{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_19003/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_19003","id":"gutenberg_19003","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/19003","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Theism"],"text":"Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Keith Edkins and\nthe Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nhttp://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of\npublic domain works from the University of Michigan Digital\nLibraries.)\n\n\n\n\n\nA\n\nCANDID EXAMINATION\n\nOF\n\nTHEISM.\n\nBY\n\nPHYSICUS.\n\nBOSTON:\nHOUGHTON, OSGOOD, & COMPANY.\n1878.\n[_All rights reserved_]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n_CANST THOU BY SEARCHING FIND OUT GOD?_\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe following essay was written several years ago; but I have hitherto\nrefrained from publishing it, lest, after having done so, I should find\nthat more mature thought had modified the conclusions which the essay sets\nforth. Judging, however, that it is now more than ever improbable that I\nshall myself be able to detect any errors in my reasoning, I feel that it\nis time to present the latter to the contemplation of other minds; and in\ndoing so, I make this explanation only because I feel it desirable to state\nat the outset that the present treatise was written before the publication\nof Mr. Mill's treatise on the same subject. It is desirable to make this\nstatement, first, because in several instances the trains of reasoning in\nthe two essays are parallel, and next, because in other instances I have\nquoted passages from Mr. Mill's essay in connections which would be\nscarcely intelligible were it not understood that these passages are\ninsertions made after the present essay had been completed. I have also\nadded several supplementary essays which have been written since the main\nessay was finished.\n\nIt is desirable further to observe, that the only reason why I publish this\nedition anonymously is because I feel very strongly that, in matters of the\nkind with which the present essay deals, opinions and arguments should be\nallowed to produce the exact degree of influence to which as opinions and\narguments they are entitled: they should be permitted to stand upon their\nown intrinsic merits alone, and quite beyond the shadow of that unfair\nprejudication which cannot but arise so soon as their author's authority,\nor absence of authority, becomes known. Notwithstanding this avowal,\nhowever, I fear that many who glance over the following pages will read in\nthe \"Physicus\" of the first one a very different motive. There is at the\npresent time a wonderfully wide-spread sentiment pervading all classes of\nsociety--a sentiment which it would not be easy to define, but the\npractical outcome of which is, that to discuss the question of which this\nessay treats is, in some way or other, morally wrong. Many, therefore, who\nshare this sentiment will doubtless attribute my reticence to a puerile\nfear on my part to meet it. I can only say that such is not the case.\nAlthough I allude to this sentiment with all respect--believing as I do\nthat it is an offshoot from the stock which contains all that is best and\ngreatest in human nature--nevertheless it seems to me impossible to deny\nthat the sentiment in question is as unreasonable as the frame of mind\nwhich harbours it must be unreasoning. If there is no God, where can be the\nharm in our examining the spurious evidence of his existence? If there is a\nGod, surely our first duty towards him must be to exert to our utmost, in\nour attempts to find him, the most noble faculty with which he has endowed\nus--as carefully to investigate the evidence which he has seen fit to\nfurnish of his own existence as we investigate the evidence of inferior\nthings in his dependent creation. To say that there is one rule or method\nfor ascertaining truth in the latter case, which it is not legitimate to\napply in the former case, is merely a covert way of saying that the Deity,\nif he exists, has not supplied us with rational evidence of his existence.\nFor my own part, I feel that such an assertion cannot but embody far more\nunworthy conceptions of a Personal God than are represented by any amount\nof earnest inquiry into whatever evidence of his existence there may be\npresent; but, neglecting this reflection, if there is a God, it is certain\nthat reason is the faculty by which he has enabled man to discover truth,\nand it is no less certain that the scientific methods have proved\nthemselves by far the most trustworthy for reason to adopt. To my mind,\ntherefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that, looking to this\nundoubted pre-eminence of the scientific methods as ways to truth, whether\nor not there is a God, the question as to his existence is both more\nmorally and more reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a\nproblem for methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other\nlight. Or, stating the case in other words, I believe that in whatever\ndegree we intentionally abstain from using in this case what we _know_ to\nbe the most trustworthy methods of inquiry in other cases, in that degree\nare we either unworthily closing our eyes to a dreaded truth, or we are\nguilty of the worst among human sins--\"Depart from us, for we desire not\nthe knowledge of thy ways.\" If it is said that, supposing man to be in a\nstate of probation, faith, and not reason, must be the instrument of his\ntrial, I am ready to admit the validity of the remark; but I must also ask\nit to be remembered, that unless faith has _some_ basis of reason whereon\nto rest, it differs in nothing from superstition; and hence that it is\nstill our duty to investigate the _rational_ standing of the question\nbefore us by the _scientific_ methods alone. And I may here observe\nparenthetically, that the same reasoning applies to all investigations\nconcerning the reality of a supposed revelation. With such investigations,\nhowever, the present essay has nothing to do, although, I may remark that\nif there is any evidence of a Divine Mind discernible in the structure of a\nprofessing revelation, such evidence, in whatever degree present, would be\nof the best possible kind for substantiating the hypothesis of Theism.\n\nSuch being, then, what I conceive the only reasonable, as well as the most\ntruly moral, way of regarding the question to be discussed in the following\npages, even if the conclusions yielded by this discussion were more\nnegative than they are, I should deem it culpable cowardice in me _for this\nreason_ to publish anonymously. For even if an inquiry of the present kind\ncould ever result in a final demonstration of Atheism, there might be much\nfor its author to regret, but nothing for him to be ashamed of; and, by\nparity of reasoning, in whatever degree the result of such an inquiry is\nseen to have a tendency to negative the theistic theory, the author should\nnot be ashamed candidly to acknowledge his conviction as to the degree of\nsuch tendency, provided only that his conviction is an _honest_ one, and\nthat he is conscious of its having been reached by using his faculties with\nthe utmost care of which he is capable.\n\nIf it is retorted that the question to be dealt with is of so ultimate a\ncharacter that even the scientific methods are here untrustworthy, I reply\nthat they are nevertheless the _best_ methods available, and hence that the\nretort is without pertinence: the question is still to be regarded as a\nscientific one, although we may perceive that neither an affirmative nor a\nnegative answer can be given to it with any approach to a full\ndemonstration. But if the question is thus conceded to be one falling\nwithin the legitimate scope of rational inquiry, it follows that the mere\nfact of demonstrative certainty being here antecedently impossible should\nnot deter us from instituting the inquiry. It is a well-recognised\nprinciple of scientific research, that however difficult or impossible it\nmay be to _prove_ a given theory true or false, the theory should\nnevertheless be tested, so far as it admits of being tested, by the full\nrigour of the scientific methods. Where demonstration cannot be hoped for,\nit still remains desirable to reduce the question at issue to the last\nanalysis of which it is capable.\n\nAdopting these principles, therefore, I have endeavoured in the following\nanalysis to fix the precise standing of the evidence in favour of the\ntheory of Theism, when the latter is viewed in all the flood of light which\nthe progress of modern science--physical and speculative--has shed upon it.\nAnd forasmuch as it is impossible that demonstrated truth can ever be shown\nuntrue, and forasmuch as the demonstrated truths on which the present\nexamination rests are the most fundamental which it is possible for the\nhuman mind to reach, I do not think it presumptuous to assert what appears\nto me a necessary deduction from these facts--namely, that, possible errors\nin reasoning apart, the rational position of Theism as here defined must\nremain without material modification as long as our intelligence remains\nhuman.\n\nLONDON, 1878.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nANALYSIS.\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nEXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM.\n\nSECT.\n\n1. Introductory.\n\n2. Object of the chapter.\n\n3. The Argument from the Inconceivability of Self-existence.\n\n4. The Argument from the Desirability of there being a God.\n\n5. The Argument from the Presence of Human Aspirations.\n\n6. The Argument from Consciousness.\n\n7. The Argument for a First Cause.\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND.\n\n8. Introductory.\n\n9. Examination of the Argument, and the independent coincidence of my views\nregarding it with those of Mr. Mill.\n\n10. Locke's exposition of the Argument, and a re-enunciation of it in the\nform of a Syllogism.\n\n11. The Syllogism defective in that it cannot explain Mind in the abstract.\nMill quoted and answered. This defect in the Syllogism clearly defined.\n\n12. The Syllogism further defective, in that it assumes Intelligence to be\nthe only possible cause of Intelligence. This assumption amounts to begging\nthe whole question as to the being of a God. Inconceivability of Matter\nthinking no proof that it may not think. Locke himself strangely concedes\nthis. His fallacies and self-contradictions pointed out in an Appendix.\n\n13. Objector to the Syllogism need not be a Materialist, but assuming that\nhe is one, he is as much entitled to the hypothesis that Matter thinks as a\nTheist is to his hypothesis that it does not.\n\n14. The two hypotheses are thus of exactly equivalent value, save that\nwhile Theism is arbitrary, Materialism has a certain basis of fact to rest\nupon. This basis defined in a footnote, where also Professor Clifford's\nessay on \"Body and Mind\" is briefly examined. Difficulty of estimating the\nworth of the Argument as to the _most_ conceivable being _most_ likely\ntrue.\n\n15. Locke's comparison between certainty of the Inconceivability Argument\nas applied to Theism and to mathematics shown to contain a _virtual_ though\nnot a _formal_ fallacy.\n\n16. Summary of considerations as to the value of this Argument from\nInconceivability.\n\n17. Introductory to the other Arguments in favour of the conclusion that\nonly Intelligence can have caused Intelligence.\n\n18. Locke's presentation of the view that the cause must contain all that\nis contained in the effects. His statements contradicted. Mill quoted to\nshow that the analogy of Nature is against the doctrine of higher\nperfections never growing out of lower ones.\n\n19. Enunciation of the last of the Arguments in favour of the proposition\nthat only Intelligence can cause Intelligence. Hamilton quoted to show that\nin his philosophy the entire question as to the being of a God hinges upon\nthat as to whether or not human volitions are caused.\n\n20. Absurdity of the old theory of Free-will. Hamilton erroneously\nidentified this theory with the fact that we possess a moral sense. His\nresulting dilemma.\n\n21. Although Hamilton was wrong in thus identifying genuine fact with\nspurious theory, yet his Argument from the fact of our having a moral sense\nremains to be considered.\n\n22. The question here is merely as to whether or not the presence of the\nmoral sense can be explained by natural causes. _A priori_ probability of\nthe moral sense having been evolved. _A posteriori_ confirmation supplied\nby Utilitarianism, &c.\n\n23. Mill's presentation of the Argument a resuscitation of Paley's. His\ncriticism on Paley shown to be unfair.\n\n24. The real fallacy of Paley's presentation pointed out.\n\n25. The same fallacy pointed out in another way.\n\n26. Paley's typical case quoted and examined, in order to illustrate the\nroot fallacy of his Argument from Design. Mill's observations upon this\nArgument criticised.\n\n27. Result yielded by the present analysis of the Argument from Design. The\nArgument shown to be a _petitio principii_.\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nTHE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS.\n\n28. My belief that no competent writer in favour of the Argument from\nDesign could have written upon it at all, had it not been for his\ninstinctive appreciation of the much more important Argument from General\nLaws. The nature of this Argument stated, and its cogency insisted upon.\n\n29. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws prior to the\nenunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The Rev. Baden\nPowell quoted.\n\n30. The nature of General Laws when these are interpreted in terms of the\ndoctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The word \"Law\" defined in terms of\nthis doctrine.\n\n31. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws subsequent to\nthe enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy.\n\n32. The self-evolution of General Laws, or the objective aspect of the\nquestion as to whether we may infer the presence of Mind in Nature because\nNature admits of being intelligently interrogated.\n\n33. The subjective aspect of this question, according to the data afforded\nby evolutionary psychology.\n\n34. Correspondence between products due to human intelligence and products\nsupposed due to Divine Intelligence, a correspondence which is only\ngeneric. Illustrations drawn from prodigality in Nature. Further\nillustrations. Illogical manner in which natural theologians deal with such\ndifficulties. The generic resemblance contemplated is just what we should\nexpect to find, if the doctrine of evolutionary psychology be true.\n\n35. The last three sections parenthetical. Necessary nature of the\nconclusion which follows from the last five sections.\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD.\n\n36. Emphatic re-statement of the conclusion reached in the previous\nchapter. This conclusion shown to be of merely scientific, and not of\nlogical conclusiveness. Preparation for considering the question in its\npurely logical form.\n\n37. The logic of probability in general explained, and canon of\ninterpretation enunciated.\n\n38. Application of this canon to the particular case of Theism.\n\n39. Exposition of the logical state of the question.\n\n40. Exposition continued.\n\n41. Result of the exposition; \"Suspended Judgment\" the only logical\nattitude of mind with regard to the question of Theism.\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY.\n\n42. Statement of the position to which the question of Theism has been\nreduced by the foregoing analysis.\n\n43. Distinction between a scientific and a metaphysical teleology.\nStatement of the latter in legitimate terms. Criticism of this statement\nlegitimately made on the side of Atheism as being gratuitous. Impartial\njudgment on this criticism.\n\n44. Examination of the question as to whether the metaphysical system of\nteleology is really destitute of all rational support. Pleading of a\nsupposed Theist in support of the system. The principle of correlation of\ngeneral laws. The complexity of Nature.\n\n45. Summary of the Theist's pleading, and judgment that it fairly removes\nfrom the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology the charge of the latter\nbeing gratuitous.\n\n46. Examination of the degree of probability that is presented by the\nhypothesis of metaphysical teleology, comprising an examination of the\nTheistic objection to the scientific train of reasoning on account of its\nsymbolism, and showing that a no less cogent objection lies against the\nmetaphysical train of reasoning on account of its embodying the supposition\nof unknowable causes. Distinction between \"inconceivability\" in a formal or\nsymbolical, and in a material or realisable sense. Reply of a supposed\nAtheist to the previous pleading of the supposed Theist. Herbert Spencer\nquoted on inconceivability of cosmic evolution as due to Mind.\n\n47. Final judgment on the rational value of a metaphysical system of\nteleology. Distinction between \"inconceivability\" in an absolute and in a\nrelative sense. Final judgment on the attitude of mind which it is rational\nto adopt towards the question of Theism. The desirability and the\nrationality of tolerance in this particular case.\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nGENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.\n\n48. General summary of the whole essay.\n\n49. Concluding remarks.\n\nAPPENDIX AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\nA Critical Exposition of a Fallacy in Locke's use of the Argument against\nthe possibility of Matter thinking on grounds of its being inconceivable\nthat it should.\n\nSUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY I.\n\nExamination of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theistical Argument, and criticism to\nshow that it is inadequate to sustain the doctrine of \"Cosmic Theism\" which\nMr. Fiske endeavours to rear upon it.\n\nSUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY II.\n\nA Critical Examination of the Rev. Professor Flint's work on \"Theism\".\n\nSUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY III.\n\nOn the Speculative Standing of Materialism.\n\nSUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IV.\n\nOn the Final Mystery of Things.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nTHEISM.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nEXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM.\n\nSec. 1. Few subjects have occupied so much attention among speculative\nthinkers as that which relates to the being of God. Notwithstanding,\nhowever, the great amount that has been written on this subject, I am not\naware that any one has successfully endeavoured to approach it, on all its\nvarious sides, from the ground of pure reason alone, and thus to fix, as\nnearly as possible, the exact position which, in pure reason, this subject\nought to occupy. Perhaps it will be thought that an exception to this\nstatement ought to be made in favour of John Stuart Mill's posthumous essay\non Theism; but from my great respect for this author, I should rather be\ninclined to regard that essay as a criticism on illogical arguments, than\nas a _careful_ or _matured_ attempt to formulate the strictly rational\n_status_ of the question in all its bearings. Nevertheless, as this essay\nis in some respects the most scientific, just, and cogent, which has yet\nappeared on the subject of which it treats, and as anything which came from\nthe pen of that great and accurate thinker is deserving of the most serious\nattention, I shall carefully consider his views throughout the course of\nthe following pages.\n\nSeeing then that, with this partial exception, no competent writer has\nhitherto endeavoured once for all to settle the long-standing question as\nto the rational probability of Theism, I cannot but feel that any attempt,\nhowever imperfect, to do this, will be welcome to thinkers of every\nschool--the more so in view of the fact that the prodigious rapidity which\nof late years has marked the advance both of physical and of speculative\nscience, has afforded highly valuable data for assisting us towards a\nreasonable and, I think, a final decision as to the strictly logical\nstanding of this important matter. However, be my attempt welcome or no, I\nfeel that it is my obvious duty to publish the results which have been\nyielded by an honest and careful analysis.\n\nSec. 2. I may most fitly begin this analysis by briefly disposing of such\narguments in favour of Theism as are manifestly erroneous. And I do this\nthe more willingly because, as these arguments are at the present time most\nin vogue, an exposure of their fallacies may perhaps deter our popular\napologists of the future from drawing upon themselves the silent contempt\nof every reader whose intellect is not either prejudiced or imbecile.\n\nSec. 3. A favourite piece of apologetic juggling is that of first demolishing\nAtheism, Pantheism, Materialism, &c., by successively calling upon them to\nexplain the mystery of self-existence, and then tacitly assuming that the\nneed of such an explanation is absent in the case of Theism--as though the\nattribute in question were more conceivable when posited in a Deity than\nwhen posited elsewhere.\n\nIt is, I hope, unnecessary to observe that, so far as the ultimate mystery\nof existence is concerned, any and every theory of things is equally\nentitled to the inexplicable fact that something is; and that any endeavour\non the part of the votaries of one theory to shift from themselves to the\nvotaries of another theory the _onus_ of explaining the necessarily\ninexplicable, is an instance of irrationality which borders on the\nludicrous.\n\nSec. 4. Another argument, or semblance of an argument, is the very prevalent\none, \"Our heart requires a God; therefore it is probable that there is a\nGod:\" as though such a subjective necessity, even if made out, could ever\nprove an objective existence.[1]\n\nSec. 5. If it is said that the theistic aspirations of the human heart, by the\nmere fact of their presence, point to the existence of a God as to their\nexplanatory cause, I answer that the argument would only be valid after the\npossibility of any more proximate causes having been in action has been\nexcluded--else the theistic explanation violates the fundamental rule of\nscience, the Law of Parcimony, or the law which forbids us to assume the\naction of more remote causes where more proximate ones are found sufficient\nto explain the effects. Consequently, the validity of the argument now\nunder consideration is inversely proportional to the number of\npossibilities there are of the aspirations in question being due to the\nagency of physical causes; and forasmuch as our ignorance of psychological\ncausation is well-nigh total, the Law of Parcimony forbids us to allow any\ndeterminate degree of logical value to the present argument. In other\nwords, we must not use the absence of knowledge as equivalent to its\npresence--must not argue from our ignorance of psychological possibilities,\nas though this ignorance were knowledge of corresponding impossibilities.\nThe burden of proof thus lies on the side of Theism, and from the nature of\nthe case this burden cannot be discharged until the science of psychology\nshall have been fully perfected. I may add that, for my own part, I cannot\nhelp feeling that, even in the present embryonic condition of this science,\nwe are not without some indications of the manner in which the aspirations\nin question arose; but even were this not so, the above considerations\nprove that the argument before us is invalid. If it is retorted that the\nfact of these aspirations having had _proximate_ causes to account for\ntheir origin, even if made out, would not negative the inference of these\nbeing due to a Deity as to their _ultimate_ cause; I answer that this is\nnot to use the argument from the presence of these aspirations; it is\nmerely to beg the question as to the being of a God.\n\nSec. 6. Next, we may consider the argument from consciousness. Many persons\nground their belief in the existence of a Deity upon a real or supposed\nnecessity of their own subjective thought. I say \"real or supposed,\"\nbecause, in its bearing upon rational argument, it is of no consequence of\nwhich character the alleged necessity actually is. Even if the necessity of\nthought be real, all that the fact entitles the thinker to affirm is, that\nit is impossible for _him_, by any effort of thinking, to rid himself of\nthe persuasion that God exists; he is not entitled to affirm that this\npersuasion is necessarily bound up with the constitution of the human mind.\nOr, as Mill puts it, \"One man cannot by proclaiming with ever so much\nconfidence that _he_ perceives an object, convince other people that they\nsee it too.... When no claim is set up to any peculiar gift, but we are\ntold that all of us are as capable of seeing what he sees, feeling what he\nfeels, nay, that we actually do so, and when the utmost effort of which we\nare capable fails to make us aware of what we are told, we perceive this\nsupposed universal faculty of intuition is but\n\n  'The Dark Lantern of the Spirit\n  Which none see by but those who bear it.'\"\n\nIt is thus, I think, abundantly certain that the present argument must,\nfrom its very nature, be powerless as an argument to anyone save its\nassertor; as a matter of fact, the alleged necessity of thought is not\nuniversal; it is peculiar to those who employ the argument.\n\nAnd now, it is but just to go one step further and to question whether the\nalleged necessity of thought is, in any case and properly speaking, a\n_real_ necessity. Unless those who advance the present argument are the\nvictims of some mental aberration, it is overwhelmingly improbable that\ntheir minds should differ in a fundamental and important attribute from the\nminds of the vast majority of their species. Or, to continue the above\nquotation, \"They may fairly be asked to consider, whether it is not more\nlikely that they are mistaken as to the origin of an impression in their\nminds, than that others are ignorant of the very existence of an impression\nin theirs.\" No doubt it is true that education and habits of thought may so\nstereotype the intellectual faculties, that at last what is conceivable to\none man or generation may not be so to another;[2] but to adduce this\nconsideration in this place would clearly be but to destroy the argument\nfrom the _intuitive_ necessity of believing in a God.\n\nLastly, although superfluous, it may be well to point out that even if the\nimpossibility of conceiving the negation of God were an universal law of\nhuman mind--which it certainly is not--the fact of his existence could not\nbe thus proved. Doubtless it would be felt to be much more probable than it\nnow is--as probable, for instance, if not more probable, than is the\nexistence of an external world;--but still it would not be necessarily\ntrue.\n\nSec. 7. The argument from the general consent of mankind is so clearly\nfallacious, both as to facts and principles, that I shall pass it over and\nproceed at once to the last of the untenable arguments--that, namely, from\nthe existence of a First Cause. And here I should like to express myself\nindebted to Mr. Mill for the following ideas:--\"The cause of every change\nis a prior change; and such it cannot but be; for if there were no new\nantecedent, there would be no new consequent. If the state of facts which\nbrings the phenomenon into existence, had existed always or for an\nindefinite duration, the effect also would have existed always or been\nproduced an indefinite time ago. It is thus a necessary part of the fact of\ncausation, within the sphere of experience, that the causes as well as the\neffects had a beginning in time, and were themselves caused. It would seem,\ntherefore, that our experience, instead of furnishing an argument for a\nfirst cause, is repugnant to it; and that the very essence of causation, as\nit exists within the limits of our knowledge, is incompatible with a First\nCause.\"\n\nThe rest of Mr. Mill's remarks upon the First Cause argument are tolerably\nobvious, and had occurred to me before the publication of his essay. I\nshall, however, adhere to his order of presenting them.\n\n\"But it is necessary to look more particularly into this matter, and\nanalyse more closely the nature of the causes of which mankind have\nexperience. For if it should turn out that though all causes have a\nbeginning, there is in all of them a permanent element which had no\nbeginning, this permanent element may with some justice be termed a first\nor universal cause, inasmuch as though not sufficient of itself to cause\nanything, it enters as a con-cause into all causation.\"\n\nHe then shows that the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy supplies us\nwith such a datum, and thus the conclusion easily follows--\"It would seem,\nthen, that the only sense in which experience supports, in any shape, the\ndoctrine of a First Cause, viz., as the primaeval and universal element of\nall causes, the First Cause can be no other than Force.\"\n\nStill, however, it may be maintained that \"all force is will-force.\" But\n\"if there be any truth in the doctrine of Conservation of Force, ... this\ndoctrine does not change from true to false when it reaches the field of\nvoluntary agency. The will does not, any more than other agencies, create\nForce: granting that it originates motion, it has no means of doing so but\nby converting into that particular manifestation, a portion of Force which\nalready existed in other forms. It is known that the source from which this\nportion of Force is derived, is chiefly, or entirely, the force evolved in\nthe processes of chemical composition and decomposition which constitute\nthe body of nutrition: the force so liberated becomes a fund upon which\nevery muscular and every nervous action, as of a train of thought, is a\ndraft. It is in this sense only that, according to the best lights of\nscience, volition is an originating cause. Volition, therefore, does not\nanswer to the idea of a First Cause; since Force must, in every instance,\nbe assumed as prior to it; and there is not the slightest colour, derived\nfrom experience, for supposing Force itself to have been created by a\nvolition. As far as anything can be concluded from human experience, Force\nhas all the attributes of a thing eternal and uncreated....\n\n\"All that can be affirmed (even) by the strongest assertion of the Freedom\nof the Will, is that volitions are themselves uncaused and are, therefore,\nalone fit to be the first or universal cause. But, even assuming volitions\nto be uncaused, the properties of matter, so far as experience discloses,\nare uncaused also, and have the advantage over any particular volition, in\nbeing, so far as experience can show, eternal. Theism, therefore, in so far\nas it rests on the necessity of a First Cause, has no support from\nexperience.\"\n\nSuch may be taken as a sufficient refutation of the argument that, as human\nvolition is apparently a cause in nature, and moreover constitutes the\nbasis of our conception of all causation, therefore all causation is\nprobably volitional in character. But as this is a favourite argument with\nsome theists, I shall introduce another quotation from Mr. Mill, which is\ntaken from a different work.\n\n\"Volitions are not known to produce anything directly except nervous\naction, for the will influences even the muscles only through the nerves.\nThough it were granted, then, that every phenomenon has an efficient and\nnot merely a phenomenal cause, and that volition, in the case of the\nparticular phenomena which are known to be produced by it, is that cause;\nare we therefore to say with these writers that since we know of no other\nefficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence, there _is_\nno other, and volition is the direct cause of all phenomena? A more\noutrageous stretch of inference could hardly be made. Because among the\ninfinite variety of the phenomena of nature there is one, namely, a\nparticular mode of action of certain nerves which has for its cause and, as\nwe are now supposing, for its efficient cause, a state of our mind; and\nbecause this is the only efficient cause of \"which we are conscious, being\nthe only one of which, in the nature of the case, we _can_ be conscious,\nsince it is the only one which exists within ourselves; does this justify\nus in concluding that all other phenomena must have the same kind of\nefficient cause with that one eminently special, narrow, and peculiarly\nhuman or animal phenomenon?\" It is then shown that a logical parallel to\nthis mode of inference is that of generalising from the one known instance\nof the earth being inhabited, to the conclusion that \"every heavenly body\nwithout exception, sun, planet, satellite, comet, fixed star, or nebula, is\ninhabited, and must be so from the inherent constitution of things.\" After\nwhich the passage continues, \"It is true there are cases in which, with\nacknowledged propriety, we generalise from a single instance to a multitude\nof instances. But they must be instances which resemble the one known\ninstance, and not such as have no circumstance in common with it except\nthat of being instances.... But the supporters of the volition theory ask\nus to infer that volition causes everything, for no other reason except\nthat it causes one particular thing; although that one phenomenon, far from\nbeing a type of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws\nbearing scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whether\nof inorganic or of organic nature.\"[3]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND.\n\nSec. 8. Leaving now the obviously untenable arguments, we next come to those\nwhich, in my opinion, may properly be termed scientific.\n\nIt will be convenient to classify those as three in number; and under one\nor other of these heads nearly all the more intelligent advocates of Theism\nwill be found to range themselves.\n\nSec. 9. We have first the argument drawn from the existence of the human mind.\nThis is an argument which, for at least the last three centuries, and\nespecially during the present one, has been more relied upon than any other\nby philosophical thinkers. It consists in the reflection that the being of\nour own subjective intelligence is the most certain fact which our\nexperience supplies, that this fact demands an adequate cause for its\nexplanation, and that the only adequate cause of our intelligence must be\nsome other intelligence. Granting the existence of a conditioned\nintelligence (and no one could reasonably suppose his own intelligence to\nbe otherwise), and the existence of an unconditioned intelligence becomes a\nlogical necessity, unless we deny either the validity of the principle that\nevery effect must have an adequate cause, or else that the only adequate\ncause of Mind is Mind.\n\nIt has been a great satisfaction to me to find that my examination of this\nargument--an examination which was undertaken and completed several months\nbefore Mr. Mill's essay appeared--has been minutely corroborated by that of\nour great logician. I mention this circumstance here, as on previous\noccasions, not for the petty motive of vindicating my own originality, but\nbecause in matters of this kind the accuracy of the reasoning employed, and\ntherefore the logical validity of the conclusions attained, are guaranteed\nin the best possible manner, if the trains of thought have been\nindependently pursued by different minds.\n\nSec. 10. Seeing that, among the advocates of this argument, Locke went so far\nas to maintain that by it alone he could render the existence of a Deity as\ncertain as any mathematical demonstration, it is only fair, preparatory to\nour examining this argument, to present it in the words of this great\nthinker.\n\nHe says:--\"There was a time when there was no knowing (_i.e._, conscious)\nbeing, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a\nknowing being from all eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no\nbeing had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all\nunderstanding, I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have\nbeen any knowledge: it being as impossible that things wholly void of\nknowledge, and operating blindly, and without perception, should produce a\nknowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three\nangles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of\nsenseless matter, that it should put into itself, sense, perception, and\nknowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put\ninto itself greater angles than two right ones.\"[4]\n\nNow, although this argument has been more fully elaborated by other\nwriters, the above presentation contains its whole essence. It will be seen\nthat it has the great advantage of resting _immediately_ upon the\nfoundation from which all argument concerning this or any other matter,\nmust necessarily arise, viz.,--upon the very existence of our argumentative\nfaculty itself. For the sake of a critical examination, it is desirable to\nthrow the argument before us into the syllogistic form. It will then stand\nthus:--\n\nAll known minds are caused by an unknown mind. Our mind is a known mind;\ntherefore, our mind is caused by an unknown mind.\n\nSec. 11. Now the major premiss of this syllogism is inadmissible for two\nreasons: in the first place, it is assumed that known mind can only be\ncaused by unknown mind; and, in the second place, even if this assumption\nwere granted, it would not explain the existence of Mind as Mind. To take\nthe last of these objections first, in the words of Mr. Mill, \"If the mere\nexistence of Mind is supposed to require, as a necessary antecedent,\nanother Mind greater and more powerful, the difficulty is not removed by\ngoing one step back: the creating mind stands as much in need of another\nmind to be the source of its existence as the created mind. Be it\nremembered that we have no direct knowledge (at least apart from\nRevelation) of a mind which is even apparently eternal, as Force and Matter\nare: an eternal mind is, as far as the present argument is concerned, a\nsimple hypothesis to account for the minds which we know to exist. Now it\nis essential to an hypothesis that, if admitted, it should at least remove\nthe difficulty and account for the facts. But it does not account for mind\nto refer our mind to a prior mind for its origin. The problem remains\nunsolved, nay, rather increased.\"\n\nNevertheless, I think that it is open to a Theist to answer, \"My object is\nnot to explain the existence of Mind in the abstract, any more than it is\nmy object to explain Existence itself in the abstract--to either of which\nabsurd attempts Mr. Mill's reasoning would be equally applicable;--but I\nseek for an explanation of _my own individual finite mind_, which I know to\nhave had a beginning in time, and which, therefore, in accordance with the\nwidest and most complete analogy that experience supplies, I believe to\nhave been _caused_. And if there is no other objection to my believing in\nIntelligence as the cause of my intelligence, than that I cannot prove my\nown intelligence caused, then I am satisfied to let the matter rest here;\nfor as every argument must have _some_ basis of assumption to stand upon, I\nam well pleased to find that the basis in this case is the most solid which\nexperience can supply, viz.,--the law of causation. Fully admitting that it\ndoes not account for Mind (in the abstract) to refer one mind to a prior\nmind for its origin; yet my hypothesis, if admitted, _does_ account for the\nfact that _my mind_ exists; and this is all that my hypothesis is intended\nto cover. For to endeavour to _explain_ the existence of an _eternal_ mind,\ncould only be done by those who do not understand the meaning of these\nwords.\"\n\nNow, I think that this reply to Mr. Mill, on the part of a theist, would so\nfar be legitimate; the theistic hypothesis _does_ supply a provisional\nexplanation of the existence of known minds, and it is, therefore, an\nexplanation which, in lieu of a better, a theist may be allowed to retain.\nBut a theist may not be allowed to confuse this provisional explanation of\nhis own mind's existence with that of the existence of Mind in the\nabstract; he must not be allowed to suppose that, by thus hypothetically\nexplaining the existence of known minds, he is thereby establishing a\nprobability in favour of that hypothetical cause, an Unknown Mind. Only if\nhe has some independent reason to infer that such an Unknown Mind exists,\ncould such a probability be made out, and his hypothetical explanation of\nknown mind become of more value than a guess. In other words, although the\ntheistic hypothesis supplies _a possible_ explanation of known mind, we\nhave no reason to conclude that it is _the true_ explanation, unless other\nreasons can be shown to justify, on independent grounds, the validity of\nthe theistic hypothesis. Hence it is manifestly absurd to adduce this\nexplanation as evidence of the hypothesis on which it rests--to argue that\nTheism must therefore be true; because we assume it to be so, in order to\nexplain _known_ mind, as distinguished from _Mind_. If it be answered, We\nare justified in assuming Theism true, because we are justified in assuming\nthat known mind can _only_ have been caused by an unknown mind, and hence\nthat Mind must somewhere be self-existing, then this is to lead us to the\nsecond objection to the above syllogism.\n\nSec. 12. And this second objection is of a most serious nature. \"Mind can only\nbe caused by Mind,\" and, therefore, Mind must either be uncaused, or caused\nby a Mind. What is our warrant for ranking this assertion? Where is the\nproof that nothing can have caused a mind except another mind? Answer to\nthis question there is none. For aught that we can ever know to the\ncontrary, anything within the whole range of the Possible may be competent\nto produce a self-conscious intelligence--and to assume that Mind is so far\nan entity _sui generis_, that it must either be self-existing, or derived\nfrom another mind which is self-existing, is merely to beg the whole\nquestion as to the being of a God. In other words, if we can prove that the\norder of existence to which Mind belongs, is so essentially different from\nthat order, or those orders, to which all else belongs, as to render it\n_abstractedly impossible_ that the latter can produce the former--if we can\nprove this, we have likewise proved the existence of a Deity. But this is\njust the point in dispute, and to set out with a bare affirmation of it is\nmerely to beg the question and to abandon the discussion. Doubtless, by the\nmere act of consulting their own consciousness, the fact now in dispute\nappears to some persons self-evident. But in matters of such high\nabstraction as this, even the evidence of self-evidence must not be relied\nupon too implicitly. To the country boor it appears self-evident that wood\nis annihilated by combustion; and even to the mind of the greatest\nphilosophers of antiquity it seemed impossible to doubt that the sun moved\nover a stationary earth. Much more, therefore, may our broad distinction\nbetween \"cogitative and incogitative being\"[5] not be a distinction which\nis \"legitimated by the conditions of external reality.\"\n\nDoubtless many will fall back upon the position already indicated, \"It is\nas repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into\nitself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of\na triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right\nones.\" But, granting this, and also that conscious matter is the sole\nalternative, and what follows? Not surely that matter cannot perceive, and\nfeel, and know, merely because it is repugnant to our idea of it that it\nshould. Granting that there is no other alternative in the whole\npossibility of things, than that matter must be conscious, or that\nself-conscious Mind must somewhere be self-existing; and granting that it\nis quite \"impossible for us to conceive\" of consciousness as an attribute\nof matter; still surely it would be a prodigious leap to conclude that for\nthis reason matter cannot possess this attribute. Indeed, Locke himself\nelsewhere strangely enough insists that thought may be a property of\nmatter, if only the Deity chose to unite that attribute with that\nsubstance. Why it should be deemed abstractedly impossible for matter to\nthink if there is no God, and yet abstractedly possible that it should\nthink if there is a God, I confess myself quite unable to determine; but I\nconceive that it is very important clearly to point out this peculiarity in\nLocke's views, for he is a favourite authority with theists, and this\npeculiarity amounts to nothing less than a suicide of his entire argument.\nThe mere circumstance that he assumed the Deity capable of endowing matter\nwith the faculty of thinking, could not have enabled him to _conceive_ of\nmatter as thinking, any more than he could _conceive_ of this in the\nabsence of his assumption. Yet in the one case he recognises the\npossibility of matter thinking, and in the other case denies such\npossibility, _and this on the sole ground of its being inconceivable_!\nHowever, I am not here concerned with Locke's eccentricities:[6] I am\nmerely engaged with the general principle, that a subjective inability to\nestablish certain relations in thought is no sufficient warrant for\nconcluding that corresponding objective relations may not obtain.\n\nSec. 13. Hence, an objector to the above syllogism need not be a materialist;\nit is not even necessary that he should hold any theory of things at all.\nNevertheless, for the sake of definition, I shall assume that he is a\nmaterialist. As a materialist, then, he would appear to be as much entitled\nto his hypothesis as a theist is to his--in respect, I mean, of this\nparticular argument. For although I think, as before shown, that in strict\nreasoning a theist might have taken exception to the last-quoted passage\nfrom Mill in its connection with the law of causation, that passage, if\nconsidered in the present connection, is certainly unanswerable. What is\nthe state of the present argument as between a materialist and a theist?\nThe mystery of existence and the inconceivability of matter thinking are\ntheir common data. Upon these data the materialist, justly arguing that he\nhas no right to make his own conceptive faculty the unconditional test of\nobjective possibility, is content to merge the mystery of his own mind's\nexistence into that of Existence in general; while the theist, compelled to\naccept without explanation the mystery of Existence in general,\nnevertheless has recourse to inventing a wholly gratuitous hypothesis to\nexplain one mode of existence in particular. If it is said that the latter\nhypothesis has the merit of causing the mystery of material existence and\nthe mystery of mental existence to be united in a thinkable manner--viz.,\nin a self-existing Mind,--I reply, It is not so; for in whatever degree it\nis unthinkable that Matter should be the cause of Mind, in that precise\ndegree must it be unthinkable that Mind was ever the cause of Matter, the\ncorrelatives being in each case the same, and experience affording no\nevidence of causality in either.\n\nSec. 14. The two hypotheses, therefore, are of exactly equivalent value, save\nthat while the one has a certain basis of fact to rest upon,[7] the other\nis wholly arbitrary. But it may still be retorted, 'Is not that which is\n_most_ conceivable _most likely_ to be true? and if it is more conceivable\nthat my intelligence is caused by another Intelligence than that it is\ncaused by Non-intelligence, may I not regard the more conceivable\nhypothesis as also the more probable one? It is somewhat difficult to say\nhow far this argument is, in this case, valid; only I think it is quite\nevident that its validity is open to grave dispute. For nothing can be more\nevident to a philosophical thinker than that the substance of Mind must--so\nfar at least as we can at present see--_necessarily_ be unknowable; so that\nif Matter (and Force) be this substance, we should antecedently expect to\nfind that the actual causal connection should, in this particular case, be\nmore inconceivable than some imaginary one: it would be more natural for\nthe mind to infer that something conceivably more akin to itself should be\nits cause, than that this cause should be the entity which really gives\nrise to the unthinkable connection. But even waiving this reflection, and\ngranting that the above argument is _valid_, it is still to an indefinite\ndegree _valueless_, seeing that we are unable to tell _how much it is more\nlikely_ that the more conceivable should here be true than that the less\nconceivable should be so.\n\nSec. 15. Returning then to Locke's comparison between the certainty of this\nargument and that which proves the sum of the angles of a triangle to be\nequal to two right-angles, I should say that there is a _virtual_, though\nnot a _formal_, fallacy in his presentation. For mathematical science being\nconfessedly but of relative significance, any comparison between the degree\nof certainty attained by reasoning upon so transcendental a subject as the\npresent, and that of mathematical demonstrations regarding relative truth,\nmust be misleading. In the present instance, the whole strain of the\nargument comes upon the adequacy of the proposed test of truth, viz., our\nbeing able to conceive it if true. Now, will any one undertake to say that\nthis test of truth is of equivalent value when it is applied to a triangle\nand when it is applied to the Deity. In the one case we are dealing with a\ngeometrical figure of an exceedingly simple type, with which our experience\nis well acquainted, and presenting a very limited number of relations for\nus to contemplate. In the other case we are endeavouring to deal with the\n_summum genus_ of all mystery, with reference to which experience is quite\nimpossible, and which in its mention contains all the relations that are to\nus unknown and unknowable. Here, then, is the oversight. Because men find\nconceivability a valid test of truth in the affairs of everyday life--as it\nis easy to show _a priori_ that it must be, if our experience has been\nformed under a given code of constant and general laws--therefore they\nconclude that it must be equally valid _wherever_ it is applied; forgetting\nthat its validity must perforce decrease in proportion to the distance at\nwhich the test is applied from the sphere of experience.[8]\n\nSec. 16. Upon the whole, then, I think it is transparently obvious that the\nmere fact of our being unable to conceive, say, how any disposition of\nmatter and motion could possibly give rise to a self-conscious\nintelligence, in no wise warrants us in concluding that for this reason no\nsuch disposition is possible. The only question would appear to be, whether\nthe test which is here proposed as an unconditional criterion of truth\nshould be allowed any the smallest degree of credit. Seeing, on the one\nhand, how very fallible the test in question is known to have proved itself\nin many cases of much less speculative difficulty--seeing, too, that even\nnow \"the philosophy of the condition proves that things there are which\nmay, nay must, be true, of which nevertheless the mind is unable to\nconstrue to itself the possibility;\"[9] and seeing, on the other hand, that\nthe substance of Mind, whatever it is, must necessarily be\nunknowable;--seeing these things, if any question remains as to whether the\ntest of inconceivability should in this case be regarded as having any\ndegree of validity at all, there can, I think, be no reasonable doubt that\nsuch degree should be regarded as of the smallest.\n\nSec. 17. Let us then turn to the other considerations which have been supposed\nto justify the assertion that nothing can have caused our mind save another\nMind. Neglecting the crushing fact that \"it does not account for Mind to\nrefer it to another Mind for its origin,\" let as see what positive reasons\nthere are for concluding that no other influence than Intelligence can\npossibly have produced our intelligence.\n\nSec. 18. First we may notice the argument which is well and tersely presented\nby Locke, thus:--\"Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily\ncontain in it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can\never after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it\nhath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarily\nfollows that the first eternal being cannot be Matter.\" Now, as this\npresentation is strictly formal, I shall first meet it with a formal reply,\nand this reply consists in a direct contradiction. It is simply untrue that\n\"whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and\nactually have, at least, all the perfections that can after exist;\" or that\nit can never \"give to another any perfection that it hath not actually in\nitself.\" In a sense, no doubt, a cause contains all that is contained in\nits effects; the latter content being _potentially_ present in the former.\nBut to say that a cause already contains _actually_ all that its effects\nmay afterwards so contain, is a statement which logic and common sense\nalike condemn as absurd.\n\nNevertheless, although the argument now before us thus admits of a\nchildishly easy refutation on strictly formal grounds, I suspect that in\nsubstance the argument in a general way is often relied upon as one of very\nconsiderable weight. Even though it is clearly illogical to say that causes\ncannot give to their effects any perfection which they themselves do not\nactually present, yet it seems in a general way incredible that gross\nmatter could contain, even potentially, the faculty of thinking.\nNevertheless, this is but to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability;\nto do which, even were it here legitimate, would, as we have seen, be\nunavailing. But to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability in this\ncase would _not_ be legitimate; for we are in possession of an abundant\nanalogy to render the supposition in question, not only conceivable, but\ncredible. In the words of Mr. Mill, \"Apart from experience, and arguing on\nwhat is called reason, that is, on supposed self-evidence, the notion seems\nto be that no causes can give rise to products of a more precious or\nelevated kind than themselves. But this is at variance with the known\nanalogies of nature. How vastly nobler and more precious, for instance, are\nthe vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of which, and by\nthe properties of which, they are raised up! The tendency of all recent\nspeculation is towards the opinion that the development of inferior orders\nof existence into superior, the substitution of greater elaboration, and\nhigher organisation for lower, is the general rule of nature. Whether this\nis so or not, there are at least in nature a multitude of facts bearing\nthat character, and this is sufficient for the argument.\"\n\nSec. 19. We now come to the last of the arguments which, so far as I know,\nhave ever been adduced in support of the assertion that there can be no\nother cause of our intelligence than another and superior Intelligence. The\nargument is chiefly remarkable for the very great prominence which was\ngiven to it by Sir W. Hamilton.\n\nThis learned and able author says:--\"The Deity is not an object of\nimmediate contemplation; as existing and in himself, he is beyond our\nreach; we can know him only mediately through his works, and are only\nwarranted in assuming his existence as a certain kind of cause necessary to\naccount for a certain state of things, of whose reality our faculties are\nsupposed to inform us. The affirmation of a God being thus a regressive\ninference from the existence of a special class of effects to the existence\nof a special character of cause, it is evident that the whole argument\nhinges on the fact,--Does a state of things really exist such as is only\npossible through the agency of a Divine Cause? For if it can be shown that\nsuch a state of things does not really exist, then our inference to the\nkind of cause requisite to account for it is necessarily null.\n\n\"This being understood, I now proceed to show you that the class of\nphaenomena which requires that kind of cause we denominate a Deity is\nexclusively given in the phaenomena of mind,--that the phaenomena of matter\ntaken by themselves, (you will observe the qualification taken by\nthemselves) so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God,\nwould, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation.\n\n\"If, in man, intelligence be a free power,--in so far as its liberty\nextends, intelligence must be independent of necessity and matter; and a\npower independent of matter necessarily implies the existence of an\nimmaterial subject,--that is, a spirit. If, then, the original independence\nof intelligence on matter in the human constitution, in other words, if the\nspirituality of mind in man be supposed a datum of observation, in this\ndatum is also given both the condition and the proof of a God. For we have\nonly to infer, what analogy entitles us to do, that intelligence holds the\nsame relative supremacy in the universe which it holds in us, and the first\npositive condition of a Deity is established in the establishment of the\nabsolute priority of a free creative intelligence.\"[10]\n\nSec. 20. Thus, according to Sir W. Hamilton, the whole question as to the\nbeing of a God depends upon that as to whether our \"intelligence be a free\npower,\"--or, as he elsewhere states it himself, \"Theology is wholly\ndependent upon Psychology, for with the proof of the moral nature of man\nstands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity.\" It will be observed\nthat I am not at present engaged with the legitimacy of this author's\ndecision upon the comparative merits of the different arguments in favour\nof Theism: I am merely showing the high opinion he entertained of the\nparticular argument before us. He positively affirms that, unless the\nfreedom of the human will be a matter of experience, Atheism is the sole\nalternative. Doubtless most well-informed readers will feel that the\nsolitary basis thus provided for Theism is a very insecure one, while many\nsuch readers will at once conclude that if this is the only basis which\nreason can provide for Theism to stand upon, Theism is without any rational\nbasis to stand upon at all. I have no hesitation in saying that the\nlast-mentioned opinion is the one to which I myself subscribe, for I am\nquite unable to understand how any one at the present day, and with the\nmost moderate powers of abstract thinking, can possibly bring himself to\nembrace the theory of Free-will. I may add that I cannot but believe that\nthose who do embrace this theory with an honest conviction, must have\nfailed to understand the issue to which modern thought has reduced the\nquestion. Here, however, is not the place to discuss this question. It will\nbe sufficient for my purpose to show that even Sir W. Hamilton himself\nconsidered it a very difficult one; and although he thought upon the whole\nthat the will must be free, he nevertheless allowed--nay, insisted--that he\nwas unable to conceive how it could be so. Such inability in itself does\nnot of course show the Free-will theory to be untrue; and I merely point\nout the circumstance that Hamilton allowed the supposed fact unthinkable,\nin order to show how very precarious, even in his eyes, the argument which\nwe are considering must have appeared. Let us then, for this purpose,\ncontemplate his attitude with regard to it a little more closely. He says,\n\"It would have been better to show articulately that Liberty and Necessity\nare both incomprehensible, as beyond the limits of legitimate thought; but\nthat though the Free-agency of Man cannot be speculatively proved, so\nneither can it be speculatively disproved; while we may claim for it as a\nfact of real actuality, though of inconceivable possibility, the testimony\nof consciousness, that we are morally free, as we are morally accountable\nfor our actions. In this manner the whole question of free- and bond-will\nis in theory abolished, leaving, however, practically our Liberty, and all\nthe moral instincts of Man entire.\"[11]\n\nFrom this passage it is clear that Sir W. Hamilton regarded these two\ncounter-theories as of precisely equivalent value in everything save \"the\ntestimony of consciousness;\" or, as he elsewhere states it, \"as equally\nunthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus\ntheoretically balanced. But, practically, our consciousness of the moral\nlaw ... gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the\ndoctrine of fate.\"\n\nBut the whole question concerning the freedom of the will has now come to\nbe as to whether or not consciousness _does_ give its verdict on the side\nof freedom. Supposing we grant that \"we are warranted to rely on a\ndeliverance of consciousness, when that deliverance is _that_ a thing is,\nalthough we may be unable to think _how_ it can be,\"[12] in this case the\nquestion still remains, whether our opponents have rightly interpreted the\ndeliverance of their consciousness. I, for one, am quite persuaded that I\nnever perform any action without some appropriate motive, or set of\nmotives, having induced me to perform it. However, I am not discussing this\nquestion, and I have merely made the above quotations for the purpose of\nshowing that Sir W. Hamilton appears to identify the _theory_ of Free-will\nwith the _fact_ that we possess a moral sense. He argues throughout as\nthough the theory he advocates were the only one that can explain a given\n\"fact of real actuality.\" But no one with whom we have to deal questions\nthe fact of our having a moral sense; and to identify this \"deliverance of\nconsciousness\" with belief in the theory that volitions are uncaused, is,\nor would now be, merely to abandon the only questions in dispute.\n\nIt is very instructive, from this point of view, to observe the dilemma\ninto which Hamilton found himself driven by this identification of genuine\nfact with spurious theory. He believed that the fact of man possessing an\nethical faculty could only be explained by the theory that man's will was\nnot determined by motives; for otherwise man could not be the author of his\nown actions. But when he considered the matter in its other aspect, he\nfound that his theory of Free-will was as little compatible with moral\nresponsibility as was the opposing theory of \"Bond-will;\" for not only did\nhe candidly confess that he could not conceive of will as acting without\nmotives, but he further allowed the unquestionable truth \"that, though\ninconceivable, a motiveless volition would, if conceived, be conceived as\nmorally worthless.\"[13] I say this is very instructive, because it shows\nthat in Hamilton's view each theory was alike irreconcilable with \"the\ndeliverance of consciousness,\" and that he only chose the one in preference\nto the other, because, although not any more conceivable a solution, it\nseemed to him a more possible one.[14]\n\nSec. 21. Such, then, is the speculative basis on which, according to Sir W.\nHamilton, our belief in a Deity can alone be grounded.\n\nThose who at the present day are still confused enough in their notions\nregarding the Free-will question to suppose that any further rational\nquestion remains, may here be left to ruminate over this _bolus_, and to\ndraw from it such nourishment as they can in support of their belief in a\nGod; but to those who can see as plainly as daylight that the doctrine of\nDeterminism not only harmonises with all the facts of observation, but\nalone affords a possible condition for, and a satisfactory explanation of,\nthe existence of our ethical faculty,--to such persons the question will\nnaturally arise:--\"Although Hamilton was wrong in identifying a known fact\nwith a false theory, yet may he not have been right in the deductions which\nhe drew from the fact?\" In other words, granting that his theory of\nFree-will was wrong, does not his argument from the existence of a moral\nsense in man to the existence of a moral Governor of the Universe remain as\nintact as ever? Now, it is quite true that whatever degree of cogency the\nargument from the presence of the moral sense may at any time have had,\nthis degree remains unaffected by the explosion of erroneous theories to\naccount for such presence. We have, therefore, still to face the fact that\nthe moral sense of man undoubtedly exists.\n\nSec. 22. The question we have to determine is, What evidence have we to show\nthat the moral part of man was created in the image of God; and if there is\nany such evidence, what counter-existence is there to show that the moral\nexistence of man may be due to natural causes? In deciding this question,\njust as in deciding any other question of a purely scientific character, we\nmust be guided in our examination by the Law of Parcimony; we must not\nassume the agency of supernatural causes if we can discover the agency of\nnatural causes; neither must we merge the supposed mystery directly into\nthe highest mystery, until we are quite sure that it does not admit of\nbeing proximately explained by the action of proximate influences.\n\nNow, whether or not Mr. Darwin's theory as to the origin and development of\nthe moral sense be considered satisfactory, there can, I think, be very\nlittle doubt in any impartial mind which duly considers the subject, that\nin _some way or other_ the moral sense has been evolved. The body of\nscientific evidence which has now been collected in favour of the general\ntheory of evolution is simply overwhelming; and in the presence of so large\nan analogy, it would require a vast amount of contradictory evidence to\nremove the presumption that human conscience, like everything else, has\nbeen evolved. Now, for my own part, I am quite unable to distinguish any\nsuch evidence, while, on the other hand, in support of the _a priori_\npresumption that conscience has been evolved, I cannot conceal from myself\nthat there is a large amount of _a posteriori_ confirmation. I am quite\nunable to distinguish anything in my sense of right and wrong which I\ncannot easily conceive to have been brought about during the evolution of\nmy intelligence from lower forms of psychical life. On the contrary,\neverything that I can find in my sense of right and wrong is precisely what\nI should expect to find on the supposition of this sense having been\nmoulded by the progressive requirements of social development. Read in the\nlight of evolution, Conscience, in its every detail, is deductively\nexplained.\n\nAnd, as though there were not sufficient evidence of this kind to justify\nthe conclusion drawn from the theory of evolution, the doctrine of\nutilitarianism--separately conceived and separately worked out on\naltogether independent grounds--the doctrine of utilitarianism comes in\nwith irresistible force to confirm that _a priori_ conclusion by the widest\nand most unexceptionable of inductions.[15]\n\nIn the supernatural interpretation of the facts, the whole stress of the\nargument comes upon the character of conscience as a _spontaneously\nadmonishing influence which acts independently of our own volition_. For it\nis from this character alone that the inference can arise that conscience\nis the delegate of the will of another. Thus, to render the whole argument\nin the singularly beautiful words of Dr. Newman:--\"If, as is the case, we\nfeel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened at transgressing the voice\nof conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible,\nbefore whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing\nwrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us\non hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same seeming serenity\nof mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight, which follows on one\nreceiving praise from a father,--we certainly have within us the image of\nsome person to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find\nour happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in\nwhose anger we waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for\ntheir exciting cause an intelligent being; we are not affectionate towards\na stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse\nor compunction in breaking mere human law. Yet so it is; conscience emits\nall these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and,\non the other hand, it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a\nresignation, and a hope which there is no sensible, no earthly object to\nelicit. 'The wicked flees when no one pursueth;' then why does he flee?\nwhence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in the\nhidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not\nbelong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception is\ndirected must be supernatural and divine; and thus the phenomena of\nconscience as a dictate avail to impress the imagination with the picture\nof a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing,\nretributive.\"[16]\n\nNow I have quoted this passage because it seems to me to convey in a\nconcise form the whole of the argument from Conscience. But how tremendous\nare the inferences which are drawn from the facts! As the first step in our\ncriticism, it is necessary to point out that two very different orders of\nfeelings are here treated by Dr. Newman. There is first the pure or\nuncompounded ethical feelings, which spring directly from the moral sense\nalone, and which all men experience in varying degrees. And next there are\nwhat we may term the _ethico-theological_ feelings, which can only spring\nfrom a blending of the moral sense with a belief in a personal God, or\nother supernatural agents. The former class of feelings, or the\nuncompounded ethical class, have exclusive reference to the moral\nobligations that subsist between ourselves and other human beings, or\nsentient organisms. The latter class of feelings, or the ethico-theological\nclass, have reference to the moral obligations that are believed to subsist\nbetween ourselves and the Deity, or other supernatural beings. Now, in\norder not to lose sight of this all-important distinction, I shall\ncriticise Dr. Newman's rendering of the ordinary argument from Conscience\nin each of these two points of views separately. To begin, then, with the\nuncompounded ethical feelings.\n\nSuch emotions as attend the operation of conscience in those who follow its\nlight alone without any theories as to its supernatural origin, are all of\nthe character of _reasonable_ or _explicable_ emotions. Granting that\nfellow-feeling has been for the benefit of the race, and therefore that it\nhas been developed by natural causes, certainly there is nothing\n_mysterious_ in the emotions that attend the violating or the following of\nthe dictates of conscience. For conscience is, by this naturalistic\nsupposition, nothing more than an organised body of certain psychological\nelements, which, by long inheritance, have come to inform us, by way of\nintuitive feeling, how we should act for the interests of society; so that,\nif this hypothesis is correct, there cannot be anything more mysterious or\nsupernatural in the working of conscience than there is in the working of\nany of our other faculties. That the disagreeable feeling of\n_self-reproach_, as distinguished from _religious_ feeling, should follow\nupon a violation of such an organized body of psychological elements,\ncannot be thought surprising, if it is remembered that one of these\nelements is natural fellow-feeling, and the others the elements which lead\nus to know directly that we have violated the interests of other persons.\nAnd as regards the mere fact that the working of conscience is independent\nof the will, surely this is not more than we find, in varying degrees, to\nbe true of all our emotions; and conscience, according to the evolution\ntheory, has its root in the emotions. Hence, it is no more an argument to\nsay that the irrepressible character of conscience refers us to a God of\nmorality, than it would be to say that the sometimes resistless force of\nthe ludicrous refers us to a god of laughter. Love, again, is an emotion\nwhich cannot be subdued by volition, and in its tendency to persist bears\njust such a striking resemblance to the feelings of morality as we should\nexpect to find on the supposition of the former having played an important\npart in the genesis of the latter. The _dictating_ character of conscience,\ntherefore, is clearly in itself of no avail as pointing to a superhuman\nDictator. Thus, for example, to take Dr. Newman's own illustration, why\nshould we feel such tearful, broken-hearted sorrow on intentionally or\ncarelessly hurting a mother? We see no shadow of a reason for resorting to\nany supernatural hypothesis to explain the fact--love between mother and\noffspring being an essential condition to the existence of higher animals.\nYet this is a simple case of truly conscientious feeling, where the thought\nof any _personal_ cause of conscience _need_ not be entertained, and is\ncertainly not necessary to explain the effects. And similarly with _all_\ncases of conscientious feeling, _except in cases where it refers directly\nto its supposed author_. But these latter cases, or the ethico-theological\nclass of feelings, are in no way surprising. If the moral sense has had a\nnatural genesis in the actual relations between man and man, as soon as an\nideal \"image\" of \"a holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive\" God is\nfirmly believed to have an objective existence, as a matter of course moral\nfeelings must become transferred to the relations which are believed to\nobtain between ourselves and this most holy God. Indeed, it is these very\nfeelings which, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, must be\nconcluded, in accordance with the law of parcimony, to have _generated_\nthis idea of God as \"holy, just,\" and good. And the mere fact that, when\nthe complex system of religious belief has once been built up, conscience\nis strongly wrought upon by that belief and its accompanying emotions, is\nsurely a fact the very reverse of mysterious. Suppose, for the sake of\nargument, that the moral sense has been evolved from the social feelings,\nand should we not certainly expect that, when the belief in a moral and\nall-seeing God is superadded, conscience should be distracted at the\nthought of offending him, and experience a \"soothing, satisfactory delight\"\nin the belief that we are pleasing him? And as to the argument, \"Why does\nthe wicked flee when none pursueth? whence his terror?\" the question admits\nof only too easy an answer. Indeed, the form into which the question is\nthrown would almost seem--were it not written by Dr. Newman--to imply a\nsarcastic reference to the power of superstition. \"Who is it that,\" not\nonly Dr. Newman, but the haunted savage, the mediaeval sorcerer, or the\nfrightened child, \"sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of\nhis heart?\" Who but the \"image\" of his own thought? \"If the cause of these\nemotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his\nperception is directed must be supernatural and divine.\" Assuredly; but\nwhat an inference from what an assumption! Whether or not the moral sense\nhas been developed by natural causes, \"these emotions\" of terror at the\nthought of offending beings \"supernatural and divine\" are not of such\nunique occurrence \"in the visible world\" as to give Dr. Newman the monopoly\nof his particular \"Object.\" With a deeper meaning, therefore, than he\nintends may we repeat, \"The phenomena of conscience as a dictate _avail_ to\nimpress the _imagination_ with the _picture_ of a Supreme Governor.\" But\ncriticism here is positively painful. Let it be enough to say that those of\nus who do not already believe in any such particular \"Object\"--be it ghost,\nshape, demon, or deity--are strangers, utter and complete, to any such\nsupernatural pursuers. The fact, therefore, of these various religious\nemotions being associated with conscience in the minds of theists, can in\nitself be no proof of Theism, seeing that it is the theory of Theism which\nitself _engenders_ these emotions; those who do not believe in this theory\nexperiencing none of these feelings of personal dread, responsibility to an\nunknown God, and the feelings of doing injury to, or of receiving praise\nfrom, a parent. To such of us the violation of conscience is its own\npunishment, as the pursuit of virtue is its own reward. For we know that\nnot more certainly than fire will burn, any violation of the deeply-rooted\nfeelings of our humanity will leave a gaping wound which even time may not\nalways heal. And when it is shown us that our natural dread of fire is due\nto a supernatural cause, we may be prepared to entertain the argument that\nour natural dread of sin, as distinguished from our dread of God, is\nlikewise due to such a cause. But until this can be done we must, as\nreasonable men, _whose minds have been trained in the school of nature_,\nforbear to allow that the one fact is of any greater cogency than the\nother, so far as the question of a supernatural cause of either is\nconcerned. For, as we have already seen, the law of parcimony forbids us to\nascribe \"the phenomena of conscience as a dictate\" to a supernatural cause,\nuntil the science of psychology shall have proved that they cannot have\nbeen due to natural causes. But, as we have also seen, the science of\npsychology is now beginning, as quick and thoroughly as can be expected, to\nprove the very converse; so that the probability is now overwhelming that\nour moral sense, like all our other faculties, has been evolved. Therefore,\nwhile the burden of proof really lies on the side of Theism--or with those\nwho account for the natural phenomena of conscience by the hypothesis of a\nsupernatural origin--this burden is now being rapidly discharged by the\nopposite side. That is to say, while the proofs which are now beginning to\nsubstantiate the naturalistic hypothesis are all in full accord with the\nordinary lines of scientific explanations, the vague and feeble reflections\nof those who still maintain that Conscience is evidence of Deity, are all\nsuch as run counter to the very truisms of scientific method.\n\nIn the face of all the facts, therefore, I find it impossible to recognise\nas valid any inference which is drawn from the existence of our moral sense\nto the existence of a God; although, of course, all inferences drawn from\nthe existence of our moral sense to the _character_ of a God already\nbelieved to exist remain unaffected by the foregoing considerations.[17]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN.\n\nSec. 23. The argument from Design, as presented by Mill, is merely a\nresuscitation of it as presented by Paley. True it is that the logical\npenetration of the former enabled him to perceive that the latter had \"put\nthe case much too strongly;\" although, even here, he has failed to see\nwherein Paley's error consisted. He says:--\"If I found a watch on an\napparently desolate island, I should indeed infer that it had been left\nthere by a human being; but the inference would not be from the marks of\ndesign, but because I already know by direct experience that watches are\nmade by men.\" Now I submit that this misses the whole point of Paley's\nmeaning; for it is evident that there would be no argument at all unless\nthis author be understood to say what he clearly enough expresses, viz.,\nthat the evidence of design supposed to be afforded by the watch is\nsupposed to be afforded by examination of its mechanism only, and not by\nany previous knowledge as to how that particular mechanism called a watch\nis made. Paley, I take it, only chose a watch for his example because he\nknew that no reader would dispute the fact that watches are constructed by\ndesign: except for the purpose of pointing out that mechanism is in some\ncases admitted to be due to intelligence, for all the other purposes of his\nargument he might as well have chosen for his illustration any case of\nmechanism occurring in nature. What the real fallacy in Paley's argument\nis, is another question, and this I shall now endeavour to answer; for, as\nMill's argument is clearly the same in kind as that of Paley and his\nnumberless followers, in examining the one I am also examining the other.\n\nSec. 24. In nature, then, we see innumerable examples of apparent design: are\nthese of equal value in testifying to the presence of a designing\nintelligence as are similar examples of human contrivance, and if not, why\nnot? The answer to the first of these questions is patent. If such examples\nwere of the same value in the one case as they are in the other, the\nexistence of a Deity would be, as Paley appears to have thought it was,\ndemonstrated by the fact. A brief and yet satisfactory answer to the second\nquestion is not so easy, and we may best approach it by assuming the\nexistence of a Deity. If, then, there is a God, it by no means follows that\nevery apparent contrivance in nature is an actual contrivance, in the same\nsense as is any human contrivance. The eye of a vertebrated animal, for\ninstance, exhibits as much apparent design as does a watch; but no one--at\nthe present day, at least--will undertake to affirm that the evidence of\ndivine thought furnished by one example is as conclusive as is the evidence\nof human thought furnished by the other--and this even assuming a Deity to\nexist. Why is this? The reason, I think, is, that we know by our personal\nexperience what are our own relations to the material world, and to the\nlaws which preside over the action of physical forces; while we can have no\ncorresponding knowledge of the relations subsisting between the Deity and\nthese same objects of our own experience. Hence, to suppose that the Deity\nconstructed the eye by any such process of thought as we know that men\nconstruct watches, is to make an assumption not only incapable of proof,\nbut destitute of any assignable degree of likelihood. Take an example. The\nrelation in which a bee stands to the external world is to a large extent a\nmatter of observation, and, therefore, no one imagines that the formation\nof its scientifically-constructed cells is due to any profound study on the\nbee's part. Whatever the origin of the cell-making instinct may have been,\nits nature is certainly not the same as it would have been in man,\nsupposing him to have had occasion to construct honeycombs. It may be said\nthat the requisite calculations have been made for the bees by the Deity;\nbut, even if this assumption were true, it would be nothing to the point,\nwhich is merely that even within the limits of the animal kingdom the\nrelations of intelligence to the external world are so diverse, that the\nsame results may be accomplished by totally different intellectual\nprocesses. And as this example is parallel to the case on which we are\nengaged in everything save the _observability_ of the relations involved,\nit supplies us with the exact measure of the probability we are trying to\nestimate. Hence it is evident that so long as we remain ignorant of the\nelement essential to the argument from design in its Paleyerian form--viz.,\nknowledge or presumption of the relations subsisting between an\nhypothetical Deity and his creation--so long must that argument remain, not\nonly unassignably weak, but incapable of being strengthened by any number\nof examples similar in kind.\n\nSec. 25. To put the case in another way. The root fallacy in Paley's argument\nconsisted in reasoning from a particular to an universal. Because he knew\nthat design was the cause of adaptation in some cases, and because the\nphenomena of life exhibited more instances of adaptation than any other\nclass of phenomena in nature, he pointed to these phenomena as affording an\nexceptional kind of proof of the presence in nature of intelligent agency.\nYet, if it is admitted--and of this, even in Paley's days, there was a\nstrong analogical presumption--that the phenomena of life are throughout\ntheir history as much subject to law as are any other phenomena\nwhatsoever,--that the method of the divine government, supposing such to\nexist, is the same here as elsewhere; then nothing can be clearer than that\nany amount of observable adaptation of means to ends within this class of\nphenomena cannot afford any different kind of evidence of _design_ than is\nafforded by any other class of phenomena whatsoever. Either we know the\nrelations of the Deity to his creation, or we do not. If we do, then we\nmust know whether or not _every_ physical change which occurs in accordance\nwith law--_i.e._, every change occurring within experience, and so, until\ncontrary evidence is produced, presumably every change occurring beyond\nexperience--was separately planned by the Deity. If we do not, then we have\nno more reason to suppose that any one set of physical changes rather than\nanother has been separately planned by him, unless we could point (as Paley\nvirtually pointed) to one particular set of changes and assert, These are\nnot subject to the same method of divine government which we observe\nelsewhere, or, in other words, to law. If it is retorted that _in some way\nor other_ all these wonderful adaptations must ultimately have been due to\nintelligence, this is merely to shift the argument to a ground which we\nshall presently have to consider: all we are now engaged upon is to show\nthat we have no right to found arguments on the assumed _mode_, _manner_,\nor _process_ by which the supposed intelligence is thought to have\noperated. We can here see, then, more clearly where Paley stumbled. He\nvirtually assumed that the relations subsisting between the Deity and the\nuniverse were such, that the exceptional adaptations met with in the\norganised part of the latter cannot have been due to the same intellectual\n_processes_ as was the rest of the universe--or that, if they were, still\nthey yielded better evidence of having been due to these processes than\ndoes the rest of the universe. And it is easy to perceive that his error\narose from his pre-formed belief in special creation. So long as a man\nregards every living organism which he sees as the lineal descendant of a\nprecisely similar organism originally struck out by the immediate fiat of\nDeity, so long is he justified in holding his axiom, \"Contrivance must have\nhad a contriver.\" For \"adaptation\" then becomes to our minds the synonym of\n\"contrivance\"--it being utterly inconceivable that the numberless\nadaptations found in any living organism could have resulted in any other\nway than by intelligent contrivance, at the time when this organism was in\nthe first instance _suddenly_ introduced into its complex conditions of\nlife. Still, as an argument, this is of course merely reasoning in a\ncircle: we adopt a hypothesis which presupposes the existence of a Deity as\nthe first step in the proof of his existence. I do not say that Paley\ncommitted this error expressly, but merely that if it had not been for his\npre-formed conviction as to the truth of the special-creation theory, he\nwould probably not have written his \"Natural Theology.\"\n\nSec. 26. Thus let us take a case of his own choosing, and the one which is\nadduced by him as typical of \"the application of the argument.\" \"I know of\nno better method of introducing so large a subject than that of comparing a\nsingle thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with a telescope. As\nfar as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same\nproof that the eye was made for vision as there is that the telescope was\nmade for assisting it. They are both made upon the same principles, both\nbeing adjusted to the laws by which the transmission and refraction of rays\nof light are regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves;\nbut these laws being fixed, the construction in both cases is adapted to\nthem. For instance: these laws require, in order to produce the same\neffect, that the rays of light, in passing through water into the eye,\nshould be refracted by a more convex surface than when it passes out of air\ninto the eye. Accordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part of\nit called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrial\nanimals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this\ndifference?\" But what, let us ask, is the proximate cause of this\ndifference? 'The immediate volition of the Deity, manifested in special\ncreation,' virtually answers Paley; while we of to-day are able to reply,\n'The agency of natural laws, to wit, inheritance, variation, survival of\nthe fittest, and probably of other laws as yet not discovered.' Now, of\ncourse, according to the former of these two premises, there can be no more\nlegitimate conclusion than that the difference in question is due to\nintelligent and special design; but, according to the other premise, it is\nequally clear that no conclusion can be more unwarranted; for, under the\nlatter view, the greater rotundity of the crystalline lens in a fish's eye\nno more exhibits the presence of any special design than does the\nadaptation of a river to the bed which it has itself been the means of\nexcavating. When, therefore, Paley goes on to ask:--\"How is it possible,\nunder circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of\nequal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the case of the eye, yet to\nacknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the plainest\nand clearest of all propositions, in the case of the telescope?\" the answer\nis sufficiently obvious, namely, that the \"evidence\" in the two cases is\n_not_ \"equal;\"--any more than is the existence, say, of the Nile of equal\nvalue in point of evidence that it was designed for traffic, as is the\nexistence of the Suez Canal that it was so designed. And the mere fact that\nthe problem of achromatism was solved by \"the mind of a sagacious optician\ninquiring how this matter was managed in the eye,\" no more proves that\n\"this could not be in the eye without purpose, which suggested to the\noptician the only effectual means of attaining that purpose,\" than would\nthe fact, say, of the winnowing of corn having suggested the\nfanning-machine prove that air currents were designed for the purpose of\neliminating chaff from grain. In short, the real substance of the argument\nfrom Design must eventually merge into that which Paley, in the\nabove-quoted passage, expressly passes over--viz., \"the origin of the laws\nthemselves;\" for so long as there is any reason to suppose that any\napparent \"adaptation\" to a certain set of \"fixed laws\" is itself due to the\ninfluence of other \"fixed laws,\" so long have we as little right to say\nthat the latter set of fixed laws exhibit any better indications of\nintelligent adaptation to the former set, than the former do to that of the\nlatter--the eye to light, than light to the eye. Hence I conceive that Mill\nis entirely wrong when he says of Paley's argument, \"It surpasses analogy\nexactly as induction surpasses it,\" because \"the instances chosen are\nparticular instances of a circumstance which experience shows to have a\nreal connection with an intelligent origin--the fact of conspiring to an\nend.\" Experience shows as this, but it shows us more besides; it shows us\nthat there is no _necessary_ or _uniform_ connection between an\n\"intelligent origin\" and the fact of apparent \"means conspiring to an\n[apparent] end.\" If the reader will take the trouble to compare this\nquotation just made from Mill, and the long train of reasoning that\nfollows, with an admirable illustration in Mr. Wallace's \"Natural\nSelection,\" he will be well rewarded by finding all the steps in Mr. Mill's\nreasoning so closely paralleled by the caricature, that but for the\nrespective dates of publication, one might have thought the latter had an\nexpress reference to the former.[18] True, Mr. Mill closes his argument\nwith a brief allusion to the \"principle of the survival of the fittest,\"\nobserving that \"creative forethought is not absolutely the only link by\nwhich the origin of the wonderful mechanism of the eye may be connected\nwith the fact of sight.\" I am surprised, however, that a man of Mr. Mill's\npenetration did not see that whatever view we may take as to \"the adequacy\nof this principle (_i.e._, Natural Selection) to account for such truly\nadmirable combinations as some of those in nature,\" the argument from\n_Design_ is not materially affected. So far as this argument is concerned,\nthe issue is not Design _versus_ Natural Selection, but it is Design\n_versus_ Natural Law. By all means, \"leaving this remarkable speculation\n(_i.e._, Mr. Darwin's) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have\nin store for it,\" and it by no means follows that \"in the present state of\nknowledge the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability\nin favour of creation by intelligence.\" For whatever we may think of this\nspecial theory as to the _mode_, there can be no longer any reasonable\ndoubt, \"in the present state of our knowledge,\" as to the truth of the\ngeneral theory of _Evolution_; and the latter, if accepted, is as\ndestructive to the argument from _Design_ as would the former be if proved.\nIn a word, it is the _fact_ and not the _method_ of Evolution which is\nsubversive of Teleology in its Paleyerian form.\n\nSec. 27. We have come then to this:--Apparent intellectual adaptations are\nperfectly valid indications of design, so long as their authorship is known\nto be confined to human intelligence; for then we know from experience what\nare our relations to these laws, and so in any given case can argue _a\nposteriori_ that such an adaptation to such a set of laws by such an\nintelligence can only have been due to such a process. But when we overstep\nthe limits of experience, we are not entitled to argue anything _a priori_\nof any other intelligence in this respect, even supposing any such\nintelligence to exist. The analogy by which the unknown relations are\ninferred from the known is \"infinitely precarious;\" seeing that two of the\nanalogous terms--to wit, the divine intelligence and the human--may differ\nto an immeasurable extent in their properties--nay, are supposed thus to\ndiffer, the one being supposed omniscient, omnipotent, &c., and the other\nnot. And, as a final step, we may now see that the argument from Design, in\nits last resort, resolves itself into a _petitio principii_. For,\nultimately, the only point which the analogical argument in question is\nadduced to prove is, that the relations subsisting between an Unknown Cause\nand certain physical forces are so far identical with the relations known\nto subsist between human intelligence and these same forces, that similar\nintellectual processes are required in the two cases to account for the\nproduction of similar effects--and hence that the Unknown Cause is\nintelligent. But it is evident that the analogy itself can have no\nexistence, except upon the presupposition that these two sets of relations\n_are_ thus identical. The point which the analogy is adduced to prove is\ntherefore postulated by the fact of its being adduced at all, and the whole\nargument resolves itself into a case of _petitio principii_.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nTHE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS.\n\nSec. 28. Turning now to an important error of Mr. Mill's in respect of\nomission, I firmly believe that all competent writers who have ever\nundertaken to support the argument from Design, have been moved to do so by\ntheir instinctive appreciation of the much more important argument, which\nMill does not mention at all and which we now proceed to consider--the\nargument from General Laws. That is to say, I cannot think that any one\ncompetent writer ever seriously believed, had he taken time to analyse his\nbeliefs, that the cogency of his argument lay in assuming any knowledge\nconcerning the _process_ of divine thought; he must have really believed\nthat it lay entirely in his observation of the _product_ of divine\nthought--or rather, let us say, of divine intelligence. Now this is the\nwhole difference between the argument from Design and the argument from\nGeneral Laws. The argument from Design says, There must be a God, because\nsuch and such an organic structure must have been due to such and such an\nintellectual _process_. The argument from General Laws says, There must be\na God, because such and such an organic structure must _in some way or\nother have been ultimately due to_ intelligence. Nor does this argument end\nhere. Not only must such and such an organic structure have been ultimately\ndue to intelligence, but every such structure--nay, every phenomenon in the\nuniverse--must have been the same; for all phenomena are alike subject to\nthe same method of sequence. The argument is thus a cumulative one; for as\nthere is no single known exception to this universal mode of existence, the\nunited effect of so vast a body of evidence is all but irresistible, and\nits tendency is clearly to point us to some _one_ explanatory cause. The\nscope of this argument is therefore co-extensive with the universe; it\ndraws alike upon all phenomena with which experience is acquainted. For\ninstance, it contains all the phenomena covered by the Design argument,\njust as a genus contains any one of its species; it being manifest, from\nwhat was said in the last section, that if the general doctrine of\nEvolution is accepted, the argument from Design must of necessity merge\ninto that from General Laws. And this wide basis, we may be sure, must be\nthe most legitimate one whereon to rest an argument in favour of Theism. If\nthere is any such thing as such an argument at all, the most unassailable\nfield for its display must be the universe as a whole, seeing that if we\nseparate any one section of the universe from the rest, and suppose that we\nhere discover a different kind of testimony to intelligence from that which\nwe can discover elsewhere, we may from analogy be abundantly sure that on\nthe confines of our division there must be second causes and general laws\nat work (whether discoverable or not), which are the immediate agents in\nthe production of the observed results. Of course I do not deny that some\nclasses of phenomena afford us more and better proofs of intellectual\nagency than do others, in the sense of the laws in operation being more\nnumerous, subtle, and complex; but it will be seen that this is a different\ninterpretation of the evidence from that against which I am contending.\nThus, if there are tokens of divine intention (as distinguished from\ndesign) to be met with in the eye,--if it is inconceivable that so \"nice\nand intricate a structure\" should exist without intelligence as its\n_ultimate_ cause; then the discovery of natural selection, or of any other\nlaw, as the _manner_ in which this intelligence wrought in no wise\nattenuates the proof as to the fact of an intelligent cause. On the\ncontrary, it tends rather to confirm it; for, besides the evidence before\nexisting, there is added that which arises from the conformity of the\nmethod to that which is observable in the rest of the universe.\n\nThus, notwithstanding what Hamilton, Chalmers, and others have said, I\ncannot but feel that the ubiquitous action of general laws is, of all facts\nsupplied by experience, the most cogent in its bearing upon teleology. If\nperpetual and uninterrupted uniformity of method does not indicate the\nexistence of a presiding intelligence, it becomes a question whether any\nother kind of method--short of the intelligently miraculous--could possibly\ndo so; seeing that the further the divine _modus operandi_ (supposing such\nto exist) were removed from absolute uniformity, the greater would be the\nroom for our interpreting it as mere fortuity. But forasmuch as the\nprogress of science has shown that within experience the method of the\nSupreme Causality is absolutely uniform, the hypothesis of fortuity is\nrendered irrational; and let us think of this Supreme Causality as we may,\nthe fact remains that from it there emanates a directive influence of\nuninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous magnitude and exact\nprecision, worthy of our highest possible conceptions of Deity.\n\nSec. 29. Had it been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I doubt not\nthat I should have regarded the foregoing considerations as final: I should\nhave concluded that there was an overwhelming balance of rational\nprobability in favour of Theism; and I think I should also have insisted\nthat this balance of rational probability would require to continue as it\nwas till the end of time. I should have maintained, in some such words as\nthe following, in which the Rev. Baden Powell conveys this argument:--\"The\nvery essence of the whole argument is the invariable preservation of the\nprinciple of _order_: not necessarily such as we can directly recognise,\nbut the universal conviction of the unfailing subordination of everything\nto _some_ grand principles of _law_, however imperfectly apprehended in our\npartial conceptions, and the successive subordination of such laws to\nothers of still higher generality, to an extent transcending our\nconceptions, and constituting the true chain of universal causation which\nculminates in the sublime conception of the COSMOS.\n\n\"It is in immediate connection with this enlarged view of universal\nimmutable natural order that I have regarded the narrow notions of those\nwho obscure the sublime prospect by imagining so unworthy an idea as that\nof occasional interruptions in the physical economy of the world.\n\n\"The only instance considered was that of the alleged sudden supernatural\norigination of new species of organised beings in remote geological epochs.\nIt is in relation to the broad principle of law, if once rightly\napprehended, that such inferences are seen to be wholly unwarranted by\nscience, and such fancies utterly derogatory and inadmissible in\nphilosophy; while, even in those instances properly understood, the real\nscientific conclusions of the invariable and indissoluble chain of\ncausation stand vindicated in the sublime contemplations with which they\nare thus associated.\n\n\"To a correct apprehension of the whole argument, the one essential\nrequisite is to have obtained a complete and satisfactory grasp of this\n_one grand principle of law pervading nature, or rather constituting the\nvery idea of nature_;--which forms the vital essence of the whole of\ninductive science, and the sole assurance of those higher inferences from\nthe inductive study of natural causes which are the vindications of a\nsupreme intelligence and a moral cause.\n\n\"_The whole of the ensuing discussion must stand or fall with the admission\nof this grand principle_. Those who are not prepared to embrace it in its\nfull extent may probably not accept the conclusions; but they must be sent\nback to the school of inductive science, where alone it must be\nindependently imbibed and thoroughly assimilated with the mind of the\nstudent in the first instance.\n\n\"On the slightest consideration of the nature, the foundations, and general\nresults of inductive science,... we recognise the powers of intellect fitly\nemployed in the study of nature,... pre-eminently leading us to perceive\n_in nature_, and in the invariable and universal constancy of its laws, the\nindications of universal, unchangeable, and recondite arrangement,\ndependence, and connection in reason....\n\n\"We thus see the importance of taking a more enlarged view of the great\nargument of natural theology; and the necessity for so doing becomes the\nmore apparent when we reflect on the injury to which these sublime\ninferences are exposed from the narrow and unworthy form in which the\nreasoning has been too often conducted....\n\n\"The satisfactory view of the whole case can only be found in those more\nenlarged conceptions which are furnished by the grand contemplation of\ncosmical order and unity, and which do not refer to inferences from the\n_past_, but to proofs of the _ever-present_ mind and reason in nature.\n\n\"If we read a book which it requires much thought and exercise of reason to\nunderstand, but which we find discloses more and more truth and reason as\nwe proceed in the study, and contains clearly more than we can at present\ncomprehend, then undeniably we properly say that thought and reason _exist\nin that book_ irrespectively of our minds, and equally so of any question\nas to its author or origin. Such a book confessedly exists, and is ever\nopen to us in the natural world. Or, to put the case under a slightly\ndifferent form:--When the astronomer, the physicist, the geologist, or the\nnaturalist notes down a series of observed facts or measured dates, he is\nnot an _author_ expressing his own ideas,--he is a mere _amanuensis_ taking\ndown the dictations of nature: his observation book is the record of the\nthoughts of _another mind_: he has but set down literally what he himself\ndoes not understand, or only very imperfectly. On further examination, and\nafter deep and anxious study, he perhaps begins to decipher the meaning, by\nperceiving some law which gives a signification to the facts; and the\nfurther he pursues the investigation up to any more comprehensive theory,\nthe more fully he perceives that there is a higher reason, of which his own\nis but the humbler interpreter, and into whose depths he may penetrate\ncontinually further, to discover yet more profound and invariable order and\nsystem, always indicating still deeper and more hidden abysses yet\nunfathomed, but throughout which he is assured the same recondite and\nimmutable arrangement ever prevails.\n\n\"That which requires thought and reason to understand must be itself\nthought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express must\nbe itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is but partial, then\nthe mind and reason studied is greater than the mind and reason of the\nstudent. If the more it be studied the more vast and complex is the\nnecessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more evident is the vast\nextent and compass of the intelligence thus partially manifested, and its\nreality, as _existing in the immutably connected order of objects\nexamined_, independently of the mind of the investigator.\n\n\"But considerations of this kind, just and transcendently important as they\nare in themselves, give us no aid in any inquiry into the _origin_ of the\norder of things thus investigated, or the _nature_ or other attributes of\nthe mind evinced in them.\n\n\"The real argument for universal _intelligence_, manifested in the\nuniversality of order and law in the material world, is very different from\nany attempt to give a form to our conceptions, even by the language of\nanalogy, as to the _nature_ or _mode of existence_ or operation of that\nintelligence [_i.e._, as I have stated the case, the argument can only rest\non a study of the _products_, as distinguished from the _processes_ of such\nintelligence]: and still more different from any extension of our inference\nfrom what _is_ to what _may have been_, from _present_ order to a supposed\n_origination_, first adjustment, or planning of that order.\n\n\"By keeping these distinctions steadily in view, we appreciate properly\nboth the limits and the extent and compass of what we may appropriately\ncall COSMOTHEOLOGY.\"[19]\n\nI have quoted these passages at length, because they convey in a more\nforcible, guarded, and accurate manner than any others with which I am\nacquainted, the strictly rational standing of this great subject prior to\nthe date at which the above-quoted passage was written. Therefore, as I\nhave said, if it had been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I\nshould certainly have rested in these \"sublime conceptions\" as in an\nargument supreme and irrefutable. I should have felt that the progress of\nphysical knowledge could never exert any other influence on Theism than\nthat of ever tending more and more to confirm that magnificent belief, by\ncontinuously expanding our human thoughts into progressively advancing\nconceptions, ever grander and yet more grand, of that tremendous Origin of\nThings--the Mind of God. Such would have been my hope--such would have been\nmy prayer. But now, how changed! Never in the history of man has so\nterrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may now\nbehold advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless in might,\nuprooting our most cherished hopes, engulfing our most precious creed, and\nburying our highest life in mindless desolation. Science, whom erstwhile we\nthought a very Angel of God, pointing to that great barrier of Law, and\nproclaiming to the restless sea of changing doubt, \"Hitherto shalt thou\ncome, but no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed,\"--even\nScience has now herself thrown down this trusted barrier; the flood-gates\nof infidelity are open, and Atheism overwhelming is upon us.\n\nSec. 30. All and every law follows as a necessary consequence from the\npersistence of force and the primary qualities of matter.[20] That this\nmust be so is evident if we consider that, were it not so, force could not\nbe permanent nor matter constant. For instance, if action and reaction were\nnot invariably equal and opposite, force would not be invariably\npersistent, seeing that in no case can the formula fail, unless some one or\nother of the forces concerned, or parts of them, disappear. And as with a\nsimple law of this kind, so with every other natural law and\ninter-operation of laws, howsoever complex such inter-operation may be; for\nit is manifest that if in any case similar antecedents did not determine\nsimilar consequents, on one or other of these occasions some quantum of\nforce, or of matter, or of both, must have disappeared--or, which is the\nsame thing, the law of causation cannot have been constant. Every natural\nlaw, therefore, may be defined as the formula of a sequence, which must\neither ensue upon certain forces of a given intensity impinging upon\ncertain given quantities, kinds, and forms of matter, or else, by not\nensuing, prove that the force or the matter concerned were not of a\npermanent nature.\n\nSec. 31. The argument, then, which was elaborated in Sec. 29, and which has so\nlong and so generally received the popular sanction in the common-sense\nepitome, that in the last record there must be mind in external nature,\nsince \"that which it requires thought and reason to understand must itself\nbe thought and reason,\"--this argument, I say, must now for ever be\nabandoned by reasonable men. No doubt it would be easy to point to several\nspeculative thinkers who have previously combated this argument,[21] and\nfrom this fact some readers will perhaps be inclined to judge, from a false\nanalogy, that as the argument in question has withstood previous assaults,\nit need not necessarily succumb to the present one. Be it observed,\nhowever, that the present assault differs from all previous assaults, just\nas demonstration differs from speculation. What has hitherto been but mere\nguess and unwarrantable assertion has now become a matter of the greatest\ncertainty. That the argument from General Laws is a futile argument, is no\nlonger a matter of unverifiable opinion: it is as sure as is the most\nfundamental axiom of science. That the argument will long remain in\nillogical minds, I doubt not; but that it is from henceforth quite\ninadmissible in accurate thinking, there can be no question. For the sake,\nhowever, of impressing this fact still more strongly upon such readers as\nhave been accustomed to rely upon this argument, and so find it difficult\nthus abruptly to reverse the whole current of their thoughts,--for the sake\nof such, I shall here add a few remarks with the view of facilitating the\nconception of an universal Order existing independently of Mind.\n\nSec. 32. Interpreting the mazy nexus of phenomena only by the facts which\nscience has revealed, and what conclusion are we driven to accept? Clearly,\nlooking to what has been said in the last two sections, that from the time\nwhen the process of evolution first began,--from the time before the\ncondensation of the nebula had showed any signs of commencing,--every\nsubsequent change or event of evolution was _necessarily bound_ to ensue;\nelse force and matter have not been persistent. How then, it will be asked,\ndid the vast nexus of natural laws which is now observable ever begin or\ncontinue to be? In this way. When the first womb of things was pregnant\nwith all the future, there would probably have been existent at any rate\nnot more than one of the formulae which we now call natural laws. This one\nlaw, of course, would have been the law of gravitation. Here we may take\nour stand. It does not signify whether there ever was a time when\ngravitation was not,--_i.e._, if ever there was a time when matter, _as we\nnow know it_, was not in existence;--for if there ever was such a time,\nthere is no reason to doubt, but every reason to conclude, that the\nevolution of matter, as we now know it, was accomplished in accordance with\nlaw. Similarly, we are not concerned with the question as to how the law of\ngravitation came to be associated with matter; for it is overwhelmingly\nprobable, from the extent of the analogy, that if our knowledge concerning\nmolecular physics were sufficiently great, the existence of the law in\nquestion would be found to follow as a necessary deduction from the primary\nqualities of matter and force, just as we can now see that, when present,\nits peculiar quantitative action necessarily follows from the primary\nqualities of space.\n\nStarting, then, with these data,--matter, force, and the law of\ngravitation,--what must happen? We have the strongest scientific reason to\nbelieve that the matter of the solar system primordially existed in a\nhighly diffused or nebulous form. By mutual gravitation, therefore, all the\nsubstance of the nebula must have begun to concentrate upon itself, or to\ncondense. Now, from this point onwards, I wish it to be clearly understood\nthat the mere consideration of the supposed facts not admitting of\nscientific proof, or of scientific explanation if true, in no wise affects\nthe certainty of the doctrine which these facts are here adduced to\nestablish. Fully granting that the alleged facts are not beyond dispute,\nand that, even if true, innumerable other unknown and unknowable facts must\nhave been associated with them--fully admitting, in short, that our ideas\nconcerning the genesis of the solar system are of the crudest and least\ntrustworthy character; still, if it be admitted, what at the present day\nonly ignorance or prejudice can deny, viz., that, as a whole, evolution has\nbeen the method of the universe; then it follows that the doctrine here\ncontended for is as certainly true as it would be were we fully acquainted\nwith every cause and every change which has acted and ensued throughout the\nwhole process of the genesis of things.\n\nNow, bearing this caveat in mind, we have next to observe that when once\nthe nebula began to condense, new relations among its constituent parts\nwould, _for this reason_, begin to be established. \"Given a rare and widely\ndiffused mass of nebulous matter,... what are the successive changes that\nwill take place? Mutual gravitation will approximate its atoms, but their\napproximation will be opposed by atomic repulsion, the overcoming of which\nimplies the evolution of heat.\" That is to say, the condensation of the\nnebula as a whole of necessity implies at least the origination of these\nnew material and dynamical relations among its constituent parts. \"As fast\nas this heat partially escapes by radiation, further approximation will\ntake place, attended by further evolution of heat, and so on continuously:\nthe processes not occurring separately, as here described, but\nsimultaneously, uninterruptedly, and with increasing activity.\" Hence the\nnewly established relations continuously acquire new increments of\nintensity. But now observe a more important point. The previous essential\nconditions remaining unaltered--viz., the persistence of matter and force,\nas well as, or rather let us say and consequently, the law of\ngravitation--these conditions, I say, remaining constant, and the newly\nestablished relations would necessarily _of themselves_ give origin to\n_new_ laws. For whenever two given quantities of force and matter met in\none of the novel relations, they would of necessity give rise to novel\neffects; and whenever, on any future occasion, similar quantities of force\nand matter again so met, precisely similar effects would of necessity\nrequire to occur: but the occurrence of similar effects under similar\nconditions is all that we mean by a natural law.\n\nContinuing, then, our quotation from Mr. Herbert Spencer's terse and lucid\nexposition of the nebular theory, we find this doctrine virtually embodied\nin the next sentences:--\"Eventually this slow movement of the atoms towards\ntheir common centre of gravity will bring about phenomena of another order.\n\n\"Arguing from the known laws of atomic combination, it will happen that,\nwhen the nebulous mass has reached a particular stage of condensation--when\nits internally situated atoms have approached to within certain distances,\nhave generated a certain amount of heat, and are subject to a certain\nmutual pressure (the heat and pressure increasing as the aggregation\nprogresses), some of them will suddenly enter into chemical union. Whether\nthe binary atoms so produced be of kinds such as we know, which is\npossible, or whether they be of kinds simpler than any we know, which is\nmore probable, matters not to the argument. It suffices that molecular\ncombinations of some species will finally take place.\" We have, then, here\na new and important change of relations. Matter, primordially uniform, has\nitself become heterogeneous; and in as many places as it has thus changed\nits state, it must, in virtue of the fact, give rise to other hitherto\nnovel relations, and so, in many cases, to new laws.[22]\n\nIt would be tedious and unnecessary to trace this genesis of natural law\nany further: indeed, it would be quite impossible so to trace it for any\nconsiderable distance without feeling that the ever-multiplying mazes of\nrelations renders all speculation as to the actual processes quite useless.\nThis fact, however, as before insisted, in no wise affects the only\ndoctrine which I here enunciate--viz., that the self-generation of natural\nlaw is a necessary corollary from the persistence of matter and force. And\nthat this must be so is now, I hope, sufficiently evident. Just as in the\nfirst dawn of things, when the proto-binary compounds of matter gave rise\nto new relations together with their appropriate laws, so throughout the\nwhole process of evolution, as often as matter acquired a hitherto novel\nstate, or in one of its old states entered into hitherto novel relations,\nso often would non-existent or even impossible laws become at once possible\nand necessary. And in this way I cannot see that there is any reason to\nstop until we arrive at all the marvellous complexity of things as they\nare. For aught that speculative reason can ever from henceforth show to the\ncontrary, the evolution of all the diverse phenomena of inorganic nature,\nof life, and of mind, appears to be as necessary and as self-determined as\nis the being of that mysterious Something which is Everything,--the Entity\nwe must all believe in, which without condition and beyond relation holds\nits existence in itself.\n\nSec. 33. Does it still seem incredible that, notwithstanding it requires\nmental processes to interpret external nature, external nature may\nnevertheless be destitute of mind? Then let us look at the subject on its\nobverse aspect.\n\nAccording to the theory of evolution--which, be it always remembered, is no\nmere gratuitous supposition, but a genuine scientific theory--human\nintelligence, like everything else, has been evolved. Now in what does the\nevolution of intelligence consist? Any one acquainted with the writings of\nour great philosopher can have no hesitation in answering: Clearly and only\nin the establishment of more and more numerous and complex internal or\npsychological relations. In other words, the law of intelligence being\n\"that the strengths of the inner cohesions between psychical states must be\nproportionate to the persistences of the outer relations symbolised,\" it\nfollows that the development of intelligence is \"secured by the one simple\nprinciple that experience of the outer relations _produces_ inner\ncohesions, and makes the inner cohesions strong in proportion as the outer\nrelations are persistent.\" Now the question before us at present is merely\nthis:--Must we not infer that these outer relations are regulated by mind,\nseeing that order is undoubtedly apparent among them, and that it requires\nmental processes on our part to interpret this order? The only legitimate\nanswer to this question is, that these outer relations _may_ be regulated\nby mind, but that, in view of the evolution theory, we are certainly not\nentitled to infer that they _are_ so regulated, _merely_ because it\nrequires mental processes on our part to interpret their orderly character.\nFor if it is true that the human mind was itself evolved by these outer\nrelations--ever continuously moulded into conformity with them as the prime\ncondition of its existence--then its process of interpreting them is but\nreflecting (as it were) in consciousness these outer relations by which the\ninner ones were originally produced. Granting that, as a matter of fact, an\nobjective macrocosm exists, and if we can prove or render probable that\nthis objective macrocosm is _of itself_ sufficient to evolve a subjective\nmicrocosm, I do not see any the faintest reason for the latter to conclude\nthat a self-conscious intelligence is inherent in the former, merely\nbecause it is able to trace in the macrocosm some of those orderly\nobjective relations by which its own corresponding subjective relations\nwere originally produced. If it is said that it is impossible to conceive\nhow, apart from mind, the orderly objective relations themselves can ever\nhave originated, I reply that this is merely to shift the ground of\ndiscussion to that which occupied us in the last section: all we are now\nengaged upon is,--Granting that the existence of such orderly relations is\nactual, whether with or without mind to account for them; and granting also\nthat these relations are _of themselves_ sufficient to produce\ncorresponding subjective relations; then the mere fact of our conscious\nintelligence being able to discover numerous and complex outer relations\nanswering to those which they themselves have caused in our intelligence,\ndoes not warrant the latter in concluding that the causal connection\nbetween intelligence and non-intelligence has ever been reversed--that\nthese outer relations in turn are caused by a similar conscious\nintelligence. How such a thing as a conscious intelligence is possible is\nanother and wholly unanswerable question (though not more so than that as\nto the existence of force and matter, and would not be rendered less so by\nmerging the fact in a hypothetical Deity); but granting, as we must, that\nsuch an entity does exist, and supposing it to have been evolved by natural\ncauses, then it would appear incontestably to follow, that whether or not\nobjective existence is presided over by objective mind, our subjective mind\nwould _alike_ and _equally_ require to read in the facts of the external\nworld an indication, whether true or false, of some such presiding agency.\nThe subjective mind being, by the supposition, but the obverse aspect of\nthe sum total of such among objective relations as have had a share in its\nproduction, when, as in observation and reflection, this obverse aspect is\nagain inverted upon its die, it naturally fits more or less exactly into\nall the prints.\n\nSec. 34. This last illustration, however, serves to introduce us to another\npoint. The supposed evidence from which the existence of mind in nature is\ninferred does not always depend upon such minute correspondences between\nsubjective method and objective method as the illustration suggests. Every\nnatural theologian has experienced more or less difficulty in explaining\nthe fact, that while there is a tolerably general similarity between the\ncontrivances due to human thought and the apparent contrivances in nature\nwhich he regards as due to divine thought, the similarity is nevertheless\n_only_ general. For instance, if a man has occasion to devise any\nartificial appliance, he does so with the least possible cost of labour to\nhimself, and with the least possible expenditure of material. Yet it is\nobvious that in nature as a whole no such economic considerations obtain.\nDoubtless by superficial minds this assertion will be met at first with an\nindignant denial: they have been accustomed to accumulate instances of this\nvery principle of economy in nature; perhaps written about it in books, and\nillustrated it in lectures,--totally ignoring the fact that the instances\nof economy in nature bear no proportion at all to the instances of\nprodigality. Conceive of the force which is being quite uselessly expended\nby all the wind-currents which are at this moment blowing over the face of\nEurope. Imagine the energy that must have been dissipated during the\nsecular cooling of this single planet. Feebly try to think of what the sun\nis radiating into space. If it is retorted that we are incompetent to judge\nof the purposes of the Almighty, I reply that this is but to abandon the\nargument from economy whenever it is found untenable: we presume to be\ncompetent judges of almighty purposes so long as they appear to imitate our\nown; but so soon as there is any divergence observable, we change front. By\nthus selecting all the instances of economy in nature, and disregarding all\nthe vastly greater instances of reckless waste, we are merely laying\nourselves open to the charge of an unfair eclecticism. And this formal\nrefutation of the argument from economy admits of being further justified\nin a strikingly substantial manner; for if all the examples of economy in\nnature that were ever observed, or admit being observed, were collected\ninto one view, I undertake to affirm that, without exception, they would be\nfound to marshal themselves in one great company--the subjects whose law is\n_survival of the fittest_. One question only will I here ask. Is it\npossible at the present day for any degree of prejudice, after due\nconsideration, to withstand the fact that the solitary exceptions to the\nuniversal prodigality so painfully conspicuous in nature are to be found\nwhere there is also to be found a full and adequate physical explanation of\ntheir occurrence?\n\nBut, again, prodigality is only one of several particulars wherein the\nmodes and the means of the supposed divine intelligence differ from those\nof its human counterpart. Comparative anatomists can point to organic\nstructures which are far from being theoretically perfect: even the mind of\nman in these cases, notwithstanding its confessed deficiencies in respect\nboth of cognitive and cogitative powers, is competent to suggest\nimprovements to an intelligence supposed to be omniscient and all-wise! And\nwhat shall we say of the numerous cases in which the supposed purposes of\nthis intelligence could have been attained by other and less roundabout\nmeans? In short, not needlessly to prolong discussion, it is admitted, even\nby natural theologians themselves, that the difficulties of reconciling,\neven approximately, the supposed processes of divine thought with the known\nprocesses of human thought are quite insuperable. The fact is expressed by\nsuch writers in various ways,--_e.g._, that it would be presumptuous in man\nto expect complete conformity in all cases; that the counsels of God are\npast finding out; that his ways are not as our ways, and so on. Observing\nonly, as before, that in thus ignoring adverse cases natural theologians\nare guilty of an unfair eclecticism, it is evident that all such\nexpressions concede the fact, that even in those provinces of nature where\nthe evidence of superhuman intelligence appears most plain, the resemblance\nof its apparent products to those of human intelligence consists in a\ngeneral approximation of method rather than in any precise similarity of\nparticulars: the likeness is generic rather than specific.\n\nNow this is exactly what we should expect to be the case, if the similarity\nin question be due to the cause which the present section endeavours to set\nforth. If all natural laws are self-evolved, and if human intelligence is\nbut a subjective photograph of certain among their interrelations, it seems\nbut natural that when this photograph compares itself with the whole\nexternal world from parts of which it was taken, its subjective lights and\nshadows should be found to correspond with some of the objective lights and\nshadows much more perfectly than with others. Still there would doubtless\nbe sufficient general conformity to lead the thinking photograph to\nconclude that the great world of objective reality, instead of being the\n_cause_ of such conformity as exists, was itself the _effect_ of some\ncommon cause,--that it too was of the nature of a picture. Dropping the\nfigure, if it is true that human intelligence has been evolved by natural\nlaw, then in view of all that has been said it must now, I think, be\ntolerably apparent, _that as by the hypothesis human intelligence has\nalways been required to think and to act in conformity with law, human\nintelligence must at last be in danger of confusing or identifying the fact\nof action in conformity with law with the existence and the action of a\nself-conscious intelligence. Reading then in external nature innumerable\nexamples of action in conformity with law, human intelligence falls back\nupon the unwarrantable identification, and out of the bare fact that law\nexists in nature concludes that beyond nature there is an Intelligent\nLawgiver._\n\nSec. 35. From what has been said in the last five sections, it manifestly\nfollows that all the varied phenomena of the universe not only may, but\nmust, depend upon the persistence of force and the primary qualities of\nmatter.[23] Be it remembered that the object of the last three sections was\nmerely to \"_facilitate conception_\" of the fact that it does not at all\nfollow, because the phenomena of external nature admit of being\nintelligently inquired into, therefore they are due to an intelligent\ncause. The last three sections are hence in a manner parenthetical, and it\nis of comparatively little importance whether or not they have been\nsuccessful in their object; for, from what went before, it is abundantly\nmanifest that, whether or not the subjective side of the question admits of\nsatisfactory elucidation, there can be no doubt that the objective side of\nit is as certain as are the fundamental axioms of science. It does not\nadmit of one moment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all the\nexquisite beauty and melodious harmony of nature follow as necessarily and\nas inevitably from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of\nmatter, as it is certainly true that force is persistent, or that matter is\nextended and impenetrable. No doubt this generalisation is too vast to be\nadequately conceived, but there can be equally little doubt that it is\nnecessarily true. If matter and force have been eternal, so far as human\nmind can soar it can discover no need of a superior mind to explain the\nvaried phenomena of existence. Man has truly become in a new sense the\nmeasure of the universe, and in this the latest and most appalling of his\nsoundings, indications are returned from the infinite voids of space and\ntime by which he is surrounded, that his intelligence, with all its noble\ncapacities for love and adoration, is yet alone--destitute of kith or kin\nin all this universe of being.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD.\n\nSec. 36. But the discussion must not end here. Inexorable logic has forced us\nto conclude that, viewing the question as to the existence of a God only by\nthe light which modern science has shed upon it, there no longer appears to\nbe any semblance of an argument in its favour. Let us then turn upon\nscience herself, and question her right to be our sole guide in this\nmatter. Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the\nhypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as certainly\nsuperfluous is the very basis of all science is certainly true. There can\nno longer be any more doubt that the existence of a God is wholly\nunnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the universe, than there is\ndoubt that if I leave go of my pen it will fall upon the table. Nay, the\ndoubt is even less than this, because while the knowledge that my pen will\nfall if I allow it to do so is founded chiefly upon empirical knowledge (I\ncould not predict with _a priori_ certainty that it would so fall, for the\npen might be in an electrical state, or subject to some set of unknown\nnatural laws antagonistic to gravity), the knowledge that a Deity is\nsuperfluous as an explanation of anything, being grounded on the doctrine\nof the persistence of force, is grounded on an _a priori_ necessity of\nreason--_i.e._, if this fact were not so, our science, our thought, our\nvery existence itself, would be scientifically impossible.\n\nBut now, having thus stated the case as strongly as I am able, it remains\nto question how far the authority of science extends. Even our knowledge of\nthe persistence of force and of the primary qualities of matter is but of\nrelative significance. Deeper than the foundations of our experience,\n\"deeper than demonstration--deeper even than definite cognition,--deep as\nthe very nature of mind,\"[24] are these the most ultimate of known truths;\nbut where from this is our warrant for concluding with certainty that these\nknown truths are everywhere and eternally true? It will be said that there\nis a strong analogical probability. Perhaps so, but of this next: I am not\nnow speaking of probability; I am speaking of certainty; and unless we deny\nthe doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, we cannot but conclude that\nthere is no absolute certainty in this case. As I deem this consideration\none of great importance, I shall proceed to develop it at some length. It\nwill be observed, then, that the consideration really amounts to\nthis:--Although it must on all hands be admitted that the fact of the\ntheistic hypothesis not being required to explain any of the phenomena of\nnature is a fact which has been demonstrated _scientifically_, nevertheless\nit must likewise on all hands be admitted that this fact has not, and\ncannot be, demonstrated _logically_. Or thus, although it is unquestionably\ntrue that so far as science can penetrate she cannot discern any\nspeculative necessity for a God, it may nevertheless be true that if\nscience could penetrate further she might discern some such necessity. Now\nthe present discussion would clearly be incomplete if it neglected to\ndefine as carefully this the logical standing of our subject, as it has\nhitherto endeavoured to define its scientific standing. As a final step in\nour analysis, therefore, we must altogether quit the region of experience,\nand, ignoring even the very foundations of science and so all the most\ncertain of relative truths, pass into the transcendental region of purely\nformal considerations. In this region theist and atheist must alike consent\nto forego all their individual predilections, and, after regarding the\nsubject as it were in the abstract and by the light of pure logic alone,\nfinally come to an agreement as to the transcendental probability of the\nquestion before them. Disregarding the actual probability which they\nseverally feel to exist in relation to their own individual intelligences,\nthey must apply themselves to ascertain the probability which exists in\nrelation to those fundamental laws of thought which preside over the\nintelligence of our race. In fine, it will now, I hope, be understood that,\nas we have hitherto been endeavouring to determine, by deductions drawn\nfrom the very foundations of all possible science, the _relative_\nprobability as to the existence of a God, so we shall next apply ourselves\nto the task of ascertaining the _absolute_ probability of such\nexistence--or, more correctly, what is the strictly _formal_ probability of\nsuch existence when its possibility is contemplated in an absolute sense.\n\nSec. 37. To begin then. In the last resort, the value of every probability is\nfixed by \"ratiocination.\" In endeavouring, therefore, to fix the degree of\nstrictly formal probability that is present in any given case, our method\nof procedure should be, first to ascertain the ultimate ratios on which the\nprobability depends, and then to estimate the comparative value of these\nratios. Now I think there can be no doubt that the value of any probability\nin this its last analysis is determined by the number, the importance, and\nthe definiteness of the relations known, as compared with those of the\nrelations unknown; and, consequently, that in all cases where the sum of\nthe unknown relations is larger, or more important, or more indefinite than\nis the sum of the known relations, it is an essential principle that the\nvalue of the probability decreases in exact proportion to the decrease in\nthe similarity between the two sets of relations, whether this decrease\nconsists in the number, in the importance, or in the definiteness of the\nrelations involved. This rule or canon is self-evident as soon as pointed\nout, and has been formulated by Professor Bain in his \"Logic\" when treating\nof Analogy, but not with sufficient precision; for, while recognising the\nelements of number and importance, he has overlooked that of definiteness.\nThis element, however, is a very essential one--indeed the most essential\nof the three; for there are many analogical inferences in which either the\ncharacter or the extent of the unknown relations is quite indefinite; and\nit is obvious that, whenever this is the case, the value of the analogy is\nproportionably diminished, and diminished in a much more material\nparticular than it is when the diminution of value arises from a mere\nexcess of the unknown relations over the known ones in respect of their\nnumber or of their importance. For it is evident that, in the latter case,\nhowever little value the analogy may possess, the exact degree of such\nvalue admits of being _determined_; while it is no less evident that, in\nthe former case, we are precluded from estimating the value of the analogy\nat all, and this just in proportion to the indefiniteness of the unknown\nrelations.\n\nSec. 38. Now the particular instance with which we are concerned is somewhat\npeculiar. Notwithstanding we have the entire sphere of human experience\nfrom which to argue, we are still unable to gauge the strictly logical\nprobability of any argument whatsoever; for the unknown relations in this\ncase are so wholly indefinite, both as to their character and extent, that\nany attempt to institute a definite comparison between them and the known\nrelations is felt at once to be absurd. The question discussed, being the\nmost ultimate of all possible questions, must eventually contain in itself\nall that is to man unknown and unknowable; the whole orbit of human\nknowledge is here insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to institute\nthe required measurements.\n\nSec. 39. I think it is desirable to insist upon this truth at somewhat greater\nlength, and, for the sake of impressing it still more deeply, I shall\npresent it in another form. No one can for a single moment deny that,\nbeyond and around the sphere of the Knowable, there exists the unfathomable\nabyss of the Unknowable. I do not here use this latter word as embodying\nany theory: I merely wish it to state the undoubted fact, which all must\nadmit, viz., that beneath all our possible explanations there lies a great\nInexplicable. Now let us see what is the effect of making this necessary\nadmission. In the first place, it clearly follows that, while our\nconceptions as to what the Unknowable contains may or may not represent the\ntruth, it is certain that we can never discover whether or not they do.\nFurther, it is impossible for us to determine even a definite _probability_\nas to the existence (much less the nature) of anything which we may suppose\nthe Unknowable to contain. We may, of course, perceive that such and such a\nsupposition is more _conceivable_ than such and such; but, as already\nindicated, the fact does not show that the one is in itself more definitely\n_probable_ than the other, unless it has been previously shown, either that\nthe capacity of our conceptions is a _fully adequate measure_ of the\nPossible, or that the proportion between such capacity and the extent of\nthe Possible is a proportion that can be _determined_. In either of these\ncases, the Conceivable would be a fair measure of the Possible: in the\nformer case, an exact equivalent (_e.g._, in any instance of contradictory\npropositions, the most conceivable would _certainly_ be true); in the\nlatter case, a measure any degree less than an exact equivalent--the degree\ndepending upon the _then_ ascertainable disparity between the extent of the\nPossible and the extent of the Conceivable. Now the Unknowable (including\nof course the Inconceivable Existent) is a species of the Possible, and in\nits name carries the declaration that the disparity between its extent and\nthe extent of the Conceivable (_i.e._, the other species of the Possible)\nis a disparity that cannot be determined. We are hence driven to the\nconclusion that the most apparently probable of all propositions, if\npredicated of anything within the Unknowable, may not in reality be a whit\nmore so than is the most apparently improbable proposition which it is\npossible to make; for if it is admitted (as of course it must be) that we\nare necessarily precluded from comparing the extent of the Conceivable with\nthat of the Unknowable, then it necessarily follows that in no case\nwhatever are we competent to judge how far an _apparent_ probability\nrelating to the latter province is an _actual_ probability. In other words,\ndid we know the proportion subsisting between the Conceivable and the\nUnknowable in respect of relative extent and character, and so of inherent\nprobabilities, we should then be able to estimate the actual value of any\napparent probability relating to the latter province; but, as it is, our\nability to make this estimate varies inversely as our inability to estimate\nour ignorance in this particular. And as our ignorance in this particular\nis total--_i.e._, since we cannot even approximately determine the\nproportion that subsists between the Conceivable and the Unknowable,--the\nresult is that our ability to make the required estimate in any given case\nis absolutely _nil_.\n\nSec. 40. I have purposely rendered this presentation in terms of the highest\nabstraction, partly to avoid the possibility of any one, whatever his\ntheory of things may be, finding anything at which to object, and partly in\norder that my meaning may be understood to include all things which are\nbeyond the range of possible knowledge. Most of all, therefore, must this\npresentation (if it contains anything of truth) apply to the question\nregarding the existence of Deity; for the _Ens Realissimum_ must of all\nthings be furthest removed from the range of possible knowledge. Hence, if\nthis presentation contains anything of truth--and of its rigidly accurate\ntruth I think there can be no question--the assertion that the\nSelf-existing Substance is a Personal and Intelligent Being, and the\nassertion that this Substance is an Impersonal and Non-Intelligent Being,\nare alike assertions wholly destitute of any assignable degree of logical\nprobability, I say _assignable_ degree of logical probability, because that\n_some_ degree of such probability may exist I do not undertake to deny. All\nI assert is, that if we are here able to institute any such probability at\nall, we are unable logically to assign to it any determinate degree of\nvalue. Or, in other words, although we may establish some probability in a\nsense relative to ourselves, we are unable to know how far this probability\nis a probability in an absolute sense. Or again, the case is not as though\nwe were altogether unacquainted with the Possible. Experience undoubtedly\naffords us some information regarding this, although, comparatively\nspeaking, we are unable to know how much. Consequently, we must suppose\nthat, in any given case, it is more likely that the Conceivable should be\nPossible than that the Inconceivable should be so, and that the Conceivably\nProbable should exist than that the Conceivably Improbable should do so: in\nneither case, however, can we know _what degree_ of such likelihood is\npresent.\n\nSec. 41. From the foregoing considerations, then, it would appear that the\nonly attitude which in strict logic it is admissible to adopt towards the\nquestion concerning the being of a God is that of \"suspended judgment.\"\nFormally speaking, it is alike illegitimate to affirm or to deny\nIntelligence as an attribute of the Ultimate. And here I would desire it to\nbe observed, that this is the attitude which the majority of\nscientifically-trained philosophers actually have adopted with regard to\nthis matter. I am not aware, however, that any one has yet endeavoured to\nformulate the justification of this attitude; and as I think there can be\nno doubt that the above presentation contains in a logical shape the whole\nof such justification, I cannot but think that some important ends will\nhave been secured by it. For we are here in possession, not merely of a\nvague and general impression that the Ultimate is super-scientific, and so\nbeyond the range of legitimate prediction; but we are also in possession of\na logical formula whereby at once to vindicate the rationality of our\nopinion, and to measure the precise degree of its technical value.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY.\n\nSec. 42. Let us now proceed to examine the effect of the formal considerations\nwhich have been adduced in the last chapter on the scientific\nconsiderations which were dealt with in the previous chapters. In these\nprevious chapters the proposition was clearly established that, just as\ncertainly as the fundamental data of science are true, so certainly is it\ntrue that the theory of Theism in any shape is, scientifically considered,\nsuperfluous; for these chapters have clearly shown that, if there is a God,\nhis existence, considered as a cause of things, is as certainly unnecessary\nas it is certainly true that force is persistent and that matter is\nindestructible. But after this proposition had been carefully justified, it\nremained to show that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge compelled\nus to carry our discussion into a region of yet higher abstraction. For\nalthough we observed that the essential qualities of matter and of force\nare the most ultimate data of human knowledge, and although, by showing how\nfar the question of Theism depended on these data, we carried the\ndiscussion of that question to the utmost possible limits of scientific\nthought, it still devolved on us to contemplate the fact that even these\nthe most ultimate data of science are only known to be of relative\nsignificance. And the bearing of this fact to the question of Theism was\nseen to be most important. For, without waiting to recapitulate the\nsubstance of a chapter so recently concluded, it will be remembered that\nits effect was to establish this position beyond all controversy--viz.,\nthat when ideas which have been formed by our experience within the region\nof phenomenal actuality are projected into the region of ontological\npossibility, they become utterly worthless; seeing that we can never have\nany means whereby to test the actual value of whatever transcendental\nprobabilities they may appear to establish. Therefore it is that even the\nmost ultimate of relative truths with which, as we have seen, the question\nof Theism is so vitally associated, is almost without meaning when\ncontemplated in an absolute sense. What, then, is the effect of these\nmetaphysical considerations on the position of Theism as we have seen it to\nbe left by the highest generalisations of physical science? Let us\ncontemplate this question with the care which it deserves.\n\nIn the first place, it is evident that the effect of these purely formal\nconsiderations is to render all reasonings on the subject of Theism equally\nillegitimate, unless it is constantly borne in mind that such reasonings\ncan only be of relative signification. Thus, as a matter of pure logic,\nthese considerations are destructive of all assignable validity of any such\nreasoning whatsoever. Still, even a strictly relative probability is, in\nsome undefinable degree, of more value than no probability at all, as we\nhave seen these same formal considerations to show (see Sec. 40); and,\nmoreover, even were this not so, the human mind will never rest until it\nattains to the furthest probability which to its powers is accessible.\nTherefore, if we do not forget the merely relative nature of the\nconsiderations which are about to be adduced, by adducing them we may at\nthe same time satisfy our own minds and abstain from violating the\nconditions of sound logic.\n\nThe shape, then, to which the subject has now been reduced is simply\nthis:--Seeing that the theory of Evolution in its largest sense has shown\nthe theory of Theism to be superfluous in a scientific sense, does it not\nfollow that the theory of Theism is thus shown to be superfluous in any\nsense? For it would seem from the discussion, so far as it has hitherto\ngone, that the only rational basis on which the theory of Theism can rest\nis a basis of teleology; and if, as has been clearly shown, the theory of\nevolution, by deducing the genesis of natural law from the primary data of\nscience, irrevocably destroys this basis, does it not follow that the\ntheory of evolution has likewise destroyed the theory which rested on that\nbasis? Now I conclude, as stated at the close of Chapter IV., that the\nquestion here put must certainly be answered in the affirmative, so far as\nits scientific aspect is concerned. But when we consider the question in\nits purely logical aspect, as we have done in Chapter V., the case is\notherwise. For although, so far as the utmost reach of scientific vision\nenables us to see, we can discern no evidence of Deity, it does not\ntherefore follow that beyond the range of such vision Deity does not exist.\nScience indeed has proved that if there is a Divine Mind in nature, and if\nby the hypothesis such a Mind exerts any causative influence on the\nphenomena of nature, such influence is exerted beyond the sphere of\nexperience. And this achievement of science, be it never forgotten, is an\nachievement of prodigious importance, effectually destroying, as it does,\nall vestiges of a scientific teleology. But be it now carefully observed,\nalthough all vestiges of a _scientific_ teleology are thus completely and\npermanently ruined, the formal considerations adduced in the last chapter\nsupply the conditions for constructing what may be termed a _metaphysical_\nteleology. I use these terms advisedly, because I think they will serve to\nbring out with great clearness the condition to which our analysis of the\nteleological argument has now been reduced.\n\nSec. 43. In the first place, let it be understood that I employ the terms\n\"scientific\" and \"metaphysical\" in the convenient sense in which they are\nemployed by Mr. Lewes, viz., as respectively designating a theory that is\nverifiable and a theory that is not. Consequently, by the term \"scientific\nteleology\" I mean to denote a form of teleology which admits either of\nbeing proved or disproved, while by the term \"metaphysical teleology\" I\nmean to denote a form of teleology which does not admit either of being\nproved or of being disproved. Now, with these significations clearly\nunderstood, it will be seen that the forms of teleology which we have\nhitherto considered belong entirely to the scientific class. That the\nPaleyerian form of the argument did so is manifest, first because this\nargument itself treats the problem of Theism as a problem that is\nsusceptible of scientific demonstration, and next because we have seen that\nthe advance of science has proved this argument susceptible of scientific\nrefutation. In other words, from the supposed axiom, \"There cannot be\napparent design without a designer,\" adaptations in nature become logically\navailable as purely scientific evidence of an intelligent cause; and that\nPaley himself regarded them exclusively in this light is manifest, both\nfrom his own \"statement of the argument,\" and from the character of the\nevidence by which he seeks to establish the argument when stated--witness\nthe typical passage before quoted (Sec. 26). On the other hand, we have\nclearly seen that this Paleyerian system of natural theology has been\neffectually demolished by the scientific theory of natural selection--the\nfundamental axiom of the former having been shown by the latter to be\nscientifically untrue. Hence the term \"scientific teleology\" is without\nquestion applicable to the Paleyerian system.\n\nNor is the case essentially different with the more refined form of the\nteleological argument which we have had to consider--the argument, namely,\nfrom General Laws. For here, likewise, we have clearly seen that the\ninference from the ubiquitous operation of General Laws to the existence of\nan omniscient Law-maker is quite as illegitimate as is the inference from\napparent Design to the existence of a Supreme Designer. In other words,\nscience, by establishing the doctrine of the persistence of force and the\nindestructibility of matter, has effectually disproved the hypothesis that\nthe presence of Law in nature is of itself sufficient to prove the\nexistence of an intelligent Law-giver.\n\nThus it is that scientific teleology in any form is now and for ever\nobsolete. But not so with what I have termed metaphysical teleology. For as\nwe have seen that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge precludes us\nfrom asserting, or even from inferring, that beyond the region of the\nKnowable Mind does not exist, it remains logically possible to institute a\nmetaphysical hypothesis that beyond this region of the Knowable Mind does\nexist. There being a necessary absence of any positive information whereby\nto refute this metaphysical hypothesis, any one who chooses to adopt it is\nfully justified in doing so, provided only he remembers that the purely\nmetaphysical quality whereby the hypothesis is ensured against disproof,\nlikewise, and in the same degree, precludes it from the possibility of\nproof. He must remember that it is no longer open to him to point to any\nparticular set of general laws and to assert, these proclaim Intelligence\nas their cause; for we have repeatedly seen that the known states of matter\nand force themselves afford sufficient explanation of the facts to which he\npoints. And he must remember that the only reason why his hypothesis does\nnot conflict with any of the truths known to science, is because he has\nbeen careful to rest that hypothesis upon a basis of purely formal\nconsiderations, which lie beyond even the most fundamental truths of which\nscience is cognisant.\n\nThus, for example, he may present his metaphysical theory of Theism in some\nsuch terms as these:--'Fully conceding what reason shows must be conceded,\nand there still remains this possible supposition--viz., that there is a\npresiding Mind in nature, which exerts its causative influence beyond the\nsphere of experience, thus rendering it impossible for us to obtain\nscientific evidence of its action. For such a Mind, exerting such an\ninfluence beyond experience, may direct affairs within experience by\nmethods conceivable or inconceivable to us--producing, possibly,\ninnumerable and highly varied results, which in turn may produce their\neffects within experience, their introduction being then, of course, in the\nordinary way of natural law. For instance, there can be no question that by\nthe intelligent creation or dissipation of energy, all the phenomena of\ncosmic evolution might have been directed, and, for aught that science can\nshow to the contrary, thus only rendered possible. Hence there is at least\none nameable way in which, even in accordance with observed facts, a\nSupreme Mind could be competent to direct the phenomena of observable\nnature. But we are not necessarily restricted to the limits of the nameable\nin this matter, so that it is of no argumentative importance whether or not\nthis suggested method is the method which the supposed Mind actually\nadopts, seeing that there may still be other possible methods, which,\nnevertheless, we are unable to suggest.'\n\nDoubtless the hypothesis of Theism, as thus presented, will be deemed by\nmany persons but of very slender probability. I am not, however, concerned\nwith whatever character of probability it may be supposed to exhibit. I am\nmerely engaged in carefully presenting the only hypothesis which can be\npresented, if the theory as to an Intelligent Author of nature is any\nlonger to be maintained on grounds of a rational teleology. No doubt,\nscientifically considered, the hypothesis in question is purely gratuitous;\nfor, so far as the light of science can penetrate, there is no need of any\nsuch hypothesis at all. Thus it may well seem, at first sight, that no\nhypothesis could well have less to recommend it; and, so far as the\npresentation has yet gone, it is therefore fully legitimate for an atheist\nto reply:--'All that this so-called metaphysical theory amounts to is a\nwholly gratuitous assumption. No doubt it is always difficult, and usually\nimpossible, logically or unequivocally to prove a negative. If my adversary\nchose to imagine that nature is presided over by a demon with horns and\nhoofs, or by a dragon with claws and tail, I should be as unable to\ndisprove this his supposed theory as I am now unable to disprove his actual\ntheory. But in all cases reasonable men ought to be guided in their beliefs\nby such positive evidence as is available; and if, as in the present case,\nthe alternative belief is wholly gratuitous--adopted not only without any\nevidence, but against all that great body of evidence which the sum-total\nof science supplies--surely we ought not to hesitate for one moment in the\nchoice of our creed?'\n\nNow all this is quite sound in principle, provided only that the\nmetaphysical theory of Theism _is_ wholly gratuitous, in the sense of being\nutterly destitute of evidential support. That it is destitute of all\n_scientific_ support, we have already and repeatedly seen; but the question\nremains as to whether it is similarly destitute of _metaphysical_ support.\n\nSec. 44. To this question, then, let us next address ourselves. From the\ntheistic pleading which we have just heard, it is abundantly manifest that\nthe formal conditions of a metaphysical teleology are present: the question\nnow before us is as to whether or not any actual evidence exists in favour\nof such a theory. In order to discuss this question, let us begin by\nallowing the theist to continue his pleading. 'You have shown me,' he may\nsay, 'that a scientific or demonstrable system of teleology is no longer\npossible, and, therefore, as I have already conceded, I must take my stand\non a metaphysical or non-demonstrable system. But I reflect that the latter\nterm is a loose one, seeing that it embraces all possible degrees of\nevidence short of actual proof. The question, therefore, I conceive to be,\nWhat amount of evidence is there in favour of this metaphysical system of\nteleology? And this question I answer by the following considerations:--As\ngeneral laws separately have all been shown to be the necessary outcome of\nthe primary data of science, it certainly follows that general laws\ncollectively must be the same--_i.e._, that the whole system of general\nlaws must be, so far as the lights of our science can penetrate, the\nnecessary outcome of the persistence of force and the indestructibility of\nmatter. But you have also dearly shown me that these lights are of the\nfeeblest conceivable character when they are brought to illuminate the\nfinal mystery of things. I therefore feel at liberty to assert, that if\nthere is any one principle to be observed in the collective operation of\ngeneral laws which cannot conceivably be explained by any cause other than\nthat of intelligent guidance, I am still free to fall back on such a\nprinciple and to maintain--Although the collective operation of general\nlaws follows as a necessary consequence from the primary data of science,\nthis one principle which pervades their united action, and which cannot be\nconceivably explained by any hypothesis other than that of intelligent\nguidance, is a principle which still remains to be accounted for; and as it\ncannot conceivably be accounted for on grounds of physical science, I may\nlegitimately account for it on grounds of metaphysical teleology. Now I\ncannot open my eyes without perceiving such a principle everywhere\ncharacterising the collective operation of general laws. Universally I\nbehold in nature, order, beauty, harmony,--that is, a perfect _correlation_\namong general laws. But this ubiquitous correlation among general laws,\nconsidered as the cause of cosmic harmony, itself requires some explanatory\ncause such as the persistence of force and the indestructibility of matter\ncannot conceivably be made to supply. For unless we postulate some one\nintegrating cause, the greater the number of general laws in nature, the\nless likelihood is there of such laws being so correlated as to produce\nharmony by their combined action. And forasmuch as the only cause that I am\nable to imagine as competent to produce such effects is that of intelligent\nguidance, I accept the metaphysical hypothesis that beyond the sphere of\nthe Knowable there exists an Unknown God.[25]\n\n'If it is retorted that the above argument involves an absurd\ncontradiction, in that while it sets out with an explicit avowal of the\nfact that the collective operation of general laws follows as a necessary\nconsequence from the primary data of physical science, it nevertheless\nafterwards proceeds to explain an effect of such collective operation by a\nmetaphysical hypothesis; I answer that it was expressly for the purpose of\neliciting this retort that I threw my argument into the above form. For the\nposition which I wish to establish is this, that fully accepting the\nlogical cogency of the reasoning whereby the action of every law is deduced\nfrom the primary data of science, I wish to show that when this train of\nreasoning is followed to its ultimate term, it leads us into the presence\nof a fact for which it is inadequate to account. If, then, my contention be\ngranted--viz., that to human faculties it is not conceivable how, in the\nabsence of a directing intelligence, general laws could be so correlated as\nto produce universal harmony--then I have brought the matter to this\nissue:--Notwithstanding the scientific train of argument being complete in\nitself, it still leaves us in the presence of a fact which it cannot\nconceivably explain; and it is this unexplained residuum--this total\nproduct of the operation of general laws--that I appeal to as the logical\njustification for a system of metaphysical teleology--a system which offers\nthe only conceivable explanation of this stupendous fact.\n\n'And here I may further observe, that the scientific train of reasoning is\nof the kind which embodies what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls \"symbolic\nconceptions of the illegitimate order.\"[26] That is to say, we can see how\nsuch simple laws as that action and reaction are equal and opposite may\nhave been self-evolved, and from this fact we go on generalising and\ngeneralising, until we land ourselves in wholly symbolic and--a paradox is\nhere legitimate--inconceivable conceptions. Now the farther we travel into\nthis region of unrealisable ideas, the less trustworthy is the report that\nwe are able to bring back. The method is in a sense scientific; but when\neven scientific method is projected into a region of really\nsuper-scientific possibility, it ceases to have that character of undoubted\ncertainty which it enjoys when dealing with verifiable subjects of inquiry.\nThe demonstrations are formal, but they are not real.\n\n'Therefore, looking to this necessarily suspicious character of the\nscientific train of reasoning, and then observing that, even if accepted,\nit leaves the fact of cosmic harmony unexplained, I maintain, that whatever\nprobability the phenomena of nature may in former times have been thought\nto establish in favour of the theory as to an intelligent Author of nature,\nthat probability has been in no wise annihilated--nor apparently can it\never be annihilated--by the advance of science. And not only so, but I\nquestion whether this probability has been even seriously impaired by such\nadvance, seeing that although this advance has revealed a speculative\n_raison d'etre_ of the mechanical precision of nature, it has at the same\ntime shown the baffling complexity of nature; and therefore, in view of\nwhat has just been said, leaves the balance of probability concerning the\nexistence of a God very much where it always was. For stay awhile to\ncontemplate this astounding complexity of harmonious nature! Think of how\nmuch we already know of its innumerable laws and processes, and then think\nthat this knowledge only serves to reveal, in a glimmering way, the huge\nimmensity of the unknown. Try to picture the meshwork of contending rhythms\nwhich must have been before organic nature was built up, and then let us\nask, Is it conceivable, is it credible, that all this can have been the\nwork of blind fate? Must we not feel that had there not been intelligent\nagency at work somewhere, other and less terrifically intricate results\nwould have ensued? And if we further try to symbolise in thought the\nunimaginable complexity of the material and dynamical changes in virtue of\nwhich that thought itself exists,--if we then extend our symbols to\nrepresent all the history of all the orderly changes which must have taken\nplace to evolve human intelligence into what it is,--and if we still\nfurther extend our symbols to try if it be possible, even in the language\nof symbols, to express the number and the subtlety of those natural laws\nwhich now preside over the human will;--in the face of so vast an\nassumption as that all this has been self-evolved, I am content still to\nrest in the faith of my forefathers.'\n\nSec. 45. Now I think it must be admitted that we have here a valid argument.\nThat is to say, the considerations which we have just adduced must, I\nthink, in fairness be allowed to have established this position:--That the\nsystem of metaphysical teleology for which we have supposed a candid theist\nto plead, is something more than a purely gratuitous system--that it does\nnot belong to the same category of baseless imaginings as that to which the\natheist at first sight, and in view of the scientific deductions alone,\nmight be inclined to assign it. For we have seen that our supposed theist,\nwhile fully admitting the formal cogency of the scientific train of\nreasoning, is nevertheless able to point to a fact which, in his opinion,\nlies without that train of reasoning. For he declares that it is beyond his\npowers of conception to regard the complex harmony of nature otherwise than\nas a product of some one integrating cause; and that the only cause of\nwhich he is able to conceive as adequate to produce such an effect is that\nof a conscious Intelligence. Pointing, therefore, to this complex harmony\nof nature as to a fact which cannot to his mind be conceivably explained by\nany deductions from physical science, he feels that he is justified in\nexplaining this fact by the aid of a metaphysical hypothesis. And in so\ndoing he is in my opinion perfectly justified, at any rate to this\nextent--that his antagonist cannot fairly dispose of this metaphysical\nhypothesis as a purely gratuitous hypothesis. How far it is a probable\nhypothesis is another question, and to this question we shall now address\nourselves.\n\nSec. 46. If it is true that the deductions from physical science cannot be\nconceived to explain some among the observed facts of nature, and if it is\ntrue that these particular facts admit of being conceivably explained by\nthe metaphysical hypothesis in question, then, beyond all controversy, this\nmetaphysical hypothesis must be provisionally accepted. Let us then\ncarefully examine the premises which are thus adduced to justify acceptance\nof this hypothesis as their conclusion.\n\nIn the first place, it is not--cannot--be denied, even by a theist, that\nthe deductions from physical science _do_ embrace the fact of cosmic\nharmony in their explanation, seeing that, as they explain the operation of\ngeneral laws collectively, they must be regarded as also explaining every\neffect of such operation. And this, as we have seen, is a consideration to\nwhich our imaginary theist was not blind. How then did he meet it? He met\nit by the considerations--1st. That the scientific train of reasoning\nevolved this conclusion only by employing, in a wholly unrestricted manner,\n\"symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate order;\" and, 2d. That when the\nconclusion thus illegitimately evolved was directly confronted with the\nfact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, he found it to be\nbeyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to\nsuch a cause. Now, as already observed, I consider these strictures on the\nscientific train of reasoning to be thoroughly valid. There can be no\nquestion that the highly symbolic character of the conceptions which that\ntrain of reasoning is compelled to adopt, is a source of serious weakness\nto the conclusions which it ultimately evolves; while there can, I think,\nbe equally little doubt that there does not live a human being who would\nventure honestly to affirm, that he can really conceive the fact of cosmic\nharmony as exclusively due to the causes which the scientific train of\nreasoning assigns. But freely conceding this much, and an atheist may\nreply, that although the objections of his antagonist against this symbolic\nmethod of reasoning are undoubtedly valid, yet, from the nature of the\ncase, this is the only method of scientific reasoning which is available.\nIf, therefore, he expresses his obligations to his antagonist for pointing\nout a source of weakness in this method of reasoning--a source of weakness,\nbe it observed, which renders it impossible for him to estimate the actual,\nas distinguished from the apparent, probability of the conclusion\nattained--this is all that he can be expected to do: he cannot be expected\nto abandon the only scientific method of reasoning available, in favour of\na metaphysical method which only escapes the charge of symbolism by leaping\nwith a single bound from a known cause (human intelligence) to the\ninference of an unknowable cause (Divine Intelligence). For the atheist may\nwell point out that, however objectionable his scientific method of\nreasoning may be on account of the symbolism which it involves, it must at\nany rate be preferable to the metaphysical method, in that its symbols\nthroughout refer to known causes.[27] With regard, then, to this stricture\non the scientific method of reasoning, I conclude that although the caveat\nwhich it contains should never be lost sight of by atheists, it is not of\nsufficient cogency to justify theists in abandoning a scientific in favour\nof a metaphysical mode of reasoning.\n\nHow then does it fare with the other stricture, or the consideration that,\n\"when the conclusion thus illegitimately[28] evolved is confronted with the\nfact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, we find it to be\nbeyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to\nsuch a cause\"? The atheist may answer, in the first place, that a great\ndeal here turns on the precise meaning which we assign to the word\n\"conceive.\" For we have just seen that, by employing \"symbolic\nconceptions,\" we _are_ able to frame what we may term a _formal_ conception\nof universal harmony as due to the persistence of force and the primary\nqualities of matter. That is to say, we have seen that such universal\nharmony as nature presents must be regarded as an effect of the collective\noperation of general laws; and we have previously arrived at a formal\nconception of general laws as singly and collectively the product of\nself-evolution. Consequently, the word \"conceive,\" as used in the theistic\nargument, must be taken to mean our ability to frame what we may term a\n_material_ conception, or a representation in thought of the whole history\nof cosmic evolution, which representation shall be in some satisfactory\ndegree intellectually realisable. Observing, then, this important\ndifference between an inconceivability which arises from an impossibility\nof establishing relations in thought between certain _abstract_ or\n_symbolic_ conceptions, and an inconceivability which arises from a mere\nfailure to realise in imagination the results which must follow among\nexternal relations if the symbolically conceivable combinations among them\never took place, an atheist may here argue as follows; and it does not\nappear that there is any legitimate escape from his reasonings.\n\n'I first consider the undoubted fact that the existence of a Supreme Mind\nin nature is, scientifically considered, unnecessary; and, therefore, that\nthe only reason we require to entertain the supposition of any such\nexistence at all is, that the complexity of nature being so great, we are\nunable adequately to conceive of its self-evolution--notwithstanding our\nreason tells us plainly that, given a self-existing universe of force and\nmatter, and such self-evolution becomes abstractedly possible. I then\nreflect that this is a negative and not a positive ground of belief. If the\nhypothesis of self-evolution is true, we should _a priori_ expect that by\nthe time evolution had advanced sufficiently far to admit of the production\nof a reasoning intelligence, the complexity of nature must be so great that\nthe nascent reasoning powers would be completely baffled in their attempts\nto comprehend the various processes going on around them. This seems to be\nabout the state of things which we now experience. Still, as reason\nadvances more and more, we may expect, both from general _a priori_\nprinciples and from particular historical analogies, that more and more of\nthe processes of nature will admit of being interpreted by reason, and that\nin proportion as our ability to _understand_ the frame and the constitution\nof things progresses, so our ability to _conceive_ of them as all naturally\nand necessarily evolved will likewise and concurrently progress. Thus, for\nexample, how vast a number of the most intricate and delicate correlations\nin nature have been rendered at once intelligible and conceivably due to\nnon-intelligent causes, by the discovery of a single principle in\nnature--the principle of natural selection.\n\n'In the adverse argument, conceivability is again made the unconditional\ntest of truth, just as it was in the argument against the possibility of\nmatter thinking. We reject the hypothesis of self-evolution, not because it\nis the more remote one, but simply because we experience a subjective\nincapacity adequately to frame the requisite generalisations in thought, or\nto frame them with as much clearness as we could wish. Yet our reason tells\nus as plainly as it tells us any general truth which is too large to be\npresented in detail, that there is nothing in the nature of things\nthemselves, as far as we can see, antagonistic to the supposition of their\nhaving been self-evolved. Only on the ground, therefore, of our own\nintellectual deficiencies; only because as yet, by the self-evolutionary\nhypothesis, the inner order does not completely answer to the outer order;\nonly because the number and complexity of subjective relations have not yet\nbeen able to rival those of the objective relations producing them; only on\nthis ground do we refuse to assent to the obvious deductions of our\nreason.[29]\n\n'And here I may observe, further, that the presumption in favour of atheism\nwhich these deductions establish is considerably fortified by certain _a\nposteriori_ considerations which we cannot afford to overlook. In\nparticular, I reflect that, as a matter of fact, the theistic theory is\nborn of highly suspicious parentage,--that Fetichism, or the crudest form\nof the theory of personal agency in external nature, admits of being easily\ntraced to the laws of a primitive psychology; that the step from this to\nPolytheism is easy; and that the step from this to Monotheism is necessary.\nIf it is objected to this view that it does not follow that because some\ntheories of personal agency have proved themselves false, therefore all\nsuch theories must be so--I answer, Unquestionably not; but the above\nconsiderations are not adduced in order to _negative_ the theistic theory:\nthey are merely adduced to show that the human mind has hitherto\nundoubtedly exhibited an undue and a vicious tendency to interpret the\nobjective processes of nature in terms of its own subjective processes; and\nas we can see quite well that the current theory of personal agency in\nnature, whether or not true, is a necessary outcome of intellectual\nevolution, I think that the fact of so abundant an historical analogy ought\nto be allowed to lend a certain degree of antecedent suspicion to this\ntheory--although, of course, the suspicion is of a kind which would admit\nof immediate destruction before any satisfactory positive evidence in\nfavour of the theory.[30]\n\n'But what is 'the satisfactory positive evidence' that is offered me?\nNothing, save an alleged subjective incapacity on the part of my opponent\nadequately to conceive of the fact of cosmic harmony as due to physical\ncausation alone. Now I have already commented on the weakness of his\nposition; but as my opponent will doubtless resort to the consideration\nthat inconceivability of an opposite is, after all, the best criterion of\ntruth which at any given stage of intellectual evolution is available, I\nwill now conclude my overthrow by pointing out that, even if we take the\nargument from teleology in its widest possible sense--the argument, I mean,\nfrom the general order and beauty of nature, as well as the gross\nconstituent part of it from design--even taking this argument in its widest\nsense and upon its own ground (which ground, I presume, it is now\nsufficiently obvious _can_ only be that of the inconceivability of its\nnegation), I will conclude my examination of this argument by showing that\nit is quite as inconceivable to predicate cosmic harmony an effect of\nIntelligence, as it is to predicate it an effect of Non-intelligence; and\ntherefore that the argument from inconceivability admits of being turned\nwith quite as terrible a force upon Theism as it can be made to exert upon\nAtheism.\n\n'\"In metaphysical controversy, many of the propositions propounded and\naccepted as quite believable are absolutely inconceivable. There is a\nperpetual confusing of actual ideas with what are nothing but pseud-ideas.\nNo distinction is made between propositions that contain real thoughts and\npropositions that are only the forms of thoughts. A thinkable proposition\nis one of which the _two terms can be brought together in consciousness\nunder the relation said to exist between them_. But very often, when the\nsubject of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and when\nthe predicate of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and\nwhen the relation alleged between them has been thought of as a known\nrelation, it is supposed that the proposition itself has been thought. The\nthinking separately of the elements of a proposition is mistaken for the\nthinking of them in the combination which the proposition affirms. And\nhence it continually happens that propositions which cannot be rendered\ninto thought at all are supposed to be not only thought but believed. The\nproposition that Evolution is caused by Mind is one of this nature. The two\nterms are separately intelligible; but they can be regarded in the relation\nof effect and cause only so long as no attempt is made to put them together\nin this relation.\n\n'\"The only thing which any one knows as Mind is the series of his own\nstates of consciousness; and if he thinks of any mind other than his own,\nhe can think of it only in terms derived from his own. If I am asked to\nframe a notion of Mind divested of all those structural traits under which\nalone I am conscious of mind in myself, I cannot do it. I know nothing of\nthought save as carried on in ideas originally traceable to the effects\nwrought by objects on me. A mental act is an unintelligible phrase if I am\nnot to regard it as an act in which states of consciousness are severally\nknown as like other states in the series that has gone by, and in which the\nrelations between them are severally known as like past relations in the\nseries. If, then, I have to conceive evolution as caused by an 'originating\nMind,' I must conceive this Mind as having attributes akin to those of the\nonly mind I know, and without which I cannot conceive mind at all.\n\n'\"I will not dwell on the many incongruities hence resulting, by asking how\nthe 'originating Mind' is to be thought of as having states produced by\nthings objective to it, as discriminating among these states, and classing\nthem as like and unlike; and as preferring one objective result to another.\nI will simply ask, What happens if we ascribe to the 'originating Mind' the\ncharacter absolutely essential to the conception of mind, that it consists\nof a series of states of consciousness? Put a series of states of\nconsciousness as cause and the evolving universe as effect, and then\nendeavour to see the last as flowing from the first. I find it possible to\nimagine in some dim way a series of states of consciousness serving as\nantecedent to any one of the movements I see going on; for my own states of\nconsciousness are often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But\nhow if I attempt to think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions\nthroughout the universe--to the motions of the multitudinous stars\nthroughout space, to the revolutions of all their planets round them, to\nthe gyrations of all these planets on their axes, to the infinitely\nmultiplied physical processes going on in each of these suns and planets? I\ncannot think of a single series of states of consciousness as causing even\nthe relatively small groups of actions going on over the earth's surface. I\ncannot think of it even as antecedent to all the various winds and the\ndissolving clouds they bear, to the currents of all the rivers, and the\ngrinding actions of all the glaciers; still less can I think of it as\nantecedent to the infinity of processes simultaneously going on in all the\nplants that cover the globe, from scattered polar lichens to crowded\ntropical palms, and in all the millions of quadrupeds that roam among them,\nand the millions of millions of insects that buzz about them. Even a single\nsmall set of these multitudinous terrestrial changes I cannot conceive as\nantecedent a single series of states of consciousness--cannot, for\ninstance, think of it as causing the hundred thousand breakers that are at\nthis instant curling over on the shores of England. How, then, is it\npossible for me to conceive an 'originating Mind,' which I must represent\nto myself as a _single_ series of states of consciousness, working the\ninfinitely multiplied sets of changes _simultaneously_ going on in worlds\ntoo numerous to count, dispersed throughout a space that baffles\nimagination?\n\n'\"If, to account for this infinitude of physical changes everywhere going\non, 'Mind must be conceived as there' 'under the guise of simple Dynamics,'\nthen the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind must be divested of all\nattributes by which it is distinguished; and that, when thus divested of\nits distinguishing attributes, the conception disappears--the word Mind\nstands for a blank....\n\n'\"Clearly, therefore, the proposition that an 'originating Mind' is the\ncause of evolution is a proposition that can be entertained so long only as\nno attempt is made to unite in thought its two terms in the alleged\nrelation. That it should be accepted as a matter of _faith_ may be a\ndefensible position, provided good cause is shown why it should be so\naccepted; but that it should be accepted as a matter of _understanding_--as\na statement making the order of the universe comprehensible--is a quite\nindefensible position.\"'[31]\n\nSec. 47. We have now heard the pleading on both sides of the ultimate issue to\nwhich it is possible that the argument from teleology can ever be reduced.\nIt therefore devolves on us very briefly to adjudicate upon the contending\nopinions. And this it is not difficult to do; for throughout the pleading\non both sides I have been careful to exclude all arguments and\nconsiderations which are not logically valid. It is therefore impossible\nfor me now to pass any criticisms on the pleading of either side which have\nnot already been passed by the pleading of the other. But nevertheless, in\nmy capacity of an impartial judge, I feel it desirable to conclude this\nchapter with a few general considerations.\n\nIn the first place, I think that the theist's antecedent objection to a\nscientific mode of reasoning on the score of its symbolism, may be regarded\nas fairly balanced by the atheist's antecedent objection to a metaphysical\nmode of reasoning on the score of its postulating an unknowable cause. And\nit must be allowed that the force of this antecedent objection is\nconsiderably increased by the reflection that the _kind_ of unknowable\ncause which is thus postulated is that which the human mind has always\nshown an overweening tendency to postulate as a cause of natural phenomena.\n\nI think, therefore, that neither disputant has the right to regard the _a\npriori_ standing of his opponent's theory as much more suspicious than that\nof his own; for it is obvious that neither disputant has the means whereby\nto estimate the actual value of these antecedent objections.\n\nWith regard, then, to the _a posteriori_ evidence in favour of the rival\ntheories, I think that the final test of their validity--_i.e._, the\ninconceivability of their respective negations--fails equally in the case\nof both theories; for in the case of each theory any proposition which\nembodies it must itself contain an infinite, _i.e._, an\ninconceivable--term. Thus, whether we speak of an Infinite Mind as the\ncause of evolution, or of evolution as due to an infinite duration of\nphysical processes, we are alike open to the charge of employing\nunthinkable propositions.\n\nHence, two unthinkables are presented to our choice; one of which is an\neternity of matter and of force,[32] and the other an Infinite Mind, so\nthat in this respect again the two theories are tolerably parallel; and\ntherefore, all that can be concluded with rigorous certainty upon the\nsubject is, that neither theory has anything to gain us against the other\nfrom an appeal to the test of inconceivability.\n\nYet we have seen that this is a test than which none can be more ultimate.\nWhat then shall we say is the final outcome of this discussion concerning\nthe rational standing of the teleological argument? The answer, I think, to\nthis question is, that in strict reasoning the teleological argument, in\nits every shape, is inadequate to form a basis of Theism; or, in other\nwords, that the logical cogency of this argument is insufficient to justify\na wholly impartial mind in accepting the theory of Theism on so insecure a\nfoundation. Nevertheless, if the further question were directly put to me,\n'After having heard the pleading both for and against the most refined\nexpression of the argument from teleology, with what degree of strictly\nrational probability do you accredit it?'--I should reply as follows:--'The\nquestion which you put I take to be a question which it is wholly\nimpossible to answer, and this for the simple reason that the degree of\neven rational probability may here legitimately vary with the character of\nthe mind which contemplates it.' This statement, no doubt, sounds\nparadoxical; but I think it is justified by the following considerations.\nWhen we say that one proposition is more conceivable than another, we may\nmean either of two very different things, and this quite apart from the\ndistinction previously drawn between symbolic conceptions and realisable\nconceptions. For we may mean that one of the two propositions presents\nterms which cannot possibly be rendered into thought at all in the relation\nwhich the proposition alleges to subsist between them; or we may mean that\none of the two propositions presents terms in a relation which is more\ncongruous with the habitual tenor of our thoughts than does the other\nproposition. Thus, as an example of the former usage, we may say, It is\nmore conceivable that two and two should make four than that two and two\nshould make five; and, as an example of the latter usage, we may say, It is\nmore conceivable that a man should be able to walk than that he should be\nable to fly. Now, for the sake of distinction, I shall call the first of\nthese usages the test of _absolute_ inconceivability, and the second the\ntest of _relative_ inconceivability. Doubtless, when the word\n\"inconceivability\" is used in the sense of relative inconceivability, it is\nincorrectly used, unless it is qualified in some way; because, if used\nwithout qualification, there is danger of its being confused with\ninconceivability in its absolute sense. Nevertheless, if used with some\nqualifying epithet, it becomes quite unexceptionable. For the process of\nconception being in all cases the process of establishing relations in\nthought, we may properly say, It is relatively more conceivable that a man\nshould walk than that a man should fly, since it is _more easy_ to\nestablish, the necessary relations in thought in the case of the former\nthan in the case of the latter proposition. The only difference, then,\nbetween what I have called absolute inconceivability and what I have called\nrelative inconceivability consists in this--that while the latter admits of\n_degrees_, the former does not.[33]\n\nWith this distinction clearly understood, I may now proceed to observe that\nin everyday life we constantly apply the test of relative inconceivability\nas a test of truth. And in the vast majority of cases this test of relative\ninconceivability is, for all practical purposes, as valid a test of truth\nas is the test of absolute conceivability. For as every man is more or less\nin harmony with his environment, his habits of thought with regard to his\nenvironment are for the most part stereotyped correctly; so that the most\nready and the most trustworthy gauge of probability that he has is an\nimmediate appeal to consciousness as to whether he _feels_ the probability.\nThus every man learns for himself to endow his own sense of probability\nwith a certain undefined but massive weight of authority. Now it is this\ntest of relative conceivability which all men apply in varying degrees to\nthe question of Theism. For if, from education and organised habits of\nthought, the probability in this matter appears to a man to incline in a\ncertain direction, when this probability is called in question, the whole\nbody of this organised system of thought rises in opposition to the\nquestioning, and being individually conscious of this strong feeling of\nsubjective opposition, the man declares the sceptical propositions to be\nmore inconceivable to him than are the counter-propositions. And in so\nsaying he is, of course, perfectly right. Hence I conceive that the\nacceptance or the rejection of metaphysical teleology as probable will\ndepend entirely upon individual habits of thought. The test of absolute\ninconceivability making equally for and against the doctrine of Theism,\ndisputants are compelled to fall back on the test of relative\ninconceivability; and as the direction in which the more inconceivable\nproposition will here seem to lie will be determined by previous habits of\nthought, it follows that while to a theist metaphysical teleology will\nappear a probable argument, to an atheist it will appear an improbable one.\nThus to a theist it will no doubt appear more conceivable that the Supreme\nMind should be such that in some of its attributes it resembles the human\nmind, while in other of its attributes--among which he will place\nomnipresence, omnipotence, and directive agency--it transcends the human\nmind as greatly as the latter \"transcends mechanical motion;\" and therefore\nthat although it is true, as a matter of logical terminology, that we ought\nto designate such an entity \"Not mind\" or \"Blank,\" still, as a matter of\npsychology, we may come nearer to the truth by assimilating in thought this\nentity with the nearest analogies which experience supplies, than by\nassimilating it in thought with any other entity--such as force or\nmatter--which are felt to be in all likelihood still more remote from it in\nnature. On the other hand, to an atheist it will no doubt appear more\nconceivable, because more simple, to accept the dogma of an eternal\nself-existence of something which we call force and matter, and with this\ndogma to accept the implication of a necessary self-evolution of cosmic\nharmony, than to resort to the additional and no less inconceivable\nsupposition of a self-existing Agent which must be regarded both as Mind\nand as Not-mind at the same time. But in both cases, in whatever degree\nthis test of relative inconceivability of a negative is held by the\ndisputants to be valid in solving the problem of Theism, in that degree is\neach man entitled to his respective estimate of the probability in\nquestion. And thus we arrive at the judgment that the rational probability\nof Theism legitimately varies with the character of the mind which\ncontemplates it. For, as the test of absolute inconceivability is equally\nannihilative in whichever direction it is applied, the test of relative\ninconceivability is the only one that remains; and as the formal conditions\nof a metaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and\nthe formal conditions of a physical explanation of cosmic harmony are no\nless undoubtedly present on the other hand, it follows that a theist and an\natheist have an equal right to employ this test of relative\ninconceivability. And as there is no more ultimate court of appeal whereby\nto decide the question than the universe as a whole, each man has here an\nequal argumentative right to abide by the decision which that court awards\n_to him individually_--to accept whatever probability the sum-total of\nphenomena appears to present to his particular understanding. And it is\nneedless to say that experience shows, even among well-informed and\naccurate reasoners, how large an allowance must thus be made for personal\nequations. To some men the facts of external nature seem to proclaim a God\nwith clarion voice, while to other men the same facts bring no whisper of\nsuch a message. All, therefore, that a logician can here do is to remark,\nthat the individuals in each class--provided they bear in mind the strictly\n_relative_ character of their belief--have a similar right to be regarded\nas holding a rational creed: the grounds of belief in this case logically\nvary with the natural disposition and the subsequent training of different\nminds.[34]\n\nIt only remains to show that disputants on either side are apt to endow\nthis test of relative inconceivability with far more than its real logical\nworth. Being accustomed to apply this test of truth in daily life, and\nthere finding it a trustworthy test, most men are apt to forget that its\nvalue as a test must clearly diminish in proportion to the distance from\nexperience at which it is applied. This, indeed, we saw to be the case even\nwith the test of absolute inconceivability (see Chapter V.), but much more\nmust it be the case with this test of relative inconceivability. For,\nwithout comment, it is manifest that our acquired sense of probability, as\ndistinguished from our innate sense of possibility, with regard to any\nparticular question of a transcendental nature, cannot be at all comparable\nwith its value in the case of ordinary questions, with respect to which our\nsense of probability is being always rectified by external facts. Although,\ntherefore, it is true that both those who reject and those who retain a\nbelief in Theism on grounds of relative conceivability are equally entitled\nto be regarded as displaying a rational attitude of mind, in whatever\ndegree either party considers their belief as of a higher validity than the\ngrounds of psychology from which it takes its rise, in that degree must the\nmembers of that party be deemed irrational. In other words, not only must a\nman be careful not to confuse the test of relative inconceivability with\nthat of absolute conceivability--not to suppose that his sense of\nprobability in this matter is determined by an innate psychological\ninability to conceive a proposition, when in reality it is only determined\nby the difficulty of dissociating ideas which have long been habitually\nassociated;--but he must also be careful to remember that the test of\nrelative inconceivability in this matter is only valid as justifying a\nbelief of the most diffident possible kind.\n\nAnd from this the practical deduction is--tolerance. Let no man think that\nhe has any argumentative right to expect that the mere subjective habit or\ntone of his own mind should exert any influence on that of his fellow; but\nrather let him always remember that the only legitimate weapons of his\nintellectual warfare are those the _material_ of which is derived from the\nexternal world, and only the _form_ of which is due to the forging process\nof his own mind. And if in battle such weapons seem to be unduly blunted on\nthe hardened armoury of traditional beliefs, or on the no less hardened\narmoury of confirmed scepticism, let him remember further that he must not\ntoo confidently infer that the fault does not lie in the character of his\nown weapons. To drop the figure, let none of us forget in how much need we\nall stand of this caution:--Knowing how greatly the value of arguments is\naffected, even to the most impartial among us, by the frame of mind in\nwhich we regard them, let all of us be jealously careful not to\nover-estimate the certainty that our frame or habit of mind is actually\nsuperior to that of our neighbour. And, in conclusion, it is surely\nneedless to insist on the yet greater need there is for most of us to bear\nin mind this further caution:--Knowing with what great subjective\nopposition arguments are met when they conflict with our established modes\nof thought, let us all be jealously careful to guard the sanctuary of our\njudgment from the polluting tyranny of habit.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nGENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.\n\nSec. 48. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here suffice\nto convey an epitomised recollection of the numerous facts and conclusions\nwhich we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first disposed of the\nconspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of things, or the mystery\nof existence, admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in any\nfurther degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the\nargument \"Our heart requires a God\" is invalid, seeing that such a\nsubjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient to\nprove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And with regard\nto the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations point to\nGod as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to observe that the\nargument could only be admissible after the possibility of the operation of\nnatural causes had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposed\nintuitive necessity of individual thought was found to be untenable, first,\nbecause, even if the supposed necessity were a real one, it would only\npossess an individual applicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact,\nit is extremely improbable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity\neven for the individual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that\nit is not such to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the\ngeneral consent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts\nand principles, was passed over without comment; while the argument from a\nfirst cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument\nthat, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is\nprobably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch of\ninference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced worthless.\n\nProceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in favour of\nTheism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds are caused\nby an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our mind is caused\nby an unknown mind,--is a syllogism that is inadmissible for two reasons.\nIn the first place, \"it does not account for mind (in the abstract) to\nrefer it to a prior mind for its origin;\" and therefore, although the\nhypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of _known_ mind, it is\nuseless as an argument for the existence of the unknown mind, the\nassumption of which forms the basis of that explanation. Again, in the next\nplace, if it be said that mind is so far an entity _sui generis_ that it\nmust be either self-existing or caused by another mind, there is no\nassignable warrant for the assertion. And this is the second objection to\nthe above syllogism; for anything within the whole range of the possible\nmay, for aught that we can tell, be competent to produce a self-conscious\nintelligence. Thus an objector to the above syllogism need not hold any\ntheory of things at all; but even as opposed to the definite theory of\nmaterialism, the above syllogism has not so valid an argumentative basis to\nstand upon. We know that what we call matter and force are to all\nappearance eternal, while we have no corresponding evidence of a \"mind that\nis even apparently eternal.\" Further, within experience mind is invariably\nassociated with highly differentiated collocations of matter and\ndistributions of force, and many facts go to prove, and none to negative,\nthe conclusion that the grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or\nat least is associated with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development.\nThere is thus both a qualitative and a quantitative relation between\nintelligence and cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and\nmotion cannot produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they\nshould, we have seen at some length that this is no conclusive\nconsideration as applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental\nnature, and that in the present case it is particularly inconclusive,\nbecause, as it is speculatively certain that the substance of mind must be\nunknowable, it seems _a priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the\nunknowable reality, this cause should be more difficult to render into\nthought in that relation than would some other hypothetical substance which\nis imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_\nconceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it is in\nthis case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly, the\nstatement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects can\ncontain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by everyday\nexperience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the will and\nthe existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively by the\ntheory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of utilitarianism. On\nthe whole, then, with regard to the argument from the existence of the\nhuman mind, we were compelled to decide that it is destitute of any\nassignable weight, there being nothing more to lead to the conclusion that\nour mind has been caused by another mind, than to the conclusion that it\nhas been caused by anything else whatsoever.\n\nWith regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that Mill's\npresentation of it is merely a resuscitation of the argument as presented\nby Paley, Bell, and Chalmers. And indeed we saw that the first-named writer\ntreated this whole subject with a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprising\nin him; for while he has failed to assign anything like due weight to the\ninductive evidence of organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into a\nsupernatural explanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failed\nsignally in his _analysis_ of the Design argument, seeing that, in common\nwith all previous writers, he failed to observe that it is utterly\nimpossible for us to know the relations in which the supposed Designer\nstands to the Designed,--much less to argue from the fact that the Supreme\nMind, even supposing it to exist, caused the observable products by any\nparticular intellectual _process_. In other words, all advocates of the\nDesign argument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be\ndue to a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude that\nthis Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such and\nsuch cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise the\nsupposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of the\nexistence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after all, of\nvery little importance whether or not we are able to divine the _methods_\nof creation, so long as the _facts_ are there to attest that, _in some way\nor other_, the observable phenomena of nature must be due to Intelligence\nof some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the first to endorse this\nremark. It has always appeared to me one of the most unaccountable things\nin the history of speculation that so many competent writers can have\ninsisted upon _Design_ as an argument for Theism, when they must all have\nknown perfectly well that they have no means of ascertaining the subjective\npsychology of that Supreme Mind whose existence the argument is adduced to\ndemonstrate. The truth is, that the argument from teleology must, and can\nonly, rest upon the observable _facts_ of nature, without reference to the\nintellectual _processes_ by which these facts may be supposed to have been\naccomplished. But, looking to the \"present state of our knowledge,\" this is\nmerely to change the teleological argument from its gross Paleyerian form,\ninto the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws. And we saw\nthat this transformation is now a rational necessity. How far the great\nprinciple of natural selection may have been instrumental in the evolution\nof organic forms, is not here, as Mill erroneously imagined, the question;\nthe question is simply as to whether we are to accept the theory of special\ncreation or the theory of organic evolution. And forasmuch as no competent\njudge at the present time can hesitate for one moment in answering this\nquestion, the argument from a proximate teleology must be regarded as no\nlonger having any rational existence.\n\nHow then does it fare with the last of the arguments--the argument from an\nultimate teleology? Doubtless at first sight this argument seems a very\npowerful one, inasmuch as it is a generic argument, which embraces not only\nbiological phenomena, but all the phenomena of the universe. But\nnevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparent power\ndwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, if force and\nmatter have been eternal, all and every natural law must have resulted by\nway of necessary consequence. It will be remembered that I dwelt at\nconsiderable length and with much earnestness upon this truth, not only\nbecause of its enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, but\nalso because no one has hitherto considered it in that relation.\n\nThe next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the conclusion that\nwas liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless collapse of all the\npossible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully demonstrated that\nthere is no shadow of a positive argument in support of the theistic\ntheory, there arose the danger that some persons might erroneously conclude\nthat for this reason the theistic theory must be untrue. It therefore\nbecame necessary to point out, that although, as far as we can see, nature\ndoes not require an Intelligent Cause to account for any of her phenomena,\nyet it is possible that, if we could see farther, we should see that nature\ncould not be what she is unless she had owed her existence to an\nIntelligent Cause. Or, in other words, the probability there is that an\nIntelligent Cause is unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of nature,\nis only equal to the probability there is that the doctrine of the\npersistence of force is everywhere and eternally true.\n\nAs a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted the\nregion of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science,\nand so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the discussion\ninto the transcendental region of purely formal considerations. And here we\nlaid down the canon, \"that the value of any probability, in its last\nanalysis, is determined by the number, the importance, and the definiteness\nof the relations known, as compared with those of the relations unknown;\"\nand, consequently, that in cases where the unknown relations are more\nnumerous, more important, or more indefinite than are the known relations,\nthe value of our inference varies inversely as the difference in these\nrespects between the relations compared. From which canon it followed, that\nas the problem of Theism is the most ultimate of all problems, and so\ncontains in its unknown relations all that is to man unknown and\nunknowable, these relations must be pronounced the most indefinite of all\nrelations that it is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently,\nthat although we have here the entire range of experience from which to\nargue, we are unable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever.\nThe unknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite,\nboth in respect of their number and importance, as compared with the known\nrelations, it is impossible for us to determine any definite probability\neither for or against the being of a God. Therefore, although it is true\nthat, so far as human science can penetrate or human thought infer, we can\nperceive no evidence of God, yet we have no right on this account to\nconclude that there is no God. The probability, therefore, that nature is\ndevoid of Deity, while it is of the strongest kind if regarded\nscientifically--amounting, in fact, to a scientific demonstration,--is\nnevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically. Notwithstanding it is\nas true as is the fundamental basis of all science and of all experience\nthat, if there is a God, his existence, considered as a cause of the\nuniverse, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that, if there had\nnever been a God, the universe could never have existed.\n\nHence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter how\ngreat the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative sense, we\nhave no means of estimating such probability in an absolute sense. From\nwhich position there emerged the possibility of another argument in favour\nof Theism--or rather let us say, of a reappearance of the teleological\nargument in another form. For it may be said, seeing that these formal\nconsiderations exclude legitimate reasoning either for or against Deity in\nan absolute sense, while they do not exclude such reasoning in a relative\nsense, if there yet remain any theistic deductions which may properly be\ndrawn from experience, these may now be adduced to balance the atheistic\ndeductions from the persistence of force. For although the latter\ndeductions have clearly shown the existence of Deity to be superfluous in a\nscientific sense, the formal considerations in question have no less\nclearly opened up beyond the sphere of science a possible _locus_ for the\nexistence of Deity; so that if there are any facts supplied by experience\nfor which the atheistic deductions appear insufficient to account, we are\nstill free to account for them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of\nTheism. And, it may be urged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in\nthe correlation of general laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It\nsignifies nothing, the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the\nmethods whereby the supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor\ndoes it signify that its operation must now be relegated to a\nsuper-scientific province. What does signify is that, taking a general view\nof nature, we find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of\nher harmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation.\nNow this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will be\nremembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply to\ndistinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, in\ncontradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction, it\nwill be remembered, consisted in this--that while all previous forms of\nteleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible reach of\nscience, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific refutation,\nthe metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis which is\nclearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be susceptible of\nscientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system of teleology does\nrest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it accepts the most\nultimate truths of which science can ever be cognisant--viz., the\npersistence of force and the consequently necessary genesis of natural\nlaw,--it nevertheless maintains that the necessity of regarding Mind as the\nultimate cause of things is not on this account removed; and, therefore,\nthat if science now requires the operation of a Supreme Mind to be posited\nin a super-scientific sphere, then in a super-scientific sphere it ought to\nbe posited. No doubt this hypothesis at first sight seems gratuitous,\nseeing that, so far as science can penetrate, there is no need of any such\nhypothesis at all--cosmic harmony resulting as a physically necessary\nconsequence from the combined action of natural laws, which in turn result\nas a physically necessary consequence of the persistence of force and the\nprimary qualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true that\nmetaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered scientifically,\nit may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if considered\npsychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable that Mind should\nbe the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the persistence of force\nshould be so, then it is not irrational to accept the more conceivable\nhypothesis in preference to the less conceivable one, provided that the\nchoice is made with the diffidence which is required by the considerations\nadduced in Chapter V.\n\nI conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology,\nalthough in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological sense\nlegitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone this\nargument can rest--viz., the position that the fundamental postulate of\nAtheism is more _inconceivable_ than is the fundamental postulate of\nTheism--we have seen two important objections to lie.\n\nFor, in the first place, the sense in which the word \"inconceivable\" is\nhere used is that of the impossibility of framing _realisable_ relations in\nthe thought; not that of the impossibility of framing _abstract_ relations\nin thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it is true that\nthe complexity of the human organisation and its functions is\ninconceivable; but in this sense the word \"inconceivable\" has much less\nweight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, without waiting\nagain to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculative standing of\nMaterialism) how far even the genuine test of inconceivability ought to be\nallowed to make against an inference which there is a body of scientific\nevidence to substantiate, we went on to the second objection against this\nfundamental position of metaphysical teleology. This objection, it will be\nremembered, was, that it is as impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as\nan effect of Mind, as it is to conceive of it as an effect of mindless\nevolution. The argument from inconceivability, therefore, admits of being\nturned with quite as terrible an effect on Theism, as it can possibly be\nmade to exert on Atheism.\n\nHence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, and\nwhich we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of Theism,\nis met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its metaphysical\ncharacter it has escaped the opposition of physical science, only to\nencounter a new opposition in the region of pure psychology to which it\nfled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry, therefore, it devolved on us to\ndetermine the relative magnitudes of these opposing forces. And in doing\nthis we first observed that, if the supporters of metaphysical teleology\nobjected _a priori_ to the method whereby the genesis of natural law was\ndeduced from the datum of the persistence of force, in that this method\ninvolved an unrestricted use of illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then it\nis no less open to an atheist to object _a priori_ to the method whereby a\ndirecting Mind was inferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this\nmethod involved the population of an unknowable cause,--and this of a\ncharacter which the whole history of human thought has proved the human\nmind to exhibit an overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of\nnatural phenomena. On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as\ntheir respective standing _a priori_ is concerned, both theories may be\nregarded as about equally suspicious. And similar with regard to their\nstanding _a posteriori_; for as both theories require to embody at least\none infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely\ninconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the\ntwo theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a\nquestion which no one man can answer for another. For as the test of\nabsolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a man\nwishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by what I\nhave designated relative inconceivability--_i.e._, in accordance with the\nverdict given by his individual sense of probability as determined by his\nprevious habits of thought. And forasmuch as the test of relative\ninconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to vary with the\ncharacter of the mind which applies it, the strictly rational probability\nof the question to which it is applied varies in like manner. Or, otherwise\npresented, the only alternative for any man in this matter is either to\ndiscipline himself into an attitude of pure scepticism, and thus to refuse\nin thought to entertain either a probability or an improbability concerning\nthe existence of a God; or else to incline in thought towards an\naffirmation or a negation of God, according as his previous habits of\nthought have rendered such an inclination more facile in the one direction\nthan in the other. And although, under such circumstances, I should\nconsider that man the more rational who carefully suspended his judgment, I\nconclude that if this course is departed from, neither the metaphysical\nteleologist nor the scientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over\nthe other in respect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a\nmetaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the\nformal conditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on\nthe other, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein\nthe pendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may be\nmade to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas.\n\nSuch is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the abstract\nnature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which at the\npresent time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the confusing\namount of good, bad, and indifferent literature on both sides of the\ncontroversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do not think that\nthe result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the score of its\nlacking precision. At a time like the present, when traditional beliefs\nrespecting Theism are so generally accepted and so commonly concluded, as a\nmatter of course, to have a large and valid basis of induction whereon to\nrest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of this short essay, by showing how\nvery concise the scientific _status_ of the subject really is, will do more\nto settle the minds of most readers as to the exact standing at the present\ntime of all the probabilities of the question, than could a perusal of all\nthe rest of the literature upon this subject. And, looking to the present\ncondition of speculative philosophy, I regard it as of the utmost\nimportance to have clearly shown that the advance of science has now\nentitled us to assert, without the least hesitation, that the hypothesis of\nMind in nature is as certainly superfluous to account for any of the\nphenomena of nature, as the scientific doctrine of the persistence of force\nand the indestructibility of matter is certainly true.\n\nOn the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical\naspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite as\nhas the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter which\ndoes not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of necessity be\nleft for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears this\nconsideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly complain of my\nnot having done my utmost in this case to define as sharply as possible the\ncharacter and the limits of this margin.\n\nSec. 49. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that any\nantecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess is\nunquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with the\nutmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions here\nworked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save the\nstrength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of society to\ngive his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they may he worth.\nJust as I am confident that truth must in the end be the most profitable\nfor the race, so I am persuaded that every individual endeavour to attain\nit, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassed and sincere, ought\nwithout hesitation to be made the common property of all men, no matter in\nwhat direction the results of its promulgation may appear to tend. And so\nfar as the ruination of individual happiness is concerned, no one can have\na more lively perception than myself of the possibly disastrous tendency of\nmy work. So far as I am individually concerned, the result of this analysis\nhas been to show that, whether I regard the problem of Theism on the lower\nplane of strictly relative probability, or on the higher plane of purely\nformal considerations, it equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all\nbelief of the kind which I conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my\nintellect with regard to this matter into an attitude of the purest\nscepticism. And forasmuch as I am far from being able to agree with those\nwho affirm that the twilight doctrine of the \"new faith\" is a desirable\nsubstitute for the waning splendour of \"the old,\" I am not ashamed to\nconfess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost\nits soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to \"work\nwhile it is day\" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the\nterribly intensified meaning of the words that \"the night cometh when no\nman can work,\" yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the\nappalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was\nmine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,--at such times\nI shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my\nnature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not being\nsufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or whether it be\ndue to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least were\nthe sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me, and for\nothers who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words of\nHamilton,--Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, but\nof annihilation, the precept _know thyself_ has become transformed into the\nterrific oracle to Oedipus--\n\n  \"Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nAPPENDIX\n\nAND\n\nSUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nA CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF A FALLACY IN LOCKE'S USE OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST\nTHE POSSIBILITY OF MATTER THINKING ON GROUNDS OF ITS BEING INCONCEIVABLE\nTHAT IT SHOULD.\n\nLest it should be thought that I am doing injustice to the views of this\nillustrious theist, I here quote his own words:--\"We have the ideas of\nmatter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any\nmere material being thinks or no, it being impossible for us, by the\ncontemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether\nomnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed a power\nto perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed a\nthinking immaterial substance; it being, in respect of our notions, not\nmuch more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if He\npleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that He should\nsuperadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we know\nnot wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substance the Almighty\nhas been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being,\nbut merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. For I see no\ncontradiction in it that the first eternal thinking being should, if he\npleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together\nas he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though,\nas I think, I have proved, lib. iv., ch. 10 and 14, &c., it is no less than\na contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature\nvoid of sense and thought) should be that eternal first-thinking being.\nWhat certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such\nas, _e.g._, pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves,\nafter a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be\nin an immaterial substance upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, as\nfar as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body; and\nmotion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce\nnothing but motion: so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain,\nor the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond\nour ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For\nsince we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way\nconceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He\ncould not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive\ncapable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of\nmatter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way\nlessen the belief of the soul's immateriality, &c.... It is a point which\nseems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge; and he who will\ngive himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate\npart of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him\nfixedly for or against the soul's materiality. Since on which side soever\nhe views it, either as an unextended substance or as a thinking extended\nmatter, the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone is in\nhis thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which\nsome men take with themselves, who, because of the inconceivableness of\nsomething they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary\nhypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed\nunderstanding.\"\n\nThis passage, I do not hesitate to say, is one of the most remarkable in\nthe whole range of philosophical literature, in respect of showing how even\nthe strongest and most candid intellect may have its reasoning faculty\nimpaired by the force of a preformed conviction. Here we have a mind of\nunsurpassed penetration and candour, which has left us side by side two\nparallel trains of reasoning. In the one, the object is to show that the\nauthor's preformed conviction as to the being of a God is justifiable on\ngrounds of reason; in the other, the object is to show that, granting the\nexistence of a God, and it is not impossible that he may have endowed\nmatter with the faculty of thinking. Now, in the former train of reasoning,\nthe whole proof rests entirely upon the fact that \"it is impossible to\nconceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking\nintelligent being.\" Clearly, if this proposition is true, it must destroy\none or other of the trains of reasoning; for it is common to them both, and\nin one of them it is made the sole ground for concluding that matter cannot\nthink, while in the other it is made compatible with the supposition that\nmatter may think. This extraordinary inconsistency no doubt arose from the\nfact that the author was antecedently persuaded of the existence of an\n_Omnipotent_ Mind, and having been long accustomed in his intellectual\nsymbols to regard it presumptuous in him to impose any limitations on this\nalmighty power, when he asked himself whether it would be possible for this\nalmighty power, if it so willed, to endow matter with the faculty of\nthinking, he argued that it might be possible, notwithstanding his being\nunable to conceive the possibility. But when he banished from his mind the\nidea of this personal and almighty power, and with that idea banished all\nits associations, he then felt that he had a right to argue more freely,\nand forthwith made his conceptive faculty a test of abstract possibility.\nYet _the sum total of abstract possibility, in relation to him, must have\nbeen the same in the two cases_; so that in whichever of the two trains of\nreasoning his argument was sound, in the other it must certainly have been\nnull.\n\nWe may well feel amazed that so able a thinker can have fallen into so\nobvious an error, and afterwards have persisted in it through pages and\npages of his work. It will be instructive, however, to those who rely upon\nLocke's exposition of the argument from Inconceivability to see how\neffectually he has himself destroyed it. For this purpose, therefore, I\nshall make some further quotations from the same train of reasoning. The\nstatement of Locke's opinion that the Almighty could endow matter with the\nfaculty of thinking if He so willed, called down some remonstrances and\nrebukes from the then Bishop of Worcester. Locke's reply was a very lengthy\none, and from it the following extracts are taken. I merely request the\nreader throughout to substitute for the words God, Creator, Almighty,\nOmipotency, &c., the words _Summum genus_ of Possibility.\n\n\"But it is further urged that we cannot conceive how matter can think. I\ngrant it, but to argue from thence that God therefore cannot give to matter\na faculty of thinking is to say God's omnipotency is limited to a narrow\ncompass because man's understanding is so, and brings down God's infinite\npower to the size of our capacities....\n\n\"If God can give no power to any parts of matter but what men can account\nfor from the essence of matter in general; if all such qualities and\nproperties must destroy the essence, or change the essential properties of\nmatter, which are to our conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to be\nthe natural consequence of that essence; it is plain that the essence of\nmatter is destroyed, and its essential properties changed, in most of the\nsensible parts of this our system. For it is visible that all the planets\nhave revolutions about certain remote centres, which I would have any one\nexplain or make conceivable by the bare essence, or natural powers\ndepending on the essence of matter in general, without something added to\nthat essence which we cannot conceive; for the moving of matter in a\ncrooked line, or the attraction of matter by matter, is all that can be\nsaid in the case; either of which it is above our reach to derive from the\nessence of matter or body in general, though one of these two must\nunavoidably be allowed to be superadded, in this instance, to the essence\nof matter in general. The omnipotent Creator advised not with us in the\nmaking of the world, and His ways are not the less excellent because they\nare past finding out....\n\n\"In all such cases, the superinducement of greater perfections and nobler\nqualities destroys nothing of the essence or perfections that were there\nbefore, unless there can be showed a manifest repugnancy between them; but\nall the proof offered for that is only that we cannot conceive how matter,\nwithout such superadded perfections, can produce such effects; which is, in\ntruth, no more than to say matter in general, or every part of matter, as\nmatter, has them not, but is no reason to prove that God, if He pleases,\ncannot superadd them to some parts of matter, unless it can be proved to be\na contradiction that God should give to some parts of matter qualities and\nperfections which matter in general has not, though we cannot conceive how\nmatter is invested with them, or how it operates by virtue of those new\nendowments; nor is it to be wondered that we cannot, whilst we limit all\nits operations to those qualities it had before, and would explain them by\nthe known properties of matter in general, without any such induced\nperfections. For if this be a right rule of reasoning, to deny a thing to\nbe because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be, I shall desire\nthem who use it to stick to this rule, and see what work it will make both\nin divinity as well as philosophy, and whether they can advance anything\nmore in favour of scepticism.\n\n\"For to keep within the present subject of the power of thinking and\nself-motion bestowed by omnipotent power in some parts of matter: the\nobjection to this is, I cannot conceive how matter should think. What is\nthe consequence? Ergo, God cannot give it a power to think. Let this stand\nfor a good reason, and then proceed in other cases by the same.\n\n\"You cannot conceive how matter can attract matter at any distance, much\nless at the distance of 1,000,000 miles; ergo, God cannot give it such a\npower: you cannot conceive how matter should feel or move itself, or affect\nany material being, or be moved by it; ergo, God cannot give it such\npowers: which is in effect to deny gravity, and the revolution of the\nplanets about the sun; to make brutes mere machines, without sense or\nspontaneous motion; and to allow man neither sense nor voluntary motion.\n\n\"Let us apply this rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an\nextended solid substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think:\ncan you conceive how your own soul or any substance thinks? You find,\nindeed, that you do think, and so do I; but I want to be told how the\naction of thinking is performed: this, I confess, is beyond my conception;\nand I would be glad any one who conceives it would explain it to me.\n\n\"God, I find, has given me this faculty; and since I cannot but be\nconvinced of His power in this instance, which, though I every moment\nexperience in myself, yet I cannot conceive the manner of, what would it be\nless than an insolent absurdity to deny His power in other like cases, only\nfor this reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how?...\n\n\"That Omnipotency cannot make a substance to be solid and not solid at the\nsame time, I think with due reverence [diffidence?[35]] we may say; but\nthat a solid substance may not have qualities, perfections, and powers,\nwhich have no natural or visibly necessary connection with solidity and\nextension, is too much for us (who are but of yesterday, and know nothing)\nto be positive in.\n\n\"If God cannot join things together by connections inconceivable to us, we\nmust deny even the consistency and being of matter itself; since every\nparticle of it having some bulk, has its parts connected by ways\ninconceivable to us. So that all the difficulties that are raised against\nthe thinking of matter, from our ignorance or narrow conceptions, stand not\nat all in the way of the power of God, if He pleases to ordain it so; nor\nprove anything against His having actually endowed some parcels of matter,\nso disposed as He thinks fit, with a faculty of thinking, till it can he\nshown that it contains a contradiction to suppose it.\n\n\"Though to me sensation be comprehended under thinking in general, in the\nforegoing discourse I have spoke of sense in brutes as distinct from\nthinking; because your lordship, as I remember, speaks of sense in brutes.\nBut here I take liberty to observe, that if your lordship allows brutes to\nhave sensation, it will follow, either that God can and doth give to some\nparcels of matter a power of perception and thinking, or that all animals\nhave immaterial, and consequently, according to your lordship, immortal\nsouls, as well as men; and to say that fleas and mites, &c., have immortal\nsouls as well as men, will possibly be looked on as going a great way to\nserve an hypothesis....\n\n\"It is true, I say, 'That bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else,' and\nso I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their\noperation. But I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton's\nincomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God's power\nin this point by my narrow conceptions. The gravitation of matter towards\nmatter, by way unconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that God\ncan, if He pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation above what\ncan be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know\nof matter, but also an unquestionable and everywhere visible instance that\nHe has done so. And therefore, in the next edition of my book, I will take\ncare to have that passage rectified....\n\n\"As to self-consciousness, your lordship asks, 'What is there like\nself-consciousness in matter?' Nothing at all in matter as matter. But that\nGod cannot bestow on some parcels of matter a power of thinking, and with\nit self-consciousness, will never be proved by asking how is it possible to\napprehend that mere body should perceive that it doth perceive? The\nweakness of our apprehension I grant in the case: I confess as much as you\nplease, that we cannot conceive how an unsolid created substance thinks;\nbut this weakness of our apprehension reaches not the power of God, whose\nweakness is stronger than anything in man.\"\n\nLastly, Locke turns upon his opponent the power of the _odium theologicum_.\n\n\"Let it be as hard a matter as it will to give an account what it is that\nshould keep the parts of a material soul together after it is separated\nfrom the body, yet it will be always as easy to give an account of it as to\ngive an account what it is that shall keep together a material and\nimmaterial substance. And yet the difficulty that there is to give an\naccount of that, I hope, does not, with your lordship, weaken the\ncredibility of the inseparable union of soul and body to eternity; and I\npersuade myself that the men of sense, to whom your lordship appeals in\nthis case, do not find their belief of this fundamental point much weakened\nby that difficulty.... But you will say, you speak only of the soul; and\nyour words are, that it is no easy matter to give an account how the soul\nshould be capable of immortality unless it be a material substance. I grant\nit, but crave leave to say, that there is not any one of these difficulties\nthat are or can be raised about the manner how a material soul can be\nimmortal, which do not as well reach the immortality of the body....\n\n\"But your lordship, as I guess from your following words, would argue that\na material substance cannot be a free agent; whereby I suppose you only\nmean that you cannot see or conceive how a solid substance should begin,\nstop, or change its own motion. To which give me leave to answer, that when\nyou can make it conceivable how any created, finite, dependent substance\ncan move itself, I suppose you will find it no harder for God to bestow\nthis power on a solid than an unsolid created substance.... But though you\ncannot see how any created substance, solid or not solid, can be a free\nagent (pardon me, my lord, if I put in both, till your lordship please to\nexplain it of either, and show the manner how either of them can of itself\nmove itself or anything else), yet I do not think you will so far deny men\nto be free agents, from the difficulty there is to see how they are free\nagents, as to doubt whether there be foundation enough for the day of\njudgment.\"\n\nLet us now, for the sake of contrast, turn to some passages which occur in\nthe other train of reasoning.\n\n\"If we suppose only matter and motion first or eternal, thought can never\nbegin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or\nwithout motion, could have originally in and from itself sense, perception,\nand knowledge; as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception, and\nknowledge must be a property eternally inseparable from matter and every\nparticle of it.\" There is a double fallacy here. In the first place,\nconceivability is made the unconditional test of possibility; and, in the\nnext place, it is asserted that unless every particle of matter can think,\nno collocation of such particles can possibly do so. This latter fallacy is\nfurther insisted upon thus:--\"If they will not allow matter as matter, that\nis, every particle of matter, to be as well cogitative as extended, they\nwill have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitative\nbeing out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended\nparts, if I may so speak.... Every particle of matter, as matter, is\ncapable of all the same figures and motions of any other, and I challenge\nany one in his thoughts to add anything else to one above another.\" Now, as\nwe have seen, Locke himself has shown in his other trains of argument that\nthis challenge is thoroughly futile as a refutation of possibilities; but\nthe point to which I now wish to draw attention is this--It does not follow\nbecause certain and highly complex collocations of material particles may\nbe supposed capable of thinking, that therefore every particle of matter\nmust be regarded as having this attribute. We have innumerable analogies in\nnature of a certain collocation of matter and force producing certain\nresults which another somewhat similar collocation could not produce: in\nsuch cases we do not assume that all the resulting attributes of the one\ncollocation must be presented also by the other--still less that these\nresulting attributes must belong to the primary qualities of matter and\nforce. Hence, it is not fair to assume that thought must either be inherent\nin every particle of matter, or else not producible by any possible\ncollocation of such particles, unless it has previously been shown that so\nto produce it by any possible collocation is in the nature of things\nimpossible. But no one could refute this fallacy better than Locke himself\nhas done in some of the passages already quoted from his other train of\nreasoning.\n\nBut to continue the quotation:--\"If, therefore, it be evident that\nsomething necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident that\nthat something must necessarily be a cogitative being; for it is as\nimpossible [_inconceivable_] that incogitative matter should produce a\ncogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, should\nproduce a positive being or matter.\" Again,--\"For unthinking particles of\nmatter, however put together, can have [_can be taught to have_] nothing\nthereby added to them, but a new relation of position, which it is\nimpossible [_inconceivable_] should give thought and knowledge to them.\"\n\nIt is unnecessary to multiply these quotations, for, in effect, they would\nall be merely repetitions of one another. It is enough to have seen that\nthis able author undertakes to demonstrate the existence of a God, and that\nhis whole demonstration resolves itself into the unwarrantable inference,\nthat as we are unable to conceive how thought can be a property of matter,\ntherefore a property of matter thought cannot be. That such an erroneous\ninference should occur in any writings of so old a date as those of Locke\nis not in itself surprising. What is surprising is the fact, that in the\nsame writings, and in the course of the same discussion, the fallacy of\nthis very inference is repeatedly pointed out and insisted upon in a great\nvariety of ways; and it has been chiefly for the sake of showing the\npernicious influence which preformed opinion may exert--viz., even to\nblinding the eyes of one of the most clear-sighted and thoughtful men that\never lived to a glaring contradiction repeated over and over again in the\ncourse of a few pages,--it has been chiefly for this reason that I have\nextended this Appendix to so great a length. I shall now conclude it by\nquoting some sentences which occur on the very next page after that from\nwhich the last quoted sentences were taken. Our author here again returns\nto his defence of the omnipotency of God; and as he now again thus\npersonifies the sum total of possibility, his mind abruptly reverts to all\nits other class of associations. In this case the transition is\nparticularly interesting, not only on account of its suddenness, but also\nbecause the correlations contemplated happen to be exactly the same in the\ntwo cases--viz., matter as the cause of mind, and mind as the cause of\nmatter. Remember that on the last page this great philosopher supposed he\nhad demonstrated the abstract impossibility of matter being the cause of\nmind on the ground of a causal connection being inconceivable, let us now\nobserve what he says upon this page regarding the abstract possibility of\nmind being the cause of matter. \"Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate\nourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would\nreach to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some\ndim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made and begin to\nexist by the power of that eternal first being.... But you will say, Is it\nnot impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing, since we\ncannot possibly conceive it? I answer--No; because it is not reasonable to\ndeny the power of an infinite being [this phrase, in the absence of\nhypothesis, _i.e._, in Locke's other train of reasoning, is of course\nequivalent to the sum-total of possibility] because we cannot comprehend\nits operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we\ncannot possibly conceive the manner of their production. We cannot conceive\nhow anything but impulse of body can move body; and yet that is not a\nreason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant\nexperience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions, which\nare produced in us only by the free action or thought of our minds, and are\nnot, nor can be, the effects of the impulse or determination of the blind\nmatter in or upon our own bodies; for then it could not be in our power or\nchoice to alter it. For example, my right hand writes, whilst my left hand\nis still: what causes rest in one and motion in the other? Nothing but my\nwill, a thought in my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand rests,\nand the left hands moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied:\nexplain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to\nunderstand creation.\"[36]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nSUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI.\n\nCOSMIC THEISM.[37]\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable is a doctrine of so much\nspeculative importance, that it behoves all students of philosophy to have\nclear views respecting its character and implications. Mr. Spencer has\nhimself so fully explained the character of this doctrine, that no\nattentive reader can fail to understand it; but concerning those of its\nimplications which may be termed theological--as distinguished from\nreligious--Mr. Spencer is silent. Within the last two or three years,\nhowever, there has appeared a valuable work by an able exponent of the new\nphilosophy; and in this work the writer, adopting his master's teaching of\nthe Unknowable, proceeds to develop it into a definite system of what may\nbe termed scientific theology. And not only so, but he assures the world\nthat this system of scientific theology is the highest, the purest, and the\nmost ennobling form of religion that mankind has ever been privileged to\nknow in the past, or, from the nature of the case, can ever be destined to\nknow in the future. It is a system, we are told, wherein the most\nfundamental truths of Theism are taught as necessary deductions from the\nhighest truths of Science; it is a system wherein no single doctrine\nappeals for its acceptance to any principle of blind or credulous faith,\nbut wherein every doctrine can be fully justified by the searching light of\nreason; it is a system wherein the noblest of our aspirations and the most\nsublime of our emotions are able to find an object far more worthy and much\nmore glorious than has ever been supplied to them by any of the older forms\nof Theism; and it is a system, therefore, in which, with a greatly enlarged\nand intensified meaning, we may worship God, and all that is within us\nbless His holy name. Assuredly a proclamation such as this, emanating from\nthe most authoritative expounders of modern thought, as the highest and the\ngreatest result to which a rigorous philosophic synthesis has led, is a\nproclamation which cannot fail to arrest our most serious attention. Nay,\nmay it not do more than this? May it not appeal to hearts which long have\nceased to worship? May it not once more revive a hope--long banished,\nperhaps, but still the dearest which our poor natures have\nexperienced--that somewhere, sometime, or in some way, it may yet be\npossible to feel that God is not far from any one of us? For to those who\nhave known the anguish of a shattered faith, it will not seem so childish\nthat our hearts should beat the quicker when we once more hear a voice\nannouncing to a world of superstitious idolaters--\"Whom ye ignorantly\nworship, Him declare I unto you.\" But if, when we have listened to the glad\ntidings of the new gospel, we find that the preacher, though apparently in\nearnest, is not worthy to be heard again on this matter; and if, as we turn\naway, our eyes grow dim with the memory of a vanished dream, surely we may\nfeel that the preacher is deserving of our blame for obtruding thus upon\nthe most sacred of our sorrows.\n\nMr. John Fiske is, as is well known, an author who unites in himself the\nqualities of a well-read student of philosophy, a clear and accurate\nthinker, a thorough master of the principles which in his recent work he\nundertakes to explain and to extend, and a writer gifted in a remarkable\ndegree with the power of lucid exposition. Such being the intellectual\ncalibre of the man who elaborates this new system of scientific theology, I\nconfess that, on first seeing his work, I experienced a faint hope that, in\nthe higher departments of the Philosophy of Evolution as conceived by Mr.\nSpencer and elaborated by his disciple, there might be found some rational\njustification for an attenuated form of Theism. But on examination I find\nthat the bread which these fathers have offered us turns out to be a stone;\nand thinking that it is desirable to warn other of the children--whether of\nthe family Philosophical or Theological--against swallowing on trust a\nmorsel so injurious, I shall endeavour to point out what I conceive to be\nthe true nature of \"Cosmic Theism.\"\n\nStarting from the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, Mr. Fiske,\nfollowing Mr. Spencer, proceeds to show how the doctrine implies that there\nmust be a mode of Being to which human knowledge is non-relative. Or, in\nother words, he shows that the postulation of phenomena necessitates the\nfurther postulation of noumena of which phenomena are the manifestations.\nNow what may we affirm of noumena without departing from a scientific or\nobjective mode of philosophising? We may affirm at least this much of\nnoumena, that they constitute a mode of existence which need not\nnecessarily vanish were our consciousness to perish; and, therefore, that\nthey now stand out of necessary relation to our consciousness. Or, in other\nwords, so far as human consciousness is concerned, noumena must be regarded\nas absolute. \"But now, what do we mean by this affirmation of absolute\nreality independent of the conditions of the process of knowing? Do we mean\nto ... affirm, in language savouring strongly of scholasticism, that\nbeneath the phenomena which we call subjective there is an occult\nsubstratum Mind, and beneath the phenomena which we call objective there is\nan occult substratum Matter? Our conclusion cannot be stated in any such\nform.... Our conclusion is simply this, that no theory of phenomena,\nexternal or internal, can be framed without postulating an Absolute\nExistence of which phenomena are the manifestations. And now let us\ncarefully note what follows. We cannot identify this Absolute Existence\nwith Mind, since what we know as Mind is a series of phenomenal\nmanifestations.... Nor can we identify this Absolute Existence with Matter,\nsince what we know as Matter is a series of phenomenal manifestations....\nAbsolute Existence, therefore,--the Reality which persists independently of\nus, and of which Mind and Matter are the phenomenal manifestations,--cannot\nbe identified either with Mind or with Matter. Thus is Materialism included\nin the same condemnation with Idealism.... See then how far we have\ntravelled from the scholastic theory of occult substrata underlying each\ngroup of phenomena. These substrata were but the ghosts of the phenomena\nthemselves; behind the tree or the mountain a sort of phantom tree or\nmountain, which persists after the body of perception has gone away with\nthe departure of the percipient mind. Clearly this is no scientific\ninterpretation of the facts, but is rather a specimen of naive barbaric\nthought surviving in metaphysics. The tree or mountain being groups of\nphenomena, what we assert as persisting independently of the percipient\nmind is a something which we are unable to condition either as tree or as\nmountain.\n\n\"And now we come down to the very bottom of the problem. Since we do\npostulate Absolute Existence, and do not postulate a particular occult\nsubstance underlying each group of phenomena, are we to be understood as\nimplying that there is a single Being of which all phenomena, internal and\nexternal to consciousness, are manifestations? Such must seem to be the\ninevitable conclusion, since we are able to carry on thinking at all only\nunder the relations of Difference and No-difference.... It may seem that,\nsince we cannot attribute to the Absolute Reality any relations of\nDifference, we must positively ascribe to it No-difference. Or, what is the\nsame thing, in refusing to predicate multiplicity of it, do we not\nvirtually predicate of it unity? We do, simply because we cannot think\nwithout so doing.\"[38]\n\nA single Absolute Reality being thus posited, our author proceeds, towards\nthe close of his work, to argue that as this Reality cannot be conceived as\nlimited either in space or time, it constitutes a Being which corresponds\nwith our essential conception of Deity. True it is devoid of certain\naccessory attributes, such as personality, intelligence, and volition; but\nfor this very reason, it is insisted, the theistic ideal as thus presented\nis a purer, and therefore a better, ideal than has ever been presented\nbefore. Nay, it is the highest possible form of this ideal, as the\nfollowing considerations will show. In what has consisted that continuous\npurification of Theism which the history of thought shows to have been\neffected, from the grossest form of belief in supernatural agency as\nexhibited in Fetichism, through its more refined form as exhibited in\nPolytheism, to its still more refined form as exhibited in Monotheism? In\nnothing but in a continuous process of what Mr. Fiske calls\n\"deanthropomorphisation.\" Consequently, must we not conclude that when we\ncarry this process yet one step further, and divest our conception of Deity\nof all the yet lingering remnants of anthropomorphism which occur in the\ncurrent conceptions of Deity, we are but still further purifying that\nconception? Assuredly, the attributes of personality, intelligence, and so\nforth, are only known as attributes of Humanity, and therefore to ascribe\nthem to Deity is but to foster, in a more refined form, the anthropomorphic\nteachings of previous religions. But if we carefully refuse to limit Deity\nby the ascription of any human attributes whatever, and if the only\nattributes which we do ascribe are such as on grounds of pure reason alone\nwe are compelled to ascribe, must we not conclude that the form of Theism\nwhich results is the purest and the most refined form in which it is\npossible for Theism to exist? \"From the anthropomorphic point of view it\nwill quite naturally be urged in objection, that this apparently desirable\nresult is reached through the degradation of Deity from an 'intelligent\npersonality' to a 'blind force,' and is therefore in reality an undesirable\nand perhaps quasi-atheistic result.\"[39] But the question which really\npresents itself is, \"theologically phrased, whether the creature is to be\ntaken as a measure of the Creator. Scientifically phrased, the question is\nwhether the highest form of Being as yet suggested to one petty race of\ncreatures by its ephemeral experience of what is going on in one tiny\ncorner of the universe, is necessarily to be taken as the equivalent of\nthat absolutely highest form of Being in which all the possibilities of\nexistence are alike comprehended.\"[40] Therefore, in conclusion, \"whether\nor not it is true that, within the bounds of the phenomenal universe the\nhighest type of existence is that which we know as humanity, the conclusion\nis in every way forced upon us that, quite independently of limiting\nconditions in space or time, there is a form of Being which can neither be\nassimilated to humanity nor to any lower type of existence. We have no\nalternative, therefore, but to regard it as higher than humanity, even 'as\nthe heavens are higher than the earth,' and except for the intellectual\narrogance which the arguments of theologians show lurking beneath their\nexpressions of humility, there is no reason why this admission should not\nbe made unreservedly, without the anthropomorphic qualifications by which\nits effect is commonly nullified. The time is surely coming when the\nslowness of men in accepting such a conclusion will be marvelled at, and\nwhen the very inadequacy of human language to express Divinity will be\nregarded as a reason for a deeper faith and more solemn adoration.\"[41]\n\nI have now sufficiently detailed the leading principles of Cosmic Theism to\nrender a clear and just conception of those fundamental parts of the system\nwhich I am about to criticise; but it is needless to say that, for all\nminor details of this system, I must refer those who may not already have\nperused them to Mr. Fiske's somewhat elaborate essays. In now beginning my\ncriticisms, it may be well to state at the outset, that they are to be\nrestricted to the philosophical aspect of the subject. With matters of\nsentiment I do not intend to deal,--partly because to do so would be unduly\nto extend this essay, and partly also because I believe that, so far as the\nacceptance or the rejection of Cosmic Theism is to be determined by\nsentiment, much, if not all, will depend on individual habits of thought.\nFor whether or not Cosmic Theism is to be regarded as a religion adapted to\nthe needs of any individual man, will depend on what these needs are felt\nto be by that man himself: we cannot assert magisterially that this\nreligion must be adapted to his needs because we have found it to be\nadapted to our own. And if it is retorted that, human nature being\neverywhere the same, a form of religion that is adapted to one man must on\nthis account be adapted to another, I reply that it is not so. For if a man\nwho is what Mr. Fiske calls an \"Anthropomorphic Theist\" finds from\nexperience that his system of religion--say Christianity--creates and\nsustains a class of emotions and general habits of thought which he feels\nto be the highest and the best of which he is capable, it is useless for a\n\"Cosmic Theist\" to offer such a man another system of religion, in which\nthe conditions essential to the existence of these particular emotions and\nhabits of thought are manifestly absent. For such a man cannot but feel\nthat the proffered substitution would be tantamount, if accepted, to an\nutter destruction of all that he regards as essentially religious. He will\ntell us that he finds it perfectly easy to understand and to appreciate\nthose feelings of vague awe and \"worship of the silent kind\" which the\nCosmic Theist declares to be fostered by Cosmic Theism; but he will also\ntell us that those feelings, which he has experienced with equal vividness\nunder his own system of Anthropomorphic Theism, are to him but as\nnon-religious dross compared with the unspeakable felicity of holding\ndefinite commune with the Almighty and Most Merciful, or of rendering\nworship that is a glad hosanna--a fearless shout of joy. On the other hand,\nI believe that it is possible for philosophic habits of thought so to\ndiscipline the mind that the feelings of vague awe and silent worship in\nthe presence of an appalling Mystery become more deep and steady than a\ntheist proper can well believe. It is therefore impossible that either\nparty can fully appreciate those sentiments of the other which they have\nnever fully experienced themselves; for even in those cases where an\nanthropomorphic theist has been compelled to abandon his creed, as the\nchange must take place in mature life, his tone of mind has been determined\nbefore it does take place; and therefore in sentiment, though not in faith,\nhe is more or less of a theist for the rest of his life: the only effect of\nthe change is to create a troubled interference between his desires and his\nbeliefs.\n\nHowever, I do not intend to develop this branch of the subject further than\nthus to point out, in a general way, that religion-mongers as a class are\napt to show too little regard for the sentiments, as distinguished from the\nbeliefs, of those to whom they offer their wares. But although I do not\nintend to constitute myself a champion of theology by pointing out the\ndefects of Cosmic Theism in the aspect which it presents to current modes\nof thought, there is one such defect which I must here dwell upon, because\nwe shall afterwards have occasion to refer to it. A theologian may very\nnaturally make this objection to Cosmic Theism as presented by Mr.\nFiske--viz., that the argument on which this philosopher throughout relies\nas a self-evident demonstration that the new system of Theism is a further\nand a final improvement on all the previous systems of Theism, is a\nfallacious argument. As we have already seen, this argument is, that as the\nprogress in the purification of Theism has throughout consisted in a\nprocess of \"deanthropomorphisation,\" therefore the terminal phase in this\nprocess, which Cosmic Theism introduces, must be still in the direction of\nthat progress. But to this argument a theologian may not unreasonably\nobject, that this terminal phase differs from all the previous phases in\none all-important feature--viz., in effecting a _total abolition_ of the\nanthropomorphic element. Before, therefore, it can be shown that this\nterminal phase is a further development of _Theism_, it must he shown that\nTheism still remains Theism after this hitherto characteristic element has\nbeen removed. If it is true, as Mr. Fiske very properly insists, that all\nthe various forms of belief in God have thus far had this as a common\nfactor, that they ascribed to God the attributes of Man; it becomes a\nquestion whether we may properly abstract this hitherto invariable factor\nof a belief, and still call that belief by the same name. Or, to put the\nmatter in another light, as cosmists maintain that Theism, in all the\nphases of its development, has been the product of a probably erroneous\ntheory of personal agency in nature, when this theory is expressly\ndiscarded--as it is by the doctrine of the Unknowable--is it\nphilosophically legitimate for cosmists to render their theory of things in\nterms which belong to the totally different theory which they discard? No\ndoubt it is true that the progressive refinement of Theism has throughout\nconsisted in a progressive discarding of anthropomorphic qualities; but\nthis fact does not touch the consideration that, when we proceed to strip\noff the last remnants of these qualities, we are committing an act which\ndiffers _toto coelo_ from all the previous acts which are cited as\nprecedents; for by this terminal act we are not, as heretofore, _refining_\nthe theory of Theism--we are completely _transforming_ it by removing an\nelement which, both genetically and historically, would seem to constitute\nthe very essence of Theism.\n\nOr the case may be presented in yet another light. The only use of terms,\nwhether in daily talk or in philosophical disquisition, is that of\ndesignating certain things or attributes to which by general custom we\nagree to affix them; so that if anyone applies a term to some thing or\nattribute which general custom does not warrant him in so applying, he is\nmerely laying himself open to the charge of abusing that term. Now apply\nthese elementary principles to the case before us. We have but to think of\nthe disgust with which the vast majority of living persons would regard the\nsense in which Mr. Fiske uses the term \"Theism,\" to perceive how intimate\nis the association of that term with the idea of a Personal God. Such\npersons will feel strongly that, by this final act of purification, Mr.\nFiske has simply purified the Deity altogether out of existence. And I\nscarcely think it is here competent to reply that all previous acts of\npurification were at first similarly regarded as destructive, because it is\nevident that none of these previous acts affected, as this one does, the\ncentral core of Theism. And, lastly, if it should be still further\nobjected, that by declaring the theory of Personal Agency the central core\nof Theism, I am begging the question as to the appropriateness of Mr.\nFiske's use of the word \"Theism,\"--seeing he appears to regard the\nessential meaning of this word to be that of a postulation of merely Causal\nAgency,--I answer, More of this anon; but meanwhile let it be observed that\nany charge of question-begging lies rather at the door of Mr. Fiske, in\nthat he assumes, without any expressed justification, that the essence of\nTheism _does_ consist in such a postulation and in nothing more. And as he\nunquestionably has against him the present world of theists no less than\nthe history of Theism in the past, I do not see how he is to meet this\ncharge except by confessing to an abuse of the term in question.\n\nI will now proceed to examine the structure of Cosmic Theism. We are all, I\nsuppose, at one in allowing that there are only three \"verbally\nintelligible\" theories of the universe,--viz., that it is self-existent, or\nthat it is self-created, or that it has been created by some other and\nexternal Being. It is usual to call the first of these theories Atheism,\nthe second Pantheism, and the third Theism. Now as there are here three\ndistinct nameable theories, it is necessary, if the term \"Cosmic Theism\" is\nto be justified as an appropriate term, that the particular theory which it\ndesignates should be shown to be in its essence theistic--_i.e._, that the\ntheory should present those distinguishing features in virtue of which\nTheism differs from Atheism on the one hand, and from Pantheism on the\nother. Now what are these features? The postulate of an Eternal\nSelf-existing Something is common to Theism and to Atheism. Here Atheism\nends. Theism, however, is generally said to assume Personality,\nIntelligence, and Creative Power as attributes of the single self-existing\nsubstance. Lastly, Pantheism assumes the Something now existing to have\nbeen self-created. To which, then, of these distinct theories is Cosmic\nTheism most nearly allied? For the purpose of answering this question, I\nshall render that theory in terms of a formula which Mr. Fiske presents as\na full and complete statement of the theory:--\"_There exists a_ POWER, _to\nwhich no limit in space or time is conceivable, of which all phenomena, as\npresented in consciousness, are manifestations, but which we can only know\nthrough these manifestations._\" But although the word \"Power\" is here so\nstrongly emphasised, we are elsewhere told that it is not to be regarded as\nhaving more than a strictly relative or symbolic meaning; so that, in point\nof fact, some more neutral word, such as \"Something,\" \"Being,\" or\n\"Substance,\" ought in strictness to be here substituted for the word\n\"Power.\" Well, if this is done, we have the postulation of a Being which is\nself-existing, infinite, and eternal--relatively, at all events, to our\npowers of conception. Thus far, therefore, it would seem that we are still\non the common standing-ground of Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism; for as it\nis not, so far as I can see, incumbent on Pantheism to affirm that \"thought\nis a measure of things,\" the _apparent_ or _relative_ eternity which the\nPrimal Something must be supposed to present may not be _actual_ or\n_absolute_ eternity. Nevertheless, as Mr. Fiske, by predicating Divinity of\nthe Primal Something, implicitly attributes to it the quality of an\n_eternal_ self-existence, I infer that Cosmic Theism may be concluded at\nthis point to part company with Pantheism. There remain, then, Theism and\nAtheism.\n\nNow undoubtedly, at first sight, Cosmic Theism appears to differ from\nAtheism in one all-important particular. For we have seen that, by means of\na subtle though perfectly logical argument, Cosmic Philosophy has evolved\nthis conclusion--that all phenomena as presented in consciousness are\nmanifestations of a not improbable Single Self-existing Power, of whose\nexistence these manifestations alone can make us cognisant. From which it\napparently follows, that this hypothetical Power must be regarded as\nexisting out of necessary relation to the phenomenal universe; that it is,\ntherefore, beyond question \"Absolute Being;\" and that, as such, we are\nentitled to call it Deity. But in the train of reasoning of which this is a\nvery condensed epitome, it is evident that the legitimacy of denominating\nthis Absolute Being Deity, must depend on the exact meaning which we attach\nto the word \"Absolute\"--and this, be it observed, quite apart from the\nquestion, before touched upon, as to whether Personality and Intelligence\nare not to be considered as attributes essential to Deity. In what sense,\nthen, is the word \"Absolute\" used? It is used in this sense. As from the\nrelativity of knowledge we cannot know things in themselves, but only\nsymbolical representations of such things, therefore things in themselves\nare absolute to consciousness: but analysis shows that we cannot\nconceivably predicate Difference among things in themselves, so that we are\nat liberty, with due diffidence, to predicate of them No-difference: hence\nthe noumena of the schoolmen admit of being collected into a _summum genus_\nof noumenal existence; and since, before their colligation noumena were\nseverally absolute, after their colligation they become collectively\nabsolute: therefore it is legitimate to designate this sum-total of\nnoumenal existence, \"Absolute Being.\" Now there is clearly no exception to\nbe taken to the formal accuracy of this reasoning; the only question is as\nto whether the \"Absolute Being\" which it evolves is absolute in the sense\nrequired by Theism. I confess that to me this Being appears to be absolute\nin a widely different sense from that in which Deity must be regarded as\nabsolute. For this Being is thus seen to be absolute in no other sense than\nas holding--to quote from Mr. Fiske--\"existence independent of the\nconditions of the process of knowing.\" In other words, it is absolute only\nas standing out of necessary relation to _human consciousness_. But Theism\nrequires, as an essential feature, that Deity should be absolute as\nstanding out of necessary relation to _all else_. Before, therefore, the\nAbsolute Being of Cosmism can be shown, by the reasoning adopted, to\ndeserve, even in part, the appellation of Deity, it must be shown that\nthere is no other mode of Being in existence save our own subjective\nconsciousness and the Absolute Reality which becomes objective to it\nthrough the world of phenomena. But any attempt to establish this position\nwould involve a disregard of the doctrine that knowledge is relative; and\nto do this, it is needless to say, would be to destroy the basis of the\nargument whereby the Absolute Being of Cosmism was posited.\n\nOr, to state this part of the criticism in other words, as the first step\nin justifying the predication of Deity, it must be shown that the Being of\nwhich the predication is made is absolute, and this not merely as\nindependent of human consciousness, but as independent of the whole\nnoumenal universe--Deity itself alone excepted. That is, the Being of which\nDeity is predicated must be Unconditioned. Hence it is incumbent on Cosmic\nTheism to prove, either that the Causal Agent which it denominates Deity is\nitself the whole noumenal universe, or that it created the rest of a\nnoumenal universe; else there is nothing to show that this Causal Agent was\nnot itself created--seeing that, even if we assume the existence of a God,\nthere is nothing to indicate that the Causal Agent of Cosmism is that God.\n\nIt would appear therefore from this, that whatever else the Cosmist's\ntheory of things may be, it certainly is not Theism; and I think that\ncloser inspection will tend to confirm this judgment. To this then let us\nproceed.\n\nMr. Fiske is very hard on the atheists, and so will probably repudiate with\nscorn any insinuations to the effect that his theory of things is\n\"quasi-atheistic.\" Nevertheless, it seems to me that he is very unjust to\nthe atheists, in that while he spares no pains to \"purify\" and \"refine\" the\ntheory of the theists, so as at last to leave nothing but what he regards\nas the distilled essence of Theism behind; he habitually leaves the theory\nof the atheists as he finds it, without making any attempt either to\n\"purify\" it by removing its weak and unnecessary ingredients, or to\n\"refine\" it by adding such sublimated ingredients as modern speculation has\nsupplied. Thus, while he despises the atheists of the eighteenth century\nfor their irrationality in believing in the self-existence of a\n_phenomenal_ universe, and reviles them for their irreligion in denying\nthat \"the religious sentiment needed satisfaction;\" he does not wait to\ninquire whether, in its essential substance, the theory of these men is not\nthe one that has proved itself best able to withstand the grinding action\nof more recent thought. But let us in fairness ask, What was the essential\nsubstance of that theory? Apparently it was the bare statement of the\nunthinkable fact that Something Is. It therefore seems to me useless in Mr.\nFiske to lay so much stress on the fact that this Something was originally\nidentified by atheists with the phenomenal universe. It seems useless to do\nthis, because such identification is clearly no part of the _essence_ of\nAtheism, which, as just stated, I take to consist in the single dogma of\nself-existence as itself sufficient to constitute a theory of things. And,\nif so, it is a matter of scarcely any moment, as regards that theory,\nwhether we are _immediately_ cognisant of that which is self-existent, or\nonly become so through the world of phenomena--the vital point of the\ntheory being, that Self-existence, _wherever posited_, is itself the only\nadmissible explanation of phenomena. Or, in other words, it does not seem\nthat there is anything in the atheistic theory, as such, which is\nincompatible with the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge; so that\nwhatever cogency there may be in the train of reasoning whereby a single\nCausal Agent is deduced from that doctrine, it would seem that an atheist\nhas as much right to the benefit of this reasoning as a theist; and there\nis thus no more apparent reason why this single Causal Agent should be\nappropriated as the God of Theism, than that it should be appropriated as\nthe Self-existing X of Atheism. Indeed, there seems to be less reason. For\nan atheist of to-day may very properly argue:--'So far from beholding\nanything divine in this Single Being absolute to human consciousness, it is\njust precisely the form of Being which my theory postulates as the\nSelf-existing All. In order to constitute such a Being God, it must be\nshown, as we have already seen, to be something more than a merely Causal\nAgent which is absolute in the grotesquely restricted sense of being\nindependent of 'one petty race of creatures with an ephemeral experience of\nwhat is going on in one tiny corner of the universe;' it must be shown to\nbe something more than absolute even in the wholly unrestricted sense of\nbeing Unconditioned; it must be shown to possess such other attributes as\nare distinctive of Deity. For I maintain that even Unconditioned Being,\n_merely as such_, would only then have a right to the name of God when it\nhas been shown that the theory of Theism has a right to monopolise the\ndoctrine of Relativity.'\n\nIn thus endeavouring to \"purify\" the theory of Atheism, by divesting it of\nall superfluous accessories, and laying bare what I conceive to be its\nessential substance; it may be well to state that, even apart from their\nirreligious character, I have no sympathy with the atheists of the past\ncentury. I mean, that these men do not seem to me to deserve any credit for\nadvanced powers of speculation merely because they adopted a theory of\nthings which in its essential features now promises to be the most\nenduring. For it is evident that the strength of this theory now lies in\nits _simplicity_,--in its undertaking to explain, so far as explanation is\npossible, the sum-total of phenomena by the single postulate of\nself-existence. But it seems to me that in the last century there were no\nsufficient data for rendering such a theory of things a rational theory;\nfor so long as the quality of self-existence was supposed to reside in\nphenomena themselves, the very simplicity of the theory, as expressed in\nwords, must have seemed to render it inapplicable as a reasonable theory of\nthings. The astounding variety, complexity, and harmony which are\neverywhere so conspicuous in the world of phenomena must have seemed to\nnecessitate as an explanation some one integrating cause; and it is\nimpossible that in the eighteenth century any such integrating cause can\nhave been conceivable other than Intelligence. Therefore I think, with Mr.\nFiske, that the atheists of the eighteenth century were irrational in\napplying their single postulate of self-existence as alone a sufficient\nexplanation of things. But of course the aspect of the case is now\ncompletely changed, when we regard it in all the flood of light which has\nbeen shed on it by recent science, physical and speculative. For the\ndemonstration of the fact that energy is indestructible, coupled with the\ncorollary that every so-called natural law is a physically necessary\nconsequence of that fact, clearly supply us with a completely novel datum\nas the ultimate source of experience--and a datum, moreover, which is as\ndifferent as can well be imagined from the ever-changing, ever-fleeting,\nworld of phenomena. We have, therefore, but to apply the postulate of\nself-existence to this single ultimate datum, and we have a theory of\nthings as rational as the Atheism of the last century was irrational.\nNevertheless, that this theory is more akin to the Atheism of the last\ncentury than to any other theory of that time, is, I think, unquestionable;\nfor while we retain the central doctrine of self-existence as alone a\nscientifically admissible, or non-gratuitous, explanation of things, we\nonly change the original theory by transferring the application of this\ndoctrine from the world of manifestations to that which causes the\nmanifestations: we do not resort to any of the _additional_ doctrines\nwhereby the other theories of the universe were distinguished from the\ntheory of Atheism in its original form. However, as by our recognition of\nthe relativity of knowledge we are precluded from dogmatically denying any\ntheory of the universe that may be proposed, it would clearly be erroneous\nto identify the doctrine of the Unknowable with the theory of Atheism: all\nwe can say is, that, so far as speculative thought can soar, the permanent\nself-existence of an inconceivable Something, which manifests itself to\nconsciousness as force and matter, constitutes the only datum that can be\nshown to be required for the purposes of a rational ontology.\n\nTo sum up. In the theory which Mr. Fiske calls Cosmic Theism, while I am\nable to discern the elements which I think may properly be regarded as\ncommon to Theism and to Atheism, I am not able to discern any single\nelement that is specifically distinctive of Theism. Still I am far from\nconcluding that the theory in question is the theory of Atheism. All I wish\nto insist upon is this--that as the Absolute Being of Cosmism presents no\nother qualities than such as are required by the renovated theory of\nAtheism, its postulation supplies a basis, not for Theism, but for\nNon-theism: a man with such a postulate ought in strictness to abstain from\neither affirming or denying the existence of God. And this, I may observe,\nappears to be the position which Mr. Spencer himself has adopted as the\nonly logical outcome of his doctrine of the Unknowable--a position which,\nin my opinion, it is most undesirable to obscure by endeavouring to give it\na quasi-theistic interpretation. I may further observe, that we here seem\nto have a philosophical justification of the theological sentiment\npreviously alluded to--the sentiment, namely, that by his attempt at a\nfinal purification of Theism, Mr. Fiske has destroyed those essential\nfeatures of the theory in virtue of which alone it exists as Theism. For\nseeing it is impossible, from the relativity of knowledge, that the\nAbsolute Being of Cosmism can ever be shown absolute in the sense required\nby Theism, and, even if it could, that it would still be but the\nUnconditioned Being of Atheism; it follows that if this Absolute Being is\nto be shown even in part to deserve the appellation of Deity, it must be\nshown to possess the only remaining attributes which are distinctive of\nDeity--to wit, personality and intelligence. But forasmuch as the final act\nof purifying the conception of Deity consists, according to Mr. Fiske, in\nexpressly removing these particular attributes from the object of that\nconception, does it not follow that the conception which remains is, as I\nhave said, not theistic, but non-theistic?\n\nHere my criticism might properly have ended, were it not that Mr. Fiske,\nafter having divested the Deity of all his psychical attributes, forthwith\nproceeds to show how it may be dimly possible to reinvest him with\nattributes that are \"quasi-psychical.\" Mr. Fiske is, of course, far too\nsubtle a thinker not to see that his previous argument from relativity\nprecludes him from assigning much weight to the ontological speculations in\nwhich he here indulges, seeing that in whatever degree the relativity of\nknowledge renders legitimate the non-ascription to Deity of known psychical\nattributes, in some such degree at least must it render illegitimate the\nascription to Deity of unknown psychical attributes. But in the part of his\nwork in which he treats of the quasi-psychical attributes, Mr. Fiske is\nmerely engaged in showing that the speculative standing of the\n\"materialists\" is inferior to that of the \"spiritualists;\" so that, as this\nis a subject distinct from Theism, he is not open to the charge of\ninconsistency. Well, feeble as these speculations undoubtedly are in the\nsupport which they render to Theism, it nevertheless seems desirable to\nconsider them before closing this review. The speculations in question are\nquoted from Mr. Spencer, and are as follows:--\n\n\"Mind, as known to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggregate of\nactivities; and the cohesion of these activities, one with another,\nthroughout the aggregate, compels the postulation of a something of which\nthey are the activities. But the same experiences which make him aware of\nthis coherent aggregate of mental activities, simultaneously make him aware\nof activities that are not included in it--outlying activities which become\nknown by their effects on this aggregate, but which are experimentally\nproved to be not coherent with it, and to be coherent with one another\n(_First Principles_, Sec.Sec. 43, 44). As, by the definition of them, these\nexternal activities cannot be brought within the aggregate of activities\ndistinguished as those of Mind, they must for ever remain to him nothing\nmore than the unknown correlatives of their effects on this aggregate; and\ncan be thought of only in terms furnished by this aggregate. Hence, if he\nregards his conceptions of these activities lying beyond Mind as\nconstituting knowledge of them, he is deluding himself: he is but\nrepresenting these activities in terms of Mind, and can never do otherwise.\nEventually he is obliged to admit that his ideas of Matter and Motion,\nmerely symbolic of unknowable realities, are complex states of\nconsciousness built out of units of feeling. But if, after admitting this,\nhe persists in asking whether units of feeling are of the same nature as\nthe units of force distinguished as external, or whether the units of force\ndistinguished as external are of the same nature as units of feeling; then\nthe reply, still substantially the same, is that we may go further towards\nconceiving units of external force to be identical with units of feeling,\nthan we can towards conceiving units of feeling to be identical with units\nof external force. Clearly, if units of external force are regarded as\nabsolutely unknown and unknowable, then to translate units of feeling into\nthem is to translate the known into the unknown, which is absurd. And if\nthey are what they are supposed to be by those who identify them with their\nsymbols, then the difficulty of translating units of feeling into them is\ninsurmountable: if Force as it objectively exists is absolutely alien in\nnature from that which exists subjectively as Feeling, then the\ntransformation of Force into Feeling is unthinkable. Either way, therefore,\nit is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of outer existence.\nBut if, on the other hand, units of Force as they exist objectively are\nessentially the same in nature with those manifested subjectively as units\nof Feeling, then a conceivable hypothesis remains open. Every element of\nthat aggregate of activities constituting a consciousness is known as\nbelonging to consciousness only by its cohesion with the rest. Beyond the\nlimits of this coherent aggregate of activities exist activities quite\nindependent of it, and which cannot be brought into it. We may imagine,\nthen, that by their exclusion from the circumscribed activities\nconstituting consciousness, these outer activities, though of the same\nintrinsic nature, become antithetically opposed in aspect. Being\ndisconnected from consciousness, or cut off by its limits, they are thereby\nrendered foreign to it. Not being incorporated with its activities, or\nlinked with these as they are with one another, consciousness cannot, as it\nwere, run through them; and so they come to be figured as unconscious--are\nsymbolised as having the nature called material, as opposed to that called\nspiritual. While, however, it thus seems an imaginable possibility that\nunits of external Force may be identical in nature with units of the force\nknown as Feeling, yet we cannot by so representing them get any nearer to a\ncomprehension of external Force. For, as already shown, supposing all forms\nof Mind to be composed of homogeneous units of feeling variously\naggregated, the resolution of them into such units leaves us as unable as\nbefore to think of the substance of Mind as it exists in such units; and\nthus, even could we really figure to ourselves all units of external Force\nas being essentially like units of the force known as Feeling, and as so\nconstituting a universal sentiency, we should be as far as ever from\nforming a conception of that which is universally sentient.\"[42]\n\nNow while I agree with Mr. Fiske that we have here \"the most subtle\nconclusion now within the ken of the scientific speculator, reached without\nany disregard of the canons prescribed by the doctrine of relativity,\" I\nwould like to point out to minds less clear-sighted than his, that this\nsame \"doctrine of relativity\" effectually debars us from using this\n\"conclusion\" as an argument of any assignable value in favour of Theism.\nFor the value of conceivability as a test of truth, on which this\nconclusion is founded, is here vitiated by the consideration that,\n_whatever_ the nature of Force-units may be, we can clearly perceive it to\nbe a subjective necessity of the case that they should admit of being more\neasily conceived by us to be of the nature of Feeling-units than to be of\nany other nature. For as units of Feeling are the only entities of which we\nare, or can be, conscious, they are the entities into which units of Force\nmust be, so to speak, subjectively translated before we can cognise their\nexistence at all. Therefore, _whatever_ the real nature of Force-units may\nbe, ultimate analysis must show that it is more conceivable to identify\nthem in thought with the only units of which we are cognisant, than it is\nto think of them as units of which we are not cognisant, and concerning\nwhich, therefore, conception is necessarily impossible. Or thus, the only\nalternative with respect to the classifying of Force-units lies between\nrefusing to classify them at all, or classifying them with the only\nultimate units with which we are acquainted. But this restriction, for\naught that can ever be shown to the contrary, arises only from the\nsubjective conditions of our own consciousness; there is nothing to\nindicate that, in objective reality, units of Force are in any wise akin to\nunits of Feeling. Conceivability, therefore, as a test of truth, is in this\nparticular case of no assignable degree of value; for as the entities to\nwhich it is applied are respectively the highest known abstractions of\nsubjective and objective existence, the test of conceivability is\nneutralised by directly encountering the inconceivable relation that\nsubsists between subject and object. I think, therefore, it is evident that\nthese ontological speculations present no sufficient warrant for an\ninference, even of the slenderest kind, that the Absolute Being of Cosmism\npossesses attributes of a nature quasi-psychical; and, if so, it follows\nthat these speculations are incompetent to form the basis of a theory\nwhich, even by the greatest stretch of courtesy, can in any legitimate\nsense be termed quasi-theistic.[43]\n\nOn the whole, then, I conclude that the term \"Cosmic Theism\" is not an\nappropriate term whereby to denote the theory of things set forth in\n\"Cosmic Philosophy;\" and that it would therefore be more judicious to leave\nthe doctrine of the Unknowable as Mr. Spencer has left it--that is, without\ntheological implications of any kind. But in now taking leave of this\nsubject, I should like it to be understood that the only reason why I have\nventured thus to take exception to a part of Mr. Fiske's work is because I\nregret that a treatise which displays so much of literary excellence and\nphilosophic power should lend itself to promoting what I regard as mistaken\nviews concerning the ontological tendencies of recent thought, and this\nwith no other apparent motive than that of unworthily retaining in the new\nphilosophy a religious term the distinctive connotations of which are\nconsidered by that philosophy to have become obsolete.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nII.\n\nSUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IN REPLY TO A RECENT WORK ON THEISM.[44]\n\nOn perusing my main essay several years after its completion, it occurred\nto me that another very effectual way of demonstrating the immense\ndifference between the nature of all previous attacks upon the teleological\nargument and the nature of the present attack, would be briefly to review\nthe reasonable objections to which all the previous attacks were open. Very\nopportunely a work on Theism has just been published which states these\nobjections with great lucidity, and answers them with much ability. The\nwork to which I allude is by the Rev. Professor Flint, and as it is\ncharacterised by temperate candour in tone and logical care in exposition,\nI felt on reading it that the work was particularly well suited for\ndisplaying the enormous change in the speculative standing of Theism which\nthe foregoing considerations must be rationally deemed to have effected. I\ntherefore determined on throwing my supplementary essay, which I had\npreviously intended to write, into the form of a criticism on Professor\nFlint's treatise, and I adopted this course the more willingly because\nthere are several other points dwelt upon in that treatise which it seems\ndesirable for me to consider in the present one, although, for the sake of\nconciseness, I abstained from discussing them in my previous essay. With\nthese two objects in view, therefore, I undertook the following\ncriticism.[45]\n\nIn the first place, it is needful to protest against an argument which our\nauthor adopts on the authority of Professor Clark Maxwell. The argument is\nnow a well-known one, and is thus stated by Professor Maxwell in his\npresidential address before the British Association for the Advancement of\nScience, 1870:--\"None of the processes of nature, since the time when\nnature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of\nany molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of\nthe molecules or the identity of their properties to the operation of any\nof the causes which we call natural. On the other hand, the exact quality\nof each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John\nHerschel has well said, the essential character of a manufactured article,\nand precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent. Thus we have\nbeen led along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at which\nscience must stop. Not that science is debarred from studying the external\nmechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any more than from\ninvestigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in tracing\nback the history of matter, science is arrested when she assures herself,\non the one hand, that the molecule has been made, and, on the other, that\nit has not been made by any of the processes we call natural.\"\n\nNow it is obvious that we have here no real argument, since it is obvious\nthat science can never be in a position to assert that atoms, the very\nexistence of which is hypothetical, were never \"made by any of the\nprocesses we call natural.\" The mere fact that in the universe, as we now\nknow it, the evolution of material atoms is not observed to be taking place\n\"by any of the processes we call natural,\" cannot possibly be taken as\nproof, or even as presumption, that there ever was a time when the material\natoms now in existence were created by a supernatural cause. The fact\ncannot be taken to justify any such inference for the following reasons. In\nthe first place, assuming the atomic theory to be true, and there is\nnothing in the argument to show that the now-existing atoms are not\nself-existing atoms, endowed with their peculiar and severally distinctive\nproperties from all eternity. Doubtless the argument is, that as there\nappear to be some sixty or more elementary atoms constituting the raw\nmaterial of the observable universe, it is incredible that they can all\nhave owed their correlated properties to any cause other than that of a\ndesigning and manufacturing intelligence. But, in the next place--and here\ncomes the demolishing force of the criticism--science is not in a position\nto assert that these sixty or more elementary atoms are in any real sense\nof the term elementary. The mere fact that chemistry is as yet in too\nundeveloped a condition to pronounce whether or not all the forms of matter\nknown to her are modifications of some smaller number of elements, or even\nof a single element, cannot possibly be taken as a warrant for so huge an\ninference as that there are really more than sixty elements all endowed\nwith absolutely distinctive properties by a supernatural cause. Now this\nconsideration, which arises immediately from the doctrine of the relativity\nof knowledge, is alone amply sufficient to destroy the present argument.\nBut we must not on this account lose sight of the fact that, even to our\nstrictly relative science in its present embryonic condition, we are not\nwithout decided indications, not only that the so-called elements are\nprobably for the most part compounds, but even that matter as a whole is\none substance, which is itself probably but some modification of energy.\nIndeed, the whole tendency of recent scientific speculation is towards the\nview that the universe consists of some one substance, which, whether\nself-existing or created, is diverse only in its relation to ignorance. And\nif this view is correct, how obvious is the inference which I have\nelaborated in Sec. 32, that all the diverse forms of matter, as we know them,\nwere probably evolved by natural causes. So obvious, indeed, is this\ninference, that to resort to any supernatural hypothesis to explain the\ndiverse properties of the various chemical elements appears to me a most\nglaring violation of the law of parcimony--as much more glaring, for\ninstance, than the violation of this law by Paley, as the number and\nvariety of organic species are greater than the number and variety of\nchemical species. And if it was illegitimate in Paley to use a mere absence\nof knowledge as to how the transmutation of apparently fixed species of\nanimals was effected as equivalent to the possession of knowledge that such\ntransmutation had not been effected, how much more illegitimate must it be\nto commit a similar sin against logic in the case of the chemical elements,\nwhere our classification is confessedly beset with numberless difficulties,\nand when we begin to discern that in all probability it is a classification\nessentially artificial. Lastly, the mere fact that the transmutation of\nchemical species and the evolution of chemical \"atoms\" are processes which\nwe do not now observe as occurring in nature, is surely a consideration of\na far more feeble kind than it is even in the case of biological species\nand biological evolution; seeing that nature's laboratory must be now so\ninconceivably different from what it was during the condensation of the\nnebula. What an atrocious piece of arrogance, therefore, it is to assert\nthat \"none of the processes of nature, _since the time when nature began_,\nhave produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule!\"\nNo one can entertain a higher respect for Professor Clark Maxwell than I\ndo; but a single sentence of such a kind as this cannot leave two opinions\nin any impartial mind concerning his competency to deal with such subjects.\n\nI am therefore sorry to see this absurd argument approvingly incorporated\nin Professor Flint's work. He says, \"I believe that no reply to these words\nof Professor Clark Maxwell is possible from any one who holds the ordinary\nview of scientific men as to the ultimate constitution of matter. They must\nsuppose every atom, every molecule, to be of such a nature, to be so\nrelated to others and to the universe generally, that things may be such as\nwe see them to be; but this their fitness to be built up into the structure\nof the universe is a proof that they have been made fit, and since natural\nforces could not have acted on them while not yet existent, a supernatural\npower must have created them, and created them with a view to their\nmanifold uses.\" Here the inference so confidently drawn would have been a\nweak one even were we not able to see that the doctrine of natural\nevolution probably applies to inorganic nature no less than to organic. For\nthe inference is drawn from considerations of a character so transcendental\nand so remote from science, that unless we wish to be deceived by a merely\nverbal argument, we must feel that the possibilities of error in the\ninference are so numerous and indefinite, that the inference itself is\nwell-nigh worthless as a basis of belief. But when we add that in Chapter\nIV. of the foregoing essay it has been shown to be within the legitimate\nscope of scientific reasoning to conclude that material atoms have been\nprogressively evolved _pari passu_ with the natural laws of chemical\ncombination, it is evident that any force which the present argument could\never have had must now be pronounced as neutralised. Natural causes have\nbeen shown, so far as scientific inference can extend, as not improbably\nsufficient to produce the observed effects; and therefore we are no longer\nfree to invoke the hypothetical action of any supernatural cause.\n\nThe same observations apply to Professor Flint's theistic argument drawn\nfrom recent scientific speculations as to the vortex-ring construction of\nmatter. If these speculations are sound, their only influence on Theism\nwould be that of supplying a scientific demonstration of the substantial\nidentity of Force and Matter, and so of supplying a still more valid basis\nfor the theory as to the natural genesis of matter from a single primordial\nsubstance, in the manner sketched out in Chapter IV. For the argument\nadduced by Professor Flint, that as the manner in which the vorticial\nmotion of a ring is originated has not as yet been suggested, therefore its\norigination must have been due to a \"Divine impulse,\" is an argument which\nagain uses the absence of knowledge as equivalent to its possession. We are\nin the presence of a very novel and highly abstruse theory, or rather\nhypothesis, in physics, which was originally suggested by, and has hitherto\nbeen mainly indebted to, empirical experiments as distinguished from\nmathematical calculations; and from the mere fact that, in the case of such\na hypothesis, mathematicians have not as yet been able to determine the\nphysical conditions required to originate vorticial motion, we are expected\nto infer that no such conditions can ever have existed, and therefore that\nevery such vortex system, if it exists, is a miracle!\n\nAnd substantially the same criticism applies to the argument which\nProfessor Flint adduces--the argument also on which Professors Balfour and\nTait lay so much stress in their work on the _Unseen Universe_--the\nargument, namely, as to the non-eternal character of heat. The calculations\non which this argument depends would only be valid as sustaining this\nargument if they were based upon a knowledge of the universe _as a whole_;\nand therefore, as before, the absence of requisite knowledge must not be\nused as equivalent to its possession.\n\nThese, however, are the weakest parts of Professor Flint's work. I\ntherefore gladly turn to those parts which are exceedingly cogent as\nwritten from his standpoint, but which, in view of the strictures on the\nteleological argument that I have adduced in Chapters IV. and VI., I submit\nto be now wholly valueless.\n\n\"How could matter of itself produce order, even if it were self-existent\nand eternal? It is far more unreasonable to believe that the atoms or\nconstituents of matter produced of themselves, without the action of a\nSupreme Mind, this wonderful universe, than that the letters of the English\nalphabet produced the plays of Shakespeare, without the slightest\nassistance from the human mind known by that famous name. These atoms\nmight, perhaps, now and then, here and there, at great distances and long\nintervals, produce by a chance contact some curious collocation or\ncompound; but never could they produce order or organisation on an\nextensive scale, or of a durable character, unless ordered, arranged, and\nadjusted in ways of which intelligence alone can be the ultimate\nexplanation. To believe that these fortuitous and indirected movements\ncould originate the universe, and all the harmonies and utilities and\nbeauties which abound in it, evinces a credulity far more extravagant than\nhas ever been displayed by the most superstitious of religionists. Yet no\nconsistent materialist can refuse to accept this colossal chance\nhypothesis. All the explanations of the order of the universe which\nmaterialists, from Democritus and Epicurus to Diderot and Lange, have\ndevised, rest on the assumption that the elements of matter, being eternal,\nmust pass through infinite combinations, and that one of these must be our\npresent world--a special collocation among the countless millions of\ncollocations, past and future. Throw the letters of the Greek alphabet, it\nhas been said, an infinite number of times, and you must produce the\n'Iliad' and all the Greek books. The theory of probabilities, I need hardly\nsay, requires us to believe nothing so absurd.... But what is the 'Iliad'\nto the hymn of creation and the drama of providence?\" &c.\n\nNow this I conceive to have been a fully valid argument at the time it was\npublished, and indeed the most convincing of all the arguments in favour of\nTheism. But, as already so frequently pointed out, the considerations\nadduced in Chapter IV. of the present work are utterly destructive of this\nargument. For this argument assumes, rightly enough, that the only\nalternative we have in choosing our hypothesis concerning the final\nexplanation of things is either to regard that explanation as Intelligence\nor as Fortuity. This, I say, was a legitimate argument a few months ago,\nbecause up to that time no one had shown that strictly natural causes, as\ndistinguished from chances, could conceivably be able to produce a cosmos;\nand although the several previous writers to whom Professor Flint\nalludes--and he might have alluded to others in this\nconnection--entertained a dim anticipation of the fact that natural causes\nmight alone be sufficient to produce the observed universe, still these dim\nanticipations were worthless as _arguments_ so long as it remained\nimpossible to suggest any natural _principle_ whereby such a result could\nhave been conceivably effected by such causes. But it is evident that\nProfessor Flint's time-honoured argument is now completely overthrown,\nunless it can be proved that there is some radical error in the reasoning\nwhereby I have endeavoured to show that natural causes not only _may_, but\n_must_, have produced existing order. The overthrow is complete, because\nthe very groundwork of the argument in question is knocked away; a third\npossibility, of the nature of a necessity, is introduced, and therefore the\nalternative is no longer between Intelligence and Fortuity, but between\nIntelligence and Natural Causation. Whereas the overwhelming strength of\nthe argument from Order has hitherto consisted in the supposition of\nIntelligence as the one and only conceivable cause of the integration of\nthings, my exposition in Chapter IV. has shown that such integration must\nhave been due, at all events in a relative or proximate sense, to a\nstrictly physical cause--the persistence of force and the consequent\nself-evolution of natural law. And the question as to whether or not\nIntelligence may not have been the absolute or ultimate cause is manifestly\na question altogether alien to the argument from Order; for if existing\norder admits of being accounted for, in a relative or proximate sense, by\nmerely physical causes, the argument from a relative or proximate order is\nnot at liberty to infer or to assume the existence of any higher or more\nultimate cause. Although, therefore, in Chapter V., I have been careful to\npoint out that the fact of existing order having been due to proximate or\nnatural causes does not actually _disprove_ the possible existence of an\nultimate and supernatural cause, still it must be carefully observed that\nthis _negative_ fact cannot possibly justify any _positive_ inference to\nthe existence of such a cause.\n\nThus, upon the whole, it may be said, without danger of reasonable dispute,\nthat as the argument from Order has hitherto derived its immense weight\nentirely from the fact that Intelligence appeared to be the one and only\ncause sufficient to produce the observed integration of the cosmos, this\nimmense weight has now been completely counterpoised by the demonstration\nthat other causes of a strictly physical kind must have been instrumental,\nif not themselves alone sufficient, to produce this integration, So that,\njust as in the case of Astronomy the demonstration of the one natural\nprinciple of gravity was sufficient to classify under one physical\nexplanation several observed facts which many persons had previously\nattributed to supernatural causes; and just as in the more complex science\nof Geology the demonstration of the one principle of uniformitarianism was\nsufficient to explain, without the aid of supernaturalism, a still greater\nnumber of facts; and, lastly, just as in the case of the still more complex\nscience of Biology the demonstration of the one principle of natural\nselection was sufficient to marshal under one scientific, or natural,\nhypothesis an almost incalculable number of facts which were previously\nexplained by the metaphysical hypothesis of supernatural design; so in the\nscience which includes all other sciences, and which we may term the\nscience of Cosmology, I assert with confidence that in the one principle of\nthe persistence of force we have a demonstrably harmonising principle,\nwhereby all the facts within our experience admit of being collocated under\none natural explanation, without there being the smallest reason to\nattribute these facts to any supernatural cause.\n\nBut perhaps the immense change which these considerations must logically be\nregarded as having produced in the speculative standing of the argument\nfrom teleology will be better appreciated if I continue to quote from\nProfessor Flint's very forcible and thoroughly logical exposition of the\nprevious standing of this argument. He says:--\n\n\"To ascribe the origination of order to _law_ is a manifest evasion of the\nreal problem. Law is order. Law is the very thing to be explained. The\nquestion is--Has law a reason, or is it without a reason? The unperverted\nhuman mind cannot believe it to be without a reason.\"\n\nI do not know where a more terse and accurate statement of the case could\nbe found; and to my mind the question so lucidly put admits of the direct\nanswer--Law clearly has a reason of a purely physical kind. And therefore I\nsubmit that the following quotation which Professor Flint makes from\nProfessor Jevons, logical as it was when written, must now be regarded as\nembodying an argument which is obsolete.\n\n\"As an unlimited number of atoms can be placed in unlimited space in an\nunlimited number of modes of distribution, there must, even granting matter\nto have had all its laws from eternity, have been at some moment in time,\nout of the unlimited choices and distributions possible, that one choice\nand distribution which yielded the fair and orderly universe that now\nexists. Only out of rational choice can order have come.\"\n\nBut clearly the alternative is now no longer one between chance and choice.\nIf natural laws arise by way of necessary consequence from the persistence\nof a single self-existing substance, it becomes a matter of scientific\n(though not of logical) demonstration that \"the fair and orderly universe\nthat now exists\" is the one and only universe that, in the nature of\nthings, _can_ exist. But to continue this interesting passage from Dr.\nFlint's work--interesting not only because it sets forth the previous\nstanding of this subject with so much clearness, but also because the work\nis of such very recent publication.\n\n\"The most common mode, perhaps, of evading the problem which order presents\nto reason is the indication of the process by which the order has been\nrealised. From Democritus to the latest Darwinian there have been men who\nsupposed they had completely explained away the evidences of design in\nnature when they had described the physical antecedents of the arrangements\nappealed to as evidences. Aristotle showed the absurdity of this\nsupposition more than 2200 years ago.\"\n\nNow this is a perfectly valid criticism on all such previous non-theistical\narguments as were drawn from an \"indication of the process by which the\norder has been realised;\" for in all these previous arguments there was an\nabsence of any physical explanation of the _ultimate_ cause of the process\ncontemplated, and so long as this ultimate cause remained obscure, although\nthe evidence of design might by these arguments have been excluded from\nparticular processes, the evidence of design could not be similarly\nexcluded from the ultimate cause of these processes. Thus, for instance, it\nis doubtless illogical, as Professor Flint points out, in any Darwinian to\nargue that because his theory of natural selection supplies him with a\nnatural explanation of the process whereby organisms have been adapted to\ntheir surroundings, therefore this process need not itself have been\ndesigned. That is to say, in general terms, as insisted upon in the\nforegoing essay, the discovery of a natural law or orderly process cannot\nof itself justify the inference that this law or method of orderly\nprocedure is not itself a product of supernatural Intelligence; but, on the\ncontrary, the very existence of such orderly processes, considered only in\nrelation to their products, must properly be regarded as evidence of the\nbest possible kind in favour of supernatural Intelligence, _provided that\nno natural cause can be suggested as adequate to explain the origin of\nthese processes_. But this is precisely what the persistence of force,\nconsidered as a natural cause, must be pronounced as necessarily competent\nto achieve; for we can clearly see that all these processes obviously must\nand actually do derive their origin from this one causative principle. And\nwhether or not behind this one causative principle of natural law there\nexists a still more ultimate cause in the form of a supernatural\nIntelligence, this is a question altogether foreign to any argument from\nteleology, seeing that teleology, in so far as it is _teleology_, can only\nrest upon the observed facts of the cosmos; and if these facts admit of\nbeing explained by the action of a single causative principle inherent in\nthe cosmos itself, teleology is not free to assume the action of any\ncausative principle of a more ultimate character. Still, as I have\nrepeatedly insisted, these considerations do not entitle us dogmatically to\ndeny the existence of some such more ultimate principle; all that these\nconsiderations do is to remove any rational argument from teleological\nsources that any such more ultimate principle exists. Therefore I am, of\ncourse, quite at one with Professor Flint when he says Professor Huxley\n\"admits that the most thoroughgoing evolutionist must at least assume 'a\nprimordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe\nare the consequences,' and 'is thereby at the mercy of the theologist, who\ncan defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not\nintended to involve the phenomena of the universe.' Granting this much, he\nis logically bound to grant more. If the entire evolution of the universe\nmay have been intended, the several stages of its evolution may have been\nintended, and they may have been intended for their own sakes as well as\nfor the sake of the collective evolution or its final result.\" Now that\nsuch _may have been_ the case, I have been careful to insist in Chapter V.;\nall I am now concerned with is to show that, in view of the considerations\nadduced in Chapter IV., there is no longer any evidence to prove, or even\nto indicate, that such _has been_ the case. And with reference to this\nopportune quotation from Professor Huxley I may remark, that the\n\"thoroughgoing evolutionist\" is now no longer \"at the mercy of the\ntheologian\" to any further extent than that of not being able to disprove a\npurely metaphysical hypothesis, which is as certainly superfluous, in any\nscientific sense, as the fundamental data of science are certainly true.\n\nIt may seem almost unnecessary to extend this postscript by pursuing\nfurther the criticism on Professor Flint's exposition in the light of \"a\nsingle new reason ... for the denial of design\" which he challenges; but\nthere are nevertheless one or two other points which it seems desirable to\nconsider. Professor Flint writes:--\n\n\"M. Comte imagines that he has shown the inference from design, from the\norder and stability of the solar system, to be unwarranted, when he has\npointed out the physical conditions through which that order and stability\nare secured, and the process by which they have been obtained.... Now the\nassertion that the peculiarities which make the solar system stable and the\nearth habitable have flowed naturally and necessarily from the simple\nmutual gravity of the several parts of nebulous matter is one which greatly\nrequires proof, but which has never received it. In saying this, we do not\nchallenge the proof of the nebular theory itself. That theory may or may\nnot be true. We are quite willing to suppose it true--to grant that it has\nbeen scientifically established. What we maintain is, that even if we admit\nunreservedly that the earth and the whole system to which it belongs once\nexisted in a nebulous state, from which they were gradually evolved into\ntheir present condition conformably to physical laws, we are in no degree\nentitled to infer from the admission the conclusion which Comte and others\nhave drawn. The man who fancies that the nebular theory implies that the\nlaw of gravitation, or any other physical law, has of itself determined the\ncourse of cosmical evolution, so that there is no need for believing in the\nexistence and operation of a divine mind, proves merely that he is not\nexempt from reasoning very illogically. The solar system could only have\nbeen evolved out of its nebulous state into that which it now presents if\nthe nebula possessed a certain size, mass, form, and constitution, if it\nwas neither too fluid nor too tenacious--if its atoms were all numbered,\nits elements all weighed, its constituents all disposed in due relation to\none another; that is to say, only if the nebula was in reality as much a\nsystem of order, which Intelligence alone could account for, as the worlds\nwhich have been developed from it. The origin of the nebula thus presents\nitself to reason as a problem which demands solution no less than the\norigin of the planets. All the properties and laws of the nebula require to\nbe accounted for. What origin are we to give them? It must be either reason\nor unreason. We may go back as far as we please, but, at every step and\nstage of the regress we must find ourselves confronted with the same\nquestion, the same alternative--intelligent purpose or colossal chance.\"\n\nNow, so far as Comte is here guilty of the fallacy I have already dwelt\nupon of building a destructive argument upon a demonstration of mere\norderly processes in nature, as distinguished from a demonstration of the\nnatural cause of these processes, it is not for me to defend him. All we\ncan say with regard to him in this connection is, that, having a sort of\nscientific presentiment that if the knowledge of his day were sufficiently\nadvanced it would prove destructive of supernaturalism in the higher and\nmore abstruse provinces of physical speculation, as it had previously\nproved in the lower and less abstruse of these provinces, Comte allowed his\ninferences to outrun their legitimate basis. Being necessarily ignorant of\nthe one generating cause of orderly processes in nature, he improperly\nallowed himself to found conclusions on the basis of these processes alone,\nwhich could only be properly founded on the basis of their cause. But\nfreely granting this much to Professor Flint, and the rest of his remarks\nin this connection will be found, in view of the altered standing of this\nsubject, to be open to amendment. For, in the first place, no one need now\nresort to the illogical supposition that \"the law of gravitation or any\nother physical law has of itself determined the course of cosmical\nevolution.\" What we may argue, and what must be conceded to us, is, that\nthe common substratum of all physical laws was at one time sufficient to\nproduce the simplest physical laws, and that throughout the whole course of\nevolution this common substratum has always been sufficient to produce the\nmore complex laws in the ascending series of their ever-increasing number\nand variety. And hence it becomes obvious that the \"origin of the nebula\"\npresents a difficulty neither greater nor less than \"the origin of the\nplanets,\" since, \"if we may go back as far as we please,\" we can entertain\nno _scientific_ doubt that we should come to a time, prior even to the\nnebula, when the substance of the solar system existed merely as\nsuch--_i.e._, in an almost or in a wholly undifferentiated form, the\nproduct, no doubt, of endless cycles of previous evolutions and\ndissolutions of formal differentiations. Therefore, although it is\nundoubtedly true that \"the solar system could only have been evolved out of\nits nebulous state into that which it now presents if the nebula possessed\"\nthose particular attributes which were necessity to the evolution of such a\nproduct, this consideration is clearly deprived of all its force from our\npresent point of view. For unless it can be shown that there is some\nindependent reason for believing these particular attributes--which must\nhave been of a more and more simple a character the further we recede in\ntime--to have been miraculously imposed, the analogy is overwhelming that\nthey all progressively arose _by way of natural law_. And if so, the\nuniverse which has been thus produced is the only universe in this\nparticular point of space and time which could have been thus produced.\nThat it is an _orderly_ universe we have seen _ad nauseam_ to be no\nargument in favour of its having been a _designed_ universe, so long as the\ncause of its order--general laws--can be seen to admit of a natural\nexplanation.\n\nThus there is clearly nothing to be gained on the side of teleology by\ngoing back to the dim and dismal birth of the nebula; for no \"thoroughgoing\nevolutionist\" would for one moment entertain the supposition that natural\nlaw in the simplest phases of its development partook any more of a\nmiraculous character than it does in its more recent and vastly more\ncomplex phases. The absence of knowledge must not be used as equivalent to\nits presence; and if analogy can be held to justify any inference\nwhatsoever, surely we may conclude with confidence that if existing general\nlaws admit of being conceivably attributed to a natural genesis, the\nprimordial laws of a condensing nebula must have been the same.\n\nThere is another passage in Professor Flint's work to which it seems\ndesirable to refer. It begins thus: \"There is the law of heredity: like\nproduces like. But why is there such a law? Why does like produce like?...\nPhysical science cannot answer these questions; but that is no reason why\nthey should not both be asked and answered. I can conceive of no other\nintelligent answer being given to them than that there is a God of wisdom,\nwho designed that the world should be for all ages the abode of life,\" &c.\n\nNow here we have in another form that same vicious tendency to take refuge\nin the more obscure cases of physical causation as proofs of supernatural\ndesign--the obscurity in this case arising from the _complexity_ of the\ncauses and work, as in the former case it arose from their _remoteness_ in\ntime. But in both cases the same answer is patent, viz., that although\n\"physical science cannot answer these questions\" by pointing out the\nprecise sequence of causes and effects, physical science is nevertheless\nquite as certain that this precise sequence arises in its last resort from\nthe persistence of force, as she would be were she able to trace the whole\nprocess. And therefore, in view of the considerations set forth in Chapter\nIV. of this work, it is no longer open to Professor Flint or to any other\nwriter logically to assert--\"I can conceive of no other intelligent answer\nbeing given to\" such questions \"than that there is a God of wisdom.\"\n\nThe same answer awaits this author's further disquisition on other\nbiological laws, so it is needless to make any further quotations in this\nconnection. But there is one other principle embodied in some of these\npassages which it seems undesirable to overlook. It is said, for instance,\n\"Natural selection might have had no materials, or altogether insufficient\nmaterials, to work with, or the circumstances might have been such that the\nlowest organisms were the best endowed for the struggle for life. If the\nearth were covered with water, fish would survive and higher creatures\nwould perish.\"\n\nNow the principle here embodied--viz., that had the conditions of evolution\nbeen other than they were, the results would have been different--is, of\ncourse, true; but clearly, on the view that _all_ natural laws spring from\nthe persistence of force, no other conditions than those which actually\noccurred, or are now occurring, could ever have occurred,--the whole course\nof evolution must have been, in all its phases and in all its processes, an\nunconditional necessity. But if it is said, How fortunate that the outcome,\nbeing unconditionally necessary, has happened to be so good as it is; I\nanswer that the remark is legitimate enough if it is not intended to convey\nan implication that the general quality of the outcome points to beneficent\ndesign as to its cause. Such an implication would not be legitimate,\nbecause, in the first place, we have no means of knowing in how many cases,\nwhether in planets, stars, or systems, the course of evolution has failed\nto produce life and mind--the one known case of this earth, whether or not\nit is the one success out of millions of abortions, being of necessity the\nonly known case. In how vastly greater a number of cases the course of\nevolution may have been, so to speak, deflected by some even slight, though\nstrictly necessary, cause from producing self-conscious intelligence, it is\nimpossible to conjecture. But this consideration, be it observed, is not\nhere adduced in order to _disprove_ the assertion that telluric evolution\nhas been effected by Intelligence; it is merely adduced to prove that such\nan assertion cannot rest on the single known result of telluric evolution,\nso long as an infinite number of the results of evolution elsewhere remain\nunknown.\n\nAnd now, lastly, it must be observed that even in the one case with which\nwe are acquainted, the net product of evolution is not such as can of\nitself point us to _beneficent_ design. Professor Flint, indeed, in common\nwith theologians generally, argues that it does. I will therefore briefly\ncriticise his remarks on this subject, believing, as I do, that they form a\nvery admirable illustration of what I conceive to be a general\nprinciple--viz., that minds which already believe in the existence of a\nDeity are, as a rule, not in a position to view this question of\nbeneficence in nature in a perfectly impartial manner. For if the existence\nof a Deity is presupposed, a mind with any particle of that most noble\nquality--reverence--will naturally hesitate to draw conclusions that\npartake of the nature of blasphemy; and therefore, unconsciously perhaps to\nthemselves, they endeavour in various ways to evade the evidence which, if\nhonestly and impartially considered, can scarcely fail to negative the\nargument from beneficence in the universe.\n\nProfessor Flint argues that the \"law of over-production,\" and the\nconsequent struggle for existence, being \"the reason why the world is so\nwonderfully rich in the most varied forms of life,\" is \"a means to an end\nworthy of Divine Wisdom.\" \"Although involving privation, pain, and\nconflict, its final result is order and beauty. All the perfections of\nsentient creatures are represented as due to it. Through it the lion has\ngained its strength, the deer its speed, and the dog its sagacity. The\ninference seems natural that these perfections were designed to be attained\nby it; that this state of struggle was ordained for the sake of the\nadvantages which it is actually seen to produce. The suffering which the\nconflict involves may indicate that God has made even animals for some\nhigher end than happiness--that he cares for animal perfection as well as\nfor animal enjoyment; but it affords no reason for denying that the ends\nwhich the conflict actually serves it was intended to serve.\"\n\nNow, whatever may be thought of such an argument as an attempted\njustification of beneficent design already on independent ground believed\nto exist, it is manifestly no argument at all as establishing any\npresumption in favour of such design, unless it could be shown that the\nDeity is so far limited in his power of adapting means to ends that the\nparticular method adopted in this case was the best, all things considered,\nthat he was able to adopt. For supposing the Deity to be, what Professor\nFlint maintains that he is--viz., omnipotent--and there can be no inference\nmore transparent than that such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends\ndesigned, exhibits an incalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the\ndivine character than that which we know in any, the very worst, of human\ncharacters. For let us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in\nnature means. Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of\nmillions of animals must be supposed to have been sentient. Since that time\ntill the present, there must have been millions and millions of generations\nof millions of millions of individuals. And throughout all this period of\nincalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms have\nbeen in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to the\noutcome, we find that more than half of the species which have survived the\nceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and insentient\nforms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find teeth and\ntalons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for\ntorment--everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, and sickness, with oozing\nblood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence that\ndimly close in deaths of brutal torture! Is it said that there are\ncompensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the enjoyments I\nplainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the pains, and this\nwhether or not evolution is due to design. Therefore all I am concerned\nwith is to show, that if such a state of things is due to \"omnipotent\ndesign,\" the omnipotent designer must be concluded, so far as reason can\ninfer, to be non-beneficent. And this it is not difficult to show. When I\nsee a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a spring-trap, I abhor the\ndevilish nature of the being who, with full powers of realising what pain\nmeans, can deliberately employ his noble faculties of invention in\ncontriving a thing so hideously cruel. But if I could believe that there is\na being who, with yet higher faculties of thought and knowledge, and with\nan unlimited choice of means to secure his ends, has contrived untold\nthousands of mechanisms no less diabolical than a spring-trap; I should\ncall that being a fiend, were all the world besides to call him God. Am I\ntold that this is arrogance? It is nothing of the kind; it is plain\nmorality, and to say otherwise would be to hide our eyes from murder\nbecause we dread the Murderer. Am I told that I am not competent to judge\nthe purposes of the Almighty? I answer that if these are _purposes_, I _am_\nable to judge of them so far as I can see; and if I am expected to judge of\nhis purposes when they appear to be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged\nalso to judge of them when they appear to be malevolent. And it can be no\npossible extenuation of the latter to point to the \"final result\" as \"order\nand beauty,\" so long as the means adopted by the \"_Omnipotent_ Designer\"\nare known to have been so revolting. All that we could legitimately assert\nin this case would be, that so far as observation can extend, \"he cares for\nanimal perfection\" _to the exclusion of_ \"animal enjoyment,\" and even to\nthe _total disregard_ of animal suffering. But to assert this would merely\nbe to deny beneficence as an attribute of God.\n\nThe dilemma, therefore, which Epicurus has stated with great lucidity, and\nwhich Professor Flint quotes, appears to me so obvious as scarcely to\nrequire statement. The dilemma is, that, looking to the facts of organic\nnature, theists must abandon their belief, either in the divine\nomnipotence, or in the divine beneficence. And yet, such is the warping\neffect of preformed beliefs on the mind, that even so candid a writer as\nProfessor Flint can thus write of this most obvious truth:--\n\n\"The late Mr. John Stuart Mill, for no better reason than that nature\nsometimes drowns men and burns them, and that childbirth is a painful\nprocess, maintained that God could not possibly be infinite. I shall not\nsay what I think of the shallowness and self-conceit displayed by such an\nargument. What it proves is not the finiteness of God, but the littleness\nof man. The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it tries to\nmeasure the attributes and limit the greatness of its Creator.\"\n\nBut the argument--or rather the truism--in question is an attempt to do\nneither the one nor the other; it simply asserts the patent fact that, if\nGod is omnipotent, and so had an unlimited choice of means whereby to\naccomplish the ends of \"animal perfection,\" \"animal enjoyment,\" and the\nrest; then the fact of his having chosen to adopt the means which he has\nadopted is a fact which is wholly incompatible with his beneficence. And on\nthe other hand, if he is beneficent, the fact of his having adopted these\nmeans in order that the sum of ultimate enjoyment might exceed the sum of\nconcomitant pain, is a fact which is wholly incompatible with his\nomnipotence. To a man who already believes, on independent grounds, in an\nomnipotent and beneficent Deity, it is no doubt possible to avoid facing\nthis dilemma, and to rest content with the assumption that, in a sense\nbeyond the reach of human reason, or even of human conception, the two\nhorns of this dilemma must be united in some transcendental reconciliation;\nbut if a man undertakes to reason on the subject at all, as he must and\nought when the question is as to the _existence_ of such a Deity, then\nclearly he has no alternative but to allow that the dilemma is a hopeless\none. With inverted meaning, therefore, may we quote Professor Flint's words\nagainst himself:--\"The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it\ntries to measure the attributes ... of its Creator;\" for certainly, if\nProfessor Flint's usually candid mind has had a Creator, it nowhere\ndisplays the \"littleness\" of prejudice in so marked a degree as it does\nwhen \"measuring his attributes.\"\n\nThus in a subsequent chapter he deals at greater length with this\ndifficulty of the apparent failure of beneficence in nature, arguing, in\neffect, that as pain and suffering \"serve many good ends\" in the way of\nwarning animals of danger to life, &c., therefore we ought to conclude\nthat, if we could see farther, we should see pain and suffering to be\nunmitigated good, or nearly so. Now this argument, as I have previously\nsaid, may possibly be admissible as between Christians or others who\n_already_ believe in the existence and in the beneficence of God; but it is\nonly the blindest prejudice which can fail to perceive that the argument is\nquite without relevancy when the question is as to the _evidences_ of such\nexistence and the _evidences_ of such character. For where the _fact_ of\nsuch an existence and character is the question in dispute, it clearly can\nbe no argument to state its bare assumption by saying that if we knew more\nof nature we should find the relative preponderance of good over evil to be\nimmeasurably greater than that which we now perceive. The platform of\nargument on which the question of \"Theism\" must be discussed is that of the\nobservable Cosmos; and if, as Dr. Flint is constrained to admit, there is a\nfearful spectacle of misery presented by this Cosmos, it becomes mere\nquestion-begging to gloss over this aspect of the subject by any vague\nassumption that the misery must have some unobservable ends of so\ntranscendentally beneficent a nature, that were they known they would\njustify the means. Indeed, this kind of discussion seems to me worse than\nuseless for the purposes which the Professor has in view; for it only\nserves by contrast to throw out into stronger relief the natural and the\nunstrained character of the adverse interpretation of the facts. According\nto this adverse interpretation, sentiency has been evolved by natural\nselection to secure the benefits which are pointed out by Professor Flint;\nand therefore the fact of this, its cause, having been a _mindless_ cause,\nclearly implies that the _restriction_ of pain and suffering cannot be an\nactive principle, or a _vera causa_, as between species and species, though\nit must be such within the limits of the same organism, and to a lesser\nextent within the limits of the same species. And this is just what we find\nto be the case. Therefore, without the need of resorting to wholly\narbitrary assumptions concerning transcendental reconciliations between\napparently needless suffering and a supposed almighty beneficence, the\nnon-theistic hypothesis is saved by merely opening our eyes to the\nobservable facts around us, and there seeing that pain and misery, alike in\nthe benefits which they bring and in the frightful excesses which they\nmanifest, play just that part in nature which this hypothesis would lead us\nto expect.\n\nTherefore, to sum up these considerations on physical suffering, the case\nbetween a theist and a sceptic as to the question of divine beneficence is\nseen to be a case of extreme simplicity. The theist believes in such\nbeneficence by purposely concealing from his mind all adverse\nevidence--feeling, on the one side, that to entertain the doubt to which\nthis evidence points would be to hold dalliance with blasphemy, and, on the\nother side, that the subject is of so transcendental a nature that, in view\nof so great a risk, it is better to avoid impartial reasoning upon it. A\nsceptic, on the other hand, is under no such obligation to preconceived\nideas, and is therefore free to draw unbiassed inferences as to the\ncharacter of God, if he exists, to the extent which such character is\nindicated by the sphere of observable nature. And, as I have said, when the\nsubject is so viewed, the inference is unavoidable that, so far as human\nreason can penetrate, God, if he exists, must either be non-infinite in his\nresources, or non-beneficent in his designs. Therefore it is evident that\nwhen the _being_ of God, as distinguished from his _character_, is the\nsubject in dispute, Theism can gain nothing by an appeal to evidences of\n_beneficent_ designs. If such evidences were unequivocal, then indeed the\nargument which they would establish to an intelligent cause of nature would\nbe almost irresistible; for the fact of the external world being in harmony\nwith the moral nature of man would be unaccountable except on the\nsupposition of both having derived their origin from a common _moral_\nsource; and morality implies intelligence. But as it is, all the so-called\nevidence of divine beneficence in nature is, without any exception of a\nkind that is worthless as proving _design_; for all the facts admit of\nbeing explained equally well on the supposition of their having been due to\npurely physical processes, acting through the various biological laws which\nwe are now only beginning to understand. And further than this, so far are\nthese facts from proving the existence of a moral cause, that, in view of\nthe alternative just stated, they even ground a positive argument to its\nnegation. For, as we have seen, all these facts are just of such a kind as\nwe should expect to be the facts, on the supposition of their having been\ndue to natural causes--_i.e._, causes which could have had no moral\nsolicitude for animal happiness as such. Let us now, in conclusion, dwell\non this antithesis at somewhat greater length.\n\nIf natural selection has played any large share in the process of organic\nevolution, it is evident that animal enjoyment, being an important factor\nin this natural cause, must always have been furthered _to the extent in\nwhich it was necessary for the adaptation of organisms to their\nenvironment_ that it should. And such we invariably find to be the limits\nwithin which animal enjoyments _are_ confined. On the other hand, so long\nas the adaptations in question are not complete, so long must more or less\nof suffering be entailed--the capacity for suffering, as for enjoyment,\nbeing no doubt itself a product of natural selection. But as all specific\ntypes are perpetually struggling together, it is manifest that the\ncompetition must prevent any considerable number of types from becoming so\nfar adapted to their environment of other types as to become exempt from\nsuffering as a result of this competition. There being no one integrating\ncause of an intelligent or moral nature to supply the conditions of\nhappiness to each organic type without the misery of this competition, such\nhappiness as animals have is derived from the heavy expenditure of pain\nsuffered by themselves and by their ancestry.\n\nThus, whether we look to animal pleasures or to animal pains, the result is\nalike just what we should expect to find on the supposition of these\npleasures and pains having been due to necessary and physical, as\ndistinguished from intelligent and moral, antecedents; for how different is\nthat which is from that which might have been! Not only might beneficent\nselection have eliminated the countless species of parasites which now\ndestroy the health and happiness of all the higher organisms; not only\nmight survival of the fittest, in a moral sense, have determined that\nrapacious and carnivorous animals should yield their places in the world to\nharmless and gentle ones; not only might life have been without sickness\nand death without pain;--but how might the exigences and the welfare of\nspecies have been consulted by the structures and the habits of one\nanother! But no! Amid all the millions of mechanisms and habits in organic\nnature, all of which are so beautifully adapted to the needs of the species\npresenting them, there is _no single instance_ of any mechanism or habit\noccurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of another\nspecies--although, as we should expect on the non-theistic theory, there\nare some comparatively few cases of a mechanism or a habit which is of\nbenefit to its possessor being also utilised by other species. Yet, on the\nbeneficent-design theory, it is impossible to understand why, when all\nmechanisms and habits in the same species are invariably correlated for the\nbenefit of that species, there should never be any such correlation between\nmechanisms and habits of different species. For how magnificent, how\nsublime a display of supreme beneficence would nature have afforded if all\nher sentient animals had been so inter-related as to minister to each\nother's happiness! Organic species might then have been likened to a\ncountless multitude of voices, all singing to their Creator in one\nharmonious psalm of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such\ncorrelation; every species is for itself, and for itself alone--an outcome\nof the always and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life.\n\nSo much, then, for the case of _physical_ evil; but Dr. Flint also treats\nof the case of _moral_ evil. Let us see what this well-equipped writer can\nmake of this old problem in the present year of grace. He says--\"But it\nwill be objected, could not God have made moral creatures who would be\ncertain always to choose what is right, always to acquiesce in His holy\nwill?... Well, far be it from me to deny that God could have originated a\nsinless moral system.... But if questioned as to why He has not done\nbetter, I feel no shame in confessing my ignorance. It seems to me that\nwhen you have resolved the problem of the origin of moral evil into the\nquestion, Why has God not originated a moral universe in which the lowest\nmoral being would be as excellent as the archangels are? you have at once\nshown it to be _speculatively incapable of solution_ [italics mine], and\npractically without importance[!]. The question is one which would\nobviously give rise to another, Why has God not created only moral beings\nas much superior to the archangels as they are superior to the lowest\nAustralian aborigines? But no complete answer can be given to a question\nwhich may be followed by a series of similar questions to which there is no\nend. We have, besides, neither the facts nor the faculties to answer such\nquestions.\"[46]\n\nNow I confess that this argument presents to my mind more of subtlety than\nsense. I had previously imagined that the archangels were supposed to enjoy\na condition of moral existence which might fairly be thought to remove them\nfrom any association with that of the Australian aborigines. But as this\nquestion is one that belongs to Divinity, I am here quite prepared to bow\nto Professor Flint's authority--hoping, however, that he is prepared to\ntake the responsibility should the archangels ever care to accuse me of\ncalumny. But, as a logician, I must be permitted to observe, that if I ask,\nWhy am I not better than I am? it is no answer to tell me, Because the\narchangels are not better than they are. For aught that I know to the\ncontrary, the archangels may be morally _perfect_--as an authority in such\nmatters has told us that even \"just men\" may become,--and therefore, for\naught that I know to the contrary, Professor Flint's regress of moral\ndegrees _ad infinitum_, may be an ontological absurdity. But granting, for\nthe sake of argument, that archangels fall infinitely short of moral\nperfection, and I should only be able to see in the fact a hopeless\naggravation of my previous difficulty. If it is hard to reconcile the\nsupreme goodness of God with the moral turpitude of man, much more would it\nbe hard to do so if his very angels are depraved. Therefore, if the\nreasonable question which I originally put \"may be followed by a series of\nsimilar questions to which there is no end,\" the goodness of God must\nsimply be pronounced a delusion. For the question which I originally put\nwas no mere flimsy question of a stupidly unreal description. My own moral\ndepravity is a matter of painful certainty to me, and I want to know why,\nif there is a God of infinite power and goodness, he should have made me\nthus. And in answer I am told that my question is \"practically without\nimportance,\" because there may be an endless series of beings who, in their\nseveral degrees, are in a similar predicament to myself. Perhaps they are;\nbut if so, the moral evil with which I am directly acquainted is made all\nthe blacker by the fact that it is thus but a drop in an infinite ocean of\nmoral imperfection. When, therefore, Professor Flint goes on to say, \"We\nought to be content if we can show that what God has done is wise and\nright, and not perplex ourselves as to why He has not done an infinity of\nother things,\" I answer, Most certainly; but _can_ we show that what God\nhas done is wise and right? Unquestionably not. That what he has done _may_\nbe wise and right, could we see his whole scheme of things, no careful\nthinker will deny; but to suppose it can be _shown_ that he has done this,\nis an instance of purblind fanaticism which is most startling in a work on\n_Theism_. \"The best world, _we may be assured_, that our fancies can feign,\nwould in reality be far inferior to the world God has made, whatever\nimperfections we may think we see in it.\" Are we leading a sermon on the\ndatum \"God is love\"? No; but a work on the questions, Is there a God? and,\nif so, Is he a God of love? And yet the work is written by a man who\nevidently tries to argue fairly. What shall we say of the despotism of\npreformed beliefs? May we not say at least this much--that those who\nendeavour to reconcile their theories of divine goodness with the facts of\nhuman evil might well appropriate to themselves the words above quoted, \"We\nhave neither the facts nor the faculties to answer such questions\"? For the\n\"facts\" indeed are absent, and the \"faculties\" of impartial thought must be\nabsent also, if this obvious truth cannot be seen--that \"these questions\"\nonly derive their \"speculatively unanswerable\" character from the rational\nfalsity of the manner by which it is sought to answer them. The \"facts\" of\nour moral nature, so far as honest reason can perceive, belie the\nhypothesis of Theism; and although the \"faculties\" of man may be forced by\nprejudice into an acceptance of contradictory propositions, the truth is\nobvious that only by the hypothesis of Evolution can that old-tied knot be\ncut--the Origin of Evil. The form of Theism for which Dr. Flint is arguing\nis the current form, viz., that there is a God who combines in himself the\nattributes of _infinite_ power and _perfect_ goodness--a God at once\n_omnipotent_ and _wholly_ moral. But, in view of the fact that moral evil\nexists in man, the proposition that God is omnipotent and the proposition\nthat he is wholly moral become contradictory; and therefore the fact of\nmoral evil can only be met, either by abandoning one or other of these\npropositions, or by altogether rejecting the hypothesis of Theism.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nIII.\n\nTHE SPECULATIVE STANDING OF MATERIALISM.\n\nAs a continuation of my criticism on Mr. Fiske's views, I think it is\ndesirable to add a few words concerning the speculative annihilation with\nwhich he supposes Mr. Spencer's doctrines to have visited Materialism. Of\ncourse it is a self-evident truism that the doctrine of Relativity is\ndestructive of Materialism, if by Materialism we mean a theory which\nignores that doctrine. In other words, the doctrine of Relativity, if\naccepted, clearly excludes the doctrine that Matter, _as known\nphenomenally_, is at all likely to be a true representative of whatever\n_thing-in-itself_ it may be that constitutes Mind. But this position is\nfully established by the doctrine of Relativity alone, and is therefore not\nin the least affected, either by way of confirmation or otherwise, by Mr.\nSpencer's extended doctrine of the Unknowable--it being only because the\nlatter doctrine presupposes the doctrine of Relativity that it is exclusive\nof Materialism in the sense which has just been stated. So far, therefore,\nMr. Spencer's writings cannot be held to have any special bearing on the\ndoctrine of Materialism. Such a special bearing is only exerted by these\nwritings when they proceed to show that \"it seems an imaginable possibility\nthat units of external force may be identical in nature with the units of\nthe force known as feeling.\" Let us then ascertain how far it is true that\nthe argument already quoted, and which leads to this conclusion, is utterly\ndestructive of Materialism.\n\nIn the first place, I may observe that this argument differs in several\ninstructive particulars from the anti-materialistic argument of Locke,\nwhich we have already had occasion to consider. For while Locke erroneously\nimagined that the test of inconceivability is of equivalent value\n_wherever_ it is applied, save only where it conflicts with preconceived\nideas on the subject of Theism (see Appendix A.), Spencer, of course, is\nmuch too careful a thinker to fall into so obvious a fallacy. But again, it\nis curious to observe that in the anti-materialistic argument of Spencer\nthe test of inconceivability is used in a manner the precise opposite of\nthat in which it is used in the anti-materialistic argument of Locke. For\nwhile the ground of Locke's argument is that Materialism must be untrue\nbecause it is inconceivable that Matter (and Force) should be of a\npsychical nature; the ground of Spencer's argument is that what we know as\nForce (and Matter) may _not_ inconceivably be of a psychical nature. For my\nown part, I think that Spencer's argument is, psychologically speaking, the\nmore valid of the two; but nevertheless I think that, logically speaking,\nit is likewise invalid to a perceptibly great, and to a further indefinite,\ndegree. For the argument sets out with the reflection that we can only know\nMatter and Force as symbols of consciousness, while we know consciousness\ndirectly, and therefore that we can go further in conceivably translating\nMatter and Force into terms of Mind than _vice versa_. And this is true,\nbut it does not therefore follow that the truth is more likely to lie in\nthe direction that thought can most easily travel. For although I am at one\nwith Mr. Spencer, whom Mr. Fiske follows, in regarding his test of\ntruth--viz., inconceivability of a negation--as the most _ultimate_ test\nwithin our reach, I cannot agree with him that in this particular case it\nis the most _trustworthy_ test within our reach. I cannot do so because the\nreflection is forced upon me that, \"as the terms which are contemplated in\nthis particular case are respectively the highest abstractions of objective\nand of subjective existence, the test of truth in question is neutralised\nby directly encountering the inconceivable relation that exists between\nsubject and object.\" Or, in other words, as before stated, \"_whatever_ the\ncause of Mind may be, we can clearly perceive it to be a subjective\nnecessity of the case that, in ultimate analysis, we should find it more\neasy to conceive of this cause as resembling Mind--the only entity of which\nwe are directly conscious--than to conceive of it as any other entity of\nwhich we are only indirectly conscious.\" When, therefore, Mr. Spencer\nargues that \"it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of\nouter existence,\" while it is not so impossible to interpret outer\nexistence in terms of inner existence, the fact is merely what we should in\nany case expect _a priori_ to be the fact, and therefore as a fact it is\nnot a very surprising discovery _a posteriori_. So that when Mr. Fiske\nproceeds to make this fact the basis of his argument, that because we can\nmore conceivably regard objective existence as like in kind to subjective\nexistence than conversely, therefore we should conclude that there is a\ncorresponding probability in favour of the more conceivable proposition, I\ndemur to his argument. For, fully accepting the fact on which the argument\nrests, and it seems to me, in view of what I have said, that the latter\nassigns an altogether disproportionate value to the test of\ninconceivability in this case. Far from endowing this test with so great an\nauthority in this case, I should regard it not only as perceptibly of very\nsmall validity, but, as I have said, invalid to a degree which we have no\nmeans of ascertaining. If it be asked, What other gauge of probability can\nwe have in this matter other than such a direct appeal to consciousness? I\nanswer, that this appeal being here _a priori_ invalid, we are left to fall\nback upon the formal probability which is established by an application of\nscientific canons to objective phenomena. (See footnote in Sec. 14.) For, be\nit carefully observed, Mr. Spencer, and his disciple Mr. Fiske, are not\nidealists. Were this the case, of course the test of an immediate appeal to\nconsciousness would be to them the only test available. But, on the\ncontrary, as all the world knows, Mr. Spencer asserts the existence of an\nunknown Reality, of which all phenomena are the manifestations.\nConsequently, what we call Force and Matter are, according to this\ndoctrine, phenomenal manifestations of this objective Reality. That is to\nsay, for aught that we can know, Force and Matter may be anything within\nthe whole range of the possible; and the only limitation that can be\nassigned to them is, that they are modes of existence which are independent\nof, or objective to, our individual consciousness, but which are uniformly\ntranslated into consciousness as Force and Matter. Now it does not signify\none iota for the purposes of Materialism whether these our symbolical\nrepresentations of Force and Matter are accurate or inaccurate\nrepresentations of their corresponding realities,--unless, of course, some\n_independent_ reason could be shown for supposing that in their reality\nthey resemble Mind. Call Force _x_ and Matter _y_, and so long as we are\nagreed that _x_ and _y_ are _objective realities which are uniformly\ntranslated into consciousness as Force and Matter_, the materialistic\ndeductions remain unaffected by this mere change in our terminology; these\nessential facts are allowed to remain substantially as before, namely, that\nthere is an external something or external somethings--Matter and Force, or\n_x_ and _y_--which themselves display no observable tokens of\nconsciousness, but which are invariably associated with consciousness in a\nhighly distinctive manner.\n\nI dwell at length upon this subject, because although Mr. Spencer himself\ndoes not appear to attach much weight to his argument, Mr. Fiske, as we\nhave seen, elevates it into a basis for \"Cosmic Theism.\" Yet so far is this\nargument from \"ruling out,\" as Mr. Fiske asserts, the essential doctrine of\nMaterialism--_i.e._, the doctrine that what we know as Mind is an effect of\ncertain collocations and distributions of _what we know_ as Matter and\nForce--that the argument might be employed with almost the same degree of\neffect, or absence of effect, to disprove any instance of recognised\ncausation. Thus, for example, the doctrine of Materialism is no more \"ruled\nout\" by the reflection that what we cognise as cerebral matter is only\ncognised relatively, than would the doctrine of chemical equivalents be\n\"ruled out\" by the parallel reflection that what we cognise as chemical\nelements are only cognised relatively. I say advisedly, \"with _almost_ the\nsame degree of effect,\" because, to be strictly accurate, we ought not\naltogether to ignore the indefinitely slender presumption which Mr.\nSpencer's subjective test of inconceivability establishes on the side of\nSpiritualism, as against the objective evidence of causation on the side of\nMaterialism. As this is an important subject, I will be a little more\nexplicit. We are agreed that Force and Matter are entities external to\nconsciousness, of which we can possess only symbolical knowledge.\nTherefore, as we have said, Force and Matter may be anything within the\nwhole range of the possible. But we know that Mind is a possible entity,\nwhile we have no certain knowledge of any other possible entity. Hence we\nare justified in saying, It is possible that Force and Matter may be\nidentical with the only entity which we know as certainly possible; but\nforasmuch as we do not know the sum of possible entities, we have no means\nof calculating the chances there are that what we know as Force and Matter\nare identical in nature with Mind. Still, that there is _a_ chance we\ncannot dispute; all we can assert is, that we are unable to determine its\nvalue, and that it would be a mistake to suppose we can do so, even in the\nlowest degree, by Mr. Spencer's test of inconceivability. Nevertheless, the\nfact that there is such a chance renders it in some indeterminate degree\nmore probable that what we know as Force and Matter are identical with what\nwe know as Mind, than that what we know as oxygen and hydrogen are\nidentical with what we know as water. So that to this extent the essential\ndoctrine of Materialism is \"ruled out\" in a further degree by the\nphilosophy of the Unknowable than is the chemical doctrine of equivalents.\nBut, of course, this indefinite possibility of what we know as Force and\nMatter being identical with what we know as Mind does not neutralise, in\nany determinable degree, the considerations whereby Materialism in its\npresent shape infers that what we know as Force and Matter are probably\ndistinct from what we know as Mind.\n\nBut I see no reason why Materialism should be restricted to this \"its\npresent shape.\" Even if we admit to the fullest extent the validity of Mr.\nSpencer's argument, and conclude with Professor Clifford as a matter of\nprobability that \"the universe consists entirely of Mind-stuff,\" I do not\nsee that the admission would affect Materialism in any essential respect.\nFor here again the admission would amount to little else, so far as\nMaterialism is directly concerned, than a change of terminology: instead of\ncalling objective existence \"Matter,\" we call it \"Mind-stuff.\" I say \"to\n_little_ else,\" because no doubt in one particular there is here some\nchange introduced in the speculative standing of the subject. So long as\nMatter and Mind, _x_ and _y_, are held to be antithetically opposed in\nsubstance, so long must Materialism suppose that a connection of\n_causality_ subsists between the two, such that the former substance is\n_produced_ in some unaccountable way by the latter. But when Matter and\nMind, _x_ and _y_, are supposed to be identical in substance, the need for\nany additional supposition as to a causal connection is excluded. But\nunless we hold, what seems to me an uncalled-for opinion, that the\nessential feature of Materialism consists in a postulation of a causal\nconnection between _x_ and _y_, it would appear that the only effect of\nsupposing _x_ and _y_ to be really but one substance _z_, must be that of\n_strengthening_ the essential doctrine of Materialism--the doctrine,\nnamely, that conscious intellectual existence is _necessarily_ associated\nwith that form of existence which we know phenomenally as Matter and\nMotion. If it is true that a \"a moving molecule of inorganic matter does\nnot possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a small piece of\nMind-stuff,\" then assuredly the central position of Materialism is shown to\nbe impregnable. For while it remains as true as ever that mind and\nconsciousness can only emerge when what we know phenomenally as \"Matter\ntakes the complex form of a living brain,\" we have abolished the necessity\nfor assuming even a causal connection between the substance of what we know\nphenomenally as Matter and the substance of what we know phenomenally as\nMind: we have found that, in the last resort, the phenomenal connection\nbetween what we know as Matter and what we know as Mind is actually even\nmore intimate than a connection of causality; we have found that it is a\nsubstantial identity.\n\nTo sum up this discussion. We have considered the bearing of modern\nspeculation on the doctrine of Materialism in three successive stages of\nargument. First, we had to consider the bearing on Materialism of the\nsimple doctrine of Relativity. Here we saw that Materialism was only\naffected to the extent of being compelled to allow that what we know as\nMatter and Motion are not known as they are in themselves. But we also saw\nthat, as the inscrutable realities are uniformly translated into\nconsciousness as Matter and Motion, it still remains as true as ever that\n_what we know_ as Matter and Motion may be the causes of what we know as\nMind. Even, therefore, if the supposition of causality is taken to be an\nessential feature of Materialism, Materialism would be in no wise affected\nby substituting for the words Matter and Motion the symbols _x_ and _y_.\n\nThe second of the three stages consisted in showing that Mr. Spencer's\nargument as to the possible identity of Force and Feeling is not in itself\nsufficient to overthrow the doctrine that what we know as Matter and Motion\nmay be the cause of what we know as Mind. For the mere fact of its being\nmore _conceivable_ that units of Force should resemble units of Feeling\nthan conversely, is no warrant for concluding that in reality any\ncorresponding probability obtains. The test of conceivability, although the\nmost ultimate test that is available, is here rendered vague and valueless\nby the _a priori_ consideration that _whatever_ the cause of Mind may be\n(if it has a cause), we must find it more easy to conceive of this cause as\nresembling Mind than to conceive of it as resembling any other entity of\nwhich we are only conscious indirectly.\n\nLastly, in the third place, we saw that even if Mr. Spencer's argument were\nfully subscribed to, and Mind in its substantial essence were conceded to\nbe causeless, the central position of Materialism would still remain\nunaffected. For Mr. Spencer does not suppose that his \"units of Force\" are\nthemselves endowed with consciousness, any more than Professor Clifford\nsupposes his \"moving molecules of inorganic matter\" to be thus endowed. So\nthat the only change which these possibilities, even if conceded to be\nactualities, produce in the speculative standing of Materialism, is to show\nthat the raw material of consciousness, instead of requiring to be _caused_\nby other substances--Matter and Force, _x_ and _y_,--occurs ready made as\nthose substances. But the essential feature of Materialism remains\nuntouched--namely, that what we know as Mind is dependent (whether by way\nof causality or not is immaterial) on highly complex forms of _what we\nknow_ as Matter, in association with highly peculiar distributions of _what\nwe know_ as Force.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nIV.\n\nTHE FINAL MYSTERY OF THINGS.\n\nSome physicists are inclined to dispute the fundamental proposition in\nwhich the whole of Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy may be said to\nrest--the proposition, namely, that the fact of the \"persistence of force\"\nconstitutes the ultimate basis of science. For my own part, I cannot but\nbelieve that any disagreement on this matter only arises from some want of\nmutual understanding; and, therefore, in order to anticipate any criticisms\nto which the present work may be open on this score, I append this\nexplanatory note.\n\nI readily grant that the term \"persistence of force\" is not a happy one,\nseeing that the word \"force,\" as used by physicists, does not at the\npresent time convey the full meaning which Mr. Spencer desires it to\nconvey. But I think that any impartial physicist will be prepared to admit\nthat, in the present state of his science, we are entitled to conclude that\nenergy of position is merely the result of energy of motion; or, in other\nwords, that potential energy is merely an expression of the fact that the\nuniverse, as a whole, is replete with actual energy, whose essential\ncharacteristic is that it is indestructible. And this may be concluded\nwithout committing ourselves to any particular theory as to the physical\nexplanation of gravity; all we need assert is, that in some way or other\ngravity is the result of ubiquitous energy. And this, it seems to me, we\nmust assert, or else conclude that gravity can never admit of a physical\nexplanation. For all that we mean by a physical explanation is the proved\nestablishment of an equation between two quantities of energy; so that if\nenergy of position does not admit of being interpreted in terms of energy\nof motion, we must conclude that it does not admit of being interpreted at\nall--at least not in any physical sense.\n\nThroughout the foregoing essays, therefore, I have assumed that all forms\nof energy are but relatively varying expressions of the same fact--the\nfact, namely, which Mr. Spencer means to express when he says that force is\npersistent. And it seems to me almost needless to show that this fact is\nreally the basis of all science. For unless this fact is assumed as a\npostulate, not only would scientific inquiry become impossible, but all\nexperience would become chaotic. The physicist could not prosecute his\nresearches unless he presupposed that the forces which he measures are of a\npermanent nature, any more than could the chemist prosecute his researches\nunless he presupposed that the materials which he estimates by energy-units\nare likewise of a permanent nature. And similarly with all the other\nsciences, as well as with every judgment in our daily experience. If,\ntherefore, any one should be hypercritical enough to dispute the position\nthat the doctrine of the conservation of energy constitutes the \"ultimate\ndatum\" of science, I think it will be enough to observe that if this is\n_not_ the \"ultimate datum\" of science, science can have no \"ultimate datum\"\nat all. For any datum more ultimate than permanent existence is manifestly\nimpossible, while any such datum as non-permanent existence would clearly\nrender science impossible. Even, therefore, if such hypercriticism had a\nvalid basis of apparently adverse fact whereon to stand, I should feel\nmyself justified in neglecting it on _a priori_ grounds; but the only basis\non which such hypercriticism can rest is, not the knowledge of any adverse\nfacts, but the ignorance of certain facts which we must either conclude to\nbe facts or else conclude that science can have no ultimate datum whereon\nto rest. In the foregoing essays, therefore, I have not scrupled to\nmaintain that the ultimate datum of science is destructive of teleology as\na scientific argument for Theism; because, unless we deny the possibility\nof any such ultimate datum, and so land ourselves in hopeless scepticism,\nwe must conclude that there can be no datum more ultimate than\nthis--Permanent Existence; and this is just the datum which we have seen to\nbe destructive of teleology as a scientific argument for Theism.\n\nIt may be well to point out that from this ultimate datum of science--or\nrather, let us say, of experience--there follows a deductive explanation of\nthe law of causation. For this law, when stripped of all the metaphysical\ncorruptions with which it has been so cumbersomely clothed, simply means\nthat a given collocation of antecedents unconditionally produces a certain\nconsequent. But this fact, otherwise stated, amounts to nothing more than a\nre-statement of the ultimate datum of experience--the fact that energy is\nindestructible. For if this latter fact be granted, it is obvious that the\nso-called law of causation follows as a deductive necessity--or rather, as\nI have said, that this law becomes but another way of expressing the same\nfact. This is obvious if we reflect that the only means we have of\nascertaining that energy is _not_ destructible, is by observing that\nsimilar antecedents _do_ invariably determine similar consequents. It is as\na vast induction from all those particular cases of sequence-changes which\ncollectively we call causation that we conclude energy to be\nindestructible. And, obversely, having concluded energy to be\nindestructible, we can plainly see that in any particular cases of its\nmanifestation in sequence-phenomena, the unconditional resemblance between\neffects due to similar causes which is formulated by the law of causation\nis merely the direct expression of the fact which we had previously\nconcluded. It seems to me, therefore, that the old-standing question\nconcerning the nature of causation ought now properly to be considered as\nobsolete. Doubtless there will long remain a sort of hereditary tendency in\nmetaphysical minds to look upon cause-connection as \"a mysterious tie\"\nbetween antecedent and consequent; but henceforth there is no need for\nscientific minds to regard this \"tie\" as \"mysterious\" in any other sense\nthan the existence of energy is \"mysterious.\" To state the law of causation\nis merely to state the fact that energy is indestructible.\n\nAnd from this there also arises at once the explanation and the\njustification of our belief in the uniformity of nature. If energy is, in\nits relation to us, ubiquitous and persistent, it clearly follows that in\nall its manifestations which collectively we call nature, similar preceding\nmanifestations must always determine similar succeeding manifestations; for\notherwise the energy concerned would require on one or on both of the\noccasions, either to have become augmented by creation, or dissipated by\nannihilation. Thus our belief in the uniformity of nature, as in the\nvalidity of the law of causation, is merely an expression of our belief in\nthe ubiquitous and indestructible character of energy.\n\nSuch being the case, we may fairly conclude that all these old-standing\n\"mysteries\" are now merged in the one mystery of existence. And deeper than\nthis it is manifestly impossible that they can be merged; for it is\nmanifestly impossible that Existence in the abstract can ever admit of what\nwe call explanation. Hence we can clearly see that, in a scientific sense,\nthere must always remain a final mystery of things. But although we can\nthus see that, from the very meaning of what we call explanation, it\nfollows that at the base of all our explanations there must lie a great\nInexplicable, I think that the mystery of Existence in the abstract may be\nrendered less appalling if we reflect that, as opposed to Existence, there\nis only one logical alternative--Non-existence. Supposing, then, our\nphysical explanations to have reached their highest limits by resolving all\nmodes of Existence into one mode--force, matter, life, and mind, being\nshown but different manifestations of the same Infinite Existence--the\nfinal mystery of things would then become resolved into the simple\nquestion, Why is there Existence?--Why is there not Nothing?\n\nLet us then first ask, What is \"Nothing\"? Is it a mere word, which presents\nno meaning as corresponding to any objective reality, or has the word a\nmeaning notwithstanding its being an inconceivable one? Or, otherwise\nphrased, is Nothing possible or impossible? Now, although in ordinary\nconversation it is generally taken for granted that Nothing is possible,\nthere is certainly no more ground for this supposition than there is for\nits converse--viz., that Nothing is merely a word which signifies the\nnegation of possibility. For analysis will show that the choice between\nthese two counter-suppositions can only be made in the presence of\nknowledge which is necessarily absent--the knowledge whether the universe\nof Existence is finite or infinite. If the universe as a whole is finite,\nthe word Nothing would stand as a symbol to denote an unthinkable blank of\nwhich a finite universe is the content. And forasmuch as Something and\nNothing would then become actual, as distinguished from nominal\ncorrelatives, we could have no guarantee that, in an absolute or\ntranscendental sense, it may not be possible, although it is inconceivable,\nfor Something to become Nothing or Nothing Something. Hence, if Existence\nis finite, No-existence becomes possible; and the doctrine of the\nindestructibility of Existence becomes, for aught that we can tell, of a\nmerely relative signification. But, on the other hand, if Existence is\ninfinite, No-existence becomes impossible; and the doctrine of the\nindestructibility of Existence becomes, in a logical sense, of an absolute\nsignification. For it is manifest that if the universe of Existence is\nwithout end in space and time, the possibility of No-existence is of\nnecessity excluded, and the word \"Nothing\" thus becomes a mere negation of\npossibility.[47]\n\nThus, if it be conceded that the universe as a whole is infinite both in\nspace and time, the concession amounts to an abolition of the final mystery\nof things. For all that we mean by a mystery is something that requires an\nexplanation, and the whole of the final mystery of things is therefore\nembodied in the question, \"Why is there Existence?--Why is there not\nNothing?\" But if the universe of Existence be conceded infinite, this\nquestion is sufficiently met by the answer, \"Because Existence is, and\nNothing is not.\" If it is retorted, But this is no real answer; I reply, It\nis as real as the question. For to ask, Why is there Existence? is, upon\nthe supposition which has been conceded, equivalent to asking, Why is the\npossible possible? And if such questions cannot be answered, it is scarcely\nright to say that on this account they embody a mystery; because the\nquestions are really not rational questions, and therefore the fact of\ntheir not admitting of any rational answer cannot be held to show that the\nquestions embody any rational mystery. That there _is_ a rational mystery,\nin the sense of there being something which can never be _explained_, I do\nnot dispute; all I assert is, that this mystery is inexplicable, only\n_because there is nothing to explain_; the mystery being ultimate, to ask\nfor an explanation of that which, being ultimate, requires no explanation,\nis irrational. Or, to state the case in another way, if it is asked, Why is\nthere not Nothing? it is a sufficient answer, on supposition of the\nuniverse being infinite, to say, Because Nothing is nothing; it is merely a\nword which presents no meaning, and which, so far as anything can be\nconceived to the contrary, never can present any meaning.\n\nThe above discussion has proceeded on the supposition of Existence being\ninfinite; but practically the same result would follow on the\ncounter-supposition of Existence being finite. For although in this case,\nas we have seen, Non-entity would still be included within the range of\npossibility, it would still be no more conceivable as such than is Entity;\nand hence the question, Why is there not Nothing? would still be\nirrational, seeing that, even if the possibility which the question\nsupposes were realised, it would in no wise tend to explain the mystery of\nSomething. And even if it could, the final mystery would not be thus\nexcluded; it would merely be transferred from the mystery of Existence to\nthe mystery of Non-existence. Thus under every conceivable supposition we\narrive at the same termination--viz., that in the last resort there must be\na final mystery, which, as forming the basis of all possible explanations,\ncannot itself receive any explanation, and which therefore is really not,\nin any proper sense of the term, a mystery at all. It is merely a fact\nwhich itself requires no explanation, because it is a fact than which none\ncan be more ultimate. So that even if we suppose this ultimate fact to be\nan Intelligent Being, it is clearly impossible that he should be able to\n_explain_ his own existence, since the possibility of any such explanation\nwould imply that his existence could not be ultimate. In the sense,\ntherefore, of not admitting of any explanation, his existence would require\nto be a mystery to himself, rendering it impossible for him to state\nanything further with regard to it than this--\"I am that I am.\"\n\nI do not doubt that this way of looking at the subject will be deemed\nunsatisfactory at first sight, because it seems to be, as it were, a merely\nlogical way of cheating our intelligence out of an intuitively felt\njustification for its own curiosity in this matter. But the fault really\nlies in this intuitive feeling of justification not being itself\njustifiable. For this particular question, it will be observed, differs\nfrom all other possible questions with which the mind has to deal. All\nother questions being questions concerning manifestations of existence\npresupposed as existing, it is perfectly legitimate to seek for an\nexplanation of one series of manifestations in another--_i.e._, to refer a\nless known group to a group better known. But the case is manifestly quite\notherwise when, having merged one group of manifestations into another\ngroup, and this into another for an indefinite number of stages, we\nsuddenly make a leap to the last possible stage and ask, \"Into what group\nare we to merge the basis of all our previous groups, and of all groups\nwhich can possibly be formed in the future? How are we to classify that\nwhich contains all possible classes? Where are we to look for an\nexplanation of Existence?\" When thus clearly stated, the question, is, as I\nhave said, manifestly irrational; but the point with which I am now\nconcerned is this--When in plain reason the question is _seen_ to be\nirrational, why in intuitive sentiment should it not be _felt_ to be so?\nThe answer, I think, is, that the interrogative faculty being usually\noccupied with questions which admit of rational answers, we acquire a sort\nof intellectual habit of presupposing every wherefore to have a therefore,\nand thus, when eventually we arrive at the last of all possible wherefores,\nwhich itself supplies the basis of all possible therefores, we fail at\nfirst to recognise the exceptional character of our position. We fail at\nfirst to perceive that, from the very nature of this particular case, our\nwherefore is deprived of the rational meaning which it had in all the\nprevious cases, where the possibility of a corresponding therefore was\npresupposed. And failing fully to perceive this truth, our organised habit\nof expecting an answer to our question asserts itself, and we experience\nthe same sense of intellectual unrest in the presence of this wholly\nmeaningless and absurd question, as we experience in the presence of\nquestions significant and rational.\n\nTHE END.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nNotes\n\n[1] The above was written before Mr. Mill's essay on Theism was published.\nLest, therefore, my refutation may be deemed too curt, I supplement it with\nMr. Mill's remarks upon the same subject. \"It may still be maintained that\nthe feelings of morality make the existence of God eminently desirable. No\ndoubt they do, and that is the great reason why we find that good men and\nwomen cling to the belief, and are pained by its being questioned. But,\nsurely, it is not legitimate to assume that, in the order of the universe,\nwhatever is desirable is true. Optimism, even when a God is already\nbelieved in, is a thorny doctrine to maintain, and had to be taken by\nLeibnitz in the limited sense, that the universe being made by a good\nbeing, is the best universe possible, not the best absolutely: that the\nDivine power, in short, was not equal to making it more free from\nimperfections than it is. But optimism, prior to belief in a God, and as\nthe ground of that belief, seems one of the oddest of all speculative\ndelusions. Nothing, however, I believe, contributes more to keep up the\nbelief in the general mind of humanity than the feeling of its\ndesirableness, which, when clothed, as it very often is, in the form of an\nargument, is a _naive_ expression of the tendency of the human mind to\nbelieve whatever is agreeable to it. Positive value the argument of course\nhas none.\" For Mill's remarks on the version of the argument dealt with in\nSec. 5, see his \"Three Essays,\" p. 204.\n\n[2] The words \"or not conceivable,\" are here used in the sense of \"not\nrelatively conceivable,\" as explained in Chap. vi.\n\n[3] For the full discussion from which the above is an extract, see _System\nof Logic_, vol. i. pp. 409-426 (8th ed.). But, substituting \"psychical\" for\n\"volitional,\" see also, for some mitigation of the severity of the above\nstatement, the closing paragraphs of my supplementary essay on \"Cosmic\nTheism.\"\n\n[4] Essay on Understanding--Existence of God.\n\n[5] Locke, _loc. cit._\n\n[6] See Appendix A.\n\n[7] Viz., the constant association within experience of mind with certain\nhighly peculiar material forms; the constant proportion which is found to\nsubsist between the quantity of cerebral matter and the degree of\nintellectual capacity--a proportion which may be clearly traced throughout\nthe ascending series of vertebrated animals, and which is very generally\nmanifested in individuals of the human species; the effects of cerebral\nanaemia, anaesthetics, stimulants, narcotic poisons, and lesions of cerebral\nsubstance. There can, in short, be no question that the whole series of\nobservable facts bearing upon the subject are precisely such as they ought\nto be upon supposition of the materialistic theory being true; while,\ncontrariwise, there is a total absence of any known facts tending to\nnegative that theory. At the same time it must be carefully noted, that the\nobserved facts (and any additional number of the like kind) do not\nlogically warrant us in concluding that mental states are necessarily\n_dependent_ upon material changes. Nevertheless, it must also be noted,\nthat, in the absence of positive proof of causation, it is certainly in\naccordance with scientific procedure, to yield our provisional assent to an\nhypothesis which undoubtedly connects a large order of constant\n_accompaniments_, rather than to an hypothesis which is confessedly framed\nto meet but a single one of the facts.\n\nProfessor Clifford, in a lecture on \"Body and Mind\" which he delivered at\nSt. George's Hall, and afterwards published in the _Fortnightly Review_,\nargues against the existence of God on the ground that, as Mind is always\nassociated with Matter within experience, there arises a presumption\nagainst Mind existing anywhere without being thus associated, so that\nunless we can trace in the disposition of the heavenly bodies some\nresemblance to the conformation of cerebral structure, we are to conclude\nthat there is a considerable balance of probability in favour of Atheism.\nNow, as this argument--if we rid it of the grotesque allusion to the\nheavenly bodies--is one that is frequently met with, it seems desirable in\nthis place briefly to analyse it. First of all, then, the validity of the\nargument depends upon the probability there is that the constant associated\nof Mind with Matter within experience is due to a _causal_ connection; for\nif the association in question is merely an _association_ and nothing more,\nthe origin of known mind is as far from being explained as it would be were\nMind never known as associated with Matter. But, in the next place,\nsupposing the constant association in question to be due to a causal\nconnection, it by no means follows that because Mind is due to Matter\nwithin experience, therefore Mind cannot exist in any other mode beyond\nexperience.\n\nDoubtless, from analogy, there is a presumption against the hypothesis that\nthe same entity should exist in more than one mode at the same time; but\nclearly in this case we are quite unable to estimate the value of this\npresumption. Consequently, even assuming a causal connection between Matter\nand Human Mind, if there is any, the slightest, indications supplied by any\nother facts of experience pointing to the existence of a Divine Mind, such\nindications should be allowed as much argumentative weight as they would\nhave had in the absence of the presumption we are considering. Hence\nProfessor Clifford's conclusion cannot be regarded as valid until all the\nother arguments in favour of Theism have been separately refuted. Doubtless\nProfessor Clifford will be the first to recognise the cogency of this\ncriticism--if indeed it has not already occurred to him; for as I know that\nhe is much too clear a thinker not to perceive the validity of these\nconsiderations, I am willing to believe that the substance of them was\nomitted from his essay merely for the sake of brevity; but, for the sake of\nless thoughtful persons, I have deemed it desirable to state thus clearly\nthat the problem of Theism cannot be solved on grounds of Materialism\nalone. [This note was written before I had the advantage of Professor\nClifford's acquaintance, but now I leave it, as I leave all other parts of\nthis essay--viz., as it was originally written.--1878.]\n\n[8] To avoid burdening the text, I have omitted another criticism which may\nbe made on Locke's argument. \"Triangle\" is a word by which we designate a\ncertain figure, one of the properties of which is that the sum of its\nangles is equal to two right angles. In other words, any figure which does\nnot exhibit this property is not that figure which we designate a triangle.\nHence, when Locke says he cannot conceive of a triangle which does not\npresent this property, it may be answered that his inability arises merely\nfrom the fact that any figure which fails to present this property is not a\nfigure to which the term \"triangle\" can apply. Thus viewed, however, the\nillustration would obviously be absurd, for the same reason that the\nquestion of the clown is absurd, \"Can you think of a horse that is just\nlike a cow?\" What Locke evidently means is, that we cannot conceive of any\ngeometrical figure which presents all the other properties of a triangle\nwithout also presenting the property in question. Now, even admitting, with\nLocke, that it is as inconceivable that the entity known to us as Matter\nshould possess the property of causing thought as it is that the figure\nwhich we term a triangle should posses the property of containing more than\ntwo right angles, still it remains, for the purposes of Locke's supposed\ntheistic demonstration, to prove that it is an inconceivable for the entity\nwhich we call Mind _not_ to be due to another Mind, as it is for a triangle\n_not_ to contain, other than two right angles. But, further, even if it\nwere possible to prove this, the demonstration would make as much against\nTheism as in favour of it; for if, as the illustration of the triangle\nimplies, we restrict the meaning of the word \"Mind\" to an entity one of\nwhose essential qualities is that it should be caused by another Mind, the\nwords \"Supreme and Uncaused Mind\" involve a contradiction in terms, just as\nmuch as would the words \"A square triangle having four right angles.\" It\nwould, therefore, seem that if we adhere to Locke's argument, and pursue it\nto its conclusion, the only logical outcome would be this:--Seeing that by\nthe word \"Mind,\" I expressly connote the quality of derivation from a prior\nMind, as a quality belonging no less essentially to Mind than the quality\nof presenting two right angles belongs to a triangle; therefore, whatever\nother attributes I ascribe to the First Cause, I must clearly exclude the\nattribute Mind; and hence, whatever else such a Cause may be, it follows\nfrom my argument that it certainly is--Not Mind.\n\n[9] Hamilton.\n\n[10] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 25-31.\n\n[11] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 542.\n\n[12] _Loc. cit._, p. 543.\n\n[13] Appendix to Discussions, pp. 614, 165.\n\n[14] Mill, in the lengthy chapter which he devotes to the freedom of the\nwill in his Examination, does not notice this point.\n\n[15] If more evidence can be wanted, it is supplied in some suggestive\nfacts of Psychology. For example, \"From our earliest childhood, the idea of\ndoing wrong (that is, of doing what is forbidden, or what is injurious to\nothers) and the idea of punishment are presented to the mind together, and\nthe intense character of the impressions causes the association between\nthem to attain the highest degree of closeness and intimacy. Is it strange,\nor unlike the usual processes of the human mind, that in these\ncircumstances we should retain the feeling and forget the reason on which\nit is grounded? But why do I speak of forgetting? In most cases the reason\nhas never, in our early education, been presented to the mind. The only\nideas presented have been those of wrong and punishment, and an inseparable\nassociation has been created between these directly, without the help of\nany intervening idea. This is quite enough to make the spontaneous feelings\nof mankind regard punishment and a wrong-doer as naturally fitted to each\nother--as a conjunction appropriate in itself, independently of any\nconsequences,\" &c.--Mill, Examination of Hamilton, p. 599.\n\n[16] Grammar of Assent, pp. 106, 107.\n\n[17] Throughout these considerations I have confined myself to the\n_positive_ side of the subject. My argument being of the nature of a\ncriticism on the erroneous inferences which are drawn from the _good_\nqualities of our moral nature, I thought it desirable, for the sake of\nclearness, not to burden that argument by the additional one as to the\nsource of the _evil_ qualities of that nature. This additional argument,\nhowever, will be found briefly stated at the close of my supplementary\nessay on Professor Flint's \"Theism.\" On reading that additional argument, I\nthink that any candid and unbiassed mind must conclude that, alike in what\nit is _not_ as well as in what it _is_, our moral nature points to a\nnatural genesis, as distinguished from a supernatural cause.\n\n[18] The illustration to which I refer is that of the watershed of a\ncountry being precisely adapted to draining purposes. The rivers just fit\ntheir own particular beds: the latter occupy the lowest grounds, and get\nbroader and deeper as they advance; pebbles, gravel, and sand all occupy\nthe best teleological situations, &c., &c.\n\n[19] \"Order of Nature,\" by the Rev. Baden Powell, M.A., F.R.S., &c., 1859,\npp. 228-241.\n\n[20] I think it desirable to state that I perceived this great truth before\nI was aware that it had been perceived also by Mr. Spencer. His statement\nof it now occurs in the short chapter of _First Principles_ entitled\n\"Relations between Forces.\" So far as I an able to ascertain, no one has\nhitherto considered this important doctrine in its immediate relation to\nthe question of Theism.\n\nIn using the term \"persistence of force,\" I am aware that I am using a term\nwhich is not unopen to criticism. But as Mr. Spencer's writings have\nbrought this term into such general use among speculative thinkers, it\nseemed to me undesirable to modify it. Questions of mere terminology are\nwithout any importance in a discussion of this kind, provided that the\nterms are universally understood to mean what they are intended to mean;\nand I think that the signification which Mr. Spencer attaches to his term,\n\"persistence of force,\" is sufficiently precise. Therefore, adopting his\nusage, whenever throughout the following pages I speak of force as\npersisting, what I intend to be understood is, that there is a\nsomething--call it force, or energy, or _x_--which, so far as experience or\nimagination can extend, is, in its relation to us, ubiquitous and\nillimitable; or, in other words, that it universally presents the property\nof permanence. (See, for a more detailed explanation, supplementary essay,\n\"On the Final Mystery of Things.\")\n\n[21] Hamilton may here be especially noticed, because he went so far as to\nmaintain that the phenomena of the external world, taken by themselves,\nwould ground a valid argument to the negation of God. Although I cannot but\nthink that this position was a conspicuously irrational one for any\ncompetent thinker to occupy before the scientific doctrine of the\ncorrelation of the forces had been enunciated, nevertheless I cannot lose\nthe opportunity of alluding to this remarkable feature in Sir William\nHamilton's philosophy, showing as it does that same prophetic forestalling\nof the results which have since followed from the discovery of the\nconservation of energy, as was shown by his no less remarkable theory of\ncausation. (See supplementary essay \"On the Final Mystery of Things.\")\n\n[22] Mr. N. Lockyer's work is now supplying important evidence on these\npoints.--1878.\n\n[23] It will of course be observed that if matter and force are identical,\nthe unification is complete.\n\n[24] Herbert Spencer.\n\n[25] It may here be observed that the above discussion would not be\naffected by the view of Professor Clifford and others, that natural law is\nto be regarded as having a subjective rather than an objective\nsignification--that what we call a natural law is merely an arbitrary\nselection made by ourselves of certain among natural processes. The\ndiscussion would not be affected by this view, because the argument is\nreally based upon the existence of a cosmos as distinguished from a chaos;\nand therefore it would be rather an intensification of the argument than\notherwise to point out that, for the maintenance of a cosmos, natural laws,\nas conceived by us, would be inadequate. And this seems a fitting place to\nmake the almost superfluous remark, that throughout this present essay I\nhave used the words \"Natural Law,\" \"Supreme Law-giver,\" &c., in an\napparently unguarded sense, merely in order to avoid needless obscurity.\nFully sensible as I am of the misleading nature of the analogy which these\nwords embody, I have yet adopted them for the sake of perspicuity--being\ncareful, however, never to allow the false analogy which they express to\nenter into an argument on either side of the question. Thus, even where it\nis said that the existence of Natural Law points to the existence of a\nSupreme Law-maker, the argument might equally well be phrased: The\nexistence of an orderly cosmos points to the existence of a disposing mind.\n\n[26] First Principles, pp. 27-29.\n\n[27] It may be here observed that this quality of indefiniteness on the\npart of such reasoning is merely a practical outcome of the theoretical\nconsiderations adduced in Chapter V. For as we there saw that the ratio\nbetween the known and the unknown is in this case wholly indefinite, it\nfollows that any symbols derived from the region of the known--even though\nsuch symbols be the highest generalities which the latter region\naffords--must be wholly indefinite when projected into the region of the\nunknown. Or rather let us say, that as the region of the unknown is but a\nprogressive continuation of the region of the known, the determinate value\nof symbols of thought varies inversely as the distance--or, not improbably,\nas the square of the distance--from the sphere of the known at which they\nare applied.\n\n[28] _i.e._, illegitimate in a _relative_ sense. The conclusion is\nlegitimate enough in a _formal_ sense, and as establishing a probability of\nsome _unassignable_ degree of value. But it would be illegitimate if this\nquality of indefiniteness were disregarded, and the conclusion supposed to\npossess the same character of actual probability as it has of formal\ndefinition.\n\n[29] In order not to burden the text with details, I have presented these\nreflections in their most general terms. Thus, if it be granted that cosmic\nharmony results from the combined action of general laws, and that these\nlaws are the necessary result of the primary qualities of force and matter,\nthis the most general statement of the atheistic position includes all more\nspecial considerations as a genus includes its species; and therefore it\nwould not signify, for the purposes of the atheistic argument, whether or\nnot any such more special considerations are possible. Nevertheless, for\nthe sake of completeness, I may here observe that we are not wholly without\nindications in nature of the physical causation whereby the effect of\ncosmic harmony is produced. The universal tendency of motion to become\nrhythmical--itself, as Mr. Spencer was the first to show, a necessary\nconsequence of the persistence of force--is, so to speak, a conservative\ntendency: it sets a premium against natural cataclysms. But a more\nimportant consideration is this,--that during the evolution of natural law\nin the way suggested in Chapter IV., as every newly evolved law came into\nexistence it must have been, as it were, grafted on the stock of all\npre-existing natural laws, and so would not enter the cosmic system as an\nelement of confusion, but rather as an element of further progress. For\ninstance, when, with the origin of organic nature, the law of natural\nselection entered upon the cosmos, it was grafted upon the pre-existing\nstock of other natural laws, and so combined within them in unity. And a\nlittle thought will show that it was impossible that it should do\notherwise; for it was impossible that natural selection could ever produce\norganisms which would ever be able by their existence to conflict with the\npre-existing system of astronomic or geologic laws; seeing that organisms,\nbeing a product of later evolution than these laws, would either have to be\nadapted to them or perish. And hence the new law of natural selection,\nwhich consists in so adapting organisms to the pre-existing laws that they\nmust either conform to them or die. Now, I have chosen the case of natural\nselection because, as alluded to in the text, it is the law of all others\nwhich is the most conspicuously effective in producing the harmonious\ncomplexity of nature. But the same kind of considerations may be seen to\napply to most of the other general laws with which we are acquainted,\nparticularly if we bear in mind that the general outcome of their united\naction as we observe it--the cosmic harmony on which so much stress is\nlaid--is not _perfectly_ harmonious. Cataclysms--whether it be the capture\nof an insect, or the ruin of a star--although events of comparatively rare\noccurrence if at any given time we take into account the total number of\ninsects or the total number of stars, are events which nevertheless do\noccasionally happen. And the fact that even cataclysms take place in\naccordance with so-called natural law, serves but to emphasise the\nconsideration on which we are engaged--viz., that the total result of the\ncombined action of general laws is not such as to produce perfect order.\nLastly, if the answer is made that human ideas of perfect order may not\ncorrespond with the highest ideal of such order, I observe that to make\nsuch a answer is merely to abandon the subject of discussion; for if a\ntheist rests his argument on the basis of our human conception of order, he\nis not free to maintain his argument and at the same time to abandon its\nbasis at whatever point the latter may be shown untenable.\n\n[30] Since the above was written, the first volume of Mr. Spencer's\n\"Sociology\" has been published; and those who may not as yet have read the\nfirst half of that work are here strongly recommended to do so; for Mr.\nSpencer has there shown, in a more connected and conclusive manner than has\never been shown before, how strictly natural is the growth of all\nsuperstitions and religions--_i.e._, of all the theories of personal agency\nin nature.--1878.\n\n[31] Herbert Spencer's Essays, vol. iii. pp. 246-249 (1874).\n\n[32] This is the truly inconceivable element in the physical theory. As I\nhave shown in the pleading on the side of Atheism, the supposed\ninconceivability of cosmic harmony being due to mindless forces, is not of\nsuch a kind as wholly refuses to be surmounted by symbolic conceptions of a\nsufficiently abstract character. But it is impossible, by the aid of any\nsymbols, to gain a conception of an eternal existence. And I may here point\nout, that if Mind is said to be the cause of evolution, not only does the\nstatement involve the inconceivable proposition that such a Mind must be\ninfinite in respect to its powers of supervision, direction, &c.; but the\nstatement also involves a necessary alternative between two additional\ninconceivable propositions--viz., either that such a Mind must have been\neternal, or that it must have come into existence without a cause. In this\nrespect, therefore, it would seem that the theory of Atheism has the\nadvantage over that of Theism; for while the former theory is under the\nnecessity of embodying only a single inconceivable term, the latter theory\nis under the necessity of embodying two such terms.\n\n[33] Mr. Herbert Spencer has treated of this subject in his memorable\ncontroversy with Mill on the \"Universal Postulate\" (see _Psychology_, Sec.\n427), and refuses to entertain the term \"Inconceivable\" as applicable to\nany propositions other than those wherein \"the terms cannot, by any effort,\nbe brought before consciousness in that relation which the proposition\nasserts between them.\" That is to say, he limits the term \"Inconceivable\"\nto that which is _absolutely_ inconceivable; and he then proceeds to affirm\nthat all propositions \"which admit of being framed in thought, but which\nare so much at variance with experience, in which its terms have habitually\nbeen otherwise united, that its terms cannot be put in the alleged relation\nwithout effort,\" ought properly to be termed \"_incredible_\" propositions.\nNow I cannot see that the class \"Incredible propositions\" is, as this\ndefinition asserts, identical with the class which I have termed\n\"Relatively inconceivable\" propositions. For example, it is a familiar\nobservation that, on looking at the setting sun, we experience an almost,\nif not quite, insuperable difficulty in _conceiving_ the sun's apparent\nmotion as due to our own actual motion, and yet we experience no difficulty\nin _believing_ it. Conversely, I entertain but little difficulty in\n_conceiving_--_i.e._, imagining--a shark with a mammalian heart, and yet it\nwould require extremely strong evidence to make me _believe_ that such an\nanimal exists. The truth appears to be that our language is deficient in\nterms whereby to distinguish between that which is wholly inconceivable\nfrom that which is with difficulty conceivable. This, it seems to me, was\nthe principle reason of the dispute between Spencer and Mill above alluded\nto,--the former writer having always used the word \"Inconceivable\" in the\nsense of \"Absolutely inconceivable,\" and the latter having apparently used\nit--in his _Logic_ and elsewhere--in both senses. I have endeavoured to\nremedy this defect in the language by introducing the qualifying words,\n\"Absolutely\" and \"Relatively,\" which, although not appropriate words, are\nthe best that I am able to supply. The conceptive faculty of the individual\nhaving been determined by the experience of the race, that which is\ninconceivable by the intelligence of the race may be said to be\ninconceivable to the intelligence of the individual in an _absolute_ sense;\nno effort on his part can enable him to surmount the organically imposed\nconditions of his conceptive faculty. But that which is inconceivable\nmerely to one individual or generation, while it is not inconceivable to\nthe intelligence of the race, may properly be said to be inconceivable to\nthe intelligence of that individual or generation only in a _relative_\nsense; apart from the special condition to which the individual\nintelligence has been subjected, there is nothing in the conditions of\nhuman intelligence as such to prevent the thing from being conceived.\n[While this work has been passing through the press, I have found that Mr.\nG. H. Lewes has already employed the above terms in precisely the same\nsense as that which is above explained.--1878.]\n\n[34] I should here like to have added some considerations on Sir W.\nHamilton's remarks concerning the effect of training upon the mind in this\nconnection; but, to avoid being tedious, I shall condense what I have to\nsay into a few sentences. What Hamilton maintains is very true, viz., that\nthe study of classics, moral and mental philosophy, &c., renders the mind\nmore capable of believing in a God than does the study of physical science.\nThe question, however, is, Which class of studies ought to be considered\nthe more authoritative in this matter? I certainly cannot see what title\nclassics, history, political economy, &c., have to be regarded at all; and\nalthough the mental and moral sciences have doubtless a better claim, still\nI think they must be largely subordinate to those sciences which deal with\nthe whole domain of nature besides. Further, I should say that there is no\nvery strong _affirmative_ influence created on the mind in this respect by\nany class of studies; and that the only reason why we so generally find\nTheism and classics, &c., united, is because we so seldom find classics,\n&c., and physical science united; the _negative_ influence of the latter,\nin the case of classical minds, being therefore generally absent.\n\n[35] The qualities named are only known in a relative sense, and therefore\nthe apparent contradiction may be destitute of meaning in an absolute\nsense.\n\n[36] All the quotations in this Appendix have been taken from the chapter\non \"Our knowledge of the existence of a God,\" and from the early part of\nthat on \"The extent of human knowledge,\" together with the appended letter\nto the Bishop of Worcester.\n\n[37] A criticism of Mr. John Fiske's proposed system of theology as\nexpounded in his work on \"Cosmic Philosophy\" (Macmillan & Co., 1874).\n\n[38] Cosmic Philosophy, vol. i. pp. 87-89.\n\n[39] Cosmic Philosophy, vol. ii. pp. 429, 430.\n\n[40] Ibid., p. 441.\n\n[41] Ibid., pp. 450, 451.\n\n[42] Principles of Psychology, vol. i. pp. 159-161.\n\n[43] We thus see that the question whether there may not be \"something\nquasi-psychical in the constitution of things\" is a question which does not\naffect the position of Theism as it has been left by a negation of the\nself-conscious personality of God. But as the speculations on which this\nquestion has been reared are in themselves of much philosophical interest,\nI may here observe that, in one form or another, they have been dimly\nfloating in men's minds for a long time past. Thus, excepting the degree of\ncertainty with which it is taught, we have in Mr. Spencer's words above\nquoted a reversion to the doctrine of Buddha; for, as \"force is\npersistent,\" all that would happen on death, supposing the doctrine true,\nwould be an escape of the \"circumscribed aggregate\" of units forming the\nindividual consciousness into the unlimited abyss of similar units\nconstituting the \"Absolute Being\" of the Cosmists, or the \"Divine Essence\"\nof the Buddhists. Again, the doctrine in a vague form pervades the\nphilosophy of Spinoza, and is next clearly enunciated by Wundt. Lastly, in\na recently published very remarkable essay \"On the Nature of Things in\nThemselves,\" Professor Clifford arrives at a similar doctrine by a\ndifferent route. The following is the conclusion to which he\narrives:--\"That element of which, as we have seen, even the simplest\nfeeling is a complex, I shall call _Mind-stuff_. A moving molecule of\ninorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a\nsmall piece of mind-stuff. When molecules are so combined together as to\nform the film on the under side of a jellyfish, the elements of mind-stuff\nwhich go along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of\nSentience. When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and\nnervous system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of mind-stuff\nare so combined as to form some kind of consciousness; that is to say,\nchanges in the complex which take place at the same time get so linked\ntogether that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other.\nWhen matters take the complex form of a living human brain, the\ncorresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, having\nintelligence and volition.\" (Mind, January, 1878.)\n\n[44] Theism, by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the\nUniversity of Edinburgh, &c.\n\n[45] Such being the objects in view, I have not thought it necessary to\nextend this criticism into anything resembling a review of Professor\nFlint's work as a whole; but, on the contrary, I have aimed rather at\nconfining my observations to those parts of his treatise which embody the\ncurrent arguments from teleology alone. I may here observe, however, in\ngeneral terms, that I consider all his arguments to have been answered by\nanticipation in the foregoing examination of Theism. I may also here\nobserve, that throughout the following essay I have used the word \"design\"\nin the sense in which it is used by Professor Flint himself. This sense is\ndistinctly a different one from that which the word bears in the writings\nof the Paley, Bell, and Chalmers school. For while in the latter writings,\nas pointed out in Chapter III., the word bears its natural meaning of a\ncertain _process of thought_, in Professor Flint's work it is used rather\nas expressive of a _product of intelligence_. In other words, \"design,\" as\nused by Professor Flint, is synonymous with _intention_, irrespective of\nthe particular psychological process by which the intention may have been\nput into effect.\n\n[46] Op. cit., pp. 255-257.\n\n[47] Let it be observed that there is a distinction between what I may call\nsubstantial and formal existence. Thus there is no doubt that flowers as\nflowers perish, or become non-existent; but the substances of which they\nwere composed persist. And, in this connection, I may here point out that\nif the universe is infinite in space and time, the universe as a whole\nwould present substantial existence as standing out of relation to space\nand time, whereas innumerable portions of the universe present only formal\nexistences, because standing in relation both to space and time. Thus, for\ninstance, the solar system, as a solar system, must have an end in time as\nit has a boundary in space; but as the substance of which it consists will\nnot become extinguished by the extinction of the system, it may not now\nstand in any real relation to what we call space and time. I am inclined to\nthink that it is upon the idea of non-existence in this formal sense that\nwe construct a pseud-idea of non-existence in a substantial sense; but it\nis evident that if the universe as a whole is absolute, this pseud-idea\nmust represent as impossibility. And from this it follows, that if\nexistence is infinite in space and time, every _quantum_ of it with which\nour experience comes into relation must represent, as its essential\nquality, that quality which we find to be presented by the substance of\nthings--the quality, that is, of persistence.","title":"A Candid Examination of Theism","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":70034}