear with a wicked one.\" Therefore we should not take\nvengeance on the wicked.\n\nObj. 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which\nis the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear,\nbut of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at\nleast in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes\nrevenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is\nunlawful even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for\nChrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed\nto St. Chrysostom] says: \"Let us learn after Christ's example to bear\nour own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not\neven by listening to them.\" Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin\nof only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): \"Of three things my\nheart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the\ngathering together of the people, and a false calumny.\" But vengeance\nshould not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Matt.\n13:29, 30, \"Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer\nboth to grow,\" says that \"a multitude should not be excommunicated,\nnor should the sovereign.\" Neither therefore is any other vengeance\nlawful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ We should look to God for nothing save what is\ngood and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His\nenemies: for it is written (Luke 18:7): \"Will not God revenge His\nelect who cry to Him day and night?\" as if to say: \"He will indeed.\"\nTherefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful.\n\n_I answer that,_ Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil\non one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we\nmust consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is\ndirected chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance\nand rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because\nto take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is\ncontrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is\nit an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly\ninflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one\nthat hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because\nthe latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be\novercome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom.\n12:21): \"Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.\"\n\nIf, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some\ngood, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has\nsinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he\nmay be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be\nupheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided\nother due circumstances be observed.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with\nhis rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes\nuse of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of\nthe earthly prince that \"he is God's minister, an avenger to execute\nwrath upon him that doeth evil.\" If, however, a man takes vengeance\noutside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and\ntherefore sins.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently,\nand in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but\nthey do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on\nGod and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v\nin Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: \"It is\npraiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook\nGod's wrongs is most wicked.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore\nthose who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the\nGospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only\nthose who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they\nbelong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and\nthe Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the\nwrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to\nseize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked\nhim (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him\ninto exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the\nwrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it\npatiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to\nbe understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine\nstates (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i).\n\nReply Obj. 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken\non them, either in respect of the whole multitude--thus the Egyptians\nwere drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of\nIsrael (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed\n(Gen. 19)--or as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the\npunishment of those who worshipped the calf.\n\nSometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the\nseverity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the\nprincipals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord\n(Num. 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the\nsin of the multitude.\n\nOn the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the\nmultitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from\nthe innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however,\nthat this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude\nshould be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the\nsovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne\nwith, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude:\nunless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the\nmultitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal\nthat was feared to arise from his punishment.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Vengeance Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct\nvirtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so\nare the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of\nthe good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of\ncommutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not\nbe accounted a special virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an\nact to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now\nman is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to\navenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special\nvirtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance.\nTherefore it is not a special virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of\njustice.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude\nto virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us\nthrough habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that\nvirtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural\ninclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every\ndefinite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now\nthere is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which\nreason animals have the irascible power distinct from the\nconcupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs,\nlest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already\nbeen inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of\nremoving the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says\n(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by \"vengeance we resist force, or wrong,\nand in general whatever is obscure\" [*_Obscurum._ Cicero wrote\n_obfuturum_ but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the\nparenthesis] \"(i.e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by\navenging it.\" Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to\ncommutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from\nthe bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of\ngratitude, so too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern\nof public justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as\nit is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a\nwrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle\nthereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the\nfervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as\na man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity\nmakes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds\nfrom charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in\nEv.), \"there are no green leaves on the bough of good works, unless\ncharity be the root.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of\nexcess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the\nmeasure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency\nand consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written\n(Prov. 13:24): \"He that spareth the rod hateth his son.\" But the\nvirtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of\nvengeance with regard to all the circumstances.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Vengeance Should Be Wrought by Means of Punishments Customary\nAmong Men?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means\nof punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to\nuproot him. But our Lord forbade (Matt. 13:29) the uprooting of the\ncockle, whereby the children of the wicked one are signified.\nTherefore sinners should not be put to death.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the\nsame punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with\ndeath, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death:\nand this is evidently false.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to\npublish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the\nmultitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion\nfor sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not\nbe inflicted for a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ These punishments are fixed by the divine law as\nappears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 105, A. 2).\n\n_I answer that,_ Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends\nto the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive\nof virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing\nthose things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning,\nelse fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for\nsin should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the\nthings which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom,\nand external goods such as riches, his country and his good name.\nWherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi),\n\"Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment\":\nnamely, \"death,\" whereby man is deprived of life; \"stripes,\"\n\"retaliation,\" or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his\nbodily safety; \"slavery,\" and \"imprisonment,\" whereby he is deprived\nof freedom; \"exile\" whereby he is banished from his country; \"fines,\"\nwhereby he is mulcted in his riches; \"ignominy,\" whereby he loses\nhis good name.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle, when\nthere is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But\nsometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without\ndanger, but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a\ncase the punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as\nregards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth of\nthe divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a\nmedicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted\non those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or\nof any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time\nas the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of\npunishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Vengeance Should Be Taken on Those Who Have Sinned\nInvoluntarily?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who\nhave sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow\nfrom the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another,\naccording to Ex. 20:5, \"I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the\niniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth\ngeneration.\" Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was cursed\n(Gen. 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck\nwith leprosy (4 Kings 5). Again the blood of Christ lays the\ndescendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they said\n(Matt. 27:25): \"His blood be upon us and upon our children.\" Moreover\nwe read (Josue 7) that the people of Israel were delivered into the\nhands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people\nwere overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons\nof Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person is to be punished without\nhaving deserved it voluntarily.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's\npower. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power;\nthus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on\naccount of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an\nepiscopal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people.\nTherefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is\nsometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of\nSodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their\nparents (Gen. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their\nchildren were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover,\ndumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain\non account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore\nvengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it\ninvoluntarily.\n\nObj. 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a\nman does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by\nfear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those\nwho have deserved it involuntarily.\n\nObj. 5: Further Ambrose says on Luke 5 that \"the ship in which Judas\nwas, was in distress\"; wherefore \"Peter, who was calm in the security\nof his own merits, was in distress about those of others.\" But Peter\ndid not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes\npunished without having voluntarily deserved it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is\nvoluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i).\nTherefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved\nit voluntarily.\n\n_I answer that,_ Punishment may be considered in two ways. First,\nunder the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due\nsave for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice\nis restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following\nhis own will suffers something that is contrary to this will.\nWherefore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 81, A. 1), it follows that no one is\npunished in this way, except for something done voluntarily.\nSecondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only\nhealing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or\nconducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes\npunished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause.\n\nIt must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater\ngood in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body\nnever blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it\nis harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of\ngreater consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest\nconsequence, while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a\nperson is punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his\nown. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this\npresent life for our humiliation or probation. But no one is punished\nin spiritual goods without any fault on his part, neither in this nor\nin the future life, because in the latter punishment is not\nmedicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for\nanother man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, in\nrespect of which each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man\nis condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin of\nanother, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may be\nthe temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in\npunishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a\nbelonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their\nmaster. Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another,\neither by _imitation,_ as children copy the sins of their parents,\nand slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater\ndaring; or by way of _merit,_ as the sinful subjects merit a sinful\nsuperior, according to Job 34:30, \"Who maketh a man that is a\nhypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?\" Hence the people of\nIsrael were punished for David's sin in numbering the people (2 Kings\n24). This may also happen through some kind of _consent_ or\n_connivance:_ thus sometimes even the good are punished in temporal\nmatters together with the wicked, for not having condemned their\nsins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order to mark\nthe unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is bound to be\nsolicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to inculcate horror\nof sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all, as though all\nwere one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ.\nsup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, \"Visiting the iniquity of\nthe fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation,\"\nseems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He does not\ntake vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in order\nthat the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the\nwickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary\nto take vengeance on them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human\njudgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is\nmanifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But\nhuman judgment cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby\nHe punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of\ntheirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments\nso as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore\naccording to human judgment a man should never be condemned without\nfault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death,\nmutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to\nhuman judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault\non his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways.\n\nFirst, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,\ndisqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being\ninfected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the\nChurch: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man\nis hindered from receiving sacred orders.\n\nSecondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own\nbut common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a\ncertain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to\nthe good of the clerics.\n\nThirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of\nanother: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his\ninheritance through the sin of his parent.\n\nReply Obj. 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in\ntemporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a\npossession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also\nin their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they\nbe spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus\ndeserve to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on\ndumb animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way\ntheir owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not\ninvoluntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 6, AA. 5, 6).\n\nReply Obj. 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin of\nJudas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of\none, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply Obj. 1, 2).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 109\n\nOF TRUTH\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning\ntruth there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether truth is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special virtue?\n\n(3) Whether it is a part of justice?\n\n(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Truth Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of\nvirtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object\nprecedes the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue,\nbut something prior to virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it\nbelongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to\nbe neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always\npraiseworthy--neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2,\n\"Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth\"--nor even in evil\nthings, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Isa.\n3:9): \"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have\nnot hid it.\" Therefore truth is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual,\nor moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its object\nis not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii)\nthat by \"truth we faithfully represent things as they are, were, or\nwill be.\" Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but\ntheir end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean\nbetween excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the\nbetter it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher both in the Second and in the\nFourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by\nreason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a\nvirtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this\nway, truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but\na certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing\nunderstood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as\nstated in the First Part (Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 21, A. 2). Secondly, truth\nmay stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which\nsense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must\nneeds be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and\nvirtue is \"that which makes its possessor good, and renders his\naction good.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far as it\nis a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does\nnot suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite for\nthat purpose that it should also be clothed with the due\ncircumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful.\nAccordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for\nthat which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by\npraising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it\nuselessly.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain\nsigns which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either\nwords, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of\nthings are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the\nlatter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far\nas this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore\ntruth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral\nvirtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways.\nFirst, on the part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On\nthe part of the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of\nequality, and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the\nvery reason that a man says what is true about himself, he observes\nthe mean between one that says more than the truth about himself, and\none that says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe\nthe mean is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought.\nExcess consists in making known one's own affairs out of season, and\ndeficiency in hiding them when one ought to make them known.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Truth Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the\ntrue and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special\nvirtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, because \"it makes its\npossessor good.\" Therefore truth is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act of\ntruth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue,\nsince every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore\ntruth is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives\naright, and of which it is written (Isa. 38:3): \"I beseech Thee . . .\nremember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect\nheart.\" Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the\ndefinition of virtue given above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore truth\nis not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since\nhypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue,\nsince it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every\nvirtue. Therefore neither is truth a special virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic.\nii, 7).\n\n_I answer that,_ The nature of human virtue consists in making a\nman's deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of\ngoodness in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto\nby a special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni\niii) good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good\nwill be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special\norder whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered\nin relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto\nman is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that\ntruth is a special virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The true and the good are convertible as to subject,\nsince every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But\nconsidered logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect\nand will exceed one another. For the intellect understands the will\nand many things besides, and the will desires things pertaining to\nthe intellect, and many others. Wherefore the _true_ considered in\nits proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular\ngood, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the _good_\nconsidered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is\nsomething true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since\nvirtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to\nbe a special virtue, just as the _true_ is a special good; yet it is\nnot possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather,\nconsidered logically, it is the genus of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species from\nwhat is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and\nbeside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns\nhimself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly\nintended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and\nbeside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act\nbravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a\nconsequence beside his principal intention.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true,\nnot whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is\nsaid to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure,\nnamely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity\nto that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to\nduplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while\nhaving another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this\nvirtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since\nthis belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a\nman pretends one thing and intends another.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Truth Is a Part of Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it\nseems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling\nthe truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the\ncase in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a\npart of justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is\nin the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4). Therefore truth is not a\npart of justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely,\n\"truth of life,\" \"truth of justice,\" and \"truth of doctrine.\" But\nnone of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all\nvirtues, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3): truth of justice is the same\nas justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine\nbelongs rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise\na part of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among\nthe parts of justice.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 80), a virtue is annexed to\njustice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something\nin common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue\nthereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with\njustice. In the first place it is directed to another, since the\nmanifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is\ndirected to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the\nthings that concern himself. In the second place, justice sets up a\ncertain equality between things, and this the virtue of truth does\nalso, for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself.\nNevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, as to\nthe notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which\njustice considers, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of\nequity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore\ntruth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary\nvirtue to its principal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes\nanother whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society.\nNow it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they\nbelieved one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence\nthe virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by\nhis own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters\nexternal signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the\nmanifestation of the truth is an act of the will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the\ntruth of life, as stated in the preceding A. 2, ad 3.\n\nWe speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to\nthe fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated\naccording to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of\njustice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life\na man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man\nobserves the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to\nanother man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do\nwith the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of\nlife. In another way the truth of justice may be understood as\nreferring to the fact that, out of justice, a man manifests the\ntruth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or gives true\nevidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of\njustice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are\nnow speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a\nman's chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: \"We are\nnot speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this\napply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned.\"\n\nThe truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths\nrelating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain\nto this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in\nspeech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern\nhim, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.\nNevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something\nconcerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of\ndoctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of\ntruth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Virtue of Truth Inclines Rather to That Which Is Less?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to\nthat which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so\ndoes one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five,\nthan that four are three. But \"every falsehood is in itself evil, and\nto be avoided,\" as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore\nthe virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather\nthan to that which is greater.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather\nthan to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is\nnearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer\nto daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to\none extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of\nequality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more\nincline to that which is less.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to\namount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract therefrom;\nand to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to\nan addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth\nthan to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the\ndenial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it\nseems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather than\nto that which is less.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that \"by this\nvirtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is\nless.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two ways of declining from the truth to\nthat which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show\nthe whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so\nforth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is\ncontained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to\nwhat is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), \"this\nseems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance.\" For\nthose who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a\nsource of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass\nothers: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a\nsource of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their\nmoderation. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:6): \"Though I should\nhave a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the\ntruth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that\nwhich he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me.\"\n\nSecondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say\nthat what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this\nvirtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply\nfalsehood. And yet this would be less repugnant to the truth, not\nindeed as regards the proper aspect of truth, but as regards the\naspect of prudence, which should be safeguarded in all the virtues.\nFor since it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to\nothers, it is more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one\nhas what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what one\nhas.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 110\n\nOF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying:\n(2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice.\nConcerning lying there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to\ntruth?\n\n(2) Of the species of lying;\n\n(3) Whether lying is always a sin?\n\n(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Lying Is Always Opposed to Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For\nopposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible\nwith truth, since he that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false,\nlies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying\nis not opposed to truth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but\nalso to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by\nthis virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's\nlife. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra\nMend. xii) that \"a lie is a false signification by words.\"\nAccordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the\nvirtue of truth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the\n\"liar's sin is the desire to deceive.\" But this is not opposed to\ntruth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not\nopposed to truth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): \"Let no one doubt\nthat it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a\nfalse statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie.\"\nBut this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.\n\n_I answer that,_ A moral act takes its species from two things, its\nobject, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is\nthe first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has\nits own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act,\nand stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material\nto formal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7).\n\nNow it has been said above (Q. 109, A. 1, ad 3) that the virtue of\ntruth--and consequently the opposite vices--regards a manifestation\nmade by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act\nof reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every\nrepresentation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the\nreason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do\nnot intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural\ninstinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this\nmanifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be\nvoluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper\nobject of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And\nthe intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is\nthat a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of\na false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.\n\nAccordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what\nis said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to\ndeceive, then there is falsehood--materially, since what is said is\nfalse, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and\neffectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.\n\nHowever, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal\nfalsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is\nfalse; wherefore also the word _mendacium_ (lie) is derived from its\nbeing in opposition to the _mind._ Consequently if one says what is\nfalse, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not\nformally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the\nspeaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the\nspeaker's intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a\nspecific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters falsehood\nformally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says\nbe true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it\ncontains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains\nthe specific nature of a lie.\n\nThat a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by\ndeceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to\nperfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires\nits species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be\nlacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force,\nlest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form.\nTherefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to\nthe virtue of truth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally\nand essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and\naccidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as\na moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a\nfalsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the\ntruth.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold\nthe chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that \"a lie\nis a false signification by words,\" the term \"words\" denotes every\nkind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something\nfalse by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of\nlying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to\nthe species of its cause.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Lies Are Sufficiently Divided into Officious, Jocose, and\nMischievous Lies?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into\n\"officious,\" \"jocose\" and \"mischievous\" lies. For a division should\nbe made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its\nnature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part.\nAnimal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting\nfrom a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of\nthat act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one\nact. Now this division is made according to the intention of the\neffect: for a \"jocose\" lie is told in order to make fun, an\n\"officious\" lie for some useful purpose, and a \"mischievous\" lie in\norder to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in\nthis way.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of\nlies. The first is \"in religious doctrine\"; the second is \"a lie that\nprofits no one and injures someone\"; the third \"profits one party so\nas to injure another\"; the fourth is \"told out of mere lust of lying\nand deceiving\"; the fifth is \"told out of the desire to please\"; the\nsixth \"injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money\"; the\nseventh \"injures no one and profits someone in saving him from\ndeath\"; the eighth \"injures no one, and profits someone in saving him\nfrom defilement of the body.\" Therefore it seems that the first\ndivision of lies is insufficient.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into\n\"boasting,\" which exceeds the truth in speech, and \"irony,\" which\nfalls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are\nnot contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore\nit seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 5:7, \"Thou wilt destroy all that\nspeak a lie,\" says \"that there are three kinds of lies; for some are\ntold for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is\nanother kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is\ntold out of malice.\" The first of these is called an officious lie,\nthe second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies\nare divided into these three kinds.\n\n_I answer that,_ Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with\nrespect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential\ndivision of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.\niv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the\ntruth, and this belongs to \"boasting,\" and the lie which stops short\nof the truth, and this belongs to \"irony.\" This division is an\nessential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed\nto truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of\nequality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.\n\nSecondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins,\nand with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of\nlying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is\naggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this\nis called a \"mischievous\" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished\nif it be directed to some good--either of pleasure and then it is a\n\"jocose\" lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the \"officious\" lie,\nwhereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from\nbeing injured. In this way lies are divided into the three kinds\naforesaid.\n\nThirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to\ntheir relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish\ntheir gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as\nstated in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are\ncontained under \"mischievous\" lies, which are either against God, and\nthen we have the lie \"in religious doctrine,\" or against man, and\nthis either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is\nthe second kind of lie, which \"profits no one, and injures someone\";\nor with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting\nanother, and this is the third kind of lie, \"which profits one, and\ninjures another.\" Of these the first is the most grievous, because\nsins against God are always more grievous, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n73, A. 3): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the\nlatter's gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another.\n\nAfter these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a\nfourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or\ndiminution; and this is the lie which is told \"out of mere lust of\nlying and deceiving.\" This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that \"the liar, when he lies from\nhabit, delights in lying.\"\n\nThe four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying.\nFor the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told \"with a desire to\nplease\": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious\nlie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This\nusefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth\nkind of lie, which \"profits someone in saving his money\"; or his\nbody, and this is the seventh kind, which \"saves a man from death\";\nor the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which\n\"saves him from unlawful defilement of his body.\"\n\nNow it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the\nsin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration\nof the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are\nenumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better\nthan the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and\nvirtue than the life of the body.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Every Lie Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident\nthat the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet\nthey seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the\nwords of Christ and of others often differ from one another:\nwherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account.\nTherefore not every lie is a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives\nof Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that \"God\nbuilt them houses\" (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ\nthat they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very\nholy men that they lied. Thus (Gen. 12 and 20) we are told that\nAbraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied\nwhen he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gen.\n27:27-29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10, 11) although she\nlied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to\navoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the\nwhole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion\nin a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore\na man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or\nanother from being killed.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised.\nYet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says\n(Synonym. ii): \"Break your faith when you have promised ill.\"\nTherefore not every lie is a sin.\n\nObj. 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive\nour neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): \"Whoever\nthinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives\nhimself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he\ndeceives others.\" Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no\none is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are\ntold, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the\nsake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions\nin Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): \"Be not willing to\nmake any manner of lie.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ An action that is naturally evil in respect of its\ngenus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an\naction to be good it must be right in every respect: because good\nresults from a complete cause, while evil results from any single\ndefect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in\nrespect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter.\nFor as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is\nunnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is\nnot in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that\n\"lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is\ngood and worthy of praise.\" Therefore every lie is a sin, as also\nAugustine declares (Contra Mend. i).\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is\ncontained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that\nthe writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be\ndeprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy\nWrit. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the\nGospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence\nAugustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): \"He that has the wit to\nunderstand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at\nthe sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no\nmatter by what words that sense is expressed.\" Hence it is evident,\nas he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that \"we must not judge that\nsomeone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way\nand in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or\nheard.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for\ntheir fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to\ntell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): \"And because the\nmidwives feared God, He built them houses.\" But the subsequent lie\nwas not meritorious.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v),\nthe deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect\nvirtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If,\nhowever, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must\nunderstand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic.\nHence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): \"We must believe that\nwhatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned\nas being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically.\"\nAs to Abraham \"when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to\nhide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since\nshe was the daughter of his father,\" Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen.\nxxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself\nsaid (Gen. 20:12): \"She is truly my sister, the daughter of my\nfather, and not the daughter of my mother,\" being related to him on\nhis father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's\nfirst-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the\nlatter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this\nmode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to\nsignify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the\nGentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.\n\nSome, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of\nperfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that\nit was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to\ndo certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for\nlying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which\nend she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that\nher words contain truth in some mystical sense.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's\nneighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above\nin this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything\ninordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as\nneither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except\nperhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore\nit is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any\ndanger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth\nprudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).\n\nReply Obj. 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what\nhe promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in\nmind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without\nfaith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two\nreasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful,\nbecause he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind.\nSecondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and\nthe business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man\nto be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to\nremain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising--since he\npromised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for\ngranted--nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because\ncircumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he\ndid not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1), did\nnot lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.\n\nReply Obj. 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First, in\nitself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie,\nfrom the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive;\nalthough in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive,\nnor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any\nsimilarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions,\nwith which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De\nMend. v), \"it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because\nevery statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a\nthing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it\nis tendered understand it to signify.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Every Lie Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is\nwritten (Ps. 6:7): \"Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie,\" and\n(Wis. 1:11): \"The mouth that belieth killeth the soul.\" Now mortal\nsin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every\nlie is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a\nmortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: \"Thou\nshalt not bear false witness.\" Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): \"Every\nliar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person\nto whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith\nwith him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty\nof iniquity.\" Now no one is said to break his faith or \"to be guilty\nof iniquity,\" for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal\nsin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for\na temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that \"we learn from\nthe reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the\nreward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might\nhave received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on\naccount of the lie of which they were guilty.\" Therefore even an\nofficious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is\nthe least of lies, is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that \"it is a\nprecept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to\nwish to lie.\" Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept.\nTherefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently\nso also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be\nworse off than others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, \"Thou wilt destroy,\"\netc.: \"There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet\nare not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake\nof our neighbor's good.\" But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore\njocose and officious lies are not mortal sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is\ncontrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as\nstated above (Q. 24, A. 12; Q. 35, A. 3). Now a lie may be contrary\nto charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of\nthe evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.\n\nA lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false\nsignification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to\nthe charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie;\nso that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of\ncharity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it\nis a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false\nsignification be about something the knowledge of which affects a\nman's good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science\nor to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on\none's neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion,\nwherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our\nneighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the\nfalse opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the\nknowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question\ndoes no harm to one's neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived\nas to some contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore\na lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.\n\nAs regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through\nbeing told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a\nmortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure\none's neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and\nthis also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's\nneighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of\ncommitting a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to\ncharity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a\nmortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little\npleasure is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of\none's neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to\ncharity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom:\nand thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were\nnot deterred through scandal from lying publicly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a\ngloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, \"Thou wilt destroy all that\nspeak a lie.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to\nthe love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1, ad 3;\nI-II, Q. 100, A. 5, ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the\ndecalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our\nneighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness\nagainst our neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even a venial sin can be called \"iniquity\" in a broad\nsense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it\nis written (1 John 3:4): \"Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'And sin is\niniquity.'].\" It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways.\nFirst as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and\ntheir reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition\nis commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in\nhis exposition of Isa. 65:21, 'And they shall build houses') explains\nthat God \"built them spiritual houses.\" Secondly, it may be\nconsidered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they\ncould merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal\nmeed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity\nof their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an\neternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words\nof Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal\nreward as though they had already merited it by their preceding\nkindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal\nsin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a\nsin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another\nspecies. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to\nanother species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to\nthat person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot\napply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a\njocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps\naccidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the\nsaying of Augustine that \"it is a precept of perfection not only not\nto lie at all, but not even to wish to lie\": although Augustine says\nthis not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: \"Unless\nperhaps it is a precept,\" etc. Nor does it matter that they are\nplaced in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound\nto safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or\nteaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal\nsin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in\nother matters.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 111\n\nOF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nIn due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under\nthis head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation?\n\n(3) Whether it is opposed to truth?\n\n(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 1]\n\nWhether All Dissimulation Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is\nwritten (Luke 24:28) that our Lord \"pretended [Douay: 'made as\nthough'] he would go farther\"; and Ambrose in his book on the\nPatriarchs (De Abraham i) says of Abraham that he \"spoke craftily to\nhis servants, when he said\" (Gen. 22:5): \"I and the boy will go with\nspeed as far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to\nyou.\" Now to pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation:\nand yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham.\nTherefore not all dissimulation is a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in\nhis commentary on Gal. 2:11, \"When Peter [Vulg.: 'Cephas'] was come\nto Antioch:--The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest\nof Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us\nthat dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed\"; and David\n\"changed his countenance before\" Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings 21:13).\nTherefore not all dissimulation is a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil to\nsimulate good, it is good to simulate evil.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people\n(Isa. 3:9): \"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they\nhave not hid it.\" Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one's sin.\nTherefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is\nnever reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a\nsin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Isa. 16:14, \"In three years,\" etc.,\nsays: \"Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate\nholiness.\" But to sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation\nis always a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 109, A. 3; Q. 110, A. 1), it\nbelongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward\nsigns to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only words, but\nalso deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by\nwords something different from that which is in one's mind, so also\nis it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify\nthe contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly\ndenoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is properly a\nlie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether\none lie in word or in any other way, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 1,\nObj. 2). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above (Q.\n110, A. 3), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), \"To pretend is\nnot always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification,\nthen it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some\nsignification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth.\"\nAnd he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is\n\"pretended,\" for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a\nfigure of something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord\n\"pretended He would go farther,\" because He acted as if wishing to go\nfarther; in order to signify something figuratively either because He\nwas far from their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.);\nor, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, \"as He was about\nto go farther away from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to\nspeak, held back on earth by their hospitality.\"\n\nAbraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i)\nsays that Abraham \"foretold what he knew not\": for he intended to\nreturn alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord\nexpressed what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that\nneither dissembled.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Jerome employs the term \"simulation\" in a broad sense\nfor any kind of pretense. David's change of countenance was a\nfigurative pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title\nof Ps. 33, \"I will bless the Lord at all times.\" There is no need to\nexcuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked\nman, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings\n10:29, 31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly\nreward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in\ndestroying the worship of Baal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked, because\nno one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do evil\ndeeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man\nmight pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has\nsome appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil,\nboth because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although\nhe is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the\nwickedness he simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself,\nits sinfulness is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this\nbe good or evil.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which\nhe is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is, for\nthis is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by\noutward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not,\nyet he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one\nmay hide one's sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus\nthat we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isa.\n3:9, that the \"second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one's sin,\"\nlest, to wit, others be scandalized thereby.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Hypocrisy Is the Same As Dissimulation?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as\ndissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But\nthere may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly,\naccording to Matt. 6:2, \"When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a\ntrumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do.\" Therefore hypocrisy is\nnot the same as dissimulation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): \"Some there are who\nwear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of\nperfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks\nof the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and\nanother to sin from malice.\" Now those who wear the habit of\nholiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers,\nsince the outward habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore\ndissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our\nLord says of hypocrites (Matt. 23:5) that \"all their works they do\nfor to be seen of men\": and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that \"they\nnever consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action\nthey may please men.\" But dissimulation consists, not in the mere\nintention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13,\n\"Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God,\" says that \"the\ndissembler simulates one thing and does another: he pretends\nchastity, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and\nfills his purse.\" Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as\ndissimulation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): \"'Hypocrite' is a Greek\nword corresponding to the Latin 'simulator,' for whereas he is evil\nwithin,\" he \"shows himself outwardly as being good; _hypo_ denoting\nfalsehood, and _krisis_, judgment.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x), \"the word hypocrite is\nderived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a\ndisguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to\nimitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under\nthe guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to\ndeceive the people in their acting.\" Hence Augustine says (De Serm.\nDom. ii) that \"just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the\nparts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon\nis not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and\nin every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is\nnot is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in\nreality.\"\n\nWe must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not,\nhowever, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person\nsimulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just\nman.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention.\nAccordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to\nthe service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not God but\nman, he simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore\nGregory says (Moral.) that \"hypocrites make God's interests\nsubservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly\nconduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves\nthe applause of their approval:\" and so they make a lying pretense of\nhaving a good intention, which they have not, although they do not\npretend to do a good deed without doing it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or\nthe clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform\nworks of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness,\nwith the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail\nthrough weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he\nis not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of\nholiness. If, however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in\norder to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a\ndissembler.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things:\none by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified. Accordingly\nthe evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified,\nwhich does not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds,\nor any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie\nas a sign.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Hypocrisy Is Contrary to the Virtue of Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of\ntruth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing\nsignified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be\nopposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue,\nand by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms\ndeeds, as stated in Matt. 6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not\nspecially opposed to the virtue of truth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile,\nwherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to\nprudence as above stated (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore, hypocrisy which is\ndissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or\nsimplicity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their end.\nNow the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory:\nwherefore a gloss on Job 27:8, \"What is the hope of the hypocrite, if\nthrough covetousness he take by violence,\" says: \"A hypocrite or, as\nthe Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through\ndesire of being honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he\nsteals praise for a life which is not his.\" [*The quotation is from\nSt. Gregory's _Moralia,_ Bk XVIII.] Therefore since covetousness or\nvainglory is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is\nhypocrisy or dissimulation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above (A.\n1). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation\nor hypocrisy is also.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24,\nx), \"contrariety is opposition as regards form,\" i.e. the specific\nform. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may\nbe opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another\nway indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be\nconsidered with regard to the very species of the act, and this\nspecies depends on that act's proper object. Wherefore since\nhypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a\ncharacter which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it\nfollows that it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows\nhimself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in _Ethic._\niv, 7.\n\nThe indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered\nin relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an\ninstrument of action, or anything else of that kind.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his\nend, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have it,\nbut in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it.\nHence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth,\ninasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And\nhe performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own\nsake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his\nhypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that\nvirtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4, 5), the vice directly\nopposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways\nof achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it\naccomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds:\nand it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to\nsimplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception,\nand sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to\nsimplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the\nvirtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated\nabove (Q. 109, A. 2, ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical\ndifference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance\nbetween sign and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one\ndoes not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly,\nand pretending another outwardly.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as\nalso of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end,\nbut from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one\nis. Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things\nof himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy,\nas the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as also we have said\nabove with regard to lying (Q. 110, A. 2).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Hypocrisy Is Always a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For\nJerome says on Isa. 16:14: \"Of the two evils it is less to sin openly\nthan to simulate holiness\": and a gloss on Job 1:21 [*St. Augustine,\non Ps. 63:7], \"As it hath pleased the Lord,\" etc., says that\n\"pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold sin\": and again a\ngloss on Lam. 4:6, \"The iniquity . . . of my people is made greater\nthan the sin of Sodom,\" says: \"He deplores the sins of the soul that\nfalls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of\nSodom.\" Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is\nalways a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin\nout of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from\nseeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is\ndeserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, \"Dissemblers and\ncrafty men prove the wrath of God\": and the hypocrite is excluded\nfrom seeing God, according to Job 13:16, \"No hypocrite shall come\nbefore His presence.\" Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of\ndissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed.\nNeither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.\n\nFurther, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But\nthis is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself\na mortal sin.\n\nFurther, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral.\nxxxi, 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither\ntherefore is hypocrisy.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness,\nand simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a\nperson whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely,\nwho cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred\nScripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a\nmortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through\nmortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate\nholiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in\nmortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the\ndissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a\nvenial sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be\ncontrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal\nsin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to\ndisseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical\npreferment, though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good\nin which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be not\ncontrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a\nman takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said\nin _Ethic._ iv, 7 that \"he would seem to be vain rather than evil\";\nfor the same applies to simulation as to a lie.\n\nIt happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of\nholiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of\nthis kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated\nwith mortal sin.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 112\n\nOF BOASTING\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head,\nnamely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) To which virtue is it opposed?\n\n(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 112, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Boasting Is Opposed to the Virtue of Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of\ntruth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast\neven without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence.\nThus it is written (Esther 1:3, 4) that Assuerus \"made a great feast\n. . . that he might show the riches of the glory\" and \"of his\nkingdom, and the greatness and boasting of his power.\" Therefore\nboasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to\nbe one of the four species of pride, \"when,\" to wit, \"a man boasts of\nhaving what he has not.\" Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29, 30): \"We\nhave heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness,\nand his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I\nknow, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is\nnot according to it.\" Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that\nboasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed\nto the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to\ntruth, but to humility.\n\nObj. 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore\nit is written (Wis. 5:8): \"What hath pride profited us? or what\nadvantage hath the boasting of riches brought us?\" Now excess of\nriches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed\nto justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that\nboasting is opposed to truth.\n\n_I answer that,_ _Jactantia_ (boasting) seems properly to denote the\nuplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw\n(_jactare_) a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift\noneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or\n'tall-talking' as we should say in English]. This happens in two\nways. For sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in\nhimself, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be: and this\nthe Apostle declines to do when he says (2 Cor. 12:6): \"I forbear\nlest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or\nanything he heareth of me.\" In another way a man uplifts himself in\nwords, by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality. And\nsince we should judge of things as they are in themselves, rather\nthan as others deem them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more\nproperly the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the\nuplifting of self above what others think of one: although in either\ncase it may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called is\nopposed to truth by way of excess.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument takes boasting as exceeding men's opinion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The sin of boasting may be considered in two ways.\nFirst, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is opposed\nto truth; as stated (in the body of the article and Q. 110, A. 2).\nSecondly, with regard to its cause, from which more frequently though\nnot always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly\nmoving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly by\narrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of great things\nabout himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from\narrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein,\nbecause he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an\nuplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not\nthe same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason\nGregory reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the\nboaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and\nso, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its\nend.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First, as an\noccasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches.\nHence (Prov. 8:18) \"riches\" are significantly described as \"proud\"\n[Douay: 'glorious']. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since\naccording to _Ethic._ iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of\nglory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories\nabout themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they\npretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 112, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Boasting Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is\nwritten (Prov. 28:25): \"He that boasteth, and puffeth himself,\nstirreth up quarrels.\" Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels,\nsince God hates those that sow discord, according to Prov. 6:19.\nTherefore boasting is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal sin.\nNow a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, \"Extol not thyself in the thoughts of thy\nsoul,\" says: \"This is a prohibition of boasting and pride.\" Therefore\nboasting is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an\nofficious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying;\nfor according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), \"the boaster\npretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for no further\npurpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the\nsake of money.\" Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious\nnor a jocose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie.\nTherefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boasting arises from vainglory, according to\nGregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin,\nbut is sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For\nGregory says (Moral. viii, 30) that \"it belongs to the very perfect,\nby outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are\nnot inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded them.\" Therefore boasting\nis not always a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 4), a mortal sin is one\nthat is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered\nin two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a\nmortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a\nman boasts of that which is contrary to God's glory--thus it is said\nin the person of the king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): \"Thy heart is lifted\nup, and thou hast said: I am God\"--or contrary to the love of our\nneighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into\ninvectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said (Luke\n18:11): \"I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust,\nadulterers, as also is this publican.\" Sometimes it is a venial sin,\nwhen, to wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor\nhis neighbor. Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its\ncause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then\nif it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin,\nthen the boasting will also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a\nvenial sin. Sometimes, however, a man breaks out into boasting\nthrough desire of gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be\naiming at the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore\nboasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that \"a man who boasts for the sake\nof gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake of glory or\nhonor.\" Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain may be\nsuch as not to injure another man.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal sin. But\nit happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels, not\nintentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not be\na mortal sin on that account.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from pride\nthat is a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie, but\nonly where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor, either\nin itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in\nboasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic.\niv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he\nwere to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn God's\ncommandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be against\nthe charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its\nlast end.\n\nTo boast for the sake of glory or gain seems to involve an officious\nlie: provided it be done without injury to others, for then it would\nat once become a mischievous lie.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 113\n\nIRONY*\n(In Two Articles)\n[*Irony here must be given the signification of the Greek _eironia_,\nwhence it is derived: dissimulation of one's own good points.]\n\nWe must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether irony is a sin?\n\n(2) Of its comparison with boasting.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 113, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Irony Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that irony, which consists in belittling\noneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's being\nstrengthened by God: and yet this leads one to belittle oneself,\naccording to Prov. 30:1, 2: \"The vision which the man spoke, with\nwhom is God, and who being strengthened by God, abiding with him,\nsaid, I am the most foolish of men.\" Also it is written (Amos 7:14):\n\"Amos answered . . . I am not a prophet.\" Therefore irony, whereby a\nman belittles himself in words, is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the\nEnglish (Regist. xii): \"It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to\nacknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty.\" But all sin is\ninconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But \"some belittle\nthemselves in words, so as to avoid pride,\" according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): \"If\nthou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before\nlying, thou hast become one by lying.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two\nways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the\ngreater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of\nhimself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle\noneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in\nrespect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its\ncircumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the\ntruth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the\nexistence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying\nsomething great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself\nto possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly. For\nthere is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly folly\nannexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, \"If any man among you seem\nto be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise.\"\nBut there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text\ngoes on to say, \"is foolishness with God.\" Accordingly, he that is\nstrengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the\nestimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which\nhuman wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, \"and the wisdom\nof men is not with me,\" and farther on, \"and I have known the science\nof the saints\" [*Vulg.: 'and I have not known the science of the\nsaints'].\n\nIt may also be replied that \"the wisdom of men\" is that which is\nacquired by human reason, while the \"wisdom of the saints\" is that\nwhich is received by divine inspiration.\n\nAmos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not\nof the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, \"nor am I the son of\na prophet.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to\nperfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only\nif he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but\nalso if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is\nnot a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not\nacknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid\nanother: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to\navoid pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): \"Shun not\narrogance so as to forsake truth\": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3)\nthat \"it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 113, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Irony Is a Less Grievous Sin Than Boasting?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than\nboasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is\na kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it\nany more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less\ngrievous sin than boasting.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), irony\nsometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony is\nnot a less grievous sin than boasting.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): \"When he shall speak\nlow, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart.\"\nNow it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a\nmanifold wickedness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): \"Those who\nspeak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious,\nseemingly, in their manners.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, AA. 2, 4), one lie is more\ngrievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is\nabout--thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most\ngrievous--and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a\nmischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now\nirony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by\nany other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person:\nso that in this respect they are equal.\n\nBut for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely,\nthe desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's\naverseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by\nuplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic.\niv, 7) that \"boasting is a more grievous sin than irony.\"\n\nSometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some\nother motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then\nirony is more grievous.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting, according\nas a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its\nmatter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in\nspiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward\nwords or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for\ninstance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the\nkind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some\nspiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Matt. 6:16)\nthat \"they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to\nfast.\" Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and\nboasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they\nsin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that\nit is \"the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves,\nand to make very little of themselves\": and for the same reason it is\nrelated of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that\nwere either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek\nglory.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, \"There is one\nthat humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit,\"\nand it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through\ndeceitful humility, \"speaks low\" wickedly.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 114\n\nOF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and\nthe opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning\nfriendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is a special virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is a part of justice?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Friendliness Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that \"the perfect friendship is\nthat which is on account of virtue.\" Now any virtue is the cause of\nfriendship: \"since the good is lovable to all,\" as Dionysius states\n(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a\nconsequence of every virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of\nfriend that he \"takes everything in a right manner both from those he\nloves and from those who are not his friends.\" Now it seems to\npertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship\nto those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue.\nTherefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, virtue \"observes the mean according as a wise man\ndecides\" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): \"The heart\nof the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where\nthere is mirth\": wherefore \"it belongs to a virtuous man to be most\nwary of pleasure\" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), \"is essentially desirous\nof sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain.\" Therefore this kind of\nfriendliness is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue.\nNow it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): \"Make thyself affable to the\ncongregation of the poor.\" Therefore affability, which is what we\nmean by friendship, is a special virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; I-II, Q. 55, A. 3),\nsince virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of\ngood, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists\nin order, as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2). And it behooves man to be\nmaintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their\nmutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words,\nso that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence\nthe need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this\norder: and this virtue is called friendliness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his\n_Ethics._ One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves\nanother and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in\ntreating of charity (Q. 23, A. 1, A. 3, ad 1; QQ. 25, 26), what\nthings belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another\nfriendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this\nhas not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain\nlikeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner\ntowards those with whom he is in contact.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain\ngeneral love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that \"every beast\nloveth its like.\" This love is signified by signs of friendship,\nwhich we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are\nstrangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this:\nbecause we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do\nnot treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to\nus by special friendship.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When it is said that \"the heart of the wise is where\nthere is mourning\" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his\nneighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): \"If, because of thy\nmeat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to\ncharity\": but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful,\naccording to Ecclus. 7:38, \"Be not wanting in comforting them that\nweep, and walk with them that mourn.\" Again, \"the heart of fools is\nwhere there is mirth,\" not that they may gladden others, but that\nthey may enjoy others' gladness. Accordingly, it belongs to the wise\nman to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not\nlustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures,\naccording to Ps. 132:1, \"Behold how good and how pleasant it is for\nbrethren to dwell together in unity.\"\n\nNevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of\nsome good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the\nvirtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those\namong whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): \"Although I\nmade you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent,\" and further on (2\nCor. 7:9), \"I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but\nbecause you were made sorrowful unto repentance.\" For this reason we\nshould not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in\norder that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin,\nand in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written\n(Ecclus. 7:26): \"Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and\nshow not thy countenance gay towards them.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 2]\n\nWhether This Kind of Friendship Is a Part of Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of\njustice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this\nvirtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably\ntowards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part\nof justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this\nvirtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in\nfellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest\npleasures, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 3).\nTherefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is\ncontrary to justice, as stated above (Q. 59, AA. 1, 2). Now,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue \"treats in\nlike manner known and unknown, companions and strangers.\" Therefore\nthis virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a\npart of justice.\n\n_I answer that,_ This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to\nit as to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is\ndirected to another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of\nthe notion of justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt,\nwhereby one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, which the\nlaw binds him to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favor\nreceived. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely,\nthat we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless at\ntimes, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them for some\ngood purpose.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 109, A. 3, ad 1), because man\nis a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the\nmanifestation of truth without which human society could not last.\nNow as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not\nwithout joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one\ncould abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a\ncertain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his\nfellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for\ntheir good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the\nsenses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which\nhave their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves\nbecomingly towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as\nthough they were noisome.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one\nought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and\nstrangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), \"it is not fitting to\nplease and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way.\"\nThis likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all\nin a fitting manner.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 115\n\nOF FLATTERY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue:\n(1) Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether flattery is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 115, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Flattery Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery\nconsists in words of praise offered to another in order to please\nhim. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov.\n31:28, \"Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and\nhe praised her.\" Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please\nothers, according to 1 Cor. 10:33, \"I . . . in all things please all\nmen.\" Therefore flattery is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But\nit is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise\ngood, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a\nsin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore\nGregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against\nflattery. \"It must be observed,\" says he, \"that by the wonderful\nmoderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by\ndetractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the\nvoice of the flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may\nhumble.\" But detraction is an evil, as stated above (Q. 73, AA. 2,\n3). Therefore flattery is a good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, \"Woe to them that sew\ncushions under every elbow,\" says, \"that is to say, sweet flattery.\"\nTherefore flattery is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 114, A. 1, ad 3), although the\nfriendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends\nchiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not\nfear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good,\nor of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish\nalways to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of\npleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the\nmere intention of pleasing he is said to be \"complaisant,\" according\nto the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the\nintention of making some gain out of it, he is called a \"flatterer\"\nor \"adulator.\" As a rule, however, the term \"flattery\" is wont to be\napplied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing\nothers by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their\nfellows.\n\nReply Obj. 1: One may praise a person both well and ill, according as\none observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing\nother due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by\npraising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive\nto make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of\nfriendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise\na person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since\nperhaps they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, \"The sinner is praised\nin the desires of his soul\"; or they may be uncertain, according to\nEcclus. 27:8, \"Praise not a man before he speaketh,\" and again\n(Ecclus. 11:2), \"Praise not a man for his beauty\"; or because there\nmay be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory,\nwherefore it is written, (Ecclus. 11:30), \"Praise not any man before\ndeath.\" Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in\norder to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress\ntherein. But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of\nvainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, according to\nPs. 52:6, \"God hath scattered the bones of them that please men,\" and\naccording to the words of the Apostle (Gal. 1:10), \"If I yet pleased\nmen, I should not be the servant of Christ.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be\nnot observed; and so too is it to praise good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one\nanother. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which\nis contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as\nregards the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person\nflattered, whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the\nperson defamed, since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks\nrather his defamation.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 115, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Flattery Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according\nto Augustine (Enchiridion xii), \"a thing is evil because it is\nharmful.\" But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, \"For\nthe sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man\nis blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord.\" Wherefore Jerome says\n(Ep. ad Celant): \"Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as\nflattery\": and a gloss on Ps. 69:4, \"Let them be presently turned\naway blushing for shame that say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well,\" says:\n\"The tongue of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the\npersecutor.\" Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less\nthan others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): \"Let their sword\nenter into their own hearts.\" Now he that flatters another induces\nhim to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, \"Let not the oil of\nthe sinner fatten my head,\" says: \"The false praise of the flatterer\nsoftens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders\nit susceptive of vice.\" Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin\nin himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3):\n\"The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and\ntreachery shall be degraded from his office.\" Now such a punishment\nas this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a\nmortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de\nSanctis) reckons among slight sins, \"if one desire to flatter any\nperson of higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of\nnecessity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 112, A. 2), a mortal sin is one\nthat is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to\ncharity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways.\nFirst, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises\nanother's sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose\njustice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he\nencourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Isa.\n5:20. \"Woe to you that call evil good.\" Secondly, by reason of the\nintention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him\nhe may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and\nof this it is written (Prov. 27:6): \"Better are the wounds of a\nfriend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy.\" Thirdly, by way of\noccasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his\nintending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it\nis necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken,\nand how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood from\nwhat has been said above concerning scandal (Q. 43, AA. 3, 4). If,\nhowever, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please\nothers, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something\nin a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently\nit is not a mortal but a venial sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises\nanother's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the\nsword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of\ngreater consequence, namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so\nefficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively,\nbeing a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can\nbe a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q.\n43, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 80, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with the\nintention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than\nothers, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning,\nwhereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters\nanother treacherously, in order to deceive him.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 116\n\nOF QUARRELING\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?\n\n(2) Of its comparison with flattery?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 116, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Quarreling Is Opposed to the Virtue of Friendship or\nAffability?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of\nfriendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord,\njust as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated\nabove (Q. 37, A. 1). Therefore quarreling is also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): \"An angry man stirreth\nup strife.\" Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or\nquarreling is also.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): \"From whence are wars and\nquarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from\nyour concupiscences which war in your members?\" Now it would seem\ncontrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it\nseems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship\n(Ethic. iv, 6).\n\n_I answer that,_ Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely,\none person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be\nobserved in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on\naccount of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to\nconsent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together,\nand this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity.\nWhereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being\na person to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence\narises quarreling, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or\naffability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those\namong whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that\n\"those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being\ndisagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be peevish and\nquarrelsome.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of\ndiscord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the\nintention of displeasing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not\non their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on\nthe species of their acts. And although quarreling arises at times\nfrom anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence it does not\nfollow that it is directly opposed to meekness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a\ngeneral evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says:\n\"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all\nevil.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 116, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Quarreling Is a More Grievous Sin Than Flattery?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the\ncontrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin\ndoes the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm\nthan quarreling, for it is written (Isa. 3:12): \"O My people, they\nthat call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of\nthy steps.\" Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in\nflattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another:\nwhereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts\nopenly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous\nsin than quarreling.\n\nObj. 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a\nflatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous\nsin than flattery.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual\nstate, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be\nmore inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim.\n3:2, 3) that it \"behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome\"; and\n(2 Tim. 3:24): \"The servant of the Lord must not wrangle.\" Therefore\nquarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.\n\n_I answer that,_ We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In\none way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more\na vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it\nis. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please\nthan to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving\ndispleasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who\nexceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as\nregards certain external motives, and thus flattery is sometimes more\ngrievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue\nhonor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for\ninstance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up\nthe speaker to contempt.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving\nsecretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly.\nNow, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person\nopenly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a\nmore grievous sin than theft, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 9).\n\nReply Obj. 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more\nvile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason:\nwherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the\nreason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since\nthey proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are\ncommitted through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise\nfrom a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason,\nalthough sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a\ngreater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by\ndeceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding\nfrom greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness\nof a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more\ngrievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more\nashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more\ngrievous.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 117\n\nOF LIBERALITY\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely,\ncovetousness and prodigality.\n\nConcerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether liberality is a virtue?\n\n(2) What is its matter?\n\n(3) Of its act;\n\n(4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take?\n\n(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?\n\n(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Liberality Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue\nis contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination\nfor one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it\npertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to\nthe Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), \"it is the mark of a liberal man not\nto look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things.\"\nTherefore liberality is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth\ncontributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8.\nSince, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the\nliberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic.\niv, 1) that \"he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but\nto give it away.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But\nliberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues:\nsince many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing\nto give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous\notherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that \"the Gospel\ncontains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated.\"\nNow in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue.\nTherefore liberality is a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), \"it belongs\nto virtue to use well the things that we can use ill.\" Now we may use\nboth well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as\nthe powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are\nwithout, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our\nlivelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these\nthings well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil\n(Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in\norder that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it\nsuffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man\ncommendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we\nare bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in\nwhich each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And\nyet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to\nattend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those\nbelonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): \"It is a\ncommendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them\nto be in want.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his\nriches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal\nto perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that \"the liberal man does not\nneglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people\"; and\nAmbrose says (De Offic. i) that \"Our Lord does not wish a man to pour\nout his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as\nEliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be\nbound by any household cares.\" For this belongs to the state of\nperfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q. 184; Q. 186, A. 3).\n\nIt must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's\npossessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is\ndirected to happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), \"those who\nspend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal\"; and\nlikewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence\nAmbrose says (De Offic. i): \"If you assist to rob others of their\npossessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your\nliberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than\nof pity.\" Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend\nmuch on certain evil works, are not liberal.\n\nAgain, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good\nuses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform\nworks of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not\nin the same way as virtuous people, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A.\n1). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being\nliberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,\n1): \"Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance,\" i.e. his\nmeans, \"for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit\nof the giver\": and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that \"it is the heart\nthat makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Liberality Is About Money?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every\nmoral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to\njustice to be about operations, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1.\nTherefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is\nabout passions and not about money.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind\nof wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial riches,\naccording to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5, 6). Therefore liberality\nis not chiefly about money.\n\nObj. 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since\nhabits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are\nthe matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they\nare not the matter of liberality.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that\n\"liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it\nbelongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is\nalso called open-handedness (_largitas_), because that which is open\ndoes not withhold things but parts with them. The term \"liberality\"\nseems also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing\nhe frees it (_liberat_), so to speak, from his keeping and ownership,\nand shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things\nwhich are the subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are\nthe goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term \"money.\"\nTherefore the proper matter of liberality is money.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), liberality depends not on\nthe quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart of\nthe giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire,\nand consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things\ngiven. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of\nliberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in his book _De Disciplina Christi_\n(Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and\nwhatsoever he owns, goes by the name of _pecunia_ (money), because\nin olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of _pecora_\n(flocks). And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): \"We give the name\nof money to anything that can be valued in currency.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Justice establishes equality in external things, but\nhas nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal\npassions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and\nin another way of justice.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Using Money Is the Act of Liberality?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality.\nFor different virtues have different acts. But using money is\nbecoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence.\nTherefore it is not the proper act of liberality.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but\nalso to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be\nconnected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be\nunsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it but\nalso in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the spender,\nand consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (De\nBenef. v): \"A man is not liberal by giving to himself.\" Therefore not\nevery use of money belongs to liberality.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): \"In whatever\nmatter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter:\nTherefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the\nbest use of riches.\" Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good\nuse of money is the act of liberality.\n\n_I answer that,_ The species of an act is taken from its object, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Now the object or matter of\nliberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the\nforegoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with\nits object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is\nconsistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful\ngoods, since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the\nproper act of liberality is making use of money or riches.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of\nriches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On\nthe other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under\nanother aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing\nis due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of\nriches under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed\nfor the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in\nrelation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall\nexplain farther on (Q. 134).\n\nReply Obj. 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make\ngood use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide\nopportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's\nfortitude not only to wield his sword against the foe, but also to\nsharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to\nliberality not only to use money, but also to keep it in preparation\nand safety in order to make fitting use of it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2, ad 1), the internal passions\nwhereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of\nliberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man\nshould not be prevented from making any due use of money through an\ninordinate affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one\nconsists in applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come under\nthe designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in\ndevoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts.\nHence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an\nimmoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from\nmaking suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving\nand spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying\nof Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving: for a man is not\nsaid to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Belongs to a Liberal Man Chiefly to Give?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man\nchiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is\nregulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence\nthat a man should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. iv, 1) that \"those who have not earned money, but have\nreceived the money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because\nthey have not experienced the want of it.\" Therefore it seems that\ngiving does not chiefly belong to the liberal man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do,\nnor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes sorry\nfor what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in _Ethic._\niv, 1. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a\nman employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar,\nas the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he\nmight provide himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore\nit seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving.\n\nObj. 4: Further, man is bound to look after himself rather than\nothers. But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving he\nlooks after others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend\nrather than to give.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that \"it\nbelongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the\nuse of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of\nmoney is like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money,\nin so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a\nhabit. Now in parting with a thing--for instance, when we throw\nsomething--the farther we put it away the greater the force\n(_virtus_) employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others\nproceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves.\nBut it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect,\nsince \"virtue is a kind of perfection\" (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18).\nTherefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen\nor spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more\nprudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be\nconsidered in money's use, which is likened to movement, than in its\nkeeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received\nmoney that others have earned, spend it more liberally, through not\nhaving experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole\ncause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of\nliberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely removes the\nimpediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to\nact liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want that\nresults from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired\nmoney from using it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise\nthe love they have for it as being their own effect, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iv, 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs\nto liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give\nit in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every\nvirtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids\nwhatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable\ngiving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, and\ngiving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at\nboth: but especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his\nproper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to all: since his\nact would be hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not\nhave the means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to\ngive.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Giving and receiving are related to one another as\naction and passion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both\naction and passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving,\nit does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and\nstill less to beg. Hence the verse:\n\nIn this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many Should give\noften, take seldom, ask never.\n\nBut he makes provision in order to give certain things according as\nliberality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, for\nhe is careful about realizing them that he may make a liberal use\nthereof.\n\nReply Obj. 4: To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence\nto spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Liberality Is a Part of Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For\njustice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the\nless liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of\njustice, but is incompatible with it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, justice is about operation as stated above (Q. 58,\nA. 9; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3): whereas liberality is chiefly about the\nlove and desire of money, which are passions. Therefore liberality\nseems to belong to temperance rather than to justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly,\nas stated (A. 4). But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and\nmercy, which pertain to charity, as state above (QQ. 30, 31).\nTherefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i): \"Justice has to do\nwith the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is\ndivided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also called\nliberality or kind-heartedness.\" Therefore liberality pertains to\njustice.\n\n_I answer that,_ Liberality is not a species of justice, since\njustice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another\nwhat is one's own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees\nwith justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as\njustice is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and\nso is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this\nArticle and above (A. 2, ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is\nreckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to\na principal virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although liberality does not consider the legal due\nthat justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is\nbased on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it\nanswers to the idea of due in the lowest degree.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the\nbody. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to\nthe body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly\npertain to temperance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the\nfact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he\ngives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But\nthe giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a\ncertain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so\nthat when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also\nto those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, but to\njustice, which is about external things.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Liberality Is the Greatest of the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues.\nFor every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man\nis likened chiefly by liberality to God, \"Who giveth to all men\nabundantly, and upbraideth not\" (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is\nthe greatest of the virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), \"in things\nthat are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best.\" Now\nthe nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since\n\"the good is self-communicative,\" according to Dionysius (Div. Nom.\niv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that \"justice reclines to\nseverity, liberality to goodness.\" Therefore liberality is the\ngreatest of virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now\nBoethius says (De Consol. ii) that \"bounty above all makes a man\nfamous\": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that \"among the\nvirtuous the liberal are the most beloved.\" Therefore liberality is\nthe greatest of virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that \"justice seems to\nbe more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more\npleasing.\" The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that \"brave and\njust men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the\ngreater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now\nliberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily\nand of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of\nits very nature it tends to set in order one's own affection towards\nthe possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which\nmoderates desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes\nprecedence of liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in\na manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the\nother in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues\nwhich are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses\nall manner of human good; and among human goods the public good\nsurpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good\nof the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things.\nAgain, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way\nit is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not\nbeing a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of\nit, whether for himself, or for the good of others, or for God's\nglory. Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many\nways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that\nwhich is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature,\nrather than according to that which pertains to them. Consequently,\nit remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for those to whom\nHe gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives,\nwherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues,\nrather than to liberality.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving\nforth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better\nthan money which liberality gives forth.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not\nthat which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others,\nbut that which is based on utility, because he is more useful in\nexternal goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the\nsame reason he becomes famous.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 118\n\nOF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF\nCOVETOUSNESS\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and\n(1) covetousness; (2) prodigality.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special sin?\n\n(3) To which virtue it is opposed;\n\n(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?\n\n(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?\n\n(7) Whether it is a capital vice?\n\n(8) Of its daughters.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Covetousness Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For\ncovetousness (_avaritia_) denotes a certain greed for gold (_aeris\naviditas_),* because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money,\nunder which all external goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for\ncovetousness _avaritia_ is derived from _aveo_ to desire; but the\nGreek _philargyria_ signifies literally \"love of money\": and it is to\nthis that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. A. 2, Obj. 2)]. Now it is not a\nsin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both\nbecause they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means\nman's life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his\nsubstance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one's neighbor,\nor oneself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 4). But covetousness is\nnot, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed\nneither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is\ndirected to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this\npertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1\nCor. 6:18): \"He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own\nbody.\" In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's\nneighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own.\nTherefore covetousness is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now\ncovetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness\nis not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 13:5): \"Let your manners be\nwithout covetousness, contented with such things as you have.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In whatever things good consists in a due measure,\nevil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that\nmeasure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in\na certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be\ncommensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate\nwith health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External\ngoods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated\nabove (Q. 117, A. 3; I-II, Q. 2, A. 1). Hence it must needs be that\nman's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other\nwords, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have\nexternal riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in\nkeeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for\nhim to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them\nimmoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined\nas \"immoderate love of possessing.\" It is therefore evident that\ncovetousness is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as means\nto an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is\nheld in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But\ncovetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about external\nthings in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the\nacquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires\nor keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly\nagainst one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external\nriches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot\nbe possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify\nimmoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches\nwhen, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in\nthem, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against\nhimself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in\nhis body as do the sins of the flesh.\n\nAs a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all\nmortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of\ntemporal things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated according to\nreason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though\nold people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as\neveryone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are\nnot excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with\nregard to riches.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Covetousness Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For\nAugustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): \"Covetousness, which in Greek is\ncalled _philargyria_, applies not only to silver or money, but also\nto anything that is desired immoderately.\" Now in every sin there is\nimmoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away\nfrom the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, Obj. 3). Therefore covetousness is a\ngeneral sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), \"the covetous\n(_avarus_) man\" is so called because he is \"greedy for brass (_avidus\naeris_),\" i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called\n_philargyria_, i.e. \"love of silver.\" Now silver, which stands for\nmoney, signifies all external goods the value of which can be\nmeasured by money, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore\ncovetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently\nseems to be a general sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, \"For I had not known\nconcupiscence,\" says: \"The law is good, since by forbidding\nconcupiscence, it forbids all evil.\" Now the law seems to forbid\nespecially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written\n(Ex. 20:17): \"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods.\" Therefore\nthe concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is\na general sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Covetousness is numbered together with other\nspecial sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: \"Being filled with all\niniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness\" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sins take their species from their objects, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1). Now the object of a sin is the good\ntowards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a\nspecial aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind\nof sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful\ngood. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since\nthey are desired under the aspect of being useful to man.\nConsequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an\nimmoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the\nname of money, whence covetousness (_avaritia_) is denominated.\n\nSince, however, the verb \"to have,\" which seems to have been\noriginally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are\nabsolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said\nto have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in _De\nPraedicamentis_), consequently the term \"covetousness\" has been\namplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything\nwhatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that\n\"covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge\nand high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after.\" In\nthis way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense\nAugustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First\nObjection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First\nObjection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All those external things that are subject to the uses\nof human life are comprised under the term \"money,\" inasmuch as they\nhave the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods\nthat can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so\nforth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire\nfor such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it\nis a special vice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for\nanything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is\nforbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to\ncovet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Covetousness Is Opposed to Liberality?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality.\nFor Chrysostom, commenting on Matt. 5:6, \"Blessed are they that\nhunger and thirst after justice,\" says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that\nthere are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special,\nto which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same\n(Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's\nexceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is\nappointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to\njustice and not to liberality.\n\nObj. 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean\nbetween two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7;\niv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according\nto the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore covetousness is not\nopposed to liberality.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:9): \"A covetous man shall\nnot be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no\nfruits from them.\" Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it\ninordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in\nthe desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.\n\n_I answer that,_ Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to\nriches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition\nand keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his\ndue, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to\njustice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27):\n\"Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to\nshed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness.\"\nSecondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for\nriches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or\ntakes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In\nthis way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these\naffections, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 3; A. 3, ad 3; A. 6).\nIn this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5): \"That they\nwould . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as\na blessing, not as covetousness,\" where a gloss observes: \"Lest they\nshould regret what they had given, and give but little.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of\ncovetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is\ncalled illiberality [*_aneleutheria_] by the Philosopher.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure\nin the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of\nlegal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's\nproperty. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally\nin the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking\nand keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as\nthese proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from\nthe point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which\nlatter depends on the rule of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite\nvice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to\njustice, the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and\nthis is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to\nliberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Covetousness Is Always a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For\nno one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy\nof death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying\n(Rom. 1:29): \"Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication,\ncovetousness [Douay: 'avarice'],\" etc. adds (Rom. 1:32): \"They who do\nsuch things are worthy of death.\" Therefore covetousness is a mortal\nsin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to one's\nown inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says\n(Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): \"It is the hungry man's bread that thou\nkeepest back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy\nman's money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as\nthou mightest succor.\"\n\nNow it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is\ncontrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all\ncovetousness a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save\nthrough a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace.\nBut, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum,\nfalsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom], \"Lust for money brings darkness\non the soul.\" Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a\nmortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, \"If any man build upon\nthis foundation,\" says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that\n\"he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world,\nhow he may please the world,\" which pertains to the sin of\ncovetousness. Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not\nmortally but venially, for it is said of him that \"he shall be saved,\nyet so as by fire.\" Therefore covetousness is some times a venial sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) covetousness is twofold. In\none way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in\nrespect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the\nunjust taking or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to\ntheft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q. 66, AA.\n6, 8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by\nreason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6, ad\n3), when we were treating of theft.\n\nIn another way covetousness may be taken as opposed to liberality: in\nwhich sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the\nlove of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in\nsuch wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter\nto the love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a\nmortal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love\nstops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he\ndoes not prefer the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling\nfor the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God or his\nneighbor, then covetousness is a venial sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by\nreason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a\nlegal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear of\ntheir want or on account of his having too much.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on\nthe soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the\nlove of riches to the love of God.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Covetousness Is the Greatest of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For\nit is written (Ecclus. 10:9): \"Nothing is more wicked than a covetous\nman,\" and the text continues: \"There is not a more wicked thing than\nto love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale.\"\nTully also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is\nbased chiefly on two things'): \"Nothing is so narrow or little minded\nas to love money.\" But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore\ncovetousness is the most grievous of sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more\ngrievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for\nAugustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36) that \"greed is the bane of charity.\"\nTherefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being\nincurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be\nmost grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an\nincurable sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that \"old\nage and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal.\" Therefore\ncovetousness is the most grievous of sins.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) that covetousness is \"a\nserving of idols.\" Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous\nsins. Therefore covetousness is also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft,\naccording to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness.\nTherefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil,\nconsists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so\nfar as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good.\nConsequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First,\non the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and\nthen the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view\na sin that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin\nthat is committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin\nagainst external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this\nseems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be\nconsidered on the part of the good to which the human appetite is\ninordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more\ndeformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower\nthan to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest\nof human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this\nis less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine\ngood. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the\nhuman appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a\ngreater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is\nthe formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the\nmaterial element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the\npoint of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the\ngood to which the appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that\ncovetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of\nthe good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it\nis given as a reason that the covetous man \"setteth his own soul to\nsale\"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul--that is, his life--to\ndanger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: \"Because\nwhile he liveth he hath cast away\"--that is, despised--\"his bowels,\"\nin order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a\n\"narrow mind,\" namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to\nany temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness:\nbecause greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch\nas a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a\ntemporal good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way,\ncovetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is\nincurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns\nGod's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby\nman's sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to\nthe greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is\nincurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature\never seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one\nseeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one\ngives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an\nindication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being\nsomewhat more dangerous.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a\ncertain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like\nthe idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in\nthe same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external\ncreature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects\nhimself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use,\nnot for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as\ngrievous a sin as idolatry.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Covetousness Is a Spiritual Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For\nspiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of\ncovetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore\ncovetousness is not a spiritual sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh.\nNow covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from\nthe corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through\ncorruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore\ncovetousness is not a spiritual sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is\ndisordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), \"He\nthat committeth fornication sinneth against his own body.\" Now\ncovetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom\n(Hom. xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was\npossessed by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore\ncovetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among\nspiritual vices.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all\nthe affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure\nand sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some\npleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those\nwhich are consummated in the carnal senses--for instance, the\npleasures of the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual\npleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of\nthe soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are\nconsummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated\nin pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is\ncovetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the\nconsideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore\ncovetousness is a spiritual sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the\npleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man\ntakes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is\nnot a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a\nmean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in\nrespect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and\npurely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of\na bodily object.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Movement takes its species from the term _whereto_ and\nnot from the term _wherefrom._ Hence a vice of the flesh is so called\nfrom its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its\noriginating in some defect of the flesh.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was\npossessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh\nin the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while\nthe possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself, the\ncovetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Covetousness Is a Capital Vice?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For\ncovetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality\nas extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor\nprodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be\nreckoned a capital vice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), those vices\nare called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of\nother vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness:\nsince riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something\ndirected to an end, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 5. Therefore\ncovetousness is not a capital vice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that \"covetousness arises\nsometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who,\nwhen they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow\nthe mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who,\nwishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other\npeople's property.\" Therefore covetousness arises from other vices\ninstead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among\nthe capital vices.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is\none which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because\nwhen an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire\nthereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the\nmost desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of\nhuman life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, AA. 4, 7, 8): wherefore the\nmore a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more\ndesirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it\nbe self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as\nthe last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency,\nas Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to\nthe Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we \"use money in token of\ntaking possession of something,\" and again it is written (Eccles.\n10:19): \"All things obey money.\" Therefore covetousness, which is\ndesire for money, is a capital vice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice\nis perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive\nappetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to\nthe same genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal\nvice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality\nis not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal\ngood of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because it\nregards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods,\nfor the reason given in the Article.\n\nOn the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is\ndesirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack\nof reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that \"a prodigal\nman is a fool rather than a knave.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is true that money is directed to something else as\nits end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible\nthings, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a\ncertain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising\nsometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4, ad 1;\nI-II, Q. 84, A. 4), provided that itself be frequently the source\nof others.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Treachery, Fraud, Falsehood, Perjury, Restlessness, Violence,\nand Insensibility to Mercy Are Daughters of Covetousness?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as\ncommonly stated, namely, \"treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury,\nrestlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy.\" For covetousness\nis opposed to liberality, as stated above (A. 3). Now treachery,\nfraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion,\nrestlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved\nobject, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these\nvices have no connection with covetousness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to\nthe same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore\nthey should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine\ndaughters of covetousness; which are \"lying, fraud, theft, perjury,\ngreed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity,\nrapacity.\" Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is\ninsufficient.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds\nof vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality,\nfor he speaks of those who are \"sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints\n[*_kyminopristes_], misers [*_kimbikes_], who do illiberal deeds,\"\nand of those who \"batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers\nof the dead, and robbers.\" Therefore it seems that the aforesaid\nenumeration is insufficient.\n\nObj. 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects.\nBut the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that \"tyrants who destroy\ncities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal,\"\ni.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter\nof covetousness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the\ndaughters mentioned above.\n\n_I answer that,_ The daughters of covetousness are the vices which\narise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now\nsince covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds\nin two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in\nthis respect covetousness gives rise to _insensibility to mercy,_\nbecause, to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the\nneedy with his riches [*See Q. 30, A. 1]. In the second place it\nbelongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect\ncovetousness may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought\n(_affectu_). In this way it gives rise to _restlessness,_ by\nhindering man with excessive anxiety and care, for \"a covetous man\nshall not be satisfied with money\" (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be\nconsidered in the execution (_effectu_). In this way the covetous\nman, in acquiring other people's goods, sometimes employs force,\nwhich pertains to _violence,_ sometimes deceit, and then if he has\nrecourse to words, it is _falsehood,_ if it be mere words, _perjury_\nif he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and\nthe deceit affects things, we have _fraud_; if persons, then we have\n_treachery,_ as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through\ncovetousness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to\nbelong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of\nsins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that\nit is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to\nhave species.\n\nReply Obj. 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the Article.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For\nlying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false\nwitnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind\nof fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy\nlucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence,\nsince it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as\ninsensibility to mercy.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather\nthan daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said\nto be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives\nbut little he is said to be \"sparing\"; if nothing, he is\n\"tightfisted\": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be\n_kyminopristes_ (\"skinflint\"), a cumin-seller, as it were, because he\nmakes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is\nsaid to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and\nthis in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful\nmeans, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of\nilliberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such\nas whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to\nhave given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to\nmake little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means,\nwhether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by\ndespoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so\nis illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence,\nare said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 119\n\nOF PRODIGALITY\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?\n\n(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?\n\n(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Prodigality Is Opposite to Covetousness?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to\ncovetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject.\nBut some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore\nprodigality is not opposite to covetousness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But\ncovetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions\nwhereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not\nseem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected\ntowards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality\nis not opposite to covetousness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now prodigality seems always to be\ndirected to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal\nsquanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures,\nwherefore it is stated (Luke 15:13) of the prodigal son that he\n\"wasted his substance living riotously.\" Therefore it seems that\nprodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to\ncovetousness and liberality.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that\nprodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we\ngive here the name of covetousness.\n\n_I answer that,_ In morals vices are opposed to one another and to\nvirtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and\nprodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency.\nThus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by\nloving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by\nbeing less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external\naction, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in\nretaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes\ndeficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it\nis evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same\nsubject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from\nwhat is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes\nthe mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and\nretaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality\nregard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said\nto be \"prodigal,\" while he who is deficient in giving is said to be\n\"covetous.\" Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in\ngiving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes\n(Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man\nexceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same\ntime exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of\nnecessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of\nhis own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to\ncovetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he\ngives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares\nnot whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous\nin different respects.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not\nas exceeding, but as deficient in them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the\nsake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes\nthrough being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes\non account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines\nto intemperance, both because through spending too much on other\nthings he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to\nwhich the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because\nthrough taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself\npleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1)\n\"that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Prodigality Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle\nsays (1 Tim. 6:10): \"Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the\nroot of all evils.\" But it is not the root of prodigality, since this\nis opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17, 18): \"Charge the rich\nof this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others.\" Now\nthis is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is\nnot a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and\nto be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming\nto the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Matt. 6:34), \"Be\nnot . . . solicitous for tomorrow,\" and (Matt. 19:21), \"Sell all\n[Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor.\" Therefore\nprodigality is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The prodigal son is held to blame for his\nprodigality.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the opposition between\nprodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either\nof which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and\nsinful through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that\nprodigality is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring,\nnot to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness,\nwhich is the concupiscence of the _fomes_ [*Cf. I-II, Q. 81, A. 3, ad\n2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a\ngeneral covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and in this\nsense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness;\nsince the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inordinately,\nnamely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to satisfy his own\nwill in giving. But to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is\nevident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of\nriches, for he had said previously (1 Tim. 6:9): \"They that will\nbecome rich,\" etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be \"the root\nof all evils,\" not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but\nbecause there is no evil that does not at some time arise from\ncovetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of\ncovetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in\norder to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive\nriches.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and\ncommunicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does\nnot do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), \"his\ngiving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought\nto be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor,\nnamely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give\nnothing.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the\ntotal amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to be\ngiven. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal\nman, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those who\ngive all their possessions with the intention of following Christ,\nand banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are\nnot prodigal but perfectly liberal.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Prodigality Is a More Grievous Sin Than Covetousness?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than\ncovetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not\ncommunicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures\nhimself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that \"the\nwasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an\nundoing of his very being.\" Now he that injures himself sins more\ngrievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, \"He that is evil to himself,\nto whom will he be good?\" Therefore prodigality is a more grievous\nsin than covetousness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable\ncircumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is\nsometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of\nthose who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to\naccept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is\naccompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we\nascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher\nobserves (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin\nthan covetousness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated\nabove (Q. 56, A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2, ad 1). Now prodigality\nis more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written\n(Prov. 21:20): \"There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the\ndwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it\": and the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that \"it is the mark of a fool to\ngive too much and receive nothing.\" Therefore prodigality is a more\ngrievous sin than covetousness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that \"the\nprodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous\nsin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because\ncovetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving,\nwherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than\nreceiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly,\nbecause the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives,\nwhile the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as\nstated in _Ethic._ iv, 6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily\ncured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is\nopposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want,\nsince much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to\nexceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue\non account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous\nman is not easily cured, for the reason given above (Q. 118, A. 5, ad\n3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The difference between the prodigal and the covetous\nman is not that the former sins against himself and the latter\nagainst another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending\nthat which is his, and his means of support, and against others by\nspending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the\nclergy, who are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to\nthe poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like\nmanner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in\ngiving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending:\nwherefore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): \"A man to whom God hath given\nriches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof.\"\nNevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both\nhimself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man\nprofits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his\nown goods for his own profit.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them\naccording to their respective natures: thus, with regard to\nprodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with\nregard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend\ntoo much for the sake of intemperance points already to several\nadditional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as\nstated in _Ethic._ iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain\nfrom taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself\nto call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so\nit calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest\nhe be forced to give to others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues\nare directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence\nalone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 120\n\nOF \"EPIKEIA\" OR EQUITY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider \"epikeia,\" under which head there are two points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether \"epikeia\" is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is a part of justice?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 1]\n\nWhether \"Epikeia\" [*_Epieikeia_] Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a virtue. For no virtue\ndoes away with another virtue. Yet _epikeia_ does away with another\nvirtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and\nseemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore _epikeia_ is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): \"With regard\nto these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when they\nmake them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge\nmust pronounce judgment not on them but according to them.\" But\nseemingly _epikeia_ pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems\nthat the law should not be observed in some particular case.\nTherefore _epikeia_ is a vice rather than a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, apparently it belongs to _epikeia_ to consider the\nintention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10).\nBut it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of\nthe lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the _Codex of Laws and\nConstitutions,_ under _Law_ i: \"It is fitting and lawful that We\nalone should interpret between equity and law.\" Therefore the act of\n_epikeia_ is unlawful: and consequently _epikeia_ is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a\nvirtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6), when we were\ntreating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned,\nare composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their\ndiversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would\napply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to\nwhat commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain\ncases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to\nthe common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires\ndeposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is\njust. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious--for instance, if a\nmadman were to put his sword in deposit, and demand its delivery\nwhile in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of\nhis deposit in order to fight against his country. In these and like\ncases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the\nletter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the\ncommon good. This is the object of _epikeia_ which we call equity.\nTherefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ does not set aside that which is just in\nitself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it\nopposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it\nought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought\nnot to be followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the _Codex of\nLaws and Constitutions_ under _Law_ v: \"Without doubt he transgresses\nthe law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat\nthe intention of the lawgiver.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: It would be passing judgment on a law to say that it\nwas not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be\nobserved in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law,\nbut on some particular contingency.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases where it\nis not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the\ninterpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there\nis need, not of interpretation, but of execution.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 2]\n\nWhether _Epikeia_ Is a Part of Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice. For,\nas stated above (Q. 58, A. 7), justice is twofold, particular and\nlegal. Now _epikeia_ is not a part of particular justice, since it\nextends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner,\nneither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside\nthat which is established by law. Therefore it seems that _epikeia_\nis not a part of justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part\nof a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as\nbeing principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now\n_epikeia_ seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as\nimplied by its name: for it is derived from _epi_, i.e. \"above,\" and\n_dikaion_, i.e. \"just.\" Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems that _epikeia_ is the same as modesty. For\nwhere the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), \"Let your modesty be known to all\nmen,\" the Greek has _epieikeia_ [*_to epieikes_]. Now, according to\nTully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance.\nTherefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that \"_epikeia_\nis a kind of justice.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue has three kinds of\nparts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one\nof which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the\nwhole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is\npredicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox:\nand sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority\nand posteriority, as _being_ of substance and accident.\n\nAccordingly, _epikeia_ is a part of justice taken in a general sense,\nfor it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v,\n10). Wherefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a subjective part of\njustice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being\npredicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the\ndirection of _epikeia._ Hence _epikeia_ is by way of being a higher\nrule of human actions.\n\nReply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ corresponds properly to legal justice, and in\none way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if\nlegal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as\nregards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the\nlawgiver, which is of more account, then _epikeia_ is the more\nimportant part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely\nthat which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then\n_epikeia_ is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its\ngeneral acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as\nexceeding it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), \"_epikeia_ is\nbetter than a certain,\" namely, legal, \"justice,\" which observes the\nletter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is\nnot better than all justice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs to _epikeia_ to moderate something, namely,\nthe observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is\nreckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life--for\ninstance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the\nterm _epieikeia_ is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of\nmoderation.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 121\n\nOF PIETY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely,\npiety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?\n\n(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 121, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Piety Is a Gift?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ\nfrom the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1). But piety is a\nvirtue, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 3). Therefore piety is not a gift.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above\nall the moral virtues, as above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now among the\nparts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any\npart of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion\nshould be a gift rather than piety.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of piety cannot remain in\nheaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that \"piety fills the inmost\nrecesses of the heart with works of mercy\": and so there will be no\npiety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q. 30, A.\n1]. Therefore piety is not a gift.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh\nchapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: \"godliness\"] [*_Pietas,_ whence\nour English word \"pity,\" which is the same as mercy.]\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1; Q. 69, AA. 1,\n3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the\nsoul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the\nHoly Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial\naffection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, \"You have received the\nspirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father).\" And since\nit belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father,\nit follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we\npay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy\nGhost.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the\nflesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as\nFather.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is\nmore excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the flesh, as\nthe piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father\nis yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord.\nWherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the\ngift of piety is greater than religion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not\nonly to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on\naccount of their being related to his father, so by the gift of piety\nhe pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on\naccount of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to\nhonor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one\nunderstands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii).\nConsequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness.\nAnd although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the\nDay of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is\nto revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that\nthis act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, \"Behold how they\nare numbered among the children of God.\" The saints will also\nmutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day,\nthe saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy\nstate.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 121, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Second Beatitude, \"Blessed Are the Meek,\" Corresponds to\nthe Gift of Piety?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, \"Blessed are the\nmeek,\" does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the\ngift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth\nbeatitude, \"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,\"\nor the fifth beatitude, \"Blessed are the merciful,\" since as stated\nabove (A. 1, Obj. 3), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore\nthe second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of\nknowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts\n(Isa. 11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter.\nSince, then, the third beatitude, \"Blessed are they that mourn,\"\ncorresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second\nbeatitude corresponds to piety.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2). Now among the fruits, goodness\nand benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which\npertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not\ncorrespond to the gift of piety.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): \"Piety\nis becoming to the meek.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold\ncongruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which\nthey are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore\nhe assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and\nthe second beatitude, \"Blessed are the meek,\" to piety, and so on.\nAnother congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature\nof each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes\nto the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth\nand fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the\nsecond. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety,\ninasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their\nproper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge\nand piety: but taking them according to their order, different\nbeatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be\nobserved, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly\nascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes\nobstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 122\n\nOF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there\nare six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?\n\n(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;\n\n(3) Of the second;\n\n(4) Of the third;\n\n(5) Of the fourth;\n\n(6) Of the other six.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Precepts of Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not\nprecepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is \"to make the\ncitizens virtuous in respect of every virtue,\" as stated in _Ethic._\nii, 1. Wherefore, according to _Ethic._ v, 1, \"the law prescribes\nabout all acts of all virtues.\" Now the precepts of the decalogue are\nthe first principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts\nof the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the\njudicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 4). But the precepts of the decalogue\nare moral precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3). Therefore\nthe precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of\njustice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers\nand the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the\ndecalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do\nnot properly belong to justice.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two\ntables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our\nneighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the\nprecepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we\nare directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the\nprecepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of\nthem. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.\n\n_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are the first\nprinciples of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at\nonce, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether\nevident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept,\nappears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those\nmatters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is\nmaster of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters\nthat refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under\nobligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the\nprecepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore\nthe first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the\nchief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety,\nwhich is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about\njustice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous,\nbut in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts\nabout those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as\nstated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral\nprecepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as\nthe ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in\nso far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are\ncontained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the\nprecepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be\nadministered in different ways according to the difference of men.\nHence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the\ndecalogue, but among the judicial precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as\ntheir end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, \"The end of the commandment is\ncharity\": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer\nimmediately to acts of justice.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the First Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is\nunfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his\nfather in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, \"How much more shall we\n[Vulg.: 'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and\nlive?\" Now the precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is\nexpressed affirmatively in these words: \"Honor thy father and thy\nmother.\" Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion,\nwhereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as\naffirmation is naturally prior to negation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to\nreligion, as stated above (A. 1). Now religion, since it is one\nvirtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are\nforbidden: since we read first: \"Thou shalt not have strange gods\nbefore Me\"; secondly, \"Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven\nthing\"; and thirdly, \"Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them.\"\nTherefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that \"the first\nprecept forbids the sin of superstition.\" But there are many wicked\nsuperstitions besides idolatry, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 2).\nTherefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it\nbehooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the\norder of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now\ntwo things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is\nthat the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the\ngeneration of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart,\nand in building a home the first thing to be set up is the\nfoundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is\ngoodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good\nuse of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on\nits object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed\nto virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it\nwere, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed\nto God, Who is the last end of man's will.\n\nThe second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in\nthe first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the\nfarmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed,\naccording to Jer. 4:3, \"Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not\nupon thorns.\" Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in\nreligion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the\nchief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god,\naccording to Matt. 6:24, \"You cannot serve God and mammon.\" Therefore\nin the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about\nreligion, namely: \"Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day.\"\nStill the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their\nmeans the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though\naffirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of\ngeneration, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as\nstated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning\nGod, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our\ninsufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).\n\nReply Obj. 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some\nserved certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images.\nHence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped\ngods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the\nwords, \"Thou shalt not have strange gods.\" Among others the worship\nof false gods was observed by using certain images: and so the very\nmaking of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, \"Thou shalt\nnot make to thyself any graven thing,\" as also the worship of those\nsame images, by the words, \"Thou shalt not adore them,\" etc.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some\ncompact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood\nto be forbidden by the words, \"Thou shalt not have strange gods.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Second Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is\nunfittingly expressed. For this precept, \"Thou shalt not take the\nname of thy God in vain\" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7:\n\"Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature,\" so that it\nforbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deut.\n5:11, \"Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain,\" adds,\ni.e. \"by giving the name of God to wood or stone,\" as though they\nforbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of\nunbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes\nreligion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first,\nwhereby superstition is forbidden.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes--for\ninstance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally\nspeaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col.\n3:17, \"All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the\nname of the Lord.\" Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of\nGod's name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept\nforbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, \"Thou\nshalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain,\" namely, by\nswearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless\nswearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false\nswearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is\nwithout justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept\nshould rather have forbidden them.\n\nObj. 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to\nGod is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other\nlike sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.\n\nObj. 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not have\nbeen said indefinitely: \"Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy\nGod in vain.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ In one who is being instructed in virtue it is\nnecessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing\nhim in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two\nways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion\nis given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to\nsuperstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to\nwit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion,\nas stated above (Q. 97, in the preamble, and in the Article that\nfollows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from\nacknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is\nengrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due\nworship to God, according to Isa. 28:20, \"The bed is straitened, so\nthat one must fall out,\" i.e. either the true God or a false god must\nfall out from man's heart, \"and a short covering cannot cover both.\"\nOn the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from\nhonoring God after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all\nacknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have\nacknowledged.\n\nFor this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before\nthe second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal\nexplanation is that which is given Deut. 5:11: \"Thou shalt not take\nthe name of . . . thy God in vain,\" namely, \"by swearing on that\nwhich is not [*Vulg.: 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His\nname upon a vain thing'].\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of\nGod, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a man's\nword by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name more\nfrequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in\nconsequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by\nthis precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the\nexplanation quoted in the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is\nnot. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called\nperjury, as stated above (Q. 98, A. 1, ad 3). For when a man swears\nto that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is\nnot supported by the truth. On the other hand, when a man swears\nwithout judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is\nno vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the\nswearer.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we\nbegin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law,\nwhich forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the\ndecalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by\nprohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common\noccurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the\ndecalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more\nfrequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often\ninto the latter sin.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the\nthing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying\nwords, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: \"Thou\nshalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain\": since it matters\nnot in which of God's names perjury is committed.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Third Precept of the Decalogue, Concerning the Hallowing\nof the Sabbath, Is Fittingly Expressed?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue,\nconcerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed.\nFor this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in\ncommenting on Luke 13:14, \"The ruler of the synagogue being angry\nthat He had healed on the Sabbath,\" says (Comment. iv): \"The Law\nforbids, not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works,\"\ni.e. \"to burden oneself with sin.\" Taken literally it is a ceremonial\nprecept, for it is written (Ex. 31:13): \"See that you keep My\nSabbath: because it is a sign between Me and you in your\ngenerations.\" Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual\nand moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of\nthe decalogue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain \"sacred\nthings, sacrifices, sacraments and observances,\" as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 101, A. 4). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred\ndays, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover,\nthere were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was\nunfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention\nonly that of the Sabbath.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But\nin the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not\nsin--for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth\nday, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also\nElias (3 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of\nGod, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who\ncarried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7,\nmust be understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is\nwritten (Luke 13:15): \"Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day\nloose his ox or his ass . . . and lead them to water?\" Therefore it\nis unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed\nalso under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not\nobserved, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the\nLord's day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many\nlike things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath\nis unfittingly expressed.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ The obstacles to true religion being removed by the\nfirst and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above (AA. 2,\n3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is\nestablished in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give\nworship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior\nworship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is\nexternal worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And\nsince for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship,\nconsisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the\nHoly Ghost, a precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior\nworship that consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the\ndecalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the Law,\nand consequently the third precept of the decalogue describes the\nexterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns\nall. This universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world,\nfrom which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh day: and\nsign of this we are commanded to keep holy seventh day--that is, to\nset it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the precept\nabout the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for it is given: \"For\nin six days the Lord made heaven and earth . . . and rested on the\nseventh day.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood\nliterally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral\nprecept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to be\ngiven to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to\nset aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as\nrefreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the\ndictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual\nrefreshment, by which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to\nhave a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine\nthings is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as this\nprecept specializes the time as a sign representing the Creation of\nthe world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial\nprecept in its allegorical signification, as representative of\nChrist's rest in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral\nsignification, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and\nthe mind's rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general precept.\nAgain, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical signification, as\nforeshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about\nhallowing the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue,\nas a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of certain\nparticular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is\nrepresentative of a general boon, namely, the production of all\ncreatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the\ngeneral precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial\nprecept of the Law.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the\nSabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself\nwith Divine things, and is signified in the words: \"Remember that\nthou keep holy the Sabbath day.\" For in the Law those things are said\nto be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing\nis cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Ex. 20:11),\n\"On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work.\" The kind of work\nmeant appears from Lev. 23:3, \"You shall do no servile work on that\nday [*Vulg.: 'You shall do no work on that day'].\" Now servile work\nis so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby\nman is the servant of sin, according to John 8:34, \"Whosoever\ncommitteth sin is the servant of sin,\" and in this sense all sinful\nacts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves\nanother. Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his\nbody, as stated above (Q. 104, AA. 5, 6, ad 1). Wherefore in this\nrespect those works are called servile whereby one man serves\nanother. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work\nof worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a\nservile work. In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the\nSabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath\nobservance: since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in\norder that he may occupy himself with works connected with God's\nservice. For this reason, according to John 7:23, \"a man [*Vulg.: 'If\na man,' etc.] receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law\nof Moses may not be broken\": and for this reason too we read (Matt.\n12:5), that \"on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the\nSabbath,\" i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, \"and are without\nblame.\" Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath\ndid not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner\nit is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any\nspiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss\non Num 28 says that \"smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath\nday, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not cease from\nhis work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the\ntemple break the Sabbath, and are without blame.\" On the other hand,\nthose works that are called servile in the first or second way are\ncontrary to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder\nman from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered\nfrom applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by\nlawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day\nis more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily\nwork. Hence Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): \"It would be better\nif the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time\nseditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk would do better to be\nmaking linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in\ntheir feasts of the new moon.\" It is not, however, against this\nprecept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not\ndestroy holiness.\n\nAgain, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of\nGod, are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to\nservants; while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they\nare common to those who serve and those who are free. Moreover,\neveryone, be he servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both\nfor himself and for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things\npertaining to the well-being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11,\n\"Deliver them that are led to death\": secondarily as regards avoiding\ndamage to one's property, according to Deut. 22:1, \"Thou shalt not\npass by if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but\nthou shalt bring them back to thy brother.\" Hence a corporal work\npertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily well-being does\nnot profane the Sabbath: for it is not against the observance of the\nSabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health of the body.\nFor this reason the Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they\nfought in self-defense on the Sabbath day (1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when\nhe fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason\nour Lord (Matt. 12:3) excused His disciples for plucking the ears of\ncorn on account of the need which they suffered. In like manner a\nbodily work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is\nnot contrary to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is\nwritten (John 7:23): \"Are you angry at Me because I have healed the\nwhole man on the Sabbath day?\" And again, a bodily work that is done\nto avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does not profane\nthe Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Matt. 12:11): \"What man shall\nthere be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a\npit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day took\nthe place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the\nprecept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of\nChristian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the\nobservance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to\nwork on the Lord's day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and\ncertain works are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on\nthe Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in\nthe New Law, dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in\nthe matter of certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity,\nbecause the figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is\nunlawful to omit even in small things; while works, considered in\nthemselves, are changeable in point of place and time.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Fourth Precept, About Honoring One's Parents, Is\nFittingly Expressed?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one's\nparents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining\nto piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance,\ngratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ. 101, 102, seq.).\nTherefore it seems that there should not have been given a special\nprecept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.\n\nObj. 2: Further, piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but\nalso to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the\nwell-wishers of our country, as stated above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 2).\nTherefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the\nhonoring of one's father and mother.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also\nsupport. Therefore the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly\nprescribed.\n\nObj. 4: Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die young,\nand on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time.\nTherefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the\npromise, \"That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the\nlove of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our\nneighbors, we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately\nafter the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the\nprecept directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle\nof our being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this\nprecept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Table.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 2), piety directs us to pay\nthe debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence,\nsince the precepts of the decalogue are general precepts, they ought\nto contain some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of\njustice, which regard some special debt.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to one's\nkindred and country since it is because we are born of our parents\nthat our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts\nof the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct man\nto his parents rather than to his country and other kindred.\nNevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to\ncommand whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as\nsecondary matter included in the principal matter.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Reverential honor is due to one's parents as such,\nwhereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for\ninstance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as\nstated above (Q. 101, A. 2). And since that which belongs to a thing\nby nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among\nthe first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the\ndecalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and\nthis honor, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support\nand whatever else is due to our parents.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A long life is promised to those who honor their\nparents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present\nlife, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): \"Piety\n[Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of\nthe life that now is and of that which is to come.\" And with reason.\nBecause the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain\ncongruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is\nungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of\nbodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his\nparents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful\nfor that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be\ndeprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However,\npresent goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except\nin so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 114, A. 12). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the\nhidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the\nfuture reward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner\ndeprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their parents,\nlive longer.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Other Six Precepts of the Decalogue Are Fittingly\nExpressed?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue\nare unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation\nthat one refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required\nthat one pay one's debts, according to Rom. 13:7, \"Render . . . to\nall men their dues.\" Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to\ninjure one's neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly\nexpressed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and\nbearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on\none's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above\n(QQ. 72, seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are\nunfittingly expressed.\n\nObj. 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as\ndenoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, \"The desire\n(_concupiscentia_) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom\":\nsecondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1,\n\"From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . .\nfrom your concupiscences which war in your members?\" Now the\nconcupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the\ndecalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they\nwould be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence\nof the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore\nit is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include some\nthat forbid concupiscence.\n\nObj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or\ntheft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder.\nTherefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the\ndesire of theft and of adultery.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that\nwhich is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for\nsome special reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays\nthat which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts\npertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after\nthe fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due\nto his parents--which duty includes the paying of all that is due for\nany special reason--it was necessary in due sequence to give certain\nprecepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all\nindifferently what is due to them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict\ninjury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing\nof those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to be\ngiven a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the\ndecalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are\npaid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove\nto include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts\nof the decalogue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor\nare reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as\ntaking precedence of others in point of generality and importance.\nFor all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are\nunderstood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the\nprincipal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with\none's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be\nforbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of\ndamage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with\ntheft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as\ndetractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden\ntogether with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly\nopposed to justice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include\nthe prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go\nfarther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their\nprohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or\npleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but\nof horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the\nother hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e.\nof something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of\nsomething useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of\nsomething concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and\nadultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the\nconcupiscence of murder.\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ. 123-170)\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 123\n\nOF FORTITUDE\n(In Twelve Articles)\n\nAfter considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude.\nWe must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts;\n(3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to\nit.\n\nConcerning fortitude three things have to be considered:\n(1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom;\n(3) the vices opposed to fortitude.\n\nUnder the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special virtue?\n\n(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?\n\n(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?\n\n(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?\n\n(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?\n\n(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?\n\n(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?\n\n(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?\n\n(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?\n\n(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?\n\n(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Fortitude Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle\nsays (2 Cor. 12:9): \"Virtue is perfected in infirmity.\" But fortitude\nis contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological,\nintellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the\ntheological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be\ngathered from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 2; Q. 62, A.\n3). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues,\nsince according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7, 8): \"Some seem to\nbe brave through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers,\" both\nof which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue,\n\"and some are called brave on account of certain passions\"; for\ninstance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on\naccount of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from\npassion but from choice, as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4).\nTherefore fortitude is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it\nis a \"good quality of the mind,\" as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7, 8).\nBut fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results\nfrom the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude\nis not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers\nfortitude among the virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) \"virtue\nis that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good.\"\nHence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes\na man good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to be in\naccordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22).\nWherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his\nwork accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by\nrectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual\nvirtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human\naffairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the\nobstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs.\nNow the human will is hindered in two ways from following the\nrectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of\npleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason\nrequires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance.\nSecondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is\nin accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that\npresents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the\nmind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as\na man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.\n\nHence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it\nconforms man to reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the\ninfirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the\nApostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear\nbravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue\nof patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity,\nand this belongs to the perfection that is called humility.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a\nvirtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than\nvirtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in\nwhich people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through\nperforming acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be\ndone in three ways. First, because they tend to that which is\ndifficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in\nthree ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not\nperceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the\nfact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers--when, for instance,\none has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes this is\nowing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who,\nthrough skill and practice in the use of arms, think little of the\ndangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending\nthemselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), \"No man\nfears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well.\"\nSecondly, a man performs an act of fortitude without having the\nvirtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he\nwishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not\nindeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained,\nsuch as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be\navoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue,\nas explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from\nits likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with\nthe notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to\nvirtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (I-II,\nQ. 63, A. 1).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Fortitude Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it\nis written (Wis. 7:7): \"She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and\njustice, and fortitude,\" where the text has \"virtue\" for \"fortitude.\"\nSince then the term \"virtue\" is common to all virtues, it seems that\nfortitude is a general virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): \"Fortitude is not\nlacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues\nand guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on\nall vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled\nagainst pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a\ndeformity that weakens virtue\"; and he says the same further on in\nconnection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special\nvirtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from\nfirmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in\n_Ethic._ ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other\nvirtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the term\n\"fortitude\" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a\ncertain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue,\nor rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher\nstates (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly\nand immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness\nonly in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most\ndifficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore\nTully says (Rhet. ii), that \"fortitude is deliberate facing of\ndangers and bearing of toils.\" In this sense fortitude is reckoned a\nspecial virtue, because it has a special matter.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word\nvirtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power\nis, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another\nsense is a principle of action, as stated in _Metaph._ v, 17. And\nsince this latter meaning is the more common, the term \"virtue,\" as\ndenoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for\nvirtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby\none acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the\nfirst sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special\nvirtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against\nall kinds of assaults.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting\nfirmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even\nas a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the\nassaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are\nmost difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those\nwhich are less difficult.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection takes fortitude in the first sense.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Fortitude Is About Fear and Daring?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring.\nFor Gregory says (Moral. vii): \"The fortitude of the just man is to\novercome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts\nof the present life.\" Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures\nrather than about fear and daring.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to\nfortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has\nnothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a\nman's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not\nabout fear and daring.\n\nObj. 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1, ad 2) in the treatise on\npassions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more\nthan about hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that\nfortitude is about fear and daring.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of\nfortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from\nfollowing the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult\nbelongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil\nthat entails difficulty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, AA. 3, 5) in\nthe treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of\ndifficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the\nreason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of\nthese difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to\nwithstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them\naltogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which\nseems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is\nabout fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the just\nman, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all\nmentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted,\nand then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special\nvirtue, by saying: \"To love the trials of this life for the sake of\nan eternal reward.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the\ncourse of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear.\nHence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but\nmediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those\npassions.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for\nhope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same\nobject, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1). And since fortitude properly\nregards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as\nappears from Tully's definition quoted in the Second Objection, it\nfollows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not\nabout hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Fortitude Is Only About Dangers of Death?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of\ndeath. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that \"fortitude is\nlove bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved\":\nand (Music. vi) he says that fortitude is \"the love which dreads no\nhardship, not even death.\" Therefore fortitude is not only about\ndanger of death, but also about other afflictions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a\nmean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a\nmean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also\nabout other fears.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is\nabout an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in\n_Ethic._ iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of\ndeath.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Andronicus says that \"fortitude is a virtue of the\nirascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the virtue of\nfortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of\nreason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold\nfirmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no\nbodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude\nof soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of\nreason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm\nagainst great things, will in consequence stand firm against less\nthings, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of\nvirtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful\nof all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods.\nWherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that \"the soul is\nshaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body\nbe stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and\ndestroyed.\" Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of\ndangers of death.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of\nadversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any\nkind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest\nevils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a\nrestricted sense.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates\nthe love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of\ncontrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money,\nas a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is\nthe case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own\nlife is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue\nmodifying the fear of death.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right\nreason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with\nreason is not contrary to virtue.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Fortitude Is Properly About Dangers of Death in Battle?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of\ndeath in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their\nfortitude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle.\nTherefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that \"fortitude is\napplicable both to warlike and to civil matters\": and Tully (De\nOffic. i), under the heading, \"That it pertains to fortitude to excel\nin battle rather than in civil life,\" says: \"Although not a few think\nthat the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of\ncivil life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge\nthe matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more\nimportant and more glorious than those connected with war.\" Now\ngreater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not\nproperly concerned with death in battle.\n\nObj. 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country's\ntemporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that \"wars are\nwaged in order to insure peace.\" Now it does not seem that one ought\nto expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of\none's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license\nin morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude is not\nabout the danger of death in battle.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude\nis chiefly about death in battle.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), fortitude strengthens a\nman's mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now\nfortitude is a virtue; and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to\ngood; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not\nfly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of\nsickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not\nseem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. On the other\nhand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly\non account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common\ngood by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there\nis the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle;\nsecondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even\nprivate individual does not refrain from giving a just judgment\nthrough fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it\nthreaten death. Hence it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind\nagainst dangers of death, not only such as arise in a general battle,\nbut also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the\ngeneral name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted that fortitude\nis properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.\n\nMoreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other\nkind of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of\ndeath on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a\nsick friend through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to\nundertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of\nshipwreck or robbers.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own\nperson, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God;\nwherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the\ngenus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason\nthey are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs,\nex. Heb. xi. 34.]\n\nReply Obj. 2: Personal and civil business is differentiated from the\nbusiness of war that regards general wars. However, personal and\ncivil affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain\nconflicts which are private wars, and so with regard to these also\nthere may be fortitude properly so called.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it\nbecome evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there\nare many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by\nit, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which\nare occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the\nflesh.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Endurance Is the Chief Act of Fortitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that endurance is not the chief act of\nfortitude. For virtue \"is about the difficult and the good\" (Ethic.\nii, 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore\nendurance is not the chief act of fortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater\npower than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on\nanother, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then\nfortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to\nfortitude to attack rather than to endure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its\nmere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack\ndenotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies\npursuit. Since then fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear,\nit seems that it regards attack rather than endurance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that \"certain\npersons are\" said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), and according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), \"fortitude is more concerned to allay\nfear, than to moderate daring.\" For it is more difficult to allay\nfear than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of\ndaring and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring, but to\nincrease fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the\nlatter moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of\nfear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is\nto stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three\nreasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being\nattacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is\nattacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more\ndifficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly,\nbecause he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas\nthe aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and it is more\ndifficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly,\nbecause endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is\nconsistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain\nunmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something\narduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that \"some hurry\nto meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the\nbehavior of a brave man.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an\naction of the soul cleaving most resolutely (_fortissime_) to good,\nthe result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of\nthe body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with\nthe cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Brave Man Acts for the Sake of the Good of His Habit?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of\nthe good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though first\nin intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the\norder of execution, follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is\nimpossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his\nhabit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): \"We love virtues for\nthe sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be\nvirtuous,\" namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own\nsake, \"without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor,\nwe shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer\nlove that for the sake of which alone we love virtue.\" But fortitude\nis a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to\nfortitude but to happiness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that \"fortitude\nis love ready to bear all things for God's sake.\" Now God is not the\nhabit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be\nbetter than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does\nnot act for the sake of the good of his habit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that \"to the\nbrave man fortitude itself is a good\": and such is his end.\n\n_I answer that,_ An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the\nproximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that\nagent's form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is\nto introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter, and\nthe end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of\nhis art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be\ncalled the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made,\nexternal matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds\nare fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the\nbrave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a\nlikeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his\nhabit: but his remote end is happiness or God.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First\nObjection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its\nend, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The\nother two objections consider the ultimate end.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Brave Man Delights in His Act?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For\n\"delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit\" (Ethic. x,\n4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after\nthe manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his\nact.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, \"But the fruit of\nthe Spirit is charity, joy, peace,\" says that deeds of virtue are\ncalled \"fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure\ndelight.\" Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he\ntakes pleasure in his act.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the\nbrave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own\nbody, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight\nin the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently\nthe brave man does all things with pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that \"the\nbrave man seems to have no delight in his act.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 31, AA. 3, 4, 5) where we\nwere treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily,\nresulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from\nan apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results\nfrom deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason.\nNow the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain\nthings that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul--for instance,\nthe loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a\nnatural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and\nthings connected with them--but also to endure things unpleasant in\nrespect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave\nman, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as\nregards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end\nthereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual\nsorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence\nwe read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: \"I suffer grievous pains in\nbody: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I\nfear Thee.\"\n\nNow the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the\nspiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's\ngrace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things\nin which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the\nBlessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said\nthat he felt as though he were walking on roses.\n\nYet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely\novercome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes\nspiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the\nlife of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that \"it is not necessary for\na brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices\nfor him not to be sad.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The vehemence of the action or passion of one power\nhinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses\nhinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper\noperation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of\ntheir end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is\nprincipally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. iii, 9) that \"to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen\nin all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the\ndelight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the\nsensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that\nspiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in\nthe presence of great bodily pain.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Fortitude Deals Chiefly with Sudden Occurrences?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with\nsudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when\nthey are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that\n\"fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil.\"\nTherefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): \"The brave man is not\nunmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures\nbeforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so\nas to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say\nafterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly\nhappen.\" But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the\ncase of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is\nnot concerned with sudden happenings.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the \"brave\nman is of good hope.\" But hope looks forward to the future, which is\ninconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of\nfortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that\n\"fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things must be considered in the operation of\nfortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not\nabout sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think\nbeforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to\nwithstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to\nGregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), \"the blow that is foreseen strikes with\nless force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we\nare forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge.\" The other thing to\nbe considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of\nthe virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden\noccurrences, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the\nhabit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a\nhabit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person without\nforethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges\non account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that\nhabitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.\n\nYet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude,\nto prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same\nway as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for\nthe Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 10]\n\nWhether the Brave Man Makes Use of Anger in His Action?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his\naction. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that\nwhich he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as\nto take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher\nsays (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does\nnot rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not\nemploy anger for his action.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he\nshould not seek the assistance of something weaker and more\nimperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of\nfortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira\ni): \"Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for\naction but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than\nfor reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid,\nthe trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?\"\nTherefore a brave man should not make use of anger.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of\nfortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or\ndesire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild\nbeasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and\nadulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now\nfortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore\nin like manner it should not employ anger.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that \"anger\nhelps the brave.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), concerning\nanger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion\nbetween the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded\nanger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or\ngood man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief,\nascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the\nsoul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in\nreality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), gave the name of passions to all the\nmovements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport\nthemselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the command\nof reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt,\nthey held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the\nother passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of\nreason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to\ncertain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they\ncalled them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them\naltogether from virtue.\n\nAccordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but\nnot immoderate anger.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is\nsubject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will,\nwhich would not be the case were it immoderate.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its\nassistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an\ninstrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it\nunbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal\nagent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover,\nSeneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed\nby him directly at Aristotle.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whereas fortitude, as stated above (A. 6), has two\nacts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the\nact of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but\nfor the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the\nother passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of\nsorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking.\nOn the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing\nthat hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as\nbeing the cause of anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 47, A. 3), or as\nmaking a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from\nsorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to a\npleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand\ndanger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far\nas one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): \"Of all the cases in which\nfortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man is\nbrave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose,\"\ni.e. for a due end; \"this is true fortitude.\"\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 11]\n\nWhether Fortitude Is a Cardinal Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For,\nas stated above (A. 10), anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now\nanger is not accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which\nbelongs to fortitude. Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned\na cardinal virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object\nof fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and\ntoil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fortitude is not\na cardinal virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon\nwhich human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a\nhinge (_cardine_). But fortitude is about dangers of death which are\nof rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude should not be\nreckoned a cardinal or principal virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary\non Luke 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fortitude\namong the four cardinal or principal virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), those\nvirtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost\nclaim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other\nconditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to \"act\nsteadfastly,\" according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Now fortitude above all\nlays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm\nis so much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall\nor recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in\naccordance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing\nevil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For\nAugustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): \"There is none that does not shun\npain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the\nmost untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the\nfear of pain.\" And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are\nmostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them that the\nbrave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Daring and anger do not cooperate with fortitude in its\nact of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended: for\nit is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal\npassion, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it\nbehooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude\nis directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands,\nand to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the\noccasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of\njustice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds,\nman encounters mortal adversaries.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 12]\n\nWhether Fortitude Excels Among All Other Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues.\nFor Ambrose says (De Offic. i): \"Fortitude is higher, so to speak,\nthan the rest.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good.\nBut fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the\ngreatest of the virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his\npossessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this\nthat a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue:\nwhereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and\nexternal things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral\nvirtues.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i): \"Justice is the\nmost resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): \"Those virtues\nmust needs be greatest which are most profitable to others.\" Now\nliberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a\ngreater virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), \"In things that are\ngreat, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good\": wherefore the\nbetter a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good,\naccording to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a\nperfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects\nthis good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of\nreason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this\ngood, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away\nfrom reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude holds\nthe first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest\npower to make man recede from the good of reason: and after fortitude\ncomes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in\nhindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks\nbefore effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by\nremoving obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues,\nprudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance\nfourth, and after these the other virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in\nrespect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both\nin warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he\nbegins by saying (De Offic. i): \"Now we come to treat of fortitude,\nwhich being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to\nwarlike and to civil matters.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the\ndifficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to\nits goodness rather than its difficulty.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of death\nexcept in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to\nfortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic.\ni) that \"fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since\nthe stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker.\"\n\nThe Fourth argument is granted.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular\nfavors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude,\nsince it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher\nsays (Rhet. i, 9) that \"just and brave men are most beloved, because\nthey are most useful in war and peace.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 124\n\nOF MARTYRDOM\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?\n\n(2) Of what virtue is it the act?\n\n(3) Concerning the perfection of this act;\n\n(4) The pain of martyrdom;\n\n(5) Its cause.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Martyrdom Is an Act of Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all\nacts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not\nvoluntary, as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for\nChrist's sake, and of whom Hilary says (Super Matth. i) that \"they\nattained the ripe age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom.\"\nTherefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is\nunlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (Q. 64, A. 5), and yet\nmartyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i)\nthat \"during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from\nthose who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river,\nand so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the\nCatholic Church with most solemn veneration.\" Therefore martyrdom is\nnot an act of virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of\nvirtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would\nit seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an\nact of virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of\nvirtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Matt. 5:10):\n\"Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for\ntheirs is the kingdom of heaven.\" Therefore martyrdom is an act of\nvirtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 1, 3), it belongs to\nvirtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason\nconsists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its\nproper effect, as shown above (Q. 109, AA. 1, 2; Q. 123, A. 12). And\nmartyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and\njustice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident that\nmartyrdom is an act of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the\nuse of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they\nsuffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture\ncontains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in\nbeing slain obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which\nothers acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for\nChrist's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the\ncase of baptized children the merit of Christ is conducive to the\nacquisition of glory through the baptismal grace, so in those who\nwere slain for Christ's sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is\nconducive to the acquisition of the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine\nsays in a sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he\nwere addressing them: \"A man that does not believe that children are\nbenefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned\nin suffering for Christ. You were not old enough to believe in\nChrist's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could\nendure suffering of Christ Who was to suffer.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that \"possibly the\nChurch was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority\nthus to honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf. Q. 64, A. 1, ad\n2].\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now\nit has been stated (I-II, Q. 108, A. 1, ad 4) that some of the\nprecepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the\npreparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared\nto do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way\ncertain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation\nof the mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act\naccording to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the\npoint in the case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance\nof sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an\noccasion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to\nendure it in moderation.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Martyrdom Is an Act of Fortitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For\nthe Greek _martyr_ signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the\nfaith of Christ. according to Acts 1:8, \"You shall be witnesses unto\nMe,\" etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: \"The mother of martyrs is the\nCatholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their\nblood.\" Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of\nfortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue\nwhich inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the\nact avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom:\nThus Maximus says in a sermon: \"The charity of Christ is victorious\nin His martyrs.\" Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act\nof martyrdom, according to John 15:13, \"Greater love than this no man\nhath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.\" Moreover without\ncharity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, \"If I\nshould deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it\nprofiteth me nothing.\" Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity\nrather than of fortitude.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: \"It is\neasy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great\nthing to imitate his faith and patience.\" Now that which calls\nchiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is\nthe act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of\nfortitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): \"Blessed\nmartyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors,\nhow shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?\" Now\na person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs.\nTherefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, seqq.), it belongs to\nfortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against\ndangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all\nagainst those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in\nmartyrdom man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he\ncleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger\nof death, the imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of\nparticular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a\nsermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): \"The crowd of onlookers wondered\nto see an unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect,\nundaunted in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine.\"\nWherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for\nwhich reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs: They \"became\nvaliant in battle\" [*Heb. 11:34].\n\nReply Obj. 1: Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude.\nOne is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is\nthe end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man\ndoes not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that\ngood, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as\ncivic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for the\nsafeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous\nfortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of Divine justice, which\nis \"through faith in Christ Jesus,\" according to Rom. 3:22. Thus\nmartyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is\nstrengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its\nfirst and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas\nfortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being\nthe virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as\ncommanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it\nmanifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious,\nlike any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not\nwithout charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the chief act of\nfortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which\nis aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude\non the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that\nmartyrs are also praised for their patience.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Martyrdom Is an Act of the Greatest Perfection?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest\nperfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not\nof precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not\nnecessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is\nnecessary for salvation, since the Apostle says (Rom. 10:10), \"With\nthe heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is\nmade unto salvation,\" and it is written (1 John 3:16), that \"we ought\nto lay down our lives for the brethren.\" Therefore martyrdom does not\npertain to perfection.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man\ngive his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give\nGod his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says\n(Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience is preferable to all sacrifices.\"\nTherefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to\nmaintain oneself in good, since the \"good of the nation is better\nthan the good of the individual,\" according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. i, 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone,\nwhereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of\nteaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of\nmartyrdom.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers\nmartyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore\nmartyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the highest degree.\n\n_I answer that,_ We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First,\nwith regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue\nproximately eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in\nthe due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous\nacts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but\nonly in so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of\nvirtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue\nbeing the end is better.\n\nA virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with\nits first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in\nthis respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life,\nsince, as the Apostle says (Col. 3:14), that \"charity . . . is the\nbond of perfection.\" Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the\ngreatest proof of the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a\nthing is proved to be so much the greater, according as that which he\ndespises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses\nto suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all\nthe goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the\nother hand he hates death more than anything, especially when it is\naccompanied by the pains of bodily torment, \"from fear of which even\ndumb animals refrain from the greatest pleasures,\" as Augustine\nobserves (QQ. 83, qu. 36). And from this point of view it is clear\nthat martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its\ngenus, as being the sign of the greatest charity, according to John\n15:13: \"Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his\nlife for his friends.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of\ncounsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being\nnecessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug.\nxiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency,\nthrough the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary\nto the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary\nfor salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for\nsalvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who\nthrough zeal for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to\nmartyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be\nunderstood as referring to the preparation of the mind.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of\nobedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil.\n2:8) that He became \"obedient unto death.\" Hence it is evident that\nmartyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered\nabsolutely.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers martyrdom according to the\nproper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all\nother virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than\nall virtues.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Death Is Essential to Martyrdom?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For\nJerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et\nEustoch.): \"I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both\nvirgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace\": and Gregory\nsays (Hom. iii in Evang.): \"Although persecution has ceased to offer\nthe opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom,\nsince even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword,\nyet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the\nspirit.\" Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.\n\nObj. 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising\nlife for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh:\nwherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the\nlife of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been\nforfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian\nfaith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the\nname of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the\nintegrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if\nshe were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy\nsaid: \"If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity\nwill gain me a twofold crown.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to\nfortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as\nAugustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships\nbesides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely\nimprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in\nHeb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint\nMarcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is\nnot essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.\n\nObj. 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A.\n2, ad 1; A. 3). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death.\nTherefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential\nto martyrdom.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that \"in\ndying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in\nliving without faith.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a martyr is so called as\nbeing a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise\nthings visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb.\n11. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to\nthe faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in\norder to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains\nthe life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all\nthings relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their\nkindred and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather\nthan lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): \"Skin\nfor skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul\" [Douay:\n'life'] i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion\nof martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet\nwith, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is\ncondemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is\nnot evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian\nfaith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight\nof men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently\nthis is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of God,\nhowever, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a\nreward, as Lucy said.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5), fortitude regards\ndanger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a\nperson is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or\nexile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result\nin death.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the\nvoluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person\nwillingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however,\nthat a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for\nChrist's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other\nkind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death\nensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this\nstate, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Faith Alone Is the Cause of Martyrdom?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For\nit is written (1 Pet. 4:15, 16): \"Let none of you suffer as a\nmurderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's\nthings. But if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him\nglorify God in this name.\" Now a man is said to be a Christian\nbecause he holds the faith of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ\ngives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne\nto the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing\nwitness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth,\notherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a\ntruth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems\nridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.\n\nObj. 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most\naccount which are directed to the common good, since \"the good of the\nnation is better than the good of the individual,\" according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause\nof martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs\nwho die for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent\nwith Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of\nthose who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of\nmartyrdom.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:10): \"Blessed are they that\nsuffer persecution for justice' sake,\" which pertains to martyrdom,\naccording to a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage.\nNow not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice.\nTherefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), martyrs are so called as\nbeing witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear\nwitness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which\nis in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ:\nwherefore Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the\ntruth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of\nfaith.\n\nBut the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also\noutward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one\nconfesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that\nhe has faith, according to James 2:18, \"I will show thee, by works,\nmy faith.\" Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): \"They\nprofess that they know God but in their works they deny Him.\" Thus\nall virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are\nprofessions of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires\nthese works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can\nbe the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the\nmartyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for\nrefusing to deny the faith, but for reproving adultery.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person is\nsaid to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but\nalso because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of\nChrist, according to Rom. 8:9, \"If any man have not the Spirit of\nChrist, he is none of His\"; and again because in imitation of Christ\nhe is dead to sins, according to Gal. 5:24, \"They that are Christ's\nhave crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences.\" Hence\nto suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the\nfaith, which is done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good\nwork, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all\ncomes under the head of witnessing to the faith.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The truth of other sciences has no connection with the\nworship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according to\ngodliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to\nbe the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as\nstated above (Q. 110, AA. 3, 4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever\ntruth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a\nlie is a sin against the Divine Law.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The good of one's country is paramount among human\ngoods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom,\nis of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good\nmay become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God, it\nfollows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may\nbe the cause of martyrdom.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 125\n\nOF FEAR*\n(In Four Articles)\n[* St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or 'timidity.' The\ntranslation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the\nconnection with the passion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a\nbetter rendering.]\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2)\nFearlessness; (3) Daring.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether fear is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?\n\n(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Fear Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 42). Now we are neither\npraised nor blamed for passions, as stated in _Ethic._ ii. Since then\nevery sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a\nsin: since the \"law of the Lord is unspotted\" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is\ncommanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): \"Servants, be\nobedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with\nfear and trembling.\" Therefore fear is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin\nis contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now\nfear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,\n7) that \"a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not\neven earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear.\" Therefore fear\nis not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): \"Fear ye not them\nthat kill the body,\" and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): \"Fear not,\nneither be thou afraid of their words.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A human act is said to be a sin on account of its\nbeing inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order,\nas stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 114, A. 1). Now this due order\nrequires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And\nreason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought\nafter. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be\nshunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that\nsome are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a\ngood is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be\nshunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to\nbe sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided.\nAccordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we\nshould endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek\nfor, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the\nappetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the\nappetite is neither inordinate nor sinful.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in\ngeneral. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or\nevil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the\nPhilosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame,\nbecause, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or\nafraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate\nmanner.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance\nwith reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in\nthe service they owe their masters.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we\ncannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing.\nHence there is no sin in fearing them.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Sin of Fear Is Contrary to Fortitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to\nfortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated\nabove (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5). But the sin of fear is not always connected\nwith dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, \"Blessed are all\nthey that fear the Lord,\" says that \"it is human fear whereby we\ndread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods.\" Again a\ngloss on Matt. 27:44, \"He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame\nword,\" says that \"evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of\npain, and fear of contempt.\" Therefore the sin of fear is not\ncontrary to fortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for\nfortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now\nsometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or\nshame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not\nto be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of\nfear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed\nthereto.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed\nnot to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1; I-II, Q.\n40, A. 4). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that\ntimidity is opposed to fortitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q. 43, A. 1),\nall fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary\nto something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular\nkind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every\nvirtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue;\nwhile inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate\nlove gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate\nfear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss\nof money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But\nthe greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for\nits object, as we find proved in _Ethic._ iii, 6. Wherefore the\ninordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards\ndangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be\nantonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure\nof speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term;\ne.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is\ninordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of\nthe danger of death.]\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its\ngeneric acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the\nend, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6): and it belongs\nto a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a\ngood. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to\nescape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is\ncontrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7),\nthat \"to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or something\ndisagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun\nhardships is a mark of effeminacy.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2), fear is the\nbeginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring.\nWherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation\npresupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some\nkind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair\nresults from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same\nkind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another\nkind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to\nfortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Fear Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1), fear is in the irascible faculty which is\na part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the\nsensuality, as stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 4). Therefore fear is\nnot a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God.\nBut fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, \"Whosoever is\nfearful,\" etc., says that \"a man is fearful when he trembles at the\nvery thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart,\nbut that he can rally and take courage.\" Therefore fear is not a\nmortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but\nalso from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept,\nbut only from perfection; for a gloss on Deut. 20:8, \"What man is\nthere that is fearful and fainthearted?\" says: \"We learn from this\nthat no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual\nwarfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches.\"\nTherefore fear is not a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and\nyet this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, \"But the\nfearful and unbelieving and the abominable,\" etc., \"shall have their\nportion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the\nsecond death.\" Therefore fear is a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), fear is a sin through being\ninordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be\nshunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of\nfear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of\nthe rational appetite's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but\nonly a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches\nto the rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately\nshuns something against the dictate of reason: and this\ninordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin.\nFor if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other\ntemporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit\nwhat is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin:\notherwise it is a venial sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the\nsensuality.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to the\nfear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may\nreply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes\nhis courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may\nhappen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one\ncannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins\nmortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from\naccomplishing what he purposed doing.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from\na good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but\nfor the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin,\nbut is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance\nwhen one has a reasonable cause for fear.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Fear Excuses from Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is\na sin, as stated above (A. 1). But sin does not excuse from sin,\nrather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this\nbe true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a\ncourageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse,\nbecause, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to\nbe an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual.\nNow fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of\ninducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal\nevil does not excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. iii, 6), \"one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor\nanything that is not a result of one's own wickedness.\" Therefore it\nseems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q. 1, Cap.\nConstat.): \"A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by\nheretics, has an ostensible excuse.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), fear is sinful in so far as\nit runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain\nevils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to\nshun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges\nto be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than\nthe loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if\nthrough fear of death he were to promise or give something to a\nrobber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners,\nrather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the\nother hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according\nto reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according\nto reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from\nsin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the\nsoul are more to be feared than the evils of the body, and evils of\nthe body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to\nincur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the\nbody, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as\nloss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to\navoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet\none's sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear\nis less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a\ncertain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher\n(Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear are\nnot simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but\nin the point of its involuntariness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the\nshortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of\nfear.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal\ngoods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that temporal\nevils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be\nfeared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal\nthings are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion\nof the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared;\nbut not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which\nis good according to virtue.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 126\n\nOF FEARLESSNESS\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there\nare two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?\n\n(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Fearlessness Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which\nis reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is\nwritten in praise of the just man (Prov. 28:1): \"The just, bold as a\nlion, shall be without dread.\" Therefore it is not a sin to be\nwithout fear.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death,\naccording to Matt. 10:28, \"Fear ye not them that kill the body,\"\netc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Isa.\n51:12, \"Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?\"\nTherefore it is not a sin to be fearless.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above (Q. 125, A.\n2). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing\nearthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), \"the love of\nGod to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city.\"\nTherefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said of the unjust judge (Luke 18:2) that\n\"he feared not God nor regarded man.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge\nalike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear\nwhereby one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of\ntemporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to\nlove his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in\ndue measure, that is, to love these things not as placing his end\ntherein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence\nit is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to\nfall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never\nlapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be\nwholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): \"No man\never hated his own flesh.\" Wherefore even those that slay themselves\ndo so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to free from\npresent stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other\ntemporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them*\nless than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect 'se'\ninstead of 'ea.' We should then read: For the reason that he loves\nhimself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these things\ncannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact\nthat he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils\ncontrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride\nof soul presuming on self and despising others, according to the\nsaying of Job 41:24, 25: \"He [Vulg.: 'who'] was made to fear no one,\nhe beholdeth every high thing\": and sometimes it happens through a\ndefect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that\nthe \"Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing.\" [*\"A man\nwould deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing\nthat he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said\nto be the case with the Celts.\"] It is therefore evident that\nfearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of\nsoul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from\nsin if it be invincible.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The just man is praised for being without fear that\nwithdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it\nis written (Ecclus. 1:28): \"He that is without fear cannot be\njustified.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man\nare not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they\nare to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as\nregards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others.\nHence it is written (Prov. 14:16): \"A wise man feareth and declineth\nfrom evil.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from\nloving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be\nfeared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): \"He that feareth the\nLord shall tremble at nothing.\" But temporal goods are not to be\ndespised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain\nthose things that pertain to Divine fear and love.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Fearlessness Is Opposed to Fortitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.\nFor we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is\nhindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is\nboth brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is\nnot opposed to fortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due\nlove, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due\nlove is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly\nto prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not\nopposed to fortitude.\n\nObj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the\nmean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then\nfortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the\nother, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness\nto be opposed to fortitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 3), fortitude is\nconcerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the\nrational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it\nbelongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to\nreason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought,\nand so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by\nexcess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to\nfortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought\nnot, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by\ndeficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to\nfear.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear,\nand to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the\nfearless man does not do.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean\nof fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in\nrespect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other\nvirtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of\ndaring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes the\nmean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its\nhaving different extremes in different respects.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 127\n\nOF DARING*\n[*Excessive daring or foolhardiness]\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether daring is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Daring Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written\n(Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory\n(Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that \"he goeth forth\nboldly to meet armed men [*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth\nto meet armed men'].\" But no vice redounds to a man's praise.\nTherefore it is not a sin to be daring.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), \"one\nshould take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been\ncounseled.\" But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore\ndaring is not sinful but praiseworthy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 45, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. But hope\nis accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring\nbe accounted a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): \"Go not on the way\nwith a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils.\" Now no man's\nfellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring\nis a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 55),\nis a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to\nreason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by\ndeficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the\nnames of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess,\nthus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which\ncase it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is\naccounted a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated\nby reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel,\nwhich is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking\ncounsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act\nrashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q. 58,\nA. 3). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far\npraiseworthy as it is directed by reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues,\nas the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4, 5, 6). Hence the\nnames of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and\nvirtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the\nnames of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the\ncase of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good\nfor this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Daring Is Opposed to Fortitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For\nexcess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But\npresumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore\ndaring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so\nfar as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts\nhimself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with\ndaring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to\ninjustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to\nfortitude but to justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as\nstated above (Q. 123, A. 3). Now since timidity is opposed to\nfortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice\nopposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is\nopposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will\nlikewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring.\nBut there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be\naccounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books\nof Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 126, A. 2), it belongs to a\nmoral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which\nit is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation\nin the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as\nimmoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice,\nimplies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of\ndaring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of\nfortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above\n(Q. 122, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend\nchiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species.\nWherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same\nvirtue as presumption which is its cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend\non its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm\ndone by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition\nof daring depend on this.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking the\noffensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature\ninclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is\nhindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the\nvice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only\ntimidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of\ntimidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), \"the daring\nare precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is\npresent,\" namely through fear.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 128\n\nOF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE\n\nWe must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider\nwhat are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each\npart.\n_______________________\n\nARTICLE [II-II, Q. 128, Art.]\n\nWhether the Parts of Fortitude Are Suitably Assigned?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably\nassigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to\nfortitude, namely _magnificence, confidence, patience,_ and\n_perseverance._ Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality;\nsince both are concerned about money, and \"a magnificent man must\nneeds be liberal,\" as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But\nliberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 5).\nTherefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope\ndoes not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by\nitself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of\nfortitude.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of\ndanger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any\nrelation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts\nof fortitude.\n\nObj. 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience\ndenotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to\nfortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part\nthereof.\n\nObj. 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not\nbe reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required\nin every virtue: for it is written (Matt. 24:13): \"He that shall\npersevere to the end he shall be saved.\" Therefore perseverance\nshould not be accounted a part of fortitude.\n\nObj. 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of\nfortitude, namely \"magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence,\nconstancy, forbearance, stability.\" Andronicus also reckons seven\nvirtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, \"courage, strength of\nwill, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence.\" Therefore\nit seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is\nincomplete.\n\nObj. 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of\nfortitude. The first is _civic_ fortitude, which produces brave deeds\nthrough fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is _military_\nfortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or\nexperience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds\nresulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude\nwhich makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome;\nthe fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through\nbeing unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not\ncomprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these\nenumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue can have three\nkinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude,\ntaken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is\nnot divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is\nabout a very special matter.\n\nHowever, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it:\nintegral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which\nis requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because\nwhat fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely\ndangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of\ncertain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as\nsecondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q. 123,\nAA. 3, 6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance.\nNow two things are required for the act of aggression. The first\nregards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind\nready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions _confidence,_ of\nwhich he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that \"with this the mind is much\nassured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings.\" The\nsecond regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not\nfailing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect\nTully mentions _magnificence,_ which he describes as being \"the\ndiscussion and administration,\" i.e. accomplishment \"of great and\nlofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind,\"\nso as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if\nthese two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to\ndangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because\nwithout them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred\nto other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues\nspecifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as\nsecondary virtues to principal: thus _magnificence_ is referred by\nthe Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and _magnanimity,_\nwhich seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two\nthings are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance.\nThe first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away\nfrom its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In\nthis respect he mentions _patience,_ which he describes as \"the\nvoluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for\nthe sake of virtue or profit.\" The other is that by the prolonged\nsuffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage,\naccording to Heb. 12:3, \"That you be not wearied, fainting in your\nminds.\" In this respect he mentions _perseverance,_ which accordingly\nhe describes as \"the fixed and continued persistence in a well\nconsidered purpose.\" If these two be confined to the proper matter of\nfortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be\nreferred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from\nfortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain\ngreatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is\nthe object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by\nfortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a\ntheological virtue, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3).\nBut by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man\nhopes in himself, yet under God withal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger,\nsince to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although\nmagnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or\nventuring on any other great things, they have a certain connection\nwith fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which\nfortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other\nhardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue\nannexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an\nintegral part thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed\nunto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is\nreckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the\nArticle.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by\nTully, namely _confidence, magnificence, forbearance,_ which he puts\nin the place of patience, and _firmness,_ which he substitutes for\nperseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely _magnanimity_\nand _security,_ are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence.\nBut Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence\ndenotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything\npresupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire,\nand this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above (I-II,\nQ. 40, A. 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped\nfor.\n\nA still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of\nhope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped\nfor. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for\nsometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope\nis avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat\ncontrary to hope, as stated above, (I-II, Q. 40, A. 4, ad 1). Hence\nMacrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely\nconstancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in\nperforming deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind.\nFor this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in\naccomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in\nthe mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may\nbe called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and\nconstant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.\n\nThose that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as\nthe above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions _perseverance_\nand _magnificence,_ and with Macrobius, _magnanimity. Strength of\nwill_ is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that\n\"strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what\nought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be\nendured\"--i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he\ndefines it as \"strength of soul in the accomplishment of its\npurpose.\" Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says\nthat \"manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue.\"\nBesides magnificence he mentions _andragathia_, i.e. manly goodness\nwhich we may render \"strenuousness.\" For magnificence consists not\nonly in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which\nbelongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence\nand solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to\n_andragathia_, strenuousness: wherefore he says that _andragathia_ is\nthe virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.\n\nAccordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the\nfour principal parts mentioned by Tully.\n\nReply Obj. 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true\nnotion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude,\nthey differ as to motive, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, ad 2);\nwherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 129\n\nOF MAGNANIMITY*\n[*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author]\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including,\nhowever, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the\nexception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity,\nof which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider\n(1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance.\nAs regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its\ncontrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?\n\n(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?\n\n(3) Whether it is a virtue?\n\n(4) Whether it is a special virtue?\n\n(5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?\n\n(6) Of its relation to confidence;\n\n(7) Of its relation to assurance;\n\n(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Magnanimity Is About Honors?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For\nmagnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows,\nsince \"magnanimity\" signifies greatness of mind, and \"mind\" denotes\nthe irascible part, as appears from _De Anima_ iii, 42, where the\nPhilosopher says that \"in the sensitive appetite are desire and\nmind,\" i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a\nconcupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it\nseems that magnanimity is not about honors.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs\nbe about either passions or operations. Now it is not about\noperations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows\nthat it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore\nmagnanimity is not about honors.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit\nrather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he\ntends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring\nhonors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about\nhonors.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that\n\"magnanimity is about honor and dishonor.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching\nforth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to\ntwo things, first to the matter about which is the field of its\nactivity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use\nof such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly\nfrom its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is\nminded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two\nways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may\nbe called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of\nsome small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good\nuse of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists\nin the best use of the greatest thing.\n\nThe things which come into man's use are external things, and among\nthese honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin\nto virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated\nabove (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2); and because it is offered to God and to the\nbest; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid\nshame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be\nmagnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and\nsimply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that\nare difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about\nhonors.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the\nconcupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is\nadded, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity\nregards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something\ngreat or difficult.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation,\nyet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a\ndifficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the\npassions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope:\neven so, we have stated (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5) with regard to fortitude\nthat it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of\nfear and daring.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a\nway as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too\ngreat a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so\nas not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving\nof blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a\nman strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think\nmuch of the honor accorded by man.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Magnanimity Is Essentially About Great Honors?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great\nhonors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated\nabove (A. 1). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore\nit is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness\nabout anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either\ngreat or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to\nmagnanimity to be about great honor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is\ndishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor,\nand consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is\nnot only about great honors.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that\nmagnanimity is about great honors.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18),\nvirtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the\nperfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that\npower, as stated in _De Coelo_ i, 116. Now the perfection of a power\nis not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such\noperations as are great or difficult: for every power, however\nimperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it\nis essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as\nstated in _Ethic._ ii, 3.\n\nNow the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act\nof virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the\npoint of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and\nestablish the rational means in some particular matter: and this\ndifficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also\nof justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which\nmay involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which\nmoderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards\nchiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions,\nbecause the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv,\n4).\n\nNow as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness\nof this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases\nfrom the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are\nthe objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great\npower of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive\nappetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to\nreason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions\nregard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is\nabout very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence\nof the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest\nanger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of\nresistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that\nare the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of\nmoney or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not\nonly regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also\nabout that which is ordinary or little: because things external,\nthough they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for\nhuman life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two\nvirtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely\nliberality, and another about large sums of money, namely\n\"magnificence.\"\n\nIn like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary\nhonors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes,\nwhich are _philotimia_, i.e. love of honor, and _aphilotimia_, i.e.\nwithout love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving\nhonor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as\nboth these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great\nhonors there is _magnanimity._ Wherefore we must conclude that the\nproper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous\nman tends to such things as are deserving of honor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in\nitself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason,\nthe mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is\nmuch more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest\npresents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any\nneed of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are\nthings existing outside the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more\nable to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous\nman looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even\nlittle honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot\nsufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence\nhe is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them\nabove him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are\nordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor,\nbut despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Magnanimity Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every\nmoral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean\nbut the greater extreme: because the \"magnanimous man deems himself\nworthy of the greatest things\" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity\nis not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But one may have a virtue without having\nmagnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that\n\"whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of\nthem, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous.\" Therefore magnanimity\nis not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Virtue is a good quality of the mind,\" as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). But magnanimity implies certain\ndispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of\n\"a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his\nutterance calm.\" Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But\nmagnanimity is opposed to humility, since \"the magnanimous deems\nhimself worthy of great things, and despises others,\" according to\n_Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But\nmagnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the\nfirst place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is\nremiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q. 113]\ntowards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others;\nfifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those\nthat are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc.\n15:18): \"Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the\ngreatness of courage (_animi magnitudinem_) with which they fought\nfor their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword.\" Now,\nonly deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity\nwhich consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding\nthe good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good.\nNow among external human things honors take precedence of all others,\nas stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 11, A. 2, Obj. 3). Therefore\nmagnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a\nvirtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), \"the\nmagnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes,\" in so far as he\ntends to what is greatest, \"but in the matter of becomingness, he\nfollows the mean,\" because he tends to the greatest things according\nto reason, for \"he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth\"\n(Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to\ntheir acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts\nof all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming\nto every virtuous man, but only to great men. On the other hand, as\nregards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all\nvirtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in\nthe soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto.\nThus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not\ncompetent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed\nto practice that act if it were competent to him according to his\nstate.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according\nto the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it\nhappens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by\nway of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man\nbeing intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish,\nwhereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few\nand require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement.\nLikewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who\nare quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the\nmagnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these\ndispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man\naccording to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are\nnaturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found\nnaturally.\n\nReply Obj. 4: There is in man something great which he possesses\nthrough the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him\nthrough the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man\ndeem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he\nholds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue,\nmagnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same\nis to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or\nexternal fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think\nlittle of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and\nmagnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from\nGod's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do\nanything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and\nesteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's\ngifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): \"In\nhis sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is\nbrought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.],\" which indicates the\ncontempt of magnanimity, \"but he honoreth them that fear the Lord,\"\nwhich points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore\nevident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one\nanother, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because\nthey proceed according to different considerations.\n\nReply Obj. 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a\nmagnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in\nthe first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful\nof those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact\nthat he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he\nrepay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of\ngratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the\nacts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he\nis remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what\nbecomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of\nworks, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is\nalso said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to\ntruth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not\ntrue, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he\ndoes not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number\nof those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. iv, 3), \"it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards\npersons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle\nclass.\" In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with\nothers: this means that he is not at home with others than his\nfriends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which\nbelong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great\nand little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also\nsaid, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any,\nbut good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to\nthe useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to\nsupply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Magnanimity Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For\nno special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher\nstates (Ethic. iv, 3) that \"whatever is great in each virtue belongs\nto the magnanimous.\" Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to\nany special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to\nthe magnanimous man. For it is stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3 that \"it\nbelongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof\" (which is an act of\nprudence), \"nor to act unjustly\" (which is an act of justice), \"that\nhe is ready to do favors\" (which is an act of charity), \"that he\ngives his services readily\" (which is an act of liberality), that \"he\nis truthful\" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that \"he is not\ngiven to complaining\" (which is an act of patience). Therefore\nmagnanimity is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul,\naccording to the saying of Isa. 61:10, \"He hath clothed me with the\ngarments of salvation,\" and afterwards he adds, \"and as a bride\nadorned with her jewels.\" But magnanimity is the ornament of all the\nvirtues, as stated in _Ethic._ iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general\nvirtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it\nfrom the other virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2), it belongs to a\nspecial virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate\nmatter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a\ndeterminate matter, namely honors, as stated above (AA. 1, 2): and\nhonor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly\nmagnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.\n\nSince, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above\n(Q. 103, A. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it\nregards all the virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great\nhonor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a\ngreat deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on\ndoing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to\nwhat is worthy of great honors.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows\nthat he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence,\nand shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a\nman is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself\nready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other\nvirtues. On the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man\nthinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their\nsake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again,\nall concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be\nthe outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes\na defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external\nevils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids\nunder a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his\nexcellence or greatness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster\nor adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment\nresults from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through\nmagnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in _Ethic._\niv, 3.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Magnanimity Is a Part of Fortitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.\nFor a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be\nthe same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): \"If\nmagnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou\nshalt live in great assurance\": and Tully says (De Offic. i): \"If a\nman is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far\nremoved from deception.\" Therefore magnanimity is not a part of\nfortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a\nmagnanimous man is not _philokindynos_, that is, a lover of danger.\nBut it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore\nmagnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a\npart thereof.\n\nObj. 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped\nfor, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or\ndared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is\na more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part\nthereof.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon\nmagnanimity as a part of fortitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 3), a principal\nvirtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of\nvirtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue\nis firmness of mind, because \"a firm standing is necessary in every\nvirtue,\" according to _Ethic._ ii. And this is chiefly commended in\nthose virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most\ndifficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to\nstand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the\nvirtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.\n\nNow it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein\nfortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the\ngreatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as\nman loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of\ndeath more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity\nagrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult\nmatter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind\nabout a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity\nis reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as\nsecondary to principal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1, 3), \"to lack evil\nis looked upon as a good,\" wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous\nevil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were\nthe obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and\nthe latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity\nmay be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference\nas regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it\nfollows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to\nall kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks\n\"many\" the same as \"great.\" This is contrary to the nature of a\nmagnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for\nthe sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that\nare truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to\ndanger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even\nas in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not _mikrokindynos_, i.e.\nendangering himself for small things, but _megalokindynos_, i.e.\nendangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat.\nVirtut.): \"Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers\nlike a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes\nthe soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to\nwithstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer\nan evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be\ndesired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to\nwit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires\nit. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than\nthat which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things\nis always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good\nthings. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue\nof magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil,\nevil is of more import in this particular respect.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Confidence Belongs to Magnanimity?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity.\nFor a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in\nanother, according to 2 Cor. 3:4, 5, \"Such confidence we have,\nthrough Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think\nanything of ourselves, as of ourselves.\" But this seems inconsistent\nwith the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to\nmagnanimity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to\nIsa. 12:2, \"I will deal confidently and will not fear.\" But to be\nwithout fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also\nbelongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is\ndue to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we\nare the house of Christ, \"if we hold fast the confidence and glory of\nhope unto the end.\" Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from\nmagnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius\nenumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute\nconfidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question\n(ad 6) and in the prologue to this.\n\n_I answer that,_ Confidence takes its name from \"fides\" (faith): and\nit belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But\nconfidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, \"Thou shalt have\nconfidence, hope being set before thee.\" Wherefore confidence\napparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing\nthe word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith\nsignifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a\nstrong opinion about something, not only on account of another's\nstatement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it\nfollows that confidence may denote the hope of having something,\nwhich hope we conceive through observing something either in\noneself--for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is\nconfident that he will live long. Or in another, for instance,\nthrough observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man\nis confident that he will receive help from him.\n\nNow it has been stated above (A. 1, ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly\nabout the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence\ndenotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation\nwhich gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good,\nit follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to\nthe \"magnanimous to need nothing,\" for need is a mark of the\ndeficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a\nman, hence he adds \"or scarcely anything.\" For it surpasses man to\nneed nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine\nassistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a\nsocial animal, for he is [not] sufficient by himself to provide for\nhis own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs\nto a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a\npoint of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who\nare able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability\ngoes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 4),\nwhen we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to\ndespair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good.\nBut as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because\nthe latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain\nstrength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is.\nSince, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of\nevil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it\nfollows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than\nto fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to\nfortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to\nfortitude.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of\nhope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now\nthe mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the\nact, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it\nto a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking,\nconfidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the\nconditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the\nparts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified\nwith magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral\npart, as stated in the preceding Question.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Security Belongs to Magnanimity?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity.\nFor security, as stated above (Q. 128, ad 6), denotes freedom from\nthe disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively.\nWherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude\ndoes not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case.\nNeither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man \"is said to be\nsecure because he is without care.\" But this seems to be contrary to\nvirtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim.\n2:15, \"Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God.\"\nTherefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great\nthings in all the virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is\naccounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14, 18, \"If thou\nwilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being\nburied thou shalt sleep secure.\" Therefore security does not belong\nto magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading:\n\"Magnanimity consists of two things,\" that \"it belongs to magnanimity\nto give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune.\"\nBut a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to\nmagnanimity.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), \"fear makes a\nman take counsel,\" because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he\nfears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of\nwhich fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom\nof the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope.\nNow, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly\nregards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to\nmagnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.\n\nIt must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so\nis fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating\nof the passion (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs\nindirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so\nsecurity belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes\ndespair.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes\nfear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of\nmind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same\nas fortitude, but is a condition thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one\nputs care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not\nfear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and\nparticipation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, Q. 5, AA.\n3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a\ncondition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's\nreward.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Goods of Fortune Conduce to Magnanimity?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to\nmagnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi):\n\"virtue suffices for itself.\" Now magnanimity takes every virtue\ngreat, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do\nnot conduce to magnanimity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But\nthe magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune:\nfor Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: \"Magnanimity consists\nof two things,\" that \"a great soul is commended for despising\nexternal things.\" Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods\nof fortune.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that \"it belongs to a great\nsoul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his\nnatural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man.\" And Aristotle\nsays (Ethic. iv, 3) that \"a magnanimous man does not grieve at\nmisfortune.\" Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of\nfortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him.\nTherefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that \"good\nfortune seems to conduce to magnanimity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), magnanimity regards two\nthings: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something\ngreat as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things.\nFor since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise,\nbut also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the\nhighest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those\nwho possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful\norgans or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily\naccomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is\nevident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it\ncan be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order\nto act more expeditiously.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch\nas he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything\nunbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he\nesteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither\nvery joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it.\nWherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external\ngoods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them\nif he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 130\n\nOF PRESUMPTION\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the\nfirst place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are\nthree, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we\nshall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of\ndeficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether presumption is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 130, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Presumption Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle\nsays: \"Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.:\n'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before.\" But it\nseems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above\noneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) \"we should not\nlisten to those who would persuade us to relish human things because\nwe are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should\nrelish those that make us immortal\": and (Metaph. i) \"that man should\npursue divine things as far as possible.\" Now divine and immortal\nthings are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists\nessentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that\npresumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): \"Not that we are\nsufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.\" If then\npresumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not\nsufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of\nanything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): \"O wicked\npresumption, whence camest thou?\" and a gloss answers: \"From a\ncreature's evil will.\" Now all that comes of the root of an evil will\nis a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by\nthe Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is\ndone in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order\nestablished in general throughout natural things is vicious and\nsinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that\nevery action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does\nany natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is\nvicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any\none should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what is\nmeant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident\nthat presumption is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: [A thing may be] above the active power of a natural\nthing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing: thus\nthe air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be\nso changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which\nsurpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and\npresumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to\nattempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect\nvirtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to\nadvance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched\nhimself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually\nadvancing forward.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the\norder of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the\nintellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In\nthis respect the Philosopher says that \"man ought to pursue immortal\nand divine things,\" not that he should do what it becomes God to do,\nbut that he should be united to Him in intellect and will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), \"what we can\ndo by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense.\" Hence\nsince we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not\naltogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man\nto attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be\npresumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in\nGod's assistance.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 130, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Presumption Is Opposed to Magnanimity by Excess?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity\nby excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against\nthe Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 21, A. 1). But the\nsin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to\ncharity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem\noneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous\neven if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his\nability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as\nlittle things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), \"on\naccount of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong\nothers, because they deem external goods as something great.\"\nTherefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but\nonly by deficiency.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that\nthe \"vain man,\" i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a\npresumptuous man, \"is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1), magnanimity\nobserves the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it\ntends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to\nanything greater than is becoming to us.\n\nNow the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not\nexceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he\ndoes exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous\nman does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is\nopposed to magnanimity by excess.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine\njustice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter\nkind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it\nimplies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or\nrather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in\nso far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability,\nit can be opposed to magnanimity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to\nsomething great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man\npresumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If,\nhowever, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption\nis not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about\nordinary honor, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so\nfar as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err\nin two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he\nhas greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly,\nas regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and\nworthy of great things, by reason of something that does not make him\nso, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), \"those who have these things without\nvirtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor\nare rightly called magnanimous.\"\n\nAgain, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his\nability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the\ncase of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has\nexceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not\nsimply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly\nclothes, despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of\nmagnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca\nsays (De Quat. Virtut.) that \"when magnanimity exceeds its measure,\nit makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on\nexcelling in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any\nconsiderations of virtue.\" Thus it is evident that the presumptuous\nman sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in\nappearance he surpasses him.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 131\n\nOF AMBITION\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 131, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Ambition Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition\ndenotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and\nthe greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for\nhonor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it\nsomething deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably\ndesired.\n\nObj. 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him\nas a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher\nstates (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor\nis not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens\nhim from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to do good\nand to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that\n\"with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave in\nhonor\": and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that \"honor fosters the\narts.\" Therefore ambition is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that \"charity is not\nambitious, seeketh not her own.\" Now nothing is contrary to charity,\nexcept sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2), honor denotes\nreverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two\nthings have to be considered with regard to man's honor. The first is\nthat a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for\nthis is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count\nhonor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point\nthat calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is\ngiven to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a\nman ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his\nexcellence, as this enables him to profit others.\n\nNow the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when\na man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is\nto desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires\nhonor for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's\nappetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of\nothers. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is\nevident that it is always a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The desire for good should be regulated according to\nreason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it\nis sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now\nthose are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason's\ndictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the\nvirtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward:\nsince the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue.\nBut it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have\nnothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which\nhonor derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to\nvirtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as\nstated in _Ethic._ iv, 3.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened\nfrom doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due\nmeasure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an\noccasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what\nmeans he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that \"the\ngood as well as the wicked covet honors for themselves, but the one,\"\ni.e. the good, \"go about it in the right way,\" whereas \"the other,\"\ni.e. the wicked, \"through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit\nand falsehood.\" Yet they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do\ngood or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things for the\nsake of honor are not truly brave.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 131, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Ambition Is Opposed to Magnanimity by Excess?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by\nexcess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one\nside. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated\nabove (Q. 130, A. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by\nexcess.\n\nObj. 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems\nto regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc. 4:7) that\n\"Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood.\" Therefore ambition is\nnot opposed to magnanimity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is\nwritten (Acts 25:27) that \"Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great\npomp (_ambitione_) . . . had entered into the hall of audience\"\n[*'Praetorium.' The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is\nthe same], and (2 Para. 16:14) that when Asa died they \"burned spices\nand . . . ointments over his body\" with very great pomp (_ambitione_).\nBut magnanimity is not about outward show. Therefore ambition is not\nopposed to magnanimity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) that \"the more a man\nexceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate\nothers.\" But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an\nexcess of magnanimity.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), ambition signifies\ninordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes\nuse of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that\nambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is\nwell ordered.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its\nend, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man\nattempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is\nopposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man\nattempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that\nmagnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes\nright use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by\nexcess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various\nrespects.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity,\non account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly\ninordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For\nif a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity,\nnot for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a\ndignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but\npresumptuous.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of\nhonor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is\nsignified by the words of James 2:2, 3: \"If there shall come into\nyour assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and\nyou . . . shall say to him: Sit thou here well,\" etc. Wherefore\nambition does not regard outward worship, except in so far as this\nis a kind of honor.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 132\n\nOF VAINGLORY\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?\n\n(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(4) Whether it is a capital vice?\n\n(5) Of its daughters.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Desire of Glory Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no\none sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph.\n5:1): \"Be ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children.\" Now by\nseeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men:\nwherefore it is written (Isa. 43:6, 7): \"Bring My sons from afar, and\nMy daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth\non My name, I have created him for My glory.\" Therefore the desire\nfor glory is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which incites a man to do good is apparently\nnot a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully\nsays (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that \"glory inflames every man to strive\nhis utmost\": and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works,\naccording to Rom. 2:7: \"To them, indeed, who according to patience in\ngood work . . . glory and honor\" [*Vulg.: 'Who will render to every\nman according to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and\nhonor and incorruption, eternal life.']. Therefore the desire for\nglory is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is\n\"consistent good report about a person, together with praise\": and\nthis comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii),\nviz. that glory is, \"as it were, clear knowledge with praise.\" Now it\nis no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to\ncall for praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, \"Take care of a good\nname,\" and Rom. 12:17, \"Providing good things not only in the sight\nof God, but also in the sight of all men.\" Therefore the desire of\nvainglory is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): \"He is better\nadvised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore\nAugustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be\n\"glorified is the same as to be clarified.\" Now clarity and\ncomeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly\ndenotes the display of something as regards its seeming comely in the\nsight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since,\nhowever, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those\nwho are far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes\nthat somebody's good is known and approved by many, according to the\nsaying of Sallust (Catilin.) [*The quotation is from Livy: Hist.,\nLib. XXII C, 39]: \"I must not boast while I am addressing one man.\"\n\nBut if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only\nconsists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few,\nor of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good\nas being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve\none's own good: for it is written (1 Cor. 2:12): \"Now we have\nreceived not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God\nthat we may know the things that are given us from God.\" Likewise it\nis not a sin to be willing to approve one's own good works: for it is\nwritten (Matt. 5:16): \"Let your light shine before men.\" Hence the\ndesire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire\nfor empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire\nanything vain, according to Ps. 4:3, \"Why do you love vanity, and\nseek after lying?\"\n\nNow glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the\nthing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that\nwhich is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for\nsomething frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from\nwhom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain:\nthirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he\ndoes not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as\nGod's honor, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says on John 13:13, \"You call Me Master\nand Lord; and you say well\" (Tract. lviii in Joan.):\n\"Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of\npride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself,\ndoes not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His:\nnor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows.\" It\nis therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but\nfor ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the\ngood of others, according to Matt. 5:16, \"That they may see your good\nworks, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but true\nglory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works,\nand of which it is written (2 Cor. 10:17, 18): \"He that glorieth let\nhim glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved,\nbut he whom God commendeth.\" It is true that some are heartened to do\nworks of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the\ndesire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does\nvirtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De\nCiv. Dei v).\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is requisite for man's perfection that he should\nknow himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it\nis not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being\nuseful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by\nmen, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to\nbe in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of\nothers' praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to\npersevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is\npraiseworthy that a man should \"take care of his good name,\" and that\nhe should \"provide good things in the sight of God and men\": but not\nthat he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Vainglory Is Opposed to Magnanimity?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.\nFor, as stated above (A. 1), vainglory consists in glorying in things\nthat are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and\nperishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the\ntestimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to\nimprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity.\nTherefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to\nmagnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with\nvainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way\npresumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above\n(Q. 130, A. 2; Q. 131, A. 2): and these differ from vainglory.\nTherefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, \"Let nothing be done through\ncontention, neither by vainglory,\" says: \"Some among them were given\nto dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the\nsake of vainglory.\" But contention [*Cf. Q. 38] is not opposed to\nmagnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading,\n\"Magnanimity consists in two things\": \"We should beware of the desire\nfor glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should\never strive to keep untrammeled.\" Therefore it is opposed to\nmagnanimity.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), glory is an\neffect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is\npraised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the\nknowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated\nabove (Q. 129, AA. 1, 2), it follows that it also is about glory:\nseeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory\nin moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly\nopposed to magnanimity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To think so much of little things as to glory in them\nis itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the\nmagnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him.\nIn like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for\nhonor's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent\nwith magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is\nsaid of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth\nthan for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man\nto glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this\nsomething great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic.\niv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon\nlittle things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from\nbeing contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall\nshort of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the\nmagnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply.\nBut if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man\nby way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great\nin his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 127, A. 2, ad 2), the opposition of\nvices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if\ndone intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends\nsave for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.\niv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing\nis great in his estimation.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Vainglory Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing\nprecludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory\nprecludes the eternal reward: for it is written (Matt. 6:1): \"Take\nheed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them:\notherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in\nheaven.\" Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper\nto God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates\nto himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (Isa.\n42:8): \"I will not give My glory to another,\" and (1 Tim. 1:17): \"To\n. . . the only God be honor and glory.\" Therefore vainglory is a\nmortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous\nand harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss of\nAugustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, \"God, Who proveth our hearts,\" says:\n\"Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not\nperceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to\ndesire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to\ntake pleasure in it, when it is given.\" Chrysostom also says (Hom.\nxix in Matth.) that \"vainglory enters secretly, and robs us\ninsensibly of all our inward possessions.\" Therefore vainglory is a\nmortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus\nImperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that \"while\nother vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory\nfinds a place even in the servants of Christ.\" Yet in the latter\nthere is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; Q. 110, A. 4; Q. 112,\nA. 2), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin\nof vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to\ncharity as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as regards the\nlove of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by\nreason of the matter about which one glories: for instance when one\nglories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe\nGod, according to Ezech. 28:2, \"Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast\nsaid: I am God,\" and 1 Cor. 4:7, \"What hast thou that thou hast not\nreceived? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou\nhadst not received it?\" Or again when a man prefers to God the\ntemporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jer. 9:23,\n24): \"Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the\nstrong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in\nhis riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he\nunderstandeth and knoweth Me.\" Or again when a man prefers the\ntestimony of man to God's; thus it is written in reproval of certain\npeople (John 12:43): \"For they loved the glory of men more than the\nglory of God.\"\n\nIn another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of\nthe one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his\nlast end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in\norder to obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is\nagainst God. In this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says\n(De Civ. Dei v, 14) that \"this vice,\" namely the love of human\npraise, \"is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory\nmore than it fears or loves God, that our Lord said (John 5:44): How\ncan you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory\nwhich is from God alone, you do not seek?\"\n\nIf, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not\ninconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in,\nnor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal\nbut a venial sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a\nvirtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done\nfor the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal\nsin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply\nthrough vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is\na mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires\nthe excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God\nalone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on\naccount of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave\nsins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too\nself-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward\ngoods.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Vainglory Is a Capital Vice?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a\nvice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital.\nBut vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a\ncapital vice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for\nthis is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor\nis not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But\nvainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it\nis not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good,\nsince human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something\noutside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the\nseven capital vices.\n\n_I answer that,_ The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For\nsome reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place\nvainglory among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi),\nreckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which\nis the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice:\nand not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on (Q.\n152, AA. 1, 2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever\ngood one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence\ntherefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of\npride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over\nthe other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special\nsources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that\nare the means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most\nconducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of\na man's goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all.\nWherefore, just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires\nhonor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of\nman he acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its\nclose connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it\nfollows that it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from\nthe inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital\nvice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from\npride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and I-II, Q.\n84, A. 2) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Praise and honor, as stated above (A. 2), stand in\nrelation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory\nis compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to\nbe honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain\nrenown in the knowledge of others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of\ndesirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to\nbe reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital\nvice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin,\ninasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Daughters of Vainglory Are Suitably Reckoned to Be\nDisobedience, Boastfulness, Hypocrisy, Contention, Obstinacy,\nDiscord, and Love of Novelties?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably\nreckoned to be \"disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention,\nobstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*_Praesumptio novitatum,_\nliterally 'presumption of novelties'].\" For according to Gregory\n(Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride.\nNow pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way\nabout, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should\nnot be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.\n\nObj. 2: Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome\nchiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with\nvainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of\nvainglory.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory\nis always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet\nthis is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men.\nTherefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter\nof vainglory.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who\nthere assigns the above daughters to vainglory.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 34, A. 5; Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q.\n84, AA. 3, 4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be\ndirected to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its\ndaughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own\nexcellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 4): and to this end a man may\ntend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is\nboasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for\nastonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at\nmost; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man\nstrives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not\ninferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the\nintellect, and thus we have _obstinacy,_ by which a man is too much\nattached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is\nbetter. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have _discord,_\nwhereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with\nothers. Thirdly, as regards _speech,_ and then we have _contention,_\nwhereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards\ndeeds, and this is _disobedience,_ whereby a man refuses to carry out\nthe command of his superiors.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 112, A. 1, ad 2), boasting is\nreckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is\narrogance: but outward boasting, according to _Ethic._ iv, is\ndirected sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and\nthus it is the result of vainglory.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Anger is not the cause of discord and contention,\nexcept in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a\nglorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on\naccount of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory\nto the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the\nsake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give\nalms as though this were something novel.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 133\n\nOF PUSILLANIMITY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?\n\n(2) To what virtue is it opposed?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Pusillanimity Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin\nmakes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a\nfainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).\nTherefore pusillanimity is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that \"a\nfainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet\ndoes not deem himself worthy of them.\" Now no one is worthy of great\ngoods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says\n(Ethic. iv, 3), \"none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor.\"\nTherefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently\npusillanimity is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Pride is the beginning of all sin\" (Ecclus. 10:15).\nBut pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man\nsets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws\nfrom the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that \"he who\ndeems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted.\"\nNow sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for\ninstance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose\nthem for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. 1:6).\nTherefore pusillanimity is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save\nsin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col.\n3:21): \"Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they\nbe discouraged.\" Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a\nsin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a\nnatural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with\nits power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or\ninanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is\nproportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so\npusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his\npower, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto.\nWherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is\nthat the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received\nfrom his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear,\nwas punished by his master (Matt. 25; Luke 19).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their\nneighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil,\nbecause he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what\nmight be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if\n\"they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged\nstrictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they\nmight have done had they been less retiring.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from\nsinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with\nloss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a\nman, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing\ncertain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through\nnot trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially,\nsometimes mortally.\n\nAgain it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great\nthings in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he\nderives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or\nfrom external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for\nvirtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of\npride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion,\nwhereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he\nis competent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): \"The sluggard is\nwiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences.\" For\nnothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and\nhaving a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says\n(Pastoral. i) of Moses that \"perchance he would have been proud, had\nhe undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving:\nand again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the\ncommand of his Creator.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which\nthey were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace:\nyet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness,\ndemurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Pusillanimity Is Opposed to Magnanimity?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to\nmagnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that \"the\nfainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good\nthings, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself.\" Now ignorance of\nself seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to\nprudence.\n\nObj. 2: Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who\nthrough pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be\nslothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of\nprudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore pusillanimity is\nnot opposed to magnanimity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear:\nhence it is written (Isa. 35:4): \"Say to the fainthearted: Take\ncourage and fear not.\" It also seems to proceed from inordinate\nanger, according to Col. 3:21, \"Fathers, provoke not your children to\nindignation, lest they be discouraged.\" Now inordinate fear is\nopposed to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore\npusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular\nvirtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that\nvirtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption\nis. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows\nthat it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary\nto the saying of Ecclus. 37:3, \"O wicked presumption, whence camest\nthou?\" Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness\nand littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and\nlittle are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to\nmagnanimity.\n\n_I answer that,_ Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways.\nFirst, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it\nis opposed to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little\ndiffer in connection with the same subject. For just as the\nmagnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so\nthe pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of\nsoul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which\non the part of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification,\nand on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one\nfalsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered\nin reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things\nof which one is worthy. But, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2, ad 3),\nopposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective\nspecies than on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is\ndirectly opposed to magnanimity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding\nfrom a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it\nis opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because\nignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from\nlaziness in considering one's own ability, according to _Ethic._ iv,\n3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of\nview of its effect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor\nis the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of\ndeath: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that\npusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we\nconsider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is\nroused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which\ndisheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however,\nwe consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby\nthe soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to\npusillanimity.\n\nReply Obj. 4: According to its proper species pusillanimity is a\ngraver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good\nthings, which is a very great evil according to _Ethic._ iv.\nPresumption, however, is stated to be \"wicked\" on account of pride\nwhence it proceeds.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 134\n\nOF MAGNIFICENCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With\nregard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special virtue?\n\n(3) What is its matter?\n\n(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Magnificence Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever\nhas one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A.\n1). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence:\nbecause the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that \"not every liberal\nman is magnificent.\" Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to\n_Ethic._ ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean,\nfor it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now \"great\" and \"little\" are\nopposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is \"equal,\" as\nstated in _Metaph._ x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but\nthe extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but\non the contrary perfects it, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 2; Q. 117,\nA. 1, Obj. 1). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the\n\"magnificent man is not lavish towards himself\": and this is opposed\nto the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore\nmagnificence is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) \"act is\nright reason about things to be made.\" Now magnificence is about\nthings to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence = _magna\nfacere_--i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather\nthan a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Human virtue is a participation of Divine power.\nBut magnificence (_virtutis_) belongs to Divine power, according to\nPs. 47:35: \"His magnificence and His power is in the clouds.\"\nTherefore magnificence is a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to _De Coelo_ i, 16, \"we speak of virtue\nin relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power,\" not as regards\nthe limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very\nnature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something\ngreat, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the\nvery notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his\nactions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent\ndeeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence,\neither actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as\nexplained above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), as also (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1)\nwhen we were treating of the connection of virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if\nwe consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean,\nif we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of\nnor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But\nthat which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that\nwhich regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at\nlarge. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to\nbe lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good,\nbut because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything\nregarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man\naccomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done\nonce, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting\nnature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with\na suitable dwelling, as stated in _Ethic._ iv.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) \"there must\nneeds be a virtue of act,\" i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite\nis inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what\nmagnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Magnificence Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For\nmagnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it\nmay belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be\ngreat: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance,\nfor he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is\nnot a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as\nthat which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to\nsomething great, as stated above (Q. 129, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it\nbelongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore\nmagnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is\nwritten (Ex. 15:11): \"Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness,\"\nand (Ps. 95:6): \"Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His\nsanctuary.\" Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above (Q.\n81, A. 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion.\nTherefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons it with other special\nvirtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).\n\n_I answer that,_ It belongs to magnificence to do (_facere_)\nsomething great, as its name implies [* magnificence = _magna\nfacere_--i.e. to make great things]. Now _facere_ may be taken in two\nways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly _facere_\nmeans to work something in external matter, for instance to make a\nhouse, or something of the kind; in a broad sense _facere_ is\nemployed to denote any action, whether it passes into external\nmatter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand\nor will.\n\nAccordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something\ngreat, the doing (_factio_) being understood in the strict sense, it\nis then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in\nthe use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of\ngoodness, namely that the work produced (_factum_) by the act is\nsomething great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is\nwhat magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.\n\nIf, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing\nsomething great, the doing (_facere_) being understood in a broad\nsense, it is not a special virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something\ngreat in the genus of that virtue, if \"doing\" (_facere_) be taken in\nthe broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper\nto magnificence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something\ngreat, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by\nmaking (_faciendo_), or by any kind of action, as stated in _Ethic._\niv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole\naspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect,\ndo something great, direct their principal intention, not to\nsomething great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the\ngreatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the\ngreatness of the virtue.\n\nOn the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do\nsomething great, \"doing\" (_facere_) being taken in the strict sense,\nbut also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence\nTully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that \"magnificence is the discussing\nand administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain\nbroad and noble purpose of mind,\" \"discussion\" referring to the\ninward intention, and \"administration\" to the outward accomplishment.\nWherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every\nmatter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that\ncan be produced in external matter (_factibili_).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intention of magnificence is the production\nof a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no\nend of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore\nmagnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine\nhonor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that \"the most\ncommendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine\nsacrifices\": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this\nreason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect\nis directed to religion or holiness.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Matter of Magnificence Is Great Expenditure?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great\nexpenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But\nliberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2).\nTherefore magnificence is not about expenditure.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"every magnificent man is liberal\" (Ethic. iv, 2).\nBut liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.\nTherefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but\nabout gifts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external\nwork. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing\nan external work, for instance when one spends much in sending\npresents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of\nmagnificence.\n\nObj. 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But\nthe poor are able to possess all the virtues, since \"the virtues do\nnot necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for\nthemselves,\" as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore\nmagnificence is not about great expenditure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that\n\"magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions\nin money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality\nin scale.\" Therefore it is only about great expenditure.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to magnificence\nto intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work,\nproportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be\nproduced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence\nto spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in\nbecoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that\n\"a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal,\"\ni.e. proportionate, \"expenditure.\" Now expenditure is the outlay of a\nsum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he\nlove money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to\nbe both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to\nproduce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in\ngoing to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love\nthe magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 129, A. 2), those virtues that are\nabout external things experience a certain difficulty arising from\nthe genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned,\nand another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that\nsame thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and\nits use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in\ngeneral, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the\nuse of money.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and\nthe magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man,\ninasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of\nmoney; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and\nexpenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love\nof money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the\nmagnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be\nproduced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as\nstated in _Ethic._ iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but\nrather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of\nsome work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do\nsomething which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he\nbrings to effect what the whole state is striving for.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a\nvirtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man\nmay be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments\nto the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot\naccomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great\nsimply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are\ngreat by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in\nitself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its\ngenus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher\nsays (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Magnificence Is a Part of Fortitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude.\nFor magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above\n(A. 3). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice.\nTherefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But\nmagnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with\nexpenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems\nto pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to\nfortitude.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that \"the\nmagnificent man is like the man of science.\" Now science has more in\ncommon with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence\nshould not be reckoned a part of fortitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De\nSomn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of\nfortitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue,\ncannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not\nagree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a\npart thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.\n\nIn order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things\nare necessary, as stated above (Q. 80). The one is that the secondary\nvirtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some\nrespect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with\nfortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous\nand difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is\nseated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls\nshort of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude\ntends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person,\nwhereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its\ndifficulty from the dispossession of one's property, which is of much\nless account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is\naccounted a part of fortitude.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed\nunder the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence\nregard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul,\nalbeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in\nreference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the\nconcupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving\nand spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the\nother hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by\nattaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in\na determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence,\nlike magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in\nmatter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it\ntends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as\nfortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something great,\nas stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the\nreason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason\nby observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand.\nThis is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both\nthose things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would\nincur the risk of a great loss.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 135\n\nOF MEANNESS*\n(In Two Articles)\n[*\"Parvificentia,\" or doing mean things, just as \"magnificentia\" is\ndoing great things.]\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which\nhead there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether meanness is a vice?\n\n(2) Of the vice opposed to it.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Meanness Is a Vice?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice\nmoderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore\nboth the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But\nmagnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue\nrather than a vice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that \"careful\nreckoning is mean.\" But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,\nsince man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius\nstates (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that \"a mean man\nis loth to spend money.\" But this belongs to covetousness or\nilliberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the\nothers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a\nspecial vice opposed to magnificence.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6),\nmoral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases\nthey are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be\nmean (_parvificus_) because he intends to do something little\n(_parvum_). Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad\naliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a\nmean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in\nrelation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in\ntwo ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in\nanother as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man\nintends principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he\nintends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so\nthat he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. iv, 4) that \"the magnificent man with equal expenditure will\nproduce a more magnificent result.\" On the other hand, the mean man\nintends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. iv, 2) that \"he seeks how he may spend least.\" As a result of\nthis he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink\nfrom producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore\nthe Philosopher says that \"the mean man after going to great expense\nforfeits the good\" of the magnificent work, \"for the trifle\" that he\nis unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man\nfails to observe the proportion that reason demands between\nexpenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in\nfailing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest\nthat meanness is a vice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule\nof reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the\nArticle. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but\nfor declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little\nthings: hence meanness is a vice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), \"fear makes us\ntake counsel\": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings,\nbecause he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in\nthings of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but\nsinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his\naffections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of\nhis reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the\nliberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so\ntoo the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth\nand slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards\nordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which\nis a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful\nthan illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that\n\"although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not\nbring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one's neighbor, nor\nare they very disgraceful.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Is a Vice Opposed to Meanness?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For\ngreat is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a\nvirtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated\nabove (A. 1), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it\nwould merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much,\nwhere they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to\nspend much, according to _Ethic._ iv, 2, and thus they have something\nof meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as\nstated above (A. 1). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order\nto make a show of their wealth, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2. But this\nbelongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated\nabove (Q. 131, A. 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of the Philosopher who\n(Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two\nopposite vices.\n\n_I answer that,_ Great is opposed to little. Also little and great\nare relative terms, as stated above (A. 1). Now just as expenditure\nmay be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in\ncomparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which\nreason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is\nmanifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend\nless than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion\nbetween his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it,\nwhereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is\nproportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek _banausia_,\nso called from the Greek _baunos_, because, like the fire in the\nfurnace, it consumes everything. It is also called _apyrokalia_, i.e.\nlacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a\ngood purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called _consumptio_ (waste).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but\nnot from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this\nbelongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which\nobserves the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice\nof waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the\nvalue of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend\nlittle. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great\nwork, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as\nwhen it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species\nof its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness\nfalls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to\nthe end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 136\n\nOF PATIENCE\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether patience is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?\n\n(3) Whether it can be had without grace?\n\n(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?\n\n(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Patience Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues\nare most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet\npatience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there,\naccording to Isa. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, \"They shall not hunger nor\nthirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them.\" Therefore\npatience is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue\nit is \"that makes its possessor good.\" Yet patience is sometimes\nfound in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many\nevils patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16,\n\"All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares,\nand in misery and in sorrow.\" Therefore patience is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 70, A. 1, ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits\n(Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Patientia i): \"The virtue of\nthe soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we\neven preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1), the moral virtues\nare directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of\nreason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions\nsorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor.\n7:10, \"The sorrow of the world worketh death,\" and Ecclus. 30:25,\n\"Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.\" Hence the\nnecessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against\nsorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does.\nWherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): \"A man's patience it is\nwhereby he bears evil with an equal mind,\" i.e. without being\ndisturbed by sorrow, \"lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods\nwhereby he may advance to better things.\" It is therefore evident\nthat patience is a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards\nthe same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the\ngoods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they\nwill remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven.\nThus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling\nand other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain\nin the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of\npatience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in\nenjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that \"patience itself will not be in\nheaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be\nborne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) \"properly\nspeaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without\ninflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those\nwho bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither\nmarvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may\nmarvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them\npatient.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 11, A. 1), the very notion of\nfruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in\nthemselves, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8. Now the names of the virtues\nare wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit\nis a virtue, but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is\nreckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the\nmind from being overcome by sorrow.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Patience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues.\nFor in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now\n\"patience hath a perfect work\" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the\ngreatest of the virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the\nsoul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written\n(Luke 21:19): \"In your patience you shall possess your souls.\"\nTherefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of\nother things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom.\nxxxv in Evang.) \"patience is the root and safeguard of all the\nvirtues.\" Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is not reckoned among the four virtues which\nGregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call\nprincipal.\n\n_I answer that,_ Virtues by their very nature are directed to good.\nFor it is virtue that \"makes its possessor good, and renders the\nlatter's work good\" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's\nsuperiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater\naccording as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly.\nNow those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more\ndirectly to good than those which are a check on the things which\nlead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective\nof good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good\n(thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and\njustice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw\nman from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a\ngreater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is\nfortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is\nconcerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship,\nwhich is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the\ngreatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological\nvirtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in\ngood, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from\ngreater obstacles to good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing\nhardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by\npatience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness;\nthirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust\ninjury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle\nis the most perfect.\n\nYet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect,\nthat it is more perfect simply.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man\nis said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by\nthe root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the\nsoul.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all\nthe virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but\nmerely because it removes their obstacles.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 3]\n\nWhether It Is Possible to Have Patience Without Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without\ngrace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it\npossible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more\nreasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of\nevil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and\nwithout the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that\n\"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they\nlove sinfully.\" Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without\nthe help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to\nbe truly patient.\n\nObj. 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more\nabhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some\nheathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than\nbetray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be\ntruly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have\npatience without the help of grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much\ntrouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the\nhealth of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health.\nTherefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure\nmany evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly\npatient.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 61:6): \"From Him,\" i.e. from\nGod, \"is my patience.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), \"the strength\nof desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly\nundertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which\ngives pleasure.\" The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of\nthemselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose\nto suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end.\nHence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing\nto endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the\nprivation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the\nfact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the\nloss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which\nloves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a\nvirtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, \"Charity is\npatient.\"\n\nBut it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through\ngrace, according to Rom. 5:5, \"The charity of God is poured forth in\nour hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.\" Therefore it is\nclearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature\nin the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of\nconcupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is\nmore prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the\nconcupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the\nsake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason:\nand yet it is this that pertains to true patience.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. I-II, Q. 61, A. 5] is\ncommensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can\ntend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without\nthe help of God's grace [*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 2]. On the other hand,\nthe good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto\nby a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man\nbears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man\nnaturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between\nthis endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Patience Is a Part of Fortitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a\nthing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as\nfortitude: because, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the proper act of\nfortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is\nstated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from St.\nGregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that \"patience consists in enduring\nevils inflicted by others.\" Therefore patience is not a part of\nfortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above\n(Q. 123, A. 3), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems\nto be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the\nconcupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of\ntemperance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if\npatience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without\npatience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently,\nbut even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience\nis not a part of fortitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of\nfortitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude,\nbecause it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For\nit belongs to patience \"to suffer with an equal mind the evils\ninflicted by others,\" as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.).\nNow of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most\ndifficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of\ndeath, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is\nclear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that\nit lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore\npatience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue,\nfor which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811).\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed,\nbut that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death:\nwhereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast\nto good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing\nthrough sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the\nlatter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is\nchiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude\navoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to\nbe patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a\npraiseworthy manner by suffering (_patiendo_) things which hurt him\nhere and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by\nthem. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is\nin the concupiscible faculty.\n\nNor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because\nthe annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the\nmatter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a\npart of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because\ntemperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures\nof touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and\nsex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other\npersons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows\nbesides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that\na man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows,\nhowever great they be.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is\nan integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may\npatiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from\nthis point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent\nwith patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the\nman who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v. in the Opus\nImperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Matt.\n4:10, \"Begone Satan,\" that \"it is praiseworthy to be patient under\nour own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked\":\nand Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that\n\"the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the\ncommonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our\nenemies.\" But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is\nannexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Patience Is the Same As Longanimity?* [*Longsuffering. It is\nnecessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison\nwith magnanimity.]\n\nObjection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For\nAugustine says (De Patientia i) that \"we speak of patience in God,\nnot as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the\nwicked, that they may be converted.\" Wherefore it is written (Ecclus.\n5:4): \"The Most High is a patient rewarder.\" Therefore it seems that\npatience is the same as longanimity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But\nimpatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay:\nfor one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils.\nTherefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so\nis place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of\nplace. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of\ntime, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct\nfrom patience.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom.\nii] on Rom. 2:4, \"Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and\npatience, and longsuffering?\" says: \"It seems that longanimity\ndiffers from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather\nthan of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while\nthose who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be\nborne patiently.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to\ngreat things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something\na long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to\ngood, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their\nobject, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in\ncommon with magnanimity than with patience.\n\nNevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two\nreasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain\nevils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly,\nendurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more\ndifficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for,\nis of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, \"Hope that\nis deferred afflicteth the soul.\" Hence there may be patience in\nbearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly\nlonganimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so\nfar as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards\nlonganimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently\naccomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered\nunder the one aspect of grievous evil.\n\nFor this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience,\nsays that \"patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of\narduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit.\" By\nsaying \"arduous\" he refers to constancy in good; when he says\n\"difficult\" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the\nproper object of patience; and by adding \"continued\" or \"long\nlasting,\" he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in\ncommon with patience.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though\ndistant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that\nwhich is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails.\nMoreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the\npoint of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time\ncoming to us.\n\nWe grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the\nreason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard\nto bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they\npersist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne\nwith longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride\nseems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride\nare stated to be borne with patience.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 137\n\nOF PERSEVERANCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under\nthe head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?\n\n(3) Of its relation to constancy;\n\n(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Perseverance Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater\nthan perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in\n_Ethic._ iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"by virtue man lives aright,\" according to Augustine\n(De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De\nPersever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living,\nunless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should\npersist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in\n_Ethic._ ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for\nTully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that \"perseverance is the fixed and\ncontinued persistence in a well-considered purpose.\" Therefore\nperseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that\n\"perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand,\nand those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are\nindifferent.\" Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to\nomit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), \"virtue\nis about the difficult and the good\"; and so where there is a special\nkind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a\nvirtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts.\nFirst, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of\nthe proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time,\nsince to persist long in something difficult involves a special\ndifficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is\naccomplished belongs to a special virtue.\n\nAccordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for\nthe reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of\nitself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring\nin connection with dangers of death (which also is something\ndifficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it\nconsists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so\nfar as necessity requires.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is\nfound in one who bears those things which are most difficult to\nendure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And\nevils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured\nfor a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is\nnot on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise.\nAmong other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures\nof touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life:\nsuch are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long\nendurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long\ntime for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the\ncontrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these\npassions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one\nwho is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect\nvirtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be\ntaken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something\nimperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take\nperseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult\ngood, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even\nif it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the\nmore perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue,\nbecause virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than\nfrom the aspect of difficulty.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name:\nthus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): \"Faith is to believe\nwithout seeing.\" Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without\nperforming the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence\nwithout exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the\nhabit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for\ninstance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it.\nAccordingly we must reply that the term \"perseverance\" is sometimes\nused to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes\nfor the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of\nperseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice\nby persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not\npersisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the\nwork, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it\nbelongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work,\nfor instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and\nthe magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are,\nhowever, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of\nlife, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last\nend of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are\nthe principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished\nuntil the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of\nperseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two\nways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that\nvirtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end,\nbelongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this\nas its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit\nto its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon\nevery virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a \"quality difficult to change.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Perseverance Is a Part of Fortitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude.\nFor, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), \"perseverance is\nabout pains of touch.\" But these belong to temperance. Therefore\nperseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain\npassions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply\nmoderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the\nmore praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason.\nTherefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue,\nbut rather of prudence which perfects the reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose\nperseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore\nperseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal\nvirtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part\nof a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance\nas a part of fortitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3,\n4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed\nsomething that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it\npractices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most\ndifficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been\nstated (Q. 123, A. 2) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because\nit observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand\nfirm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity\nthat every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance\nof something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to\nprincipal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay\nin accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise:\nnor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore\nperseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal\nvirtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends\nnot only on the matter [*Cf. Q. 136, A. 4, ad 2], but also on the\nmode, because in everything form is of more account than matter.\nWherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in\ncommon with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more\nin common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the\ndifficulty arising from length of time.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks\n(Ethic. vii, 4, 7) does not moderate any passions, but consists\nmerely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance,\nconsidered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of\nweariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like\nfortitude, is in the irascible.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting,\nnot a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end,\naccording to Matt. 24:13, \"He that shall persevere to the end, he\nshall be saved.\" Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance\nfor it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137. Art. 3]\n\nWhether Constancy Pertains to Perseverance?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to\nperseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q.\n137, A. 5): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore\nconstancy does not pertain to perseverance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"virtue is about the difficult and the good.\" Now it\ndoes not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in\ngreat deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy\npertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would\nseem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of\nunchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i)\ncondivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates\nperseverance, as stated above (Q. 128, A. 6). Therefore constancy\ndoes not pertain to perseverance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ One is said to be constant because one stands to a\nthing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as\nappears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy\nbelongs to perseverance.\n\n_I answer that,_ Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it\nbelongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to\nthose things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the\nvirtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good,\nagainst the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the\nact: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against\ndifficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence\nperseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude,\nbecause the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more\nintrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external\nobstacles.\n\nReply Obj. 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are\nespecially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as\nstated above (Q. 136, A. 1). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance\nas to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which\noccasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore\nconstancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in\nlittle or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length\nof time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which\nmagnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which\nperseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has\nsomething in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the\npoint of their difference, as stated in the Article.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Perseverance Needs the Help of Grace?\n[*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 10]\n\nObjection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of\ngrace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now\naccording to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner\nof nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for\nperseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm\nbrought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now \"before\nsin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had\nreceived,\" as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more\ntherefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ,\npersevere without the help of a further grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds\nof virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7):\n\"We . . . have walked through hard ways.\" Now some persevere in\nsinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also\npersevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Persev. i): \"We hold that\nperseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in\nChrist.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2, ad 3),\nperseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit\nof perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the\ngift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly,\nit may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until\ndeath: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also\nthe gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of\nlife, as stated above (I-II, Q. 109, A. 10), when we were treating of\ngrace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature,\nwhich changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace\nbestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the\nfree-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good,\nthough it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our\npower to choose yet not to accomplish.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned,\ninclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a\nthing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the\nhabit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), \"it was\ngiven to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere\nof his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to\nmake perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ,\nthe predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but\nperseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened,\nof his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited\nso great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas\nthese, although the world rage against their constancy, have\npersevered in faith.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot\nby himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling\ninto sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be\npersevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the\nother hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering\nin good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs\nthe help of grace for that end.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 138\n\nOF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which\nhead there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Of effeminacy;\n\n(2) Of pertinacity.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 138, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Effeminacy* Is Opposed to Perseverance?\n[* _Mollities,_ literally \"softness\"]\n\nObjection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.\nFor a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, \"Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate,\nnor liers with mankind,\" expounds the text thus: \"Effeminate--i.e.\nobscene, given to unnatural vice.\" But this is opposed to chastity.\nTherefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that \"delicacy\nis a kind of effeminacy.\" But to be delicate seems akin to\nintemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but\nto temperance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that \"the man\nwho is fond of amusement is effeminate.\" Now immoderate fondness of\namusement is opposed to _eutrapelia_, which is the virtue about\npleasures of play, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy\nis not opposed to perseverance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that \"the\npersevering man is opposed to the effeminate.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, AA. 1, 2), perseverance is\ndeserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on\naccount of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is\ndirectly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake\na good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is\nwhat we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be\n\"soft\" if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared\nto be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the\nbattering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he\nyields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7)\nthat \"it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and\noverwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he\nstruggles against them.\" Now it is evident that fear of danger is\nmore impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De\nOffic. i) under the heading \"True magnanimity consists of two\nthings\": \"It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to\nbe defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to\nyield to pleasure.\" Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of\nattraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of\nwithdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an\neffeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow\ncaused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by\ncustom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more\ndifficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by\nnatural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering\nthrough the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are\ncompared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore\nthose who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being\nwomanish themselves, as it were.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it\nis only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the\ndelicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that\ndiminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Deut. 28:56): \"The tender and\ndelicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her\nfoot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness'].\" Thus delicacy is a kind\nof effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of\npleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for\ninstance toil or the like.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In play two things may be considered. In the\nfirst place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of\nplay is opposed to _eutrapelia_. Secondly, we may consider the\nrelaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it\nbelongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too\nit belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation\ninordinately.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 138, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Pertinacity Is Opposed to Perseverance?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to\nperseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises\nfrom vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to\nmagnanimity, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2). Therefore pertinacity is\nnot opposed to perseverance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either\nby excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because\nthe pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) \"they rejoice when they\nprevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected.\" And if it be\nopposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is\nclearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to\nperseverance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against\nsorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures,\nthe brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity\nis over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is not\nopposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity\nis to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition\nis opposed to religion, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 1). Therefore\npertinacity is opposed to perseverance.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x) \"a person is said to be\npertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious.\"\n\"Pervicacious\" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man\n\"perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients\ncalled 'vicia' what we call victory.\" These the Philosopher (Ethic.\nvii, 9) calls _ischyrognomones_, that is \"head-strong,\" or\n_idiognomones_, that is \"self-opinionated,\" because they abide by\ntheir opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does\nso less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it\nis clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while\npertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for\nfalling short of it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own\nopinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own\nexcellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause.\nNow it has been stated above (Q. 127, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 133, A. 2), that\nopposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on\ntheir species.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately\nin something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain\npleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man.\nSince, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it\ntoo much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or\neffeminate man.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the other virtues persist against the\nonslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in\nthe same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to\npraise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity\nis directly opposed to perseverance.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 139\n\nOF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this\nis the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?\n\n(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 139, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Fortitude Is a Gift?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues\ndiffer from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should\nnot be reckoned a gift.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the acts of the gifts remain in heaven, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of fortitude does not remain\nin heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that \"fortitude encourages the\nfainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from\nheaven.\" Therefore fortitude is not a gift.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that \"it is a\nsign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures\nof the passing show.\" Now noisome pleasures and delights are the\nconcern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems\nthat fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of\nfortitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the\nHoly Ghost (Isa. 11:2).\n\n_I answer that,_ Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as\nstated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 3): and this firmness of\nmind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially\nwith regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according\nto his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in\nboth these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of\ndifficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in\nenduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or\ngeneral virtue, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2).\n\nYet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that\nhe may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils\nmay threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in\na man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or\ndangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the\nHoly Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life,\nwhich is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils.\nA certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy\nGhost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that\nfortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been\nstated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) that the gifts regard the motion\nof the mind by the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the\nendurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to\ngive confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the\nfortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the\nway: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the\nend. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from\ntoil and evil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude\nnot only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch\nas it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the\ngift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to\nbe concerned chiefly with the greater goods.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 139, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Fourth Beatitude: \"Blessed Are They That Hunger and\nThirst After Justice,\" Corresponds to the Gift of Fortitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, \"Blessed are they\nthat hunger and thirst after justice,\" does not correspond to the\ngift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of\nfortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and\nthirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this\nbeatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of\nfortitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for\ngood. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of\nwisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above\n(Q. 45). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of\nfortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since\ndelight is essential to beatitude, according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Now\nthe fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude.\nTherefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i):\n\"Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to\nenjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material\nthings, must toil.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 121, A. 2), Augustine makes the\nbeatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which\nthey are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness\nbetween them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning\nthe hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely\nfortitude.\n\nYet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A.\n1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult,\nnot merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation\nof works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable\ndesire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may\nunderstand here not only particular, but also universal justice,\nwhich is related to all virtuous deeds according to _Ethic._ v, 1,\nwherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a\ngift.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as\nstated above (Q. 23, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 4, ad 3). Hence\nwhatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond\nsufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which\nregards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard\nthe long delay and accomplishment of goods.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 140\n\nOF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the precepts of fortitude:\n\n(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;\n\n(2) The precepts of its parts.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 140, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Precepts of Fortitude Are Suitably Given in the Divine\nLaw?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably\ngiven in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old\nLaw. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Deut. 20).\nTherefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law\nalso.\n\nObj. 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than\nnegative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but\nnot vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to\ncontain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated\nabove (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2). Now the precepts are\ndirected to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be\nproportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should\nhave been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the\nchief precepts of the Law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.\n\n_I answer that,_ Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by\nthe lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in\nvarious ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so\nthat even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of\nkingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of\nthe Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine\nLaw contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues,\nwith a view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is\nwritten (Deut. 20:3, 4): \"Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God\nis in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies.\"\n\nAs to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and\namong them we find precepts of fortitude according to the\nrequirements of those goods.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while\nthe promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal,\naccording to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there\nwas need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily\ncontest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New\nTestament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of\neternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Matt. 11:12, \"The\nkingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away.\"\nHence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8, 9): \"Your adversary the devil, as a\nroaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist\nye, strong in faith,\" as also James 4:7: \"Resist the devil, and he\nwill fly from you.\" Since, however, men while tending to spiritual\ngoods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of\nfortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might\nbravely endure temporal evils, according to Matt. 10:28, \"Fear ye not\nthem that kill the body.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts. But\nthe things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the\nthings to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the\nprecepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, A. 1), the precepts of the\ndecalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to\nbe known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the\ndecalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the\nnotion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because\nit is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear\ndangers of death.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 140, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Precepts of the Parts of Fortitude Are Suitably Given in\nthe Divine Law?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are\nunsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and\nperseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence,\nmagnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (Q. 128). Now we find\nprecepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance.\nTherefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and\nmagnanimity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the\nguardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv).\nNow the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience\nshould not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm.\nDom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.\n\nObj. 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as\nstated above (Q. 128; Q. 136, A. 4; Q. 137, A. 2). Now the precepts\nof fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above\n(A. 1, ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance\nshould have been negative and not affirmative.\n\nThe contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given\nby Holy Writ.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such\nthings as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright\nman needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and\nannexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only\nabout the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of\nthe secondary and annexed virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus\nof fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness\nwhich they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining\nto excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under\nprecepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather\nthan of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other\nhand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience\nand perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them,\nbut on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of\nprecepts of patience and perseverance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 3, A. 2), although affirmative\nprecepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but\naccording to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative\nprecepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the\npreparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil\nthem when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be\nunderstood in the same way.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance,\nis about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution;\nnor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On\nthe other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships\nand toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially\nin general, what is to be done in such cases.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 141\n\nOF TEMPERANCE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nIn the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself;\n(2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must\nconsider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special virtue?\n\n(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?\n\n(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?\n\n(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a\nkind of touch?\n\n(6) What is the rule of temperance?\n\n(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?\n\n(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Temperance Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue\ngoes against the inclination of nature, since \"there is in us a\nnatural aptitude for virtue,\" as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1. Now\ntemperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines,\naccording to _Ethic._ ii, 3, 8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But some people have temperance without\nhaving the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet\ncovetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as\nappears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4). But\nseemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have\nbeen already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ. 8, 9, 19, 45, 52, 71,\n139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): \"Temperance is the\nname of a virtue.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3), it is essential\nto virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in\naccordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence\nhuman virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance\nwith reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its\nvery name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes.\nTherefore temperance is a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to\nit. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to\nhim. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that\nthose pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with\nreason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but\nfrom those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that\ntemperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is\nin accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the\nanimal nature that is not subject to reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect\nvirtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are\nin sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to\nthe opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though\nthey do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so\nfar as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1), or acquired by habituation, which virtues,\nthrough lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear,\nwhereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to\nPs. 118:120: \"Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear.\" The gift of fear\nhas for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in\nthis respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above\n(Q. 19, A. 9, ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object\nwhatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands\nin the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things\nwhich are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance:\nwherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Temperance Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue.\nFor Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that \"it belongs to\ntemperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption\nfor God's sake.\" But this is common to every virtue. Therefore\ntemperance is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that \"what we observe\nand seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul.\" But this is\ncommon to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that \"we cannot\nseparate the beautiful from the virtuous,\" and that \"whatever is just\nis beautiful.\" Now the beautiful is considered as proper to\ntemperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27).\nTherefore temperance is not a special virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it\na special virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is customary in human speech to employ a common\nterm in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things\nto which that common term is applicable: thus the word \"city\" is used\nantonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of\nspeech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term;\ne.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word\n\"temperance\" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its\ncommon signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a\ngeneral virtue, because the word \"temperance\" signifies a certain\ntemperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human\noperations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue.\nYet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude,\neven if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance\nwithdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying\nreason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those\nthings on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.\n\nOn the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as\nwithholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive\nto man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a\nspecial matter.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things\nwhich seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law.\nWherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can,\nlike the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and\nsecondly in a sense of excellence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a\nmost disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are\nnatural to man, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5). Hence\ntranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence,\nalthough it is a common property of all the virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is\nascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First,\nin respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a\ncertain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we\nunderstand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).\nSecondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold\nthe lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his\nanimal nature, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5; Q. 142, A. 4),\nwherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In\nconsequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above\nall hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty\nmust be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral\ngoodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute\nof temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): \"An honest man is one who\nhas no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state.\" This is\nmost applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring\nmost dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q. 142, A. 4).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires\nand pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that\n\"temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other\nwanton emotions of the mind.\" Now all the passions of the soul are\ncalled emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is\nnot only about desires and pleasures.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Virtue is about the difficult and the good\"\n[*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear,\nespecially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires\nand pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and\ndangers, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore it seems\nthat the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and\npleasures.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) \"the grace of\nmoderation belongs to temperance\": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27)\nthat \"it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the\nmind and to enforce moderation.\" Now moderation is needed, not only\nin desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever\npertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about\ndesires and pleasures.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not\noccur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii,\nand De Different. ii, 39]: that \"it is temperance whereby lust and\ndesire are kept under control.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 136, A. 1), it\nbelongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the\npassions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's\npassions is twofold, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2), when we\nwere treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive\nappetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it\nflies from sensible and bodily evils.\n\nThe first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against\nreason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily\ngoods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason,\nbut are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to\nattain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing\nto the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in\naccord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral\nvirtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.\n\nOn the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying\nfrom sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through\nbeing immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when\na man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany\nthe good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of\nreason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying\nfrom evil to remain firm in the good of reason.\n\nAccordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very\nnature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz.\nfear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with\ndaring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining\nsome good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation,\nis chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible\ngoods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows\nthat arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring\npresupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the\nabsence of the aforesaid pleasures.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 25, A.\n1), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which\npertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to\nthe pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the\npassions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly\nmoderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good,\nas a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as\nmoderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the\npassions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is\nmoderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the\nthings he desires.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the\nobject of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to\ntemperance. On the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind\nfrom certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which\nfortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and\nfortitude about fears.\n\nReply Obj. 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions of the\nsoul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the\ninternal passions.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures of Touch?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires\nand pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that\n\"the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which\ndraw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from\nthe fruit of His goodness\"; and a little further on he adds that \"it\nis the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular\npraise.\" Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire\nfor pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the\nother senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and\nagain by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is\nwritten (1 Tim. 6:10). \"Desire [*_Cupiditas,_ which the Douay version\nfollowing the Greek _philargyria_ renders 'desire of money'] is the\nroot of all evils.\" Therefore temperance is not only about desires of\npleasures of touch.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that \"one who is\nworthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate,\nbut he is not magnificent.\" Now honors, whether small or great, of\nwhich he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch,\nbut in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only\nabout desires for pleasures of touch.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to\npertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect.\nNow all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus.\nTherefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.\n\nObj. 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures\nof the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5) in the treatise on\nthe passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of\nvirtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through\ncuriosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man\nknowledge, saying (Gen. 3:5): \"Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and\nevil.\" Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of\ntemperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of\ntouch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur\nin games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of\ntemperance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that\n\"temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), temperance is about desires\nand pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring.\nNow fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest\nevils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of\ndeath. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about\ndesires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a\nnatural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results\nfrom a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural\noperations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by\nmeans of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union\nof the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat\nand drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the\nsense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about\npleasures of touch.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes\ntemperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but\nas concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever:\nand this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also\nreply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can\nhe control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to\ntemperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and\nsecondarily other pleasures.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation\nin external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is\nproportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's\nemotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part\nin man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not\nresult from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch:\nthus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in\nrelation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the\nother senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the\nbecomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about\nthe pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch,\nnot principally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible\nobjects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their\nbecomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound,\nthis pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.\nHence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can\nbe referred to them antonomastically.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature\ngreater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the\nsenses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive\nappetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by\nmoral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly\nspeaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no\ncontrol, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a\nhindrance to another greater and more binding.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of\nnature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about\nall pleasures of touch.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Temperance Is About the Pleasures Proper to the Taste?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper\nto the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink,\nwhich are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which\nregard the touch. But according to what has been said (A. 4),\ntemperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human\nlife. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste\nrather than about those proper to the touch.\n\nObj. 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about\nthings themselves. Now, according to _De Anima_ ii, 3, \"the touch is\nthe sense of food,\" as regards the very substance of the food,\nwhereas \"savor\" which is the proper object of the taste, is \"the\npleasing quality of the food.\" Therefore temperance is about the\ntaste rather than about the touch.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vii, 4, 7: \"temperance and\nintemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and\nincontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy,\" to which delicacy\npertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors\nwhich are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about\npleasures proper to the taste.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that\n\"seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do\nwith the taste.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), temperance is about the\ngreatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human\nlife either in the species or in the individual. In these matters\ncertain things are to be considered as principal and others as\nsecondary. The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary\nmeans, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the\nspecies, or of food and drink which are necessary for the\npreservation of the individual: while the very use of these\nnecessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.\n\nIn regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the\nuse more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a\npleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly\nabout the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of\nthese necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the\ntouch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about\npleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible\nobjects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the\nnecessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste\nis more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that\ntemperance is more about the taste than about the other senses.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially\nresults therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says\n(De Anima ii, 3) that \"touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or\ncold, wet or dry.\" To the taste belongs the discernment of savors,\nwhich make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of\nits being suitable for nourishment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to\nspeak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use\nof food and drink.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food,\nbut secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which\nit is served.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Rule of Temperance Depends on the Need of the Present\nLife?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not\ndepend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not\nregulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the\nsoul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of\ntemperance does not depend on the needs of the body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs\nof the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against\ntemperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by\nnature, which is content with very little. But this would seem\nunreasonable.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the\nneed of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin\nin using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for\nthe sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need\nof the body is not the rule of temperance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): \"In both\nTestaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule\nforbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of\nthem desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself\nof those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a\nlover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and\nof his station.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 123, A. 12),\nthe good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason:\nbecause \"man's good is to be in accord with reason,\" as Dionysius\nasserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by\nwhich it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of\nreason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of\nend, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now\nall the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed\nto some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance\ntakes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects\nof which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of\nthis life requires.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded\nas a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that\nsometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work,\nthus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas\nsometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and\nrule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the\nthing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is\nuseful for life is subordinate.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First,\nit may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term \"necessary\"\nto that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is\nnecessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something\nwithout which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards\nnot only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that \"the temperate man desires\npleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound\ncondition of body.\" Other things that are not necessary for this\npurpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to\nhealth and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not\nuse of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But\nothers are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses\nmoderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in\nkeeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher\n(Ethic. iii, 11) says that the \"temperate man also desires other\npleasant things,\" those namely that are not necessary for health or a\nsound condition of body, \"so long as they are not prejudicial to\nthese things.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according\nto the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the\nrequirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external\nthings, such as riches and station, and more still on the\nrequirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii,\n11) that \"the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided\nthat not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily\ncondition, but also that they be not inconsistent with good,\" i.e.\ngood conduct, nor \"beyond his substance,\" i.e. his means. And\nAugustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the \"temperate man\nconsiders the need\" not only \"of this life\" but also \"of his station.\"\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Temperance Is a Cardinal Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue.\nFor the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is\nabout those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely\nabout pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in\n_Ethic._ iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to\ncontrol. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more\nimpetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is\nwritten (Prov. 27:4): \"Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh\nforth; and who can bear the violence (_impetum_) of one provoked?\"\nTherefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of\ndesire and concupiscence, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4). But\nhumility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore,\nseemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance\nwhich controls concupiscence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory reckons temperance among the principal\nvirtues (Moral. ii, 49).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 11; Q. 61, A. 3), a\nprincipal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost\nclaim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite\nfor the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is\nrequisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures\nof touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these\npleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to\nabstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because\ntheir objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above\n(A. 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or\ncardinal virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is\nthe agent's power (_virtus_) shown to be: wherefore the very fact\nthat the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are\nfurthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power.\nThis is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident,\nfor instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its\nimpetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire\nfor pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is\nmore lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a\nmore principal virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire,\nwherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible.\nBut the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite\nwith greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore\ntemperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal\nvirtue.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Temperance Is the Greatest of the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the\nvirtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that \"what we observe and\nseek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and\nthe regard for what is beautiful.\" Now virtue deserves praise for\nbeing honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest\nof the virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue.\nNow it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch\nthan to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to\ntemperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a\ngreater virtue than justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more\nnecessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of\ndeath which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these\noccur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than\nfortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than\nfortitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the\n\"greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for\nwhich reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) \"the good\nof the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,\"\nwherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better\nit is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more\nthan temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one\nman and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are\nendured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the\ndesires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident\nthat justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than\ntemperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more\nexcellent still.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance,\nnot on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance,\nbut on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it\nwithdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower\nanimals.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the\nexcellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,\nwherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein\ntemperance excels.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which is general because it regards the many\nconduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is\ngeneral because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former\nway, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply,\nalthough in some respects temperance may be described as greater not\nonly than fortitude but also than justice.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 142\n\nOF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?\n\n(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;\n\n(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Insensibility Is a Vice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For\nthose are called insensible who are deficient with regard to\npleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to\nbe altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan.\n10:2, 3): \"In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I\nate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth,\nneither was I anointed with ointment.\" Therefore insensibility is not\na sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"man's good is to be in accord with reason,\"\naccording to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all\npleasures of touch is most conducive to man's progress in the good of\nreason: for it is written (Dan. 1:17) that \"to the children\" who took\npulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), \"God gave knowledge, and\nunderstanding in every book and wisdom.\" Therefore insensibility,\nwhich rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin\nwould seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in\navoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to\ninsensibility. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that \"if we\ndeny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin.\" Therefore there\nis nothing vicious in insensibility.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now\ninsensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a\nvice.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to the natural order is\nvicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that\nare necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires\nthat man should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are\nnecessary for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of\nthe individual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to\nreject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary\nfor nature's preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the\norder of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.\n\nIt must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and\neven necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures\nas result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's\nhealth, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and\nsex; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes\nand soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to\nfulfil their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to\nrecover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures,\nas a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up\nto contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal\nthings. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of\ninsensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any\nhorror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some\npraiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights\nof contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the\ntext goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately\nafterwards.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive\npowers, which need a bodily organ, as stated in the First Part (Q.\n84, AA. 7, 8), man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use\nhis reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that\nafford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if\nhe abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of\nthe body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less\nthe powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore\nit is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving\nthemselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual\ngood, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from\nmany pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily\noccupations and carnal procreation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not\naltogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Intemperance Is a Childish Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin.\nFor Jerome in commenting on Matt. 18:3, \"Unless you be converted, and\nbecome as little children,\" says that \"a child persists not in anger,\nis unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful\nwoman,\" all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore\nintemperance is not a childish sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now \"in\nrespect of natural desires few sin by intemperance,\" according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a\nchildish sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas\nconcupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned,\nare always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. 3:5,\n\"Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . .\nconcupiscence\" [*Vulg.: 'your members which are upon the earth,\nfornication . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a\nchildish sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that \"we\napply the term intemperance* to childish faults.\" [*_Akolasia_ which\nAristotle refers to _kolazo_ to punish, so that its original sense\nwould be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint.']\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be childish for two reasons.\nFirst, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does\nnot mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense.\nSecondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of\nintemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is\none of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three\nways. First, as regards that which they both desire, for like a child\nconcupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human\naffairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason.\nWherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading \"Comeliness\nis twofold,\" that \"the beautiful is that which is in keeping with\nman's excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals.\"\nNow a child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like\nmanner \"concupiscence does not listen to reason,\" according to\n_Ethic._ vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike as to the result. For a\nchild, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is\nwritten (Ecclus. 30:8): \"A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a\nchild left to himself will become headstrong.\" So, too,\nconcupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine\nsays (Confess. viii, 5): \"Lust served became a custom, and custom not\nresisted became necessity.\" Thirdly, as to the remedy which is\napplied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence\nit is written (Prov. 23:13, 14): \"Withhold not correction from a\nchild . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from\nHell.\" In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it\naccording to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he\nsays (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual\nthings, and remain fixed \"thereon, the impulse of custom,\" i.e.\ncarnal concupiscence, \"is broken, and being suppressed is gradually\nweakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not\nwholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it.\" Hence\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that \"as a child ought to live\naccording to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible\nto accord with reason.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument takes the term \"childish\" as denoting\nwhat is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of\nintemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as\nstated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First,\nwith regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are\nabout natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex,\nwhich are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire\nmay be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that\nnature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not\nhappen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for\nnature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no\nsin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to\nquantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to\nnatural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).\n\nThere are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and\nthese are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity\n[*Cf. Q. 167], such as the nice (_curiosa_) preparation of food, or\nthe adornment of women. And though children do not affect these\nthings much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason\ngiven above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and\nfostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason\nin them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Cowardice* Is a Greater Vice Than Intemperance?\n[*Cf. Q. 125]\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than\nintemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to\nthe good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a\nmore excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 141,\nA. 8). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the\nless is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. vii, 7) that \"it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable,\nif a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains.\"\nNow seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other\npassions; hence it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, that \"it is more\ndifficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would\nseem to be stronger than fear.\" Therefore intemperance, which is\novercome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is\novercome by fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now\ncowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires\nto be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death,\nwhich pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous\nsin than intemperance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that\n\"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice.\"\nTherefore it is more sinful.\n\n_I answer that,_ one may be compared with another in two ways. First,\nwith regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man\nwho sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than\ncowardice.\n\nFirst, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death,\nto avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving\nlife. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire\nof which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because,\nas stated above (A. 2, ad 2), intemperance is more about certain\nannexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures.\nNow the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin.\nWherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the\npart of the object or motive matter.\n\nIn like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for\nthree reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the\nmore grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who\nare demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of\ndeath, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive\nof intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the\ngraver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than\ncowardice has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions\ndone through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external\nagent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in\n_Ethic._ iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are\nsimply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an\nintemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary\ngenerically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is\nenticed by individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man.\nHence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell\non the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in\nmatters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that\nimposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside\nhis shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more\nvoluntary, for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is\nmore voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes\nplace, is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply\nmore voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it\nis easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since\npleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are\nof everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by\nfrequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas\ndangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for\nman to encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with\ntemperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard\nto the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is\ndirected to the common good more than temperance is. And from this\npoint of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance,\nsince by cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common\ngood. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more\ndifficult to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any\npleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for\ncowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a\ngreater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the\nother hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser\nvice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof of a greater\nvice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one\nshuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures\nwhatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of\nlife. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of\ndeath, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex:\nalthough the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow,\nand fear, occasioned by certain other evils.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a\ngeneral than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases\nwe have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Intemperance Is the Most Disgraceful of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most\ndisgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to\nsin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance\nmurder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the\nmost disgraceful of sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly\nless disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of\nintemperance are most common, because they are about things connected\nwith the common use of human life, and in which many happen to sin.\nTherefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and\nintemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain\ndesires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and\npleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as\nthe Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not\nthe most disgraceful of sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that\n\"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory.\nNow honor is due to excellence, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1), and\nglory denotes clarity (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3). Accordingly intemperance\nis most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most\nrepugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common to\nus and the lower animals, as stated above (Q. 141, AA. 2, 3).\nWherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): \"Man, when he was in honor, did\nnot understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made\nlike to them.\" Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's\nclarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of\nintemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and\nbeauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as\nbeing most slavish.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12] \"the sins of the\nflesh,\" which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although\nless culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability\nis measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace\nregards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of\nthe sin in respect of the sinner.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and\ndisgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the\nnature of the vices themselves.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we\nmean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are\nconnected with human passions which to a certain extent are in\nconformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode\nof human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices\nare apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of\nexcess: for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in\ncommitting the unnatural vice.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 143\n\nOF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL\n\nWe must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these\nsame parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.\n_______________________\n\nARTICLE [II-II, Q. 143, Art.]\n\nWhether the Parts of Temperance Are Rightly Assigned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)\nunbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to\nbe \"continence, mildness, and modesty.\" For continence is reckoned to\nbe distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is\ncomprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of\ntemperance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But\ntemperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch,\nas stated above (Q. 141, A. 4). Therefore mildness is not a part of\ntemperance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the\nApostle says (Phil. 4:5): \"Let your modesty be known to all men.\" Now\nexternal actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q. 58,\nA. 8). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of\ntemperance.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more\nparts of temperance: for he says that \"temperance results in modesty,\nshamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness,\nsobriety, purity.\" Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that \"the\ncompanions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility,\nsimplicity, refinement, method, contentment.\" [*_Per-se-sufficientiam_\nwhich could be rendered \"self-sufficiency,\" but for the fact that\nthis is taken in a bad sense. See Q. 169, A. 1.] Therefore it seems\nthat Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (QQ. 48, 128), a cardinal virtue may\nhave three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and\npotential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the\nconcurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect\nthere are two integral parts of temperance, _shamefacedness,_ whereby\none recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and\n_honesty,_ whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated\nabove (Q. 141, A. 2, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue\nlays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance\nexcel others in disgrace.\n\nThe subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of\na virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of\nmatter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which\nare of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these\nas regards meat, there is _abstinence,_ and as regards drink properly\nthere is _sobriety._ Other pleasures are directed to the power of\nprocreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the\nact itself of procreation, there is _chastity,_ and as to the\npleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from\nkissing, touching, or fondling, we have _purity._\n\nThe potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary\nvirtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some\nprincipal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein\nmoderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to\nmoderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate.\nWherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter\nor other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards\nsomething, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed\nthereto.\n\nThis happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the\nsoul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body;\nthirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of\nconcupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in\nthe soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first\nplace there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse\nof passion: and this movement is restrained by _continence,_ the\neffect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate\nconcupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward\nmovement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the\nresultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by _humility._\nThe third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and\nthis is restrained by _meekness_ or _mildness._\n\nWith regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint\nis the effect of _modesty,_ which, according to Andronicus, has three\nparts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what\nnot to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what\nwe do: this he assigns to _method._ The second is that a man observe\ndecorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to _refinement._ The\nthird has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse\nbetween a man and his friends, and this is called _gravity._\n\nWith regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be\nobserved. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius\nassigns _lowliness,_ and Andronicus _contentment_; secondly, we must\nnot be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes\n_moderation,_ Andronicus _simplicity._\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as\nimperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q. 165,\nA. 1); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has\nsomething in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is\nabout pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of\nrestraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance\nnot because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the\nmode of restraint and moderation as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what\nis due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain\nmoderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of\ntemperance.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the\nmoderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the\nmoderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 144\n\nOF SHAMEFACEDNESS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in\nthe first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and\nhonesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?\n\n(2) What is its object?\n\n(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?\n\n(4) What kind of people are ashamed?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Shamefacedness Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is\nproper to a virtue \"to observe the mean as fixed by reason\": this is\nclear from the definition of virtue given in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now\nshamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher\nobserves (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or\nsomething connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.\nBut it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence,\nsince it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part\nof justice. Since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas\njustice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of\nfortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and\naggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from\nsomething; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is\nabout desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as\nthe Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth.\nii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible\naccording to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of\nhonesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that \"shamefacedness is\nthe companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness,\na stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the\nsupport of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful.\" Therefore\nshamefacedness is a virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices\nare opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate\nprudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.\n\nObj. 5: Further, \"like acts beget like habits,\" according to _Ethic._\nii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from\nmany such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is\na virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore\nshamefacedness is a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that\nshamefacedness is not a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and\nin a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in\n_Phys._    vii, 17, 18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with\nperfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue.\nNow shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the\nfear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that \"shamefacedness is fear of\na base action.\" Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult\ngood, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3), when we were treating\nof the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does\nnot apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as\nbeing possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to\navoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of\ndisgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a\nvirtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.\n\nTaken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and\npraiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way\nshamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a\npraiseworthy passion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of\nvirtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's\ndefinition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be \"an\nelective habit,\" that is to say, operating from choice. Now\nshamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its\nmovement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it\nfalls short of the notion of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and\ndisgrace. Now it has been stated (Q. 142, A. 4) that the vice of\nintemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness\npertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of\nits motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the\nspecies of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the\nvices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful,\nshamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which\nis contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of\nhonesty.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is\nsufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow\nthat whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every\nvice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence\nshamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of\ndisgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an\nacquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the\nobject of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their\nregard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man\nwould be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of\nshamefacedness.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Shamefacedness Is About a Disgraceful Action?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a\ndisgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that\n\"shamefacedness is fear of disgrace.\" Now sometimes those who do\nnothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, \"For thy sake I\nhave borne reproach, shame hath covered my face.\" Therefore\nshamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is\nsinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance\nwhen he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that\nshamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.\n\nObj. 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most\nbeautiful according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Yet sometimes people are\nashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Luke 9:26, \"He that shall\nbe ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be\nashamed,\" etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful\naction.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful\naction, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more\nashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser\nsins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to\nPs. 51:3, \"Why dost thou glory in malice?\" Therefore shamefacedness\nis not properly about a disgraceful action.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of\nNyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that \"shamefacedness is fear\nof doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3),\nwhen we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an\narduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace\nis twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in\nthe deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has\nnot the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the\nwill alone does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability:\nwherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of\nfear.\n\nThe other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in\nthe reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory\nconsists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the\ncharacter of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an\narduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards\nfirst and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is\nproperly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that\nshamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"a man is less ashamed of those\ndefects which are not the result of any fault of his own.\"\n\nNow shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man\nrefrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a\nman while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear\nof reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa\n(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person \"blushing,\" in the\nlatter we say that he is \"ashamed.\" Hence he says that \"the man who\nis ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin\nwhich is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6)\nthat \"a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the\ncause.\" Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is\nsubject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the\nPhilosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it\nsaid of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that \"they (the apostles) went from\nthe presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted\nworthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus.\" It is owing to\nimperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the\nreproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more\nvirtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good\nor evil. Wherefore it is written (Isa. 51:7): \"Fear ye not the\nreproach of men.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 63, A. 3), though honor is not\nreally due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence:\nand the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to\nsin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind of\ndefect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and\nthe like.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such.\nYet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either\nbecause he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or\nbecause he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical\nfor doing virtuous deeds.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either\nbecause they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison\nwith sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance\nof some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than\nof daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of\npower. The same applies to other sins.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Man Is More Shamefaced of Those Who Are More Closely\nConnected with Him?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those\nwho are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in _Rhet._\nii, 6 that \"men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire\napprobation.\" Now men desire this especially from people of the\nbetter sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man\nis not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with\nhim.\n\nObj. 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who\nperform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those\nwhom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to\n_Rhet._ ii, 6, \"a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does\nhimself.\" Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most\nclosely connected with him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that \"men take\nmore shame from those who retail their information to many, such as\njokers and fable-tellers.\" But those who are more closely connected\nwith a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take\nshame chiefly from them.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that \"men are\nmost liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done\nnothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first\ntime; by those whose friends they wish to become.\" Now these are less\nclosely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by\nthose who are more closely united to him.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that \"man is made most\nashamed by those who are to be continually with him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor\ndenotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the\nexcellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of\nwhich is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect,\nespecially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a\nperson's attestation is considered to be, the more does he make\nanother person ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered\nas being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or\nbecause of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's\nattestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of\nhis judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man\nis more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a\ngreater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire\nno one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on\naccount of his knowledge of the matter attested, because \"everyone\njudges well of what is known to him\" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we\nare more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us,\nsince they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers\nand persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do,\ninspire us with no shame at all.\n\nAn attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some\nadvantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more\ndesirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are\nmore liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some\nharm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons\nconnected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be\ncontinually in their society, as though this entailed a continual\nharm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby\nceases almost at once.\n\nReply Obj. 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same\nreason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just\nas the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they\nhave a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments\nhold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom\nwe live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in\ndetail.\n\nReply Obj. 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are connected\nwith us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they\nlook upon our defect as disgraceful.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm\nthey do by making many think ill of us.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us\nmore ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to\nwit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again\nbecause when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition\nseems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in\none whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more\ndisgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom\nwe ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be,\nis that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our\nrequest, or by failing to become their friends.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Even Virtuous Men Can Be Ashamed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For\ncontraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness\nare not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, \"Thou hadst a harlot's\nforehead, thou wouldst not blush.\" Therefore those who are virtuous\nare more inclined to be ashamed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that \"men are\nashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil\": and this\nhappens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.\n\nObj. 3: Further, shamefacedness is \"fear of disgrace\" [*Ethic. iv,\n9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if\nthey are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly.\nTherefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.\n\nObj. 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated\nabove (Q. 143). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since\nthen temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is\nalso.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a\n\"virtuous man is not shamefaced.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2) shamefacedness is fear of\nsome disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not\nfeared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because\none reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult\nto avoid.\n\nAccordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First,\nbecause the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him\nto be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are\nwithout shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast\nof them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to\nthemselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous\nare not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were\nanything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that \"shame is in the virtuous\nhypothetically.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men\nthrough different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average\nmen it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and\nyet are not altogether free from evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice,\nbut also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1 Thess.\n5:22, \"From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves.\" The\nPhilosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should\navoid \"not only what is really evil, but also those things that are\nregarded as evil.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1, ad 1) the virtuous man despises\nignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore\nhe is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent,\nshame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though\nit entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore\nAmbrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that \"shamefacedness lays the first\nfoundation of temperance,\" by inspiring man with the horror of\nwhatever is disgraceful.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 145\n\nOF HONESTY*\n(In Four Articles)\n[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with\nmoral goodness, from the point of view of decorum.]\n\nWe must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;\n\n(2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral\ngoodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty];\n\n(3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;\n\n(4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Honesty Is the Same As Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue.\nFor Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that \"the honest is what is\ndesired for its own sake.\" Now virtue is desired, not for its own\nsake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic.\ni, 9) that \"happiness is the reward and the end of virtue.\" Therefore\nhonesty is not the same as virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) \"honesty means an\nhonorable state.\" Now honor is due to many things besides virtue,\nsince \"it is praise that is the proper due of virtue\" (Ethic. i, 12).\nTherefore honesty is not the same as virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the \"principal part of virtue is the interior\nchoice,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems\nto pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40,\n\"Let all things be done decently (_honeste_) and according to order\"\namong you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth.\nAccording to Ecclus. 11:14, \"good things and evil, life and death\n[poverty and riches] are from God\" [*The words in brackets are\nomitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has\n_honestas_]. But virtue does not consist in external wealth.\nTherefore honesty is not the same as virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides\nhonesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also\ndivided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x) \"honesty means an\nhonorable state,\" wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through\nbeing worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above (Q. 144, A. 2, ad\n2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged\nchiefly according to his virtue, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 17.\nTherefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as\nvirtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those\nthings that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for\ntheir own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such\nas happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only\nfor their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in\nthemselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but\nalso for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive\nto some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable\nfor their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52)\nthat \"some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by\ntheir own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge.\" And this suffices\nto give a thing the character of honest.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are\nmore excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like\nthings are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we\npractice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of\nhonesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far\nas they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power,\nand riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3)\nthat these things \"are honored by some people, but in truth it is\nonly the good man who is worthy of honor.\" Now a man is good in\nrespect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the\nlatter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is\ndue to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the\ncharacter of honesty.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is\ndue. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as stated\nabove (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2). But one attests only to what one knows; and\nthe internal choice is not made known save by external actions.\nWherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as\nit reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists\nradically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the\nexternal conduct.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly\nregarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name\nof honesty is given to external prosperity.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Honest Is the Same As the Beautiful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the honest is not the same as the\nbeautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite,\nsince the honest is \"what is desirable for its own sake\" [*Cicero, De\nInvent. Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty\nof vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the\nsame as the honest.\n\nObj. 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is\ncharacteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then\nhonor and glory differ, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), it\nseems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.\n\nObj. 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above (A.\n1). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is\nwritten (Ezech. 16:15): \"Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the\nharlot because of thy renown.\" Therefore the honest is not the same\nas the beautiful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23, 24): \"Those that\nare our uncomely (_inhonesta_) parts, have more abundant comeliness\n(_honestatem_), but our comely (_honesta_) parts have no need.\" Now\nby uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the\nbeautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are\napparently the same.\n\n_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div.\nNom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of\nclarity and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be\nbeautiful, as being \"the cause of the harmony and clarity of the\nuniverse.\" Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his\nbodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of\ncolor. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or\nactions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity\nof reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have stated\n(A. 1) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates\naccording to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore\n\"honesty is the same as spiritual beauty.\" Hence Augustine says (QQ.\n83, qu. 30): \"By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we\nproperly designate as spiritual,\" and further on he adds that \"many\nthings are beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to\ncall honest.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended\ngood. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is\napprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"the beautiful and the good are\nbeloved by all.\" Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies\nspiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully\nsays (De Offic. i, 5): \"Thou perceivest the form and the features, so\nto speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as\nPlato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), glory is the\neffect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person\nacquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the same\nthing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest\nand beautiful.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body:\nalthough it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to\nplay the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to\nEzech. 28:17, \"Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast\nlost thy wisdom in thy beauty.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Honest Differs from the Useful and the Pleasant?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the\nuseful and the pleasant. For the honest is \"what is desirable for its\nown sake\" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired\nfor its own sake, for \"it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes\nto be pleased,\" as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore\nthe honest does not differ from the pleasant.\n\nObj. 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good:\nfor Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): \"There is a thing that\nattracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very\nnature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility\": and \"that is\nmoney.\" Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written\n(Ecclus. 11:14): \"Poverty and riches (_honestas_) are from God,\" and\n(Ecclus. 13:2): \"He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship\nwith one more honorable,\" i.e. richer, \"than himself.\" Therefore the\nhonest differs not from the useful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be\nuseful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De\nOffic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Q. 83, qu. 30): \"The honest is\nthat which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies\nreference to something else.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The honest concurs in the same subject with the\nuseful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as\nstated above (A. 2), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it\nhas a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever\nis regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man.\nAgain, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is\nbecoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to\nman: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue\n(Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing\nmay be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason.\nA pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects\nhis nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is\nreferred to something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly\nthe honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.\n\nNevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest\nas having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its\nspiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest\nto desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant,\nhowever, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since\nwhatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas\nthe converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its\nown sake by the rational appetite, which tends to that which is in\naccordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is\ndesired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion\nof the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the\ninstruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible\nwith honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it\nis contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with\nreason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with\nregard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every\nuseful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Honesty Should Be Reckoned a Part of Temperance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part\nof temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and\nwhole in respect of one same thing. Now \"temperance is a part of\nhonesty,\"    according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore\nhonesty is not a part of temperance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that \"wine . . . makes\nall thoughts honest.\" But the use of wine, especially in excess, in\nwhich sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to\nintemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a\npart of temperance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now\n\"it is the just and the brave who receive most honor,\" according to\nthe Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to\ntemperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar\nsaid as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: \"I suffer an honorable (_honesta_)\ndeath, for the most venerable and most holy laws.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a\npart of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as\npertaining especially to temperance.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), honesty is a kind of\nspiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful:\nand opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly\nhonesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels\nthat which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal\nlusts. Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the\ngood of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil\ndesires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason\nto temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective\npart, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition\nattaching thereto.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty\ntaken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a\npart of temperance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When a man is intoxicated, \"the wine makes his thoughts\nhonest\" according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great\nand deserving of honor [*Cf. Q. 148, A. 6].\n\nReply Obj. 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to\ntemperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet\ngreater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds\nin check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus\nhonesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule\ngiven by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that \"our uncomely\nparts have more abundant comeliness,\" which, namely, destroys\nwhatever is uncomely.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 146\n\nOF ABSTINENCE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those\nwhich are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about\npleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence,\nwhich is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically\nabout drink.\n\nWith regard to abstinence three points have to be considered:\n(1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite\nvice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special virtue?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 146, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Abstinence Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the\nApostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): \"The kingdom of God is not in speech but\nin power (_virtute_).\" Now the kingdom of God does not consist in\nabstinence, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:17): \"The kingdom of God is\nnot meat and drink,\" where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang.\nii, qu. 11] observes that \"justice consists neither in abstaining nor\nin eating.\" Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself\nto God: \"This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take\nfood as physic.\" Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art\nto regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one's\nfood, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every virtue \"observes the mean,\" as stated in\n_Ethic._ ii, 6, 7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean\nbut to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore\nabstinence is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence\nexcludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that\n\"impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its\npeaceful seclusion.\" Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that\n\"sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer,\"\nso that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a\nvirtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 1:5, 6): \"Join with your\nfaith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge\nabstinence\"; where abstinence is numbered among other virtues.\nTherefore abstinence is a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of\nfood. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as\ndenoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it\nsignifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something\nindifferent. Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and\nthen it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is\nthe meaning of Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we\nought \"to join abstinence with knowledge,\" namely that in abstaining\nfrom food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he\nlives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered in\nthemselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle\nsays (1 Cor. 8:8): \"Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if\nwe eat not [*Vulg.: 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'],\nshall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more,\" i.e.\nspiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in\nso far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and\nquality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the\nbody: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good\nof reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang.\nii, qu. 11): \"It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how\nmuch food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the\npeople among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the\nrequirements of his health: but it matters how readily and\nuncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity\nto abstain.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which\nare too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to\nstrengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of\nreason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a\ncertain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their\nname, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which\nall its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part\nof temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the\nmean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is\nnot in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain\nas one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e.\nfor God's glory and not one's own.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 146, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Abstinence Is a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue.\nFor every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not\npraiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that \"the\nvirtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other\nvirtues.\" Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii)\nthat \"the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature\nof God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body.\" Now this\nbelongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence\nis not a special virtue distinct from chastity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so\nshould he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim.\n6:8, \"Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should\nbe [Vulg.: 'are'] content.\" Now there is no special virtue in being\ncontent with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in\nabstinence which moderates food.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons\nabstinence as a special part of temperance.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1; Q. 141, A. 3) moral\nvirtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the\npassions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion\ndeparts from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue.\nNow pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the\ngood of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is\nnecessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he\ndesires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special\nvirtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Wherefore one virtue receives help and\ncommendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in\nthis way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of\nthe other virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only\nagainst the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony:\nsince by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the\nonslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to\nthem. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue\nthrough being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use\nof food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special\nvirtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 147\n\nOF FASTING\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?\n\n(2) Of what virtue is it the act?\n\n(3) Whether it is a matter of precept?\n\n(4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?\n\n(5) The time of fasting;\n\n(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?\n\n(7) The hour of eating for those who fast;\n\n(8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Fasting Is an Act of Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For\nevery act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always\nacceptable to God, according to Isa. 58:3, \"Why have we fasted and\nThou hast not regarded?\" Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now\nfasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of\nabstinence takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of\nnature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else\nthose who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence.\nTherefore fasting is not an act of virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil,\nis not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is\nfasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts\n(2 Cor. 6:5, 6) where the Apostle says: \"In fasting, in knowledge, in\nchastity, etc. [Vulg.: 'in chastity, in knowledge'].\"\n\n_I answer that,_ An act is virtuous through being directed by reason\nto some virtuous (_honestum_) [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1] good. Now this is\nconsistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold\npurpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore\nthe Apostle says (2 Cor. 6:5, 6): \"In fasting, in chastity,\" since\nfasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome\n[*Contra Jov. ii.] \"Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not\nthere,\" that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and\ndrink. Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind\nmay arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence\nit is related (Dan. 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from\nGod after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for\nsins: wherefore it is written (Joel 2:12): \"Be converted to Me with\nall your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning.\" The same\nis declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm.\nlxxii] (ccxxx, de Tempore)): \"Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the\nmind, subjects one's flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite\nand humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire\nof lust, kindles the true light of chastity.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered\nvicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text\ngoes on to say: \"Behold in the day of your fast your own will is\nfounded,\" and a little further on (Isa. 58:4): \"You fast for debates\nand strife and strike with the fist wickedly.\" These words are\nexpounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: \"The will\nindicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh\nrestrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be\nwrecked by vice.\" And Augustine says (in the same sermon) that\n\"fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns\npride, commends humility, helps man to perceive what is frail and\npaltry.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The mean of virtue is measured not according to\nquantity but according to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6.\nNow reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive,\nfor a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under\nordinary circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or\nin order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much\nmore does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and\nthe pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much\nfrom one's food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus\nJerome says:* \"It matters not whether thou art a long or a short time\nin destroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately,\nwhether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping\ntoo little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods.\" [*The quotation\nis from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De\nConsecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there ascribes the quotation to\nSt. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint's works.] In like\nmanner right reason does not retrench so much from a man's food as to\nrender him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in\nthe same reference) \"Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets\nfasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of\nhis senses.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is\nsaid to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure\nnegation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is\nonly the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a\nreasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting\n(_jejunium jejunii_) [*Literally the 'fast of fasting']: while the\nlatter is called the faster's fast, because he fasts for a purpose.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Fasting Is an Act of Abstinence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence.\nFor Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the\nreference is lacking] commenting on Matt. 17:20, \"This kind of devil\"\nsays: \"To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all\nmanner of lusts.\" Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting\nis not exclusively an act of abstinence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that\n\"the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year.\" Now paying tithes is\nan act of religion, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). Therefore fasting\nis an act of religion and not of abstinence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above\n(QQ. 143, 146, A. 1, ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with\nfortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems\nvery applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of\nabstinence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that \"fasting is\nfrugality of fare and abstinence from food.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every\nvirtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that\nappoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food,\nwherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident\nthat fasting is an act of abstinence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from\nfood, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything\nharmful, and such especially is sin.\n\nWe may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence\nfrom all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1), an act\nceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to\nanother virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that\nvirtue, as explained above (Q. 32, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 85, A. 3).\nAccordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act of\nreligion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure,\nnot any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger of\ndeath. To endure hardships resulting from privation of pleasure of\ntouch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are the\nhardships of fasting.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Fasting Is a Matter of Precept?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept.\nFor precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a\nmatter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it\nwould have to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore\nfasting is not a matter of precept.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin.\nTherefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast\nwould sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that \"the Wisdom\nof God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of\nfreedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the\ncommunity of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude,\nshould be bound together in subjection to one God.\" Now the liberty\nof the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of\nobservances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For\nAugustine says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that \"whereas God in His\nmercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the\nevidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people\nrender it oppressive with slavish burdens.\" Therefore it seems that\nthe Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting\nsays: \"Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the\ncommands of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles.\"\nTherefore fasting is a matter of precept.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make\nlegal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal\nin temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to\nprescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the\nfaithful in spiritual goods.\n\nNow it has been stated above (A. 1) that fasting is useful as atoning\nfor and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things.\nAnd everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to practice\nfasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore\nfasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law, while\nthe fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and\nprofitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of\npositive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is\nthe Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fasting considered in itself denotes something not\neligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful\nto some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under\nprecept, but it is binding under precept to each one that stands in\nneed of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this\nremedy, both because \"in many things we all offend\" (James 3:2), and\nbecause \"the flesh lusteth against the spirit\" (Gal. 5:17), it was\nfitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by\nall in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a\nmatter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is\nof general obligation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those commandments which are given under the form of a\ngeneral precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject\nto the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a\nmortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the\nlawgiver's authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate\nthe end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to\nkeep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially\nif the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were\npresent. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the\nChurch, sin mortally.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking there of those things \"that are\nneither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found\namong the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the\ncustom of the universal Church.\" On the other hand, the fasts that\nare of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are\nsanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they\nopposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in\nhindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom,\nof which it is written (Gal. 5:13): \"You, brethren, have been called\nunto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 4]\n\nWhether All Are Bound to Keep the Fasts of the Church?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of\nthe Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as\nthe commandments of God, according to Luke 10:16, \"He that heareth\nyou heareth Me.\" Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God.\nTherefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by\nthe Church.\n\nObj. 2: Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from\nfasting, on account of their age: for it is written (Joel 2:15):\n\"Sanctify a fast,\" and further on (Joel 2:16): \"Gather together the\nlittle ones, and them that suck the breasts.\" Much more therefore are\nall others bound to keep the fasts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal,\nand necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily\nworks are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed\nto spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since\nfasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary\nthing by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of\nthe Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or\nbodily works.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through\nnecessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now the poor are wont to fast\nthrough necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought\nthey to fast willingly.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast.\nFor the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to\nChrist's teaching. But our Lord said (Luke 5:34) that \"the children\nof the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them\n[*Vulg.: 'Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst\nthe bridegroom is with them?'].\" Now He is with all the righteous by\ndwelling in them in a special manner [*Cf. I, Q. 8, A. 3], wherefore\nour Lord said (Matt. 28:20): \"Behold I am with you . . . even to the\nconsummation of the world.\" Therefore the righteous are not bound by\nthe commandment of the Church to fast.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 98, AA. 2,\n6), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the\nmany. Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what\nhappens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the\nprecept to be binding on a person in whom for some special reason\nthere is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet\ndiscretion must be brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be\nevident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting\nto fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it\nbe difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority. On the\nother hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to\nthe superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases. And\nthis must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all\nare bound in general, unless there be some special obstacle to this\nobservance.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The commandments of God are precepts of the natural\nlaw, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the\ncommandments of the Church are about matters which are necessary for\nsalvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the\nChurch. Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which\ncertain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In children there is a most evident reason for not\nfasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which\nthey need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and\nbecause they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth,\nwhich results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as\nthe stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until they have\ncompleted the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep\nthe Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time\nthey should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in\naccordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity\nthreatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of more\nsevere penance, according to Jonah 3:7, \"Let neither men nor\nbeasts . . . taste anything . . . nor drink water.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to\npilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work\ncan be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the\nbodily health and such external conditions as are necessary for the\nupkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting\nthe fasts of the Church. But if one be under the necessity of\nstarting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or of\ndoing much work, either for one's bodily livelihood, or for some need\nof the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep\nthe fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because in\nordering fasts the Church would not seem to have intended to prevent\nother pious and more necessary undertakings. Nevertheless, in such\ncases one ought seemingly, to seek the superior's dispensation;\nexcept perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since\nwhen superiors are silent they would seem to consent.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient\nfor one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the\nfasts of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be exempt\nwho beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable at any one time\nto have a sufficiency of food.\n\nReply Obj. 5: This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways.\nFirst, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that\n\"the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as\nyet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an old\ngarment.\" Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be\nfostered with kindness rather than drilled with the harshness of\nfasting. According to this interpretation, it is fitting that\ndispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners,\nrather than to the elders and the perfect, according to a gloss on\nPs. 130:2, \"As a child that is weaned is towards his mother.\"\nSecondly, we may say with Jerome [*Bede, Comment. in Luc. v] that our\nLord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law.\nWherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held\nback by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the\nnewness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang.\nii, 27), who states that fasting is of two kinds. One pertains to\nthose who are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting\nperfect men, for they are called \"children of the bridegroom\"; hence\nwhen we read in Luke: \"The children of the bridegroom cannot fast\n[*Hom. xiii, in Matth.],\" we read in Matt. 9:15: \"The children of the\nbridegroom cannot mourn [*Vulg.: 'Can the children of the bridegroom\nmourn?'].\" The other pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering\nto spiritual things: and this fasting is befitting the perfect.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Times for the Church Fast Are Fittingly Ascribed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the times for the Church fast are\nunfittingly appointed. For we read (Matt. 4) that Christ began to\nfast immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate\nChrist, according to 1 Cor. 4:16, \"Be ye followers of me, as I also\nam of Christ.\" Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the\nEpiphany when Christ's baptism is celebrated.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the\nceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the\nOld Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written\n(Zech. 8:19): \"The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the\nfifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall\nbe to the house of Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities.\"\nTherefore the fast of certain months, which are called Ember days,\nare unfittingly kept in the Church.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27),\njust as there is a fast \"of sorrow,\" so is there a fast \"of joy.\" Now\nit is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in\nChrist's Resurrection. Therefore during the five weeks which the\nChurch solemnizes on account of Christ's Resurrection, and on Sundays\nwhich commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be appointed.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the general custom of the Church.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), fasting is directed to\ntwo things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to\nheavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to be appointed specially\nfor those times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and\nthe minds of the faithful to be raised to God by devotion: and these\nthings are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when\nsins are loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on\nEaster-eve, on which day our Lord's burial is commemorated, because\n\"we are buried together with Christ by baptism unto death\" (Rom.\n6:4). Moreover at the Easter festival the mind of man ought to be\ndevoutly raised to the glory of eternity, which Christ restored by\nrising from the dead, and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed\nimmediately before the Paschal feast; and for the same reason, on the\neve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one ought to make\nready to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in\nthe Church for Holy Orders to be conferred every quarter of the year\n(in sign whereof our Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves,\nwhich signify the New Testament year as Jerome says [*Comment. in\nMarc. viii]): and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for\nordination, and even the whole people, for whose good they are\nordained, need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the\nordination. Hence it is related (Luke 6:12) that before choosing His\ndisciples our Lord \"went out into a mountain to pray\": and Ambrose\n[*Exposit. in Luc.] commenting on these words says: \"What shouldst\nthou do, when thou desirest to undertake some pious work, since\nChrist prayed before sending His apostles?\"\n\nWith regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi\nin Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First, \"because\nthe power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the\nHoly Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four.\"\nOr \"because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body\nthrough whose lusts we transgress the Lord's commandments which are\ndelivered to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should\npunish that same body forty times. Or, because, just as under the Law\nit was commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive\nto pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three\nhundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirty-six\ndays\" (namely, the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) \"we pay\nGod a tithe of our year.\" According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ.\nii, 16) a fourth reason may be added. For the Creator is the\n_Trinity,_ Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: while the number _three_\nrefers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded to love God,\nwith our whole heart, with our whole soul, and with our whole mind:\nand the number _four_ refers to the visible creature, by reason of\nheat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the number _ten_ [*Ten is the sum of\nthree, three, and four] signifies all things, and if this be\nmultiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of\nthings, we have the number forty.\n\nEach fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of\nthe number of months in each season: or on account of the number of\nHoly orders which are conferred at these times.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but in\norder to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him to\nfast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to\nfast before our baptism.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very\nsame time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in\nJuly, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the\nfirst), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai\nbroke the tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, according to Jer.\n39:2, \"the walls of the city were first broken through.\" In the fifth\nmonth, which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded\nnot to go up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on\naccount of the spies (Num. 14): also in this month the temple of\nJerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52) and afterwards\nby Titus. In the seventh month which we call October, Godolias was\nslain, and the remnants of the people were dispersed (Jer. 51). In\nthe tenth month, which we call January, the people who were with\nEzechiel in captivity heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech.\n4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The \"fasting of joy\" proceeds from the instigation of\nthe Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting\nshould not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by\nthe commandment of the Church are rather \"fasts of sorrow\" which are\ninconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered\nby the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on Sundays:\nand if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to the\ncustom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi)\n\"is to be considered as law,\" or even through some erroneous opinion\n(thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of\nobligation)--he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting\nconsidered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote\n(Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi): \"Would that we might fast always.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 6]\n\nWhether It Is Requisite for Fasting That One Eat but Once?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that\none eat but once. For, as stated above (A. 2), fasting is an act of\nthe virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not\nless than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not\nlimited for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of\nmeals be limited.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink:\nwherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot\nreceive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to\ndrink at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should\nnot be forbidden to eat several times.\n\nObj. 3: Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take\nthem on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to\nfasting to take only one meal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the common custom of the Christian people.\n\n_I answer that,_ Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to\nbridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one\nmeal is seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is\nable to satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from\nconcupiscence by minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is\nappointed by the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast\nshould take one meal in the day.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food\nfor all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result\nbeing that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for\nthe most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A. 1, ad 3]. One is the\nnatural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This is\nbroken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not\nlawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another\nkind and is called the \"fasting of the faster,\" and this is not\nbroken save by such things as the Church intended to forbid in\ninstituting the fast. Now the Church does not intend to command\nabstinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily refreshment,\nand digestion of the food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat.\nIt is, however, possible to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by\npartaking of too much drink: as also by eating immoderately at one\nmeal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken\nchiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break\none's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to\ntake digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and\nby way of food.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Ninth Hour Is Suitably Fixed for the Faster's Meal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed\nfor the faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect\nthan the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted\nuntil evening, for it is written (Lev. 23:32): \"It is a sabbath . . .\nyou shall afflict your souls,\" and then the text continues: \"From\nevening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths.\" Much more\ntherefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until\nthe evening.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all.\nBut all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it\nseems that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the\ncommandment to fast.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as\nstated above (A. 2). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in\nthe same way to all, since what is much for one is little for\nanother, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should\nnot be fixed for those who fast.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the\nCapitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and\nis said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De\nConsecratione] says: \"During Lent those are by no means to be\ncredited with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of\nVespers,\" which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour.\nTherefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3, 5), fasting is directed\nto the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add\nsomething to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to\nnature. Now the right and common custom is for men to eat about the\nsixth hour: both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural\nheat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the\nsurrounding cold of the night), and the humor spread about through\nthe limbs (to which result the heat of the day conduces until the sun\nhas reached its zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that\nthe nature of the human body needs assistance against the external\nheat that is in the air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in\norder that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for\ntheir sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their meal.\n\nMoreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion,\nwhich was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when \"bowing His\nhead, He gave up the ghost\" (John 19:30): because those who fast by\npunishing their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ,\naccording to Gal. 5:24, \"They that are Christ's, have crucified their\nflesh with the vices and concupiscences.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The state of the Old Testament is compared to the\nnight, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day,\naccording to Rom. 13:12, \"The night is passed and the day is at\nhand.\" Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but\nnot in the New Testament.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict\ncalculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be\nabout the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now\nit is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for\nthe most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed\nfor those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do\nmuch harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however\nthis were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness,\nage, or some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or\nbe allowed to forestall the hour by a little.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 8]\n\nWhether It Is Fitting That Those Who Fast Should Be Bidden to Abstain\nfrom Flesh Meat, Eggs, and Milk Foods?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be\nbidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has\nbeen stated above (A. 6) that fasting was instituted as a curb on the\nconcupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking\nwine more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, \"Wine is a\nluxurious thing,\" and Eph. 5:18, \"Be not drunk with wine, wherein is\nluxury.\" Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine,\nit seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat.\n\nObj. 2: Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of\ncertain animals. Now \"concupiscence is desire of the delectable,\" as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 30, A. 1). Therefore since fasting which was\ninstituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the\neating of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.\n\nObj. 3: Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs and\ncheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the Lenten\nfast.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the common custom of the faithful.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), fasting was instituted by\nthe Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which\nregard pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex. Wherefore\nthe Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which\nboth afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great\nincentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest\non the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products,\nsuch as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds.\nFor, since such like animals are more like man in body, they afford\ngreater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body,\nso that from their consumption there results a greater surplus\navailable for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great\nincentive to lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to\nabstain especially from these foods.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely,\nheat, spirit [*Cf. P. I., Q. 118, A. 1, ad 3], and humor. Wine and\nother things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent\nfoods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital spirit: but\nit is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of\nnourishment, that conduces to the production of humor. Now the\nalteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital spirits are\nof short duration, whereas the substance of the humor remains a long\ntime. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of flesh meat rather\nthan of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account\nof the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating flesh\nmeat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not\nalways the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh\nmeat, rather than to eat fish.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast,\nfor as much as they originate from animals that provide us with\nflesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of\nthe prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the\nmost solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ,\nand because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our\nredemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in\nevery fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on\neggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other\nfasts the custom varies among different people, and each person is\nbound to conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among\nwhom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii,\n18; cf. De Nat. et Grat. lxvii]: \"Let each province keep to its own\npractice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they\nwere the laws of the apostles.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 148\n\nOF GLUTTONY\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether gluttony is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?\n\n(4) Its species;\n\n(5) Whether it is a capital sin?\n\n(6) Its daughters.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Gluttony Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord\nsaid (Matt. 15:11): \"Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a\nman.\" Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore,\nsince every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"No man sins in what he cannot avoid\" [*Ep. lxxi, ad\nLucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid\nthis, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): \"Since in eating pleasure\nand necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of\nnecessity and the seduction of pleasure,\" and Augustine says\n(Confess. x, 31): \"Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more\nthan necessary?\" Therefore gluttony is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin.\nBut the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and\nthirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that \"unless we\nfirst tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous\nappetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual\ncombat.\" But man's inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and\ndrinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be\ninordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of\nmoral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being\ncontrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of\nits substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the\nJews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed\ncertain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their\nsignification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. I-II, Q. 102, A.\n6, ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man\nspiritually.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard\nthe substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated\nby reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from\ndesire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this\npertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a\ncase of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in\neating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite,\nwhich belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers\nvirtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to\nreason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the\npowers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and\nthirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the\nsensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite\nthat the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of\ngluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this\nis not without sin.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Gluttony Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For\nevery mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this,\napparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a\nmortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated\nabove (Q. 132, A. 3). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither\nas regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one's\nneighbor. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf.\nAppend. to St. Augustine's works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]:\n\"Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he\nshould know that this is one of the lesser sins.\" But this pertains\nto gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that\nis to say venial, sins.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): \"As long as\nthe vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done\nvaliantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is\nunrestrained, all virtue comes to naught.\" But virtue is not done\naway save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the vice of gluttony\nproperly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of\nreason in regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two\npoints of view. First, with regard to things directed to the end,\ninasmuch as they may be incommensurate and consequently\nimproportionate to the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself,\ninasmuch as concupiscence turns man away from his due end.\nAccordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be found to\nturn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a mortal sin. This\nis the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony as his end,\nfor the sake of which he contemns God, being ready to disobey God's\ncommandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other hand,\nif the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of gluttony be found to\naffect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when\na man has too great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet\nwould not for their sake do anything contrary to God's law, it is a\nvenial sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning\nman away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction,\nit is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands\nus to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly\nopposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which\ncontain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain\nspecially to justice and its parts, as stated above (Q. 122, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: In so far as it turns man away from his last end,\ngluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our\nlast end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a\nmortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting\ninordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the\nend.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much\non its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it.\nFor Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): \"When the belly is distended by\ngluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Gluttony Is the Greatest of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For\nthe grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the\npunishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for\nChrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth.]: \"Gluttony turned Adam out of\nParadise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of\nNoah.\" According to Ezech. 16:49, \"This was the iniquity of Sodom,\nthy sister . . . fulness of bread,\" etc. Therefore the sin of\ngluttony is the greatest of all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now\ngluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps.\n135:10, \"Who smote Egypt with their first-born,\" says: \"Lust,\nconcupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony.\" Therefore\ngluttony is the greatest of sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man should love himself in the first place after\nGod, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 4). Now man, by the vice of gluttony,\ninflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus. 37:34): \"By\nsurfeiting many have perished.\" Therefore gluttony is the greatest of\nsins, at least excepting those that are against God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is\nreckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).\n\n_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways.\nFirst and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is\ncommitted: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine\nthings are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the\ngreatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment\nof the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who\nsins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished\nrather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking\nfood, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and\nmoderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the\nresult that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity,\ninasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These punishments are to be referred to the vices that\nresulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang,\nrather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from\nParadise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of\ngluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom\nwere inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins\nthat result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful,\nunless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but\nthe accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the\npleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is\naccidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of\ngluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man\nincur some bodily injury through taking too much food.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Species of Gluttony Are Fittingly Distinguished?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly\ndistinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): \"The vice of\ngluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of\nneed; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food\nto be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of\nrefreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of\nan immoderate appetite\"--which are contained in the following verse:\n\"Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.\"\n\nFor the above are distinguished according to diversity of\ncircumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do\nnot differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are\nnot distinguished according to the aforesaid.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then\ngluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that\nthere should likewise be others in respect of place and other\ncircumstances.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do\nthe other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the\nother moral virtues are not distinguished according to various\ncircumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony\ndistinguished thus.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), gluttony denotes inordinate\nconcupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in\neating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly,\nthe inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First,\nwith regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance\nor species of food a man seeks \"sumptuous\"--i.e. costly food; as\nregards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely--i.e.\n\"daintily\"; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating \"too much.\"\n\nSecondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the\nconsumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time\nfor eating, which is to eat \"hastily,\" or one fails to observe the\ndue manner of eating, by eating \"greedily.\"\n\nIsidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under\none heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in \"what\" he eats,\nor in \"how much,\" \"how\" or \"when he eats.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes the\nvarious species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by\nreason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For\nin him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the\nvery species of the food; in him that forestalls the time\nconcupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Place and other circumstances include no special motive\nconnected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In all other vices, whenever different circumstances\ncorrespond to different motives, the difference of circumstances\nargues a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all\ncircumstances, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9).\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Gluttony Is a Capital Vice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For\ncapital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause,\nother vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has\nnot the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but\nfor the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain\npre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony,\nwhich, in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins,\nseeing that it is most akin to what is [according to nature].\nTherefore gluttony is not a capital vice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the [good] of\nvirtue on account of something useful to the present life, or\npleasing to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of\nutility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness.\nTherefore, seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect\nof pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than\ngluttony, and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a\ncapital vice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among\nthe capital vices.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3), a capital vice\ndenotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a\nmost desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring\nthat end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered\nmost desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness\nwhich is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to\nhappiness, according to _Ethic._ i, 8; x, 3, 7, 8. Therefore the vice\nof gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost\namong other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is true that food itself is directed to something as\nits end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most\ndesirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it\nfollows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil\nof man's life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7, \"All the\nlabor of man is for his mouth.\" Yet gluttony seems to be about\npleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as\nAugustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), \"with such food as is good for\nthe worthless body, men desire to be fed,\" wherein namely the\npleasure consists, \"rather than to be filled: since the whole end of\nthat desire is this--not to thirst and not to hunger.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the\nconversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the\naversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has\nthe most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and\nconsequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital\nvices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is\nuseful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something\nelse: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of\ndesirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such\nthings.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 6]\n\nWhether [Five] Daughters Are Fittingly Assigned to Gluttony?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that [five] daughters are unfittingly\nassigned to gluttony, to wit, \"unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness,\nloquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding.\"\nFor unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14,\n\"Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked\nthings.\" Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin,\naccording to Prov. 14:22, \"They err that work evil.\" Therefore they\nare unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of\ngluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Isa.\n28:8, \"All tables were full of vomit and filth.\" But this seems to be\nnot a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter\nof counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, \"If thou hast been forced to\neat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee.\"\nTherefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a\ndaughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the\ndaughters of gluttony.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters\nto gluttony.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), gluttony consists\nproperly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore\nthose vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are\nthe results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be\naccounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the\nbody. On the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First,\nas regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat\nand drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony,\n\"dullness of sense in the understanding,\" on account of the fumes of\nfood disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence\nconduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles.\n2:3, \"I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I\nmight turn my mind in wisdom.\" Secondly, as regards the appetite,\nwhich is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and\ndrinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this\nrespect \"unseemly joy\" is reckoned, because all the other inordinate\npassions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5.\nTo this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdr. 3:20, that \"wine . . .\ngives every one a confident and joyful mind.\" Thirdly, as regards\ninordinate words, and thus we have \"loquaciousness,\" because as\nGregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), \"unless gluttons were carried away by\nimmoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted\nsumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his tongue.\"\nFourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have\n\"scurrility,\" i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason,\nwhich is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain\noutward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, \"Or foolish talking or\nscurrility,\" says that \"fools call this geniality--i.e. jocularity,\nbecause it is wont to raise a laugh.\" Both of these, however, may be\nreferred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason\nof excess which belongs to \"loquaciousness,\" or by reason of\nunbecomingness, which belongs to \"scurrility.\"\n\nOn the part of the body, mention is made of \"uncleanness,\" which may\nrefer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities,\nor especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph.\n5:3, \"But fornication and all uncleanness,\" says: \"That is, any kind\nof incontinence that has reference to lust.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin,\nespecially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous\njoy which is described as \"unseemly\" arises chiefly from immoderate\npartaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of\nsense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas\ndullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from\ngluttony, for the reason given above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating too\nmuch, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by\nimmoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting\nas a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not\nfrom the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be\nreferred to either vice.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 149\n\nOF SOBRIETY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely\ndrunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is the matter of sobriety?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special virtue?\n\n(3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?\n\n(4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Drink Is the Matter of Sobriety?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to\nsobriety. For it is written (Rom. 12:3): \"Not to be more wise than it\nbehooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety.\" Therefore\nsobriety is also about wisdom, and not only about drink.\n\nObj. 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis.\n8:7) that \"she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence,\nand justice, and fortitude,\" where sobriety stands for temperance.\nNow temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and\nsexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from \"measure\"\n[*_Bria,_ a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's\n_Lexicon_]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things\nappertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): \"We should live\nsoberly and justly and godly,\" where a gloss remarks: \"Soberly, in\nourselves\"; and (1 Tim. 2:9): \"Women . . . in decent apparel,\nadorning themselves with modesty and sobriety.\" Consequently it would\nseem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things\nappertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter\nproper to sobriety.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): \"Wine taken with\nsobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou\nshalt be sober.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ When a virtue is denominated from some condition\ncommon to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that\nin which it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that\ncondition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and\ntemperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from\n\"measure,\" for a man is said to be sober because he observes the\n_bria,_ i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to\nthat matter wherein the observance of the measure is most deserving\nof praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the\nmeasured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess\ntherein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more\nthan excessive eating. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 31:37, 38):\n\"Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess\nraiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins.\" For this reason sobriety\nis especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that\nwhich by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the brain,\nsuch as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be\nemployed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated\nabove (Q. 123, A. 2; Q. 141, A. 2) with regard to fortitude and\ntemperance.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his\nbody, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is\nsaid to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its\ndelight, according to Ps. 22:5, \"My chalice which inebriateth me, how\ngoodly is it!\" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in\nspeaking of the contemplation of wisdom.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance are\nnecessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore\nit behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the\nbusiness of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to\ndesignate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than\nin other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with\ndrink.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety\nis not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in\nthose wherein there is most need for a measure.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Sobriety Is by Itself a Special Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special\nvirtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now\nthere is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety,\nwhich is about drink, a special virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch\nas sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make\nfood, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment.\nTherefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink\nis distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and\nof drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue,\nseemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each\ndifferent kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it\nwould seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety\nto be a special part of temperance.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 146, A. 2), it belongs to moral\nvirtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may\nhinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason,\nthere must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating\ndrink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch\nas it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove\nthis hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is\nrequisite.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good\nof reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in\nthis respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But\nintoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above,\nwherefore it requires a special virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink,\nconsidered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does\nnot follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds\nof food.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of\nhindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks\nbears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does\nnot call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the\ndifference of meats.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Use of Wine Is Altogether Unlawful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the use of wine is altogether\nunlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of\nsalvation: since it is written (Wis. 7:28): \"God loveth none but him\nthat dwelleth with wisdom,\" and further on (Wis. 9:19): \"By wisdom\nthey were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the\nbeginning.\" Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is\nwritten (Eccles. 2:3): \"I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh\nfrom wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom.\" Therefore\nwine-drinking is altogether unlawful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): \"It is good not to\neat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is\noffended or scandalized, or made weak.\" Now it is sinful to forsake\nthe good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren.\nTherefore it is unlawful to make use of wine.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that \"after the\ndeluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of\nthe ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning.\"\nTherefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:23): \"Do not still\ndrink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy\nfrequent infirmities\"; and it is written (Ecclus. 31:36): \"Wine\ndrunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful,\naccording to Matt. 15:11, \"Not that which goeth into the mouth\ndefileth a man.\" Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such.\nYet it may become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a\ncircumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily\nthe worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to\ndrink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because\nto wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on\naccount of others who would be scandalized thereby.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general\nway, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it\nis required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain\naltogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use.\nSecondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in\nthis way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for\ncertain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this\ndepends on circumstances of certain persons and places.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to\nabstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would\ngive scandal to certain people.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Christ withdraws us from some things as being\naltogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to\nperfection. It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the\nuse of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and\nthe like.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Sobriety Is More Requisite in Persons of Greater Standing?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons\nof greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing;\nwherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Lev.\n19:32, \"Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the\naged man.\" Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be\nexhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, \"That the aged man be\nsober.\" Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and\nthe Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Tim. 3:2, \"It\nbehooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife,\nsober, prudent,\" etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in\npersons of high standing.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is\nforbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs:\nwhile it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction,\naccording to Prov. 31:4, \"Give not wine to kings,\" and further on\n(Prov. 31:6), \"Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to\nthem that are grieved in mind.\" Therefore sobriety is more requisite\nin persons of standing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:11): \"The women in like\nmanner, chaste . . . sober,\" etc., and (Titus 2:6) \"Young men in like\nmanner exhort that they be sober.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the\ncontrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads.\nAccordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons\nfor two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the\nconcupiscences which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the\nvices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most\nrequisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of\npleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while\nin women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist\nconcupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [*Dict. Fact.\nMemor. ii, 1] among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly,\nsobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as being more\nnecessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of\nwine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety\nis specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous\nin instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church,\nwho should fulfil their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to\nkings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 150\n\nOF DRUNKENNESS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether drunkenness is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(3) Whether it is the most grievous sin?\n\n(4) Whether it excuses from sin?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Drunkenness Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every\nsin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to\ndaring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to\ndrunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every sin is voluntary [*Augustine, De Vera Relig.\nxiv]. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be\ndeprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself.\nTherefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a\nsin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would\nseem very hard.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is\nnot applied to drunkards: for Gregory [*Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4\nwhere Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of\nCanterbury] says that \"we must forbear with their ways, lest they\nbecome worse if they be compelled to give up the habit.\" Therefore\ndrunkenness is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:13): \"Not in rioting and\ndrunkenness.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it\nmay signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking\nmuch wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In\nthis sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect\nresulting from a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by\nwhich a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two\nways. In one way, through the wine being too strong, without the\ndrinker being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may\noccur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence,\nand thus we believe that Noah was made drunk as related in Gen. 9. In\nanother way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and\nuse of wine: in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised\nunder gluttony as a species under its genus. For gluttony is divided\ninto \"surfeiting [Douay: 'rioting'] and drunkenness,\" which are\nforbidden by the Apostle (Rom. 13:13).\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), insensibility\nwhich is opposed to temperance \"is not very common,\" so that like its\nspecies which are opposed to the species of intemperance it has no\nname. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and yet if a\nman were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting\nnature grievously, he would not be free from sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This objection regards the resulting defect which is\ninvoluntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is\nin this that the sin consists.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the\nstrength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink\nexcused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of\nperson to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be\nlacking neither is excused from sin.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be\nforegone, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 6). Hence Augustine says in\na letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), \"Meseems, such things are cured\nnot by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than\ncommanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be\nfollowed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should\nbe treated with severity.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Drunkenness Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For\nAugustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix\nto St. Augustine's works] that \"drunkenness if indulged in\nassiduously, is a mortal sin.\" Now assiduity denotes a circumstance\nwhich does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot\naggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as\nshown above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 5). Therefore if drunkenness is not a\nmortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St.\nAugustine's works]: \"Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is\nnecessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins.\" Now\nthe lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is\ncaused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of\nmedicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician,\nthat they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink\ndrunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli,\nxlii): \"A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or\ngambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed;\na subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either\ngive them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity.\"\nNow such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins.\nTherefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing\nArticle, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine.\nNow this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows\nnot the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness\nmay be without sin, as stated above (A. 1). Secondly, so that he\nperceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be\nintoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly,\nit may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate\nand intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from\ndrink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals\ntake their species not from things that occur accidentally and beside\nthe intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way\ndrunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and\nknowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs\nvirtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running\nthe risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De\nAbraham i.]): \"We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which\nprevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when\nsober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness.\" Therefore\ndrunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on\naccount of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is\nimpossible for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing\nhimself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many\ntimes experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to\ndrunkenness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to\nthe vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly\nto take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin.\nHence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): \"Drunkenness is far from me:\nThou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding\nsometimes hath crept upon Thy servant.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 141, A. 6), meat and drink should\nbe moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's health.\nWherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink which\nare moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too\nit may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man is\nmoderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or\ndrinks much at the physician's advice in order to provoke vomiting,\nhe is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There\nis, however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure\nvomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore\nthis is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 3]\n\nWhether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins.\nFor Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that \"nothing gains the\ndevil's favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the\nvices.\" And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante\nomnia): \"Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by\nthe clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of\nreason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of\ndrunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its\npunishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for\nAmbrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that \"there would be no\nslavery, were there no drunkards.\" Therefore drunkenness is the\ngreatest of sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12),\nspiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one\nof the carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be evil because it removes a\ngood. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver\nthe evil. Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a\nhuman good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are\ngraver than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the\ngood of human reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such\nlike concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this\nreason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not\nfor being graver than other sins, but because they occur more\nfrequently among men.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way\nby that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes\naway the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more\nthe character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of\nreason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by\ndrunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue,\nwhich are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are\nalways good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so\nfar as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for\nhaving laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But\nslavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Drunkenness Excuses from Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin.\nFor the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that \"the drunkard deserves\ndouble punishment.\" Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of\nexcusing from it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it.\nNow drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as\nman's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But\nconcupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is\ndrunkenness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43),\nLot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as\nstated above (A. 1), namely the resulting defect and the preceding\nact. On the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is\nfettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it\ncauses an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of\nthe preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if\nthe drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the\nsubsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case\nof Lot. If, however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not\naltogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is\nrendered voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act,\ninasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into\nthe subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished,\neven as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore\nAugustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that \"Lot's guilt is to be\nmeasured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves\nmore severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for\nhis twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the\nlaw of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered\n\"those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished\nthan if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than\none.\" In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), \"he seems to\nhave considered the advantage,\" namely of the prevention of wrong,\n\"rather than the leniency which one should have for drunkards,\"\nseeing that they are not in possession of their faculties.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the point\nof its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that\nresults from it, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as\ndrunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a man\ninsane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it\nis less grievous to sin through weakness than through malice.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 151\n\nOF CHASTITY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity:\n(2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the\ncontrary vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether chastity is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it is a general virtue?\n\n(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?\n\n(4) Of its relation to purity.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Chastity Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we\nare treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs\nto the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in\na certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body.\nTherefore chastity is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue is \"a voluntary habit,\" as stated in _Ethic._\nii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be\ntaken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore\nit seems that chastity is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some\nunbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But\nchastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore chastity\nis not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de\nTempore]): \"Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since\nchastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust,\nwhile thou wishest thy wife to be victorious.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason\n\"chastises\" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue\nconsists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above\n(I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a\nvirtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject,\nthough its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a\nman make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the\njudgment of his reason and the choice of his will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), \"so long as her\nmind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in\nbody, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her body of\nits holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency.\" He\nalso says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that \"in the mind there is a virtue\nwhich is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer\nany evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), \"it is\nimpossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is\nit possible to be just unless one live by faith.\" Whence he argues\nthat in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other\nvirtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as\nhe adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) \"virtues are distinguished from vices\nnot by their functions,\" i.e. their acts, \"but by their ends.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in\naccordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it\nis reckoned among the fruits.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Chastity Is a General Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For\nAugustine says (De Mendacio xx) that \"chastity of the mind is the\nwell-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to\nthe greater things.\" But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore\nchastity is a general virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Chastity\" takes its name from \"chastisement\" [*Cf.\nA. 1]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be chastised\nby reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the\nappetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication\nseems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Ps. 72:27):\n\"Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: 'hast destroyed'] all them that go\nawhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee.\" Therefore chastity is\na general virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be\na part of temperance.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word \"chastity\" is employed in two ways. First,\nproperly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter,\nnamely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly,\nthe word \"chastity\" is employed metaphorically: for just as a\nmingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper\nmatter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the\nspiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a\npleasure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically\nspeaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise\nmetaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the\nspiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united,\nnamely God, and refrains from delighting in union with other things\nagainst the requirements of the order established by God, this may be\ncalled a spiritual chastity, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, \"I have\nespoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste\nvirgin to Christ.\" If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any\nother things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine\norder, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to Jer.\n3:1, \"But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers.\" Taking\nchastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue\nwithdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful\nthings. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists\nprincipally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the\nhuman mind is united to God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 1; Q. 142, A. 2), the concupiscence\nof that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child,\nbecause the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of\npleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature.\nHence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered\nby consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a\nchild left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these\npleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and\nconsequently chastity is applied antonomastically to such like\nconcupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we\nstand in the greatest need of strength of mind.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication\nmetaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity,\nas stated.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Chastity Is a Distinct Virtue from Abstinence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue\nfrom abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same,\none virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the\nsame sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate\nwhich are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are\nthe matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity\nis not a distinct virtue from abstinence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of\nintemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now \"chastity\"\ntakes its name from \"chastisement\" of the contrary vices. Since then\ncertain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is\nchastity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of\ntemperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are\nthe matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the\nmatter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are\nthe matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand.\nCf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, \"Not given to\nwine, no striker,\" etc.: \"The belly and the organs of generation are\nneighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their\ncomplicity in vice.\" Therefore abstinence and chastity are not\ndistinct virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5, 6) reckons \"chastity\"\ntogether with \"fastings\" which pertain to abstinence.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4), temperance is\nproperly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that\nwhere there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different\nvirtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate\nto the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in _Ethic._ ix,\n4, 5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food\nwhereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically\nfrom actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the\nnature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is\nabout venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which\nis about pleasures of the palate.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as\nregards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch, which\njudgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as\nregards the use itself of those objects, as stated in _Ethic._ iii,\n10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in\ncharacter. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though\nthey regard the one sense.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more\noppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and\ntherefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint,\nsince if one consent to them this increases the force of\nconcupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine\nsays (Soliloq. i, 10): \"I consider that nothing so casts down the\nmanly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those\nbodily contacts which belong to the married state.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the\nmaintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed to\npleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there\nis no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of\nthe palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are\nessentially directed to the preservation of man's life: wherefore by\ntheir very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue\nwhich is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Purity Belongs Especially to Chastity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to\nchastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that \"purity is a\nvirtue of the soul.\" Therefore it is not something belonging to\nchastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, _pudicitia_ (purity) is derived from _pudor,_ which\nis equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De Fide\nOrth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all\nsinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the\nother virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that \"every\nkind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach.\" Now it would\nseem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach.\nTherefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not\nespecially to chastity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): \"We must\ngive praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none\nbut a lawful use the organs intended for procreation.\" Now the use of\nthese organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity\nbelongs properly to chastity.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Obj. 2), _pudicitia_ (purity) takes\nits name from _pudor,_ which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs\nbe properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men\nare most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei\nxiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by\nthe honesty [*Cf. Q. 145] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and\nthis because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject\nto the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external\nmembers. Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of\nall the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6).\nConsequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially\nthe signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And\nsince the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather\nthese external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union.\nTherefore purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct\ntherefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless\nthe one is sometimes used to designate the other.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating\nchastity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices\nof intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (Q. 142,\nA. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most\ndeserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of the\ngenital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is\nabsorbed.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 152\n\nOF VIRGINITY\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) In what does virginity consist?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful?\n\n(3) Whether it is a virtue?\n\n(4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;\n\n(5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Virginity Consists in Integrity of the Flesh?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in\nintegrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The\nquotation is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that \"virginity is the\ncontinual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh.\" But\nmeditation does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not\nsituated in the flesh.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that \"purity dwells in the soul.\" Therefore\nvirginity is not incorruption of the flesh.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in\nthe seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without\nloss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that \"those\norgans may be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physicians,\ntoo, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder\nto see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch the proof of\nvirginity that she sought.\" And he adds: \"Nobody, I think, would be\nso foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily\nsanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ.\" Therefore\nvirginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.\n\nObj. 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in\nresolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation,\nwhether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost\nwithout copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that\n\"virginal integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual\nintercourse is the portion of angels.\" Therefore virginity does not\nconsist in incorruption of the flesh.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that \"virginity\nis continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated\nand observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Virginity takes its name apparently from _viror_\n(freshness), and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining\nits freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so\ntoo, virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared\nby the heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the\ngreatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence,\nAmbrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that \"virginal chastity is integrity\nfree of pollution.\"\n\nNow venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The\nfirst is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of\nvirginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the\nsoul and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of\nthe semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the\npart of the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of\nthese three the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such\nmust be considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the\nrelation of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are\nthe matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of\nform and complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in\nthat which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in\nfreedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity\nof the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; while freedom from\npleasure in resolution of the semen is related thereto materially;\nand the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the\nformal and completive element in virginity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This definition of Augustine's expresses directly that\nwhich is formal in virginity. For \"meditation\" denotes reason's\npurpose; and the addition \"perpetual\" does not imply that a virgin\nmust always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear\nin mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material\nelement is expressed indirectly by the words \"on incorruption in a\ncorruptible body.\" This is added to show the difficulty of virginity:\nfor if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to\nmaintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the\nsoul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same\nwith virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that\n\"although virginity resides in the flesh,\" and for this reason is a\nbodily quality, \"yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency\nfosters and preserves.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is\naccidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely\nabstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily\norgan. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other\nway, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of\na hand or foot.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise\nin two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it destroys\nvirginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however,\nmentions copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary and\nnatural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the\npurpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through violence and\nwithout the mind's consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from\nit, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who\nare subject to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not\nforfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity\nwhich excludes virginity.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Virginity Is Unlawful?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever\nis contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as\nthe words of Gen. 2:16, \"Of every tree\" that is in \"paradise, thou\nshalt eat,\" indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to\nthe preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gen. 1:28,\n\"Increase and multiply, and fill the earth,\" express a precept of the\nnatural law, in reference to the preservation of the species.\nTherefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this\nwould be to act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a\nsin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to\nact against the good of the species.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is\napparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue,\nsince it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. ii, 2), that \"he who revels in every pleasure, and\nabstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from\nall is loutish and insensible.\" Therefore virginity is something\nsinful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden\ntimes those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius\nMaximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to\nAugustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato \"is said to have sacrificed to\nnature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as\nthough it were a sin.\" Therefore virginity is a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But\nvirginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor.\n7:25): \"Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I\ngive counsel.\" Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.\n\n_I answer that,_ In human acts, those are sinful which are against\nright reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an\nend should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again,\nman's good is threefold as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8; one consisting in\nexternal things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily\ngoods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which the\ngoods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the\nactive life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord\ndeclared (Luke 10:42), \"Mary hath chosen the better part.\" Of these\ngoods those that are external are directed to those which belong to\nthe body, and those which belong to the body are directed to those\nwhich belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the\nactive life are directed to those which belong to the life of\ncontemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use\nexternal goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like\nmanner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from\npossessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to\npossess), for the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of\ntruth, this is not sinful, but in accord with right reason. In like\nmanner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely\nto give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance\nwith the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all\nvenereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine\ncontemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34): \"The unmarried\nwoman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may\nbe holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh\non the things of the world, how she may please her husband.\"\nTherefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful is worthy\nof praise.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above (Q. 122, A.\n1). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be\nfulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside\nwithout sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and\nthe fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the\nmultitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be\ndischarged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing\nthis, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law\nwhich binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual,\notherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the\nprecept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which\nneeds not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually.\nWherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if\nsome betake themselves to carnal procreation, while others abstaining\nfrom this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things,\nfor the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus too in an\narmy, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others\nfight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the\nmultitude, although they cannot be done by one person.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right reason,\nabstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for\npleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does\nnot refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is\nvenereal: and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated\nabove. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to\nquantity but to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6: wherefore\nit is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that \"in point of\nquantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he\nfollows the mean.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more\nfrequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone\nrefrained from all venereal pleasure through love of the\ncontemplation of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence\nit was not through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice,\nbut \"because he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow\ncountrymen,\" as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Virginity Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For \"no\nvirtue is in us by nature,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1).\nNow virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born.\nTherefore virginity is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Yet some have other virtues without having\nvirginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without\nvirtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would involve\nthe condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity\nis not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii ad\nEustoch.]: \"Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin\nafter her downfall.\" Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost\nwithout sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal\npurity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not\na virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): \"Love of virginity\nmoves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we\nshould seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the formal and completive\nelement in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal\npleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so\nfar, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine\nthings: while the material element in virginity is integrity of the\nflesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest\nthat where a good action has a special matter through having a\nspecial excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example,\nmagnificence which is about great expenditure is for this reason a\nspecial virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of\nmoney in general. Now to keep oneself free from the experience of\nvenereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater\npraise than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal pleasure.\nWherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as\nmagnificence to liberality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Men have from their birth that which is material in\nvirginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal\nexperience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity,\nnamely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake,\nwhich purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence\nAugustine says (De Virgin. xi): \"Nor do we praise virgins for being\nvirgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy\ncontinency.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that which\nis formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as\nstated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), but not by reason of that which is\nmaterial in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing\nthe matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus\na poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of\nmagnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues\nlacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the\nflesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity,\nhis mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding\nthis same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do\nso: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the\npurpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a\nposition to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in\nmind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which\npreparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that\nwhich is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material\ntherein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he\ndoes not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a\nperson who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the\nmatter of virginity but the purpose of virginity.\n\nAs regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be\nmiraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ,\nwhich we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something\nelse which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who\nhas experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that\nexperience. For God cannot make that which is done not to have been\ndone, as stated in the First Part (Q. 25, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by\nvow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin.\nviii) that \"by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed,\nconsecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and\nflesh.\" Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because\nit abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to\nit above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds\nsomething to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that\nwhich is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from\nvenereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity\nalone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is\nreckoned above liberality.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Virginity Is More Excellent Than Marriage?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than\nmarriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): \"Continence was\nequally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who\nbegot children.\" Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore\nvirginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his\nvirtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence,\nit would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than\nany married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not\npreferable to marriage.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private\ngood, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is\ndirected to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.\nxvi): \"What food is to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse\nto the welfare of the human race.\" On the other hand, virginity is\nordered to the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the\nApostle calls the \"tribulation of the flesh,\" to which married people\nare subject (1 Cor. 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than\nconjugal continence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): \"Both solid\nreason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage\nsinful, nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or\neven to that of widowhood.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of\nJovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to\nmarriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ\nWho both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a\nvirgin, and by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels\nvirginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both\nbecause a Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and because\nthe good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again\nbecause the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the\nactive life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in\nrespect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking \"on the\nthings of God\" [Vulg.: 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is directed to\nthe good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human race,\nand belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace\nthe married life have to think \"on the things of the world,\" as the\nApostle says (1 Cor. 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is\npreferable to conjugal continence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but\nstill more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so\ndisposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in\nkeeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal\ncontinence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of\nJohn, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the\naccidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that\nboth \"the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought\nChrist's battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John\nwas continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in\nhabit.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a\nmarried person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on\nthe part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more\nprepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient,\nthan the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono\nConjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: \"I am no better than\nAbraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the\nchastity of marriage.\" Further on he gives the reason for this: \"For\nwhat I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him\nto do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved\nme now to do it.\" Secondly, because perhaps the person who is not a\nvirgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De\nVirgin. xliv): \"Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to\nthe Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on\naccount of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom,\nwhereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is\nalready able to drink the chalice of the Lord?\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The common good takes precedence of the private good,\nif it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is\nbetter generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated\nto God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De\nVirgin. ix): \"It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the\nflesh, even of those women who in these times seek naught else from\nmarriage but children in order to make them servants of Christ,\ncannot compensate for lost virginity.\"\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Virginity Is the Greatest of Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues.\nFor Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): \"We address\nourselves now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less\nexalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing,\nthe pride and ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion\nof Christ's flock.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now\nthe greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold\nfruit, according to a gloss on Matt. 13:23. Therefore virginity is\nthe greatest of the virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater\nit is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is\ndeclared in the Apocalypse (14:4) that virgins \"follow the Lamb\nwhithersoever He goeth,\" and (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing \"a new\ncanticle,\" which \"no\" other \"man\" could say. Therefore virginity is\nthe greatest of the virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): \"No one,\nmethinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom,\" and (De Virgin.\nxlv): \"The authority of the Church informs the faithful in no\nuncertain manner, so that they know in what place the martyrs and the\nholy virgins who have departed this life are commemorated in the\nSacrament of the Altar.\" By this we are given to understand that\nmartyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to virginity.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in\nsome particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely\nin the genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of\nwidowhood and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to\nchastity antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is\nascribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): \"Can\nanyone esteem any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is\nbeloved of her King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord,\nconsecrated to her God?\" Secondly, a thing may be most excellent\nsimply, and in this way virginity is not the most excellent of the\nvirtues. Because the end always excels that which is directed to the\nend; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end, the\nbetter it is. Now the end which renders virginity praiseworthy is\nthat one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above (A. 4).\nWherefore the theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion,\nthe acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are\npreferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in\norder to cleave to God--since for this end they hold their own life\nin contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries--since for this end\nthey give up their own will and all that they may possess--than\nvirgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose.\nTherefore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virgins are \"the more honored portion of Christ's\nflock,\" and \"their glory more sublime\" in comparison with widows and\nmarried women.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity,\naccording to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its\nsuperiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed,\nand to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But\naccording to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), \"the hundredfold fruit\nis given to martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to\nmarried persons.\" Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is\nsimply the greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other\ndegrees of chastity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Virgins \"follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,\"\nbecause they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but\nalso of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore\nthey follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they\nfollow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more\nclosely by imitation of the mind. The \"new hymn\" which virgins alone\nsing, is their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 153\n\nOF LUST\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity:\n(1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are\nfive points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is the matter of lust?\n\n(2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?\n\n(3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?\n\n(4) Whether lust is a capital vice?\n\n(5) Concerning its daughters.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Matter of Lust Is Only Venereal Desires and Pleasures?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only\nvenereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6)\nthat \"lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance.\" But surfeit\nregards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore\nlust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): \"Wine is a lustful\n[Douay: 'luxurious'] thing.\" Now wine is connected with pleasure of\nmeat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, lust is defined \"as the desire of wanton pleasure\"\n[*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure\nregards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore\nlust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.\n\n_On the contrary,_ To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii\n[*Written by St. Augustine]): \"He that soweth in the flesh, of the\nflesh shall reap corruption.\" Now the sowing of the flesh refers to\nvenereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x), \"a lustful man is one who\nis debauched with pleasures.\" Now venereal pleasures above all\ndebauch a man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with\nsuch like pleasures.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to\npleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is\nreferred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal\npleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a\nman's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters\npertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says \"lust is any\nkind of surfeit.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense\nin which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the\nuse of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the\nname of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to\nwhich also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks\n(De Civ. xiv, 15, 16).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 2]\n\nWhether No Venereal Act Can Be Without Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin.\nFor nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal\nact is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i,\n10): \"I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its\nheight as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts.\"\nTherefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason\nis sinful, because virtue is corrupted by \"excess\" and \"deficiency\"\nas stated in _Ethic._ ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is\nexcess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that \"it is\nincompatible with the act of understanding,\" as the Philosopher\nobserves (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.;\nCf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of\nthe prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy.\nTherefore no venereal act can be without sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now\noriginal sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without\nwhich no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et\nConcup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): \"This is a\nsufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no\nsin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals,\nnor a commandment\": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse\nbetween the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not\nevery venereal act is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the\norder of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering\neverything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if\none, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a\nfitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted,\nprovided this end be something truly good. Now just as the\npreservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good,\nso, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a\nvery great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the\npreservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal\nacts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence\nAugustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): \"What food is to a man's well\nbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human\nrace.\" Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be\ntaken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the\nbody, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided\nthey be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of\nhuman procreation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways.\nFirst, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this\nnothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the\nperfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by\nthat which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual\nintercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height,\ni.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.\nviii): \"Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about\nserving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the\nword of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal\nchastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more\nthat of the Virgin Mary.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 152, A. 2, ad 2; I-II, Q. 64, A.\n2), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with\nright reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a\nvenereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean\nof virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of\npleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the\ndisposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior\nappetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the\nact in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free\nact of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with\nthe aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act\nof reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in\naccordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person\nto set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are\nnot subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the\npunishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling\nagainst God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), \"the child,\nshackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which\nis not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin.\"\nHence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that\nit contains something penal resulting from the first sin.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Lust That Is About Venereal Acts Can Be a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a\nsin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is\nthe surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim.\ni, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other\nsuperfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal\nacts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of\nwhat is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own,\nexcept perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in\nvenereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no\nvice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now\nwine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the\nApostle (Eph. 5:18), \"Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay:\n'luxury'].\" Therefore lust is forbidden.\n\nFurther, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19\n[Douay: 'luxury'].\n\n_I answer that,_ The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves\none to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more\nsinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of\nvenereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary\nfor the common good, namely the preservation of the human race.\nWherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of\nreason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection\nagainst the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust\nconsists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the\nmatter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener.\nAnim. i, 18), \"the semen is a surplus that is needed.\" For it is said\nto be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the\nnutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative\npower. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not\nto be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided\none observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the\nemission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting\nthe end for which it is needed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking against\nlust, \"You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in\nyour body.\" Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a\nman wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine\nsays (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): \"God Who thus\ngoverns His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and\ncommandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which\nthou hast begun to be.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men\nare more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised\nunder insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for\nsexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Lust Is a Capital Vice?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is\napparently the same as \"uncleanness,\" according to a gloss on Eph.\n5:3 (Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony,\naccording to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a\ncapital vice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that \"as pride\nof mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind\nsafeguard the chastity of the flesh.\" Now it is seemingly contrary to\nthe nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore\nlust is not a capital vice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph. 4:19,\n\"Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness.\" But\ndespair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of\nsloth, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is\nlust a capital vice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the\ncapital vices.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 148, A. 5; I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3,\n4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that\nthrough desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all\nof which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice.\nNow the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great.\nWherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive\nappetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and\nbecause such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is\nevident that lust is a capital vice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 148, A. 6), according to some, the\nuncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain\nuncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point.\nIf, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it\nis caused by gluttony materially--in so far as gluttony provides the\nbodily matter of lust--and not under the aspect of final cause, in\nwhich respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of\nothers.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 132, A. 4, ad 1), when we were\ntreating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all\nsins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly\nthrough hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair,\nso that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle\nthereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary\nfor a capital vice.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Daughters of Lust Are Fittingly Described?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly\nreckoned to be \"blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,\nrashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence\nor despair of a future world.\" For mental blindness, thoughtlessness\nand rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every\nsin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not\nbe reckoned especially as daughters of lust.\n\nObj. 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated\nabove (Q. 128, ad 6; Q. 137, A. 3). But lust is contrary, not to\nfortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter\nof lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Self-love extending to the contempt of God\" is the\norigin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).\nTherefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four,\nnamely, \"obscene,\" \"scurrilous,\" \"wanton\" and \"foolish talking.\"\nThere the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).\n\n_I answer that,_ When the lower powers are strongly moved towards\ntheir objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and\ndisordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that\nthe lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently\nintent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of\nthe vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely\nthe reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.\n\nNow the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is\nsimple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act\nis hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, \"Beauty hath deceived\nthee, and lust hath perverted thy heart.\" In this respect we have\n\"blindness of mind.\" The second act is counsel about what is to be\ndone for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the\nconcupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1),\nspeaking of lecherous love: \"This thing admits of neither counsel nor\nmoderation, thou canst not control it by counseling.\" In this respect\nthere is \"rashness,\" which denotes absence of counsel, as stated\nabove (Q. 53, A. 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be\ndone, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the\nlustful old men (Dan. 13:9): \"They perverted their own mind . . .\nthat they might not . . . remember just judgments.\" In this respect\nthere is \"thoughtlessness.\" The fourth act is the reason's command\nabout the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so\nfar as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered\nfrom doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this \"inconstancy\"\nmust be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the\nLeonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man\nwho declared that he would leave his mistress: \"One little false tear\nwill undo those words.\"\n\nOn the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One\nis the desire for the end, to which we refer \"self-love,\" which\nregards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the\nother hand there is \"hatred of God,\" by reason of His forbidding the\ndesired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed\nto the end. With regard to this there is \"love of this world,\" whose\npleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is\n\"despair of a future world,\" because through being held back by\ncarnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since\nthey are distasteful to him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5),\nintemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices\nopposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal\nspecies of intemperance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards\nhardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from\npleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as\nstated above (Q. 143). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto\nis to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first\nnamed inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles\na man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee 4:11,\n\"Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay:\n'understanding'].\" Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that \"the\nless a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death.\"\nNor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the\ndaughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. Q. 35, A.\n4, ad 2; Q. 118, A. 8, ad 1; Q. 148, A. 6).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires\nfor himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special\npoint of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a\ndaughter of lust.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external\nacts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold\ninordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer\n\"obscene words\": for since \"out of the abundance of the heart the\nmouth speaketh\" (Matt. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full\nof lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly,\non account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and\nrashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or\ngiving a thought to his words, which are described as \"scurrilous.\"\nThirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks\npleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to\n\"wanton words.\" Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by\nhis words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a\nman's sentiments, and so he gives way \"to foolish talking,\" for\ninstance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to\nanything else.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 154\n\nOF THE PARTS OF LUST\n(In Twelve Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are\ntwelve points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Into what parts is lust divided?\n\n(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?\n\n(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?\n\n(4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like\nseduction?\n\n(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?\n\n(6) Of seduction;\n\n(7) Of rape;\n\n(8) Of adultery;\n\n(9) Of incest;\n\n(10) Of sacrilege;\n\n(11) Of the sin against nature;\n\n(12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Six Species Are Fittingly Assigned to Lust?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned\nto lust, namely, \"simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction,\nrape, and the unnatural vice.\" For diversity of matter does not\ndiversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard\nto diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has\nintercourse is married or a virgin, or of some other condition.\nTherefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this\nway.\n\nObj. 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not\ndifferentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery\ndoes not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man\nhaving intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an\ninjustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a\nspecies of lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a\nwoman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that\na man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow.\nTherefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as\nadultery is.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another\nwoman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter\nsin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among\nthe species thereof.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): \"Lest again, when I\ncome, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them that sinned\nbefore, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication\nand lasciviousness that they have committed.\" Therefore it seems that\nalso uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of\nlust, as well as fornication.\n\nObj. 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among\nits parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is\nwritten (Gal. 5:19): \"The works of the flesh are manifest, which are\nfornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury'].\"\nTherefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species\nof lust.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals\n36, qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 153, A. 3), the sin of lust\nconsists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right\nreason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter\nwherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due\nmatter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a\ncircumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is\nderived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the\nspecies of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.\n\nNow this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways.\nFirst, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act.\nIn this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the\n_vice against nature,_ which attaches to every venereal act from\nwhich generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing\nand advancement of the child when born, there is _simple\nfornication,_ which is the union of an unmarried man with an\nunmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is\nconsummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other\npersons; and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with\nwhom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to\nher; and thus there is _incest,_ which consists in the misuse of a\nwoman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with\nregard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and\nif she be under the authority of a husband, it is _adultery,_ if\nunder the authority of her father, it is _seduction,_ in the absence\nof violence, and _rape_ if violence be employed.\n\nThese species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than\nof the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is\nby way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been\nstated above (Obj. 1) that the aforesaid species are assigned with\nregard to a difference of matter.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a\nformal difference of object, which difference results from different\nmodes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7), nothing hinders\nthe deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in\nthis way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this\ndeformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust\nthat obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby\nshown to be more grievous.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a\nspiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the\nviolation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner,\nthe other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced\nto other species of lust.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected\nwith undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not\nconstitute the species of a moral act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18,\nA. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 5: As a gloss says on this passage, \"uncleanness\" stands\nfor lust against nature, while \"lasciviousness\" is a man's abuse of\nboys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also\nreply that \"lasciviousness\" relates to certain acts circumstantial to\nthe venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.\n\nReply Obj. 6: According to a gloss on this passage \"lust\" there\nsignifies any kind of excess.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Simple Fornication Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal\nsin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a\npar with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as\nthings that are not mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29):\n\"That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood,\nand from things strangled, and from fornication.\" But there is not\nmortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Tim. 4:4, \"Nothing is\nrejected that is received with thanksgiving.\" Therefore fornication\nis not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But\nthe Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): \"Go take thee a wife of fornications,\nand have of her children of fornications.\" Therefore fornication is\nnot a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without\ndisapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without\ndisapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus\nwe read (Gen. 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and\nfurther on (Gen. 30:5, 9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the\nhandmaids of his wives; and again (Gen. 38:18) that Juda was with\nThamar whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication\nis not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple\nfornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love\nof God, since it is not a sin directly against God, nor as regards\nthe love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore\nsimple fornication is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 5: Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But\nsimple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose\n[*The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to\nSt. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8,\n\"Godliness is profitable to all things,\" says: \"The whole of\nChristian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man\nconforms to this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the\nflesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish.\"\nTherefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that \"what food\nis to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the\nwelfare of the human race.\" But inordinate use of food is not always\na mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse;\nand this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which\nis the least grievous of the aforesaid species.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:13): \"Take heed to keep\nthyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure\nto know a crime.\" Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore\nfornication and all intercourse with other than one's wife is a\nmortal sin.\n\nFurther, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But\nfornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal.\n5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices,\nadds: \"They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.\"\nTherefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.\n\nFurther, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can.\nPraedicandum): \"They should know that the same penance is to be\nenjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder\nand other criminal offenses.\" Therefore simple fornication is a\ncriminal or mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to\nbe a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in\nDeut., qu. 37] on Deut. 23:17, says: \"This is a prohibition against\ngoing with whores, whose vileness is venial.\" For instead of \"venial\"\nit should be \"venal,\" since such is the wanton's trade. In order to\nmake this evident, we must take note that every sin committed\ndirectly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication\nimplies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the\noffspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where\nthe upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female,\nthat these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a\ncertain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all\nbirds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the\nfemale alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is\nindeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is\nevident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the\nmother's care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his\nfather as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods\nboth internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an\nindeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be\nunited to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time\nor even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the\nmale has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because\non him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would\ncease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.\n\nThis union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which\nfor the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since,\nhowever, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the\nwhole human race, and common goods depend on the law for their\ndetermination, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), it follows that\nthis union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined\nby some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the\nThird Part of this work (Suppl., Q. 50, seqq.), where we shall treat\nof the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an\nindeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with\nmatrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child's upbringing, and\nconsequently it is a mortal sin.\n\nNor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by\nfornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the\nchild: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law\nis judged according to what happens in general, and not according to\nwhat may happen in a particular case.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these\nthings, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because\nthe matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute\nbetween Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing\nunanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed\nunlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason: whereas\nthe Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful.\nThe other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom\nintroduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles\nforbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were\nunlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the Jews,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4, ad 3).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary\nto right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as it is ruled\nby the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which\na man does by God's will and in obedience to His command, is not\ncontrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general\norder of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the\nDivine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the\nusual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in\nbeing willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed God,\nalthough considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason\nin general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by\nGod's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called\nfornication, though it be so called in reference to the general\ncourse of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): \"When God\ncommands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any\npeople, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be\ndone\"; and afterwards he adds: \"For as among the powers of human\nsociety, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser,\nso must God in preference to all.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no\npurpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of\nmatrimony (Suppl., Q. 65, A. 5, ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to\nexcuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our\nneighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born,\nas we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a\nmanner disadvantageous to the future child.\n\nReply Obj. 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to\nthe inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far\nas these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and\nbecause by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy;\nbut not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal\ninconstancy impenitent until death.\n\nReply Obj. 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a man,\nwherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future\nchild, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only\nas to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one\nmeal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the\nact of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would,\nhowever, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a\nfood which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the\ncase with Adam.\n\nNor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised\nunder lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous\npleasure is a lesser sin.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Fornication Is the Most Grievous of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of\nsins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it\nproceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous\npleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the\n\"flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust.\" Therefore it\nseems that fornication is the gravest of sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against\na person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more\ngrievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger.\nNow according to 1 Cor. 6:18, \"He that committeth fornication sinneth\nagainst his own body,\" which is most intimately connected with a man.\nTherefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be\nthe sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly\nopposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was\nsaid in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according\nto 1 Cor. 6:15, \"Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make\nthem the members of a harlot?\" Therefore fornication is the most\ngrievous of sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of\nthe flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways,\nfirst with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some\naccident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin\nitself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to\nthe good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to\nthe good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to\nits species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods,\nsuch as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those\nwhich are directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the\nlife of one already born, such as murder.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that\nwhich is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure\nthat is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the\nless grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a\ngreater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure\nis in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm.\nccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine's works]) that of\nall a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of\nchastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and\nIsidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that \"mankind is subjected to\nthe devil by carnal lust more than by anything else,\" because, to\nwit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not\nmerely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the\nflesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts\nagainst the good of his own body by an undue resolution and\ndefilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does\nit follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin,\nbecause in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if\nthere be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the\nhuman race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual\nbegetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an\nactual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the\nspecies more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point\nof view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind\nof lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human species.\nAgain, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and\ntherefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous.\nMoreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though\nthe fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same\nway as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are\nChrist's members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to\n1 Cor. 6:17, \"He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.\" Wherefore\nalso spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Can Be Mortal Sin in Touches and Kisses?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and\nkisses. For the Apostle says (Eph. 5:3): \"Fornication and all\nuncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among\nyou, as becometh saints,\" then he adds: \"Or obscenity\" (which a gloss\nrefers to \"kissing and fondling\"), \"or foolish talking\" (as \"soft\nspeeches\"), \"or scurrility\" (which \"fools call geniality--i.e.\njocularity\"), and afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): \"For know ye\nthis and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous\nperson (which is the serving of idols), hath inheritance in the\nkingdom of Christ and of God,\" thus making no further mention of\nobscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore\nthese are not mortal sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being\nprejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and\nupbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or\nblandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never\nbe good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done\nsometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in\nthemselves.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a\nkiss. But according to Matt. 5:28, \"Whosoever shall look on a woman\nto lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his\nheart.\" Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things\nmortal sins.\n\nFurther, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), \"By their\nvery intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their\nembraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither\nhonor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime.\" Therefore by\ndoing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be a mortal sin in two ways.\nFirst, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or\ntouch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is\npossible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being\nthe custom of one's country, or on account of some obligation or\nreasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by\nreason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead\nsomeone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt\nintention. Now it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 8), that it\nis a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the\ndelectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal\nsin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in\nsuch like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the\npleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and\ncaresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are\nmortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful.\nTherefore in so far as they are lustful, they are mortal sins.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these three\nbecause they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had\nmentioned before.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature\nhinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which\nis the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are\nmortally sinful.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument proves that such things are not mortal\nsins in their species.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Nocturnal Pollution Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the\nsame things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit\nwhile he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep\nobtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings 3:2, Par. 1).\nTherefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal\npollution would seem to be a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has\nthe use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently\ndiscuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one\nthing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep,\nso that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a\nsin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot\nact according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is\ninstructed and reproved by God, according to Job 33:15, 16, \"By a\ndream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of\nmen [*Vulg.: 'When deep sleep falleth upon men.' St. Thomas is\napparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly\nabove, Q. 95, A. 6, Obj. 1.] . . . Then He openeth the ears of men,\nand teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn.\" Therefore a\nman, while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and\nthis is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that\nnocturnal pollution is a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): \"When the\nsame image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to\nthe mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish\nthe imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once\nmoved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet\nthere is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore\nthinking about such things while one is awake.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways.\nFirst, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For\nevery sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first\nmovement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far\nas it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of\nreason's judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has\nnot a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not\nregard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they\nwere real, as stated above in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 8, ad 2).\nWherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's\njudgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as neither are the actions\nof a maniac or an imbecile.\n\nSecondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its\ncause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there\nis excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is\ndisintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other\ndisturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the\ndischarge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing\nhappens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that\nphantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed\nin the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a\nsinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal\npollution has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the\nexcess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a\nsinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself\nnor in its cause.\n\nA second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and\nthe inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account\nof some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was\nawake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks\nabout the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while\nsometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of\nconcupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt\nto arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such\npleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul,\nso that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent\nto acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. i, 13) that \"in so far as certain movements in some degree\npass\" from the waking state to the state of sleep, \"the dreams of\ngood men are better than those of any other people\": and Augustine\nsays (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that \"even during sleep, the soul may\nhave conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition.\" Thus it\nis evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its\ncause. On the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution\nensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were\nspeculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful,\nneither in itself nor in its cause.\n\nThe third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the\nwork of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce\nthe aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous\nsin, namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil.\nHence the words of the hymn at even: \"Our enemy repress, that so our\nbodies no uncleanness know\" [*Translation W. K. Blount].\n\nOn the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part,\nand through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the\n_Collationes Patrum_ (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to\nsuffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil\nbrought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy\nCommunion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a\nsin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while\nhe was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is\nfor this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to\nGod (3 Kings 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep,\naccording as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by\nsleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations.\nNevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to\nelicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the First Part (Q.\n84, A. 8, ad 2). Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as\na sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to\nthe same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason\nturning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human\nthought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from\napprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his\nprevious thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through\nDivine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Seduction Should Be Reckoned a Species of Lust?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a\nspecies of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a\nvirgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad\ncan. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried man and an\nunmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction\nshould not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct from fornication.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]):\n\"Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery.\" Now\na species is not contained under another that is differentiated in\nopposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it\nseems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to\ninjustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to\nanother, namely the violated maiden's father, who \"can take the\ninjury as personal to himself\" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue\nthe seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a\nspecies of lust.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Seduction consists properly in the venereal act\nwhereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about\nvenereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.\n\n_I answer that,_ When the matter of a vice has a special deformity,\nwe must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust\nis a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (Q. 153, A.\n1). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who\nis under her father's care: both on the part of the maid, who through\nbeing violated without any previous compact of marriage is both\nhindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to\na wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the\nseal of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her\nguardian, according to Ecclus. 42:11, \"Keep a sure watch over a\nshameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a\nlaughing-stock to thy enemies.\" Therefore it is evident that\nseduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while\nstill under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate species\nof lust.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage,\nshe is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of\nvirginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in\nthat it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not\nsimple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots,\nwomen, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2\nCor. 12: \"And have not done penance for the uncleanness and\nfornication,\" etc.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as\napplicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction,\nin the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man\nand any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding:\n\"Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not.\" In\nthis sense, too, we are to understand the words of Num. 5:13: \"If\n[Vulg.: 'But'] the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by\nwitnesses, because she was not found in adultery (_stupro_).\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity\nthrough being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a\ngreater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the\nconcupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it\nrefrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an\ninjustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the\npart of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is\nnevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to compensation.\nHence it is written (Ex. 22:16, 17): \"If a man seduce a virgin not\nyet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to\nwife. If the maid's father will not give her to him, he shall give\nmoney according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive.\" The\nother injury is done to the maid's father: wherefore the seducer is\nbound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (Deut.\n22:28, 29): \"If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not\nespoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to\njudgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid\nfifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he\nhath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life\":\nand this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, as\nAugustine observes. [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xxxiv.]\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Rape Is a Species of Lust, Distinct from Seduction?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that rape is not a species of lust,\ndistinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that\n\"seduction (_stuprum_), or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful\nintercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption:\nwherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer.\" Therefore it seems\nthat rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from\nseduction.\n\nObj. 2: Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated\nin the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that\n\"rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her\nfather's house that after being violated she may be taken to wife.\"\nBut the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this\nessentially regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems\nthat rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is\nwritten (1 Cor. 7:2): \"For fear of fornication, let every man have\nhis own wife.\" Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it\nwas enacted in the council of Meaux: \"We decree that those who are\nguilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have\nthose women in marriage, although they should have subsequently\nmarried them with the consent of their parents.\" Therefore rape is\nnot a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife\nwithout committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take\nher away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge\nof her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species\nof lust.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore\nstates (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore\nrape is a species of lust.\n\n_I answer that,_ Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a\nspecies of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes\nthere is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.\n\nThey coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate\na virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin\nand towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to\nthe virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by\nforce from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape\ndiffers in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by\nforce from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while\nsometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated,\nbut of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act\nof marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is\nemployed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or\none who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad\nCaesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], \"We abhor abductors\nwhether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of\ntheir crime.\"\n\nThere is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force,\nviolates a virgin unlawfully.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one\nis sometimes used to signify the other.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from the\ngreatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear\nto endanger himself by offering violence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to\nbe judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For\none who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed,\nwho has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that\nis not promised to another must first of all be restored to her\nfather's care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her\nparents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever\nsteals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not\ndissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment\nto its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question,\nit was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated.\nWherefore Jerome [*The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2]\ndeclares the contrary: \"Three kinds of lawful marriage,\" says he,\n\"are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden\ngiven away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a\nman finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge of\nher. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to\nthe father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity [*Cf.\nDeut. 22:23-29]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from\nsuch a man, and is given to another at the father's will.\"\n\nWe may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to\nothers in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words\nin the present tense.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The man who is just married has, in virtue of the\nbetrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by\nusing violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope\nGelasius says [*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: \"This law\nof bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with\nregard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken\naway by force.\"\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Adultery Is Determinate Species of Lust, Distinct from the\nOther Species?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species\nof lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name\nfrom a man having intercourse \"with a woman who is not his own [ad\nalteram],\" according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de\nDivers. lxiii] on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be\nof various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's\ncare, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems\nthat adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: \"It matters not for\nwhat reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the\nPythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is\nan adulterer,\" and in like manner one who is over enamored of any\nwoman. Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore\nadultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be\nreckoned a species of lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there\nwould seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is\nthe same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either\ncase a woman is violated who is under another person's authority.\nTherefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct\nfrom the others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf.\nAppend. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that \"adultery\nis sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of\nthe marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust,\nor with the consent of the other party.\" Now this implies a special\ndeformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of\nlust.\n\n_I answer that,_ Adultery, as its name implies, \"is access to\nanother's marriage-bed (_ad alienum torum_)\" [*Cf. Append. Gratian,\nad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a\ntwofold offense against chastity and the good of human procreation.\nFirst, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage,\nwhich is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children.\nSecondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in\nmarriage, and thus he hinders the good of another's children. The\nsame applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery.\nWherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:32, 33): \"Every woman . . . that\nleaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath\nbeen unfaithful to the law of the Most High\" (since there it is\ncommanded: \"Thou shalt not commit adultery\"); \"and secondly, she hath\noffended against her husband,\" by making it uncertain that the\nchildren are his: \"thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath\ngotten children of another man,\" which is contrary to the good of her\noffspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins,\nwhile the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery.\nHence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust,\nthrough having a special deformity in venereal acts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If a married man has intercourse with another woman,\nhis sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is\nalways adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of\nmarriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse;\nand thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has\nintercourse with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character\nof seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions\naffecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been\nstated above (A. 1) that the species of lust correspond to the\nvarious conditions of women.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human\noffspring, as stated above (A. 2). But adultery is specially opposed\nto matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is\ndue between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a\nlover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her\nindecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be\ncalled an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a\nlover of another woman.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to\nhim in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority, as\none who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery\nis contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of\nseduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ\nspecifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in\nthe Third Part [* Cf. Suppl., Q. 59, A. 3; QQ. 60, 62], when we treat\nof matrimony.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Incest Is a Determinate Species of Lust?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species\nof lust. For incest [* _Incestus_ is equivalent to _in-castus_ =\n\"unchaste\"] takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But\nall kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that\nincest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf.\nAppend. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that \"incest is intercourse between\na man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity.\" Now affinity\ndiffers from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several\nspecies of lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity,\ndoes not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse\nbetween those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not,\nof itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have been\nlawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The species of lust are distinguished according to\nthe various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful\nintercourse. Now incest implies a special condition on the part of\nthe woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by\nconsanguinity or affinity as stated (Obj. 2). Therefore incest is a\ndeterminate species of lust.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 6) wherever we find\nsomething incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there\nmust needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse\nwith women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to\nvenereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a\ncertain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood\nrelations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so\nmuch so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates\n[*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed right for a son to\nbathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now\nfrom what has been said (Q. 142, A. 4; Q. 151, A. 4), it is evident\nthat in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent\nwith respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is\nunseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse.\nThis reason seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where we read: \"She is\nthy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness,\" and the same is\nexpressed further on with regard to others.\n\nThe second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close\ntouch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from\nvenereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very\nfrequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in\nthe Old Law [*Lev. 18] the prohibition was apparently directed\nspecially to those persons who must needs live together.\n\nThe third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many\nfriends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his\nwife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship,\nas though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): \"The demands of charity are most perfectly\nsatisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties\nof friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and\nbecoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one,\nbut each should have one.\"\n\nAristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural\nthat a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to\nthis be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse,\nhis love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive\nto lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that\nincest is a determinate species of lust.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one\nanother would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the\nopportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love,\nas stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between\nsuch persons is called \"incest\" antonomastically.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who is\nrelated by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the\nother, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of\nunbecomingness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary\nto natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by\nblood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and\nimmediately related to one another, since children naturally owe\ntheir parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De\nAnimal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw\nitself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done,\nbecause some animals even have a natural respect for those that have\nbegotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness\nattaching to other persons who are related to one another not\ndirectly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or\nunbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law:\nbecause, as stated above (A. 2), sexual intercourse, being directed\nto the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says\n(De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes\nback to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation\nwhen religion forbade it.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Sacrilege Can Be a Species of Lust?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of\nlust. For the same species is not contained under different genera\nthat are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species\nof irreligion, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 2). Therefore sacrilege\ncannot be reckoned a species of lust.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can.\nLex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are\nreckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species\nof lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done\nby the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not\nreckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice.\nTherefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that \"if it is\nwicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how\nmuch more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds\nof morals!\" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters\nis a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to\noverthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred\nmatters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is\na species of lust.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7), the act of\na virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or\nvice, assumes the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the\nsake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is\nevident that as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of\nchastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of\nreligion, as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity.\nWherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something\npertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species of\nsacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of\nlust.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end,\nbecomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also\na species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which\nare species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a\nspecies of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its\nend, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful\nintercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual\nrelationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse\nwith a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of\nChrist, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her\nfather's authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be\nemployed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil\nlaw punishes more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian\nsays [*Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: \"If any man dare, I will\nnot say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view\nto marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a\nconsecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for\nsexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired\nfor possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may\nalso come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an\ninjury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a\nsacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless,\nsacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to\nchastity for the observance of which certain persons are specially\nconsecrated.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 11]\n\nWhether the Unnatural Vice Is a Species of Lust?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species\nof lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the\nenumeration given above (A. 1, Obj. 1). Therefore it is not a species\nof lust.\n\nObj. 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised\nunder vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but\nunder bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5).\nTherefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.\n\nObj. 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as\nstated above (Q. 153, A. 2): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts\nfrom which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is\nnot a species of lust.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned together with the other species of\nlust (2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: \"And have not done penance for the\nuncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness,\" where a gloss\nsays: \"Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 6, 9) wherever there occurs a\nspecial kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered\nunbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in\ntwo ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is\ncommon to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is\ncontrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the\nhuman race: and this is called \"the unnatural vice.\" This may happen\nin several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any\ncopulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the\nsin of \"uncleanness\" which some call \"effeminacy.\" Secondly, by\ncopulation with a thing of undue species, and this is called\n\"bestiality.\" Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with\nmale, or female with female, as the Apostle states (Rom. 1:27): and\nthis is called the \"vice of sodomy.\" Fourthly, by not observing the\nnatural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to\nother monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are not\ncontrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed\nto human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue,\nand therefore is reducible to the same genus.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but\nvenereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts\nfrom which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought\nin the unnatural vice.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12]\n\nWhether the Unnatural Vice Is the Greatest Sin Among the Species of\nLust?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the\ngreatest sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is\ncontrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and\nrape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary\nto the love of our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other\nperson is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest\namong the species of lust.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most\ngrievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since it\nis injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver\nsin than the unnatural vice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according\nas we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is\ncommitted. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more\nthose persons who are united to him--and such are those whom he\ndefiles by incest--than persons who are not connected with him, and\nwhom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore\nincest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it\nis against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of\nuncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature,\nsince it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and\npatient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow\nthat uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not\ntrue. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins\nof lust.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation\nis from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono\nConjugali, viii.]) that \"of all these,\" namely the sins belonging to\nlust, \"that which is against nature is the worst.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of\nthe principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason\nare those things that are according to nature, because reason\npresupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other\nthings according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in\nspeculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in\nspeculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that\nwhich is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on\nman, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act\nagainst things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the\nunnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by\nnature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in\nthis matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which,\nas stated above (A. 9), is contrary to the natural respect which we\nowe persons related to us.\n\nWith regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression\nmerely of that which is determined by right reason, on the\npresupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more\nagainst reason to make use of the venereal act not only with\nprejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another\nperson besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed\nwithout injustice to another person, is the least grave among the\nspecies of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have intercourse\nwith a woman who is subject to another's authority as regards the act\nof generation, than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore\nadultery is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are\naggravated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver\nthan seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are\naggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (A.\n10, ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man,\nso the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins\ncontrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an\ninjury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says\n(Confess. iii, 8): \"Those foul offenses that are against nature\nshould be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as\nwere those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit,\nthey should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God\nwhich hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For\neven that very intercourse which should be between God and us is\nviolated, when that same nature, of which He is the Author, is\npolluted by the perversity of lust.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as stated\nabove (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of\nsacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and\nmore firm than any subsequently established order.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The nature of the species is more intimately united to\neach individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against\nthe specific nature are more grievous.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing\nthan on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against\nnature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which\nconsists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While the\nmost grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due\nspecies is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gen. 37:2, \"He accused his\nbrethren of a most wicked crime,\" says that \"they copulated with\ncattle.\" After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right\nsex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right\nmanner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the\n\"vas\" than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other\ncircumstances.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 155\n\nOF CONTINENCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the potential parts of temperance:\n(1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we\nmust consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether continence is a virtue?\n\n(2) What is its matter?\n\n(3) What is its subject?\n\n(4) Of its comparison with temperance.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Continence Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For\nspecies and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division.\nBut continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. vii, 1, 9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to\nAugustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19), \"a virtue is a thing that no one\nmakes ill use of.\" Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for\ninstance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing\nit. Therefore continence is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful,\nbut only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23, \"Faith,\nmodesty,\" etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from\nthings that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a\nvirtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus]\nthat \"continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure.\" Therefore\ncontinence is a virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word \"continence\" is taken by various people in\ntwo ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from\nall venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity\n(Gal. 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the\nfirst place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies\nto continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated\nabove (Q. 152, A. 3) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand\ncontinence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires,\nwhich in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes\ncontinence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the\nConferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10, 11). In this way\ncontinence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to\nwit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it\nbe led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature\nof a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to\nreason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in\nthe sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9)\nthat \"continence is not a virtue but a mixture,\" inasmuch as it has\nsomething of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.\n\nIf, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of\ncommendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same\ndivision with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according to\nreason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds (_tenet se_) to\nthat which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself.\nNow whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to\nreason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to\nthat which is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is\nin accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right\nreason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason.\nWherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right\nreason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to\nperverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter\nshould rather be said to be obstinate in evil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense,\nas denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful\ngoods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in\norder to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Desires for Pleasures of Touch Are the Matter of Continence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are\nnot the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46):\n\"General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is\nvirtuous is restrained* in its every action.\" [*\"Continentem\"\naccording to St. Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote \"concinentem =\nharmonious\"].\n\nObj. 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for\nthe good of right reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Now other\npassions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence\nthan the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of\nmortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him\nbehave like a madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore\ncontinence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of\ntouch.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): \"It is\ncontinence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel.\"\nNow cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather\nthan the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10,\n\"Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] (_philargyria_), is the root\nof all evils.\" Therefore continence is not properly about the desires\nfor pleasures of touch.\n\nObj. 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal\nmatters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only\nto the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of\ntouch is not its proper matter.\n\nObj. 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but\nbestial, both as regards food--for instance, the pleasure of eating\nhuman flesh; and as regards venereal matters--for instance the abuse\nof animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as\nstated in _Ethic._ vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch\nare not the proper matter of continence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that\n\"continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance\nand intemperance.\" Now temperance and intemperance are about the\ndesires for pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4).\nTherefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.\n\n_I answer that,_ Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain\ncurbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his\npassions. Hence continence is properly said in reference to those\npassions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein\nit is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing:\nwhereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the\nlike, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is\npraiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as\nstated above (Q. 123, AA. 3, 4). Now it is to be observed that\nnatural inclinations are the principles of all supervening\ninclinations, as stated above (I, Q. 60, A. 2). Wherefore the more\nthey follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the\npassions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines\nchiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the\nmaintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance\nof the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain\nto the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to\ndesires for pleasures of touch.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in\nconnection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter\nwherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly\nspeaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to\ncontain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a\ngeneral sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and\nin this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in\nrelation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude\nimplies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the\npursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the\nsoul--in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured\nhim--rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be\nsaid to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.\n\nReply Obj. 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in\nthemselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of\nnature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as\nbeing continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding\nthat they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor\nand so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general\nsense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a\nrestricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of\nthe palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and\nincontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in\nreference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are\napplicable to both.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it\nregards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that \"if a man were to lay hold of a\nchild with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion\nwhether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent\n[*See A. 4], not absolutely, but relatively.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Subject of Continence Is the Concupiscible Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the\nconcupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be\nproportionate to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence,\nas stated (A. 2), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which\npertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the\nconcupiscible power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Opposites are referred to one same thing\" [*Categ.\nviii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions\novercome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that\n\"incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by\nfollowing which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to\nreason.\" Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason,\nor the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the\nconcupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason,\nfor then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will,\nsince continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor\nagain is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the\npassions of the irascible, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it\nfollows that it is in the concupiscible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Every virtue residing in a certain power removes\nthe evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil\nact of the concupiscible: since \"the continent man has evil desires,\"\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is\nnot in the concupiscible power.\n\n_I answer that,_ Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that\nsubject have a different disposition from that which it has while\nsubjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same\ndisposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent,\nsince in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires.\nWherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible\nas its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both,\nsince both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and\neach of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow\nhis unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to\nbe found in their choice: since the continent man, though subject to\nvehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason;\nwhereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his\nreason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of\nthe soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated\nabove (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures\nof touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is\nin the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them.\nFor this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of\none thing against another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The will stands between reason and the concupiscible,\nand may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the\nreason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible.\nHence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover,\nand incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong\nimmediately to the will as their proper subject.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the passions are not in the will as their\nsubject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it\nis that the will of the continent man resists desires.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Continence Is Better Than Temperance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance.\nFor it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): \"No price is worthy of a continent\nsoul.\" Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater\nthe virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for\nit is written (2 Tim. 2:5): \"He . . . is not crowned, except he\nstrive lawfully,\" and the continent man, since he is subject to\nvehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom\nthese things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater\nvirtue than temperance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the\nconcupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is\nin the concupiscible, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore continence is\na greater virtue than temperance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus\n[*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to\na principal virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), continence has a twofold\nsignification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal\npleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater\nthan temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what\nwe said above (Q. 152, A. 5) concerning the preeminence of virginity\nover chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be\ntaken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when\nthey are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far\ngreater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its\npraise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of\nreason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent\nman, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to\nreason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent\nman the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil\ndesires. Hence continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect\nto the perfect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First\nin reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from\nall things venereal: and thus it means that \"no price is worthy of a\ncontinent soul,\" in the genus of chastity; since not even the\nfruitfulness of the flesh which is the purpose of marriage is\nequalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated\nabove (Q. 152, AA. 4, 5). Secondly it may be understood in reference\nto the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from\nthings unlawful: and thus it means that \"no price is worthy of a\ncontinent soul,\" because its value is not measured with gold or\nsilver, which are appreciable according to weight.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed\nfrom two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because\nsome people by their natural temperament are more prone to\nconcupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which\ninflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for\nothers. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas\nstrength of concupiscence increases it. On the other hand, weakness\nor strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual\ncause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of\nreason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of\nconcupiscence, by reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas\nstrength of concupiscence diminishes it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will is more akin to the reason than the\nconcupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason--on account of\nwhich virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to\nthe will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the\ntemperate man--is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the\nwill, as in the case of one who is continent.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 156\n\nOF INCONTINENCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?\n\n(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?\n\n(3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;\n\n(4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in\ndesire?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Incontinence Pertains to the Soul or to the Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul\nbut to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but\nfrom the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence:\nfor the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described\neither as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence\npertains not to the soul but to the body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from\nthe temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily\ntemperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that \"it is\nespecially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose\nincontinence is one of unbridled desire.\" Therefore incontinence\nregards the body.\n\nObj. 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the\nvanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because \"the flesh\nlusteth against the spirit,\" and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence\npertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the\nsoul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for\nwe ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly\non the part of the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather\nthan to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the\npart of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since\nit is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise\nin the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet\nthese passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient\ncause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so\nlong as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his\npassions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take\naway the use of reason altogether--as in the case of those who become\ninsane through the vehemence of their passions--the essential\nconditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people\ndo not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows\nand the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct\ncause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to\nresist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according\nto the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to\nthe passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is\ncalled \"unbridled incontinence\" or \"impetuosity\": secondly, when a\nman does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding\nweakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is\ncalled \"weakness.\" Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains\nchiefly to the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain\npowers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these\norgans conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are\naccomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the\nintellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from\nthe senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive\nappetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak\ntemperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds\nto, she holds to it weakly; although in rare cases the opposite\noccurs, according to Prov. 31:10, \"Who shall find a valiant woman?\"\nAnd since small and weak things \"are accounted as though they were\nnot\" [*Aristotle, _Phys._ ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as\nthough they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the\ncontrary happens in some women. Hence he states that \"we do not\ndescribe women as being continent, because they are vacillating\"\nthrough being unstable of reason, and \"are easily led\" so that they\nfollow their passions readily.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at\nonce follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the\nimpulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious\npersons [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 5], or from its vehemence, as in the\nmelancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most\nvehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand\nto that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion\nby reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with\nregard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic\ntemperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are\ndue to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not\na sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh\novercomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain\nnegligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Incontinence Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as\nAugustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): \"No man sins in what he cannot\navoid.\" Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to\nWis. 8:21, \"I know [Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be\ncontinent, except God gave it.\" Therefore incontinence is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But\nthe judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore\nincontinence is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man\nbecomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"Paul, through incontinence of\ndivine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I\" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore\nincontinence is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim.\n3:3) where it is written: \"Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful,\" etc.\nTherefore incontinence is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two\nways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus\nincontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as\nintemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Q. 155,\nA. 2). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first,\nbecause the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord\nwith reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures.\nHence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that \"incontinence is\ncensurable not only because it is wrong\"--that is, by straying from\nreason--\"but also because it is wicked\"--that is, by following evil\ndesires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered,\nproperly--inasmuch as it is a straying from reason--but not simply;\nfor instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his\ndesire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in\nthemselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but\nrelatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence (Q.\n155, A. 2, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the\nfact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to\nobserve the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of\nthemselves desirable.\n\nThirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but\nmetaphorically, for instance about the desires for things of which\none cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may\nbe said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because\njust as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even\nso is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with\nreason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the\nperfection of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's\nhelp, according to John 15:5: \"Without Me you can do nothing.\"\nWherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be\ncontinent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in\n_Ethic._ iii, 3, \"what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a\nway, ourselves.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent\nman, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a\ncertain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting\nthe passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not\nproperly.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Incontinent Man Sins More Gravely Than the Intemperate?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely\nthan the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his\nconscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Luke 12:47, \"That\nservant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall\nbe beaten with many stripes.\" Now the incontinent man would seem to\nact against his conscience more than the intemperate because,\naccording to _Ethic._ vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how\nwicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion,\nwhereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good.\nTherefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.\n\nObj. 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable\nit is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave,\nare declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would\nappear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a\nperson's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly\nare no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong,\nand does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate\nman that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be\nadmonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins\nmore gravely than the intemperate.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his\nsin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate,\nsince the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which\nthe intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent\nman sins more gravely than the intemperate.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore\nAugustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12, 13) that \"impenitence is\na sin against the Holy Ghost.\" Now according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. vii, 8) \"the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent,\nfor he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined\nto repentance.\" Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than\nthe incontinent.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin\nis chiefly an act of the will, because \"by the will we sin and live\naright\" [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater\ninclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the\nintemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own\nchoice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas\nin the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a\npassion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is \"a\ndisposition difficult to remove,\" the result is that the incontinent\nman repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so\nthe intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because\nthe sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit.\nWherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14)\nthat \"they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most\nwicked things.\" Hence it follows that \"the intemperate man is much\nworse than the incontinent,\" as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic.\nvii, 7).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the\ninclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the\nignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in\nso far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in\nthe reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and\nthen such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin,\nbecause the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be\ngreater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man,\nignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something,\neither by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the\nintemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the\nintemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards\nduration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only\nwhile the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever\nlasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the\nintemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance\nof the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic\ndisease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect\nthe ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing\nignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some\nparticular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must\nchoose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's\nignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing\ngood, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed.\nHence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7, 8) that \"the incontinent\nman is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best\nprinciple [*_To beltiston, e arche_, 'the best thing, i.e. the\nprinciple'],\" to wit, the right estimate of the end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent\nman, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches\nconcupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of\nadmonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his\ndesires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Q. 142,\nA. 2). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his\ncuring is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part\nof reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end,\nwhich holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now\nit is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to\nthe principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who\nerrs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the\ninclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds\nfrom a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination\nof the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily\nsuppressed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is\ngreater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained\nabove. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite\nis sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin\nexcept through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man\nsins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it.\nHence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the\nintemperate man, \"because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or\nwith calm,\" i.e. slight desire. \"For what would he have done if he\nhad desired it with passion?\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Incontinent in Anger Is Worse Than the Incontinent in Desire?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse\nthan the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to\nresist the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence:\nwherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): \"It is not wonderful,\nindeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and\noverwhelming pleasures or pains.\" Now, \"as Heraclitus says, it is\nmore difficult to resist desire than anger\" [*Ethic. ii. 3].\nTherefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence\nof anger.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be\nso vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the\ncase of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is\nincontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one\nwho is incontinent in desire: since \"anger listens to reason\nsomewhat, but desire does not\" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii,\n6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent\nin desire.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is.\nNow incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it\nleads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more\ngrievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.\nTherefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that\n\"incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of\ndesire.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The sin of incontinence may be considered in two\nways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall\nof reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than\nincontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more\ninordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for\nthis, and the Philosopher indicates them, _Ethic._ vii, 6: First,\nbecause the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the\nangry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates\nthis in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly,\nbecause he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. On the other\nhand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and\nnowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger\nresults more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of\nthe movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by\nbodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than\none who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent:\nwherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who\nare disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the\nchildren of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed\nto concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition\nof the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because\nanger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise\nitself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject\nto concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as\nthough forced by a certain previous displeasure.\n\nSecondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to\nthe evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus\nincontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because\nit leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly\nthan anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it\nis more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as\nthough it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because\nnowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it\nis more disgraceful.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard to its\nresult.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 157\n\nOF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices.\nConcerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?\n\n(2) Whether each of them is a virtue?\n\n(3) Whether each is a part of temperance?\n\n(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Clemency and Meekness Are Absolutely the Same?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely\nthe same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is \"desire of vengeance\" [*Aristotle, Rhet.\nii, 2]. Since, then, clemency \"is leniency of a superior in\ninflicting punishment on an inferior,\" as Seneca states (De Clementia\nii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem\nthat clemency and meekness are the same.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that \"clemency\nis a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when\nunreasonably provoked to hatred of a person,\" so that apparently\nclemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi],\nhatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and\nclemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely\nthe same.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues.\nBut the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and\nclemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are\nabsolutely the same.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca\n(Obj. 1) \"clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior\":\nwhereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each\nto everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the\nsame.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, a moral virtue is\n\"about passions and actions.\" Now internal passions are principles of\nexternal actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore\nvirtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards\nthe same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they\ndiffer specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain\nman from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire\nof money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality\nconcurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from\ntheft. This applies to the case in point; because through the passion\nof anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while\nit belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this\nmight be prevented by excessive anger.\n\nConsequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of\nanger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ\nfrom one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment,\nwhile meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of\nvengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is\napplied externally for the purpose of vengeance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man's affections incline to the moderation of things\nthat are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man\nloving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment\nin itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance\njustice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes\none quick to mitigate punishment--and this pertains to\nclemency--while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this\nreason Tully says that \"the mind provoked to hatred\" that is to\npunish too severely, \"is restrained by clemency,\" from inflicting too\nsevere a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred\nbut punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the\npassion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly\nconcerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in\npunishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that \"those are\ncalled cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in\npunishing.\" Those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake\nmay be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling\nthat leads one man to love another.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Both Clemency and Meekness Are Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a\nvirtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these\nare apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore\nneither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect\" [*Ethic.\nii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease;\nfor clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger.\nTherefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Matt. 5:4) among\nthe beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues\ndiffer from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not\ncomprised under virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): \"Every good man\nis conspicuous for his clemency and meekness.\" Now it is virtue\nproperly that belongs to a good man, since \"virtue it is that makes\nits possessor good, and renders his works good also\" (Ethic. ii, 6).\nTherefore clemency and meekness are virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ The nature of moral virtue consists in the\nsubjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.\ni, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For\nclemency, in mitigating punishment, \"is guided by reason,\" according\nto Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates\nanger according to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 5.\nWherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for\nmeekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the\nexternal infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem\nrather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external\npunishing, as stated above (A. 1). Yet they are not really opposed to\none another, since they are both according to right reason. For\nseverity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right\nreason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also\naccording to right reason, when and where this is requisite.\nWherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about\nthe same thing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), \"the habit\nthat observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is\ndenominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the\nname of meekness.\" For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to\nexcess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for\ninjuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since\n\"scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself,\" as Sallust\nobserves [*Cf. Q. 120]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not\nin respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards\nthat which is according to common law, which is the object of legal\njustice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it\nmitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to\nbe punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1):\n\"Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets\nfree are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission\nof punishment due amounts to a pardon.\" Wherefore it is clear that\nclemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek _epieikeia_\n[*Cf. Q. 120]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as\nregards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet\nclemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A. 3, ad\n1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are\ndelights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being\nreckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Aforesaid Virtues Are Parts of Temperance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts\nof temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above (A.\n2). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which\npertains to justice, as stated above (Q. 120, A. 2). Therefore\nseemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas\nmeekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and\nvengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): \"A man may be said\nto be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty.\" Now this is\nopposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is\nopposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of\nprudence rather than of temperance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that \"clemency is\ntemperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge.\"\nTully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of\ntemperance.\n\n_I answer that,_ Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so\nfar as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode\nwhence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the\nmode and name of justice consist in a certain _equality,_ those of\nfortitude in a certain _strength of mind,_ those of temperance in a\ncertain _restraint,_ inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement\nconcupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness\nlikewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates\npunishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (AA. 1,\n2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as\nprincipal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation of\npunishment. One is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance\nwith the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter\nof the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other\npoint is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that\nhe does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs\nproperly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that\n\"it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking\nrevenge.\" This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of\ndisposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful\nto another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that \"clemency\nis a certain smoothness of the soul\"; for, on the other hand, there\nwould seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to\npain others.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues\ndepends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form\nof the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency\nagree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not\nin matter.\n\nReply Obj. 3: _Unsoundness_ is corruption of _soundness._ Now just as\nsoundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition\ndue to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind\nlapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs\nboth in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason,\nand in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that\nhumane feeling whereby \"every man is naturally friendly towards all\nother men\" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes\nthe use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes\npleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind,\nis because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane\nfeeling which gives rise to clemency.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Clemency and Meekness Are the Greatest Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the\ngreatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because\nit directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God.\nNow meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is\nwritten (James 1:21): \"With meekness receive the ingrafted word,\" and\n(Ecclus. 5:13): \"Be meek to hear the word\" of God. Again, Dionysius\nsays (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that \"Moses was deemed worthy of the\nDivine apparition on account of his great meekness.\" Therefore\nmeekness is the greatest of virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as\nit is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be\nmost acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34, 35): \"That\nwhich is agreeable\" to God is \"faith and meekness\"; wherefore Christ\nexpressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Matt. 11:29),\nwhere He says: \"Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart\";\nand Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that \"Christ dwells\nin us by our meekness of soul.\" Again, it is most acceptable to men;\nwherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): \"My son, do thy works in\nmeekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men\": for\nwhich reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King's\n\"throne is strengthened by clemency.\" Therefore meekness and clemency\nare the greatest of virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that\n\"the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but\novercome evil by good.\" Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety\nwhich would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of\nAmbrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, \"Piety [Douay:\n'Godliness'] is profitable to all things,\" observes that \"piety is\nthe sum total of the Christian religion.\" Therefore meekness and\nclemency are the greatest virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but\nare annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain virtues from being\ngreatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a\nparticular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be\nabsolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the\nfact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or\npunishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil.\nWherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise\nprudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely\ngreater virtues than clemency and meekness.\n\nYet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain\nrestricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil\ninclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on\naccount of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free\njudgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man\nself-possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): \"My son, keep\nthy soul in meekness.\" Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of\ntouch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which\nreason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as\nstated above (Q. 141, A. 7, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it\nmitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity,\nthe greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our\nneighbor, and hinder his evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by\nremoving an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes\nman self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above;\nsecondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not\ncontradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed\nby anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): \"To be\nmeek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it\ncondemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know\nbetter and have a clearer insight of the truth.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and\nmen, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the\nvirtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our\nneighbor's evils.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency\nby concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our\nneighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety\nrelieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for\ninstance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil,\nbecause this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon\nit as affecting oneself, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 2): and this\nresults from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for\nthe same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to\nvengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far\nas it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 158\n\nOF ANGER\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed\nto meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning\nanger there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?\n\n(2) Whether anger is a sin?\n\n(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?\n\n(5) Of its species;\n\n(6) Whether anger is a capital vice?\n\n(7) Of its daughters;\n\n(8) Whether it has a contrary vice?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Be Angry?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For\nJerome in his exposition on Matt. 5:22, \"Whosoever is angry with his\nbrother,\" etc. says: \"Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in\nthe genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is\nforbidden altogether.\" Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) \"The soul's\nevil is to be without reason.\" Now anger is always without reason:\nfor the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that \"anger does not listen\nperfectly to reason\"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that \"when\nanger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends\nit by its riot\"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): \"From\nwhatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the\neye of the mind.\" Therefore it is always evil to be angry.\n\nObj. 3: Further, anger is \"desire for vengeance\" [*Aristotle, Rhet.\nii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, \"Thou shalt not hate thy\nbrother in thy heart.\" Now it would seem unlawful to desire\nvengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Deut.\n32:35, \"Revenge is Mine.\" Therefore it would seem that to be angry is\nalways an evil.\n\nObj. 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is\nevil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since\nGod judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be\nangry is always an evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum,\nfalsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: \"He that is angry\nwithout cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause,\nshall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless,\njudgments unstable, crimes unchecked.\" Therefore to be angry is not\nalways an evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ Properly speaking anger is a passion of the\nsensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 46, A. 1) when we were treating of the\npassions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be\nobserved that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason\nof the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's\nobject. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since\nit is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in\nitself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks\n(Ethic. ii, 6), \"the very mention of envy denotes something evil.\"\nNow this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge,\nsince revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is\nfound in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that is in\nrespect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in\nanger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason\ndemands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's\nanger is deserving of praise.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions\nas emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they\ndeemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above\n(I-II, Q. 24, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. It is in\nthis sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger\nwhereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing\nhim a wrong.--But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion\nAugustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions\nof the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be\nmoderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not\nalways evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First,\nantecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and\nhas therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch\nas the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice\nand in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called\n\"zealous anger.\" Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): \"We must\nbeware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it\noverrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of\nfollowing in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey.\"\nThis latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason\nin the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of\nreason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that \"zealous anger\ntroubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it.\" Nor is\nit incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be\ninterrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since\nart also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about\nwhat has to be done, while having to act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil\nto the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire\nvengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to\nthis the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved\nthereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with\nthe order of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to\npunish \"is God's minister,\" as stated in Rom. 13:4.\n\nReply Obj. 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for\ngood; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our\ndesire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the\nmovement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.\nv, 45) that \"anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it\nbows to the command of reason.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Anger Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by\nsinning. But \"we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do\nwe incur blame thereby,\" as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5. Consequently no\npassion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above (I-II, Q.\n46, A. 1) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a\nsin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable\ngood. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to\na person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"No man sins in what he cannot avoid,\" as Augustine\nasserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a\ngloss on Ps. 4:5, \"Be ye angry and sin not,\" says: \"The movement of\nanger is not in our power.\" Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic.\nvii, 6) that \"the angry man acts with displeasure.\" Now displeasure\nis contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene\n[*De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to\nbe angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible;\nwherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that\n\"to be angry is the property of man.\" Therefore it is not a sin to be\nangry.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): \"Let all indignation\nand anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from\nyou.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Anger, as stated above (A. 1), is properly the name\nof a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far\nas it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order\nof reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be\nconsidered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the\nappetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore\nif one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of\nreason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called \"zealous\nanger\" [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire\nthe taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of\nreason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not\ndeserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order\nprescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of\njustice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will\nbe sinful, and this is called sinful anger.\n\nSecondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in\nrelation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of\nanger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor\nexternally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack\nsin, even though just vengeance be desired.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated\nby reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not\ninclude the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as\nregulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of\npraise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may\nbe demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. ii, 5) that \"it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is\npraised or blamed.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its\nown sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite\nturns as to a mutable good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment of\nhis reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that\njudgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e.\nso that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each\none, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger\nis not in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement\narise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not\nentirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the\nPhilosopher that \"the angry man acts with displeasure,\" means that he\nis displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he\ndeems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to\nseek vengeance.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his\nreason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in\naccord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is\ncontrary to man's nature.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 3]\n\nWhether All Anger Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is\nwritten (Job 5:2): \"Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: 'Anger\nindeed killeth the foolish'],\" and he speaks of the spiritual killing,\nwhence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal\ncondemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord\nsaid (Matt. 5:22): \"Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in\ndanger of the judgment\": and a gloss on this passage says that \"the\nthree things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and\nhell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state\nof eternal damnation corresponding to various sins.\" Therefore anger\nis a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin.\nNow anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in his\ncommentary on Matt. 5:22, \"Whosoever is angry with his brother,\" etc.\nwhere he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor.\nTherefore anger is a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 4:5, \"Be ye angry and sin not,\"\nsays: \"Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful\nin two ways, as stated above (A. 2). First, on the part of the\nappetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger\nis a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to\ncharity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a\nvenial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This\nimperfection is considered either in relation to the subject desirous\nof vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment\nof his reason; or in relation to the desired object, as when one\ndesires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of\nno account, so that even if one proceeded to action, it would not be\na mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair,\nor by some other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may be\ninordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too\nfiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of\nanger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point of its\ngenus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through\nthe fierceness of his anger a man fall away from the love of God and\nhis neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that all\nanger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by\nanger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their\nreason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God\nor by doing injury to their neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the\nwords of the Law: \"Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the\njudgment\" (Matt. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the\nmovement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave\ninjury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to\nthis desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a\nmortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have\nsaid.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Anger Is the Most Grievous Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For\nChrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that \"nothing is more\nrepulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a\nruthless* face, and most of all than a cruel soul.\" [*_Severo_. The\ncorrect text is _Si vero._ The translation would then run thus . . .\n\"and nothing uglier.\" And if his \"face is ugly, how much uglier is\nhis soul!\"]. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem\nto be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), \"a thing is\nsaid to be evil because it hurts.\" Now anger is most hurtful, because\nit deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for\nChrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that \"anger differs in no way\nfrom madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome\nthan one harassed by a demon.\" Therefore anger is the most grievous\nsin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their\noutward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most\ngrievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the\nbeam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): \"Lest anger grow\ninto hatred and a mote become a beam.\" Therefore anger is not the\nmost grievous sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the inordinateness of\nanger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an\nundue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to\nthe appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the\nleast of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some\nperson, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the\npart of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those\nsins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred;\nbut while hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the\nenvious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory,\nthe angry man desires another's evil under the aspect of just\nrevenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than\nenvy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an\nevil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as\nhonor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On\nthe part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires\nan evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a\ngood. In this respect again, absolutely speaking, the sin of anger is\napparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the\ngood of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the\npleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of\nconcupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that\n\"the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent\nin anger.\"\n\nOn the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of\nbeing angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on\naccount of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to\nProv. 27:4, \"Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth:\nand who can bear the violence of one provoked?\" Hence Gregory says\n(Moral. v, 45): \"The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is\nconvulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the face\nis inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those\nwhom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense\nin its utterance.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the\noutward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement of\nanger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from\nanger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the\naspect of justice, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Philosopher Suitably Assigns the Species of Anger?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably\nassigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some\nangry persons are \"choleric,\" some \"sullen,\" and some \"ill-tempered\"\nor \"stern.\" According to him, a person is said to be \"sullen\" whose\nanger \"is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time.\" But this\napparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems\nthat anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the\nother circumstances.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that \"ill-tempered\" or\n\"stern\" persons \"are those whose anger is not appeased without\nrevenge, or punishment.\" Now this also pertains to the\nunquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is\nthe same as bitterness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He\nsays (Matt. 5:22): \"Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in\ndanger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca,\nshall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say\" to his\nbrother, \"Thou fool.\" But these degrees are not referable to the\naforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of\nanger is not fitting.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi]\nsays \"there are three species of irascibility,\" namely, \"the anger\nwhich is called wrath [*_Fellea,_ i.e. like gall. But in I-II, Q.\n46, A. 8, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has _Cholos_ which we\nrender 'wrath'],\" and \"ill-will\" which is a disease of the mind, and\n\"rancour.\" Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid.\nFor \"wrath\" he describes as \"having beginning and movement,\" and the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to \"choleric\" persons:\n\"ill-will\" he describes as \"an anger that endures and grows old,\" and\nthis the Philosopher ascribes to \"sullenness\"; while he describes\n\"rancour\" as \"reckoning the time for vengeance,\" which tallies with\nthe Philosopher's description of the \"ill-tempered.\" The same\ndivision is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the\naforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.\n\n_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to\nthe passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated\nwhen treating of the passions (I-II, Q. 46, A. 8) how it is to be\napplied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is\nchiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here,\nhowever, we have to take the distinction of these species in its\napplication to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.\n\nFor the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two\nthings. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards\n\"choleric\" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight\ncause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger\nendures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way,\nbecause the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too\nlong in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a\nlasting displeasure, wherefore he is \"grievous\" and \"sullen\" to\nhimself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a\nman seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to \"ill-tempered\" or\n\"stern\" people, who do not put aside their anger until they have\ninflicted punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his\npertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the\naforesaid species.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Both \"sullen\" and \"ill-tempered\" people have a\nlong-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a \"sullen\" person\nhas an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he\nholds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the\noutward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does\nhe of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear\naway with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger\nof \"ill-tempered\" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense\ndesire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can\nbe quelled only by revenge.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer\nto the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of\nthe human act [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 8, Obj. 3]. For the first degree\nis an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: \"Whosoever\nis angry with his brother.\" The second degree is when the anger is\nmanifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect;\nand in reference to this He says: \"Whosoever shall say to his\nbrother, Raca!\" which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is\nwhen the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the\neffect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and\nthe least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in\nreference to this He says: \"Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou\nfool!\" Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first,\nand the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal\nsin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A. 3, ad\n2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation\nis assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case\n\"judgment\" is assigned, and this is the least severe, for as\nAugustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], \"where judgment is to be\ndelivered, there is an opportunity for defense\": in the second case\n\"council\" is assigned, \"whereby the judges deliberate together on the\npunishment to be inflicted\": to the third case is assigned\n\"hell-fire,\" i.e. \"decisive condemnation.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Anger Should Be Reckoned Among the Capital Vices?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among\nthe capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice\nknown by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a\ncapital vice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it\nshould be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, \"An angry [Douay:\n'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels,\" says: \"Anger is the door to\nall vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the\nvirtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime.\" Now no\ncapital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite\nones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the\ncapital vices.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3, 4), a capital\nvice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two\nreasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on\nthe part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability,\nin so far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*,\nwhich is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (A. 4).\n[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with\nmoral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q. 145, A. 1.]\nThe second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates\nthe mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident\nthat anger is a capital vice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most\npart, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results\nfrom an injury inflicted.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 118, A. 7; Q. 148, A. 5; Q. 153, A.\n4; I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to\nhave a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through\nthe desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of\ngood, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter\ndesires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a\ncapital vice than hatred is.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices\naccidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the\njudgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is,\nhowever, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called\nits daughters.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Six Daughters Are Fittingly Assigned to Anger?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly\nassigned to anger, namely \"quarreling, swelling of the mind,\ncontumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy.\" For blasphemy is\nreckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of\npride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger.\n\nObj. 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his\nrule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of\nanger.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"a swollen mind\" would seem to be the same as pride.\nNow pride is not the daughter of a vice, but \"the mother of all\nvices,\" as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of\nthe mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters\nto anger.\n\n_I answer that,_ Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as\nconsisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. One is on\nthe part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems\nunworthy (_indignum_) of acting thus towards him, and this is called\n\"indignation.\" The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in\nso far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like\nthoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, \"Will a wise\nman . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?\" And thus we have\n\"swelling of the mind.\"\n\nSecondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a\ntwofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his\nanger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A. 5, ad 3) of the\nman who says to his brother, \"Raca\": and this refers to \"clamor,\"\nwhich denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is\nwhen a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against\nGod, it is \"blasphemy,\" if against one's neighbor, it is \"contumely.\"\n\nThirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus\nanger gives rise to \"quarrels,\" by which we are to understand all\nmanner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately\nproceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God:\nsince, according to Ecclus. 10:14, \"the beginning of the pride of man\nis to fall off from God,\" i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is\nthe first part of pride [*Cf. Q. 162, A. 7, ad 2]; and this gives\nrise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out\nthrough a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a\nprevious cause, from which it arises more directly, namely\ndispleasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure.\nNow through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes\nto hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from\nsloth rather than from anger.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical\nwith pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take\nvengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 8]\n\nWhether There Is a Vice Opposed to Anger Resulting from Lack of Anger?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is not a vice opposed to anger,\nresulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now\nby being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who\njudges \"with tranquillity\" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is\nnot a vice to be altogether without anger.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless.\nBut the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves\nin the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it\nseems that lack of anger is not a vice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), \"man's evil\nis to be without reason.\" Now the judgment of reason remains\nunimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack\nof anger amounts to a vice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus\nImperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: \"He who\nis not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable\npatience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and\nincites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as\na simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not\nthrough passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus\nwithout doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which\nanger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in\nMatth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John\nChrysostom): \"Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment.\nFor anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion\": and\nwhen a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion:\nwherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger\nis taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with\npassion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a\nnecessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the\nlower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher\nappetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in\nthe sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the\nmovement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack\nof the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement\nin the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be\nangry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's\npunishing by judgment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of the\nsensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt\nexecution [*Cf. I-II, Q. 24, A. 3] of reason's dictate: else, the\nsensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas \"nature\ndoes nothing without purpose\" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].\n\nReply Obj. 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his\nreason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also\nof the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore\njust as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is\nremoved, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason\nis lacking.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 159\n\nOF CRUELTY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?\n\n(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 159, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Cruelty Is Opposed to Clemency?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency.\nFor Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that \"those are said to be cruel\nwho exceed in punishing,\" which is contrary to justice. Now clemency\nis reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore\napparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): \"They are cruel, and will\nhave no mercy\"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now\nmercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 4, ad\n3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.\n\nObj. 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of\npunishment, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 1): whereas cruelty applies\nto the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17, \"But he\nthat is cruel casteth off even his own kindred.\" Therefore cruelty is\nnot opposed to clemency.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that \"the\nopposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness\nof heart in exacting punishment.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Cruelty apparently takes its name from _cruditas_\n(rawness). Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to\nhave an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a\ndisagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (Q. 157,\nA. 3, ad 1; A. 4, ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or\nsweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment.\nHence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment\naccording to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one\nto this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards\nthe external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the\nhardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment,\nbelongs to cruelty.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both\nshun and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For\nit belongs to mercy [*Cf. Q. 30, A. 1] to relieve another's\nunhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to\nmitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And\nsince cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more\ndirectly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the\nmutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for\nmercilessness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which\nis lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of\nbeneficence is in itself a punishment.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 159, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Cruelty Differs from Savagery or Brutality?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or\nbrutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one\nvirtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way\nof excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the\nsame.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that \"severity is as it were\nsavagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending\nto piety\": so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of\npunishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now\nthis has been stated to belong to cruelty (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore\ncruelty is the same as savagery.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way\nof excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,\nwhich latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to\nthe vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to\ndeficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission\nor laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): \"Let there be love, but\nnot that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury,\nlet there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety\nwithout undue clemency.\" Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that \"a man who\nis angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is\nnot said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ \"Savagery\" and \"brutality\" take their names from a\nlikeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For\nanimals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and\nnot for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to\nreason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery\napplies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a\ndefault of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive\nfrom a man's torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised\nunder bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial,\nand resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt\nnature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not\nonly regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the\nmode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or\nbrutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in\n_Ethic._ vii, 5.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed\nto it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or\nbrutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly\nopposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls \"heroic\" or \"god-like,\" which\naccording to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy\nGhost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to\nthe gift of piety.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because\nthis implies a vice; but he is said to be \"savage as regards the\ntruth,\" on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined\nto mitigate punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it\ndisregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished\non account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other\nhand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission\nof punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 160\n\nOF MODESTY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of\nits species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?\n\n(2) What is the matter of modesty?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Modesty Is a Part of Temperance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance.\nFor modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every\nvirtue: since virtue is directed to good; and \"good,\" according to\nAugustine (De Nat. Boni 3), \"consists in mode, species, and order.\"\nTherefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be\nreckoned a part of temperance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise\nchiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its\nname. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its\nparts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our\nneighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24, 25, \"The servant of the Lord must\nnot wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty\nadmonishing them that resist the truth.\" Now admonishing wrong-doers\nis an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 1).\nTherefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of\ntemperance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as\na part of temperance.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4; Q. 157, A. 3),\ntemperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most\ndifficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of\ntouch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of\nvery great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters\nof lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by\nthe virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above (Q.\n134, A. 3, ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure,\nthere is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with\nordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate\nother lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This\nvirtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its\nprincipal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes\nappropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of\nangel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way,\nmode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially\nappropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest\nthings.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some things need tempering on account of their\nstrength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in\nall things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong\npassions, and modesty about weaker passions.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation\nwhich is necessary in all virtues.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Modesty Is Only About Outward Actions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward\nactions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to\nother persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): \"Let your modesty\nbe known to all men.\" Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are\ndistinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is\nseemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it\nwill not be concerned with inward passions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining\nto the appetite--which is proper to the moral virtues--and about\nthings pertaining to knowledge--which is proper to the intellectual\nvirtues--and again about things pertaining to the irascible and\nconcupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it\ncannot be about all these things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In all these things it is necessary to observe the\n\"mode\" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all\nof them.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), modesty differs from\ntemperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where\nrestraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that\npresent less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various\nopinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of\ngood or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the\nprovince of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is\nclear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a\nspecial difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from\nmodesty.\n\nIn addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)\nconsidered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of\npunishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held\nmodesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require\nmoderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. One is the movement of\nthe mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by\n_humility._ The second is the desire of things pertaining to\nknowledge, and this is moderated by _studiousness_ which is opposed\nto curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which\nrequire to be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1],\nwhether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show,\nfor instance in dress and the like.\n\nTo some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed\ncertain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions\n\"meekness, simplicity, humility,\" and other kindred virtues, of which\nwe have spoken above (Q. 143); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7)\nassigned _eutrapelia_ to pleasures in games, as stated above (I-II,\nQ. 60, A. 5). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by\nTully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also\ninward actions.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals.\nNevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain\noutward signs.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities are\ncomprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from\nregarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not\nso great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there\nis between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which\nis about passions, because in actions and passions that present no\ngreat difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of\nmoderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of\nmoderation.\n\nWherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 161\n\nOF HUMILITY\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride\nwhich is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite,\nCuriosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as\naffecting outward attire.\n\nConcerning humility there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether humility is a virtue?\n\n(2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?\n\n(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?\n\n(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?\n\n(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;\n\n(6) Of the degrees of humility.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Humility Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue\nconveys the notion of a good. But humility conveys the notion of a\npenal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, \"They humbled his feet in\nfetters.\" Therefore humility is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility\nseemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23): \"There\nis one that humbleth himself wickedly.\" Therefore humility is not a\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility\nis apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at\ngreat things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem\nthat humility is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 4: Further, virtue is \"the disposition of that which is perfect\"\n(Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the\nimperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be\nsubject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions,\naccording to _Ethic._ ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the\nPhilosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it\ncomprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would\nseem not to be a virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Origen commenting on Luke 1:48, \"He hath regarded\nthe humility of His handmaid,\" says (Hom. viii in Luc.): \"One of the\nvirtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our\nSaviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2) when we were\ntreating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive\nto the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something\nrepulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In\nrespect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in\nrespect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been\nstated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 2) that for those appetitive movements\nwhich are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a\nmoderating and restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a\nkind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a\nmoral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold\nvirtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper\nand restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and\nthis belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the\nmind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things\naccording to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is\nevident that humility is a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), \"a humble man is so\ncalled because he is, as it were, _humo acclinis\"_ [*Literally, \"bent\nto the ground\"], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen\nin two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when\none is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment.\nSecondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done\nsometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own\nfailings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus\nAbraham said to the Lord (Gen. 18:27), \"I will speak to my Lord,\nwhereas I am dust and ashes.\" In this way humility is a virtue.\nSometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, \"not\nunderstanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and\nbecomes like to them\" (Ps. 48:13).\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a\nvirtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the\nlowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs\nand pretense: wherefore this is \"false humility,\" of which Augustine\nsays in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is \"grievous pride,\" since to\nwit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however,\nthis is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way,\nproperly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does\nnot consist in externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the\nmind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great\nthings against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to\ngreat things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that\nmagnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,\nthat each is according to right reason.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First\nabsolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature\nnor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To\nHim humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only\nas regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be\nperfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature\nor state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in\ncomparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the\nword of Isa. 40:17, \"All nations are before Him as if they had no\nbeing at all.\" In this way humility may be competent to every man.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as\ndirected to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another\nis defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is\na matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special\nvirtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake\nhe humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Humility Has to Do with the Appetite?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite\nbut the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now\npride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says\n(Moral. xxxiv, 22) that \"pride, when it extends outwardly to the\nbody, is first of all shown in the eyes\": wherefore it is written\n(Ps. 130:1), \"Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty.\"\nNow eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem\nthat humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks\nlittle of oneself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that \"almost the\nwhole of Christian teaching is humility.\" Consequently nothing\ncontained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now\nChristian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according\nto 1 Cor. 12:31, \"Be zealous for the better gifts.\" Therefore it\nbelongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things\nbut the estimate thereof.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain\nexcessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive\nwithdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul\nagainst fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against\nthe difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore\nif humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow\nthat humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is\nevidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire\nbut with the estimate of great things.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to\noutward show; for he says that humility is \"the habit of avoiding\nexcessive expenditure and parade.\" Therefore it is not concerned with\nthe movement of the appetite.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that\n\"the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of\nthe Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners.\" But choice\nconcerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite\nrather than with the estimative power.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs properly to\nhumility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that\nwhich is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion\nto that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own\ndeficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite.\nNevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and\nconsequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking,\nmoderates the movement of the appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes\nrespect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially\nwont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves\nwith others. But it does not follow from this that humility is\nessentially concerned with knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things\nthrough confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things\nthrough confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility;\nespecially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is\none exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi):\n\"It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise\noneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He\nraiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth\ndown.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining\ndaring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason\nin both cases is that man should set the good of reason before\ndangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope\nwhich pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for\nstrengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for\nstrengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's\nproper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good\nwhich was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing\npresumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man\nought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him\naccording to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore\nhumility would seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to\nGod; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4)\nascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the\ngift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the\nrelation of fortitude to daring differs from that of humility to\nhope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so\nthat excess of daring is more like fortitude than lack of daring is.\nOn the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self\nmore than it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more\nopposed to humility than lack of confidence is.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be\ndone with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility.\nAccordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals,\nas signs of the inward movement of the appetite.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 3]\n\nWhether One Ought, by Humility, to Subject Oneself to All Men?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to\nsubject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3),\nhumility consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought\nnot to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with\nall acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not\nto subject oneself to man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv): \"Humility\nshould take the part of truth, not of falsehood.\" Now some men are of\nthe highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves\nto their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject\noneself to all men.\n\nObj. 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the\ndetriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject\nhimself to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to\nwhom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise\nthe other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): \"Lest through\nexcessive humility the superior lose his authority.\" Therefore a man\nought not, by humility, to subject himself to all.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:3): \"In humility, let each\nesteem others better than themselves.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We may consider two things in man, namely that which\nis God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is\nman's: but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is\nGod's, according to the saying of Osee 13:9, \"Destruction is thy own,\nO Israel; thy help is only in Me.\" Now humility, as stated above (A.\n1, ad 5; A. 2, ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is\nsubject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his\nown, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that\nwhich the latter has of God's: but humility does not require a man to\nsubject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in\nanother. For those who have a share of God's gifts know that they\nhave them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: \"That we may know the things\nthat are given us from God.\" Wherefore without prejudice to humility\nthey may set the gifts they have received from God above those that\nothers appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph.\n3:5): \"(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it\nis now revealed to His holy apostles.\" In like manner, humility does\nnot require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that\nwhich his neighbor has of man's: otherwise each one would have to\nesteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle\nsays without prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): \"We by nature are\nJews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners.\" Nevertheless a man may\nesteem his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or\nhimself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which,\nhe may subject himself to him with humility.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that\nwhich is His in each one, although not with the same measure of\nreverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves\nwith humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 1\nPet. 2:13, \"Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's\nsake\"; but to God alone do we owe the worship of latria.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If we set what our neighbor has of God's above that\nwhich we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a\ngloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, \"Esteem\nothers better than themselves,\" says: \"We must not esteem by\npretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for\nanother person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he\nis better than we are, although our own good whereby we are\napparently better than he, be not hidden.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly\nin the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may\nsubject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion\nof detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means\nin his Rule (Ep. ccxi): \"With fear, the superior should prostrate\nhimself at your feet in the sight of God.\" On the other hand, due\nmoderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as\nof other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If,\nhowever, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an\noccasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with\nhumility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Humility Is a Part of Modesty or Temperance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or\ntemperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is\nsubject to God, as stated above (A. 3). Now it belongs to a\ntheological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility\nshould be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of\ntemperance or modesty.\n\nObj. 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility\nwould seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to\nit, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently\nhumility is not a part of temperance or modesty.\n\nObj. 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object,\nas stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not\nof temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 5).\nTherefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or\nmodesty.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): \"If thou wilt\nhear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the\nphilosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as\nwhat they called _metriotes_, i.e. measure or moderation.\" Now this\nevidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a\npart of modesty or temperance.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3,\nad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the\nlikeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of\ntemperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or\nsuppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues\nrestrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity\nof the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as\nmeekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress\nthe movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at\ngreat things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part\nof temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says\nthat a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not\nmagnanimous but \"temperate,\" and such a man we may call humble.\nMoreover, for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2), among the\nvarious parts of temperance, the one under which humility is\ncomprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,\n54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of\nspirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 3:4): \"In the\nincorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last end,\nwhich is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes\nof all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by\nreverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or\ntemperance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a\nsameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated\nabove (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2). Consequently,\nalthough humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned\nas a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter,\nthey differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a\npart of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Humility Is the Greatest of the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the\nvirtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the\npublican (Luke 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that \"if\nhumility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it\novertakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it\nnot reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the\nangels by the judgment seat of God.\" Hence it is clear that humility\nis set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all\nthe virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C.\n1]): \"Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality?\nAttend first of all to the foundation of humility.\" Now this would\nseem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue.\nTherefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now\nthe greatest reward is due to humility, since \"he that humbleth\nhimself shall be exalted\" (Luke 14:11). Therefore humility is the\ngreatest of virtues.\n\nObj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16),\n\"Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through\nthe human nature which He assumed.\" Now He especially proposed His\nhumility for our example, saying (Matt. 11:29): \"Learn of Me, because\nI am meek and humble of heart.\" Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii,\n1) that the \"lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption\nis the humility of God.\" Therefore humility would seem to be the\ngreatest of virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Charity is set above all the virtues, according to\nCol. 3:14, \"Above all . . . things have charity.\" Therefore humility\nis not the greatest of virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ The good of human virtue pertains to the order of\nreason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end:\nwherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have\nthe last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered\nin reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance,\nas to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but\nby participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and\nthis ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice.\nNow humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and\nin all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some\nspecial matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the\nintellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after\njustice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before that\njustice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even\nso, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is\nsaid of the publican (Luke 18:14) that through the merit of his\nhumility \"he went down into his house justified.\" Hence Chrysostom\nsays [*De incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: \"Bring me a pair of two-horse\nchariots: in the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin\nwith humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not\nby its own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see the\nother pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight\nand size of pride.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason\nof a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which is\nthe first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the\nfoundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now\nthe virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in\nthe acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way\nof removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place,\ninasmuch as it expels pride, which \"God resisteth,\" and makes man\nsubmissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence\nit is written (James 4:6): \"God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace\nto the humble.\" In this sense humility is said to be the foundation\nof the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues\ndirectly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first\nstep towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, \"He that cometh\nto God must believe.\" In this sense faith is the foundation in a more\nexcellent way than humility.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things\nare promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who\ndespise earthly riches, according to Matt. 6:19, 20, \"Lay not up to\nyourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves\ntreasures in heaven.\" Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to\nthose who despise worldly joys, according to Matt. 4:5, \"Blessed are\nthey that mourn, for they shall be comforted.\" In the same way\nspiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone\nmerits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly\nuplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]):\n\"Think not that he who humbles himself remains for ever abased, for\nit is written: 'He shall be exalted.' And do not imagine that his\nexaltation in men's eyes is effected by bodily uplifting.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us,\nwas because it especially removes the obstacle to man's spiritual\nwelfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things,\nin which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly\nthings. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our\nspiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that\noutward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were,\na disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine\ngoods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so\ncharity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are\ngreater than humility.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Twelve Degrees of Humility Are Fittingly Distinguished in the\nRule of the Blessed Benedict?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that\nare set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives\nthese degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict]\nare unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be \"humble not only in\nheart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on\nthe ground\"; the second is \"to speak few and sensible words, and not\nto be loud of voice\"; the third is \"not to be easily moved, and\ndisposed to laughter\"; the fourth is \"to maintain silence until one\nis asked\"; the fifth is \"to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by\nthe common rule of the monastery\"; the sixth is \"to believe and\nacknowledge oneself viler than all\"; the seventh is \"to think oneself\nworthless and unprofitable for all purposes\"; the eighth is \"to\nconfess one's sin\"; the ninth is \"to embrace patience by obeying\nunder difficult and contrary circumstances\"; the tenth is \"to subject\noneself to a superior\"; the eleventh is \"not to delight in fulfilling\none's own desires\"; the twelfth is \"to fear God and to be always\nmindful of everything that God has commanded.\" For among these there\nare some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience\nand patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false\nopinion--and this is inconsistent with any virtue--namely to declare\noneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe\noneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these\nare unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility.\n\nObj. 2: Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do\nother virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which\nconcern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which\npertain to inward actions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of\nhumility, the first of which is \"to acknowledge oneself\ncontemptible\"; the second, \"to grieve for this\"; the third, \"to\nconfess it\"; the fourth, \"to convince others of this, that is to wish\nthem to believe it\"; the fifth, \"to bear patiently that this be said\nof us\"; the sixth, \"to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt\";\nthe seventh, \"to love being thus treated.\" Therefore the aforesaid\ndegrees would seem to be too numerous.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a gloss on Matt. 3:15 says: \"Perfect humility has\nthree degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are\nabove us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is\nsufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set\nourselves before our inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The\nthird degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is\nperfect righteousness.\" Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to\nbe too numerous.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): \"The measure of\nhumility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is\nimperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to\nbe entrapped.\" Now the measure of a man's greatness cannot be fixed\naccording to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem\nthat it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2) humility has essentially to\ndo with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of\nhis soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is\nin the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be\nabove what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these\nthings is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of\nhumility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and\ngestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also\nwith the other virtues. For \"a man is known by his look, and a wise\nman, when thou meetest him, by his countenance\" (Ecclus. 19:26).\nWherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something\nregarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree, \"that a\nman fear God and bear all His commandments in mind.\"\n\nAgain, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest\none aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is done in three\nways. First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to\nthe eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one's\nsuperior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by\nnot being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and\nhardships that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.\n\nCertain things also are included referring to the estimate a man\nforms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways.\nFirst by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs\nto the eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great\nthings, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in\nthis respect one should put others before oneself, and this belongs\nto the sixth degree.\n\nAgain, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of\nthese regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart\nfrom the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others\nhave reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to\nspeak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not\nimmoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to\ndo with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks,\nwhich regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other\nsigns of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow\noneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults\nwhich we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which\nothers have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): \"Bethink you\nthat some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although\noutwardly you are better than they.\" Again, without falsehood one may\navow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in\nrespect of one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency\nto God, according to 2 Cor. 3:5, \"Not that we are sufficient to think\nanything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from\nGod.\" And there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those\nthings that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises\nfrom another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue\nproceeds from the act of another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly\nby a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the\noutward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of\nall restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking\nout the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees\nof humility are here enumerated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to\nknowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first\ndegree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it\nwould be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this is excluded\nby the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal\nof one's own deficiency; namely that not merely one simply assert\none's failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three\ndegrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward\nexcellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity,\nwhether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist.\nii, 10, Ep. 36), \"there is nothing great in being humble towards\nthose who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this: but\nwe should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer,\" and\nthis belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite may even\ngo so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this\npertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are\ncomprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above.\n\nReply Obj. 4: These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely\nthe nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are either\nof higher or lower or of equal degree.\n\nReply Obj. 5: This argument also considers the degrees of humility\nnot according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the\naforesaid degrees are assigned, but according to the various\nconditions of men.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 162\n\nOF PRIDE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first\nman's sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the first head\nthere are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether pride is a sin?\n\n(2) Whether it is a special vice?\n\n(3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject?\n\n(4) Of its species;\n\n(5) Whether it is a mortal sin?\n\n(6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins?\n\n(7) Of its relation to other sins;\n\n(8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Pride Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the\nobject of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will do;\nand He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the\nDivine promises: for it is written (Isa. 60:15): \"I will make thee to\nbe an everlasting pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and\ngeneration.\" Therefore pride is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for\nevery creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does\nthis become the rational creature which is made to God's image and\nlikeness. Now it is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that \"pride is\nlove of one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is\nsupremely excellent.\" Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): \"Pride\nimitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all.\"\nTherefore pride is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a\ncontrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice\nis found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:14): \"Never suffer pride to\nreign in thy mind or in thy words.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Pride (_superbia_) is so called because a man\nthereby aims higher (_supra_) than he is; wherefore Isidore says\n(Etym. x): \"A man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear\nabove (super) what he really is\"; for he who wishes to overstep\nbeyond what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every\nman's will should tend to that which is proportionate to him.\nTherefore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right\nreason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, because\naccording to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), \"the soul's evil is to be\nopposed to reason.\" Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Pride (_superbia_) may be understood in two ways.\nFirst, as overpassing (_supergreditur_) the rule of reason, and in\nthis sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply\ndenominate \"super-abundance\"; in which sense any super-abundant thing\nmay be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as\nsignificant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the\nsame passage (Isa. 61:6) says that \"there is a good and an evil\npride\"; or \"a sinful pride which God resists, and a pride that\ndenotes the glory which He bestows.\"\n\nIt may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those\nthings in which men may take pride.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Reason has the direction of those things for which man\nhas a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule\nof reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is\nthe case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now\npride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason.\nWherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the\n\"desire for inordinate exaltation\": and hence it is that, as he\nasserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), \"pride imitates God\ninordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and\nwishes to usurp His dominion over our fellow-creatures.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility,\nwhich, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity,\nas stated above (Q. 161, A. 1, ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride\nby default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by\ndefault to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge\nthe mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility\nto withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of great things\nagainst presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a\ndeficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to\nmagnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment\nto things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to\nhumility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In\nthe same way, on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both\nto magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to\nhumility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch\nas it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride\nimplies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility,\neven as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in tending\ntowards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Pride Is a Special Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For\nAugustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that \"you will find no sin\nthat is not labelled pride\"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii,\n2) that \"without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible.\"\nTherefore pride is a general sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, \"That He may withdraw man from\nwickedness [*Vulg.: 'From the things that he is doing, and may\ndeliver him from pride'],\" says that \"a man prides himself when he\ntransgresses His commandments by sin.\" Now according to Ambrose [*De\nParad. viii], \"every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a\ndisobedience of the heavenly commandments.\" Therefore every sin is\npride.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue.\nBut pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral.\nxxxiv, 23): \"Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one\nvirtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and\nlike an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body\";\nand Isidore says (Etym. [*De Summo Bono ii, 38]) that it is \"the\ndownfall of all virtues.\" Therefore pride is not a special sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride\nhas a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that \"one\nman is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by\nmean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues.\"\nTherefore pride is not a special but a general sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): \"If he\nlook into the question carefully, he will find that, according to\nGod's law, pride is a very different sin from other vices.\" Now the\ngenus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a\ngeneral but a special sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ The sin of pride may be considered in two ways.\nFirst with regard to its proper species, which it has under the\naspect of its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin,\nbecause it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's\nown excellence, as stated (A. 1, ad 2). Secondly, it may be\nconsidered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this\nway it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may\narise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins\nbeing directed to the end of pride which is one's own excellence, to\nwhich may be directed anything that is inordinately desired.\nSecondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing\nan obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which\nhinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20, \"Thou hast broken\nMy yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve.\"\n\nIt must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride\nadmits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes,\nbut it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For\nthough one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin,\nthrough contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always\nbreak the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through\nignorance, and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason\nAugustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that \"many things are done\namiss which are not done through pride.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into his book\n_De Nat. et Grat.,_ not as being his own, but as those of someone\nwith whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the\nassertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride.\nWe might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as\nreferring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the\ncommandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act\nof pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed,\nnot always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance,\nsometimes through weakness, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not\naffectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a\nparricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend\nit. Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride\nhimself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by\ndirect contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every\nvirtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the\nspecial virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another\nway a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and\nthus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion\nof pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to\nexcellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which\naspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of\none's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Subject of Pride Is the Irascible Faculty?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the\nirascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): \"A swollen\nmind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light.\"\nNow the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the\nrational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that \"the proud\nobserve other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath\nthem with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with\npride\": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue\nobservation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the\nrational faculty.\n\nObj. 3: Further, pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible\nthings, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it\nconsists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus.\n10:14, \"The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God.\"\nNow the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite,\ncannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot\nbe in the irascible.\n\nObj. 4: Further, as stated in Prosper's _Liber Sententiarum,_ sent.\n294, \"Pride is love of one's own excellence.\" But love is not in the\nirascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the\nirascible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift\nof fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the\nirascible.\n\n_I answer that,_ The subject of any virtue or vice is to be\nascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act\ncannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of\nboth. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for\npride is the desire of one's own excellence, as stated above (AA. 1,\n2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible\nfaculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a\nstrict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even\nas anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite.\nSecondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to\nbelong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is\nsometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the\nangels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice\npronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this\nbroad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated\nabove in the First Part (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 82, A. 5, ad 1 and 2).\n\nConsequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride,\nwere merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite\nmight tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of\nthe sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has\nin view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must\nneeds say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only\nstrictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in\nits wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite.\nWherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely\nspeculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause.\nFor the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may\nreceive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matt. 11:25,\n\"Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent,\" i.e. from\nthe proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, \"and hast\nrevealed them to little ones,\" i.e. to the humble.\n\nNor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written\n(Ecclus. 6:34): \"If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive\ninstruction.\" The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is\ndirectly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in\ntheir own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory\nsays (Moral. xxiii, 17) that \"the proud, although certain hidden\ntruths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their\nsweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them.\" Hence\nit is written (Prov. 11:2): \"Where humility is there also is wisdom.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 161, AA. 2, 6), humility observes\nthe rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now\npride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems\nhimself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate\ndesire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what\nhe desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne\ntowards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever\nthings lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and\none of those is the observing of other people's failings, just as, on\nthe other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), \"holy\nmen, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others\nabove themselves.\" Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in\nthe rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the\nsensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification,\nas stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), \"love\nprecedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,\"\nwherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It\nis in this sense that pride is said to be \"love of one's own\nexcellence,\" inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his\nsuperiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Four Species of Pride Are Fittingly Assigned by Gregory?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly\nassigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): \"There are four\nmarks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself;\neither when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they\nbelieve it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their\nown merits; or when they boast of having what they have not, or\ndespise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what\nthey have.\" For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as\nhumility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to\nunbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his good from God,\nor that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore\nthis should not be reckoned a species of pride.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of\ndifferent genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as\nstated above (Q. 110, A. 2; Q. 112). Therefore it should not be\naccounted a species of pride.\n\nObj. 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which\nare not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that\n\"nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful\":\nand Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that \"it belongs to pride to\nexcuse oneself of a sin one has committed.\" Again, presumption\nwhereby one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much\nto do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not\nsufficiently account for the different species of pride.\n\nObj. 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm\n[*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride,\nsaying that there is \"pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of\ndeed.\" Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also reckons\ntwelve degrees of pride, namely \"curiosity, frivolity of mind,\nsenseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption,\ndefense of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license,\nsinful habit.\" Now these apparently are not comprised under the\nspecies mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be\nassigned unfittingly.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The authority of Gregory suffices.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), pride denotes\nimmoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is\nnot in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all\nexcellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be\nconsidered in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that\nthe greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that\none derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good\ngreater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his\nown excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we\nhave the third species of pride, namely \"boasting of having what one\nhas not.\"\n\nSecondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as\nto have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of\nanother. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another\nas though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is\nborne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of\none's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus\nwe have the first two species of pride, namely \"when a man thinks he\nhas from himself that which he has from God,\" or \"when he believes\nthat which he has received from above to be due to his own merits.\"\n\nThirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it,\nin so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some\ngood more excellently than other men; the result again being that his\nappetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus\nwe have the fourth species of pride, which is \"when a man despises\nothers and wishes to be singularly conspicuous.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First,\nuniversally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is\ndestroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice,\nand unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication,\njudges that for the time being it is good for him to commit\nfornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to\nsay that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question\nin point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that\nthere is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men\nfor their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and\nnot to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence,\nto boast of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of\none's own merits.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the\noutward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has\nnot: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned\nby Gregory to be a species of pride.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from\nanother: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to\ningratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to\nthe third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the\ngood of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is\nabove one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which\nconsists in wishing to be preferred to others.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the\nprogress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in\nthought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.\n\nThe twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of\nopposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken\nabove (Q. 161, A. 6). For the first degree of humility is to \"be\nhumble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes\nfixed on the ground\": and to this is opposed \"curiosity,\" which\nconsists in looking around in all directions curiously and\ninordinately. The second degree of humility is \"to speak few and\nsensible words, and not to be loud of voice\": to this is opposed\n\"frivolity of mind,\" by which a man is proud of speech. The third\ndegree of humility is \"not to be easily moved and disposed to\nlaughter,\" to which is opposed \"senseless mirth.\" The fourth degree\nof humility is \"to maintain silence until one is asked,\" to which is\nopposed \"boasting\". The fifth degree of humility is \"to do nothing\nbut to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery,\" to\nwhich is opposed \"singularity,\" whereby a man wishes to seem more\nholy than others. The sixth degree of humility is \"to believe and\nacknowledge oneself viler than all,\" to which is opposed \"arrogance,\"\nwhereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of\nhumility is \"to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all\npurposes,\" to which is opposed \"presumption,\" whereby a man thinks\nhimself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of\nhumility is \"to confess one's sins,\" to which is opposed \"defense of\none's sins.\" The ninth degree is \"to embrace patience by obeying\nunder difficult and contrary circumstances,\" to which is opposed\n\"deceitful confession,\" whereby a man being unwilling to be punished\nfor his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility\nis \"obedience,\" to which is opposed \"rebelliousness.\" The eleventh\ndegree of humility is \"not to delight in fulfilling one's own\ndesires\"; to this is opposed \"license,\" whereby a man delights in\ndoing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is \"fear\nof God\": to this is opposed \"the habit of sinning,\" which implies\ncontempt of God.\n\nIn these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated,\nbut also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have\nstated above with regard to humility (Q. 161, A. 6).\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Pride Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a\ngloss on Ps. 7:4, \"O Lord my God, if I have done this thing,\" says:\n\"Namely, the universal sin which is pride.\" Therefore if pride were a\nmortal sin, so would every sin be.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride\nis apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of God,\nnor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence which,\nby pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to God's\nhonor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is\nnot opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as\nGregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), \"sometimes a man is elated by\nsublime and heavenly virtues.\" Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that \"pride is a\nmost evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the\nelect.\" But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins.\nTherefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly\nregards the subjection of man to God, as stated above (Q. 161, A. 1,\nad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so\nfar as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him\naccording to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the\nApostle (2 Cor. 10:13), \"But we will not glory beyond our measure;\nbut according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to\nus.\" Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): \"The beginning of the\npride of man is to fall off from God\" because, to wit, the root of\npride is found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to\nGod and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is\nof its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away\nfrom God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin.\nNevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus\n(for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions\nthat are venial by reason of their imperfection (through forestalling\nthe judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the\nmatter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial\nsins, when reason does not consent to them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2) pride is a general sin, not by\nits essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may\nhave their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all sins\nare mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have\nstated to be a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch\nas the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he\nought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor;\nwhen, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and\nthis again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has\nestablished order among men, so that one ought to be subject to\nanother.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct\ncause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a\nvirtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from\nbeing the accidental cause of another, as stated in _Phys._ viii, 1.\nHence some are even proud of their humility.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Pride Is the Most Grievous of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of\nsins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it\nwould seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine\nsays in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), \"Other sins find their vent in the\naccomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good\ndeeds to destroy them.\" Therefore pride is not the most grievous of\nsins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"The greater evil is opposed to the greater good,\"\nas the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which\npride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Q.\n61, A. 5). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues,\nsuch as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are\nmore grievous sins than pride.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil.\nBut pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom. 1:28,\nwhere it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of\nscience were delivered \"to a reprobate sense, to do those things\nwhich are not convenient.\" Therefore pride is not the most grievous\nof sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 118:51, \"The proud did\niniquitously,\"    says: \"The greatest sin in man is pride.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to\na mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion\nfrom the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and\ncomplement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for\npride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride\ncovets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the\ngood of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme\ngravity, because in other sins man turns away from God, either\nthrough ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any\nother good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply\nthrough being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence\nBoethius [*Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that \"while all\nvices flee from God, pride alone withstands God\"; for which reason it\nis specially stated (James 4:6) that \"God resisteth the proud.\"\nWherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a\nconsequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very\nnature, for its act is the contempt of God. And since that which\nbelongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than\nthat which belongs to it through something else, it follows that\npride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds\nin aversion which is the formal complement of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on\naccount of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in\nits onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and \"still more\ndifficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its\nconnaturality,\" as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, 9. A difficulty of this\nkind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man\nsins the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous\ntemptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12, 15).\n\nSecondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being\nhidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes\noccasion even from good deeds, as stated (A. 5, ad 3). Hence\nAugustine says pointedly that it \"lies in wait for good deeds\"; and\nit is written (Ps. 141:4): \"In the way wherein I walked, the proud\n[*Cf. Ps. 139:6, 'The proud have hidden a net for me.'] [Vulg.:\n'they'] have hidden a snare for me.\" Hence no very great gravity\nattaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and\nbefore it is discovered by the judgment of reason: but once\ndiscovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one's\nown infirmity, according to Ecclus. 10:9, \"Why is earth and ashes\nproud?\" and by considering God's greatness, according to Job 15:13,\n\"Why doth thy spirit swell against God?\" as well as by considering\nthe imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, according\nto Isa. 40:6, \"All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the\nflower of the field\"; and farther on (Isa. 64:6), \"all our justices\"\nare become \"like the rag of a menstruous woman.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from\nthe object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this\nway pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has\nhumility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the\npart of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For\nunbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud contempt, is\nrendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or\nweakness. The same applies to despair and the like.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible\nconclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more\nevident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God\npunishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh,\nwhich though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence\nIsidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that \"pride is the worst of all\nvices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest\nand foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous\ndeeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. On the other hand,\ncarnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a\nshameful nature: and yet, under God's dispensation, it is less\ngrievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels\nit not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he\nmay rise from his abasement.\"\n\nFrom this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a\nwise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient\nto contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown\nto be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows\nmen to fall into other sins.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Pride Is the First Sin of All?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all.\nFor the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not\naccompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says\n(De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done \"amiss which are not\ndone with pride.\" Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the \"beginning of\n. . . pride is to fall off from God.\" Therefore falling away from God\nprecedes pride.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the\norder of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all\nvirtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): \"Evil men and seducers\nshall grow worse and worse\"; so that apparently man's beginning of\nwickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of\nsins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the\nfirst sin.\n\nObj. 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that \"pride apes fortitude and\ndaring.\" Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): \"Pride is the\nbeginning of all sin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The first thing in every genus is that which is\nessential. Now it has been stated above (A. 6) that aversion from\nGod, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride\nessentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride\nfulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is \"the beginning of all\nsins,\" as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 2), when we were treating of\nthe causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part\nof sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Pride is said to be \"the beginning of all sin,\" not as\nthough every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin\nis naturally liable to arise from pride.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of\npride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being\nthe first part of pride. For it has been said above (A. 5) that pride\nregards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence\nit scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be the\nsame as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that\nwhich is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore\nas faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to\nwhich sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7,\n\"Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof,\" says that \"by\nheaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief,\" and the\nApostle says (1 Tim. 1:19) that \"some rejecting a good conscience\nhave made shipwreck concerning the faith.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because\nthat which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride\nis the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride\nthere may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through\nignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is\npride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous.\nAnd as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the\nwithdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, \"I shall be cleansed from\nthe greatest sin,\" says: \"Namely from the sin of pride, which is the\nlast in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw\nfrom God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned\nfortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man\nthinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be\ndaring or brave.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Pride Should Be Reckoned a Capital Vice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital\nvice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst.\nCaenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.\n\nObj. 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since\nboth covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice.\nTherefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that \"pride\nbegets envy, nor is it ever without this companion.\" Now envy is\nreckoned a capital vice, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4). Much more\ntherefore is pride a capital vice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride\namong the capital vices.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 5, ad 1) pride may be\nconsidered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin;\nsecondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the\ncapital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many\nkinds of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of\na special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But\nGregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all\nvices, as explained above (A. 2, Obj. 3), did not place it among the\ncapital vices, but held it to be the \"queen and mother of all the\nvices.\" Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): \"Pride, the queen of vices,\nwhen it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it\ninto the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that\nthey may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds.\"\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause\nthereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory\ncovets the outward show of excellence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises\nfrom pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it\nis still more principal than the capital vices themselves.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 163\n\nOF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his\nsin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?\n\n(2) What the first man coveted by sinning?\n\n(3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?\n\n(4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Pride Was the First Man's First Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man's first\nsin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that \"by the disobedience of\none man many were made sinners.\" Now the first man's first sin is the\none by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin.\nTherefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Luke 4:3, \"And the devil\nsaid to Him,\" that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same\norder as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to\ngluttony, as appears from Matt. 4:3, where it was said to Him: \"If\nthou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread.\"\nTherefore the first man's first sin was not pride but gluttony.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the devil\nin tempting man promised him knowledge (Gen. 3:5). Therefore\ninordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which\npertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the\nfirst sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1 Tim.\n2:14, \"The woman being seduced was in the transgression,\" says: \"The\nApostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to\naccept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them\nto touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they\nwould be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them\nthe godhead . . .\" Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a\nthing. Therefore man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): \"Pride is the\nbeginning of all sin.\" Now man's first sin is the beginning of all\nsin, according to Rom. 5:12, \"By one man sin entered into this\nworld.\" Therefore man's first sin was pride.\n\n_I answer that,_ Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the\ncharacter of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is\nfirst found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward\nmovement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body;\nsince, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the\nbody is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains.\nAlso, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the\nend before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of\nthe end; and consequently man's first sin was where it was possible\nfor his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so\nappointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of\nthe flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the\nfirst inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his\ncoveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh\ntends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the\nfirst inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting\ninordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it\ninordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established\nby the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man's first sin consisted\nin his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this\npertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's first sin was\npride.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not willed\nby man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one\npresuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he\nwilled it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he\ncoveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his\ndisobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the\nstatement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4])\nthat \"man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and\nscorned God's commands.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first\nparents. For it is written (Gen. 3:6): \"The woman saw that the tree\nwas good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and\nshe took of the fruit thereof, and did eat.\" Yet the very goodness\nand beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but\nthe persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gen. 3:5): \"Your eyes\nshall be opened and you shall be as Gods\": and it was by coveting\nthis that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony\nresulted from the sin of pride.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents\nfrom their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began\nby saying: \"You shall be as Gods,\" and added: \"Knowing good and evil.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30), \"the\nwoman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were\ndebarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not\nalready filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud\nself-presumption.\" This does not mean that pride preceded the\npromptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken\nhis words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being\nthat she believed the demon to have spoken truly.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the First Man's Pride Consisted in His Coveting God's Likeness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist\nin his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that\nwhich is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness\nis competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gen.\n1:26): \"Let us make man to our image and likeness.\" Therefore he did\nnot sin by coveting God's likeness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in\norder that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was\nthe serpent's suggestion: \"You shall be as Gods knowing good and\nevil.\" Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to\nthe saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i,\n1: \"All men naturally desire knowledge.\" Therefore he did not sin by\ncoveting God's likeness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first\nman was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, \"He filled\nthem with the knowledge of understanding.\" Since then every sin\nconsists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would\nseem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible.\nBut it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying\nof Ex. 15:11, \"Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?\"\nTherefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps.\n68], \"Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away,\"\nsays: \"Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost\nhappiness.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute\nequality [*Cf. I, Q. 93, A. 1]: and such a likeness to God our first\nparents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not\nconceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.\n\nThe other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a\ncreature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates\nsomewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius\nsays (Div. Nom. ix): \"The same things are like and unlike to God;\nlike, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated;\nunlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause.\" Now every\ngood existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first\ngood.\n\nWherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above\nhis measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he\ncoveted God's likeness inordinately.\n\nIt must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite\nis a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the\nrational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be\nconsidered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being:\nand this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their\ncreation, both on man--of whom it is written (Gen. 1:26) that God\nmade man \"to His image and likeness\"--and on the angel, of whom it is\nwritten (Ezech. 28:12): \"Thou wast the seal of resemblance.\"\nSecondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the\nangel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just\nquoted, \"Thou wast the seal of resemblance,\" we read: \"Full of\nwisdom.\" But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received\nthis likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the\npower of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness\nactually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there\nremained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.\n\nAccordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted\nGod's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a\nlikeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting\nGod's likeness as regards \"knowledge of good and evil,\" according to\nthe serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he\nmight decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again\nthat he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would\nbefall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as\nregards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural\npower he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says\n(Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that \"the woman's mind was filled with love of\nher own power.\" On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's\nlikeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig.\n13) that \"he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's.\"\nNevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as\neach wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine\nrule.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man\ndid not sin by coveting this, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to\nknowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that\nis, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on\nPs. 70:18, \"O God, who is like Thee?\" says: \"He who desires to be of\nhimself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God.\nThus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man\nwho refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Sin of Our First Parents Was More Grievous Than Other Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more\ngrievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15):\n\"Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid\nsin.\" Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin,\nbecause they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore\nthe sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of\nour first parents was most severely punished, since by it \"death\nentered into this world,\" as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore\nthat sin was more grievous than other sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest\n(Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first parents\nwas the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: \"I think that a\nman who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall\nsuddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little.\" Now\nour first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade.\nTherefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin.\none results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that\nadultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity\nof sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The\nformer gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment:\nhence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather\nthan of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin\nwas not graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of\nthe sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence\nover other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God\nis greater than the pride whereby one covets God's likeness\ninordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated (A.\n2).\n\nBut if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that\nsin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We\nmust accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively\nbut not simply.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting\nfrom the person of the sinner.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that first\nsin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its\nspecies but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed\nthe innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence\nbrought disorder upon the whole human nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first must\nneeds be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one\nfollows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that\nthe first sin is the greatest.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Adam's Sin Was More Grievous Than Eve's?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than\nEve's. For it is written (1 Tim. 2:14): \"Adam was not seduced, but\nthe woman being seduced was in the transgression\": and so it would\nseem that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through\nassured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to\nLuke 12:47, 48, \"That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and\ndid not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but\nhe that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten\nwith few stripes.\" Therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix; xcvi\nde Temp.]): \"If the man is the head, he should live better, and give\nan example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him.\" Now\nhe who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a sin.\nTherefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the\nmost grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost,\nbecause while sinning he relied on God's mercy [*Cf. Q. 21, A. 2,\nObj. 3. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter\nLombard quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption.\nTherefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was\nmore grievously punished than the man, as appears from Gen. 3.\nTherefore she sinned more grievously than the man.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated (A. 3), the gravity of a sin depends on\nthe species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we\nmust assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these\npersons, the man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more\nperfect than the woman.\n\nAs regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered\nto be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad\nlit. xi, 35): \"Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex,\nthough parity of pride.\"\n\nBut as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more\ngrievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up\nthan the man. For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive\nwords, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest\nthey should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God's\nlikeness by eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the\nheight of desiring to obtain something against God's will. On the\nother hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did\nnot wish to attain to God's likeness against God's will: but his\npride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power.\nSecondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the\nman; wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly,\nthe man's sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine says\n(Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), \"he consented to the sin out of a certain\nfriendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will offend\nGod rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to\nhave done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence.\"\n\nIt is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than\nthe man's.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The woman was deceived because she was first of all\npuffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but\naggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed\nup with still greater pride.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers the circumstance of personal\ncondition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous than\nthe woman's.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach to\ncontempt of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy\nGhost, but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv,\n11]), it was due to the fact that, \"having had no experience of God's\nseverity, he thought the sin to be venial,\" i.e. easily forgiven\n[*Cf. I-II, Q. 89, A. 3, ad 1].\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 164\n\nOF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this\nhead there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common\npunishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 164, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Death Is the Punishment of Our First Parents' Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our\nfirst parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called\na punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates\nit. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the\nfact that his body is composed of contraries, and because \"mortal\" is\nincluded in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a\npunishment of our first parents' sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found\nin man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. 3:19, \"The\ndeath of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both\nequal.\" But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin.\nTherefore neither is it so in men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of\nparticular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human\nnature. Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our\nfirst parents' sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first parents.\nTherefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin, it\nwould follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But\nthis is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more\npainfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the\nfirst sin.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above\n(I, Q. 48, A. 6; Q. 49, A. 2). But death, apparently, is not from\nGod: for it is written (Wis. 1:13): \"God made not death.\" Therefore\ndeath is not the punishment of the first sin.\n\nObj. 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since\nmerit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death\nis sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death.\nTherefore it would seem that death is not a punishment.\n\nObj. 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death\napparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is\ndead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is\nnot a punishment of sin.\n\nObj. 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have\nfollowed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents\nlived a long time after their sin (Gen. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly,\ndeath is not a punishment of sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): \"By one man sin\nentered into this world, and by sin death.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of\na favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment\nof that fault. Now as we stated in the First Part (Q. 95, A. 1; Q.\n97, A. 1), God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state,\nthat as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his\nsoul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul.\nBut inasmuch as through sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to\nGod, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject\nto his reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the\ncarnal appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject\nto the soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life\nand soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul,\nas the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the\nother hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to\nthe lack of the body's subjection to the soul.\n\nIt is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite\nagainst the spirit is a punishment of our first parents' sin, so also\nare death and all defects of the body.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the\nprinciples of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form\nand matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of\nitself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part\nof his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of\ncontraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and\nin this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached\nto the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity,\nsince it was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch,\nand consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was\nimpossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher\nstates (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not\nattached to the adaptability of matter to form because, if it were\npossible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather\nbe incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this\nbeing suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make\nit fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary\nresult of such a matter and is not according to the agent's choice;\nfor, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that\nwould not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful,\nwherefore when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of\nbeing exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter: which\nfavor, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents.\nAccordingly death is both natural on account of a condition attaching\nto matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor\npreserving man from death [*Cf. I-II, Q. 85, A. 6].\n\nReply Obj. 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards a\ncondition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of\ncontraries. But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is\nimmortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Our first parents were made by God not only as\nparticular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human\nnature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with\nthe Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin\nthe entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their\nposterity, incurred death.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a\npunishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in\nthose to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that\nwhich results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that\none who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed,\nshould fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to\nthe sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot\nforesee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for\nthe first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the\nwithdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of\nhuman nature was maintained. But the defects resulting from this\nwithdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life.\nWherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the\nfirst sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all\nfuture events, Divine providence has so disposed that these penalties\nare apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on\naccount of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen\nheld [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of Rom.\n9:11, \"When they . . . had not done any good or evil\"; and also\ncontrary to statements made in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 4; Q. 118,\nA. 3), namely that the soul is not created before the body: but\neither in punishment of their parents' sins, inasmuch as the child is\nsomething belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often\npunished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for\nthe spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties, to\nwit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take\npride in his virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil\nof human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling\nman through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely\nas being a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore\nAugustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death,\nexcept in so far as it is a punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), \"just as the\nwicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous\nmake good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is\nthat both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good,\nwhile good men die well, although death is an evil.\" Wherefore\ninasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them\nmeritorious.\n\nReply Obj. 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the\nprivation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the\nprivation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of\nsense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting\nthe corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may\nspeak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as\nbeing the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which\nlife departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has\nno pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including\nthe previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in\nmotion towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while\nin motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death\nmay be painful.\n\nReply Obj. 8: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. [*De Pecc. Mer. et\nRem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32]), \"although our first parents\nlived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they\nheard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 164, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Particular Punishments of Our First Parents Are Suitably\nAppointed in Scripture?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the particular punishments of our\nfirst parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which\nwould have occurred even without sin should not be described as a\npunishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been \"pain in\nchild-bearing,\" even had there been no sin: for the disposition of\nthe female sex is such that offspring cannot be born without pain to\nthe bearer. Likewise the \"subjection of woman to man\" results from\nthe perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female sex.\nAgain it belongs to the nature of the earth \"to bring forth thorns\nand thistles,\" and this would have occurred even had there been no\nsin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the first sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a person's dignity does not,\nseemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the \"multiplying of\nconceptions\" pertains to a woman's dignity. Therefore it should not\nbe described as the woman's punishment.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the punishment of our first parents' sin is\ntransmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death (A. 1).\nBut all \"women's conceptions\" are not \"multiplied,\" nor does \"every\nman eat bread in the sweat of his face.\" Therefore these are not\nsuitable punishments of the first sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing\nin the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore it would\nseem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable\npunishment of man.\n\nObj. 5: Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be\nnaturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other\nobstacles in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the\ncherubim, and the \"flaming sword turning every way.\"\n\nObj. 6: Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to the\nnecessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality\nby the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid\nhim to eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words of Gen.\n3:22: \"See, lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of\nlife . . . and live for ever.\"\n\nObj. 7: Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy\nand clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture,\naccording to Ps. 144:9, \"His tender mercies are over all His works.\"\nTherefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents,\nalready reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of Gen.\n3:22, \"Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil.\"\n\nObj. 8: Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, according\nto 1 Tim. 6:8, \"Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these\nwe are content.\" Therefore just as food was appointed to our first\nparents before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed\nto them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say that God\nmade for them garments of skin.\n\nObjection 9: Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should\noutweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the\npunishment would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our\nfirst parents gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according\nto Gen. 3:7. But this outweighs in good all the penal evils which are\nstated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting\nfrom our first parents' sin are unsuitably described.\n\n_On the contrary,_ These punishments were appointed by God, Who does\nall things, \"in number, weight, and measure [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast\nordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.']\" (Wis.\n11:21).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in the foregoing Article, on account of\ntheir sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favor,\nwhereby the integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by\nthe withdrawal of this favor human nature incurred penal defects.\nHence they were punished in two ways. In the first place by being\ndeprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely\nthe place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (Gen. 3:23)\nwhere it is stated that \"God sent him out of the paradise of\npleasure.\" And since he was unable, of himself, to return to that\nstate of original innocence, it was fitting that obstacles should be\nplaced against his recovering those things that were befitting his\noriginal state, namely food (lest he should take of the tree of life)\nand place; for \"God placed before . . . paradise . . . Cherubim, and\na flaming sword.\" Secondly, they were punished by having appointed to\nthem things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor: and\nthis as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the body,\nto which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was\nappointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman\npunishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which\nshe is united to the man; and these are the begetting of children,\nand community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the\nbegetting of children, she was punished in two ways: first in the\nweariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after\nconception, and this is indicated in the words (Gen. 3:16), \"I will\nmultiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions\"; secondly, in the pain\nwhich she suffers in giving birth, and this is indicated by the words\n(Gen. 3:16), \"In sorrow shalt thou bring forth.\" As regards family\nlife she was punished by being subjected to her husband's authority,\nand this is conveyed in the words (Gen. 3:16), \"Thou shalt be under\nthy husband's power.\"\n\nNow, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in\nmatters relating to the family life, so it belongs to the husband to\nprovide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished\nin three ways. First, by the barrenness of the earth, in the words\n(Gen. 3:17), \"Cursed is the earth in thy work.\" Secondly, by the\ncares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the\nearth; hence the words (Gen. 3:17), \"With labor and toil shalt thou\neat thereof all the days of thy life.\" Thirdly, by the obstacles\nencountered by the tillers of the soil, wherefore it is written (Gen.\n3:18), \"Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee.\"\n\nLikewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the\nsoul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced at the\nrebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (Gen.\n3:7): \"The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived\nthemselves to be naked.\" Secondly, by the reproach for their sin,\nindicated by the words (Gen. 3:22), \"Behold Adam is become as one of\nUs.\" Thirdly, by the reminder of their coming death, when it was said\nto him (Gen. 3:19): \"Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return.\"\nTo this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign\nof their mortality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been\npainless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): \"Just as, in\ngiving birth, the mother would then be relieved not by groans of\npain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing and\nconceiving the union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire\nbut of deliberate action\" [*Cf. I, Q. 98, A. 2].\n\nThe subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as\ninflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since\neven before sin the man was the \"head\" and governor \"of the woman\"),\nbut as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her\nown.\n\nIf man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and\nthistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man, because\ntheir growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the\nsoil, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin [*Interrog. et\nResp. in Gen. lxxix], however, holds that, before sin, the earth\nbrought forth no thorns and thistles, whatever: but the former\nopinion is the better.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a\npunishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children,\nfor this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of\nthe numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject, through\ncarrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly\nstated: \"I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman\nwho conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child\nwith pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who \"conceived without\ncorruption, and bore without pain\" [*St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf.\noct. Assum. B. V. M.], because her conceiving was not according to\nthe law of nature, transmitted from our first parents. And if a woman\nneither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of\nbarrenness, which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise\nwhoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his\nbrow: while those who do not themselves work on the land, are busied\nwith other labors, for \"man is born to labor\" (Job 5:7): and thus\nthey eat the bread for which others have labored in the sweat of\ntheir brow.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not\nman for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself\ndeprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things\nthat have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed in\nthings pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is\nprepared for man by Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual\ninterpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on\naccount of the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the\nnighness of the sun. This is denoted by the \"flaming sword,\" which is\ndescribed as \"turning every way,\" as being appropriate to the\ncircular movement that causes this heat. And since the movements of\ncorporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the\nangels, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), it was fitting\nthat, besides the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim\n\"to keep the way of the tree of life.\" Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad\nlit. xi, 40): \"It is to be believed that even in the visible paradise\nthis was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery\nguard set there by the ministry of angels.\"\n\nReply Obj. 6: After sin, if man had [eaten] of the tree of life, he\nwould not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that\nbeneficial food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words\n\"And live for ever,\" \"for ever\" signifies \"for a long time.\" For it\nwas not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this\nlife.\n\nReply Obj. 7: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 39), \"these\nwords of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a\ndeterrent to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest\nthey be proud likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that\nwhich he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made.\"\n\nReply Obj. 8: Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of\nunhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect\nof external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold.\nSecondly, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those\nmembers wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most\nmanifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the primitive state.\nbecause then man's body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as\nstated in the First Part (Q. 97, A. 2), nor was there in man's body\nanything shameful that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is\nwritten (Gen. 2:23): \"And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his\nwife, and were not ashamed.\" The same cannot be said of food, which\nis necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain the body.\n\nReply Obj. 9: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 31), \"We must not\nimagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed,\nespecially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was\nfair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so\nthat they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their\nminds before, this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not\nhitherto.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 165\n\nOF OUR FIRST PARENTS' TEMPTATION\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider our first parents' temptation, concerning which\nthere are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?\n\n(2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 165, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Was Fitting for Man to Be Tempted by the Devil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be\ntempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to\nthe angels' sin and to man's, according to Matt. 25:41, \"Go [Vulg.:\n'Depart from Me'] you cursed into everlasting fire, which was\nprepared for the devil and his angels.\" Now the angels' first sin did\nnot follow a temptation from without. Therefore neither should man's\nfirst sin have resulted from an outward temptation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the\ndemon's temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew full\nwell that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it\nwould seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone should\nhave an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of an\nassault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault.\nTherefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 34:11): \"He that hath not\nbeen tempted [Douay: 'tried'], what manner of things doth he know?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ God's wisdom \"orders all things sweetly\" (Wis. 8:1),\ninasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is\nbefitting it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says (Div.\nNom. iv), \"it belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain,\nnature.\" Now it is a condition attaching to human nature that one\ncreature can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was\nfitting that God should both allow man in the state of innocence to\nbe tempted by evil angels, and should cause him to be helped by good\nangels. And by a special favor of grace, it was granted him that no\ncreature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby\nhe was able even to resist the temptation of the demon.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Above the human nature there is another that\nadmits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above\nthe angelic nature. Now only one that is already become evil through\nsin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting that\nby an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to\nthe order of nature he is moved forward to perfection by means of a\ngood angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something above\nhim, namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because\naccording to James 1:13, \"God is not a tempter of evils.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as God knew that man, through being\ntempted, would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his\nfree will, to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man's\nnature required that he should be left to his own will, according to\nEcclus. 15:14, \"God left\" man \"in the hand of his own counsel.\" Hence\nAugustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 4): \"It seems to me that man would\nhave had no prospect of any special praise, if he were able to lead a\ngood life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an\nevil life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his power he\nhad the will, not to consent to the persuader.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist\nit: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any\ndifficulty, to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter's assault\nwas not a punishment to man.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 165, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Manner and Order of the First Temptation Was Fitting?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the manner and order of the first\ntemptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the\nangel was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came\nupon man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should have\ncome upon the woman through the man; in other words the woman should\nhave been tempted by the man, and not the other way about.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the temptation of our first parents was by\nsuggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without\nmaking use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first\nparents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to\nsensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting\nfor man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an outward,\ntemptation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through\nsome apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance\nof good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted\nby the devil through a serpent.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom,\nspeech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal.\nTherefore the serpent is unfittingly described (Gen. 3:1) as \"more\nsubtle than any of the beasts of the earth,\" or as \"the most prudent\nof all beasts\" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: and\nlikewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to\nhave been punished by God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That which is first in any genus should be\nproportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind\nof sin we find the same order as in the first temptation. For,\naccording to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the\nconcupiscence of sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent;\nextends to the lower reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and\nreaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the\nman. Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting.\n\n_I answer that,_ Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective\nand sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a\ntwofold incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by\npromising the Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge\nwhich man naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense.\nThis he did by having recourse to those sensible things, which are\nmost akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who\nwas akin to him in the same species; partly by tempting the woman\nthrough the serpent, who was akin to them in the same genus; partly\nby suggesting to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin\nto them in the proximate genus.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the act of tempting the devil was by way of\nprincipal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of\ntemptation in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because\nthe woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to be\ndeceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil\nwas able to deceive the man especially through her. Now there is no\nparity between principal agent and instrument, because the principal\nagent must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the\ninstrumental agent.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to\nman spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than\noutward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least,\nman's imagination is changed by the devil [*Cf. First Part, Q. 91, A.\n3]; whereas by an outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on\nan outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power against man\nbefore sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward\nsuggestion, but only by outward suggestion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 3), \"we are\nnot to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of\ntemptation; but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could\nonly do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29), \"the\nserpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the\ncunning of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of\na prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a\nprudent or cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly.\nNor indeed (Gen. ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent understand the\nsounds which were conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we\nto believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since\nnot even men, who are rational by nature, know what they say when a\ndemon speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29) the serpent\nspoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat spoke to him,\nexcept that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the latter\nwas the work of an angel. Hence (Gen. ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent was\nnot asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its\nown nature, but the devil in it, who was already condemned to\neverlasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to\nthe serpent were directed to him who wrought through the serpent.\"\n\nMoreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii, 17,\n18), \"his, that is, the devil's, punishment mentioned here is that\nfor which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is\nreserved till the last judgment. For when it was said to him: 'Thou\nart cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth,' the cattle are\nset above him, not in power, but in the preservation of their nature,\nsince the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had\nit, but they continue to live in the nature which they received.\" It\nis also said to him: \"'Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,'\"\naccording to another version [*The Septuagint] \"Here the breast\nsignifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the soul\ndominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part\nof the body is softest to the touch: and on these he creeps to those\nwhom he wishes to deceive.\" The words, \"'Earth shalt thou eat all the\ndays of thy life' may be understood in two ways. Either 'Those shall\nbelong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,' namely\nsinners who are signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of\ntemptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat\nearth is to look into things deep and dark.\" The putting of enmities\nbetween him and the woman \"means that we cannot be tempted by the\ndevil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects\nthe likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil is the temptation to\nevil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the\ntemptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait\nfor the woman's heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what\nis unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her: and she watches his head\nthat she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 166\n\nOF STUDIOUSNESS\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity.\nConcerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is the matter of studiousness?\n\n(2) Whether it is a part of temperance?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 166, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Proper Matter of Studiousness Is Knowledge?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of\nstudiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies\nstudy to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every\nmatter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore\nseemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity,\nwhich is derived from _cura_ (care), may also refer to elegance of\napparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the\nApostle says (Rom. 13:14): \"Make not provision (_curam_) for the\nflesh in its concupiscences.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further it is written (Jer. 6:13): \"From the least of them\neven to the greatest, all study [Douay: 'are given to']\ncovetousness.\" Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but\nrather about the possession of wealth, as stated above (Q. 118, A.\n2). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from \"study,\" is not\nproperly about knowledge.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 27:11): \"Study wisdom, my\nson, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him\nthat reproacheth.\" Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the\nsame as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is\nproperly about _knowledge._\n\n_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of\nthe mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except\nby knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind's application to knowledge\nprecedes its application to those things to which man is directed by\nhis knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and\nas a result it regards any other things the working of which requires\nto be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that matter\nabout which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned\nabout dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch.\nTherefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters,\nexcept in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason.\nHence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior\nregard for knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man's mind is drawn, on account of his affections,\ntowards the things for which he has an affection, according to Matt.\n6:21, \"Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also.\" And since man\nhas special affection for those things which foster the flesh, it\nfollows that man's thoughts are concerned about things that foster\nhis flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his\nbody. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things\npertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for\nthis it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things.\nAccordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to\ncovetousness.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 166, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Studiousness Is a Part of Temperance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that studiousness is not a part of\ntemperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his\nstudiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called\nstudious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the\nterm \"studious\" (_spoudaios_) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4, 8, 9).\n[*In the same sense Aristotle says in _Ethic._ iii, 2, that \"every\nvicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do.\"] Therefore\nstudiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temperance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, studiousness, as stated (A. 1), pertains to\nknowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues\nwhich are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to\nthe intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore\nsolicitude is an act of prudence as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9).\nTherefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal\nvirtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not\nresemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name\nfrom being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the\nvice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from\nbeing the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem\nto be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of\nstudy, rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity.\nwherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says\n(Etym. x) that \"a studious man is one who is curious to study.\"\nTherefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): \"We are\nforbidden to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance\nbestows.\" Now curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness.\nTherefore studiousness is a part of temperance.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, AA. 3, 4, 5), it belongs to\ntemperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend\nexcessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in\nrespect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures\nof food and sex, so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to\nknow something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his\n_Metaphysics_ (i, 1): \"All men have a natural desire for knowledge.\"\n\nThe moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness;\nwherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of\ntemperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue.\nMoreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above\n(Q. 160, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as\nstated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge\nof prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term \"studiousness,\"\nwhich properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the\nappetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above (I-II,\nQ. 9, A. 1). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is\nconnected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to\nthe intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate\nabout each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the\nappetitive power, and consists in man's appetite being directed\naright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or\nthat thing. And this belongs to the virtue of seriousness. Wherefore\nit is reckoned among the moral virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be\nvirtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally\ninclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us chiefly to fear\ndangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is\nchiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such\ndangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the\nflesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For\non the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of\nthings; and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint\non this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the\npart of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of\nseeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination\nstudiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it\nis reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination,\nthis virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in\nseeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The\nformer is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the\ndesire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is\ndirected, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to\nknowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by\nthat which removes an obstacle.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 167\n\nOF CURIOSITY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?\n\n(2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 167, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Curiosity Can Be About Intellective Knowledge?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about\nintellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.\nii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are\nessentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good:\nbecause man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being\nreduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge\nof truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"the good of the\nhuman soul is to be in accordance with reason,\" whose perfection\nconsists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot\nbe about intellective knowledge.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he\nreceives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge\nis from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, \"All wisdom is from the Lord\nGod,\" and Wis. 7:17, \"He hath given me the true knowledge of things\nthat are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues\nof the elements,\" etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to\nGod, since \"all things are naked and open to His eyes\" (Heb. 4:13),\nand \"the Lord is a God of all knowledge\" (1 Kings 2:3). Therefore\nhowever abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good.\nNow the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity\ncannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of\nintellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical\nsciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them:\nfor Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): \"Those who refused to partake of\nthe king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had\nconsidered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful,\nwould never have consented to learn that which was unlawful\": and\nAugustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that \"if the philosophers\nmade any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from\nunjust possessors.\" Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge\ncannot be sinful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says:\n\"Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the\ndialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the\nheavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?\" Now\nvanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore\ncuriosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 166, A. 2, ad 2) studiousness is\ndirectly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study\nin the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the\nknowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit\nof the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly\nspeaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some\nresult, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth,\naccording to 1 Cor. 8:1, \"Knowledge puffeth up,\" or because one uses\nthe knowledge of truth in order to sin.\n\nOn the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of\ntruth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to\nthe knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for\ninstance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride\nin their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): \"Some\nthere are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of\nthe majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they\nare doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness\nthey explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So\ngreat a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in\nthe very heavens about which they argue.\" In like manner, those who\nstudy to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful\nstudy, according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, \"They have taught their\ntongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity.\"\n\nSecondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study\ndirected to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this\nin four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable\nstudy from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence\nJerome says [*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: \"We see priests forsaking the\ngospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love\nsongs of pastoral idylls.\" Secondly, when a man studies to learn of\none, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who\nseek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious\ncuriosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): \"Maybe, the\nphilosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity\nin seeking knowledge from the demons.\"\n\nThirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures,\nwithout referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge\nof God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that \"in studying\ncreatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity;\nbut we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things.\"\n\nFourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of\nhis own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error:\nwherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): \"Seek not the things that are\ntoo high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . .\nand in many of His works be not curious,\" and further on (Ecclus.\n3:26), \"For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath\ndetained their minds in vanity.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet\nman's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but\nin the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher\nstates (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of\ncertain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not\ndirected in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth,\nwherein supreme happiness consists.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge of\ntruth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing\nthe knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the\nknowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good\nshould be regulated in due manner.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and\ncommendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired\nthrough God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since,\nhowever, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the\nfaith, the Apostle says (Col. 2:8): \"Beware lest any man cheat you by\nphilosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . .\nand not according to Christ\": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad\nPolycarp.) of certain philosophers that \"they make an unholy use of\ndivine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom\nstrive to destroy the worship of God.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 167, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Vice of Curiosity Is About Sensitive Knowledge?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about\nsensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense\nof sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and\ntaste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not\ncuriosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the\nvice of curiosity about things known by the sight.\n\nObj. 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games;\nwherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when \"a fall occurred\nin the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly,\nand overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes.\" But it does not\nseem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on\naccount of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight,\nas the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity\nis not about the knowledge of sensible objects.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire\ninto our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 1 John\n2:16]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of\nothers, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God \"gave to every one of\nthem commandment concerning his neighbor.\" Therefore the vice of\ncuriosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular\nsensible objects.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that\n\"concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious.\" Now according to Bede\n(Comment. in 1 John 2:16) \"concupiscence of the eyes refers not only\nto the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the\ndiscovery and dispraise of our neighbor's faults,\" and all these are\nparticular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the\neves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life,\nwhich are members of the same division (1 John 2:16), it seems that\nthe vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.\n\n_I answer that,_ The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two\nthings. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it\nis directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this\nkind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek\nthose things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the\nsecond place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to\nintellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly\nto employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be\nsinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not\ndirected to something useful, but turns man away from some useful\nconsideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), \"I go no more\nto see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country,\nif I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from\nsome weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou,\nhaving made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become\nfoolishly dull.\" Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is\ndirected to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to\nlust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is\ndirected to detraction. On the other hand, if one be ordinately\nintent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity\nof sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible\ntruth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is\nvirtuous.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the\nuse of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising\nfrom the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to\nAugustine (Confess. x, 35) \"it is called concupiscence of the eyes\"\nbecause \"the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge,\nso that all sensible things are said to be seen,\" and as he says\nfurther on: \"By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein\npleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for\npleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory,\nsoft; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of\nthese, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust\nof experiment and knowledge.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man\nprone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees\nrepresented. Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such\nsights make men adulterers and shameless.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One may watch other people's actions or inquire into\nthem, with a good intent, either for one's own good--that is in order\nto be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor--or for\nour neighbor's good--that is in order to correct him, if he do\nanything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of\none's position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. 10:24,\n\"Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works.\" But\nto observe our neighbor's faults with the intention of looking down\nupon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose\nthan that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov.\n24:15), \"Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of\nthe just, nor spoil his rest.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 168\n\nOF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements\nof the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of\nthe body that are done seriously?\n\n(2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions?\n\n(3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play;\n\n(4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Any Virtue Regards the Outward Movements of the Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward\nmovements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual\nbeauty of the soul, according to Ps. 44:14, \"All the glory of the\nking's daughter is within,\" and a gloss adds, \"namely, in the\nconscience.\" Now the movements of the body are not within, but\nwithout. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Virtues are not in us by nature,\" as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are\nin man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some\nslow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of\noutward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of\nthis kind.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed\nto another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and\nfortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another\nperson, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is connected with\nthem.\n\nObj. 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as\nstated above (Q. 166, A. 1, Obj. 1; A. 2, ad 1). Now it is censurable\nto apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements: for\nAmbrose says (De Offic. i, 18): \"A becoming gait is one that reflects\nthe carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the\nfoot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor\naffectation, but natural and artless movement.\" Therefore seemingly\nthere is no virtue about the style of outward movements.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The beauty of honesty [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1] pertains\nto virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty\nof honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): \"The sound of the\nvoice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they\nbe unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be\nour model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of\nhonesty.\" Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward\nmovement.\n\n_I answer that,_ Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to\nman being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward\nmovements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members\nare set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that\nthere is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these\nmovements.\n\nNow the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold\nstandpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly,\nin respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or\nplace. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): \"Beauty of conduct\nconsists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex\nand person,\" and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds:\n\"This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish\nbecoming to every action.\"\n\nHence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these\noutward movements: namely \"taste\" (_ornatus_) which regards what is\nbecoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of\nwhat is becoming in movement and behavior; and \"methodicalness\"\n(_bona ordinatio_) which regards what is becoming to the business in\nhand, and to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it \"the practical\nknowledge of separation,\" i.e. of the distinction of \"acts.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition,\naccording to Ecclus. 19:27, \"The attire of the body, and the laughter\nof the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is\"; and Ambrose\nsays (De Offic. i, 18) that \"the habit of mind is seen in the gesture\nof the body,\" and that \"the body's movement is an index of the soul.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although it is from natural disposition that a man is\ninclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what\nis lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence\nAmbrose says (De Offic. i, 18): \"Let nature guide the movement: and\nif nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of\nthe inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the\nsoul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that \"from these\nthings,\" i.e. the outward movements, \"the man that lies hidden in our\nhearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or\non the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish.\" It is\nmoreover from our outward movements that other men form their\njudgment about us, according to Ecclus. 19:26, \"A man is known by his\nlook, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his\ncountenance.\" Hence moderation of outward movements is directed\nsomewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in\nhis Rule (Ep. ccxi), \"In all your movements, let nothing be done to\noffend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the\nholiness of your state.\" Wherefore the moderation of outward\nmovements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher\nmentions in _Ethic._ iv, 6, 7. For, in so far as by outward movements\nwe are directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward\nmovements belongs to \"friendliness or affability\" [*Cf. Q. 114, A.\n1]. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds\nin reference to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so\nfar as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their\nmoderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q. 9], whereby\na man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It is censurable to study the style of one's outward\nmovements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do\nnot agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one\nto study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may be\ncorrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): \"Let them be without\nartifice, but not without correction.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Can Be a Virtue About Games?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games.\nFor Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): \"Our Lord said: 'Woe to you who\nlaugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not\nonly excessive, games should be avoided.\" Now that which can be done\nvirtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be\na virtue about games.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us,\"\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in\nMatth.]: \"It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun.\nListen to what happened to those who played: 'The people sat down to\neat and drink, and they rose up to play.'\" Therefore there can be no\nvirtue about games.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that \"playful\nactions are not directed to something else.\" But it is a requisite of\nvirtue that the agent in choosing should \"direct his action to\nsomething else,\" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore\nthere can be no virtue about games.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): \"I pray thee,\nspare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax\nthe high pressure of his attention to work.\" Now this relaxation of\nthe mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it\nbecomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at\ntimes. Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to\ngames the virtue of _eutrapelia_, which we may call \"pleasantness.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's\nrefreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is\nfinite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it\nwith his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount\nof work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain\nwork, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when\nthe soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the\nintellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs.\nNow sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the\nsoul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations\nof reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul,\nwhether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the\npractical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater\nif the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby\nit is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain\noutward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor.\nIn either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another,\naccording as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now\njust as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so\nweariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and\nthe soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2;\nI-II, Q. 31, A. 1, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of\nsoul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by\nslackening the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the\n_Conferences of the Fathers_ (xxiv, 21), it is related of Blessed\nJohn the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on\nfinding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have\ntold one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the\nlatter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do\nit indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it,\nthe bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that\nin like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never\nrelaxed.\n\nNow such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than\nthe soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is\nnecessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it\nwere, to the soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that \"in the intercourse of this life\nthere is a kind of rest that is associated with games\": and\nconsequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.\n\nNevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points\nwhich require especial caution. The first and chief is that the\npleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious\ndeeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that \"one kind\nof joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene.\" Another\nthing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind\naltogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): \"We should beware\nlest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony\nwhich is the concord of good works\": and Tully says (De Offic. i,\n29), that, \"just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute\nfreedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with good\nbehavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright\nmind.\" Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to\nconform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account\nof other circumstances, so that our fun \"befit the hour and the man,\"\nas Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).\n\nNow these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a\nhabit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there\ncan be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of\nwittiness (_eutrapelia_), and a man is said to be pleasant through\nhaving a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a\ncheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from\nimmoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. [*_Eutrapelia_ is\nderived from _trepein_ = \"to turn\"].\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and\npersons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that \"when the\naudience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something\nnovel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the\ngravity of the subject.\" Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with\nthings of the greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, \"Hear, for I\nwill speak of great things.\" Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether\nexclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he\nbegins by saying: \"Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant,\nnevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule;\nsince how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in\nHoly Writ?\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use\nof fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end;\nof whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): \"They have accounted our life a\npastime.\" Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): \"We are so\nbegotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun,\nbut rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and\nmoment.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their species\nare not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such\nactions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and\naccordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use\nof fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): \"It is indeed lawful to\nmake use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to\nsleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty\nby grave and serious matters.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Can Be Sin in the Excess of Play?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of\nplay. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful.\nNow play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be\ngrave sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in\nfun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems\nthat there is no sin in excessive play.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital\nvices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play does\nnot seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would\nseem not to be a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play,\nsince they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess of\nplay were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all\nthose who employ them, as well as those who make them any payment,\nwould sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue;\nfor it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii. 63) that\nis was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain jester would\nbe with him in the life to come.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Prov. 14:13, \"Laughter shall be mingled\nwith sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy,\" remarks: \"A\nmourning that will last for ever.\" Now there is inordinate laughter\nand inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin\ntherein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.\n\n_I answer that,_ In all things dirigible according to reason, the\nexcessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which\nfalls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated (A. 2) that\nplayful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason.\nWherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of\nreason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very\nspecies of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of\njesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be\n\"discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene,\" when to wit a man,\nfor the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such\nas are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal\nsins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.\n\nSecondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due\ncircumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue\ntimes or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or\npersons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong\nattachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives\ntherefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a\ncommandment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like\namusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance\nwhere a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its\nsake to do anything in disobedience to God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Certain things are sinful on account of the intention\nalone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an\nintention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of\nwhich is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from\nsin, or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to\ntheir species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is\nno excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which\nGregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it\nis written (Ex. 32:6): \"The people sat down to eat and drink, and\nthey rose up to play.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2), play is necessary for the intercourse\nof human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a\nlawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of\nplay-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not\nunlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that\ntheir playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or\ndeeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into\nundue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have\nno other occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in\nreference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both\nserious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own\npassions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor.\nWherefore those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act\njustly, by rewarding them for their services. On the other hand, if a\nman spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who\npractice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them in their sin.\nHence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that \"to give one's\nproperty to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue\"; unless by chance\nsome play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to\nassist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic. [*Quoted in Canon Pasce,\ndist. 86]): \"Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst\nsave a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain\nhim.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Is a Sin in Lack of Mirth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For\nno sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a\npenitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: \"Let him\nrefrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to\nobtain the grace of a full pardon.\" Therefore there is no sin in lack\nof mirth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men.\nBut some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for it\nis written (Jer. 15:17): \"I sat not in the assembly of jesters,\" and\n(Tobias 3:17): \"Never have I joined myself with them that play;\nneither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in\nlightness.\" Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the\nvirtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives\nnor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the\nlack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than\nsinful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the\nlack of mirth to be a vice.\n\n_I answer that,_ In human affairs whatever is against reason is a\nsin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others,\nby offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment.\nWherefore Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De\nContinentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): \"Let your\nconduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or\ndespise you as a cad.\" Now a man who is without mirth, not only is\nlacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he\nis deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are\nvicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher\nstates (Ethic. iv, 8).\n\nSince, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and\npleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are\nnot in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as\nstated in _Ethic._ x, 6, it follows that \"lack of mirth is less\nsinful than excess thereof.\" Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,\n10): \"We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but\nlittle sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt\nsuffices for our meat.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called\nupon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default,\nbecause this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with\nreason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the\nstate of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds: \"I\nsat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats.\" The words of\nTobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his\nadding: \"Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in\nlightness.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures,\nbut only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it would\nseem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6)\ncalls \"friendliness,\" or _eutrapelia_, otherwise wittiness.\nNevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement\nwith temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 169\n\nOF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel,\nand under this head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward\napparel?\n\n(2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 169, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Can Be Virtue and Vice in Connection with Outward\nApparel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in\nconnection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not\nbelong to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different\ntimes and places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12)\nthat \"among the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a\ncloak with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is\nscandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without\nthem.\" Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us\na natural aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue or\nvice about such things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with\noutward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in\noutward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of\nthe altar use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry.\nLikewise it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it\nis said in praise of certain people (Heb. 11:37): \"They wandered\nabout in sheepskins and in goatskins.\" Therefore it seems that there\ncannot be virtue and vice in this matter.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or\nintellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with\nmatter of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge\nof truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected therewith,\nsince that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues\nenumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it.\nTherefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection\nwith this kind of attire.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Honesty [*Cf. Q. 145] pertains to virtue. Now a\ncertain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says\n(De Offic. i, 19): \"The body should be bedecked naturally and without\naffectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not\nwith costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that\nnothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to\nincrease its beauty.\" Therefore there can be virtue and vice in the\noutward attire.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is not in the outward things themselves which man\nuses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them\nimmoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in\ncomparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore\nAugustine says (Confess. iii, 8): \"Those offenses which are contrary\nto the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs\ngenerally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by\ncustom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the\nlawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part,\nwhich harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive.\" Secondly, the\nlack of moderation in the use of these things may arise from the\ninordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man\nsometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either in accordance\nwith the custom of those among whom he dwells or contrary to such\ncustom. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): \"We must\navoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only\nwickedly to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but\nfrequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden,\nwhile under the restraint of established morality, it displays its\ndeformity in a most lawless outbreak.\"\n\nIn point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways.\nFirst when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; in so\nfar as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence\nGregory says (Hom. xl in Ev.): \"There are some who think that\nattention to finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were\nno fault, the word of God would not say so expressly that the rich\nman who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine\nlinen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly apparel\" (such, namely, as\nexceeds his estate) \"save for vainglory.\" Secondly, when a man seeks\nsensuous pleasure from excessive attention to dress, in so far as\ndress is directed to the body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too\nsolicitous [*Cf. Q. 55, A. 6] in his attention to outward apparel.\n\nAccordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in\nconnection with outward attire; namely \"humility,\" which excludes the\nseeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is \"the habit of\navoiding excessive expenditure and parade\"; \"contentment\" [*Cf. Q.\n143, Obj. 4], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure,\nwherefore he says that \"contentedness is the habit that makes a man\nsatisfied with what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is\nbecoming in his manner of life\" (according to the saying of the\nApostle, 1 Tim. 6:8): \"Having food and wherewith to be covered, with\nthese let us be content;\"--and \"simplicity,\" which excludes excessive\nsolicitude about such things, wherefore he says that \"simplicity is a\nhabit that makes a man contented with what he has.\"\n\nIn the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two\nways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite study or\ntrouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. vii, 7) that \"it is a mark of effeminacy to let one's cloak\ntrail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up.\" Secondly,\nby seeking glory from the very lack of attention to outward attire.\nHence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that \"not only\nthe glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of\nmourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as\nbeing a decoy under the guise of God's service\"; and the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. iv, 7) that \"both excess and inordinate defect are a\nsubject of ostentation.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although outward attire does not come from nature, it\nbelongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally\ninclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward\nraiment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or again\nthe ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel than\nothers, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the\nexcellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this\nis not sinful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii,\n12): \"Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the\nbounds observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either\nsignifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he\nuses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation.\"\n\nLikewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is\nnot always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people. For, if\nthis be done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself\nabove others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas, if this be done\nto tame the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue\nof temperance. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12):\n\"Whoever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is\ncustomary with those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or\nsuperstitious.\" Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment\nbefitting to those who by word and example urge others to repentance,\nas did the prophets of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage\nquoted. Wherefore a gloss on Matt. 3:4, says: \"He who preaches\npenance, wears the garb of penance.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: This outward apparel is an indication of man's estate;\nwherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable to the\nvirtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns\nto deeds and words, which are indications of something connected with\nman's estate.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 169, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Adornment of Women Is Devoid of Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid\nof mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine\nlaw is a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a\nprecept of the Divine law; for it is written (1 Pet. 3:3): \"Whose,\"\nnamely women's, \"adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the\nhair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel.\"\nWherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: \"Those who are clothed in silk and\npurple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with\ngold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind\nand body.\" Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the\nadornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): \"I hold that not\nonly virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without\nexception, should be admonished that nowise should they deface God's\nwork and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of\nyellow pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that\nalters the natural features.\" And afterwards he adds: \"They lay hands\non God, when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an\nassault on the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou\nshalt not be able to see God, having no longer the eyes that God\nmade, but those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on\nwhose account thou art bedecked.\" But this is not due except to\nmortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal\nsin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man's\nclothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately.\nNow the former is a sin, for it is written (Deut. 22:5): \"A woman\nshall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use\nwoman's apparel.\" Therefore it seems that also the excessive\nadornment of women is a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ If this were true it would seem that the\nmakers of these means of adornment sin mortally.\n\n_I answer that,_ As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in\nmind the general statements made above (A. 1) concerning outward\napparel, and also something special, namely that a woman's apparel\nmay incite men to lust, according to Prov. 7:10, \"Behold a woman\nmeeteth him in harlot's attire, prepared to deceive souls.\"\n\nNevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest\nthrough despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written (1\nCor. 7:34) that the woman \"that is married thinketh on the things of\nthe world, how she may please her husband.\" Wherefore if a married\nwoman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this\nwithout sin.\n\nBut those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are\nin a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin\ndesire to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because\nthis is to incite them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves\nwith this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally;\nwhereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of\nostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the\nsame applies to men in this respect. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv\nad Possid.): \"I do not wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing\nof gold or costly attire except in the case of those who being\nneither married nor wishful to marry, should think how they may\nplease God: whereas the others think on the things of the world,\neither husbands how they may please their wives, or wives how they\nmay please their husbands, except that it is unbecoming for women\nthough married to uncover their hair, since the Apostle commands them\nto cover the head.\" Yet in this case some might be excused from sin,\nwhen they do this not through vanity but on account of some contrary\ncustom: although such a custom is not to be commended.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As a gloss says on this passage, \"The wives of those\nwho were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves\nthat they might please other men\": and the Apostle forbids this.\nCyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid married\nwomen to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the\nlatter be afforded an occasion of sin with other women. Hence the\nApostle says (1 Tim. 2:9): \"Women . . . in ornate [Douay: 'decent']\napparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with\nplaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire\": whence we are\ngiven to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves\nsoberly and moderately but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and\nimmodestly.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this\nis a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore\nAugustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): \"To dye oneself with paints in\norder to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit.\nI doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it,\nby whom alone\" (i.e. the husbands) \"are they to be permitted, but not\nordered, to adorn themselves.\" However, such painting does not always\ninvolve a mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of\nsensuous pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to like cases that\nCyprian refers.\n\nIt must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a\nbeauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement arising from\nsome cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since\naccording to the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23), \"such as we think to be the\nless honorable members of the body, about these we put more abundant\nhonor.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in the foregoing Article, outward apparel\nshould be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the\ngeneral custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear\nman's clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of\nsensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Deut.\n22) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for\nthe purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this may be done\nsometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order\nto hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of other clothes, or\nfor some similar motive.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In the case of an art directed to the production of\ngoods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen\nsin in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion\nof sin; for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything\npertaining to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the\nproducts of which may be employed by man either for a good or for an\nevil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such\nan art is not sinful. These alone should be called arts; wherefore\nChrysostom says [*Hom. xlix super Matth.]: \"The name of art should be\napplied to those only which contribute towards and produce\nnecessaries and mainstays of life.\" In the case of an art that\nproduces things which for the most part some people put to an evil\nuse, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves, nevertheless,\naccording to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from\nthe State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since women may\nlawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of their\nestate, or even by adding something thereto, in order to please their\nhusbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do\nnot sin in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing\nmeans that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says\n(Super Matth.) that \"even the shoemakers' and clothiers' arts stand\nin need of restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by\nabusing its needs, and debasing art by art.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 170\n\nOF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the precepts of temperance:\n\n(1) The precepts of temperance itself;\n\n(2) The precepts of its parts.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 170, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Precepts of Temperance Are Suitably Given in the Divine\nLaw?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the precepts of temperance are\nunsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater\nvirtue than temperance, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 141, A. 8;\nI-II, Q. 66, A. 4). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the\nprecepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the\nprecepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the\nprecepts of the decalogue the prohibition of adultery, which is\ncontrary to temperance, as stated above (Q. 154, AA. 1, 8).\n\nObj. 2: Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but\nalso about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the\ndecalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of\nmeat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore,\nshould they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to\nvenereal pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue\nprecedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order\nthat obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the\ndecalogue are the most important in the Divine law. Therefore the\nprecepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept\ndirectly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative\nprecept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue\n(Ex. 20:14, 17).\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), \"the end of the\ncommandment is charity,\" which is enjoined upon us in the two\nprecepts concerning the love of God and of our neighbor. Wherefore\nthe decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the\nlove of God and of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to\ntemperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of\nour neighbor, since thereby a man lays hold of another's property for\nhis own use, by abusing his neighbor's wife. Wherefore the precepts\nof the decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only\nas committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there\nis not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor as\nadultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance.\nAnd yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to\nbe sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the\nprecepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus. 8:18): \"Go not\non the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our\nneighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust,\nfor a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over\nwhom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of\nhis wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [*1\nCor. 7:4].\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, AA. 1, 4) the precepts of the\ndecalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need\nto be common precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common\naffirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of\ntemperance varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks\n(De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and\ncustoms.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 170, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Precepts of the Virtues Annexed to Temperance Are\nSuitably Given in the Divine Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed\nto temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the\nprecepts of the Decalogue, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), are certain\nuniversal principles of the whole Divine law. Now \"pride is the\nbeginning of all sin,\" according to Ecclus. 10:15. Therefore among\nthe precepts of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding\npride.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a place before all should have been given in the\ndecalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced to\nfulfil the Law, because these would seem to be the most important.\nNow since humility subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to\ndispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience\nis accounted one of the degrees of humility, as stated above (Q. 161,\nA. 6); and the same apparently applies to meekness, the effect of\nwhich is that a man does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as\nAugustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that\nthe Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility and meekness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that adultery\nis forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the love of\nour neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is\ncontrary to modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore\nAugustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): \"In all your movements let\nnothing be done to offend the eye of any person whatever.\" Therefore\nit seems that this kind of inordinateness should also have been\nforbidden by a precept of the Decalogue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ suffices the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered\nin two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects.\nConsidered in themselves they have no direct connection with the love\nof God or of our neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation\nof things pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects,\nthey may regard the love of God or of our neighbor: and in this\nrespect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the\nprohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of\ntemperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness,\nis sometimes that a man goes on to commit murder (and this is\nforbidden in the Decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses due honor\nto his parents, which may also be the result of pride, which leads\nmany to transgress the precepts of the first table.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in\nthe heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common.\nHence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of\nthe Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to\nthe observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given,\nwherefore they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a\nplace in the Decalogue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one's\nneighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder,\nadultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only\nas being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (Q. 168,\nA. 1, ad 1, 3).\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON GRATUITOUS GRACES (QQ. 171-182)\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 171\n\nOF PROPHECY\n(In Six Articles)\n\nAfter treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain\nto men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those\nthings which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple\ndifference between men as regards things connected with the soul's\nhabits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous\ngraces, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, 7: \"There are diversities of graces\n. . . and to one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to\nanother the word of knowledge,\" etc. Another difference arises from\nthe diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative\nlife, which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it\nis stated (1 Cor. 12:4, 7) that \"there are diversities of\noperations.\" For the purpose of operation in Martha, who \"was busy\nabout much serving,\" which pertains to the active life, differed from\nthe purpose of operation in Mary, \"who sitting . . . at the Lord's\nfeet, heard His word\" (Luke 10:39, 40), which pertains to the\ncontemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various\nduties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. 4:11, \"And He gave\nsome apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and\nother some pastors and doctors\": and this pertains to diversity of\nministries, of which it is written (1 Cor. 12:5): \"There are\ndiversities of ministries.\"\n\nWith regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be\nconsidered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to\nknowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things\npertaining to knowledge may be comprised under _prophecy,_ since\nprophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to\nman, but also to things relating to God, both as to those which are\nto be believed by all and are matters of _faith,_ and as to yet\nhigher mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to _wisdom._\nAgain, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual\nsubstances, by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to\nthe _discernment of spirits._ Moreover it extends to the direction of\nhuman acts, and this pertains to _knowledge,_ as we shall explain\nfurther on (Q. 177). Accordingly we must first of all consider\nprophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy.\n\nProphecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence;\n(2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division\nof prophecy.\n\nUnder the first head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?\n\n(2) Whether it is a habit?\n\n(3) Whether it is only about future contingencies?\n\n(4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy?\n\n(5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the\ngift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit?\n\n(6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Prophecy Pertains to Knowledge?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to\nknowledge. For it is written (Ecclus. 48:14) that after death the\nbody of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (Ecclus. 49:18) it is said\nof Joseph that \"his bones were visited, and after death they\nprophesied.\" Now no knowledge remains in the body or in the bones\nafter death. Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): \"He that prophesieth,\nspeaketh to men unto edification.\" Now speech is not knowledge\nitself, but its effect. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does\nnot pertain to knowledge.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and\nmadness. Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is\nwritten (Osee 9:7): \"Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish\nand mad [*Vulg.: 'the spiritual man was mad'].\" Therefore prophecy is\nnot a cognitive perfection.\n\nObj. 4: Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so\ninspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a\nkind of motion. Now prophecy is described as \"inspiration\" or\n\"revelation,\" according to Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt. i].\nTherefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the\nintellect more than to the affections.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Kings 9:9): \"For he that is now\ncalled a prophet, in time past was called a seer.\" Now sight pertains\nto knowledge. Therefore prophecy pertains to knowledge.\n\n_I answer that,_ Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge,\nbecause, to wit, prophets know things that are far (_procul_) removed\nfrom man's knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name\nfrom _phanos_, \"apparition,\" because things appear to them from afar.\nWherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), \"in the Old Testament,\nthey were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and\nsurveyed things hidden in mystery.\" Hence among heathen nations they\nwere known as _vates,_ \"on account of their power of mind (_vi\nmentis_),\"    [*The Latin _vates_ is from the Greek _phates_, and may\nbe rendered \"soothsayer\"] (ibid. viii, 7).\n\nSince, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): \"The manifestation of\nthe Spirit is given to every man unto profit,\" and further on (1 Cor.\n14:12): \"Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church,\" it\nfollows that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far as\nthe prophets declare for the instruction of others, the things they\nknow through being taught of God, according to the saying of Isa.\n21:10, \"That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of\nIsrael, I have declared unto you.\" Accordingly, as Isidore says\n(Etym. viii, 7), \"prophets\" may be described as _praefatores_\n(foretellers), \"because they tell from afar (_porro fantur_),\" that\nis, speak from a distance, \"and foretell the truth about things to\ncome.\"\n\nNow those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be\nconfirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards the\noperation of the Divine power, according to Mk. 16:20, \"They . . .\npreached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word\nwith signs that followed.\" Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned with\nthe working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic\nutterances. Wherefore it is written (Deut. 34:10, 11): \"There arose\nno more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face\nto face, in all the signs and wonders.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the\nthird point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic\nutterances.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those prophets who are described as foolish and mad are\nnot true but false prophets, of whom it is said (Jer. 3:16): \"Hearken\nnot to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive\nyou; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth\nof the Lord,\" and (Ezech. 13:3): \"Woe to the foolish prophets, that\nfollow their own spirit, and see nothing.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the\nmind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is\nwritten (Ezech. 2:1): \"Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will\nspeak to thee.\" This raising of the intention is brought about by the\nmotion of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: \"And the\nSpirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet.\" After the\nmind's intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the\nthings of God; hence the text continues: \"And I heard Him speaking to\nme.\" Accordingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards\nthe raising of the mind, according to Job 32:8, \"The inspiration of\nthe Almighty giveth understanding\": while revelation is necessary, as\nregards the very perception of Divine things, whereby prophecy is\ncompleted; by its means the veil of darkness and ignorance is\nremoved, according to Job 12:22, \"He discovereth great things out of\ndarkness.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Prophecy Is a Habit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to\n_Ethic._ ii, 5, \"there are three things in the soul, power, passion,\nand habit.\" Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all\nmen, since the powers of the soul are common to them. Again it is not\na passion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 22, A. 2); whereas prophecy pertains\nprincipally to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing Article.\nTherefore prophecy is a habit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every perfection of the soul, which is not always in\nact, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul; and it is\nnot always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep.\nTherefore seemingly prophecy is a habit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces.\nNow grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 2). Therefore prophecy is a habit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A habit is something \"whereby we act when we\nwill,\" as the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198] says\n(De Anima iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will,\nas appears in the case of Eliseus (4 Kings 3:15), \"who on Josaphat\ninquiring of him concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy\nfailing him, caused a minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit\nof prophecy might come down upon him through the praise of psalmody,\nand fill his mind with things to come,\" as Gregory observes (Hom. i\nsuper Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not a habit.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13), \"all that is made\nmanifest is light,\" because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the\nmaterial sight takes place through material light, so too the\nmanifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual\nlight. Accordingly manifestation must be proportionate to the light\nby means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate\nto its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that\nsurpasses natural reason, as stated above (A. 1), it follows that\nprophecy requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of\nnatural reason. Hence the saying of Micah 7:8: \"When I sit in\ndarkness, the Lord is my light.\" Now light may be in a subject in two\nways: first, by way of an abiding form, as material light is in the\nsun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or passing\nimpression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic light is not in\nthe prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form, else a prophet\nwould always be able to prophesy, which is clearly false. For Gregory\nsays (Hom. i super Ezech.): \"Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is\nlacking to the prophet, nor is it always within the call of his mind,\nyet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a\ngift.\" Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4 Kings 4:27): \"Her\nsoul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not\ntold me.\" The reason for this is that the intellectual light that is\nin a subject by way of an abiding and complete form, perfects the\nintellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle of the\nthings manifested by that light; thus by the light of the active\nintellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all\nthings known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to\nsupernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God\nHimself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is\nseen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an\nabiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, \"In Thy light we\nshall see light.\"\n\nIt follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's\nsoul by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated\nEx. 33:22: \"When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of\nthe rock,\" etc., and 3 Kings 19:11: \"Go forth and stand upon the\nmount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth,\" etc. Hence it is\nthat even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too\nthe prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a\ndisciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to\nhave every detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Isa.\n1:4): \"In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a\nmaster.\" This is also indicated by the very manner in which\nprophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that \"the Lord spake to\nsuch and such a prophet,\" or that \"the word of the Lord,\" or \"the\nhand of the Lord was made upon him.\"\n\nBut a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that,\nproperly speaking, prophecy is not a habit.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This division of the Philosopher's does not comprise\nabsolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be\nprinciples of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion,\nsometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of\nthose who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before\nhaving the habit of that action.\n\nHowever, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand\npassion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the\nPhilosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that \"to understand is, in a way,\nto be passive.\" For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible\nintellect is passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in\nprophetic knowledge the human intellect is passive to the\nenlightening of the Divine light.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases,\nthere remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion--thus\nwood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too in the\nprophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there\nremains an aptitude to be enlightened anew--thus when the mind has\nonce been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its\nformer devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9)\nthat our prayers need to be frequent, \"lest devotion be extinguished\nas soon as it is kindled.\"\n\nWe might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even\nwhile his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of\nhis being deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, \"And I made thee a\nprophet unto the nations.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every gift of grace raises man to something above human\nnature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the substance\nof the act--for instance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge\nof the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom--and for such\nacts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing\nis above human nature as to the mode but not the substance of the\nact--for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His\ncreatures--and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Prophecy Is Only About Future Contingencies?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about future\ncontingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that\n\"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue\nof things with unchangeable truth.\" Now issues pertain to future\ncontingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future\ncontingencies alone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is\ndifferentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things;\nand from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits;\nand from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts\nare differentiated by their objects, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A.\n2). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected\nwith any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future\ncontingencies alone.\n\nObj. 3: Further, difference of object causes difference of species,\nas stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Therefore, if one prophecy is\nabout future contingencies, and another about other things, it would\nseem to follow that these are different species of prophecy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that some\nprophecies are \"about the future, for instance (Isa. 7:14), 'Behold a\nvirgin shall conceive, and bear a son'\"; some are \"about the past, as\n(Gen. 1:1), 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'\"; some\nare \"about the present,\" as (1 Cor. 14:24, 25), \"If all prophesy, and\nthere come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart\nare made manifest.\" Therefore prophecy is not about future\ncontingencies alone.\n\n_I answer that,_ A manifestation made by means of a certain light can\nextend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the\nbody's sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge\nextends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect.\nNow prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is\npossible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and\ncorporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them\nall. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation\nconcerning the perfections of God and the angels was made to Isa.\n6:1, where it is written, \"I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high\nand elevated.\" Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to\nnatural bodies, according to the words of Isa. 40:12, \"Who hath\nmeasured the waters in the hollow of His hand,\" etc. It also contains\nmatters relating to human conduct, according to Isa. 58:1, \"Deal thy\nbread to the hungry,\" etc.; and besides this it contains things\npertaining to future events, according to Isa. 47:9, \"Two things\nshall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and widowhood.\"\n\nSince, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge,\nit must be observed that the more remote things are from our\nknowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things\nthere are three degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the\nknowledge, either sensitive or intellective, of some particular man,\nbut not from the knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by\nsense things present to him locally, which another man does not know\nby human sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew\nprophetically what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4\nKings 5:26), and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are\nmanifested prophetically to another, according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and\nagain in this way what one man knows by demonstration may be revealed\nto another prophetically.\n\nThe second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge\nof all men without exception, not that they are in themselves\nunknowable, but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as\nthe mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim\nsaying: \"Holy, Holy, Holy,\" etc. (Isa. 6:3).\n\nThe last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all\nmen, through being in themselves unknowable; such are future\ncontingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that\nwhich is predicated universally and by its very nature, takes\nprecedence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative\nsense, it follows that revelation of future events belongs most\nproperly to prophecy, and from this prophecy apparently takes its\nname. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): \"And since a prophet\nis so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its\nsignificance when he speaks of the past or present.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Prophecy is there defined according to its proper\nsignification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from\nthe other gratuitous graces.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This is evident from what has just been said. We might\nalso reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have\nthe common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine\nrevelation; whereas those that are the matter of _wisdom, knowledge,_\nand the _interpretation of speeches,_ can be known by man through\nnatural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through the\nenlightening of the Divine light. As to _faith,_ although it is about\nthings invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of\nthe things believed, but with a man's certitude of assent to things\nknown by others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine\nlight, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy, although\nthe things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 4]\n\nWhether by the Divine Revelation a Prophet Knows All That Can Be\nKnown Prophetically?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet\nknows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos\n3:7): \"The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His\nservants the prophets.\" Now whatever is revealed prophetically is\nsomething done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is\nrevealed to the prophet.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"God's works are perfect\" (Deut. 32:4). Now prophecy\nis a \"Divine revelation,\" as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is\nperfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters of\nprophecy were revealed prophetically, since \"the perfect is that\nwhich lacks nothing\" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters\nof prophecy are revealed to the prophet.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more\npowerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human\nscience. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains\nto that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar.\nTherefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that \"sometimes\nthe spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind\nand nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but\nto the future.\" Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of\nprophecy.\n\n_I answer that,_ Things which differ from one another need not exist\nsimultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are\nconnected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above\n(I-II, Q. 65, AA. 1, 2) that all the virtues must needs exist\nsimultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things\nthat are known through some principle are connected in that principle\nand depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as\nregards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all\nthat can be known through that principle; whereas if the common\nprinciple is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not\nfollow that one knows all those things at the same time, but each of\nthem has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of\nthem may be known, and some not.\n\nNow the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested\nby the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see\nin itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible\nmatters of prophecy; but each one knows some of them according to the\nspecial revelation of this or that matter.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are\nnecessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every\none, but some to one, and some to another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the\ngenus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8) that\n\"prophecies shall be made void,\" and that \"we prophesy in part,\" i.e.\nimperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its perfection\nin heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor. 113:10): \"When\nthat which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done\naway.\" Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking to\nprophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things to which\nprophecy is directed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that\nscience, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends;\nwherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know\nwhatever is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle\nof prophetic knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy;\nwherefore the comparison fails.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Prophet Always Distinguishes What He Says by His Own\nSpirit from What He Says by the Prophetic Spirit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what\nhe says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit.\nFor Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said \"she\ncould, through a certain feeling, which in words she could not\nexpress, discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her\nown soul.\" Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above (A.\n3). Therefore the prophet always distinguishes what he says by the\nspirit of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome\n[*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]\nsays. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer. 23:28): \"The prophet that\nhath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him\nspeak My word with truth.\" Therefore the prophet can distinguish what\nhe has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is\ngreater than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now\nhe that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain\nthat he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is\nmuch more certain that he has it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): \"It must be\nobserved that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter\ncertain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to\nprophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways:\nin one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most\nmysterious instinct to \"which the human mind is subjected without\nknowing it,\" as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the\nprophet has the greatest certitude about those things which he knows\nby an express revelation, and he has it for certain that they are\nrevealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:15): \"In\ntruth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your\nhearing.\" Else, were he not certain about this, the faith which\nrelies on the utterances of the prophet would not be certain. A sign\nof the prophet's certitude may be gathered from the fact that Abraham\nbeing admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his\nonly-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had he not been\nmost certain of the Divine revelation.\n\nOn the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by\ninstinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully\nwhether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own\nspirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all\nmanifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something\nimperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to\nunderstand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to\nerror, \"they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For\ninstance, cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq.], and from Him they hear the truth,\nso that they reproach themselves for having said what was untrue,\" as\nGregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.).\n\nThe arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation\nthat is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the\nobjections is clear.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Things Known or Declared Prophetically Can Be False?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that things known or declared\nprophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future\ncontingencies, as stated above (A. 3). Now future contingencies may\npossibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore\nthe matter of prophecy can be false.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Isa. 38:1):\n\"Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not\nlive,\" and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6).\nAgain the Lord said (Jer. 18:7, 8): \"I will suddenly speak against a\nnation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to\ndestroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent\nof their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to\ndo them.\" This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites,\naccording to John 3:10: \"The Lord [Vulg.: 'God'] had mercy with\nregard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He\ndid it not.\" Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the\nantecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely\nnecessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands\nin the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the\npremises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary\nalways leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in I\nPoster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the\nfollowing conditional proposition must needs be true: \"If a thing has\nbeen prophesied, it will be.\" Now the antecedent of this conditional\nproposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past.\nTherefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is\nunfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies.\nTherefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that\n\"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue\nof things with invariable truth.\" Now the truth of prophecy would not\nbe invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false\ncan come under prophecy.\n\n_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said (AA. 1,\n3, 5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the form of\nteaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation. Now the\ntruth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the\nknowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the\nteacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is\na likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense\nwhen he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that \"prophecy is the seal\nof the Divine foreknowledge.\" Consequently the same truth must needs\nbe in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge,\nunder which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the First\nPart (Q. 16, A. 8). Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13) the\ncertitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the\ncontingency of future singular events, because that knowledge regards\nthe future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore\nprophecy also, which is an \"impressed likeness\" or \"seal of the\nDivine foreknowledge,\" does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the\ncontingency of future things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two\nways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees\nthem in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch\nas it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects. And\nthough future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are\ndeterminate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they\nare not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again,\nthough this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine\nintellect, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation,\nbecause an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a par\nwith the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic\nrevelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in\nso far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: and\nsuch things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this\nsaying of Isa. 7:14: \"Behold a virgin shall conceive.\" Sometimes,\nhowever, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the\nDivine foreknowledge as knowing the order of causes to effects; and\nthen at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy\ndoes not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of the prophecy is that\ninferior causes, whether they be natural causes or human acts, are so\ndisposed as to lead to such a result. In this way we are to\nunderstand the saying of Isa. 38:1: \"Thou shalt die, and not live\";\nin other words, \"The disposition of thy body has a tendency to\ndeath\": and the saying of Jonah 3:4, \"Yet forty days, and Nineveh\nshall be destroyed,\" that is to say, \"Its merits demand that it\nshould be destroyed.\" God is said \"to repent,\" metaphorically,\ninasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by\n\"changing His sentence, although He changes not His counsel\" [*Cf. I,\nQ. 19, A. 7, ad 2].\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as\nthe truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional\nproposition: \"If this was prophesied, it will be,\" is true in the same\nway as the proposition: \"If this was foreknown, it will be\": for in\nboth cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the\nconsequent is necessary, considered, not as something future in our\nregard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in\nthe First Part (Q. 14, A. 13, ad 2).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 172\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are\nsix points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether prophecy is natural?\n\n(2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?\n\n(3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?\n\n(4) Whether a good life is requisite?\n\n(5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?\n\n(6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Prophecy Can Be Natural?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory\nsays (Dial. iv, 26) that \"sometimes the mere strength of the soul is\nsufficiently cunning to foresee certain things\": and Augustine says\n(Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is\nwithdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future\n[*Cf. I, Q. 86, A. 4, ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore\nthe soul can acquire prophecy naturally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while one\nwakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally\nforesee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil.\n[*De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]).\nMuch more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb\nanimals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things\nthat concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is\nevident from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain\ncommences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be\ngathered from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm.\nMuch more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns\nthemselves, and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes\nfrom nature.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): \"When prophecy shall\nfail, the people shall be scattered abroad\"; wherefore it is evident\nthat prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now\n\"nature does not fail in necessaries\" [*Aristotle, _De Anima_ iii,\n9]. Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): \"For prophecy came\nnot by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke,\ninspired by the Holy Ghost.\" Therefore prophecy comes not from\nnature, but through the gift of the Holy Ghost.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 171, A. 6, ad 2) prophetic\nforeknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as\nthey are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes.\nNow, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper\nto the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as\nstated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13). Wherefore such like\nforeknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine\nrevelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown\nin their causes with a natural knowledge even by man: thus a\nphysician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through\nprevious experimental knowledge of the order of those causes to such\neffects. Such like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in\na man by nature in two ways. In one way that the soul, from that\nwhich it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine\nsays (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): \"Some have deemed the human soul to\ncontain a certain power of divination.\" This seems to be in accord\nwith the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that\nour souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas;\nbut that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body;\nyet in some more, in others less, according to a difference in bodily\npurity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are\nnot much obscured through union with the body, are able to foreknow\nsuch like future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion\nAugustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): \"How is it that the soul\ncannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes\nto have it?\"\n\nSince, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of\nAristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated\nin the First Part (Q. 84, A. 6), it is better to have recourse to\nanother explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge\nof the future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience,\nwherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends\non the perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of\nhis understanding.\n\nNevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two\nways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First,\nbecause the former can be about any events whatever, and this\ninfallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had\nnaturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may\nextend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is \"according to the\nunchangeable truth\" [*Q. 171, A. 3, Obj. 1], while the latter is not,\nand can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the\nlatter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above (Q.\n171, A. 3), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass\nhuman knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly so\ncalled cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it\nbecomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances\n[*Cf. I, Q. 88, A. 4, ad 2], and also is more inclined to receive the\nsubtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the\nimpression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving\nthem while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial.\niv, 26) that \"the soul, at the approach of death, foresees certain\nfuture things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature,\" inasmuch as\nit is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future\nthings by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power,\nbecause according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), \"if this were\nso, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed,\"\nwhich is clearly false.\n\nObj. 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from\nthe revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause, as\nstated above (Q. 95, A. 6), when we were treating of divination. Now\nboth these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than\nwhile awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external\nsensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions\neither of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes; although\nas regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in\nwaking than in sleeping.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future\nevents, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their\nimagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination,\nespecially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than\naccording to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects\nmuch more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes\neffects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy\nassists man still more.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction of\nhuman acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government\nof a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this\nnature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Prophetic Revelation Comes Through the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come\nthrough the angels. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom\n\"conveyeth herself into holy souls,\" and \"maketh the friends of God,\nand the prophets.\" Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately.\nTherefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the\nmedium of the angels.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces.\nBut the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1\nCor. 12:4, \"There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit.\"\nTherefore the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that prophecy\nis a \"Divine revelation\": whereas if it were conveyed by the angels,\nit would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not\nbestowed by means of the angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): \"Our glorious\nfathers received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers\"; and\nhe is speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic\nrevelation is conveyed by means of the angels.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), \"Things that are of\nGod are well ordered [*Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of\nGod.'].\" Now the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius [*Coel.\nHier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed\nby middle things. Now the angels hold a middle position between God\nand men, in that they have a greater share in the perfection of the\nDivine goodness than men have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments\nand revelations are conveyed from God to men by the angels. Now\nprophetic knowledge is bestowed by Divine enlightenment and\nrevelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed by the angels.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a\nperfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression;\nwhereas prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel\nalso can form an impression, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A.\n1), wherefore the comparison fails between the two.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as\ntheir first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men by\nmeans of the angels.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed to the principal\nagent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a minister is\nlike an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the\nministry of the angels, is said to be Divine.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Natural Disposition Is Requisite for Prophecy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite\nfor prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to\nthe disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos\n1:2, \"The Lord will roar from Sion,\" says: \"Anyone who wishes to make\na comparison naturally turns to those things of which he has\nexperience, and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors\ncompare their enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck.\nIn like manner Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to\nthat which is inspired by the lion's roar.\" Now that which is\nreceived by a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a\nnatural disposition. Therefore prophecy requires a natural\ndisposition.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty than\nthose of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the\nconsiderations of acquired science, since many are prevented by\nnatural indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations of\nscience. Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for\nthe contemplation of prophecy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle\nthan an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are\nhindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his\ncommentary on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in\nNum.] that \"at the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy\nGhost will not be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that\nfulfils the duty of procreation.\" Much more therefore does a natural\nindisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good\nnatural disposition is requisite for prophecy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in\nEv.): \"He,\" namely the Holy Ghost, \"fills the boy harpist and makes\nhim a Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes\nhim a prophet.\" Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition,\nbut depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is\nwritten (1 Cor. 12:2): \"All these things, one and the same Spirit\nworketh, dividing to every one according as He will.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), prophecy in its true and\nexact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes\nfrom a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative\nsense. Now we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient\ncause requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of\nmatter in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant\nto bring into being matter and disposition and form, so neither does\nHe require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is\nable to produce both the spiritual effect and at the same time the\nfitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature.\nMore than this, He is able at the same time, by creation, to produce\nthe subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the\nprophetic grace, at the very instant of its creation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the\nthing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no\nchange in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him\nincompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The considerations of science proceed from a natural\ncause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in\nmatter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an\nobstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were\naltogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man\nmight be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong\npassion, whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by\nany other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is\nremoved by the Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Good Life Is Requisite for Prophecy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for\nprophecy. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wisdom of God\n\"through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls,\" and \"maketh the\nfriends of God, and prophets.\" Now there can be no holiness without a\ngood life and sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without\na good life and sanctifying grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according\nto John 15:15, \"But I have called you friends, because all things\nwhatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you.\" Now\nGod reveals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it\nwould seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is\nimpossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be\nwithout charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:15): \"Beware of false\nprophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they\nare ravening wolves.\" Now all who are without grace are likened\ninwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false\nprophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by\ngrace.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De\nDivinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that \"if\ninterpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be\nbestowed on any but the best.\" Now it is evident that the gift of\nprophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed\nonly to the best men.\n\n_On the contrary,_ To those who had said, \"Lord, have we not\nprophesied in Thy name?\" this reply is made: \"I never knew you\"\n(Matt. 7:22, 23). Now \"the Lord knoweth who are His\" (2 Tim. 2:19).\nTherefore prophecy can be in those who are not God's by grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ A good life may be considered from two points of\nview. First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying\ngrace. Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and\nthe outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order\nthat man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine\nsays (De Trin. xv, 18): \"A man is not transferred from the left side\nto the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a\nlover of God and of his neighbor.\" Hence whatever can be without\ncharity can be without sanctifying grace, and consequently without\ngoodness of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is\nclear on two counts. First, on account of their respective acts: for\nprophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the\nwill, which power is perfected by charity. For this reason the\nApostle (1 Cor. 13) reckons prophecy with other things pertinent to\nthe intellect, that can be had without charity. Secondly, on account\nof their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous graces\nis given for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, \"The\nmanifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit\"; and\nis not directly intended to unite man's affections to God, which is\nthe purpose of charity. Therefore prophecy can be without a good\nlife, as regards the first root of this goodness.\n\nIf, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of\nthe soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life\nis an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be\nraised very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this\nis hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of\nexternal things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings\n4:38) that they \"dwelt together with [Vulg.: 'before']\" Eliseus,\nleading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should\nbe a hindrance to the gift of prophecy.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both\nfor the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and\nsuch are those whom Divine wisdom, \"conveying itself\" by sanctifying\ngrace to their minds, \"maketh the friends of God, and prophets.\"\nOthers, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of\nothers. Hence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, says: \"Sometimes\nprophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons\nare accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but\neither to the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of\nthose who invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev.] expounding this passage\n[*John 15:15] says: \"Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon\nas we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love is\nto know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because\nhaving renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of\nperfect love.\" In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed\nto prophets.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only those\nwhose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf.\nin Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and\nfalsely ascribed to him] that \"Catholic teachers, though they be\nsinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves,\nbecause they do not purpose the destruction of Christians.\" And since\nprophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such\nare false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.\n\nReply Obj. 4: God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who are\nsimply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best\nas regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants\nthe gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Any Prophecy Comes from the Demons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons.\nFor prophecy is \"a Divine revelation,\" according to Cassiodorus\n[*Prol. in Psalt. i]. But that which is done by a demon is not\nDivine. Therefore no prophecy can be from a demon.\n\nObj. 2: Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for\nprophetic knowledge, as stated above (Q. 171, AA. 2, 3). Now the\ndemons do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the\nFirst Part (Q. 119, A. 3). Therefore no prophecy can come from the\ndemons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now\nprophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss on\nRom. 12:6, \"Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of\nfaith,\" says: \"Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with\nprophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our\nfaith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied.\"\nTherefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the demons.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (3 Kings 18:19): \"Gather unto me all\nIsrael unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and\nfifty, and the prophets of the grove four hundred, who eat at\nJezebel's table.\" Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it\nwould seem that there is also a prophecy from the demons.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 171, A. 1), prophecy denotes\nknowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an\nintellect of a higher order can know some things that are far removed\nfrom the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human\nintellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also the\nintellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature.\nHence the demons, even by their natural knowledge, know certain\nthings remote from men's knowledge, which they can reveal to men:\nalthough those things which God alone knows are remote simply and\nmost of all.\n\nAccordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine\nrevelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the demons may\nbe called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom\nsomething is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures as\nprophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as \"false\nprophets,\" or \"prophets of idols.\" Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.\nxii, 19): \"When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes\nas these,\" namely visions, \"he makes him either devilish, or\npossessed, or a false prophet.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its proper and\nsimple acceptation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The demons reveal what they know to men, not by\nenlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by\naudible speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true\nprophecy.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from\nDivine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom\nsays [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John\nChrysostom] that \"some prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as\ndiviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil\nsometimes utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never.\" Wherefore it\nis written (Deut. 18:21, 22): \"If in silent thought thou answer: How\nshall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this\nsign: Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in the name of the\nLord, and it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Prophets of the Demons Ever Foretell the Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the prophets of the demons never\nforetell the truth. For Ambrose [*Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on\n1 Cor. 12:3] says that \"Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from\nthe Holy Ghost.\" Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from the\nHoly Ghost, because \"there is no concord between Christ and Belial\n[*'What concord hath Christ with Belial?']\" (2 Cor. 6:15). Therefore\nit would seem that they never foretell the truth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of\ntruth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit of\nuntruth, according to 3 Kings 22:22, \"I will go forth, and be a lying\nspirit in the mouth of all his prophets.\" Now the prophets inspired\nby the Holy Ghost never speak false, as stated above (Q. 111, A. 6).\nTherefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is said of the devil (John 8:44) that \"when he\nspeaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and\nthe father thereof,\" i.e. of lying. Now by inspiring his prophets,\nthe devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God's\nminister to declare the truth, since \"light hath no fellowship with\ndarkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness?']\" (2\nCor. 6:14). Therefore the prophets of the demons never foretell the\ntruth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that \"Balaam was a\ndiviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons\nand the magic art.\" Now he foretold many true things, for instance\nthat which is to be found in Num. 24:17: \"A star shall rise out of\nJacob, and a scepter shall spring up from Israel.\" Therefore even the\nprophets of the demons foretell the truth.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the good is in relation to things, so is the true\nin relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one\nthat is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for\nany knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth.\nHence Bede says [*Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ.\nEvang. ii, 40] that \"no teaching is so false that it never mingles\ntruth with falsehood.\" Hence the teaching of the demons, with which\nthey instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is\nrendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood by\nthe semblance of truth, even as the will is seduced to evil by the\nsemblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in\nMatth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: \"The\ndevil is allowed sometimes to speak true things, in order that his\nunwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the\ndemons' revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was\nevidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke\nto him (Num. 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons, because\nGod makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He\nforetells certain truths even by the demons' prophets, both that the\ntruth may be rendered more credible, since even its foes bear witness\nto it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more\neasily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true\nthings about Christ.\n\nYet even when the demons' prophets are instructed by the demons, they\nforetell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own nature, the\nauthor of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the\ngood spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): so that\neven then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of\ntruth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what is\nnot true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the\nspirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even\nthe very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes\nfalse, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those things are called the demons' own, which they\nhave of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of\nthemselves but of God, those things which belong to them by nature:\nand it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell\nthe truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to\nmake known the truth which is to be accomplished through them, by\nrevealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already\nstated (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19; I, Q. 109, A. 4, ad 1).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 173\n\nOF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is\nconveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the prophets see God's very essence?\n\n(2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of\ncertain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone?\n\n(3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction\nfrom the sense?\n\n(4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things\nprophesied?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Prophets See the Very Essence of God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the prophets see the very essence of\nGod, for a gloss on Isa. 38:1, \"Take order with thy house, for thou\nshalt die and not live,\" says: \"Prophets can read in the book of\nGod's foreknowledge in which all things are written.\" Now God's\nforeknowledge is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God's very\nessence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) that \"in that\neternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with\nthe mind's eye the type both of our being and of our actions.\" Now,\nof all men, prophets have the highest knowledge of Divine things.\nTherefore they, especially, see the Divine essence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, future contingencies are foreknown by the prophets\n\"with unchangeable truth.\" Now future contingencies exist thus in God\nalone. Therefore the prophets see God Himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The vision of the Divine essence is not made void\nin heaven; whereas \"prophecy is made void\" (1 Cor. 13:8). Therefore\nprophecy is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar\noff. Wherefore it is said of the prophets (Heb. 11:13) that \"they\nwere beholding . . . afar off.\" But those who are in heaven and in\nthe state of bliss see, not as from afar off, but rather, as it were,\nfrom near at hand, according to Ps. 139:14, \"The upright shall dwell\nwith Thy countenance.\" Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge\ndiffers from the perfect knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so\nthat it is distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the perfect,\nand when the latter comes the former is made void, as appears from\nthe words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 13:10).\n\nSome, however, wishing to discriminate between prophetic knowledge\nand the knowledge of the blessed, have maintained that the prophets\nsee the very essence of God (which they call the \"mirror of\neternity\") [*Cf. De Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D, XI, part 2, art.\n2, ad 4], not, however, in the way in which it is the object of the\nblessed, but as containing the types [*Cf. I, Q. 15] of future\nevents. But this is altogether impossible. For God is the object of\nbliss in His very essence, according to the saying of Augustine\n(Confess. v, 4): \"Happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not\nthese,\" i.e. creatures. Now it is not possible to see the types of\ncreatures in the very essence of God without seeing It, both because\nthe Divine essence is Itself the type of all things that are\nmade--the ideal type adding nothing to the Divine essence save only a\nrelationship to the creature--and because knowledge of a thing in\nitself--and such is the knowledge of God as the object of heavenly\nbliss--precedes knowledge of that thing in its relation to something\nelse--and such is the knowledge of God as containing the types of\nthings. Consequently it is impossible for prophets to see God as\ncontaining the types of creatures, and yet not as the object of\nbliss. Therefore we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not\nthe vision of the very essence of God, and that the prophets do not\nsee in the Divine essence Itself the things they do see, but that\nthey see them in certain images, according as they are enlightened by\nthe Divine light.\n\nWherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking of prophetic\nvisions, says that \"the wise theologian calls that vision divine\nwhich is effected by images of things lacking a bodily form through\nthe seer being rapt in divine things.\" And these images illumined by\nthe Divine light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine\nessence: since in a mirror images are formed from other things, and\nthis cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet's mind thus enlightened\nmay be called a mirror, in so far as a likeness of the truth of the\nDivine foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason it is called\nthe \"mirror of eternity,\" as representing God's foreknowledge, for\nGod in His eternity sees all things as present before Him, as stated\nabove (Q. 172, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The prophets are said to read the book of God's\nforeknowledge, inasmuch as the truth is reflected from God's\nforeknowledge on the prophet's mind.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man is said to see in the First Truth the type of his\nexistence, in so far as the image of the First Truth shines forth on\nman's mind, so that he is able to know himself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: From the very fact that future contingencies are in God\naccording to unalterable truth, it follows that God can impress a\nlike knowledge on the prophet's mind without the prophet seeing God\nin His essence.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 2]\n\nWhether, in Prophetic Revelation, New Species of Things Are Impressed\non the Prophet's Mind, or Merely a New Light?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in prophetic revelation no new\nspecies of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, but only a new\nlight. For a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2 says that \"prophets draw\ncomparisons from things with which they are conversant.\" But if\nprophetic vision were effected by means of species newly impressed,\nthe prophet's previous experience of things would be inoperative.\nTherefore no new species are impressed on the prophet's soul, but\nonly the prophetic light.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), \"it is\nnot imaginative but intellective vision that makes the prophet\";\nwherefore it is declared (Dan. 10:1) that \"there is need of\nunderstanding in a vision.\" Now intellective vision, as stated in the\nsame book (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6) is not effected by means of images,\nbut by the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that\nprophetic revelation is not effected by impressing species on the\nsoul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy Ghost endows man\nwith something that surpasses the faculty of nature. Now man can by\nhis natural faculties form all kinds of species of things. Therefore\nit would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things\nare impressed, but merely an intellectual light.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Osee 12:10): \"I have multiplied\"\ntheir \"visions, and I have used similitudes, by the ministry of the\nprophets.\" Now multiplicity of visions results, not from a diversity\nof intellectual light, which is common to every prophetic vision, but\nfrom a diversity of species, whence similitudes also result.\nTherefore it seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things\nare impressed, and not merely an intellectual light.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), \"prophetic\nknowledge pertains most of all to the intellect.\" Now two things have\nto be considered in connection with the knowledge possessed by the\nhuman mind, namely the acceptance or representation of things, and\nthe judgment of the things represented. Now things are represented to\nthe human mind under the form of species: and according to the order\nof nature, they must be represented first to the senses, secondly to\nthe imagination, thirdly to the passive intellect, and these are\nchanged by the species derived from the phantasms, which change\nresults from the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in\nthe imagination there are the forms of sensible things not only as\nreceived from the senses, but also transformed in various ways,\neither on account of some bodily transformation (as in the case of\npeople who are asleep or out of their senses), or through the\ncoordination of the phantasms, at the command of reason, for the\npurpose of understanding something. For just as the various\narrangements of the letters of the alphabet convey various ideas to\nthe understanding, so the various coordinations of the phantasms\nproduce various intelligible species of the intellect.\n\nAs to the judgment formed by the human mind, it depends on the power\nof the intellectual light.\n\nNow the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind something which\nsurpasses the natural faculty in both these respects, namely as to\nthe judgment which depends on the inflow of intellectual light, and\nas to the acceptance or representation of things, which is effected\nby means of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to\nprophetic revelation in the second of these respects, but not in the\nfirst. For a man represents certain things to his disciple by signs\nof speech, but he cannot enlighten him inwardly as God does.\n\nBut it is the first of these two that holds the chief place in\nprophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowledge. Wherefore if\ncertain things are divinely represented to any man by means of\nimaginary likenesses, as happened to Pharaoh (Gen. 41:1-7) and to\nNabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:1-2), or even by bodily likenesses, as\nhappened to Balthasar (Dan. 5:5), such a man is not to be considered\na prophet, unless his mind be enlightened for the purpose of\njudgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect in the genus\nof prophecy. Wherefore some [*Rabbi Moyses, Doct. Perplex. II, xxxvi]\nhave called this \"prophetic ecstasy,\" and such is divination by\ndreams. And yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be\nenlightened merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in\nimagination by others, as in the case of Joseph who interpreted\nPharaoh's dream. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),\n\"especially is he a prophet who excels in both respects, so,\" to wit,\n\"as to see in spirit likenesses significant of things corporeal, and\nunderstand them by the quickness of his intellect.\"\n\nNow sensible forms are divinely presented to the prophet's mind,\nsometimes externally by means of the senses--thus Daniel saw the\nwriting on the wall (Dan. 5:25)--sometimes by means of imaginary\nforms, either of exclusively Divine origin and not received through\nthe senses (for instance, if images of colors were imprinted on the\nimagination of one blind from birth), or divinely coordinated from\nthose derived from the senses--thus Jeremiah saw the \"boiling caldron\n. . . from the face of the north\" (Jer. 1:13)--or by the direct\nimpression of intelligible species on the mind, as in the case of\nthose who receive infused scientific knowledge or wisdom, such as\nSolomon or the apostles.\n\nBut intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the human\nmind--sometimes for the purpose of judging of things seen by others,\nas in the case of Joseph, quoted above, and of the apostles whose\nunderstanding our Lord opened \"that they might understand the\nscriptures\" (Luke 24:45); and to this pertains the \"interpretation of\nspeeches\"--sometimes for the purpose of judging according to Divine\ntruth, of the things which a man apprehends in the ordinary course of\nnature--sometimes for the purpose of discerning truthfully and\nefficaciously what is to be done, according to Isa. 63:14, \"The\nSpirit of the Lord was their leader.\"\n\nHence it is evident that prophetic revelation is conveyed sometimes\nby the mere infusion of light, sometimes by imprinting species anew,\nor by a new coordination of species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above, sometimes in prophetic revelation\nimaginary species previously derived from the senses are divinely\ncoordinated so as to accord with the truth to be revealed, and then\nprevious experience is operative in the production of the images, but\nnot when they are impressed on the mind wholly from without.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Intellectual vision is not effected by means of bodily\nand individual images, but by an intelligible image. Hence Augustine\nsays (De Trin. ix, 11) that \"the soul possesses a certain likeness of\nthe species known to it.\" Sometimes this intelligible image is, in\nprophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God, sometimes it\nresults from pictures in the imagination, by the aid of the prophetic\nlight, since a deeper truth is gathered from these pictures in the\nimagination by means of the enlightenment of the higher light.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is true that man is able by his natural powers to\nform all kinds of pictures in the imagination, by simply considering\nthese pictures, but not so that they be directed to the\nrepresentation of intelligible truths that surpass his intellect,\nsince for this purpose he needs the assistance of a supernatural\nlight.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Prophetic Vision Is Always Accompanied by Abstraction\nfrom the Senses?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the prophetic vision is always\naccompanied by abstraction from the senses. For it is written (Num.\n12:6): \"If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to\nhim in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.\" Now a gloss says\nat the beginning of the Psalter, \"a vision that takes place by dreams\nand apparitions consists of things which seem to be said or done.\"\nBut when things seem to be said or done, which are neither said nor\ndone, there is abstraction from the senses. Therefore prophecy is\nalways accompanied by abstraction from the senses.\n\nObj. 2: Further, when one power is very intent on its own operation,\nother powers are drawn away from theirs; thus men who are very intent\non hearing something fail to see what takes place before them. Now in\nthe prophetic vision the intellect is very much uplifted, and intent\non its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision is always\naccompanied by abstraction from the senses.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same thing cannot, at the same time, tend in\nopposite directions. Now in the prophetic vision the mind tends to\nthe acceptance of things from above, and consequently it cannot at\nthe same time tend to sensible objects. Therefore it would seem\nnecessary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by\nabstraction from the senses.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 14:32): \"The spirits\nof the prophets are subject to the prophets.\" Now this were\nimpossible if the prophet were not in possession of his faculties,\nbut abstracted from his senses. Therefore it would seem that\nprophetic vision is not accompanied by abstraction from the senses.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in the foregoing Article, the prophetic\nrevelation takes place in four ways: namely, by the infusion of an\nintelligible light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by\nimpression or coordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the\noutward presentation of sensible images. Now it is evident that there\nis no abstraction from the senses, when something is presented to the\nprophet's mind by means of sensible species--whether these be\ndivinely formed for this special purpose, as the bush shown to Moses\n(Ex. 3:2), and the writing shown to Daniel (Dan. 5:)--or whether they\nbe produced by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine\nprovidence to be prophetically significant of something, as, for\ninstance, the Church was signified by the ark of Noah.\n\nAgain, abstraction from the external senses is not rendered necessary\nwhen the prophet's mind is enlightened by an intellectual light, or\nimpressed with intelligible species, since in us the perfect judgment\nof the intellect is effected by its turning to sensible objects,\nwhich are the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the\nFirst Part (Q. 84, A. 6).\n\nWhen, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by images in the\nimagination, abstraction from the senses is necessary lest the things\nthus seen in imagination be taken for objects of external sensation.\nYet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes complete, so that a\nman perceives nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is\nincomplete, so that he perceives something with his senses, yet does\nnot fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from those he\nsees in imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12):\n\"Those images of bodies which are formed in the soul are seen just as\nbodily things themselves are seen by the body, so that we see with\nour eyes one who is present, and at the same time we see with the\nsoul one who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes.\"\n\nYet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets\nwithout subverting the order of nature, as is the case with those who\nare possessed or out of their senses; but is due to some well-ordered\ncause. This cause may be natural--for instance, sleep--or\nspiritual--for instance, the intenseness of the prophets'\ncontemplation; thus we read of Peter (Acts 10:9) that while he was\npraying in the supper-room [*Vulg.: 'the house-top' or\n'upper-chamber'] \"he fell into an ecstasy\"--or he may be carried away\nby the Divine power, according to the saying of Ezechiel 1:3: \"The\nhand of the Lord was upon him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted refers to prophets in whom imaginary\npictures were formed or coordinated, either while asleep, which is\ndenoted by the word \"dream,\" or while awake, which is signified by\nthe word \"vision.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant\nthings which are far removed from the senses, the intensity of its\napplication leads to abstraction from the senses; but when it is\nintent, in its act, upon the coordination of or judgment concerning\nobjects of sense, there is no need for abstraction from the senses.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The movement of the prophetic mind results not from its\nown power, but from a power acting on it from above. Hence there is\nno abstraction from the senses when the prophet's mind is led to\njudge or coordinate matters relating to objects of sense, but only\nwhen the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more lofty\nthings.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The spirit of the prophets is said to be subject to the\nprophets as regards the prophetic utterances to which the Apostle\nrefers in the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in\ndeclaring what they have seen speak their own mind, and are not\nthrown off their mental balance, like persons who are possessed, as\nPriscilla and Montanus maintained. But as regards the prophetic\nrevelation itself, it would be more correct to say that the prophets\nare subject to the spirit of prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Prophets Always Know the Things Which They Prophesy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the prophets always know the things\nwhich they prophesy. For, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),\n\"those to whom signs were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses\nof bodily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless the mind was\nbrought into action, so that those signs were also understood by\nthem.\" Now what is understood cannot be unknown. Therefore the\nprophet is not ignorant of what he prophesies.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the light of prophecy surpasses the light of natural\nreason. Now one who possesses a science by his natural light, is not\nignorant of his scientific acquirements. Therefore he who utters\nthings by the prophetic light cannot ignore them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prophecy is directed for man's enlightenment;\nwherefore it is written (2 Pet. 1:19): \"We have the more firm\nprophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that\nshineth in a dark place.\" Now nothing can enlighten others unless it\nbe lightsome in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is\nfirst enlightened so as to know what he declares to others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 11:51): \"And this he\"\n(Caiphas) \"spoke, not of himself, but being the High Priest of that\nyear, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation,\" etc. Now\nCaiphas knew this not. Therefore not every prophet knows what he\nprophesies.\n\n_I answer that,_ In prophetic revelation the prophet's mind is moved\nby the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to\nthe principal agent. Now the prophet's mind is moved not only to\napprehend something, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes\nindeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, sometimes to\none only, and in each case there may be a defect in the prophet's\nknowledge. For when the prophet's mind is moved to think or apprehend\na thing, sometimes he is led merely to apprehend that thing, and\nsometimes he is further led to know that it is divinely revealed to\nhim.\n\nAgain, sometimes the prophet's mind is moved to speak something, so\nthat he understands what the Holy Ghost means by the words he utters;\nlike David who said (2 Kings 23:2): \"The Spirit of the Lord hath\nspoken by me\"; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person whose\nmind is moved to utter certain words knows not what the Holy Ghost\nmeans by them, as was the case with Caiphas (John 11:51).\n\nAgain, when the Holy Ghost moves a man's mind to do something,\nsometimes the latter understands the meaning of it, like Jeremias who\nhid his loin-cloth in the Euphrates (Jer. 13:1-11); while sometimes\nhe does not understand it--thus the soldiers, who divided Christ's\ngarments, understood not the meaning of what they did.\n\nAccordingly, when a man knows that he is being moved by the Holy\nGhost to think something, or signify something by word or deed, this\nbelongs properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his\nknowing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct.\nNevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet's mind is a\ndefective instrument, as stated above, even true prophets know not\nall that the Holy Ghost means by the things they see, or speak, or\neven do.\n\nAnd this suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since the\narguments given at the beginning refer to true prophets whose minds\nare perfectly enlightened from above.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 174\n\nOF THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)\n\nWe must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head\nthere are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) The division of prophecy into its species;\n\n(2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without\nimaginative vision?\n\n(3) The various degrees of prophecy;\n\n(4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?\n\n(5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet?\n\n(6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Prophecy Is Fittingly Divided into the Prophecy of Divine\nPredestination, of Foreknowledge, and of Denunciation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided\naccording to a gloss on Matt. 1:23, \"Behold a virgin shall be with\nchild,\" where it is stated that \"one kind of prophecy proceeds from\nthe Divine predestination, and must in all respects be accomplished\nso that its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the\none in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God's foreknowledge:\nand into this our will enters. And another prophecy is called\ndenunciation, which is significative of God's disapproval.\" For that\nwhich results from every prophecy should not be reckoned a part of\nprophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge,\nsince the prophets \"read in the book of foreknowledge,\" as a gloss\nsays on Isa. 38:1. Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to\nforeknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is\nsomething foretold in promise, and both of these are subject to\nalteration. For it is written (Jer. 18:7, 8): \"I will suddenly speak\nagainst a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull\ndown, and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken\nshall repent of their evil, I also will repent\"--and this pertains to\nthe prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text continues in\nreference to the prophecy of promise (Jer. 18:9, 10): \"I will\nsuddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant\nit. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I will repent of the good\nthat I have spoken to do unto it.\" Therefore as there is reckoned to\nbe a prophecy of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of\npromise.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): \"There are seven kinds\nof prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport of the\nmind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner\nof beasts therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in Isaias,\nwho says (Isa. 6:1): 'I saw the Lord sitting,' etc. The third kind is\na dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from\nthe midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a\nvoice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (Gen.\n22:11): 'Lay not thy hand upon the boy.' The sixth kind is taking up\na parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num. 23:7; 24:15). The\nseventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in the case of\nnearly all the prophets.\" Further, he mentions three kinds of vision;\n\"one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul's imagination, a\nthird by the eyes of the mind.\" Now these are not included in the\naforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss\nabove quoted is ascribed.\n\n_I answer that,_ The species of moral habits and acts are\ndistinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy\nis something known by God and surpassing the faculty of man.\nWherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is\ndivided into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been\nstated above (Q. 71, A. 6, ad 2) that the future is contained in the\nDivine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we\nhave the prophecy of _denunciation,_ which is not always fulfilled.\nbut it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes\nhindered by some other occurrence supervening. Secondly, God\nforeknows certain things in themselves--either as to be accomplished\nby Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of _predestination,_\nsince, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30), \"God\npredestines things which are not in our power\"--or as to be\naccomplished through man's free-will, and of such is the prophecy of\n_foreknowledge._ This may regard either good or evil, which does not\napply to the prophecy of predestination, since the latter regards\ngood alone. And since predestination is comprised under\nforeknowledge, the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only\ntwo species to prophecy, namely of _foreknowledge,_ and of\n_denunciation._\n\nReply Obj. 1: Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition\nof future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a\nspecies of prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connection with\nfuture events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes, it is\ncommon to every species of prophecy.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The prophecy of promise is included in the prophecy of\ndenunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in both. But it\nis denominated in preference from denunciation, because God is more\ninclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised blessings.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of\nprophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying--either\naccording to man's cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination,\nand intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision mentioned\nboth by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7)--or according\nto the different ways in which the prophetic current is received.\nThus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the\n\"fullness of the Holy Ghost\" which he mentions in the seventh place.\nAs to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions\nthree, namely \"dreams,\" to which he gives the third place; \"vision,\"\nwhich occurs to the prophet while awake and regards any kind of\nordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and \"ecstasy,\"\nwhich results from the mind being uplifted to certain lofty things,\nand to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he\nreckons three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is--either a\ncorporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as \"a cloud,\"\nwhich he mentions in the fourth place--or a \"voice\" sounding from\nwithout and conveyed to man's hearing--this he puts in the fifth\nplace--or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a\nsimilitude, and this pertains to the \"parable\" to which he assigns\nthe sixth place.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Prophecy Which Is Accompanied by Intellective and\nImaginative Vision Is More Excellent Than That Which Is Accompanied\nby Intellective Vision Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the prophecy which has intellective\nand imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is\naccompanied by intellective vision alone. For Augustine says (Gen. ad\nlit. xii, 9): \"He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but\nthe signs representative of things, by means of the images of things\ncorporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed with the\nunderstanding of these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who\nexcels in both ways,\" and this refers to the prophet who has\nintellective together with imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of\nprophecy is more excellent.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the greater a thing's power is, the greater the\ndistance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains\nchiefly to the mind, as stated above (Q. 173, A. 2). Therefore\napparently the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater\nthan that which is confined to the intellect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) distinguishes the\n\"prophets\" from the \"sacred writers.\" Now all those whom he calls\nprophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective\ntogether with imaginative vision: but not those whom he calls sacred\nwriters, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as\nJob, David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem more\nproper to call prophets those who had intellective together with\nimaginative vision, than those who had intellective vision alone.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that \"it is\nimpossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened\nround about by the many-colored sacred veils.\" Now the prophetic\nrevelation is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore\nit seems that it cannot be without the veils of phantasms.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that\n\"the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by\nthe mere inspiration of the Holy Ghost, apart from any outward\nassistance of deed, word, vision, or dream.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by\nthe end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that\nsurpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this\nmanifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident\nthat the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare\ncontemplation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which\nis conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it\napproaches nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in\nGod's essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a\nsupernatural truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent\nthan that in which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of the\nsimilitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination.\n\nMoreover the prophet's mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even\nas in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp the bare\nintelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better\nunderstanding than one who needs to be taken by the hand and helped\nby means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in\ncommendation of David's prophecy (2 Kings 23:3): \"The strong one of\nIsrael spoke to me,\" and further on (2 Kings 23:4): \"As the light of\nthe morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without\nclouds.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: When a particular supernatural truth has to be revealed\nby means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the\nintellectual light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than\nhe that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is\nin this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the\nprophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is greater\nthan all.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The same judgment does not apply to things that are\nsought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of\nsomething else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent's\npower is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous\nand more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if\nhe is able to heal more people, and those who are further removed\nfrom health. On the other hand, in things sought only for the sake of\nsomething else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is\nable to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to\nhand: thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a\nsick person by means of fewer and more gentle remedies. Now, in the\nprophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own\nsake, but on account of the manifestation of the intelligible truth.\nWherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it\nless.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fact that a particular predicate is applicable to\none thing and less properly to another, does not prevent this latter\nfrom being simply better than the former: thus the knowledge of the\nblessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer,\nalthough faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge,\nbecause faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In like manner\nprophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the\nintelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly\napplied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the more\nexcellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision,\nprovided the same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the\nintellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may\nknow some supernatural things, but that he may be able to judge, with\nthe certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human\nreason, such intellectual prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed\nby an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this\nkind of prophecy that all those had who are included in the ranks of\nthe prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special\nreason that they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence\nthey spoke as God's representatives, saying to the people: \"Thus\nsaith the Lord\": but not so the authors of the _sacred writings,_\nseveral of whom treated more frequently of things that can be known\nby human reason, not in God's name, but in their own, yet with the\nassistance of the Divine light withal.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray\nis not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according to\nhis present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand\nwithout a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to have\nphantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any\nimaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic vision is\nsaid to be without imaginary vision.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Degrees of Prophecy Can Be Distinguished According to the\nImaginary Vision?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy cannot be\ndistinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of a\nthing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on\naccount of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is\nsought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of\nsomething else, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it would seem\nthat the degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to\nimaginary, but only according to intellectual, vision.\n\nObj. 2: Further, seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of\nprophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various\nimaginary visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does\nnot entail a difference of prophecy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to a gloss [*Cassiodorus, super Prolog.\nHieron. in Psalt.], prophecy consists of words, deeds, dreams, and\nvisions. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should not be\ndistinguished according to imaginary vision, to which vision and\ndreams pertain, rather than according to words and deeds.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The medium differentiates the degrees of\nknowledge: thus science based on direct [*_Propter quid_] proofs is\nmore excellent than science based on indirect [*_Quia_] premises or\nthan opinion, because it comes through a more excellent medium. Now\nimaginary vision is a kind of medium in prophetic knowledge.\nTherefore the degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according\nto imaginary vision.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 173, A. 2), the prophecy\nwherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural truth is revealed\nthrough an imaginary vision, holds the mean between the prophecy\nwherein a supernatural truth is revealed without imaginary vision,\nand that wherein through the intelligible light and without an\nimaginary vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining to\nhuman conduct. Now knowledge is more proper to prophecy than is\naction; wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy is when a man, by an\ninward instinct, is moved to perform some outward action. Thus it is\nrelated of Samson (Judges 15:14) that \"the Spirit of the Lord came\nstrongly upon him, and as the flax [*_Lina._ St. Thomas apparently\nread _ligna_ ('wood')] is wont to be consumed at the approach of\nfire, so the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed.\"\nThe second degree of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an\ninward light so as to know certain things, which, however, do not go\nbeyond the bounds of natural knowledge: thus it is related of Solomon\n(3 Kings 4:32, 33) that \"he spoke . . . parables . . . and he treated\nabout trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that\ncometh out of the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and\nof creeping things and of fishes\": and all of this came from divine\ninspiration, for it was stated previously (3 Kings 4:29): \"God gave\nto Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much.\"\n\nNevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy properly so\ncalled, because they do not attain to supernatural truth. The\nprophecy wherein supernatural truth is manifested through imaginary\nvision is differentiated first according to the difference between\ndreams which occur during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is\nawake. The latter belongs to a higher degree of prophecy, since the\nprophetic light that draws the soul away to supernatural things while\nit is awake and occupied with sensible things would seem to be\nstronger than that which finds a man's soul asleep and withdrawn from\nobjects of sense. Secondly the degrees of this prophecy are\ndifferentiated according to the expressiveness of the imaginary signs\nwhereby the intelligible truth is conveyed. And since words are the\nmost expressive signs of intelligible truth, it would seem to be a\nhigher degree of prophecy when the prophet, whether awake or asleep,\nhears words expressive of an intelligible truth, than when he sees\nthings significative of truth, for instance \"the seven full ears of\ncorn\" signified \"seven years of plenty\" (Gen. 41:22, 26). In such\nlike signs prophecy would seem to be the more excellent, according as\nthe signs are more expressive, for instance when Jeremias saw the\nburning of the city under the figure of a boiling cauldron (Jer.\n1:13). Thirdly, it is evidently a still higher degree of prophecy\nwhen a prophet not only sees signs of words or deeds, but also,\neither awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or showing something to\nhim, since this proves the prophet's mind to have approached nearer\nto the cause of the revelation. Fourthly, the height of a degree of\nprophecy may be measured according to the appearance of the person\nseen: for it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who speaks or\nshows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be seen by him\nunder the form of an angel, than if he be seen by him under the form\nof man: and higher still is it, if he be seen by the prophet whether\nasleep or awake, under the appearance of God, according to Isa. 6:1,\n\"I saw the Lord sitting.\"\n\nBut above all these degrees there is a third kind of prophecy, wherein\nan intelligible and supernatural truth is shown without any imaginary\nvision. However, this goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so\ncalled, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3); and consequently the degrees of\nprophecy are properly distinguished according to imaginary vision.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We are unable to know how to distinguish the\nintellectual light, except by means of imaginary or sensible signs.\nHence the difference in the intellectual light is gathered from the\ndifference in the things presented to the imagination.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 171, A. 2), prophecy is by way, not\nof an abiding habit, but of a transitory passion; wherefore there is\nnothing inconsistent if one and the same prophet, at different times,\nreceive various degrees of prophetic revelation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The words and deeds mentioned there do not pertain to\nthe prophetic revelation, but to the announcement, which is made\naccording to the disposition of those to whom that which is revealed\nto the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by words,\nsometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and the working of\nmiracles, are something consequent upon prophecy, as stated above (Q.\n171, A. 1).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Moses Was the Greatest of the Prophets?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Moses was not the greatest of the\nprophets. For a gloss at the beginning of the Psalter says that\n\"David is called the prophet by way of excellence.\" Therefore Moses\nwas not the greatest of all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, greater miracles were wrought by Josue, who made the\nsun and moon to stand still (Josh. 10:12-14), and by Isaias, who made\nthe sun to turn back (Isa. 38:8), than by Moses, who divided the Red\nSea (Ex. 14:21). In like manner greater miracles were wrought by\nElias, of whom it is written (Ecclus. 48:4, 5): \"Who can glory like\nto thee? Who raisedst up a dead man from below.\" Therefore Moses was\nnot the greatest of the prophets.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 11:11) that \"there hath not\nrisen, among them that are born of women, a greater than John the\nBaptist.\" Therefore Moses was not greater than all the prophets.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 34:10): \"There arose no more\na prophet in Israel like unto Moses.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Although in some respect one or other of the\nprophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was simply the greatest\nof all. For, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 171, A. 1), in prophecy we\nmay consider not only the knowledge, whether by intellectual or by\nimaginary vision, but also the announcement and the confirmation by\nmiracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other prophets.\nFirst, as regards the intellectual vision, since he saw God's very\nessence, even as Paul in his rapture did, according to Augustine\n(Gen. ad lit. xii, 27). Hence it is written (Num. 12:8) that he saw\nGod \"plainly and not by riddles.\" Secondly, as regards the imaginary\nvision, which he had at his call, as it were, for not only did he\nhear words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form of God,\nand this not only while asleep, but even when he was awake. Hence it\nis written (Ex. 33:11) that \"the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as\na man is wont to speak to his friend.\" Thirdly, as regards the\nworking of miracles which he wrought on a whole nation of\nunbelievers. Wherefore it is written (Deut. 34:10, 11): \"There arose\nno more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face\nto face: in all the signs and wonders, which He sent by him, to do in\nthe land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to his\nwhole land.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The prophecy of David approaches near to the vision of\nMoses, as regards the intellectual vision, because both received a\nrevelation of intelligible and supernatural truth, without any\nimaginary vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent as\nregards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more fully knew and\nexpressed the mysteries of Christ's incarnation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: These signs of the prophets mentioned were greater as\nto the substance of the thing done; yet the miracles of Moses were\ngreater as regards the way in which they were done, since they were\nwrought on a whole people.\n\nReply Obj. 3: John belongs to the New Testament, whose ministers take\nprecedence even of Moses, since they are spectators of a fuller\nrevelation, as stated in 2 Cor. 3.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 6]\n\nWhether There Is a Degree of Prophecy in the Blessed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is a degree of prophecy in the\nblessed. For, as stated above (A. 4), Moses saw the Divine essence,\nand yet he is called a prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed\ncan be called prophets.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prophecy is a \"divine revelation.\" Now divine\nrevelations are made even to the blessed angels. Therefore even\nblessed angels can be prophets.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Christ was a comprehensor from the moment of His\nconception; and yet He calls Himself a prophet (Matt. 13:57), when He\nsays: \"A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country.\"\nTherefore even comprehensors and the blessed can be called prophets.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written of Samuel (Ecclus. 46:23): \"He lifted\nup his voice from the earth in prophecy to blot out the wickedness of\nthe nation.\" Therefore other saints can likewise be called prophets\nafter they have died.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The prophetic word is compared (2 Pet. 1:19) to a\n\"light that shineth in a dark place.\" Now there is no darkness in the\nblessed. Therefore they cannot be called prophets.\n\n_I answer that,_ Prophecy denotes vision of some supernatural truth\nas being far remote from us. This happens in two ways. First, on the\npart of the knowledge itself, because, to wit, the supernatural truth\nis not known in itself, but in some of its effects; and this truth\nwill be more remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal\nthings, than if it be known in its intelligible effects; and such\nmost of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed by images and\nlikenesses of corporeal things. Secondly, vision is remote on the\npart of the seer, because, to wit, he has not yet attained completely\nto his ultimate perfection, according to 2 Cor. 5:6, \"While we are in\nthe body, we are absent from the Lord.\"\n\nNow in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; wherefore they\ncannot be called prophets.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This vision of Moses was interrupted after the manner\nof a passion, and was not permanent like the beatific vision,\nwherefore he was as yet a seer from afar. For this reason his vision\ndid not entirely lose the character of prophecy.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The divine revelation is made to the angels, not as\nbeing far distant, but as already wholly united to God; wherefore\ntheir revelation has not the character of prophecy.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Christ was at the same time comprehensor and wayfarer\n[*Cf. III, QQ. 9, seqq.]. Consequently the notion of prophecy is not\napplicable to Him as a comprehensor, but only as a wayfarer.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Samuel had not yet attained to the state of\nblessedness. Wherefore although by God's will the soul itself of\nSamuel foretold to Saul the issue of the war as revealed to him by\nGod, this pertains to the nature of prophecy. It is not the same with\nthe saints who are now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference\nthat this is stated to have been brought about by the demons' art,\nbecause although the demons are unable to evoke the soul of a saint,\nor to force it to do any particular thing, this can be done by the\npower of God, so that when the demon is consulted, God Himself\ndeclares the truth by His messenger: even as He gave a true answer by\nElias to the King's messengers who were sent to consult the god of\nAccaron (4 Kings 1).\n\nIt might also be replied [*The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet\ndeclared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture; Cf. I, Q. 89, A. 8,\nad 2] that it was not the soul of Samuel, but a demon impersonating\nhim; and that the wise man calls him Samuel, and describes his\nprediction as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and\nthe bystanders who were of this opinion.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Degrees of Prophecy Change As Time Goes On?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy change as\ntime goes on. For prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine\nthings, as stated above (A. 2). Now according to Gregory (Hom. in\nEzech.), \"knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on.\"\nTherefore degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to\nthe process of time.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prophetic revelation is conveyed by God speaking to\nman; while the prophets declared both in words and in writing the\nthings revealed to them. Now it is written (1 Kings 3:1) that before\nthe time of Samuel \"the word of the Lord was precious,\" i.e. rare;\nand yet afterwards it was delivered to many. In like manner the books\nof the prophets do not appear to have been written before the time of\nIsaias, to whom it was said (Isa. 8:1): \"Take thee a great book and\nwrite in it with a man's pen,\" after which many prophets wrote their\nprophecies. Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree\nof prophecy made progress.\n\nObj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Matt. 11:13): \"The prophets and the\nlaw prophesied until John\"; and afterwards the gift of prophecy was\nin Christ's disciples in a much more excellent manner than in the\nprophets of old, according to Eph. 3:5, \"In other generations\" the\nmystery of Christ \"was not known to the sons of men, as it is now\nrevealed to His holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit.\" Therefore\nit would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy advanced.\n\n_On the contrary,_ As stated above (A. 4), Moses was the greatest of\nthe prophets, and yet he preceded the other prophets. Therefore\nprophecy did not advance in degree as time went on.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), prophecy is directed to the\nknowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not\nonly instructed in faith, but also guided in our actions, according\nto Ps. 42:3, \"Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted\nme.\" Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the true\nknowledge of God, according to Heb. 11:6, \"He that cometh to God must\nbelieve that He is\"; secondly, in the mystery of Christ's\nincarnation, according to John 14:1, \"You believe in God, believe\nalso in Me.\" Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the\nGodhead as its end, it progressed according to three divisions of\ntime, namely before the law, under the law, and under grace. For\nbefore the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically\ntaught things pertinent to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are\ncalled prophets, according to Ps. 104:15, \"Do no evil to My\nprophets,\" which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and\nIsaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to\nfaith in the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than\nhitherto, because then not only certain special persons or families\nbut the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the\nLord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2, 3): \"I am the Lord that appeared to\nAbraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God almighty, and My\nname Adonai I did not show to them\"; because previously the\npatriarchs had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one\nand Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity\nof the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Ex. 3:14): \"I am Who\nam\"; and this name is signified by Jews in the word \"Adonai\" on\naccount of their veneration for that unspeakable name. Afterwards in\nthe time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son\nof God Himself, according to Matt. 28:19: \"Going . . . teach ye all\nnations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son,\nand of the Holy Ghost.\"\n\nIn each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which\nwas given first. Now the first revelation, before the Law, was given\nto Abraham, for it was at that time that men began to stray from\nfaith in one God by turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no\nsuch revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of\none God. A less excellent revelation was made to Isaac, being founded\non that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore it was said to him (Gen.\n26:24): \"I am the God of Abraham thy father,\" and in like manner to\nJacob (Gen. 28:13): \"I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God\nof Isaac.\" Again in the state of the Law the first revelation which\nwas given to Moses was more excellent, and on this revelation all the\nother revelations to the prophets were founded. And so, too, in the\ntime of grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the\nrevelation vouchsafed to the apostles, concerning the faith in one\nGod and three Persons, according to Matt. 16:18, \"On this rock,\" i.e.\nof thy confession, \"I will build My Church.\"\n\nAs to the faith in Christ's incarnation, it is evident that the\nnearer men were to Christ, whether before or after Him, the more\nfully, for the most part, were they instructed on this point, and\nafter Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 3:5).\n\nAs regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation\nvaried not according to the course of time, but according as\ncircumstances required, because as it is written (Prov. 29:18), \"When\nprophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad.\" Wherefore\nat all times men were divinely instructed about what they were to do,\naccording as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saying of Gregory is to be referred to the time\nbefore Christ's incarnation, as regards the knowledge of this mystery.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 27), \"just as in\nthe early days of the Assyrian kingdom promises were made most\nexplicitly to Abraham, so at the outset of the western Babylon,\"\nwhich is Rome, \"and under its sway Christ was to come, in Whom were\nto be fulfilled the promises made through the prophetic oracles\ntestifying in word and writing to that great event to come,\" the\npromises, namely, which were made to Abraham. \"For while prophets\nwere scarcely ever lacking to the people of Israel from the time that\nthey began to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit, not\nfor that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings were being\nset up with greater publicity, which at some future time were to\nbenefit the nations, it was fitting to begin when this city,\" Rome to\nwit, \"was being built, which was to govern the nations.\"\n\nThe reason why it behooved that nation to have a number of prophets\nespecially at the time of the kings, was that then it was not\nover-ridden by other nations, but had its own king; wherefore it\nbehooved the people, as enjoying liberty, to have prophets to teach\nthem what to do.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The prophets who foretold the coming of Christ could\nnot continue further than John, who with his finger pointed to Christ\nactually present. Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, \"This\ndoes not mean that there were no more prophets after John. For we\nread in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the four maidens,\ndaughters of Philip, prophesied.\" John, too, wrote a prophetic book\nabout the end of the Church; and at all times there have not been\nlacking persons having the spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the\ndeclaration of any new doctrine of faith, but for the direction of\nhuman acts. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that \"the emperor\nTheodosius sent to John who dwelt in the Egyptian desert, and whom he\nknew by his ever-increasing fame to be endowed with the prophetic\nspirit: and from him he received a message assuring him of victory.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 175\n\nOF RAPTURE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?\n\n(2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive\npower?\n\n(3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God?\n\n(4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses?\n\n(5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from\nhis body?\n\n(6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Soul of Man Is Carried Away to Things Divine?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away\nto things divine. For some define rapture as \"an uplifting by the\npower of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to\nthat which is above nature\" [*Reference unknown; Cf. De Veritate\nxiii, 1]. Now it is in accordance with man's nature that he be\nuplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the beginning of his\nConfessions: \"Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is\nrestless, till it rest in Thee.\" Therefore man's soul is not carried\naway to things divine.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that \"God's justice\nis seen in this that He treats all things according to their mode and\ndignity.\" But it is not in accordance with man's mode and worth that\nhe be raised above what he is according to nature. Therefore it would\nseem that man's soul is not carried away to things divine.\n\nObj. 3: Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules\nus not by violence or force, as Damascene says [*De Fide Orth. ii,\n30]. Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:2): \"I know a man in\nChrist . . . rapt even to the third heaven.\" On which words a gloss\nsays: \"Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above\n(Obj. 3); and \"the violent is that which has its principle without,\nand in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all\" (Ethic.\niii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in\naccordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural.\nWherefore he who is carried away by some external agent, must be\ncarried to something different from that to which his inclination\ntends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of\nthe inclination--for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to\nbe borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the\nmanner of tending--for instance a stone may be thrown downwards with\ngreater velocity than consistent with its natural movement.\n\nAccordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold\nmanner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as\nregards the term of transport--as when it is carried away to\npunishment, according to Ps. 49:22, \"Lest He snatch you away, and\nthere be none to deliver you\"; in another way, as regards the manner\nconnatural to man, which is that he should understand the truth\nthrough sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the\napprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though\nhe be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally: provided\nthis be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to\nsleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be\ncalled rapture, properly speaking.\n\nThis withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold\ncause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer\nabstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power\nof the demons, as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power\nof God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a\nman is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and\nwithdrawn from his senses, according to Ezech. 8:3, \"The spirit\nlifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the\nvision of God into Jerusalem.\"\n\nIt must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be\ncarried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but\nalso through being withdrawn from the things to which he was\nattending, as when a person's mind wanders contrary to his purpose.\nBut this is to use the expression in a less proper signification.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to tend to divine things through\nthe apprehension of things sensible, according to Rom. 1:20, \"The\ninvisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by\nthe things that are made.\" But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted to\ndivine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It belongs to man's mode and dignity that he be\nuplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to\nGod's image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty\nof man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance\nwhich is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not\ncontrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man's mind\nbe thus uplifted in rapture by God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a\nman does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the\nscope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger\noperation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we\nconsider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to\nwhich man is directed both by nature and by his intention.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Rapture Pertains to the Cognitive Rather Than to the\nAppetitive Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive\nrather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.\niv): \"The Divine love causes ecstasy.\" Now love pertains to the\nappetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that \"he who fed the\nswine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life;\nwhereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into\necstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself.\" Now the prodigal\nson sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who\nare carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is affected.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, \"In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped,\nlet me never be confounded,\" says in explaining the title [*Unto the\nend, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy]: \"_Ekstasis_ in Greek\nsignifies in Latin _excessus mentis,_ an aberration of the mind. This\nhappens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or\nthrough the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this\nlower world.\" Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite.\nTherefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in\nopposition to this dread, also pertains to the appetite.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 115:2, \"I said in my excess: Every\nman is a liar,\" says: \"We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders\nthrough fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of\nrevelation.\" Now revelation pertains to the intellective power.\nTherefore ecstasy or rapture does also.\n\n_I answer that,_ We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with\nregard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture\ncannot pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power.\nFor it was stated (A. 1) that rapture is outside the inclination of\nthe person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power\nis an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking,\nin desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself.\n\nSecondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and\nthus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For\nfrom the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards\nsomething, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection,\nthat a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an\neffect on the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in\nthe things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was\nrapt, not only \"to the third heaven\"--which pertains to the\ncontemplation of the intellect--but also into \"paradise,\" which\npertains to the appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means\nsimply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper\norder [*Cf. I-II, Q. 28, A. 3]; while rapture denotes a certain\nviolence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the\nappetitive power, as when a man's appetite tends to something outside\nhim, and in this sense Dionysius says that \"the Divine love causes\necstasy,\" inasmuch as it makes man's appetite tend to the object\nloved. Hence he says afterwards that \"even God Himself, the cause of\nall things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside\nHimself in His providence for all beings.\" But even if this were said\nexpressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause\nof rapture.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the\nintellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive\nappetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his\nlower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher\nmove the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the\nappetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man's intellective appetite\ntends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things\nwhereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says\n(Div. Nom. iv) that \"Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of\nDivine love\" exclaimed: \"I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.\"\n\nIn another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the\nlower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is\nthus that \"he who fed the swine debased himself\"; and this latter\nkind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin\nthan the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite\nis more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower\nappetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite,\nit is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to\nhim. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is\nable to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of\nrapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away\nentirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with\nanger or love.\n\nIt must be observed, however, that both these excesses affecting the\nappetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because\nthe mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through\nbeing drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up\ninto some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard\nto good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil.\nWherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and\nall the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De Civ.\nDei xiv, 7, 9).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Paul, When in Rapture, Saw the Essence of God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, did not see\nthe essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to\nthe third heaven, so we read of Peter (Acts 10:10) that \"there came\nupon him an ecstasy of mind.\" Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not\nGod's essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem that\nneither did Paul see the essence of God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his\nrapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to the\nunhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by\nthe overflow from his soul, as will happen to the saints after the\nresurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when\nin rapture saw not the essence of God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to 1 Cor. 13:10-12, faith and hope are\nincompatible with the vision of the Divine essence. But Paul when in\nthis state had faith and hope. Therefore he saw not the essence of\nGod.\n\nObj. 4: Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7),\n\"pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision.\" Now Paul is\nstated (2 Cor. 12:2, 4) to have seen certain pictures in his rapture,\nfor instance of the \"third heaven\" and of \"paradise.\" Therefore he\nwould seem to have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to\nthe vision of the Divine essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; ad Paulin., de videndo\nDeum) concludes that \"possibly God's very substance was seen by some\nwhile yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in\nrapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto man to\nutter.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw \"not\nthe very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity.\"\nBut Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his\nbook (De videndo Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28 (quoted in a\ngloss on 2 Cor. 12:2). Indeed the words themselves of the Apostle\nindicate this. For he says that \"he heard secret words, which it is\nnot granted unto man to utter\": and such would seem to be words\npertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the state\nof the wayfarer, according to Isa. 64:4, \"Eye hath not seen, O God,\nbesides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that love\n[Vulg.: 'wait for'] Thee\" [*1 Cor. 2:9]. Therefore it is more\nbecoming to hold that he saw God in His essence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man's mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of\ndivine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through\ncertain imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon\nPeter. Secondly, so that he contemplates the divine truth through its\nintelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (Ps.\n115:11): \"I said in my excess: Every man is a liar.\" Thirdly, so that\nhe contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of Paul, as\nalso of Moses [*Cf. Q. 174, A. 4]; and not without reason, since as\nMoses was the first Teacher of the Jews, so was Paul the first\n\"Teacher of the gentiles\" [*Cf. I, Q. 68, A. 4].\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Divine essence cannot be seen by a created\nintellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written\n(Ps. 35:10): \"In Thy light we shall see light.\" But this light can be\nshared in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus it\nbeatifies the saints in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory\npassion, as stated above (Q. 171, A. 2) of the light of prophecy; and\nin this way that light was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this\nvision did not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body,\nbut only in a restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains\nsomewhat to prophecy.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as to the\nhabit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he had\nnot the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In one way by the third heaven we may understand\nsomething corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean\n[*1 Tim. 2:7; Cf. I, Q. 12, A. 11, ad 2], which is described as the\n\"third,\" in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better\nstill, in relation to the aqueous and crystalline heavens. Moreover\nPaul is stated to be rapt to the \"third heaven,\" not as though his\nrapture consisted in the vision of something corporeal, but because\nthis place is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence\nthe gloss on 2 Cor. 12 says that the \"third heaven is a spiritual\nheaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation\nof God: and when Paul says that he was rapt to this heaven he means\nthat God showed him the life wherein He is to be seen forevermore.\"\n\nIn another way the third heaven may signify a supra-mundane vision.\nSuch a vision may be called the third heaven in three ways. First,\naccording to the order of the cognitive powers. In this way the first\nheaven would indicate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through\nthe senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (Dan.\n5:5); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias\nsaw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third heaven would denote an\nintellectual vision according to Augustine's explanation (Gen. ad\nlit. xii, 26, 28, 34). Secondly, the third heaven may be taken\naccording to the order of things knowable, the first heaven being\n\"the knowledge of heavenly bodies, the second the knowledge of\nheavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of God Himself.\" Thirdly,\nthe third heaven may denote the contemplation of God according to the\ndegrees of knowledge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees\nbelongs to the angels of the lowest hierarchy [*Cf. I, Q. 108, A. 1],\nthe second to the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the\nangels of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Cor. 12.\n\nAnd since the vision of God cannot be without delight, he says that he\nwas not only \"rapt to the third heaven\" by reason of his\ncontemplation, but also into \"Paradise\" by reason of the consequent\ndelight.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Paul, When in Rapture, Was Withdrawn from His Senses?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, was not\nwithdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28):\n\"Why should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher\nof the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was\nwilling to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to\ntake the place of the present life?\" Now in that future life after\nthe resurrection the saints will see the Divine essence without being\nwithdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a\nwithdrawal take place in Paul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an\nuninterrupted vision of the Divine essence, without, however, being\nwithdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be\nwithdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence of God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, after seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered\nwhat he had seen in that vision; hence he said (2 Cor. 12:4): \"He\nheard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter.\" Now the\nmemory belongs to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher\n(De Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the\nessence of God, was not withdrawn from his senses.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27): \"Unless a\nman in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of\nhis body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses,\nso that he truly knows not as the Apostle said, whether he be in the\nbody or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that\nvision.*\" [*The text of St. Augustine reads: \"when he is rapt,\" etc.]\n\n_I answer that,_ The Divine essence cannot be seen by man through any\ncognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect\ndoes not turn to intelligible objects except by means of the\nphantasms [*Cf. I, Q. 84, A. 7] which it takes from the senses\nthrough the intelligible species; and it is in considering these\nphantasms that the intellect judges of and coordinates sensible\nobjects. Hence in any operation that requires abstraction of the\nintellect from phantasms, there must be also withdrawal of the\nintellect from the senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer it is\nnecessary for man's intellect, if it see God's essence, to be\nwithdrawn from phantasms. For God's essence cannot be seen by means\nof a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelligible species [*Cf.\nI, Q. 12, A. 2], since God's essence infinitely transcends not only\nall bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all\nintelligible creatures. Now when man's intellect is uplifted to the\nsublime vision of God's essence, it is necessary that his mind's\nwhole attention should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that\nhe understand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely in\nGod. Therefore it is impossible for man while a wayfarer to see God\nin His essence without being withdrawn from his senses.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, Obj. 2), after the resurrection,\nin the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow\nfrom the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it\nis in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul\nwill turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no\nsuch overflow in those who are raptured, as stated (A. 3, Obj. 2, ad\n2), and consequently the comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The intellect of Christ's soul was glorified by the\nhabit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the Divine essence much\nmore fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on\naccount of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He was\n\"made a little lower than the angels\" (Heb. 2:9), by dispensation,\nand not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence\nthere is no comparison between Him and other wayfarers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Paul, after seeing God in His essence, remembered what\nhe had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible species\nthat remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the\nabsence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the\nsoul which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this\nwas the knowledge that he was unable wholly to think over or express\nin words.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 5]\n\nWhether, While in This State, Paul's Soul Was Wholly Separated from\nHis Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that, while in this state, Paul's soul was\nwholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6, 7):\n\"While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by\nfaith, and not by sight\" [*_Per speciem,_ i.e. by an intelligible\nspecies]. Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the\nLord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore\nhe was not in the body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the\nsoul's essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the\nintellect, which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its\nbodily surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation.\nMuch more therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the\nbody.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the forces of the vegetative soul are more material\nthan those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be rapt to\nthe vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn from the\nforces of the sensitive soul, as stated above (A. 4). Much more,\ntherefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces\nof the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to operate, the\nsoul is no longer in any way united to the body. Therefore it would\nseem that in Paul's rapture it was necessary for the soul to be\nwholly separated from the body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad Paulin.; de\nvidendo Deum): \"It is not incredible that this sublime revelation\"\n(namely, that they should see God in His essence) \"was vouchsafed\ncertain saints, without their departing this life so completely as to\nleave nothing but a corpse for burial.\" Therefore it was not\nnecessary for Paul's soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated\nfrom his body.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, Obj. 1), in the rapture of\nwhich we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God's power, \"from that\nwhich is according to nature to that which is above nature.\"\nWherefore two things have to be considered: first, what pertains to\nman according to nature; secondly, what has to be done by God in man\nabove his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the body as its\nnatural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to\nunderstand by turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the\ndivine power from the soul in rapture, since its state undergoes no\nchange, as stated above (A. 3, ad 2, 3). Yet, this state remaining,\nactual conversion to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from\nthe soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which\ntranscends all phantasms, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore it was\nnot necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from\nthe body as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was\nnecessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms and the\nperception of sensible objects.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as\nregards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but\nnot as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated\nabove (A. 3, ad 2, 3).\n\nReply Obj. 2: A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the natural\npower above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it can be\nuplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body by\nthe violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the place\nbefitting it according to its specific nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The forces of the vegetative soul do not operate\nthrough the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces,\nbut by way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need\nfor withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose\noperations would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective\nknowledge.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 6]\n\nDid Paul Know Whether His Soul Were Separated from His Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Paul was not ignorant whether his\nsoul were separated from his body. For he says (2 Cor. 12:2): \"I know\na man in Christ rapt even to the third heaven.\" Now man denotes\nsomething composed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death.\nSeemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his\nbody by death, which is the more probable seeing that this is the\ncommon opinion of the Doctors.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it appears from the same words of the Apostle that\nhe knew whither he was rapt, since it was \"to the third heaven.\" Now\nthis shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if he\nknew the third heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known\nthat his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal\nthing cannot be an object of sight save through the body. Therefore\nit would seem that he was not ignorant whether his soul were\nseparated from his body.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28) that \"when in\nrapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him in\nheaven.\" Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know\nwhether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too\nknew this.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 12:3): \"Whether in the body,\nor out of the body, I know not, God knoweth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question must be gathered\nfrom the Apostle's very words, whereby he says he knew something,\nnamely that he was \"rapt even to the third heaven,\" and that\nsomething he knew not, namely \"whether\" he were \"in the body or out\nof the body.\" This may be understood in two ways. First, the words\n\"whether in the body or out of the body\" may refer not to the very\nbeing of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul\nwere in his body or not), but to the mode of rapture, so that he\nignored whether his body besides his soul, or, on the other hand, his\nsoul alone, were rapt to the third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated\n(Ezech. 8:3) to have been \"brought in the vision of God into\nJerusalem.\" This was the explanation of a certain Jew according to\nJerome (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that \"lastly our\nApostle\" (thus said the Jew) \"durst not assert that he was rapt in\nhis body, but said: 'Whether in the body or out of the body, I know\nnot.'\"\n\nAugustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (Gen. ad lit.\nxii, 3 seqq.) for this reason that the Apostle states that he knew he\nwas rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really\nthe third heaven to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness\nof the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to\nan imaginary third heaven, in the same way he might state that he was\nrapt in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as\nappears in one's dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third\nheaven, it follows that either he knew it to be something spiritual\nand incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he\nknew it to be something corporeal, and then his soul could not be\nrapt thither without his body, unless it were separated from his\nbody. Consequently we must explain the matter otherwise, by saying\nthat the Apostle knew himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but\nthat he ignored how his soul stood in relation to his body, to wit,\nwhether it were accompanied by his body or not.\n\nHere we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle\nknew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but ignored\nwhether it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were\nabstracted from the operations of the vegetative soul. But he could\nnot but know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he\nknew himself to be rapt; and as to his being abstracted from the\noperation of the vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as\nto require him to be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then,\nthat the Apostle ignored whether his soul were united to his body as\nits form, or separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this\nsay that the Apostle did not consider the matter while he was in\nrapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards\nhe questioned the point, when taking cognizance of what he had seen.\nBut this also is contrary to the Apostle's words, for he there\ndistinguishes between the past and what happened subsequently, since\nhe states that at the present time he knows that he was rapt\n\"fourteen years ago,\" and that at the present time he knows not\n\"whether he was in the body or out of the body.\"\n\nConsequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored\nwhether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore Augustine\n(Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after discussing the question at length,\nconcludes: \"Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored whether, when\nhe was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the\nsame way as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living body\neither of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn\nfrom his bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out\nof his body altogether, so that his body lay dead.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of man,\nespecially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. Or\nagain we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been\nrapt was a man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen years\nafterwards: for he says \"I know a man,\" not \"I know a rapt man.\"\nAgain nothing hinders death brought about by God being called\nrapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3): \"If the\nApostle doubted the matter, who of us will dare to be certain about\nit?\" Wherefore those who have something to say on this subject speak\nwith more conjecture than certainty.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Apostle knew that either the heaven in question was\nsomething incorporeal, or that he saw something incorporeal in that\nheaven; yet this could be done by his intellect, even without his\nsoul being separated from his body.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Paul's vision, while he was in rapture, was like the\nvision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen;\nand, unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing,\nbecause he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence\nAugustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): \"Although, when the Apostle\nwas rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he lacked that\nfull and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that\nhe knew not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will\nsurely not be lacking after reunion with the body in the resurrection\nof the dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 176\n\nOF THE GRACE OF TONGUES\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech,\nand (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word of wisdom and\nknowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of\nall languages?\n\n(2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 176, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Those Who Received the Gift of Tongues Spoke in Every\nLanguage?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that those who received the gift of tongues did\nnot speak in every language. For that which is granted to certain\npersons by the divine power is the best of its kind: thus our Lord\nturned the water into good wine, as stated in John 2:10. Now those\nwho had the gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since\na gloss on Heb. 1, says that \"it is not surprising that the epistle\nto the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the other epistles,\nsince it is natural for a man to have more command over his own than\nover a strange language. For the Apostle wrote the other epistles in\na foreign, namely the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the\nHebrew tongue.\" Therefore the apostles did not receive the knowledge\nof all languages by a gratuitous grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one is\nsufficient; and much less does God Whose work is more orderly than\nnature's. Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all,\nwhile speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, \"Every man\nheard them speak in his own tongue,\" says that \"they spoke in every\ntongue, or speaking in their own, namely the Hebrew language, were\nunderstood by all, as though they spoke the language proper to each.\"\nTherefore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in\nall languages.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is\nthe Church, according to John 1:16, \"Of His fullness we all have\nreceived.\" Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one\nlanguage, nor does each one of the faithful now speak save in one\ntongue. Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not\nreceive the grace to the extent of speaking in all languages.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 2:4) that \"they were all\nfilled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers\ntongues, according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak\"; on which\npassage a gloss of Gregory [*Hom. xxx in Ev.] says that \"the Holy\nGhost appeared over the disciples under the form of fiery tongues,\nand gave them the knowledge of all tongues.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order\nthat they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His\nfaith everywhere, according to Matt. 28:19, \"Going . . . teach ye all\nnations.\" Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to\nteach others should need to be taught by others, either as to how\nthey should speak to other people, or as to how they were to\nunderstand those who spoke to them; and all the more seeing that\nthose who were being sent were of one nation, that of Judea,\naccording to Isa. 27:6, \"When they shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg.:\n'When they shall rush in unto Jacob,' etc.] . . . they shall fill\nthe face of the world with seed.\" Moreover those who were being sent\nwere poor and powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily\nfound someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or to\nexplain what others said to them, especially as they were sent to\nunbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, in this respect, that God\nshould provide them with the gift of tongues; in order that, as the\ndiversity of tongues was brought upon the nations when they fell away\nto idolatry, according to Gen. 11, so when the nations were to be\nrecalled to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity might\nbe applied by the gift of tongues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As it is written (1 Cor. 12:7), \"the manifestation of\nthe Spirit is given to every man unto profit\"; and consequently both\nPaul and the other apostles were divinely instructed in the languages\nof all nations sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of\nthe faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of style which human\nart adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in his own, but\nnot in a foreign tongue. Even so they were sufficiently instructed in\nwisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching the faith,\nbut not as to all things known by acquired science, for instance the\nconclusions of arithmetic and geometry.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although either was possible, namely that, while\nspeaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they\nshould speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should\nspeak in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of\ntheir knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also\nto understand what was said by others. Whereas if their one language\nwere intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the\nknowledge of those who understood their speech, or it would have\namounted to an illusion, since a man's words would have had a\ndifferent sound in another's ears, from that with which they were\nuttered. Hence a gloss says on Acts 2:6 that \"it was a greater\nmiracle that they should speak all kinds of tongues\"; and Paul says\n(1 Cor. 14:18): \"I thank my God I speak with all your tongues.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Christ in His own person purposed preaching to only one\nnation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any doubt He\npossessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was no\nneed for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, as Augustine\nsays (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), \"whereas even now the Holy Ghost is\nreceived, yet no one speaks in the tongues of all nations, because\nthe Church herself already speaks the languages of all nations: since\nwhoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 176, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Gift of Tongues Is More Excellent Than the Grace of Prophecy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent\nthan the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper\nto better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now\nthe gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in\nthe sequence of Pentecost [*The sequence: _Sancti Spiritus adsit\nnobis gratia_ ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author\nof the _Veni Sancte Spiritus._ Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]: \"On\nthis day Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to\nall time\": whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament,\naccording to Heb. 1:1, \"God Who at sundry times and in divers manners\nspoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets.\" Therefore it\nwould seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift\nof prophecy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly\nmore excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by the\ngift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is\ndirected to man; for it is written (1 Cor. 14:2, 3): \"He that\nspeaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but\nhe that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification.\" Therefore\nit would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the\ngift of prophecy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the\nperson who has it, and \"he can use it when he will\"; wherefore it is\nwritten (1 Cor. 14:18): \"I thank my God I speak with all your\ntongues.\" But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above\n(Q. 171, A. 2). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be more\nexcellent than the gift of prophecy.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the \"interpretation of speeches\" would seem to be\ncontained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded by the\nsame Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of\nspeeches is placed after \"divers kinds of tongues\" (1 Cor. 12:10).\nTherefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than\nthe gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part of the latter.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:5): \"Greater is he\nthat prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues,\nin three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the\nutterance of certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and\nthis again is signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary\nvision; wherefore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift\nof tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has been\nstated above (Q. 173, A. 2) that the gift of prophecy consists in the\nmind itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth.\nWherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than the\nimaginary vision, as stated above (Q. 174, A. 2), so also is prophecy\nmore excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself.\nSecondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge of\nthings, which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which\nthe gift of tongues pertains.\n\nThirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle\nproves this in three ways (1 Cor. 14); first, because prophecy is\nmore profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose\nhe that speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation\nfollow (1 Cor. 14:4, 5). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself,\nfor if he be enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding\nthem, which pertains to the gift of prophecy, his own mind would not\nbe edified (1 Cor. 14:7-14). Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose\nespecial benefit the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since\nperchance they might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (1\nCor. 14:23), for instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the\nlatter spoke in various tongues (Acts 2:13): whereas by prophecies\nthe unbeliever is convinced, because the secrets of his heart are\nmade manifest (Acts 2:25).\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 174, A. 3, ad 1), it belongs to the\nexcellence of prophecy that a man is not only enlightened by an\nintelligible light, but also that he should perceive an imaginary\nvision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost's\noperation, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and\nthe imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the Old\nTestament, but also to endow the tongue with external erudition, in\nthe utterance of various signs of speech. All this is done in the New\nTestament, according to 1 Cor. 14:26, \"Every one of you hath a psalm,\nhath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation,\" i.e. a prophetic\nrevelation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in his\nmind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his\ntongue. \"He that speaketh in a tongue\" is said to speak \"not unto\nmen,\" i.e. to men's understanding or profit, but unto God's\nunderstanding and praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is\ndirected both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect\ngift.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of all\nthings supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results\nthat in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by\nway of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. On the other\nhand, the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular\nknowledge, namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent\nwith the imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly\nand by way of habit.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The interpretation of speeches is reducible to the gift\nof prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to understand\nand explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a\ndifficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered being\nunknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan.\n5:16, \"I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure\nthings, and resolve difficult things.\" Hence the interpretation of\nspeeches is more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from\nthe saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:5), \"Greater is he that\nprophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he\ninterpret.\" Yet the interpretation of speeches is placed after the\ngift of tongues, because the interpretation of speeches extends even\nto the interpretation of divers kinds of tongues.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 177\n\nOF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of\nwhich the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): \"To one . . . by the Spirit is\ngiven the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge.\" Under\nthis head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?\n\n(2) To whom is the grace becoming?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 177, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Any Gratuitous Grace Attaches to Words?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to\nwords. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of\nnature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a\nman is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as\nAugustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the\ngrace of words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is\nnot a gratuitous grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the\nApostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): \"The kingdom of God is not in speech, but\nin power.\" Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with\nwords.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no grace is given through merit, since \"if by grace,\nit is not now of works\" (Rom. 11:6). But the word is sometimes given\nto a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in\nexplanation of Ps. 118:43, \"Take not Thou the word of truth utterly\nout of my mouth\" that \"the word of truth is that which Almighty God\ngives to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not.\"\nTherefore it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous\ngrace.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it behooves man to declare in words things\npertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to\nthe gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom\nand the word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of\nfaith should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): \"A gracious tongue in\na good man shall abound [Vulg.: 'aboundeth'].\" Now man's goodness is\nby grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of\nothers, as stated above (I-II, Q. 111, AA. 1, 4). Now the knowledge a\nman receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by\nmeans of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything\nthat pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the\nmembers of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only\nspeaks so as to be understood by different people, which pertains to\nthe gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains\nto the grace _of the word._\n\nThis happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the\nintellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as _to teach._\nSecondly, in order to move the affections, so that a man willingly\nhearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as\n_to please_ his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but\nin order to draw them to listen to God's word. Thirdly, in order that\nmen may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to\nfulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks as _to sway_\nhis hearers. In order to effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the\nhuman tongue as of an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work\nwithin. Hence Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in\nEv.): \"Unless the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain\ndoes the voice of the teacher resound in the ears of the body.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a more\nexcellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the\nHoly Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which\nart can effect in a less efficient manner.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the word that relies\non human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he\nsays just before (1 Cor. 4:19): \"I . . . will know, not the speech of\nthem that are puffed up, but the power\": and of himself he had\nalready said (1 Cor. 2:4): \"My speech and my preaching was not in the\npersuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit\nand power.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above, the grace of the word is given to a\nman for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes through\nthe fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the\nspeaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace\ndirectly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying\ngrace also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault, and yet he\ndoes not merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the\nobstacles to grace.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As stated above, the grace of the word is directed to\nthe profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith to others\nthis is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says\n(De Trin. xiv, 1) that \"to know how faith may profit the godly and be\ndefended against the ungodly, is apparently what the Apostle means by\nknowledge.\" Hence it was not necessary for him to mention the word of\nfaith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the word of knowledge\nand of wisdom.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 177, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Grace of the Word of Wisdom and Knowledge Is Becoming to\nWomen?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and\nknowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to\nthis grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to\na woman to teach; for it is written (Prov. 4:3, 4): \"I was an only\nson in the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg.: 'I was my\nfather's son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother.\nAnd he taught me.'].\" Therefore this grace is becoming to women.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace of\nthe word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its\nutterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah\n(Judges 4:4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4\nKings 22:14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9).\nMoreover the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): \"Every woman praying or\nprophesying,\" etc. Much more therefore would it seem that the grace\nof the word is becoming to a woman.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 4:10): \"As every man hath\nreceived grace ministering the same one to another.\" Now some women\nreceive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister\nto others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the\nword is becoming to women.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34): \"Let women keep\nsilence in the churches,\" and (1 Tim. 2:12): \"I suffer not a woman to\nteach.\" Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word.\nTherefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women.\n\n_I answer that,_ Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way\nprivately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this\nrespect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another\nway, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is\nnot permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the\ncondition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be\nsubject to man, as appears from Gen. 3:16. Now teaching and\npersuading publicly in the church belong not to subjects but to the\nprelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they\nbe so commissioned, because their subjection is not a result of their\nnatural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by\naccident). Secondly, lest men's minds be enticed to lust, for it is\nwritten (Ecclus. 9:11): \"Her conversation burneth as fire.\" Thirdly,\nbecause as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit\nto be intrusted with public teaching.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of private teaching whereby a\nfather instructs his son.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The grace of prophecy consists in God enlightening the\nmind, on the part of which there is no difference of sex among men,\naccording to Col. 3:10, 11, \"Putting on the new\" man, \"him who is\nrenewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that created\nhim, where there is neither male nor female [*Vulg.: 'Neither Gentile\nnor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian,\nbond nor free.' Cf. I, Q. 93, A. 6, ad 2 footnote].\" Now the grace of\nthe word pertains to the instruction of men among whom the difference\nof sex is found. Hence the comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The recipients of a divinely conferred grace administer\nit in different ways according to their various conditions. Hence\nwomen, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can\nadminister it by teaching privately but not publicly.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 178\n\nOF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there\nare two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?\n\n(2) To whom is it becoming?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 178, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is a Gratuitous Grace of Working Miracles?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to\nthe working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one to\nwhom it is given (Cf. I-II, Q. 90, A. 1). Now the working of miracles\nputs nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles\nare wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we read (4 Kings\n13:21) that \"some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus.\nAnd when it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life,\nand stood upon his feet.\" Therefore the working of miracles does not\nbelong to a gratuitous grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost,\naccording to 1 Cor. 12:4, \"There are diversities of graces, but the\nsame Spirit.\" Now the working of miracles is effected even by the\nunclean spirit, according to Matt. 24:24, \"There shall arise false\nChrists and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders.\"\nTherefore it would seem that the working of miracles does not belong\nto a gratuitous grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, miracles are divided into \"signs,\" \"wonders\" or\n\"portents,\" and \"virtues.\" [*Cf. 2 Thess. 2:9, where the Douay\nversion renders _virtus_ by \"power.\" The use of the word \"virtue\" in\nthe sense of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term\n\"miracle\" is elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor. 12:10, 28; Heb.\n2:4; Acts 2:22]. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the \"working\nof miracles\" a gratuitous grace, any more than the \"working of signs\"\nand \"wonders.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the\npower of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be\ndistinguished from the working of miracles.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the working of miracles results from faith--either\nof the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2, \"If I should have all faith,\nso that I could remove mountains,\" or of other persons for whose sake\nmiracles are wrought, according to Matt. 13:58, \"And He wrought not\nmany miracles there, because of their unbelief.\" Therefore, if faith\nbe reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in\naddition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9, 10) says that among\nother gratuitous graces, \"to another\" is given \"the grace of healing\n. . . to another, the working of miracles.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 177, A. 1), the Holy Ghost\nprovides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto\nsalvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now\njust as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be\nbrought to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and\nthe grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed\nin order that it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of\nmiracles, according to Mk. 16:20, \"And confirming the word with signs\nthat followed\": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive\nat the intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore\njust as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some\nknowledge of God through His natural effects, so is he brought to a\ncertain degree of supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by\ncertain supernatural effects which are called miracles. Therefore the\nworking of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known\nsupernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that\ncan be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine\nomnipotence which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is\nimpossible for the principle of working miracles to be a quality\nabiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the\nprophet's mind is moved by divine inspiration to know something\nsupernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind of the miracle\nworker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous effect\nwhich God causes by His power. Sometimes this takes place after\nprayer, as when Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40):\nsometimes without any previous prayer being expressed, as when Peter\nby upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira delivered them to death\n(Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 30) that \"the saints\nwork miracles, sometimes by authority, sometimes by prayer.\" In\neither case, however, God is the principal worker, for He uses\ninstrumentally either man's inward movement, or his speech, or some\noutward action, or again the bodily contact of even a dead body. Thus\nwhen Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh. 10:12): \"Move\nnot, O sun, toward Gabaon,\" it is said afterwards (Josh. 10:14):\n\"There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying the\nvoice of a man.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be\nwrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2\nThess. 2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be \"according to the\nworking of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders.\" To\nquote the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), \"it is a matter of\ndebate whether they are called signs and lying wonders, because he\nwill deceive the senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he\nwill seem to do what he does not, or because, though they be real\nwonders, they will seduce into falsehood them that believe.\" They are\nsaid to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just as\nPharaoh's magicians made real frogs and real serpents; but they will\nnot be real miracles, because they will be done by the power of\nnatural causes, as stated in the First Part (Q. 114, A. 4); whereas\nthe working of miracles which is ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is\ndone by God's power for man's profit.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is that\nwhich is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature,\nand in this respect miracles are called \"virtues.\" The other thing is\nthe purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation\nof something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly\ncalled \"signs\": but on account of some excellence they receive the\nname of \"wonder\" or \"prodigy,\" as showing something from afar\n(_procul_).\n\nReply Obj. 4: The \"grace of healing\" is mentioned separately, because\nby its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on man in\naddition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the\nbringing of men to the knowledge of God.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for two\nreasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of faith,\nsecondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which faith\nrelies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the grace\nof the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the faith,\nso too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be\nconfirmed in their faith.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 178, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Wicked Can Work Miracles?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For\nmiracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1).\nNow the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to John 9:31,\n\"We know that God doth not hear sinners,\" and Prov. 28:9, \"He that\nturneth away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an\nabomination.\" Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work\nmiracles.\n\nObj. 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Matt.\n17:19, \"If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to\nthis mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove.\" Now\n\"faith without works is dead,\" according to James 2:20, so that,\nseemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would\nseem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work\nmiracles.\n\nObj. 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to Heb.\n2:4, \"God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers\nmiracles\": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain\npersons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear\nwitness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men\ncannot work miracles.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the good are more closely united to God than the\nwicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do\nthe wicked.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): \"If I should have\nall faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I\nam nothing.\" Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because \"this\ngift alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the\nkingdom from the children of perdition,\" as Augustine says (De Trin.\nxv, 18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work\nmiracles.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds,\nbecause they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while\nothers are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true\nmiracle, because they are done by the power of some natural cause.\nBoth of these can be done by the demons, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).\n\nTrue miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God\nworks them for man's benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for\nthe confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a\nperson's holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of\nvirtue. In the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who\npreaches the true faith and calls upon Christ's name, as even the\nwicked do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miracles.\nHence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, \"Have not we prophesied in Thy\nname?\" says: \"Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the\ncasting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do\nthese things, but to the invoking of Christ's name, that men may\nhonor God, by invoking Whom such great miracles are wrought.\"\n\nIn the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints,\nsince it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought\nduring their lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by\nothers. For we read (Acts 19:11, 12) that \"God wrought by the hand of\nPaul . . . miracles\" and \"even there were brought from his body to\nthe sick, handkerchiefs . . . and the diseases departed from them.\"\nIn this way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from working\nmiracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is ascribed not to him,\nbut to the one in proof of whose holiness such things are done.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 83, A. 16) when we were treating of\nprayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but on God's\nmercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers even\nof sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says (Tract.\nxliv in Joan.) that \"the blind man spoke these words before he was\nanointed,\" that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; \"since God\ndoes hear sinners.\" When it is said that the prayer of one who hears\nnot the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the\nsinner's merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for\nthe spiritual welfare of the one who prays--as the publican was heard\n(Luke 18:14)--or for the good of others and for God's glory.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as regards the\nbeliever, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace. But\nnothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead\ninstrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while\nemploying instrumentally the faith of a sinner.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for\nwhich they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine\nnever work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although\nsometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which they\ninvoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If\nthey teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as\nconfirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness.\nHence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): \"Magicians work miracles\nin one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians in another.\nMagicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by\ntheir manifest righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of\nrighteousness.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), \"the reason\nwhy these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most baneful\nerror the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater\ngifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is\nobtained.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 179\n\nOF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must next consider active and contemplative life. This\nconsideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into\nactive and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the\nactive life; (4) Of the comparison between the active and the\ncontemplative life.\n\nUnder the first head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?\n\n(2) Whether this is an adequate division?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 179, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Life Is Fittingly Divided into Active and Contemplative?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into\nactive and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by\nits essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that \"in\nliving things to live is to be.\" Now the soul is the principle of\naction and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that\nlife is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is\nunfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and\ncontemplative, or \"speculative\" and \"practical,\" are differences of\nthe intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while \"to live\" comes before \"to\nunderstand,\" since \"to live\" comes first to living things through the\nvegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4).\nTherefore life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the word \"life\" implies movement, according to\nDionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in\nrest, according to Wis. 8:16: \"When I enter into my house, I shall\nrepose myself with her.\" Therefore it would seem that life is\nunfittingly divided into active and contemplative.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): \"There is a\ntwofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the\nactive life and the contemplative.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, those things are said to live\nwhose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which\nis proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which\nis most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing\ngives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it,\nand to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to\nconsist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in\nsensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding\nand acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of\nevery man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on\nwhich he is most intent; thus especially does he wish \"to associate\nwith his friends\" (Ethic. ix, 12).\n\nAccordingly since certain men are especially intent on the\ncontemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on\nexternal actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided\ninto active and contemplative.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it actually _to be_\nis properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence _to live_ is,\nin living things, _to be,_ because living things through having\n_being_ from their form, act in such and such a way.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Life in general is not divided into active and\ncontemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from\nhaving an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect\nand human life.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external\nmovements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the\nintellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement;\nin which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation\nand understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is\ndefined \"the act of a perfect thing.\" In this way Dionysius (Div.\nNom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation,\nnamely, \"straight,\" \"circular,\" and \"oblique\" [*Cf. Q. 180, A. 6].\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 179, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Life Is Adequately Divided into Active and Contemplative?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into\nactive and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that\nthere are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of \"pleasure,\"\nthe \"civil\" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the\n\"contemplative\" life. Therefore the division of life into active and\ncontemplative would seem to be inadequate.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1, 2, 3, 19) mentions\nthree kinds of life, namely the life of \"leisure\" which pertains to\nthe contemplative, the \"busy\" life which pertains to the active, and\na third \"composed of both.\" Therefore it would seem that life is\ninadequately divided into active and contemplative.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers\nactions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two\noccupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life\nshould be divided into more kinds than the active and the\ncontemplative.\n\n_On the contrary,_ These two lives are signified by the two wives of\nJacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the\ntwo hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the\nactive life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv\nin Ezech.]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were\nmore than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active\nand contemplative.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), this division applies\nto the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is\ndivided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective\nknowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to\nthe contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains\nto the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is\nadequately divided into active and contemplative.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures\nof the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. _Ethic._ i, 5), it is the life \"of a beast.\"\nHence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into\nactive and contemplative.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore\nit is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale\nin white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise\nthat which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one\nof the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life\nsometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All the occupations of human actions, if\ndirected to the requirements of the present life in accord with right\nreason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities\nof the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the\nother hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong\nto the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life.\nThose human occupations that are directed to the consideration of\ntruth belong to the contemplative life.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 180\n\nOF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there\nare eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or\nalso to the affections?\n\n(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?\n\n(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in\nseveral?\n\n(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the\ncontemplative life?\n\n(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to\nthe vision of God?\n\n(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div.\nNom. iv);\n\n(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;\n\n(8) Of the duration of contemplation.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Contemplative Life Has Nothing to Do with the Affections,\nand Pertains Wholly to the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to\ndo with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the\nPhilosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that \"the end\nof contemplation is truth.\" Now truth pertains wholly to the\nintellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly\nregards the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.)\nthat \"Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or\nrather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_;\nCf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative life.\" Now the\nvision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore\nthe contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to\nthe contemplative life, \"to rest from external action.\" Now the\naffective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore\nit would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the\nappetitive power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that \"the\ncontemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God\nand our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator.\" Now\ndesire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore the\ncontemplative life has also something to do with the affective or\nappetitive power.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) theirs is said to be\nthe contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of\ntruth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I-II, Q.\n12, A. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the\nwill. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of\nthe action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive\ncause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which\nmoves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as\nstated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1).\n\nNow the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the\nsenses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen\nbecause, as it is written (Matt. 6:21), \"where thy treasure is, there\nis thy heart also,\" sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one\nacquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative\nlife to consist in the \"love of God,\" inasmuch as through loving God\nwe are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when\nhe obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life\nterminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the\nresult being that love also becomes more intense.\n\nReply Obj. 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of\ncontemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable\nand delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive\npower.\n\nReply Obj. 2: We are urged to the vision of the first\nprinciple, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says\n(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that \"the contemplative life tramples on all\ncares and longs to see the face of its Creator.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily\nmembers to perform external actions, but also the intellect to\npractice the act of contemplation, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Contemplative Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the\ncontemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that \"the\ncontemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor\nwith the whole mind.\" Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are\nprescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of\nGod and of our neighbor, for \"love . . . is the fulfilling of the\nLaw\" (Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues\nbelong to the contemplative life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the\ncontemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that \"the\nmind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its\nCreator.\" Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart,\nwhich is a result of moral virtue [*Cf. Q. 8, A. 7]. For it is\nwritten (Matt. 5:8): \"Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall\nsee God\": and (Heb. 12:14): \"Follow peace with all men, and holiness,\nwithout which no man shall see God.\" Therefore it would seem that the\nmoral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that \"the\ncontemplative life gives beauty to the soul,\" wherefore it is\nsignified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gen. 29:17) that she was \"of\na beautiful countenance.\" Now the beauty of the soul consists in the\nmoral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i,\n43, 45, 46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the\ncontemplative life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The moral virtues are directed to external\nactions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A. 1,\nObj. 3]) that it belongs to the contemplative life \"to rest from\nexternal action.\" Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the\ncontemplative life.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two\nways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong\nto the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the\ncontemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), \"knowledge,\" which pertains to the\nconsideration of truth, \"has little influence on the moral virtues\":\nwherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to\nactive but not to contemplative happiness.\n\nOn the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life\ndispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the\ncontemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the\nimpetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention from\nintelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the\nmoral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the\ndisturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong\ndispositively to the contemplative life.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the contemplative life has its\nmotive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the\nlove of God and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life.\nNow motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but\ndispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral\nvirtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues\nthat are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the\nreason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations,\naccording to Isa. 32:17, \"The work of justice shall be peace\": since\nhe who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of\nquarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the\ncontemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Beauty, as stated above (Q. 145, A. 2), consists in a\ncertain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found\nradically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty\nseen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to\nreason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the\nreason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence;\nwherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: \"I\nbecame a lover of her beauty.\"\n\nOn the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation,\nin so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially\nis it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which\nespecially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of\nchastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal\npleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as\nAugustine says (Soliloq. i, 10).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Are Various Actions Pertaining to the Contemplative\nLife?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining\nto the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat.\nContempl. i, 3, 4] distinguishes between \"contemplation,\"\n\"meditation,\"    and \"cogitation.\" Yet all these apparently pertain\nto contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are various\nactions pertaining to the contemplative life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): \"But we . . .\nbeholding (_speculantes_) the glory of the Lord with open face, are\ntransformed into the same clarity [*Vulg.: 'into the same image from\nglory to glory.'].\" Now this belongs to the contemplative life.\nTherefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision (_speculatio_)\nbelongs to the contemplative life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that \"the first and\ngreatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty.\" Now according\nto Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear.\nTherefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the\ncontemplative life.\n\nObj. 4: Further, \"Prayer,\" \"reading,\" and \"meditation\" [*Hugh of St.\nVictor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the\ncontemplative life. Again, \"hearing\" belongs to the contemplative\nlife: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is\nsignified) \"sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word\" (Luke\n10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for\nthe contemplative life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Life signifies here the operation on which a man\nis chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the\ncontemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative\nlives.\n\n_I answer that,_ We are now speaking of the contemplative life as\napplicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between\nman and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the\ntruth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception\nof a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly,\nthen, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally\ncompleted, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it\nderives its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this\nfinal act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles, from\nwhich it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned\nwith deducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which\nis sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself\nof the truth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Richard of St. Victor \"cogitation\" would\nseem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a\nperson intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may\ncomprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance\nof certain effects, but also the imaginations. And again the reason's\ndiscussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the\ntruth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7),\ncogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect.\n\"Meditation\" would seem to be the process of reason from certain\nprinciples that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and\n\"consideration\" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De\nConsid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,\n1), every operation of the intellect may be called \"consideration.\"\nBut \"contemplation\" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth;\nwherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that\n\"contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object\nof its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in\nsearching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is\nprone to wander.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of Augustine\non this passage, \"beholding\" (_speculatio_) denotes \"seeing in a\nmirror (_speculo_), not from a watch-tower (_specula_).\" Now to see a\nthing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its\nlikeness is reflected. Hence \"beholding\" would seem to be reducible\nto meditation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the\napprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it\nresults from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was\nstated above (A. 1) that contemplation terminates in the affections.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First,\nby means of things received from another. In this way, as regards the\nthings he receives from God, he needs _prayer,_ according to Wis.\n7:7, \"I called upon\" God, \"and the spirit of wisdom came upon me\":\nwhile as regards the things he receives from man, he needs _hearing,_\nin so far as he receives from the spoken word, and _reading,_ in so\nfar as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he\nneeds to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires\n_meditation._\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Contemplative Life Consists in the Mere Contemplation of\nGod, or Also in the Consideration of Any Truth Whatever?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not\nonly in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of\nany truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): \"Wonderful are Thy works,\nand my soul knoweth right well.\" Now the knowledge of God's works is\neffected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem\nthat it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only\nthe divine truth, but also any other.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that \"contemplation\nconsists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly of His\njudgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises.\" Now of\nthese four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the other\nthree pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life\nconsists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also\nin the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6]\ndistinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to \"the\nimagination alone,\" and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The\nsecond is in \"the imagination guided by reason,\" and consists in\nconsidering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third\nis in \"the reason based on the imagination\"; when, to wit, from the\nconsideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is\nin \"the reason and conducted by the reason,\" when the mind is intent\non things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The\nfifth is \"above the reason,\" but not contrary to reason, when by\ndivine revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be\ncomprehended by the human reason. The sixth is \"above reason and\ncontrary to reason\"; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know\nthings that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of\nthe mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to\npertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth\nregards not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered\nin creatures.\n\nObj. 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of truth\nis sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a\nperfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life\nconsists in the contemplation of any truth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that \"in\ncontemplation we seek the principle which is God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a thing may belong to the\ncontemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or\ndispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative\nlife is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this\ncontemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine\nsays (De Trin. i, 8) that \"the contemplation of God is promised us as\nbeing the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of\nour joys.\" This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come,\nwhen we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us\nperfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is\ncompetent to us imperfectly, namely \"through a glass\" and \"in a dark\nmanner\" (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate\nbeatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to\ncome; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's ultimate\nhappiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.\n\nSince, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation\nof God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, \"The invisible things of\nGod . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are\nmade,\" it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also\nbelongs to the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby\nto the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix)\nthat \"in the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and\nfutile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things\nunperishable and everlasting.\"\n\nAccordingly it is clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2, 3) that\nfour things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life;\nfirst, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of\ncontemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects;\nfourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the\ndivine truth itself.\n\nReply Obj. 1: David sought the knowledge of God's works, so that he\nmight be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps. 142:5,\n6): \"I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy\nhands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided to\nthe consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the\ndivine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's\nmercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be\nvouchsafed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means\nof creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists\nin the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step\nconsists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the\nthird step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible\nthings; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible\nobjects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is\nthe contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable\nby means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the\nsixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the\nreason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime\ncontemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately\nperfected.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the\ndivine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to\nthe divine truth.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 5]\n\nWhether in the Present State of Life the Contemplative Life Can Reach\nto the Vision of the Divine Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the\ncontemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence.\nFor, as stated in Gen. 32:30, Jacob said: \"I have seen God face to\nface, and my soul has been saved.\" Now the vision of God's face is\nthe vision of the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the\npresent life one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in\nHis essence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that \"contemplative men\nwithdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things, nor\ndo they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if\nthese follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous\nof seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of\ntheir limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is\nabove them, they overcome that which they are.\" Now man is not\nhindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the\nincomprehensible light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal\nphantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the\npresent life can extend to the vision of the incomprehensible light\nin its essence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): \"All creatures are\nsmall to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of\nGod,\" the blessed Benedict, to wit, \"saw a fiery globe in the tower\nand angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such\nthings by the light of God.\" Now the blessed Benedict was still in\nthis life. Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend\nto the vision of the essence of God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): \"As long as we\nlive in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of\ncontemplation as to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of\nincomprehensible light.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), \"no one\nseeing God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have\ntheir play: and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by\ngoing altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal\nsenses, he is not caught up into that vision.\" This has been\ncarefully discussed above (Q. 175, AA. 4, 5), where we spoke of\nrapture, and in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 2), where we treated of the\nvision of God.\n\nAccordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways.\nFirst, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of\nthe bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can\nnowise attain to the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in\nthis life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say,\nwhen the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to\nmake use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination,\nas happens in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the\npresent life can attain to the vision of the Divine essence.\nConsequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life\nis that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state\nbetween the present life and the life to come.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), \"if anyone\nseeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but\nsomething belonging to God.\" And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.):\n\"By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees\nsomething of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that\nafterwards it may attain to the glory of vision.\" Accordingly the\nwords of Jacob, \"I saw God face to face\" do not imply that he saw\nGod's essence, but that he saw some shape [*Cf. I, Q. 12, A. 11, ad\n1], imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him. Or, \"since we know\na man by his face, by the face of God he signified his knowledge of\nHim,\" according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the present state of life human contemplation is\nimpossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see\nthe intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states\n(De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the\nphantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of\nthe intelligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but\nalso in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius says (Coel.\nHier. i) that \"the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies\nunder certain symbolic figures, and by its power we are brought back\nto the single ray of light,\" i.e. to the simple knowledge of the\nintelligible truth. It is in this sense that we must understand the\nstatement of Gregory that \"contemplatives do not carry along with\nthem the shadows of things corporeal,\" since their contemplation is\nnot fixed on them, but on the consideration of the intelligible truth.\n\nReply Obj. 3: By these words Gregory does not imply that the blessed\nBenedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes to\nshow that because \"all creatures are small to him that sees God,\" it\nfollows that all things can easily be seen through the enlightenment\nof the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: \"For however little he may\nsee of the Creator's light, all created things become petty to him.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Operation of Contemplation Is Fittingly Divided into a\nThreefold Movement, Circular, Straight and Oblique?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is\nunfittingly divided into a threefold movement, \"circular,\"\n\"straight,\" and \"oblique\" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains\nexclusively to rest, according to Wis. 8:16, \"When I go into my\nhouse, I shall repose myself with her.\" Now movement is opposed to\nrest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life should not\nbe described as movements.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the\nintellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes\nthese movements as being different in the angels from what they are\nin the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the \"circular\" movement\nin the angel is \"according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and\nthe good.\" On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the\nsoul to several things: the first of which is the \"withdrawal of the\nsoul into itself from externals\"; the second is \"a certain\nconcentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and\nof outward occupation\"; and the third is \"union with those things\nthat are above it.\" Again, he describes differently their respective\nstraight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the\nangel is that by which he proceeds to the care of those things that\nare beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight\nmovement of the soul as being twofold: first, \"its progress towards\nthings that are near it\"; secondly, \"its uplifting from external\nthings to simple contemplation.\" Further, he assigns a different\noblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the\nangels to the fact that \"while providing for those who have less they\nremain unchanged in relation to God\": whereas he assigns the oblique\nmovement of the soul to the fact that \"the soul is enlightened in\nDivine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing.\" Therefore it would\nseem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned\naccording to the ways mentioned above.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5) mentions\nmany other different movements in likeness to the birds of the air.\n\"For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another\nswoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the\nright, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag\nbehind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended;\nand others remain suspended almost immovably in one place.\" Therefore\nit would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 119, A. 1, ad 3), the operation\nof the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is\ncalled a movement, in so far as movement is the act of a perfect\nthing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since,\nhowever, it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge\nof intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take\nplace without movement, the result is that even intelligible\noperations are described as movements, and are differentiated in\nlikeness to various movements. Now of bodily movements, local\nmovements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in _Phys._\nviii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible operations are\ndescribed by being likened to them. These movements are of three\nkinds; for there is the \"circular\" movement, by which a thing moves\nuniformly round one point as center, another is the \"straight\"\nmovement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third\nis \"oblique,\" being composed as it were of both the others.\nConsequently, in intelligible operations, that which is simply\nuniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation\nby which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the\nstraight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites\nsomething of uniformity with progress to various points is compared\nto the oblique movement.\n\nReply Obj. 1: External bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of\ncontemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations: but\nthe movements of intellectual operations belong to the quiet of\ncontemplation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but\nthe intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man.\nConsequently these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in\ndifferent ways, according as they are differently related to\nuniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two\nrespects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from\nthe variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands\nthe truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple\nintuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires\nintelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a\ncertain discoursing of the reason.\n\nWherefore Dionysius assigns the \"circular\" movement of the angels to\nthe fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having\nneither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither\nbeginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the\npart of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack\nof uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the\nvariety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing\nfrom externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the\ncircular movement of the soul is \"the soul's withdrawal into itself\nfrom external objects.\" Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires\nto be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of\nreason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the\nsimple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated\nby his saying in the second place that \"the soul's intellectual\npowers must be uniformly concentrated,\" in other words that\ndiscoursing must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the\ncontemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul\nthere is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the\nunderstanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition.\nAfterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the\nuniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all things\nbeing laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of God\nalone. This he expresses by saying: \"Then being thus made uniform\nunitedly,\" i.e. conformably, \"by the union of its powers, it is\nconducted to the good and the beautiful.\" The \"straight\" movement of\nthe angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by\nconsidering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to\nthe fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels through\nthe angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says:\n\"The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the\ncare of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things\nare direct,\" i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct\norder. Whereas he ascribes the \"straight\" movement in the soul to the\nsoul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of\nintelligible objects. The \"oblique\" movement in the angels he\ndescribes as being composed of the straight and circular movements,\ninasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with\ntheir contemplation of God: while the \"oblique\" movement in the soul\nhe also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, in so far\nas in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from the\ndistinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and\nbackwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either\nstraight [or] oblique movement, because they all denote discursions\nof reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or\nfrom the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to\nbelow: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to\nleft; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and\nforwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at hand\nor far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of\nreason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to\nthe order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if\nit be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the\noblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he\ndescribes as immobility belongs to the circular movement.\n\nWherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of\ncontemplation with much greater fulness and depth.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 7]\n\nWhether There Is Delight in Contemplation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.\nFor delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation\nresides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there\nis no delight in contemplation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight.\nNow there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says\n(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that \"when the soul strives to contemplate God,\nit is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes,\nbecause by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the\nincomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs,\nbecause even while tasting, it fails.\" Therefore there is no delight\nin contemplation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as\nstated in _Ethic._ x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is\nimperfect, according to 1 Cor. 13:12, \"We see now through a glass in\na dark manner.\" Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the\ncontemplative life.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now\ncontemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated\n(Gen. 32) that after Jacob had said (Gen. 32:30), \"'I have seen God\nface to face' . . . he halted on his foot (Gen. 32:31) . . . because\nhe touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank\" (Gen. 32:32).\nTherefore seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis.\n8:16): \"Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any\ntediousness, but joy and gladness\": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in\nEzech.) that \"the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly\nlovable.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There may be delight in any particular contemplation\nin two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. I-II, Q.\n3, A. 5], because each individual delights in the operation which\nbefits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of\nthe truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal:\nthe result being that \"all men naturally desire to know,\" so that\nconsequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more\ndelightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom\nand knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without\ndifficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of\nits object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even\nas bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is\npleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves.\nSince, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the\ncontemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above\n(AA. 1, 2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight in the\ncontemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself,\nbut also by reason of the Divine love.\n\nIn both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight,\nboth because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5), when we were treating of the\npassions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity\nsurpasses all love. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): \"O taste and see\nthat the Lord is sweet.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an\nact of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it\nis through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And\nsince the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term\nalso and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the\nappetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very\ndelight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore\nGregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that \"when we see one whom we love,\nwe are so aflame as to love him more.\" And this is the ultimate\nperfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be\nnot only seen but also loved.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an\nexternal thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not\nin a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he\nstrives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he\ndelights yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that\n\"the more peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the\ntriumph.\" But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the\npart of the truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part\nof our defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags\nus down to lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, \"The corruptible\nbody is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth\ndown the mind that museth upon many things.\" Hence it is that when\nman attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more,\nwhile he hates the more his own deficiency and the weight of his\ncorruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): \"Unhappy\nman that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?\"\nWherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): \"When God is once known\nby desire and understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in\ncomparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the\ndelight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as compared with\nthe delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written (Ps.\n35:9): \"Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure.\"\nYet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by\nwayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other\ncontemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that\nwhich is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal.\ni, 5): \"We may happen to have our own little theories about those\nsublime beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but\nfeebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us\nmore delight than any of those things that are round about us\": and\nGregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): \"The\ncontemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries\nthe soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers the\nspiritual world to the eyes of the mind.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot,\n\"because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax\nstrong in the love of God,\" as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.).\n\"Thus when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound\nwhile the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans\nonly on that foot which is sound.\"\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Contemplative Life Is Continuous?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not\ncontinuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things\npertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of\nthis life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, \"Whether\nprophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge\nshall be destroyed.\" Therefore the contemplative life is made void.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by\nsnatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says\n(Confess. x, 40), \"Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in\nmy inmost soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous\nweight I sink down again.\" Again, Gregory commenting on the words of\nJob 4:15, \"When a spirit passed before me,\" says (Moral. v, 33): \"The\nmind does not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward\ncontemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the\nvery immensity of the light.\" Therefore the contemplative life is not\ncontinuous.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be\ncontinuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. x, 7), \"is better than the life which is according to man.\"\nTherefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.\n\n_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Luke 10:42): \"Mary hath chosen the\nbest part, which shall not be taken away from her,\" since as Gregory\nsays (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), \"the contemplative life begins here so\nthat it may be perfected in our heavenly home.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may be described as continuous in two ways:\nfirst, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is\nevident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for\ntwo reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and\nunchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there\nis nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in\n_Topic._ i, 13. But even in our regard contemplative life is\ncontinuous--both because it is competent to us in respect of the\nincorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it\ncan endure after this life--and because in the works of the\ncontemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the\nmore able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher\nobserves (Ethic. x, 7).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in\nheaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of\ncharity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory\nspeaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): \"The contemplative life\nbegins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the\nfire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater\nlove when we see Him Whom we love.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now the\nhighest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine\ncontemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as\nwe have stated above (A. 6, ad 2). Hence although contemplation\ncannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as\nregards the other contemplative acts.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be\nabove man, because it befits us \"so far as there is in us something\ndivine\" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is incorruptible\nand impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure longer.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 181\n\nOF THE ACTIVE LIFE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the active life, under which head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active\nlife?\n\n(2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life?\n\n(3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life?\n\n(4) Of the duration of the active life.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 1]\n\nWhether All the Actions of the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Active\nLife?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not\nall pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards\nonly our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv\nin Ezech.) that \"the active life is to give bread to the hungry,\" and\nafter mentioning many things that regard our relations with other\npeople he adds finally, \"and to give to each and every one whatever\nhe needs.\" Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all\nthe acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its\nparts, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 2, 8; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3).\nTherefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the\nactive life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was\nblear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which \"being\noccupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor\nboth by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous\noffspring of good deeds.\" Now this would seem to belong to charity,\nwhereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues.\nTherefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the\nactive life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 2), the moral virtues\ndispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection\nbelong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral\nvirtues do not pertain to the active life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): \"In the\nactive life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice\nof good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye\nbeing purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine\nlight.\" Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral\nvirtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the\nactive life.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) the active and the\ncontemplative life differ according to the different occupations of\nmen intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the\nconsideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative\nlife, while the other is external work to which the active life is\ndirected.\n\nNow it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not\nto the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that \"for virtue knowledge is of\nlittle or no avail.\" Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong\nessentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher\n(Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one\nman is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher\nproves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with\nreference to our relations with other people, because it consists in\nthese things, not exclusively, but principally.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues,\nfor one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what\nGregory here ascribes to the active life.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of\nanother virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter\nvirtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the\nactive life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are\ncomprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we\npractice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves,\nand not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues\nbelong to the active life.\n\nIt may also be replied, however, that the active life is a\ndisposition to the contemplative life.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Prudence Pertains to the Active Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the\nactive life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the\ncognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power.\nNow prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive\npower. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the \"active\nlife being occupied with work, sees less,\" wherefore it is signified\nby Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that\none may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that\nprudence does not pertain to the active life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the\nintellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the\nactive life, as stated above (A. 1), so do the intellectual virtues\npertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that\nprudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative\nlife, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes\nmention (De Civ. Dei xix, 2, 3, 19).\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence\npertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), if\none thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially\nin moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is\ndirected: for instance \"he who commits adultery that he may steal, is\na thief rather than an adulterer,\" according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is\ndirected to the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is\n\"right reason applied to action\" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of\nthe moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher\nsays in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (A. 1, ad\n3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of\ncontemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of\nprudence, which is of itself directed to the works of the moral\nvirtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take\nprudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.\n\nIf, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any\nkind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part\nthereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De\nOffic. i, 5) says that \"the man who is able most clearly and quickly\nto grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be\nconsidered most prudent and wise.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as\nstated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), wherefore the knowledge\npertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the\nvery knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through\nhaving its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the\nactive life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: External occupation makes a man see less in\nintelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with\nwhich the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the\nexternal occupation of the active life enables a man to see more\nclearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence,\nboth on account of experience, and on account of the mind's\nattention, since \"brains avail when the mind is attentive\" as Sallust\nobserves [*Bell. Catilin., LI].\n\nReply Obj. 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the\nintellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same\nsubject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same\nmatter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is\nintermediate between the active and the contemplative life as regards\nthe things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied\nsometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal\nthings.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 811, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Teaching Is a Work of the Active or of the Contemplative Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active\nbut of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.)\nthat \"the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods,\nat least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose\nminds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty.\" But this\npertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the\ncontemplative life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same\nkind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher\nsays (Metaph. i, 1) that \"to be able to teach is an indication of\nknowledge.\" Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the\ncontemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the\ncontemplative life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the\ncontemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another,\nbelongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it\nbelongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by\nteaching him, of the truth we have meditated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): \"The active\nlife is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words\nof wisdom.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The act of teaching has a twofold object. For\nteaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the\ninterior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or\nobject of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching\nbelongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life.\nIt belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly,\nso as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to\nthe contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in\nthe consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says\n(De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): \"Let them choose for themselves the\nbetter part,\" namely the contemplative life, \"let them be busy with\nthe word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with\nsalutary knowledge,\" thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to\nthe contemplative life.\n\nThe other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and\nthus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all\ndoctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to\nits matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and\nlove of truth.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument\nclearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains\nto the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far\nas he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to\nbring another man to understand the truth.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the man\nfor whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible\ntruth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by\nexternal action. Hence the comparison fails.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Active Life Remains After This Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this\nlife. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as\nstated above (A. 1). But the moral virtues endure after this life\naccording to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life\nremains after this life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as\nstated above (A. 3). But in the life to come when \"we shall be like\nthe angels,\" teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in\nthe angels of whom one \"enlightens, cleanses, and perfects\" [*Coel.\nHier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the \"receiving of\nknowledge,\" according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it\nwould seem that the active life remains after this life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is\nit able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly\nmore lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that \"we\ncan remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to\nmaintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life.\" Therefore the\nactive life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after\nthis life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): \"The active\nlife ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to\nbe perfected in our heavenly home.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the active life has its end\nin external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of\ncontemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative\nlife. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of\nexternal actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at\nall, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as\nAugustine says at the end of _De Civitate Dei_ xxii, 30, \"there we\nshall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and\npraise.\" And he had said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that \"there\nGod will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without\ntiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the\nuniversal activity.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1, ad 1), the moral virtues\nwill remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as\nto the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that\nconduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted\nabove Augustine denotes by \"rest,\" and this rest excludes not only\noutward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the passions.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The contemplative life, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 4),\nconsists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one\nangel does not teach another, since according to Matt. 18:10, \"the\nlittle ones' angels,\" who belong to the lower order, \"always see the\nface of the Father\"; and so, in the life to come, no man will teach\nanother of God, but \"we shall\" all \"see Him as He is\" (1 John 3:2).\nThis is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: \"They shall\nteach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord: for\nall shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest.\"\n\nBut as regards things pertaining to the \"dispensation of the\nmysteries of God,\" one angel teaches another by cleansing,\nenlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they have something of\nthe active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they\nare occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is\nsignified by the fact that Jacob saw angels \"ascending\" the\nladder--which refers to contemplation--and \"descending\"--which refers\nto action. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), \"they do\nnot wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the\njoys of inward contemplation.\" Hence in them the active life does not\ndiffer from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the\nworks of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation.\n\nNor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the\nadministering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by\nreason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of\nour seeing God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That the durability of the active life in the\npresent state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life\narises not from any property of either life considered in itself, but\nfrom our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of\ncontemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral.\nii, 3) that \"the mind through its very weakness being repelled from\nthat immense height recoils on itself.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 182\n\nOF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the active life in comparison with the\ncontemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?\n\n(2) Which of them has the greater merit?\n\n(3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?\n\n(4) Of their order.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Active Life Is More Excellent Than the Contemplative?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent\nthan the contemplative. For \"that which belongs to better men would\nseem to be worthier and better,\" as the Philosopher says (Top. iii,\n1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely\nprelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that \"in our actions we must not\nlove honor or power in this life.\" Therefore it would seem that the\nactive life is more excellent than the contemplative.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the\nmore important; thus the military art, being the more important,\ndirects the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to\nthe active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears\nfrom the words addressed to Moses (Ex. 19:21), \"Go down and charge\nthe people, lest they should have a mind to pass the\" fixed \"limits\nto see the Lord.\" Therefore the active life is more excellent than\nthe contemplative.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing in\norder to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.\n12:31): \"Be zealous for the better gifts.\" Now some are taken away\nfrom the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the\nactive life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state\nof prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more\nexcellent than the contemplative.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Luke 10:42): \"Mary hath chosen the\nbest part, which shall not be taken away from her.\" Now Mary figures\nthe contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more\nexcellent than the active.\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent\nin themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect.\nAccordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more\nexcellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight\nreasons (Ethic. x, 7, 8). The first is, because the contemplative\nlife becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the\nintellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things\nintelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals.\nHence Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is\ninterpreted \"the vision of the principle,\" [*Or rather, 'One seeing\nthe principle,' if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_; Cf. Jerome, De Nom.\nHebr.] whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is\nsignified by Lia who was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the\ncontemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards\nthe highest degree of contemplation, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 8,\nad 2; Q. 181, A. 4, ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative\nlife is signified, is described as \"sitting\" all the time \"at the\nLord's feet.\" Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more\ndelightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.\nSerm. ciii) that \"Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted.\" Fourthly,\nbecause in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since\nhe needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Luke\n10:41): \"Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many\nthings.\" Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for\nits own sake, while the active life is directed to something else.\nHence it is written (Ps. 36:4): \"One thing I have asked of the Lord,\nthis will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all\nthe days of my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord.\"\nSixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest,\naccording to Ps. 45:11, \"Be still and see that I am God.\" Seventhly,\nbecause the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas\nactive life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says\n(De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): \"'In the beginning was the Word': to Him\nwas Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made flesh': Him was Martha\nserving.\" Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to\nthat which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in\nthe works of the active life the lower powers also, which are common\nto us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (Ps. 35:7) after the\nwords, \"Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord,\" that which is\nspecial to man is added (Ps. 35:10): \"In Thy light we shall see\nlight.\"\n\nOur Lord adds a ninth reason (Luke 10:42) when He says: \"Mary hath\nchosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her,\" which\nwords Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: \"Not--Thou\nhast chosen badly but--She has chosen better. Why better?\nListen--because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden\nof necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the\nsweetness of truth is eternal.\"\n\nYet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer\nthe active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too\nthe Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): \"It is better to be wise than\nto be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . .\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should\nalso excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii,\n1): \"A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than\nothers in contemplation.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of\nmind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that \"the contemplative\nlife obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal\nbut of eternal things.\" And Boethius says (De Consol. v, 2): \"The\nsoul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the\nDivine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things.\" Wherefore\nit is evident that the active life does not directly command the\ncontemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life\nas dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly\nserves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says\n(Hom. iii in Ezech.) that \"the active life is bondage, whereas the\ncontemplative life is freedom.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative\nlife to the works of the active life, on account of some necessity of\nthe present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake\ncontemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19):\n\"The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity\nundertake an honest toil,\" the work namely of the active life. \"If no\none imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the\nresearch and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we\nmust bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must\nnot altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive\nourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us.\" Hence it\nis clear that when a person is called from the contemplative life to\nthe active life, this is done by way not of subtraction but of\naddition.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Active Life Is of Greater Merit Than the Contemplative?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit\nthan the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed\nis due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, \"Every man shall receive\nhis own reward according to his own labor.\" Now labor is ascribed to\nthe active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says\n(Hom. xiv in Ezech.): \"Whosoever is converted to God must first of\nall sweat from labor, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may\nrest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle.\" Therefore\nthe active life is of greater merit than the contemplative.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the\nhappiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on John 21:22, \"So\nI will have him to remain till I come,\" says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.):\n\"This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me\nconformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun\nhere remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall\ncome.\" And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that \"contemplation\nbegins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home.\" Now the\nlife to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the\nreward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to\nhave less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the\ncharacter of reward.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that \"no sacrifice\nis more acceptable to God than zeal for souls.\" Now by the zeal for\nsouls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it\nwould seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than\nthe active.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): \"Great are the\nmerits of the active life, but greater still those of the\ncontemplative.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4), the root of\nmerit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), charity\nconsists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by\nitself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated\nabove (Q. 27, A. 8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to\nthe love of God is generically more meritorious than that which\npertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the\ncontemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of\nGod; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that \"the love of\" the\nDivine \"truth seeks a holy leisure,\" namely of the contemplative\nlife, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life\nseeks, as stated above (Q. 181, A. 4, ad 2). On the other hand, the\nactive life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor,\nbecause it is \"busy about much serving\" (Luke 10:40). Wherefore the\ncontemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active\nlife. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): \"The\ncontemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the\nlatter labors under the stress of present work,\" by reason of the\nnecessity of assisting our neighbor, \"while the former with heartfelt\nrelish has a foretaste of the coming rest,\" i.e. the contemplation of\nGod.\n\nNevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of\nthe active life than another by the works of the contemplative life.\nFor instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then\nsuffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the\ntime being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake.\nThus the Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): \"I wished myself to be an anathema\nfrom Christ, for my brethren\"; which words Chrysostom expounds as\nfollows (De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): \"His\nmind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired\nabove all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he\npleased Christ.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the\naccidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the\nessential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor\nborne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign\nthereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this\nlife, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived at\nperfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and\nif there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the\ngreater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without\nsome imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it\ndoes not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on\naccount of the practice of greater Divine charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when\nsomething is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially\naccepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in\nsacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his\nsoul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, \"Have pity on thy own soul,\npleasing God\"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to\nApoc. 22:17, \"He that heareth, let him say: Come.\" And the more\nclosely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more\nacceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is more acceptable\nto God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to\ncontemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that \"no\nsacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls,\" does not\nmean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of\nthe contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to\nGod one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external\ngifts.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Contemplative Life Is Hindered by the Active Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by\nthe active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain\nstillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, \"Be still, and see that I\nam God\"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to\nLuke 10:41, \"Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many\nthings.\" Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.\n\nObj. 2: Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the\ncontemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision;\nfor Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it \"is blear-eyed and\nfruitful, because the active life, being occupied with work, sees\nless.\" Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now the active and\nthe contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another, since\nthe active life is busy about many things, while the contemplative\nlife attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in\nopposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the\ncontemplative life is hindered by the active.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): \"Those who wish to\nhold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the\ncamp of action.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The active life may be considered from two points of\nview. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external\nworks: and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the\ncontemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with\nexternal action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine\ncontemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting\nand directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point\nof view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the\nlatter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions.\nHence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): \"Those who wish to hold the\nfortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of\naction. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no\nlonger wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the\nwrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither\novercome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor cast down\nwith too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way\nthey will know when they withdraw within themselves, in order to\nexplore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the\nshadows of the things corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether\nthey prudently drive them away.\" Hence the work of the active life\nconduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior passions\nwhich give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments\nconsider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect\nwhich is the quelling of the passions.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Active Life Precedes the Contemplative?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the\ncontemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the\nlove of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our\nneighbor. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor,\nsince we love our neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the\ncontemplative life also precedes the active life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): \"It should be\nobserved that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to\ncontemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the\ncontemplative to the active life.\" Therefore the active is not simply\nprior to the contemplative.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any\norder between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the\nactive and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects;\nfor Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): \"Often those who were able to\ncontemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when\npressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live\nadvantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures\nare killed by the sword of their inaction.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with\nregard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes\nthe active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and\nare better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active\nlife. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is\ncompared to the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the\nhusband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband,\nas Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3, 7, 12).\n\nSecondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first\nin the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the\ncontemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above\n(A. 1; Q. 181, A. 1, ad 3); and, in the order of generation,\ndisposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and\naccording to its nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of God,\nnot of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active\nlife is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence\nGregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): \"Without the contemplative life it\nis possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the\ngood actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein without\nthe active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do.\"\n\nFrom this it is also evident that the active precedes the\ncontemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the\norder of generation, that which is proper to the perfect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative life is\naccording to the order of generation; whereas the return from the\ncontemplative life to the active is according to the order of\ndirection, in so far as the active life is directed by the\ncontemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the\nacquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in _Ethic._ ii,\n7.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on account\nof his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by\nreason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37)\nthat \"there be some so restless that when they are free from labor\nthey labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for\nthought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear.\" Others, on\nthe contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they\nare apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves\nwholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore\nGregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that \"some are so slothful of mind that\nif they chance to have any hard work to do they give way at the very\noutset.\" Yet, as he adds further on, \"often . . . love stimulates\nslothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are disturbed\nin contemplation.\" Consequently those who are more adapted to the\nactive life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the\npractice of the active life; while none the less, those who are more\nadapted to the contemplative life can take upon themselves the works\nof the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON THE STATES OF LIFE (QQ. 183-189)\n_______________________\n\nOF MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must next consider man's various states and duties. We shall\nconsider (1) man's duties and states in general; (2) the state of the\nperfect in particular.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What constitutes a state among men?\n\n(2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties?\n\n(3) Of the diversity of duties;\n\n(4) Of the diversity of states.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Notion of a State Denotes a Condition of Freedom or\nServitude?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote\na condition of freedom or servitude. For \"state\" takes its name from\n\"standing.\" Now a person is said to stand on account of his being\nupright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): \"To fall by speaking\nharmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness.\" But\na man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God;\nwherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, \"Praise becometh the upright,\" says:\n\"The upright are those who direct their heart according to God's\nwill.\" Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine\ncommandments suffices alone for the notion of a state.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the word \"state\" seems to denote immobility\naccording to 1 Cor. 15:48, \"Be ye steadfast (_stabiles_) and\nimmovable\"; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech.): \"The stone\nis foursquare, and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will\nmake it fall.\" Now it is virtue that enables us \"to act with\nimmobility,\" according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore it would seem\nthat a state is acquired by every virtuous action.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the word \"state\" seems to indicate height of a kind;\nbecause to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made higher\nthan another by various duties; and in like manner men are raised\nupwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore the\nmere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a\ndifference of states.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu. vi,\ncan. Si Quando): \"Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or\nstate is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own\nperson\"; and \"state\" here has reference to freedom or servitude.\nTherefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man's state,\nexcept that which refers to freedom or servitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ \"State,\" properly speaking, denotes a kind of\nposition, whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a\nmanner according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his\nhead should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground,\nand his other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and\nthis is not the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when\nhe stands upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but\nonly when he is still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a\nmatter is said to have stability (_statum_) in reference to its own\ndisposition in the point of a certain immobility or restfulness.\nConsequently matters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do\nnot constitute a state among men, for instance that a man be rich or\npoor, of high or low rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law\n[*Dig. I, IX, De Senatoribus] (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) it is\nsaid that if a man be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his\ndignity rather than of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains\nto a man's state, which regards an obligation binding his person, in\nso far, to wit, as a man is his own master or subject to another, not\nindeed from any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly\nestablished; and this is something pertaining to the nature of\nfreedom or servitude. Therefore state properly regards freedom or\nservitude whether in spiritual or in civil matters.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Uprightness as such does not pertain to the notion of\nstate, except in so far as it is connatural to man with the addition\nof a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to stand\nwithout its being required that they should be upright; nor again are\nmen said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they be\nstill.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Immobility does not suffice for the notion of state;\nsince even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is not said\nto stand.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Duty implies relation to act; while grades denote an\norder of superiority and inferiority. But state requires immobility\nin that which regards a condition of the person himself.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Should Be Different Duties or States in the Church?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there should not be different duties\nor states in the Church. For distinction is opposed to unity. Now the\nfaithful of Christ are called to unity according to John 17:21, 22:\n\"That they . . . may be one in Us . . . as We also are one.\"\nTherefore there should not be a distinction of duties and states in\nthe Church.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one\nsuffices. But the working of grace is much more orderly than the\nworking of nature. Therefore it were more fitting for things\npertaining to the operations of grace to be administered by the same\npersons, so that there would not be a distinction of duties and\nstates in the Church.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the good of the Church seemingly consists chiefly in\npeace, according to Ps. 147:3, \"Who hath placed peace in thy\nborders,\" and 2 Cor. 13:11, \"Have peace, and the God of peace . . .\nshall be with you.\" Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for\npeace would seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19,\n\"Every beast loveth its like,\" while the Philosopher says (Polit.\nvii, 5) that \"a little difference causes dissension in a state.\"\nTherefore it would seem that there ought not to be a distinction of\nstates and duties in the Church.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written in praise of the Church (Ps. 44:10)\nthat she is \"surrounded with variety\": and a gloss on these words\nsays that \"the Queen,\" namely the Church, \"is bedecked with the\nteaching of the apostles, the confession of martyrs, the purity of\nvirgins, the sorrowings of penitents.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The difference of states and duties in the Church\nregards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of\nthe Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection,\nwhich in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created\nuniverse except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the\nfulness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to\nHis members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the\nChurch. This is the meaning of the Apostle's words (Eph. 4:11, 12):\n\"He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some\nevangelists, and other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of\nthe saints.\" Secondly, it regards the need of those actions which are\nnecessary in the Church. For a diversity of actions requires a\ndiversity of men appointed to them, in order that all things may be\naccomplished without delay or confusion; and this is indicated by the\nApostle (Rom. 12:4, 5), \"As in one body we have many members, but all\nthe members have not the same office, so we being many are one body\nin Christ.\" Thirdly, this belongs to the dignity and beauty of the\nChurch, which consist in a certain order; wherefore it is written (3\nKings 10:4, 5) that \"when the queen of Saba saw all the wisdom of\nSolomon . . . and the apartments of his servants, and the order of\nhis ministers . . . she had no longer any spirit in her.\" Hence the\nApostle says (2 Tim. 2:20) that \"in a great house there are not only\nvessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The distinction of states and duties is not an obstacle\nto the unity of the Church, for this results from the unity of faith,\ncharity, and mutual service, according to the saying of the Apostle\n(Eph. 4:16): \"From whom the whole body being compacted,\" namely by\nfaith, \"and fitly joined together,\" namely by charity, \"by what every\njoint supplieth,\" namely by one man serving another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as nature does not employ many means where one\nsuffices, so neither does it confine itself to one where many are\nrequired, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), \"If\nthe whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing?\" Hence there\nwas need in the Church, which is Christ's body, for the members to be\ndifferentiated by various duties, states, and grades.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as in the natural body the various members are\nheld together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and are\ndissociated from one another as soon as that spirit departs, so too\nin the Church's body the peace of the various members is preserved by\nthe power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church, as\nstated in John 6:64. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:3): \"Careful to\nkeep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.\" Now a man departs\nfrom this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an\nearthly kingdom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his own.\nBesides, the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is the\nbetter preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby\nthe greater number have a share in public actions. Wherefore the\nApostle says (1 Cor. 12:24, 25) that \"God hath tempered (_the body_)\ntogether that there might be no schism in the body, but the members\nmight be mutually careful one for another.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Duties Differ According to Their Actions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that duties do not differ according to\ntheir actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in\nspirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction\namong things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties\ncannot be differentiated according to a difference of acts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the active and the contemplative life differ\naccording to their acts, as stated above (Q. 179, A. 1). But the\ndistinction of duties seems to be other than the distinction of\nlives. Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, even ecclesiastical orders, states, and grades\nseemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duties differ\naccording to their acts it would seem that duties, grades, and states\ndiffer in the same way. Yet this is not true, since they are divided\ninto their respective parts in different ways. Therefore duties do\nnot differ according to their acts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that \"_officium_\n(duty) takes its name from _efficere_ (to effect), as though it were\ninstead of _efficium,_ by the change of one letter for the sake of\nthe sound.\" But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties differ\naccording to their acts.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), difference among the members\nof the Church is directed to three things: perfection, action, and\nbeauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a threefold\ndistinction among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and\nthus we have the difference of states, in reference to which some\npersons are more perfect than others. Another distinction regards\naction and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are said to\nhave various duties when they are appointed to various actions. A\nthird distinction regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and\nthus we distinguish various grades according as in the same state or\nduty one person is above another. Hence according to a variant text\n[*The Septuagint] it is written (Ps. 47:4): \"In her grades shall God\nbe known.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The material diversity of human acts is infinite. It is\nnot thus that duties differ, but by their formal diversity which\nresults from diverse species of acts, and in this way human acts are\nnot infinite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Life is predicated of a thing absolutely: wherefore\ndiversity of lives results from a diversity of acts which are\nbecoming to man considered in himself. But efficiency, whence we have\nthe word \"office\" (as stated above), denotes action tending to\nsomething else according to _Metaph._ ix, text. 16 [*Ed. Did. viii,\n8]. Hence offices differ properly in respect of acts that are\nreferred to other persons; thus a teacher is said to have an office,\nand so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vi,\n19) that \"to have an office is to be officious,\" i.e. harmful \"to no\none, but to be useful to all.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Differences of state, offices and grades are taken from\ndifferent things, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Yet these three\nthings may concur in the same subject: thus when a person is\nappointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office and\ngrade, and sometimes, besides this, a state of perfection, on account\nof the sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The\necclesiastical orders are particularly distinct according to divine\noffices. For Isidore says (Etym. vi): \"There are various kinds of\noffices; but the foremost is that which relates to sacred and Divine\nthings.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Difference of States Applies to Those Who Are Beginning,\nProgressing, or Perfect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the difference of states does not\napply to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect. For\n\"diverse genera have diverse species and differences\" [*Aristotle,\nCateg. ii]. Now this difference of beginning, progress, and\nperfection is applied to the degrees of charity, as stated above (Q.\n24, A. 9), where we were treating of charity. Therefore it would seem\nthat the differences of states should not be assigned in this manner.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1), state regards a condition of\nservitude or freedom, which apparently has no connection with the\naforesaid difference of beginning, progress, and perfection.\nTherefore it is unfitting to divide state in this way.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the distinction of beginning, progress, and\nperfection seems to refer to _more_ and _less,_ and this seemingly\nimplies the notion of grades. But the distinction of grades differs\nfrom that of states, as we have said above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore\nstate is unfittingly divided according to beginning, progress, and\nperfection.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11): \"There are three\nstates of the converted, the beginning, the middle, and the\nperfection\"; and (Hom. xv in Ezech.): \"Other is the beginning of\nvirtue, other its progress, and other still its perfection.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) state regards freedom or\nservitude. Now in spiritual things there is a twofold servitude and a\ntwofold freedom: for there is the servitude of sin and the servitude\nof justice; and there is likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and\nfrom justice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 6:20,\n22), \"When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice\n. . . but now being made free from sin,\" you are . . . \"become\nservants to God.\"\n\nNow the servitude of sin or justice consists in being inclined to\nevil by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by a habit of justice:\nand in like manner freedom from sin is not to be overcome by the\ninclination to sin, and freedom from justice is not to be held back\nfrom evil for the love of justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his\nnatural reason, is inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to\nnatural reason, it follows that freedom from sin is true freedom\nwhich is united to the servitude of justice, since they both incline\nman to that which is becoming to him. In like manner true servitude\nis the servitude of sin, which is connected with freedom from\njustice, because man is thereby hindered from attaining that which is\nproper to him. That a man become the servant of justice or sin\nresults from his efforts, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 6:16): \"To\nwhom you yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom\nyou obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto\njustice.\" Now in every human effort we can distinguish a beginning, a\nmiddle, and a term; and consequently the state of spiritual servitude\nand freedom is differentiated according to these things, namely, the\nbeginning--to which pertains the state of beginners--the middle, to\nwhich pertains the state of the proficient--and the term, to which\nbelongs the state of the perfect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Freedom from sin results from charity which \"is poured\nforth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us\" (Rom.\n5:5). Hence it is written (2 Cor. 3:17): \"Where the Spirit of the\nLord is, there is liberty.\" Wherefore the same division applies to\ncharity as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Men are said to be beginners, proficient, and perfect\n(so far as these terms indicate different states), not in relation to\nany occupation whatever, but in relation to such occupations as\npertain to spiritual freedom or servitude, as stated above (A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As already observed (A. 3, ad 3), nothing hinders grade\nand state from concurring in the same subject. For even in earthly\naffairs those who are free, not only belong to a different state from\nthose who are in service, but are also of a different grade.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 184\n\nOF THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider those things that pertain to the state of\nperfection whereto the other states are directed. For the\nconsideration of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the\nlegislator; and in relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the\nconsideration of orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part\n[*Suppl., Q. 34].\n\nConcerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration\npresents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things\nrelating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the\nperfection of religious.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity?\n\n(2) Whether one can be perfect in this life?\n\n(3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing\nthe counsels or the commandments?\n\n(4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?\n\n(5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of\nperfection?\n\n(6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection?\n\n(7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state?\n\n(8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and\narchdeacons.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Perfection of the Christian Life Consists Chiefly in\nCharity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the perfection of the Christian life\ndoes not consist chiefly in charity. For the Apostle says (1 Cor.\n14:20): \"In malice be children, but in sense be perfect.\" But charity\nregards not the senses but the affections. Therefore it would seem\nthat the perfection of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in\ncharity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Eph. 6:13): \"Take unto you the armor\nof God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to stand\nin all things perfect\"; and the text continues (Eph. 6:14, 16),\nspeaking of the armor of God: \"Stand therefore having your loins girt\nabout with truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice . . . in\nall things taking the shield of faith.\" Therefore the perfection of\nthe Christian life consists not only in charity, but also in other\nvirtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, virtues like other habits, are specified by their\nacts. Now it is written (James 1:4) that \"patience hath a perfect\nwork.\" Therefore seemingly the state of perfection consists more\nspecially in patience.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 3:14): \"Above all things have\ncharity, which is the bond of perfection,\" because it binds, as it\nwere, all the other virtues together in perfect unity.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be perfect in so far as it\nattains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection thereof. Now\nit is charity that unites us to God, Who is the last end of the human\nmind, since \"he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in\nhim\" (1 John 4:16). Therefore the perfection of the Christian life\nconsists radically in charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The perfection of the human senses would seem to\nconsist chiefly in their concurring together in the unity of truth,\naccording to 1 Cor. 1:10, \"That you be perfect in the same mind\n(_sensu_), and in the same judgment.\" Now this is effected by charity\nwhich operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfection of\nthe senses consists radically in the perfection of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man may be said to be perfect in two ways. First,\nsimply: and this perfection regards that which belongs to a thing's\nnature, for instance an animal may be said to be perfect when it\nlacks nothing in the disposition of its members and in such things as\nare necessary for an animal's life. Secondly, a thing is said to be\nperfect relatively: and this perfection regards something connected\nwith the thing externally, such as whiteness or blackness or\nsomething of the kind. Now the Christian life consists chiefly in\ncharity whereby the soul is united to God; wherefore it is written (1\nJohn 3:14): \"He that loveth not abideth in death.\" Hence the\nperfection of the Christian life consists simply in charity, but in\nthe other virtues relatively. And since that which is simply, is\nparamount and greatest in comparison with other things, it follows\nthat the perfection of charity is paramount in relation to the\nperfection that regards the other virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Patience is stated to have a perfect work in relation\nto charity, in so far as it is an effect of the abundance of charity\nthat a man bears hardships patiently, according to Rom. 8:35,\n\"Who . . . shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall\ntribulation? Or distress?\" etc.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Any One Can Be Perfect in This Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that none can be perfect in this life. For\nthe Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): \"When that which is perfect is come,\nthat which is in part shall be done away.\" Now in this life that\nwhich is in part is not done away; for in this life faith and hope,\nwhich are in part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"The perfect is that which lacks nothing\" (Phys.\niii, 6). Now there is no one in this life who lacks nothing; for it\nis written (James 3:2): \"In many things we all offend\"; and (Ps.\n138:16): \"Thy eyes did see my imperfect being.\" Therefore none is\nperfect in this life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life, as stated (A.\n1), relates to charity, which comprises the love of God and of our\nneighbor. Now, neither as to the love of God can one have perfect\ncharity in this life, since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in Ezech.)\n\"the furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more\nfiercely when we see Him Whom we love\"; nor as to the love of our\nneighbor, since in this life we cannot love all our neighbors\nactually, even though we love them habitually; and habitual love is\nimperfect. Therefore it seems that no one can be perfect in this life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Divine law does not prescribe the impossible.\nYet it prescribes perfection according to Matt. 5:48, \"Be you . . .\nperfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect.\" Therefore\nseemingly one can be perfect in this life.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the perfection of the\nChristian life consists in charity. Now perfection implies a certain\nuniversality because according to _Phys._ iii, 6, \"the perfect is\nthat which lacks nothing.\" Hence we may consider a threefold\nperfection. One is absolute, and answers to a totality not only on\nthe part of the lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so\nthat God be loved as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this\nis not possible to any creature, but is competent to God alone, in\nWhom good is wholly and essentially.\n\nAnother perfection answers to an absolute totality on the part of the\nlover, so that the affective faculty always actually tends to God as\nmuch as it possibly can; and such perfection as this is not possible\nso long as we are on the way, but we shall have it in heaven.\n\nThe third perfection answers to a totality neither on the part of the\nobject served, nor on the part of the lover as regards his always\nactually tending to God, but on the part of the lover as regards the\nremoval of obstacles to the movement of love towards God, in which\nsense Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that \"carnal desire is the\nbane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfection of\ncharity.\" Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two\nways. First, by the removal from man's affections of all that is\ncontrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no charity\napart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation.\nSecondly, by the removal from man's affections not only of whatever\nis contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind's\naffections from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible apart from\nthis perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those\nwho are proficient.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking there of heavenly perfection\nwhich is not possible to those who are on the way.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who are perfect in this life are said to \"offend\nin many things\" with regard to venial sins, which result from the\nweakness of the present life: and in this respect they have an\n\"imperfect being\" in comparison with the perfection of heaven.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the conditions of the present life do not allow of a\nman always tending actually to God, so neither does it allow of his\ntending actually to each individual neighbor; but it suffices for him\nto tend to all in common and collectively, and to each individual\nhabitually and according to the preparedness of his mind. Now in the\nlove of our neighbor, as in the love of God we may observe a twofold\nperfection: one without which charity is impossible, and consisting\nin one's having in one's affections nothing that is contrary to the\nlove of one's neighbor; and another without which it is possible to\nhave charity. The latter perfection may be considered in three ways.\nFirst, as to the extent of love, through a man loving not only his\nfriends and acquaintances but also strangers and even his enemies,\nfor as Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the\nperfect children of God. Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which\nis shown by the things which man despises for his neighbor's sake,\nthrough his despising not only external goods for the sake of his\nneighbor, but also bodily hardships and even death, according to John\n15:13, \"Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his\nlife for his friends.\" Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a\nman will surrender not only temporal but also spiritual goods and\neven himself, for his neighbor's sake, according to the words of the\nApostle (2 Cor. 12:15), \"But I most gladly will spend and be spent\nmyself for your souls.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 3]\n\nWhether, in This Life, Perfection Consists in the Observance of the\nCommandments or of the Counsels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that, in this life, perfection consists in\nthe observance not of the commandments but of the counsels. For our\nLord said (Matt. 19:21): \"If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all\n[Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come,\nfollow Me.\" Now this is a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the\ncounsels and not the precepts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all are bound to the observance of the commandments,\nsince this is necessary for salvation. Therefore, if the perfection\nof the Christian life consists in observing the commandments, it\nfollows that perfection is necessary for salvation, and that all are\nbound thereto; and this is evidently false.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life is gauged\naccording to charity, as stated above (A. 1). Now the perfection of\ncharity, seemingly, does not consist in the observance of the\ncommandments, since the perfection of charity is preceded both by its\nincrease and by its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic.\nJoan. Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede the\nobservance of the commandments, since according to John 14:23, \"If\nany one love Me, he will keep My word.\" Therefore the perfection of\nlife regards not the commandments but the counsels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): \"Thou shalt love the\nLord thy God with thy whole heart,\" and (Lev. 19:18): \"Thou shalt\nlove thy neighbor [Vulg.: 'friend'] as thyself\"; and these are the\ncommandments of which our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): \"On these two\ncommandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets.\" Now the\nperfection of charity, in respect of which the Christian life is said\nto be perfect, consists in our loving God with our whole heart, and\nour neighbor as ourselves. Therefore it would seem that perfection\nconsists in the observance of the precepts.\n\n_I answer that,_ Perfection is said to consist in a thing in two\nways: in one way, primarily and essentially; in another, secondarily\nand accidentally. Primarily and essentially the perfection of the\nChristian life consists in charity, principally as to the love of\nGod, secondarily as to the love of our neighbor, both of which are\nthe matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated\nabove. Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not commanded\naccording to a measure, so that what is in excess of the measure be a\nmatter of counsel. This is evident from the very form of the\ncommandment, pointing, as it does, to perfection--for instance in the\nwords, \"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart\": since\n\"the whole\" is the same as \"the perfect,\" according to the\nPhilosopher (Phys. iii, 6), and in the words, \"Thou shalt love thy\nneighbor as thyself,\" since every one loves himself most. The reason\nof this is that \"the end of the commandment is charity,\" according to\nthe Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5); and the end is not subject to a measure,\nbut only such things as are directed to the end, as the Philosopher\nobserves (Polit. i, 3); thus a physician does not measure the amount\nof his healing, but how much medicine or diet he shall employ for the\npurpose of healing. Consequently it is evident that perfection\nconsists essentially in the observance of the commandments; wherefore\nAugustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii): \"Why then should not this\nperfection be prescribed to man, although no man has it in this life?\"\n\nSecondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection consists in the\nobservance of the counsels, all of which, like the commandments, are\ndirected to charity; yet not in the same way. For the commandments,\nother than the precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of\nthings contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is\nincompatible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal of\nthings that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not contrary to\ncharity, such as marriage, the occupation of worldly business, and so\nforth. Hence Augustine says (Enchiridion cxxi): \"Whatever things God\ncommands, for instance, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' and\nwhatever are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, for\ninstance, 'It is good for a man not to touch a woman,' are then done\naright when they are referred to the love of God, and of our neighbor\nfor God's sake, both in this world and in the world to come.\" Hence\nit is that in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the\nabbot Moses says: \"Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures,\npenury and loss of all one's wealth, these are not perfection but\nmeans to perfection, since not in them does the school of perfection\nfind its end, but through them it achieves its end,\" and he had\nalready said that \"we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the\nperfection of charity.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: In this saying of our Lord something is indicated as\nbeing the way to perfection by the words, \"Go, sell all thou hast,\nand give to the poor\"; and something else is added wherein perfection\nconsists, when He said, \"And follow Me.\" Hence Jerome in his\ncommentary on Matt. 19:27, says that \"since it is not enough merely\nto leave, Peter added that which is perfect: 'And have followed\nThee'\"; and Ambrose, commenting on Luke 5:27, \"Follow Me,\" says: \"He\ncommands him to follow, not with steps of the body, but with devotion\nof the soul, which is the effect of charity.\" Wherefore it is evident\nfrom the very way of speaking that the counsels are means of\nattaining to perfection, since it is thus expressed: \"If thou wilt be\nperfect, go, sell,\" etc., as though He said: \"By so doing thou shalt\naccomplish this end.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii) \"the\nperfection of charity is prescribed to man in this life, because one\nruns not right unless one knows whither to run. And how shall we know\nthis if no commandment declares it to us?\" And since that which is a\nmatter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not break a\ncommandment through not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is\nenough to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now the perfection of Divine\nlove is a matter of precept for all without exception, so that even\nthe perfection of heaven is not excepted from this precept, as\nAugustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii [*Cf. De Spir. et Lit. XXXVI]),\nand one escapes transgressing the precept, in whatever measure one\nattains to the perfection of Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine\nlove is to love nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally\nwith God, and whoever fails from this degree of perfection nowise\nfulfils the precept. There is another degree of the Divine love,\nwhich cannot be fulfilled so long as we are on the way, as stated\nabove (A. 2), and it is evident that to fail from this is not to be a\ntransgressor of the precept; and in like manner one does not\ntransgress the precept, if one does not attain to the intermediate\ndegrees of perfection, provided one attain to the lowest.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as man has a certain perfection of his nature as\nsoon as he is born, which perfection belongs to the very essence of\nhis species, while there is another perfection which he acquires by\ngrowth, so again there is a perfection of charity which belongs to\nthe very essence of charity, namely that man love God above all\nthings, and love nothing contrary to God, while there is another\nperfection of charity even in this life, whereto a man attains by a\nkind of spiritual growth, for instance when a man refrains even from\nlawful things, in order more freely to give himself to the service of\nGod.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Whoever Is Perfect Is in the State of Perfection?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that whoever is perfect is in the state of\nperfection. For, as stated above (A. 3, ad 3), just as bodily\nperfection is reached by bodily growth, so spiritual perfection is\nacquired by spiritual growth. Now after bodily growth one is said to\nhave reached the state of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after\nspiritual growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfection,\none is in the state of perfection.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to _Phys._ v, 2, movement \"from one\ncontrary to another\" has the same aspect as \"movement from less to\nmore.\" Now when a man is changed from sin to grace, he is said to\nchange his state, in so far as the state of sin differs from the\nstate of grace. Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when\none progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to reach the\nperfect degree, one is in the state of perfection.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man acquires a state by being freed from\nservitude. But one is freed from the servitude of sin by charity,\nbecause \"charity covereth all sins\" (Prov. 10:12). Now one is said to\nbe perfect on account of charity, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore,\nseemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has the state\nof perfection.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Some are in the state of perfection, who are\nwholly lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or\nreligious. Therefore it would seem that on the other hand some have\nthe perfection of life, who nevertheless have not the state of\nperfection.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 183, A. 1), state properly\nregards a condition of freedom or servitude. Now spiritual freedom or\nservitude may be considered in man in two ways: first, with respect\nto his internal actions; secondly, with respect to his external\nactions. And since according to 1 Kings 16:7, \"man seeth those things\nthat appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart,\" it follows that with\nregard to man's internal disposition we consider his spiritual state\nin relation to the Divine judgment, while with regard to his external\nactions we consider man's spiritual state in relation to the Church.\nIt is in this latter sense that we are now speaking of states, namely\nin so far as the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of\nstates [*Cf. Q. 183, A. 2].\n\nNow it must be observed, that so far as men are concerned, in order\nthat any one attain to a state of freedom or servitude there is\nrequired first of all an obligation or a release. For the mere fact\nof serving someone does not make a man a slave, since even the free\nserve, according to Gal. 5:13, \"By charity of the spirit serve one\nanother\": nor again does the mere fact of ceasing to serve make a man\nfree, as in the case of a runaway slave; but properly speaking a man\nis a slave if he be bound to serve, and a man is free if he be\nreleased from service. Secondly, it is required that the aforesaid\nobligation be imposed with a certain solemnity; even as a certain\nsolemnity is observed in other matters which among men obtain a\nsettlement in perpetuity.\n\nAccordingly, properly speaking, one is said to be in the state of\nperfection, not through having the act of perfect love, but through\nbinding himself in perpetuity and with a certain solemnity to those\nthings that pertain to perfection. Moreover it happens that some\npersons bind themselves to that which they do not keep, and some\nfulfil that to which they have not bound themselves, as in the case\nof the two sons (Matt. 21:28, 30), one of whom when his father said:\n\"Work in my vineyard,\" answered: \"I will not,\" and \"afterwards . . .\nhe went,\" while the other \"answering said: I go . . . and he went\nnot.\" Wherefore nothing hinders some from being perfect without being\nin the state of perfection, and some in the state of perfection\nwithout being perfect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By bodily growth a man progresses in things pertaining\nto nature, wherefore he attains to the state of nature; especially\nsince \"what is according to nature is,\" in a way, \"unchangeable\"\n[*Ethic. v, 7], inasmuch as nature is determinate to one thing. In\nlike manner by inward spiritual growth a man reaches the state of\nperfection in relation to the Divine judgment. But as regards the\ndistinctions of ecclesiastical states, a man does not reach the state\nof perfection except by growth in respect of external actions.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument also regards the interior state. Yet when\na man passes from sin to grace, he passes from servitude to freedom;\nand this does not result from a mere progress in grace, except when a\nman binds himself to things pertaining to grace.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Again this argument considers the interior state.\nNevertheless, although charity causes the change of condition from\nspiritual servitude to spiritual freedom, an increase of charity has\nnot the same effect.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Religious and Prelates Are in the State of Perfection?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prelates and religious are not in the\nstate of perfection. For the state of perfection differs from the\nstate of the beginners and the proficient. Now no class of men is\nspecially assigned to the state of the proficient or of the\nbeginners. Therefore it would seem that neither should any class of\nmen be assigned to the state of perfection.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the outward state should answer to the inward, else\none is guilty of lying, \"which consists not only in false words, but\nalso in deceitful deeds,\" according to Ambrose in one of his sermons\n(xxx de Tempore). Now there are many prelates and religious who have\nnot the inward perfection of charity. Therefore, if all religious and\nprelates are in the state of perfection, it would follow that all of\nthem that are not perfect are in mortal sin, as deceivers and liars.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 1), perfection is measured\naccording to charity. Now the most perfect charity would seem to be\nin the martyrs, according to John 15:13, \"Greater love than this no\nman hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends\": and a gloss\non Heb. 12:4, \"For you have not yet resisted unto blood,\" says: \"In\nthis life no love is more perfect than that to which the holy martyrs\nattained, who strove against sin even unto blood.\" Therefore it would\nseem that the state of perfection should be ascribed to the martyrs\nrather than to religious and bishops.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) ascribes perfection to\nbishops as being perfecters, and (Eccl. Hier. vi) to religious (whom\nhe calls monks or _therapeutai_, i.e. servants of God) as being\nperfected.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), there is required for the\nstate of perfection a perpetual obligation to things pertaining to\nperfection, together with a certain solemnity. Now both these\nconditions are competent to religious and bishops. For religious bind\nthemselves by vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might\nlawfully use, in order more freely to give themselves to God, wherein\nconsists the perfection of the present life. Hence Dionysius says\n(Eccl. Hier. vi), speaking of religious: \"Some call them\n_therapeutai_,\" i.e. servants, \"on account of their rendering pure\nservice and homage to God; others call them _monachoi_\" [*i.e.\nsolitaries; whence the English word 'monk'], \"on account of the\nindivisible and single-minded life which by their being wrapped in,\"\ni.e. contemplating, \"indivisible things, unites them in a Godlike\nunion and a perfection beloved of God\" [*Cf. Q. 180, A. 6]. Moreover,\nthe obligation in both cases is undertaken with a certain solemnity\nof profession and consecration; wherefore Dionysius adds (Eccl. Hier.\nvi): \"Hence the holy legislation in bestowing perfect grace on them\naccords them a hallowing invocation.\"\n\nIn like manner bishops bind themselves to things pertaining to\nperfection when they take up the pastoral duty, to which it belongs\nthat a shepherd \"lay down his life for his sheep,\" according to John\n10:15. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:12): \"Thou . . . hast\nconfessed a good confession before many witnesses,\" that is to say,\n\"when he was ordained,\" as a gloss says on this passage. Again, a\ncertain solemnity of consecration is employed together with the\naforesaid profession, according to 2 Tim. 1:6: \"Stir up the grace of\nGod which is in thee by the imposition of my hands,\" which the gloss\nascribes to the grace of the episcopate. And Dionysius says (Eccl.\nHier. v) that \"when the high priest,\" i.e. the bishop, \"is ordained,\nhe receives on his head the most holy imposition of the sacred\noracles, whereby it is signified that he is a participator in the\nwhole and entire hierarchical power, and that not only is he the\nenlightener in all things pertaining to his holy discourses and\nactions, but that he also confers this on others.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Beginning and increase are sought not for their own\nsake, but for the sake of perfection; hence it is only to the state\nof perfection that some are admitted under certain obligations and\nwith solemnity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who enter the state of perfection do not profess\nto be perfect, but to tend to perfection. Hence the Apostle says\n(Phil. 3:12): \"Not as though I had already attained, or were already\nperfect; but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend\": and\nafterwards (Phil. 3:15): \"Let us therefore as many as are perfect, be\nthus minded.\" Hence a man who takes up the state of perfection is not\nguilty of lying or deceit through not being perfect, but through\nwithdrawing his mind from the intention of reaching perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Martyrdom is the most perfect act of charity. But an\nact of perfection does not suffice to make the state of perfection,\nas stated above (A. 4).\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 6]\n\nWhether All Ecclesiastical Prelates Are in the State of Perfection?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all ecclesiastical prelates are\nin a state of perfection. For Jerome commenting on Titus 1:5,\n\"Ordain . . . in every city,\" etc. says: \"Formerly priest was the\nsame as bishop,\" and afterwards he adds: \"Just as priests know that\nby the custom of the Church they are subject to the one who is placed\nover them, so too, bishops should recognize that, by custom rather\nthan by the very ordinance of our Lord, they are above the priests,\nand are together the rightful governors of the Church.\" Now bishops\nare in the state of perfection. Therefore those priests also are who\nhave the cure of souls.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as bishops together with their consecration\nreceive the cure of souls, so also do parish priests and archdeacons,\nof whom a gloss on Acts 6:3, \"Brethren, look ye out . . . seven men\nof good reputation,\" says: \"The apostles decided here to appoint\nthroughout the Church seven deacons, who were to be of a higher\ndegree, and as it were the supports of that which is nearest to the\naltar.\" Therefore it would seem that these also are in the state of\nperfection.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as bishops are bound to \"lay down their life\nfor their sheep,\" so too are parish priests and archdeacons. But this\nbelongs to the perfection of charity, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3).\nTherefore it would seem that parish priests and archdeacons also are\nin the state of perfection.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v): \"The order of\npontiffs is consummative and perfecting, that of the priests is\nilluminative and light-giving, that of the ministers is cleansing and\ndiscretive.\" Hence it is evident that perfection is ascribed to\nbishops only.\n\n_I answer that,_ In priests and deacons having cure of souls two\nthings may be considered, namely their order and their cure. Their\norder is directed to some act in the Divine offices. Wherefore it has\nbeen stated above (Q. 183, A. 3, ad 3) that the distinction of orders\nis comprised under the distinction of offices. Hence by receiving a\ncertain order a man receives the power of exercising certain sacred\nacts, but he is not bound on this account to things pertaining to\nperfection, except in so far as in the Western Church the receiving\nof a sacred order includes the taking of a vow of continence, which\nis one of the things pertaining to perfection, as we shall state\nfurther on (Q. 186, A. 4). Therefore it is clear that from the fact\nthat a man receives a sacred order a man is not placed simply in the\nstate of perfection, although inward perfection is required in order\nthat one exercise such acts worthily.\n\nIn like manner, neither are they placed in the state of perfection on\nthe part of the cure which they take upon themselves. For they are\nnot bound by this very fact under the obligation of a perpetual vow\nto retain the cure of souls; but they can surrender it--either by\nentering religion, even without their bishop's permission (cf.\nDecret. xix, qu. 2, can. Duae sunt)--or again an archdeacon may with\nhis bishop's permission resign his arch-deaconry or parish, and\naccept a simple prebend without cure, which would be nowise lawful,\nif he were in the state of perfection; for \"no man putting his hand\nto the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God\" (Luke\n9:62). On the other hand bishops, since they are in the state of\nperfection, cannot abandon the episcopal cure, save by the authority\nof the Sovereign Pontiff (to whom alone it belongs also to dispense\nfrom perpetual vows), and this for certain causes, as we shall state\nfurther on (Q. 185, A. 4). Wherefore it is manifest that not all\nprelates are in the state of perfection, but only bishops.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We may speak of priest and bishop in two ways. First,\nwith regard to the name: and thus formerly bishops and priests were\nnot distinct. For bishops are so called \"because they watch over\nothers,\" as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xix, 19); while the\npriests according to the Greek are \"elders.\" [*Referring to the Greek\n_episkopos_ and _presbyteros_ from which the English 'bishop' and\n'priest' are derived.] Hence the Apostle employs the term \"priests\"\nin reference to both, when he says (1 Tim. 5:17): \"Let the priests\nthat rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor\"; and again he uses\nthe term \"bishops\" in the same way, wherefore addressing the priests\nof the Church of Ephesus he says (Acts 20:28): \"Take heed to\nyourselves\" and \"to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath\nplaced you bishops, to rule the church of God.\"\n\nBut as regards the thing signified by these terms, there was always a\ndifference between them, even at the time of the apostles. This is\nclear on the authority of Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), and of a gloss\non Luke 10:1, \"After these things the Lord appointed,\" etc. which\nsays: \"Just as the apostles were made bishops, so the seventy-two\ndisciples were made priests of the second order.\" Subsequently,\nhowever, in order to avoid schism, it became necessary to distinguish\neven the terms, by calling the higher ones bishops and the lower ones\npriests. But to assert that priests nowise differ from bishops is\nreckoned by Augustine among heretical doctrines (De Heres. liii),\nwhere he says that the Arians maintained that \"no distinction existed\nbetween a priest and a bishop.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Bishops have the chief cure of the sheep of their\ndiocese, while parish priests and archdeacons exercise an inferior\nministry under the bishops. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 12:28, \"to one,\nhelps, to another, governments [*Vulg.: 'God hath set some in the\nchurch . . . helps, governments,' etc.],\" says: \"Helps, namely\nassistants to those who are in authority,\" as Titus was to the\nApostle, or as archdeacons to the bishop; \"governments, namely\npersons of lesser authority, such as priests who have to instruct the\npeople\": and Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that \"just as we see the\nwhole hierarchy culminating in Jesus, so each office culminates in\nits respective godlike hierarch or bishop.\" Also it is said (XVI, qu.\ni, can. Cunctis): \"Priests and deacons must all take care not to do\nanything without their bishop's permission.\" Wherefore it is evident\nthat they stand in relation to their bishop as wardens or mayors to\nthe king; and for this reason, just as in earthly governments the\nking alone receives a solemn blessing, while others are appointed by\nsimple commission, so too in the Church the episcopal cure is\nconferred with the solemnity of consecration, while the archdeacon or\nparish priest receives his cure by simple appointment; although they\nare consecrated by receiving orders before having a cure.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As parish priests and archdeacons have not the chief\ncure, but a certain ministry as committed to them by the bishop, so\nthe pastoral office does not belong to them in chief, nor are they\nbound to lay down their life for the sheep, except in so far as they\nhave a share in their cure. Hence we should say that they have an\noffice pertaining to perfection rather than that they attain the\nstate of perfection.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Religious State Is More Perfect Than That of Prelates?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the religious state is more perfect\nthan that of prelates. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): \"If thou wilt\nbe perfect, go\" and \"sell\" all [Vulg.: 'what'] \"thou hast, and give\nto the poor\"; and religious do this. But bishops are not bound to do\nso; for it is said (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): \"Bishops, if\nthey wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired\nproperty, and whatever belongs to them personally.\" Therefore\nreligious are in a more perfect state than bishops.\n\nObj. 2: Further, perfection consists more especially in the love of\nGod than in the love of our neighbor. Now the religious state is\ndirectly ordered to the love of God, wherefore it takes its name from\n\"service and homage to God,\" as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi);\n[*Quoted above A. 5] whereas the bishop's state would seem to be\nordered to the love of our neighbor, of whose cure he is the\n\"warden,\" and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes (De\nCiv. Dei. xix, 19). Therefore it would seem that the religious state\nis more perfect than that of bishops.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the religious state is directed to the contemplative\nlife, which is more excellent than the active life to which the\nepiscopal state is directed. For Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7) that\n\"Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the\nactive life desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who\nwas fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against\nbeing sent to preach.\" Therefore it would seem that the religious\nstate is more perfect than the episcopal state.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is not lawful for anyone to pass from a more\nexcellent to a less excellent state; for this would be to look back\n[*Cf. Luke 9:62]. Yet a man may pass from the religious to the\nepiscopal state, for it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that\n\"the holy ordination makes a monk to be a bishop.\" Therefore the\nepiscopal state is more perfect than the religious.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), \"the agent\nis ever more excellent than the patient.\" Now in the genus of\nperfection according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v, vi), bishops are in\nthe position of \"perfecters,\" whereas religious are in the position\nof being \"perfected\"; the former of which pertains to action, and the\nlatter to passion. Whence it is evident that the state of perfection\nis more excellent in bishops than in religious.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Renunciation of one's possessions may be considered in\ntwo ways. First, as being actual: and thus it is not essential, but a\nmeans, to perfection, as stated above (A. 3). Hence nothing hinders\nthe state of perfection from being without renunciation of one's\npossessions, and the same applies to other outward practices.\nSecondly, it may be considered in relation to one's preparedness, in\nthe sense of being prepared to renounce or give away all: and this\nbelongs directly to perfection. Hence Augustine says (De QQ. Evang.\nii, qu. 11): \"Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom understand\nrighteousness to consist neither in eating nor in abstaining, but in\nbearing want patiently.\" Wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:12): \"I\nknow . . . both to abound and to suffer need.\" Now bishops especially\nare bound to despise all things for the honor of God and the\nspiritual welfare of their flock, when it is necessary for them to do\nso, either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering\n\"with joy the being stripped of\" their \"own goods\" [*Heb. 10:34].\n\nReply Obj. 2: That bishops are busy about things pertaining to the\nlove of their neighbor, arises out of the abundance of their love of\nGod. Hence our Lord asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him,\nand afterwards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gregory\nsays (Pastor. i, 5): \"If the pastoral care is a proof of love, he who\nrefuses to feed God's flock, though having the means to do so, is\nconvicted of not loving the supreme Pastor.\" And it is a sign of\ngreater love if a man devotes himself to others for his friend's\nsake, than if he be willing only to serve his friend.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1), \"a prelate\nshould be foremost in action, and more uplifted than others in\ncontemplation,\" because it is incumbent on him to contemplate, not\nonly for his own sake, but also for the purpose of instructing others.\nHence Gregory applies (Hom. v in Ezech.) the words of Ps. 144:7, \"They\nshall publish the memory . . . of Thy sweetness,\" to perfect men\nreturning after their contemplation.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Parish Priests and Archdeacons Are More Perfect Than\nReligious?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that also parish priests and archdeacons\nare more perfect than religious. For Chrysostom says in his Dialogue\n(De Sacerdot. vi): \"Take for example a monk, such as Elias, if I may\nexaggerate somewhat, he is not to be compared with one who, cast\namong the people and compelled to carry the sins of many, remains\nfirm and strong.\" A little further on he says: \"If I were given the\nchoice, where would I prefer to please, in the priestly office, or in\nthe monastic solitude, without hesitation I should choose the\nformer.\" Again in the same book (ch. 5) he says: \"If you compare the\ntoils of this project, namely of the monastic life, with a\nwell-employed priesthood, you will find them as far distant from one\nanother as a common citizen is from a king.\" Therefore it would seem\nthat priests who have the cure of souls are more perfect than\nreligious.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (ad Valerium, Ep. xxi): \"Let thy\nreligious prudence observe that in this life, and especially at these\ntimes, there is nothing so difficult, so onerous, so perilous as the\noffice of bishop, priest, or deacon; while in God's sight there is no\ngreater blessing, if one engage in the fight as ordered by our\nCommander-in-chief.\" Therefore religious are not more perfect than\npriests or deacons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Ep. lx, ad Aurel.): \"It would be\nmost regrettable, were we to exalt monks to such a disastrous degree\nof pride, and deem the clergy deserving of such a grievous insult,\"\nas to assert that \"'a bad monk is a good clerk,' since sometimes even\na good monk makes a bad clerk.\" And a little before this he says that\n\"God's servants,\" i.e. monks, \"must not be allowed to think that they\nmay easily be chosen for something better,\" namely the clerical\nstate, \"if they should become worse thereby,\" namely by leaving the\nmonastic state. Therefore it would seem that those who are in the\nclerical state are more perfect than religious.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is not lawful to pass from a more perfect to a\nless perfect state. Yet it is lawful to pass from the monastic state\nto a priestly office with a cure attached, as appears (XVI, qu. i,\ncan. Si quis monachus) from a decree of Pope Gelasius, who says: \"If\nthere be a monk, who by the merit of his exemplary life is worthy of\nthe priesthood, and the abbot under whose authority he fights for\nChrist his King, ask that he be made a priest, the bishop shall take\nhim and ordain him in such place as he shall choose fitting.\" And\nJerome says (Ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): \"In the monastery so live\nas to deserve to be a clerk.\" Therefore parish priests and\narchdeacons are more perfect than religious.\n\nObj. 5: Further, bishops are in a more perfect state than religious,\nas shown above (A. 7). But parish priests and archdeacons, through\nhaving cure of souls, are more like bishops than religious are.\nTherefore they are more perfect.\n\nObj. 6: Further, virtue \"is concerned with the difficult and the\ngood\" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to lead a good life in\nthe office of parish priest or archdeacon than in the religious\nstate. Therefore parish priests and archdeacons have more perfect\nvirtue than religious.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce): \"If a man\nwhile governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading\na secular life is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work out\nhis salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, since he\nis led by a private law, there is no reason why he should be\nconstrained by a public law.\" Now a man is not led by the law of the\nHoly Ghost, which is here called a \"private law,\" except to something\nmore perfect. Therefore it would seem that religious are more perfect\nthan archdeacons or parish priests.\n\n_I answer that,_ When we compare things in the point of\nsuper-eminence, we look not at that in which they agree, but at that\nwherein they differ. Now in parish priests and archdeacons three\nthings may be considered, their state, their order, and their office.\nIt belongs to their state that they are seculars, to their order that\nthey are priests or deacons, to their office that they have the cure\nof souls committed to them.\n\nAccordingly, if we compare these with one who is a religious by\nstate, a deacon or priest by order, having the cure of souls by\noffice, as many monks and canons regular have, this one will excel in\nthe first point, and in the other points he will be equal. But if the\nlatter differ from the former in state and office, but agree in\norder, such as religious priests and deacons not having the cure of\nsouls, it is evident that the latter will be more excellent than the\nformer in state, less excellent in office, and equal in order.\n\nWe must therefore consider which is the greater, preeminence of state\nor of office; and here, seemingly, we should take note of two things,\ngoodness and difficulty. Accordingly, if we make the comparison with\na view to goodness, the religious state surpasses the office of\nparish priest or archdeacon, because a religious pledges his whole\nlife to the quest of perfection, whereas the parish priest or\narchdeacon does not pledge his whole life to the cure of souls, as a\nbishop does, nor is it competent to him, as it is to a bishop, to\nexercise the cure of souls in chief, but only in certain particulars\nregarding the cure of souls committed to his charge, as stated above\n(A. 6, ad 2). Wherefore the comparison of their religious state with\ntheir office is like the comparisons of the universal with the\nparticular, and of a holocaust with a sacrifice which is less than a\nholocaust according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence it is said\n(XIX, qu. i, can. Clerici qui monachorum.): \"Clerics who wish to take\nthe monastic vows through being desirous of a better life must be\nallowed by their bishops the free entrance into the monastery.\"\n\nThis comparison, however, must be considered as regarding the genus\nof the deed; for as regards the charity of the doer it happens\nsometimes that a deed which is of less account in its genus is of\ngreater merit if it be done out of greater charity.\n\nOn the other hand, if we consider the difficulty of leading a good\nlife in religion, and in the office of one having the cure of souls,\nin this way it is more difficult to lead a good life together with\nthe exercise of the cure of souls, on account of outward dangers:\nalthough the religious life is more difficult as regards the genus of\nthe deed, by reason of the strictness of religious observance. If,\nhowever, the religious is also without orders, as in the case of\nreligious lay brethren, then it is evident that the pre-eminence of\norder excels in the point of dignity, since by holy orders a man is\nappointed to the most august ministry of serving Christ Himself in\nthe sacrament of the altar. For this requires a greater inward\nholiness than that which is requisite for the religious state, since\nas Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) the monastic order must follow the\npriestly orders, and ascend to Divine things in imitation of them.\nHence, other things being equal, a cleric who is in holy orders, sins\nmore grievously if he do something contrary to holiness than a\nreligious who is not in holy orders: although a religious who is not\nin orders is bound to regular observance to which persons in holy\norders are not bound.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We might answer briefly these quotations from\nChrysostom by saying that he speaks not of a priest of lesser order\nwho has the cure of souls, but of a bishop, who is called a\nhigh-priest; and this agrees with the purpose of that book wherein he\nconsoles himself and Basil in that they were chosen to be bishops. We\nmay, however, pass this over and reply that he speaks in view of the\ndifficulty. For he had already said: \"When the pilot is surrounded by\nthe stormy sea and is able to bring the ship safely out of the\ntempest, then he deserves to be acknowledged by all as a perfect\npilot\"; and afterwards he concludes, as quoted, with regard to the\nmonk, \"who is not to be compared with one who, cast among the people\n. . . remains firm\"; and he gives the reason why, because \"both in\nthe calm and in the storm he piloted himself to safety.\" This proves\nnothing more than that the state of one who has the cure of souls is\nfraught with more danger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself\ninnocent in face of a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. on\nthe other hand, it also indicates greatness of virtue if a man avoid\ndangers by entering religion; hence he does not say that \"he would\nprefer the priestly office to the monastic solitude,\" but that \"he\nwould rather please\" in the former than in the latter, since this is\na proof of greater virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This passage quoted from Augustine also clearly refers\nto the question of difficulty which proves the greatness of virtue in\nthose who lead a good life, as stated above (ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Augustine there compares monks with clerics as regards\nthe pre-eminence of order, not as regards the distinction between\nreligious and secular life.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Those who are taken from the religious state to receive\nthe cure of souls, being already in sacred orders, attain to\nsomething they had not hitherto, namely the office of the cure, yet\nthey do not put aside what they had already. For it is said in the\nDecretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): \"With regard to those monks\nwho after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of\nclerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose.\"\n\nOn the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons, when they enter\nreligion, resign their cure, in order to enter the state of\nperfection. This very fact shows the excellence of the religious\nlife. When religious who are not in orders are admitted to the\nclerical state and to the sacred orders, they are clearly promoted to\nsomething better, as stated: this is indicated by the very way in\nwhich Jerome expresses himself: \"So live in the monastery as to\ndeserve to be a clerk.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: Parish priests and archdeacons are more like bishops\nthan religious are, in a certain respect, namely as regards the cure\nof souls which they have subordinately; but as regards the obligation\nin perpetuity, religious are more like a bishop, as appears from what\nwe have said above (AA. 5, 6).\n\nReply Obj. 6: The difficulty that arises from the arduousness of the\ndeed adds to the perfection of virtue; but the difficulty that\nresults from outward obstacles sometimes lessens the perfection of\nvirtue--for instance, when a man loves not virtue so much as to wish\nto avoid the obstacles to virtue, according to the saying of the\nApostle (1 Cor. 9:25), \"Everyone that striveth for the mastery\nrefraineth himself from all things\": and sometimes it is a sign of\nperfect virtue--for instance, when a man forsakes not virtue,\nalthough he is hindered in the practice of virtue unawares or by some\nunavoidable cause. In the religious state there is greater difficulty\narising from the arduousness of deeds; whereas for those who in any\nway at all live in the world, there is greater difficulty resulting\nfrom obstacles to virtue, which obstacles the religious has had the\nforesight to avoid.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 185\n\nOF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE EPISCOPAL STATE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider things pertaining to the episcopal state. Under\nthis head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop definitively?\n\n(3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the episcopal office?\n\n(4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious state?\n\n(5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a bodily manner?\n\n(6) Whether he can have anything of his own?\n\n(7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing ecclesiastical goods\nto the poor?\n\n(8) Whether religious who are appointed to the episcopal office are\nbound to religious observances?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Desire the Office of a Bishop?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to desire the office of\na bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:1): \"He that desires [Vulg.:\n'If a man desire'] the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.\"\nNow it is lawful and praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it\nis even praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the\nreligious, as we have said above (Q. 184, A. 7). But it is\npraiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state. Therefore it is\nalso praiseworthy to desire promotion to the episcopal state.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 11:26): \"He that hideth up corn\nshall be cursed among the people; but a blessing upon the head of\nthem that sell.\" Now a man who is apt, both in manner of life and by\nknowledge, for the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the\nspiritual corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting\nthe episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of spiritual\ncorn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a\nbishop, and blameworthy to refuse it.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the deeds of the saints related in Holy Writ are set\nbefore us as an example, according to Rom. 15:4, \"What things soever\nwere written, were written for our learning.\" Now we read (Isa. 6:8)\nthat Isaias offered himself for the office of preacher, which belongs\nchiefly to bishops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire\nthe office of a bishop.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): \"The higher\nplace, without which the people cannot be ruled, though it be filled\nbecomingly, is unbecomingly desired.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in the episcopal\noffice. One is principal and final, namely the bishop's work, whereby\nthe good of our neighbor is intended, according to John 21:17, \"Feed\nMy sheep.\" Another thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is\nplaced above others, according to Matt. 24:45, \"A faithful and a wise\nservant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family.\" The third is\nsomething resulting from these, namely reverence, honor, and a\nsufficiency of temporalities, according to 1 Tim. 5:17, \"Let the\npriests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor.\"\nAccordingly, to desire the episcopal office on account of these\nincidental goods is manifestly unlawful, and pertains to covetousness\nor ambition. Wherefore our Lord said against the Pharisees (Matt.\n23:6, 7): \"They love the first places at feasts, and the first chairs\nin the synagogues, and salutations in the market-place, and to be\ncalled by men, Rabbi.\" As regards the second, namely the height of\ndegree, it is presumptuous to desire the episcopal office. Hence our\nLord reproved His disciples for seeking precedence, by saying to them\n(Matt. 20:25): \"You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it\nover them.\" Here Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in Matth.) that in these\nwords \"He points out that it is heathenish to seek precedence; and\nthus by comparing them to the gentiles He converted their impetuous\nsoul.\"\n\nOn the other hand, to desire to do good to one's neighbor is in\nitself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as\nan episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would\nseem that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it\nwould be presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in\norder to do them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that \"it was\npraiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when it was certain to\nbring one into graver dangers.\" Wherefore it was not easy to find a\nperson to accept this burden, especially seeing that it is through\nthe zeal of charity that one divinely instigated to do so, according\nto Gregory, who says (Pastor. i, 7) that \"Isaias being desirous of\nprofiting his neighbor, commendably desired the office of preacher.\"\n\nNevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, desire to do such like\nworks if he should happen to be in that office, or to be worthy of\ndoing them; so that the object of his desire is the good work and not\nthe precedence in dignity. Hence Chrysostom* says: \"It is indeed good\nto desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor is vanity.\nFor primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors one that desires it.\"\n[*The quotation is from the Opus Imperfectum in Matth. (Hom. xxxv),\nfalsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.]\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), \"when the Apostle said\nthis he who was set over the people was the first to be dragged to\nthe torments of martyrdom,\" so that there was nothing to be desired\nin the episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augustine says\n(De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle said, \"'Whoever desireth\nthe office of bishop, desireth a good work,' he wished to explain\nwhat the episcopacy is: for it denotes work and not honor: since\n_skopos_ signifies 'watching.' Wherefore if we like we may render\n_episkopein_ by the Latin _superintendere_ (to watch over): thus a\nman may know himself to be no bishop if he loves to precede rather\nthan to profit others.\" For, as he observed shortly before, \"in our\nactions we should seek, not honor nor power in this life, since all\nthings beneath the sun are vanity, but the work itself which that\nhonor or power enables us to do.\" Nevertheless, as Gregory says\n(Pastor. i, 8), \"while praising the desire\" (namely of the good work)\n\"he forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear, when he\nadds: It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless,\" as though to say:\n\"I praise what you seek, but learn first what it is you seek.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: There is no parity between the religious and the\nepiscopal state, for two reasons. First, because perfection of life\nis a prerequisite of the episcopal state, as appears from our Lord\nasking Peter if he loved Him more than the others, before committing\nthe pastoral office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite\nof the religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection.\nHence our Lord did not say (Matt. 19:21): \"If thou art perfect, go,\nsell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast,\" but \"If thou wilt be perfect.\"\nThe reason for this difference is because, according to Dionysius\n(Eccl. Hier. vi), perfection pertains actively to the bishop, as the\n\"perfecter,\" but to the monk passively as one who is \"perfected\": and\none needs to be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but\nnot in order to be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptuous to\nthink oneself perfect, but it is not presumptuous to tend to\nperfection. Secondly, because he who enters the religious state\nsubjects himself to others for the sake of a spiritual profit, and\nanyone may lawfully do this. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei\nxix, 19): \"No man is debarred from striving for the knowledge of\ntruth, since this pertains to a praiseworthy ease.\" On the other\nhand, he who enters the episcopal state is raised up in order to\nwatch over others, and no man should seek to be raised thus,\naccording to Heb. 5:4, \"Neither doth any man take the honor to\nhimself, but he that is called by God\": and Chrysostom says: \"To\ndesire supremacy in the Church is neither just nor useful. For what\nwise man seeks of his own accord to submit to such servitude and\nperil, as to have to render an account of the whole Church? None save\nhim who fears not God's judgment, and makes a secular abuse of his\necclesiastical authority, by turning it to secular uses.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The dispensing of spiritual corn is not to be carried\non in an arbitrary fashion, but chiefly according to the appointment\nand disposition of God, and in the second place according to the\nappointment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said (1\nCor. 4:1): \"Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ,\nand the dispensers of the mysteries of God.\" Wherefore a man is not\ndeemed to hide spiritual corn if he avoids governing or correcting\nothers, and is not competent to do so, neither in virtue of his\noffice nor of his superior's command; thus alone is he deemed to hide\nit, when he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to do so\nin virtue of his office, or obstinately refuses to accept the office\nwhen it is imposed on him. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,\n19): \"The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity\nundertake an honest labor. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we\nmust devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but\nif it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of\nus.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), \"Isaias, who wishing to\nbe sent, knew himself to be already cleansed by the live coal taken\nfrom the altar, shows us that no one should dare uncleansed to\napproach the sacred ministry. Since, then, it is very difficult for\nanyone to be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline\nthe office of preacher.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for a Man to Refuse Absolutely an Appointment to\nthe Episcopate?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to refuse absolutely an\nappointment to the episcopate. For as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7),\n\"Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the\nactive life, desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias who\nwas fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator by contemplation\nexclaimed against being sent to preach.\" Now no man sins by being\nunwilling to forgo better things in order to adhere to things that\nare not so good. Since then the love of God surpasses the love of our\nneighbor, and the contemplative life is preferable to the active, as\nshown above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 2; Q. 182, A. 1) it would seem\nthat a man sins not if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), \"it is very\ndifficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed: nor\nshould anyone uncleansed approach the sacred ministry.\" Therefore if\na man perceives that he is not cleansed, however urgently the\nepiscopal office be enjoined him, he ought not to accept it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prologue, super Marc.) says that \"it is\nrelated of the Blessed Mark* that after receiving the faith he cut\noff his thumb that he might be excluded from the priesthood.\" [*This\nprologue was falsely ascribed to St. Jerome, and the passage quoted\nrefers, not to St. Mark the Evangelist, but to a hermit of that name.\n(Cf. Baronius, Anno Christi, 45, num. XLIV)] Likewise some take a vow\nnever to accept a bishopric. Now to place an obstacle to a thing\namounts to the same as refusing it altogether. Therefore it would\nseem that one may, without sin, refuse the episcopal office\nabsolutely.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. xlviii ad Eudox.): \"If Mother\nChurch requires your service, neither accept with greedy conceit, nor\nrefuse with fawning indolence\"; and afterwards he adds: \"Nor prefer\nyour ease to the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing\nto assist her in her labor, you would seek in vain how we could be\nborn of her.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered in the acceptance\nof the episcopal office: first, what a man may fittingly desire\naccording to his own will; secondly, what it behooves a man to do\naccording to the will of another. As regards his own will it becomes\na man to look chiefly to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he\nlook to the spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to\nthe appointment of another having authority, as stated above (A. 1,\nad 3). Hence just as it is a mark of an inordinate will that a man of\nhis own choice incline to be appointed to the government of others,\nso too it indicates an inordinate will if a man definitively refuse\nthe aforesaid office of government in direct opposition to the\nappointment of his superior: and this for two reasons.\n\nFirst, because this is contrary to the love of our neighbor, for\nwhose good a man should offer himself according as place and time\ndemand: hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that \"the demands\nof charity undertake an honest labor.\" Secondly, because this is\ncontrary to humility, whereby a man submits to his superior's\ncommands: hence Gregory says (Pastor. i, 6): \"In God's sight humility\nis genuine when it does not obstinately refuse to submit to what is\nusefully prescribed.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although simply and absolutely speaking the\ncontemplative life is more excellent than the active, and the love of\nGod better than the love of our neighbor, yet, on the other hand, the\ngood of the many should be preferred to the good of the individual.\nWherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above: \"Nor prefer\nyour own ease to the needs of the Church,\" and all the more since it\nbelongs to the love of God that a man undertake the pastoral care of\nChrist's sheep. Hence Augustine, commenting on John 21:17, \"Feed My\nsheep,\" says (Tract. cxxiii in Joan.): \"Be it the task of love to\nfeed the Lord's flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny the\nShepherd.\"\n\nMoreover prelates are not transferred to the active life, so as to\nforsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,\n19) that \"if the burden of the pastoral office be imposed, we must\nnot abandon the delights of truth,\" which are derived from\ncontemplation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: No one is bound to obey his superior by doing what is\nunlawful, as appears from what was said above concerning obedience\n(Q. 104, A. 5). Accordingly it may happen that he who is appointed to\nthe office of prelate perceive something in himself on account of\nwhich it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But this obstacle\nmay sometimes be removed by the very person who is appointed to the\npastoral cure--for instance, if he have a purpose to sin, he may\nabandon it--and for this reason he is not excused from being bound to\nobey definitely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes,\nhowever, he is unable himself to remove the impediment that makes the\npastoral office unlawful to him, yet the prelate who appoints him can\ndo so--for instance, if he be irregular or excommunicate. In such a\ncase he ought to make known his defect to the prelate who has\nappointed him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment,\nhe is bound humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said (Ex. 4:10): \"I\nbeseech thee, Lord, I am not eloquent from yesterday, and the day\nbefore,\" the Lord answered (Ex. 4:12): \"I will be in thy mouth, and I\nwill teach thee what thou shalt speak.\" At other times the impediment\ncannot be removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the one\nappointed--for instance, if an archbishop be unable to dispense from\nan irregularity; wherefore a subject, if irregular, would not be\nbound to obey him by accepting the episcopate or even sacred orders.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is not in itself necessary for salvation to accept\nthe episcopal office, but it becomes necessary by reason of the\nsuperior's command. Now one may lawfully place an obstacle to things\nthus necessary for salvation, before the command is given; else it\nwould not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus\nincur an impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But this would\nnot be lawful in things necessary for salvation. Hence the Blessed\nMark did not act against a precept by cutting off his finger,\nalthough it is credible that he did this by the instigation of the\nHoly Ghost, without which it would be unlawful for anyone to lay\nhands on himself. If a man take a vow not to accept the bishop's\noffice, and by this intend to bind himself not even to accept it in\nobedience to his superior prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if he\nintend to bind himself, so far as it lies with him, not to seek the\nepiscopal office, nor to accept it except under urgent necessity, his\nvow is lawful, because he vows to do what it becomes a man to do.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 3]\n\nWhether He That Is Appointed to the Episcopate Ought to Be Better\nThan Others?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one who is appointed to the\nepiscopate ought to be better than others. For our Lord, when about\nto commit the pastoral office to Peter, asked him if he loved Him\nmore than the others. Now a man is the better through loving God the\nmore. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to\nthe episcopal office except he be better than others.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Pope Symmachus says (can. Vilissimus I, qu. 1): \"A\nman is of very little worth who though excelling in dignity, excels\nnot in knowledge and holiness.\" Now he who excels in knowledge and\nholiness is better. Therefore a man ought not to be appointed to the\nepiscopate unless he be better than others.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in every genus the lesser are governed by the\ngreater, as corporeal things are governed by things spiritual, and\nthe lower bodies by the higher, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 3).\nNow a bishop is appointed to govern others. Therefore he should be\nbetter than others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Decretal [*Can. Cum dilectus, de Electione]\nsays that \"it suffices to choose a good man, nor is it necessary to\nchoose the better man.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In designating a man for the episcopal office,\nsomething has to be considered on the part of the person designate,\nand something on the part of the designator. For on the part of the\ndesignator, whether by election or by appointment, it is required\nthat he choose such a one as will dispense the divine mysteries\nfaithfully. These should be dispensed for the good of the Church,\naccording to 1 Cor. 14:12, \"Seek to abound unto the edifying of the\nChurch\"; and the divine mysteries are not committed to men for their\nown meed, which they should await in the life to come. Consequently\nhe who has to choose or appoint one for a bishop is not bound to take\none who is best simply, i.e. according to charity, but one who is\nbest for governing the Church, one namely who is able to instruct,\ndefend, and govern the Church peacefully. Hence Jerome, commenting on\nTitus 1:5, says against certain persons that \"some seek to erect as\npillars of the Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to\nthe Church, but those whom they love more, or those by whose\nobsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone, or for whom some\nperson in authority has spoken, and, not to say worse than this, have\nsucceeded by means of gifts in being made clerics.\"\n\nNow this pertains to the respect of persons, which in such matters is\na grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. clxvii ad Hieron.]\non James 2:1, \"Brethren, have not . . . with respect of persons,\"\nsays: \"If this distinction of sitting and standing be referred to\necclesiastical honors, we must not deem it a slight sin to 'have the\nfaith of the Lord of glory with respect of persons.' For who would\nsuffer a rich man to be chosen for the Church's seat of honor, in\ndespite of a poor man who is better instructed and holier?\"\n\nOn the part of the person appointed, it is not required that he\nesteem himself better than others, for this would be proud and\npresumptuous; but it suffices that he perceive nothing in himself\nwhich would make it unlawful for him to take up the office of\nprelate. Hence although Peter was asked by our Lord if he loved Him\nmore than the others, he did not, in his reply, set himself before\nthe others, but answered simply that he loved Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord knew that, by His own bestowal, Peter was in\nother respects fitted to govern the Church: wherefore He questioned\nhim about his greater love, to show that when we find a man otherwise\nfitted for the government of the Church, we must look chiefly to his\npre-eminence in the love of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This statement refers to the pursuits of the man who is\nplaced in authority. For he should aim at showing himself to be more\nexcellent than others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore\nGregory says (Pastor. ii, 1) \"the occupations of a prelate ought to\nexcel those of the people, as much as the shepherd's life excels that\nof his flock.\" But he is not to be blamed and looked upon as\nworthless if he excelled not before being raised to the prelacy.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to 1 Cor. 12:4 seqq., \"there are diversities\nof graces . . . and . . . of ministries . . . and . . . of\noperations.\" Hence nothing hinders one from being more fitted for the\noffice of governing, who does not excel in the grace of holiness. It\nis otherwise in the government of the natural order, where that which\nis higher in the natural order is for that very reason more fitted to\ndispose of those that are lower.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Bishop May Lawfully Forsake the Episcopal Cure, in Order to\nEnter Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully forsake his\nepiscopal cure in order to enter religion. For no one can lawfully\npass from a more perfect to a less perfect state; since this is \"to\nlook back,\" which is condemned by the words of our Lord (Luke 9:62),\n\"No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for\nthe kingdom of God.\" Now the episcopal state is more perfect than the\nreligious, as shown above (Q. 184, A. 7). Therefore just as it is\nunlawful to return to the world from the religious state, so is it\nunlawful to pass from the episcopal to the religious state.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the order of grace is more congruous than the order\nof nature. Now according to nature a thing is not moved in contrary\ndirections; thus if a stone be naturally moved downwards, it cannot\nnaturally return upwards from below. But according to the order of\ngrace it is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal state.\nTherefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the episcopal to\nthe religious state.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the works of grace nothing should be inoperative.\nNow when once a man is consecrated bishop he retains in perpetuity\nthe spiritual power of giving orders and doing like things that\npertain to the episcopal office: and this power would seemingly\nremain inoperative in one who gives up the episcopal cure. Therefore\nit would seem that a bishop may not forsake the episcopal cure and\nenter religion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No man is compelled to do what is in itself\nunlawful. Now those who seek to resign their episcopal cure are\ncompelled to resign (Extra, de Renunt. cap. Quidam). Therefore\napparently it is not unlawful to give up the episcopal cure.\n\n_I answer that,_ The perfection of the episcopal state consists in\nthis that for love of God a man binds himself to work for the\nsalvation of his neighbor, wherefore he is bound to retain the\npastoral cure so long as he is able to procure the spiritual welfare\nof the subjects entrusted to his care: a matter which he must not\nneglect--neither for the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation,\nsince the Apostle, on account of the needs of his subjects, suffered\npatiently to be delayed even from the contemplation of the life to\ncome, according to Phil. 1:22-25, \"What I shall choose I know not,\nbut I am straitened between two, having a desire to be dissolved, and\nto be with Christ, a thing by far better. But to abide still in the\nflesh is needful for you. And having this confidence, I know that I\nshall abide\"; nor for the sake of avoiding any hardships or of\nacquiring any gain whatsoever, because as it is written (John 10:11),\n\"the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep.\"\n\nAt times, however, it happens in several ways that a bishop is\nhindered from procuring the spiritual welfare of his subjects.\nSometimes on account of his own defect, either of conscience (for\ninstance if he be guilty of murder or simony), or of body (for\nexample if he be old or infirm), or of irregularity arising, for\ninstance, from bigamy. Sometimes he is hindered through some defect\nin his subjects, whom he is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says\n(Dial. ii, 3): \"The wicked must be borne patiently, when there are\nsome good who can be succored, but when there is no profit at all for\nthe good, it is sometimes useless to labor for the wicked. Wherefore\nthe perfect when they find that they labor in vain are often minded\nto go elsewhere in order to labor with fruit.\" Sometimes again this\nhindrance arises on the part of others, as when scandal results from\na certain person being in authority: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.\n8:13): \"If meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh\":\nprovided, however, the scandal is not caused by the wickedness of\npersons desirous of subverting the faith or the righteousness of the\nChurch; because the pastoral cure is not to be laid aside on account\nof scandal of this kind, according to Matt. 15:14, \"Let them alone,\"\nthose namely who were scandalized at the truth of Christ's teaching,\n\"they are blind, and leaders of the blind.\"\n\nNevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the charge of authority\nat the appointment of a higher superior, so too it behooves him to be\nsubject to the latter's authority in laying aside the accepted charge\nfor the reasons given above. Hence Innocent III says (Extra, de\nRenunt., cap. Nisi cum pridem): \"Though thou hast wings wherewith\nthou art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so tied by the\nbonds of authority, that thou art not free to fly without our\npermission.\" For the Pope alone can dispense from the perpetual vow,\nby which a man binds himself to the care of his subjects, when he\ntook upon himself the episcopal office.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The perfection of religious and that of bishops are\nregarded from different standpoints. For it belongs to the perfection\nof a religious to occupy oneself in working out one's own salvation,\nwhereas it belongs to the perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself in\nworking for the salvation of others. Hence so long as a man can be\nuseful to the salvation of his neighbor, he would be going back, if\nhe wished to pass to the religious state, to busy himself only with\nhis own salvation, since he has bound himself to work not only for\nhis own but also for others' salvation. Wherefore Innocent III says\nin the Decretal quoted above that \"it is more easily allowable for a\nmonk to ascend to the episcopacy, than for a bishop to descend to the\nmonastic life. If, however, he be unable to procure the salvation of\nothers it is meet he should seek his own.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: On account of no obstacle should a man forego the work\nof his own salvation, which pertains to the religious state. But\nthere may be an obstacle to the procuring of another's salvation;\nwherefore a monk may be raised to the episcopal state wherein he is\nable also to work out his own salvation. And a bishop, if he be\nhindered from procuring the salvation of others, may enter the\nreligious life, and may return to his bishopric should the obstacle\ncease, for instance by the correction of his subjects, cessation of\nthe scandal, healing of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by\nsufficient instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony of\nwhich he was in ignorance, and resigning his episcopate entered the\nreligious life, he can be reappointed to another bishopric [*Cap.\nPost translat., de Renunt.]. On the other hand, if a man be deposed\nfrom the episcopal office for some sin, and confined in a monastery\nthat he may do penance, he cannot be reappointed to a bishopric.\nHence it is stated (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): \"The holy synod\norders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity\nto the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means\nrise again to the episcopate.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even in natural things power remains inactive on\naccount of a supervening obstacle, for instance the act of sight\nceases through an affliction of the eye. So neither is it\nunreasonable if, through the occurrence of some obstacle from\nwithout, the episcopal power remain without the exercise of its act.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 5]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for a Bishop on Account of Bodily Persecution to\nAbandon the Flock Committed to His Care?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful for a bishop, on\naccount of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence\nfrom the flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (John 10:12)\nthat he is a hireling and no true shepherd, who \"seeth the wolf\ncoming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth\": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv\nin Ev.) that \"the wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his\ninjustice and robbery oppresses the faithful and the humble.\"\nTherefore if, on account of the persecution of a tyrant, a bishop\nwithdraws his bodily presence from the flock entrusted to his care,\nit would seem that he is a hireling and not a shepherd.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): \"My son, if thou be\nsurety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a\nstranger,\" and afterwards (Prov. 6:3): \"Run about, make haste, stir\nup thy friend.\" Gregory expounds these words and says (Pastor. iii,\n4): \"To be surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by\nengaging oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an\nexample to the lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even\nto rouse his friend.\" Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily\npresence from his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should\nnot on account of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his\nflock.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop's state\nthat he devote himself to the care of his neighbor. Now it is\nunlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake\naltogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would\nseem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the\nexecution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting\nhimself to works of perfection in a monastery.\n\n_On the contrary,_ our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors\nbishops are (Matt. 10:23): \"When they shall persecute you in this\ncity, flee into another.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In any obligation the chief thing to be considered\nis the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfil\nthe pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects.\nConsequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal\npresence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal\npresence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal\nadvantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his\nperson, since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his\nsheep.\n\nOn the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be\nsufficiently provided for by another person in the absence of the\npastor, it is lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence\nfrom his flock, either for the sake of some advantage to the Church,\nor on account of some danger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep.\nccxxviii ad Honorat.): \"Christ's servants may flee from one city to\nanother, when one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in\norder that the Church be not abandoned by others who are not so\nsought for. When, however, the same danger threatens all, those who\nstand in need of others must not be abandoned by those whom they\nneed.\" For \"if it is dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship\nwhen the sea is calm, how much more so when it is stormy,\" as Pope\nNicholas I says (cf. VII, qu. i, can. Sciscitaris).\n\nReply Obj. 1: To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal advantage\nor one's bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one's neighbor.\nHence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.): \"A man cannot endanger himself\nfor the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them not\nthrough love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he\nfears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves.\" But\nhe who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without\nendangering the flock, does not flee as a hireling.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If he who is surety for another be unable to fulfil his\nengagement, it suffices that he fulfil it through another. Hence if a\nsuperior is hindered from attending personally to the care of his\nsubjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he\nembraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection;\nand if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to\nanother kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious\nstate. Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of\ndevoting himself to his neighbor's salvation, should an opportunity\noffer, and necessity require it of him.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 6]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for a Bishop to Have Property of His Own?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for a bishop to have\nproperty of his own. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): \"If thou wilt\nbe perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the\npoor . . . and come, follow Me\"; whence it would seem to follow that\nvoluntary poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the\nstate of perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to\npossess anything as their own.\n\nObj. 2: Further, bishops take the place of the apostles in the\nChurch, according to a gloss on Luke 10:1. Now our Lord commanded the\napostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Matt. 10:9,\n\"Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses\";\nwherefore Peter said for himself and the other apostles (Matt.\n19:27): \"Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee.\"\nTherefore it would seem that bishops are bound to keep this command,\nand to possess nothing of their own.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): \"The Greek\n_kleros_ denotes the Latin _sors._ Hence clerics are so called either\nbecause they are of the Lord's estate, or because the Lord Himself is\nthe estate, i.e. portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord,\ncan have nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver,\npossessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord\ndoes not vouchsafe to be his portion also.\" Therefore it would seem\nthat not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their\nown.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus):\n\"Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or\nacquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless\nhe binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep.\ncxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment.): \"Since you have taken the vow, you\nhave already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before\nyou were bound by the vow, you were free to submit.\" Now it is\nevident that to live without possessing anything is a work of\nsupererogation, for it is a matter not of precept but of counsel.\nWherefore our Lord after saying to the young man: \"If thou wilt enter\ninto life, keep the commandments,\" said afterwards by way of\naddition: \"If thou wilt be perfect go sell\" all \"that thou hast, and\ngive to the poor\" (Matt. 19:17, 21). Bishops, however, do not bind\nthemselves at their ordination to live without possessions of their\nown; nor indeed does the pastoral office, to which they bind\nthemselves, make it necessary for them to live without anything of\ntheir own. Therefore bishops are not bound to live without\npossessions of their own.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1) the perfection of\nthe Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty,\nbut voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the perfection of\nlife. Hence it does not follow that where there is greater poverty\nthere is greater perfection; indeed the highest perfection is\ncompatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was said\n(Gen. 17:1): \"Walk before Me and be perfect,\" is stated to have been\nrich (Gen. 13:2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: This saying of our Lord can be understood in three\nways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor\nsilver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal\nwisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage.\n\nSecondly, according to Augustine's explanation (De Consens. Ev. ii,\n30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but\nin permission. For he permitted them to go preaching without gold or\nsilver or other means, since they were to receive the means of\nlivelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: \"For\nthe workman is worthy of his meat.\" And yet if anyone were to use his\nown means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of\nsupererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12,\n15).\n\nThirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Rom.\nxvi, 3, we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His\ndisciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to\npreach to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His\npower, seeing that He provided for their wants without their having\nmeans of their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or\ntheir successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having\nmeans of their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he\n\"received wages\" of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians,\nwherefore it is clear that he possessed something sent to him by\nothers. And it seems foolish to say that so many holy bishops as\nAthanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine would have disobeyed these\ncommandments if they believed themselves bound to observe them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every part is less than the whole. Accordingly a man\nhas other portions together with God, if he becomes less intent on\nthings pertaining to God by occupying himself with things of the\nworld. Now neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means of\ntheir own, that while busy with their own they neglect those that\nconcern the worship of God.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Bishops Sin Mortally If They Distribute Not to the Poor the\nEcclesiastical Goods Which Accrue to Them?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they\ndistribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they\nacquire. For Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp., among the\nsupposititious works of St. Jerome] expounding Luke 12:16, \"The land\nof a certain . . . man brought forth plenty of fruits,\" says: \"Let no\nman claim as his own that which he has taken and obtained by violence\nfrom the common property in excess of his requirements\"; and\nafterwards he adds: \"It is not less criminal to take from him who\nhas, than, when you are able and have plenty to refuse him who has\nnot.\" Now it is a mortal sin to take another's property by violence.\nTherefore bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor that\nwhich they have in excess.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Isa. 3:14, \"The spoil of the\npoor is in your house,\" says that \"ecclesiastical goods belong to the\npoor.\" Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which\nbelongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution.\nTherefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations\nor friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that\nthey are bound to restitution.\n\nObj. 3: Further, much more may one take what is necessary for oneself\nfrom the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus therefrom.\nYet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Can. Clericos,\ncause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause. xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv,\namong the supposititious works of St. Jerome]: \"It is right that\nthose clerics who receive no goods from their parents and relations\nshould be supported from the funds of the Church. But those who have\nsufficient income from their parents and their own possessions, if\nthey take what belongs to the poor, they commit and incur the guilt\nof sacrilege.\" Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:16): \"If any of\nthe faithful have widows, let him minister to them, and let not the\nChurch be charged, that there may be sufficient for them that are\nwidows indeed.\" Much more therefore do bishops sin mortally if they\ngive not to the poor the surplus of their ecclesiastical goods.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Many bishops do not give their surplus to the\npoor, but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the\nrevenue of the Church.\n\n_I answer that,_ The same is not to be said of their own goods which\nbishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real\ndominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the\ncase they are not bound to give these things to others, and may\neither keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will.\nNevertheless they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection,\nwhich leads them either to accumulate more than they should, or not\nto assist others, in accordance with the demands of charity; yet they\nare not bound to restitution, because such things are entrusted to\ntheir ownership.\n\nOn the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or\ntrustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv ad Bonif.): \"If we possess\nprivately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to\nthe poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim\nownership of them only by wicked theft.\" Now dispensing requires good\nfaith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, \"Here now it is required among the\ndispensers that a man be found faithful.\" Moreover ecclesiastical\ngoods are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to\nthe divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said\n(XII, qu. ii, can. de reditibus): \"Of the Church's revenues or the\nofferings of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the\nbishop, two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of\nsuspension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the\npoor; the remaining part is to be divided among the clergy according\nto their respective merits.\" Accordingly if the goods which are\nassigned to the use of the bishop are distinct from those which are\nappointed for the use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the\necclesiastical worship, and if the bishop keeps back for himself part\nof that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers for\ntheir use, or expended on the divine worship, without doubt he is an\nunfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is bound to restitution.\n\nBut as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the\nsame apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins\nthrough immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds\nmoderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others\naccording to the demands of charity.\n\nOn the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods,\ntheir distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or\nexceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his\ngood faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide\nprecisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be\nvery great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would\nseem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it\nis written (Matt. 24:48-51) that \"if that evil servant shall say in\nhis heart: My lord is long a-coming,\" which shows contempt of God's\njudgment, \"and shall begin to strike his fellow-servants,\" which is a\nsign of pride, \"and shall eat and drink with drunkards,\" which\nproceeds from lust, \"the lord of that servant shall come in a day\nthat he hopeth not . . . and shall separate him,\" namely from the\nfellowship of good men, \"and appoint his portion with hypocrites,\"\nnamely in hell.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This saying of Ambrose refers to the administration not\nonly of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods whatever from\nwhich a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide for those who\nare in need. But it is not possible to state definitely when this\nneed is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal sin, as\nis the case in other points of detail that have to be considered in\nhuman acts: for the decision in such matters is left to human\nprudence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above the goods of the Church have to be\nemployed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other\npurposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that\nwhich is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or\nothers, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit,\nthat they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby.\nHence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): \"It is a commendable liberality\nif you overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want;\nyet not so as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the\npoor.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to the\npoor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De\nOffic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship\nare to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the\npoor. In such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to\nmaintain himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to\nhave a patrimony of his own on which to support himself.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for the\ngood of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there\nbeing no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the\nsurplus from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by\nfor some future use connected with the Church or the needs of the\npoor. But if there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by\nfor the future is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is\nforbidden by our Lord Who said (Matt. 6:34): \"Be . . . not solicitous\nfor the morrow.\"\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Religious Who Are Raised to the Episcopate Are Bound to\nReligious Observances?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the\nepiscopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said\n(XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a \"canonical election loosens a\nmonk from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession,\nand the holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop.\" Now the regular\nobservances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who\nare appointed bishops are not bound to religious observances.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is\nseemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower\ndegree: thus it was stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1) that a\nreligious is not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a\nreligious who is appointed to the episcopate ascends to something\ngreater, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore it would seem that\na bishop is not bound to those things whereto he was bound in the\nstate of religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to\nobedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious\nwho are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of\ntheir order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound\nto poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (Obj. 1) \"when\nthe holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right,\nas the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance.\" Moreover\nthey are sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are\nthey bound to other regular observances.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De\nMonachis): \"With regard to those who after long residence in a\nmonastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay\naside their former purpose.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2) the religious state\npertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the\nepiscopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of\nperfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal\nstate, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to\nperfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of\nperfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with\nperfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with\nperfection, it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has\nbecome a professor it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it\nbecomes him to read and meditate even more than before. Accordingly\nwe must assert that if there be among religious observances any that\ninstead of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard\nof perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so forth, a\nreligious, even after he has been made a bishop, remains bound to\nobserve these, and consequently to wear the habit of his order, which\nis a sign of this obligation.\n\nOn the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious\nobservances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for\ninstance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or\nwatchings and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the\nepiscopal office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them,\naccording to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of\nlife of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious\nsuperiors dispense themselves in such matters.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is loosened\nfrom the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything, but in\nthose that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are\ncompared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal,\nas stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1). But the vows of religion are\ncompared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now\nthe particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the\ndisposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops are not\nbound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit, they\nhave ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious\nsuperiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually,\nso that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound\nto obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of\ntheir rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they\nhave any.\n\nAs to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal\ninheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is\nadded (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained\nbishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed\naccording to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.\n\nNor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with\nthe sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with\nhis death, after which a testament comes into force according to the\nApostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope's permission he make a\nwill, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but\nwe are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his\nadministration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his\ndeath.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 186\n\nOF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS\n(In Ten Articles)\n\nWe must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which\nconsideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider\nthose things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly,\nthose things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the\ndifferent kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the\nreligious state.\n\nUnder the first head there are ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the religious state is perfect?\n\n(2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels?\n\n(3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state?\n\n(4) Whether continency is necessary?\n\n(5) Whether obedience is necessary?\n\n(6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow?\n\n(7) Of the sufficiency of these vows;\n\n(8) Of their comparison one with another;\n\n(9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a\nstatute of his rule?\n\n(10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more\ngrievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Religion Implies a State of Perfection?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of\nperfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not\nseemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for\nsalvation, whether because \"thereby we are bound (_religamur_) to the\none almighty God,\" as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because\nit takes its name from \"our returning (_religimus_) to God Whom we\nhad lost by neglecting Him\" [*Cf. Q. 81, A. 1], according to\nAugustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion\ndoes not denote the state of perfection.\n\nObj. 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,\n53) is that \"which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature.\"\nNow the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain\nto the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of\nstates, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 2; Q. 183, A. 3). Therefore it\nwould seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the state\nof beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also some\nare beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does not\ndenote the state of perfection.\n\nObj. 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it is\nsaid in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): \"The holy synod\norders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity\nto the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means\nrise again to the episcopate.\" Now a place of repentance is opposed\nto the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi) places\npenitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be\ncleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of\nperfection.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7)\nabbot Moses speaking of religious says: \"We must recognize that we\nhave to undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil,\nprivation, reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these\ndegrees to mount to the perfection of charity.\" Now things pertaining\nto human acts are specified and denominated from the intention of the\nend. Therefore religious belong to the state of perfection.\n\nMoreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called\nservants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and\nsubjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 2) that which is\napplicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to\nthat to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of\n\"fortitude\" is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of\nthe mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of\n\"temperance,\" by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures.\nNow religion as stated above (Q. 81, A. 2; A. 3, ad 2) is a virtue\nwhereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God.\nWherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give\nthemselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust\nto God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): \"Some there are who\nkeep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their\ntongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess.\" Now\nthe perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated\nabove (Q. 184, A. 2), and in this sense religion denotes the state of\nperfection.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To offer something to the worship of God is necessary\nfor salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's possessions to\nthe worship of God belongs to perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1, 2; Q.\n85, A. 3) when we were treating of the virtue of religion, religion\nhas reference not only to the offering of sacrifices and other like\nthings that are proper to religion, but also to the acts of all the\nvirtues which in so far as these are referred to God's service and\nhonor become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his whole\nlife to the divine service, his whole life belongs to religion, and\nthus by reason of the religious life that they lead, those who are in\nthe state of perfection are called religious.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, AA. 4, 6) religion denotes the\nstate of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it does not\nfollow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect,\nbut that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on Matt.\n19:21, \"If thou wilt be perfect,\" etc., says (Tract. viii in Matth.)\nthat \"he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to become\nperfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his\ngoods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will\nbegin to lead him to all the virtues.\" Thus all are not perfect in\nreligion, but some are beginners, some proficient.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly that we\nmight obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the\nobstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the\nobstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut\noff, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs\nto penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the\nreligious state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII,\nqu. ii, cap. Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to\nenter a monastery which is described as \"better and lighter,\" rather\nthan to do public penance while remaining in the world.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Every Religious Is Bound to Keep All the Counsels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all\nthe counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound\nto observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious\nprofesses the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound\nto keep all the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that \"he who\nrenounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who\nhas gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness.\" Now it\nbelongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it\nbelongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so it would\nseem that each of them is bound to fulfil all the counsels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of perfection\nto fulfil all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfil some of\nthem. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life fulfil\nsome of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence.\nTherefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of\nperfection is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and\nsuch are the counsels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do\nworks of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to\nkeep all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some,\nothers to others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First,\nessentially, and thus, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3) the perfect\nobservance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection.\nSecondly, a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those\nthings that result from the perfection of charity, for instance to\nbless them that curse you (Luke 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like\nkind, which though they be binding as regards the preparedness of the\nmind, so that one has to fulfil them when necessity requires; yet are\nsometimes fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through\nsuperabundance of charity. Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection\ninstrumentally and dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence,\nand the like.\n\nNow it has been stated (A. 1) that the perfection of charity is the\nend of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or\nexercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach\nby various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in\norder to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it\nis not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it\nis requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who\nenters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but\nhe is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect\ncharity.\n\nFor the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that\nresult from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend\nto fulfil them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them,\nwherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.\n\nIn like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby\nperfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely\nprescribed to him by the rule which he has professed.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He who enters religion does not make profession to be\nperfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even as\nhe who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to\nstudy in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De\nCiv. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise\nman, but acknowledged himself, \"a lover of wisdom.\" Hence a religious\ndoes not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he\ndespises to tend to perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with their\nwhole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which\ncannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be\nomitted without sin (Q. 184, A. 2, ad 3), provided there be no\ncontempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and\nseculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they\ncan, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. 9:10):\n\"Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly.\" Yet there is a\nway of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do\nwhat one can as required by the conditions of one's state of life:\nprovided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt\nsets the mind against spiritual progress.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There are some counsels such that if they be omitted,\nman's whole life would be taken up with secular business; for\ninstance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state,\nor do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of\nreligion themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such\nlike counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain\nparticular better actions, which can be omitted without one's life\nbeing taken up with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for\nreligious to be bound to fulfil all of them.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Poverty Is Required for Religious Perfection?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious\nperfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently\nbelong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful\nfor a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor.\n8:12) lays down the way in which the faithful are to give alms\nsaying: \"If the will be forward, it is accepted according to that\nwhich a man hath,\" i.e. \"you should keep back what you need,\" and\nafterwards he adds (2 Cor. 8:13): \"For I mean not that others should\nbe eased, and you burthened,\" i.e. \"with poverty,\" according to a\ngloss. Moreover a gloss on 1 Tim. 6:8, \"Having food, and wherewith to\nbe covered,\" says: \"Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing\naway, we must not give up these temporal things altogether.\"\nTherefore it seems that voluntary poverty is not requisite for\nreligious perfection.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he who\nrenounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself\nto danger--not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, \"Lest perhaps\n. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the\nname of my God,\" and Ecclus. 27:1, \"Through poverty many have\nsinned\"--but also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. 7:13): \"As\nwisdom is a defense, so money is a defense,\" and the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. iv, 1) that \"the waste of property appears to be a sort of\nruining of one's self, since thereby man lives.\" Therefore it would\nseem that voluntary poverty is not requisite for the perfection of\nreligious life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Virtue observes the mean,\" as stated in _Ethic._\nii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to\nthe extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not\nact virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of\nlife.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man consists in\nhappiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written\n(Ecclus. 31:8): \"Blessed is the rich man that is found without\nblemish,\" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that \"riches\ncontribute instrumentally to happiness.\" Therefore voluntary poverty\nis not requisite for religious perfection.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the\nreligious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above (Q.\n185, A. 6). Therefore religious may also.\n\nObj. 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and as\nChrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr.) \"is a most effective remedy\nin repentance.\" Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it would\nseem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): \"There are some of\nthe righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very\nheight of perfection, while they aim at higher objects within,\nabandon all things without.\" Now, as stated above, (AA. 1, 2), it\nbelongs properly to religious to brace themselves up in order to lay\nhold of the very height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them\nto abandon all outward things by voluntary poverty.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the religious state is an\nexercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For\nthis it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from\nworldly things; since Augustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to\nGod: \"Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee,\nwhich he loveth not for Thee.\" Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu.\n36) that \"greater charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means\nno cupidity.\" Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind\nto the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et\nTheras.) that \"we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we\nhave them than when we desire them: since why did that young man go\naway sad, save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not\nto wish to lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what\none already has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter\nare cut off as a limb.\" And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth.)\nthat \"the possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire\nfor it becomes stronger.\"\n\nHence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the\nfirst foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without\nproperty of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (Matt.\n19:21), \"If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou\nhast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the gloss adds, \"when the Apostle said this (namely\n'not that you should be burthened,' i.e. with poverty),\" he did not\nmean that \"it were better not to give: but he feared for the weak,\nwhom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation.\" Hence in\nlike manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce\nall one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity.\nWherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): \"Our Lord does not wish,\"\nnamely does not command us \"to pour out our wealth all at once, but\nto dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen,\nand fed the poor with that which was his own so that no household\ncare might hold him back.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's sake\nexposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For\nspiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not\nvoluntary; because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire\nof money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, \"They\nthat will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the\ndevil.\" This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary\npoverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated\nabove. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on\nfollowing Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust\nthemselves to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.\nin Monte ii, 17): \"Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His\njustice are not weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is\nnecessary.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), the mean\nof virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the\nquantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance\nwith right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the\nquantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against\nright reason to throw away all one's possessions through\nintemperance, or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in\naccordance with right reason to renounce wealth in order to devote\noneself to the contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are\nsaid to have done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.): \"The\nfamous Theban, Crates, once a very wealthy man, when he was going to\nAthens to study philosophy, cast away a large amount of gold; for he\nconsidered that he could not possess both gold and virtue at the same\ntime.\" Much more therefore is it according to right reason for a man\nto renounce all he has, in order perfectly to follow Christ.\nWherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): \"Poor thyself,\nfollow Christ poor.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Happiness or felicity is twofold. One is perfect, to\nwhich we look forward in the life to come; the other is imperfect, in\nrespect of which some are said to be happy in this life. The\nhappiness of this life is twofold, one is according to the active\nlife, the other according to the contemplative life, as the\nPhilosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Now wealth conduces\ninstrumentally to the happiness of the active life which consists in\nexternal actions, because as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) \"we\ndo many things by friends, by riches, by political influence, as it\nwere by instruments.\" On the other hand, it does not conduce to the\nhappiness of the contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle\nthereto, inasmuch as the anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of\nthe soul, which is most necessary to one who contemplates. Hence it\nis that the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that \"for actions many\nthings are needed, but the contemplative man needs no such things,\"\nnamely external goods, \"for his operation; in fact they are obstacles\nto his contemplation.\"\n\nMan is directed to future happiness by charity; and since voluntary\npoverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect\ncharity, it follows that it is of great avail in acquiring the\nhappiness of heaven. Wherefore our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): \"Go, sell\nall [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt\nhave treasure in heaven.\" Now riches once they are possessed are in\nthemselves of a nature to hinder the perfection of charity,\nespecially by enticing and distracting the mind. Hence it is written\n(Matt. 13:22) that \"the care of this world and the deceitfulness of\nriches choketh up the word\" of God, for as Gregory says (Hom. xv in\nEv.) by \"preventing the good desire from entering into the heart,\nthey destroy life at its very outset.\" Consequently it is difficult\nto safeguard charity amidst riches: wherefore our Lord said (Matt.\n19:23) that \"a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of\nheaven,\" which we must understand as referring to one who actually\nhas wealth, since He says that this is impossible for him who places\nhis affection in riches, according to the explanation of Chrysostom\n(Hom. lxiii in Matth.), for He adds (Matt. 19:24): \"It is easier for\na camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to\nenter into the kingdom of heaven.\" Hence it is not said simply that\nthe \"rich man\" is blessed, but \"the rich man that is found without\nblemish, and that hath not gone after gold,\" and this because he has\ndone a difficult thing, wherefore the text continues (Matt. 19:9):\n\"Who is he? and we will praise him; for he hath done wonderful things\nin his life,\" namely by not loving riches though placed in the midst\nof them.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The episcopal state is not directed to the attainment\nof perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of the\nperfection which he already has, a man may govern others, by\nadministering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This\nbelongs to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be\ndone by means of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Wherefore\nit is not required of bishops, who make profession of governing\nChrist's flock, that they have nothing of their own, whereas it is\nrequired of religious who make profession of learning to obtain\nperfection.\n\nReply Obj. 6: The renouncement of one's own wealth is compared to\nalmsgiving as the universal to the particular, and as the holocaust\nto the sacrifice. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that those\nwho assist \"the needy with the things they possess, by their good\ndeeds offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God and keep\nback something for themselves; whereas those who keep nothing for\nthemselves offer a holocaust which is greater than a sacrifice.\"\nWherefore Jerome also says (Contra Vigilant.): \"When you declare that\nthose do better who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out\nthe fruits of their possessions to the poor, it is not I but the Lord\nWho answers you; If thou wilt be perfect,\" etc., and afterwards he\ngoes on to say: \"This man whom you praise belongs to the second and\nthird degree, and we too commend him: provided we acknowledge the\nfirst as to be preferred to the second and third.\" For this reason in\norder to exclude the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl. Dogm.\nxxxviii): \"It is a good thing to give away one's goods by dispensing\nthem to the poor: it is better to give them away once for all with\nthe intention of following the Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be\npoor with Christ.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Perpetual Continence Is Required for Religious Perfection?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that perpetual continence is not required\nfor religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life\nbegan with Christ's apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have\nobserved continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we\nread Matt. 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence is\nnot requisite for religious perfection.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the first example of perfection is shown to us in\nthe person of Abraham, to whom the Lord said (Gen. 17:1): \"Walk\nbefore Me, and be perfect.\" Now the copy should not surpass the\nexample. Therefore perpetual continence is not requisite for\nreligious perfection.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is required for religious perfection is\nto be found in every religious order. Now there are some religious\nwho lead a married life. Therefore religious perfection does not\nrequire perpetual continence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): \"Let us cleanse\nourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit,\nperfecting sanctification in the fear of God.\" Now cleanness of flesh\nand spirit is safeguarded by continence, for it is said (1 Cor.\n7:34): \"The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of\nthe Lord that she may be holy both in spirit and in body [Vulg.:\n'both in body and in spirit'].\" Therefore religious perfection\nrequires continence.\n\n_I answer that,_ The religious state requires the removal of whatever\nhinders man from devoting himself entirely to God's service. Now the\nuse of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the\nservice of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its\nvehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases\nconcupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): and\nhence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that\nperfect intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when\nhe says (Solil. i, 10): \"I consider that nothing so casts down the\nmanly mind from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily\ncontacts which belong to the married state.\" Secondly, because it\ninvolves man in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children,\nand his temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence the Apostle\nsays (1 Cor. 7:32, 33): \"He that is without a wife is solicitous for\nthe things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he\nthat is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he\nmay please his wife.\"\n\nTherefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary poverty, is\nrequisite for religious perfection. Wherefore just as Vigilantius was\ncondemned for equaling riches to poverty, so was Jovinian condemned\nfor equaling marriage to virginity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The perfection not only of poverty but also of\ncontinence was introduced by Christ Who said (Matt. 19:12): \"There\nare eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of\nheaven,\" and then added: \"He that can take, let him take it.\" And\nlest anyone should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection,\nhe admitted to the state of perfection those even who were married.\nNow the husbands could not without committing an injustice forsake\ntheir wives, whereas men could without injustice renounce riches.\nWherefore Peter whom He found married, He severed not from his wife,\nwhile \"He withheld from marriage John who wished to marry\" [*Prolog.\nin Joan. among the supposititious works of St. Jerome].\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxii), \"the chastity\nof celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage, one of which\nAbraham had in use, both of them in habit. For he lived chastely, and\nhe might have been chaste without marrying, but it was not requisite\nthen.\" Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had perfection of mind\ntogether with wealth and marriage, which is a mark of the greatness\nof their virtue, this is no reason why any weaker person should\npresume to have such great virtue that he can attain to perfection\nthough rich and married; as neither does a man unarmed presume to\nattack his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the jaw-bone of\nan ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable to observe\ncontinence and poverty, would have been most careful to observe them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Such ways of living as admit of the use of marriage are\nnot the religious life simply and absolutely speaking, but in a\nrestricted sense, in so far as they have a certain share in those\nthings that belong to the religious state.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Obedience Belongs to Religious Perfection?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that obedience does not belong to\nreligious perfection. For those things seemingly belong to religious\nperfection, which are works of supererogation and are not binding\nupon all. But all are bound to obey their superiors, according to the\nsaying of the Apostle (Heb. 13:17), \"Obey your prelates, and be\nsubject to them.\" Therefore it would seem that obedience does not\nbelong to religious perfection.\n\nObj. 2: Further, obedience would seem to belong properly to those who\nhave to be guided by the sense of others, and such persons are\nlacking in discernment. Now the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that \"strong\nmeat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses\nexercised to the discerning of good and evil.\" Therefore it would\nseem that obedience does not belong to the state of the perfect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if obedience were requisite for religious\nperfection, it would follow that it is befitting to all religious.\nBut it is not becoming to all; since some religious lead a solitary\nlife, and have no superior whom they obey. Again religious superiors\napparently are not bound to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem\nnot to pertain to religious perfection.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if the vow of obedience were requisite for religion,\nit would follow that religious are bound to obey their superiors in\nall things, just as they are bound to abstain from all venery by\ntheir vow of continence. But they are not bound to obey them in all\nthings, as stated above (Q. 104, A. 5), when we were treating of the\nvirtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience is not requisite\nfor religion.\n\nObj. 5: Further, those services are most acceptable to God which are\ndone freely and not of necessity, according to 2 Cor. 9:7, \"Not with\nsadness or of necessity.\" Now that which is done out of obedience is\ndone of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are more\ndeserving of praise which are done of one's own accord. Therefore the\nvow of obedience is unbecoming to religion whereby men seek to attain\nto that which is better.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Religious perfection consists chiefly in the\nimitation of Christ, according to Matt. 19:21, \"If thou wilt be\nperfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor,\nand follow Me.\" Now in Christ obedience is commended above all\naccording to Phil. 2:8, \"He became [Vulg.: 'becoming'] obedient unto\ndeath.\" Therefore seemingly obedience belongs to religious perfection.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3) the religious state is a\nschool and exercise for tending to perfection. Now those who are\nbeing instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must\nneeds follow the direction of someone under whose control they are\ninstructed or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a\nmaster. Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and\ncommand of someone as regards things pertaining to the religious\nlife; wherefore it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): \"The\nmonastic life denotes subjection and discipleship.\" Now one man is\nsubjected to another's command and instruction by obedience: and\nconsequently obedience is requisite for religious perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To obey one's superiors in matters that are essential\nto virtue is not a work of supererogation, but is common to all:\nwhereas to obey in matters pertaining to the practice of perfection\nbelongs properly to religious. This latter obedience is compared to\nthe former as the universal to the particular. For those who live in\nthe world, keep something for themselves, and offer something to God;\nand in the latter respect they are under obedience to their\nsuperiors: whereas those who live in religion give themselves wholly\nand their possessions to God, as stated above (AA. 1, 3). Hence their\nobedience is universal.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1, 2), by\nperforming actions we contract certain habits, and when we have\nacquired the habit we are best able to perform the actions.\nAccordingly those who have not attained to perfection, acquire\nperfection by obeying, while those who have already acquired\nperfection are most ready to obey, not as though they need to be\ndirected to the acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining\nthemselves by this means in that which belongs to perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The subjection of religious is chiefly in reference to\nbishops, who are compared to them as perfecters to perfected, as\nDionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi), where he also says that the\n\"monastic order is subjected to the perfecting virtues of the\nbishops, and is taught by their godlike enlightenment.\" Hence neither\nhermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedience to bishops;\nand if they be wholly or partly exempt from obedience to the bishop\nof the diocese, they are nevertheless bound to obey the Sovereign\nPontiff, not only in matters affecting all in common, but also in\nthose which pertain specially to religious discipline.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The vow of obedience taken by religious, extends to the\ndisposition of a man's whole life, and in this way it has a certain\nuniversality, although it does not extend to all individual acts. For\nsome of these do not belong to religion, through not being of those\nthings that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as\nrubbing one's beard, lifting a stick from the ground and so forth,\nwhich do not come under a vow nor under obedience; and some are\ncontrary to religion. Nor is there any comparison with continence\nwhereby acts are excluded which are altogether contrary to religion.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The necessity of coercion makes an act involuntary and\nconsequently deprives it of the character of praise or merit; whereas\nthe necessity which is consequent upon obedience is a necessity not\nof coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is willing to obey,\nalthough perhaps he would not be willing to do the thing commanded\nconsidered in itself. Wherefore since by the vow of obedience a man\nlays himself under the necessity of doing for God's sake certain\nthings that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very reason that\nwhich he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be of less\naccount, because man can give nothing greater to God, than by\nsubjecting his will to another man's for God's sake. Hence in the\nConferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it is stated that \"the\nSarabaitae are the worst class of monks, because through providing\nfor their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free\nto do as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily\noccupied in work than those who live in monasteries.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 6]\n\nWhether It Is Requisite for Religious Perfection That Poverty,\nContinence, and Obedience Should Come Under a Vow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for religious\nperfection that the three aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and\nobedience, should come under a vow. For the school of perfection is\nfounded on the principles laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in\nformulating perfection (Matt. 19:21) said: \"If thou wilt be perfect,\ngo, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor,\"\nwithout any mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem that a vow is\nnot necessary for the school of religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a vow is a promise made to God, wherefore (Eccles.\n5:3) the wise man after saying: \"If thou hast vowed anything to God,\ndefer not to pay it,\" adds at once, \"for an unfaithful and foolish\npromise displeaseth Him.\" But when a thing is being actually given\nthere is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for religious\nperfection that one keep poverty, continence, and obedience without.\nvowing them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent., de Adult. Conjug. i,\n14): \"The services we render are more pleasing when we might lawfully\nnot render them, yet do so out of love.\" Now it is lawful not to\nrender a service which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if\nwe have vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more pleasing\nto God to keep poverty, continence, and obedience without a vow.\nTherefore a vow is not requisite for religious perfection.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In the Old Law the Nazareans were consecrated by\nvow according to Num. 6:2, \"When a man or woman shall make a vow to\nbe sanctified and will consecrate themselves to the Lord,\" etc. Now\nthese were a figure of those \"who attain the summit of perfection,\"\nas a gloss [*Cf. Moral. ii] of Gregory states. Therefore a vow is\nrequisite for religious perfection.\n\n_I answer that,_ It belongs to religious to be in the state of\nperfection, as shown above (Q. 174, A. 5). Now the state of\nperfection requires an obligation to whatever belongs to perfection:\nand this obligation consists in binding oneself to God by means of a\nvow. But it is evident from what has been said (AA. 3, 4, 5) that\npoverty, continence, and obedience belong to the perfection of the\nChristian life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be\nbound to these three by vow. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.):\n\"When a man vows to God all his possessions, all his life, all his\nknowledge, it is a holocaust\"; and afterwards he says that this\nrefers to those who renounce the present world.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord declared that it belongs to the perfection of\nlife that a man follow Him, not anyhow, but in such a way as not to\nturn back. Wherefore He says again (Luke 9:62): \"No man putting his\nhand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.\"\nAnd though some of His disciples went back, yet when our Lord asked\n(John 6:68, 69), \"Will you also go away?\" Peter answered for the\nothers: \"Lord, to whom shall we go?\" Hence Augustine says (De\nConsensu Ev. ii, 17) that \"as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and\nAndrew followed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not as\nthough they purposed to return, but as following Him at His command.\"\nNow this unwavering following of Christ is made fast by a vow:\nwherefore a vow is requisite for religious perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Gregory says (Moral. ii) religious perfection\nrequires that a man give \"his whole life\" to God. But a man cannot\nactually give God his whole life, because that life taken as a whole\nis not simultaneous but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole\nlife to God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Among other services that we can lawfully give, is our\nliberty, which is dearer to man than aught else. Consequently when a\nman of his own accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of\nabstaining from things pertaining to God's service, this is most\nacceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et\nArment.): \"Repent not of thy vow; rejoice rather that thou canst no\nlonger do lawfully, what thou mightest have done lawfully but to thy\nown cost. Happy the obligation that compels to better things.\"\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 7]\n\nWhether It Is Right to Say That Religious Perfection Consists in\nThese Three Vows?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not right to say that religious\nperfection consists in these three vows. For the perfection of life\nconsists of inward rather than of outward acts, according to Rom.\n14:17, \"The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and\npeace and joy in the Holy Ghost.\" Now the religious vow binds a man\nto things belonging to perfection. Therefore vows of inward actions,\nsuch as contemplation, love of God and our neighbor, and so forth,\nshould pertain to the religious state, rather than the vows of\npoverty, continence, and obedience which refer to outward actions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the three aforesaid come under the religious vow, in\nso far as they belong to the practice of tending to perfection. But\nthere are many other things that religious practice, such as\nabstinence, watchings, and the like. Therefore it would seem that\nthese three vows are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state\nof perfection.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by the vow of obedience a man is bound to do\naccording to his superior's command whatever pertains to the practice\nof perfection. Therefore the vow of obedience suffices without the\ntwo other vows.\n\nObj. 4: Further, external goods comprise not only riches but also\nhonors. Therefore, if religious, by the vow of poverty, renounce\nearthly riches, there should be another vow whereby they may despise\nworldly honors.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Extra, de Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad\nmonasterium) that \"the keeping of chastity and the renouncing of\nproperty are affixed to the monastic rule.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The religious state may be considered in three ways.\nFirst, as being a practice of tending to the perfection of charity:\nsecondly, as quieting the human mind from outward solicitude,\naccording to 1 Cor. 7:32: \"I would have you to be without\nsolicitude\": thirdly, as a holocaust whereby a man offers himself and\nhis possessions wholly to God; and in corresponding manner the\nreligious state is constituted by these three vows.\n\nFirst, as regards the practice of perfection a man is required to\nremove from himself whatever may hinder his affections from tending\nwholly to God, for it is in this that the perfection of charity\nconsists. Such hindrances are of three kinds. First, the attachment\nto external goods, which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly,\nthe concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which are\nvenereal pleasures, and these are removed by the vow of continence;\nthirdly, the inordinateness of the human will, and this is removed by\nthe vow of obedience. In like manner the disquiet of worldly\nsolicitude is aroused in man in reference especially to three things.\nFirst, as regards the dispensing of external things, and this\nsolicitude is removed from man by the vow of poverty; secondly, as\nregards the control of wife and children, which is cut away by the\nvow of continence; thirdly, as regards the disposal of one's own\nactions, which is eliminated by the vow of obedience, whereby a man\ncommits himself to the disposal of another.\n\nAgain, \"a holocaust is the offering to God of all that one has,\"\naccording to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Now man has a threefold\ngood, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of\nexternal things, which he wholly offers to God by the vow of\nvoluntary poverty: secondly, the good of his own body, and this good\nhe offers to God especially by the vow of continence, whereby he\nrenounces the greatest bodily pleasures. The third is the good of the\nsoul, which man wholly offers to God by the vow of obedience, whereby\nhe offers God his own will by which he makes use of all the powers\nand habits of the soul. Therefore the religious state is fittingly\nconstituted by the three vows.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the end whereunto the religious\nvow is directed is the perfection of charity, since all the interior\nacts of virtue belong to charity as to their mother, according to 1\nCor. 13:4, \"Charity is patient, is kind,\" etc. Hence the interior\nacts of virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth, do not\ncome under the religious vow, but this is directed to them as its end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All other religious observances are directed to the\nthree aforesaid principal vows; for if any of them are ordained for\nthe purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as labor, questing, and\nso on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of\nwhich religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other observances\nwhereby the body is chastised, such as watching, fasting, and the\nlike, are directly ordained for the observance of the vow of\ncontinence. And such religious observances as regard human actions\nwhereby a man is directed to the end of religion, namely the love of\nGod and his neighbor (such as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and\nthe like), are comprised under the vow of obedience that applies to\nthe will, which directs its actions to the end according to the\nordering of another person. The distinction of habit belongs to all\nthree vows, as a sign of being bound by them: wherefore the religious\nhabit is given or blessed at the time of profession.\n\nReply Obj. 3: By obedience a man offers to God his will, to which\nthough all human affairs are subject, yet some are subject to it\nalone in a special manner, namely human actions, since passions\nbelong also to the sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain\nthe passions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of appetite,\nwhich hinder the perfection of life, there was need for the vows of\ncontinence and poverty; but for the ordering of one's own actions\naccordingly as the state of perfection requires, there was need for\nthe vow of obedience.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), strictly and\ntruly speaking honor is not due save to virtue. Since, however,\nexternal goods serve instrumentally for certain acts of virtue, the\nconsequence is that a certain honor is given to their excellence\nespecially by the common people who acknowledge none but outward\nexcellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection of\nvirtue it becomes them not to renounce the honor which God and all\nholy men accord to virtue, according to Ps. 138:17, \"But to me Thy\nfriends, O God, are made exceedingly honorable.\" On the other hand,\nthey renounce the honor that is given to outward excellence, by the\nvery fact that they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special\nvow is needed for this.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Vow of Obedience Is the Chief of the Three Religious Vows?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the vow of obedience is not the chief\nof the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life\nwas inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of\npoverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of\nobedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of\nobedience.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that \"no price is\nworthy of a continent soul.\" Now the vow of that which is more worthy\nis itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more\nexcellent than the vow of obedience.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the greater a vow the more indispensable it would\nseem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence \"are so\ninseparable from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign\nPontiff can allow them to be broken,\" according to a Decretal (De\nStatu Monach., cap. Cum ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a\nreligious from obeying his superior. Therefore it would seem that the\nvow of obedience is less than the vow of poverty and continence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): \"Obedience is\nrightly placed before victims, since by victims another's flesh, but\nby obedience one's own will, is sacrificed.\" Now the religious vows\nare holocausts, as stated above (AA. 1, 3, ad 6). Therefore the vow\nof obedience is the chief of all religious vows.\n\n_I answer that,_ The vow of obedience is the chief of the three\nreligious vows, and this for three reasons.\n\nFirst, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something\ngreater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his\nown body, which he offers God by continence, and than external\nthings, which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that\nwhich is done out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that\nwhich is done of one's own will, according to the saying of Jerome\n(Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): \"My words are intended to teach you not\nto rely on your own judgment\": and a little further on he says: \"You\nmay not do what you will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat,\nyou may possess as much as you receive, clothe yourself with what is\ngiven to you.\" Hence fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done\nof one's own will, according to Isa. 58:3, \"Behold in the day of your\nfast your own will is found.\"\n\nSecondly, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but\nnot vice versa: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe\ncontinence and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well\nas many other things besides the keeping of continence and poverty.\n\nThirdly, because the vow of obedience extends properly to those acts\nthat are closely connected with the end of religion; and the more\nclosely a thing is connected with the end, the better it is.\n\nIt follows from this that the vow of obedience is more essential to\nthe religious life. For if a man without taking a vow of obedience\nwere to observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he\nwould not therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be\npreferred to virginity observed even by vow; for Augustine says (De\nVirgin. xlvi): \"No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the\nmonastic life.\" [*St. Augustine wrote not _monasterio_ but\n_martyrio_--to \"martyrdom\"; and St. Thomas quotes the passage\ncorrectly above, Q. 124, A. 3, and Q. 152, A. 5].\n\nReply Obj. 1: The counsel of obedience was included in the very\nfollowing of Christ, since to obey is to follow another's will.\nConsequently it is more pertinent to perfection than the vow of\npoverty, because as Jerome, commenting on Matt. 19:27, \"Behold we\nhave left all things,\" observes, \"Peter added that which is perfect\nwhen he said: And have followed Thee.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The words quoted mean that continence is to be\npreferred, not to all other acts of virtue, but to conjugal chastity,\nor to external riches of gold and silver which are measured by weight\n[*_Pondere,_ referring to the Latin _ponderatio_ in the Vulgate,\nwhich the Douay version renders \"price.\"]. Or again continence is\ntaken in a general sense for abstinence from all evil, as stated\nabove (Q. 155, A. 4, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Pope cannot dispense a religious from his vow of\nobedience so as to release him from obedience to every superior in\nmatters relating to the perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him\nfrom obedience to himself. He can, however, exempt him from\nsubjection to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him from\nhis vow of obedience.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 9]\n\nWhether a Religious Sins Mortally Whenever He Transgresses the Things\nContained in His Rule?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a religious sins mortally whenever he\ntransgresses the things contained in his rule. For to break a vow is\na sin worthy of condemnation, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11, 12, where\nthe Apostle says that widows who \"will marry have [Vulg.: 'having']\ndamnation, because they have made void their first faith.\" But\nreligious are bound to a rule by the vows of their profession.\nTherefore they sin mortally by transgressing the things contained in\ntheir rule.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the rule is enjoined upon a religious in the same\nway as a law. Now he who transgresses a precept of law sins mortally.\nTherefore it would seem that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses\nthe things contained in his rule.\n\nObj. 3: Further, contempt involves a mortal sin. Now whoever\nrepeatedly does what he ought not to do seems to sin from contempt.\nTherefore it would seem that a religious sins mortally by frequently\ntransgressing the things contained in his rule.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The religious state is safer than the secular\nstate; wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his Morals [*Epist.\nMissoria, ad Leand. Episc. i] compares the secular life to the stormy\nsea, and the religious life to the calm port. But if every\ntransgression of the things contained in his rule were to involve a\nreligious in mortal sin, the religious life would be fraught with\ndanger of account of its multitude of observances. Therefore not\nevery transgression of the things contained in the rule is a mortal\nsin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 1, 2), a thing is\ncontained in the rule in two ways. First, as the end of the rule, for\ninstance things that pertain to the acts of the virtues; and the\ntransgression of these, as regards those which come under a common\nprecept, involves a mortal sin; but as regards those which are not\nincluded in the common obligation of a precept, the transgression\nthereof does not involve a mortal sin, except by reason of contempt,\nbecause, as stated above (A. 2), a religious is not bound to be\nperfect, but to tend to perfection, to which the contempt of\nperfection is opposed.\n\nSecondly, a thing is contained in the rule through pertaining to the\noutward practice, such as all external observances, to some of which\na religious is bound by the vow of his profession. Now the vow of\nprofession regards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely\npoverty, continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to\nthese. Consequently the transgression of these three involves a\nmortal sin, while the transgression of the others does not involve a\nmortal sin, except either by reason of contempt of the rule (since\nthis is directly contrary to the profession whereby a man vows to\nlive according to the rule), or by reason of a precept, whether given\norally by a superior, or expressed in the rule, since this would be\nto act contrary to the vow of obedience.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He who professes a rule does not vow to observe all the\nthings contained in the rule, but he vows the regular life which\nconsists essentially in the three aforesaid things. Hence in certain\nreligious orders precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to\nlive according to the rule, i.e. to tend to form one's conduct in\naccordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is set aside by\ncontempt. Yet greater precaution is observed in some religious orders\nby professing obedience according to the rule, so that only that\nwhich is contrary to a precept of the rule is contrary to the\nprofession, while the transgression or omission of other things binds\nonly under pain of venial sin, because, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2),\nsuch things are dispositions to the chief vows. And venial sin is a\ndisposition to mortal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 3), inasmuch\nas it hinders those things whereby a man is disposed to keep the\nchief precepts of Christ's law, namely the precepts of charity.\n\nThere is also a religious order, that of the Friars Preachers, where\nsuch like transgressions or omissions do not, by their very nature,\ninvolve sin, either mortal or venial; but they bind one to suffer the\npunishment affixed thereto, because it is in this way that they are\nbound to observe such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially or\nmortally through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not all the contents of the law are set forth by way of\nprecept; for some are expressed under the form of ordinance or\nstatute binding under pain of a fixed punishment. Accordingly, just\nas in the civil law the transgression of a legal statute does not\nalways render a man deserving of bodily death, so neither in the law\nof the Church does every ordinance or statute bind under mortal sin;\nand the same applies to the statutes of the rule.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An action or transgression proceeds from contempt when\na man's will refuses to submit to the ordinance of the law or rule,\nand from this he proceeds to act against the law or rule. On the\nother hand, he does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause,\nwhen he is led to do something against the ordinance of the law or\nrule through some particular cause such as concupiscence or anger,\neven though he often repeat the same kind of sin through the same or\nsome other cause. Thus Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that\n\"not all sins are committed through proud contempt.\" Nevertheless the\nfrequent repetition of a sin leads dispositively to contempt,\naccording to the words of Prov. 18:3, \"The wicked man, when he is\ncome into the depth of sins, contemneth.\"\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 10]\n\nWhether a Religious Sins More Grievously Than a Secular by the Same\nKind of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a religious does not sin more\ngrievously than a secular by the same kind of sin. For it is written\n(2 Paralip. 30:18, 19): \"The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all\nthem who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their\nfathers, and will not impute it to them that they are not\nsanctified.\" Now religious apparently follow the Lord the God of\ntheir fathers with their whole heart rather than seculars, who partly\ngive themselves and their possessions to God and reserve part for\nthemselves, as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Therefore it would\nseem that it is less imputed to them if they fall short somewhat of\ntheir sanctification.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God is less angered at a man's sins if he does some\ngood deeds, according to 2 Paralip. 19:2, 3, \"Thou helpest the\nungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the\nLord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord:\nbut good works are found in thee.\" Now religious do more good works\nthan seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins, God is less angry\nwith them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, this present life is not carried through without\nsin, according to James 3:2, \"In many things we all offend.\"\nTherefore if the sins of religious were more grievous than those of\nseculars it would follow that religious are worse off than seculars:\nand consequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter\nreligion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The greater the evil the more it would seem to be\ndeplored. But seemingly the sins of those who are in the state of\nholiness and perfection are the most deplorable, for it is written\n(Jer. 23:9): \"My heart is broken within me,\" and afterwards (Jer.\n23:11): \"For the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house\nI have found their wickedness.\" Therefore religious and others who\nare in the state of perfection, other things being equal, sin more\ngrievously.\n\n_I answer that,_ A sin committed by a religious may be in three ways\nmore grievous than a like sin committed by a secular. First, if it be\nagainst his religious vow; for instance if he be guilty of\nfornication or theft, because by fornication he acts against the vow\nof continence, and by theft against the vow of poverty; and not\nmerely against a precept of the divine law. Secondly, if he sin out\nof contempt, because thereby he would seem to be the more ungrateful\nfor the divine favors which have raised him to the state of\nperfection. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 10:29) that the believer\n\"deserveth worse punishments\" who through contempt tramples under\nfoot the Son of God. Hence the Lord complains (Jer. 11:15): \"What is\nthe meaning that My beloved hath wrought much wickedness in My\nhouse?\" Thirdly, the sin of a religious may be greater on account of\nscandal, because many take note of his manner of life: wherefore it\nis written (Jer. 23:14): \"I have seen the likeness of adulterers, and\nthe way of lying in the Prophets of Jerusalem; and they strengthened\nthe hands of the wicked, that no man should return from his evil\ndoings.\"\n\nOn the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt, but out of\nweakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not against the vow of\nhis profession, without giving scandal (for instance if he commit it\nin secret) he sins less grievously in the same kind of sin than a\nsecular, because his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many\ngood works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from it.\nFirst, because he has a right intention towards God, and though it be\nintercepted for the moment, it is easily restored to its former\nobject. Hence Origen commenting on Ps. 36:24, \"When he shall fall he\nshall not be bruised,\" says (Hom. iv in Ps. 36): \"The wicked man, if\nhe sin, repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the\njust man knows how to make amends and recover himself; even as he who\nhad said: 'I know not the man,' shortly afterwards when the Lord had\nlooked on him, knew to shed most bitter tears, and he who from the\nroof had seen a woman and desired her knew to say: 'I have sinned and\ndone evil before Thee.'\" Secondly, he is assisted by his\nfellow-religious to rise again, according to Eccles. 4:10, \"If one\nfall he shall be supported by the other: woe to him that is alone,\nfor when he falleth he hath none to lift him up.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to things done through weakness\nor ignorance, but not to those that are done out of contempt.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Josaphat also, to whom these words were addressed,\nsinned not out of contempt, but out of a certain weakness of human\naffection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The just sin not easily out of contempt; but sometimes\nthey fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which they\neasily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of contempt,\nthey become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of\nJer. 2:20: \"Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and\nthou hast said: 'I will not serve.' For on every high hill and under\nevery green tree thou didst prostitute thyself.\" Hence Augustine says\n(Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. Hippon.): \"From the time I began to serve God,\neven as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress in\nmonasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the\nmonastery have fallen.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 187\n\nOF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE COMPETENT TO RELIGIOUS\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the things that are competent to religious; and\nunder this head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and do like\nthings?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular business?\n\n(3) Whether they are bound to manual labor?\n\n(4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms?\n\n(5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest?\n\n(6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser clothes than other\npersons?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for Religious to Teach, Preach, and the Like?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to teach, preach,\nand the like. For it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam) in an\nordinance of a synod of Constantinople [*Pseudosynod held by Photius\nin the year 879]: \"The monastic life is one of subjection and\ndiscipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care.\" And\nJerome says (ad Ripar. et Desider. [*Contra Vigilant. xvi]): \"A\nmonk's duty is not to teach but to lament.\" Again Pope Leo [*Leo I,\nEp. cxx ad Theodoret., 6, cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Adjicimus]: says \"Let\nnone dare to preach save the priests of the Lord, be he monk or\nlayman, and no matter what knowledge he may boast of having.\" Now it\nis not lawful to exceed the bounds of one's office or transgress the\nordinance of the Church. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for\nreligious to teach, preach, and the like.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in an ordinance of the Council of Nicea (cf. XVI,\nqu. i, can. Placuit) it is laid down as follows: \"It is our absolute\nand peremptory command addressed to all that monks shall not hear\nconfessions except of one another, as is right, that they shall not\nbury the dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or if\nby chance a brother happen to die while on a visit.\" But just as the\nabove belong to the duty of clerics, so also do preaching and\nteaching. Therefore since \"the business of a monk differs from that\nof a cleric,\" as Jerome says (Ep. xiv ad Heliod.), it would seem\nunlawful for religious to preach, teach, and the like.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Regist. v, Ep. 1): \"No man can fulfil\necclesiastical duties, and keep consistently to the monastic rule\":\nand this is quoted XVI, qu. i, can. Nemo potest. Now monks are bound\nto keep consistently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would seem\nthat they cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching and\npreaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for them to\npreach, teach, and do similar things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory is quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Ex\nauctoritate) as saying: \"By authority of this decree framed in virtue\nof our apostolic power and the duty of our office, be it lawful to\nmonk priests who are configured to the apostles, to preach, baptize,\ngive communion, pray for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from\nsin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is declared to be unlawful to a person in\ntwo ways. First, because there is something in him contrary to that\nwhich is declared unlawful to him: thus to no man is it lawful to\nsin, because each man has in himself reason and an obligation to\nGod's law, to which things sin is contrary. And in this way it is\nsaid to be unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things,\nbecause there is in him something incompatible with these things,\neither by reason of a precept--thus those who are irregular by\nordinance of the Church may not be raised to the sacred orders--or by\nreason of sin, according to Ps. 49:16, \"But to the sinner God hath\nsaid: Why dost thou declare My justice?\"\n\nIn this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and do\nlike things, both because they are bound neither by vow nor by\nprecept of their rule to abstain from these things, and because they\nare not rendered less apt for these things by any sin committed, but\non the contrary they are the more apt through having taken upon\nthemselves the practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that a\nman is rendered less fit for spiritual duties through advancing\nhimself in holiness; and consequently it is foolish to declare that\nthe religious state is an obstacle to the fulfilment of such like\nduties. This error is rejected by Pope Boniface [*Boniface IV] for\nthe reasons given above. His words which are quoted (XVI, qu. i, can.\nSunt. nonnulli) are these: \"There are some who without any dogmatic\nproof, and with extreme daring, inspired with a zeal rather of\nbitterness than of love, assert that monks though they be dead to the\nworld and live to God, are unworthy of the power of the priestly\noffice, and that they cannot confer penance, nor christen, nor\nabsolve in virtue of the power divinely bestowed on them in the\npriestly office. But they are altogether wrong.\" He proves this first\nbecause it is not contrary to the rule; thus he continues: \"For\nneither did the Blessed Benedict the saintly teacher of monks forbid\nthis in any way,\" nor is it forbidden in other rules. Secondly, he\nrefutes the above error from the usefulness of the monks, when he\nadds at the end of the same chapter: \"The more perfect a man is, the\nmore effective is he in these, namely in spiritual works.\"\n\nSecondly, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man, not on account of\nthere being in him something contrary thereto, but because he lacks\nthat which enables him to do it: thus it is unlawful for a deacon to\nsay mass, because he is not in priestly orders; and it is unlawful\nfor a priest to deliver judgment because he lacks the episcopal\nauthority. Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those\nthings which are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to one who\nhas not the order, whereas matters of jurisdiction can be deputed to\nthose who have not ordinary jurisdiction: thus the delivery of a\njudgment is deputed by the bishop to a simple priest. In this sense\nit is said to be unlawful for monks and other religious to preach,\nteach, and so forth, because the religious state does not give them\nthe power to do these things. They can, however, do them if they\nreceive orders, or ordinary jurisdiction, or if matters of\njurisdiction be delegated to them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It results from the words quoted that the fact of their\nbeing monks does not give monks the power to do these things, yet it\ndoes not involve in them anything contrary to the performance of\nthese acts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Again, this ordinance of the Council of Nicea forbids\nmonks to claim the power of exercising those acts on the ground of\ntheir being monks, but it does not forbid those acts being delegated\nto them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These two things are incompatible, namely, the ordinary\ncure of ecclesiastical duties, and the observance of the monastic\nrule in a monastery. But this does not prevent monks and other\nreligious from being sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties\nthrough being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure;\nespecially members of religious orders that are especially instituted\nfor that purpose, as we shall say further on (Q. 188, A. 4).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for Religious to Occupy Themselves with Secular\nBusiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to occupy\nthemselves with secular business. For in the decree quoted above (A.\n1) of Pope Boniface it is said that the \"Blessed Benedict bade them\nto be altogether free from secular business; and this is most\nexplicitly prescribed by the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of\nall the Fathers, not only to religious, but also to all the canonical\nclergy,\"    according to 2 Tim. 2:4, \"No man being a soldier to God,\nentangleth himself with secular business.\" Now it is the duty of all\nreligious to be soldiers of God. Therefore it is unlawful for them to\noccupy themselves with secular business.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:11): \"That you use your\nendeavor to be quiet, and that you do your own business,\" which a\ngloss explains thus--\"by refraining from other people's affairs, so\nas to be the better able to attend to the amendment of your own\nlife.\" Now religious devote themselves in a special way to the\namendment of their life. Therefore they should not occupy themselves\nwith secular business.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Jerome, commenting on Matt. 11:8, \"Behold they that\nare clothed in soft garments are in the houses of kings,\" says:\n\"Hence we gather that an austere life and severe preaching should\navoid the palaces of kings and the mansions of the voluptuous.\" But\nthe needs of secular business induce men to frequent the palaces of\nkings. Therefore it is unlawful for religious to occupy themselves\nwith secular business.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 16:1): \"I commend to you\nPhoebe our Sister,\" and further on (Rom. 16:2), \"that you assist her\nin whatsoever business she shall have need of you.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 186, AA. 1, 7, ad 1), the\nreligious state is directed to the attainment of the perfection of\ncharity, consisting principally in the love of God and secondarily in\nthe love of our neighbor. Consequently that which religious intend\nchiefly and for its own sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if\ntheir neighbor be in need, they should attend to his affairs out of\ncharity, according to Gal. 6:2, \"Bear ye one another's burthens: and\nso you shall fulfil the law of Christ,\" since through serving their\nneighbor for God's sake, they are obedient to the divine love. Hence\nit is written (James 1:27): \"Religion clean and undefiled before God\nand the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their\ntribulation,\" which means, according to a gloss, to assist the\nhelpless in their time of need.\n\nWe must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for either monks or\nclerics to carry on secular business from motives of avarice; but\nfrom motives of charity, and with their superior's permission, they\nmay occupy themselves with due moderation in the administration and\ndirection of secular business. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals\n(Dist. xxxviii, can. Decrevit): \"The holy synod decrees that\nhenceforth no cleric shall buy property or occupy himself with\nsecular business, save with a view to the care of the fatherless,\norphans, or widows, or when the bishop of the city commands him to\ntake charge of the business connected with the Church.\" And the same\napplies to religious as to clerics, because they are both debarred\nfrom secular business on the same grounds, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Monks are forbidden to occupy themselves with secular\nbusiness from motives of avarice, but not from motives of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To occupy oneself with secular business on account of\nanother's need is not officiousness but charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To haunt the palaces of kings from motives of pleasure,\nglory, or avarice is not becoming to religious, but there is nothing\nunseemly in their visiting them from motives of piety. Hence it is\nwritten (4 Kings 4:13): \"Hast thou any business, and wilt thou that I\nspeak to the king or to the general of the army?\" Likewise it becomes\nreligious to go to the palaces of kings to rebuke and guide them,\neven as John the Baptist rebuked Herod, as related in Matt. 14:4.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Religious Are Bound to Manual Labor?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religious are bound to manual labor.\nFor religious are not exempt from the observance of precepts. Now\nmanual labor is a matter of precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, \"Work\nwith your own hands as we commanded you\"; wherefore Augustine says\n(De oper. Monach. xxx): \"But who can allow these insolent men,\"\nnamely religious that do no work, of whom he is speaking there, \"who\ndisregard the most salutary admonishment of the Apostle, not merely\nto be borne with as being weaker than others, but even to preach as\nthough they were holier than others.\" Therefore it would seem that\nreligious are bound to manual labor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. xxi)] on\n2 Thess. 3:10, \"If any man will not work, neither let him eat,\" says:\n\"Some say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual works,\nand not to the bodily labor of the farmer or craftsman\"; and further\non: \"But it is useless for them to try to hide from themselves and\nfrom others the fact that they are unwilling not only to fulfil, but\neven to understand the useful admonishments of charity\"; and again:\n\"He wishes God's servants to make a living by working with their\nbodies.\" Now religious especially are called servants of God, because\nthey give themselves entirely to the service of God, as Dionysius\nasserts (Eccl. Hier. vi). Therefore it would seem that they are bound\nto manual labor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): \"I would\nfain know how they would occupy themselves, who are unwilling to work\nwith their body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms,\nreading, and the word of God.\" Yet these things are no excuse, and he\nproves this, as regards each in particular. For in the first place,\nas to prayer, he says: \"One prayer of the obedient man is sooner\ngranted than ten thousand prayers of the contemptuous\": meaning that\nthose are contemptuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with\ntheir hands. Secondly, as to the divine praises he adds: \"Even while\nworking with their hands they can easily sing hymns to God.\" Thirdly,\nwith regard to reading, he goes on to say: \"Those who say they are\noccupied in reading, do they not find there what the Apostle\ncommanded? What sort of perverseness is this, to wish to read but not\nto obey what one reads?\" Fourthly, he adds in reference to preaching\n[*Cap. xviii]: \"If one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot\nspare time for manual work, can all in the monastery do this? And\nsince all cannot do this, why should all make this a pretext for\nbeing exempt? And even if all were able, they should do so by turns,\nnot only so that the others may be occupied in other works, but also\nbecause it suffices that one speak while many listen.\" Therefore it\nwould seem that religious should not desist from manual labor on\naccount of such like spiritual works to which they devote themselves.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a gloss on Luke 12:33, \"Sell what you possess,\"\nsays: \"Not only give your clothes to the poor, but sell what you\npossess, that having once for all renounced all your possessions for\nthe Lord's sake, you may henceforth work with the labor of your\nhands, so as to have wherewith to live or to give alms.\" Now it\nbelongs properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore it\nwould seem likewise to belong to them to live and give alms through\nthe labor of their hands.\n\nObj. 5: Further, religious especially would seem to be bound to\nimitate the life of the apostles, since they profess the state of\nperfection. Now the apostles worked with their own hands, according\nto 1 Cor. 4:12: \"We labor, working with our own hands.\" Therefore it\nwould seem that religious are bound to manual labor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Those precepts that are commonly enjoined upon all\nare equally binding on religious and seculars. But the precept of\nmanual labor is enjoined upon all in common, as appears from 2 Thess.\n3:6, \"Withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly,\"\netc. (for by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1\nCor. 7:12, \"If any brother have a wife that believeth not\"). Now it\nis written in the same passage (2 Thess. 3:10): \"If any man will not\nwork, neither let him eat.\" Therefore religious are not bound to\nmanual labor any more than seculars are.\n\n_I answer that,_ Manual labor is directed to four things. First and\nprincipally to obtain food; wherefore it was said to the first man\n(Gen. 3:19): \"In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread,\" and it\nis written (Ps. 127:2): \"For thou shalt eat the labors of thy hands.\"\nSecondly, it is directed to the removal of idleness whence arise many\nevils; hence it is written (Ecclus. 33:28, 29): \"Send\" thy slave \"to\nwork, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much evil.\"\nThirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupiscence, inasmuch as\nit is a means of afflicting the body; hence it is written (2 Cor.\n6:5, 6): \"In labors, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity.\"\nFourthly, it is directed to almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph.\n4:28): \"He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him\nlabor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may\nhave something to give to him that suffereth need.\" Accordingly, in\nso far as manual labor is directed to obtaining food, it comes under\na necessity of precept in so far as it is necessary for that end:\nsince that which is directed to an end derives its necessity from\nthat end, being, in effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be\nobtained without it. Consequently he who has no other means of\nlivelihood is bound to work with his hands, whatever his condition\nmay be. This is signified by the words of the Apostle: \"If any man\nwill not work, neither let him eat,\" as though to say: \"The necessity\nof manual labor is the necessity of meat.\" So that if one could live\nwithout eating, one would not be bound to work with one's hands. The\nsame applies to those who have no other lawful means of livelihood:\nsince a man is understood to be unable to do what he cannot do\nlawfully. Wherefore we find that the Apostle prescribed manual labor\nmerely as a remedy for the sin of those who gained their livelihood\nby unlawful means. For the Apostle ordered manual labor first of all\nin order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph. 4:28, \"He that stole,\nlet him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his\nhands.\" Secondly, to avoid the coveting of others' property,\nwherefore it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): \"Work with your own hands,\nas we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards them that are\nwithout.\" Thirdly, to avoid the discreditable pursuits whereby some\nseek a livelihood. Hence he says (2 Thess. 3:10-12): \"When we were\nwith you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not work,\nneither let him eat. For we have heard that there are some among you\nwho walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling\"\n(namely, as a gloss explains it, \"who make a living by meddling in\nunlawful things). Now we charge them that are such, and beseech them\n. . . that working with silence, they would eat their own bread.\"\nHence Jerome states (Super epist. ad Galat. [*Preface to Bk. ii of\nCommentary]) that the Apostle said this \"not so much in his capacity\nof teacher as on account of the faults of the people.\"\n\nIt must, however, be observed that under manual labor are comprised\nall those human occupations whereby man can lawfully gain a\nlivelihood, whether by using his hands, his feet, or his tongue. For\nwatchmen, couriers, and such like who live by their labor, are\nunderstood to live by their handiwork: because, since the hand is\n\"the organ of organs\" [*De Anima iii, 8], handiwork denotes all kinds\nof work, whereby a man may lawfully gain a livelihood.\n\nIn so far as manual labor is directed to the removal of idleness, or\nthe affliction of the body, it does not come under a necessity of\nprecept if we consider it in itself, since there are many other means\nbesides manual labor of afflicting the body or of removing idleness:\nfor the flesh is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is\nremoved by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the divine\npraises. Hence a gloss on Ps. 118:82, \"My eyes have failed for Thy\nword,\" says: \"He is not idle who meditates only on God's word; nor is\nhe who works abroad any better than he who devotes himself to the\nstudy of knowing the truth.\" Consequently for these reasons religious\nare not bound to manual labor, as neither are seculars, except when\nthey are so bound by the statutes of their order. Thus Jerome says\n(Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): \"The Egyptian monasteries are wont to\nadmit none unless they work or labor, not so much for the necessities\nof life, as for the welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray by\nwicked thoughts.\" But in so far as manual labor is directed to\nalmsgiving, it does not come under the necessity of precept, save\nperchance in some particular case, when a man is under an obligation\nto give alms, and has no other means of having the wherewithal to\nassist the poor: for in such a case religious would be bound as well\nas seculars to do manual labor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This command of the Apostle is of natural law:\nwherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:6, \"That you withdraw yourselves from\nevery brother walking disorderly,\" says, \"otherwise than the natural\norder requires,\" and he is speaking of those who abstained from\nmanual labor. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead of\narms and clothes, with which she has provided other animals, in order\nthat with his hands he may obtain these and all other necessaries.\nHence it is clear that this precept, even as all the precepts of the\nnatural law, is binding on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not\neveryone sins that works not with his hands, because those precepts\nof the natural law which regard the good of the many are not binding\non each individual, but it suffices that one person apply himself to\nthis business and another to that; for instance, that some be\ncraftsmen, others husbandmen, others judges, and others teachers, and\nso forth, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), \"If\nthe whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole\nwere the hearing, where would be the smelling?\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: This gloss is taken from Augustine's _De operibus\nMonachorum,_ cap. 21, where he speaks against certain monks who\ndeclared it to be unlawful for the servants of God to work with their\nhands, on account of our Lord's saying (Matt. 6:25): \"Be not\nsolicitous for your life, what you shall eat.\" Nevertheless his words\ndo not imply that religious are bound to work with their hands, if\nthey have other means of livelihood. This is clear from his adding:\n\"He wishes the servants of God to make a living by working with their\nbodies.\" Now this does not apply to religious any more than to\nseculars, which is evident for two reasons. First, on account of the\nway in which the Apostle expresses himself, by saying: \"That you\nwithdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly.\" For he\ncalls all Christians brothers, since at that time religious orders\nwere not as yet founded. Secondly, because religious have no other\nobligations than what seculars have, except as required by the rule\nthey profess: wherefore if their rule contain nothing about manual\nlabor, religious are not otherwise bound to manual labor than\nseculars are.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A man may devote himself in two ways to all the\nspiritual works mentioned by Augustine in the passage quoted: in one\nway with a view to the common good, in another with a view to his\nprivate advantage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly\nto the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from manual labor\nfor two reasons: first, because it behooves them to be occupied\nexclusively with such like works; secondly, because those who devote\nthemselves to such works have a claim to be supported by those for\nwhose advantage they work.\n\nOn the other hand, those who devote themselves to such works not\npublicly but privately as it were, ought not on that account to be\nexempt from manual labor, nor have they a claim to be supported by\nthe offerings of the faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is\nspeaking. For when he says: \"They can sing hymns to God even while\nworking with their hands; like the craftsmen who give tongue to fable\ntelling without withdrawing their hands from their work,\" it is clear\nthat he cannot refer to those who sing the canonical hours in the\nchurch, but to those who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers.\nLikewise what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the\nprivate prayer and reading which even lay people do at times, and not\nto those who perform public prayers in the church, or give public\nlectures in the schools. Hence he does not say: \"Those who say they\nare occupied in teaching and instructing,\" but: \"Those who say they\nare occupied in reading.\" Again he speaks of that preaching which is\naddressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a few in\nparticular by way of private admonishment. Hence he says expressly:\n\"If one has to speak.\" For according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 2:4,\n\"Speech is addressed privately, preaching to many.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Those who despise all for God's sake are bound to work\nwith their hands, when they have no other means of livelihood, or of\nalmsgiving (should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of\nprecept), but not otherwise, as stated in the Article. It is in this\nsense that the gloss quoted is to be understood.\n\nReply Obj. 5: That the apostles worked with their hands was sometimes\na matter of necessity, sometimes a work of supererogation. It was of\nnecessity when they failed to receive a livelihood from others. Hence\na gloss on 1 Cor. 4:12, \"We labor, working with our own hands,\" adds,\n\"because no man giveth to us.\" It was supererogation, as appears from\n1 Cor. 9:12, where the Apostle says that he did not use the power he\nhad of living by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this\nsupererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive the\nfalse apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they preached merely\nfor a temporal advantage; hence he says (2 Cor. 11:12): \"But what I\ndo, that I will do that I may cut off the occasion from them,\" etc.\nSecondly, in order to avoid burdening those to whom he preached;\nhence he says (2 Cor. 12:13): \"What is there that you have had less\nthan the other churches, but that I myself was not burthensome to\nyou?\" Thirdly, in order to give an example of work to the idle; hence\nhe says (2 Thess. 3:8, 9): \"We worked night and day . . . that we\nmight give ourselves a pattern unto you, to imitate us.\" However, the\nApostle did not do this in places like Athens where he had facilities\nfor preaching daily, as Augustine observes (De oper. Monach. xviii).\nYet religious are not for this reason bound to imitate the Apostle in\nthis matter, since they are not bound to all works of supererogation:\nwherefore neither did the other apostles work with their hands.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for Religious to Live on Alms?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to live on alms.\nFor the Apostle (1 Tim. 5:16) forbids those widows who have other\nmeans of livelihood to live on the alms of the Church, so that the\nChurch may have \"sufficient for them that are widows indeed.\" And\nJerome says to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2;\nCan. Quoniam, cause xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv among the\nsupposititious works of St. Jerome] that \"those who have sufficient\nincome from their parents and their own possessions, if they take\nwhat belongs to the poor they commit and incur the guilt of\nsacrilege, and by the abuse of such things they eat and drink\njudgment to themselves.\" Now religious if they be able-bodied can\nsupport themselves by the work of their hands. Therefore it would\nseem that they sin if they consume the alms belonging to the poor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to live at the expense of the faithful is the\nstipend appointed to those who preach the Gospel in payment of their\nlabor or work, according to Matt. 10:10: \"The workman is worthy of\nhis meat.\" Now it belongs not to religious to preach the Gospel, but\nchiefly to prelates who are pastors and teachers. Therefore religious\ncannot lawfully live on the alms of the faithful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, religious are in the state of perfection. But it is\nmore perfect to give than to receive alms; for it is written (Acts\n20:35): \"It is a more blessed thing to give, rather than to receive.\"\nTherefore they should not live on alms, but rather should they give\nalms of their handiwork.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it belongs to religious to avoid obstacles to virtue\nand occasions of sin. Now the receiving of alms offers an occasion of\nsin, and hinders an act of virtue; hence a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9,\n\"That we might give ourselves a pattern unto you,\" says: \"He who\nthrough idleness eats often at another's table, must needs flatter\nthe one who feeds him.\" It is also written (Ex. 23:8): \"Neither shalt\nthou take bribes which . . . blind the wise, and pervert the words of\nthe just,\" and (Prov. 22:7): \"The borrower is servant to him that\nlendeth.\" This is contrary to religion, wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess.\n3:9, \"That we might give ourselves a pattern,\" etc., says, \"our\nreligion calls men to liberty.\" Therefore it would seem that\nreligious should not live on alms.\n\nObj. 5: Further, religious especially are bound to imitate the\nperfection of the apostles; wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 3:15):\n\"Let us . . . as many as are perfect, be thus minded.\" But the\nApostle was unwilling to live at the expense of the faithful, either\nin order to cut off the occasion from the false apostles as he\nhimself says (2 Cor. 11:12), or to avoid giving scandal to the weak,\nas appears from 1 Cor. 9:12. It would seem therefore that religious\nought for the same reasons to refrain from living on alms. Hence\nAugustine says (De oper. Monach. 28): \"Cut off the occasion of\ndisgraceful marketing whereby you lower yourselves in the esteem of\nothers, and give scandal to the weak: and show men that you seek not\nan easy livelihood in idleness, but the kingdom of God by the narrow\nand strait way.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): The Blessed Benedict\nafter leaving his home and parents dwelt for three years in a cave,\nand while there lived on the food brought to him by a monk from Rome.\nNevertheless, although he was able-bodied, we do not read that he\nsought to live by the labor of his hands. Therefore religious may\nlawfully live on alms.\n\n_I answer that,_ A man may lawfully live on what is his or due to\nhim. Now that which is given out of liberality becomes the property\nof the person to whom it is given. Wherefore religious and clerics\nwhose monasteries or churches have received from the munificence of\nprinces or of any of the faithful any endowment whatsoever for their\nsupport, can lawfully live on such endowment without working with\ntheir hands, and yet without doubt they live on alms. Wherefore in\nlike manner if religious receive movable goods from the faithful they\ncan lawfully live on them. For it is absurd to say that a person may\naccept an alms of some great property but not bread or some small sum\nof money. Nevertheless since these gifts would seem to be bestowed on\nreligious in order that they may have more leisure for religious\nworks, in which the donors of temporal goods wish to have a share,\nthe use of such gifts would become unlawful for them if they\nabstained from religious works, because in that case, so far as they\nare concerned, they would be thwarting the intention of those who\nbestowed those gifts.\n\nA thing is due to a person in two ways. First, on account of\nnecessity, which makes all things common, as Ambrose [*Basil, Serm.\nde Temp. lxiv, among the supposititious works of St. Ambrose]\nasserts. Consequently if religious be in need they can lawfully live\non alms. Such necessity may occur in three ways. First, through\nweakness of body, the result being that they are unable to make a\nliving by working with their hands. Secondly, because that which they\ngain by their handiwork is insufficient for their livelihood:\nwherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii) that \"the good works\nof the faithful should not leave God's servants who work with their\nhands without a supply of necessaries, that when the hour comes for\nthem to nourish their souls, so as to make it impossible for them to\ndo these corporal works, they be not oppressed by want.\" Thirdly,\nbecause of the former mode of life of those who were unwont to work\nwith their hands: wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxi)\nthat \"if they had in the world the wherewithal easily to support this\nlife without working, and gave it to the needy when they were\nconverted to God, we must credit their weakness and bear with it.\"\nFor those who have thus been delicately brought up are wont to be\nunable to bear the toil of bodily labor.\n\nIn another way a thing becomes due to a person through his affording\nothers something whether temporal or spiritual, according to 1 Cor.\n9:11, \"If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great\nmatter if we reap your carnal things?\" And in this sense religious\nmay live on alms as being due to them in four ways. First, if they\npreach by the authority of the prelates. Secondly, if they be\nministers of the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13, 14, \"They that\nserve the altar partake with the altar. So also the lord ordained\nthat they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel.\" Hence\nAugustine says (De oper. Monach. xxi): \"If they be gospelers, I\nallow, they have\" (a claim to live at the charge of the faithful):\n\"if they be ministers of the altar and dispensers of the sacraments,\nthey need not insist on it, but it is theirs by perfect right.\" The\nreason for this is because the sacrament of the altar wherever it be\noffered is common to all the faithful. Thirdly, if they devote\nthemselves to the study of Holy Writ to the common profit of the\nwhole Church. Wherefore Jerome says (Contra Vigil. xiii): \"It is\nstill the custom in Judea, not only among us but also among the\nHebrews, for those who meditate on the law of the Lord day and night,\nand have no other share on earth but God alone, to be supported by\nthe subscriptions of the synagogues and of the whole world.\"\nFourthly, if they have endowed the monastery with the goods they\npossessed, they may live on the alms given to the monastery. Hence\nAugustine says (De oper. Monach. xxv) that \"those who renouncing or\ndistributing their means, whether ample or of any amount whatever,\nhave desired with pious and salutary humility to be numbered among\nthe poor of Christ, have a claim on the community and on brotherly\nlove to receive a livelihood in return. They are to be commended\nindeed if they work with their hands, but if they be unwilling, who\nwill dare to force them? Nor does it matter, as he goes on to say, to\nwhich monasteries, or in what place any one of them has bestowed his\ngoods on his needy brethren; for all Christians belong to one\ncommonwealth.\"\n\nOn the other hand, in the default of any necessity, or of their\naffording any profit to others, it is unlawful for religious to wish\nto live in idleness on the alms given to the poor. Hence Augustine\nsays (De oper. Monach. xxii): \"Sometimes those who enter the\nprofession of God's service come from a servile condition of life,\nfrom tilling the soil or working at some trade or lowly occupation.\nIn their case it is not so clear whether they came with the purpose\nof serving God, or of evading a life of want and toil with a view to\nbeing fed and clothed in idleness, and furthermore to being honored\nby those by whom they were wont to be despised and downtrodden. Such\npersons surely cannot excuse themselves from work on the score of\nbodily weakness, for their former mode of life is evidence against\nthem.\" And he adds further on (De oper. Monach. xxv): \"If they be\nunwilling to work, neither let them eat. For if the rich humble\nthemselves to piety, it is not that the poor may be exalted to pride;\nsince it is altogether unseemly that in a life wherein senators\nbecome laborers, laborers should become idle, and that where the\nlords of the manor have come after renouncing their ease, the serfs\nshould live in comfort.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: These authorities must be understood as referring to\ncases of necessity, that is to say, when there is no other means of\nsuccoring the poor: for then they would be bound not only to refrain\nfrom accepting alms, but also to give what they have for the support\nof the needy.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Prelates are competent to preach in virtue of their\noffice, but religious may be competent to do so in virtue of\ndelegation; and thus when they work in the field of the Lord, they\nmay make their living thereby, according to 2 Tim. 2:6, \"The\nhusbandman that laboreth must first partake of the fruits,\" which a\ngloss explains thus, \"that is to say, the preacher, who in the field\nof the Church tills the hearts of his hearers with the plough of\nGod's word.\" Those also who minister to the preachers may live on\nalms. Hence a gloss on Rom. 15:27, \"If the Gentiles have been made\npartakers of their spiritual things, they ought also in carnal things\nto minister to them,\" says, \"namely, to the Jews who sent preachers\nfrom Jerusalem.\" There are moreover other reasons for which a person\nhas a claim to live at the charge of the faithful, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Other things being equal, it is more perfect to give\nthan to receive. Nevertheless to give or to give up all one's\npossessions for Christ's sake, and to receive a little for one's\nlivelihood is better than to give to the poor part by part, as stated\nabove (Q. 186, A. 3, ad 6).\n\nReply Obj. 4: To receive gifts so as to increase one's wealth, or to\naccept a livelihood from another without having a claim to it, and\nwithout profit to others or being in need oneself, affords an\noccasion of sin. But this does not apply to religious, as stated\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Whenever there is evident necessity for religious\nliving on alms without doing any manual work, as well as an evident\nprofit to be derived by others, it is not the weak who are\nscandalized, but those who are full of malice like the Pharisees,\nwhose scandal our Lord teaches us to despise (Matt. 15:12-14). If,\nhowever, these motives of necessity and profit be lacking, the weak\nmight possibly be scandalized thereby; and this should be avoided.\nYet the same scandal might be occasioned through those who live in\nidleness on the common revenues.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 5]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for Religious to Beg?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to beg. For\nAugustine says (De oper. Monach. xxviii): \"The most cunning foe has\nscattered on all sides a great number of hypocrites wearing the\nmonastic habit, who go wandering about the country,\" and afterwards\nhe adds: \"They all ask, they all demand to be supported in their\nprofitable penury, or to be paid for a pretended holiness.\" Therefore\nit would seem that the life of mendicant religious is to be condemned.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): \"That you . . . work\nwith your own hands as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly\ntowards them that are without: and that you want nothing of any\nman's\": and a gloss on this passage says: \"You must work and not be\nidle, because work is both honorable and a light to the unbeliever:\nand you must not covet that which belongs to another and much less\nbeg or take anything.\" Again a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper.\nMonach. iii)] on 2 Thess. 3:10, \"If any man will not work,\" etc.\nsays: \"He wishes the servants of God to work with the body, so as to\ngain a livelihood, and not be compelled by want to ask for\nnecessaries.\" Now this is to beg. Therefore it would seem unlawful to\nbeg while omitting to work with one's hands.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is forbidden by law and contrary to\njustice, is unbecoming to religious. Now begging is forbidden in the\ndivine law; for it is written (Deut. 15:4): \"There shall be no poor\nnor beggar among you,\" and (Ps. 36:25): \"I have not seen the just\nforsaken, nor his seed seeking bread.\" Moreover an able-bodied\nmendicant is punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi,\nde Valid. Mendicant.). Therefore it is unfitting for religious to beg.\n\nObj. 4: Further, \"Shame is about that which is disgraceful,\" as\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i,\n30) that \"to be ashamed to beg is a sign of good birth.\" Therefore it\nis disgraceful to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to\nreligious.\n\nObj. 5: Further, according to our Lord's command it is especially\nbecoming to preachers of the Gospel to live on alms, as stated above\n(A. 4). Yet it is not becoming that they should beg, since a gloss on\n2 Tim. 2:6, \"The husbandman, that laboreth,\" etc. says: \"The Apostle\nwishes the gospeler to understand that to accept necessaries from\nthose among whom he labors is not mendicancy but a right.\" Therefore\nit would seem unbecoming for religious to beg.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It becomes religious to live in imitation of\nChrist. Now Christ was a mendicant, according to Ps. 39:18, \"But I am\na beggar and poor\"; where a gloss says: \"Christ said this of Himself\nas bearing the 'form of a servant,'\" and further on: \"A beggar is one\nwho entreats another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for\nhimself.\" Again it is written (Ps. 69:6): \"I am needy and poor\";\nwhere a gloss says: \"'Needy,' that is a suppliant; 'and poor,' that\nis, not having enough for myself, because I have no worldly wealth.\"\nAnd Jerome says in a letter [*Reference unknown]: \"Beware lest\nwhereas thy Lord,\" i.e. Christ, \"begged, thou amass other people's\nwealth.\" Therefore it becomes religious to beg.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in reference to\nmendicancy. The first is on the part of the act itself of begging,\nwhich has a certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those\nwould seem most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that\nthey have to receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve\npraise for begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in\nother ways, as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which\nthey desire to quench either in themselves or in others by their\nexample. For just as a disease that arises from excessive heat is\nmost efficaciously healed by things that excel in cold, so proneness\nto pride is most efficaciously healed by those things which savor\nmost of abasement. Hence it is said in the Decretals (II, cap. Si\nquis semel, de Paenitentia): \"To condescend to the humblest duties,\nand to devote oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of\nhumility; for thus one is able to heal the disease of pride and human\nglory.\" Hence Jerome praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean.) for that\nshe desired \"to receive alms, having poured forth all her wealth for\nChrist's sake.\" The Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having\nrenounced all his possessions for Christ's sake he rejoiced in\nreceiving alms even from his own servants. It is also related of the\nBlessed Arsenius in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave\nthanks because he was forced by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it\nis enjoined to some people as a penance for grievous sins to go on a\npilgrimage begging. Since, however, humility like the other virtues\nshould not be without discretion, it behooves one to be discreet in\nbecoming a mendicant for the purpose of humiliation, lest a man\nthereby incur the mark of covetousness or of anything else\nunbecoming. Secondly, mendicancy may be considered on the part of\nthat which one gets by begging: and thus a man may be led to beg by a\ntwofold motive. First, by the desire to have wealth or meat without\nworking for it, and such like mendicancy is unlawful; secondly, by a\nmotive of necessity or usefulness. The motive is one of necessity if\na man has no other means of livelihood save begging; and it is a\nmotive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish something useful, and\nis unable to do so without the alms of the faithful. Thus alms are\nbesought for the building of a bridge, or church, or for any other\nwork whatever that is conducive to the common good: thus scholars may\nseek alms that they may devote themselves to the study of wisdom. In\nthis way mendicancy is lawful to religious no less than to seculars.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those who beg\nfrom motives of covetousness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The first gloss speaks of begging from motives of\ncovetousness, as appears from the words of the Apostle; while the\nsecond gloss speaks of those who without effecting any useful\npurpose, beg their livelihood in order to live in idleness. On the\nother hand, he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This precept of the divine law does not forbid anyone\nto beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are\ncompelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on\nable-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of\nnecessity.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Disgrace is twofold; one arises from lack of honesty\n[*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1], the other from an external defect, thus it is\ndisgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such like uncomeliness of\nmendicancy does not pertain to sin, but it may pertain to humility,\nas stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Preachers have the right to be fed by those to whom\nthey preach: yet if they wish to seek this by begging so as to\nreceive it as a free gift and not as a right this will be a mark of\ngreater humility.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 6]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful for Religious to Wear Coarser Clothes Than\nOthers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to wear coarser\nclothes than others. For according to the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22) we\nought to \"refrain from all appearance of evil.\" Now coarseness of\nclothes has an appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Matt. 7:15):\n\"Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep\":\nand a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, \"Behold a pale horse,\" says: \"The devil\nfinding that he cannot succeed, neither by outward afflictions nor by\nmanifest heresies, sends in advance false brethren, who under the\nguise of religion assume the characteristics of the black and red\nhorses by corrupting the faith.\" Therefore it would seem that\nreligious should not wear coarse clothes.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): \"Avoid somber,\"\ni.e. black, \"equally with glittering apparel. Fine and coarse clothes\nare equally to be shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the other\nvainglory.\" Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the use\nof pleasure, it would seem that religious who should aim at what is\nmore perfect ought to avoid coarse rather than fine clothes.\n\nObj. 3: Further, religious should aim especially at doing works of\npenance. Now in works of penance we should use, not outward signs of\nsorrow, but rather signs of joy; for our Lord said (Matt. 6:16):\n\"When you fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad,\" and afterwards He\nadded: \"But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and wash thy\nface.\" Augustine commenting on these words (De Serm. Dom. in Monte\nii, 12): \"In this chapter we must observe that not only the glare and\npomp of outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a\nsubject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under\nthe guise of God's service.\" Therefore seemingly religious ought not\nto wear coarse clothes.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:37): \"They wandered\nabout in sheep-skins, in goat-skins,\" and a gloss adds--\"as Elias and\nothers.\" Moreover it is said in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis\njactantia: \"If any persons be found to deride those who wear coarse\nand religious apparel they must be reproved. For in the early times\nall those who were consecrated to God went about in common and coarse\napparel.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12), \"in\nall external things, it is not the use but the intention of the user\nthat is at fault.\" In order to judge of this it is necessary to\nobserve that coarse and homely apparel may be considered in two ways.\nFirst, as being a sign of a man's disposition or condition, because\naccording to Ecclus. 19:27, \"the attire . . . of the man\" shows \"what\nhe is.\" In this way coarseness of attire is sometimes a sign of\nsorrow: wherefore those who are beset with sorrow are wont to wear\ncoarser clothes, just as on the other hand in times of festivity and\njoy they wear finer clothes. Hence penitents make use of coarse\napparel, for example, the king (Jonah 3:6) who \"was clothed with\nsack-cloth,\" and Achab (3 Kings 21:27) who \"put hair-cloth upon his\nflesh.\" Sometimes, however, it is a sign of the contempt of riches\nand worldly ostentation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustico\nMonach.): \"Let your somber attire indicate your purity of mind, your\ncoarse robe prove your contempt of the world, yet so that your mind\nbe not inflated withal, lest your speech belie your habit.\" In both\nthese ways it is becoming for religious to wear coarse attire, since\nreligion is a state of penance and of contempt of worldly glory.\n\nBut that a person wish to signify this to others arises from three\nmotives. First, in order to humble himself: for just as a man's mind\nis uplifted by fine clothes, so is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence\nspeaking of Achab who \"put hair-cloth on his flesh,\" the Lord said to\nElias: \"Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me?\" (3 Kings 21:29).\nSecondly, in order to set an example to others; wherefore a gloss on\nMatt. 3:4, \"(John) had his garments of camel's hair,\" says: \"He who\npreaches penance is clothed in the habit of penance.\" Thirdly, on\naccount of vainglory; thus Augustine says (cf. Obj. 3) that \"even the\nweeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation.\"\n\nAccordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to wear humble\napparel, but in the third way it is sinful.\n\nSecondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered as the result of\ncovetousness or negligence, and thus also it is sinful.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Coarseness of attire has not of itself the appearance\nof evil, indeed it has more the appearance of good, namely of the\ncontempt of worldly glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide their\nwickedness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.\nin Monte ii, 24) that \"the sheep should not dislike their clothing\nfor the reason that the wolves sometimes hide themselves under it.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Jerome is speaking there of the coarse attire that is\nworn on account of human glory.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to our Lord's teaching men should do no deeds\nof holiness for the sake of show: and this is especially the case\nwhen one does something strange. Hence Chrysostom [*Hom. xiii in\nMatth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John\nChrysostom] says: \"While praying a man should do nothing strange, so\nas to draw the gaze of others, either by shouting or striking his\nbreast, or casting up his hands,\" because the very strangeness draws\npeople's attention to him. Yet blame does not attach to all strange\nbehavior that draws people's attention, for it may be done well or\nill. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that \"in\nthe practice of the Christian religion when a man draws attention to\nhimself by unwonted squalor and shabbiness, since he acts thus\nvoluntarily and not of necessity, we can gather from his other deeds\nwhether his behavior is motivated by contempt of excessive dress or\nby affectation.\" Religious, however, would especially seem not to act\nthus from affectation, since they wear a coarse habit as a sign of\ntheir profession whereby they profess contempt of the world.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 188\n\nOF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under\nthis head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one?\n\n(2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the\nactive life?\n\n(3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?\n\n(4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and\nthe exercise of like works?\n\n(5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of\nscience?\n\n(6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative\nlife is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life?\n\n(7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing\nsomething in common?\n\n(8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to\nthe religious life of those who live in community?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Only One Religious Order?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is but one religious order. For\nthere can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and\nperfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated\nin the First Part (Q. 6, AA. 2, 3, 4). Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx\nin Ezech.), \"when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his\nlife, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust,\" without which there is\nno religious life. Therefore it would seem that there are not many\nreligious orders but only one.\n\nObj. 2: Further, things which agree in essentials differ only\naccidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three\nessential vows of religion, as stated above (Q. 186, AA. 6, 7).\nTherefore it would seem that religious orders differ not\nspecifically, but only accidentally.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is competent both to\nreligious and to bishops, as stated above (Q. 185, AA. 5, 7). Now the\nepiscopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it\nmay be; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan.): \"Wherever a\nbishop is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio,\nhe has the same excellence, the same priesthood.\" Therefore in like\nmanner there is but one religious order.\n\nObj. 4: Further, anything that may lead to confusion should be\nremoved from the Church. Now it would seem that a diversity of\nreligious orders might confuse the Christian people, as stated in the\nDecretal de Statu Monach. et Canon. Reg. [*Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig.\nDom.]. Therefore seemingly there ought not to be different religious\norders.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it pertains to the\nadornment of the queen that she is \"surrounded with variety.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 186, A, 7; Q. 187, A. 2), the\nreligious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at\nthe perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to\nwhich a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of\nexercise. Wherefore religious orders may be differentiated in two\nways. First, according to the different things to which they may be\ndirected: thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims,\nanother to visiting or ransoming captives. Secondly, there may be\nvarious religious orders according to the diversity of practices;\nthus in one religious order the body is chastised by abstinence in\nfood, in another by the practice of manual labor, scantiness of\nclothes, or the like.\n\nSince, however, the end imports most in every matter, [*Arist.,\n_Topic._ vi 8] religious orders differ more especially according to\ntheir various ends than according to their various practices.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The obligation to devote oneself wholly to God's\nservice is common to every religious order; hence religious do not\ndiffer in this respect, as though in one religious order a person\nretained some one thing of his own, and in another order some other\nthing. But the difference is in respect of the different things\nwherein one may serve God, and whereby a man may dispose himself to\nthe service of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The three essential vows of religion pertain to the\npractice of religion as principles to which all other matters are\nreduced, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 7). But there are various ways\nof disposing oneself to the observance of each of them. For instance\none disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, by solitude of\nplace, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many like means.\nAccordingly it is evident that the community of the essential vows is\ncompatible with diversity of religious life, both on account of the\ndifferent dispositions and on account of the different ends, as\nexplained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In matters relating to perfection, the bishop stands in\nthe position of agent, and the religious as passive, as stated above\n(Q. 184, A. 7). Now the agent, even in natural things, the higher it\nis, is so much the more one, whereas the things that are passive are\nvarious. Hence with reason the episcopal state is one, while\nreligious orders are many.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order.\nAccordingly the multitude of religious orders would lead to\nconfusion, if different religious orders were directed to the same\nend and in the same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to\nprevent this happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish\na new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 2]\n\nWhether a Religious Order Should Be Established for the Works of the\nActive Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no religious order should be\nestablished for the works of the active life. For every religious\norder belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above (Q. 184, A.\n5; Q. 186, A. 1). Now the perfection of the religious state consists\nin the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says (Eccl.\nHier. vi) that they are \"called servants of God by reason of their\nrendering pure service and subjection to God, and on account of the\nindivisible and singular life which unites them by holy reflections,\"\ni.e. contemplations, \"on invisible things, to the Godlike unity and\nthe perfection beloved of God.\" Therefore seemingly no religious\norder should be established for the works of the active life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, seemingly the same judgment applies to canons\nregular as to monks, according to Extra, De Postul., cap. Ex parte;\nand De Statu Monach., cap. Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that\n\"they are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of\nmonks\": and the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now\nthe monastic rule was established for the purpose of the\ncontemplative life; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii ad Paulin.): \"If\nyou wish to be what you are called, a monk,\" i.e. a solitary, \"what\nbusiness have you in a city?\" The same is found stated in Extra, De\nRenuntiatione, cap. Nisi cum pridem; and De Regular., cap. Licet\nquibusdam. Therefore it would seem that every religious order is\ndirected to the contemplative life, and none to the active life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the active life is concerned with the present world.\nNow all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore Gregory\nsays (Hom. xx in Ezech.): \"He who renounces this world, and does all\nthe good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers\nsacrifice in the wilderness.\" Therefore it would seem that no\nreligious order can be directed to the active life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 1:27): \"Religion clean and\nundefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless\nand widows in their tribulation.\" Now this belongs to the active\nlife. Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the\nactive life.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the religious state is\ndirected to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of\nGod and of our neighbor. Now the contemplative life which seeks to\ndevote itself to God alone belongs directly to the love of God, while\nthe active life, which ministers to our neighbor's needs, belongs\ndirectly to the love of one's neighbor. And just as out of charity we\nlove our neighbor for God's sake, so the services we render our\nneighbor redound to God, according to Matt. 25:40, \"What you have\ndone [Vulg.: 'As long as you did it'] to one of these My least\nbrethren, you did it to Me.\" Consequently those services which we\nrender our neighbor, in so far as we refer them to God, are described\nas sacrifices, according to Heb. 13:16, \"Do not forget to do good and\nto impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained.\" And since\nit belongs properly to religion to offer sacrifice to God, as stated\nabove (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1), it follows that certain\nreligious orders are fittingly directed to the works of the active\nlife. Wherefore in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the\nAbbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various aims of religious orders\nsays: \"Some direct their intention exclusively to the hidden life of\nthe desert and purity of heart; some are occupied with the\ninstruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries; while\nothers delight in the service of the guesthouse,\" i.e. in hospitality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Service and subjection rendered to God are not\nprecluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his\nneighbor for God's sake, as stated in the Article. Nor do these works\npreclude singularity of life; not that they involve man's living\napart from his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man\nindividually devotes himself to things pertaining to the service of\nGod; and since religious occupy themselves with the works of the\nactive life for God's sake, it follows that their action results from\ntheir contemplation of divine things. Hence they are not entirely\ndeprived of the fruit of the contemplative life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The same judgment applies to monks and to all other\nreligious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for\ninstance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine\nservice, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and\ntheir refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that\nthis likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic\nprofession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life.\nHence in the aforesaid Decretal, De Postulando, it is not simply\nstated that \"the same judgment applies to canons regular\" as \"to\nmonks,\" but that it applies \"in matters already mentioned,\" namely\nthat \"they are not to act as advocates in lawsuits.\" Again the\nDecretal quoted, De Statu Monach., after the statement that \"canons\nregular are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of\nmonks,\" goes on to say: \"Nevertheless they obey an easier rule.\"\nHence it is evident that they are not bound to all that monks are\nbound.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way by\nhis bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence\nour Lord said to His disciples (John 15:19): \"I have chosen you out\nof the world,\" and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (John\n17:11): \"These are in the world, and I come to Thee.\" Although, then,\nreligious who are occupied with the works of the active life are in\nthe world as to the presence of the body, they are not in the world\nas regards their bent of mind, because they are occupied with\nexternal things, not as seeking anything of the world, but merely for\nthe sake of serving God: for \"they . . . use this world, as if they\nused it not,\" to quote 1 Cor. 7:31. Hence (James 1:27) after it is\nstated that \"religion clean and undefiled . . . is . . . to visit the\nfatherless and widows in their tribulation,\" it is added, \"and to\nkeep one's self unspotted from this world,\" namely to avoid being\nattached to worldly things.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Religious Order Can Be Directed to Soldiering?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to\nsoldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of\nperfection. Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of\nChristian life (Matt. 5:39): \"I say to you not to resist evil; but if\none strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him also the other,\"\nwhich is inconsistent with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no\nreligious order can be established for soldiering.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more\ngrievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel\nat law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from\nthe Decretal De Postulando quoted above (A. 2, Obj. 2). Therefore it\nis much less seemly for a religious order to be established for\nsoldiering.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we\nhave said above (Q. 187, A. 6). Now according to the code of laws\nsoldiering is forbidden to penitents. For it is said in the Decretal\nDe Poenit., Dist. v, cap. 3: \"It is altogether opposed to the rules\nof the Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance.\"\nTherefore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established\nfor soldiering.\n\nObj. 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an unjust\nobject. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), \"A just war is one that\nis waged by order of the emperor.\" Since then religious are private\nindividuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and\nconsequently no religious order may be established for this purpose.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad Bonifac.), \"Beware\nof thinking that none of those can please God who handle war-like\nweapons. Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great\ntestimony.\" Now religious orders are established in order that men\nmay please God. Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a\nreligious order for the purpose of soldiering.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a religious order may be\nestablished not only for the works of the contemplative life, but\nalso for the works of the active life, in so far as they are\nconcerned in helping our neighbor and in the service of God, but not\nin so far as they are directed to a worldly object. Now the\noccupation of soldiering may be directed to the assistance of our\nneighbor, not only as regards private individuals, but also as\nregards the defense of the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of\nJudas Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2, 3) that \"he [Vulg.: 'they'] fought with\ncheerfulness the battle of Israel, and he got his people great\nhonor.\" It can also be directed to the upkeep of divine worship,\nwherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated to have said: \"We will fight\nfor our lives and our laws,\" and further on (1 Macc. 13:3) Simon\nsaid: \"You know what great battles I and my brethren, and the house\nof my father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary.\"\n\nHence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering,\nnot indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine\nworship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed,\naccording to Ps. 81:4: \"Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of\nthe hand of the sinner.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways.\nFirst, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus\nit may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for\nthe spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating\npatiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to\nimperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer\nin a becoming manner. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): \"The\ncourage whereby a man in battle defends his country against\nbarbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends against\nrobbers is full of justice\": even so our Lord says in the passage\nquoted [*Luke 6:30: \"Of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not\nagain\"; Cf. Matt. 5:40,\" . . . thy goods, ask them not again.\"] If,\nhowever, a man were not to demand the return of that which belongs to\nanother, he would sin if it were his business to do so: for it is\npraiseworthy to give away one's own, but not another's property. And\nmuch less should the things of God be neglected, for as Chrysostom\n[*Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St.\nJohn Chrysostom] says, \"it is most wicked to overlook the wrongs done\nto God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order to act as\ncounsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent to do\nso at the orders of one's superior and in favor of one's monastery,\nas stated in the same Decretal, or for the defense of the poor and\nwidows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii, cap.\n1): \"The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to buy\nproperty or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view to\nthe care of the fatherless . . . and widows.\" Likewise to be a\nsoldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all\nreligious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for\nthe sake of God's service.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but the\nsoldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a\npenance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is\nenjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The establishment of a religious order for the purpose\nof soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on their\nown authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the\nsovereign or of the Church.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Religious Order Can Be Established for Preaching or Hearing\nConfessions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no religious order may be established\nfor preaching, or hearing confessions. For it is said (VII, qu. i\n[*Cap. Hoc nequaquam; Cf. Q. 187, A. 1, Obj. 1]): \"The monastic life\nis one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or\npastoral care,\" and the same apparently applies to religious. Now\npreaching and hearing confessions are the actions of a pastor and\nteacher. Therefore a religious order should not be established for\nthis purpose.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the purpose for which a religious order is\nestablished would seem to be something most proper to the religious\nlife, as stated above (A. 1). Now the aforesaid actions are not\nproper to religious but to bishops. Therefore a religious order\nshould not be established for the purpose of such actions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems unfitting that the authority to preach and\nhear confessions should be committed to an unlimited number of men;\nand there is no fixed number of those who are received into a\nreligious order. Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to\nbe established for the purpose of the aforesaid actions.\n\nObj. 4: Further, preachers have a right to receive their livelihood\nfrom the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 9. If then the\noffice of preaching be committed to a religious order established for\nthat purpose, it follows that the faithful of Christ are bound to\nsupport an unlimited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden\non them. Therefore a religious order should not be established for\nthe exercise of these actions.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the organization of the Church should be in\naccordance with Christ's institution. Now Christ sent first the\ntwelve apostles to preach, as related in Luke 9, and afterwards He\nsent the seventy-two disciples, as stated in Luke 10. Moreover,\naccording to the gloss of Bede on \"And after these things\" (Luke\n10:1), \"the apostles are represented by the bishops, the seventy-two\ndisciples by the lesser priests,\" i.e. the parish priests. Therefore\nin addition to bishops and parish priests, no religious order should\nbe established for the purpose of preaching and hearing confessions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4),\nAbbot Nesteros, speaking of the various kinds of religious orders,\nsays: \"Some choosing the care of the sick, others devoting themselves\nto the relief of the afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves\nto teaching, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly\nesteemed on account of their devotion and piety.\" Therefore just as a\nreligious order may be established for the care of the sick, so also\nmay one be established for teaching the people by preaching and like\nworks.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it is fitting for a\nreligious order to be established for the works of the active life,\nin so far as they are directed to the good of our neighbor, the\nservice of God, and the upkeep of divine worship. Now the good of our\nneighbor is advanced by things pertaining to the spiritual welfare of\nthe soul rather than by things pertaining to the supplying of bodily\nneeds, in proportion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal\nthings. Hence it was stated above (Q. 32, A. 3) that spiritual works\nof mercy surpass corporal works of mercy. Moreover this is more\npertinent to the service of God, to Whom no sacrifice is more\nacceptable than zeal for souls, as Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.).\nFurthermore, it is a greater thing to employ spiritual arms in\ndefending the faithful against the errors of heretics and the\ntemptations of the devil, than to protect the faithful by means of\nbodily weapons. Therefore it is most fitting for a religious order to\nbe established for preaching and similar works pertaining to the\nsalvation of souls.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He who works by virtue of another, acts as an\ninstrument. And a minister is like an \"animated instrument,\" as the\nPhilosopher says (Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 11]). Hence if a\nman preach or do something similar by the authority of his superiors,\nhe does not rise above the degree of \"discipleship\" or \"subjection,\"\nwhich is competent to religious.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some religious orders are established for soldiering,\nto wage war, not indeed on their own authority, but on that of the\nsovereign or of the Church who are competent to wage war by virtue of\ntheir office, as stated above (A. 3, ad 4). In the same way certain\nreligious orders are established for preaching and hearing\nconfessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the authority\nof the higher and lower superiors, to whom these things belong by\nvirtue of their office. Consequently to assist one's superiors in\nsuch a ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Bishops do not allow these religious severally and\nindiscriminately to preach or hear confessions, but according to the\ndiscretion of the religious superiors, or according to their own\nappointment.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The faithful are not bound by law to contribute to the\nsupport of other than their ordinary prelates, who receive the tithes\nand offerings of the faithful for that purpose, as well as other\necclesiastical revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to\nthe faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and\nwithout demanding payment as of right, the faithful are not burdened\nthereby because their temporal contributions can be liberally repaid\nby those men, nor are they bound by law to contribute, but by\ncharity, and yet not so that they be burdened thereby and others\neased, as stated in 2 Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote\nthemselves gratuitously to services of this kind, the ordinary\nprelate is bound, if he cannot suffice by himself, to seek other\nsuitable persons and support them himself.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The seventy-two disciples are represented not only by\nthe parish priests, but by all those of lower order who in any way\nassist the bishops in their office. For we do not read that our Lord\nappointed the seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but\nthat \"He sent them two and two before His face into every city and\nplace whither He Himself was to come.\" It was fitting, however, that\nin addition to the ordinary prelates others should be chosen for\nthese duties on account of the multitude of the faithful, and the\ndifficulty of finding a sufficient number of persons to be appointed\nto each locality, just as it was necessary to establish religious\norders for military service, on account of the secular princes being\nunable to cope with unbelievers in certain countries.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 5]\n\nWhether a Religious Order Should Be Established for the Purpose of\nStudy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a religious order should not be\nestablished for the purpose of study. For it is written (Ps. 70:15,\n16): \"Because I have not known letters [Douay: 'learning'], I will\nenter into the powers of the Lord,\" i.e. \"Christian virtue,\"\naccording to a gloss. Now the perfection of Christian virtue,\nseemingly, pertains especially to religious. Therefore it is not for\nthem to apply themselves to the study of letters.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is a source of dissent is unbecoming to\nreligious, who are gathered together in the unity of peace. Now study\nleads to dissent: wherefore different schools of thought arose among\nthe philosophers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says:\n\"Before a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and people\nsaid: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas,\" etc. Therefore it\nwould seem that no religious order should be established for the\npurpose of study.\n\nObj. 3: Further, those who profess the Christian religion should\nprofess nothing in common with the Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles\nwere some who professed philosophy, and even now some secular persons\nare known as professors of certain sciences. Therefore the study of\nletters does not become religious.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome (Ep. liii ad Paulin.) urges him to acquire\nlearning in the monastic state, saying: \"Let us learn on earth those\nthings the knowledge of which will remain in heaven,\" and further on:\n\"Whatever you seek to know, I will endeavor to know with you.\"\n\nI answer that As stated above (A. 2), religion may be ordained to the\nactive and to the contemplative life. Now chief among the works of\nthe active life are those which are directly ordained to the\nsalvation of souls, such as preaching and the like. Accordingly the\nstudy of letters is becoming to the religious life in three ways.\nFirst, as regards that which is proper to the contemplative life, to\nwhich the study of letters helps in a twofold manner. In one way by\nhelping directly to contemplate, namely by enlightening the\nintellect. For the contemplative life of which we are now speaking is\ndirected chiefly to the consideration of divine things, as stated\nabove (Q. 180, A. 4), to which consideration man is directed by\nstudy; for which reason it is said in praise of the righteous (Ps.\n1:2) that \"he shall meditate day and night\" on the law of the Lord,\nand (Ecclus. 39:1): \"The wise man will seek out the wisdom of all the\nancients, and will be occupied in the prophets.\" In another way the\nstudy of letters is a help to the contemplative life indirectly, by\nremoving the obstacles to contemplation, namely the errors which in\nthe contemplation of divine things frequently beset those who are\nignorant of the scriptures. Thus we read in the Conferences of the\nFathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot Serapion through simplicity fell\ninto the error of the Anthropomorphites, who thought that God had a\nhuman shape. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi) that \"some through\nseeking in contemplation more than they are able to grasp, fall away\ninto perverse doctrines, and by failing to be the humble disciples of\ntruth become the masters of error.\" Hence it is written (Eccles.\n2:3): \"I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I\nmight turn my mind to wisdom and might avoid folly.\"\n\nSecondly, the study of letters is necessary in those religious orders\nthat are founded for preaching and other like works; wherefore the\nApostle (Titus 1:9), speaking of bishops to whose office these acts\nbelong, says: \"Embracing that faithful word which is according to\ndoctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to\nconvince the gainsayers.\" Nor does it matter that the apostles were\nsent to preach without having studied letters, because, as Jerome\nsays (Ep. liii ad Paulin.), \"whatever others acquire by exercise and\ndaily meditation in God's law, was taught them by the Holy Ghost.\"\n\nThirdly, the study of letters is becoming to religious as regards\nthat which is common to all religious orders. For it helps us to\navoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad\nRust. Monach.): \"Love the science of the Scriptures and thou shalt\nhave no love for carnal vice.\" For it turns the mind away from\nlustful thoughts, and tames the flesh on account of the toil that\nstudy entails according to Ecclus. 31:1, \"Watching for riches*\nconsumeth the flesh.\" [*_Vigilia honestatis._ St. Thomas would seem\nto have taken _honestas_ in the sense of virtue]. It also helps to\nremove the desire of riches, wherefore it is written (Wis. 7:8):\n\"I . . . esteemed riches nothing in comparison with her,\" and (1\nMacc. 12:9): \"We needed none of these things,\" namely assistance from\nwithout, \"having for our comfort the holy books that are in our\nhands.\" It also helps to teach obedience, wherefore Augustine says\n(De oper. Monach. xvii): \"What sort of perverseness is this, to wish\nto read, but not to obey what one reads?\" Hence it is clearly fitting\nthat a religious order be established for the study of letters.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This commentary of the gloss is an exposition of the\nOld Law of which the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): \"The letter killeth.\"\nHence not to know letters is to disapprove of the circumcision of the\n\"letter\" and other carnal observances.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Study is directed to knowledge which, without charity,\n\"puffeth up,\" and consequently leads to dissent, according to Prov.\n13:10, \"Among the proud there are always dissensions\": whereas, with\ncharity, it \"edifieth and begets concord.\" Hence the Apostle after\nsaying (1 Cor. 1:5): \"You are made rich . . . in all utterance and in\nall knowledge,\" adds (1 Cor. 1:10): \"That you all speak the same\nthing, and that there be no schisms among you.\" But Jerome is not\nspeaking here of the study of letters, but of the study of\ndissensions which heretics and schismatics have brought into the\nChristian religion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The philosophers professed the study of letters in the\nmatter of secular learning: whereas it becomes religious to devote\nthemselves chiefly to the study of letters in reference to the\ndoctrine that is \"according to godliness\" (Titus 1:1). It becomes not\nreligious, whose whole life is devoted to the service of God, to seek\nfor other learning, save in so far as it is referred to the sacred\ndoctrine. Hence Augustine says at the end of _De Musica_ vi, 17:\n\"Whilst we think that we should not overlook those whom heretics\ndelude by the deceitful assurance of reason and knowledge, we are\nslow to advance in the consideration of their methods. Yet we should\nnot be praised for doing this, were it not that many holy sons of\ntheir most loving mother the Catholic Church had done the same under\nthe necessity of confounding heretics.\"\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 6]\n\nWhether a Religious Order That Is Devoted to the Contemplative Life\nIs More Excellent Than on That Is Given to the Active Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a religious order which is devoted to\nthe contemplative life is not more excellent than one which is given\nto the active life. For it is said (Extra, de Regular. et Transeunt.\nad Relig., cap. Licet), quoting the words of Innocent III: \"Even as a\ngreater good is preferred to a lesser, so the common profit takes\nprecedence of private profit: and in this case teaching is rightly\npreferred to silence, responsibility to contemplation, work to rest.\"\nNow the religious order which is directed to the greater good is\nbetter. Therefore it would seem that those religious orders that are\ndirected to the active life are more excellent than those which are\ndirected to the contemplative life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every religious order is directed to the perfection\nof charity, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Now a gloss on Heb. 12:4,\n\"For you have not yet resisted unto blood,\" says: \"In this life there\nis no more perfect love than that to which the holy martyrs attained,\nwho fought against sin unto blood.\" Now to fight unto blood is\nbecoming those religious who are directed to military service, and\nyet this pertains to the active life. Therefore it would seem that\nreligious orders of this kind are the most excellent.\n\nObj. 3: Further, seemingly the stricter a religious order is, the\nmore excellent it is. But there is no reason why certain religious\norders directed to the active life should not be of stricter\nobservance than those directed to the contemplative life. Therefore\nthey are more excellent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Luke 10:42) that the \"best part\"\nwas Mary's, by whom the contemplative life is signified.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the difference between one\nreligious order and another depends chiefly on the end, and\nsecondarily on the exercise. And since one thing cannot be said to be\nmore excellent than another save in respect of that in which it\ndiffers therefrom, it follows that the excellence of one religious\norder over another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily on\ntheir respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these comparisons is\nconsidered in a different way. For the comparison with respect to the\nend is absolute, since the end is sought for its own sake; whereas\nthe comparison with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise\nis sought not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a\nreligious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end\nthat is absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good\nor because it is directed to more goods. If, however, the end be the\nsame, the excellence of one religious order over another depends\nsecondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on the proportion of\nthe exercise to the end in view. Wherefore in the Conferences of the\nFathers (Coll. ii, 2) Blessed Antony is quoted, as preferring\ndiscretion whereby a man moderates all his actions, to fastings,\nwatchings, and all such observances.\n\nAccordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold.\none proceeds from the fulness of contemplation, such as teaching and\npreaching. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words\nof Ps. 144:7, \"They shall publish the memory of . . . Thy sweetness,\"\nrefer \"to perfect men returning from their contemplation.\" And this\nwork is more excellent than simple contemplation. For even as it is\nbetter to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to\nothers the fruits of one's contemplation than merely to contemplate.\nThe other work of the active life consists entirely in outward\noccupation, for instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like,\nwhich are less excellent than the works of contemplation, except in\ncases of necessity, as stated above (Q. 182, A. 1). Accordingly the\nhighest place in religious orders is held by those which are directed\nto teaching and preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to the\nepiscopal perfection, even as in other things \"the end of that which\nis first is in conjunction with the beginning of that which is\nsecond,\" as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place\nbelongs to those which are directed to contemplation, and the third\nto those which are occupied with external actions.\n\nMoreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted that one religious\norder excels another through being directed to higher action in the\nsame genus; thus among the works of the active life it is better to\nransom captives than to receive guests, and among the works of the\ncontemplative life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel\nanother if it be directed to more of these actions than another, or\nif it have statutes more adapted to the attainment of the end in view.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This Decretal refers to the active life as directed to\nthe salvation of souls.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those religious orders that are established for the\npurpose of military service aim more directly at shedding the enemy's\nblood than at the shedding of their own, which latter is more\nproperly competent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious\nof this description should not acquire the merit of martyrdom in\ncertain cases, and in this respect stand higher than other religious;\neven as in some cases the works of the active life take precedence of\ncontemplation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Strictness of observances, as the Blessed Antony\nremarks (Conferences of the Fathers; Coll. ii, 2), is not the chief\nobject of commendation in a religious order; and it is written (Isa.\n58:5): \"Is this such a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict\nhis soul for a day?\" Nevertheless it is adopted in religious life as\nbeing necessary for taming the flesh, \"which if done without\ndiscretion, is liable to make us fail altogether,\" as the Blessed\nAntony observes. Wherefore a religious order is not more excellent\nthrough having stricter observances, but because its observances are\ndirected by greater discretion to the end of religion. Thus the\ntaming of the flesh is more efficaciously directed to continence by\nmeans of abstinence in meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and\nthirst, than by the privation of clothing, which pertains to cold and\nnakedness, or by bodily labor.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Religious Perfection Is Diminished by Possessing Something in\nCommon?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that religious perfection is diminished by\npossessing something in common. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): \"If\nthou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast and give\nto the poor.\" Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs\nto the perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess something\nin common do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it would seem that\nthey do not quite reach to the perfection of Christian life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the perfection of the counsels requires that one\nshould be without worldly solicitude; wherefore the Apostle in giving\nthe counsel of virginity said (1 Cor. 7:32): \"I would have you to be\nwithout solicitude.\" Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present\nlife that certain people keep something to themselves for the morrow;\nand this solicitude was forbidden His disciples by our Lord (Matt.\n6:34) saying: \"Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow.\" Therefore it\nwould seem that the perfection of Christian life is diminished by\nhaving something in common.\n\nObj. 3: Further, possessions held in common belong in some way to\neach member of the community; wherefore Jerome (Ep. lx ad Heliod.\nEpisc.) says in reference to certain people: \"They are richer in the\nmonastery than they had been in the world; though serving the poor\nChrist they have wealth which they had not while serving the rich\ndevil; the Church rejects them now that they are rich, who in the\nworld were beggars.\" But it is derogatory to religious perfection\nthat one should possess wealth of one's own. Therefore it is also\nderogatory to religious perfection to possess anything in common.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Gregory (Dial. iii, 14) relates of a very holy man\nnamed Isaac, that \"when his disciples humbly signified that he should\naccept the possessions offered to him for the use of the monastery,\nhe being solicitous for the safeguarding of his poverty, held firmly\nto his opinion, saying: A monk who seeks earthly possessions is no\nmonk at all\": and this refers to possessions held in common, and\nwhich were offered him for the common use of the monastery. Therefore\nit would seem destructive of religious perfection to possess anything\nin common.\n\nObj. 5: Further, our Lord in prescribing religious perfection to His\ndisciples, said (Matt. 10:9, 10): \"Do not possess gold, nor silver,\nnor money in your purses, nor script for your journey.\" By these\nwords, as Jerome says in his commentary, \"He reproves those\nphilosophers who are commonly called Bactroperatae [*i.e. staff and\nscrip bearers], who as despising the world and valuing all things at\nnaught carried their pantry about with them.\" Therefore it would seem\nderogatory to religious perfection that one should keep something\nwhether for oneself or for the common use.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Prosper [*Julianus Pomerius, among the works of\nProsper] says (De Vita Contempl. ix) and his words are quoted (XII,\nqu. 1, can. Expedit): \"It is sufficiently clear both that for the\nsake of perfection one should renounce having anything of one's own,\nand that the possession of revenues, which are of course common\nproperty, is no hindrance to the perfection of the Church.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 185, A. 6,\nad 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in poverty, but in\nfollowing Christ, according to the saying of Jerome (Super Matth.\nxix, 27): \"Since it is not enough to leave all, Peter adds that which\nis perfect, namely, 'We have followed Thee,'\" while poverty is like\nan instrument or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in\nthe Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the abbot Moses says:\n\"Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, poverty, and\nprivation of all one's possessions are not perfection, but means of\nperfection.\"\n\nNow the privation of one's possessions, or poverty, is a means of\nperfection, inasmuch as by doing away with riches we remove certain\nobstacles to charity; and these are chiefly three. The first is the\ncares which riches bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Matt.\n13:22): \"That which was sown [Vulg.: 'He that received the seed']\namong thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care of this\nworld, and the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up the word.\" The\nsecond is the love of riches, which increases with the possession of\nwealth; wherefore Jerome says (Super Matth. xix, 23) that \"since it\nis difficult to despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not\nsay: 'It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of\nheaven,' but: 'It is difficult.'\" The third is vainglory or elation\nwhich results from riches, according to Ps. 48:7, \"They that trust in\ntheir own strength, and glory in the multitude of their riches.\"\n\nAccordingly the first of these three cannot be altogether separated\nfrom riches whether great or small. For man must needs take a certain\namount of care in acquiring or keeping external things. But so long\nas external things are sought or possessed only in a small quantity,\nand as much as is required for a mere livelihood, such like care does\nnot hinder one much; and consequently is not inconsistent with the\nperfection of Christian life. For our Lord did not forbid all care,\nbut only such as is excessive and hurtful; wherefore Augustine,\ncommenting on Matt. 6:25, \"Be not solicitous for your life, what you\nshall eat,\" says (De Serm. in Monte [*The words quoted are from De\nOperibus Monach. xxvi]): \"In saying this He does not forbid them to\nprocure these things in so far as they needed them, but to be intent\non them, and for their sake to do whatever they are bidden to do in\npreaching the Gospel.\" Yet the possession of much wealth increases\nthe weight of care, which is a great distraction to man's mind and\nhinders him from giving himself wholly to God's service. The other\ntwo, however, namely the love of riches and taking pride or glorying\nin riches, result only from an abundance of wealth.\n\nNevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if riches, whether\nabundant or moderate, be possessed in private or in common. For the\ncare that one takes of one's own wealth, pertains to love of self,\nwhereby a man loves himself in temporal matters; whereas the care\nthat is given to things held in common pertains to the love of\ncharity which \"seeketh not her own,\" but looks to the common good.\nAnd since religion is directed to the perfection of charity, and\ncharity is perfected in \"the love of God extending to contempt of\nself\" [*Augustine, De Civ. Dei xiv, 28,] it is contrary to religious\nperfection to possess anything in private. But the care that is given\nto common goods may pertain to charity, although it may prove an\nobstacle to some higher act of charity, such as divine contemplation\nor the instructing of one's neighbor. Hence it is evident that to\nhave excessive riches in common, whether in movable or in immovable\nproperty, is an obstacle to perfection, though not absolutely\nincompatible with it; while it is not an obstacle to religious\nperfection to have enough external things, whether movables or\nimmovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we consider poverty in\nrelation to the common end of religious orders, which is to devote\noneself to the service of God. But if we consider poverty in relation\nto the special end of any religious order, then this end being\npresupposed, a greater or lesser degree of poverty is adapted to that\nreligious order; and each religious order will be the more perfect in\nrespect of poverty, according as it professes a poverty more adapted\nto its end. For it is evident that for the purpose of the outward and\nbodily works of the active life a man needs the assistance of outward\nthings, whereas few are required for contemplation. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that \"many things are needed for\naction, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But\nthe contemplative man requires no such things for the exercise of his\nact: he needs only the necessaries; other things are an obstacle to\nhis contemplation.\" Accordingly it is clear that a religious order\ndirected to the bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering\nor the lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common\nriches; whereas those religious orders which are directed to the\ncontemplative life are the more perfect, according as the poverty\nthey profess burdens them with less care for temporal things. And the\ncare of temporal things is so much a greater obstacle to religious\nlife as the religious life requires a greater care of spiritual\nthings.\n\nNow it is manifest that a religious order established for the purpose\nof contemplating and of giving to others the fruits of one's\ncontemplation by teaching and preaching, requires greater care of\nspiritual things than one that is established for contemplation only.\nWherefore it becomes a religious order of this kind to embrace a\npoverty that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is\nclear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time for one's\nnecessary use involves the least burden of care. Wherefore a\nthreefold degree of poverty corresponds to the three aforesaid\ndegrees of religious life. For it is fitting that a religious order\nwhich is directed to the bodily actions of the active life should\nhave an abundance of riches in common; that the common possession of\na religious order directed to contemplation should be more moderate,\nunless the said religious be bound, either themselves or through\nothers, to give hospitality or to assist the poor; and that those who\naim at giving the fruits of their contemplation to others should have\ntheir life most exempt from external cares; this being accomplished\nby their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting\ntime. This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by His example.\nFor He had a purse which He entrusted to Judas, and in which were\nkept the things that were offered to Him, as related in John 12:6.\n\nNor should it be argued that Jerome (Super Matth. xvii, 26) says: \"If\nanyone object that Judas carried money in the purse, we answer that\nHe deemed it unlawful to spend the property of the poor on His own\nuses,\"    namely by paying the tax--because among those poor His\ndisciples held a foremost place, and the money in Christ's purse was\nspent chiefly on their needs. For it is stated (John 4:8) that \"His\ndisciples were gone into the city to buy meats,\" and (John 13:29)\nthat the disciples \"thought, because Judas had the purse, that Jesus\nhad said to him: But those things which we have need of for the\nfestival day, or that he should give something to the poor.\" From\nthis it is evident that to keep money by, or any other common\nproperty for the support of religious of the same order, or of any\nother poor, is in accordance with the perfection which Christ taught\nby His example. Moreover, after the resurrection, the disciples from\nwhom all religious orders took their origin kept the price of the\nlands, and distributed it according as each one had need (Acts 4:34,\n35).\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1), this saying of\nour Lord does not mean that poverty itself is perfection, but that it\nis the means of perfection. Indeed, as shown above (Q. 186, A. 8), it\nis the least of the three chief means of perfection; since the vow of\ncontinence excels the vow of poverty, and the vow of obedience excels\nthem both. Since, however, the means are sought not for their own\nsake, but for the sake of the end, a thing is better, not for being a\ngreater instrument, but for being more adapted to the end. Thus a\nphysician does not heal the more the more medicine he gives, but the\nmore the medicine is adapted to the disease. Accordingly it does not\nfollow that a religious order is the more perfect, according as the\npoverty it professes is more perfect, but according as its poverty is\nmore adapted to the end both common and special. Granted even that\nthe religious order which exceeds others in poverty be more perfect\nin so far as it is poorer, this would not make it more perfect\nsimply. For possibly some other religious order might surpass it in\nmatters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus be more\nperfect simply, since to excel in better things is to be better\nsimply.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Our Lord's words (Matt. 6:34), \"Be not solicitous for\ntomorrow,\" do not mean that we are to keep nothing for the morrow;\nfor the Blessed Antony shows the danger of so doing, in the\nConferences of the Fathers (Coll. ii, 2), where he says: \"It has been\nour experience that those who have attempted to practice the\nprivation of all means of livelihood, so as not to have the\nwherewithal to procure themselves food for one day, have been\ndeceived so unawares that they were unable to finish properly the\nwork they had undertaken.\" And, as Augustine says (De oper. Monach.\nxxiii), \"if this saying of our Lord, 'Be not solicitous for\ntomorrow,' means that we are to lay nothing by for the morrow, those\nwho shut themselves up for many days from the sight of men, and apply\ntheir whole mind to a life of prayer, will be unable to provide\nthemselves with these things.\" Again he adds afterwards: \"Are we to\nsuppose that the more holy they are, the less do they resemble the\nbirds?\" And further on (De oper. Monach. xxiv): \"For if it be argued\nfrom the Gospel that they should lay nothing by, they answer rightly:\nWhy then did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the money that\nwas collected? Why, in days long gone by, when famine was imminent,\nwas grain sent to the holy fathers? Why did the apostles thus provide\nfor the needs of the saints?\"\n\nAccordingly the saying: \"Be not solicitous for tomorrow,\" according\nto Jerome (Super Matth.) is to be rendered thus: \"It is enough that\nwe think of the present; the future being uncertain, let us leave it\nto God\": according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvi in the Opus Imperfectum,\nfalsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], \"It is enough to endure the\ntoil for necessary things, labor not in excess for unnecessary\nthings\": according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17):\n\"When we do any good action, we should bear in mind not temporal\nthings which are denoted by the morrow, but eternal things.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The saying of Jerome applies where there are excessive\nriches, possessed in private as it were, or by the abuse of which\neven the individual members of a community wax proud and wanton. But\nthey do not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use,\nmerely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands in need. For\nit amounts to the same that each one makes use of things pertaining\nto the necessaries of life, and that these things be set by for the\ncommon use.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Isaac refused to accept the offer of possessions,\nbecause he feared lest this should lead him to have excessive wealth,\nthe abuse of which would be an obstacle to religious perfection.\nHence Gregory adds (Dial. iii, 14): \"He was as afraid of forfeiting\nthe security of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his\nperishable wealth.\" It is not, however, related that he refused to\naccept such things as are commonly necessary for the upkeep of life.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5, 6) that bread, wine,\nand the like are natural riches, while money is artificial riches.\nHence it is that certain philosophers declined to make use of money,\nand employed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore\nJerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally forbade both, that\nit comes to the same to have money and to possess other things\nnecessary for life. And though our Lord commanded those who were sent\nto preach not to carry these things on the way, He did not forbid\nthem to be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord should be\nunderstood has been shown above (Q. 185, A. 6 ad 2; I-II, Q. 108, A.\n2, ad 3).\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Religious Life of Those Who Live in Community Is More\nPerfect Than That of Those Who Lead a Solitary Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the religious life of those who live\nin community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary\nlife. For it is written (Eccles. 4:9): \"It is better . . . that two\nshould be together, than one; for they have the advantage of their\nsociety.\" Therefore the religious life of those who live in community\nwould seem to be more perfect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Matt. 18:20): \"Where there are two or\nthree gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.\"\nBut nothing can be better than the fellowship of Christ. Therefore it\nwould seem better to live in community than in solitude.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the vow of obedience is more excellent than the\nother religious vows; and humility is most acceptable to God. Now\nobedience and humility are better observed in company than in\nsolitude; for Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach.): \"In solitude\npride quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, he\ndoes what he likes\"; whereas when instructing one who lives in\ncommunity, he says: \"You may not do what you will, you must eat what\nyou are bidden to eat, you may possess so much as you receive, you\nmust obey one you prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your\nbrethren, you must fear the superior of the monastery as God, love\nhim as a father.\" Therefore it would seem that the religious life of\nthose who live in community is more perfect than that of those who\nlead a solitary life.\n\nObj. 4: Further, our Lord said (Luke 11:33): \"No man lighteth a\ncandle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor under a bushel.\" Now\nthose who lead a solitary life are seemingly in a hidden place, and\nto be doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their\nreligious life is not more perfect.\n\nObj. 5: Further, that which is in accord with man's nature is\napparently more pertinent to the perfection of virtue. But man is\nnaturally a social animal, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1).\nTherefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life is not more\nperfect than to lead a community life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii) that\n\"those are holier who keep themselves aloof from the approach of all,\nand give their whole mind to a life of prayer.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of\nperfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the Conferences of the\nFathers (Coll. i, 7) the Abbot Moses says that \"solitude,\" even as\nfasting and other like things, is \"a sure means of acquiring purity\nof heart.\" Now it is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to\naction but to contemplation, according to Osee 2:14, \"I . . . will\nlead her into solitude [Douay: 'the wilderness']; and I will speak to\nher heart.\" Wherefore it is not suitable to those religious orders\nthat are directed to the works whether corporal or spiritual of the\nactive life; except perhaps for a time, after the example of Christ,\nWho as Luke relates (6:12), \"went out into a mountain to pray; and He\npassed the whole night in the prayer of God.\" On the other hand, it\nis suitable to those religious orders that are directed to\ncontemplation.\n\nIt must, however, be observed that what is solitary should be\nself-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one \"that lacks\nnothing,\" and this belongs to the idea of a perfect thing\n[*Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 6]. Wherefore solitude befits the\ncontemplative who has already attained to perfection. This happens in\ntwo ways: in one way by the gift only of God, as in the case of John\nthe Baptist, who was \"filled with the Holy Ghost even from his\nmother's womb\" (Luke 1:11), so that he was in the desert even as a\nboy; in another way by the practice of virtuous action, according to\nHeb. 5:14: \"Strong meat is for the perfect; for them who by custom\nhave their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil.\"\n\nNow man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship of others in\ntwo ways. First, as regards his intellect, to the effect of his being\ninstructed in that which he has to contemplate; wherefore Jerome says\n(ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): \"It pleases me that you have the\nfellowship of holy men, and teach not yourself.\" Secondly, as regards\nthe affections, seeing that man's noisome affections are restrained\nby the example and reproof which he receives from others; for as\nGregory says (Moral. xxx, 23), commenting on the words, \"To whom I\nhave given a house in the wilderness\" (Job 39:6), \"What profits\nsolitude of the body, if solitude of the heart be lacking?\" Hence a\nsocial life is necessary for the practice of perfection. Now solitude\nbefits those who are already perfect; wherefore Jerome says (ad\nRustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): \"Far from condemning the solitary life,\nwe have often commended it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from\nthe monastic school to be such as not to be deterred by the hard\nnoviciate of the desert, and such as have given proof of their\nconduct for a considerable time.\"\n\nAccordingly, just as that which is already perfect surpasses that\nwhich is being schooled in perfection, so the life of the solitaries,\nif duly practiced, surpasses the community life. But if it be\nundertaken without the aforesaid practice, it is fraught with very\ngreat danger, unless the grace of God supply that which others\nacquire by practice, as in the case of the Blessed Antony and the\nBlessed Benedict.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Solomon shows that two are better than one, on account\nof the help which one affords the other either by \"lifting him\" up,\nor by \"warming him,\" i.e. giving him spiritual heat (Eccles. 4:10,\n11). But those who have already attained to perfection do not require\nthis help.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to 1 John 4:16, \"He that abideth in charity\nabideth in God and God in him.\" Wherefore just as Christ is in the\nmidst of those who are united together in the fellowship of brotherly\nlove, so does He dwell in the heart of the man who devotes himself to\ndivine contemplation through love of God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Actual obedience is required of those who need to be\nschooled according to the direction of others in the attainment of\nperfection; but those who are already perfect are sufficiently \"led\nby the spirit of God\" so that they need not to obey others actually.\nNevertheless they have obedience in the preparedness of the mind.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), \"no one is\nforbidden to seek the knowledge of truth, for this pertains to a\npraiseworthy leisure.\" That a man be placed \"on a candlestick,\" does\nnot concern him but his superiors, and \"if this burden is not placed\non us,\" as Augustine goes on to say (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), \"we must\ndevote ourselves to the contemplation of truth,\" for which purpose\nsolitude is most helpful. Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary\nlife are most useful to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine\nsays (De Morib. Eccl. xxxi): \"They dwell in the most lonely places,\ncontent to live on water and the bread that is brought to them from\ntime to time, enjoying colloquy with God to whom they have adhered\nwith a pure mind. To some they seem to have renounced human\nintercourse more than is right: but these understand not how much\nsuch men profit us by the spirit of their prayers, what an example to\nus is the life of those whom we are forbidden to see in the body.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: A man may lead a solitary life for two motives. One is\nbecause he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship on\naccount of his uncouthness of mind; and this is beast-like. The other\nis with a view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is\nsuperhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that \"he who\nassociates not with others is either a beast or a god,\" i.e. a godly\nman.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 189\n\nOF THE ENTRANCE INTO RELIGIOUS LIFE\n(In Ten Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the entrance into religious life. Under this\nhead there are ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether those who are not practiced in the observance of the\ncommandments should enter religion?\n\n(2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by vow to enter\nreligion?\n\n(3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter religion are bound to\nfulfil their vow?\n\n(4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound to remain there\nin perpetuity?\n\n(5) Whether children should be received into religion?\n\n(6) Whether one should be withheld from entering religion through\ndeference to one's parents?\n\n(7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter religion?\n\n(8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to another?\n\n(9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?\n\n(10) Whether serious deliberation with one's relations and friends\nis requisite for entrance into religion?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Those Who Are Not Practiced in Keeping the Commandments\nShould Enter Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that none should enter religion but those\nwho are practiced in the observance of the commandments. For our Lord\ngave the counsel of perfection to the young man who said that he had\nkept the commandments \"from his youth.\" Now all religious orders\noriginate from Christ. Therefore it would seem that none should be\nallowed to enter religion but those who are practiced in the\nobservance of the commandments.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ezech., and Moral. xxii):\n\"No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a beginning of\na good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish great\nthings.\" Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to the\nperfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments\nwhich belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that\none ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the\ncounsels, unless one be already practiced in the observance of the\nprecepts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the religious state, like the holy orders, has a\nplace of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to the bishop\nSiagrius [*Regist. ix, Ep. 106], \"order should be observed in\nascending to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the\nsummit by overpassing the steps.\" [*The rest of the quotation is from\nRegist. v, Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc.]. \"For we are well aware that\nwalls when built receive not the weight of the beams until the new\nfabric is rid of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with\nweight before they are seasoned they bring down the whole building\"\n(Dist. xlviii, can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it would seem that\none should not enter religion unless one be practiced in the\nobservance of the precepts.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, \"As a child that is weaned is\ntowards his mother,\" says: \"First we are conceived in the womb of\nMother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are\nnourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same\nelements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being\nregenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her\nhands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in\ngood works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while\nwe progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother's\nmilk for a father's control, that is to say, we pass from simple\ndoctrine, by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word\nthat was in the beginning with God.\" Afterwards it goes on to say:\n\"For those who are just baptized on Holy Saturday are borne in the\nhands of the Church as it were and fed with milk until Pentecost,\nduring which time nothing arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising\nat midnight. Afterwards they are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit,\nand being weaned so to speak, begin to fast and keep other difficult\nobservances. Many, like the heretics and schismatics, have perverted\nthis order by being weaned before the time. Hence they have come to\nnaught.\" Now this order is apparently perverted by those who enter\nreligion, or induce others to enter religion, before they are\npracticed in the easier observance of the commandments. Therefore\nthey would seem to be heretics or schismatics.\n\nObj. 5: Further, one should proceed from that which precedes to that\nwhich follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels,\nbecause they are more universal, for \"the implication of the one by\nthe other is not convertible\" [*Categor. ix], since whoever keeps the\ncounsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold.\nSeeing then that the right order requires one to pass from that which\ncomes first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not\nto pass to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being\nfirst of all practiced in the observance of the commandments.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Matthew the publican who was not practiced in the\nobservance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the\nobservance of the counsels. For it is stated (Luke 5:28) that\n\"leaving all things he . . . followed Him.\" Therefore it is not\nnecessary for a person to be practiced in the observance of the\ncommandments before passing to the perfection of the counsels.\n\n_I answer that,_ As shown above (Q. 188, A. 1), the religious state\nis a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of\ncharity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to\nperfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are\nthose things which attach man's affections to earthly things. Now the\nattachment of man's affections to earthly things is not only an\nobstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the\nloss of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods\nman turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it\nis evident that the observances of the religious state, while\nremoving the obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions\nof sin: for instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience,\nand the like withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all\nother manner of sins.\n\nConsequently it is right that not only those who are practiced in the\nobservance of the commandments should enter religion in order to\nattain to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not\npracticed, in order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to\nperfection.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) says: \"The young man lies\nwhen he says: 'All these have I kept from my youth.' For if he had\nfulfilled this commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as\nthyself,' why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou\nhast and give to the poor?\" But this means that he lied as to the\nperfect observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (Tract.\nviii super Matth.) that \"it is written in the Gospel according to the\nHebrews that when our Lord had said to him: 'Go, sell all thou hast,'\nthe rich man began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to\nhim: How sayest thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets,\nseeing that it is written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as\nthyself? Behold many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are\nclothed in filth, and die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all\nmanner of good things, and nothing whatever hath passed thence to\nthem. And thus our Lord reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect,\ngo, etc. For it is impossible to fulfil the commandment which says,\nThou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, especially\nto have such great wealth.\" This also refers to the perfect\nfulfilment of this precept. On the other hand, it is true that he\nkept the commandments imperfectly and in a general way. For\nperfection consists chiefly in the observance of the precepts of\ncharity, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3). Wherefore in order to show\nthat the perfection of the counsels is useful both to the innocent\nand to sinners, our Lord called not only the innocent youth but also\nthe sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His call, and the youth obeyed\nnot, because sinners are converted to the religious life more easily\nthan those who presume on their innocency. It is to the former that\nour Lord says (Matt. 21:31): \"The publicans and the harlots shall go\ninto the kingdom of God before you.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The highest and the lowest place can be taken in three\nways. First, in reference to the same state and the same man; and\nthus it is evident that no one comes to the summit suddenly, since\nevery man that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of\nhis life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in comparison with\nvarious states; and thus he who desires to reach to a higher state\nneed not begin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be\na cleric he need not first of all be practiced in the life of a\nlayman. Thirdly, in comparison with different persons; and in this\nway it is clear that one man begins straightway not only from a\nhigher state, but even from a higher degree of holiness, than the\nhighest degree to which another man attains throughout his whole\nlife. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): \"All are agreed that the boy\nBenedict began at a high degree of grace and perfection in his daily\nlife.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 6) the holy orders\nprerequire holiness, whereas the religious state is a school for the\nattainment of holiness. Hence the burden of orders should be laid on\nthe walls when these are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the\nburden of religion seasons the walls, i.e. men, by drawing out the\ndamp of vice.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It is manifest from the words of this gloss that it is\nchiefly a question of the order of doctrine, in so far as one has to\npass from easy matter to that which is more difficult. Hence it is\nclear from what follows that the statement that certain \"heretics\"\nand \"schismatics have perverted this order\" refers to the order of\ndoctrine. For it continues thus: \"But he says that he has kept these\nthings, namely the aforesaid order, binding himself by an oath\n[*Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking _retributio,_\nwhich Douay renders _reward,_ as meaning 'punishment']. Thus I was\nhumble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for 'I was\nhumbly minded'; because I was first of all fed with milk, which is\nthe Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of the bread of\nangels, namely the Word that is in the beginning with God.\" The\nexample which is given in proof, of the newly baptized not being\ncommanded to fast until Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are\nto be laid on them as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires\nthem inwardly to take upon themselves difficult things of their own\nchoice. Hence after Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy Ghost the\nChurch observes a fast. Now the Holy Ghost, according to Ambrose\n(Super Luc. 1:15), \"is not confined to any particular age; He ceases\nnot when men die, He is not excluded from the maternal womb.\" Gregory\nalso in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.) says: \"He fills the boy\nharpist and makes him a psalmist: He fills the boy abstainer and\nmakes him a wise judge [*Dan. 1:8-17],\" and afterwards he adds: \"No\ntime is needed to learn whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind\nby the merest touch.\" Again it is written (Eccles. 8:8), \"It is not\nin man's power to stop the Spirit,\" and the Apostle admonishes us (1\nThess. 5:19): \"Extinguish not the Spirit,\" and (Acts 7:51) it is said\nagainst certain persons: \"You always resist the Holy Ghost.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: There are certain chief precepts which are the ends, so\nto say, of the commandments and counsels. These are the precepts of\ncharity, and the counsels are directed to them, not that these\nprecepts cannot be observed without keeping the counsels, but that\nthe keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance of the\nprecepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to the\nprecepts of charity; in such a way that unless one observe them it is\naltogether impossible to keep the precepts of charity. Accordingly in\nthe intention the perfect observance of the precepts of charity\nprecedes the counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of\ntime. For such is the order of the end in relation to things directed\nto the end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of\ncharity together with the other precepts, is compared to the counsels\nas the common to the proper, because one can observe the precepts\nwithout observing the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common\nobservance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order of\nnature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in point of\ntime, for a thing is not in the genus before being in one of the\nspecies. But the observance of the precepts apart from the counsels\nis directed to the observance of the precepts together with the\ncounsels; as an imperfect to a perfect species, even as the\nirrational to the rational animal. Now the perfect is naturally prior\nto the imperfect, since \"nature,\" as Boethius says (De Consol. iii,\n10), \"begins with perfect things.\" And yet it is not necessary for\nthe precepts first of all to be observed without the counsels, and\nafterwards with the counsels, just as it is not necessary for one to\nbe an ass before being a man, or married before being a virgin. In\nlike manner it is not necessary for a person first of all to keep the\ncommandments in the world before entering religion; especially as the\nworldly life does not dispose one to religious perfection, but is\nmore an obstacle thereto.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 2]\n\nWhether One Ought to Be Bound by Vow to Enter Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to\nenter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the\nreligious vow. Now before profession a year of probation is allowed,\naccording to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according\nto the decree of Innocent IV [*Sext. Decret., cap. Non solum., de\nRegular. et Transeunt, ad Relig.] who moreover forbade anyone to be\nbound to the religious life by profession before completing the year\nof probation. Therefore it would seem that much less ought anyone\nwhile yet in the world to be bound by vow to enter religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 15): Jews \"should be\npersuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but of their own free\nwill\" (Dist. xlv, can. De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil\nwhat one has vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter\nreligion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one should give another an occasion of falling;\nwherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33, 34): \"If a man open a pit . . .\nand an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of the pit shall pay the\nprice of the beasts.\" Now through being bound by vow to enter\nreligion it often happens that people fall into despair and various\nsins. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow\nto enter religion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written, (Ps. 75:12): \"Vow ye, and pay to\nthe Lord your God\"; and a gloss of Augustine says that \"some vows\nconcern the individual, such as vows of chastity, virginity, and the\nlike.\" Consequently Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things.\nBut Holy Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore\nit is better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 6), when we were treating\nof vows, one and the same work done in fulfilment of a vow is more\npraiseworthy than if it be done apart from a vow, both because to vow\nis an act of religion, which has a certain pre-eminence among the\nvirtues, and because a vow strengthens a man's will to do good; and\njust as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a will\nobstinate in evil, so a good work is the more praiseworthy through\nproceeding from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. Therefore\nit is in itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The religious vow is twofold. One is the solemn vow\nwhich makes a man a monk or a brother in some other religious order.\nThis is called the profession, and such a vow should be preceded by a\nyear's probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple\nvow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds\nhim to enter religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a\nyear's probation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The words quoted from Gregory must be understood as\nreferring to absolute violence. But the compulsion arising from the\nobligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of\nend, because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of\nsalvation unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be\navoided; indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Armentar. et\nPaulin.), \"happy is the necessity that compels us to better things.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The vow to enter religion is a strengthening of the\nwill for better things, and consequently, considered in itself,\ninstead of giving a man an occasion of falling, withdraws him from\nit. But if one who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not\nderogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does it derogate\nfrom the goodness of Baptism that some sin more grievously after\nbeing baptized.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 3]\n\nWhether One Who Is Bound by a Vow to Enter Religion Is Under an\nObligation of Entering Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter\nreligion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is\nsaid in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): \"Consaldus, a\npriest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to\nbecome a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or\nabbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his\nbenefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health\nhe refused to become a monk.\" And afterwards it is added: \"We adjudge\nand by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be\nadmitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to\nretain them in peace.\" Now this would not be if he were bound to\nenter religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep\none's vow of entering religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his power. Now\nit is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends\non the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would\nseem that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound\nhimself to enter religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one.\nNow the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the\nfulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land;\nand the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man\nobtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the\nvow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not\nnecessarily to be fulfilled.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3): \"If thou hast vowed\nanything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish\npromise displeaseth him\"; and a gloss on Ps. 75:12, \"Vow ye, and pay\nto the Lord your God,\" says: \"To vow depends on the will: but after\nthe vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 1), when we were treating\nof vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning God.\nNow, as Gregory says in a letter to Boniface [*Innoc. I, Epist. ii,\nVictricio Epo. Rotomag., cap. 14; Cf. can. Viduas: cause. xxvii, qu.\n1]: \"If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely\nirrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given\nto God be deserving of punishment!\" Therefore a man is under an\nobligation to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something\npertaining to God.\n\nNow it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to\nGod, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine\nservice, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1). Hence it follows that he who\nbinds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter\nreligion according as he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that\nif he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as\nsoon as he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas\nif he intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a\ncertain fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time\ncomes or the condition is fulfilled.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple vow.\nHence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to dwell\nin a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of\nconscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter\nreligion. Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Per tuas)\nthe Bishop of Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing\nto enter religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counseled\nthat if \"he wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the\ngovernment of his see and pay his vows to the Most High.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 88, A. 3, ad 2), when we were\ntreating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a certain\nreligious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to be\nreceived in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to\nenter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound\nto go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one\nparticular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the\nobligation to which he has engaged himself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The vow to enter religion being perpetual is greater\nthan the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a temporal vow;\nand as Alexander III says (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap.\nScripturae), \"he who exchanges a temporary service for the perpetual\nservice of religion is in no way guilty of breaking his vow.\"\n\nMoreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into\nreligion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving\nalms a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan.\n4:24, \"Redeem thou thy sins with alms,\" much more does it suffice to\nsatisfy for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the\ndivine service by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of\nsatisfaction, even that of public penance, according to the Decretals\n(XXXIII, qu. i, cap. Admonere) just as a holocaust exceeds a\nsacrifice, as Gregory declares (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence we read in\nthe Lives of the Fathers (vi, 1) that by entering religion one\nreceives the same grace as by being baptized. And yet even if one\nwere not thereby absolved from all debt of punishment, nevertheless\nthe entrance into religion is more profitable than a pilgrimage to\nthe Holy Land, as regards the advancement in good, which is\npreferable to absolution from punishment.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 4]\n\nWhether He Who Has Vowed to Enter Religion Is Bound to Remain in\nReligion in Perpetuity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that he who has vowed to enter religion,\nis bound in perpetuity to remain in religion. For it is better not to\nenter religion than to leave after entering, according to 2 Pet.\n2:21, \"It had been better for them not to have known the way of\njustice, than after they have known it to turn back,\" and Luke 9:62,\n\"No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for\nthe kingdom of God.\" But he who bound himself by the vow to enter\nreligion, is under the obligation to enter, as stated above (A. 3).\nTherefore he is also bound to remain for always.\n\nObj. 2: Further, everyone is bound to avoid that which gives rise to\nscandal, and is a bad example to others. Now by leaving after\nentering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of\nscandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited\nto leave. Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to\nfulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to remain\nevermore.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the vow to enter religion is accounted a perpetual\nvow: wherefore it is preferred to temporal vows, as stated above (A.\n3, ad 3; Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1). But this would not be so if a person\nafter vowing to enter religion were to enter with the intention of\nleaving. It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter religion is\nbound also to remain in perpetuity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The vow of religious profession, for the reason\nthat it binds a man to remain in religion for evermore, has to be\npreceded by a year of probation; whereas this is not required before\nthe simple vow whereby a man binds himself to enter religion.\nTherefore it seems that he who vows to enter religion is not for that\nreason bound to remain there in perpetuity.\n\n_I answer that,_ The obligation of a vow proceeds from the will:\nbecause \"to vow is an act of the will\" according to Augustine [*Gloss\nof Peter Lombard on Ps. 75:12]. Consequently the obligation of a vow\nextends as far as the will and intention of the person who takes the\nvow. Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind himself not only to\nenter religion, but also to remain there evermore, he is bound to\nremain in perpetuity. If, on the other hand, he intend to bind\nhimself to enter religion for the purpose of trial, while retaining\nthe freedom to remain or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound\nto remain. If, however, in vowing he thought merely of entering\nreligion, without thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in\nperpetuity, it would seem that he is bound to enter religion\naccording to the form prescribed by common law, which is that those\nwho enter should be given a year's probation. Wherefore he is not\nbound to remain for ever.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is better to enter religion with the purpose of\nmaking a trial than not to enter at all, because by so doing one\ndisposes oneself to remain always. Nor is a person accounted to turn\nor to look back, save when he omits to do that which he engaged to\ndo: else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit for the\nkingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is evidently false.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man who has entered religion gives neither scandal\nnor bad example by leaving, especially if he do so for a reasonable\nmotive; and if others are scandalized, it will be passive scandal on\ntheir part, and not active scandal on the part of the person leaving,\nsince in doing so, he has done what was lawful, and expedient on\naccount of some reasonable motive, such as sickness, weakness, and\nthe like.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who enters with the purpose of leaving forthwith,\ndoes not seem to fulfil his vow, since this was not his intention in\nvowing. Hence he must change that purpose, at least so as to wish to\ntry whether it is good for him to remain in religion, but he is not\nbound to remain for evermore.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Children Should Be Received in Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that children ought not to be received in\nreligion. Because it is said (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad\nRelig., cap. Nullus): \"No one should be tonsured unless he be of\nlegal age and willing.\" But children, seemingly, are not of legal\nage; nor have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of\nreason. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in\nreligion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the state of religion would seem to be a state of\nrepentance; wherefore religion is derived [*Cf. Q. 81, A. 1] from\n_religare_ (to bind) or from _re-eligere_ (to choose again), as\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3 [*Cf. De Vera Relig. lv]). But\nrepentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they\nshould not enter religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is like that of an oath. But\nchildren under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath\n(Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum.). Therefore it\nwould seem that neither should they be bound by vow.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an\nobligation that can be justly canceled. Now if any persons of unripe\nage bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their\nparents or guardians. For it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii,\ncan. Puella) that \"if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the\nsacred veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they\nchoose, can at once declare the deed null and void.\" It is therefore\nunlawful for children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or\nbound to religion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 19:14): \"Suffer the little\nchildren, and forbid them not to come to Me.\" Expounding these words\nOrigen says (Tract. vii in Matth.) that \"the disciples of Jesus\nbefore they have been taught the conditions of righteousness [*Cf.\nMatt. 19:16-30], rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ:\nbut our Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children.\nWe must therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel\nin wisdom we despise the Church's little ones, as though we were\ngreat, and forbid the children to come to Jesus.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 1), the religious vow is\ntwofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to\nGod, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such\na vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may\nencounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as\nin the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding [*Extra, De\nRegular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Sicut tenor]. The same applies\nto children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to\nbe capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the\nage of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is\ncalled \"the age of puberty,\" although in some it comes earlier and in\nothers it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of\nnature. Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an\nobstacle, if the person who makes a vow to God is not his own master;\nfor instance, if a slave, though having the use of reason, vows to\nenter religion, or even is ordained, without the knowledge of his\nmaster: for his master can annul this, as stated in the Decretals\n(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). And since boys and girls under the age\nof puberty are naturally in their father's power as regards the\ndisposal of their manner of life, their father may either cancel or\napprove their vow, if it please him to do so, as it is expressly said\nwith regard to a woman (Num. 30:4).\n\nAccordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a\nsimple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in\nvirtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching\nthe age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his\nvow; yet this obligation may be removed by his father's authority,\nunder whose control he still remains, because the ordinance of the\nlaw whereby one man is subject to another considers what happens in\nthe majority of cases. If, however, the child has passed the age of\npuberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the authority of his parents;\nthough if he has not the full use of reason, he would not be bound in\nthe sight of God.\n\nThe other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious.\nSuch a vow is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of\nthe solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what\nhappens in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of\npuberty, however much the person who makes profession may have the\nuse of reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to\nmake him a religious (Extra, De Regular., etc. cap. Significatum\nest.).\n\nNevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of\npuberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received\ninto religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the\nBaptist (Luke 1:80) that \"the child grew and was strengthened in\nspirit, and was in the deserts.\" Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii,\n3), \"the Roman nobles began to give their sons to the blessed\nBenedict to be nurtured for Almighty God\"; and this is most fitting,\naccording to Lam. 3:27, \"It is good for a man when he has borne the\nyoke from his youth.\" It is for this reason that by common custom\nchildren are made to apply themselves to those duties or arts with\nwhich they are to pass their lives.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The legal age for receiving the tonsure and taking the\nsolemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is able to\nmake use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is\npossible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be\neducated in a religious house.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The religious state is chiefly directed to the\natta[in]ment of perfection, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4); and\naccordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it.\nBut as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as\noccasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated\nabove (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as the\ncanon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however, they\nbind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in\nGod's sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound\nin the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is not\nrebuked (Num. 30:4) for taking a vow without her parents' consent:\nbut the vow can be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that\nshe does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she\nbinds herself by vow, so far as she may, without prejudice to her\nparents' authority.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 6]\n\nWhether One Ought to Be Withdrawn from Entering Religion Through\nDeference to One's Parents?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one ought to be withdrawn from\nentering religion through deference to one's parents. For it is not\nlawful to omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which\nis optional. Now deference to one's parents comes under an obligation\nof the precept concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex. 20:12);\nwherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): \"If any widow have children\nor grandchildren, let her learn first to govern her own house, and to\nmake a return of duty to her parents.\" But the entrance to religion\nis optional. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to omit\ndeference to one's parents for the sake of entering religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, seemingly the subjection of a son to his father is\ngreater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is natural,\nwhile slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from Gen.\n9:25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master in order\nto enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals\n(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set aside\nthe deference due to his father in order to enter religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man is more indebted to his parents than to those\nto whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone cannot\nenter religion. For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that \"those\nwho are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into a\nmonastery, when they seek admittance, unless first of all they\nwithdraw from public business\" (Dist. liii, can. Legem.). Therefore\nseemingly much less may children enter religion in despite of their\nduty to their parents.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is related (Matt. 4:22) that James and John\n\"left their nets and father, and followed our Lord.\" By this, says\nHilary (Can. iii in Matth.), \"we learn that we who intend to follow\nChrist are not bound by the cares of the secular life, and by the\nties of home.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 101, A. 2, ad 2) when we were\ntreating of piety, parents as such have the character of a principle,\nwherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their\nchildren. Hence it is unlawful for a person having children to enter\nreligion so as altogether to set aside the care for their children,\nnamely without providing for their education. For it is written (1\nTim. 5:8) that \"if any man have not care of his own . . . he hath\ndenied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.\"\n\nNevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted\nby their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a\ncondition of necessity. Consequently we must say that when their\nparents are in such need that they cannot fittingly be supported\notherwise than by the help of their children, these latter may not\nlawfully enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents.\nIf, however, the parents' necessity be not such as to stand in great\nneed of their children's assistance, the latter may, in despite of\nthe duty they owe their parents, enter religion even against their\nparents' command, because after the age of puberty every freeman\nenjoys freedom in things concerning the ordering of his state of\nlife, especially in such as belong to the service of God, and \"we\nshould more obey the Father of spirits that we may live [*'Shall we\nnot much more obey the Father of Spirits, and live?'],\" as says the\nApostle (Heb. 12:9), than obey our parents. Hence as we read (Matt.\n8:22; Luke 9:62) our Lord rebuked the disciple who was unwilling to\nfollow him forthwith on account of his father's burial: for there\nwere others who could see to this, as Chrysostom remarks [*Hom. xxvii\nin Matth.].\n\nReply Obj. 1: The commandment of honoring our parents extends not\nonly to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the paying of\ndeference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfil the\ncommandment of honoring their parents, by praying for them and by\nrevering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those\nwho live in the world honor their parents in different ways as befits\ntheir condition.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since slavery was imposed in punishment of sin, it\nfollows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise he\nwould be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person,\nfor \"a slave belongs wholly to his master\" [*Aristotle, Polit. i, 2].\nOn the other hand, the son, through being subject to his father, is\nnot hindered from freely disposing of his person by transferring\nhimself to the service of God; which is most conducive to man's good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who is under a certain fixed obligation cannot\nlawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfil it. Wherefore\nif a person is under an obligation to give an account to someone or\nto pay a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation\nin order to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and\nhas not wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he can, namely\nby surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to civil law\n[*Cod. IV, x, de Oblig. et Action, 12] money lays an obligation not\non the person of a freeman, but on his property, because the person\nof a freeman \"is above all pecuniary consideration\" [*Dig. L, xvii,\nde div. reg. Jur. ant. 106, 176]. Hence, after surrendering his\nproperty, he may lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain\nin the world in order to earn the means of paying the debt.\n\nOn the other hand, he does not owe his father a special debt, except\nas may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Parish Priests May Lawfully Enter Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that parish priests cannot lawfully enter\nreligion. For Gregory says (Past. iii, 4) that \"he who undertakes the\ncure of souls, receives an awful warning in the words: 'My son, if\nthou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a\nstranger'\" (Prov. 6:1); and he goes on to say, \"because to be surety\nfor a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the surety\nof one's own behavior.\" Now he who is under an obligation to a man\nfor a debt, cannot enter religion, unless he pay what he owes, if he\ncan. Since then a priest is able to fulfil the cure of souls, to\nwhich obligation he has pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for\nhim to lay aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is lawful to one is likewise lawful to all. But\nif all priests having cure of souls were to enter religion, the\npeople would be left without a pastor's care, which would be\nunfitting. Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot lawfully\nenter religion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, chief among the acts to which religious orders are\ndirected are those whereby a man gives to others the fruit of his\ncontemplation. Now such acts are competent to parish priests and\narchdeacons, whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and\nhear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a parish\npriest or archdeacon to pass over to religion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. ii, cap.\nDuce sunt leges.): \"If a man, while governing the people in his\nchurch under the bishop and leading a secular life, is inspired by\nthe Holy Ghost to desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or\nunder some canonical rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we\nauthorize him to go freely.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 3; Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1),\nthe obligation of a perpetual vow stands before every other\nobligation. Now it belongs properly to bishops and religious to be\nbound by perpetual vow to devote themselves to the divine service\n[*Cf. Q. 184, A. 5], while parish priests and archdeacons are not, as\nbishops are, bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain the cure\nof souls. Wherefore bishops \"cannot lay aside their bishopric for any\npretext whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff\" (Extra,\nDe Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.): whereas\narchdeacons and parish priests are free to renounce in the hands of\nthe bishop the cure entrusted to them, without the Pope's special\npermission, who alone can dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it\nis evident that archdeacons and parish priests may lawfully enter\nreligion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Parish priests and archdeacons have bound themselves to\nthe care of their subjects, as long as they retain their archdeaconry\nor parish, but they did not bind themselves to retain their\narchdeaconry or parish for ever.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Jerome says (Contra Vigil.): \"Although they,\" namely\nreligious, \"are sorely smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about whom\nyou argue, saying; 'If all shut themselves up and live in solitude,\nwho will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will be able\nto urge sinners to virtue?' If this holds true, if all are fools with\nthee, who can be wise? Nor will virginity be commendable, for if all\nbe virgins, and none marry, the human race will perish. Virtue is\nrare, and is not desired by many.\" It is therefore evident that this\nis a foolish alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest the\nriver run dry. [*St. Thomas gives no reply to the third objection,\nwhich is sufficiently solved in the body of the article.]\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 8]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Pass from One Religious Order to Another?\n\nObjection 1: It seems unlawful to pass from one religious order to\nanother, even a stricter one. For the Apostle says (Heb. 10:25): \"Not\nforsaking our assembly, as some are accustomed\"; and a gloss\nobserves: \"Those namely who yield through fear of persecution, or who\npresuming on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or of\nthe imperfect, that they may appear to be righteous.\" Now those who\npass from one religious order to another more perfect one would seem\nto do this. Therefore this is seemingly unlawful.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the profession of monks is stricter than that of\ncanons regular (Extra, De Statu Monach. et Canonic. Reg., cap. Quod\nDei timorem). But it is unlawful for anyone to pass from the state of\ncanon regular to the monastic state. For it is said in the Decretals\n(XIX, qu. iii, can. Mandamus): \"We ordain and without any exception\nforbid any professed canon regular to become a monk, unless (which\nGod forbid) he have fallen into public sin.\" Therefore it would seem\nunlawful for anyone to pass from one religious order to another of\nhigher rank.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a person is bound to fulfil what he has vowed, as\nlong as he is able lawfully to do so; thus if a man has vowed to\nobserve continence, he is bound, even after contracting marriage by\nwords in the present tense, to fulfil his vow so long as the marriage\nis not consummated, because he can fulfil the vow by entering\nreligion. Therefore if a person may lawfully pass from one religious\norder to another, he will be bound to do so if he vowed it previously\nwhile in the world. But this would seem objectionable, since in many\ncases it might give rise to scandal. Therefore a religious may not\npass from one religious order to another stricter one.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XX, qu. iv, can.\nVirgines): \"If sacred virgins design for the good of their soul to\npass to another monastery on account of a stricter life, and decide\nto remain there, the holy synod allows them to do so\": and the same\nwould seem to apply to any religious. Therefore one may lawfully pass\nfrom one religious order to another.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is not commendable to pass from one religious\norder to another: both because this frequently gives scandal to those\nwho remain; and because, other things being equal, it is easier to\nmake progress in a religious order to which one is accustomed than in\none to which one is not habituated. Hence in the Conferences of the\nFathers (Coll. xiv, 5) Abbot Nesteros says: \"It is best for each one\nthat he should, according to the resolve he has made, hasten with the\ngreatest zeal and care to reach the perfection of the work he has\nundertaken, and nowise forsake the profession he has chosen.\" And\nfurther on he adds (cap. 6) by way of reason: \"For it is impossible\nthat one and the same man should excel in all the virtues at once,\nsince if he endeavor to practice them equally, he will of necessity,\nwhile trying to attain them all, end in acquiring none of them\nperfectly\": because the various religious orders excel in respect of\nvarious works of virtue.\n\nNevertheless one may commendably pass from one religious order to\nanother for three reasons. First, through zeal for a more perfect\nreligious life, which excellence depends, as stated above (Q. 188, A.\n6), not merely on severity, but chiefly on the end to which a\nreligious order is directed, and secondarily on the discretion\nwhereby the observances are proportionate to the due end. Secondly,\non account of a religious order falling away from the perfection it\nought to have: for instance, if in a more severe religious order, the\nreligious begin to live less strictly, it is commendable for one to\npass even to a less severe religious order if the observance is\nbetter. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xix, 3, 5, 6)\nAbbot John says of himself that he had passed from the solitary life,\nin which he was professed, to a less severe life, namely of those who\nlived in community, because the hermetical life had fallen into\ndecline and laxity. Thirdly, on account of sickness or weakness, the\nresult of which sometimes is that one is unable to keep the\nordinances of a more severe religious order, though able to observe\nthose of a less strict religion.\n\nThere is, however, a difference in these three cases. For in the\nfirst case one ought, on account of humility, to seek permission: yet\nthis cannot be denied, provided it be certain that this other\nreligion is more severe. \"And if there be a probable doubt about\nthis, one should ask one's superior to decide\" (Extra, De Regular. et\nTranseunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.). In like manner the superior's\ndecision should be sought in the second case. In the third case it is\nalso necessary to have a dispensation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those who pass to a stricter religious order, do so not\nout of presumption that they may appear righteous, but out of\ndevotion, that they may become more righteous.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Religious orders whether of monks or of canons regular\nare destined to the works of the contemplative life. Chief among\nthese are those which are performed in the divine mysteries, and\nthese are the direct object of the orders of canons regular, the\nmembers of which are essentially religious clerics. On the other\nhand, monastic religious are not essentially clerics, according to\nthe Decretals (XVI, qu. i, cap. Alia causa). Hence although monastic\norders are more severe, it would be lawful, supposing the members to\nbe lay monks, to pass from the monastic order to an order of canons\nregular, according to the statement of Jerome (Ep. cxxv, ad Rustic.\nMonach.): \"So live in the monastery as to deserve to become a\ncleric\"; but not conversely, as expressed in the Decretal quoted\n(XIX, qu. iii). If, however, the monks be clerics devoting themselves\nto the sacred ministry, they have this in common with canons regular\ncoupled with greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to\npass from an order of canons regular to a monastic order, provided\nwithal that one seek the superior's permission (XIX, qu. iii; cap.\nStatuimus).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The solemn vow whereby a person is bound to a less\nstrict order, is more binding than the simple vow whereby a person is\nbound to a stricter order. For if after taking a simple vow a person\nwere to be married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be\nafter his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who is professed\nin a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a simple vow he has\ntaken on entering a more severe order.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 9]\n\nWhether One Ought to Induce Others to Enter Religion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no one ought to induce others to\nenter religion. For the blessed Benedict prescribes in his Rule\n(lviii) that \"those who seek to enter religion must not easily be\nadmitted, but spirits must be tested whether they be of God\"; and\nCassian has the same instruction (De Inst. Caenob. iv, 3). Much less\ntherefore is it lawful to induce anyone to enter religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, our Lord said (Matt. 23:15): \"Woe to you . . .\nbecause you go round about the sea and the land to make one\nproselyte, and when he is made you make him the child of hell twofold\nmore than yourselves.\" Now thus would seem to do those who induce\npersons to enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one should induce another to do what is to his\nprejudice. But those who are induced to enter religion, sometimes\ntake harm therefrom, for sometimes they are under obligation to enter\na stricter religion. Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to\ninduce others to enter religion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 26:3, seqq. [*St. Thomas quotes\nthe sense, not the words]): \"Let one curtain draw the other.\"\nTherefore one man should draw another to God's service.\n\n_I answer that,_ Those who induce others to enter religion not only\ndo not sin, but merit a great reward. For it is written (James 5:20):\n\"He who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his way,\nshall save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins\";\nand (Dan. 12:3): \"They that instruct many to justice shall be as\nstars for all eternity.\"\n\nNevertheless such inducement may be affected by a threefold\ninordinateness. First, if one person force another by violence to\nenter religion: and this is forbidden in the Decretals (XX, qu. iii,\ncap. Praesens). Secondly, if one person persuade another simoniacally\nto enter religion, by giving him presents: and this is forbidden in\nthe Decretal (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to\nthe case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by\neducating him in the world for the religious life; or when without\nany compact one gives a person little presents for the sake of good\nfellowship. Thirdly, if one person entices another by lies: for it is\nto be feared that the person thus enticed may turn back on finding\nhimself deceived, and thus \"the last state of that man\" may become\n\"worse than the first\" (Luke 11:26).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those who are induced to enter religion have still a\ntime of probation wherein they make a trial of the hardships of\nreligion, so that they are not easily admitted to the religious life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to Hilary (Can. xxiv in Matth.) this saying\nof our Lord was a forecast of the wicked endeavors of the Jews, after\nthe preaching of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to\nobserve the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of\nhell, because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former sins which\nthey committed while adherents of Judaism, and furthermore they\nincurred the guilt of Jewish perfidy; and thus interpreted these\nwords have nothing to do with the case in point.\n\nAccording to Jerome, however, in his commentary on this passage of\nMatthew, the reference is to the Jews even at the time when it was\nyet lawful to keep the legal observances, in so far as he whom they\nconverted to Judaism \"from paganism, was merely misled; but when he\nsaw the wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and\nbecoming a pagan deserved greater punishment for his treachery.\"\nHence it is manifest that it is not blameworthy to draw others to the\nservice of God or to the religious life, but only when one gives a\nbad example to the person converted, whence he becomes worse.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The lesser is included in the greater. Wherefore a\nperson who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, may be\nlawfully induced to enter a greater one, unless there be some special\nobstacle, such as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress\nin the lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow or\noath to enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced to enter a\nlesser order, except for some special and evident motive, and then\nwith the superior's dispensation.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 10]\n\nWhether It Is Praiseworthy to Enter Religion Without Taking Counsel\nof Many, and Previously Deliberating for a Long Time?\n\nObjection 1: It would not seem praiseworthy to enter religion without\ntaking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time.\nFor it is written (1 John 4:1): \"Believe not every spirit, but try\nthe spirits if they be of God.\" Now sometimes a man's purpose of\nentering religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught\nthrough his leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts 5:38,\n39): \"If this counsel or this work be of God, you cannot overthrow\nit.\" Therefore it would seem that one ought to make a searching\ninquiry before entering religion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 25:9): \"Treat thy cause with\nthy friend.\" Now a man's cause would seem to be especially one that\nconcerns a change in his state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought\nnot to enter religion without discussing the matter with one's\nfriends.\n\nObj. 3: Further, our Lord (Luke 14:28) in making a comparison with a\nman who has a mind to build a tower, says that he doth \"first sit\ndown and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have\nwherewithal to finish it,\" lest he become an object of mockery, for\nthat \"this man began to build and was not able to finish.\" Now the\nwherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Laetum\nccxliii), is nothing less than that \"each one should renounce all his\npossessions.\" Yet it happens sometimes that many cannot do this, nor\nkeep other religious observances; and in signification of this it is\nstated (1 Kings 17:39) that David could not walk in Saul's armor, for\nhe was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to\nenter religion without long deliberation beforehand and taking\ncounsel of many.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Matt. 4:20) that upon our Lord's\ncalling them, Peter and Andrew \"immediately leaving their nets,\nfollowed Him.\" Here Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.): \"Such\nobedience as this does Christ require of us, that we delay not even\nfor a moment.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Long deliberation and the advice of many are\nrequired in great matters of doubt, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.\niii, 3); while advice is unnecessary in matters that are certain and\nfixed. Now with regard to entering religion three points may be\nconsidered. First, the entrance itself into religion, considered by\nitself; and thus it is certain that entrance into religion is a\ngreater good, and to doubt about this is to disparage Christ Who gave\nthis counsel. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. c, 2): \"The\nEast,\" that is Christ, \"calleth thee, and thou turnest to the West,\"\nnamely mortal and fallible man. Secondly, the entrance into religion\nmay be considered in relation to the strength of the person who\nintends to enter. And here again there is no room for doubt about the\nentrance to religion, since those who enter religion trust not to be\nable to stay by their own power, but by the assistance of the divine\npower, according to Isa. 40:31, \"They that hope in the Lord shall\nrenew their strength, they shall take wings as eagles, they shall run\nand not be weary, they shall walk and not faint.\" Yet if there be\nsome special obstacle (such as bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or\nthe like) in such cases a man must deliberate and take counsel with\nsuch as are likely to help and not hinder him. Hence it is written\n(Ecclus. 37:12): \"Treat with a man without religion concerning\nholiness [*The Douay version supplies the negative: 'Treat not . . .\nnor with . . .'], with an unjust man concerning justice,\" meaning\nthat one should not do so, wherefore the text goes on (Ecclus. 37:14,\n15), \"Give no heed to these in any matter of counsel, but be\ncontinually with a holy man.\" In these matters, however, one should\nnot take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. and Paulin.\nliii): \"Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than loosen the rope that\nholds the boat to the shore.\" Thirdly, we may consider the way of\nentering religion, and which order one ought to enter, and about such\nmatters also one may take counsel of those who will not stand in\none's way.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saying: \"Try the spirits, if they be of God,\"\napplies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits be of God;\nthus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who\noffers himself to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved\nby hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be\nmoved by the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion\nthere can be no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to\nwhich his heart has given birth is from the spirit of God, for it is\nHis spirit \"that leads\" man \"into the land of uprightness\" (Ps.\n142:10).\n\nNor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn back; since\nnot all that is of God is incorruptible: else corruptible creatures\nwould not be of God, as the Manicheans hold, nor could some who have\ngrace from God lose it, which is also heretical. But God's \"counsel\"\nwhereby He makes even things corruptible and changeable, is\nimperishable according to Isa. 46:10, \"My counsel shall stand and all\nMy will shall be done.\" Hence the purpose of entering religion needs\nnot to be tried whether it be of God, because \"it requires no further\ndemonstration,\" as a gloss says on 1 Thess. 5:21, \"Prove all things.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even as \"the flesh lusteth against the spirit\" (Gal.\n5:17), so too carnal friends often thwart our spiritual progress,\naccording to Mic. 7:6, \"A man's enemies are they of his own\nhousehold.\" Wherefore Cyril expounding Luke 9:61, \"Let me first take\nmy leave of them that are at my house,\" says [*Cf. St. Thomas's\nCatena Aurea]: \"By asking first to take his leave of them that were\nat his house, he shows he was somewhat of two minds. For to\ncommunicate with his neighbors, and consult those who are unwilling\nto relish righteousness, is an indication of weakness and turning\nback. Hence he hears our Lord say: 'No man putting his hand to the\nplough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God,' because he\nlooks back who seeks delay in order to go home and confer with his\nkinsfolk.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The building of the tower signifies the perfection of\nChristian life; and the renunciation of one's possessions is the\nwherewithal to build this tower. Now no one doubts or deliberates\nabout wishing to have the wherewithal, or whether he is able to build\nthe tower if he have the wherewithal, but what does come under\ndeliberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it need not be\na matter of deliberation whether one ought to renounce all that one\nhas, or whether by so doing one may be able to attain to perfection;\nwhereas it is a matter of deliberation whether that which one is\ndoing amounts to the renunciation of all that he has, since unless he\ndoes renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot, as the\ntext goes on to state, be Christ's disciple, and this is to build the\ntower.\n\nThe misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they may be able to\nattain to perfection by entering religion is shown by many examples\nto be unreasonable. Hence Augustine says (Confess. viii, 11): \"On\nthat side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go,\nthere appeared to me the chaste dignity of continency . . . honestly\nalluring me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to receive\nand embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples.\nThere were so many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth\nand every age, grave widows and aged virgins . . . And she smiled at\nme with a persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what\nthese youths and these maidens can? Or can they either in themselves,\nand not rather in the Lord their God? . . . Why standest thou in\nthyself, and so standest not? Cast thyself upon Him; fear not, He\nwill not withdraw Himself that thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself\nfearlessly upon Him: He will receive and will heal thee.\"\n\nThe example quoted of David is not to the point, because \"the arms of\nSaul,\" as a gloss on the passage observes, \"are the sacraments of the\nLaw, as being burdensome\": whereas religion is the sweet yoke of\nChrist, for as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), \"what burden does He lay\non the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun all troublesome\ndesires, Who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this\nworld?\"\n\nTo those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themselves He promises\nthe refreshment of the divine fruition and the eternal rest of their\nsouls.\n\nTo which may He Who made this promise bring us, Jesus Christ our\nLord, \"Who is over all things God blessed for ever. Amen.\"","title":"Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae): Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":728332}