{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_20233/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_20233","id":"gutenberg_20233","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/20233","summary":null,"tags":["Atheism","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality"],"text":"Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Karina Aleksandrova\nand the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nhttp://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of\npublic domain works from the University of Michigan Digital\nLibraries.)\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\n 1. Several misprints (including Greek) were corrected. A full list\n    of corrections can be found at the end of the text.\n    Misspelling and inconsistencies in the French quotations, unless\n    otherwise noted, have been preserved.\n\n 2. Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of chapters.\n\n 3. Footnote 138 had no footnote marker within the text; the reference\n    was added in a possible place.\n\n 4. Symbol of a hand pointing right has been replaced with a right\n    arrow: ==>.\n\n\n\n\n                 MODERN ATHEISM\n\n               UNDER ITS FORMS OF\n\n         PANTHEISM, MATERIALISM, SECULARISM,\n            DEVELOPMENT, AND NATURAL LAWS.\n\n\n                        BY\n\n            JAMES BUCHANAN, D. D., LL. D.,\n\nDIVINITY PROFESSOR IN \"THE NEW COLLEGE,\" EDINBURGH, AND AUTHOR\n      OF \"THE OFFICE AND WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT,\" ETC.\n\n\n\n                      BOSTON:\n                _GOULD AND LINCOLN_,\n                59 WASHINGTON STREET.\n         NEW YORK: SHELDON, BLAKEMAN & CO.,\n          CINCINNATI: GEORGE S. BLANCHARD.\n                        1857.\n\n\nEntered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by\n\n                   _GOULD AND LINCOLN_,\n\nIn the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of\nMassachusetts.\n\n                 Electro-Stereotyped by\n                _G. J. STILES & COMPANY_,\n               23 Congress Street, Boston.\n\n\n\n\nPREFATORY NOTE.\n\n\nThe contents of this volume originally constituted about one half of a\nwork, entitled \"Faith in God and Modern Atheism compared, in their\nEssential Nature, Theoretic Grounds, and Practical Influence.\"\nSimultaneously with the first issue of that work in Scotland, the five\nprincipal chapters in this volume were published separately, accompanied\nwith the announcement that _each was complete in itself_. The hint thus\ngiven by the author, has been acted upon by the present publishers. On\nexamining the whole work, it was found to be divided into four Sections.\nOf these, the third was devoted exclusively to \"_Modern Atheism_.\" It\nembraced the five chapters already alluded to, together with a general\nintroduction and four shorter chapters. It appeared, in fact, to be a\ncomplete treatise by itself; and it is now presented to the American\npublic in the conviction that such a work is peculiarly demanded by the\npresent state of religious opinion in this country.\n\nThe author is one of the most distinguished divines of the Free Church\nof Scotland. In 1845, he was appointed Professor of Apologetic Theology\nin the New College, Edinburgh; and, on the death of Dr. Chalmers, in\n1847, he was translated to the Chair of Systematic Theology thus made\nvacant. In the former position, it became his duty to prepare a complete\ncourse of Lectures on Natural Religion. His work on \"Faith in God,\" &c.,\ncontains, in an altered form, adapted to general readers, the substance\nof those Lectures.\n\nRespecting this work, the British press generally has spoken in the\nhighest terms. The distinguished geologist, Hugh Miller, says, in the\n_Edinburgh Witness_: \"It is one of, at once, the most readable and\nsolid which we have ever perused;\" and the _News of the Churches_, the\norgan of the Free Church, describes it as \"a work of which nothing less\ncan be said than that, both in spirit and substance, style and argument,\nit fixes irreversibly the name of its author as a leading classic in the\nChristian literature of Britain.\" An American critic says: \"His succinct\nanalysis of the doctrines held by the various schools of modern atheism\nare admirable, and his criticisms on their doctrines original and\nprofound; while his arguments in defence of the Christian faith against\nphilosophical objectors are unsurpassed by those of any modern writer.\nClear, vigorous, logical, learned, and strong as a Titan, he fairly\nvanquishes all antagonists by pure mental superiority; never\nunderstating their views or evading their arguments, but meeting them in\nall their force and _crushing_ them.\" Another critic says: \"It is a\ngreat argument for Theism and against Atheism, magnificent in its\nstrength, order, and beauty.... The style is lucid, grave, harmonious,\nand every way commensurate with the dignity and importance of the\nsubject.... The chapter on Pantheism is admirable. Regarding it as 'the\nmost formidable rival of Christian Theism at the present day,' Dr.\nBuchanan seems to have specially addressed himself to the task of\nexposing and refuting this error. His statement of Spinoza's system is\nbeautifully clear.\"\n\nThe reader will find that there is no exaggeration in these encomiums.\nHugh Miller, always felicitous in his choice of words, has exactly\ndescribed the two leading characteristics of \"Modern Atheism,\" by the\nphrase \"readable and solid.\" Every one who begins the book will find\nhimself drawn strongly onward to the end; and no one can rise from its\nperusal without a conviction that it contains a weight of argument\nagainst _all_ the forms of Atheism such as never before has been\ncombined in one book.\n\nShould the reception of this volume by the public furnish sufficient\nencouragement, it is the intention of the publishers to issue the\nremainder of the work (\"Faith in God,\" &c.), in uniform style.\n\n     BOSTON, _December_, 1856.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n                                                        PAGE\n\nINTRODUCTION,                                              9\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\nMODERN ATHEISM,                                           15\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\nTHEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT,                                  45\n\n  SECTION I.\n  THEORY OF COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT,--\"THE VESTIGES,\"        47\n\n  SECTION II.\n  THEORY OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT,--\"TELLIAMED,\"\n  --PHYSIO-PHILOSOPHY,                                    61\n\n  SECTION III.\n  THEORY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,--AUGUSTE COMTE,           84\n\n  SECTION IV.\n  THEORY OF ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT,--J. H. NEWMAN,   116\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\nTHEORIES OF PANTHEISM,                                   129\n\n  SECTION I.\n  THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA,                                 142\n\n  SECTION II.\n  MATERIAL PANTHEISM,                                    161\n\n  SECTION III.\n  IDEAL PANTHEISM,                                       167\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\nTHEORIES OF MATERIALISM,                                 189\n\n  SECTION I.\n  DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM,                         192\n\n  SECTION II.\n  PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM,                           207\n\n  SECTION III.\n  RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY,                  235\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\nTHEORY OF GOVERNMENT BY NATURAL LAWS,--VOLNEY,--COMBE,   249\n\n  SECTION I.\n  THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES,        252\n\n  SECTION II.\n  THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN IN ITS RELATION TO THE\n  GOVERNMENT OF GOD,                                     254\n\n  SECTION III.\n  THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER,                                283\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\nTHEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE,                             303\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\nTHEORIES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM,                        323\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\nTHEORIES OF CERTITUDE AND SKEPTICISM,                    333\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\nTHEORY OF SECULARISM,                                    361\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nA Treatise on the Being and Perfections of God, as the Creator and\nGovernor of the world, can scarcely be adapted to the exigencies of\nmodern society, unless it be framed with express reference to the\nexisting forms of unbelief, and the prevailing tendencies both of\nphilosophical thought and of popular opinion. It is quite possible,\nindeed, to construct a scheme of evidence on this subject out of the\nample materials which the storehouse of nature affords, without entering\ninto any discussion of the questions, whether Physical or Metaphysical,\nwhich have been raised respecting it. But this method, although it might\nbe sufficient for many, perhaps for most, of our readers--for all,\nindeed, who come to the study of the subject with reflective but\nunsophisticated minds--could scarcely be expected to meet the case or to\nsatisfy the wants of those who stand most in need of instruction; the\nmen, and especially the young men, in all educated communities, who,\nimbued with the spirit of philosophical speculation, and instructed,\nmore or less fully, in the principles of modern science, have been led,\nunder the influence of certain celebrated names, to adopt opinions which\nprevent them from seriously considering any theological question, and to\nregard the whole subject of religion with indifference or contempt, as\none that lies beyond the possible range of science,--the only\nlegitimate domain of human thought. In such cases (and they are neither\nfew nor unimportant), it may be useful and even necessary to neutralize\nthose adverse presumptions or \"prejudicate opinions,\" which prevent them\nfrom considering the evidence to which Theism appeals, and to review the\nvarious theories from which they spring, so as to show that they afford\nno valid reason for discarding the subject, and no ground for alleging\nthat it is not fit _to go to proof_. It is true that we must ultimately\nrely, for the establishment of our main positions, on that body of\nnatural and historical evidence, which depends little, if at all, on any\nof the Theories of Philosophical Speculation, or even on any of the\ndiscoveries of Physical Science; but it is equally true that the\nevidence, however conclusive in itself, cannot be expected to produce\nconviction unless it be candidly examined and weighed; and if there be\nanything in the existing state of public opinion which leads men to\nregard the whole subject with indifference or suspicion, to conceive of\nit as a problem insoluble by the human faculties, and to treat Theology\nas a fond fancy or a waking dream, it were surely well to examine the\ngrounds of such opinions, to expose their fallacy so as to counteract\ntheir influence, and to refute those theories which prevent men from\njudging of the evidence as they would on any other topic of Inductive\nInquiry. In adopting this course, we are only following the footsteps of\nthe profound author of the \"Analogy,\" who finding it, he knew not how,\n\"to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so\nmuch as a subject of inquiry,\" set himself, in the first instance, to\nprove \"that it is not, however, so clear a case that there is nothing in\nit;\"--this preliminary proof being designed to neutralize objections,\nand to disburden the subject of all adverse presumptions, so as to be\njudged on its own proper and independent merits. We are imitating, too,\nthe example of another sagacious writer on a kindred theme, who thought\nthat \"Apologists had paid too little attention to the _prejudices_ of\ntheir opponents, and had been too confident of accomplishing their\nobject at once, by an overpowering statement of the direct evidence,\nforgetting that the influence of prejudice renders the human mind very\nnearly inaccessible to both evidence and argument.\"[1]\n\nIf this method was ever necessary or expedient, it is peculiarly so in\nthe present age. Opinions are afloat in society, and are even avowed by\nmen of high philosophical repute, which formally exclude Theology from\nthe domain of human thought, and represent it as utterly inaccessible to\nthe human faculties. They amount to a denial, not merely of its truth,\nbut of its very possibility. They place it among the dreams of the\npast--with the fables of the Genii, or the follies of Alchemy, or the\nphantoms of Astrology. They intimate, in no ambiguous terms, not only\nthat Catholicism is effete, and Christianity itself dead or dying, but\nthat Theology of every kind, even the simplest and purest form of\nTheism, must speedily vanish from the earth. Admitting that the\nreligious element was necessarily developed in the infancy of the\nspecies, and that its influence was alike inevitable and salutary during\nthe world's minority, when it was placed provisionally \"under tutors and\ngovernors,\" they proclaim that mankind have outgrown the vestments which\nsuited them in earlier times, and that now they must \"put away childish\nthings.\" That such sentiments have been publicly avowed, that they have\nbeen proclaimed as the scientific results of speculative thought, and\nthat they have been widely circulated in the vehicles both of\nphilosophic discussion and of popular literature, will be proved by\nevidence, equally sad and conclusive, in the succeeding chapters; in the\nmeantime we refer to them merely for the purpose of showing that, in so\nfar as their influence prevails, they must necessarily tend, unless\nthey be counteracted by some effective antidote, to generate such a\nprejudice against the whole scheme of Theology, whether Natural or\nRevealed, as may be expected, especially in the case of young,\ninexperienced, and ardent minds, to prevent them from entertaining the\nsubject at all, or examining, with serious and candid interest, any kind\nor amount of evidence that might be adduced in regard to it. For this\nreason, we propose to review the various Theories or Systems which may\nbe said to embody and exhibit these prevailing tendencies, to meet our\nopponents on their own chosen ground, and to subject their favorite\nspeculations to a rigorous and sifting scrutiny; and this, not for the\npurpose of proving our fundamental position, for that must rest on its\nproper and independent evidence, but simply with the view of\nneutralizing the adverse presumptions which prevent many from\nconsidering its claims, and proving that it is a subject that demands\nand deserves their serious and sustained attention.\n\nTaking a comprehensive view of European Science and Literature during\nthe last half century, we may discern the great currents, or chief\ntendencies, of speculative thought, in so far as it bears on the\nevidences and doctrines of Religion, in several distinct but closely\nrelated systems of opinion, which, whether considered severally or\ncollectively, must exert, in proportion to their prevalence, a powerful\ninfluence on the side of Atheism. These systems may be divided generally\ninto _two_ great classes, according as they relate to the _substance_ or\nto the _evidence_ of Theism, to the _truths_ which it involves, or the\n_proofs_ to which it appeals. The interval between the first and second\nFrench Revolutions may be regarded as the season during which the\ntheories to which we refer were progressively developed, and ultimately\nconsolidated in their existing forms. The germ of each of them may have\nexisted before, and traces of them may be detected in the literature of\nthe ancient world, and even in the writings of mediaeval times; nay, it\nmight not be too much to affirm that in the systems of Oriental\nSuperstition, and in the Schools of Grecian Skepticism, several of them\nwere more fully taught in early times than they have yet been in Modern\nEurope, and that the recent attempts to reconstruct and reproduce them\nin a shape adapted to the present stage of civilization, have been poor\nand meagre in comparison with those more ancient efforts of\nunenlightened reason. What modern system of Skepticism can rival that of\nSextus Empiricus? What code of Pantheism, French or German, can be said\nto equal the mystic dreams of the Vedanta School? What godless theory of\nNatural Law can compete with the Epicurean philosophy, as illustrated in\nthe poetry of Lucretius? The errors of these ancient systems have been\nrevived even amidst the light of the nineteenth century, and prevail to\nan extent that may seem to justify the apprehension, frequently\nexpressed on the Continent of late years, of the restoration of a sort\nof Semi-Paganism in Modern Europe; and it is still necessary, therefore,\nfor the defence of a pure Theism, to reexamine those ancient forms of\nerror which have reaeppeared on the scene after it might have been\nsupposed that they had vanished for ever. For the very tenacity with\nwhich they cleave to the human mind, and their perpetual recurrence at\nintervals along the whole course of the world's history, show that there\nmust be something in the wants, or at least in the weaknesses of our\nnature, which induces men to tolerate and even to embrace them. But the\nchief danger, as we conceive, lies in those new, or at least newly\norganized, theories that have only recently received their full\ndevelopment in the Inductive and Scientific pursuits which constitute\nthe peculiar glory of modern times; and which, commencing with the era\nof Bacon and Descartes, and gradually matured by Newton, Leibnitz, and\ntheir successors, have at length issued in the construction of a solid\nfabric of Science. To Theism there is no danger in Science, in so far as\nit is true, for all truth is self-consistent and harmonious; but there\nmay be much danger in the use that is made of it, or in the spirit in\nwhich it is applied. In the hands of Bacon, and Newton, and Boyle, the\ndoctrine of Natural Laws was treated as an ally, not as an antagonist,\nto Theology; in the hands of Comte it becomes a plea for Atheism; and\neven in the hands of Combe an argument against a special Providence and\nthe efficacy of prayer. Here the danger is the greater just by reason of\nthe acknowledged truth and practical value of the Inductive Philosophy;\nfor its certainty is so well ascertained, and its manifold uses so\ngenerally appreciated, that if it shall come to be regarded as\nincompatible with the recognition of God and Religion, Society will soon\nfind itself on the verge of universal Atheism. And this is the fearful\nissue to which the more recent schools of speculation are manifestly\ntending. The first French Revolution was brought about by the labors of\nmen who fought against Christianity, at least ostensibly, under the\nbanner of Deism or Natural Religion; the second Revolution was\nconsummated under the auspices, not of a Deistic, but of an Atheistic\nphilosophy. The school of Voltaire and Rousseau has given place to the\nschool of Comte and Leroux. The difference between the two indicates a\nrapid and alarming advance. It may not be apparent at first sight, or on\na superficial survey; but it will become evident to any one who compares\nthe two French Encyclopaedias, which may be regarded as the exponents of\nthe reigning philosophy of the two great revolutionary eras. The first,\nthe Encyclopedie of D'Alembert, Voltaire, and Diderot, sought to malign\nand extirpate Christianity, while it did frequent homage to Natural\nTheology; the second, the \"Nouvelle Encyclopedie\" of Pierre Leroux and\nhis coadjutors, proclaims the deification of Humanity, and the\ndethronement of God!\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] BISHOP BUTLER, \"Analogy,\" Preface, p. II.\n\nDR. INGLIS, \"Vindication of the Christian Faith,\" p. VI.\n\n\n\n\nMODERN ATHEISM.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nGENERAL VIEW OF ATHEISM.\n\n\nBefore entering on a detailed discussion of the theories to which it\nappeals, it may be useful to offer some general reflections on ATHEISM\nitself, its generic nature and specific varieties, its causes and\nsprings, whether permanent or occasional, and its moral and social\ninfluence, as illustrated alike by individual experience and by public\nhistory.\n\nBy Atheism we mean any system of opinion which leads men either to\n_doubt_ or to _deny_ the Existence, Providence, and Government of a\nliving, personal, and holy God, as the Creator and Lord of the world. In\nits practical aspect, it is that state of mind which leads them to\n_forget_, _disown_, or _disobey_ Him.\n\nWe are met, however, at the outset, by a previous question, _Whether\nAtheism be a real or even a possible thing?_ a question which was wont\nto be discussed by divines under the head, _an dentur Athei?_[2] and\nwhich has recently been revived by the strong protestations of some\nphilosophic writers, who deny not only the existence, but the very\npossibility of Atheism. On this point the policy which infidels have\npursued has been widely different at different times. On some occasions,\nthey have sought to exaggerate the number of Atheists, claiming as their\nown adherents or allies a large majority of the intellectual classes, as\nwell as whole tribes or nations of barbarians, in order to impress the\npublic mind with the conviction that belief in God is neither natural\nnor universal; at other times, they have sought to allay the prejudice\nwhich avowed Atheism seldom fails to awaken, by disclaiming much that\nhad been imputed to them, by professing a sort of mystic reverence for\nthe Spirit of Nature, and by denying that their speculations involve a\ndisbelief in God. In following these opposite courses at different\ntimes, they have been actuated by a politic regard to the exigencies of\ntheir wretched cause, and have alternately adopted the one or the other,\njust as it might seem, in existing circumstances, to be more expedient\neither to brave or to conciliate public opinion. It is incumbent,\ntherefore, on every enlightened advocate of Christian Theism to exercise\na prudent discretion in the treatment of this topic, and to guard\nequally against the danger either of being led to exaggerate the extent,\nor of being blinded to the existence of the evil. Nor is it difficult to\ndiscover a safe middle path between the opposite extremes: it is only\nnecessary to define, in the first instance, what we mean when we speak\nof Theism or Atheism respectively, and then to ascertain, in the second\nplace, whether any, and what, parties have avowed principles which\nshould fairly serve to connect them with the one system or with the\nother. A clear conception of the radical principle or essential nature\nof Atheism is indispensable; for without this, we shall be liable, on\nthe one hand, to the risk of imputing Atheism to many who are not justly\nchargeable with it--a fault which should be most carefully avoided;[3]\nand equally liable, on the other hand, to the danger of overlooking the\nwide gulf which separates Religion from Irreligion, and Theism from\nAtheism. There is much room for the exercise both of Christian candor\nand of critical discrimination, in forming our estimate of the\ncharacters of men from the opinions which they hold, when these\nopinions relate not to the vital truths of religion, but to collateral\ntopics, more or less directly connected with them. It is eminently\nnecessary, in treating this subject, to discriminate aright between\nsystems which are essentially and avowedly atheistic, and those\nparticular opinions on cognate topics which have sometimes been applied\nin support of Atheism, but which may, nevertheless, be held by some\n_salva fide_, and without conscious, still less avowed, Infidelity. And\nhence Buddaeus and other divines have carefully distinguished between the\nradical principles or grounds of Atheism, and those opinions which are\noften, but not invariably, associated with it.[4]\n\nBut it is equally or still more dangerous, on the other hand, to admit a\nmere nominal recognition of God as a sufficient disproof of Atheism,\nwithout inquiring what conception is entertained of His nature and\nperfections; whether He be conceived of as different from, or identical\nwith, Nature; as a living, personal, and intelligent Being, distinct\nfrom the universe, or as the mere sum of existing things; as a free\nCreator and Moral Governor, or as a blind Destiny and inexorable Fate.\nThese are vital questions, and they cannot be evaded without serious\ndetriment to the cause of religion. A few examples will suffice to prove\nour assertion. M. Cousin contends that _Atheism is impossible_, and\nassigns no other reason for his conviction than this,--that the\nexistence of God is necessarily implied in every affirmation, and may be\nlogically deduced from the premises on which that affirmation\ndepends.[5] His reasoning may possibly be quite conclusive _in point of\nlogic_, in so far as it is an attempt to show that the existence of God\n_ought_ to be deduced from the consciousness of thought; but it cannot\nbe held conclusive as to _the matter of fact_, that there is no Atheism\nin the world, unless it can be further shown that all men know and\nacknowledge His existence as a truth involved in, and deducible from,\ntheir conscious experience. Yet he does not hesitate to affirm that\n\"every thought implies a spontaneous faith in God;\" nay, he advances\nfurther, and adds that even when the sage \"denies the existence of God,\nstill his words imply the idea of God, and that belief in God remains\nunconsciously at the bottom of his heart.\" Surely the denial or the\ndoubt of God's existence amounts to Atheism, however inconsistent that\nAtheism may be with the natural laws of thought, or the legitimate\nexercise of speech.\n\nYet the bold paradox of COUSIN was neither an original discovery nor an\nunprecedented delusion. It was taught, in a different form, but with\nequal confidence, by several writers belonging to the era of the first\nFrench Revolution. Thus HELVETIUS, in his work on MAN, says expressly:\n\"There is no man of understanding who does not acknowledge _an active\npower in Nature; there is, therefore, no Atheist_. He is not an Atheist\nwho says that _motion is God_; because, in fact, motion is\nincomprehensible, as we have no clear idea of it, since it does not\nmanifest itself but by its effects, and because by it all things are\nperformed in the universe. He is not an Atheist who says, on the\ncontrary, that _motion is not God_, because motion is not a being, but a\nmode of being. They are not Atheists who maintain that motion is\nessential to matter, and regard it as the invisible and moving force\nthat spreads itself through all its parts,\" \"as the universal soul of\nmatter, and the divinity that alone penetrates its substance. Are the\nphilosophers of this last opinion Atheists? No; they equally acknowledge\nan unknown force in the universe. Are even those who have no ideas of\nGod Atheists? No; because then all men would be so, because no one has a\nclear idea of the Divinity.\"[6]\n\nA more recent writer, the ABBE LAMENNAIS, is equally explicit, and very\nmuch for the same reasons: \"The Atheist himself has his own notion of\nGod, only he transfers it from the Creator to the creation; he ascribes\nto finite, relative, and contingent being the properties of the\nnecessary Being; he confounds the work with the workman. Matter being,\naccording to him, eternal, is endowed with certain primitive,\nunchangeable properties, which, having their own reason in themselves,\nare themselves the reasons of all successive phenomena;\" and \"it matters\nlittle whether he rejects the _name_ of God or not,\" or \"whether he has,\nor has not, an explicit knowledge of Him;\" he cannot but acknowledge an\neternal First Cause.[7] And so a whole host of Pantheistic Spiritualists\nwill indignantly disclaim the imputation of Atheism, and even attempt to\nvindicate Spinoza himself from the odious charge.[8] Nay, some of the\ngrossest Materialists, such as Atkinson and Martineau, while they\nexplicitly deny the existence of a living personal God, will affirm that\nPantheism is not Atheism.[9] Now, unquestionably, if by Theism we mean\nnothing more than the recognition of an active power in nature,--such a\npower as may or may not be identified with motion, and as may be\ndesignated indifferently as the Divinity, or as the Soul of the\nworld,--the possibility of Atheism may be effectually excluded; but this\nonly serves to show the indispensable necessity of a correct definition\nof the terms which are employed in this discussion, since it is\nperfectly manifest that they are not used in the same sense by the\ncontending parties, and that consequently the disputants are not arguing\nabout the same thing. For Pantheism, whatever form it may assume, and\nwhatever language it may adopt, can be regarded in no other light than\nas a system of Atheism, by all who have any definite conception of what\nis meant when we either affirm or deny the existence and government of a\nliving, intelligent, personal God.\n\nAs Atheism has appeared in several distinct forms, it is necessary to\nconsider both its _generic nature_ and its _specific varieties_. It may\nbe defined, generally, as that state of mind which involves either _the\ndenial_ or _the doubt_ of the existence and government of God as an\nall-perfect Being, distinct from the created universe; or which leads to\nthe habitual forgetfulness and wilful neglect of His claims as our\nCreator, Preserver, and Lord. This state of mind, whether evinced by\nwords or by actions, contains in it the essence of Atheism, and it is\nrecognized in Scripture, in each of its two aspects, as an evil alike\nnatural and prevalent. The words of the Psalmist, \"The fool hath said in\nhis heart, No God,\"[10] whether they be interpreted as the expression of\nan _opinion_ or of a _wish_, indicate in either case the existence of\nthat state of mind which has just been described, and which may issue\neither in practical or speculative Atheism, according to the temperament\nof individual minds, and the influences which are brought to bear upon\nthem. The same inspired writer has said,[11] that \"The wicked through\nthe pride of his countenance will not seek after God; God is not in all\nhis thoughts;\"--\"He hath said in his heart, God hath forgotten; He\nhideth his face; He will never see it.\"--\"Wherefore doth the wicked\ncontemn God? he hath said in his heart, Thou wilt not require it;\" And\nthese words exhibit a graphic delineation, of that state of mind in\nwhich occasional thoughts of God are neutralized by habitual unbelief,\nand the warnings of conscience silenced by the denial of a supreme moral\ngovernment. In like manner, when the apostle tells the Ephesian converts\nthat at one time \"they were _without God_ in the world,\"[12] and the\nGalatians, that \"when they knew not God, they did service unto them\nwhich by nature are no gods;\" when he further speaks of some as \"lovers\nof pleasures more than lovers of God,\" as \"having a form of godliness,\nbut denying the power thereof,\" as \"professing that they know God, but\n_in works denying Him_;\"[13]--in all these statements we see the generic\nnature of that ungodliness which cleaves as an inveterate disease to our\nfallen nature, and which, whether it appears only in the form of\npractical unbelief and habitual forgetfulness, or assumes the more\ndaring aspect of avowed infidelity, contains in it the essence of\nAtheism.\n\nWhile such is its _generic nature_, we must further discriminate between\nits specific varieties; for it does not always wear the same aspect, or\nrest on the same grounds. It may be divided, first of all, into\n_speculative_ and _practical_ Atheism: the former implying a denial, or\na doubt of the existence and government of God, either openly avowed or\nsecretly cherished; while the latter is perfectly compatible with a\nnominal religious profession, and consists in the habitual forgetfulness\nof God and of the duties which arise out of His relation to us as His\ncreatures and subjects. Speculative Atheism is comparatively rare;\nPractical Atheism is widely prevalent, and may be justly regarded as the\ngrand parent sin, the universal characteristic of fallen humanity.[14]\nIt is not Atheism in profession, it is Atheism in practice. Those who\nare chargeable with it may \"profess that they _know_ God, but in works\nthey _deny_ Him.\" As distinguished from theoretical or speculative\nAtheism, it is fitly termed _ungodliness_. It does not necessarily imply\neither the denial or the doubt of the existence or government of God,\nbut consists mainly in the forgetfulness of His character and claims.\nSpeculative Atheism always implies habitual ungodliness; but the latter\nmay exist where the former has never been embraced, and has even been\nopenly and sincerely disclaimed. Yet such is the _connection_ between\nthe two, that Speculative Atheism invariably presupposes and perpetuates\npractical ungodliness; and that the latter has also a tendency to\nproduce the former, since the habitual disregard of God in the practical\nconduct of life indicates a state of mind in which men are peculiarly\nexposed to the seductions of infidelity and prone to yield to them,\nespecially in seasons of revolutionary excitement or of prevailing\nepidemic unbelief. It would be wrong to rank every ungodly man among\nprofessed or even conscious Atheists, for he may never have denied or\neven doubted the existence and government of God; yet it were equally\nwrong to represent or treat him as a true believer, since he shows that,\npractically, \"God is not in all his thoughts;\" and hence the necessity\nof our _first_ distinction between [Transcriber's note: Original had\n\"beetween\"] _theoretical_ or _speculative_, and _practical_ or\n_habitual_ Atheism.\n\nSpeculative Atheism, again, is either _dogmatic_ or _skeptical_. It is\n_dogmatic_, when it amounts to an affirmation, either that there is no\nGod, or that the question of his existence is necessarily insoluble by\nthe human faculties. Atheism has been distinguished from Anti-theism;\nand the former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recognition of\nGod, while the latter asserts His non-existence. This distinction is\nfounded on the difference between _unbelief_ and _disbelief_;[15] and\nits validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely between\ndogmatic and skeptical Atheism. But Anti-theism is maintained, in the\nstrictest sense of the term, where it is affirmed either that there is\nno God, or that the existence of the Supreme Being _cannot_ in any\ncircumstances become an object of human knowledge. In each of these\nforms, Atheism is dogmatic; it denies the existence of God, or it denies\nthe possibility of His being known. But there is also a _skeptical_\nAtheism, which does not affirm absolutely either that there is no God,\nor that the knowledge of God is necessarily excluded by the limitations of\nhuman reason, but contents itself with saying, \"_non-liquet_,\"--_i.e._,\nwith denying the sufficiency of the evidence. It answers every appeal to\nthat evidence by saying that, however satisfactory it may be to the minds\nof some, it does not carry conviction to the minds of all, and that for\nthis reason it may be justly regarded as doubtful or inconclusive. These\ntwo forms of Atheism--the Dogmatic and the Skeptical--are widely different\nfrom each other; they rest on distinct grounds, and they require, therefore,\nto be discussed separately, each on its own peculiar and independent merits.\nThe Dogmatic Atheist feels no force in the arguments which are directed\nmerely against his skeptical ally; for, strong in his own position and\nconfident in his ability to maintain it, he is conscious of no\nspeculative doubt, and affirms boldly what he unhesitatingly believes.\nThe Skeptical Atheist, again, feels no force in the arguments which are\ndirected against a Dogmatic System such as he utterly disclaims; he is\nequally unwilling to affirm either that there is, or that there is not,\na God: he takes refuge in doubt, and refuses alike to affirm or to deny;\nhis only plea is, the want or the weakness of evidence on either side.\nFrom this radical difference between the two forms of Speculative\nAtheism, there arises a necessity for discussing each of them on its own\nmerits; and yet, although theoretically they may be easily\ndistinguished, it will be found that practically they are often\nconjoined, since the same mind will often fluctuate between the two, and\nshift its ground by betaking itself alternately to the one or the\nother, according to the exigencies of the argument. Assail the Dogmatic\nAtheist with the unanswerable statement of John Foster, that it would\nrequire nothing less than Omniscience to warrant the denial of a God,\nand he will probably defer to it so far as to admit that he cannot prove\nhis negative conclusion, but will add that he is not bound to do so, and\nthat all that can be reasonably required of him is to show that the\nevidence adduced on the opposite side is insufficient to establish the\nDivine existence, or that the phenomena which supply that evidence may\nbe as well, or more satisfactorily, explained in some other way. Assail,\nin like manner, the Skeptical Atheist with the self-evident truth that,\neven on his own principles, he is not entitled to assume or to act upon\nthe assumption, that _there is no God_, since the result of his\nreasonings is _doubt_ merely, and such doubt as implies that there _may\nbe_ a Creator, Governor, and Judge, he will probably defer to it so far\nas to admit that this is the only logical result of his system, but will\nadd that, where there is no conclusive evidence on either side, there\ncan be no moral obligation to a religious life, and no guilt in living\n\"without God in the world.\" It will be found, too, that, distinct as\nthese two forms of Speculative Atheism may appear to be, yet they have\noften been made to rest on a common ground, and the self-same arguments\nhave been adduced in support of both. Thus the doctrine of Materialism,\nthe theory of Development, and the system of Natural Laws, have all been\napplied by the Dogmatic Atheist to justify his denial of the existence\nand government of God, on the ground that all the phenomena of Nature\nmay be accounted for without the supposition of a Supreme Mind; while\nthe very same doctrines or theories have been also applied by the\nSkeptical Atheist to justify, not his _denial_, but his _doubt_, and to\nvindicate his verdict of \"_non-liquet_\" on the evidence adduced. And as\nthe same arguments are often employed by both parties in support of\ntheir respective views, so they make use, for the most part, of the\nsame objections in assailing the cause of Theism; insomuch that it would\nbe impossible, and even were it possible it would be superfluous, to\nattempt a formal refutation of either, without discussing those more\ngeneral principles which are applicable to both. For this reason, we\npropose to examine in the sequel the various theories which have been\napplied in support alike of Dogmatic and of Skeptical Atheism, so as to\nillustrate the grounds that are common to both, while we consider also\nthe distinctive peculiarities of the two systems, and more particularly\nthe grounds of Religious Skepticism.\n\nBesides the radical distinction between Dogmatic and Skeptical Atheism,\nwe must consider the difference between _the four great leading systems_\nwhich have been applied to account for the existing order of Nature,\nwithout the recognition of a living, intelligent, personal God. There\nare many specific varieties of Atheism; but, ultimately, they may be\nreduced to _four_ classes. The _first_ system assumes and asserts the\neternal existence of THE COSMOS; that is, of the present order of\nNature, with all its laws and processes, its tribes and races, whether\nof vegetable or animal life; and affirms that the world, as now\nconstituted, never had a beginning, and that it will never have an end.\nThis has been called the Aristotelian Hypothesis, because Aristotle,\nwhile he spoke of a Supreme Mind or Reason, maintained not only the\neternity of matter, but also the eternity of \"substantial forms and\nqualities.\"\n\nThe _second_ system affirms, not the eternal existence of THE\nCOSMOS,--for the commencement of the existing order of Nature is\nadmitted to be comparatively recent,--but the eternal existence of\nMatter and Motion; and attempts to account for the origin of the world\nand of the races by which it is peopled, either by ascribing it, with\nEpicurus, to a fortuitous concourse of atoms, or, with more modern\nSpeculatists, to a law of progressive development. This has been called\nthe Epicurean Hypothesis, because Epicurus, while nominally admitting\nthe existence of God, denied the creation of the world, and ascribed its\norigin to atoms supposed to have been endued with motion or certain\ninherent properties and powers, and to have been self-existent and\neternal.\n\nThe _third_ system affirms the coexistence and coeternity of God and the\nWorld; and, while it admits a distinction between the two, represents\nthem as so closely and necessarily conjoined, that God can be regarded\nonly as the Soul of the World,--superior to matter, as soul is to body,\nbut neither anterior to it, nor independent of it, and subject, as\nmatter itself is, to the laws of necessity and fate. This has been\ncalled the Stoical System; since the Stoics, notwithstanding all their\nsublime moral speculations and their frequent recognition of God, taught\nthat God sustains the same relation to the World as the soul of man does\nto his body.\n\nThe _fourth_ system denies the distinction between God and the World,\nand affirms that all is God, and God is all; that there exists only _one\nsubstance_ in the Universe, of which all existing beings are only so\nmany modes or manifestations; that these beings proceed from that _one_\nsubstance, not by creation, but by emanation; that when they disappear,\nthey are not destroyed, but reaebsorbed; and that thus, through endless\ncycles of change, of reproduction and decay, it is one and the same\neternal being that is continually modified and manifested. This has been\ncalled the Pantheistic Hypothesis, and it is exemplified, on a large\nscale, in the speculations of the Brahmins in India, and, in Europe, in\nthose of Spinoza and his numerous followers.\n\nIf this be a correct analysis of Speculative Atheism, in so far as it\nassumes a positive or dogmatic shape, we have only to conjoin with it\nthe peculiar characteristics of that which is merely Skeptical, and we\nshall obtain a comprehensive view of the whole subject, which may serve\nas a useful guide in the selection and treatment of the topics which\ndemand our chief attention in the prosecution of this inquiry.\n\nIt is necessary, however, in discussing this subject, to bear in mind\nthat there is a wide difference between Systems of Atheism, such as we\nhave briefly described, and certain doctrines which have sometimes been\nassociated with it, or even applied in its support or vindication. These\ndoctrines may have been connected, historically, with the promulgation\nand defence of atheistic views; they may even seem to have a tendency\nadverse to the evidence or truths of Christian Theism; but they must not\non that account be summarily characterized as atheistic, nor must those\nwho have at any time maintained them be forthwith classed among avowed\ninfidels.[16] The doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, which in the\nhands of Jonathan Edwards was applied, whether consistently or\notherwise, in illustration and defence of Christian truth, became in the\nhands of Collins and Godwin an associate and ally of anti-Christian\nerror; the doctrine of the natural Mortality of the Soul, which in the\nhands of Dodwell was applied, whether consistently or otherwise, to\nvindicate the peculiar privileges of the Christian Covenant, has often\nbeen applied by infidels as a weapon of assault against the fundamental\narticles of Natural Religion itself; the doctrine of Materialism, which\nin the hands of Priestly was maintained, whether consistently or\notherwise, in connection with an avowed belief in God as the Creator and\nGovernor of the world, became in the hands of Baron D'Holbach and his\nassociates the corner-stone of the atheistic \"System of Nature;\" the\ndoctrine of \"Natural Laws,\" which in the hands of Bishop Butler is so\npowerfully applied in proof of a system of Divine Government, has become\nin the hands of Mr. Combe a plausible pretext for denying a special\nProvidence and the efficacy of prayer; and the mere fact that these\ndoctrines have been applied to such different and even opposite uses, is\na sufficient proof of itself that they are not in their own nature\nessentially atheistic, and that they should be carefully discriminated\nfrom the systems with which they have been occasionally associated. We\nare not entitled to identify them with Atheism, in the case of those by\nwhom Atheism is explicitly disclaimed; and yet there may be such an\napparent connection between the two, and such a tendency in the human\nmind to pass from the one to the other, as may afford a sufficient\nreason for examining these cognate doctrines, each on its proper merits,\nfor defining the sense in which they should be severally understood, for\nestimating the evidence which may be adduced for or against them\nindividually, and for showing in what way, and to what extent, they may\nhave a legitimate bearing on the grounds of our Theistic belief. For\nthis reason, we shall bring under review, not only several systems of\navowed Atheism, but also various theories, not necessarily atheistic,\nwhich have been applied to the support and defence of Atheism, and which\nhave a tendency, as thus applied, to induce an irreligious frame of\nmind.\n\nThe _causes and springs of Atheism_ may easily be distinguished from\n_the reasons_ on which it is founded. In the present state of human\nnature, there is _a permanent cause_ which is abundantly sufficient to\naccount for this species of unbelief, notwithstanding all the evidence\nwhich Nature affords of the being, perfections, and providence of God.\nOur Lord explained in a single sentence the whole Philosophy of\nUnbelief, when he said that \"men loved the darkness rather than the\nlight, because their deeds are evil; for whoso doeth evil hateth the\nlight, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved.\"\nNo thoughtful man can seriously reflect on his own conscious experience,\nwithout discovering, in the disordered state of his moral nature, a\nreason which sufficiently explains his natural aversion from God; he\nfinds _there_ an evidence, which he can neither overlook nor deny, of\nhis own personal turpitude and guilt; he is self-convinced and\nself-condemned at the bar of his own conscience; he remembers with\nremorse and shame many cases of actual transgression in which he\nresisted the dictates of reason, and resigned himself to the dominion of\nevil passions; and when, with these convictions and feelings, he is\nasked to conceive of God as a living, personal Being, everywhere\npresent, beholding the evil and the good, whose \"eyes are as a flame of\nfire,\" and can discern \"the very thoughts and intents of the heart;\"\nwhen he conceives of such a Being as his Lawgiver, Governor, and Judge,\nas one who demands the homage of the heart and the obedience of the\nlife, and who has power to enforce His rightful claims by the sanctions\nof reward and punishment, he will be sensible, in the first instance, of\nan instinctive disposition to recoil from the contemplation of his\ncharacter, and a strong desire to deny, or at least to forget, His\nclaims; and just in proportion as the idea of God becomes more vivid, or\nis more frequently presented to his mind, it will become the more\nintolerable, insomuch that he will be tempted either to banish the\nsubject altogether from his thoughts, or, if he cannot succeed in this,\nto alter and modify his view of the Divine character so as to bring it\ninto accordance with his own wishes, and to obtain some relief from the\nfears and forebodings which it would otherwise awaken in his mind. If he\nshould succeed in this attempt, he will fall into one or other of two\nopposite states of mind, which, however apparently different, do\nnevertheless spring from the same latent source,--a state _of security_,\nor a state of _servitude_. In the former, he either forgets God\naltogether,--\"God is not in all his thoughts;\" or he conceives of Him as\n\"one like unto himself,\" indulgent to sin, and neither strict to mark\nnor just to punish it: in the latter, he either \"remembers God and is\ntroubled,\" or, if he would allay the remorse and forebodings of an\nuneasy conscience, he has recourse to penance and mortification, to\npainful sacrifices and ritual observances, in the hope, that by these he\nmay propitiate an offended Deity. In the one case, the conflict ends in\npractical Atheism, in the other, in abject Superstition. And these two,\nAtheism and Superstition, however different and even opposite they may\nseem to be, are really offshoots from the same corrupt root,--\"the evil\nheart of unbelief which departeth from the living God.\" In the case of\nthe great majority of mankind, who are little addicted to speculative\ninquiry, or to serious thought of any kind, it may be safely affirmed\nthat, in the absence of Revelation, they will inevitably fall into one\nor other of these two extremes, or rather, that they will oscillate\nalternately between the two,--in seasons of ease and prosperity living\n\"without God in the world,\" and in seasons of distress or danger\nbetaking themselves for relief to the rites of a superstitious worship.\nThe apostle describes at once the secret cause and the successive steps\nof this sad degeneracy, when, speaking of the Gentiles, he says that\n\"when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were\nthankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart\nwas darkened; professing themselves wise, they became fools, and changed\nthe glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to\ncorruptible man.\"--\"And even as they did not like to retain God in their\nknowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind.\"[17] The secret cause\nof all these evils was a latent \"enmity against God,\"--\"they did not\n_like_ to retain God in their knowledge.\" From this proceeded, in the\nfirst instance, a _practical habit_ of Atheism,--\"they glorified him not\nas God, neither were thankful;\" and from hence proceeded, in the second\ninstance, the gross superstition of _Polytheistic belief and\nworship_,--\"they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an\nimage made like to corruptible man,\"--\"they changed the truth of God\ninto a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the\nCreator, who is blessed forever.\"\n\nBut, while practical Atheism and blind Superstition are the two extremes\nwhich divide among them the great majority of mankind, there have always\nbeen some more thoughtful and inquiring spirits, who have sought to\npenetrate the mysteries of their being, and to account for the present\norder of things. They have asked, and have attempted to answer, such\nquestions as these: What are we? what was our origin? what is our\ndestination? Whence came this stupendous fabric of Nature? Is it\nself-existent and eternal? or did it come into being at some definite\ntime? If not eternal, how was it produced? by chance or by design? by\ninevitable fate or by spontaneous will? Whence the order which pervades\nit, and the beauty by which it is adorned? Whence, above all, the evil,\nmoral and physical, by which it is disfigured and cursed? And, in reply\nto these thoughtful questionings, various theories have been invented to\naccount for the existing order of things, while not a few of the most\ndaring thinkers have abandoned the subject in despair, and, holding it\nto be an insoluble problem, have resigned themselves to the cheerless\ngloom of Skepticism. In reviewing all these speculations and theories,\nwe must bear in mind that their authors and advocates, although more\nthoughtful and inquisitive than the great majority of mankind, were\nequally subject to the same corrupting influence,--\"the evil heart of\nunbelief,\"--and that the same cause which produced practical Atheism in\nsome, and abject Superstition in others, may also have operated, but\nmore insidiously, in producing Speculative Infidelity in the minds of\nthose who are more addicted to abstruse philosophical inquiries. We must\nseek to get down to the root of the evil, if we would suggest or apply\nan effectual remedy; we must not deal with the symptoms merely, but\nsearch for and probe the seat of the disease; and if that be the\ndisordered state of our moral nature, which gives rise to fears and\nforebodings as often as we think of God, no remedy will be effectual\nwhich does not remove our distrust, suspicion, and jealousy; and no\nargument, however conclusive, will have any practical power which does\nnot present such views of God as to make him an object of confidence,\nand trust, and love. It is of vast importance that this fundamental\ntruth should be kept steadily in view; for, as the disordered state of\nour moral nature is the rudimental source both of practical Atheism and\nof popular Superstition, so it is also the prolific parent of\nSpeculative Infidelity in every variety of form: and as long as the\nremedy is not applied to the root of the disease, the Atheist, if forced\nto relinquish one theory, will only betake himself to another, and after\nhaving gone the round of them all, will rather throw himself into the\nvortex of utter and hopeless skepticism, than acknowledge a God whom he\ncannot love, a Judge whom he cannot but dread. Christianity alone can\nsupply an effectual remedy, and it is such a remedy as is fitted to cure\nalike the habitual ungodliness, the abject superstition, and the\nspeculative infidelity, which have all sprung from the same prolific\nsource. It exhibits such a view of the character and will of God as may\nrelieve us from the fears and forebodings of guilt, and, by revealing a\ndivine method of reconciliation, may place us in a position the most\nfavorable for a calm and dispassionate consideration of the natural\nevidence in favor of His Being, Perfections, and Moral Government.\n\nBut, while the grand parent cause of all Atheism--whether practical or\nspeculative, dogmatic or skeptical--is to be found in the disordered\nstate of our own moral nature, there are other subordinate causes in\noperation, which may be regarded either as _incidental occasions_, or as\n_plausible pretexts_, for this form of unbelief. The internal causes are\nthe primary and most powerful; but there are external influences which\ncooeperate with these, and serve to stimulate and strengthen them. Among\nthe incidental occasions of Atheism, we might mention a defective,\nbecause irreligious, education in early life, the influence of ungodly\nexample and profane converse, and the authority of a few great names in\nliterature or science which have become associated with the cause of\nInfidelity; and among the plausible pretexts for Atheism we might\nmention the inconsistencies of professed believers and especially of the\nclergy, the divided state of the religious world, as indicated by the\nmultiplicity of sects, the bitterness of religious controversy, the\nsupposed opposition of the Church to the progress of science and the\nextension of civil and religious liberty, and the gross superstitions\nwhich have been incorporated with Christianity itself in some of the\noldest and most powerful states of Europe. These and similar topics may\nbe justly said to be the \"loci communes of Atheism,\" and they are often\nemployed in eloquent declamation or indignant invective, so as to make a\nmuch deeper impression, especially on young and ardent minds, than their\nintrinsic weight or real argumentative value can either justify or\nexplain. Infidel writers have not been slow to avail themselves of these\npretexts for unbelief, in regard alike to Natural and Revealed Religion;\nand have artfully identified Religion with Superstition, and\nChristianity with Popery, as if there were no consistent or tenable\nmedium between the two. And, perhaps, of all the incidental occasions or\nexternal inducements to Atheism, none has exerted so much influence over\nreflecting minds as the wide-spread prevalence of Superstition; for\nnever was Atheism more general among the cultivated classes in ancient\ntimes than in the States of Greece, whose hospitable Pantheon enclosed\nthe gods of all nations, and whose inhabitants were \"exceedingly given\nto idolatry;\" and nowhere, in modern times, has Atheism been more\nexplicitly avowed or more zealously propagated than in those countries\nof Europe which are most thoroughly subjugated to the superstitions of\nthe Papacy. In the graphic words of Robert Hall, \"Infidelity was bred in\nthe stagnant marshes of corrupted Christianity.\"[18]\n\nHaving described the nature, evinced the reality, and referred to the\npermanent and occasional causes of Atheism, we may briefly advert to\n_its moral and social influence_. On this point three distinct questions\nhave been raised: _First_, whether Atheism be conducive to personal\nhappiness? _Secondly_, whether it be compatible with pure morality and\nvirtue? and, _thirdly_, whether it be consistent with social well-being,\nwith the authority of the laws, and the safety or comfort of the\ncommunity? In considering these questions, it is necessary to remember\nthat in no age, and in no region of the world, has Speculative Atheism\nbeen universal, or even so prevalent as to exhibit on a large scale a\nfull development of its legitimate results. It has always been in a\nminority, and has been continually checked, modified and controlled, by\nthe prevailing beliefs of society; and, whether these beliefs were\npurely religious or grossly superstitious, they have exerted a powerful\ninfluence in counteracting the native tendencies of atheistic\nspeculation. \"The effects of Atheism,\" as Mr. Estlin justly observes,\n\"we have not yet in any great degree experienced, as the mental habits\nof those who hold it in speculation were in general formed, before they\nhad adopted their present principles, by the imperceptible influence of\nthat religion which they now traduce.\"[19] Perhaps the nearest approach\nto a state of prevailing Atheism which has ever been exhibited in the\nhistory of the world, is to be found in France at the era of the first\nRevolution, when Christianity was publicly abjured, and the goddess of\nReason substituted for the God of the Bible. But that even this fearful\noutburst of impiety did not proceed from the universal prevalence of\nSpeculative Atheism among the great body of the people; that there still\nexisted in the heart of society some germs of religious feeling, and\ncertain instinctive or traditionary beliefs which operated as a\nrestraint and check even during that season of revolutionary frenzy, is\nsufficiently evinced by the reaction which speedily occurred in the\npublic mind, and which restored Catholicism itself, as if by magic, to\nits wonted supremacy; while the anti-social tendency of Atheism, in so\nfar as it did prevail, was strikingly attested by the fact, that the\nleading actors in that fearful drama found themselves compelled to\nprovide for the public safety by restoring at least the forms of\nreligious worship, and to acknowledge that \"if there were no God, it\nwould be necessary to invent one.\"--\"The true light,\" says the eloquent\nRobert Hall, \"in which the French Revolution ought to be contemplated is\nthat of a grand experiment on human nature.\" \"God permitted the trial to\nbe made. In one country, and that the centre of Christendom, Revelation\nunderwent a total eclipse, while Atheism, performing on a darkened\ntheatre its strange and fearful tragedy, confounded the first elements\nof society, blended every age, rank, and sex, in indiscriminate\nproscription and massacre, and convulsed all Europe to its centre, that\nthe imperishable memorial of these events might teach the last\ngenerations of mankind to consider Religion as the pillar of society,\nthe safeguard of nations, the parent of social order, which alone has\npower to curb the fury of the passions, and secure to every one his\nrights; to the laborious the reward of their industry, to the rich the\nenjoyment of their wealth, to nobles the preservation of their honors,\nand to princes the stability of their thrones.\"[20]\n\nIn the case of individuals holding atheistic opinions, but living in the\nmidst of Christian society, the full influence of these opinions cannot\nbe felt, nor their effects fully developed, in the presence of those\nrestraints and checks which are imposed by the religious beliefs and\nobservances of others. We cannot estimate their influence either on the\npersonal happiness, or the moral character, or the social welfare of\nmen, without taking this circumstance into account. To arrive at even a\ntolerable approximation to a correct judgment, we must endeavor to\nconceive of Atheism as prevailing universally in the community, as\nemancipated from all restraint, and free to develop itself without let\nor hindrance of any kind, as tolerated by law, and sanctioned by public\nopinion, and unopposed by any remaining forms either of domestic piety\nor of public worship, as reigning supreme in every heart, and as forming\nthe creed of every household; and thus conceiving of it as an\ninveterate, universal epidemic, we are then to inquire whether, and on\nwhat conditions, society would in such a case be possible, and how far\nthe prevalence of Atheism might be expected to affect the morals and\nwelfare of mankind.\n\nThe question has been raised whether Atheism might not be more conducive\nthan religion to _the personal happiness of individuals_; and some, who\nhave confounded Religion with Superstition, have not hesitated to answer\nthat question in the affirmative. The conviction that there is no God,\nand no moral government, and no state of future retribution, could it\nonly be steadfastly and invariably maintained, might serve, it has been\nthought, to relieve the mind of many forebodings and fears which disturb\nits peace, and, if it could not ensure perfect happiness, might act at\nleast as an opiate or sedative to a restless and uneasy conscience. In\nthe opinion of Epicurus and Lucretius, tranquillity of mind was the\ngrand practical benefit of that unbelief which they sought to inculcate\nrespecting the doctrine of Providence and Immortality. They frequently\naffirmed that _fear_ generated superstition, and that superstition, in\nits turn, deepened and perpetuated the fear from which it sprung; that\nthe minds of men must necessarily be overcast with anxiety and gloom as\nlong as they continued to believe in a moral government and a future\nstate; and that the only sovereign and effectual antidote to\nsuperstitious terror is the spirit of philosophical unbelief. Similar\nviews are perpetually repeated in the eloquent but declamatory pages of\n\"The System of Nature.\" But the remedy proposed seems to be subject to\ngrave suspicion, as one that may be utterly powerless, or at the best,\nexceedingly precarious; for, first of all, the fears which are supposed\nto have generated Religion must have been anterior to it, and must have\narisen from some natural cause, which will continue to operate even\nafter Religion has been disowned. They spring, in fact, necessarily out\nof our present condition as dependent, responsible, and dying creatures;\nand they can neither be prevented nor cured by the mere negations of\nAtheism; we can only be raised above their depressing influence by a\nrational belief and well-grounded trust in the being and character of\nGod. Again, if the denial of a Providence and of a future state might\nserve, were it associated with a full assurance of certainty, to relieve\nus from _the fear_ of retribution hereafter, it must equally destroy\n_all hope_ of immortality, and reduce us to the dreary prospect of\nannihilation at death,--a prospect from which the soul of man\ninstinctively recoils, and by which his whole life would be embittered\njust in proportion as he became more thoughtful and reflective. Unbelief\ncan operate as a sedative to fear only in so far as it is habitual,\nuniform, undisturbed by any inward misgivings or apparent uncertainty;\nbut, in the case of men not utterly thoughtless or insensible, it is\nrarely, if ever, found to possess this character. It is often shaken,\nand always liable to be disquieted, by occasional convictions, which no\namount of vigilance can ward off, and no strength of resolution repress.\nIt is maintained only by a painful and sustained conflict, which is but\nill-concealed by the vehemence of its protestations, and often\nsignificantly indicated by the very extravagance of its zeal. Add to\nthis, that Atheism itself affords no guarantee against future suffering.\nIt may deny a Providence here and a judgment hereafter, it may even deny\na future state of conscious existence, and take refuge in the hope of\nannihilation that it may escape from the dread prospect of retribution;\nbut it cannot affirm the _impossibility_, it can only doubt the\n_certainty_ of these things; and in their bare possibility there is\nenough at once to impose an obligation to serious inquiry, and to\noccasion the deepest anxiety, especially in seasons of affliction or\ndanger, which awaken reflective thought. \"_Atheism_,\" said the acute but\nskeptical Bayle, \"_does not shelter us from the fear of eternal\nsuffering_.\" But, even if it did, what influence would it exert on our\npresent happiness? Would it not limit our enjoyments, by confining our\nviews within the narrow range of things seen and temporal? Would it not\ndeprive us of the loftiest hopes? Would it not repress our highest\naspirations, by interdicting the contemplation of the noblest Object of\nthought, the Ideal Standard of truth and excellence, the Moral Glory of\nthe Universe? Would it not diminish the pleasure which we derive even\nfrom earthly objects, and aggravate the bitterness of every trial? How\nwretched must be the condition of those who are \"proud of being the\noffspring of chance, in love with universal disorder, whose happiness is\ninvolved in the belief of there being no witness to their designs, and\nwho are at ease only because they suppose themselves _inhabitants of a\nforsaken and fatherless world_!\"[21] \"No one in creation,\" said Jean\nPaul, \"is so alone as the denier of God: he mourns, with an orphaned\nheart that has lost its great Father, by the corpse of Nature which no\nWorld-Spirit moves and holds together, and which grows in its grave; and\nhe mourns by that corpse till he himself crumble off from it. The whole\nworld lies before him, like the Egyptian Sphynx of stone, half-buried in\nthe sand; and the All is the cold iron mask of a formless Eternity.\"[22]\n\nBut the malign influence of Atheism on personal happiness will become\nmore apparent, if we consider its tendency to affect the _moral springs\nof action_, on which happiness mainly depends. The question whether\nAtheism be compatible with moral virtue, or whether an Atheist may be a\nvirtuous man, is one of those that can only be answered by\ndiscriminating aright between the different senses of the same term. In\nthe Christian sense of virtue, which comprehends the duties of both\ntables of the Law, and includes the love of God as well as of man, it is\nclear that the Atheist cannot be reputed virtuous, since he wants that\nwhich is declared to be the radical principle of obedience, the very\nspirit and substance of true morality. But, in the worldly sense of the\nterm, as denoting the decent observance of _relative_ duty, it is\npossible that he may be so far influenced by considerations of prudence\nor policy, or even by certain natural instincts and affections, as to be\njust in his dealings, faithful to his word, courteous in his manners,\nand obedient to the laws. But this secular, prudential morality, is as\nprecarious in its practical influence as it is defective in its radical\nprinciple. Atheism saps and undermines the very foundation of Ethics.\nThe only law which it can recognize (if that can be called a law in any\nsense which is not conceived of as the expression of a Supreme Will) is,\neither the greatest happiness of the individual, or the greatest\nhappiness of the greatest number; but, whether it assumes the form of\n_Felicitarian_ or of _Utilitarian_ calculation, it degenerates into a\nprocess of arithmetic, and is no longer a code of morals. The\nfundamental idea of DUTY is awanting, and can only be supplied from a\nsource which the Atheist ignores. By denying the existence of God, he\nrobs the universe of its highest glory, obliterates the idea of perfect\nwisdom and goodness, and leaves nothing better and holier as an object\nof thought than the qualities and relations of earthly things. He\ndegrades human nature, by doing what he can to sever the tie which binds\nman to his Maker, and which connects the earth with Heaven. He\ncircumscribes his prospects within the narrow range of \"things seen and\ntemporal,\" and thus removes every stimulus to dignity of sentiment, and\nevery incentive to elevation of character. His wretched creed (if a\nseries of cold negations may be called a creed) must be fatal to every\ndisinterested and heroic virtue; let it prevail, and the spirit of\nself-sacrifice will give place to Epicurean indulgence, and the age of\nmartyrdom will return no more. Substitute Nature, or even Humanity, for\nGod, and the eternal standard of truth and holiness and goodness being\nsuperseded, every moral sentiment will be blighted and obscured.\nConscience has a relation to God similar to that which a chronometer\nbears to the sun. Blot the sun from the sky, and the chronometer is\nuseless; deny God, and conscience is powerless. And the vices which, if\nnot subdued, were yet curbed and restrained by the overawing sense of an\nunseen omnipresent Power, will burst forth with devastating fury,\nsnapping asunder the feebler fetters of human law, and overleaping the\nbarriers of selfish prudence itself; vanity and pride, ambition and\ncovetousness, sensual indulgence and ferocious cruelty, will rise into\nthe ascendancy, and establish their dark throne on the ruins of\nReligion.\n\nIf such be the natural and legitimate effect of Atheism on the personal\nhappiness and moral character of individuals, we can be at no loss to\ndiscover what must be its influence on society at large. For society is\ncomposed of individuals, and its character and welfare depend on the\naggregate sentiments of its constituent members. The question whether\nAtheism might not be consistent with social well-being, with the\ncontinued authority of the laws, and the general comfort of the\ncommunity, is answered historically by the fact, that in modern France\nthe Reign of Atheism was the Reign of Terror, and that in ancient Rome\nits prevalence was followed by such scenes of proscription,\nconfiscation, and blood, as were then unparalleled in the history of the\nworld. The truth is that, wherever Atheism prevails, GOVERNMENT BY LAW\nmust give place to GOVERNMENT BY FORCE; for law needs some auxiliary\nsanction; and if it be deprived of the sanction of Religion, it must\nhave recourse, for its own preservation, and the prevention of utter\nanarchy, to the brute power of the temporal sword. It is worse than\nuseless to discuss, in this connection, the question, revived by\nBayle,[23] whether Atheism or Superstition should be regarded as the\nworst enemy to the Commonwealth, for it has no relevancy to our present\ninquiry; we are not contending for either, we are objecting to both; and\nwe are under no necessity of choosing the least of two evils, when we\nhave the option of \"pure and undefined Religion.\" But we may observe, in\npassing, that, historically it has been found possible to keep society\ntogether, and to maintain the authority of law with a greater or less\nmeasure of civil liberty, where Superstition has been generally\nprevalent; whereas there is no instance on record of anything\napproaching to national Atheism, in which government by law was not\nspeedily superseded by anarchy and despotism. And the reason of this\ndifference may be that in every system of Superstition, whether it be a\ncorruption of Natural or of Revealed Religion, \"some faint embers of\nsacred truth remain unextinguished,\" some convictions which still\nconnect man with the spiritual and the eternal, and which are\nsufficient, if not to enlighten and pacify the conscience, yet to keep\nalive a sense of responsibility and a fear of retribution; \"certain\nsparks,\" as Hooker calls them, \"of the light of truth intermingled with\nthe darkness of error,\" which may have served a good purpose in\nmaintaining civil virtue and social order, although these would have\nbeen far better secured by the prevalence of a purer faith.\n\nThere are some circumstances, of a novel and unprecedented nature, which\nimpart a solemn interest to our present inquiry. At the beginning of the\npresent century, Robert Hall, referring to the unbelief which preceded\nand accompanied the first outburst of the Revolution in France,\nmentioned _three_ circumstances which appeared to him to be \"equally new\nand alarming.\" He regarded it as the first attempt which had ever been\nwitnessed on an extensive scale to establish the principles of Atheism,\nas the first attempt to popularize these principles by means of a\nliterature addressed and adapted to the common people, and as the first\nsystematic attempt to undermine the foundations, and to innovate on the\nvery substance of Morals.[24] But if we compare the first with the new\nEncyclopedie,--the former concocted by Voltaire, D'Alembert and Diderot,\nthe latter by Pierre Leroux and his associates,--we shall find that\nInfidelity has assumed greater hardihood, and has appeared under less\nrestraint in recent than in former times; while the speculations of\nComte and Crousse are as thoroughly atheistic as those of D'Holbach\nhimself. For, however irreligious and profane Voltaire and his\nassociates might be, and however devoted to their avowed object of\ncrushing Christ and his cause, so significantly indicated by their motto\nand watchword, \"Ecrasez l'Infame;\"[25] yet they continued, as a party,\nto advocate Deism, and seemed at least to oppose the bolder speculations\nof the author of the \"Systeme de la Nature.\" Both Voltaire and\nFrederick the Great wrote in reply to its atheistic tenets.[26] But now,\nin France, these tenets are openly avowed and zealously propagated. Nor\nis this fatal moral epidemic confined to our continental neighbors:\nthere is too much reason to fear that it has infected, to some extent,\nthe artisans of our own manufacturing towns, and even, in some quarters,\nthe inhabitants of our rural districts. The Communists of France have\ntheir analogues in the Socialists of Britain; and the periodical press,\nalthough for the most part sound, or at least innocuous, has lent its\naid to the dissemination of the grossest infidelity which the Continent\nhas produced. The \"Leader\" gives forth Lewes's version of Comte's\nPhilosophy; and the \"Glasgow Mechanics' Journal,\" a digest of his Law of\nHuman Progress, which is essentially atheistic.[27] Nor is indigenous\nAtheism wanting. Mr. Mackay in his \"Progress of the Intellect,\" Atkinson\nand Martineau in their \"Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and\nDevelopment,\" and Mr. G. Holyoake in \"The Reasoner,\" have sufficiently\nproved that if Atheism be an exotic, it is capable of taking root and\ngrowing up in the land of Bacon, Newton, and Boyle.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[2] BUDDAEI, \"Theses Theologicae de Atheismo et Superstitione,\" cap. I.\n\n[3] J. C. WOLFIUS, \"De Atheismi falso Suspectis.\"\n\n[4] BUDDAEI, \"Theses Theologicae,\" cap. III., \"De dogmatibus quae cum\nAtheismo conjuncta sunt, aut ad eum ducunt,\" p. 240.\n\n[5] COUSIN, \"Introduction Generale a l'Histoire de la Philosophie,\" I.\n169:--\"Que toute pensee implique une foi spontanee a Dieu, et qu'il n'y\na pas d'Atheisme naturel. Croit-il qu'il existe, par exemple? S'il croit\ncela, cela me suffit,\"--\"il a donc foi au principe de la pensee;--or la\nest Dieu,\"--\"Selon moi, toute parole prononcee avec confiance, n'est pas\nmoins qu'une profession de la foi a la pensee,--a la raison en\nsoi,--c'est a dire a Dieu.\"\n\n[6] M. HELVETIUS, \"Treatise on Man, his Intellectual Faculties and\nEducation: translated by W. Hooper, M. D.,\" I. 247.\n\n[7] M. LAMENNAIS, \"Esquisse d'une Philosophie,\" I. 95.\n\n[8] \"Spinoza is a God-intoxicated man.\"--NOVALIS, quoted in T. Carlyle's\nEssays, II. 43.\n\n[9] \"Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development, by H. G.\nATKINSON and HARRIET MARTINEAU,\" p. 241.\n\n[10] Psalm 14: 1; 53: 1.\n\n[11] Psalm 10: 4, 11, 13.\n\n[12] Eph. 2: 12, [Greek: Atheoi en to kosmo].\n\n[13] Gal. 4: 8; 2 Tim. 3: 4; Titus 1: 16.\n\n[14] ESTLIN, \"Discourse on Atheism,\" pp. 8, 19, 28. DR. CHALMERS,\n\"Institutes,\" I. 375.\n\n[15] DR. CHALMERS, Works, \"Natural Theology,\" I. 58. \"The Reasoner,\"\nedited by HOLYOAKE, XI. 15, 232.\n\n[16] ROBERT HALL'S Works, I. 58.\n\n[17] Romans 1: 21, 28.\n\n[18] HALL'S \"Works,\" I. 128.\n\n[19] ESTLIN'S \"Discourse,\" p. 57.\n\n[20] ROBERT HALL, \"Modern Infidelity Considered,\" I. 38, 67.\n\n[21] ROBERT HALL on Modern Infidelity, I. 70.\n\n[22] T. CARLYLE, \"Essays,\" II. 142.\n\n[23] P. BAYLE, \"Pensees diverses Ecrites a un Docteur de Sorbonne a\nl'Occasion de la _Comete_,\" 4 vols. Also his \"Reponse aux Questions d'un\nProvincial,\" II. 688, IV. 101, 112.\n\n[24] HALL on Modern Infidelity, I. 59, 64.\n\n[25] ABBE [TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: ORIGINAL HAD \"ABBE\"] BARRUEL, \"Memoires\npour servir a l'Histoire du Jacobinisme,\" I. 31, 131, 135, 184, 357.\n\n[26] ABBE BARRUEL, \"Memoires pour servir a l'Histoire du Jacobinisme,\"\nI. 22, II. 190, 193.\n\n[27] \"The Leader;\" a series of articles on Comte's Philosophy, by G. H.\nLEWES, April 7, 10, 17, etc., etc., 1852.--\"The Glasgow Mechanics'\nJournal.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT.\n\n\nThere have been various applications of the general principle of\nDevelopment, by means of which an attempt has been made to explain the\norigin of all things by Natural Laws, so as to exclude the necessity of\nany Divine interposition, either for the creation of the world, or for\nthe introduction and establishment of Christianity itself. It has been\napplied, first, to explain the origin of worlds and planetary systems,\nby showing that, certain specified conditions being presupposed, there\nare fixed mechanical laws which might sufficiently account for the\nproduction of the earth and of the other planets and satellites of our\nSolar System, without any special interposition of Divine power at the\ncommencement of the existing order of things. It has been applied,\nsecondly, to explain the origin of the various tribes or races of\nvegetable and animal life, and especially the production of the human\nrace, by showing that the existing types may have sprung, by a process\nof gradual development, from inferior races previously existing, and\nthat these again may have been produced by the action of chemical agents\nin certain favorable conditions. It has been applied, thirdly, to\nexplain all the most important phenomena of Human History, and to\nillustrate the law which is supposed to determine and regulate the\nprogressive course of civilization, so as to account, on natural\nprinciples, for the origin and prevalence of the various forms of\nReligion, and even for the introduction, in its appointed season, of\nChristianity itself, without having recourse to anything so utterly\nunphilosophical as the idea of a Divine Revelation, or the supposition\nof supernatural agency. And it has been applied, fourthly, to explain\nthe order, and to vindicate the use, of those additions both to the\ndoctrines and rites of primitive Christianity, which Protestants have\ndenounced as _corruptions_, but which Popish and Tractarian writers\ndefend as _developments_, of the system that was originally deposited,\nlike a prolific germ or seed, in the bosom of the Catholic Church.\n\nIt is the more necessary to examine the various forms of this theory,\nbecause unquestionably it can appeal to not a few _natural analogies_,\nwhich may serve, on a superficial view, to give it the aspect of\nverisimilitude. For many of the most signal works of God have been\nmanifestly framed on the principle of gradual growth, and matured by a\nprocess of progressive development. We see in the natural world a small\nseed deposited in the earth, which, under the agency of certain suitable\ninfluences, germinates and springs up, producing first a tender shoot,\nthen a stem, and branches, and leaves, and blossoms, and fruit; and\nevery herb or tree, \"having seed in itself,\" makes provision for the\nrepetition of the same process, and the perpetuation and indefinite\nincrease of its kind. The same law is observed in the animal kingdom,\nwhere a continuous race is produced from a single pair. And even in the\nsupernatural scheme of Revelation itself, the truth was gradually\nunfolded in a series of successive dispensations; the First Promise\nbeing the germ, which expanded as the Church advanced, until it reached\nits full development in the Scriptures of the New Testament. These and\nsimilar instances may suffice to show that, both in the natural and\nsupernatural Providence of God, He has been pleased to act on the\nprinciple of _gradual and progressive_, as contradistinguished from that\nof _instant and perfect_ production; and they may seem, at first sight,\nto afford some natural analogies in favor of the radical idea on which\nthe various modern Theories _of_ Development are based. In such\ncircumstances it would be an unwise and dangerous course either to\noverlook the palpable facts which Nature and Revelation equally attest,\nor to deny that they may afford signal manifestations of the manifold\nwisdom of God. Nor is it necessary for any enlightened advocate of\nTheism to betake himself to these expedients; he may freely admit the\nexistence of _such_ cases of gradual development, he may even appeal to\nthem as illustrative of the order of Nature, and the design which that\norder displays; and the only question which he is at all concerned to\ndiscuss amounts in substance to this: Whether the method of production\nwhich is pursued in the _ordinary course_ of Nature can account for the\n_original commencement_ of the present system of things?\n\nBut the state of the question, and the right application of the\nargument, may be best illustrated by considering each of the _four_\nforms of the theory separately and in succession.\n\n\nSECTION I.\n\nTHEORY OF _COSMICAL_ DEVELOPMENT, OR OF THE PRODUCTION OF WORLDS AND\nPLANETARY SYSTEMS BY NATURAL LAW.--\"THE VESTIGES.\"\n\nThe doctrine of a Nebular Cosmogony was first suggested by some\nobservations of the elder Herschell on those cloud-like appearances\nwhich may be discerned in various parts of the heavens by the aid of the\ntelescope, or even, in some cases, by the naked eye. It assumed a more\ndefinite form in the hands of La Place, although even by him it was\noffered, not as an ascertained discovery of science, but simply as a\nhypothetical explanation of the way in which the production of the\nplanets and their satellites _might_ possibly be accounted for _by_ the\noperation of the known laws of Nature.\n\nThe explanation of the whole theory may be best understood by dividing\nit into two parts: the _first_ being that which attempts to account for\nthe formation of planets and satellites, _on the assumption of the\nexistence of a central sun_, and _of certain other specified\nconditions_; the _second_ being that which undertakes to account for the\nformation of the sun itself, on the assumption of the existence of _a\ndiffused nebulous matter_ in space, or, as it has been aptly called, \"a\nuniversal Fire-Mist.\"[28]\n\nWhen the theory is limited to the explanation of the origin of the\nplanets and their satellites, the original condition of our solar system\nis assumed to have been widely different from what it now is; the sun is\nsupposed to have existed for a time alone, to have revolved upon his\naxis, and to have been surrounded with an atmosphere expanded by intense\nheat, and extending far beyond the limits of our system as it now\nexists. This solar atmosphere revolved, like the sun itself, around its\naxis; but its heat, constantly radiated into sidereal space, gradually\ndiminished, and the atmosphere being contracted in proportion as it\ncooled, the rapidity of its rotation was accelerated, until it reached\nthe point at which the central attraction was overcome by the\ncentrifugal force, and then a zone of vapor would be detached or thrown\noff, which might either retain its form as a nebulous ring, like the\nring of Saturn, or first breaking into fragments, from some want of\ncontinuity in its structure, and afterwards coalescing into one mass,\nmight be condensed into a planet as the vapor continued to cool. These\nrings or planets, thus detached from the central atmospheric mass, would\ncontinue to revolve, in virtue of the force originally impressed upon\nthem, and their motion would be nearly circular, in the same plane and\nin the same direction with that of the sun. The first planet, so\nformed, must have been that at the extreme limit of our solar system;\nthe second the next in point of remoteness from the centre, and so on;\neach resulting from the operation of the same natural laws, and emerging\ninto distinct existence at that precise point in the gradual cooling and\ncontraction of the atmosphere at which the centrifugal became stronger\nthan the centripetal force. But each planet might also be subjected to\nthe same process of cooling and contracting, and might therefore throw\noff, under the operation of the same mechanical laws, zones of vapor\nmore or less dense, which might consolidate into moons or satellites,\nand which should also revolve, like the planets, round their primary.\nThus, Uranus has six satellites, and Saturn seven; while the latter has\nalso thrown off two zones so perfectly uniform in their internal\nstructure that they remain unbroken, and constitute a double ring around\nthe planet.\n\nIn this _first_ form of the theory, which assumes the existence of the\nsun and its atmosphere, and the rotation of both round an axis, La Place\nsought to give a scientific form to the speculations of Sir William\nHerschell on the condensation of Nebulae, by proving simply the\n_dynamical possibility_ of the formation of a planetary system by such\nmeans, according to the known laws of matter and motion; but he did not\naffirm the scientific certainty of his conjecture, and far less the\nactual production of the solar system in this way. He has been followed\nby M. Comte, who has attempted to furnish, if not a complete\ndemonstration, at least a plausible mathematical verification, of the\nhypothesis.[29] Utterly excluding all supernatural agency in the work of\ncreation, he equally excludes from the problem which he attempts to\nsolve, the origin of the sun and its atmosphere; and confining himself\nto the task of accounting, in the way not of demonstrative certainty,\nbut merely of plausible hypothesis, for the formation of the planets and\nsatellites of our solar system, he conceives the theory of La Place to\nbe susceptible of such a numerical verification as is sufficient to give\nit a high degree of verisimilitude. Assuming that the periodic time of\neach planet must be equal to that of the portion of the solar atmosphere\nof which it was formed at the era when it was thrown off, and combining\nthe theorems of Huygens on the measure of centrifugal forces with\nNewton's law of gravitation, he establishes a simple equation between\nthe time of the rotation of each zone or section of the solar\natmosphere, and the distance of the corresponding planets. On applying\nthis equation to the various bodies of our system, he found that the\nperiodic time of the moon agrees, at least within the tenth of a day,\nwith the duration of the earth's revolution, when her atmosphere is\nsupposed to have extended to the moon; and that the periodic times of\nthe planets maintain a similar correspondence with what must have been\nthe duration of the solar revolution when they were severally thrown off\nfrom its atmosphere. It is the less necessary, however, to enter on a\ndetailed exposition of his argument, because he admits that it can\nafford at the utmost only a probable proof of an hypothesis; and\nfurther, because it is expressly limited to the production of the\nplanets and their satellites, while not only is the existence of the\nsolar atmosphere presupposed, but also its existence in _a certain\nstate_, and with _several determinate conditions_; while no account\nwhatever is given of the origin either of the sun or its atmosphere, and\nnone of the laws or conditions on which the whole process of development\nis confessedly dependent.\n\nBut the author of \"The Vestiges\" takes a much wider range, and attempts\na more arduous task. He seeks to account for the origin both of suns and\nof solar systems by the agency of natural laws. Not content with the\nmore limited form of the theory, which M. Comte holds to be the only\nlegitimate or practical object of scientific treatment, he holds that\nthe origin of the sun itself, and the _forms_, the _positions_, the\n_relations_, and the _motions_, of all the heavenly bodies, may be\naccounted for by supposing a previous state of matter, fluid or\ngasiform, subject only to the law of gravitation. The Nebular Cosmogony,\nwhich is well characterized by himself as his \"version of _the romance\nof Nature_,\" is based on the assumption that \"the nebulous matter of\nspace, previously to the formation of stellar and planetary bodies, must\nhave been a universal FIRE-MIST,\"[30] in other words, a diffused\nluminous vapor, intensely hot, which might be gradually condensed into a\nfluid, and then into a solid state, by losing less or more of its heat.\nThe existence of such a luminous matter being assumed, and it being\nfurther supposed that it was not entirely uniform or homogeneous, but\nthat it existed in various states of condensation, and that it had\n\"certain nuclei established in it which might become centres of\naggregation for the neighboring diffused matter,\"--the author attempts\nto show that on such centres a rotatory motion would be established\nwherever, as was the most likely case, there was any obliquity in the\nlines of direction in which the opposing currents met each other; that\nthis motion would increase as the agglomeration proceeded; that at\ncertain intervals the centrifugal force, acting on the remoter part of\nthe rotating mass, would overcome the agglomerating force; and that a\nseries of rings would thus be left apart, each possessing the motion\nproper to itself at the crisis of separation. These, again, would only\ncontinue in their annular form, if they were entirely uniform in their\ninternal structure. There being many chances against this, they would\nprobably break up in the first instance, and be thereafter \"agglomerated\ninto one or several masses, which would become representatives of the\nprimary mass, and perhaps give rise to a progeny of inferior masses.\" In\nsupport of this theory, reference is made to the existence, at the\npresent moment, of certain cloud-like nebulae, or masses of diffused\nluminous matter, exhibiting a variety of appearances, as if they were in\nvarious degrees of condensation, and which are described as \"solar\nsystems in the process of being formed\" out of a previous condition of\nmatter. And the observations of M. Plateau, of Ghent, are adduced as\naffording an experimental verification of some parts of the theory, and,\nespecially, as serving to explain the spherical form of the planets, the\nflattening at the poles, and the swelling out at the equator.\n\nIt does not belong to our proper province, nor is it necessary for our\npresent purpose, to discuss the merits of this theory, considered as a\nquestion of science. This has been already done, with various degrees of\nability, but with unwonted unanimity, by some of the ablest men of the\nage,--by Whewell, Sedgwick and Mason, in England, by Sir David Brewster\nand Mr. Miller, in Scotland, and by Professor Dod and President\nHitchcock, in America.[31] But, viewing it simply in its relation to the\nTheistic argument, we conceive that the adverse presumption which it may\npossibly generate in some minds against the evidence of Natural\nTheology, will be effectually neutralized by establishing the following\npositions:\n\nThat it is _a mere hypothesis_, and one which, from the very nature of\nthe case, is incapable of being proved by such evidence as is necessary\nto establish _a matter of fact_.\n\nThat the progress of scientific discovery, so far from tending to\nverify and confirm, has served rather to disprove and invalidate the\nfundamental assumption on which it rests.\n\nThat even were it admitted, either as a possible, or probable, or\ncertain explanation of the origin of the present planetary systems, it\nwould not necessarily destroy the evidence of Theology, nor establish on\nits ruins the cause of Atheism.\n\nEach of these positions may be conclusively established, and the three\ncombined constitute a complete answer to the theory of Development, in\nso far as it has been applied in the support or defence of Atheism.\n\n1. That it is a mere hypothesis or conjecture, designed, not to\nestablish the _historical fact_, but to explain merely the _dynamical\npossibility_ of the production of the planetary bodies by the operation\nof known natural laws, must be admitted, I think, even by its most\nenthusiastic admirers. It might have seemed, indeed, to have something\nlike a basis of fact to rest upon, had the conception of the elder\nHerschell been verified, when he announced the existence of a nebulous\nfluid, capable of being distinguished, by certain well-defined marks,\nfrom unresolved clusters of stars; but even then it presupposed so many\npostulates, which could in no way be established by experimental or\nhistorical evidence, that it could scarcely be regarded in any other\nlight than as an ingenious speculation or a splendid conjecture. For,\nlet it be considered, first of all, that the theory proceeds on the\nassumption of the existence and wide diffusion of a nebulous fluid of\nwhose reality there is no actual proof; secondly, that it necessarily\nrequires, also, the supposed existence of certain favorable conditions;\nand, thirdly, the operation of certain invariable laws; and it will be\nmanifest at once that it is purely hypothetical throughout, and that it\nincludes a variety of topics which never have been, and never can be\nmade the subjects of experimental verification. For it postulates, in\nthe words of an acute writer, \"the establishment of nuclei in the body\nof the elemental mass, as well as the action of heat on its substance,\nand then seeks to explain the concentration of the nebulous particles\ninto these nuclei by the force of gravitation, the rotation of the\nbodies so produced by the confluence of the nebulous fluid, the\nseparation of a portion of the outer surface of these revolving masses\nin the form of rings, the disruption of these rings, and the subsequent\nrecomposition of their fragments into separate spheres, answering to the\nplanets and satellites of our system.\"[32] But even were the existence\nof a nebulous fluid admitted, we have no access to know what was its\ninternal structure; we cannot determine whether it was uniform and\nhomogeneous throughout, or whether it contained nuclei which might\nbecome centres of aggregation; we have no means of estimating the\nintensity of the heat which belonged to it, or of calculating the\nprocess by which it was dispersed, so as to occasion the condensation of\nsuccessive portions of the mass. No eye ever saw the separation of any\npart of it in the form of a ring, or the disruption of that ring, or the\nsubsequent recomposition of its fragments into a solid sphere. And even\nhad all this been matter, not of mere conjecture, but of actual\nobservation, it would still have left much to be explained which can\nonly be accounted for by ascribing it to a designing Intelligent Cause.\n\n2. The progress of scientific discovery, so far from tending to verify,\nhas served rather to invalidate the fundamental assumption on which the\nwhole theory depends. That assumption was the existence of a Nebulous\nFluid or Fire-Mist, capable of being distinguished, by certain\ncharacteristic marks, from unresolved nebulae or clusters of stars. The\nexistence of any such fluid has become more and more doubtful, in\nproportion as astronomers have been enabled, with the aid of larger and\nbetter constructed telescopes, to resolve several nebulae which had\npreviously defied the power of less perfect instruments. We do not\naffirm that every cluster has been already resolved, nor is it necessary\nfor the purposes of our argument to suppose that, at any future time,\nthis stupendous achievement is likely to be effected; for it is a very\nobvious consideration, that just in proportion as our telescopic powers\nare enlarged so as to enable us to resolve many of the nearer nebulae,\nthey must also bring within the range of our extended vision _others_\nmore remote and hitherto unperceived, which may continue to exhibit the\nsame cloud-like appearance as the former, until, by a new improvement of\nthe telescope, we may succeed in separating them into distinct stars;\nand even then the march of discovery is not ended,--we may reasonably\nexpect that with every fresh increase of telescopic vision, new clusters\nwill be brought into view, and new clouds appear in the utmost verge of\nthe horizon. But, unquestionably, the progress which has already been\nmade in this direction affords a strong presumption in favor of the\nidea, that the apparent nebulosity of those masses which still appear,\neven to our best telescopes, as cloud-like vapors, is to be ascribed\nrather to the imperfection of our instruments than to any difference\nbetween them and such as have been already resolved. Sir John Herschell,\na high authority in such a case, tells us that \"we have every reason to\nbelieve, at least in the generality of cases, that a nebula is nothing\nmore than a cluster of stars.\"[33] Sir David Brewster is equally\nexplicit: \"It was certainly a rash generalization to maintain that\nnebulae differed essentially from clusters of stars, because existing\ntelescopes could not resolve them. The very first application of Lord\nRosse's telescopes to the heavens overturned the hypothesis; and with\nsuch unequivocal facts as that instrument has brought to light, we\nregard it as a most unwarrantable assumption to suppose that there are\nin the heavenly spaces any masses of matter different from solid bodies,\ncomposing planetary systems.\"[34] And Professor Nichol, while he\ngracefully acknowledges that he has \"somewhat altered the views which he\nformerly gave to the public, as the highest then known and generally\nentertained, regarding the structure of the heavens,\" states, as the\nresult of more mature reflection, that \"the supposed distribution of a\nself-luminous fluid, in separate patches, through the heavens, has,\nbeyond all doubt, been proved fallacious by that most remarkable of\ntelescopic achievements,--the resolution of the great nebula in Orion\ninto a superb cluster of stars; and that this discovery necessitates\nimportant changes in previous speculations on Cosmogony.\"[35]\n\nIn short, Lord Rosse's observations at Parsonstown have conclusively\nproved that what appeared to be a nebula was in reality a cluster of\nstars; and while they still leave many nebulae unresolved, they afford a\nstrong warrant for believing that discoveries in the same direction\nmight be indefinitely extended in proportion to the increase of\ntelescopic power.\n\n3. But even were the Nebular Hypothesis admitted, and were the Theory of\nDevelopment by Natural Laws conceived to afford a satisfactory\nexplanation of the origin of the planetary systems, it would not follow,\nas a necessary consequence, that the peculiar evidence of Theism--that\non which it mainly depends, and to which it makes its most confident\nappeal--would be thereby destroyed, or even diminished. The only\nlegitimate result of such a doctrine would seem to be, that we must\ndistinguish aright between a work of _Mediate_, and a work of\n_Immediate_ Creation. In the Bible each of these is distinctly\nrecognized. We have a specimen of the one in the creation of the first\nman by the direct agency of Divine power; we have a specimen of the\nother in the creation, less direct but equally real, of all his natural\nposterity, through the medium of ordinary generation. Men do not cease\nto be the _creatures_ of God because they are born of their parents, in\nvirtue of that creative word, \"Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish\nthe earth;\" and hence children are admonished \"to remember _their\nCreator_ in the days of their youth.\"[36] The work of creation is\nequally real and equally Divine, whether it be effected _mediately_ or\n_immediately_, with or without the intervention of means, by the direct\nand instantaneous exertion of Almighty power, or by the gradual and\nsuccessive operation of second causes acting according to established\nlaws. In the ordinary course of Providence, the method of mediate\nproduction, gradual growth, and progressive development, may be observed\nin innumerable instances; but it can never be justly held to exclude, or\neven to obscure, the evidence of a presiding Intelligence and a\nsupernatural Power. On the contrary, it may serve rather to enhance that\nevidence; since the very arrangements and provisions which have been\nmade with a view to the reproduction of every thing after its kind, may\nbear on them the legible impress of a designing Mind and an ordaining\nWill. Thus, year by year continually, the whole inhabitants of the world\nare supported by the fruits of harvest, which are produced and matured\nunder the action of natural laws; yet every intelligent Theist ascribes\nthe result ultimately to the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, and\nsees in the very processes by which it is brought to pass some of the\nmost signal proofs of these Divine perfections.\n\nNow, as this method is followed in the work of Providence, which may be,\nand often has been, described as a _continuous creation,_ and yet has no\ntendency to destroy, or even to diminish, the evidence of a presiding\nIntelligence in Nature, so no good reason can be assigned why it _might_\nnot also have been adopted in the production of planets and astral\nsystems, if so it had seemed good to Supreme Wisdom. If this method was\nadopted for the propagation of plants and animals, no reason can be\ngiven why it might not also have been adopted for the production of\nplanets and moons; nor would it in the latter case, any more than in the\nformer, impair the evidence of God's creative wisdom and power. For,\nsuppose it be possible that, by a marvellous process of self-evolution,\nthe material elements of Nature might assume new forms, so as to\noriginate a succession of new worlds and new planetary systems, without\nthe _immediate_ or _direct_ interposition of a Supernatural Will;\nsuppose that the earth and the other bodies now belonging to our own\nsystem, were generated out of a prior condition of matter, existing in a\ngasiform state and diffused through space as a Fire-Mist, subject to the\nordinary action of heat and gravitation; suppose, in short, that there\nwere LAWS FOR THE GENERATION OF WORLDS in the larger cycles of time,\njust as there ARE LAWS FOR THE GENERATION OF ANIMALS in the short ages\nof terrestrial life;--would a provision for such a succession of\nmarvellous developments necessarily destroy, or even impair, the\nevidence for the being and perfections of God? Does the generation of\nthe animated tribes diminish the evidence of design in the actual\nconstitution of the world? And why should a similar provision, if any\nsuch were found to exist, for the generation of stars and systems, be\nregarded in any other light than as an exhibition, on a still larger\nscale, of \"the manifold wisdom of God?\"\n\nLet it ever be remembered that the Theistic argument depends, not on\n_the mode of production_, but on _the character of the resulting\nproduct_. The world may have been produced mediately or immediately,\nwith or without the operation of natural laws; but if it exhibit such an\narrangement of parts, such an adaptation of means to ends, or such a\ncombination of collocations and adjustments, as enables us at once to\ndiscern the distinctive marks of intelligent design, the evidence cannot\nbe diminished, it may even be possibly enhanced, by the method of\nproduction. Provision is made, doubtless, for the growth and development\nof the eye, the ear, and the hand, in the human foetus, and the\nprocess by which they are gradually formed is regulated by natural laws.\nBut the resulting products are so exquisitely constructed, so admirably\nadapted to the elements of nature, and so evidently designed for the\nuses of life, that they irresistibly suggest the idea of wise and\nbenevolent contrivances; and this idea is as strong and clear as it\ncould have been had they been produced instantaneously by the _direct_\nact of creative power. And so of the planets and astral systems: they\nmay have been generated, that is, produced, in a way of natural\ndevelopment; yet the resulting products are such as to evince the\nsupreme wisdom and beneficence which presided over their formation. But\neven this is not all. Let us suppose, further, that Philosophy may yet\nreach its extreme, and, as we humbly conceive, unattainable limit; let\nus suppose that it may succeed in decomposing all the chemical elements\nnow known, by resolving them into ONE primary basis; let us even suppose\nthat it may succeed in reducing all the subordinate laws of Nature into\nONE supreme and universal law; still the development of such a system as\nwe see around us out of such materials, and by such means, would not be\nnecessarily exclusive of the idea of God, but might afford evidence of a\nSupreme Mind, creating, combining, and controlling all things for the\nmanifestation of His adorable perfections.\n\nWe have thus seen that the Theory of Cosmical Development is a mere\nhypothesis, incapable of experimental or historical proof; that the\nrecent progress of scientific discovery has tended to disprove the\nfundamental assumption on which it rests; and that, even were it\nadmitted as a possible, or, still more, as a plausible explanation of\nthe origin of planets and astral systems, it would not serve to destroy,\nand scarcely, if at all, to diminish the evidence of Theism.\n\nThe last of these positions, if well established, might seem to\nsupersede the necessity of discussing the hypothesis at all in\nconnection with our present theme. But such a discussion of it as has\nbeen offered may be useful to those--and they are not a few--who,\nsuperficially acquainted with Science in its more popular form, are\nexposed to the danger of being seduced by the authority of a few\ndistinguished names which have unfortunately become identified with the\ncause of Atheism. For, while the author of \"The Vestiges\" repudiates the\natheistic conclusions which some have deduced from his hypothesis, M.\nCOMTE boldly avows his creed in the following revolting terms: \"To minds\nunacquainted with the study of the heavenly bodies, Astronomy has still\nthe reputation of being a science eminently religious, as if the famous\nverse, 'Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei' ('The heavens declare the glory OF\nGOD'), had preserved all its force.\" And, he adds, in a note, \"At\npresent, to minds that have been early familiarized with the true\nastronomical philosophy, the heavens declare _no other glory_ than that\nof Hipparchus, Kepler, Newton, and all those who have contributed to the\nestablishment of their laws!\" The _reader_ of these laws may become\nillustrious, but the Maker of them must be utterly ignored!\n\n\nSECTION II.\n\nTHEORY OF _PHYSIOLOGICAL_ DEVELOPMENT; OR THE PRODUCTION OF VEGETABLE\nAND ANIMAL RACES BY NATURAL LAW.--\"TELLIAMED.\"--PHYSIO-PHILOSOPHY.\n\nThe Theory of Development has been applied not only to explain the\norigin of worlds and of astral systems in the sky, but also to account\nfor the origin of the various tribes of vegetable and animal life which\nexist on the earth itself. There is nothing, indeed, in any of the\nkingdoms of Nature that may not be included in it, since the formation\nof all material bodies, organic or inorganic, is supposed to be\nsufficiently accounted for by the sole action of Chemical or Mechanical\nlaws. The wide range of this theory is strikingly illustrated by the\nwords of one whose powers of observation have added some interesting\ndiscoveries to Natural History, but whose speculations on the origin of\nNature resemble the distempered ravings of lunacy, rather than the\nmature results of philosophic thought \"Physio-philosophy has to show,\"\nsays Dr. Oken, \"how, and in accordance indeed with what laws, the\nMaterial took its origin, and, therefore, how something took its\nexistence from nothing. It has to portray the first periods of _the\nworld's development from nothing_; how the elements and heavenly bodies\noriginated; in what method, _by self-evolution_ into higher and manifold\nforms, they separated into minerals, became finally organic, and, in\nman, attained self-consciousness.... Physio-philosophy is, therefore,\n_the generative history of the world_; or, in general terms, the history\nof Creation, a name under which it was taught by the most ancient\nphilosophers, namely, as Cosmogony. From its embracing the Universe, it\nis plainly the Genesis of Moses!\"[37]\n\nIt will be observed that this strange speculation goes far beyond the\ncomparatively modest conjecture of La Place. It postulates _nothing_,\nand undertakes to account for _everything_. In flagrant opposition to\nthe old atheistic maxim, \"Ex nihilo, nihil,\" it boldly affirms, \"Ex\nnihilo, omnia.\" It speaks, indeed, of \"laws in accordance with which the\nworld took its origin;\" but these laws must be as abstract as those of\nMathematics, since they existed before matter itself; nay, more\nabstract, or, rather, more inconceivable still, since they existed, it\nwould seem, even before Mind! Dr. Oken attempts to explain the\nproduction of the world from nothing by comparing it to the evolution of\nArithmetical and Mathematical Science, out of the fundamental conception\nof _zero_! But, waiving this, we shall direct our attention to the only\npoints in this theory which, in the existing state of speculative\nthought, can be held to have any practical interest in connection with\nour great theme.\n\nThat theory attempts to account for the production both of the FLORA and\nthe FAUNA of the natural world by _the process of Development_ rather\nthan by _the miracle of Creation_. It proceeds on the assumption, akin\nto that of Epicurus, that atoms or monads alone existed in the first\ninstance; and that from these were derived, under the action of natural\nlaw and by a process of gradual development, all existing substances and\nbeings, whether organic or inorganic, mineral, vegetable, or animal. \"No\norganism has been created,\" says Dr. Oken, \"of larger size than an\ninfusorial point. No organism is, nor ever has one been created, which\nis not microscopic. Whatever is larger has not been created, but\ndeveloped. Man has not been created, but developed.\" On this fundamental\nassumption the whole theory is based. But we must carefully distinguish\nbetween the Atomic Theory and the application which is here made of it.\nThe recent discoveries of Chemistry, by which all material compounds\nhave been decomposed into their constituent elements, amounting to\nlittle more than fifty substances, which are either the primary or the\nproximate bases of all existing bodies, and the marvellous\ntransformations which these elementary principles undergo, in respect\nalike of form, of density, of solidity, and of magnitude, under the\naction of natural laws,--may serve to make it credible that there is no\n_a priori_ impossibility in the assumption on which the Atomic Theory\ndepends. Had it been the will of God to call into being the various\nvegetable and animal races in the way of gradual evolution out of these\nprimary monads, no enlightened Theist will presume to say that it was\neither impossible, or inconsistent with His wisdom to do so. It must be\nobserved, however, that the natural analogies which have sometimes been\nappealed to in support of this hypothesis, labor under a grievous defect\nwhen they are applied to account for the origin of the existing races,\nand that they are extended far beyond their legitimate limits when they\nare supposed to prove that these races might begin to be without any\ndirect interposition of creative power. For, while the oak may spring\nfrom an acorn, and the largest animal from a microscopic monad, yet\nwithin the whole range of our experience both in the vegetable and\nanimal kingdoms, _the seed is produced by the organism_, and necessarily\npresupposes it; whence it follows, either that there must have been an\neternal succession of organisms producing seed, and thereby perpetuating\nthe race, or if this be inconceivable, still more if it can be disproved\nby geological or historical evidence, then that the analogy of our\npresent experience leads us up, not to \"an infusorial point\" or\n\"microscopic monad,\" but to a primary living organism as the\ncommencement of each existing tribe. In the words of Dr. Barclay, \"It\nwill not be easy, on any principles exclusive of the vital, to answer\nthese questions, What was the origin of the first egg, or what was the\norigin of the first bird? For where is the egg that comes not from a\nbird, and where is the bird that comes not from an egg? To the mere\nmaterialists, who exclude every species of vitality but that from\norganism, this problem is nearly as embarrassing as the origin of the\nUniverse itself.\"[38]\n\nIf these views be correct, all the natural analogies would lead us to\nacquiesce, as Dr. Barclay did, in the Mosaic narrative as the most\nphilosophical account of the commencement of the present order of\nthings. It traces up every race to a primary organism, endowed with\nreproductive powers; for it tells us, in regard to the FLORA, that God\nsaid, \"Let the earth bring forth grass, _the herb yielding seed_, and\nthe fruit-tree yielding fruit _after his kind_, whose _seed is in\nitself_, upon the earth; and it was so.\" And it tells us, with regard to\nthe FAUNA, that God said, \"Let the waters bring forth abundantly the\nmoving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth in\nthe open firmament of heaven. And God created great whales, and every\nliving creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly,\n_after their kind_, and every winged fowl _after his kind_. And God\nblessed them, saying, _Be fruitful, and multiply_, and fill the waters\nin the seas, and let fowl multiply in the earth.\"\n\nHere the distinction between different genera and species, and the\nprovision that was made for the perpetuation of different races, are\nprominently presented; while the production, in the first instance, not\nof an \"infusorial point\" or \"microscopic monad,\" but of a living\norganism capable of multiplying its kind, is expressly declared; and\nevery race is traced up to that primary organism, in perfect consistency\nwith the only law, whether of vegetable or animal reproduction, which is\nknown to be in operation at the present day. And _this_ law of\nreproduction, so far from being exclusive of a primary act of Creation,\nseems to presuppose and require it; for there must be a living organism\nbefore there can be vital transmission. But the theory of Physiological\nDevelopment proceeds on a totally different supposition,--a supposition\nfor the truth of which we have not only no historical evidence, but not\neven the slightest _analogical presumption_, since we have no instance\nof development anywhere except from a germ or seed, produced by an\norganism preexisting in a state of maturity.\n\nBut the exigencies of that theory demand a wide departure from all the\nfamiliar lessons of experience; and hence recourse has been had to a\nseries of the wildest and most extravagant conjectures, such as may well\njustify the opinion of those who have held that the creed of certain\nphilosophers makes a much larger demand on human credulity than that of\nalmost any section of the Christian Church. For, according to that\ntheory, the origin of the FLORA is first accounted for by the action of\nsome element--probably electricity--on a certain _mucus_, which is\nsupposed to be generated at those points where the ocean comes into\ncontact with the earth and air; that is, on the shore of the sea at low\nwater mark. MAILLET had broached the idea of the marine origin of all\nour present \"herbs, plants, roots, and grains,\"[39] at a period when the\nUniversal Ocean, of which Leibnitz said so much, was still the creed of\nsome speculative minds; but it has been more recently revived, and\nexhibited in greater detail, though not with stronger evidence, by some\nwriters of our own age. Thus Dr. Oken tells us that \"all life is from\nthe sea;\" that \"when the sea organism, by self-elevation, succeeds in\nattaining into form, there issues forth from it a higher organism;\" and\nthat \"the first organic forms, whether plants or animals, emerged from\nthe shallow parts of the sea.\" And so the author of \"The Vestiges\"\nattempts to show that new races, both of plants and animals, marine and\nterrestrial, may be accounted for, without any act of immediate\ncreation, by a change or transmutation of species resulting from the\nagency of natural causes. \"There is,\" as he tells us, \"another set of\nphenomena presented in the course of our history; the coming into\nexistence, namely, of a long suite of living things, vegetable and\nanimal, terminating in the families which we still see occupying the\nsurface. The question arises,--In what manner has this set of phenomena\noriginated? Can we touch at, and rest for a moment on, the possibility\nof plants and animals having likewise been produced in the way of\nNatural Law, thus assigning but one class of causes for everything\nrevealed to our sensual observation? Or are we at once to reject this\nidea, and remain content either to suppose that creative power here\nacted in a different way, or to believe, unexaminingly, that the inquiry\nis one beyond our powers?\"[40] In reply to these questions, he proceeds\nto show that \"there is a balance of probability from actual evidence in\nfavor of _an organic creation by law_,\" and that \"in tracing the actual\nhistory of organic beings upon the earth,\" as revealed by Geology, we\nfind that \"these came not at once, as they might have been expected to\ndo if produced by some special act, or even some special interposition\nof will, on the part of the Deity; they came in a long-continued\nsuccession, in the order, as we shall afterwards see more convincingly,\nof progressive organization, grade following grade, till, from an humble\nstarting-point in both kingdoms, the highest forms were realized.\" Such\nis his general principle; and, without entering into the details, we may\nsum up his general argument by saying, in the words of another,[41]\nthat, according to his theory, \"dulse and hen-ware became, through a\nvery wonderful metamorphosis, cabbage and spinach; that kelp-weed and\ntangle bourgeoned into oaks and willows; and that slack, rope-weed, and\ngreen-raw, shot up into mangel-wurzel, rye-grass, and clover.\" So much\nfor the FLORA; and now for the _Fauna_, and the transition from the one\nto the other. His views are thus exhibited by Sir David Brewster: \"The\nelectric spark, escaping from the wild elements around it, struck life\ninto an elementary and reproductive germ, and sea-plants, the food of\nanimals, first decked the rude pavement of the ocean. The lichen and the\nmoss reared their tiny fronds on the first rocks that emerged from the\ndeep; land-plants, evolving the various forms of fruit and flower, next\narose,--the Upas and the bread-fruit tree, the gnarled oak and the lofty\ncedar. Animal life appeared when the granary of nature was ready with\nits supplies. A globule, having a new globule forming within itself,\nwhich is the fundamental form of organic being, may be produced in\nalbumen by electricity; and as such globules may be identical with\nliving and reproductive cells, we have the earliest germ of organic\nlife, the first cause of all the species of animated nature which people\nthe earth, the ocean, and the air. Born of electricity and albumen, the\nsimple monad is the first living atom; the microscopic animalcules, the\nsnail, the worm, the reptile, the fish, the bird, and the quadruped, all\nspring from its invisible loins. The human similitude at last appears in\nthe character of the monkey; the monkey rises into the baboon, the\nbaboon is exalted to the ourang-outang, and the chimpanzee, with a more\nhuman toe and shorter arms, gives birth to man.\"[42]\n\nThe remarks which were offered, in the previous section, on Cosmical\nDevelopment, are equally applicable, _mutatis mutandis_, to this other\nform of the doctrine of Creation by Natural Law. It might be shown, with\nreference to the supposed generation of plants and animals, just as it\nwas then shown with reference to the generation of planets and astral\nsystems, first, that the theory rests upon a mere hypothesis, which is\nutterly unsupported by experimental evidence; secondly, that the\nprogress of science has hitherto afforded no ground to believe that the\ntransmutation of species is provided for under the established\nconstitution of nature; and, thirdly, that even were the theory\nadmitted, it would not destroy the evidence of Theism, any more than the\npropagation of plants and animals under the existing system, which, so\nfar from excluding or impairing, serves rather to enhance and illustrate\nthe proof of creative wisdom and power. In support of this last\nposition, we might adduce the testimony of the author of \"The Vestiges\"\nhimself; for, referring to the idea that \"to presume a creation of\nliving beings by the intervention of law\" is equivalent to \"superseding\nthe whole doctrine of the Divine authorship of organic nature,\" he takes\noccasion to say, \"Were this true, it would form a most important\nobjection to the Law theory; but I think it is not only not true, but\nthe reverse of the truth. As formerly stated, the whole idea of law\nrelates only to the mode in which the Deity is pleased to manifest His\npower in the natural world. It leaves the absolute fact of His\nauthorship of and supremacy over Nature precisely where it was.\" He\nadds, in the words of Dr. Buckland, \"Such an aboriginal constitution, so\nfar from superseding an Intelligent Agent, would only exalt our\nconceptions of the consummate skill and power that could comprehend such\nan infinity of future uses under future systems, in the original\ngroundwork of His Creation.\"[43]\n\nBut, without enlarging on those general considerations which were\nformerly stated, and which admit of an easy and obvious application to\nthis _second_ form of the theory, we shall offer a few remarks bearing\ndirectly on its distinctive peculiarities, and directed to the exposure\nof its radical defects.\n\nThe theory rests on two very precarious foundations: the assumption of\n_spontaneous generation_, on the one hand, and the assumption of a\n_transmutation of species_ on the other. Each of these assumptions is\nnecessarily involved in any attempt to account for the origin of the\nvegetable and animal races by natural law, without direct Divine\ninterposition. For if, after the first organism was brought into being,\nthe production of every subsequent type may be accounted for simply by a\ntransmutation of species, yet the production of the original organism\nitself, or the first commencement of life in any form, must necessarily\nbe ascribed either to a creative act or to spontaneous generation. A new\nproduct is supposed to have come into being, differing from any that\never existed before it, in the possession of vital and reproductive\npowers; and this product can only be ascribed, if Creation be denied, to\nthe spontaneous action of some element, such as Electricity, on mucus or\nalbumen. In this sense the doctrine of spontaneous generation seems to\nbe necessarily involved in the first step of the process of Development,\nand is, indeed, indispensable, if any account is to be given of the\norigin of vegetable and animal life; but in the subsequent steps of the\nsame process it is superseded by a supposed transmutation of species,\nwhereby a lower form of life is said to rise into a higher, and an\ninferior passes into a more perfect organism.\n\nBut we have no experience either of spontaneous generation on the one\nhand, or of a transmutation of species on the other. Observation has not\ndiscovered, nor has history recorded, an authentic example of either. In\nregard to the _first_, the author of \"The Vestiges\" anticipates this\nobjection, and attempts to answer it. The objection is, that \"a\ntransition from the inorganic to the organic, such as we must suppose to\nhave taken place in the early geological ages, is no ordinary cognizable\nfact of the present time upon earth; structure, form, life, _are never\nseen_ to be imparted to the insensate elements; the production of the\nhumblest plant or animalcule, otherwise than as a repetition of some\nparental form, is not one of the possibilities of science.\"[44] Such is\nthe objection; and how does he attempt to answer it? He endeavors to\nshow, first, that the work of creation having been _for the most part_\naccomplished thousands of years ago, we have no reason to expect that\nthe origination of life and species should be _conspicuously\nexemplified_ in the present day; secondly, that the comparative\ninfrequency, or even the entire absence, of such phenomena _now_ would\nbe no valid reason for believing that they have _never_ been exhibited\nheretofore, if, on other grounds, the doctrine of 'natural creation' or\n'life-creating laws' can be rendered probable; and, thirdly, that even\nin our own times there ARE facts which seem to indicate the reality, or\nat least the possibility, of \"the primitive imparting of life and form\nto inorganic elements.\"[45]\n\nNow, to this elaborate argument in favor of _spontaneous generation,_ or\nthe production of life by natural law, we answer, in the first place,\nthat the mere fact of its being adduced in connection with the Theory of\nDevelopment affords a conclusive proof that it is indispensable to the\nmaintenance of that theory, that the hypothesis would be incomplete\nwithout it, and that no account can be given of creation by the mere\ndoctrine of a _transmutation of species_. It is the more necessary to\nmake this remark, because not a few who embrace the latter doctrine\naffect to disown the former, and seek to keep it out of view. But the\none is as necessary as the other to a complete theory of Natural\nDevelopment. The author of \"The Vestiges\" felt this, and virtually\nacknowledges it when he undertakes the task of vindicating the\ncredibility of spontaneous generation. But we answer, in the second\nplace, that the method in which he performs his self-imposed task is\nsingularly curious, and not a little instructive. He had, it must be\nowned, a difficult game to play. The general theory of \"The Vestiges\"\nis founded on the fact that, in the ordinary course of Nature, the races\nof plants and animals are perpetuated by propagation, according to\nestablished Natural Laws,--a fact which might seem to afford a strong\nanalogical argument in favor of the supposition that the same order of\nNature is maintained also in the few apparently exceptional cases in\nwhich, from our defective knowledge, we are unable to trace the\nconnection between the parent and the product. And yet the author\nevinces no little anxiety to make out a case in favor of \"a\nnon-generative origin of life even at the present day;\" and he appeals\nto a class of facts, confessedly obscure, which have not been, as he\nthinks, satisfactorily accounted for by the law which usually regulates\nthe production of organic beings. He refers us to the speculations of\nDr. Allen Thomson on the primitive production of Infusoria,[46] to the\nfacts which modern science, aided by the microscope, has discovered\nrespecting the Entozoa, or the creatures which live within the bodies of\nothers, and, above all, to the experiments of Mr. Crosse and Mr. Weekes,\nwhich seemed to result in the production of a small species of insect\n(_Acarus Crossii_) from the action of a voltaic battery on a saturated\nsolution of the silicate of potash, or the nitrate of copper, or the\nferrocyanate of potassium. The reason of his anxiety to avail himself of\nthese cases is evident. The exigencies of his theory demanded a method\nof accounting for the primary origin of life different from any that can\nbe found in the common process of propagation. He saw clearly enough\nthat his main argument, founded, as it was, on the law of hereditary\ntransmission, could not account for the production of the first\norganism; and that, if he would avoid either the doctrine of _Immediate\nCreation_, which is so offensive to him, or the idea of _Eternal\nGeneration_, which is utterly excluded by the clearest lessons of Fossil\nGeology, he must have recourse to the hypothesis of _Spontaneous\nGeneration_. Hence he attempts to account for the commencement of new\nspecies both of plants and animals, in the course of the world's\nhistory, by a transmutation of species; while, for the origin of the\nfirst species, he has recourse to the same law of Development, but\nacting in widely different circumstances, and giving rise to what he\ncalls \"aboriginal generation,\" whereby the inorganic passes into the\norganic, and life, form, and structure, are imparted to hitherto inert\nmaterials by the action of Electricity on mucus or albumen. To\naccomplish this twofold purpose, he felt it necessary to insist, in the\nfirst instance, on the ordinary law of generation as the established\norder of _mediate_ creation; while he found it equally necessary, in the\nsecond place, to insist on those apparently exceptional cases in which\nthe connection between the germ and the product has hitherto eluded\nphilosophical research,--and this for the purpose of showing that the\noriginal production of plants and animals was _not similar_ to the\nordinary method of their propagation in any other respect than this,\nthat in both cases the result is brought about by Natural Laws, without\nthe direct interposition of any supernatural cause.\n\nNow, in so far as his argument is founded on the principle of\nanalogy,--and it is on this principle that it proceeds throughout,--we\nsubmit that it is radically vicious, and utterly inconclusive. For the\nvast majority of cases in which the commencement of life and\norganization falls under our notice being confessedly those, not of\nprimary production, but of mediate reproduction, it is reasonable to\nbelieve that the same law governs all cases alike, whether we have been\nable or not to trace the origin of life to the principle of propagation,\nthe few apparent exceptions being sufficiently accounted for by our\nimperfect knowledge of the causes and conditions on which they depend.\nBesides, the argument from analogy in favor of a primary production of\nlife by natural causes, in so far as it is founded on the present law\nof hereditary transmission, is radically defective, since the two cases\nare widely different; the one presupposing _a primary organism of the\nsame kind_, from which others are evolved by a law of natural\nsuccession, the other exhibiting life as a new product, resulting not\nfrom any prior organism, but from the action of _causes of a totally\ndifferent kind_, which are not known to be capable of giving birth\neither to vegetable or animal organisms under the actual constitution of\nNature.\n\nBut suppose, even, that the _Acarus Crossii_ were admitted to be a real\nproduct of Galvanic action on the silicate of potash, and an undeniable\ninstance of \"a non-generative origin of life,\" how would the\nillustrative example accord with the author's general theory? It might\nafford a specimen of aboriginal production; but how would it fit in with\nhis favorite doctrine of _a gradual and progressive advancement_ from\nthe lower to the higher forms of organization? The _Acarus_, at first\nsupposed to be a new and hitherto unknown creature, is now acknowledged\nto be one of a very familiar species,--a species which may have\ndeposited its ova, and propagated its kind, since the commencement of\nthe present order of things, and whose eggs might very well resist the\naction even of nitrate of copper, since the creature itself could live\nin that poisonous mixture. Moreover, it belongs, in point of\norganization, to one of the highest orders of organisms; not to the\n_radiata_, not to the _mollusca_, but to the highest type of the\n_articulata_, the nearest to the _vertebrata_. Had it been a monad,--a\nmere living cell,--which Galvanism evolved from the solution, and had\nthis primary product developed itself afterwards in various forms,\naccording to the ascending scale of a progressively improving\norganization, it might have accorded admirably with the twofold doctrine\nof spontaneous generation and transmutation of species; but,\nunfortunately, the first process is so perfect, in the present instance,\nas to leave little room for the second, and we are almost tempted to\nhope that perhaps the clumsy and troublesome expedient of a\ntransmutation of species may yet be superseded by the discovery of some\nmethod,--we know not what,--whereby not only the _articulata_, but the\n_vertebrata_, and even Man himself, may be immediately produced by some\nnew combination of Nature's elemental laws![47]\n\nWe have given prominence, in the first instance, to the doctrine of\n\"spontaneous\" or \"aboriginal\" production, because it constitutes an\nindispensable part of the Theory of Development, and because we believe\nthat, were this clearly understood, that theory would soon sink into\ngeneral discredit or total oblivion, like the kindred speculations of\nAnaximander and Anaxagoras, of the old Ionic School. The experiments of\nEhrenberg, instituted with the view of testing the doctrine of\nspontaneous generation, may be said to have decided the whole question.\nThey did not succeed, indeed, in explaining every apparently exceptional\ncase, for some of the facts are still obscure, and will probably\ncontinue to be so, notwithstanding every extension of microscopic power,\njust as, in the analogous case of the Nebulae, the increase of telescopic\npower has enabled us to resolve not a few of them into clusters of\nstars, while it has served to bring others yet unresolved within the\nrange of our vision. But they were sufficient, at least, to show that,\nas far as our clear knowledge extends, the one uniform law, \"_Omne vivum\nex ovo_,\" universally prevails, and that the whole analogy of Nature, in\nso far as its constitution has been ascertained, is adverse to the\ndoctrine of spontaneous generation. Ehrenberg detected the minute germs\nof vegetable mould, and the ova of some of the smallest animalcules; and\nwhen it is considered that these germs and ova are so tenacious of\nvitality that certain prolific seeds have come down to us from the age\nof the Pharaohs in the wrappings of the Egyptian mummies,--that they are\nwidely diffused in the air and the waters, insomuch that no sooner does\na coral reef appear above the level of the sea than it is forthwith\ncovered with herbage by means of seeds wafted by the winds or deposited\nby the waves,--and that it is almost impossible to exclude them by any\nartificial expedient, since they are capable of resisting the action of\nboiling water and even of alcohol itself,--it cannot, we think, be\ndenied that the few cases which still remain obscure or unexplained may\nbe, at least, _probably_ accounted for in accordance with the same\nnatural law which is found to be invariably established in every\ndepartment to which our clear knowledge extends.\n\nIn regard, again, to the supposed \"transmutation of species,\" we are\nequally warranted in affirming that it is destitute of all experimental\nevidence, and unsupported even by any natural analogy. As the doctrine\nof spontaneous generation stands opposed to the maxim that _organic life\ncan be produced only by organic life_, so the doctrine of a\ntransmutation of species stands opposed to the equally certain maxim\nthat _like produces like, both in the vegetable and animal kingdoms_.\nCuvier has demonstrated, with reference to the birds and reptiles\npreserved in Egypt, an entire fixity and uniformity of species, in\nevery, even the least, particular, for at least three thousand\nyears.[48] In the actual course of Nature we see no tendency to change;\nnay, a barrier seems to have been erected in the constitution of Nature\nitself to prevent the possible confusion of races by promiscuous\nintercourse, through that provision which renders the mule incapable of\nreproduction. No plant has ever been found in a state of transition from\na lower to a higher form; no instance has ever been produced of one of\nthe algae being transmuted into the lowest form of terrestrial\nvegetation; nor of a small gelatinous body developing itself into a\nfish, a bird, or a beast; nor of an ourang-outang rising into a man.[49]\nIt is true, indeed, that \"there is a capacity in all species to\naccommodate themselves, to a certain extent, to a change of external\ncircumstances, this extent varying greatly according to the species.\nThere may thus arise changes of appearance or structure, and some of\nthese changes are transmissible to the offspring; but the mutations thus\nsuperinduced are _governed by constant laws and confined within certain\nlimits_. Indefinite divergence from the original type is not possible,\nand the extreme limit of possible variation may usually be reached in a\nshort period of time; in short, species have a real existence in Nature,\nand a transformation from one to another does not exist.\"[50]\n\nThe whole science of Natural History is based on the existence of\ndistinct species, capable of being discriminated from each other by\ncertain characteristic marks; and the whole art of the agriculturist and\nthe stockbreeder proceeds on the assumption of a law, invariable in its\noperation, whereby \"like produces like in the vegetable and animal\nworlds.\" The instances to which the author of \"The Vestiges\" refers in\nsupport of his theory are utterly frivolous when opposed to the copious\ninductions to which they are opposed; and they may all be explained\nconsistently with the _law of variation within definite limits_, as\nstated by Dr. Whewell, or by our ignorance of all the conditions\ninvolved in each particular case. Nor is his argument founded on the\nlimited range of our observation, even with its singular illustration\nderived from Mr. Babbage's calculating engine, fitted to diminish, in\nthe slightest degree, our confidence in the general results of these\ninductions; for, not to mention that it amounts to nothing more than an\nappeal from what we do know to what we do not know, from knowledge to\nignorance, from the certainties of science to the mere possibilities of\nconjecture, it has been well shown by Mr. Miller, that our range of\nobservation is not so limited as the author of \"The Vestiges\" would have\nus to believe, since \"_extent of space_ is, in a matter of this kind,\nequivalent to _duration of time_. For, although no man has lived five\nhundred years, so as to observe the gradual development of the oak from\nthe acorn in its various stages of progress, yet every man who can\nsurvey five hundred yards of an English forest, can see the oak in every\nstage of its growth, and need have no doubt as to the law of its\nprogressive development. And so, had there really been such a\ntransmutation of species as is contended for, we might expect to find,\nsomewhere on the vastly extended sea coasts of our islands and\ncontinents, some specimens of plants or animals in a state of transition\nfrom the lower to the higher forms.\"\n\nWe are told, indeed, in answer to this argument, that Mr. Babbage's\nengine produces numbers according to a certain law up to a particular\npoint, and then, most unexpectedly, perhaps even unaccountably, the law\nof the series is changed, and the next term exhibits a striking\ndeparture from the order previously followed; and so, it is argued, it\nmay be in nature. Each organism may propagate after its kind for immense\nperiods, so as to give the impression of this being an invariable law;\nbut at a certain stage the order may change, and the next term in the\nseries may differ from all that went before it. The argument--if it can\nbe called an argument--amounts to this: Mr. Babbage's machine produces a\n_series of numbers, and of numbers only_, but according to different\nlaws of succession; _ergo_, Nature may produce in the same way, and with\nsimilar variations, _different races of plants and animals_. The\nargument would have been perfect if the engine had produced _something\nelse than numbers_; if, as Professor Dod supposes, \"while watching Mr.\nBabbage's machine, presenting to us successive numbers by the revolution\nof its plates, we should suddenly see one of those plates resolving\nitself into types, and these types arranging themselves in the order of\na page of 'Paradise Lost,' or even of 'The Vestiges of Creation;'--in\nsuch a case, there might have been something in the argument; but even\nthen, the withering question remains, Is there any man in his senses who\nwould not immediately conclude that _some new cause was now at work_?\"\n\nIn short, in so far as the _facts of the case_ are concerned, there is\nnot only no known instance either of \"spontaneous generation\" or of\n\"transmutation of species,\" but there is not even any natural analogy\nthat can give the theory the slightest aspect of verisimilitude. The\nauthor of \"The Vestiges\" thinks that a presumption in its favor may be\nderived from \"the analogy of the inorganic world,\"--in other words, from\nthe supposed conversion of nebulae into planets and astral systems by the\noperation of natural causes; but this analogy has been conclusively set\naside by disproving the hypothesis on which it depends. He further\nthinks that a favorable presumption may be derived from \"the analogy of\nthe organic world,\"--in other words, from the process of propagation by\nwhich the races of plants and animals are perpetuated; but the\npresumption thence derived, so far from being favorable, is directly\nopposed to his theory, since all the facts which come under our\ncognizance in every department of Nature serve only to establish the two\ngreat maxims of Natural History,--that _organic life can spring only\nfrom organic life_, and that _like produces like, both in the vegetable\nand animal world_.\n\nIf we have succeeded in disposing of _the facts of the case_, we shall\nhave little difficulty in exposing _the fallacy of the principles_ which\nare involved in the author's speculations on this subject. It is of\nfundamental importance, in this inquiry, to form a clear and correct\nconception of the precise point at issue, and of the two alternatives\nbetween which we are called to make our choice. It has been well said\nthat \"the great antagonist points in the array of the opposite lines are\nsimply the LAW of Development _versus_ the MIRACLE of Creation.\"[51] And\nthe author of \"The Vestiges\" virtually acknowledges this to be the real\nstate of the question, when he says that \"if we can see no _natural_\norigin for species, a _miraculous_ one must be admitted.\"[52] Now, the\ngrand alternative being Creation by Miracle or Creation by Law, that is,\nCreation by a Natural or by a Supernatural cause, we affirm that it is\nutterly presumptuous and unphilosophical to represent the one as less\nworthy of God, or more derogatory to His infinite perfections, than the\nother. Yet the author does not hesitate to say that the _natural_ ought\nto be preferred to the _miraculous_ method of accounting for the origin\nboth of planets and of their inhabitants, for this among other reasons,\nthat the latter would be derogatory to the wisdom and power of the Most\nHigh. His words are remarkable: \"The Eternal Sovereign arranges a solar\nor an astral system by dispositions imparted primordially to matter; He\ncauses, by the same majestic means, vast oceans to form and continents\nto rise, and all the grand meteoric agencies to proceed in ceaseless\nalternation, so as to fit the earth for a residence of organic beings.\nBut when, in the course of these operations, fuci and corals are to be\nfor the first time placed in those oceans, a particular interference of\nthe Divine power is required; and this special attention is needed\nwhenever a new family of organisms is to be introduced,--a new fiat for\nfishes, another for reptiles, a third for birds; nay, taking up the\npresent views of Geologists as to species, such an event as the\ncommencement of a certain cephalopod, one with a few new nodulosites and\ncorrugations upon its shell, would, on this theory, require the\nparticular care of that same Almighty who willed at once the whole means\nby which infinity was replenished with its worlds?\" ... \"Is it\nconceivable, as a fitting mode of exercise for Creative Intelligence,\nthat it should be constantly paying a special attention to the creation\nof species, as they may be required in each situation throughout those\nworlds at particular times? Is such an idea accordant with our general\nconception of the dignity, not to speak of the power, of the Great\nAuthor?\" ... \"It would be distressing to be compelled to picture the\npower of God as put forth _in any other manner_ than in those slow,\nmysterious, universal laws which have so plainly an eternity to work\nin.\"[53]\n\nSuch is the author's presumptuous decision on a matter which is far \"too\nhigh for him.\" We offer the following remarks upon it:\n\n_First_ of all, let it be observed that, unless on the principle of\nabsolute Atheism, which he professes to repudiate, he cannot but\nacknowledge that _once_, at least, the power of God must have been put\nforth _in another manner_ than \"in those slow, mysterious, universal\nlaws\" of which he speaks; and that, even if he could succeed in\ndisproving \"repeated interferences of creative power,\" he could in\nnowise dispense with a primitive act of direct, immediate, supernatural\ncreation, since he does not profess to believe in the eternal existence\nof matter and its laws. We find, indeed, that even in the subsequent\nacts of a continuous, but mediate creation, he is compelled to\nacknowledge a supernatural power as acting, in each individual case,\naccording to established natural laws; for he says expressly, \"There\ncannot be _an inherent intelligence in these laws_; the intelligence\nappears _external to the laws_, something of which the laws are but as\nthe expression of the will and power. If this be admitted, the laws\ncannot be regarded as primary or independent causes of the phenomena of\nthe physical world. We come, in short, to a being beyond Nature,--its\nAuthor, its God.\" ... \"When we speak of Natural Law, we only speak of\n_the mode in which the Divine power is exercised_; it is but another\nphrase for _the action of the ever-present and sustaining God_.\"[54] It\nis admitted, then, _first_, that there must have been a primary act of\ncreation, in the highest and strictest sense, by a direct and immediate\ninterposition of Divine power, at the commencement of created existence;\nand, _secondly_, that, even in the continuous work of creation, which is\nsupposed to have been subsequently carried on after the method of\ndevelopment by established natural laws, Divine agency is still equally\nreal, although it is differently manifested, and is indispensably\nnecessary to account for the resulting products. Now, can it be\nreasonably asserted that the direct and immediate creation of such a\nbeing as Man would be more derogatory to the wisdom and power of God\nthan the primordial production of \"a universal Fire-Mist,\" or even of\n\"electricity and albumen?\" or, will it be pretended that immediate\ncreation of molluscs as molluscs, of fishes as fishes, of reptiles as\nreptiles, would be less worthy of the great Author of Nature than the\nestablishment of a system which _must_ in due time give them birth, and\nthat, too, not without the concurrence and cooeperation of the Divine\nwill; for \"natural law is but another phrase for _the action_ of the\never-present and sustaining God?\"\n\nBut, while we hold that there is no good ground for an affirmative\nanswer to these questions, we would carefully guard against rushing to\nthe opposite extreme, and affirming, either that the production of new\nraces by the method of natural law was, on _a priori_ grounds,\nimpossible, or that God might not have adopted that method, had He so\npleased, in perfect consistency with the manifestation of His wisdom and\npower. We see that He has done so, under the actual constitution of\nNature, so far as the production of _individuals_ is concerned; we see\nnot why a similar provision might not have been made for the production\nof _genera and species_. In either way His power and His wisdom might\nhave been displayed. But, when we are told that the one is derogatory to\nthe Divine Majesty, and the other alone consistent with the loftiest\nviews of His perfections, we denounce the whole speculation as one that\nis alike presumptuous and unphilosophical, on the simple but conclusive\nground that we are in no degree competent judges of the best method\neither of creating or of governing the world. Had we been asked to say\nwhether it was likely that, under the rule of infinite wisdom and\nalmighty power, certain insects, reptiles, and fishes, that are\nunattractive to the eye, and loathsome to the fastidious taste of many,\ncould find a place at all among the works of God, we might have thought\nit improbable that they should be created; but they exist\nnotwithstanding, and the fact of their existence is enough to silence\nall our presumptive reasonings. And surely it is not less--it is much\nmore--presumptuous to affirm that, existing as they do, they could not\nhave been brought into being, without disparagement to Divine wisdom,\notherwise than by the action of established laws, or by a process of\nnatural development; as if it were unworthy of God to _produce_ that for\nwhose production He confessedly did make _provision_.\n\nBut, further, we see here very strikingly exemplified the tendency of\nsuch speculations to _exclude God from all real, active, and direct\nconnection with His works_. The dominion of Natural Law, which, as we\nshall afterwards see, is held by M. Comte and Mr. Combe to exclude the\ndoctrine of a special Providence and the efficacy of prayer, is here\nextended, by the author of \"The Vestiges,\" so as to be exclusive also of\nany direct Divine interposition in the work of Creation itself, other\nthan what may have been implied in the aboriginal production of matter\nand its laws, or in the subsequent concurrence of His will with the\naction of these laws in the established order of Nature.\n\nWe have said that the Theory of Development, as expounded in \"The\nVestiges,\" is not necessarily atheistic, partly because the author\nprofessedly disclaims Atheism, and partly also because, in strict logic,\nit might still be possible, even on the basis of that theory, considered\nsimply in itself and apart from the speculations with which it has been\nassociated, to construct, from the actual phenomena of Nature, a valid\nproof for the being and attributes of God. And yet we have thought it\nnecessary to advert to it as one of the recent speculations of science,\nbecause, whatever may be its _professed aim_, its _practical tendency_\nis unquestionably hostile to the influence of religious truth. It will\nbe found, in the great majority of cases, and especially in the case of\nardent youthful minds, that this theory, when it is embraced as an\narticle of their philosophic creed, is, to all practical purposes,\ntantamount to Atheism. For not to insist on the consideration, so\nforcibly stated by others,[55] that the natural argument for the\nImmortality of Man, or for the doctrine of a Future Life, as implying\ndistinct individuality and continued self-consciousness, must be\nmaterially weakened, if not entirely neutralized, by a theory of\ndevelopment which traces the human lineage up through the monkeys and\nfishes to albumen impregnated by electricity, or, further still, to a\ndiffused Nebula or universal Fire-Mist,--we think that the Sensational\nand Materialistic speculations with which the work abounds have a\ntendency to weaken the evidence for a living, personal, spiritual God,\nas the Creator and Moral Governor of the world, and to diminish that\nreverence, confidence, and love, which these aspects of His character\nalone can inspire. The system of Epicurus, although it contained a\nformal recognition of a First Cause, has always been held to be\npractically atheistic, simply because it removed God from the active\nsuperintendence of the affairs of the world, and excluded the doctrine\nof a special providence and of a moral government. It was held, in the\nwords of Cicero, \"Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos,--re sustulisse.\"[56]\nAnd so, in \"The Vestiges,\" Natural Law is substituted for Supernatural\nInterposition, not only in the common course of Providence, but in the\nstupendous work of Creation itself.\n\n\nSECTION III.\n\nTHEORY OF _SOCIAL_ OR _HISTORICAL_ DEVELOPMENT.--AUGUSTE COMTE.\n\nIt might have been thought that the principle of Development had\nexhausted its powers, and achieved its highest triumphs, when it had\nbeen applied successively to account, first, for the creation of planets\nand astral systems, and, secondly, for the production of vegetable and\nanimal life; and that little could remain for it to do after it had\nsucceeded in tracing the genealogy of MAN back, in a direct line through\nmany generations, to the nebulous matter or luminous Fire-Mist which was\ndiffused at the beginning of time throughout the Universe. But, on a\nmore careful study of its last and highest product,--MAN, with his\nintellectual and moral nature, his religious beliefs, his social\nhistory, and his immortal hopes,--it seemed as if there were still some\nphenomena which remained to be accounted for, some facts of palpable\nreality and great magnitude which had not yet been adequately explained.\nThe mental faculties and their operations, the moral laws that are\nuniversally recognized and appealed to, the social institutions which\nhave been established, the religious beliefs and feelings which have\ngenerally prevailed, and the rites of worship which have been observed\nin all ages and climes, were so widely different from the phenomena of\nmere vegetable or animal life, that they seemed to demand a distinct\naccount of their origin; and it might not be apparent, at first sight,\nhow they could be reduced under the same all-pervading law by which the\nplanets were formed, so as to exclude all idea of Divine supernatural\ninterposition. This Herculean task was fearlessly undertaken, however,\nby M. AUGUSTE COMTE, and it has been elaborated with singular ability in\nhis ponderous work, the \"Cours de Philosophie Positive.\"\n\nM. Comte's Course of Positive Philosophy began to be delivered at Paris\nin the winter of 1829-30, and was completed in its published form in\n1842-43. It comprehends a general outline of all the branches of\nInductive Science, and of the relations which they bear to each other;\nand they are expounded in a style singularly copious, clear, and\nforcible. He has acquired, in consequence, a high reputation as a\nphilosophical thinker, and has already found, in our own country, some\nable allies, and not a few enthusiastic admirers. The \"System of Logic,\"\nby John Stuart Mill, and \"The Biographical History of Philosophy,\" by\nG. H. Lewes, are avowedly indebted to his speculations for some of their\nmost characteristic contents; while the outline of his theory has been\npresented to the more popular class of readers in England through the\ncolumns of \"The Leader,\" and in Scotland through those of \"The Glasgow\nMechanics' Journal.\"\n\nIt is not my intention, nor is it necessary for my present purpose, to\noffer any remarks on the strictly scientific portion of his voluminous\nwork. I shall confine myself exclusively to those speculations which\nbear, more or less directly, on the great cause of Natural and Revealed\nReligion, selecting them from all the various parts of his work, and\nexhibiting them, in one comprehensive view, as a compact theory of\nabsolute and avowed Atheism.\n\nThe fundamental idea of his system is a supposed \"law of the development\nof human thought,\" which regulates and determines the whole progress of\nthe species in the acquisition of knowledge. This law is announced with\nthe air of a man who has made a great discovery, and who is entitled, in\nconsequence, to be regarded both as an original thinker, and as a\nbenefactor to the world. \"I believe,\" he says, \"that I have discovered a\ngrand fundamental law,\"--\"the fundamental law of the development of the\nhuman mind;\" ... \"the grand law which I have indicated in the first part\nof my system of Positive Politics, ... where I have divulged, for the\nfirst time, the discovery of this law.\"[57] Now, what, it may be asked,\nis this marvellous discovery, which bids so fair both to immortalize its\nauthor and to enlighten the world? It is stated briefly in the _first_,\nand illustrated at greater length in the _fourth_ and following volumes\nof his work. The general outline of his theory is thus sketched: \"That\nlaw consists in this,--that each one of our leading conceptions, every\nbranch of our knowledge, passes successively through _three different\ntheoretic states_: the state theological or fictitious, the state\nmetaphysical or abstract, and the state scientific or positive. In other\nwords, the human mind, by its nature, employs successively, in each of\nits researches, three methods of philosophizing, whose character is\nessentially different, and even _radically opposed_: first, the\nTheological method; then, the Metaphysical; and, last of all, the\nPositive. Hence three systems of Philosophies, which _mutually exclude\neach other_. The first is the necessary starting-point of the human\nmind; the third is its fixed, ultimate state; the second is purely\nprovisional, and destined merely to serve as an intermediate stage.\"[58]\n\nThese are the _three_ great stages through which the collective mind of\nHumanity must necessarily pass in its progressive advancement towards a\nperfect knowledge of truth; but of these three, the _first_, or the\nTheological Epoch, is again subdivided, and exhibited as commencing with\nFetishism, then advancing to Polytheism, and finally consummated in\nMonotheism.\n\nFETISHISM is supposed to have been the first form of the Theological\nPhilosophy; and it is described as consisting in the ascription of a\nlife and intelligence essentially analogous to our own to every existing\nobject, of whatever kind, whether organic or inorganic, natural or\nartificial. It is traced to a primitive tendency, supposed to exist\nequally in man and in the lower animals, to conceive of all external\nobjects as animated, and to ascribe to them the same, or similar, powers\nand feelings with those which belong to the living tribes\nthemselves.[59] \"Let an infant, for example, or a savage, on the one\nhand, and, on the other hand, a dog or a monkey, behold a watch for the\nfirst time, there will doubtless be no immediate profound difference,\nunless in respect to the manner of representing it, between the\nspontaneous conception which will represent to the one and the other\nthat admirable product of human industry as a sort of veritable animal,\nhaving its own peculiar tastes and inclinations; whence results,\nconsequentially, in this respect, a Fetishism fundamentally common to\nboth, the former only having the exclusive privilege of being able\nultimately to get out of it.\" This instinctive and spontaneous\nbelief--the natural, and, indeed, the necessary result of a tendency\ninherent in living beings--is conceived to have been an indispensable\nand a most useful provision for the primeval state of man, and to have\nexerted a highly salutary influence on the progressive development of\nhuman thought. It is contrasted with the subsequent but more advanced\nstage of Polytheism;[60] and the latter is held to denote a spontaneous\nbelief in supernatural beings, distinct from and even independent of\nmatter, since it is passively subject to their will; while the former\nconsiders matter itself as animated, and has no idea of any higher or\nmore spiritual form of being. It is further supposed that idolatry,\nproperly so called, belongs to Fetishism only, and not at all to\nPolytheism, for this singular, but not very conclusive reason, among\nothers, that if Polytheism be justly chargeable with idolatry because it\nrecognizes many wills superior to Nature and having power over it,\nCatholicism would be equally liable to the same charge in respect of the\nhomage which it renders to saints and angels![61]\n\nBut Fetishism is only the initial step in the process of our\nintellectual development; and it passes into Polytheism, not suddenly\nand _per salium_, but slowly and gradually, through the intermediate\nstage of \"_Astrolatrie_,\" or the worship of the heavenly bodies. The\nmind is imperceptibly divested of the idea that everything around it is\nanimated, and, by a process of real, but as yet imperfect\ngeneralization, it rises from Fetishism to Polytheism; in which latter\nsystem of belief an order of powers superior to Nature is recognized,\nwhile as yet there is no conception of a supreme and all-perfect Mind.\nThe Polytheistic system, which prevailed so universally in the ancient\nworld, and which still prevails among Heathen nations, is supposed to\nhave been, not a _declension_ from a purer and better state, not a\n_corruption_ either of natural or revealed religion, but _a step in\nadvance_ of the primary faith of mankind, a result of growing\nintelligence, a vast and most beneficial change in the right direction.\nIt was the first great product of the metaphysical spirit, the result of\nan early but imperfect generalization; it constituted the principal era\nof the theological history of mankind; it was admirably adapted, and,\nindeed, indispensably necessary, to the exigencies of society at the\ntime when it prevailed; it was more intensely religious than Monotheism\nitself, since it brought man habitually into contact with a multitude of\ngods, whose symbols were always present and visible to the eye, while it\nexerted a wholesome influence on Science, on Poetry, on Industry, on\nMorals, and, indeed, on the whole process of man's mental and social\ndevelopment.[62]\n\nBut Polytheism, although indispensable and salutary as a provisional\nbelief, was not destined to be permanent; it was to be superseded in due\ntime, at least in the case of the _elite_ of humanity, by the higher and\nstill more abstract system of Monotheism, which is regarded as the\nnatural and inevitable product of human intelligence, independently of\nall supernatural teaching, at a certain stage of its development. But\nhere, as in the former instance, the change is not effected suddenly;\nthe human mind advances gradually from Polytheism to Monotheism, through\nthe intermediate stage of the idea of Immutability or Destiny,--an idea\nsuggested partly by the study of the invariable order of Nature, and\npartly by the irresistible domination of one great temporal power, such\nas the iron empire of Rome.[63] Historically, indeed, Monotheism is said\nto have spread in Europe through the Jews, who derived it from Egypt;\nbut it is added that, had there been no Jews, others would have given\nbirth to a system so necessary for the development of human thought. The\nprevalence of Monotheism, for a limited time, was useful, and even\nnecessary, as the natural result of the great law of human progress,\nand the indispensable precursor of a new and brighter era; but it was\ntemporary and provisional merely,--a stage in the onward march of\ndevelopment, not the ultimate landing-place of human thought. It is\nconceived to be radically incompatible with the recognition of\ninvariable natural laws, and even with the exercise of the industrial\narts.[64] It is, however, the last and highest form of the Theological\nPhilosophy; and, having reached this stage, the human mind necessarily\nadvances beyond it, until it arrives at a point where all theology\ndisappears, and where it is entirely and forever emancipated from all\nthe beliefs, the hopes, and the fears which have any reference to an\ninvisible spiritual world.\n\nThe ultimate goal of speculative thought is \"the Positive Philosophy,\"\nwhich treats only of the Facts of Nature, and of their cooerdination\nunder general laws, to the utter exclusion of all supernatural powers,\nand of all knowledge of causes, whether _efficient_ or _final_. But this\ngoal cannot be reached, it seems, by a sudden or abrupt transition from\nthe Theological to the Atheistic creed. There must be an intermediate\nstage,--the era, in short, of Metaphysics,--during which the process of\nCriticism will operate as a solvent on all previous beliefs, and by\nproducing Skepticism, in the first instance, in regard to all other\nsystems, will tend at length to concentrate the attention of mankind\nexclusively on the truths of Inductive Science. The Metaphysical\nPhilosophy is held to be the necessary, but temporary stage of\ntransition from the theological to the positive method in science. It is\ndestined to supersede the one, and to introduce the other. It is\nconceived to be equally at variance with both; and the era of its\nascendency is described as a critical, destructive, revolutionary age,\nuseful only as it delivers mankind from the shackles of former beliefs,\nand prepares them for the adoption of a new and purely natural system\nof thought. During this era of decomposition there will commence the\nreconstruction of human opinion on new and more solid foundations; and\nthe transition from Monotheism to Positive Science will be the greatest\nachievement of the race, greater far than the advancement from Fetishism\nto Polytheism, or even from Polytheism to Monotheism itself. The\nculminating point of human progress is absolute and universal\nAtheism.[65]\n\nSurely such a prospect may well arrest the most thoughtless, and prompt\nthem to inquire, with some measure of moral earnestness, What _is_ this\nPositive Philosophy, this ultimate landing-place of human thought, this\nfinal goal of human progress? Is it nothing else than the Inductive\nScience of Bacon, but under a new and less attractive name? or is it a\nphilosophy radically different from it, and entitled, therefore, to be\nregarded as an original method? The author tells us that he might have\ncalled it \"Natural Science,\" or \"the Philosophy of Nature,\" since it\ntreats of Facts and their Laws; but that he had been induced to prefer\nthe distinctive title of _positive_, as one better fitted to mark the\ncontrast between it and the _negative_ character of those metaphysical\nand theological systems which it is destined to supersede. And yet it\nwill be found that, in so far as it differs at all from the Inductive\nScience of Bacon, it is purely _negative_, since its chief\ncharacteristic is the negation of all Theology, and the entire exclusion\nfrom the domain of human knowledge, of Causes, whether efficient or\nfinal. It _adds_ nothing to the sum of human thought which might not be\nreached by Bacon's method; it only _subtracts_ whatever has reference to\nthe Divine and Supernatural, and especially everything connected with\nthe theory of Causation. It makes no new contribution to the general\nstock, unless, indeed, it be the hitherto unknown law of development\nwhich is supposed to regulate and determine the progress of humanity\nfrom primeval Fetishism to ultimate Atheism; and it takes away Theology,\nwith all its ennobling beliefs and blessed hopes, not by grappling with\nand solving, but by merely discarding the problem both of the origin and\nend of the world.\n\nThat this is a correct account of the new theory is evident from his own\nwords: \"The fundamental character of the Positive Philosophy is, to\nregard all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural _laws_, the\nprecise discovery of which, and their reduction to the least possible\nnumber, is the end of all our efforts; while we regard the investigation\nof what are called _causes_, whether first or final, as absolutely\n_inaccessible and void of sense for us_.\" ... \"We have no pretension to\nexpound the producing causes of the phenomena, for in that we can never\ndo more than push back the difficulty; we seek only to analyze with\nexactitude the circumstances of their production, and to connect them\nwith one another by the normal relations of _succession and\nsimilitude_.\"--\"In the positive state of science, the human mind,\nacknowledging the impossibility of obtaining absolute knowledge,\nabandons the search after the _origin and destination_ of the universe,\nand the knowledge of the secret _causes_ of phenomena.\"[66]\n\nIt is thus plainly announced that the Positive Philosophy is the science\nof facts and their laws, exclusive of all reference to causes, efficient\nor final; and it is even admitted that Theology could not be excluded,\nwere it deemed legitimate or possible for the human mind to investigate\nthe causes of phenomena.\n\nViewing the theory in this light, we submit the following remarks as a\nsufficient antidote to this daring but impotent attempt to exclude\nTheology from the domain of human knowledge.\n\n1. It is worthy of notice how completely the Infidel party have shifted\ntheir ground and changed their tactics since the era of the first French\nRevolution; and how utterly inconsistent are the arguments of M. Comte\nand the Positive School with those of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists.\nFormerly, Religion was wont to be ascribed to priestcraft; it was\nsupposed to have been invented by fraud, supported by falsehood, and\nprofessed in hypocrisy; and the Church, but especially the hierarchy of\nRome, was the object of incessant ridicule or malignant abuse. But now,\nReligion is discovered to be the natural, necessary, and salutary result\nof the legitimate action of the human faculties in the earlier stages of\ntheir development, the initial impellent of social progress, the\nindispensable condition of advancing civilization; and, on the broad,\ngeneral principle that sincerity of conviction is essential to\nwide-spread success, the theory which ascribes its origin to the fraud\nor the policy, whether of kings, or priests, or fanatics, is scouted as\na mere delirium of Voltaire, or as one of those revolutionary prejudices\nof his disastrous era which were alike irrational and injurious. And the\nChurch, so far from being ridiculed or maligned, is lauded above measure\nas the highest extant product of _human_ wisdom; Catholicism is even\npreferred to Christianity itself, as a manifest improvement on the more\nprimitive form of faith and worship; it is declared to be the\nindispensable basis of the future reorganization of society, which, when\nit shall have been freed from all theological influence, its only point\nof weakness, will still survive, with its separate speculative class,\nits imposing public forms, and its splendid hierarchy,--an Atheistic\nsociety, but still Catholic and One.[67] The change, in this respect,\nbetween the opinions which prevailed, respectively, at the era of the\n_first_ and that of the _second_ Revolution, is at once striking and\ninstructive. It shows how variable and vacillating is the wretched creed\nof Infidelity, and how the firm maintenance of truth will eventually\ncompel the homage, even where it may not succeed in carrying the\nconvictions, of speculative minds. That Religion in all its successive\nforms, from the rudest Fetishism up to the sublimest Christian\nMonotheism, has been the natural and genuine product of human\nintelligence, working ever onward and upward to a still higher stage of\ndevelopment,--that its existence was inevitable, and its influence, on\nthe whole, highly beneficial,--and that, even when it shall have passed\naway, society will still be largely indebted to it for the impulse, yet\nunspent, which it has imparted to the cause of civilization and\nprogress,--all this is admitted and even maintained by M. Comte, in\ndirect and often derisive opposition to the theorists who once ascribed\nits origin to fraud, and its prevalence to priestcraft; nay, he elevates\nit to the rank of a primordial and indispensable element of human\nprogress, a necessary and legitimate result of the great law of human\ndevelopment. We know of no parallel instance of a change of opinion so\ngreat and sudden, unless it be the marvellous transition of certain\nmodern Rationalists who were wont to ridicule the doctrine of the\nTrinity as absurd and incomprehensible, but who have now arrived at the\nconclusion that it is the fundamental law of human thought![68]\n\nStill, with all this outward homage to Religion, considered as a mere\nmatter of history, the theory of M. Comte is essentially and even\navowedly Atheistic. It is mainly designed to account for the origin of\nall Religion, whether Natural or Revealed, without having recourse to\nthe supposition either of the existence of God, or of his interposition\nat any time in the affairs of men. He seems to have proposed to himself\na twofold object: _first_, to account for the prevalence of the various\nforms of natural religion and superstition, without recognizing any\nvalid evidence for the existence of supernatural powers; and,\n_secondly_, to account for the origin of Judaism and Christianity, or,\nas he calls it, of Monotheism, without recognizing the reality of any\nDivine Revelation. And he attempts to accomplish _both_ objects by means\nof the same law--a law of development which, in primitive times,\nproduced Fetishism--which then produced Polytheism; then Monotheism;\nthen the Metaphysical transition era, during which all Theology is\nundergoing a process of disintegration and decay; and, last of all (the\nnoblest, because the latest, birth of time), the Positive Philosophy,\nunder whose predicted ascendancy all Theology must die and be buried in\neverlasting oblivion. His theory is not merely Anti-Protestant, although\nit is bitterly so;[69] nor merely Anti-Christian, as opposed to all\nRevelation; but it is Anti-Theological, as opposed to all Religion. It\nproposes to eliminate Theology from the scheme of our knowledge, by\nshowing that it is utterly inaccessible to our faculties, and neither\nnecessary to society nor useful to morals.[70] It anticipates the time,\nas being near at hand, when it shall have no existence, save on the\nhistoric page.\n\n2. This Atheistic theory rests entirely on a supposed discovery of M.\nComte,--the discovery of _a law of human development_, which serves at\nonce to account for the origin and prevalence of Theological beliefs in\nthe past, and to insure their utter disappearance in the future; a law\nwhich, like the magician's wand, can raise the apparition, and then lay\nit again! Now, of this law we affirm and undertake to prove that it is\n_utterly groundless_; that it has no solid basis of evidence on which it\ncan be established; that it is contradicted by the history of the\nworld, and opposed to our own experience at the present day.\n\nIt can scarcely be imagined that a man accustomed, as M. Comte has been,\nto the severe pursuits of Science, could give publicity to a law of this\nkind, and claim the credit of a great original discovery, without having\nsome plausible reasons to plead for it; and he does assign certain\nreasons for his belief, which are, it may be safely affirmed, as\nfrivolous and inconclusive as any that have ever been offered in support\nof the most baseless revery. They may be reduced to THREE; the _first_,\nderived from our cerebral organization; the _second_, from the history\nof a certain portion of our species; the _third_, from the analogy of\nour individual experience.[71]\n\nHe founds, in the first instance, on our _cerebral organization_. He is\nan ardent admirer of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, and has no scruple in\navowing himself a decided Materialist. It is unnecessary here to enter\non a discussion of Materialism, or even of Phrenology,--that will be\ndone hereafter; in the mean time it is enough merely to indicate the\nfact that the theory proceeds on that ground, and then to inquire _how\nthe fundamental law of Development is deduced from it_. How does the\ntheory of Materialism, or even of Phrenology, were it assumed on the one\nside and admitted on the other, contribute to the establishment or\nverification of that law? Suppose it to be conceded that every mental\nfaculty or propensity has a distinct cerebral organ, or, more generally,\nthat the brain may be divided into three parts, representing,\nrespectively, the animal propensities, the more elevated sentiments, and\nthe intellectual faculties; could it be rationally inferred from this\nconcession that human nature must necessarily develop itself after a\ncertain order or method, and especially in the precise way that is\nindicated in M. Comte's law? Would it prove that Man must needs pass,\nin the process of his mental and social development, through _three_\ndistinct and successive stages,--the preparatory Theological state, the\ntransitory Metaphysical state, and the final Positive state? Would it\nprove that Religion must first exist as Fetishism, then as Polytheism,\nthen as Monotheism, and thereafter disappear from the earth altogether\non the advent of M. Comte? He seems to think that there is a real\nconnection between the cerebral theory and his great fundamental law;\nbut it is not easy for a common reader to discern or to explain it.\nConsidering the cranium, according to what he conceives to be the true\nanatomical theory, as simply a prolongation of the vertebral\ncolumn,--the primitive centre of the whole nervous system,--he argues\nthat the functions, intellectual and emotional, which are proper to the\nupper and anterior parts of it, are less energetic than the animal\npropensities, whose organs lie in the lower and posterior region, just\nin proportion as they are further removed from the spine; and that, for\nthis reason, the latter must first come into action, then the\nintermediate organs of sentiment, and, last of all, the intellectual\npowers. And this doctrine he applies to the verification both of his\notherwise admirable classification of the Sciences, and of his far more\ndoubtful law of human development. We conceive that if it were\napplicable at all to the problem of human progress, it might possibly be\napplied to indicate the probable development of an _individual mind_, in\nthe successive stages of infancy, youth, and manhood; but that it does\nnot admit of the same application to _the history of the race_,\notherwise than by the aid of a very fanciful analogy. We have no faith\nin the _a priori_ methods of constructing the chart of human history,\nand tracing the necessary course of social progress, which have recently\nbecome so popular in Germany and France. We cannot, with M. Comte,\nundertake to solve the problem,--Given three lobes of the brain,\nrepresenting the propensities, affections, and intellectual powers, but\ndiffering from each other in size and situation, what will be the future\nhistory of the race,--religious, aesthetic, industrial, metaphysical,\nsocial? We cannot, with M. Cousin, undertake to solve the\nproblem,--Given three terms, the finite, the infinite, and the relation\nbetween the two, what will be the development of human thought, first,\nin the experience of individuals, and, secondly, in the history of\nsociety?[72] All such problems are too high for us. The history of the\nhuman race must be ascertained from the authentic records and extant\nmonuments of the past, not constructed by theories, or divined by _a\npriori_ speculations.\n\nBut M. Comte does appeal, in the second instance, to history in\nconfirmation of his views. He is far from affirming, however, that the\nprogress of the race, under the operation of his great law of\ndevelopment, has been either uniform or invariable; on the contrary, he\nadmits, with regard to India, China, and other nations, comprising\nprobably the majority of mankind, whose state, intellectually and\nsocially, has been stationary for ages, that they afford little or no\nevidence in support of his theory; and for this, among other reasons, he\nconfines himself to the history of what he calls the _elite_, or\nadvanced guard of humanity, and in this way makes it a very \"_abstract_\"\nhistory indeed![73] Beginning with Greece, as the representative of\nancient civilization, and surveying the history of the Roman empire, and\nof its successors in Western Europe, he endeavors to show that the\nactual progress of humanity has been, on the whole, in conformity with\nhis general law. He gives no historical evidence, however, of the\nprevalence of Fetishism in primitive times; _that_ is an inference\nmerely, depending partly on his theory of cerebral organization, and\npartly on the assumption that in the savage state, which is\ngratuitously supposed to have been the primitive condition of man,\nthere must have been a tendency to regard every object, natural or\nartificial, as endowed with life and intelligence. Polytheism, again, he\nconceives to have been a step in advance, an improvement on the\npreexisting state of things, instead of being, as it really was, a\ndeclension from a purer and better faith, an aberration from the light\nof Nature, not less than from the lessons of Revelation. He conceives\nMonotheism, whether as taught, to the Jews by Moses, or to the world at\nlarge by Christ and his apostles, to have been the natural product of\nman's unaided intelligence; and he assumes this, without making a single\nreference to the supernatural events by which its publication, in either\ninstance, is said to have been accompanied, or to the sacred books in\nwhich they are recorded; nay, he does not even name the Founder of the\nChristian faith, otherwise than by describing him as \"the founder, real\nor imaginary, of this great religious system.\"[74]\n\nIn treating, again, of the Critical or destructive system of\nMetaphysics, and of the Positive or reconstructive system of the New\nPhilosophy, he adduces no evidence to show that _the same element_ is\nnegatived by the one and restored by the other; on the contrary, were\nhis statement true in all respects, it would only serve to prove that\nthe Theological element, which is slowly dissipated by Metaphysics, is\nformally and finally abjured by Positivism. He assumes and asserts, on\nvery insufficient grounds, that there is a real, radical, and necessary\ncontrariety between the facts and laws of Science and the first\nprinciples of Theology, whether natural or revealed; and he anticipates,\ntherefore, that in proportion as Science advances, Theology must recede,\nand ultimately quit the field. He ought to have known that there are\nminds in every part of Europe as thoroughly scientific as his own, and\nas deeply imbued with the spirit of modern Inductive Philosophy, who,\nso far from seeing any discordance between the results of scientific\ninquiry and the fundamental truths of Theology, are in the habit of\nappealing to the former in proof or illustration of the latter; and who,\nthe further they advance in the study of the works of Nature, are only\nthe more confirmed in their belief of a Creative Intelligence and a\nGoverning Power. It may be that, in his own immediate circle at Paris,\nthere is a tendency towards Atheism; but, assuredly, no such tendency\nexists in the highest and most scientific minds of modern Europe. The\nfaith of Bacon, Newton, and Boyle, of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Pascal,\nin regard to the first principles of Theology, is still the prevailing\ncreed of the Sedgwicks, the Whewells, the Herschells, and the Brewsters\nof the present day.\n\nThe only plausible part of his Historical Survey, and that which, in our\napprehension, is the most likely to make some transient impression on\nthe popular mind, is his elaborate attempt to show, with regard to each\nbranch of Science, in detail, that it was enveloped during its infancy\nin a cloud of superstition; and that just in proportion as the light\nshone more clearly, or was more distinctly discerned, the cloud was\ngradually dissipated and dispersed, until, one after another, they were\nall emancipated from their supposed connection with supernatural causes,\nand reduced under fixed natural laws. Confounding Theology with\nSuperstition, or failing, at least, to discriminate duly between the\ntwo, M. Comte draws a vivid picture of the successive inroads which\nScience has made on the consecrated domain of Religion, and represents\nthe one as receding just in proportion as the other advances. For as the\ndarkness disappears before the rising sun, whose earliest rays gild only\nthe loftier mountain peaks, but whose growing brightness spreads over\nthe lowly valleys and penetrates the deepest recesses of nature, so\nTheology gradually retires before the advance of Science, which first\nconquers and brings under the rule of natural law the simplest and\nleast complicated branches, such as Mechanics and Astronomy; then\nattacks the more complex, such as Chemistry and Physiology; and, last of\nall, advances to the assault of the most difficult, such as Ethics and\nSociology; until, having emancipated each of them successively from\ntheir previous connection with supernatural beliefs, it effects the\nentire elimination of Theology, first from the philosophic, and\nafterwards from the popular creed of mankind. M. Comte conceives that\nthe religious spirit has been steadily decreasing throughout the whole\ncourse of human development, from the time when it was universal, in the\nform of Fetishism, till it reached its most abstract, but least\ninfluential form in Monotheism; and that now the period of its decline\nand fall has arrived, when it is subjected to the powerful solvent of a\nMetaphysical and Skeptical Philosophy, and when its ultimate extinction\nis certain under the action of Positive Science.\n\nWe deem this by far the most dangerous, because it is the most plausible\npart of his speculations; so plausible that, even where his reasonings\nin support of it may fail to carry the full conviction of the\nunderstanding, they may yet leave behind them a certain impression\nunfavorable to faith in Divine things, since they appeal to many\npalpable facts in the history of Science, too well attested to be\ndoubted, and too important to be overlooked. The theory itself--whatever\nmay be thought of the peculiar form which it has assumed in the hands of\nM. Comte--cannot be regarded, in its main and essential features, as one\nof his original discoveries; for the general idea on which it rests had\nbeen announced with equal brevity and precision by the celebrated LA\nPLACE: \"Let us survey the history of the progress of the human mind and\nof its errors; we shall there see _final causes constantly pushed back\nto the boundaries of its knowledge_. These causes, which Newton pushed\nback to the limits of the solar system, were, even in his time, placed\nin the atmosphere to explain meteoric appearances. They are nothing\nelse, therefore, in the eyes of a philosopher, than _the expression of\nour ignorance of the true causes_.\" Supposing this to be a correct\naccount of the fact, the inference which M. Comte deduces from it might\nseem to follow very much as a matter of course,--the inference, viz.,\nthat in proportion as Science advances and succeeds in subjecting one\ndepartment of Nature after another to fixed and invariable laws,\nTheology, or the doctrine of Final Causes, must necessarily recede\nbefore it, and, at length, disappear altogether, when human knowledge\nhas reached its highest ultimate perfection. But is it a correct account\nof the fact? Is it true that the doctrine of Final Causes is less\ngenerally admitted, or more dubiously maintained, in regard to those\nsciences which have already reached their maturity, than in regard to\nthose other sciences which are still comparatively in their infancy? Or\nis it true that it has lost instead of gaining ground by the progress of\nscientific discovery, so as to occupy a narrower space and to hold a\nmore precarious footing, _now_, than it did in the earlier ages of\nignorance and superstition? Did Final Causes disappear from the view of\nNewton when he discovered the law which regulates the movements of the\nheavenly bodies? Did Galen or did Paley discard them when they surveyed\nthe human frame in the light of scientific anatomy? or Harvey, when,\nimpelled and guided by this doctrine as his governing principle, he\ndiscovered the circulation of the blood? In what departments of Nature,\nand in what branches of Science, does the Theistic philosopher or the\nChristian divine find the clearest and strongest proofs of order,\nadaptation, and adjustment? Is it not in those very departments of\nNature whose laws have been most fully ascertained? in those very\nbranches of Science which have been most thoroughly matured? Did we\nbelieve Comte and La Place, we should expect to find that the doctrine\nof Final Causes and the science of Theology could now find no footing in\nthe domain of Astronomy, of Physics, or of Chemistry, since in these\ndepartments the phenomena have been reduced, by many successive\ndiscoveries, to rigorous general laws; and that they could only survive\nfor a brief time by taking refuge in the yet unconquered territory of\nMeteorology, Biology, and Social Science. But is it so? Examine the\nSeries of Bridgewater Treatises, or any other recent philosophical\nexposition of the Evidence of Natural Theology, and it will be apparent,\non the most cursory review, that in point of fact the arguments and\nillustrations are derived almost entirely from _the more advanced\nsciences_; and that, so far from receding or threatening to disappear,\nFinal Causes have only become more prominent and more striking in\nproportion as inquiring men have succeeded in removing the vail from any\ndepartment of Nature.\n\nIt were easy, indeed, to cull from the records of the past many facts\nwhich might seem to give a plausible aspect to the theory of M. Comte.\nWe might be told of the early history of Astronomy, when the astrologer\ngazed upon the heavens with a superstitious eye, and spoke of the mystic\ninfluence of the planets, and constructed the horoscope for the\ncalculation of nativities and the prediction of future events. We might\nbe told of the early history of Anatomy, when, from the entrails of\nbirds and animals, the _haruspex_ prognosticated the fate of empires and\nthe fortunes of battle. We might be told of the early history of\nChemistry, when alchemists sought in their concoctions a panacea for all\nhuman evils, and in their crucibles an alkalest or universal menstruum.\nWe might be told of the early history of Zooelogy, when the augur watched\nthe flight, the singing, the feeding of birds, and applied them to the\npurposes of divination. We might be told of Aeromancy as the earliest\nform of Meteorology, and of Geomancy as the earliest form of\nGeology.[75] And we might be told of the popular superstitions which\nlingered, till a very recent period, among the peasantry of our own\ncountry, and which are now gradually disappearing in proportion as the\nlight of Religion and Science is diffused.[76] These facts, which appear\non the surface of human history, do unquestionably prove that _there has\nbeen a process of gradual advancement_, by which each of the sciences\nhas been, in succession, purged of its earlier errors, and placed on a\nmore solid and enduring basis. But they prove nothing more than this:\nthey do _not_ prove that these sciences must ultimately supersede\nTheology, or that they have a necessary tendency towards Atheism. On the\ncontrary, we hold that they afford a valid presumption from analogy on\nthe other side. For suppose, even, that Religion, following the same law\nof development which determines the progress of every other branch of\nhuman knowledge, had become incorporated, in its earlier stages, with\nmany fond and foolish superstitions, the analogy of the other sciences\nwould lead us to conclude that, just as the reveries of Astrology had\npassed away and given place to a solid system of Astronomy,--and as the\nvain speculations of Alchemy had been superseded by the useful\ndiscoveries of Chemistry,--and as the arts of Augury and Divination had\nfinally issued in the inductive science of true Natural History,--so\nTheology might also purge itself from the fond conceits which had been\nfor a time incorporated with it, and still survive, after all\nsuperstition had passed away, as a sound and fruitful branch of the tree\nof knowledge.\n\nThis is not the precise light, however, in which M. Comte regards\nTheology, He does not speak of it as _a distinct and independent\nscience_, but rather as _a method of Philosophy_, which has been applied\nto the explanation of _all_ the departments of Nature; and, viewed in\nthis light, he objects to it on the ground that Positive Science\nperemptorily demands the elimination of all causes, efficient and final,\nand, consequently, the exclusion of all reference to God, or to any\nsupernatural power, in connection with the laws either of the material\nor moral world. This is the fundamental basis of his theory. It is\nassumed that the recognition of natural laws is incompatible with the\nbelief in supernatural powers, and that these laws must be invariable\nand independent of any superior will. Hence the supposed antagonism\nbetween Theology and Physical Science, which is strongly affirmed by M.\nComte[77]; as if the laws of Nature could not exist unless they were\nindependent of the Divine will, or as if the arts of industry could not\nbe pursued, on the supposition of a Providence, without sacrilegious\npresumption. The laws for which he contends must have had no author to\nestablish, and can have no superior will to control them; they had no\nbeginning, and can have no end; they cannot be reversed, suspended, or\ninterfered with; they are necessary, immutable, and eternal, not\nsubordinate to God, but independent of Him; they are, in short, nothing\nless than Destiny or Fate, the same that Cudworth describes as the\nDemocritic, Physiological, or Atheistic Fate, which consists in \"the\nmaterial necessity of all things without a God.\"[78] Now, we have no\njealousy of natural laws. We believe in their existence; we believe,\nalso, in their regular operation in the ordinary course of Nature; but\nwe deny that they must needs be _independent_ of a supreme will, and\naffirm that, being subordinate to that will, they are not necessarily\n_invariable_. They are expressly recognized and cordially maintained by\ndivines, not less than by men of science; but in such a sense as to be\nperfectly compatible both with the doctrine of a primitive creation, and\nalso with the possibility of a subsequent miraculous interposition. The\nWestminster Divines explicitly declare that \"God, the First Cause, by\nHis providence, ordereth all things to fall out _according to the nature\nof second causes_, either necessarily, freely, or contingently;\" and\nthat \"in His ordinary providence, He maketh use of means, but is free to\nact without, above, and against them at His pleasure.\"[79] But M. Comte\nwill have no laws, however regular, unless they be also invariable, and\nindependent of any superior will. And, doubtless, if this were the sense\nin which Science has established the doctrine of natural laws, it would\nbe at direct variance with Theology, both Natural and Revealed; and the\nantagonism between the two might afford some ground for the belief that,\nsooner or later, Theology must quit the field. But it is not the\nexistence of these natural laws, nor even their regular operation in the\ncommon course of Providence, that is hostile to our religious\nbeliefs,--it is only the supposition that they are unoriginated,\nindependent, and invariable; and to assume this without proof, as if it\nwere a self-evident or axiomatic truth, or to apply it in a process of\nhistorical deduction respecting either the past development or the\nfuture prospects of the race, is such a shameless begging of the whole\nquestion,--that we know of no parallel to it except in the kindred\nspeculations of Strauss, who assumes the same radical principle, and\ngravely tells us that whatever is supernatural must needs be\nunhistorical.[80]\n\nThere is absolutely no evidence, properly historical, that there is any\nnecessary tendency in the recognition of established natural laws to\nsupersede Theology, or to introduce an era of universal Atheism. Some\nsuch tendency might exist were these laws conceived of as necessary,\nindependent, and invariable. But this hypothesis, equally\nunphilosophical and irreligious, is not and never has been maintained\nby the great body of Inductive inquirers, who see no contradiction\neither between the established order of Nature and the supposition of\nits Divine origin, or between the operation of natural laws and the\nrecognition of a supreme, superintending Providence. Nor should it be\nforgotten, in this connection, that the evidence in favor of Theism\ndepends not so much on _the mere laws_ as on _the dispositions and\nadjustments_ that are observable in Nature.[81] There is, therefore, no\nhistorical proof to establish the supposed law of human development, and\nno rational ground to expect that the progress of Inductive Science will\never supplant or supersede Theology. It is true that Theology, although\na distinct and independent science, is so comprehensive in its range\nthat it gathers its proofs and illustrations from _every_ department of\nNature, and that, were it excluded from any one of these, it might, for\nthe same reason, be excluded from all the rest; but it is not true that\nthere is any real or necessary antagonism between the laws of Nature and\nthe prerogatives of God. On the contrary, let our knowledge advance\nuntil _all_ the phenomena both of the Material and Moral worlds shall be\nreduced under so many general laws, even then Superstition might\ndisappear, but Theology would remain, and would only receive fresh\naccessions of evidence and strength, in proportion as the wise order of\nNature is more fully unfolded, and its most hidden mysteries disclosed.\n\nWe scarcely know whether it is needful to advert at all to the argument\nin favor of his theory which M. Comte founds on _the analogy of\nindividual experience_. It is a transparent fallacy. He tells us that\nthe race is, like an individual man, Religious in infancy, Metaphysical\nin youth, and Positive--that is, Scientific, without being Religious--in\nmature manhood.[82] Now, this analogical argument, to have any\nlegitimate weight, must proceed on the assumption of two facts. The\nfirst is, that the law of individual development commences, in the case,\nat least, of all who belong to the _elite_ of humanity, with Theology,\nand terminates in Atheism; and the second is, that the individual is, in\nthis respect, the type or pattern of his race, and that the experience\nof the one is only an outline in miniature of the history of the other.\nIt would be difficult, we think, to establish the truth of either of\nthese positions by evidence that could be satisfactory to any reflecting\nmind. We cannot doubt, indeed, for experience amply attests, that the\nreligious sensibilities of childhood have often been sadly impaired in\nthe progress from youth to manhood, and that, after the tumultuous\nexcitements, whether of speculation or of passion, not a few have sought\na refuge from their fears in the cold negations of Atheism. But is this\nthe law of development and progress? Is it a law that is uniform and\ninvariable in its operation? Are there no instances of an opposite kind?\nAre there no instances of men whose early religious culture had been\nneglected, and who passed through youth without one serious thought of\nGod and their relation to Him, but who, as they advanced in years, began\nto reflect and inquire, and ultimately attained to a firm religious\nfaith? If such diversities of individual experience are known to exist,\nthen clearly the result is not determined by any necessary or invariable\nlaw of intellectual development; but must be ascribed to other causes,\nchiefly of a moral and practical kind, which exert a powerful influence,\nfor good or evil, on every human mind. Montaigne speaks of an error\nmaintained by Plato, \"that children and old people were most susceptible\nof Religion, as if it sprung and derived its credit from our\nweakness.\"[83] And we find M. Comte himself complaining, somewhat\nbitterly, that his _quondam_ friend, the celebrated St. Simon, had\nexhibited, as he advanced in years (_cette tendance banale vers une\nvague religiosite_), a tendency towards something like Religion.[84]\nCases of this kind are utterly fatal to his supposed law of individual\ndevelopment, and they must be equally fatal to his theory of the\nprogress of the human race.\n\nHitherto we have considered merely the reasons which M. Comte urges in\nsupport of his theory, and have endeavored to show that they are utterly\nincapable of establishing it as a valid scientific doctrine. It may be\nuseful, however, to advert, in conclusion, to some considerations which\nafford decisive objections against it, arising from the testimony of\nauthentic history and the plainest principles of reason.\n\nIn so far as the testimony of history and tradition is concerned,\nnothing can be more certain than that the progress of the race has\nfollowed a very different course from that which M. Comte has traced out\nfor it by his grand fundamental law. The theory of a primitive state of\nignorance and barbarism, in which a rude Theology existed, in the form\nof Fetishism, is opposed not more to the authority of Scripture, the\nearliest record of our race, than to the unanimous voice of antiquity,\nwhich attests the general belief of mankind in a primeval state of light\nand innocence. There is a sad but striking contrast between the views\nwhich are generally held by the Christian Theist, and those which are\navowed by M. Comte on this subject. The Christian Theist admits the\ndoctrine of a primeval Revelation and a pristine state of purity and\npeace; M. Comte maintains the doctrine of a primitive barbarism and a\nnatural aboriginal Superstition. The Christian Theist believes in a fall\nsubsequent to the creation of man, and ascribes the ignorance and error,\nthe superstition and idolatry which ensued, to the perversion and abuse\nof his intellectual and moral powers; M. Comte affirms that man did not\n_fall_, that he did actually _rise_ by a process of slow but\nprogressive self-elevation, and that, in _advancing_ from Fetishism to\nPolytheism, and from Polytheism to Monotheism, and from Monotheism to\nAtheism, he has all along been determined by the law of his normal\ndevelopment. In the view of the Christian Theist, Revelation was the sun\nwhich shed its cheering rays on the first fathers of mankind, and which,\nafter having been obscured, for a time, by the clouds and darkness of\nSuperstition, shines out again, clear and strong, under the dispensation\nof the Gospel; in the view of M. Comte, Science is the only sun that is\ndestined to enlighten the world,--a sun which has not yet fully risen,\nbut which has sent before, as the harbingers of its speedy advent, a few\nscattered rays to gild the lofty mountain peaks, while all beneath is\nstill buried in Cimmerian darkness. The Christian Theist anticipates the\ntime when the true light which now shineth shall cover the whole earth;\nM. Comte predicts its utter and final extinction, when Positive Science\nshall have risen into the ascendant. His theory is contradicted by the\nhistory of the past; let us hope that the events of the future will\nequally belie his prediction. For Christianity is the only hope of the\nworld. The prospects of man would be dark indeed on the supposition of\nits being abolished. \"There might remain among a few of the more\nenlightened some occasional glimpses of religious truth, as we find to\nhave been the case in the Pagan world; but the degradation of the great\nmass of the people to that ignorance, and idolatry, and superstition,\nout of which the Gospel had emancipated them, would be certain and\ncomplete. This retrograde movement might be retarded by the advantages\nwhich we have derived from that system, whose influence we should\ncontinue to feel long after we had ceased to acknowledge the divinity of\nits source. But these advantages would by degrees lose their efficacy,\neven as mere matters of speculation, and give place to the workings of\nfancy, and credulity, and corruption. A radiance might still glow on\nthe high places of the earth after the sun of Revelation had gone down;\nand the brighter and the longer it had shone, the more gradual would be\nthe decay of that light and warmth which it had left behind it. But\nevery where there would be the sad tokens of a departed glory and of a\ncoming night. Twilight might be protracted through the course of many\ngenerations, and still our unhappy race might be able to read, though\ndimly, many of the wonders of the eternal Godhead, and to wind a dubious\nway through the perils of the wilderness. But it would be twilight\nstill; shade would thicken after shade; every succeeding age would come\nwrapped in a deeper and a deeper gloom; till, at last, that flood of\nglory which the Gospel is now pouring upon the world would be lost and\nburied in impenetrable darkness.\"[85]\n\nM. Comte's theory is liable to another objection, the force of which he\nseems, in some measure, although inadequately, to have felt and\nacknowledged. The three states or stages, which he describes as\nnecessarily _successive_, are, in point of fact, _simultaneous_. They do\nnot mark so many different eras in the course of human progress,--they\ndenote the natural products of man's intelligence, the constituent\nelements of his knowledge in _all_ states of society. The Theological,\nthe Metaphysical, and the Scientific elements have always coexisted.\nDiverse as they may be in other respects, they resemble each other in\nthis,--they are all the natural and spontaneous products of man's\nintelligent activity. That they were, to a certain extent,\n_simultaneous_ at first, and that they are _simultaneous_ still, is\nactually admitted by M. Comte, while he conceives, nevertheless, that\nthey are radically incompatible with each other;[86] and their\ncoexistence hitherto is felt by him to be a serious objection to his\nfundamental law, which represents them not only as _necessarily\nsuccessive_, but also as _mutually exclusive_. The fact is admitted, and\nthat fact is fatal to his whole theory. For if the three methods have\ncoexisted hitherto, why may they not equally coexist hereafter? And what\nground is left for the reckless prediction that Theology is doomed, and\n_must_ fall before the onward march of Positive Science? If man was able\nfrom the beginning to observe, to compare, to abstract, and to\ngeneralize, and if the fundamental laws of human thought have been ever\nthe same, it follows that there must have been a tendency, coeval with\nthe origin of the race, towards Theological, Metaphysical, and Inductive\nSpeculation, and that the same tendency must continue as long as his\npowers remain unchanged. It can only, therefore, be a _preponderance_,\nmore or less complete, of one of the three methods over the other two,\nthat we should be warranted in expecting, _even under the operation of\nM. Comte's favorite law_; and yet he boldly proclaims the utter\nexclusion of Metaphysics, and the entire and everlasting elimination of\nTheology, as branches of human knowledge!\n\nM. Comte's theory is still more vulnerable at another point. The\nfundamental assumption on which it is based is utterly groundless. It\namounts to this, that all knowledge of causes, whether efficient or\nfinal, is interdicted to man, and incapable of being reached by any\nexertion of his faculties.[87] He tells us that Theology is impossible,\nfor this reason, that, in the view of the Positive Philosophy, all\nknowledge of causes is absolutely excluded; nay, he admits that Theology\nis inevitable if we inquire into causes at all. We know of no simpler or\nmore effectual method of dealing with his specious sophistry on this\nsubject, than by showing that, if his general principle be conclusive\nagainst the knowledge of God, it is equally conclusive against the\nknowledge of any other being or cause; just as Sir James Mackintosh\ndealt with the skeptical philosophy of Hume, when, with admirable\npractical sagacity, he said: \"As those dictates of experience which\nregulate conduct must be the objects of belief, all objections which\nattack them, in common with the principles of reasoning, must be utterly\nineffectual. Whatever attacks every principle of belief, can destroy\nnone. As long as the foundations of knowledge are allowed to remain on\nthe same level with the maxims of life, the whole system of human\nconviction must continue undisturbed.... Skepticism has practical\nconsequences of a very mischievous nature. This is because its\n_universality_ is not steadily kept in view and constantly borne in\nmind. If it were, the above short and plain remark would be an effectual\nantidote to the poison. But, in practice, it is an armory from which\nweapons are taken to be employed against _some_ opinions, while it is\nhidden from notice that the same weapons would equally cut down _every\nother_ conviction. It is thus that Mr. Hume's _theory of causation_ is\nused as an answer to arguments for the existence of the Deity, without\nwarning the reader that it would equally lead him to expect--that _the\nsun will not rise to-morrow_.\"[88]\n\nThe exclusion of all knowledge of causes is so indispensable to M.\nComte's theory that he admits \"the inevitable tendency of our\nintelligence towards a philosophy radically Theological, as often as we\nseek to penetrate, on whatever pretext, into the intimate nature of the\nphenomena.\"[89] The exclusion of such knowledge would, of course, be\nfatal to Theology, since, without taking some account of causes,\nefficient and final, we cannot rise to God as the author of the\nuniverse. But did it never occur to M. Comte that the self-same\nprinciple may possibly be destructive of his present, or, at least, of\nhis posthumous fame, as the author of the Positive Philosophy? For, if\nwe can know nothing of _efficient causes_, in what sense, or on what\nground, shall any one presume to ascribe the authorship of this system\nto M. Comte? True, it may be said,--Here is an effect which exhibits\nmanifest signs of intelligence, order, and scientific skill; its parts\nare regularly adjusted and all directed to a common end; and, reasoning\nafter the _teleological_ method, we must infer that it proceeded from a\nvery clever, but somewhat eccentric mind; but, unfortunately, _final\ncauses_ are as expressly interdicted as efficient ones; and, on the\nprinciples of his own theory, the \"Course of Positive Philosophy\" can\nnever be warrantably ascribed to the authorship of M. Comte.\n\nA still more serious objection to M. Comte's theory respecting the law\nof human development arises from the false view which it exhibits of\n_the nature and history of Truth_, considered as the object of human\nknowledge. It is a favorite opinion with him, that man can have no\n_absolute_ knowledge; that truth is not fixed, but fluctuating; that\nwhat was believed in one age, and believed _necessarily_, according to\nthe fundamental laws of thought, is as necessarily disbelieved in the\nnext; and that there is no standard of truth at any time better or surer\nthan the public opinion, or general consent, of the most advanced\nclasses of society.[90] This theory of Truth, as necessarily mobile and\nfluctuating, has a tendency, we think, to engender universal skepticism,\neven when it is stated, with various important modifications, by such\nwriters as Lamennais and Morell; but, in the hands of M. Comte, it\nbecomes more dangerous still, since it represents the human race as\nhaving been from the beginning, through a long series of ages, subject\nto a law of development which not only _permitted_, but actually\n_compelled_ them to believe a lie; and thus casts a dark shade of\nsuspicion both on the constitution of man and on the government of God.\n\nSuch a theory would seem also to preclude all rational calculations\nrespecting the future progress and prospects of the race. For what\nground can exist for any prognostication in regard to the ulterior\nadvancement or ultimate destiny of man, if it be true that, in his past\nhistory, Fetishism has passed into Polytheism, and Polytheism into\nMonotheism, without any extraneous instruction, and by the mere action\nof those inherent laws to which humanity is subject? And, still more, if\nit be further true that even now the human mind is in a state of\ntransition, passing through the crisis of Metaphysical doubt towards the\ngoal of Positive Atheism, who shall assure us that this will be its last\nand final metamorphosis? It does appear to us to be one of the most\nsingular and perplexing anomalies of his elaborate system, that he can\ndogmatize so confidently on the _terminus ad quem_ of human progress,\nwhen from the _terminus a quo_ there has been, according to his own\naccount, a series of variations so wonderful, and a succession of states\nso diverse and opposite, as those which he describes. And yet he\npronounces oracularly that Positive Science is the ultimate\nlanding-place of human thought, and that universal Atheism is the final\nbarrier which must needs close and terminate the long series of\ndevelopments.\n\nWe have spoken sternly of his system; we have no wish to speak harshly\nof the man. Had we any disposition to do so, there is more than enough\nin the personal explanation, prefixed to the closing volume of his work,\neffectually to disarm us. We have too much sympathy with the trials of a\nvigorous but eccentric mind, struggling in untoward circumstances, and\nagainst an adverse tide, to maintain a position of honorable\nindependence, to say a word that could wound the feelings or injure the\nprospects of a man of science. But it is not unkind to add that his life\nmight have been a more prosperous one had he devoted himself to the\npursuits of Science, without assailing the truths of Religion; and that\nhis fame would have been at once more extensive and more enduring had it\nbeen left to repose on his Classification or Hierarchy of the Sciences,\nwithout being associated with the more doubtful merits of his\nfundamental law of Man's Development.\n\n\nSECTION IV.\n\nTHEORY OF _ECCLESIASTICAL_ DEVELOPMENT.--J. H. NEWMAN.\n\nThis particular phase of the general theory bears less directly on the\nsubject of our present inquiry than either of the _three_ which have\nalready passed under review, and yet it has recently been applied in\nsuch a way as may entitle it to a passing notice.\n\nFor while the theory of Ecclesiastical Development has a _direct_\nrelation only to the question in regard to the Rule of Faith, it has\nalso an _indirect_ or _collateral_ relation to the truths of Natural as\nwell as of Revealed Religion; and this relation demands for it,\nespecially in the existing state of theological speculation, the earnest\nattention of all who are concerned for the maintenance even of the\nsimplest and most elementary articles of Divine truth.\n\nThe most elaborate and systematic exposition of this theory is exhibited\nin the \"Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, by JOHN HENRY\nNEWMAN;\" an Essay primarily directed to the discussion of the points of\ndifference between the Popish and the Protestant Churches, but which\nwill be found to have an important bearing, also, on some doctrines\nwhich are common to both, and especially on the fundamental articles of\nNatural Religion itself.\n\nIt is thus stated by Mr. Newman:[91] \"That the increase and expansion of\nthe Christian Creed and Ritual, and the variations which have attended\nthe process in the case of individual writers and churches, are the\nnecessary attendants on any philosophy or polity which takes possession\nof the intellect and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion;\nthat, from the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full\ncomprehension and perfection of great ideas; and that the highest and\nmost wonderful truths, though communicated to the world once for all by\ninspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at once by the\nrecipients, but, as received and transmitted by minds not inspired, and\nthrough media which were human, have required only the longer time and\ndeeper thought for their full elucidation. This may be called _the\nTheory of Developments_.\"\n\nIt is further illustrated as follows: \"It is sometimes said that the\nstream is clearest near the spring. Whatever use may fairly be made of\nthis image, it does not apply to the history of a philosophy or sect,\nwhich, on the contrary, is more equable, and purer, and stronger, when\nits bed has become deep, and broad, and full. It necessarily rises out\nof an existing state of things, and, for a time, savors of the soil. Its\nvital element needs disengaging from what is foreign and temporary, and\nis employed in efforts after freedom, more vigorous and hopeful as its\nyears increase. Its beginnings are no measures of its capabilities, nor\nof its scope. At first, no one knows what it is, or what it is worth. It\nremains, perhaps, for a time, quiescent; it tries, as it were, its\nlimbs, and proves the ground under it, and feels its way. From time to\ntime it makes essays which fail, and are, in consequence, abandoned. It\nseems in suspense which way to go; it wavers, and, at length, strikes\nout in one definite direction. In time it enters upon strange territory;\npoints of controversy alter their bearing; parties rise and fall about\nit; dangers and hopes appear in new relations, and old principles\nreappear under new forms; it changes with them, in order to remain the\nsame. In a higher world it is otherwise; but here below _to live is to\nchange, and to be perfect is to have changed often_.\"[92]\n\nIn answer to the objection, \"that inspired documents, such as the Holy\nScriptures, at once determine the doctrines which we should believe,\" it\nis replied, \"that they were intended to create an idea, and that idea is\nnot in the sacred text, but in the mind of the reader; and the question\nis, whether that idea is communicated to him, in its completeness and\nminute accuracy, on its first apprehension, or expands in his heart and\nintellect, and comes to perfection in the course of time. Nor could it\nbe maintained without extravagance that the letter of the New Testament,\nor of any assignable number of books, comprises a delineation of all\npossible forms which a Divine message will assume when submitted to a\nmultitude of minds.\"[93]\n\nWhat relation, it may be asked, can this theory respecting the\ndevelopment of revealed or Christian truth bear to the question of the\nbeing and perfections of God? We answer, that it is founded on a general\nphilosophical principle which may affect the truths of natural as well\nas those of revealed Religion; and that it is applied in such a way as\nto show that, as it has already led to the worship of angels and saints,\nso it may hereafter issue in the deification of Nature, which is\nPantheism, or in the separate worship of its component parts, which is\nPolytheism; and, in either case, the personality and supremacy of the\none only, the living and the true God, would be effectually superseded,\nif not explicitly denied.\n\nBut, is there any real danger of such a disastrous consummation? We\nanswer, that the mere coexistence of the theory of Ecclesiastical\nDevelopment with the infidel speculations on the doctrine of Human\nProgress is of itself an ominous symptom; and, further, that the mutual\ninterchange of complimentary acknowledgments between the Infidel and\nPopish parties is another, especially when both are found to coincide in\nsome of the main grounds of their opposition to Scripture as the supreme\nrule of faith, and when the homage which the advocates of Development\nrender to the theory of progress is responded to by glowing eulogiums\nfrom the infidel camp on the genius of Catholicism as the masterpiece of\nhuman policy. But there are other grounds of apprehension, arising more\ndirectly out of the very nature of the theory of Development itself.\n\nThat theory has been described by Dr. Brownson--himself a convert to\nCatholicism--as the product of \"a _school_ formed, at first, outside of\nthe Church, but now brought within her communion,\" and compared, in\nregard to its dangerousness, with the speculations of Hermes and\nLamennais.[94] And a still more competent judge--Professor Sedgwick, of\nCambridge[95]--has characterized it as \"a monstrous compound of Popery\nand Pantheism,\" according to which \"the Catholic faith is not a religion\nrevealed to us in the Sacred Books we call canonical, and in the works\nof the Fathers which are supposed to contain the oral traditions of the\nApostles and their followers; but a new Pantheistic element is to be\nfastened on the faith of men,--a principle of Development which may\novershadow both the _verbum Dei scriptum_ and the _verbum Dei non\nscriptum_ of the Romish Church, and change both the form and substance\nof primitive Christianity.\"\n\nIt is only justice to Mr. Newman to say that he appears to have been\naware of this possible objection to his theory, and that he makes an\nattempt to obviate it. Speaking of the difficulty which the Church\nexperienced in keeping \"Paganism out of her pale,\" he adverts to \"the\n_hazard which attended on the development_ of the Catholic ritual,--such\nas the honors publicly assigned to saints and martyrs, the formal\nveneration of their relics, and the usages and observances which\nfollowed.\" And he asks: \"What was to hinder the rise of a sort of\nrefined Pantheism, and the overthrow of Dogmatism _pari passu_ with the\nmultiplication of heavenly intercessors and patrons? If what is called\nin reproach 'Saint-worship' resembled the Polytheism which it\nsupplanted, or was a corruption, how did Dogmatism survive? Dogmatism is\na religious profession of its own reality as contrasted with other\nsystems; but Polytheists are liberals, and hold that one religion is as\ngood as another. Yet the theological system was developing and\nstrengthening, as well as the monastic rule, all the while the ritual\nwas assimilating itself, as Protestants say, to the Paganism of former\nages.\"[96]\n\nIt seems to be admitted in these words, that, in the _past_ history of\nthe Church, the development of the Catholic ritual _was_ attended with\nsome danger of infection from Paganism or Pantheism; and there may be\nequal reason to fear that, in the _future_ history of the Church, still\nworking on the principle of development, that danger may be very\nconsiderably aggravated by the general prevalence of theories utterly\ninconsistent with the faith of primitive times. What the Church has\nalready done in the exercise of her developing power may be only a\nspecimen of what she may hereafter accomplish. She has already\ndeveloped Christianity into a system which bears a striking resemblance\nto Polytheism; she may yet develop it more fully, so as to bring it into\naccordance with philosophical Pantheism; or, retaining both forms,--for\nthey are not necessarily exclusive of each other,--she may use the first\nin dealing with the ignorant, and reserve the second as a sort of\nesoteric doctrine for minds of higher culture. Nor let it be said that\nwe are either unjust or uncharitable towards the Romish Church, in\nsuggesting the possibility of some such development; for what she has\nalready done, and what she still claims the power of doing, afford very\nsufficient ground for our remarks. When Dr. Conyers Middleton published\nhis celebrated \"Letter from Rome,\" showing an exact conformity between\nPopery and Paganism, and that \"the religion of the present Romans is\nderived from that of their Heathen ancestors,\" many liberal Catholics\nresented the imputation as an insult to their faith; but now Mr. Newman\nnot only admits the fact that the Church did _assimilate_ its ritual to\nthe Paganism of former ages, but vindicates her right to do so, and\nascribes to her _a power of assimilation_ to which it seems impossible\nto assign any limits. \"There is, in truth,\" says this writer, \"a certain\nvirtue or grace in the Gospel, which changes the quality of doctrines,\nopinions, usages, actions, and personal characters, which become\nincorporated with it, and makes them right and acceptable to its Divine\nAuthor, when before they were either contrary to truth, or, at best, but\nshadows of it.\"--\"Confiding, then, in the power of Christianity to\nresist the infection of evil, and to _transmute the very instruments and\nappendages of demon worship to an Evangelical use_, ... the rulers of\nthe Church from early times were prepared, should the occasion arise, to\nadopt, or imitate, or sanction _the existing rites and customs of the\npopulace_, as well as _the philosophy of the educated class_.\"--\"The\nChurch can extract good from evil, or, at least, gets no harm from it.\nShe inherits the promise made to the disciples, that they should take\nup serpents, and, if they drank any deadly thing, it should not hurt\nthem.\"--\"It has borne, and can bear, principles or doctrines which, in\nother systems of religion, quickly degenerate into _fanaticism or\ninfidelity_.\" This marvellous power of assimilation, which made \"those\nobservances pious in Christianity\" that were \"superstitions in\nPaganism,\" advanced, rapidly in its work, and successively introduced\nthe deification of man, the _cultus_ of angels and saints, and the\nbeatification of Mary as Queen of heaven and earth. The sanctification,\nor rather _the deification of the nature of Man_, is one of these\ndevelopments. Christ \"is in them, because He is in human nature; and He\ncommunicates to them that nature, deified by becoming His, that it may\n_deify_ them.\" The worship of saints is another of these developments:\n\"Those who are known to be God's adopted sons in Christ are fit objects\nof worship on account of Him who is in them.... Worship is the necessary\ncorrelative of glory; and, in the same sense in which created nature can\nshare in the Creator's incommunicable glory, do they also share in that\nworship which is His property alone.\" But a \"new sphere\" was yet to be\ndiscovered in the realms of light, to which the Church had not yet\nassigned its inhabitant. \"There was 'a wonder in heaven;' a throne was\nseen, far above all created powers, mediatorial, intercessory; a title\narchetypal; a crown bright as the morning star; a glory issuing from the\nEternal Throne; robes pure as the heavens; and a sceptre over all. And\nwho was the predestined heir of that Majesty? Who was that Wisdom, and\nwhat was her name?--'the Mother of fair love, and fear, and holy hope,'\nexalted like a palm-tree in Engaddi and a rose-plant in Jericho, created\nfrom the beginning before the world in God's counsels, and 'in Jerusalem\nwas her power.' The vision is found in the Apocalypse, a Woman clothed\nwith the Sun, and the Moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of\ntwelve stars.\" The DEIFICATION of Mary is decreed. The doctrine of her\nImmaculate Conception is a further _development_ at the present moment,\nand who can tell what other developments may be in store for the future?\n\nWe advert to this form of the theory only in so far as it stands related\nto our great theme,--the existence, perfections, and prerogatives of the\none only, the living and the true God; and it can scarcely be\nquestioned, we think, that it has already introduced doctrines and\npractices into the Church which have a manifest tendency to obscure the\nlustre and impair the evidence of some of the most fundamental articles\nof Natural Religion. Let it still advance in the same direction, and who\nshall assure us that it may not develop into still grosser idolatry, or\neven into Pantheism? Why should it not develop, for example, into Sun\nworship? \"On the new system,\" says Professor Butler, \"a modern growth of\nChristian Guebres might make out no feeble case; the public religious\nrecognition of this great visible type of the True Light is but a fair\ndevelopment of 'the typical principle;' the justifiable imitation of the\nguilt of heathens in its adoration is but an instance of the\ntransforming powers of 'the sacramental principle;' while it requires\nbut the most moderate use of the great instrument of orthodoxy,\n'mystical interpretation,' to find the duty hinted (clearly enough for\nwatchful faith, though obscurely to the blinded or undevout) in those\npassages that speak of a 'tabernacle for the Sun,' or Deity itself being\n'a Sun,' or the rising of 'the Sun of righteousness.'... Indeed, the\nwhole body of the righteous are promised to 'shine as the Sun' in the\nheavenly kingdom,--an expression which, though it appear superficially\nto refer to a period not yet arrived, the Church has correctively\ndeveloped into an assurance of their present beatification, and\nconsequent right to worship; while it must be at once manifest that, if\nany representative emblem of the Deity may demand religious prostration\nin our Churches, the analogous emblem of the 'deified,' in the great\ntemple of the Material Universe, may fairly expect a participation in\nthat honor. It is true there is an express command, 'Take heed lest,\nwhen thou seest the Sun, ... thou shouldst be driven to worship them;'\nbut so there is a command, at least as distinct and imperative, against\nthe worship of _Images_, which, Mr. Newman instructs us, has been\nrepealed under the Gospel, and was never more than a mere Judaic\nprohibition, 'intended for mere temporary observance in the\nletter.'\"[97]\n\nIf it be said that, in the case of the Church of Rome, there is not only\na process of development, but an infallible developing power, and that\nthis affords a guaranty, strong as the Divine promise itself, against\nthat risk of error which is attendant on the ordinary methods of human\nteaching,--we answer, that this is a mere assumption, which requires to\nbe proved, and that it cannot be proved in the face of the facts which\nattest the historical variations of the Romish Creed, as these are\nadmitted and defended by Mr. Newman himself. For some of these\nvariations are not consistent developments of the primitive articles of\nfaith, but involve either a corruption or a contradiction of these very\nprinciples; and if her infallibility has not preserved her from the\ndeification of saints, what security have we that it will preserve her\nfrom the deification of Nature? If it has already introduced a Christian\nPolytheism, why may it not issue in a Christian Pantheism?\n\nAdmit the principle of development, and it may lead to the deification\nof man, as well as to the worship of Mary; to a sacred Calendar of\nHeroes, as well as of Saints.[98] It may terminate either in Infidelity\nor in Superstition, according to the mental temperament of the\nindividual by whom it is adopted and applied. \"An organ of\ninvestigation being introduced, which may be employed for any purpose\nindifferently, the tendency of such a theory of religious inquiry will\njust tell according to the spirit in which it acts. A skeptic will\ndevelop the principle into Infidelity, a believer into Superstition; but\nthe principle itself remains accurately the same in both.\"[99] The\nconnection between the theory of Ecclesiastical Development and the\ninfidel theory of Progress has not escaped the notice of many acute and\nprofound thinkers in recent times, nor the danger resulting from it to\nthe most fundamental articles of faith. \"Modern Spiritualists tell us\nthat Christianity is a development, as the Papists also assert, and the\nNew Testament is its first and rudimentary product; only, unhappily, as\nthe development, it seems, may be things so different as Popery and\nInfidelity, we are as far as ever from any criterium as to which, out of\nthe ten thousand possible developments, is the true; but it is a matter\nof the less consequence, since it will, on such reasoning, be _always\nsomething future_.\"[100] One of the most pernicious tenets of the\nNeologists beyond the Rhine is thus expressed by themselves:\n\"Christianity renews itself in the human heart, and follows _the\ndevelopment_ of the human mind, and invests itself with new forms of\nthought and language, and adopts new systems of Church organization, to\nwhich it gives expression and life.\" ... \"But are these teachers the\n_only_ destroyers of Faith and Morals? Are not _they_ also chargeable\nwith precisely the same offence who command us to submit implicitly to\nthe so-called divinely-inspired Spirit of '_one_ living Infallible\nJudge' or 'Developing Power'? Can we have _fixed_ articles of faith and\nmorals in this system, any more than in the other? No. '_Unus utrisque\nerror, sed variis ill[=u]det partibus._' There is the same evil in both,\nbut it operates in different ways; in the former, every one develops\nfor himself; in the latter, the Pope develops for every one. You look\nwith fear on the progress of Rationalism; and what hope can any man\nderive from that of Romanism?\"[101]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWe have examined, each on its own peculiar merits, the various forms of\nthe Theory of Development which have been propounded in modern times,\nand applied to account for the origin of planets and astral systems, of\nvegetable and animal races, and of the different successive systems of\nhuman opinion and belief. We have found that, imposing as it may seem to\nbe, and high as its pretensions are, that theory has no claim to the\ncharacter of a scientific doctrine; that it is a mere hypothesis, and\nnothing more; a speculative figment, which may be injurious to those who\nthoughtlessly dally with it, but which can have no power to hurt any one\nwho will resolutely lay hold of it, and examine its claims.\n\n    \"Gently, softly, touch a nettle,\n      And it stings you for your pains;\n    Grasp it, like a man of mettle,\n      And it soft as silk remains.\"\n\nIt is only necessary to add, that _the same general principle_ seems to\nbe involved in _all_ the forms of this theory,--the principle, namely,\nthat we are bound to account for the past _only_ by causes known to be\nin actual operation at the present day. M. Comte lays it down in the\nfollowing terms: \"Our conjectures on the origin, or formation of our\nworld should evidently be subjected to this indispensable\ncondition,--not to allow of the interposition of any other natural\nagents than those whose influence we clearly discern in our ordinary\nphenomena, and whose operations, _then_, would only be on a greater\nscale. Without this rule, our work can have no truly scientific\ncharacter, and we shall fall into the inconvenience, so justly made a\nground of reproach to the greater number of geological hypotheses,--that\nof introducing, for the purpose of explaining the ancient revolutions of\nthe globe, agencies which do not exist at the present day, and whose\ninfluence it is impossible, for that very reason, to verify or even to\ncomprehend.\" The same principle is strongly stated, but with due\nlimitation, by Sir Charles Lyell, who insists on the explanation of all\nterrestrial changes by _means of causes and according to laws known to\nbe in operation at the present day_: \"During the progress of Geology,\nthere have been great fluctuations of opinion respecting the nature of\nthe causes to which all former changes in the earth's surface are\nreferable. The first observers conceived that the monuments which the\nGeologist endeavors to decipher relate to a period when the physical\nconstitution of the earth differed entirely from the present, and that,\neven after the creation of living beings, there have been causes in\naction distinct in kind or degree from these now forming part of the\neconomy of nature. These views have been gradually modified, and some of\nthem entirely abandoned.\"[102]\n\nThe general principle which is involved in these and similar statements\nmay be perfectly sound, when it is applied merely to _natural events_,\noccurring in the ordinary course, and according to the established\nconstitution of the material and moral world; but it is manifestly\ninapplicable to _supernatural events_, such as the creation of the\nworld, or the revelation of Divine truth, since these events cannot be\naccounted for by any known natural cause, and must be ascribed to the\nimmediate agency of a Higher Power. Without some such limitation, the\ngeneral principle cannot be admitted, since it would involve an\negregious fallacy. We must not limit Omnipotence by circumscribing the\nrange of its possible exercise within the narrow bounds of the existing\neconomy, or of our actual experience. We are not warranted to assume\nthat the origin of the world, on the one hand, or the establishment of\nChristianity on the other, may be accounted for by _natural causes_\nstill known to be in actual operation. In regard to _natural events_ the\nprinciple is sound, and it is rigorously adhered to by the expounder of\nNatural Theology; in regard to _supernatural events_ it can have no\nlegitimate application, except in so far as it is combined with the\ndoctrine of efficient and final causes, which leads us up to the\nrecognition of a Higher Power. It might be safe and legitimate enough,\nwhen we find a fossil organism imbedded in the earth, to ascribe its\nproduction to the ordinary law of generation, even although we had not\nwitnessed the fact of its birth, provided the same species is known to\nhave existed previously; but when we find _new races_ coming into being,\nfor which the ordinary law of derivation cannot account, we are not at\nliberty to apply the same rule to a case so essentially different, and\nstill less to postulate _a spontaneous generation_, or a _transmutation\nof species_, for which we have no experience at all. In such a case, we\ncan only reason on the principle that _like_ effects must have _like_\ncauses, that marks of _design_ imply a _designing_ cause, and that\nevents which cannot be accounted for by _natural causes_ must be\nascribed to a Power distinct from nature, and superior to it. It is\nmanifestly unreasonable to assume that nothing can be brought to pass in\nthe Universe otherwise than by the operation of the same natural laws\nwhich are now in action; or that, in the course of our limited and\npartial experience, we must necessarily know all the agencies that may\nhave been at work during the long flow of time. And, in accordance with\nthese views, Sir Charles Lyell expressly limits the general principle to\n_natural events_, and shows that \"Geology differs as widely from\nCosmogony as speculations concerning the _Creation of Man_ differ from\nhis _History_.\"\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[28] \"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,\" p. 17.\n\n[29] AUGUSTE COMTE, \"Cours de Philosophic Positive,\" II. 363, 376. The\nmerits of this attempt are very differently estimated by two competent\nauthorities; by PROFESSOR SEDGWICK in the \"Edinburgh Review,\" No. 82, p.\n22; and by SIR DAVID BREWSTER in the \"North British Review,\" No. 3, p.\n476.\n\n[30] \"Vestiges,\" p. 11, 23.\n\n[31] WHEWELL, \"Indications of a Creator.\" SEDGWICK'S \"Discourse,\" 5th\nedition. \"Edinburgh Review,\" No. 82. SIR D. BREWSTER, \"North British\nReview,\" No. 3. PROFESSOR DOD, \"Princeton Theological Essays,\" second\nseries. H. MILLER, \"Footprints of the Creator.\" T. MONCK MASON,\n\"Creation by the Immediate Agency of God.\"\n\n[32] THOMAS MONCK MASON, \"Creation by the Immediate Agency of God, as\nopposed to Creation by Natural Law; being a Refutation of 'The\nVestiges,'\" &c., p. 34.\n\n[33] SIR JOHN HERSCHELL, \"Memoir on Nebulae and Clusters of Stars,\"\nLondon Philosophical Transactions, 1833. \"Edinburgh Review,\" No. 82, p.\n19.\n\n[34] \"North British Review,\" No. 3, p. 477.\n\n[35] PROFESSOR NICHOL, \"The System of the World,\" Preface, VI., and 108.\n\n[36] Ecclesiastes 12: 1.\n\n[37] LORENZ OKEN, M. D., \"Elements of Physio-philosophy,\"--reprinted\n(unfortunately) under the auspices of the Ray Society, London, 1847.\n\n[38] DR. JOHN BARCLAY, \"Inquiry concerning Life and Organization,\" pp.\n33, 36. See also pp. 177, 235, 413, 526.\n\n[39] \"Telliamed; ou, Entretiens d'un Philosophe Indien avec un\nMissionaire Francois, sur la Diminution de la Mer, la Formation de la\nTerre, l'Origine de l'Homme,\" 2 vols., 1748.\n\n[40] \"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,\" 6th edition, p. 90.\n\n[41] MR. HUGH MILLER, \"Footprints of the Creator,\" p. 226.\n\n[42] \"North British Review,\" 1845, p. 483.\n\n[43] \"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,\" p. 92.\n\n[44] \"The Vestiges,\" p. 104.\n\n[45] Ibid.\n\n[46] TODD, \"Cyclopaedia of Anatomy and Physiology,\" article, Generation.\n\n[47] MR. HUGH MILLER, \"Footprints of the Creator,\" p. 233. T. MONCK\nMASON, \"Creation by the Immediate Agency of God.\" \"Princeton Theological\nEssays,\" Second Series, p. 422.\n\n[48] CUVIER, \"Ossemens Fossiles,\" p. 61.\n\n[49] MR. HUGH MILLER, \"Footprints,\" p. 254.\n\n[50] DR. WHEWELL'S \"Indications,\" p. 54.\n\n[51] \"Footprints of the Creator,\" p. 19.\n\n[52] \"The Vestiges,\" p. 105.\n\n[53] \"The Vestiges,\" pp. 91, 96.\n\n[54] \"The Vestiges,\" p. 9.\n\n[55] HUGH MILLER, \"Footprints,\" pp. 13, 15. PROFESSOR DOD, \"Princeton\nTheological Essays,\" II. 432.\n\n[56] CICERO, \"De Natura Deorum,\" L. II.\n\n[57] M. COMTE, \"Cours de Philosophie Positive,\" I. 3, 6, 14; IV. viii.,\n653, 656, 708, 711, 723; V. 1, 9.\n\n[58] M. COMTE, \"Cours de la Philosophie Positive,\" I. 3.\n\n[59] Ibid., V. 30, 42, 50, 96, 98, 101.\n\n[60] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" V. 37, 75, 91, 101.\n\n[61] Ibid., V. 58, 87, 94, 105, 125, 278.\n\n[62] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" V. 107, 115, 119, 124, 136, 148, 162, 167, 207,\n224, 229.\n\n[63] Ibid., V. 128, 164, 268, 279, 281, 290.\n\n[64] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" V. 297, 325, 461, 470; VI. 231.\n\n[65] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" V. 479, 487, 496, 505; VI. 2.\n\n[66] COMTE, \"Cours,\" I. 4, 10; IV. 664, 669, 676, 702.\n\n[67] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" V. 299, 326, 345; VI. 62, 72, 157, 234, 503,\n864.\n\n[68] ABBE MARET, \"Theodicee Chretienne,\" p. 218.\n\n[69] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" V. 327, 344, 369, 538, 582, 684; VI. 137.\n\n[70] Ibid., V. 428, 597, 684, 836; VI. 419, 521, 860.\n\n[71] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" I. 44, 141; IV. 673; V. 45, 303.\n\n[72] VICTOR COUSIN, \"Introduction a l'Histoire de la Philosophie,\" I.\n121. Ibid., \"Cours de la Philosophie,\" III. 2, 464.\n\n[73] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" V. 3, 5, 22; VI. 32, 481.\n\n[74] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" V. 382, \"Premier fondateur, _reel ou ideal_, de\nce grand systeme religieux.\"\n\n[75] \"Encyc. Britan.,\" articles \"Augury\" and \"Divination.\" DR. THOMSON'S\n\"History of Chemistry.\"\n\n[76] MR. H. MILLER'S \"Scenes and Legends of the North of Scotland.\"\n\n[77] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" I. 13; V. 461, 470; VI. 86, 126, 148.\n\n[78] DR. CUDWORTH, \"Intellectual System,\" I. 33.\n\n[79] \"Westminster Confession of Faith,\" chap. V. Sec. 2, 3.\n\n[80] STRAUSS, \"Life of Jesus,\" I. 88. HENRY ROGERS, \"Reason and Faith,\"\nAppendix, p. 96.\n\n[81] DR. CHALMERS' Works, I. \"Natural Theology.\"\n\n[82] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" I. 7.\n\n[83] MONTAIGNE, \"Apology for Raimond de Sebonde,\" Essays, II. 148.\n\n[84] COMTE, \"Cours,\" VI., Preface, IX.\n\n[85] DR. ANDREW THOMSON, \"Sermons on Infidelity,\" p. 62.\n\n[86] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" IV. 709: \"Je puis affirmer n'avoir jamais trouve\nd'argumentation serieuse en opposition a cette loi, depuis dix-sept ans\nque j'ai eu le bonheur de la decouvrir, si ce n'est celle que l'on\nfondait sur la consideration de la _simultaneite jusq'ici necessairement\ntres commune_, des trois philosophies chez les memes intelligences.\"\n\"Cours,\" I. 27, 50, 10: \"L'emploi _simultane_ des trois philosophies\nradicalement incompatibles,\"--\"la _coexistence_ de ces trois\nphilosophies opposees.\" See also IV. 683, 694; V. 28, 39, 41, 57, 171;\nVI. 26, 31, 34, 155.\n\n[87] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" I. 14: \"En considerant comme _absolument\ninaccessible et vide de sens pour nous_ la recherche de ce qu'on appelle\nles _causes, soit premieres, soit finales_.\"\n\n[88] SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH, \"Encyc., Britan.,\" Preliminary Dissertation,\np. 354.\n\n[89] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" IV. 664.\n\n[90] Ibid., VI. 728, 730, 760, 826, 835, 866.\n\n[91] NEWMAN'S \"Essay on Development,\" p. 27.\n\n[92] NEWMAN'S \"Essay on Development,\" p. 38.\n\n[93] Ibid., p. 95.\n\n[94] BROWNSON'S \"Quarterly Review,\" No. 1, p. 43.\n\n[95] SEDGWICK'S \"Discourse,\" Fourth Edition. Preface, CCCXCIII.\n\n[96] NEWMAN'S \"Essay,\" p. 447.\n\n[97] Letters of Rev. W. A. BUTLER on the \"Development of Christian\nDoctrine,\" p. 116.\n\n[98] PIERRE LEROUX, \"Sur l'Humanite.\" AUGUSTUS COMTE, \"Positive\nCalendar.\" The author gave some account of this in an article\ncontributed to the \"North British Review,\" May, 1851.\n\n[99] PROFESSOR BUTLER'S \"Letters,\" p. 87.\n\n[100] \"Eclipse of Faith,\" p. 13.\n\n[101] DR. WORDSWORTH, \"Letters to M. Gondon,\" p. 153.\n\n[102] LYELL, \"Principles of Geology,\" I. 75.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHEORIES OF PANTHEISM.\n\n\nAt the commencement of the present century, Pantheism might have been\njustly regarded and safely treated as an obsolete and exploded\nerror,--an error which still prevailed, indeed, in the East as one of\nthe hereditary beliefs of Indian superstition, but which, when\ntransplanted to Western Europe by the daring genius of Spinoza, was\nfound to be an exotic too sickly to take root and grow amidst the fresh\nand bracing air of modern civilization.\n\nBut no one who has marked the recent tendencies of speculative thought,\nand who is acquainted, however slightly, with the character of modern\nliterature, can have failed to discern a remarkable change in this\nrespect within the last fifty years. German philosophy, always prolific,\nand often productive of monstrous births, has given to the world many\nelaborate systems, physical and metaphysical, whose most prominent\nfeature is the deification of Nature or of Man. France, always alert and\nlively, has appropriated the ideas of her more ponderous neighbors, and\nhas given them currency through educated Europe on the wings of her\nlighter literature. And even in England and America there are not\nwanting some significant tokens of a disposition to cherish a kind of\nspeculation which, if it be not formally and avowedly Pantheistic, has\nmuch of the same dreamy and mystic character, and little, if any,\nharmony with definite views of God, or of the relations which He bears\nto man.\n\nOne of the most significant symptoms of a reaction in favor of Pantheism\nmay be seen in the numerous republications and versions of the writings\nof Spinoza which have recently appeared, in the public homage which has\nbeen paid to his character and genius, and in the more than philosophic\ntolerance--the kindly indulgence--which has been shown to his most\ncharacteristic principles. He is now recognized by many as the real\nfounder both of the Philosophic and of the Exegetic Rationalism, which\nhas been applied, with such disastrous effect, to the interpretation\nalike of the volume of Nature and of the records of Revelation. In\nGermany his works have been edited by Paulus (1803) and by Gfroerer\n(1830); in France they have been translated by Emile Saisset, Professor\nof Philosophy in the Royal College; while a copious account of his life\nand writings has been published by Amand Saintes, the historian of\nRationalism in Germany.[103] All this might be accounted for by\nascribing it simply to the admiration of philosophical thinkers for the\nextraordinary talents of the man; and it might be said that his writings\nhave been reprinted, just as those of Hobbes have been recently\nreproduced in England, more as a historical monument of the past than as\na mirror that reflects the sentiments of the present age. But it is more\ndifficult to explain the eulogiums with which the reappearance of\nSpinoza has been greeted, and the cordiality with which his daring\nspeculations have been received. He has not only been exculpated from\nthe charge of Atheism, but even panegyrized as a saint and martyr! \"That\nholy and yet outcast man,\" exclaimed Schleiermacher,--\"he who was fully\npenetrated by the universal Spirit,--for whom the Infinite was the\nbeginning and the end, and the Universe his only and everlasting\nlove,--he who, in holy innocence and profound peace, delighted to\ncontemplate himself in the mirror of an eternal world, where, doubtless,\nhe saw himself reflected as its most lovely image,--he who was full of\nthe sentiment of religion, because he was filled with the Holy Spirit!\"\n\"Instead of accusing Spinoza of Atheism,\" says M. Cousin, \"he should\nrather be subjected to the opposite reproach.\"[104] \"He has been loudly\naccused,\" says Professor Saisset, \"of Atheism and impiety.... The truth\nis that never did a man believe in God with a faith more profound, with\na soul more sincere, than Spinoza. Take God from him, and you take from\nhim his system, his thought, his life.\" \"Spinoza, although a Jew,\" says\nthe Abbe Sabatier, a member of the Catholic clergy, \"always lived as a\nChristian, and was as well versed in our divine Testament as in the\nbooks of the ancient Law. If he ended, as we cannot doubt he did, in\nembracing Christianity, he ought to be _enrolled in the rank of saints_,\ninstead of being placed at the head of the enemies of God.\"\n\nContrast the language in which Spinoza is now compared to Thomas a\nKempis, and proposed as a fit subject for canonization itself, with the\nterms in which he was wont to be spoken of by men of former times; and\nthe startling difference will sufficiently indicate a great change in\nthe current of European thought. And if we add to this the\ncontemporaneous reappearance of such writers as Bruno and Vanini, whose\nworks have been reprinted by the active philosophical press of Paris, we\nmay be well assured that it is not by overlooking or despising such\nspeculations, but by boldly confronting and closely grappling with them,\nthat we shall best protect the mind of the thinking community from their\ninsidious and pestilent influence.\n\nBut we are not left to _infer_ the existence, in many quarters, of a\nprevailing tendency towards Pantheism, from such facts as have been\nstated, significant as they are; we have explicit testimonies on the\npoint, in a multitude of writings, philosophical and popular, which have\nrecently issued from the Continental press. In a report presented to the\nAcademy of Sciences, M. Franck, a member of the Institute, represents\nPantheism as the last and greatest of all the Metaphysical systems which\nhave come into collision with Revelation; and describes it as a theory,\n\"according to which spirit and matter, thought and extension, the\nphenomena of the soul and of the body, are all equally related, either\nas attributes or modes, to the same substance or being, at once _one_\nand _many_, finite and infinite,--Humanity, Nature, God.\" Conceiving\nthat the older forms of error--Dualism and Materialism--have all but\ndisappeared; and that Atheism, in its gross mechanical form, cannot now,\nas Broussais himself said, \"find entrance into a well-made head which\nhas seriously meditated on nature,\" M. Franck concludes that Pantheism\nalone, such as has been conceived and developed in Germany, is likely to\nhave the power of seducing serious minds, and that it may for a season\nexert considerable influence as an antagonist to Christianity.[105] M.\nJavari gives a similar testimony. He tells us that \"that great lie,\nwhich is called Pantheism (_ce grand mensonge qu'on appelle le\nPantheisme_), has dragged German philosophy into an abyss; that it is\nfascinating a large number of minds among his own countrymen; and that\nit is this doctrine, rather than any other, which will soon gather\naround it all those who do not know or who reject the truth.\"[106] The\nBiographer of Spinoza, referring to the recent progress and prospective\nprevalence of these views, affirms that \"the tendency of the age, in\nmatters of Philosophy, Morals, and Religion, seems to incline towards\nPantheism;\" that \"the time is come when every one who will not frankly\nembrace the pure and simple Christianity of the Gospel will be obliged\nto acknowledge Spinoza as his chief, unless he be willing to expose\nhimself to ridicule;\" that \"Germany is already saturated with his\nprinciples;\" that \"his philosophy domineers over all the contemporary\nsystems, and will continue to govern them until men are brought to\nbelieve that word, 'No man hath seen God at any time, but He who was in\nthe bosom of the Father hath revealed Him;'\" that it is this\n\"Pantheistic philosophy, boldly avowed, towards which the majority of\nthose writers who have the talent of commanding public interest are\ngravitating at the present day;\" and that \"the ultimate struggle will\nbe, not between Christianity and Philosophy, but between Christianity\nand Spinozism, its strongest and most inveterate antagonist.\"[107] And\nthe critical reviewer of Pantheism, whose Essay is said to have been the\nfirst effective check to its progress in the philosophical schools of\nParis, gives a similar testimony. He tells us that it was his main\nobject to point out \"the Pantheistic tendencies of the age;\" to show\nthat Germany and France are deeply imbued with its spirit; that both\nPhilosophy and Poetry have been infected by it; that this is \"the\nveritable heresy of the nineteenth century; and that, when the most\ncurrent beliefs are analyzed, they resolve themselves into Pantheism,\navowed or disguised.\"[108]\n\nA few _specimens_ of this mode of thinking may be added in confirmation\nof these statements. Lessing, as reported by Jacobi, expressed his\nsatisfaction with the poem \"Prometheus,\" saying: \"This poet's point of\nview is my own; the orthodox ideas on the Divinity no longer suit me; I\nderive no profit from them: [Greek: hen kai pan],--(_un et tout, the\none_ and _the all_),--I know no other.\" Schelling, in his earlier\nwritings, while he was Professor at Jena, and before the change of\nsentiment which he avowed at Berlin, represented God as the one only\ntrue and really absolute existence; as nothing more or less than Being,\nfilling the whole sphere of reality; as the infinite Being (_Seyn_)\nwhich is the essence of the Universe, and evolves all things from itself\nby self-development. Hegel seeks unity in every thing and every where.\nThis unity he discovers in the identity of existence and thought, in the\none substance which exists and thinks, in God who manifests and develops\nhimself in many forms. \"The Absolute produces all and absorbs all; it is\nthe essence of all things. The life of the Absolute is never consummated\nor complete. God does not properly exist, but comes into being: 'Gott\nist in werden.'--_Deus est in fieri_. With him God is not a Person, but\nPersonality, which realizes itself in every human consciousness as so\nmany thoughts of one eternal Mind.... Apart from, and out of the world,\ntherefore, there is no God; and so, also, apart from the universal\nconsciousness of man, there is no Divine consciousness or personality.\nGod is with him the whole process of thought, combining in itself the\nobjective movement, as seen in Nature, with the subjective, as seen in\nLogic; and fully realizing itself only in--the universal spirit of\nHumanity.\"[109]\n\nWe select only two specimens from the recent literature of France; they\nmight be multiplied indefinitely. Pierre Leroux, the editor of the\n\"Encyclopedie Nouvelle,\" says, in his \"Essay on Humanity,\" dedicated to\nthe poet Beranger:--\"It is the God immanent in the Universe, in\nHumanity, in each Man, that I adore.\"--\"The worship of Humanity was the\nworship of Voltaire.\"--\"What, is Humanity considered as comprehending\nall men? Is it something, or is it nothing but an abstraction of our\nmind? Is Humanity a collective being, or is it nothing but a series of\nindividual men?\"--\"Being, or the soul, is eternal by its nature. Being,\nor the soul, is infinite by its nature. Being, or the soul, is permanent\nand unchangeable by its nature. Being, or the soul, is one by its\nnature. Being, or the soul, is God by its nature.\"--\"Socrates has proved\nour eternity and the divinity of our nature.\"[110] The next specimen is\na singular but very instructive one. It is derived from the treatise of\nM. Crousse, who holds that \"intelligence is a property or an effect of\nmatter;\" \"that the world is a great body, which has sense, spirit, and\nreason;\" that \"matter, in appearance the most cold and insensible, is in\nreality animated, and capable of engendering thought.\" It might be\namusing, were it not melancholy, to refer to one of his proofs of this\nposition: \"Une horologe mesure le temps; certes, c'est la un effet\nintellectuel produit par une cause physique!\"[111] His grand principle\nis the doctrine of what he calls \"Unisubstancisme,\" and it is applied\nequally to the nature of God and the soul of man. God is admitted, but\nit is the God of Pantheism,--Nature, including matter and mind, but\nexcluding any higher power. \"God is the self-existent Being, which\nincludes all, and beyond which no other can be imagined. The Infinite is\nidentical with the Universe.\"--\"God is and can only be the whole of that\nwhich exists. Let us proclaim it aloud, that the echoes may repeat it,\nGod, the Great Being, is the All, and the All is One. God is every thing\nthat exists; the Universe, that is the supreme Being. In it are life\neternal, power, wisdom, knowledge, perfect organization, all the\nqualities, in a word, that are inseparable from the Divinity. Beyond the\nuniverse, or apart from it, there is nothing (_neant_); above the\nvisible world and its laws there is for man--_nullite_.\"\n\nIt is deeply humbling to think that, in the light of the nineteenth\ncentury, and in the very centre of European civilization, speculations\nsuch as these should have found authors to publish, and readers to\npurchase them. Need we wonder that several Catholic writers on the\ncontinent, conversant with the works which are daily issuing from the\npress, and familiar with the state of society in which they live, have\npublicly expressed their apprehension that, unless some seasonable and\neffective check can be given to the progress of this fearful system, we\nmay yet witness the restoration of Polytheistic worship and the revival\nof Paganism in Europe?[112]\n\nThe most cursory review of _the history of Pantheism_[113] will serve to\nconvince every reflecting reader that it must have its origin in some\nnatural but strangely perverted principle of the human mind; and that\nits recent reappearance in Europe affords an additional and very\nunexpected proof that, like the weeds which spring up, year after year,\nin the best cultivated field, it must have its roots or seeds deep in\nthe soil. In the annals of our race, we find it exhibited in two\ndistinct forms; _first_, as a Religious doctrine, and, _secondly_, as a\nPhilosophical system. It had its birthplace in the East, where the\ngorgeous magnificence of Nature was fitted to arrest the attention and\nto stimulate the imagination of a subtle, dreamy, and speculative\npeople. The primitive doctrine of Creation was soon supplanted by the\npagan theory of Emanation. The Indian Brahm is the first and only\nSubstance, infinite, absolute, indeterminate Being, from which all is\nevolved, manifested, developed, and to which all returns and is\nreabsorbed. The Vedanta philosophy is based on this fundamental\nprinciple, and it has been well described as \"the most rigorous system\nof Pantheism which has ever appeared.\"\n\nWe learn from the writings of Greece that a similar system prevailed in\nEgypt, different, indeed, in form, and expressed in other terms, but\nresting on the same ultimate ground; and we know that Christianity found\none of its earliest and most formidable antagonists in the philosophical\nschool of Alexandria, which was deeply imbued with a Pantheistic spirit,\nand which, perhaps for that reason, has recently become an object of\nmuch interest to speculative minds in France and Germany. The Gnostic\nand the Neoplatonic sects maintained, and the writings of Plotinus and\nProclus still exhibit, many principles the same in substance with those\nwhich have been recently revived in Continental Europe. In the earlier\nas well as the later literature of Greece we find traces of Pantheism,\nwhile the Polytheistic worship, which universally prevailed, was its\nnatural product and appropriate manifestation. The ancient Orphic\ndoctrines, which were taught in the Mysteries, seem to have been based\non the oriental idea of Emanation. Even in the masculine literature of\nRome we find numerous passages which are still quoted, with glowing\nadmiration, by the Pantheists of modern times.[114] There is, indeed,\nbut too much reason to believe that the numerous references which occur\nin the Classics to the existence of one absolute and supreme Being, and\nwhich Dr. Cudworth has so zealously collected, with the view of proving\n\"the naturality of the idea of God,\" must be interpreted, at least in\nmany instances, in a Pantheistic sense, and that they imply nothing more\nthan the recognition of one parent Substance, from which all other\nbeings have been successively developed.\n\nWe find some lingering remains of Pantheism in the writings of the\nmiddle age. Scot Erigena, in his work, \"De Divisione Naturae,\" sums up\nhis theory by saying: \"All is God, and God is all.\" Amaury de Chartres\nmade use of similar language. And it must have been more widely diffused\nin these times than many may be ready to believe, if it be true, as the\nAbbe Maret affirms, and as M. de Hammer offers to prove, that the\nKnights of the Order of the Temple were affiliated to secret societies\nin which the doctrines of Gnosticism and the spirit of Pantheism were\nmaintained and cherished.[115] It reappeared in the philosophical\nschools of Italy before the dawn, and during the early progress, of the\nrevival of letters and the Reformation of Religion;[116] and even now,\nafter three centuries of scientific progress and social advancement, it\nis once more rising into formidable strength, and aspiring to universal\nascendancy.\n\nFrom this rapid survey of the history of the past, it is clear that\nPantheism is one of the oldest and most inveterate forms of error; that\nin its twofold character, as at once _a philosophy_ and _a faith_, it\npossesses peculiar attractions for that class of minds which delight to\nluxuriate in mystic speculation; and that, in the existing state of\nsociety, it may be reasonably regarded as the most formidable rival to\nNatural and Revealed Religion. We are far from thinking, indeed, that\nthe old mechanical and materialistic Atheism is so completely worn out\nor so utterly exploded as some recent writers would have us to\nbelieve;[117] for M. Comte and his school still avow that wretched\ncreed, while they profess to despise Pantheism, as a system of empty\nabstractions. We do think, however, that the grand ultimate struggle\nbetween Christianity and Atheism will resolve itself into a contest\nbetween Christianity and Pantheism. For, in the Christian sense,\nPantheism is itself Atheistic, since it denies the Divine personality,\nand ascribes to the universe those attributes which belong only to the\nliving God; but then it is a distinct and very peculiar form of Atheism,\nmuch more plausible in its pretensions, more fascinating to the\nimagination, and less revolting to the reason, than those colder and\ncoarser theories which ascribed the origin of the world to a fortuitous\nconcourse of atoms, or to the mere mechanical laws of matter and motion.\nIt admits much which the Atheism of a former age would have denied; it\nrecognizes the principle of causality, and gives a reason, such as it\nis, for the existing order of Nature; it adopts the very language of\nTheism, and speaks of the Infinite, the Eternal, the Unchangeable One;\nit may even generate a certain mystic piety, in which elevation of\nthought may be blended with sensibility of emotion, springing from a\nwarm admiration of Nature; and it admits of being embellished with the\ncharms of a seductive eloquence, and the graces of a sentimental poetry.\nIt may be regarded, therefore, not indeed as the only, but as the most\nformidable rival of Christian Theism at the present day.\n\nWe have sometimes thought that the recent discoveries of Chemical\nScience might have a tendency, at least in the case of superficial\nminds, to create a prepossession in favor of Pantheism; for what does\nmodern Chemistry exhibit, but the spectacle of Nature passing through a\nseries of successive transmutations?--the same substance appearing in\ndifferent forms, and assuming in every change different properties, but\nnever annihilated, never destroyed; now existing in the form of solid\nmatter, again in the form of a yielding fluid, again in the form of an\nelastic gas; now nourishing a plant, and entering into its very\nsubstance; now incorporated with an animal, and forming its sinews or\nits bones; now reduced again to dust and ashes, but only to appear anew,\nand enter once more into other combinations. The facts are certain, and\nthey are sufficiently striking to suggest the question, May not Nature\nitself be the one Being whose endless transformations constitute the\nhistory of the universe? This question may be naturally suggested, and\nit may even be lawfully entertained; but it cannot be satisfactorily\ndetermined by any theory which leaves the evident marks of Intelligence\nand Design in the whole constitution and course of Nature unaccounted\nfor or unexplained.\n\nInfluenced by these and similar considerations, many thoughtful men have\nrecently avowed their belief that the two grand alternatives in modern\ntimes are, Christianity and Pantheism. The Abbe Maret and Amand Saintes\ndiffer only in this: that by Christianity the former means Catholicism,\nthe latter means the Gospel, or the religion of the primitive church;\nbut both agree that Pantheism is the only other alternative. Schlegel\ncontrasts the same alternatives in the following impressive terms: \"Here\nis the decisive point; two distinct, opposite, or diverging paths lie\nbefore us, and man must choose between them. The clear-seeing spirit,\nwhich, in its sentiments, thoughts, and views of life, would be in\naccordance with itself, and would act consistently with them, must, in\nany case, take one or the other. Either there is a living God, full of\nlove, even such a One as love seeks and yearns after, to whom faith\nclings, and in whom all our hopes are centred (and such is the personal\nGod of Revelation),--and on this hypothesis the world is not God, but is\ndistinct from Him, having had a beginning, and being created out of\nnothing,--or there is only one supreme form of existence, and the world\nis eternal, and not distinct from God; there is absolutely but One, and\nthis eternal One comprehends all, and is itself all in all; so that\nthere is no where any real and essential distinction, and even that\nwhich is alleged to exist between evil and good is only a delusion of a\nnarrow-minded system of Ethics.... Now, the necessity of this choice and\ndetermination _presses urgently upon our own time_, which stands midway\nbetween two worlds. Generally, it is between _these two paths alone_\nthat the decision is to be made.\"[118]\n\nWe have made the preceding remarks on purpose to show that the\ndistinctive doctrines of Pantheism, as a system different, in some\nrespects, from the colder forms of Atheism, demand the careful study of\nthe Divines and the Philosophers of the present age; and that any\nstatement of the evidence in favor of the being and perfections of God,\nwhich overlooks the prevalence of these doctrines, or makes only a\ncursory reference to them, must be alike defective in itself, and ill\nadapted to the real exigencies of European society. Let this be our\napology for attempting, as we now propose, to exhibit an outline of the\nPantheistic system, to resolve it into its constituent elements and\nultimate grounds, to examine the validity of the reasons on which it\nrests, and to contrast it with the doctrine of Christian Theism, which\nspeaks of a living, personal God, and of a distinct but dependent\nCreation, the product of His supreme wisdom and almighty power. The task\nis one of considerable difficulty,--difficulty arising not so much from\nthe nature of the subject, as from the metaphysical and abstruse manner\nin which it has been treated. We must follow Spinoza through the\nlabyrinth of his Theological Politics and his Geometrical Ethics; we\nmust follow Schelling and Hegel into the still darker recesses of their\nTranscendental Philosophy; for a philosophy of one kind can only be met\nand neutralized by a higher and a better, and the first firm step\ntowards the refutation of error is a thorough comprehension of it. But\nhaving an assured faith in those stable laws of thought which are\ninwoven with the very texture of the human mind, and in the validity and\nforce of that natural evidence to which Theology appeals, we have no\nfear of the profoundest Metaphysics that can be brought to bear on the\nquestion at issue, provided only they be not altogether unintelligible.\n\nPantheism has appeared in several different forms; and it may conduce\nboth to the fullness and the clearness of our exposition if we offer, in\nthe first instance, a comprehensive outline of the theory of Spinoza,\nwith a brief criticism on its leading principles, and thereafter advance\nto the consideration of the twofold development of Pantheism in the\nhands of Materialists and Idealists, respectively.\n\n\nSECTION I.\n\nTHE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA.\n\nThe Pantheistic speculations which have been revived in modern times can\nscarcely be understood, and still less accounted for or answered,\nwithout reference to the system of Spinoza. That system met with little\nfavor from any, and with vigorous opposition from not a few, of the\ndivines and philosophers of the times immediately subsequent to its\npublication. It was denounced and refuted by Musaeus, a judicious and\nlearned professor of divinity at Jena; by Mansvelt, a young but\npromising professor of philosophy at Utrecht; by Cuyper of Rotterdam; by\nWittichius of Leyden; by Pierre Poiret of Reinsburg; by Fenelon,\nArchbishop of Cambray; by Huet, Bishop of Avranches; by John Howe, and\nDr. Samuel Clarke, as well as by many others,[119] whose writings\nserved for a time to preserve the Church from the infection of his most\ndangerous errors. But gradually these views became an object of\nspeculative interest to Metaphysical inquirers, and found favor even\nwith a growing class of Philosophical Divines;[120] partly by reason of\nthe strong intellectual energy with which they were conceived and\nannounced, and partly, also, there is reason to fear, on account of a\nprevailing tendency to lower the authority of Scripture, and to exalt\nthe prerogatives of reason, in matters of faith. The system of Spinoza,\nas developed in his \"Tractatus Theologico-politicus,\" and, still more,\nin his \"Ethica,\"--a posthumous publication,--may be said to contain the\ngerms of the whole system both of Theological and Philosophical\nRationalism which was subsequently unfolded,--in the Church, by Paulus,\nWegscheider, and Strauss,--and, in the Schools, by Fichte, Schelling,\nand Hegel.\n\nTheological Rationalism consists in making Reason the sole arbiter and\nthe supreme judge in matters of faith; in setting aside or undermining\nthe authority of Revelation, partly by denying or questioning the\nplenary inspiration of Scripture, partly by explaining or accounting for\nmiracles on natural principles, partly by assuming, as Strauss assumes,\nthat whatever is supernatural must necessarily be unhistorical; in\nreducing every article of the creed, by a new method of critical\nexegesis, to a mere statement of some natural fact or some moral\ndoctrine, embellished, in the one case, by mythical legends, and\naccommodated, in the other, to local and temporary prejudices, but\namounting substantially to nothing more than a natural development of\nhuman thought. The prolific germs of this Neologian method of the\ninterpretation of Scripture are to be found every where in the writings\nof Spinoza.\n\nPhilosophical Rationalism, again, although often, or rather generally,\nblended with the Theological, is yet, in some respects, distinct from\nit. The one has been developed in the Church, the other in the Schools.\nThe former, cultivated by divines who acknowledged more or less\nexplicitly the authority of Scripture, has directed its efforts mainly\nto the establishment of a new method of Biblical exegesis and criticism,\nby which all that is peculiar to Revelation, as a supernatural scheme,\nmight be enervated or explained away. The latter cultivated by\nPhilosophic speculators who were not bound by any authority, nor\nfettered by any subscription to articles of faith, has sought, without\nreference to Revelation, to solve the great problems relating to God,\nMan, and the Universe, on purely natural principles; and, after many\nfruitless efforts, has taken refuge, at last, in the Faith of Pantheism\nand the Philosophy of the Absolute. The prolific germs of this method of\nthe interpretation of Nature are also to be found in the writings of\nSpinoza.\n\nThe circumstance, indeed, which, more than any other, seems to have\ncommended his system to some of the most inquisitive minds in Europe, is\n_its apparent completeness_. It is not a mere theory of Pantheism, nor a\nmere method of Exegesis, nor a mere code of Ethics, nor a mere scheme of\nPolitics, although all these are comprehended under it; but it is a\nsystem founded on a few radical principles, which are exhibited in the\nshape of axioms and definitions, and unfolded, by rigorous logical\ndeduction, in a series of propositions, with occasional scholia and\ncorollaries, after the method of Geometry; a system which undertakes to\nexplain the rationale of _every_ part of human knowledge, to interpret\nalike the Book of Nature and the Book of Revelation, to determine the\ncharacter of prophetic inspiration, and to account for apparent miracles\non natural principles, to establish the real foundations of moral duty,\nand the ultimate grounds of state policy; and all this on the strength\nof a few simple definitions, and a series of necessary deductions from\nthem. It is important to mark this characteristic feature of his system;\nfor while we have directly nothing to do with by far the larger part of\nhis speculations, which relate to questions foreign to our present\ninquiry, yet the fact that his ethical and political conclusions are\ndeduced from the same principles on which his Pantheistic theory is\nfounded, serves at once to account for the extensive influence which his\nwritings have exerted on every department of modern speculation, and\nalso to show that, in opposing that system, we are entitled to found on\nthe conclusions which he has himself deduced from it, for the purpose of\ndisproving the fundamental principles on which it rests. For if, on the\none hand, the principles which he assumes in his definitions and axioms\ndo necessarily involve the conclusions which are propounded in his\nEthics and Politics; and if, on the other hand, these conclusions are\nfound to be at variance with the highest views of Morality and\nGovernment, then the more logical the process by which they have been\ndeduced, the more certain will it be that there is some fundamental flaw\nin the basis on which the whole superstructure is reared. In other\ncases, it might be doubtful how far the consequences that may seem to be\ndeducible from a theory could be legitimately urged in argument,\nespecially when these consequences are disavowed by the author of it;\nbut, in the present case, the consequences are explicitly declared, not\nless than the principles,--they are even exhibited as corollaries\nrigorously deduced from them; and thus the very comprehensiveness of the\nsystem, which gives it so much of the aspect of completeness, and which\nhas fascinated the minds of speculative men, always fond of bold and\nsweeping generalizations, may be found to afford the most conclusive\nproof of its inherent weakness, and to show that it comes into fatal\ncollision, at all points, not only with the doctrines of Natural and\nRevealed Religion, but also with the practical duties and political\nrights of mankind.\n\nWe may present, in brief compass, a comprehensive summary of the\ndoctrine of Spinoza. The fundamental principle of his whole theory is\ncontained in the assumption with which he sets out,--that the entire\nsystem of Being consists only of _three_ elements, \"Substance,\nAttributes, and Modes,\" and in the _definitions_ which are given of\nthese terms respectively. With him, Substance is Being; not this or that\nparticular being, nor even being in general, considered in the abstract,\nbut absolute Being,--Being in its plentitude, which comprehends all\nexistences that can be conceived without requiring the concept of any\nother thing, and without which no other thing can either exist or be\nconceived.[121] By an \"Attribute\" he means, not substance, but a\nmanifestation of substance, yet such a manifestation as belongs to its\nvery essence; and, by a \"Mode,\" he means an affection of substance, or\nthat which exists in another thing, and is conceived by means of that\nthing. These are the three fundamental ideas of his system.[122]\n\nThe \"Substance\" of which he speaks is God, the infinite, self-existent,\neternal Being, whose essential nature is defined in terms which might\nseem to be expressive of a great truth, for he says: \"I understand by\nGod an absolutely infinite Being, that is to say, a Substance\nconstituted by an infinity of Attributes, each of which expresses an\neternal and infinite essence.\" But, on closer inspection, we find that\nthe God of whom he speaks is not the Creator and Governor of the world,\nnot a living, personal Being, distinct from Nature and superior to it,\nnot the Holy One and the Just, possessing infinite moral perfections,\nand exercising a supreme dominion over His works; but, simply, absolute\nBeing, the necessary self-existent Substance, whose known \"Attributes\"\nare _extension_ and _thought_, and whose affections, or \"Modes,\"\ncomprehend all the varieties of finite existence; in short, it is Nature\nthat is God, for every possible existence may be included under the\ntwofold expression of _Natura naturans_ and _Natura naturata_.\nAccordingly, the principle of _Unisubstancisme_ is broadly avowed, and\nthe very possibility of creation denied. He affirms, and, indeed,\naccording to his definition, he is entitled to affirm, that there is not\nand cannot be more than _one substance_; for by \"Substance\" he means a\nself-existent, necessary, and eternal Being. And, on the same ground, he\naffirms that the creation of _such_ a substance is impossible; for,\nhaving excluded every finite thing--everything that does not exist of\nitself--from his definition of Substance, he is warranted in saying that\nanything called into being by a creative act of Divine power could not\nbe a \"substance,\" _in his sense of that term_. He sets himself to prove,\nby a series of propositions whose logical correctness, as deductions\nfrom his fundamental assumption, may be freely and most safely admitted,\nthat the production of a \"substance\" is absolutely impossible; that\nbetween two \"substances,\" having different \"attributes,\" there is\nnothing in common; that where two things have nothing in common, the one\ncannot be the cause of the other; that two or more distinct things can\nonly be discriminated from each other by the difference of the\n\"attributes\" or \"affections\" of their \"substance;\" and that, in the\nnature of things, there cannot be two or more substances of the same\nkind, or possessing the same attributes. He holds, of course, that\nNature is as necessary as God, or, rather, that God and Nature are one;\nthere being but one Substance, appearing only in different aspects, as\ncause and effect, as substance and mode, as infinite and yet finite, as\none and yet many, as ever the same and yet infinitely variable.\n\nIt is only necessary to add, that the sole attributes of this Substance\nwhich are capable of being known by our limited intelligence, and which\nare discerned by an immediate \"intuition of reason,\" are two, namely,\n_extension_ and _thought_. We know nothing, and can know nothing, of God\nbeyond this: He has no will, or his will is mere intelligence or\nthought; He has no law, or His law is merely His thought embodied in the\narrangements of nature; He has no moral properties that are cognizable\nby the human faculties. It follows that God is not the creator of the\nworld, for creation implies an act of will, and God has no will; that He\nis not the Lawgiver or Governor of the world, for there is no law\nemanating from a superior, but such only as is created by _human compact\nor agreement_, and there is \"no natural obligation to obey God,\" no\ninvariable standard of right and wrong. The principles which are thus\nassumed in regard to the nature of God are afterwards applied to many\nimportant questions, relating, first, to the soul of man; secondly, to\nthe science of Ethics; thirdly, to the doctrine of political right and\nliberty; and, fourthly, to the supposed claims of Revelation. And they\nare carried out, with inexorable logic, into all their most revolting\nresults.\n\nSuch is a concise, but, as we believe, a correct outline of the leading\nprinciples of the system of Spinoza. We shall now offer a few remarks\nupon it, directed to the object of showing wherein consists the radical\nfallacy on which it rests, and what are the considerations by which\nthoughtful men may be most effectually secured against its pernicious\ninfluence.\n\nIt has been well said by Professor Saisset, that the fallacy of this\nsystem does not lie in any one proposition of the series, but that it is\na vicious circle throughout; that the paralogism is not in this or that\npart of the \"Ethics,\"--it is everywhere; and that the germ of the whole\nis contained in the _definitions_, which are assumed, but not\nproved.[123] Our attention, therefore, must be given, in the first\ninstance, to the fundamental assumptions on which the whole\nsuperstructure is built.\n\n1. It is assumed, without proof, that the entire system of Being may be\nranked under the three categories of Substance, Attributes, and Modes.\nIt is assumed, equally without proof, that there can be no substance\nwhich is not self-existent, necessary, and eternal, and that every being\nwhich does not possess these properties must be only a \"mode\" or\naffection of another being to whom they belong. It is further assumed,\nalso without proof, that _extension_ and _thought_ are necessary\n\"attributes\" of the one self-existent \"substance,\" each of the two\nexhibiting only a different aspect of his eternal essence, while both\nare equally essential and equally infinite. And, finally, it is assumed,\nstill without proof, that Nature comprehends a twofold series of\nexistences, distinct from each other, but developed, as it were, in\nparallel lines,--Corporeal and Intellectual beings, which correspond\nrespectively to the Divine attributes of extension and thought,--which\npartake of the essential nature of these attributes, but exhibit them in\nfinite and transient forms, as mere modes or manifestations of the one\ninfinite \"substance.\" These are some of the fundamental assumptions on\nwhich he proceeds; they are not proved, nor even attempted to be proved;\nfor, although several are stated in the form of distinct propositions,\nand accompanied with a formal demonstration, the most cursory inspection\nof the pretended proof is sufficient to show that it consists entirely\nin a series of _deductions from principles previously assumed_, and that\nits validity must ultimately rest on the _definitions_ in which these\nprinciples are embodied.\n\nNow, let any one examine these \"definitions,\" and he will find that they\nare wholly arbitrary, and that he is not bound by any law of his\nintellectual nature to admit them, still less entitled, on any ground of\nexperience, to assume and found upon them, as if they were self-evident\nor axiomatic truths. It is possible, and it may even be legitimate and\nuseful for the purposes of philosophical speculation, to classify the\nvarious objects of human knowledge by ranging them under the categories\nof Substance, Attributes, and Modes. But is it a self-evident truth,\nthat there can be no substance in nature excepting such as is\nself-existent and eternal? Is it a self-evident truth that man, with his\ndistinct personality and individual consciousness, is a mere \"mode\" or\naffection of another being? Is it a self-evident truth that the ape, the\nlizard, and the worm are equally \"modes\" of the same substance with the\nangel and the seraph? Is it a self-evident truth that _extension_ and\n_thought_ are equally expressive of the uncreated Essence and necessary\n\"attributes\" of the Eternal? Is it a self-evident truth that no being\ncan exist in nature otherwise than by _development out of the Divine\nsubstance_, and that the _creation_ of a distinct but dependent being is\nimpossible? In regard to questions such as these, the appeal must lie to\nthat common sense, or those laws of thought, which are the heritage of\nevery thinking mind, and which cannot be cramped or fettered by the\narbitrary definitions of any philosophical system whatever. These\ndefinitions must commend themselves _as true_, either by their own\nself-evidencing light, or by their manifest conformity with experience,\nbefore they can be assumed and founded on in any process of reasoning;\nand we are very sure that those which have been specified cannot be\ncandidly examined without appearing to be, as they really are, the\ngrossest instances of a _petitio principii_ that have ever been offered\nto the world. For these \"definitions\" constitute the foundation of the\nwhole superstructure; they contain the germ, which is subsequently\nexpanded and developed in a long series of propositions; and, as they\nare assumed without proof, while they are far from being self-evident,\nno amount of logical power and no effort of dialectic skill can possibly\nextract from them any doctrinal results, whether theological, ethical,\nor political, possessing greater evidence than what belongs to\nthemselves. This is our _first_ objection.\n\n2. The philosophical method of Spinoza, as applied to our special\nsubject, is radically vicious. It is not the inductive or experimental\nmethod; it is an argument _a priori_, a deductive process of reasoning.\nNow, this method, suitable as it is to a certain class of subjects, such\nas those of Geometry, in which clear and precise definitions are\nattainable, is either utterly inapplicable to another class of subjects,\nsuch as most of those of which Spinoza treats, or it is peculiarly\ndangerous, especially in the hands of a daring speculator, since, in the\nabsence of adequate definitions, he may be tempted to have recourse to\nsuch as are purely arbitrary. All the possible properties of a circle\nmay be deduced from the simple definition of it; but it will not follow\nthat all the possible forms of being in nature may be deduced from the\ndefinition of \"substance.\" The reason is clear; we cannot have such a\ndefinition of substance as we may have of a circle. We do not object\nmerely to the _geometrical form_ of his reasoning,--that is a mere\naccessory, and one which renders the \"Ethica\" much more dry and less\nattractive than the \"Tractatus,\" in which he gives free scope to his\nsubtle intellect, unfettered by any such artificial plan,--but we object\nto the essential nature of his system, to the _a priori_ and deductive\nmethod by which he attempts to solve some of the highest problems of\nphilosophy respecting God, Nature, and Man. Here, if anywhere, is a\nfield of inquiry which demands for its due cultivation an enlarged\nexperience and a patient spirit of induction. Yet, with him, the\nstarting-point of philosophy is the highest object of human thought. He\nbegins with the idea of self-existent Being, without which, as he\nimagines, nothing else can be conceived; and then, following the line of\na descending series, he attempts to deduce from it the philosophy of\nthe whole system of the universe![124] His Metaphysics must borrow\nnothing from experience; his very Psychology must be purely deductive.\nFrom the intuitive idea of \"substance\" he deduces the nature and\nexistence of God; from the nature of God, the necessity of a Divine\ndevelopment; from the necessity of a Divine development, the existence\nof a universe comprising souls and bodies; and nowhere does he\ncondescend to take notice of the facts of experience, except in two of\nhis axioms, in which he assumes that \"man thinks,\" and that \"he feels\nhis body to be affected in various ways.\" His whole philosophy resolves\nitself ultimately into an intellectual intuition, whose object is\nSubstance or Being, with its infinite attributes of extension and\nthought,--an intuition which discerns its object directly and\nimmediately, in the light of its own self-evidence, without the aid of\nany intermediate sign, and which is as superior, in a philosophical\npoint of view, to the intimations of sense, as its objects are superior\nto the fleeting phenomena of Nature.\n\nNow, we submit that this method of constructing a philosophy of Nature\nis radically vicious, and diametrically opposed to the only legitimate,\nthe only possible way of attaining to sound knowledge. He is not content\nto tell us _what is_ the order of things; he aspires, forsooth, to show\nwhat the order of things _must be_. We have no wish to disparage\nMetaphysical Science; it has a natural root in human reason, and a\nlegitimate domain in the ample territory of human thought; but we\nprotest against any attempt to extend it beyond its proper boundaries,\nor to apply it to subjects which belong to the province of experience\nand observation. The schemes which have been recently broached in\nGermany, and imitated in France, for constructing, at one time, a\ndeductive Psychology, at another a deductive Physics, at a third a\ndeductive Ethics, at a fourth a deductive Theory of Progress, at a\nfifth a deductive History of Religion, afford more than sufficient\nevidence that hitherto the spirit of the Baconian philosophy has been\nlittle understood, and still less appreciated, by our continental\nneighbors; and that the efforts of the highest genius have been sadly\nfrustrated, in attempting the impracticable task of extracting from mere\nreason that knowledge which can only be acquired in the school of\nexperience. This is our _second_ objection.\n\n3. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it applies a mere\nabstraction of the human mind to account for whatever is real and\nconcrete in the universe. We have no sympathy with those who rail at all\nabstract ideas, as if they were imaginary essences or mere illusions; we\nrecognize the faculty of abstraction as one of the wisest provisions of\nNature, and one of the most useful powers belonging to the mind of\nman,--a power which comes into action with the first dawn of infant\nintelligence, and is only matured as reason rises into manhood, till it\nbecomes the internal spring of all Philosophy and Science. Nor do we\nhold that an abstract idea is necessarily an unreality, or a mere\nnegation; for, without reviving the controversy between the Nominalists\nand Realists, or pronouncing any decision on the intricate questions\nwhich that controversy involved, we may say, in general terms, that the\nidea of a circle, of a square, or of a triangle, is neither unreal nor\nnegative, but a very positive, and, withal, intelligible thing. It is\nthe idea of that which is essential to the nature of each of these\nfigures respectively, and common to all possible figures of the same\nclass, whatever may be their accidental varieties, whether in point of\ndimension or form. And so the idea of Being or Substance, although it be\nhighly abstract, is not necessarily unreal or negative; it is the idea\nof _existence_, or of that which is common to everything that _is_,\nabstraction being made of every diversity by which one being is\ndistinguished from another. Conscious that we ourselves exist, and\nobserving that other beings exist around us, we strike off the\npeculiarities which belong to individuals, and form the general idea\nwhich includes nothing but what is common to all, and yet contains a\npositive element, which is the object of one of the strongest\nconvictions of the human mind.[125] The conception of Infinite Being\ncontains the positive element of _being_, abstraction being made of all\n_limitation_ or _bounds_. That this is a real, legitimate, and useful\nconception, we have no disposition to deny; we cannot divest ourselves\nof it; it springs up spontaneously from the innermost fountain of\nthought. But we cannot accept the account which Spinoza has given of its\nnature and origin, and still less can we assent to the application which\nhe has made of it. He describes it as the idea of absolute, necessary,\nself-existent, eternal Being; and he traces its origin, not to the\ncombined influence of experience and abstraction, acting under the great\nprimitive law of _causality_, but to an immediate perception, or direct\n_intuition, of reason_. Now, we submit that the concept of _being_, and\nthe concept of absolute _self-existent being_, are perfectly distinct\nfrom each other, and that they spring from different laws of thought.\nThe concept of _being_ applies to everything that exists, without\nreference to the cause or manner of its existence; and this springs\nsimply from experience and abstraction. The concept of _self-existent\nbeing_, which is equally suggested by the laws of our mental\nconstitution, does not apply to everything that exists, but only to that\nwhose existence is not originated or determined by any other being; and\nthis concept springs also from experience and abstraction, combined,\nhowever, with the law or principle of _causality_, which teaches us that\nno change can occur in Nature, and that nothing can ever come into\nbeing, _without a cause_, and prompts us to infer from _the fact of\nexistence now_, the conclusion that _something must have existed from\nall eternity_. The origin of each of these concepts may thus be\nnaturally accounted for by the known laws of our mental constitution,\nwithout having recourse to any faculty of _intellectual intuition_ such\nas Spinoza describes,--a faculty independent of experience, and superior\nto it,--a faculty which gazes direct on Absolute Being, and penetrates,\nwithout the aid of any intermediate sign or manifestation, into the very\nessence of God. Spinoza has not discriminated aright between these two\nconcepts, in respect either of their nature or their origin. He has not\noverlooked, indeed, the distinction, between _abstract ideas_ and the\n_intellectual intuitions_, of which he speaks; but he confounds the\nconcept of _being_ with the concept of _self-existent being_, as if the\ntwo were identical, or as if _being_ could not be predicated of\nanything, otherwise than as it is a \"mode\" or affection of the one only\n\"substance.\" A sounder Psychology has taught us that our conception of\nexistence arises, in the first instance, from our own conscious\nexperience; and that, when this conception subsequently expands into the\nidea of Absolute Being, and results in the belief of a necessary,\nself-existent, and eternal Cause, the new element which is thus added to\nit may be accounted for by the _principle of causality_, which\nconstitutes one of the fundamental laws of human thought, and which, if\nit may be said to resemble _intuition_ in the rapidity and clearness\nwith which it enables us to discern the truth, differs essentially from\nthat _immediate intuition_ of which Spinoza speaks, since it is\ndependent on experience, and, instead of gazing direct on Absolute\nBeing, makes use of intermediate signs and manifestations, by which it\nrises to the knowledge of \"the unseen and eternal.\"\n\nWe submit, further, that a system which rests on the mere idea of Being\nas its sole support, cannot afford any satisfactory explanation of real\nand concrete existences. The idea of Being is one of our most abstract\nconceptions; it is associated, indeed, with an invincible belief in the\nreality of Being,--a belief which springs up spontaneously, along with\nthe idea itself, from our own conscious experience. It is even\nassociated with an invincible belief in necessary, self-existent, and\neternal Being,--a belief which springs from _the principle of\ncausality_, or that law of thought whereby, from the fact that something\nexists now, we instinctively conclude that something _must_ have existed\nfrom all eternity. But neither the simple concept of Being, which is\nderived from experience and framed by abstraction, nor the additional\nconcept of self-existent Being, which springs from the action of our\nrational faculties on the data furnished by experience, can afford any\nexplanation of the nature and origin of the real, concrete existences in\nthe universe. These must be studied in the light of their own\nappropriate evidence; they must be interpreted, and not divined; they\ncannot be inferred deductively from any, even the highest and most\nabstract, conception of the human mind. Yet the philosophy of Spinoza\nattempts to explain all the phenomena of the universe by the idea of\nAbsolute Being; it accounts for the concrete by the abstract; it\nrepresents all individual beings as mere modes or affections of one\nuniversal substance; in other words, it _realises_ the abstract idea of\nthought and extension, but _denies the existence_ of bodies and souls,\notherwise than as manifestations of these eternal essences.\n\n4. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because his whole reasoning on the\nsubject of Creation is pervaded by a transparent fallacy. He affirms the\nimpossibility of Creation, and attempts to demonstrate his position. But\nhow? By proving that a \"substance\" cannot be produced. And why may not\n\"a substance\" be produced? Because, _by the definition_, \"a substance\"\nis that which is \"self-existent.\" In other words, a self-existent\nsubstance cannot be created,--a truism which scarcely required the\napparatus of a geometrical proof by means of propositions, scholia, and\ncorollaries, or, as Professor Saisset says, with laconic naivete, \"_ce\nqui a a peine besoin d'etre demontre_.\" But, while the only proof that\nis offered extends no further than to self-existent or uncreated\nsubstance, it is afterwards applied to everything that exists, so as to\nexclude the creation even of that which is _not_ self-existent; and this\non the convenient assumption that whatever exists must be either a\n\"substance,\" or an \"attribute,\" or a \"mode.\" And thus, partly by an\nambiguity of language, partly by an arbitrary and gratuitous assumption,\nhe excludes the possibility of Creation altogether. Surely it might have\noccurred to him that by proving the necessary existence of an uncreated\nBeing--a doctrine held by every Christian Theist--he did not advance one\nstep towards the disproof of the possibility of creation, nor even\ntowards the establishment of his favorite theory of _unisubstancisme_;\nfor, grant that there is an uncreated and self-existent Being; grant,\neven, that there can be no more than _one_,--would it follow that there\ncan be no created and dependent beings, or that they can only exist as\n\"modes\" or \"affections\" of that absolute Essence? Might they not exist\nas _creatures_, as _products_, as _effects_, without partaking of the\nnature of their cause?[126] Yet, if there be one idea more than another\nwhich Spinoza is anxious to extirpate, it is that of creation, and he\nsummons the whole strength, both of his logic and sarcasm, when he has\nto deal with the argument from \"final causes.\" And no marvel; for the\ndoctrine of a creation would cut up his system by the roots. The radical\ndifference, in fact, between Theism and Pantheism mainly consists in\nthis: that the former regards creation as distinct from the Creator, as\nthe product of His omnipotent and free will, as the object of His\nconstant providential care, as the subject of His supreme control and\ngovernment; whereas the latter represents it as a necessary _emanation_\nfrom the Divine substance, as an eternal _development_ of the uncreated\nEssence; the finite, in all its forms, being a \"mode\" of the infinite,\nand the temporary phases of nature so many transient but ever-renewed\nmanifestations of the unchangeable and eternal. These two conceptions\nare diametrically opposed; they cannot admit of conciliation or\ncompromise; and hence the daring attempt of Spinoza to prove the\nimpossibility of creation, even when he admits the existence of an\nInfinite and Eternal Being.\n\n5. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it involves erroneous\nconclusions respecting both the _body_ and the _soul_. He denies that\nthey are \"substances.\" And why? Because, _by the definition_, \"a\nsubstance\" is that which is self-existent, and may be conceived without\nreference to any other being. Be it so. What does this argument amount\nto? Why, simply to this, that they are not gods. What, then, are they?\nCreated beings? No. And why? Because creation is impossible, and, also,\nbecause whatever exists must be either a \"substance,\" or an \"attribute,\"\nor a \"mode.\" What then? Clearly not an \"attribute,\" for the only\nattributes known to us are extension and thought, and these attributes\nare as infinite as \"the substance\" to which they belong; they must\ntherefore be \"modes\" or \"affections\" of that \"substance.\" But in what\nsense? In the sense of being created, and therefore dependent,\nexistences, whose nature and origin cannot be conceived of or accounted\nfor without reference to the Being who produced them at first, and still\ncontinues to maintain them? No; for in that sense all Theists admit the\nderivation and dependence of every finite being; but they must be\n\"modes\" or \"affections\" of the one uncreated essence, mere phenomenal\nmanifestations of it. The soul, whose essence is thought, is a mere\nsuccession of ideas. The body is a mere \"mode\" of the Divine \"attribute\"\nof extension; and neither the one nor the other can be described as a\n_distinct being_. They are affections, and nothing more, of the one\ninfinite \"substance.\"\n\nIt is important to remark that, according to this theory, _the distinct\npersonality of man_ is excluded, not less than _the distinct personality\nof God_. It is not easy, indeed, to explain this part of Spinoza's\ntheory; for he has a subtle disquisition on the relation subsisting\nbetween the soul and the body, by means of which he attempts to explain\nthe phenomena of self-consciousness, and to show that individual\npersonality is not necessarily inconsistent with the doctrine which\nrepresents man as a mere \"mode\" of the Divine \"substance.\" But one thing\nis clear: there is no room in the system of Spinoza for the distinct\npersonality of man, in the ordinary acceptation of that expression. The\nunity, especially of the human soul, its individuality, its\nself-consciousness, its identity, as a being, dependent, indeed, on God,\nbut really distinct from Him, must be sacrificed, if the system is to be\nsaved; and no other being can be recognized but the absolute\n\"substance,\" with its infinite \"attributes\" and its finite \"modes.\" This\nconsideration appears to us to be fatal to the whole theory. For it\nshows that the Pantheistic speculations, which are directed against _the\npersonality of God_, are equally conclusive, if they be conclusive at\nall, against _the personality of Man_; that they run counter to the\nintuitive knowledge of the human mind; and that they cannot be embraced\nwithout doing violence to some of our clearest and surest convictions.\nFor what clearer or surer conviction can there be than that of my own\npersonal existence, as a distinct, self-conscious, intelligent, active,\nand responsible being? And yet the existence of our own bodies and souls\nis denied, except in so far as they are mere \"modes\" or affections of\nthe one uncreated \"substance,\" which is known, not by experience or\nobservation, but by a transcendental faculty of intuition.\n\nAnd, _finally_, the system of Spinoza is vicious, because the\nexposition of it is replete with the most manifest and glaring\nself-contradictions. His logical power has been so much admired, and his\nrigorous geometrical method so highly extolled, that his Philosophy has\nacquired a certain _prestige_, which commends it to many ardent,\nspeculative minds. Yet there are few philosophical writers who have made\na larger number of gratuitous assumptions, or who have abounded more in\ncontradictory statements. The \"Antinomies\" of Spinoza might make the\nsubject of an amusing, and even instructive, dissertation. Thus, by way\nof specimen, take the following:\n\nGod is extended; but, nevertheless, incorporeal.\n\nGod thinks; but, nevertheless, has no intelligence.\n\nGod is active; but, nevertheless, has no will.\n\nThe soul is a \"mode\" of the Divine thought; but, nevertheless, there is\nno analogy between God's thought and man's thought.\n\nThe love of God is the supreme law of man; but, nevertheless, it is\nequally lawful for man to live according to appetite or to reason.\n\nThe will of man, is, in no sense, free; but, nevertheless, there is a\nscience of human ethics.\n\nMan is under no natural obligation to obey God; but, nevertheless, God\nis his highest good.\n\nGod is neither a Lawgiver nor a Governor; but, nevertheless, a future\nstate is necessary, that every man may have his due.\n\nMight is Right, and Government has power to restrain \"the liberty of\nProphesying;\" but, nevertheless, has no power to restrain \"the liberty\nof Philosophizing.\"\n\nThese are only a few specimens of the gratuitous assumptions and\nflagrant contradictions with which his writings abound; but they afford\na sufficient proof of the reckless character of his genius, and of the\nutter fallacy of the system which he promulgated as a rival, or as a\nsubstitute, for Natural and Revealed Religion.\n\nOn a review of what has been advanced, it must be manifest that the\nPantheistic system of Spinoza is founded on principles assumed without\nproof, and embodied in his \"definitions;\" that it is constructed\naccording to a philosophical method which is radically vicious; that it\nabounds in self-contradictory statements; and that it is opposed, at\nmany points, to some of the clearest lessons of experience, and to some\nof the surest convictions of reason. It is a system which is not\ndemonstrated, but merely developed. The germ of it exists in the\n\"definitions;\" deny these, and you destroy his whole philosophy. It\ncannot, therefore, be held sufficient to foreclose the question\nrespecting the existence of a living, personal God, distinct from Nature\nand independent of it; nor can Pantheism, in this form, become the\nsuccessful rival of Christian Theism, until the human mind has lost the\npower of discriminating between the different kinds of evidence to which\nthey respectively appeal.\n\n\nSECTION II.\n\nMATERIAL OR HYLOZOIC PANTHEISM.\n\nIn the system of Spinoza, the two \"attributes of _extension_ and\n_thought_\" and the corresponding \"modes\" of _body_ and _soul_, were\nequally recognized, and were employed jointly, in connection with his\nfavorite doctrine of Unisubstancisme. They constituted the opposite\npoles of his theory, but were both essential to its completeness. But\nmost of his followers, influenced by an excessive desire for\nsimplification, have attempted to blend the two into one; and have\neither merged the spiritual in the corporeal, or virtually annihilated\nthe material by resolving it into the mental. Hence two distinct, and\neven opposite forms of Pantheism,--the _material_ or _hylozoic_, and the\n_ideal_ or _spiritual_.\n\nThe former was the first in the order of historical development, so far\nas modern Europe is concerned. It was most in accordance with the\nSensational Philosophy which prevailed in the school of Condillac,[127]\nand which continued to maintain its ascendancy until it was assailed by\nthe reviving spirit of Idealism. It was the characteristic feature of\nthe Atheism of the last century, and was fully exhibited in the \"Systeme\nde la Nature.\" The recent revival of Idealism has done much to check its\nprogress, but it has not effected its destruction; on the contrary, the\ntheory of Material or Hylozoic Pantheism is an error as inveterate as it\nis ancient, and it is continually reappearing even in the light of the\nintellectual and spiritual Psychology of the nineteenth century.\n\nThis theory, although it has been propounded as a religious creed, rests\nmainly on a philosophical dogma. It is based ultimately on the\nsupposition that nothing exists in the universe except _matter_ and its\nlaws; that _mind_ is the product of material organization; and that all\nthe phenomena of thought, of feeling, of conscience, and even of\nreligion, may be accounted for by ascribing them to certain powers\ninherent in matter, and evolved by certain peculiarities of cerebral\nstructure. This fundamental assumption, on which the whole theory of\nHylozoic Pantheism ultimately rests, will be subjected to examination in\nthe sequel. We think that it may be best discussed separately and apart,\nfor this among other reasons, that it stands equally related to the old\nmechanical Atheism and the new material Pantheism, and that, in point of\nfact, it has been applied indifferently to the support of both. Our\nremarks at present, therefore, will be directed, not to the refutation\nof Materialism, but to the exposition and exposure of the Pantheism\nwhich has been founded upon it.\n\nIt is not easy--perhaps it might be found, on trial, to be\nimpossible--to show that there is any real difference, except in name,\nbetween mechanical Atheism and material Pantheism. Both equally affirm\nthe self-existence and eternity of the Universe; both equally deny the\nfact of creation, and the doctrine of a living, personal God, distinct\nfrom nature, and superior to it. The only apparent difference between\nthe two consists in this,--that the former speaks more of the rude\nmaterials, and the cold, hard, unbending laws, which exist in Nature;\nthe latter speaks more of the vital powers, the subtle and ethereal\nforces, which are at work in her bosom, and which may seem to impart\nwarmth and animation to a system that would otherwise be felt to be\ncold, inert, and deathlike. But the mechanical Atheist never denied the\nvital powers of Nature, he only attempted to account for them without an\nintelligent first Cause; and the material Pantheist has little, if any,\nadvantage over him, except in this, that he has combined Chemistry with\nMechanics in attempting to account for the phenomena of the universe,\nand has drawn his analogies from the laboratory and the crucible, the\nprocess of vegetation, and the laws of reproduction and growth, not less\nthan from the formulae of Physical Science.\n\nThe theory of Material Pantheism runs insensibly into one or other of\nthe forms of naked Atheism to which we have already referred. Ignoring\nthe existence of mind, or of any spiritual Power distinct from Nature\nand superior to it, it must necessarily hold the eternal existence of\nmatter; and, in this respect, it coincides entirely with the Atheistic\nhypothesis. It may, or it may not, hold also the eternal existence of\nthe present _order of Nature_, including all the varieties of vegetable\nand animal life. In the one case, it harmonizes with the ancient theory\nof Atheism, as maintained by Ocellus Lucanus; in the other, it must run\ninto the modern theory of Development, if it makes any attempt to\naccount for the origin of new races, as made known by the researches of\nGeologists. In either case, it is equivalent to Atheism, and dependent\non one or other of the various theories which have been applied to the\ndefence of the Atheist's creed.\n\nIt is worthy of remark, in this connection, how frequently those who are\nthe most daring and decided advocates of Atheism or Pantheism do\nnevertheless ascribe to Nature many of the attributes which belong to\nGod only. This fact is admirably illustrated by the distinguished\nfounder of the Boyle Lectureship;[128] and it is abundantly confirmed by\nexamples which have been furnished by more recent times. The author of\nthe \"System of Nature,\" which appeared before the first French\nRevolution, was an avowed and most reckless Atheist;[129] yet he\nascribes to Nature most of the attributes which are usually supposed to\nbelong to God, such as self-existence, eternity, immutability,\ninfinitude, and unity; and if the _intellectual_ and _moral_ attributes\nmay seem to be omitted, as they must be, to some extent, in any system\nof Atheism, yet _thought_, _design_, and _will_, are expressly ascribed\nto Nature.[130] And the only difference between the Theist and the\nAtheist is said to be, that the latter ascribes all the phenomena of\nNature \"to material, natural, sensible, and known causes,\" while the\nformer ascribes them to \"spiritual, supernatural, unintelligible, and\nunknown causes;\" or, in other words, \"to an _occult cause_.\"[131] It is\nmanifestly a matter of indifference whether this method of accounting\nfor the phenomena of Nature be called Atheism or Pantheism; in either\naspect it is essentially the same.\n\nThe more recent advocates of Atheism or Pantheism have often made use of\nsimilar language. M. Crousse affirms that \"all nature is _animated_ by\nan internal force which moves it;\" that this is the true _spontaneity_,\nthe _causality_, which is the origin of all sensible manifestations, for\n\"_mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet_;\" that \"matter, the most\ncold and indifferent, is full of life, capable of engendering thought,\nand containing mind in it, at least _potentially_;\" and that, to every\nman who has true insight, \"the world feels, moves, speaks, and\nthinks.\"[132] The author of \"The Purpose of Existence\" makes it his\ngrand object to show that \"the evolvement of mind out of matter\" is the\nprimary law and final cause of the universe; that \"this process\ncommences with vegetation, extracting from matter the spirit of\nvitality;\" that \"this spirit is preserved amid the decay of vegetables,\nand transfused into animals, thus establishing the great\nworking-principle of Nature, that spirit is extracted from matter by\norganized bodies, and survives their dissolution.\"[133] Of course, if\nmatter have the power of evolving intelligent and even immortal minds by\nits own inherent properties and established laws, it will not be\ndifficult to find in Nature a sufficient substitute for God.\n\nBut the most revolting specimen of that material Pantheism, which is\nonly another name for absolute Atheism, that has recently appeared,\noccurs in the Letters of Atkinson and Martineau: \"We require no\nsupernatural causes, when we can recognize adequate natural causes,\n_inherent in the constitution of Nature_;\" \"nor are more causes to be\nadmitted than are sufficient to produce any particular change or\neffect.\"--\"Man has his place in Natural History; his nature does not\nessentially differ from that of the lower animals; he is but a fuller\ndevelopment, and varied condition, of the same fundamental nature or\ncause,--of _that which we contemplate as matter_, and its changes,\nrelations, and properties. Mind is the consequence or product of the\nmaterial man, its existence depending on the action of the brain.\"--\"Its\nhighest object seems to be, a sense of the infinite and abstract\npower,--_the inherent force and principle of Nature_.\"[134]\n\nFrom these specimens it must be evident that whatever nominal\ndistinction may exist between Material Pantheism and avowed Atheism,\nthey are radically identical, and that, for all practical purposes, they\nmay be treated as one and the same. From the same specimens we may\nderive some useful hints respecting the essential conditions and the\nright conduct of the Theistic argument. It is not enough to show that\nthere must be a self-existent, eternal, and infinite First Cause, for\nthis is admitted by the advocate of Material Pantheism, who substitutes\nNature for God. It is further necessary to show that the actual\nphenomena of the Universe cannot be accounted for by means of any\nproperties or powers inherent in itself; and that they must be ascribed\nto a living, intelligent, and powerful Being, distinct from Nature and\nsuperior to it. The theory of Materialism must be discussed on its own\nproper and peculiar merits, and if we find good cause to reject it, the\nmain pillar of Material Pantheism will fall to the ground. In the mean\ntime we shall only further observe, that this form of Pantheism cannot\nbe maintained without the help either of the doctrine of the Eternity of\nMatter or of the Theory of Development, or, rather, without the aid of\nboth; and that, if it could be established, Polytheism would be its\nnatural product, if not its inevitable result.\n\n\nSECTION III.\n\nIDEAL PANTHEISM.\n\nWe have already seen that the system of Spinoza equally recognized the\ntwo \"attributes\" of extension and thought, and the two corresponding\n\"modes\" of body and soul, in connection with the one infinite and\neternal \"Substance.\" We have also seen that most of his followers have\ntaken a one-sided view of the subject, and have either merged the\nspiritual into the corporeal, so as to educe a Material or Hylozoic\nPantheism, or have virtually annihilated the material by resolving it\ninto the mental, so as to educe a system of Ideal or Spiritual\nPantheism.\n\n\"In Spinoza,\" says Mr. Morell, \"we see the model upon which the modern\nIdealists of Germany have renewed their search into the absolute ground\nof all phenomena;\" and there can be no doubt that his speculations\ncontain the germ of Ideal as well as of Material Pantheism. The\nhistorical filiation of modern Pantheism cannot be satisfactorily\nexplained, in either of its two forms, without reference to his\nwritings; and yet its precise character, as it is developed in more\nrecent systems, demands for its full elucidation some knowledge of the\ncourse and progress of philosophical speculation in the interval which\nelapsed between the death of Spinoza and the subsequent developments of\nhis theory.\n\nWe cannot here attempt to trace the history of German Idealism, from its\nsource in the writings of Leibnitz, through the logical school of\nWolfius and his successors, till it reached its culminating point in the\nphilosophy of Hegel:--we shall content ourselves with a brief reference\nto the fundamental principles of Kant's system, which may be justly said\nto have contained the prolific germs, or, at least, to have determined\nthe prevailing character, of all the subsequent speculations of the\nGerman schools. For if modern Pantheism be indebted to Spinoza for its\n_substance_, it is equally indebted to Kant for its _form_; and no\nintelligible account can be given of the phases which it has\nsuccessively assumed, without reference to the powerful influence which\nhis Philosophy, in one or other of its constituent elements, has exerted\non all his successors in the same field of inquiry.\n\nThe Philosophy of Kant has a most important bearing on the whole\nquestion as to the validity of the natural evidence for the being and\nperfections of God. We shall confine our attention to those parts of his\nsystem which give rise to the speculations that have issued in the\nrecent theories of Ideal or Spiritual Pantheism.\n\nIn attempting to explain the nature and origin of the whole system of\nhuman knowledge, Kant divides our intellectual being into _three_\ndistinct faculties,--sensation, understanding, and reason. He supposes\nthat from sensation we derive the whole _matter_ of our knowledge; that\nfrom the understanding we derive its _form_, or the manner in which it\nis conceived of by us; and that from reason we derive certain general or\nabstract notions, which are highly useful, since they give a systematic\nunity to human thought, but which have no _objective validity_, that is,\neither no reality in nature that corresponds to them, or none, at least,\nthat can be scientifically demonstrated. From this fundamental principle\nof his system it follows, that the only part of our knowledge which has\nany objective reality is that which is derived from our\nsense-perceptions, all else being purely _formal or subjective_, and\narising solely from the laws of our own mental nature, which determine\nus to conceive of things in a particular way; and that even that part of\nour knowledge which is derived from sense-perception is purely\nphenomenal, since we know nothing of any object around us beyond the\nbare fact that it exists, and that it appears to us to be as our senses\nrepresent it. Hence the _skeptical_ tendency of Kant's speculations, in\nso far as the scientific certainty of our knowledge is concerned. The\n_practical utility_ of that knowledge is not disputed, but its\n_objective reality_, or the possibility of proving it, is, to a large\nextent, denied. Still he admits a primitive _dualism_, and a radical\ndistinction between _the subject and the object_, between the mind which\nthinks and the matter of its thoughts. The _matter_ comes from without,\nthe _form_ from within; and the senses are the channels through which\nthe phenomena of nature are poured into the mould of the human mind. All\nknowledge implies this combination of _matter_ with _form_, and is\npossible only on the supposition of the concurrent action both of the\n_object_ and _subject_; not that either of the two is known to us in its\nessence, or that their real existence can be scientifically\ndemonstrated, for we know the subject only in its relation to the\nobject, and the object only in its relation to the subject; but that\nthis _relation_ necessarily requires the joint action of both, by which\nalone we can acquire the only knowledge of which we are capable, and\nwhich is supposed to be purely phenomenal, relative, and subjective. It\nis true that we are capable of forming certain grand ideas, such as that\nof God, the universe, and the soul; but these are the pure products of\nReason, the mere personifications of our own modes of thinking, and have\nno objective reality, at least none that can be scientifically\ndemonstrated. But, while \"the Speculative Reason\" is held to be\nincompetent to prove the existence of God, \"the Practical Reason\" is\nappealed to; and in the conscious liberty of the soul, and its sense of\nincumbent moral duty,--\"the Categorical Imperative,\"--Kant finds\nmaterials for reconstructing the basis and fabric of a true Theology,\nnot scientifically perfect, but practically sufficient for all the\npurposes of life.\n\nIt was scarcely possible that Philosophy could find a permanent\nresting-place in such a theory as this; for, while it recognized both\nthe \"object\" and the \"subject\" as equally indispensable, the one for the\n_matter_, the other for the _form_, of human knowledge, it did not hold\nthe balance even between the two. It assigned so much to the \"subject,\"\nand so little to the \"object,\" and made so large a part of our knowledge\nmerely formal and subjective, that it could neither be regarded as a\nself-consistent system of Skepticism, nor yet as a satisfactory basis\nfor Scientific Belief. It was almost inevitable that speculative minds,\nstarting from this point, should diverge into one or other of _three_\ncourses; either following the line of the \"subject\" exclusively, and\ntreating the \"object\" as a superfluous incumbrance, so as to reach, as\nSchulz and Maimon did, a pure Subjective Idealism, akin to utter\nSkepticism; or following the line of the \"object,\" and giving it greater\nprominence than it had in the system of Kant, so as to lay the\nfoundation, as Jacobi and Herbart did, of a system of Objective\nCertitude; or keeping _both_ in view, and attempting, as Fichte,\nSchelling, and Hegel did, to blend the two into one, so as to reduce\nthem to systematic unity.[135]\n\nIn Kant's system a _dualism_ was admitted, a real distinction between\nthe \"subject\" and \"object\" of thought; but he had ascribed so much to\nthe subject, and so little to the object, that Fichte conceived the idea\nof dispensing with the latter altogether, and constructing his whole\nphilosophy on a purely subjective basis. Since Kant had taught that all\nobjects are conceived of either according to the forms of our\nsensational faculty, or the categories of our understanding, or the\nideas of pure reason, it seemed to be unnecessary to suppose the\nexistence of any object distinct from the mind itself. For if it be the\nmind which furnishes the form of Space, and gives us the idea of\nSubstance, of Cause, of Being, the mind alone might suffice to account\nfor the whole sum of human knowledge. Fichte was followed by Schelling,\nand Schelling by Hegel, each differing from his predecessor, but all\nconcurring in the attempt _to identify \"Seyn,\" or absolute Being, with\nThought_, and to represent everything in the universe as a mere mode or\nmanifestation of one Infinite Essence. The _identity_ of Existence and\nThought is the fundamental principle of Hegel's doctrine. With him,\nBeing and the Idea of being, are the same; and Being and Thought are\ncombined in the \"Absolute,\" which is at once ideal and real (l'etre and\nl'idee). With him, the idea of God is that of _a logical process of\nthought_, \"ever unfolding itself, but never unfolded,\"--a dialectic\nmovement rather than a Divine Being, which realizes itself, and reaches\na state of self-consciousness in man. God, nature, and man, are but one\nprocess of thought, considered in different aspects; all finite\npersonalities are only so many thoughts of one eternal mind; God is in\nman, and man is in God, and the progress of humanity, in all its stages,\nis a Divine development.\n\nThis bare outline of these systems must suffice for our present purpose,\nand we now proceed to offer a few remarks on the doctrine of Ideal as\ndistinguished from Material Pantheism.\n\n1. The whole system of \"Idealism,\" as propounded in the German schools,\nis utterly baseless, and contradicts the intuitive, the universal\nconvictions of the human mind. For what is Idealism? Reduced to its\nutmost simplicity, and expressed in the briefest formula, it amounts, in\nsubstance, to this: _that the whole universe is to us a mere process of\nthought_, and that nothing exists, or, at least, can be known by us,\nbeyond _the ideas of our own minds_. And what is the ground on which it\nrests? It rests entirely on the assumption, that, since we can know\nnothing otherwise than through the exercise of our mental faculties,\nthese faculties must be the sole sources of all our knowledge, and\naltogether independent of any external object. According to this theory,\nthe mind is not informed or instructed by the universe, but the universe\nis created by the mind; the objective is developed from the subjective;\nand there is no reality anywhere except in the region of consciousness.\nNature is seen only as it is imaged in the mirror within; and to us it\nis a mere phantasmagoria, a series of phenomena, a succession of\nthoughts. \"The sum total,\" says Fichte, \"is this; there is absolutely\nnothing permanent, either without me or within me, but only an unceasing\nchange. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own.\nI myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images there are; they constitute\nall that apparently exists; and what they know of themselves is after\nthe manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being\naught to witness their transition; that consist, in fact, of the images\nof images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of\nthese images; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of\nimages. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life\nto dream of, and without a mind to dream,--into a dream made up only of\na dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought--the source of all\nexistence, and all the reality which I imagine to myself of _my_\nexistence, of my power, of my destination--is the dream of that\ndream.\"[136]\n\nThe tendency of such speculations as these towards universal Skepticism,\nor even absolute Nihilism, with the exception only of certain fleeting\nphenomena of Consciousness, is too apparent to require any formal proof;\nand it must be equally evident that they contradict some of the most\nuniversal and deeply-rooted convictions of the human mind. The ultimate\nground of every system of Idealism which excludes the knowledge of an\nexternal world must be one or other of these two assumptions, or a\ncombination of both: either, that our knowledge cannot extend beyond the\nrange of consciousness, which takes cognizance only of ideas, or of\nsubjective mental states; or that any attempt to extend it beyond these\nlimits, so as to embrace external objects as really existing, can only\nbe successful on this condition,--that we _prove_, by reasoning from the\nsubjective to the objective, that there is a necessary _logical_\nconnection between the state of the one and the reality of the other.\nEach of these assumptions is equally groundless. It is true that\nconsciousness, strictly so called, takes cognizance only of what passes\nwithin; it is not true that consciousness, in this restricted sense, is\ncommensurate with our entire knowledge. It is true that we acquire our\nknowledge only through the exercise of our mental faculties; it is not\ntrue that our mental faculties are the only sources of our knowledge,\nnor even that, without the concurrence of certain objects, they could\ngive us any knowledge at all. It is true that there must be a connection\nbetween the subjective and the objective; it is not true that this\nconnection must be established by _reasoning_, or that we must _prove_\nthe existence of an external world distinct from the thinking mind,\nbefore we are entitled to believe in it. For a great part of our\nknowledge is _presentative_, and we directly perceive the objects of\nNature not less than the phenomena of Consciousness.\n\nWhen it is said, in the jargon of the modern German philosophy, that\n\"the Ego has no immediate consciousness of the Non-Ego as existing, but\nthat the Non-Ego is only represented to us in a modification of the\nself-conscious Ego, and is, in fact, only a phenomenon of the Ego,\"--a\nplain, practical Englishman, little tolerant of these subtle\ndistinctions, might be ready, if not deterred by the mere sound of the\nwords, to test them by a particular example. What am I to think, he\nmight say, of my own father and mother? They are familiarly known to me.\nI have seen them, and talked with, them, and loved them as my own soul.\nI have hitherto believed that they existed, and that they were really a\nfather and mother to me. But now I am taught that they are--mere\nmodifications of my own mind; that they are nothing more than simple\nphenomena of the self-conscious Ego; and that, so far from being the\nearthly authors of my existence, they are themselves--the creation and\noffspring of my own thought. And on what ground am I asked to receive\nthis astonishing discovery? Why, simply because I can be sure of nothing\nbut the facts of consciousness. But how are _these facts proved_? They\n\"need no proof; they are self-evident; they are immediately and\nirresistibly believed.\" Be it so. I can just as little doubt of the\nexistence of my body, of the distinct personality of my parents, and the\nreality of an external universe, as of any fact of consciousness. May it\nnot be, whether we can explain it or not, that the one set of facts is\nas directly _presented_, and needs as little to be _proved_, as the\nother?\n\n2. The doctrine of \"Identity\" constitutes a prominent and indispensable\npart of the theory of Idealism, and is the ground-principle of\nPhilosophical Pantheism. It amounts, in substance, to the proposition,\nthat Existence and Thought are _one_, that the \"subject\" and \"object\" of\nknowledge are _one_. \"If the doctrine of Identity means anything, it\nmeans that Thought and Being are essentially one; that the process of\n_thinking_ is virtually the same as the process of _creating_; that in\nconstructing the universe by logical deduction, we do virtually the same\nthing as Deity accomplishes in developing himself in all the forms and\nregions of creation; that every man's reason, therefore, is really God;\nin fine, that Deity is the whole sum of consciousness immanent in the\nworld.\"[137] It is through the medium of this doctrine of Identity that\nIdealism passes into Pantheism,--not, indeed, the Idealism of Berkeley,\nwhich recognized, consistently or otherwise, the existence of the human\nmind and of the Divine Spirit, while it denied the independent\nexistence of matter,--but the Idealism of Fichte and others, which\nresolved mind into a mere process of thought, a continuous stream or\nsuccession of ideas. To _such_ a theory the doctrine of Identity was\nindispensable. Its advocates were bound to show that nothing existed, or\ncould be proved to exist, in the universe but _thought_, and that, in\nevery case, the _subject_ and _object_ of thought might be identified as\none. We find, accordingly, that from the earliest ages down to the\npresent time, the idea of \"absolute unity,\" or \"universal identity,\" has\nbeen frequently exhibited in connection with the speculations of\nphilosophical Idealists. The disciples of the Eleatic school in ancient\nGreece, not less than those of the modern schools of Germany, insisted\non the identity of thought and its object, and regarded everything that\nmight seem to be external to the mind as a mere illusion.\n\nIt may be difficult for the British mind, familiarized from infancy with\nthe philosophy of common sense, to grasp the idea which this doctrine\ninvolves; but, on the principles of absolute Idealism, it may be easily\nexplained, and may even seem to have some foundation in facts that must\nbe acknowledged by all. There are _two_ cases, particularly, which may\nserve to illustrate, if they cannot suffice to prove, it. The first is\nthat of the Supreme Intelligence, conceived as existing before the\nproduction of a created universe, when He was himself the sole \"subject\"\nand the sole \"object\" of thought; in other words, the absolute\n\"Subject-Object.\" The second is that of the human consciousness,\nconceived as occupied solely with certain subjective mental states, when\nthe mind may be said to be at once the \"subject\" and the \"object\" of its\nown thought. There are cases, then, in which mind may be regarded as a\n\"subject-object;\" the case of human consciousness, when the mind takes\ncognizance of its own states or acts, and the case of the Divine\nconsciousness, while as yet the created universe had not been called\ninto being. But the question is, whether, _in all cases_, the \"subject\"\nand \"object\" of thought are the same? or, whether existence and thought\nare _universally_ identical? An affirmative answer to this question\nwould imply, that nothing whatever exists except only in the mind that\nperceives it; that, according to Bishop Berkeley, \"the existence of\nunthinking things without any relation to their being perceived\" is an\nabsurd or impossible supposition; that \"their _esse_ is _percipi_,\" that\nis, that their being consists in their being perceived or known; whence\nit would follow, as Berkeley himself admits, that we have no reason to\nbelieve in the continued existence of the desk at which we write, after\nwe have left the room in which we see it, excepting such as may arise\nfrom the supposition, that if we returned to that room we might still\nsee it, or that in our absence it may still be perceived by some other\nmind. Existence is identified with thought, and nothing exists save only\nas it is thought of. Why? Simply because it can become known to us only\nthrough the medium of consciousness, and that, too, in no other\ncharacter than as _a phenomenon of our own minds_.\n\nThat this doctrine is at direct variance with the universal convictions\nof mankind, is too evident to require the slightest proof. That it is\n_unphilosophical_, as well as _unpopular_, may be made apparent by two\nvery simple considerations. The _first_ is, that it assumes without\nproof the only point in question, namely, that the objects of our\nknowledge are nothing but the ideas of our own minds; whereas it is\naffirmed, on the other side, and surely with at least an equal amount of\napparent reason, that we are so constituted as to have a direct\nperception of external objects as well as of internal mental states. The\n_second_ is, that the very formula of Idealism, which represents the\n\"Non-ego\" as a mere modification of the conscious \"Ego,\" seems to\ninvolve a palpable contradiction; since it recognizes, in a certain\nsense, _the difference between the \"Ego and the Non-ego,\"_ and yet, in\nthe same breath, annihilates that difference, and proclaims their\n\"identity.\"[138] Fichte admits, indeed, that we have the idea of\nsomething which is _not-self_; but instead of ascribing it to an\nexternal object, he accounts for it by a law of our mental nature, which\nconstrains us to _create a limit_, so as to give a determinate character\nto our thought. The three technical formulas, therefore, which are\nsaid[139] to express, respectively,--the affirmation of self,--the\naffirmation of not-self,--and the determination of the one by the\nother,--are all equally the products of our own mental laws, and do not\nnecessarily require the supposition of any external object; and hence it\nfollows that Self is the one only absolute principle, and that\neverything else that is conceived of is constructed out of purely\nsubjective materials. The question whether the \"object\" be the\ngenerative principle of the \"idea,\" or _vice versa_, is thus superseded;\nfor there is no longer any distinction between \"object\" and \"subject;\"\nexistence is identified with thought; the _Ego_ and the _Non-ego_ unite\nin one absolute existence; and Self becomes the sole Subject-object, the\npercipient and the perceived, the knowing and the known.\n\nOf course, on this theory, there is no knowledge of God, just as there\ncan be no knowledge of Nature, and no knowledge of our fellow-men, as\ndistinct objective realities; it is a system of pure Idealism, which, if\nconsistently followed out, must terminate in utter _skepticism_ in\nregard to many of the most familiar objects of human knowledge; or,\nrather, in the hands of a thoroughly consequent reasoner, it must issue,\nas Jacobi endeavored to show, in absolute _Nihilism_; since we can have\nno better reason for believing in the existence of Self than we have\nfor believing in the reality of an external world, and the coexistence\nof our fellow-men. Each of these beliefs is equally the spontaneous\nproduct of certain mental laws, which are just as trustworthy, and need\nas little to be proved, in the one case as in the other.\n\nFichte seems to have become aware of this fundamental defect of his\nsystem; and, at a later period, he attempted to give it a firmer basis\nby representing _self_, not as individual, but as Divine, that is, as\nthe Absolute manifesting itself in Man. He now admitted what, if he had\nnot denied, he had overlooked before, an essential reality as the\nsubstratum both of the _Ego_ and _Non-ego;_ a reality of which all\nthings, whether within or without, are only so many \"modes\" or\nmanifestations. And it is at this point that his subjective Idealism\npasses into Pantheism, and that we mark the close affinity between his\nspeculations and those of Spinoza. There is, in some respects, a wide\ndifference between the two; Spinoza assumed, Fichte denied, the\nexistence of matter; the former affirmed Substance to be the absolute\nand infinite Essence; the latter proclaimed a spiritual universe, whose\nessence was the infinite reason, or the Divine idea: but still, with\nthese and other points of difference, there existed a real, radical\naffinity between the two systems, that of Fichte, not less than that of\nSpinoza, being based on _the identity of existence and thought_; and\nboth systems being directed to show that there is but one Absolute\nBeing, of which all phenomena, whether material or mental, are only so\nmany modes or manifestations.\n\n3. The philosophy of \"the absolute,\" as applied in support of German\nPantheism, depends on the doctrine of \"Identity,\" and must stand or fall\nalong with it.[140] The \"absolute\" is described as being at once\n_ideal_ and _real_, pure _being_ and pure _thought_, and as developing\nitself in a great variety of forms. The philosophy of the \"absolute\" is\nrepresented as the _only science_, properly so called: it is assumed\nthat there can be no science of the finite, the variable, the\ncontingent, the relative, but only of the absolute, the unchangeable,\nand the infinite. To constitute _this_ science, the doctrine of\n\"identity\" is indispensable; the subject and the object of thought,\nknowledge and being, must be reduced to scientific unity. Realism and\nIdealism are thus blended together, or rather identified in the\nphilosophy of the \"absolute.\" The idea of the \"absolute,\" in which\n_being_ and _thought_ are identical, is the only foundation of science,\nand the ultimate ground of all certitude. And Pantheism is inferred from\nthis idea; for the \"absolute,\" in which _being_ and _thought_ are\nidentified, is properly _the sole existence_, which develops and\nmanifests itself in a great variety of finite forms.\n\nWe are not disposed to treat the philosophy of the \"absolute\" either\nwith levity or with scorn. We feel that it brings us into contact with\nsome of the most profound and most deeply mysterious problems of human\nthought. Finite as we are, we are so constituted that we cannot avoid\nframing the _idea_, although we can never attain to a _comprehension_,\nof the Infinite. There are absolute truths, and necessary truths, among\nthe elements of human knowledge. Account for them as we may, their\nreality cannot be reasonably denied, nor their importance disparaged.\nThere is a tendency--and a most useful one--in the human mind, to seek\nunity in all things, to trace effects to causes, to reduce phenomena to\nlaws, to resolve the complex into the simple, and to rise from the\ncontingent to the absolute, from the finite to the infinite. There are\nfew more interesting inquiries in the department of Psychology than that\nwhich seeks to investigate the nature, the origin, and the validity of\nthose ideas which introduce us into the region of absolute, eternal,\nand immutable Truth; and it were a lamentable result of the erratic\nspeculations of Germany did they serve to cast discredit on this\ninquiry, or even to excite a prejudice against it, in the more sober,\nbut not less profound, minds of our own countrymen. But there need be\nlittle apprehension on this score, if it be clearly understood and\ncarefully remembered, that the philosophy of the absolute, as taught in\nGermany and applied in support of Pantheism, rests ultimately on the\ntheory of Idealism and the doctrine of Identity, by which all is\nresolved into one absolute \"subject-object,\" and _existence_ is\nidentified with _thought_. _This_ system may be discarded, and yet there\nmay still remain a sound, wholesome, and innocuous philosophy of the\n\"absolute;\" a philosophy which does not seek to identify things so\ngenerically different as _existence_ and _thought_, or to reduce mind\nand matter, the finite and the infinite, to the same category; but\nwhich, recognizing the differences subsisting between the various\nobjects of thought, seeks merely to investigate the nature and sources\nof that part of human knowledge which relates to absolute or necessary\ntruths. The former of these rival systems may be favorable to Pantheism,\nthe latter will be found to be in entire accordance with Christian\nTheism.\n\nThe fundamental principle of philosophical Pantheism is either _the\nunity of substance_, as taught by Spinoza, or _the identity of existence\nand thought_, as taught, with some important variations, by Fichte,\nSchelling, and Hegel. The Absolute is conceived of, not as a living\nBeing to whom a proper personality and certain intelligible attributes\nmay be ascribed, but as a vague, indeterminate _somewhat_, which has no\ndistinctive character, and of which, in the first instance, or prior to\nits development, almost nothing can be either affirmed or denied. But\nthis absolute existence, by some unknown, inherent necessity, develops,\ndetermines, and limits itself: it becomes being, and constitutes all\nbeing: the infinite passes into the finite, the absolute into the\nrelative, the necessary into the contingent, the one into the many; all\nother existences are only so many modes or forms of its manifestation.\nHere is a theory which, to say the very least, is neither more\nintelligible, nor less mysterious, than any article of the Christian\nfaith. And what are the proofs to which it appeals, what the principles\non which it rests? Its two fundamental positions are these; that finite\nthings have no distinct existence as realities in nature, and that there\nexists only one Absolute Being, manifesting itself in a variety of\nforms. And how are they demonstrated? Simply by the affirmation of\nuniversal \"Identity.\" But what if this affirmation be denied? What if,\nfounding on the clearest data of consciousness, we refuse to acknowledge\nthat _existence_ is identical with _thought_?[141] What if we continue\nto believe that there are objects of thought which are distinct from\nthought itself, and which must be _presented_ to the mind before they\ncan be _represented_ by the mind? What if, while we recognize the idea\nboth of the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute, the\ncontingent and the necessary, we cannot, by the utmost effort of our\nreason, obliterate the difference between them, so as to reduce them to\none absolute essence? Then the whole superstructure of Pantheism falls\nalong with the Idealism on which it depends; and it is found to be, not\na solid and enduring system of truth, but a frail edifice, ingeniously\nconstructed out of the mere abstractions of the human mind.\n\nThe advocates of this system assume that the relations which subsist\nbetween _beings_ are the same as the relations which subsist between our\n_ideas_, and infer that _logic_ is sufficient to construct a system of\n_metaphysic_. But Professor Nicolas has well said, that \"while it is\ncertain we cannot know things but by the notions which we have of them,\nand a certain parallelism may thus be established between _what exists_\nand _what we think_ of that which exists, yet from this to the\n_identity of being and thought_, such as Pantheism requires, there is a\nvast distance, and we have no ground for believing that the _logical\nrelations_ of our ideas are identical with the _real relations_ of\nbeings. Speculative Pantheism is wholly built on this assumption. It\ndescribes the relations of being according to the logical relations of\nour thought; and it takes _logic_ for a kind of _metaphysic_. It\nconfounds the laws of thought with the laws of being. It seeks to solve\nthe question, What is the first Being, and what are its relations to\nother beings? That Being must necessarily be the condition of all other\nbeings, and must virtually contain them all; nay, it must be capable of\nbecoming all things. It must therefore be simple, indeterminate,\nindifferent, possessing no essential character, resembling nothing that\nwe actually know. All this is true of our _ideas_, but not of _beings_.\nThe highest idea,--that which is the logical condition of all others, and\nalso the most general, the most abstract, the most indeterminate,--this\nidea contains all others, and by receiving this or that determination, it\nbecomes this or that particular idea. But what is true of the _idea_ is\nnot true of the _being_; no such vague, indeterminate, indifferent being\nexists; and yet Pantheism confounds _the idea_ with _the being_, and\nrests entirely on that confusion of thought.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn bringing our review of Modern Pantheism to a close, we may offer a\nfew remarks illustrative of its _nature and tendency_, whether\nconsidered as a system of speculative thought, or as a substitute for\nreligious belief.\n\nIn this view, it is important to observe, first of all, that the theory\nof \"Idealism,\" and the doctrine of \"Identity,\" which constitute the\ngroundwork of the more spiritual form of Pantheism, are not more adverse\nto our belief in the existence and personality of God, than they are to\nour belief in the reality of an external world, or in the existence and\npersonality of man himself. They stand equally related to each of these\n_three_ topics; and, if they be accepted at all, they must be\nimpartially applied, and consistently carried out into all their\nlegitimate consequences, as the only philosophical solution of the whole\nquestion of Ontology. Perhaps this is not understood; certainly it has\nnot been duly considered by the more superficial _litterateurs_, who\nhave been slightly tinctured with Pantheism; but it will be acknowledged\nat once by every consistent Idealist, who understands his own\nphilosophy, and who is honest or bold enough to carry it out into all\nits practical applications. He knows very well, and, if sufficiently\ncandid, he will frankly confess, that the principles on which he founds,\nif they be conclusive against the existence of a living, personal God,\nare equally conclusive against the reality of an external world, and\nagainst the doctrine of our own personality or that of our fellow-men.\nWith most minds, this consideration would be of itself a powerful\ncounteractive to all that is most dangerous in the theory of Idealism,\nwere it only clearly apprehended and steadily kept in view; for an\nargument which proves too much is justly held to prove nothing, and that\ntheory which leaves us no right to believe in the existence of Nature,\nor in the distinct personality of our fellow-men, can scarcely be held\nsufficient to disprove the existence of God.\n\nIt may be observed, further, that Ideal Pantheism has a strong tendency\nto engender a spirit either of Mysticism, on the one hand, or of\nSkepticism on the other. It terminates in Mysticism when, seeking to\navoid Skepticism, it takes refuge in the doctrine of an \"intellectual\nintuition,\" such as gives an immediate knowledge of the Absolute: and it\nterminates in Skepticism when, seeking to avoid Mysticism, it rejects\nthe doctrine of \"intellectual intuition,\" and discovers that it has no\nother and no higher claims to our confidence than such as are equally\npossessed by any one of our common faculties, whose testimony the\nIdealist has been taught to distrust and doubt.\n\nIt is further worthy of remark, that the philosophy of the Absolute, as\ntaught in the German schools, has been applied to the whole circle of\nthe Sciences, not less than to Theology, and that it has given birth to\nnumerous speculative systems, in Physics, in Chemistry, in Ethics, in\nHistory, and in Politics, all strongly marked by the same characteristic\nfeature--the substitution of _a priori and deductive_ speculation for\nthe more sober and legitimate method of Inductive inquiry. The province\nof Natural Science, in which, if anywhere, we should be guided by the\nlight of experience and observation, has been rudely invaded by this\ntranscendental philosophy, which offers to construct a theory of\nuniversal knowledge on the basis of a certain self-development of the\nAbsolute. We are indebted to Mr. Morell for a specimen,[142] alike\namusing and instructive, of Schelling's speculations on this subject. We\nshall not attempt to interpret its meaning, for, in sooth, we do not\npretend to understand it: but one thing is clear, the laws of Matter, of\nDynamics, of Organic structure and life, the laws of Knowledge, of\nAction, and of Art, are all exhibited as mere deductions or corollaries\nfrom the \"idea of the Absolute;\" and in the name of Natural Science, not\nless than on behalf of Theology, we protest against this vicious method\nof Philosophy, and do most earnestly deprecate the substitution of\nFichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in the place of our own Bacon, and Boyle,\nand Newton, as models of scientific thought.\n\nThe _practical influence_ of Pantheism, in so far as its peculiar\ntendencies are not restrained or counteracted by more salutary beliefs,\nmust be deeply injurious, both to the individual and social welfare of\nmankind. In its Ideal or Spiritual form it may be seductive to some\nardent, imaginative minds; but it is a wretched creed notwithstanding;\nand it will be found, when calmly examined, to be fraught with the most\nserious evils. It has been commended, indeed, in glowing terms, as a\ncreed alike beautiful and beneficent,--as a source of religious life\nnobler and purer than any that can ever spring from the more gloomy\nsystem of Theism: for, on the theory of Pantheism, God is manifest to\nall, everywhere, and at all times; Nature, too, is aggrandized and\nglorified, and everything in Nature is invested with a new dignity and\ninterest; above all, Man is conclusively freed from all fantastic hopes\nand superstitious fears, so that his mind can now repose, with tranquil\nsatisfaction, on the bosom of the Absolute, unmoved by the vicissitudes\nof life, and unscared even by the prospect of death. For what is death?\nThe dissolution of any living organism is but one stage in the process\nof its further development; and whether it passes into a new form of\nself-conscious life, or is reabsorbed into the infinite, it still forms\nan indestructible element in the vast sum of Being. We may, therefore,\nor, rather, we must, leave our future state to be determined by Nature's\ninexorable laws, and we need, at least, fear no Being higher than\nNature, to whose justice we are amenable, or whose frown we should\ndread.[143] But, even as it is thus exhibited by some of its warmest\npartisans, it appears to us, we own, to be a dreary and cheerless creed,\nwhen compared with that faith which teaches us to regard God as our\n\"Father in heaven,\" and that \"hope which is full of immortality.\" It is\nworse, however, than dreary; it is destructive of all religion and of\nall morality. If it be an avowed antagonist to Christianity, it is not\nless hostile to Natural Theology and to Ethical Science. It consecrates\nerror and vice, as being, equally with truth and virtue, necessary and\nbeneficial manifestations of the \"infinite.\" It is a system of\nSyncretism, founded on the idea that error is only an incomplete truth,\nand maintaining that truth must necessarily be developed by error, and\nvirtue by vice. According to this fundamental law of \"human progress,\"\nAtheism itself may be providential; and the axiom of a Fatalistic\nOptimism--\"Whatever is, is best\"--must be admitted equally in regard to\ntruth and error, to virtue and vice.\n\nIt may be further observed, that modern Pantheism, whether in its\nMaterial or Ideal form, is nothing else than the revival of some of the\nearliest and most inveterate Principles of Paganism,--the same Paganism\nwhich still flourishes among the \"theosophic\" dreamers of India, and\nwhich exhibits its practical fruits in the horrors of Hindoo\nsuperstition. For Pantheism, although repeatedly revived and exhibited\nin new forms, has made no real progress since the time when it was first\ntaught in the Vedanta system, and sublimed in the schools of Alexandria.\nChristianity, which encountered and triumphed over it in her youth, can\nhave nothing to fear from it in her mature age,[144] provided only that\nshe be faithful to herself, and spurn every offered compromise. But\nthere must be no truce, and no attempt at conciliation between the two.\nThe Pantheists of Germany have made the most impudent claims to the\nvirtual sanction of Christianity; they have even dared to make use of\nBible terms in a new sense, and have spoken of Revelation, Inspiration,\nIncarnation, Redemption, Atonement, and Regeneration, in such a way as\nto adapt them to the Pantheistic hypothesis. Common honesty is outraged,\nand the conscience of universal humanity offended, by the conduct of\nindividuals--some of them wearing the robes of the holy ministry--who\nhave substituted the dreams of Pantheism for the doctrines of Jesus\nChrist, and assailed, both from the pulpit and the press, the sacred\ncause which they had solemnly vowed to maintain. But even in Germany\nitself a powerful reaction has commenced; and the learning and labors of\nsuch men as Olshausen, and Tholuck, and Hengstenberg, may be hailed as\nthe dawn of a better and brighter day.\n\nIt may be observed, _finally_, that Pantheism stands directly opposed to\nChristian Theism in several distinct respects. The following are the\nprincipal points of collision between the two:\n\n1. Pantheism denies,--Christian Theism affirms, the existence of a\n_living, personal God_, distinct from Nature, and superior to it.\n\n2. Pantheism supersedes,--Christian Theism reveals, the doctrine of a\nreal creation.\n\n3. Pantheism contests,--Christian Theism confirms, the doctrine of the\nconstant providence and moral government of God.\n\n4. Pantheism disowns,--Christian Theism declares, the doctrine of _a\nconscious, personal immortality_.\n\n5. Pantheism rejects,--Christian Theism receives, the whole scheme of\nRevelation, considered as a supernatural code of Divine truth. The one\naccounts for its origin on the principle of natural development, the\nother on that of supernatural interposition.\n\n6. Pantheism has no living, self-conscious, personal God, no loving\nFather, no watchful Providence, no Hearer of Prayer, no Object of\nconfiding trust, no Redeemer, no Sanctifier, no Comforter: it leaves us\nwith nothing higher than Nature as our portion here, and nothing beyond\nits eternal vicissitudes as our prospect hereafter.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[103] AMAND SAINTES, \"Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza,\nFondateur de l'Exegese et de la Philosophie Modernes.\"\n\n[104] M. COUSIN, \"Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie,\" I. 403. See\nalso \"Fragmens Philosophiques,\" Preface, second edition, p. XXVII.;\n\"Nouveaux Fragments,\" pp. 9, 160.\n\n[105] M. AD. FRANCK, \"De la Certitude,\" Preface, p. XXI.\n\n[106] M. A. JAVARI, \"De la Certitude,\" p. 509.\n\n[107] AMAND SAINTES, \"Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza,\"\npp. 208, 210.\n\n[108] ABBE MARET, \"Essai sur le Pantheisme dans les Societes Modernes,\"\npp. 6, 11, 31. Ibid., \"Theodicee Chretienne,\" pp. 437, 444, 449.\n\n[109] MR. MORELL'S \"Historical and Critical View,\" II. 104, 153.\n\n[110] PIERRE LEROUX, \"De l'Humanite,\" I. vi. 3, 295.\n\n[111] L. D. CROUSSE, \"Des Principes, ou Philosophie Premiere,\" 2d\nEdition, Paris, 1846.\n\n[112] ABBE MARET, \"Theodicee Chretienne,\" p. 94.\n\n[113] ABBE GOSCHLER, sur \"l'Histoire du Pantheisme.\" ABBE MARET,\n\"Essai,\" chap. IV.\n\n[114] PIERRE LEROUX, \"De l'Humanite,\" I. 249. M. CROUSSE, \"Des\nPrincipes,\" pp. 199, 211, 296. BAYLE, \"Pensees,\" III. 67. The well-known\nlines of the sixth AEneid, \"Principio coelum, ac terras, camposque\nliquentes,\" &c. are thus applied.\n\n[115] ABBE MARET, \"Essai,\" pp. 152, 156, 221.\n\n[116] DR. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, \"History of Reformation,\" V. 84.\n\n[117] ABBE MARET, \"Essai,\" p. 89; \"Theodicee,\" p. 368.\n\n[118] FRED. VON SCHLEGEL, \"Philosophy of Life,\" p. 417. See, also, DR.\nTHOLUCK'S remarks on the same point in the \"Princeton Theological\nEssays,\" I. 555.\n\n[119] MUSAEUS, \"Tractatus Theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen\nexaminatus,\" 1674. REGNERI A MANSVELT, \"Adversus anonymum\nTheologico-politicum, Liber singularis,\" 1674. FRANCOIS CUYPER, \"Arcana\nAtheismi Revelata,\" 1676. JOHN BREDENBOURG, \"Enervatio Tractatus\nTheol.-polit.\" CHRIST. WITTICHII, \"Anti-Spinoza, sive Examen,\" 1690.\nPIERRE POIRET, \"Fundamenta Atheismi Eversa, sive Specimen Absurditatis\nSpinozianae.\" FENELON, \"De l'Existence de Dieu,\" p. II., c. III.,\n\"Refutation du Spinozisme.\" HUET, \"La Conformite de la Raison avec la\nFoi,\" 1692. HOWE, \"Living Temple,\" I. 262. S. CLARKE, \"Discourse on the\nBeing and Attributes of God,\" pp. 25, 44, 58, 80.\n\n[120] JEAN COLERUS, \"Vie de Spinoza,\" reprinted by Saisset, p. 4.\n\n[121] SPINOZA, \"Ethica,\" Definitions III., IV., V.\n\n[122] \"Il construit le systeme entiere des etres avec ces trois seuls\nelements; la substance, l'attribut, et le mode.\"--\"Voila l'idee mere de\nla metaphysique de Spinoza.\"--SAISSET.\n\n[123] SAISSET, \"Introduction,\" p. XXXIX.\n\n[124] SPINOZA, \"De Intellectus Emendatione.\" This treatise contains the\nexposition of his method.\n\n[125] M. F. PERRON, \"Essai d'une Nouvelle Theorie sur les Idees\nFondamentales,\" 1843.\n\n[126] \"Ici, a prendre les mots dans le sens ordinaire, il semble qu'il\nsoit demontre qui _la Creation est impossible_, principe justement cher\nau Pantheisme; tandis qu'au fond, tout ce qui est demontre, c'est que\n_l'Etre en soi est necessairement incree_,--verite incontestable, dont\n_le Pantheisme n'a rien a tirer_.\"--PROF. SAISSET, Introduction, p.\nXLII.\n\n[127] M. L'ABBE DE CONDILLAC, \"Traite des Sensations,\" 2 vols.\n\n[128] The HON. ROBERT BOYLE, \"Theological Works,\" II. 79.--\"A Free\nInquiry into the Received Notion of Nature.\"\n\n[129] \"Systeme de la Nature,\" II. 75, 110, 115.\n\n[130] \"Tout est toujours dans l'ordre relativement a la Nature, ou tous\nles etres ne font que suivre les loix qui leur sont imposees. Il est\nentre _dans son plans_ que de certaines terres produiroient des fruits\ndelicieux, tandis que d'autres ne fourniroient que des epines, des\nvegetaux dangereux. _Elle a volu_ que quelques societes produise des\nsages,\" &c.--Vol. I. 265, also 267.\n\n[131] \"Systeme de la Nature,\" II. 102.\n\n[132] M. CROUSSE, \"Des Principes,\" Paris, 1846, pp. 81, 93: \"Pour qui\nsait voir, le Monde sent, se ment, parle, et pense.\"\n\n[133] \"The Purpose of Existence,\" pp. 85, 89. London, 1850.\n\n[134] \"Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development.\" By H. G.\nATKINSON and HARRIET MARTINEAU. London, 1852.\n\n[135] MR. MORELL, \"History of Philosophy,\" II. 71.\n\n[136] SIR WM. HAMILTON'S Edition of DR. REID'S \"Works,\" p. 129.\n\n[137] MR. MORELL, \"History of Philosophy,\" II. 127. M. MARET, \"Essai sur\nle Pantheisme,\" pp. 129, 133, 143, 192, 276. Ibid., \"Theodicee,\" pp. 5,\n123, 192, 199.\n\n[138] SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S edition of REID'S \"Works,\" p. 281. Sir\nWilliam does not seem to admit that there is a contradiction such as I\nhave noted.\n\n[139] 1. \"The _ego_ or _moi_ affirms _itself_.\" 2. \"The _ego_ or _moi_\naffirms a _non-ego_ or _non-moi_.\" 3. \"The _ego_ or _moi_ affirms itself\nto be determined by the _non-ego_ or _non-moi_.\"\n\n[140] M. MARET, \"Essai,\" pp. 129, 142, 146, 175, 192, 225, 276. Ibid.,\n\"Theodicee,\" pp. 193, 366, 378, 386, 394. MR. MORELL, \"History,\" II.\n127, 138.\n\n[141] PROFESSOR NICOLAS, \"Quelques Considerations sur le Pantheisme,\"\npp. 20-31.\n\n[142] MR. MORELL, \"History of Philosophy,\" II. 129.\n\n[143] M. CROUSSE, \"Des Principes.\" M. MARET, \"Essal,\" pp. 69, 86, 150;\n\"Theodicee\" pp. 311, 314. VALROGER, \"Etudes Critiques,\" pp. 97, 101,\n115, 151, 412.\n\n[144] M. MARET, \"Essai sur Pantheisme,\" p. 107. \"Le Christianisme saura\nvaincre dans son age mur l'ennemi qu'il a terrasse en naissant.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nTHEORIES OF MATERIALISM.\n\n\nThe doctrine of Materialism stands equally related to the \"mechanical\"\nform of Atheism, and to the \"hylozoic\" form of Pantheism. It is subsumed\nin both, and is the fundamental postulate on which they respectively\ndepend.\n\nIt has no natural affinity with the more \"ideal\" or \"spiritual\" form of\nPantheism. We must not conclude, however, that it has no historical\nconnection with it. For it is instructive to mark, in tracing the\nhistory of philosophic speculation, that its course resembles not so\nmuch the uniform current of a stream, as the alternate flowing and\nebbing of the tide; or, if we may change the figure, that its movement\nmay be likened to the oscillation of a pendulum, which no sooner reaches\nits highest elevation on the one side, than it acquires a tendency to\nrush to the opposite extreme on the other. There can be little doubt\nthat the recent revival of speculative \"Idealism\" was the result, at\nleast in part, of a strong reaction against the \"sensational\"\nphilosophy, which had degenerated in the school of Priestley at home,\nand in that of Condillac abroad, into a system of gross and revolting\nMaterialism. For the same reason, we may now, I think, anticipate a\nspeedy reaction the other way,--a reaction against the extravagances of\n\"idealistic\" and \"transcendental\" speculation, and a tendency towards a\nmore practical and matter-of-fact philosophy. This tendency, if guided\nby the true spirit of the Baconian method, may give a powerful impulse\nto Inductive Science in all its departments; but, if biased by partial\nand one-sided views, may issue either in the temporary ascendancy of the\nPositive School, or the partial revival of some other form of\nMaterialism.\n\nSome such tendency might have been expected to arise as soon as Idealism\nshould have reached its culminating point. For, on a comprehensive view\nof the whole history of speculative thought, we find that there are just\n_four_ great systems of Metaphysics, which are perpetually recurring, as\nit were, in cycles. The first is the system of Dualism,--not the Dualism\nof Christian Theology, which speaks of God and nature, the Creator and\nthe creature,--but the Dualism of ancient Paganism, which held Matter\nand Spirit to be equally uncreated and eternal: the second is\nMaterialism, which resolves all into Matter and its laws: the third is\nIdealism, which resolves all into Mind and its modifications: and the\nfourth is Pantheism, which identifies Existence with Thought, and\nresolves all into the Absolute.[145] In the present age, Idealism is in\nthe ascendant, and has risen to the height of Pantheism; but, by a\nnatural reaction, many are beginning to desiderate a more substantial\nand practical philosophy, while the rapid progress of physical science\nis directing their thoughts more and more to the wonders of the material\nworld. In these circumstances, there may be a tendency to relapse into\nthe Materialism of the last century, which attempted to explain the\nwhole theory of the universe by the laws of _matter_ and _motion_; or at\nleast to embrace some modification of the Positive Philosophy, which\nexcludes all _causes_, whether efficient or final, from the field of\nhuman knowledge, and confines our inquiries to the mere phenomena and\nlaws of material nature.\n\nThere are not wanting various significant indications of the existence\nof this tendency at the present day. It is sufficiently indicated, in\nsome quarters, by the mere omission of all reference to Mind or Spirit\nas distinct from Matter; and, in others, by elaborate attempts to\nexplain all the phenomena of life and thought by means of physical\nagencies and organic laws. The writings of Comte, Crousse, Cabanis, and\nBroussais,[146] afford ample evidence of its growing prevalence in\nFrance; and although it has been said by a recent historian of\nPhilosophy that in England there has been no formal avowal, or at least\nno recognized school, of Materialism, since the publication of Dr.\nThomas Brown's reply to Darwin's Zooenomia, yet there is too much reason\nto believe that it was all along cherished by not a few private\nthinkers, who had imbibed the spirit of Hobbes and Priestley; and now it\nis beginning to speak out, in terms too unambiguous to be misunderstood,\nin such works as \"The Purpose of Existence\" and the \"Letters\" of\nAtkinson and Martineau. But apart from the opinions of individual\ninquirers, it must be remembered that there is a tendency in certain\nstudies, when exclusively pursued, to generate a frame of mind which\nwill tempt men either to adopt the theory of Materialism, or at least to\nattach undue importance to physical agencies and organic laws. This\ntendency may be observed in the study of Physiology, especially when it\nis combined with that of Phrenology and Animal Magnetism; not that there\nis any necessary or strictly logical connection between these studies\nand Materialism, for some of their ablest expounders, including Cabanis,\nGall, and Spurzheim, have explicitly disavowed that theory; but simply\nthat, in prosecuting such inquiries, the mind is insensibly led to\nbestow an undue, if not exclusive, attention on the phenomena and laws\nof our material organization, so as to become comparatively unmindful of\nwhat is mental, moral, and spiritual in the constitution of man. For\nthese reasons, and considering, especially, the close connection of\nMaterialism both with the mechanical Atheism of the past, and the\nhylozoic Pantheism of the present age, we deem it necessary to subject\nits claims to a rigorous scrutiny, in connection with the subject of our\npresent inquiry.\n\nWhat, then, is the doctrine of Materialism? What are the forms in which\nit has appeared, and what the ground on which it rests? How does it\nstand related to the question concerning the nature and existence of\nGod, or the constitution and destiny of Man? A brief answer to these\nquestions will be sufficient to show that this theory cannot be safely\ndisregarded in any attempt to construct a comprehensive and conclusive\nargument on the first principles of Natural Theology.\n\n\nSECTION I.\n\nDISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM.\n\nThe doctrine of Materialism has assumed several distinct phases or forms\nin the hands of its different advocates; and these must be carefully\ndiscriminated from each other, if we would either estimate aright their\nrespective merits, or do justice to the parties by whom they have been\nseverally maintained.\n\nThe grossest and most revolting form of Materialism is that which\n_identifies mind with matter_, and _thought with motion_. It denies that\nthere is any real or radical difference between physical and moral\nphenomena, and affirms that life and thought are so entirely dependent\non material organization, that the dissolution of the body must\nnecessarily be the destruction of conscious existence, and that death\ncan only be an eternal sleep. This is the doctrine of Materialism which\nwas taught in a former age, by the author of the \"Systeme de la Nature,\"\nand which has recently been revived by M. Comte in France, and by\nAtkinson and Martineau in England. A few extracts will sufficiently\nillustrate its character and tendency. \"Men have evidently abused the\ndistinction,\" says Baron D'Holbach, \"which is so often made between _man\nphysical_ and _man moral_: man moral is nothing else than that physical\nbeing considered in a certain point of view, that is, with reference to\nsome modes of action which belong to his peculiar organization.\"--\"The\nuniverse--that vast assemblage of everything that exists--exhibits\nnowhere anything else than _matter and motion_.\"--\"If we are asked, what\nis man? we reply, that he is a material being, organized or framed so as\nto feel, to think, and to be affected in certain ways peculiar to\nhimself, according to his organization.\"[147] More recently, M. Comte\nhas affirmed that \"the subject of all our researches is _one_,\" and that\n\"all natural phenomena are the necessary results either of the laws of\nextension or of the laws of motion;\" while M. Crousse is quite clear\nthat \"intelligence is a property or effect of matter,\" and that \"body\nand spirit together constitute matter.\" In our own country, Atkinson and\nMartineau have not shrunk from the avowal of the same doctrine, or the\nadoption of the most revolting consequences that can be deduced from it.\n\"Instinct, passion, thought, are effects of organized substances.\"--\"Mind\nis the consequence or product of the material man; it is not a thing\nhaving a seat or home in the brain, but it is the manifestation or\nexpression of _the brain in action,_ as heat and light are of fire, and\nfragrance of the flower.\"[148]\n\nThe doctrine of Materialism, as formerly taught by Dr. Priestley and\nhis followers, is in some respects similar to that which we have just\nnoticed, but in other respects differs from it, if not in its essential\nnature, at least in its collateral adjuncts and its practical\napplications. It resembles the theory of D'Holbach and Comte, in so far\nas it affirms the doctrine of _unisubstancisme_, and rejects the idea of\na _dualism_ such as is implied in the common doctrine of Matter and\nSpirit. But it differs from that theory, inasmuch as it is combined,\nwhether consistently or otherwise, with the recognition of a personal\nGod, a resurrection from the dead, and a future state of reward and\npunishment. Dr. Priestley seems to have fluctuated for a time between\ntwo opposite extremes,--that of _spiritualizing_ Matter, and that of\n_materializing_ Mind; for, in a very remarkable passage, we find him\nsaying, \"This scheme of _the immateriality of Matter_, as it may be\ncalled, or rather, _the mutual penetration of Matter_, first occurred to\nmy friend Mr. Mitchell on reading 'Baxter on the Immateriality of the\nSoul.'\"[149] But at length he settled down in the fixed belief of\nMaterialism, as he had always held the principle of _unisubstancisme_.\nHe held throughout that \"Man does not consist of two principles so\nessentially different from each other as Matter and Spirit, but the\nwhole man is of _one uniform composition_; and that either the material\nor the immaterial part of the universal system is superfluous.\"[150] He\nattempts, therefore, to show, that sensation, perception, and\nthought,--the common properties of _mind_,--are not incompatible with\nextension, attraction, and repulsion, which he conceives to be the only\nessential properties of _matter;_ that both classes of properties may\npossibly belong to the same subject; and that hence no second substance\nis necessary to account for and explain any of the phenomena of human\nnature. In this respect, his theory is precisely the same with that\nwhich has been already noticed; but the peculiarity by which it is\ndistinguished from the Atheistic and Antichristian speculations of\nD'Holbach and Comte is twofold. In the _first_ place, while he ascribes\nto mere matter the power of sensation, thought, and volition, he admits\nthat these powers, and all others belonging to matter, were communicated\nto it at the first, and are still continued, by the Divine will, thus\nrecognizing the doctrine both of Creation and Providence; and in the\n_second_ place, while he denies the natural immortality of the soul, and\neven the possibility of its conscious existence in a state of separation\nfrom the body, he does not deny the immortality of man, but receives it,\nas well as the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, on the\nauthority of that Divine Revelation which speaks of \"the resurrection of\nthe dead,\" and of \"a judgment to come.\" In these respects, his theory is\nwidely different from that of the \"Systeme de la Nature,\" while the two\nare substantially the same in so far as they relate simply to the\nconstitution of human nature. He is not an Atheist, but a Theist, and a\nTheist, too, who, believing in Revelation, admits the immortality of\nman, and a future state of retribution. But it must be evident that as\nin these respects he founds entirely on the authority of Scripture, so\nhe may be confronted with the same authority when he denies the\nspirituality of the soul; and in that case the question would resolve\nitself into one of Biblical exegesis, and would fall to be decided, not\nby metaphysical reasoning, but by Scriptural proofs.\n\nAnother variety of the theory is presented by Dr. Good in his \"Life of\nLucretius.\" It agrees with the doctrine of Priestley in representing the\nsoul as material; but differs from it in holding the possible existence\nof the soul in a separate state, during the interval between the\ndissolution and resurrection of the body. It speaks of the body as being\ncomposed of gross material particles; and of the soul as consisting of\nmore subtle, refined, and ethereal matter. This modification of the\ntheory may be illustrated by the following extract: \"Perception,\nconsciousness, cognition, we continue to be told, are qualities which\ncannot appertain to matter; there must hence be a thinking and an\nimmaterial principle; and man must still be a compound being. Yet, why\nthus degrade matter, the plastic and prolific creature of the Deity,\nbeyond what we are authorized to do? Why may it not perceive, why not\nthink, why not become conscious? What eternal and necessary impediment\nprevents? or what self-contradiction and absurdity is hereby implied?\nLet us examine Nature as she presents herself to us in her most simple\nand inorganized forms; let us trace her through her gradual and\nascending stages of power and perfection. In its simplest form, matter\nevinces the desire of reciprocal union, or, as it is commonly called,\nthe attraction of gravitation. Increase its mass, arrange it in other\nmodifications, and it immediately evinces other powers or attractions;\nand these will be perpetually, and almost infinitely, varied, in\nproportion as we vary its combinations. If arranged, therefore, in one\nmode, it discloses the power of magnetism; in another, that of\nelectricity or galvanism; in a third, that of chemical affinities; in a\nfourth, that of mineral assimilations. Pursue its modifications into\nclasses of a more complex, or rather, perhaps, of a more gaseous or\nattenuate nature, and it will evince the power of vegetable or fibrous\nirritability: ascend through the classes of vegetables, and you will at\nlength reach the strong stimulative perfection, the palpable vitality of\nthe _mimosa pudica_, or the _hedysarum gyrans,_ the former of which\nshrinks from the touch with the most bashful coyness, while the latter\nperpetually dances beneath the jocund rays of the sun. And when we have\nthus attained the summit of vegetable powers and vegetable life, it will\nrequire, I think, no great stretch of the imagination to conceive that\nthe fibrous irritability of animals, as well as vegetables, is the mere\nresult of a peculiar arrangement of simple and unirritable material\natoms.\"--\"Hence, then, animal sensation, and hence, necessarily and\nconsequently, ideas, and a material soul or spirit, rude and confined,\nindeed, in its first and simplest mode of existence, but, like every\nother production of Nature, beautifully and progressively advancing from\npower to power, from faculty to faculty, from excellence to excellence,\ntill at length it terminate in the perfection of the human mind.\"[151]\n\nAccording to this theory, the mind is supposed to have a real existence,\nas a substance distinct from the grosser forms of matter, and capable\neven of surviving its separation from them. It is supposed to be \"a\ncombination of the most volatile auras or gases, diffused over the whole\nbody, though traced in a more concentrate form in some organs than in\nothers;\" and it is described as \"the very texture of that separate state\nof existence which the infallible page of Revelation clearly indicates\nwill be ours.\"\n\nA form of the theory very nearly resembling this has been recently\nreproduced. It consists in representing the Mind or Spirit of man, not\nas a mere fleeting phenomenon of the brain, or an evanescent effect of\nits organization, but as a distinct substantive product, generated,\nindeed, from matter, and partaking, therefore, of its nature, but so\nexquisitely subtle and ethereal that it has no resemblance to the\ngrosser materials of the body, and admits only of being compared with\nthe Dynamides--the imponderable elements and forces of Nature. This\n\"spirit\" is generated in man by his peculiar organization, and\nespecially by the action of the brain; it is capable of surviving the\ndissolution of the body, of retaining its individual consciousness after\ndeath, of passing into new spheres of being, and of rising from lower to\nhigher states, according to a law of eternal progression. Such is the\ntheory of Davis, the \"Poughkeepsie Seer;\" and such also, with some\nvariations, is that of the author of \"The Purpose of Existence.\"\n\n\"Matter and Spirit,\" says Davis, \"have heretofore been supposed to\nconstitute two distinct and independent substances, the latter not\nhaving any material origin.\" ... \"Instead of making material and\nspiritual existence totally disconnected, the object and intention of\nthe foregoing has been to prove, by acknowledged laws and principles of\nmatter, _the production of intelligence,_ the perfection of which is\n_spirit_;\" to show that \"the Organizer uses Nature and all things\ntherein as an effect, to produce _spirit_ as an end and designed\nultimate.\" The author of \"The Purpose of Existence\" adopts a similar\nview. He tells us, indeed, that \"the first simple forms or states of\nexistence are admitted to be _two_, spirit and matter,--the first the\nmoving power, the second the moved substance;\" that of the positive\nessence of either we can arrive at no knowledge; and that \"whether\nspirit be a refined, etherealized portion of matter, or a distinct\ndynamic principle, we cannot ascertain.\" And yet, one of the leading\nobjects of his work is to account for \"the origin and development of the\nhuman mind;\" and this he does by ascribing it to \"a self-dynamic spirit\nwhich is resident in matter,\" and which he denominates \"the spirit of\nvitality.\" The spirit exists in vegetables, and is extracted by means of\nthe organs of the animals which feed upon them, and then, \"by a delicate\nwork of distillation, it is converted into _spirit_!\"--\"Nature proclaims\none of her great working principles to be, that _spirit is evolved out\nof matter, and outlives the body in which it is educated_.\"--\"Matter is\nfull of spirit. This spirit is brought out of matter by vegetation. By\nmeans of vegetation, it is conveyed into animal frames, in which its\npurest essence centres in the brain.... This is no idle theory,\" he\nadds, \"no vain hypothesis, for making matter think. It is a clear\nproposition, showing how matter is employed by the Supreme Intelligence\nfor evolving, training, and educating spirit.\"--\"We conclude that\nProgression is the great law of the universe, the purpose for which its\npresent arrangement was ordained; and that the object of this\nprogression is _the evolvement of mind out of matter._\"\n\nThis is a new and very singular phase of Materialism. It is widely\ndifferent from the doctrine which was taught by the infidel writers of\nthe last century. They had recourse to the theory of Materialism chiefly\nwith the view of excluding a world of spirits, and of undermining the\ndoctrine of a future state: here it is applied to prove the constant\ndevelopment and indestructible existence of minds generated from matter,\nbut destined to survive the dissolution of the body; nay, every particle\nof matter in the universe is supposed to be advancing, in one\nmagnificent progression, towards the spiritual state. The danger now is,\nnot that Religion may be undermined by Materialism, but that it may be\nsupplanted by a fond and foolish superstition, in which the facts of\nMesmerism and the fictions of Clairvoyance are blended into one ghostly\nsystem, fitted to exert a powerful but pernicious influence on\nover-credulous minds.[152]\n\nOn a review of the various forms which the theory of Materialism has\nassumed, it must be evident that we should be doing great injustice to\ntheir respective advocates, did we place them all on the same level in\nrelation to Theology, or pronounce upon them one indiscriminate censure.\nIn the hands of D'Holbach and Comte, it was associated with the avowal\nof Atheism, and the denial of a future state: in the hands of Priestley,\nit was associated with the recognition of a God, and the Christian\ndoctrine of a resurrection: in the hands of Dr. Good, it was combined\nwith the principles of Theism, and even with the revealed doctrine of\nthe separate existence of the soul during the interval between death and\nthe resurrection: and in the hands of Davis and the author of the\n\"Purpose of Existence,\" it is exhibited in connection with a theory of\nProgression, widely different, indeed, from the doctrine of Scripture,\nbut equally different from the infidel speculations of the last century.\nStill, with all these shades of difference, there is _that common to\nall_ the forms in which it can be presented which shows that they are\nradically one and the same: _they all deny the existence of any generic\ndifference between Matter and Mind_.\n\nConfining our attention to this common element, and omitting the\nconsideration of minor diversities, we may now inquire into the grounds\non which the theory rests, and the most plausible reasons which have\nbeen urged in support of it.\n\nTo some minds it has been recommended by its _apparent simplicity_. It\nspeaks only of _one_ substance as existing in Nature under various\nmodifications. It represents the universe, so far as created being is\nconcerned, as entirely composed of _matter_, more or less refined; and\nthus excludes the complication which must necessarily arise from the\nsupposition of two substances, generically different, yet intimately and\nindissolubly related. The principle, therefore, which prompts us to seek\nunity in diversity, and to reduce, by some comprehensive generalization,\na multitude of phenomena under one general law, has led some to adopt\nthe theory of _unisubstancisme_ in preference to the opposite doctrine\nof _dualism_. Not content with the generalization, alike safe and\nlegitimate, which ranks both mind and matter under the generic head of\n_substance_, they have sought to reduce them to the same category, and\nto give to matter a monopoly of the universe, at least of created being.\nIn support of their views, they remind us of the fundamental principle\nof philosophy as laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, that \"we are to admit no\nmore causes of things than are sufficient to explain appearances.\"[153]\nThe principle is a sound one; and the only question is, whether matter\nalone is sufficient to account for mental phenomena? On _this_ question\nthe two parties are at irreconcilable variance; and the controversy\ncannot be determined, _brevi manu_, by the mere assumption of the\nsimplicity and uniform composition of everything in Nature; it can be\nsettled only by an appeal to the facts as they are known to exist. It is\nthe aim of science, undoubtedly, to reduce all compound substances to\nthe smallest possible number of constituent elements, and all complex\nphenomena to the smallest possible number of general laws. But we feel\nthat, desirable as this simplification may be, we are not warranted in\nidentifying light with heat, or even electricity with magnetism, however\nclosely connected with each other, simply because there are certain\nobserved differences between them, which could not be explained, in the\npresent state of our knowledge, consistently with any such theory of\ntheir absolute identity: and so, there are such manifest differences\nbetween Mental and Material phenomena, that we cannot yield to the\ntemptation of ascribing them to one cause or origin, until it has been\nsatisfactorily proved that the same cause is sufficient to account for\nappearances so diverse. It should be considered, too, in connection with\nthis pretence of greater simplicity, that even if we could succeed in\ngetting rid of the _dualism_ of Mind and Matter in the constitution of\nman, we never can get rid of it with reference to the universe at\nlarge, otherwise than by denying _the spirituality of God himself_: for\nthe grand, the indestructible, the eternal _dualism_ would still\nremain,--the distinction between God and His works,--between the Creator\nand the universe which He has called into being,--between the finite,\ncontingent, and transitory, and the infinite, necessary, and eternal.\nAnd this is a distinction that cannot be obliterated, although it may be\nobscured, by the speculations of Pantheism.\n\nAnother reason which has induced some to adopt, or at least to regard\nwith favor, the theory of Materialism, is--the difficulty of conceiving\nof the union of two substances so incongruous as Mind and Matter are\nsupposed to be,--and still more the difficulty of explaining how they\ncould have any mutual action on each other. Dr. Priestley largely\ninsists on this, as well as on the former reason, as one of the main\ninducements which led him to abandon the commonly-received doctrine.\n\"Many doubts occurred to me,\" he says, \"on the subject of _the intimate\nunion of two substances so entirely heterogeneous_ as the soul and body\nwere represented to be.\" And he was led to conclude, that \"man does not\nconsist of two principles so essentially different from one another as\nmatter and spirit, which are always described as having _no one common\nproperty_ by means of which they can affect or act upon each other.\" In\nthe \"Systeme de la Nature,\" the same argument is often urged. It is\nboldly and repeatedly affirmed that \"an immaterial cause cannot produce\nmotion;\" and this is applied equally to the soul and to God. \"How can we\nform an idea of a substance destitute of extension, and yet acting on\nour senses, that is, on material organs which are extended? How can a\nbeing without extension be capable of motion, and of putting matter into\nmotion?\"--\"It is as impossible that spirit or thought should produce\nmatter, as that matter should produce spirit or thought.\"[154]\n\nNow, it is not denied by any,--it is admitted on all hands,--that the\nunion between the soul and the body is a great mystery, and that we are\nnot able, in the present state of our knowledge, to explain either the\naction of matter on mind, or the action of mind on matter. The mode of\nthe union between them, and the nature of the influence which they\nmutually exercise, are to us inscrutable: but _the facts_ of our most\nfamiliar experience are not the less certain, because they depend on\ncauses to us unknown, or stand connected with mysteries which we cannot\nsolve. Besides, the theory of _unisubstancisme_ itself, were it adopted,\nwould still leave many facts unexplained, and the inmost nature of man\nwould continue to be as inscrutable as before. There is nothing\ninconceivable, impossible, or self-contradictory in the supposition of a\nnon-material or spiritual substance; nor is there any reason _a priori_\nto conclude that such a substance could not be united to a material\nframe, although the nature of their union, and the mode of their\nreciprocal action, might be to us inexplicable.\n\nThere is still another reason which is urged by some, derived from _the\ndependence of the mind on the body_, and its liability to be affected,\nbeneficially or injuriously, by mere physical influences. \"The faculty\nof thinking,\" says Dr. Priestley, \"in general ripens and comes to\nmaturity with the body; it is also observed to decay with it,\"--\"If the\nbrain be affected, as by a blow on the head, by actual pressure within\nthe skull, by sleep, or by inflammation, the mental faculties are\nuniversally affected in proportion. Likewise, as the mind is affected in\nconsequence of the affections of the body and brain, so the body is\nliable to be reciprocally affected by the affections of the mind, as is\nevident in the visible effects of all-strong passions,--hope or fear,\nlove or anger, joy or sorrow, exultation or despair. These are certainly\nirrefragable arguments that it is properly no other than _one and the\nsame thing_ that is subject to these affections.\"[155] Mr. Atkinson\nurges the same reason. \"The proof that mind holds the same relation to\nthe body that all other phenomena do to material conditions, may be\nfound,\" he tells us, \"in the whole circumstances of man's existence, his\norigin and growth; the faculties following the development of the body\nin man and other animals; the direction of the faculties being\ninfluenced by surrounding circumstances; the desires, the will, the\nhopes, the fears, the habits, and the opinions, being effects traceable\nto causes,--to natural causes,--and becoming the facts of History and\nStatistics. We observe the influence of climate, of sunshine and damp,\nof wine and opium and poison, of health and disease.\" ... \"When a glass\nof wine turns a wise man into a fool, is it not clear that the result is\nthe consequence of a change in the material conditions?\"[156]\n\nNow, these facts are sufficient to show that, in the present life, there\nis a very close and intimate union between the soul and the body, and\nthat they exert a reciprocal and very powerful influence. This is\nadmitted by the firmest advocates of _Spiritualism_; nay, it is\nnecessarily involved in the doctrine which they maintain, relative to\n_the union_ of two distinct, but mutually dependent, principles in the\npresent constitution of human nature. But it is far, very far, from\naffording any ground or warrant for the idea, that Matter may be\nidentified with Mind, or Thought with Motion.\n\nThere are certain Theological considerations which, if they have not\nbeen pleaded as reasons, may yet have been felt as inducements, to the\nadoption of the theory of Materialism. Not to speak of the difficulty\nwhich has been felt in explaining \"the traduction or propagation of\nhuman souls,\" occasionally referred to in this controversy, it is plain\nthat many Deists in the last century, and that not a few Atheists still,\nhave been induced to embrace and avow Materialism, with the view of\nundermining the doctrine of man's immortality, and of a future state of\nrewards and punishments. It is equally certain that Dr. Priestley was\ninfluenced by his peculiar views as a Socinian; for he tells us himself\nthat the doctrine of Materialism commended itself to his mind as a sure\nand effectual means of disproving _the preexistence of Christ_. \"The\nconsideration,\" he says with singular candor, \"that biases me as a\nChristian, exclusive of philosophical considerations, against the\ndoctrine of a separate soul, is, that it has been the foundation of what\nappears to me to be the very grossest corruptions of Christianity, and\neven of that very Antichristianism that began to work in the apostles'\ntimes, and which extended itself so amazingly and dreadfully afterwards.\nI mean the Oriental philosophy of the 'preexistence of souls,' which\ndrew after it the belief of the preexistence and divinity of Christ, the\nworship of Christ and of dead men, and the doctrine of Purgatory, with\nall the Popish doctrines and practices that are connected with them, and\nsupported by them.\"--\"This doctrine (of the preexistence of Christ) is\nthe point to which all that I have written tends, it being the capital\ninference that I make from the doctrine of Materialism.\" There is also\nabundant reason to believe that both Atheists and Pantheists have had\nrecourse to the theory of Materialism with the view of excluding the\ndoctrine of a living, personal God, and explaining all the phenomena of\nNature by the eternal laws of matter and motion. Now, if the question\nstands related in any way to such themes as these,--the immortality of\nman, the preexistence and divinity of Christ, and the personality and\nspirituality of God,--it must be confessed to have at least a very high\n_relative_ importance, as it bears on some of the most momentous\narticles of our _religious faith_; and the question naturally arises,\nWhat relation it bears to the fundamental principles of Theism, and how\nfar it comports with right views of God, as the Creator and Governor of\nthe world?\n\nWe cannot, in the face of direct evidence to the contrary, bring an\nindiscriminate charge of Atheism, or even of irreligion, against all the\nadvocates of Materialism. It is true that it has often, perhaps most\ngenerally, been associated with infidel opinions, and that in the hands\nof D'Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson, it has been applied in support of\nAtheism; but it is equally true, that in the hands of Dr. Priestley and\nDr. Good, it is combined with the professed, and, as we believe, the\nsincere recognition of a personal God and of a future state. In point of\nfact, then, all Materialists have not been Atheists; and even were we\nconvinced that Materialists professing religion were illogical or\ninconsequent reasoners, we should not be justified in ascribing to them\nthose consequences of their system which they explicitly disclaim and\ndisavow. Still it is competent, and it may be highly useful, to\nentertain the question, What are the grounds on which the theory of\nMaterialism rests? And whether, if these grounds be valid, they would\nnot lead, in strict logic, to conclusions at variance with some of the\nmost vital and fundamental articles of the Christian faith?\n\nIn attempting to discuss the merits of that theory, we propose to state,\nconfirm, and illustrate a few propositions which are sufficient, in our\nopinion, to show that the grounds on which it rests, and the reasons to\nwhich it appeals, are not such as to warrant or justify any prejudice\nagainst the articles of Natural or Revealed Religion.\n\n\nSECTION II.\n\nPROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM.\n\nI. Our _first_ proposition is, that the recent progress of Natural\nScience, great and rapid as it has been, has not materially altered \"the\nstate of the question\" respecting the distinction between Mind and\nMatter, however much it may have extended our knowledge respecting the\nproperties of both, and of the relation subsisting between the two.\n\nWe place this proposition on the foreground, because we have reason to\nbelieve that a very different impression prevails in certain quarters,\nassociated in some cases with the hope, in others with the apprehension,\nthat the advances which have been made in physical science may\nultimately lead to the obliteration of the old distinction between Mind\nand Matter. This impression has been deepened by every successive\naddition to the doctrines of Physiology; and especially by the recent\nspeculations on Phrenology, Animal Magnetism, and Clairvoyance. Now, we\nthink that these speculations, even if they were admitted into the rank\nof true sciences, would not materially alter the \"state of the question\"\nrespecting the distinction between Mind and Matter, as that question was\ndiscussed in former times.\n\nTake the case of Phrenology. It had always been admitted that the mind\nhas certain _external organs_, through which it receives various\nimpressions from without, and holds communication with the sensible\nuniverse. The existence and use of these organs were held to be\nperfectly compatible with the doctrine that the soul itself is\nimmaterial. Phrenology appears, and professes to have discovered\n_certain other organs_, certain cerebral developments, which stand\nconnected with the various functions of thought and feeling; in other\nwords, to the _five senses_ which are universally recognized, it adds\n_thirty_ or _forty_ organs in the brain, not hitherto known to exist.\nBut how does this discovery, even supposing it to be fully established,\naffect the state of the question respecting the radical distinction\nbetwixt Mind and Matter? A material organization, in the case of man,\nwas always admitted; and the only difference which that discovery could\nbe supposed to make, must arise from the addition of certain organs to\nthose which were previously established. But why should the spirituality\nof the soul be more affected by the one set of organs than it was by the\nother? The ablest advocates of Phrenology have repudiated Materialism.\nDr. Spurzheim expressly disclaims it. \"I incessantly repeat,\" says he,\n\"that the aim of Phrenology is never to attempt pointing out _what the\nmind is in itself_. I do not say that the organization produces the\naffective and intellectual faculties of man's mind, as a tree brings\nforth fruit or an animal procreates its kind; I only say that organic\nconditions are necessary to every manifestation of mind.\"--\"If the\nmanifestation of the faculties of the mind depend on organization,\nMaterialism, it is said, will be established.... When our antagonists,\nhowever, maintain that we are Materialists, they ought to show where we\nteach _that there is nothing but matter._ The entire falsehood of the\naccusation is made obvious by a review of the following considerations.\nThe expression 'organ' designates an instrument by means of which some\nfaculty proclaims itself. The muscles, for example, are the organs of\nvoluntary motion, but they are not the moving power; the eyes are the\norgan of sight, but they are not the faculty of seeing. We separate the\nfaculties of the soul, or of the mind, from the organs; and consider the\ncerebral parts as the instruments by means of which they manifest\nthemselves. Now, even the adversaries of Phrenology must, to a certain\nextent, admit the dependence of the soul on the body.... We are,\ntherefore, no more Materialists than our predecessors, whether\nanatomists, physiologists, or physicians, or the great number of\nphilosophers and moralists, who have admitted the dependence of the soul\non the body. For the Materialism is essentially the same, whether the\nfaculties of the mind be said to depend on the whole body, on the whole\nbrain, or individual powers on particular parts of the brain; the\nfaculties still depend on organization for their exhibition.\"[157] We\nconclude, therefore, that Phrenology, even supposing it to be fully\nestablished, could not materially affect the state of the question\nrespecting the radical distinction between Mind and Matter.\n\nSimilar remarks apply to the case of Mesmerism or Animal Magnetism. It\nhad always been known and admitted that the soul is liable, by reason of\nits connection with the body in the present state, to be affected by\n_certain influences_,--from light, from heat, from electricity, from the\natmosphere, and from other sources. Mesmerism appears, and professes to\nhave discovered _another influence_ by which the nervous system is\npeculiarly affected; in other words, it merely adds a new influence to\nthe number of those which were universally acknowledged before, it\nmatters little whether it be the Magnetism of Mesmer, or the Odyle of\nReichenbach, or the Dia-magnetism of Faraday. But how could this\ndiscovery, even supposing it to be fully established, affect the state\nof the question respecting the radical distinction between Mind and\nMatter? If we were Immaterialists before, while we acknowledged the\ninfluence of the atmosphere, of light, of heat, and of electricity, may\nwe not be Immaterialists still, notwithstanding the addition of Odyle to\nthe class of _dynamides_? May we not admit the stranger, with the\nstrange name, if suitably attested, without the slightest apprehension\nof thereby weakening the grounds on which we hold Mind to be\nessentially different from Matter, and incapable of being identified\nwith it? It were a foolish and dangerous expedient, and one to which no\nenlightened advocate of Immaterialism will have recourse, to denounce\nthe professed discoveries either of Phrenology or of Mesmerism, on the\nground of their supposed tendency to obliterate the distinction between\nMind and Matter. For the fact, that certain \"organs\" exist, by means of\nwhich the mind acquires a large portion of its knowledge, and that\ncertain \"influences\" are known to affect it from without, is too well\nestablished to be called in question; and the mere extension of that\nfact by the discovery of _other organs and other influences_, hitherto\nunknown, could have no tendency to shut us up, more than before, to the\nadoption of the theory of Materialism. It is the part of wisdom, then,\nto leave ample scope and verge for the progress of Physiological\nresearch in this as in every other department, and to rest in the\nconfident persuasion that whatever discoveries may yet be made in regard\nto the _connection_ between mind and body, they can have no effect in\ndisproving a _radical distinction_ between the two. And this we deem a\nmuch safer ground than that which Professor Gregory has adopted, when he\nfirst of all denies the possibility of defining either matter or spirit,\nand then leaves the existence of \"a thinking principle or soul distinct\nfrom the body\" to rest merely on \"our instinctive consciousness.\"[158]\nWe think it, in every point of view, a safer course to meet all\nobjections by saying, that the admission of the _odylic_ or any other\ninfluence of a similar kind, would not in the least affect the grounds\nof our belief in the existence of an immaterial mind.\n\nWe are disposed to pursue the same line of argument a step further, and\nto apply it to the case of \"Hypnotism\" or \"Clairvoyance.\" It had always\nbeen known that the mind, in its present state of connection with the\nbody, is liable to be affected by _sleep_ and by _dreams_; and the\nphenomena of natural sleep and of ordinary dreams were never supposed to\nbe incompatible with the distinction between mind and body. But the\nHypnotist or the Clairvoyant appears, and announces a state of _magnetic\nsleep_, with a new set of phenomena dependent on it, resembling the\ndreams and visions of the night. The facts are strange and startling;\nbut, after recovering from our first surprise, we may calmly ask, what\neffect these facts, if established, should have in modifying our\nconvictions respecting the essential nature of mind and matter; and we\nshall find that they afford no sufficient reason for relinquishing the\ndoctrine of an \"immaterial spirit,\" but that, on the contrary, these\nvery facts, were they sufficiently verified, would open up a new view of\nthe powers and activities of \"spirit,\" such as might well fill us with\nwonder and awe. \"I have heard, times innumerable,\" says Professor\nGregory, \"religious persons declare, on seeing these phenomena, that\nnothing could more clearly demonstrate the immateriality, and\nconsequently the immortality of the soul. 'In _clairvoyance_,' say these\npersons, 'we observe the mind acting separate from the body, and\nentirely independent of it. How beautiful a proof of the infinite\ndifference between _spirit_ and _matter_.'\" It is a proof that we would\nbe slow to adduce, for the facts are doubtful as well as obscure; but,\nfor our present purpose, it is not necessary either to admit or to deny\nthe truth of these facts; it is sufficient to say that the phenomena of\nMesmeric sleep and the visions of Clairvoyance are not more inconsistent\nwith the doctrine of an immaterial soul than the more familiar, but\nscarcely less mysterious, phenomena of natural sleep and common dreams.\nIt is, indeed, not a little remarkable that the profound and sagacious\nButler expressed himself in the following terms, long before the\nphenomena of Magnetism and Clairvoyance were spoken of as subjects of\nscientific study: \"That we have no reason to think our _organs_ of\nsense _percipients_ ... is confirmed by the experience of dreams, by\nwhich we find we are at present possessed of a latent, and what would\notherwise be an unimagined, unknown power of perceiving sensible\nobjects, in as strong and lively a manner, _without our external organs\nof sense as with them_.\"[159]\n\nOn the whole, we think it clear that neither by Phrenology, which adds\nmerely to the number of our material \"organs,\" nor by Mesmerism, which\nadds _one_ to the number of the \"influences\" by which we are affected,\nnor by Clairvoyance, which adds the phenomena of _magnetic_ to those of\n_natural_ sleep, is the state of the question materially altered from\nwhat it was before these additions were made to Physiological\nspeculation. And hence those who are well versed in our older writers on\nthe doctrine of \"spirit\" and \"matter,\" will be sufficiently furnished\nwith weapons for repelling the more recent assaults of Materialism. If\nany one has read and digested the Treatises of Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his\nreplies to Dodwell, Collins, and Leibnitz; the \"Free Discussion\" between\nDr. Priestley and Dr. Price; the \"Examen du Materialisme\" by Bergier, in\nreply to the \"Systeme de la Nature;\" and the writings of Andrew Baxter,\nDrew, Ditton, and others, on the same subject, he will find little\ndifficulty in grappling with the arguments of Comte, Atkinson, and\nMartineau. He will see at once that the main, the fundamental question,\nis not materially affected by the advances which have been made in\nPhysiological discovery. These discoveries may have extended our\nknowledge respecting _the relations_ which subsist between the \"mind\"\nand the \"body;\" they have in no degree served to obliterate the\n_distinction betwixt the two_.\n\nIn perfect consistency, however, with this conviction, we may frankly\navow our opinion, that some of the older opponents of Materialism\nadopted a method of stating their argument which appears to us to be\nliable to just exception, and which the progress of Physical, and\nespecially of Chemical science, has tended greatly to discredit. They\nseem to have been apprehensive that by ascribing any peculiar properties\nor active powers to matter, they might incur the hazard of weakening the\ngrounds on which they contended for the spirituality of man and the\nsupremacy of God. Thus, in the \"Inquiry into the Nature of the Human\nSoul,\" by Andrew Baxter, the existence of any active property or power\nin matter is explicitly denied, and the only property which is ascribed\nto it is a certain passive power, or \"vis inertiae,\" by which it is\nincapable of changing its state, whether of rest or of motion. This \"vis\ninertiae\" is not only supposed to be the sole property of matter, but is\neven held to be inconsistent with, and exclusive of, any active power\nwhatever; and all the effects which are usually said to be produced by\nit are ascribed to the power of an immaterial Being. We are told that\n\"vis inertiae,\" or \"a resistance to any change of its present state, is\nessential to matter, and inconsistent with any active power in it;\" that\n\"all gravity, attraction, elasticity, repulsion, or whatever other\ntendencies to motion are observed in matter (commonly called natural\npowers of matter), are not powers implanted in matter or possible to be\nmade inherent in it, but impulse or force impressed upon it _ab extra_;\"\nand that \"the cause of its motion must be sought for in something not\nmatter, in some _immaterial cause or being_.\"--\"Gravity,\" for instance,\n\"is not the action of matter upon matter, but the virtue or power of an\nimmaterial cause or being, constantly impressed upon it.\" Nor has this\ndoctrine been confined to such metaphysical reasoners as Andrew Baxter.\nProfessor Playfair tells us, that when he was introduced to Dr. Horsley,\nthe Bishop \"expressed great respect for Lord Monboddo, for his learning\nand his acuteness, and (what was more surprising) for the soundness of\nhis judgment. He talked very seriously of the notion of _mind being\nunited to all the parts of matter and being the cause of motion_. So far\nas I could gather, Dr. Horsley supposes that _every atom of matter has a\nsoul_, which is the cause of its motion, its gravitation, &c. What has\nmade him adopt this strange unphilosophical notion I cannot tell, unless\nit be the fear that his study of natural philosophy should make him\nsuspected of Atheism, or at least of Materialism. For it is certain that\nthere is at present a prejudice among the English clergy that natural\nphilosophy has a tendency to make men Atheists or Materialists. This\nabsurd prejudice was first introduced, I think, by that illiberal,\nthough learned, prelate, Dr. Warburton.\"[160] A similar opinion has been\nrecently reproduced by Dr. Burnett in his \"Philosophy of Spirits in\nrelation to Matter,\" in which he attempts to show that the forces and\nlaws of Nature cannot be proved to be _the result of anything inherent\nin matter alone_, and that they ought to be ascribed to some substantive\nand distinct, but immaterial and dependent _spirits_, called \"the spirit\nof life,\" \"the spirit of electricity,\" \"the spirit of heat.\"[161].\n\nAll these statements are only so many modifications of the same theory,\nand they agree in denying the existence of any active powers in matter,\nwhile they ascribe the phenomena of motion, life, and thought to an\nimmaterial principle. There is, as it seems to us, a mixture of truth\nand error in this theory. It affirms a great truth, in so far as it\ndeclares the impossibility of accounting for the phenomena of motion,\nlife, and thought, without ascribing them ultimately to a spiritual,\nintelligent, and voluntary cause; but it adopts a dangerous, and, as we\nconceive, a perfectly gratuitous assumption, when it denies that matter\nis capable of possessing any other properties or powers than those of\nextension, solidity, and \"vis inertiae.\" We know little of the nature of\nthose fluids, forces, or powers, which have been denominated \"dynamides\"\nor \"imponderables;\" but, unquestionably, they possess properties and\nproduce phenomena very different from any that can be reasonably\nascribed to mere \"vis inertiae.\" Nor is their possession of these\nproperties incompatible with that law, when it is correctly understood.\nFor what is the real import of the law of \"vis inertiae?\" It amounts\nsimply to this, as stated by Baxter himself, \"that a resistance to any\nchange of its present state,--whether of motion or rest,--is essential\nto 'matter,'\" he adds, indeed, \"and inconsistent with any active power\nin it;\" but this is an assumption which is true only in a sense that\nwould make it inconclusive with reference to the point at issue. It is\ntrue, if it means merely that matter is destitute of spontaneity and\nself-motion, such as belongs to living, voluntary agents; but it is not\ntrue, if it means that matter is destitute of all inherent properties\nand powers. Indeed, the \"vis inertiae\" which is ascribed to matter is\nitself a power, and a very formidable one; it is described by Baxter\nhimself as \"a kind of positive or stubborn inactivity,\" as \"something\nreceding further from action than bare inactivity,\" for \"_matter is so\npowerfully inactive a thing_!\" Now, if such a power as this may be\nascribed to matter, why may it not be admitted with equal safety that\nGod has bestowed on it certain other properties and powers, not\ninconsistent with this, but additional to it; and that He has\nestablished such relations and affinities between different substances\nas that they may act and react--mechanically or chemically--on one\nanother? The phenomena of chemical affinity, the motions, and other\nchanges, produced by the contact, or even the juxtaposition, of certain\nsubstances, and the variety of the resulting products, do certainly\nevince the operation of other powers besides that of \"vis inertiae;\" and\nwe cannot see why these powers should be ascribed to \"immaterial\nspirits,\" any more than that of \"vis inertiae\" itself, or why it would be\na whit more dangerous to ascribe them to matter than to created\n_spirits_. All that is required, as it appears to us, to establish the\ndependence of the creature on the Creator and to vindicate the truth of\nChristian Theism, is to maintain these two positions: _first_, that\nwhatever properties or powers belong either to \"matter\" or to \"mind,\"\nwere originally conferred on them, respectively, at the time of their\ncreation by the will of God; and, _secondly_, that by the same will,\nthese properties and powers are continually sustained, governed, and\ncontrolled. These two positions are held by all enlightened Theists, and\nare abundantly sufficient, if proved, to vindicate their doctrine\nagainst every assault; but we think it unwarrantable and dangerous to go\nfurther, and to ascribe, on the strength of mere gratuitous assumptions,\nall the activity, motion, and change which occur in the universe to\ncreated spirits or immaterial causes. These assumptions are extremely\ndifferent from the common-sense notions of men, and they are utterly\nunnecessary for the support of any doctrine which we are concerned to\ndefend.\n\nOn the whole, we venture to conclude that the radical distinction\nbetween Mind and Matter has not been materially affected by the recent\nprogress of Physiological research, and that the old arguments against\nMaterialism are still available, except in so far as they were founded\non a too limited view of the properties of matter, which the advancing\nScience of Chemistry has done so much, to unfold and to illustrate.\n\nII. Our _second_ proposition may be thus stated: That were we reduced to\nthe necessity of embracing any form of the theory of \"unisubstancisme,\"\nthere could not be less,--there might even be greater,--reason for\n_spiritualizing matter_, than for _materializing mind_.\n\nOn the supposition that one or other of the two must be dispensed with,\nthe question still remains, which of them can be most easily spared? or,\nwhich of them can be most conclusively proved? Mankind have generally\nthought that they had equally good evidence for the existence of both;\nthat in the direct and irresistible evidence of Consciousness, they had\nproof sufficient of a thinking, voluntary, and active spirit, and in the\nless direct, but not less irresistible, evidence of Perception, proof\nsufficient of the existence of a material world. But each of these\nconvictions has been in its turn assailed by the cavils of skepticism;\nand men have been asked to prove _by reasoning_ what needed, and,\nindeed, admitted of no _such_ proof,--the existence of Matter as\ndistinct from Mind, and the existence of Mind as distinct from Matter.\nThe latter is denied by Materialists, the former is equally denied by\nIdealists; and what we affirm is, that each of these opposite theories\nis one-sided and partial, and that, on the supposition of our being\nreduced to the necessity of adopting the idea of \"unisubstancisme,\" we\nshould still have greater reason to reduce all to the category of\n\"spirit,\" than to reduce all to the category of \"matter.\" Many seem to\nthink that it is more easy, or, perhaps, that it is less necessary, to\nprove the distinct existence of matter, than to prove the distinct\nexistence of mind. They are so familiar with matter, and so continually\nsurrounded by it, that they cannot conceive of its non-existence as\npossible, and scarcely think it necessary to inquire after any evidence\nin the case. But can it be justly said that they are more familiar with\nmatter and its movements than they are with a living spirit within them,\nwhich feels, and thinks, and wills, and by means of which alone the\nphenomena of external nature itself can become known to them? If they\nreceive the testimony of Perception as a sufficient proof of the\nexistence of Matter, why should they not also receive the still more\ndirect and immediate testimony of Consciousness as a sufficient proof of\nthe existence of Mind? Or, if they refuse the latter, and admit the\nformer, are they quite sure that, on their own partial principles, they\ncould offer any conclusive answer to the \"Idealism\" of Berkeley? That\ningenious and amiable prelate will tell them that \"the objects of sense\ncannot exist otherwise than _in a mind perceiving them_;\" that \"their\n_esse_ is _percipi_, nor is it possible that they should have any\nexistence out of the minds, or thinking things, which perceive them;\"\nand that \"all the choir of heaven and the furniture of the earth,--in a\nword, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have\nnot any subsistence without a mind.\"[162] Nay, others who are not\nIdealists, but who believe equally in the existence of \"mind\" and\n\"matter,\" will tell them that Berkeley's arguments are conclusive, at\nleast to the extent of showing that the existence of \"matter,\" as a\nthing external to us, cannot be proved without presupposing the\nexistence of \"mind.\" \"For what,\" says Lord Brougham, \"is this matter?\nWhence do we derive any knowledge of it? How do we assure ourselves of\nits existence? What evidence have we at all respecting either its being\nor its qualities? We feel, or taste, or smell something; that is, we\nhave certain sensations, which make us conclude that something exists\nbeyond ourselves.\" ... \"But what are our sensations? The feelings or\nthoughts of our own minds. Then what we do is this: from certain ideas\nin our minds, produced no doubt by, and connected with, our bodily\nsenses, but independent of and separate from them, we draw certain\nconclusions by reasoning; and these conclusions are in favor of the\nexistence of something other than our sensations and our reasonings, and\nother than that which experiences the sensations and makes the\nreasonings, passive in the one case, active in the other. That something\nis what we call--Mind. But plainly, whatever it is, we owe to it the\nknowledge that matter exists; for that knowledge is gained by means of a\nsensation or feeling, followed by a process of reasoning; it is gained\nby the mind having first suffered something, and then done something.\nTherefore, to say _there is no such thing as matter_ would be a much\nless absurd inference than to say _there is no such thing as mind_.\" ...\n\"The truth is, that we believe in the existence of 'matter,' because we\ncannot help it. The inferences of our reason from our sensations impel\nus to this conclusion, and the steps are few and short by which we reach\nit. But the steps are fewer, and shorter, and of the self-same nature,\nwhich lead us to believe in the existence of Mind, for of that we have\nthe evidence within ourselves.\"[163]\n\nIt follows that were we reduced, as we are not, to the necessity of\nadopting the theory of \"unisubstancisme,\" we might with at least as good\nreason dispense with the existence of \"matter\" as with the existence of\n\"mind;\" for, in the words of Dugald Stewart, \"it would no more be proper\nto say of 'mind' that it is _material_, than to say of 'body' that it is\n_spiritual.\"_[164]\n\nIII. Our _third_ proposition is, That we are _not_ reduced to the\nnecessity of adopting any theory of \"unisubstancisme,\" since there is\nnothing inconceivable or self-contradictory in the supposition of two\ndistinct substantive beings, possessing diverse properties, such as\n\"mind\" and \"body,\" or \"spirit\" and \"matter,\" are usually held to be.\n\nLet any one endeavor to assign a reason for the sole, exclusive\nexistence either of \"matter\" or of \"spirit,\" or a distinct, specific\nground for the opinion that they are necessarily incompatible with each\nother, and he will be compelled to own that the theory of\n\"unisubstancisme,\" however plausible by reason of its apparent\nsimplicity, is really nothing more than a gratuitous assumption. It\ncannot be admitted with reference even to _nature_ and _man_ without\nconfounding the simplest elements of human knowledge; and with reference\nto _God_ and the _universe_, it is attended with still more fatal\nconsequences, since it must lead, if consistently followed out, to\nundisguised Pantheism. Why should it be supposed that there is, or can\nonly be, _one_ substance in Nature? one substance invested with all\nthose properties and powers which exist, in such manifold diversity, in\nthe organic and inorganic kingdoms? The wonder might rather seem to be\nthat any _two_ substances should be capable of accounting for such a\nvariety of phenomena as the universe exhibits. A \"dualism\" is\nunavoidable, unless we are to materialize God as well as man; and why\nmay there not be a \"dualism\" in the case of created _mind_ and _matter_,\nas there must be, on any supposition except that of Pantheism, in the\ncase of the uncreated mind and the material universe? We see variety and\ngradation in all the works of God; we see thousands of substances,\nsimple and compound, possessing various properties, even in the\ninorganic world; we see different forms of life, vegetable and animal,\nascending by steps of regular gradation, from the lowest to the highest;\nwe see, in the animal kingdom, various propensities, instincts, and\npowers, which constitute the characteristics of distinct species; at\nlength we rise to Man, with his rational, responsible, and immortal\nnature. Why may not Man be the _nexus_ between a world of \"matter\" and a\nworld of \"spirits,\"--Man, who is equally connected with the material\nworld by his body, and with the spiritual by his soul,--who is, as it\nwere, \"mind incarnate,\" spirit in flesh? And why may there not be higher\nspirits still, whether embodied in subtler and more refined vehicles, or\nexisting apart from all material forms, in those other worlds which\nAstronomy has brought to light? No reason can be assigned for a negative\nanswer to these and similar queries, unless it be that _we cannot\nconceive of pure spirit without bodily form_; and this may be true, if\nit be meant merely to affirm that we can find no sensible image for it,\nnothing by which it can be represented to our sight, or pictured in our\nimagination, as visible things may be; but it is not true, if it be\nmeant to imply that we have no distinct notion of \"mind\" or \"spirit,\"\nfor it is as clearly known by its properties, of thought, feeling,\nvolition, and consciousness, as matter itself can be; and who will\nventure to define, or to depict, or to form any image of _the substance\nof matter_, apart from the properties which belong to it?\n\nWe are under no necessity, then, of adopting the theory of\n\"unisubstancisme,\" and we cannot found upon it in argument without\nbuilding on a mere gratuitous assumption.\n\nIV. Our _fourth_ proposition is, That the same reason which warrants us\nin ascribing certain properties and phenomena to a distinct substance\ncalled \"matter,\" equally warrants us in ascribing certain other\nproperties and phenomena to a distinct substance called \"mind;\" and that\nthe difference between their respective properties and phenomena is so\ngreat as to justify the belief that the _substances_ are different and\nought to be denominated by distinctive names.\n\nWhen Materialists affirm, as they do, the existence of one only\nsubstantive being in Nature, and represent all our mental phenomena as\nthe mere results of physical organization, they assume that \"matter,\" at\nleast, is a real _entity_; that it is a _substance_ or _substratum_ in\nwhich certain powers or qualities inhere; and that its existence, as\nsuch, is evident and undeniable. We are entirely relieved, therefore, by\ntheir own admission or assumption, from the necessity of discussing the\nmore general problem of Ontology; the problem, whether we can prove the\nexistence of _any_ being, properly so called, from a mere series of\nphenomena, a succession of appearances. They virtually admit, since they\nevidently assume, that the phenomena must have a substance under them,\nthe qualities a substratum in which they inhere. Now, the very same\nreason which warrants, or rather obliges them to recognize \"matter\" as a\nsubstance and not as a shadow,--as an _entity_ which really exists and\nmanifests itself by its properties and effects,--must equally warrant,\nor rather oblige them to recognize \"mind\" or \"spirit\" also as a\ndistinct substantive being, unless it can be shown either that its\nproperties are the same with those of matter, or that they may be\naccounted for by some peculiar modification of matter, some law of\nphysical organization. There can be no reason for admitting the\nexistence of \"matter\" as a substance, which does not apply also to the\nexistence of \"mind\" as a distinct substance, if it shall be found that\ntheir properties are essentially different. We know, and can know,\nnothing of _substance_ otherwise than by its properties or powers: we\nknow nothing of \"matter,\"--it would, in fact, be to us non-existent, but\nfor its extension, solidity, and other properties; we know nothing of\n\"mind,\"--it would equally be to us non-existent, but for its\nconsciousness, its thoughts, feelings, and desires; and if it be right\nto ascribe the one set of properties to a substantive being, called\n\"matter,\" it cannot be wrong to ascribe the other set of properties also\nto a substantive being, called \"mind.\"\n\nIf it could be shown, indeed, that the properties of the one substance\nmight either be identified with, or accounted for, by those of the\nother; if animal feeling could be identified with or derived from, mere\nphysical impulse; if intellectual thought could be reduced to material\nmotion; if desire and aversion, hope and fear could be explained by the\nnatural laws of attraction and repulsion, then we might blend the two\nsubstances into one, and speak of \"mind\" as a mere modification of\n\"matter.\" But as long as the properties or powers by which alone any\nsubstance can be known are seen to be generically different, we cannot\nconfound the substances themselves, or reduce them to one category,\nwithout violating the plainest rules of philosophical inquiry.\n\nAnd yet to these rules Dr. Priestley refers, as if they warranted the\nconclusions at which he had arrived. He desires his readers \"to recur to\nthe universally received rules of philosophizing, such as are laid down\nby Sir Isaac Newton at the beginning of his third book of \"Principia.\"\nThe first of these rules, as laid down by him, is that we are to _admit\nno more causes than are sufficient to explain appearances_; and the\nsecond is, that to _the same effect_ we must, as far as possible, assign\n_the same cause_.\" We cheerfully accept these canons of philosophical\ninquiry; and it is just because no one substance is sufficient, in our\nestimation, to account for _all_ the appearances, that we equally reject\nthe \"spiritualism\" of Berkeley, who would resolve all phenomena into\n\"mind,\" and the \"materialism\" of Priestley, who would resolve all\nphenomena into \"matter.\" Matter and Mind may, indeed, be said to\nresemble each other in some respects,--in their being equally existent,\nequally created, and equally dependent; but their essential properties\nare generically different, for there is no identity, but a manifest and\nundeniable diversity, between thought, feeling, desire, volition, and\nconscience, and the various qualities or powers belonging to matter,\nsuch as extension, solidity, and _vis inertiae_, or even the powers of\nattraction and repulsion. On the ground of this manifest difference\nbetween the properties by which alone any substance makes itself known,\nwe hold ourselves warranted to affirm that the \"mind\" is immaterial, and\nto ascribe mental phenomena to a _distinct substantive being_, not less\nthan the material phenomena of Nature.\n\nSome ingenious thinkers, on both sides of the question, have not been\nfully satisfied with this method of stating the grounds of our opinion.\nIt has been said by our opponents, that if we found merely on the\nacknowledged difference between two sets of properties or phenomena,\nwhile we admit that the substance or substratum is in itself entirely\nunknown to us, or known only through the medium of the properties to\nwhich we refer,--then the dispute becomes a purely _verbal_ one, and can\namount to nothing more than this, whether a _substance_ of whose essence\nwe are entirely ignorant should be called by the name of \"matter\" or by\nthe name of \"spirit.\" But the dispute is not a purely _verbal_ one,\neven on the suppositions which have been stated. For it is essential to\na right \"philosophy of nature,\" that every substance possessing peculiar\nproperties should have a distinctive name. Thus, even in the material\nworld itself, we distinguish sulphur from soda, gold from granite, and\nmagnesia from electricity or _odyle_. Why? Because, while they have some\nproperties in common, in virtue of which we rank them in the same\ncategory as \"material substances,\" they have, severally, certain\ndistinctive or peculiar characteristics, which forbid us to call the one\nby the same name as the other. And for precisely the same reason, when\nwe find another class of properties and powers existing in certain\nbeings, which are totally different from those belonging to mere\nmaterial substances,--incapable not only of being identified with them,\nbut also of being accounted for by means of them,--we are equally\nwarranted in ascribing these properties to a _substance_, and in\naffirming that this substance, of which we know nothing except through\nits properties, is radically different from \"matter.\" That there is\nsomething more than a mere _verbal_ difference between us and our\nopponents might seem to be admitted by themselves, when they evince so\nmuch zeal in assailing our position and defending their own; but it\nbecomes strikingly apparent as soon as we extend our inquiry so as to\nembrace the grand question respecting the distinction, if any, between\nGod and the material universe.\n\nSome, again, who are substantially, at least in all important respects,\non our side of the question, have not been satisfied with showing that\nthe two sets of properties are generically different, and that the same\nreason exists for ascribing the one to a distinct substantive being\ncalled \"mind,\" as for ascribing the other to a substantive being called\n\"matter.\" They have been anxious to advance a step further; and to show\nthat the two sets of properties are _mutually exclusive_, and that they\ncould not possibly _coexist_ in the same subject. This is the declared\nobject of Baxter's Work on the Soul, which professes to prove that the\nonly power belonging to \"matter,\" namely, its _vis inertiae_, or\nresistance to any change in its present state, is inconsistent with its\npossession of any active power. It is not held sufficient to show that\nthe properties are generically different, and that the substances in\nwhich these properties inhere may and should be designated by distinct\nnames, as matter and spirit, soul and body; but it must be further\nproved that they are so heterogeneous and inconsistent as to be mutually\nexclusive, and incapable of coexisting in the same substance. To a\ncertain extent, we think this mode of reasoning may be admitted. We do\nnot conceive that \"vis inertiae\" is the only property belonging to\nmatter, or that it is necessarily exclusive of attraction and repulsion,\nand the other powers which may belong to its specific varieties; but we\ndo conceive that the \"vis inertiae\" of mere matter is utterly\ninconsistent with the self-activity, the self-moving power, which\nbelongs to \"mind:\" and we are confirmed in this conviction by the\nanxiety which our opponents have evinced to explain the phenomena of\nmind by purely mechanical laws, and to establish a system, not of\n_moral_, but of _material_ necessity, in opposition to the doctrine of\nman's spontaneity and freedom. We are further of opinion, that\n_extension_ cannot be predicated of \"mind,\" without also being\npredicated of \"thought;\" and that to ascribe it to either would lead to\nridiculous absurdities, such as have been noted, and perhaps\ncaricatured, by Dr. Thomas Brown. We think, too, that the unity and\ncontinuity of consciousness, with the intimate sense of personal\nidentity, that belongs to all rational and responsible beings, are\nutterly irreconcilable with the continual flux and mutation that are\nincident to matter, and that they cannot be accounted for without the\nsupposition of a distinct substance, existing the same throughout all\nthe changes that occur in the material receptacle in which it dwells. To\nthis extent we think that the argument is alike legitimate and valid;\nbut when it goes beyond this, and attempts either to divest matter of\nall active properties, or to demonstrate that, in the very nature of\nthings, sensation and thought could not possibly be annexed to a\nmaterial substance, we think that it advances beyond the real exigencies\nof the case, and that it undertakes a task which is somewhat too arduous\nfor our present powers,--a task which many of the ablest advocates of\nImmaterialism would humbly, but firmly, decline.\n\nIn this connection, it may be useful to remark that it is only with\nreference to this advanced and more arduous part of the general\nargument, that such writers as Locke and Bonnet, whose authority is\noften pleaded in opposition to our views, ever felt the slightest\ndifficulty. They were both \"Immaterialists,\" because they both discerned\nthe radical difference between mental and material phenomena, and\nbecause they both admitted the reasonableness of ascribing them,\nrespectively, to a _distinct substance_. But they were not convinced by\nthe more metaphysical arguments of those who professed to show that none\nof the phenomena of \"mind\" could possibly be exhibited by matter, or, at\nleast, they declined to take that ground. That Locke was an\nImmaterialist is evident from many passages in his writings. \"By putting\ntogether,\" he says, \"the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty and\npower of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a\nperception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material.\nFor putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, &c., joined to\n_substance_, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an\nimmaterial spirit; and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid\nparts and a power of being moved, joined with _substance_, of which\nlikewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of matter: the one\nis as clear and distinct an idea as the other.\"[165] But notwithstanding\nthis explicit statement, he demurred to the doctrine of those who\nmaintained that the power of thinking could not possibly be superadded\nto matter, and this because he deemed it presumptuous to set limits to\nthe Divine omnipotence, or to pronounce any judgment on a question of\nthat kind. \"We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall\nnever be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it\nbeing impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without\nRevelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some\nsystems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think.... I\nsee _no contradiction_ in it that the first eternal thinking Being\nshould, if He pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless\nmatter, put together as He sees fit, some degrees of sense, perception,\nand thought.\"[166]\n\nIn these and similar passages, Locke did not mean, we think, to retract\nor modify the doctrine which he had taught respecting the radical\ndistinction betwixt mind and matter; he intended merely to intimate\nthat, in adopting that doctrine, he proceeded on grounds different from\nthose which had been assumed by some other writers; that his belief\nrested mainly on the essential difference between the properties\nbelonging to the two substances, and not on the mere metaphysical\narguments by which some had attempted to prove that God himself could\nnot impart to matter the power of thinking. He shrunk from pronouncing a\npositive decision on _this_ one point; and yet his words have ever since\nbeen quoted with triumph by the advocates of Materialism as affording a\nvirtual sanction to _the possibility_ at least of that for which they\ncontend. And on the same account, Locke has been severely blamed by some\nmodern \"spiritualists.\" Mr. Carlyle, speaking of \"Hartley's and\nDarwin's, and all the possible forms of Materialism,--the grand\nIdolatry, as we may rightly call it, by which at all times the true\nworship, that of the invisible, has been polluted and withstood\"--adds\nthe following characteristic remarks: \"Locke, himself a clear,\nhumble-minded, patient, reverent, nay religious man, had paved the way\nfor banishing religion from the world. Mind, by being modelled in men's\nimaginations into a Shape, a Visibility, and reasoned of as if it had\nbeen some composite, divisible, and reunitable substance, some finer\nchemical salt, or curious piece of logical joinery, began to lose its\nimmaterial, mysterious, divine, though invisible character: it was\ntacitly figured as something that might, were our organs fine enough, be\n_seen_. Yet who had ever seen it? who could ever see it? Thus, by\ndegrees, it passed into a Doubt, a Relation, some faint Possibility,\nand, at last, into a highly probably Nonentity. Following Locke's\nfootsteps, the French had discovered that 'as the stomach secretes\nchyle, so does the brain secrete thought.'\"[167]\n\nThe sentiments of Bonnet of Geneva, as stated in his \"Palingenesie,\" are\nsubstantially in accordance with those of Locke, and have met with\nsimilar treatment. He is not a Materialist; he admits a real\ndistinction, as well as a close union, between the soul and the body; he\nspeaks even of the possible existence of disembodied souls or pure\nspirits; he affirms the immateriality of the thinking principle; and\nexpressly assigns his reasons for _not_ being a Materialist.[168] But he\nappears to have thought, as Locke did, that possibly the power of\nthinking might be superadded to matter, by the Creator's omnipotent\nwill, and that there is nothing in this supposition which could\nseriously affect either the doctrine of Theism or the \"immortality\" of\nman. And hence he affirmed, in words which Dr. Priestley selected for\nthe motto of his \"Disquisitions,\" that \"if any one should ever\ndemonstrate the soul to be material, far from being alarmed at this, we\nshould only admire the power which could give to _matter_ the power of\n_thinking_.\"\n\nWe conceive that the language both of Locke and Bonnet on this\nparticular point amounts to a dangerous and very unnecessary concession.\nWere it meant merely to affirm that God could so unite a thinking\nspiritual being with a material organism, as to make the two mutually\ndependent and subservient, this is no more than is admitted by all the\nadvocates of Immaterialism, and it is actually exhibited in the\nconstitution of human nature. But if it were meant to admit that the\npower of \"thinking\" and \"willing\" might be superadded as a property or\nquality to matter itself, _without any substantive being other than\nmatter as a substratum_, then we conceive it to be at variance with the\ngrounds on which Locke and Bonnet themselves had previously declared\ntheir belief in the distinct existence both of matter and spirit. We\nshall only add, that the prejudice against our doctrine, which is\nfounded on the union of two _substances_ apparently so heterogeneous as\nmind and matter in _the same person_, is, to say the least, fully\ncounterbalanced by the difficulty, incident to the theory, of\ndemonstrating the coexistence of _two sets of properties_, apparently so\ndiverse and disparate as thought and extension, \"vis inertiae\" and\nspontaneity, in _the same substance_.\n\nOn the whole, we conclude that the same reason which warrants us in\nascribing certain properties or phenomena to a distinct substance called\n\"matter,\" equally warrants us in ascribing certain other properties or\nphenomena to a distinct substance called \"mind;\" and that the difference\nbetween their properties and phenomena is so great as to justify the\nbelief that the substances are different, and ought to be denominated by\ndistinctive names.\n\nV. Our _fifth_ proposition is, That it is impossible to account for the\nphenomena of thought, feeling, desire, volition, and self-consciousness,\nby ascribing them, as Materialists do, either to the _substance of_\n\"matter,\" or to its _form_; that is, either to the _atomic particles_\nof which it consists, or to the _peculiar organization_ in which these\nparticles are arranged.\n\nIt is too manifest to admit either of doubt or denial, that the power of\nthinking, feeling, and willing, does not belong to every form of matter.\nIt is not, therefore, one of its essential properties; and if it belong\nto it at all, it must be either a _quality superadded_ to the ordinary\npowers of matter, or a _product resulting_ from its configuration in an\norganized form.\n\nIf it be a quality superadded merely to the ordinary powers of matter,\nthen it must exist equally in every part of the mass to which it is\nattached; every particle of the matter in which it inheres must be\nsentient, intelligent, voluntary, and active; and, on this supposition,\nit will remain a difficult, if not desperate problem, to account for the\n_unity_ of consciousness by such a diversity of parts, and especially\nfor the _continuity_ of consciousness, when the material elements are\nconfessedly in a state of constant flux and mutation. It would seem,\ntoo, that if thought be thus connected with an extended, divisible, and\nmutable substance, it must be itself extended, and, of course,\ndivisible; and, accordingly, Dr. Priestley does not hesitate to affirm\nthat our _ideas_, as well as our _minds_, possess these characters.\n\"Whatever ideas,\" he says, \"are in themselves, they are evidently\nproduced by external objects, and must therefore correspond to them; and\nsince many of the objects or archetypes of ideas are _divisible_, it\nnecessarily follows that _the ideas themselves are divisible also_.\" ...\n\"If the archetypes of ideas have _extension_, the ideas which are\nexpressive of them, and are actually produced by them according to\ncertain mechanical laws, must have extension likewise; and, therefore,\nthe mind in which they exist, whether it be material or immaterial, must\nhave extension also.... I am, therefore, obliged to conclude that the\nsentient principle in man, containing ideas which certainly have parts,\nand are divisible, and consequently must have extension, cannot be that\nsimple, indivisible, and immaterial substance that some have imagined it\nto be, but something that has real extension, and therefore may have the\nother properties of matter.\"[169] He argues that _ideas_ must be\nextended and divisible because their objects or archetypes are so; and,\nfurther, that the _mind_ itself must be material, because these\nproperties belong to the ideas which inhere in it as their subject or\nseat. Now, _this_ argument is fairly met by the reasoning, or the\nridicule, call it which you will, of Dr. Thomas Brown: \"In saying of\nmind that it is matter, we must mean, if we mean anything, that the\nprinciple which thinks is hard and divisible; and that it will be not\nmore absurd to talk of the _twentieth_ part of an affirmation, or the\n_quarter_ of a hope, of the _top_ of a remembrance, and the north and\neast corners of a comparison, than of the twentieth part of a pound, or\nof the different points of the compass, in reference to any part of the\nglobe. The true answer to the statement of the Materialist,--the answer\nwhich we feel in our hearts, on the very expression of the plurality and\ndivisibility of feeling,--is that it assumes what, far from admitting,\nwe cannot even understand, and that, with every effort of attention\nwhich we can give to our mental analysis, we are as incapable of forming\nany conception of what is meant by the quarter of a doubt, or the half\nof a belief, as of forming to ourselves an image of a circle without a\ncentral point, or of a square without a single angle.\"[170]\n\nBut the theory which supposes the soul to be extended and divisible, and\nits ideas, feelings, and volitions to be extended and divisible also,\nhas given place to another, which does not represent the mental\nqualities as inhering in every particle of the matter with which they\nare associated, but rather as _the products of organization_, the\nresults, not of the atomic elements, but of the form, or figure, into\nwhich they are cast. It seems to have been felt that it would be unsafe\nto ascribe the power of thinking to every particle of the brain, and it\nis now represented as the result or product of \"the brain in action, as\nlight and heat are of fire, and fragrance of the flower.\"[171] This idea\nis illustrated by a great variety of natural examples, in which certain\neffects are produced by the _arrangement of matter,_ which could not be\nproduced by its individual particles, existing separate and apart, or\ncombined in other forms. Nor is this a new phase of the theory, or an\noriginal discovery of the present age; it was familiarly known and fully\ndiscussed[172] in the days of Clarke and Collins, and every similitude\nwhich is now employed to illustrate it may be found dissected in their\nwritings. Collins had undertaken to prove that \"an individual power may\nreside in a material system which consists of separate and distinct\nparts,\"--\"an individual power which is _not_ in every one, nor in any\none, of the particles that compose it, when taken apart and considered\nsingly:\" and he had adduced as an example the very similitude which\nAtkinson employs, namely, \"fragrance from the flower;\" for he adds, \"a\nrose, for example, consists of several particles, which, separately and\nsingly, want a power to produce that agreeable sensation we experience\nin them when united.\" Other instances are given; such as \"the power of\nthe eye to contribute to the act of seeing, the power of a clock to show\nthe hour of the day, the power of a musical instrument to produce in us\nharmonious sounds;\" these, he says, \"are powers not at all resulting\nfrom any powers of _the same kind_ inhering in the parts of the system;\"\nand he infers that \"in the same manner the power of thinking, without\nbeing an aggregate of powers of the same kind, may yet inhere in a\nsystem of matter.\" But these examples, so far from confirming, serve\nrather to confute, the theory in whose support they are adduced. Could\nit be shown, indeed, that the eye possesses _in itself_ the power of\nvision, and that sight results solely from its peculiar texture; or,\nthat a clock is really an \"intellectual machine,\" and produces an\n\"intellectual effect;\" or, that a musical instrument possesses in itself\nthe soul of melody, and is conscious of its own sweet sounds,--then it\nmight be possible to entertain the supposition that, _in like manner_,\nan organized brain may have the power of producing thought, and feeling,\nand will. But what is the matter of fact? Let Dr. Clarke's answer with\nreference to the case of a timepiece suffice for all: \"That which you\ncall the power of a clock to show the time of the day is evidently\n_nothing in the clock itself_, but the figure and motion of its parts,\nand, consequently, not anything of a different sort or kind from the\npowers inherent in the parts. Whereas 'thinking,' if it was the result\nof the powers of the different parts of the machine of the body, or of\nthe brain in particular, would be something really inhering in the\nmachine itself, specifically different from all and every one of the\npowers of the several parts out of which it resulted; which is an\nexpress contradiction, a supposing the effect to have more in it than\nthe cause.\" ... \"That particular and determinate _degree of velocity_ in\na wheel, whereby it turns once round precisely in twelve hours, is that\nwhich you call _the power of a clock_ to show the time of the day; and\nbecause such a determinate velocity of motion is _made use of by us_ for\nthe measure of time, is it therefore really a new quality or power\ndistinct from the motion itself?\" The same answer is equally applicable\nto all the other examples, and it may be stated generally as amounting\nto this, that \"it is absolutely false in fact, and impossible in the\nnature of things, that any power whatsoever should inhere or reside in\nany system or composition of matter, different from the powers residing\nin the single parts.\"[173]\n\nThe two great difficulties which adhere to the theory of Materialism,\nand which must ever prove insurmountable, are these: first, to account\nfor the power of thinking by means of material atoms, which are\nindividually destitute of it; and secondly, to account for the unity and\ncontinuity of human consciousness by means of material atoms which are\nconstantly undergoing flux and mutation. For the first end, recourse has\nbeen had to the theory which ascribes the power of thinking, not to the\nparticles of matter, but to their order, arrangement, or organization;\nand for the second, the continuous sense of personal identity is\nsupposed to be sufficiently accounted for by supposing that, as the\nparticles which compose the brain are changed, the retiring atoms leave\ntheir share of the general consciousness as a legacy to their\nsuccessors. And both these expedients for surmounting the difficulty are\nexquisitely caricatured in the \"Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus,\" in a\nchapter which is justly described as \"an inimitable ridicule on Collins'\nargument against Clarke, to prove the soul only a quality.\" The Society\nof Freethinkers, addressing Martinus, propose to send him an answer to\nthe ill-grounded sophisms of their opponents, and likewise \"an easy\nmechanical explanation of perception or thinking.\"--\"One of their chief\narguments,\" say they, \"is that self-consciousness cannot inhere in any\nsystem of matter, because all matter is made up of several distinct\nbeings which never can make up one individual thinking being. This is\neasily answered by a familiar instance. In every _jack_ there is a\n_meat-roasting_ quality, which neither resides in the fly, nor in the\nweight, nor in any particular wheel, of the jack, but is the result of\nthe whole composition.... And as the general quality of meat-roasting,\nwith its several modifications, does not inhere in any one part of the\njack, so neither does consciousness, with its several modes of\nsensation, intellection, volition, &c., inhere in any one, but is the\nresult from the mechanical composition of the whole animal.\" And then,\nin regard to the _second_ difficulty: \"The parts,\" say they, \"of an\nanimal body are perpetually changed, ... from whence it will follow that\nthe idea of individual consciousness must be constantly translated from\none particle of matter to another.... We answer, this is only a fallacy\nof the imagination. They make a great noise about this _individuality_,\nhow a man is conscious to himself that he is the same individual he was\ntwenty years ago, notwithstanding the flux state of the particles of\nmatter that compose his body. We think this is capable of a very plain\nanswer, and may be easily illustrated by a familiar example. Sir John\nCutler had a pair of black worsted stockings, which his maid darned so\noften with silk, that they became at last a pair of silk stockings. Now,\nsupposing those stockings of Sir John's endued with some degree of\nconsciousness at every particular darning, they would have been sensible\nthat they were the same individual pair of stockings, both before and\nafter the darning!\"\n\nThe subject is here presented in a ludicrous point of view, and some may\ndoubt whether this is a legitimate method of treating it. But it should\nnot be forgotten that while _ridicule is no safe test of truth, it may\nbe the most effective exposure of nonsense and folly_.\n\n\nSECTION III.\n\nTHE RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY.\n\nIt has been generally felt and acknowledged, that the doctrine which\npreserves the distinction between matter and spirit, body and soul, is\nmore in accordance with the truths of Natural and Revealed Religion,\nthan the opposite theory which identifies them; and that, on the other\nhand, a profound and serious study of these truths has a tendency to\nraise our thoughts above the low level of Materialism, and to direct\nthem to the contemplation of a higher and nobler world,--the world of\nspirits.\n\nThere are many distinct points at which the theory of Materialism comes\ninto contact and collision with the truths both of Natural and Revealed\nReligion. By a brief enumeration of these, the practical importance of\nthe subject may be clearly evinced.\n\n1. The doctrine of \"the immortality of the soul\" is seriously affected\nby the theory of Materialism. That there is _some_ connection between\nthe two is apparent from the very anxiety with which infidels have\nlabored to undermine the doctrine of \"spirit,\" on purpose to get rid of\nthe doctrine of \"immortality.\" But in stating the connection between\nthem, we must exercise the utmost caution, lest we should unwarily place\nthe truth on a precarious or questionable basis. In arguing for the\nfuture life of the soul, as a doctrine of Natural Religion, some writers\nhave spoken as if they supposed that nothing more was needful to\ndemonstrate its \"immortality\" than the bare fact of its being\n\"immaterial,\" and that, by its very nature as \"spirit,\" it is\nindestructible by God Himself. Now, we do not hold that the mere proof\nof its being an immaterial substance would necessarily infer its being\nalso immortal. For ought we know, the principle of life, sensation,\nmemory, and volition _may_ belong to an immaterial substance even in the\nlower animals, who are not supposed to be immortal; and the only use\nwhich we would make of its \"immateriality\" in connection with its\n\"immortality,\" is simply this,--that not being material, _its\ndestruction is not necessarily implied in the dissolution of the body_.\nIt is not in the metaphysical doctrine of its immaterial nature, but in\nthe practical evidence of its moral responsibilities and religious\ncapacities, that we find the most satisfactory natural proof of its\nimmortality. It is perfectly possible to hold, on the one hand, that all\n\"immaterial substances\" are not necessarily indestructible; and yet to\nhold, on the other hand, that _such_ an immaterial substance as the soul\nof man is known to be,--endowed with conscience, with intelligence, with\naffections and aspirations, with hopes and fears such as can find no\nsuitable object and no adequate range within the limits of the present\nlife,--must be destined to an immortal existence. The \"immortality,\" for\nwhich alone we ought to contend, is such as implies neither a necessity\nof existence in the creature, nor its independence on the will of the\nCreator. The _power_ of God to annihilate the soul is not called in\nquestion, but the _purpose_ of God to make the soul immortal is inferred\nfrom its nature and capacities, its aspirations and hopes and fears. And\nall that is necessarily implied in the doctrine of what has been called\n\"the natural immortality of the soul\" is well stated by Dr. S. Clarke,\nwhen he says that, \"the soul may be such a substance as is able to\ncontinue its own duration forever, by the powers given to it at its\nfirst production, and the continuance of those general influences which\nare requisite for the support of created beings in general.\" Mr. Baxter,\nacute and metaphysical as he was, placed the argument substantially on\nthe same ground. \"It appears,\" he says, \"that all substance equally, as\nwell material as immaterial, cannot cease to exist but by an effect of\ninfinite power.... The human soul, having no parts, must be\nindissoluble in its nature by anything that hath not power to destroy or\nannihilate it. And since it hath not a natural tendency to annihilation,\nnor a power to annihilate itself, nor can be annihilated by any being\nfinitely powerful only, without an immediate act of the omnipotent\nCreator to annihilate it, it must endlessly abide an active perceptive\nsubstance, without either fear or hopes of dying through all eternity,\nwhich is, in other words, to be immortal as to the agency of all natural\nor second causes, that is, 'naturally immortal.'\"[174]\n\nWhen thus stated and limited, the argument is at once safe and valid. It\nis first proved that the Mind is a \"substance,\" living, perceptive, and\nactive, which is simple and indivisible, and not capable, like matter,\nof being separated into parts possessing the same properties or powers;\nand then this distinction betwixt mind and matter is applied to prove\nthat it cannot be _destroyed by dissolution_, as the body may be, but\nthat if it be destroyed at all, it must be by _annihilation_. But no\nsubstance, material or immaterial, can be annihilated by any _finite or\nsecond cause_; it can be annihilated only by the will of him who created\nit; and the question respecting the soul of man remains, What are the\nindications of God's will concerning it? When this question is seriously\nentertained, we can hardly fail to see in the structure of its powers,\nin the grandeur of its capacities, in the moral and responsible\nconsciousness which belongs to it, a strong presumptive proof of its\nbeing His purpose that it should continue to live after the dissolution\nof the body. The Metaphysical argument is sufficient to remove\npreliminary objections, the Moral argument furnishes a presumptive\nproof.\n\nThe theory of Materialism, as it assumes different forms, so it admits\nof being associated with different views respecting the future\nprospects of the soul. When it is held in its grossest form, it stands\nin a relation of direct antagonism to the doctrine of \"immortality,\" as\nis apparent in the speculations of D'Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson, who\ninsist at large on the proof of Materialism on purpose to undermine and\noverthrow the doctrine of Immortality. The theory of Materialism has\nbeen maintained by Dr. Priestley and others, in conjunction with a\nprofessed, and, as we believe, sincere belief in a future state of\nrewards and punishments. The sleep of the soul during the interval\nbetween death and the resurrection, and its ultimate awakening by an\nimmediate and miraculous interposition of Divine power, are equally held\nto be true,--the one on the ground of a natural evidence, the other on\nthat of the authority of Revelation. But the natural evidence is\ndefective, since it depends entirely on the assumption that \"thought\" is\nproduced by and dependent on a certain material organization, without\nwhich it could not exist; and the supernatural authority is still less\nto be relied on, since it _seems_, at least, to recognize the existence\nof disembodied spirits, and unequivocally declares that the soul cannot\nbe killed as the body may. If the soul be material, as Dr. Priestley\nsays it is, it must be, equally with the body, affected by the stroke of\ndeath; yet our Lord says,--and His authority cannot be declined when the\ndoctrine of a future resurrection is made to depend on the mere\ntestimony of Scripture,--\"Fear not them which kill the body, but are not\nable to kill the soul; but rather fear Him which is able to destroy both\nsoul and body in hell.\"[175] And the soul is represented as existing in\na state of conscious happiness or misery, even during the interval\nbetween death and the resurrection, in the parable of the rich man and\nLazarus, as well as in the statement of the apostle that \"he was in a\nstrait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and to be with Christ,\nwhich is far better.\"[176] In its most recent and refined form, the\ntheory of Materialism represents \"mind\" as a subtle product, evolved out\nof matter, and destined to an endless existence,--an ever-ascending\nprogression; and in this form of it, the doctrine of a distinct,\npersonal immortality is, no doubt, far better preserved than in its\nearlier and grosser forms, which spoke of the utter destruction of\nindividual consciousness at the hour of death, and of our material\nparticles passing merely into other kinds of organic or inorganic being.\nBut then, it is placed on a very precarious ground,--the mere\nsupposition of a material product, which can never be established by\nproof, and which, if there were no other objection to it, might well\nseem to be sufficiently discredited by the mere fact that it ascribes to\n_the effect_ properties and powers, of a very high and peculiar order,\nwhich do not exist in _the cause_.\n\n2. The doctrine of \"future rewards and punishments,\" or of \"man's\nresponsibility\" as a subject of the Divine government, is also\nmaterially affected by the theory of Materialism, in some, at least, of\nits forms. When it is connected, as it often has been, with the doctrine\nof \"Mechanical Necessity,\" which represents every thought, opinion,\nemotion, desire, and habit, as the unavoidable result of mere physical\ninfluences acting on the brain, and makes no account of the spontaneity\nor freedom which belongs to man as an intelligent, moral, and\nresponsible agent, it is manifestly impossible to discover any ground\nfor the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. And accordingly,\nD'Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson describe man as if he were the mere\ncreature of circumstances, and deny that his character could possibly\nhave been different from what it is. But even when it is not associated\nwith fatalism, the theory, which denies the distinct existence of the\nsoul as a substantive being, has a tendency to shake our belief in the\ndoctrine of a \"future retribution,\" properly so called, since that\ndoctrine rests on the assumption of our continued personal identity, or\nthe unity and continuity of our consciousness, as dying yet immortal\nbeings; whereas, if there be no \"soul,\" or substantive spiritual being,\nand if the \"body\" be in a state of perpetual flux and mutation, it is\ndifficult to see how _the same being that sinned can suffer_, or how the\ndoctrine of \"retribution,\" properly so called, can be consistently\nmaintained.\n\n3. The doctrine of \"the spirituality\" of the Divine nature must be\nseriously affected, in different ways, by the theory of Materialism.\n\nIt is said in Scripture that \"God made man in His own image,\" and that\nHe \"breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a\nliving soul.\" Deny the existence of \"spirit\" or \"soul,\" as God's living\nimage on earth, and what ground of evidence, or what help of analogy,\nremains for either conceiving or proving aright the existence of Him who\nis \"a Spirit\" and \"the Father of the spirits of all flesh?\" And if the\n\"spirituality\" of the Divine nature be called in question, many of the\nDivine attributes must also suffer; for it is only as \"a spirit\" that\nGod can be _omnipresent_, and his omnipresence is presupposed in his\n_omniscience_ and _omnipotence_. For these reasons, we incur the\ngreatest risk of entertaining limited and false conceptions of God, by\nobliterating the distinction between \"matter\" and \"spirit.\"\n\nIt is, no doubt, competent, and it may even be highly useful, to\nentertain the question, how far the theory of Materialism should be held\nto affect the grounds on which we believe in a living, personal,\nspiritual God? In answer to this question, we have no hesitation in\navowing our conviction that the theory of Materialism, however it may be\nmodified, has a tendency to impair the evidence of that fundamental\narticle of faith. God is \"a Spirit,\" and man was made \"in the image of\nGod.\" Take away all spiritual essences; reduce every known object in\nnature to matter, gross or refined; let mental and moral phenomena be\nblended with the physical, and what remains to constitute the groundwork\nof a \"spiritual\" system, or to conduct us to the recognition of a\nsupreme, immaterial Mind? If the material body, with its peculiar\norganization, be capable of producing human thought, and sufficient to\naccount for the intelligence of man, why may not the material universe,\nwith its mysterious laws and manifold forces, be held sufficient to\nexplain whatever marks of a higher intelligence may appear in Nature?\nand why may we not at once embrace Pantheism, and conceive of God only\nas \"the soul of the world?\" Dr. Priestley's reply to this question\nappears to us to be a mere evasion of the difficulty. In treating of\n\"the objection to the system of Materialism derived from the\nconsideration of the Divine essence,\" he first of all premises that \"in\nfact we have no proper idea of any essence whatever; that our ideas\nconcerning 'matter' do not go beyond the powers of which it is\npossessed, and much less can our ideas go beyond powers, properties, or\nattributes with respect to the Divine Being;\" and then adds, \"Now, the\npowers and properties of the Divine mind, as clearly deduced from the\nworks of God, are not only so infinitely superior to those of the human\nmind, when there is some analogy between them, but so essentially\ndifferent from them in other respects, that whatever term we make use of\nto denote the one, it must be improperly applied to the other.\" He\nspecifies several points of \"essential difference\" between the human and\nthe Divine mind: the _first_ is, the limited intelligence of the one as\ncontrasted with the all-comprehensive omniscience of the other; the\n_second_ is, the omnipotence which belongs to God, and in virtue of\nwhich He can produce, or annihilate, anything at His pleasure: the\n_third_ is, that \"the Divine essence cannot be the object of any of our\nsenses, as everything else that we call 'matter' is.\" And on these\ngrounds he concludes that \"as the Divine powers, so the Divine nature,\nmust be essentially different from ours, and, consequently, no common\nterm, except such comprehensive terms as _being, nature_, &c., can be\nproperly used to express both.\" He further argues that \"no proof of the\nmateriality of man can be extended, by any just analogy, to a proof or\nevidence of a similar materiality of the Divine nature; for the\nproperties or powers being different, the 'substance' or 'essence' (if\nit be any convenience to us to use such terms at all) must be different\nalso.\"[177]\n\nNow, we conceive this to be a mere evasion of the real difficulty:\n_first_, because the same mode of reasoning, if applied to the case of\nthe human mind, would equally serve to prove that _it_ should be\ndistinguished from matter: and, _secondly_, because the alleged\n_differences_ between the human and the Divine mind, great and real as\nwe admit them to be, afford no better reason for calling God a \"spirit,\"\nthan that which may be found in the _resemblance or analogy_ between\ncreated and uncreated intelligence. It is as true of the human as it is\nof the Divine mind, that we know nothing of its essence, except what we\nlearn through its properties and powers, that \"it cannot be the object\nof any of our senses, as everything that we call 'matter' is,\" and that\nif it be right to give different and distinctive names to substances,\nexpressive of their properties in so far as these are known to us, we\nare warranted in calling the human soul a \"spirit\" and distinguishing it\nfrom \"matter,\" until it can be shown that the properties of both are\nidentical. If this be denied, we cannot see on what ground the\ndistinction between \"matter\" and \"spirit\" can be maintained with\nreference to God Himself. Dr. Priestley founds, not on the _resemblance\nor analogy,_ but on the _essential difference_, between created and\nuncreated intelligence; but, in point of fact, the _difference_, great\nand real as it is, has no bearing on the only question at issue; it is\nthe _resemblance or analogy_ between all thinking beings and the\nSupreme Mind that suggests the reason for classing them under the same\ncategory as \"spirits,\" and that enables us to rise from the spiritual\nnature of man to the spiritual nature of God.\n\nThe personality of God, as a living, self-conscious, and active Being,\ndistinct from the created universe and superior to it, is dependent on\nthe \"spirituality\" of His nature; and in so far as the latter is\naffected by the theory of Materialism, the evidence of the former must\nalso be proportionally weakened. We find, accordingly, that many\nMaterialists have exhibited a tendency towards a Pantheistic theory of\nnature, in which the material universe is conceived of as the \"body,\" of\nwhich God is the \"soul.\" Some Materialists, indeed, have stopped short\nof Pantheism; but this may have arisen from their being less consequent\nreasoners, or more timid thinkers, than others who were prepared to\nfollow out their principles fearlessly to all their logical results;\nfor, assuredly, if there be no evidence sufficient to show that the\n\"mind\" is distinct from the \"body,\" it will require a very high kind of\nevidence to make it certain that \"God\" is distinct from \"Nature.\"\n\n4. The theory of Materialism comes into direct collision, at several\npoints, with the doctrines of Revealed Religion.\n\nThe doctrine of Scripture in regard to the \"human soul\" is manifestly at\nvariance with that theory. In the earliest pages of Genesis, we have an\naccount of its creation, which, when compared with other statements and\nforms of expression occurring elsewhere, seems very clearly to imply\nthat the \"soul\" is a distinct substantive being, possessing properties\nand powers peculiar to itself, and, although now united to the \"body,\"\nyet capable of existing apart from it, and destined to an immortal\nexistence hereafter.[178] That it is a distinct substantive being,\nconnected with the body, but not dependent on it, at least in the sense\nof being incapable of existing apart from it, appears from various\ntestimonies of the inspired Word. God is there pleased to call Himself\n\"the Father of our spirits,\" and that, too, in contradistinction to \"the\nfathers of our flesh.\" \"We have had fathers of our 'flesh' which\ncorrected us, and we gave them reverence; shall we not much rather be in\nsubjection unto the Father of 'spirits' and live?\" He is called \"the God\nof the 'spirits' of all flesh,\" and \"the Lord who formeth the 'spirit'\nof man within him.\" The historical narrative, too, of man's creation,\nwhich declares that he was \"made in the image of God,\" and that his\n\"soul\" was infused by an immediate Divine afflatus, seems to imply that\nthere is another and a higher relation subsisting between God and the\n\"soul\" than any that subsists between God and \"matter.\" In other\npassages, the soul is expressly represented as distinct and different\nfrom the body:--\"Fear not them which can kill the 'body,' but are not\nable to kill the 'soul.'\" \"Into thy hands I commit my 'spirit,'\" said\nour Lord, just as his proto-martyr Stephen said, \"Lord Jesus, receive my\n'spirit.'\" There are other passages still which affirm the separate\nexistence of disembodied spirits: \"Then shall the dust return to the\nearth as it was, and 'the spirit,' shall return unto God who gave it.\"\n\"A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have.\" Nay, _spiritual\nlife_, such as clearly presupposes the continuance of conscious\nexistence, without interruption and without end, is said to be imparted\nby Christ to his people:--\"I am the resurrection and the life: he that\nbelieveth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live again, and\nwhosoever liveth and believeth in me _shall never die_.\"--\"Whoso\nbelieveth in me ... is passed from death unto life.\"[179] Life is said\nto be already imparted, such a life as shall survive death, and\ncontinue without interruption and without end; and surely this is\nutterly inconsistent with that theory of Materialism which affirms,\neither the annihilation of the \"soul\" at death, or even the cessation of\nits conscious existence during the interval between death and the\nresurrection.\n\nThe revealed doctrine of \"angels,\" or spiritual intelligences existing\nin other parts of the universe, is also opposed to the theory of\nMaterialism. According to the common belief, the \"soul\" of man is the\n_nexus_ between two worlds or states of being,--the world of \"matter\"\nand the world of \"mind.\" In man the elements of both worlds are united;\nby his body he is connected with the world of matter, by his soul with\nthe world of mind. Death, which dissolves the union between the two,\nconsigns the one to the dust, and introduces the other into the world of\nspirits. On this view, there is no difficulty in rising to the\nconception of higher spiritual intelligences; and the variety and\ngradation that are observable in all the works of God on earth may\nimpart to that sublime conception such a measure of verisimilitude as to\nmake it easily credible on the authority of Revelation. But the theory\nof Materialism, especially as advocated by Dr. Priestley, plainly\nexcludes the existence of any order of \"spiritual beings\" other than the\nuncreated Mind; for if that only is to be termed \"spirit\" which\npossesses omniscience and the power of producing anything at pleasure,\nit is clear that the highest angels and seraphims are no more \"spirits\"\nthan the souls of men.\n\nSuch being the relation which subsists between the theory of\nMaterialism, and some of the most important doctrines of Natural and\nRevealed Religion, it is not wonderful that a serious consideration of\nthe latter should lead reflective men to abjure the former, or that\ntheir aversion to it should increase in proportion as their views of\nDivine truth are extended and enlarged. Not a few have yielded, in early\nyouth, to the charm of speculative inquiry, and fondly embraced the\nidea of \"unisubstancisme,\" who have lived to exchange it for a more\nScriptural faith. For just in proportion as men are brought under the\ninfluence of serious views of God, of the soul, and of an eternal world,\nin the same proportion will they become alienated, and even averse, from\na theory which confounds \"spirit\" with \"matter,\" obscures their\nconceptions of God and of the world of spirits, and degrades men to the\nlevel of the beasts that perish. This effect of new, or, at least, more\nvivid views of \"things unseen and eternal\" was instructively exemplified\nin the case of the late Robert Hall. Like many an ardent speculatist, he\nhad embraced in early life the system of Materialism; and even after he\nhad entered on the work of the ministry, he could write to a professedly\nChristian congregation in the following terms: \"I am, and have been for\na long time, a Materialist, though I have never drawn your attention to\nthis subject in my preaching, because I have always considered it\nmyself, and wished you to consider it, as a _mere metaphysical\nspeculation_. My opinion, however, on this head, is, that the nature of\nman is simple and uniform, that the thinking powers and faculties are\nthe result of a certain organization of matter,--and that after death he\nceases to be conscious until the resurrection.\"[180] But speculative\ninquiry was soon to give place to spiritual faith. The death of his\nrevered and pious father brought his mind into realizing contact with an\nunseen and eternal world; and, in the words of his biographer,\ndistinguished alike for profound science and deep practical piety, \"The\ndeath of Mr. Hall's father tended greatly to bring his mind to the state\nof serious thought with which he entered on the pastoral office.\nMeditating with the deepest veneration upon the unusual excellences of a\nparent now forever lost to him, he was led to investigate, with renewed\nearnestness, the truth as well as the value of those high and sacred\nprinciples from which his eminent piety and admirable consistency so\nevidently flowed. He called to mind, too, several occasions on which his\nfather, partly by the force of reason, partly by that of tender\nexpostulation, had exhorted him to abandon the vague and dangerous\nspeculations to which he was prone. Some important changes in Mr. Hall's\nsentiments resulted from an inquiry conducted under such solemn\nimpressions, and among these may be mentioned his renunciation of\nMaterialism, which, he often declared, he _buried in his father's\ngrave_.\"\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[145] M. AD. FRANCK, \"Rapport a l'Academie,\" Preface, p. XXI.\n\n[146] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" I. 44, 89, 141; IV. 675; V. 45, 303. M.\nCROUSSE, \"Des Principes,\" pp. 16, 20, 84, 88. M. CABANIS, \"Rapports du\nPhisique et du Moral de l'Homme,\" 3 vols. M. BROUSSAIS, \"Traite de\nPhysiologie appliquee a la Pathologie,\" 1828.\n\n[147] \"Systeme de la Nature,\" I. 2, 10, 86, 101, and _passim_. This\neloquent text-book of the Atheism of the last century is dissected and\nrefuted by M. BERGIER in his \"Examen du Materialisme,\" 2 vols. Paris,\n1771.\n\n[148] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" I. 44, 141. M. CROUSSE, \"Des Principes,\" pp.\n84, 86. ATKITSON AND MARTINEAU, \"Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and\nDevelopment.\"\n\n[149] DR. PRIESTLEY, \"Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and\nColors.\" MR. DUGALD STEWART, \"Philosoph. Essays,\" p. 187.\n\n[150] DR. PRIESTLEY, \"Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit;\"\n\"Free Discussion of the Doctrine of Materialism;\" \"Correspondence\nbetween Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price.\"\n\n[151] DR. JOHN MASON GOOD, \"Life of Lucretius,\" prefixed to his poetical\nversion of \"The Nature of Things,\" I. XXXVIII.\n\n[152] The \"fictions of Clairvoyance\" may be studied at large in \"The\nPrinciples of Nature and her Divine Revelations,\" by AND. J. DAVIS, the\nPoughkeepsie Seer, 2 vols.; and in \"The Celestial Telegraph,\" by M.\nCAHAGNET. An attempt has been made to popularize the doctrine by\nintroducing it into the light literature of the Continent. See \"Memoirs\nof a Physician, Joseph Balsamo,\" by ALEXANDER DUMAS, I. 15, 21, 82; II.\n50, 62, 70. Whether the cases reported by Dr. Gregory deserve to be\nranked as facts or fictions is a question which we need not wait to\nsolve, before we reject the \"Revelations\" of Davis.\n\n[153] DR. PRIESTLEY, \"Disquisitions,\" p. 2.\n\n[154] \"Systeme de la Nature,\" I. 97, 108.\n\n[155] DR. PRIESTLEY, \"Disquisitions,\" pp. 27, 38, 60.\n\n[156] MR. ATKINSON, \"Laws of Man's Nature,\" p. 17.\n\n[157] DR. SPURZHEIM, \"Philosophical Principles of Phrenology,\" pp. VI.,\n86, 100. PROFESSOR DOD, \"Princeton Theological Essays,\" II. 376.\n\n[158] DR. GREGORY, \"Letters on Animal Magnetism,\" p. 57.\n\n[159] BISHOP BUTLER, \"Analogy,\" p. I. c. 1, p. 170.\n\n[160] DR. JOHN PLAYFAIR, \"Works,\" I., Preface, XXIX.\n\n[161] C. M. BURNETT, M. D., \"Philosophy,\" &c. London, 1850.\n\n[162] BISHOP BERKELEY, \"Words,\" I. 80.\n\n[163] LORD BROUGHAM, \"Discourse of Natural Theology,\" p. 238.\n\n[164] STEWART, \"Elements of Philosophy,\" I. 5.\n\n[165] LOCKE'S \"Essay,\" b. II. c. 23, Sec. 15. Ibid., b. IV. c. 3, Sec. 6.\n\n[166] LOCKE, \"Letter to Bishop of Worcester,\" Works, IV. 31.\n\n[167] THOMAS CARLYLE, \"Essays,\" I. 77, 214.\n\n[168] C. BONNET, \"Palingenesie Philosophique,\" 4 vols., I. 7, 47, 52.\n\n[169] DR. PRIESTLEY, \"Disquisitions,\" pp. 37, 38.\n\n[170] DR. THOMAS BROWN, \"Lectures,\" No. XCVI.\n\n[171] ATKINSON, \"Letters,\" p. 17.\n\n[172] DR. SAM. CLARKE'S \"Third Defence,\" in reply to Collins, pp. 5, 8,\n17.\n\n[173] DR. SAM. CLARKE, \"First Defence,\" pp. 11, 16; \"Second Defence,\"\npp. 4, 10.\n\n[174] DR. CLARKE'S \"Letter to Mr. Dodwell,\" pp. 34, 69, 72. ANDREW\nBAXTER, \"On the Soul,\" I. 227, 233.\n\n[175] Matthew 10: 28.\n\n[176] Luke 16: 22; Phil. 1: 23.\n\n[177] DR. PRIESTLEY, \"Disquisitions,\" p. 103; \"Free Discussion,\" pp. 66,\n237.\n\n[178] FLAVEL, \"Pneumatologia; or, Treatise of the Soul,\" I. 290. SIR M.\nHALE, \"Primitive Origination of Mankind,\" p. 309.\n\n[179] _Compare_ Heb. 12: 9; Num. 16: 22; 27: 16; Zech. 12: 1; Luke 23:\n43, 46; Acts 7: 59; Eccles. 12: 7; 2 Cor. 5: 8; James 2: 26; Luke 24:\n39; John 10: 25; John 5: 24.\n\n[180] DR. OLINTHUS GREGORY, \"Life of Hall,\" Works, VI. 26.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHEORY OF GOVERNMENT BY NATURAL LAWS.--VOLNEY.--COMBE.\n\n\nThe theory of \"natural laws\" has been applied to disprove or supersede\nthe doctrine of Creation, by means of the principle of Development. It\nhas been further applied to _the government_, as well as to the\n_creation_, of the world; and in this connection, it has been urged as a\nreason for disbelieving the doctrine of God's special PROVIDENCE, and\nemployed to discredit the efficacy of PRAYER.\n\nWhen thus applied, it is often associated with the recognition of the\nDivine existence, and cannot, therefore, be ranked among systems\navowedly Atheistic. But from the earliest times, it has been the belief\nof seriously reflecting men, that a system which professedly recognizes\nthe Divine Being as the Creator of the world, but practically excludes\nHim from the government of its affairs, however _theoretically_\ndifferent from Atheism, is substantially the same with it.[181] It was\nagainst this Epicurean Atheism that Howe contended in his \"Living\nTemple;\" an Atheism which acknowledged gods, but \"accounted that they\nwere such as between whom and man there could be no conversation,--on\n_their_ part by providence, on _man's_ by religion.\" And it was against\nthe same Epicurean Atheism that Cudworth contended in his \"Intellectual\nSystem of the Universe,\" when he grappled with the objections which had\nbeen urged against the doctrine of Providence and the practice of\nprayer.[182]\n\nIt is not wonderful that either Atheists or Pantheists should discard\nthe doctrine of Providence, or deny the efficacy of Prayer. On their\nprinciples, there is no room for the recognition of a supreme\nintelligent Power governing the world, or of a Will capable of\ncontrolling the course of human affairs.[183] But while neither Atheism\nnor Pantheism could be expected to recognize a presiding Providence,\nsince they equally exclude a personal God, it may well seem strange that\nany system of Theism, whether natural or revealed, should omit or oppose\nthis fundamental truth. For the doctrine of Providence may be\nestablished, _inductively_, by the very same kind of evidence to which\nevery Theist has recourse in proving the existence and perfections of\nthe Divine Being; and, His existence and perfections being proved, the\ndoctrine of Providence may be inferred, _deductively_, from His\ncharacter, and from the relations which He sustains towards His\ncreatures, since it cannot be supposed that He who brought them into\nbeing, as the products of His own wisdom, goodness, and power, and\nendowed them with all their various properties for some great and noble\nend, will ever cease to care for them, or deem them unworthy of His\nregard. Yet, strong as is the proof arising from these and similar\nsources, there have occasionally appeared in all ages, and especially at\na certain stage in the progress of philosophical speculation, men who\nadmitted, and even maintained, the existence of the Supreme Being, while\nthey denied, nevertheless, the doctrine of Providence and the efficacy\nof Prayer.\n\nIn certain stages of philosophic inquiry, there is a natural tendency,\nwe think, or at least a strong temptation, to substitute the laws of\nNature in the place of God, or to conceive of him as somehow removed to\na greater distance from us by means of these laws. Every one must be\nconscious, to some extent, of this tendency in his own personal\nexperience; he must have felt that when he first began to apprehend any\none of the great laws of Nature, and still more when he advanced far\nenough to see that every department of the physical world is subject to\nthem, so as to exhibit a constant order, an all-pervading harmony, his\nviews of God and Providence became less impressive in proportion as the\ndomain of \"law\" was extended, and that he was in imminent danger of\nsinking, if not into _theoretical_, at least into _practical_ Atheism.\n\"It is a fact,\" says Dr. Channing, \"that Science has not made Nature _as\nexpressive of God_ in the first instance or, to the beginner in\nreligion, as it was in earlier times. Science reveals a rigid, immutable\n_order_; and this to common minds looks much like self-subsistence, and\ndoes not manifest intelligence, which is full of life, variety, and\nprogressive operation. Men in the days of their ignorance saw an\nimmediate Divinity accomplishing an immediate purpose, or expressing an\nimmediate feeling, in every sudden, striking change of Nature, ... and\nNature, thus interpreted, became the sign of a present,\ndeeply-interested Deity.\"[184] That the scientific study of Nature, and\nespecially of certain departments of physical inquiry, has often had the\neffect of deadening our sense of a present and presiding Deity, of\nobscuring or perplexing our views of the connection of God with His\nworks, and of virtually removing Him from all efficient control over the\ncreatures of His hands, is attested, not only by the published\nspeculations of some, but also by the inward consciousness of many more,\nwho have never avowed infidel sentiments to others, nor even, at least\narticulately, to themselves. It may be useful, therefore, to inquire\nsomewhat particularly, whether, and how far, the existence of \"natural\nlaws\" and the operation of \"second causes\" should affect our views of\nthe Providence which God exercises over us, or of the Prayers which we\naddress to Him.\n\n\nSECTION I.\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES.\n\nThe existence of \"natural laws,\" and the operation of \"second causes,\"\nare often explicitly recognized, and always obviously implied, in\nScripture. Revelation is not designed to explain the nature or the\naction of either; but it assumes the reality of both.[185] It is plainly\nimplied in the very _first_ chapter of Genesis, that, at the era of\ncreation, God gave _a definite constitution_, implying peculiar\nproperties and powers, to all the various classes of objects which were\nthen called into being. He created light, with its peculiar properties;\nHe created water, with its peculiar properties. He created everything\n\"after its kind.\" The distinction between one created thing and another,\nsuch as light and water, and the distinction also between \"genera\" and\n\"species,\" especially in the case of plants, trees, fish, fowl, cattle,\nand reptiles, are very strongly marked in the sacred narrative: and this\ndistinction implies the existence of certain properties peculiar to each\nof these objects or classes,--properties not common to them all, but\ndistinctive and characteristic, which made them to be, severally, what\nthey are, and which amount to a _distinct definite constitution_. These\nproperties, account for them as we may, are essential to their\nexistence as distinct objects in nature, and cannot be separated from\nthem as long as the objects themselves exist. Light has certain\nproperties, and so has water, and so has every distinct order of\nvegetable or animal life, which make them to be what they severally are,\nand which cannot be severed from them otherwise than by the destruction\nof their very nature. These properties are known to us by their\n_effects_; and hence the substances or beings to which they respectively\nbelong are regarded by us as _causes_; and their operation as causes is\nregulated by certain \"laws,\" imposed upon them by the same Omnipotent\nWill which called them into being and endowed them with all their\npeculiar properties and powers. The operation of these \"natural causes,\"\nand the existence of certain \"established laws\" by which they are\nregulated, are explicitly recognized or obviously assumed in\nScripture.[186] \"Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth; they\ncontinue this day _according to thine ordinances_, for all are _thy\nservants_.\"\n\nThe established constitution and settled order of Nature, as well as the\n\"laws,\" \"decrees,\" or \"ordinances\" by which it is regulated, are thus\nexplicitly recognized in Scripture itself; and there are several reasons\nwhy this fact should be deliberately considered. First, because it seems\nto have been assumed by our opponents, that the discovery of \"natural\nlaws,\" and the admission of \"second causes,\" must necessarily be\nadverse, and may ultimately prove fatal, to the cause of Religion; or,\nin other words, that Faith must recede just in proportion as Science\nadvances; whereas the Bible speaks both of natural objects, possessing\npeculiar properties and powers, and also of natural laws, as God's\n\"ordinances\" both in the heavens and the earth, but speaks nevertheless\nof a presiding Providence or governing Will, without ever supposing\nthat the two are incompatible or mutually exclusive. Secondly, because\nsome of the less intelligent members of the Christian community itself\nseem to be influenced, to a certain extent, by the very same error which\nwe ascribe to our opponents; and evince a very groundless jealousy of\nScience, as if they feared that the progress of physical research might\nhave the effect of weakening the grounds on which they believe in the\ncare of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer; whereas the Bible gives\nno countenance to any jealousies or fears of this kind, but affirms\nGod's providential government and encourages man's believing prayer, at\nthe very time when it founds upon and appeals to the established\nconstitution and course of Nature.[187] And thirdly, because a right\napprehension of the properties and powers belonging to created beings,\nand of the laws to which they are severally subject, will be found to\nconduce largely to a clear and comprehensive view of the relation which\nGod sustains to His works. His Providence, as it is declared and\nexemplified in Scripture, has _a necessary reference to the natural\nconstitution of things_; and hence the Westminster Confession, in the\nspirit of the highest philosophy, and with admirable discrimination and\naccuracy, affirms that \"God, the Creator of all things, doth uphold,\ndirect, dispose, and govern, all creatures, actions, and things, from\nthe greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy Providence;\"\nthat \"by the same Providence, He ordereth all things to fall out\n_according to the nature of second causes_, either necessarily, freely,\nor contingently;\" and that \"God in His ordinary Providence maketh use of\nmeans, yet is free to work without, above, and against them at His\npleasure.\"[188]\n\n\"Natural laws\" and \"second causes\" are thus established by experience,\nand explicitly recognized in Scripture. It is necessary, however,\nespecially with reference to certain modern speculations, to\ndiscriminate between the two; and to show that while they are closely\nrelated and equally legitimate objects of philosophical inquiry, they\nare nevertheless radically different, as well as easily distinguishable,\nfrom each other. It is the favorite doctrine of the Positive school in\nFrance that the knowledge of \"causes\" is utterly interdicted to man, and\nthat the only science to which he should aspire consists exclusively in\nthe knowledge of \"phenomena,\" and their cooerdination under \"general\nlaws.\" M. Comte explicitly avows this doctrine, and Mr. Mill and Mr.\nLewes give it their implied sanction.[189] According to their theory,\nall Science is limited to \"the laws of the coexistence and succession of\nphenomena,\" and \"causes\" are not only unknown, but incapable of being\nknown. And to such an extent is this doctrine carried that M. Comte\nanticipates the possible ultimate reduction of _all_ \"phenomena\" to\n_one_ all-comprehensive, all-pervading \"law,\" as the highest perfection\nof Science and the decisive extinction of Religion; while Mr. Mill,\ndoubtful of this being possible, thinks it conceivable, at least, that\nthere may be worlds, different from our own, in which events occur\n_without causes_ of any kind, and even without any _fixed law_.\n\nIn regard to this theory it might well be asked, how it comes to pass\nthat human language, which is the natural exponent of human thought,\nshould contain, in every one of its multifarious dialects, so many\nexpressions which denote or imply \"causation,\" if it be true that all\nknowledge of causes is utterly inaccessible to the human faculties? Nay,\nwhy is it that the axiom of causation needs only to be announced to\ncommand the immediate assent of the whole human race?\n\nIt will be found, we believe, that even in the case of those who\ncontend for this theory, the instinctive and spontaneous belief in\n\"causation\" is not extinguished nor even impaired; but that they seek\nmerely _to substitute \"laws\" for \"causes_,\" or rather to represent _the\nlaws of nature_ as the only _efficient causes_ of all natural phenomena.\nThey thus identify or confound two things which it is of the utmost\nconsequence to discriminate and keep distinct. There is an ambiguity,\nhowever, in the common usage of the term \"law,\" which may seem to give a\nplausible appearance to their theory, or at least to vail over and\nconceal its radical fallacy. It denotes sometimes the mere statement of\n_a general fact_, or the result of a comprehensive generalization,\nfounded on the observation and comparison of many particular facts; it\ndenotes at other times _the force or power_, whatever that may be, which\nproduces any given set of phenomena. The \"law\" of gravitation, for\nexample, is often used to denote nothing more than the _general fact_,\nascertained by experience, that all bodies near the surface of the earth\ntend to its centre with a velocity proportioned directly to their mass,\nand inversely to the square of their distance; and when it is employed\nin _this_ sense, it determines nothing as to the \"cause\" which is in\noperation,--it affirms merely a fact, or a fact reduced to a formula,\nand confirmed by universal experience. But it is often transferred, at\nleast mentally and almost perhaps unconsciously, to denote some \"power\"\nwhich is instinctively supposed to be in operation when any change is\nobserved,--a \"power\" which may be conceived of, either as a _property_\ninherent in mind or in matter, or as a _force_, such as the Divine\nvolition, acting upon it _ab extra_; and it is only in the latter of\nthese two senses, as denoting a \"cause,\" properly so called, and not a\nmere fact or law, that it can be applied to account for any phenomenon.\nIn like manner, the \"laws of motion\" are merely the generalized results\nof our experience and observation relative to the direction, velocity,\nand other phenomena of moving bodies; but \"motion,\" although it is\nregulated, is not produced, by these laws; it depends on a \"cause,\"\nwhatever that may be, which is not only distinguishable, but different\nfrom them all. Yet when we speak of the \"laws of motion,\" we may\nimperceptibly include, in our conception of them, that _force_ or\n_power_ which impels the body, as well as the mere _law_ or _rule_ which\nregulates its movements. It were a mere unprofitable dispute about\nwords, did we entertain and discuss the question, whether the import of\nthe term \"law\" might not be so extended as to include under it _powers_,\n_properties_, and _causes_, as well as the _rules_ and _conditions_ of\ntheir operation: for, even were this question answered in the\naffirmative, there would still be room for a real distinction between\nthe two, and there could be no reason for saying that the knowledge of\n\"causes,\" as distinguished from \"laws,\" is wholly inaccessible to the\nhuman faculties. There is thus a real and important distinction between\n\"laws\" considered simply as general facts, and \"causes\" considered as\nefficient agents; and the two cannot be reduced to the same category,\notherwise than by giving such an extension to the term \"law\" as shall\nmake it comprehensive of _causation_; and even then, the distinction\nremains between the mere formulas of Science and the actual forces of\nNature. \"The laws of Nature,\" says the sagacious Dr. Reid, \"are the\n_rules_ according to which the effects are produced, but there must be a\n_cause_ which operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation\nnever navigated a ship; the rules of architecture never built a\nhouse.\"[190]\n\nIt might be shown, were it needful for our present purpose, that the\nobject of Science is _threefold: first_, to ascertain particular facts;\n_secondly_, to reduce these facts under general laws; and, _thirdly_, to\ninvestigate the \"causes\" by which both _facts_ and _laws_ may be\naccounted for. The exclusion of any one of the three would be fatal to\nPhilosophy as well as Religion; and it is prohibited by the \"natural\nlaws\" of the human mind, which has the capacity not only of observing\nparticular facts, but of comparing and contrasting them so as to deduce\nfrom them a knowledge of general laws, and which is also imbued with an\ninstinctive and spontaneous tendency to ascribe every change that is\nobserved to some \"power\" or \"cause\" capable of producing such an effect.\nIt might further be shown, that in every instance a \"cause,\" properly so\ncalled, is a _substance_ or _being_ possessing certain properties or\npowers,--properties which may be called, if you will, the \"laws\" of that\nsubstance, but which necessarily include the idea of _causation_ or\n_efficiency_; that in the case of mere physical agency, there must be a\nplurality of substances so related as that the one shall act on the\nother in certain conditions which are indispensable to their mutual\naction; and that these requirements leave ample room for those manifold\nadjustments and adaptations on which the argument from \"design,\" in\nfavor of the Perfections and Providence of God, is founded. The mere\nrecognition of \"general laws,\" considered simply as the \"cooerdination of\nfacts,\" and especially as exclusive of the idea of causation or\nefficiency, can never satisfy the demands of reason, nor exhaust the\nlegitimate functions of Science. For, in the expressive words of Sir\nJohn Herschell, \"It is high time that philosophers, both physical and\nothers, should come to some nearer agreement than seems to prevail, as\nto the meaning they intend to convey in speaking of causes and\ncausation. On the one hand, we are told that the grand object of\nphysical inquiry is to explain the nature of phenomena by referring them\nto their _causes_; on the other, that the inquiry into 'causes' is\naltogether vain and futile, and that Science has no concern but with the\ndiscovery of 'laws.' Which of these is the truth? Or are both views of\nthe matter true _on a different interpretation of the terms_? Whichever\nview we may take, or whichever interpretation we may adopt, there is\none thing certain,--the extreme inconvenience of such a state of\nlanguage. This can only be reformed by a careful analysis of the widest\nof all human generalizations, disentangling from one another the\ninnumerable shades of meaning which have got confounded together in its\nprogress, and establishing among them a rational classification and\nnomenclature.... A 'law' may be a _rule of action_, but it is not\n_action_. The great First Agent may lay down a rule of action for\nhimself, and that rule may become known to man by observation of its\nuniformity; but, constituted as our minds are, and having that conscious\nknowledge of _causation_ which is forced upon us by the reality of the\ndistinction between _intending_ a thing, and _doing_ it, we can never\nsubstitute the 'rule' for the 'act.'\"[191]\n\nBut while the existence of \"natural laws\" and the operation of \"second\ncauses\" are equally admitted, and yet duly discriminated, large room is\nstill left for diversities of opinion or of statement in regard to _the\nprecise relation which God sustains to His works_, and especially in\nregard to _the nature and method of His agency in connection with the\nuse of \"second causes_.\" Hence have arisen the various theories which\nhave appeared successively in the history of Philosophy, and which have\nhad for their avowed object the explanation of the _connection between\nGod and Nature_, or the conciliation of Theology with Science.[192]\nHence, first of all, the theory of \"occasional causes,\" as taught by\nFather Malebranche, with the laudable, but, as we think, mistaken,\ndesign of vindicating the Divine agency in Providence by virtually\nsuperseding every other power in Nature;--a theory which represents\nphysical agencies as the mere _occasions_, and God as the sole _cause_\nof all changes, which teaches that a healthy eye, with the presence of\nlight, is not the cause of vision, but the occasion only of that Divine\ninterposition by which alone we are enabled to see, and that a man's\ndesire or volition to walk is not the cause of his walking, but the\noccasion merely of that Divine interposition which alone puts the proper\nmuscles in motion. Hence, secondly, the theory of \"preestablished\nharmony\" as taught by Leibnitz;--a theory which was mainly designed to\nexplain the relation subsisting between the soul and the body, but which\ninvolves principles bearing on the general doctrine of cause and effect,\nand applicable to the relation subsisting between God and His works.\nThis theory teaches that mind and body, although closely united, have no\nreal influence on each other, that each of them acts by its own\nproperties and powers, and that their respective operations exactly\ncorrespond to each other by virtue of a \"preestablished harmony\" between\nthe two, just as one clock may be so adjusted as to keep time with\nanother, although each has its own moving power, and neither receives\nany part of its motions from the other. This theory, therefore, denies\neverything like causal action between mind and matter; and when it is\nextended, as it may legitimately be, to the relation between God and the\nworld, it would seem to imply the coequal existence and independence of\nboth, and the impossibility of any causal relation between the two. The\nmanifest defects of these theories have given rise to a _third_, which,\nin one of its forms, has been generally adopted by Divines,--the theory\nof \"instrumental causes.\"\n\nThis theory has assumed two distinct and very different forms. In the\nfirst, all natural effects are ascribed to powers _imparted_ to created\nbeings, and _inherent_ in them; that is, to powers which are supposed to\nhave been conferred at the era of Creation, and to be still sustained by\nGod's will in Providence, subject, however, to be suspended or revoked\naccording to His pleasure. In the second, which resembles in some\nrespects the doctrine of \"occasional causes,\" all natural effects are\nascribed to powers not _imparted_, but _impressed_, not belonging to the\nnatural agent, but communicated by impulse _ab extra_; and God's will is\nrepresented as the only efficient cause in Nature. In both forms of the\ntheory, the agency of God and the instrumentality of natural means are,\nin a certain sense, acknowledged; but in the _former_, second causes are\napt to be regarded as if they were self-existent and independent of God;\nin the _latter_, second causes are apt to be virtually annulled, and all\nevents to be regarded as the immediate effects of Divine volition. Both\nextremes are dangerous. For, on the one hand, the operation of second\ncauses cannot be regarded as necessary and independent, without severing\nthe tie which connects the created universe with the will of the\nSupreme; and, on the other hand, the operation of second causes cannot\nbe excluded or denied, without virtually making God's will _the only\nefficient cause_, and thereby charging directly and immediately on Him,\nnot only all the physical changes which occur in Nature, but also all\nthe volitions and actions of His creatures. In order to guard against\nthese opposite and equally dangerous extremes, we must hold the real\nexistence and actual operation of \"second causes;\" while we are careful,\nat the same time, to show both that whatever powers belong to any\ncreated being were originally conferred by God, and also that they are\nstill preserved and perpetuated by Him, subject to his control, and\nliable to be suspended or revoked, according to the pleasure of His\nwill. We would thus have _one First_, and MANY SECOND CAUSES; the former\n_supreme_, the latter _subordinate_; really distinct, but not equally\nindependent, since \"second causes\" are, from their very nature, subject\nto the dominion and control of that Omniscient Mind which called them\ninto being, and which knows how to overrule them all for the\naccomplishment of His great designs.\n\nWe are aware that some are unwilling to acknowledge the _efficiency_ of\nany \"second causes,\" and seek to resolve all events, even such as are\nbrought about by the volitions of men, into the will of God, as the only\nAgent in Nature. Others, again, admitting the existence of created\nspirits, and their operation as real causes, are unwilling to\nacknowledge any active powers in _matter_, and are anxious to show that\n_mind_, and _mind only_, can be an efficient cause. We see no reason for\nthis extreme jealousy of \"second causes\" either in the mental or the\nmaterial world. In the mental world, they cannot be denied, as distinct,\nalthough subordinate and dependent, agencies, without virtually making\nGod's will _the only cause_ in Nature, and thereby representing Him as\nthe _cause of sin_, if sin, indeed, could exist on that supposition, or\nwithout destroying the distinct individuality and personal\nresponsibility of man. Man must be regarded as a distinct, though\ndependent, _agent_, and, as such, a real, though subordinate, _cause_;\notherwise every action, whether good or evil, must be ascribed directly\nand immediately to the efficiency of the Divine will, and _to that\nalone_. And in the material world, \"second causes\" can as little be\ndispensed with; for every theory, even the most meagre, must acknowledge\nthe existence of _some_ power or property in matter, were it only the\npassive power or _vis inertiae_ on which all the laws of motion depend.\nAnd if _this_ can be admitted as a power inherent in matter and\ninseparable from it, we cannot see why the existence of _other_ powers,\nnot incompatible with this, should be deemed a whit more derogatory to\nthe dominion and providence of God. In a certain sense, indeed, God's\nwill may be said to be the First, the Supreme Cause of all, since\nnothing can happen without His permission or appointment: but, in this\nsense, the existence of \"natural laws\" and the operation of \"second\ncauses\" are by no means excluded; they are only held to have been\noriginated at first, and ever afterwards sustained by the Divine Will,\nthe latter being _supreme_, the former _subordinate_. It may also be\nsaid, in a certain sense, that Mind only is active:[193] for all the\nproperties and powers of matter are the results of the Divine volition,\nand their mode of action is regulated and determined by \"laws\" which God\nhas imposed; but it were unphilosophical, as well as unscriptural, to\ninfer from this that He is the only Agent in the Universe; it is enough\nto say that He created the system of Nature, and that He still upholds\nand governs it by His Providence.\n\nIt must be evident that the speculations to which we have referred have\na close connection with the argument, founded on natural evidence, for\nthe being, perfections, and providence of God. That argument, in so far\nas it depends on the mutual adaptations between natural objects and the\nnice adjustments of natural laws, might be seriously impaired by\nsupposing that there is really only one cause in Nature; whereas the\nascription of certain properties and powers to created beings, whether\nmental or material, can have no effect in diminishing its force, since\nthe evidence depends not so much on the phenomena of _physical_, as on\nthose of _moral_ causation.\n\nOn the whole, we conclude that the existence of \"natural laws\" and the\noperation of \"second causes\" are recognized alike by the sacred writers\nand by sound philosophy; and that neither the one nor the other ought to\nbe regarded as adverse to any doctrine which, as Christian Theists, we\nare concerned to defend.\n\n\nSECTION II.\n\nTHE CONSTITUTION OF MAN CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF\nGOD.\n\n\"The Constitution of Man considered in Relation to External\nObjects,\"[194]--such is the title of a popular, and, in some respects,\ninstructive work, which has obtained, partly through the aid of an\nendowment, extensive circulation among the reading class of artisans and\ntradesmen. Written in a lucid style, and illustrated by numerous facts\nin Natural History and Philosophy, it is skilfully adapted to the\ncapacities and tastes of common readers, and it is not wonderful that it\nshould have exerted considerable influence on the public mind. The\ncharacter of that influence, and its tendency to induce a religious or\nirreligious frame of spirit, has been made a matter of controversial\ndiscussion. On the one hand, Mr. Combe tells us that \"'The Constitution\nof Man' not only admits the existence of God, but is throughout devoted\nto the object of expounding and proving that He exercises a real,\npractical, and intelligible government of this world, rewarding virtue\nwith physical and moral well-being, and punishing vice with want and\nsuffering.\" On the other hand, it is manifest, beyond the possibility of\ndoubt or denial, that if his professed Theism has subjected him to the\ncharge of being an inconsequent thinker in some of the organs of avowed\nAtheism,[195] his favorite arguments in support of \"government by\nnatural law\" have been applied by himself, and eagerly welcomed by\nothers, as conclusive objections to the doctrine of a special Providence\nand the efficacy of Prayer.\n\nWe do not object to the limitation of his inquiry to the one point of\nthe relation subsisting between \"the Constitution of Man and External\nObjects,\"--that is a perfectly legitimate, and might be a highly\ninstructive field of investigation; but we do object to his utter\nforgetfulness of that limitation in the progress of his work, and to his\nattempt to introduce a variety of other topics which are manifestly\nalien from his professed design. If he meant to discuss merely the\nrelation between the constitution of man and external objects, he had\nnothing whatever to do with the far higher and more comprehensive\ndoctrine respecting the relation between the constitution of man and the\ngovernment of God, and, least of all, with the _revealed_ doctrines of a\nspecial Providence, of a fall into a state of sin, of death as its\nwages, and of \"spiritual influences\" by which the ruin occasioned by the\nfall may be redressed; and yet these topics, foreign as they are to the\nprofessed design of his work, are all introduced, and treated, too, in a\nway that is fitted, if not designed, to shake the confidence of his\nreaders in what have hitherto been regarded as important articles of the\nChristian faith. It has received this significant testimony, \"'Combe's\nConstitution of Man' would be worth a hundred New Testaments on the\nbanks of the Ganges.\"[196]\n\nThere are _two points_, especially, on which he comes more directly into\ncollision with our present argument:\n\n1. He speaks as if God governed the universe _only_ by \"natural laws,\"\nso as to exclude any other dispensation of Providence.\n\n2. He speaks as if the \"physical and organic\" laws of Nature possessed\nthe same authority and imposed the same obligation as the \"moral\" laws\nof Conscience and Revelation; and as if the breach or neglect of the\nformer were _punishable_ in the same sense, and for the same reason, as\nthe transgression of the latter.\n\nNext to the omission of all reference to a future state, and the total\nexclusion of the connection which subsists between the temporal and the\neternal under the Divine government, we hold these _two_ to be the\ncapital defects of his treatise; and it may be useful, in the present\nstate of public opinion, to offer a few remarks upon each of them.\n\nIn regard to the _first_, we need not repeat what we have already\nexplicitly declared, that God does govern the world _in part_ by means\nof \"natural laws\" and \"second causes;\" but, not content with this\nconcession, Mr. Combe speaks as if He governed the world _only_ by these\nmeans, to the exclusion of everything like a \"special Providence,\" or\n\"Divine influences.\" It is not so much in his dogmatic statements as in\nhis illustrative examples that the real tendency of his theory becomes\napparent. Thus he speaks of \"the most pious and benevolent missionaries\nsailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but, embarking in an\nunsound ship, they are drowned by their disobeying a physical law,\nwithout their destruction being averted by their morality;\" and, on the\nother hand, of \"the greatest monsters of iniquity\" embarking in a\nstaunch and strong ship, and escaping drowning \"in circumstances exactly\nsimilar to those which would send the missionaries to the bottom.\" Thus,\nagain, he speaks of plague, fever, and ague, as resulting from the\nneglect of \"organic laws,\" and as resulting from it so necessarily that\nthey could be averted neither by Providence nor by Prayer; and he\nillustrates his views by the mental distress of the wife of Ebenezer\nErskine, and the recorded experience of Mrs. Hannah More.[197] It cannot\nbe doubted, we think, that in all these cases he speaks as if God\ngoverned the world _only_ by natural laws; and that he does not\nrecognize any special Providence or any answer to Prayer, but resolves\nall events into the operation of these \"laws.\"\n\nNow, there are evidently _two_ suppositions that may be entertained on\nthis subject: either, that God orders _all_ events to fall out according\nto \"natural laws\" and by means of \"second causes;\" or, that while He\n_generally_ makes use of means in the ordinary course of His Providence,\nHe reserves the liberty and the power of interposing directly and\nimmediately, when He sees cause, for the accomplishment of His sovereign\nwill. These two suppositions seem to exhaust the only possible\nalternatives in a question of this kind; and, strange as it may at first\nsight appear to be, it is nevertheless true that neither the one nor the\nother is necessarily adverse to the doctrine for which we now contend.\nEven on the first supposition,--that God orders _all_ events to fall out\naccording to \"natural laws\" and by means of \"second causes,\"--there\nmight still be room, not, indeed, for miraculous interposition, but for\nthe exercise of a special Providence and even for an answer to prayer;\nfor it should never be forgotten that, among the \"second causes\" created\nand governed by the Supreme Will, there are other agencies besides those\nthat are purely physical,--there are intelligent beings, belonging both\nto the visible and invisible worlds, who may be employed, for ought we\nknow to the contrary, as \"ministers in fulfilling His will,\" and whose\nagency may, without any miraculous interference with the established\norder of Nature, bring about important practical results, just as man's\nown agency is admitted to have the power of arranging, modifying, and\ndirecting the elements of Nature, while it has no power to suspend or\nreverse any \"natural law.\" And if God is ordinarily pleased to make use\nof means, why should it be thought incredible that He may make use of\nthe ministry of intelligent beings, whether they be men or angels, for\nthe accomplishment of His designs? But on the second supposition,--that\nwhile He generally makes use of means in the ordinary course of His\nProvidence, He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing\ndirectly and immediately when He sees cause,--the doctrine of a special\nProvidence, including every interposition, natural or supernatural, is\nat once established; and we cannot see how Mr. Combe, as a professed\nbeliever in Revelation, which must of course be regarded as a\nsupernatural effect of \"Divine influence,\" can consistently deny God's\ndirect and immediate agency in Providence, since he is compelled to\nadmit it at least on _two_ great occasions, namely, the Creation of the\nworld, and the promulgation of His revealed will.\n\nIn regard, again, to the second capital defect or error of his system,\nit may be conclusively shown that he confounds, or fails at least duly\nto discriminate, two things which are radically different, when he\nspeaks as if the \"physical and organic laws\" of Nature had the same\n_authority_, and imposed the same obligations, as the \"moral laws\" of\nConscience and Revelation, and as if the breach or neglect of the former\nwere _punishable_, in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the\ntransgression of the latter.\n\nThe declared object of his treatise is twofold: first, to illustrate the\nrelation subsisting between the \"natural laws\" and the \"constitution of\nman;\" and, secondly, to prove the _independent operation_ of these laws,\nas _a key to the explanation of the Divine government_. In illustrating\nthe relation between the \"natural laws\" and the \"constitution of man,\"\nhe attempts to show that the natural laws require obedience not less\nthan the moral, and that they inflict punishment on disobedience: \"The\npeculiarity of the new doctrine is that these (the physical, organic,\nand moral laws) operate independently of each other; that each requires\nobedience to itself; that each, in its own specific way, rewards\nobedience and punishes disobedience; and that human beings are happy in\nproportion to the extent to which they place themselves in accordance\nwith _all_ of these Divine institutions.\" In regard to these \"natural\nlaws,\"--including the physical, the organic, the intellectual, and the\nmoral,--_four_ positions are laid down: first, that they are independent\nof each other; secondly, that obedience or disobedience to each of them\nis followed by reward or punishment; thirdly, that they are universal\nand invariable; and, fourthly, that they are in harmony with the\n\"constitution of man.\"[198]\n\nNow, in this theory of \"natural laws,\" especially as it is applied to\nthe doctrines of Providence and Prayer, there seem to be _three_ radical\ndefects:\n\n1. Mr. Combe speaks of _obedience_ and _disobedience_ to the \"physical\nand organic\" laws, as if they _could_ be obeyed or disobeyed in the same\nsense and in the same way as the \"moral\" laws, and as if they imposed an\nobligation on man which it would be sinful to disregard. He has not duly\nconsidered that the moral law differs from the physical and organic laws\nof Nature in two important respects: first, that while the former _may_,\nthe latter _cannot_, be broken or violated by man; and secondly, that\nwhile the former does impose an imperative obligation which is felt by\nevery conscience, the latter have either no relation to the conscience\nat all, or, if they have, it is collateral and indirect only, and arises\nnot from the mere existence of such laws, but from the felt obligation\nof a _moral law belonging to our own nature_, which prescribes\n_prudence_ as a duty with reference to our personal conduct in the\ncircumstances in which we are placed.\n\nThat the \"physical and organic\" laws cannot be broken or violated in the\nsame sense in which the \"moral law\" may be transgressed, is evident from\nthe simple consideration that the violation of a natural law, were it\npossible, _would be not a sin, but a miracle_! And that these laws\nimpose no real obligation on the conscience is further manifest, because\nwe hold it to be perfectly lawful to counteract, so far as we can, the\noperation of one physical or organic law by employing the agency of\nanother, as in the appliances of Mechanics, the experiments of\nChemistry, and the art of Navigation. When the aeronaut inflates his\nballoon with a gas specifically lighter than atmospheric air, or the\nship-builder constructs vessels of wood or iron, so that when filled\nwith air they shall be lighter than water, and float with their cargo on\nits surface, each is attempting to counteract the law of gravitation by\nthe application of certain other related laws: but no one ever dreams of\ntheir _disobeying_ God in thus availing themselves of one physical agent\nto counterpoise another. The \"moral law,\" however, cannot be treated in\nthe same way, and that simply because it is generically different.\n\nIt is true, that _indirectly_ the laws of Nature, when known, may and\nought to regulate our practical conduct; not, however, by virtue of any\nobligation imposed _by them_ on our conscience, but solely by virtue of\nthat law of _moral prudence_ which springs from conscience itself, and\nwhich teaches us that we _ought_ so to act with reference to outward\nobjects as to secure, so far as we can, our own safety and happiness,\nand the welfare of our fellow-men. But there can be no greater blunder\nthan to confound _the laws of natural objects_ with _the law of human\nconduct_; and into this deplorable blunder Mr. Combe has allowed himself\nto fall. Throughout the whole of his statements respecting the \"natural\nlaws,\" there are two things included under one name, which are perfectly\ndistinct and separate from each other. In the first place, there are the\nlaws which belong to the constitution of natural objects, and which\nregulate their mutual action on one another: in the second place, there\nare, in the words of a late sagacious layman, \"_rules_ which the\nintellect of man is able to deduce for the regulation of his own\nconduct, by means of his knowledge of those laws which govern the\nphenomena of Nature. These last are perfectly distinct from the former;\nand it is a monstrous confusion of ideas to mix them up together....\nThe true state of the case is this,--it is for our interest to study\nthese natural arrangements, and to accommodate our conduct to them, as\nfar as we know them; and in doing so, we _obey_, not those laws of\nNature, physical and organic, but the laws of _prudence and good sense_,\narising from a due use of our moral and intellectual faculties.\"[199]\nAnother acute writer,[200] who states the substance of the argument in\nvery few words, has shown that the theory of \"natural laws,\" as taught\nby Mr. Combe, is true in one sense and false in another: \"It is _true_,\nfirst, that the Creator has bestowed constitutions on physical objects;\nin other words, the constitutions which physical objects possess were\n_given_ them, given during His pleasure; secondly, that the\nconstitutions of physical objects are _definite_,--that is, they are\ndistinct, individual, and incapable of transmutation _by natural\ncauses_; thirdly, that no power but the power of the Creator can vary\ntheir constitutions. But it is _not true_, first, that any mode of\naction of a physical object is otherwise inherent in it, than as it is\nthe will of God that that object should _now_ present that mode of\naction. Nor is it true, secondly, that it is beyond the power of God to\nvary, when He pleases, either temporarily or permanently, the\nconstitution of physical objects.\" He further shows that, on Mr. Combe's\nprinciple of \"natural laws\" being all equally Divine institutions which\nmust be _obeyed_, \"human obedience is a very complicated and perplexing\naffair, so complicated and so perplexing as to involve positive\ncontradictions;\" that \"the very same act is required by one law, and\nforbidden by another, both laws being equally Divine;\" and that \"we\nsometimes cannot obey both the 'organic' and the 'moral' laws.\" He\nconcludes that \"physical laws ought not to be confounded with laws of\nhuman conduct;\" that \"these we always must obey, and those we may\noften, without deserving blame, boldly disregard;\" and that \"by\ncommingling distinct classes of 'natural laws,' Mr. Combe introduces\ninto his system dangerous error and gross absurdity.\"\n\n2. Another radical defect in this theory of \"natural laws\" consists in\nits representing the consequences of our ignorance or neglect of them as\n_punishments_ in the same sense in which moral delinquencies are said to\nbe followed by penal inflictions. There is something here which is\ntotally at variance with the instinctive feelings and moral convictions\nof mankind. Mr. Combe affirms that each of the three great classes of\n\"natural laws\" requires _obedience_ to itself, and that each, in its own\nspecific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience. And he gives,\nas one example, the case of the most pious and benevolent missionaries\nsailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but embarking in an\nunsound ship, and being drowned _by disobeying a \"natural law;\"_ as\nanother, the case of \"a child or an aged person, stumbling into the\nfire, through mere lack of physical strength to keep out of it;\" as\nanother, the case of \"an ignorant child, groping about for something to\neat and drink, and stumbling on a phial of laudanum, drinking it and\ndying;\" and as another, the case of \"a slater slipping from the roof of\na high building, in consequence of a stone of the ridge having given way\nas he walked upright along it.\"[201] In all these cases, the accident or\nmisfortune which befalls the individual is represented as the\n_punishment_ connected with the neglect or transgression of a \"natural\nlaw,\" just as remorse, shame, conviction, and condemnation may be the\npunishment for a moral offence. In other words, a child who ignorantly\ndrinks laudanum is _punished with death_, in the same sense, and for the\nsame reason, that the murderer is punished with death for shedding the\nblood of a fellow-creature; and the poor slater who misses his foot,\nand falls, most unwillingly, from a roof or parapet, is _punished with\ndeath_, just as a man would be who threw himself over _with the\nintention_ of committing suicide! Surely there is some grave error\nhere,--an error opposed to the surest dictates of our moral nature, and\none that cannot be glossed over by any apologue, however ingeniously\nconstructed, to show the evil effects which would follow from a\nsuspension of the general laws of Nature. For, in the words of Mr.\nScott, it is only where \"the law is previously known\"--and not only so,\nbut where the \"circumstances which determine the effect might be\nforeseen\"--that \"the pleasures or pains annexed to actions can properly\nbe termed _rewards and punishments_;\" for \"these have reference to the\nstate of mind of the party who is to be rewarded or punished; it is the\nintention or disposition of the mind, and not the mere act of the body,\nthat is ever considered as obedience or disobedience, or thought worthy,\nin a moral sense, of either reward or punishment.\" And as the theory is\nthus subversive of all our ideas of moral retribution, so it demands of\nman a kind of obedience which it is _impossible_ for him to render,\nsince _all_ the laws of Nature, and _all_ the states of particular\nthings at a given time, cannot possibly be known by the ignorant many,\nnor even by the philosophic few. The philosopher, not less than the\npeasant, may perish through the explosion of a steam engine, or the\nunsoundness of a ship, or the casual ignition of his dwelling; and that,\ntoo, without blame or punishment being involved in either case. On Mr.\nCombe's theory, it would seem to be necessary that every one should be a\nman of science, if he would avoid _sin_ and _punishment_; and yet,\nunfortunately, the ablest man of science is not exempt, in the present\nstate of his knowledge, from the same calamities which befall his less\nenlightened, but not less virtuous, neighbors.\n\nThese views are strikingly confirmed by the remarks of a writer in \"The\nReasoner,\" who blames Mr. Combe for complicating his argument\nunnecessarily and uselessly with some of the truths of Theism, and who\nthinks that the doctrine of \"natural laws\" can only be consistently\nmaintained on the ground of Atheism. \"If the system of Nature,\" he says,\n\"be viewed by itself, without any reference to a Divine Author or\nall-perfect Creator,--merely as an isolated system of facts,--no\ncomparison could be made, no reconciliation would be necessary, and the\nsystem of Nature would be regarded as the result of some unknown cause,\na combination of good and evil, and no more to be censured or wondered\nat for being what it is, than any single substance or fact in Nature\nexcites censure or surprise on account of its peculiar constitution....\nThe assumption of a Supernatural Being as the author and director of the\nlaws of Nature appears to me to be attended with several mischievous\nresults. First, you make every infringement of the laws of Nature an\noffence against the supposed Divine Legislator, which, to a pious and\nconscientious mind, must give rise to distressing remorse.... Again,\nunder this view, the penalties incurred will often be very unjust,\noppressive, and cruel; as where persons are placed in circumstances that\ncompel them to violate the laws of Nature, as when they are obliged to\npursue some unwholesome employment which injures their health and\nshortens their lives; or where the penalty is incurred by an accident,\nas when a person breaks a leg or an arm, or is killed by a fall; or\nwhere a person is materially or fatally injured in endeavoring to save\nanother person from injury or death. In such cases as these, to\nrepresent the unavoidable pain or death incurred or undergone for an act\nof beneficence, as a punishment inflicted for a transgression of the\nlaws of God the Divine Legislator, is to violate all our notions of\njustice and right, to say nothing of goodness or mercy, and to represent\nthe Divine Being as grossly unjust and cruelly vindictive.... Again, if\nall suffering, however unavoidably incurred, is to be regarded as a\npunishment from the Divine Legislator, to attempt to alleviate or\nremove the suffering thus incurred would be to fly in the face of the\nDivine authority, by endeavoring to set aside the punishment it had\ninflicted; just as it would be an opposition to the authority of human\nlaws to rescue a prisoner from custody, or deliver a culprit from\npunishment.\"[202]\n\n3. We deem it another radical defect in Mr. Combe's theory of \"natural\nlaws,\" that he represents the _distinct existence and independent action\nof these laws_ as \"the key to the Divine government,\" as the one\nprinciple which explains all apparent irregularities, and accounts\nsatisfactorily for the casualties and calamities of human life. We\ncannot doubt, indeed, either the wisdom or the benevolence of that\nconstitution of things under which we live, nor dispute the value and\nimportance of those laws according to which the world is ordinarily\ngoverned. We admit that the suspension of any one of these laws, except\nperhaps on some signal occasion of miraculous interposition, would go\nfar to unsettle and derange the existing economy. But \"natural\nlaws\"--whether viewed individually or collectively, and whether\nconsidered as acting independently of each other, or as mutually related\nand interdependent--cannot afford of themselves any key to the Divine\ngovernment, or any solution of the difficulties of Providence. We must\nrise to a far higher platform if we would survey the whole scheme of the\nDivine administration: we must consider, not merely _the independent\noperation_ of the several classes of \"natural laws,\" but also their\n_mutual relations_, as distinct but connected parts of one vast system,\nin which the \"physical and organic\" laws are made subordinate and\nsubservient to the \"moral,\" under the superintendence of that Supreme\nIntelligence which makes the things that are \"seen and temporal\" to\nminister to those things which are \"unseen and eternal;\" we must\ncarefully discriminate, as Bishop Butler has done, between the mere\n\"natural government\" which is common to man with the inferior and\nirresponsible creation, and the higher \"moral government\" which is\npeculiar to intelligent and accountable agents; and we must seek to know\nhow far--the reality of both being admitted--the former is auxiliary or\nsubservient to the latter, and whether, on the whole, the system is\nfitted to generate that frame of mind, and to inculcate those lessons of\ntruth, which are appropriate to the condition of man, as a subject of\nmoral discipline in a state of probation and trial. Nothing short of\nthis will suffice for the explanation of the Divine government, or for\nthe satisfaction of the human mind. It is felt to be a mere insult to\nthe understandings, and a bitter mockery to the feelings, of men, to\ntalk only of \"natural laws,\" or even of their \"independent action\" in\nsuch a case, to tell a weeping mother that her child died, and died too\nas the transgressor of a wise and salutary \"natural law\" which\nestablishes a certain relation between opium and the nervous system:\nfor, grant that the law is wise and salutary, grant that evil would\nresult from its abolition, grant even that it acts independently of any\nother law, physical or moral, still the profounder question remains,\nwhether such an event as the death of a tender child, through the\noperation of a law of which that child was necessarily ignorant, can\nproperly be regarded as a punishment inflicted by Divine justice? and\nwhether a theory of this kind can afford \"a key to the government of\nGod?\"\n\nSuch are some of the radical and incurable defects of Mr. Combe's theory\nof \"natural laws.\" We ascribe it to him simply because he has been the\nmost recent and the most popular expounder of it. But it is not\noriginal, nor in any sense peculiar to him alone. He acknowledges his\nobligations in this respect to a manuscript work of Dr. Spurzheim,\nentitled, \"A Sketch of the Natural Laws of Man;\" and he refers, somewhat\nincidentally, to Volney's \"Law of Nature,\" published originally as a\nCatechism, and afterwards reprinted under the title, \"La Loi Naturelle;\n_ou, Principes Physiques de la Morale_.\" The same theory, in substance,\nhad been broached in the \"Systeme de la Nature,\" and _there_ it was\napplied in support of the atheistic conclusions of that remarkable\ntreatise. But it may be said to have been _methodized_ by Volney; and in\nhis treatise it is exhibited in a form adapted to popular\ninstruction.[203] There is a striking resemblance between his\nspeculations and those of Mr. Combe. He, too, acknowledges the existence\nof God; but virtually supersedes His Providence by the substitution of\n\"natural laws.\" The \"law of Nature\" is defined as \"the constant order by\nwhich _God_ governs the world,\" and is represented as the most universal\n\"rule of action.\" That law is supposed to be a command or a prohibition\nto act in certain cases, accompanied with the natural sanction of\n_reward and punishment_. After giving several examples of \"natural\nlaws,\" which are all merely _general facts_ or the generalized results\nof experience, he describes man's relation to these laws almost in the\nwords of Mr. Combe. \"Since all these, and similar facts,\" he says, \"are\nunchangeable, constant, and regular, there result for man as many true\nlaws to which he must conform, with the express clause of a _penalty\nattached to their infraction_, or of a benefit attached to their\nobservance; so that if a man shall pretend to see well in the dark, if\nhe acts in opposition to the course of the seasons or the action of the\nelements, if he pretends to live under water without being drowned, or\nto touch fire without being burned, or to deprive himself of air without\nbeing suffocated, or to drink poison without being destroyed, he\nreceives for each of these infractions of the 'natural laws' a corporeal\n_punishment_, and one that is proportioned to his offence; while, on\nthe contrary, if he observes and obeys every one of these laws, in their\nexact and regular relations to him, he will preserve his existence, and\nmake it as happy as it can be.\"\n\nThis code of \"natural laws\" is then described by Volney as possessing no\nfewer than _ten_ peculiar characteristics, which give it a decided\npreeminence over every other moral system, whether human or Divine,--as\nbeing _primitive, immediate, universal, invariable, evident, reasonable,\njust, peaceful, beneficial_, and alone _sufficient_. But it is so only\nwhen viewed in connection with the miserably low and meagre system of\nmorals with which it is avowedly associated. For when morals are\ndescribed as a mere physical science, founded on man's organization, his\ninterests and passions,--when the treatise, according to its _second_\ntitle, is professedly an attempt to expound the _physical principles of\nmorals_,--and when, in pursuance of this plan, all the principles of\nEthics are rigorously reduced to _one_, namely, the principle of\nself-preservation, which is enforced, as a duty, by the only sanctions\nof pleasure and pain,--it is not wonderful that, _for such an end_, the\n\"natural laws\" might be held sufficient: but it is wonderful that any\nmind capable of a moment's reflection should not have perceived that, in\nsuch a system, the cardinal idea of _Deity_ is altogether omitted, or\nleft unaccounted for, in the case of Man, and that no attempt is made to\nexplain or to account for anything that is properly _moral_ in the\ngovernment of God.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOn a review of these speculations, it is important to bear in mind that\nthe existence of natural laws is not necessarily exclusive of a\nsuperintending Providence. Their operation, on the contrary, may afford\nsome of the strongest proofs of its reality. For, whether considered as\na scheme of _provision_ or as a system of _government_, Divine\nProvidence rests on a strong body of natural evidence. In the one\naspect, it upholds and preserves all things; in the other, it controls\nand overrules all things for the accomplishment of the Divine will.\nConsidered as a scheme of government, it is either _natural_ or _moral_.\nTo the former, all created beings without exception are subject; to the\nlatter, only some orders of being,--such, namely, as are intelligent,\nvoluntary, and responsible agents. In the case of man, constituted as he\nis, the Physical, Organic, Intellectual, and Moral laws are all\ncombined; and he is subject, therefore, both to a _natural_ government,\nwhich is common to him with all other material and organized beings, and\nalso to a _moral_ government, which is peculiar to himself as a free and\naccountable agent. The _natural_ government of God extends to all his\ncreatures, and includes man considered simply as one of them; and its\nreality is proved, first, by the _laws_ to which all created things are\nsubject, and which they have no power to alter or resist; secondly, by\nthe _final causes_ or beneficial ends which are obviously contemplated\nin the arrangements of Nature, and the great purposes which are actually\nserved by them; and, thirdly, by the _necessary dependence_ of all\ncreated things on the will of Him to whom they owe alike the\ncommencement and the continuance of their being. But the natural\ngovernment of God, which extends to _all_ His creatures, does not\nexhaust or complete the doctrine of His Providence: it includes also a\nscheme of _moral_ government, adapted to the nature, and designed for\nthe regulation, of His intelligent, voluntary, and responsible subjects.\nAnd the reality of a moral government may be proved, _first_, by the\n_moral faculty_, which is a constituent part of human nature, and which\nmakes man \"a law to himself;\" _secondly_, by the _essential nature_ of\nvirtuous and vicious dispositions, as being inherently pleasant or\npainful; _thirdly_, by the _natural consequences_ of our actions, which\nindicate a sure connection between moral and physical evil; and,\n_fourthly_, by the _moral atmosphere_ in which we are placed, as being\nmembers of a community in which the distinction between right and wrong\nis universally acknowledged, and applied in the way of approbation or\ncensure. By such proofs, the Providence of God may be shown to be a\nscheme both of _natural_ and _moral_ government,--two aspects of the\nsame system which are _equally real_, yet _widely different_. But the\ndistinction between the two, although founded on a real and radical\ndifference, is not such as to imply that they have no relation to each\nother, or no mutual influence, as distinct but connected parts of the\nsame comprehensive scheme. They are not isolated, but interpenetrating;\nthey come into contact at many points, and _the natural is made\nsubordinate and subservient to the moral_. For there is a beautiful\ngradation in the order of the established laws of Nature. The physical\nlaws are made subordinate and subservient to the organic; both the\nphysical and organic are subservient to the intellectual; the physical,\norganic, and intellectual are subservient to the moral; and the\nintellectual and moral are subservient to our preparation for the\nspiritual and eternal. In the words of Bishop Butler, \"The natural and\nmoral constitution and government of the world are _so connected_ as to\nmake up together but _one scheme_; and it is highly probable that the\nfirst is formed and carried on merely in _subserviency to the latter_,\nas the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for\nminds.\"[204]\n\nEvery instance of pleasure or pain arising from the voluntary actions of\nmen, is a proof that a relation of some kind has been established\nbetween all the distinct, but independent, provinces of Nature; and the\ninvariable connection between moral and physical evil shows how the\nlower are made subservient to the higher departments of the Divine\ngovernment. Apart from a scheme of moral discipline, there is no reason\ndiscernible, _a priori_, why pain should be the accompaniment or\nconsequent of one mode of action rather than another; and the relations\nwhich have been established, in the natural constitution of things,\nbetween sin and misery, affords a strong proof not only of the _reality_\nof a moral government, but of the _subordination_ of physical and\norganic agencies to its great designs.\n\nThis relation between the _natural_ and the _moral_ government of God is\nadmirably illustrated by Bishop Warburton: \"The application of _natural\nevents_ to _moral government_, in the common course of Providence,\nconnects the character of Lord and Governor of the intellectual world\nwith that of Creator and Preserver of the material.... The doctrine of\nthe _preestablished harmony_,--the direction of natural events to moral\ngovernment,--obviates all irreligious suspicions, and not only satisfies\nus that there is but _one_ governor of both systems, but that both\nsystems are conducted by _one_ scheme of Providence. To form the\nconstitution of Nature in such a manner that, without controlling or\nsuspending its laws, it should continue, throughout a long succession of\nages, to produce its physical revolutions as they best contribute to the\npreservation and order of its own system, just at those precise periods\nof time when their effects, whether salutary or hurtful to many, may\nserve as instruments for the government of the moral world: for example,\nthat a foreign enemy, amidst our intestine broils, should desolate all\nthe flourishing works of rural industry,--that warring elements, in the\nsuited order of _natural_ government, should depopulate and tear in\npieces a highly-viced city, just in those very moments when _moral_\ngovernment required a warning and example to be held out to a careless\nworld,--is giving us the noblest as well as the most astonishing idea of\nGod's goodness and justice.... When He made the world, the free\ndeterminations of the human will, and the necessary effects of laws\nphysical, were so fitted and accommodated to one another, that a sincere\nrepentance in the _moral_ world should be sure to avert an impending\ndesolation in the _natural_, not by any present alteration or suspension\nof its established laws, but by originally adjusting all their\noperations to all the foreseen circumstances of moral agency.\"[205]\n\nViewed in this light, the course of Providence is wonderfully adapted to\nthe constitution of human nature, since it affords as much _certainty_\nin regard to some things as is sufficient to lay a foundation for\nforethought, prudence, and diligence in the use of means, and yet leaves\nso much remaining _uncertainty_ in regard to other things as should\nimpress us with a sense of constant _dependence_ on Him \"in whom we\nlive, and move, and have our being.\" The constitution of Nature and the\ncourse of Providence in the present state seem mainly intended to teach\nthese _two_ lessons,--first, of _diligence_ in the use of means, and,\nsecondly, of _dependence_ on a Higher Power: for there is sufficient\n_regularity_ in the course of events to encourage human industry in\nevery department of labor; and yet there is as much _uncertainty_,\narising from the endless complication of causes and the limited range of\nhuman knowledge, as should impress us with a sense of our utter\nhelplessness. The wisdom of God in the government of the world may be\nequally manifested in the _regular order_ which He has established, and\nwhich, within certain limits, man may be able to ascertain and reckon on\nas a ground of hopeful activity; and in the _apparent casualty_ and\n_inscrutable mystery_ of many things which can neither be divined by\nhuman wisdom, nor controlled by human power. It matters not whether the\nremaining uncertainty is supposed to arise from some classes of events\nnot being subject to regular laws, or from our ignorance of these laws,\nand the variety of their manifold combinations. In either case, it is\ncertain that, in our actual experience, and, so far as we can judge, in\nthe experience of every creature not possessed of omniscient knowledge,\nthese two elements are and must be combined,--such a measure of\n_certainty_ as should encourage industry in the use of means, and such\na measure of remaining _uncertainty_ as should keep them mindful that\nthey are not, and never can be, independent of God.\n\n\nSECTION III.\n\nTHE EFFICACY OF PRAYER.\n\nThe doctrine of Providence lays a firm foundation for the duty of\nPrayer. In the case of all intelligent, moral, and responsible beings,\nthe mere existence of a Divine government to which they are subject,\nwould seem to imply an obligation to own and acknowledge it; and this\nobligation is best fulfilled by the exercise of prayer, which is a\npractical testimony alike to man's _dependence_ and to God's _dominion_.\n\nPrayer, in its widest sense, includes the whole homage which man is\ncapable of rendering to God as the sole object of religious worship; and\nit implies the recognition of all His supreme perfections and\nprerogatives as the Creator and Governor of the world. It is usually\ndescribed[206] as consisting, first, in \"adoration,\"--in which we\nexpress our sense of His rightful supremacy and absolute perfection, and\ndo homage to Him for what He is in himself; secondly, in\n\"thanksgiving,\"--in which we express our sense of gratitude for all His\nkindness and care, and do homage to Him for the benefits which He has\nbestowed; thirdly, in \"confession,\"--in which we express our sense of\nsin in having transgressed His law, and do homage to Him as our moral\nGovernor and Judge; and, fourthly, in \"petition,\"--in which we express\nour sense of dependence alike on His providence and grace, and do homage\nto Him as the \"Father of lights, from whom cometh down every good and\nperfect gift.\" Of these, the _three first_ are so evidently reasonable\nand becoming, so necessarily involved in the simplest idea which we can\nform of our relations to God and of the obligations which result from\nthem, that few, if any, of those who admit the existence and providence\nof the Supreme Being, will deny that the sentiments themselves are\nappropriate to our condition, however they may doubt the necessity or\nthe duty of giving formal utterance to them in the language of religious\nworship. But in regard to the _fourth_, which, if it be not the most\nsublime or elevated, is yet the most urgent motive to the exercise of\ndevotion, many difficulties have been raised and many objections urged,\nwhich do not apply, at least in the same measure, to the other parts of\nPrayer, and which, in so far as they prevail with reflecting minds,\nwould soon lead to the practical neglect of _all_ religious worship. The\npractice of offering up \"petitions\" either for ourselves or others, with\nthe view of thereby obtaining any benefit, whether of a temporal or\nspiritual kind, has been denounced, and even ridiculed, as an\nunphilosophical attempt to alter the established course of Nature, or\nthe preordained sequences of events. The supposition of its \"efficacy\"\nhas been represented as a flagrant instance of superstitious ignorance,\nworthy only of the dark ages, and even as a presumptuous blasphemy,\nderogatory to the unchangeable character of the Supreme. Some have held,\nindeed, that while prayer can have no real efficacy either in averting\nevil or procuring good, it may nevertheless be both legitimate and\nuseful, by reason of the wholesome _reflex influence_ which it is fitted\nto exert on the mind of the worshipper; and they have recommended the\ncontinuance of the practice on this ground, as if men, once convinced of\nits utter inefficacy, _would_ or _could_ continue, with any fervency, to\noffer up their requests to God, merely for the sake of impressing their\nown minds through the medium of a sort of conscious hypocrisy! We are\ntold that David Hume, \"after hearing a sermon preached by Dr. Leechman,\nin which he dwelt on the power of prayer to render the wishes it\nexpressed more ardent and passionate, remarked with great justice, that\n'we can make use of no expression, or even thought, in prayers and\nentreaties, which does not imply that these prayers have an influence.'\"\nThis intermediate ground, therefore, is plainly untenable, and we are\nshut up to one or other of two alternatives: either there _is_ an\n\"efficacy\" in prayer as a means of averting evil and procuring good,\nsuch as may warrant, and should encourage, us in offering up our\nrequests unto God; or, there _is no_ such efficacy in it, and no reason\nwhy it should be observed by any of God's intelligent creatures, whether\non earth or in heaven.\n\nThe principles which are applicable to the decision of this important\nquestion may be best explained, after adverting briefly to some of the\nparticular objections which have been urged against the \"efficacy of\nprayer.\" Several of these objections evidently proceed on an erroneous\nview of the nature and object of prayer. When it is said, for example,\nthat God, being omniscient, does not need to be informed either of the\nwants or the wishes of any of His creatures, the objection involves a\ngreat and important truth,--a truth which was explicitly recognized by\nour Lord when He said, \"Your heavenly Father knoweth what things ye have\nneed of before ye ask Him;\" but that truth is grievously misapplied when\nit is directed to prove that prayer is either superfluous or\nineffectual, since the objection virtually assumes that the object of\nprayer is _to inform God of what He did not know before_, and that His\nomniscience is of itself sufficient to show that prayer from men or\nangels must needs be unavailing. When it is said, _again_, that God\nbeing immutable, His will cannot be affected or altered by the\n\"petitions\" of His creatures, this objection, like the former one,\ninvolves a great and important truth,--a truth which is also explicitly\nrecognized in Scripture when it is said that \"He is without variableness\nor the least shadow of turning;\" but this truth, too, is grievously\nmisapplied when it is directed to prove that there can be no efficacy in\nprayer, since it might as well be said that the Divine dispensations\nmust be invariably the same whatever may be the conduct of His creatures\n_in other respects_, as that they must be the same whether men do or do\nnot pray; or, that His procedure as a Moral Governor has no reference\nwhatever either to the character or conduct of his subjects. But, in the\nwords of Dr. Price, \"God's unchangeableness, when considered in relation\nto the exertion of His attributes in the government of the world,\nconsists, not in always acting in the same manner however cases and\ncircumstances alter, but in always doing what is right, and varying His\nconduct according to the various actions, characters and dispositions of\nbeings. If, then, prayer makes an alteration in the case of the\nsuppliant, as being the discharge of an indispensable duty, what would\nin truth infer _changeableness_ in Him would be, not His regarding and\nanswering it, but His _not_ doing this.\"[207] When it is said, _again_,\nthat there can be no \"efficacy in prayer,\" because there is an\nestablished constitution and regular course of Nature, by which all\nevents, whether prosperous or adverse, are invariably determined, and\nwhich cannot be altered or modified without _a miracle_, this objection,\nlike each of the two former, involves an important truth,--a truth which\nis also explicitly recognized in Scripture when it speaks of \"the\nordinances of the heavens and the earth,\" and of the peculiar laws and\nproperties of all created things; but this truth is also grievously\nmisapplied when it is directed to prove that God's will has no efficient\ncontrol over natural events, or that He has no agencies at His disposal\nby which he can accomplish the desires of them that seek Him. In all\nthese objections there is an apparent truth, but there is also a latent\nerror; and the false conclusion is founded on an erroneous supposition\nin regard to the nature and object of prayer.\n\nFor this reason, we shall endeavor to separate the truth from the error,\nand to lay down a few positions which may be established both by reason\nand Scripture, and which will be sufficient to show that the doctrine\nwhich affirms the efficacy of prayer is not only credible, but true.\n\n1. Prayer, in the restricted sense in which we now speak of it, as\ndenoting \"petition\" or \"supplication,\" consists in offering up \"the\ndesires of the heart to God for things agreeable to His will.\" It is not\na mere formal, outward homage, such as might be rendered by words, or\nceremonies; it is a spiritual service, in which the mind and heart of\nman come into immediate converse with God Himself. It is offered to Him\npersonally, as to the invisible but ever-present \"Searcher of hearts,\"\nwho \"hears the _desire_ of the humble,\" and whose \"ear is attentive to\nthe voice of their supplications.\" This implies the recognition of His\nomnipresence and omniscience, but these perfections of His nature do not\nsupersede the expression of our desires in prayer, just because prayer\nis designed, not to increase His knowledge, but to declare our sense of\ndependence on His will, and to procure His grace to help us in every\ntime of need. Our petitions, too, are always bounded within certain\nlimits, and subject to at least one indispensable condition; they are\noffered only \"for things agreeable to His will;\" and when our own will\nis thus, in the very act of prayer, expressly subordinated to that which\nis alone unerring and supreme, we acknowledge at once His rightful\nsovereignty and our dutiful subjection, and we are not justly chargeable\nwith the presumption of dictating to God the course of procedure which\nHe should pursue towards us. We are protected, too, against the evils\nwhich our own _errors in prayer_ might otherwise entail on us, for \"we\nknow not what things to pray for as we ought;\" and we have an infallible\nsecurity that, in the best and highest sense,--that which is most in\naccordance with our real welfare,--our prayers _must_ be answered,\nsince our wills are resolved into His will; and His will, being\nomnipotent, cannot be resisted or frustrated in any of its designs. Our\nassurance of the certain efficacy of our prayers is so much the greater,\nin proportion as we have reason to believe that the things for which we\npray are agreeable to His will; and hence we are more confident in\nasking spiritual than temporal gifts; for the former we know to be\nalways agreeable to His will and conducive to our own welfare, while the\nlatter may, or may not, be good for us in our present circumstances, and\nmust be left at the sovereign disposal of Him who knows what is in man,\nand what is best for each of His children.\n\n2. Considering the relation in which we stand to God as His creatures\nand subjects, it is natural, fit, and proper that _we_ should make known\nour requests to Him, and supplicate the aids both of His providence and\ngrace; and if it be _our duty_ to pray, it is reasonable to believe that\nGod will have some respect to our prayers in His methods of dealing with\nus; in other words, that, as a righteous moral governor, he will make a\ndifference between the godly and the ungodly, the men who do, and the\nmen who do not, pray.\n\nIn this position it is assumed that there are certain relations, natural\nor revealed, subsisting betwixt us and God, in virtue of which it is our\nduty to acknowledge His dominion and our dependence, by supplicating the\naids of His providence and grace. That such relations do subsist between\nGod and man, is evinced alike by the light of Nature and of Revelation;\nand they cannot be discerned or realized without immediately suggesting\nthe idea of certain corresponding obligations and duties. Every one\nwhose conscience has not been utterly seared must instinctively feel the\nforce of that appeal, \"If I be a Father, where is mine honor? and if I\nbe a Master, where is my fear?\" For, considering God in the very\nsimplest aspect of His character as the Creator and Governor of the\nworld, He stands related to us as the Author and Preserver of our\nbeing, as our rightful Proprietor and constant Benefactor, as our\nsupreme Lawgiver, Governor, and Judge; and these _natural relations_,\napart altogether from the _supernatural_ which are revealed in\nScripture, are sufficient to lay a solid groundwork for \"the duty of\nprayer\" in the case of every intelligent being who is capable of knowing\nGod, and acknowledging his dependence on the Divine will. In such a\ncase, prayer is felt to be a natural, fit, and becoming expression of\nwhat is known to be true, and what _ought_, as a matter of duty, to be\npractically avowed. Now, this is the grand design of prayer; and in its\nreal design, when that is rightly apprehended, it finds its noblest\nvindication. The object of prayer is, neither to _inform_ God, as if he\nwere not omniscient, nor to alter His eternal purposes, as if He were\nnot unchangeable, nor to unsettle the established course of Nature, as\nif He were not \"a God of order;\" but simply to acknowledge His\n_dominion_ and our _dependence_, and to obtain from Him, in the way of\nHis own appointment, the blessings of which we stand in need.\n\nIt is not unreasonable to believe that God, as the Governor of the\nworld, will have some regard to the dispositions and actions of His\nresponsible creatures, as a reason for dealing differently with those\nwho own, and those who disown, His supremacy; and that He may require\nthe use of certain means, such as the exercise of prayer, with the view\nof our obtaining from Him, in a way the most beneficial to ourselves,\nthe blessings, whether temporal or spiritual, of which we stand in need.\nFor if we really be the creatures of God, and, as such, dependent on His\nprovidential bounty, and subject to His righteous government, it is\nself-evidently natural and right that we should, as intelligent and\nresponsible beings, acknowledge His supreme dominion and our absolute\ndependence by supplicating the aids both of His providence and grace.\nThis is _our duty_, considering the relations which He sustains towards\nus; and if it be fit and proper that we should pray to God, if it be,\nin our circumstances, a duty which we owe to Him, then it is most\nreasonable to believe that it is equally fit and proper in God to have\nsome respect to our prayers, and to deal with us differently according\nas we either observe or neglect this religious duty.\n\nPrayer may be regarded in one or other of two distinct aspects: either\nas _a duty_, the observance or neglect of which must be followed, under\na system of moral government, with different results; or simply as _a\nmeans_, the use of which is productive of certain effects which are made\nto depend on this special instrumentality. And in either view, its\n\"efficacy\" may be affirmed on the same grounds on which we are wont to\nvindicate the use of _all other means_, and to enforce the observance of\n_all other duties_, in connection with the system of the Divine\ngovernment.\n\n3. The efficacy of prayer, so far from being inconsistent with, is\nfounded on, the immutability of the Divine purposes and the faithfulness\nof the Divine promises. God's purposes are justly held, in all other\ncases, to include the _means_ as well as the _ends_; and they are often\nfulfilled through the instrumentality of \"second causes.\" His purpose to\nprovide for the wants of man and beast has reference not merely to the\nharvest which is the result, but also to the agricultural labor by\nwhich, instrumentally, the harvest is prepared. May not \"prayer\" be also\n_a means_ ordained by God in the original constitution of the world, a\nmeans towards certain ends which are made dependent on its use? If it be\nsuch a means, then its \"efficacy\" is established, in the only sense in\nwhich we are concerned to contend for it; while it is shown to be _no\nmore inconsistent_ with the immutability of the Divine purposes, than\nany other system of _means or instruments_ that may be employed as\nsubordinate agencies in the government of the world. This important view\nis strikingly illustrated in Scripture. For some of the _purposes_ of\nGod, which might have been undiscoverable in the mere light of Nature,\nare there explicitly declared; nay, they are thrown into the form of\nexpress _promises_, to which the Divine faithfulness is solemnly\npledged; and yet the exercise of prayer, so far from being superseded by\nthese promises, is rather stimulated and encouraged by them; and the\nbeliever pleads with increased fervor and confidence when he simply\nconverts _God's promises into his own petitions_. He feels that in doing\nso he is taking God at his word; and that his own prayer, in so far as\nit is warranted by His promise, cannot be ineffectual any more than\nGod's faithfulness can fail.\n\nThus Daniel \"understood by books the number of the years whereof the\nword of the Lord came to Jeremiah the prophet, that He would accomplish\n_seventy_ years in the desolation of Jerusalem.\" He knew the Lord's\npromise, and that the time for its fulfilment was at hand; yet so far\nfrom regarding either the immutability of the Divine _purpose_, or even\nthe infallible certainty of the Divine _promise_, as a reason for\nneglecting prayer, as if that exercise were superfluous or vain, he was\nstimulated and encouraged to pray just because \"he knew the word of the\nLord.\"--\"And I set my face,\" he says, \"unto the Lord God, to seek by\nprayer and supplications, with fasting, sackcloth, and ashes;\" and I\nprayed unto the Lord my God, and said, \"O Lord! hear; O Lord! forgive; O\nLord! hearken and do; defer not, for thine own sake, O my God!\"[208]\nThus, _again_, when the Lord gave certain great and precious promises to\nHis ancient people, assuring them that \"He would sprinkle clean water\nupon them, and give them a new heart and a right spirit,\" it is added,\n\"I will yet for this be inquired of by the house of Israel to do it for\nthem.\"[209] Thus, _again_, when the Saviour himself gave to His\ndisciples that promise, which is emphatically called \"the promise of\nthe Father,\" assuring them that they should be \"baptized with the Holy\nGhost not many days hence,\" and directing them to \"wait at Jerusalem\nuntil they should be endued with power from above,\" the apostles, so far\nfrom regarding that \"promise\" as superseding the exercise of \"prayer,\"\nbetook themselves immediately to an upper room, and \"all continued with\none accord in prayer and supplication;\" and, at the appointed time,\nGod's promise was fulfilled, and their prayer answered, when \"they were\nall filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues as\nthe Spirit gave them utterance.\" These examples are abundantly\nsufficient to show that prayer, so far from being inconsistent with, is\nfounded on, the immutability of the Divine _purposes_, and the\nfaithfulness of the Divine _promises_.\n\n4. Our next position is, that _the method_ in which God answers the\nprayers of His people may be, in many respects, mysterious or even\ninscrutable; but no objection to \"the efficacy of prayer,\" which is\nfounded on our ignorance of His infinite resources, can have any weight,\nespecially when there are _several hypothetical solutions_, any one of\nwhich is sufficient to neutralize its force.\n\nAn omnipresent, omniscient, and almighty Being, presiding over the\naffairs of His own world, as the author, upholder, and governor of all\nthings, may well be conceived to have infinite resources at His\ncommand,--such as we can never fully estimate,--by which he can give\neffect to prayer in ways that may be to us inscrutable. But our\nignorance of the _mode_ is no reason for doubting the _reality_ of His\ninterposition in answer to prayer; and even if we were unable to decide\non the comparative merits of the various explanations of it which have\nbeen proposed, the mere fact that there are several solutions, at once\nconceivable and credible, any one of which may be sufficient, as a\nhypothetical explanation, to neutralize every adverse presumption,\nshould be held tantamount to a proof that no valid or conclusive\nobjection can be urged against it. Dr. Chalmers has frequently\nillustrated the legitimate and important uses of \"hypothetical\nsolutions\" in Theology; and has conclusively shown that even where they\nleave us at a loss to determine which of various methods of solving a\ndifficulty is the truest or the best, they yet serve a great purpose, if\nthey merely neutralize an objection, by showing that the difficulty in\nquestion _might_ be satisfactorily accounted for, were our knowledge\nmore extensive or more precise.[210] Now, with regard to \"the efficacy\nof prayer,\" there are _four_ distinct solutions, or rather _four_\ndifferent methods of disposing of the difficulty, any one of which is\nsufficient to vindicate the claims of the doctrine on our faith. We\nshall not discuss the respective merits of these various solutions in\ndetail, but shall merely state them, with the view of showing that there\nare several methods of accounting for \"the efficacy of prayer\" in\nperfect consistency with the established order of Nature.\n\nThe first is the theory of those who hold that there _is the same\nrelation between prayer and the answer to prayer_ as between _cause and\neffect in any other sequence of Nature_. Prayer is supposed to be the\ncause, and the answer the effect; and this by an invariable law,\nestablished in the original constitution, and manifested in the uniform\ncourse, of the world. To this solution Dr. Chalmers seems to refer when\nhe says, that \"the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer but introduces _a\nnew sequence_ to the notice of the mind,\" that \"it may add another law\nof Nature to those which have been formerly observed,\" and that \"the\ngeneral truth may be preserved, that the same result always follows in\nthe same circumstances, although it should be discovered that prayer is\none of those influential circumstances by which the result is liable to\nbe modified.\"[211] Now, if it be meant merely to affirm that, in the\nadministration of His providential government, God has respect to the\nprayers of men as a consideration which affects their relation to Him\nand His treatment of them, and that this rule is as invariable as any\nother law of Nature, the principle that is involved in this solution may\nbe admitted as sound and valid; but if it be further meant, that prayer\nand the answer to prayer are _in all respects_ similar to any other\ninstance of cause and effect, it must be remembered that the answer is\nnot the effect of the prayer, at least directly and immediately, but the\neffect of the Divine will; and then the question suggested by Dr.\nM'Cosh--whether _causality_ can properly be ascribed to our prayers with\nreference to the Divine will?--would claim our serious consideration.\nBut in the former sense, as implying nothing more than that, in the\noriginal constitution and the ordinary course of Providence, the same\neffect is given to our prayers as to _any other moral cause or\ncondition_, it seems to be exempt from all reasonable objection, and to\nafford a sufficient explanation of the difficulty.\n\nThe second \"hypothetical solution\" is that of those who hold that while\nGod, in answering the prayers of men, does not ordinarily disturb the\nknown or discoverable sequences of the natural world, yet His\ninterference may be alike real and efficacious though it should take\nplace at a point in the series of natural causes far removed beyond the\nlimits of our experience and observation; and thus \"the answer to prayer\nmay be effectually given without any infringement on the known\nregularities of Nature.\" Dr. Chalmers adverts to this second solution in\nreplying to an objection which might possibly be raised against the\nfirst, namely, that \"we see no evidence of the constancy of visible\nnature giving way to that invisible agency, the interposition of which\nit is the express object of prayer to obtain;\" and he suggests that, in\nthe vast scale of natural sequences, which constitute one connected\nchain, the responsive touch from the finger of the Almighty may be\ngiven \"either at a higher or a lower place in the progression,\" and\nthat if it be supposed to be \"given far enough back,\" it might originate\na new sequence, but without doing violence to any ascertained law, since\nit occurs beyond the reach of our experience and observation. This\nsolution we hold to be not so much an effective argument in favor of the\nefficacy of prayer, as a conclusive answer to a particular objection\nagainst it. It is sufficient to show that, with our very limited\nknowledge, we act presumptuously in deciding against the possibility of\nan answer to prayer such as _may_ leave the established course of Nature\nunaltered; but there is no necessity, and no reason, for supposing that\nthe responsive touch _can only_ be given at a point to which our\nknowledge does not extend, or that, were our knowledge extended, we\nwould have less difficulty in admitting it _there_, than in holding it\nto be possible at any lower term in the scale of sequences.\n\nThe third \"hypothetical solution\" is that of those who hold that a\nDivine answer to prayer may be conveyed through _the ministry of\nangels_, or the agency of intelligent, voluntary, and active beings,\nemployed by God, in subordination to His Providence, for the\naccomplishment of His great designs. The existence of such an order, or\nrather hierarchy, of created intelligences is clearly revealed in\nScripture; and it is rendered credible, or even probable, by _the\nanalogy of Nature_, since we observe on earth a regular gradation of\nanimal life from the insect up to man, and we have no reason to suppose\nthat the gradation is suddenly arrested just at the point where the\nanimal and the spiritual are combined. But not only their existence,\ntheir _active agency_ also, as \"ministers fulfilling His will,\" as\n\"ministering spirits sent forth to minister to them who shall be heirs\nof salvation,\" is explicitly and frequently declared as well as\nexemplified in Scripture; and this, too, would be, on the supposition of\ntheir existence, in strict accordance with _the analogy of Nature_,\nwhich shows that the lower orders of being are placed under the care\nand control of the higher. Mr. Boyle, accordingly, makes frequent\nreference, in his Theological treatises, to _the ministry of angels_, as\nsubordinate agents, through whose instrumentality many of the designs of\nProvidence may be carried into effect; and President Edwards enlarges on\nthe same theme.[212]\n\nThe fourth \"hypothetical solution\" is that of those who hold that God\nhas so arranged His Providence from the beginning as to provide for\nparticular events as well as for general results, and especially to\nprovide an answer to the prayers of His intelligent creatures. This\nsolution is more general than any of the _three_ former, and may even be\ncomprehensive of them all. It regards prayer as an element which was\ntaken into account at the original constitution of the world, and for\nwhich an answer was provided, as the result of natural laws or of\nangelic agency, employed for this express end by the omniscient\nforeknowledge and wisdom of God. It is the solution that has obtained\nthe sanction of some of the highest names in Science and Theology.\n\n\"I begin,\" says Euler, \"with considering an objection which almost all\nthe Philosophical Systems have started against prayer. Religion\nprescribes this as our duty, with an assurance that God will hear and\nanswer our vows and prayers, provided they are conformable to the\nprecepts which He hath given us. Philosophy, on the other hand,\ninstructs us that all events take place in strict conformity to the\ncourse of Nature, established from the beginning, and that our prayers\ncan effect no change whatever, unless we pretend to expect that God\nshould be continually working miracles in compliance with our prayers.\nThis objection has the greater weight, that Religion itself teaches the\ndoctrine of God's having established the course of all events, and that\nnothing can come to pass but what God foresaw from all eternity. Is it\ncredible, say the objectors, that God should think of altering this\nsettled course, in compliance with any prayers which men might address\nto Him? But I remark, _first_, that when God established the course of\nthe universe, and arranged all the events that must come to pass in it,\nHe paid attention to _all the circumstances_ which should accompany each\nevent, and, particularly, to _the dispositions, desires, and prayers_ of\nevery intelligent being; and that the arrangement of all events was\ndisposed _in perfect harmony_ with all these circumstances. When,\ntherefore, a man addresses to God a prayer worthy to be heard, that\nprayer was already heard from all eternity, and the Father of mercies\narranged the world expressly in favor of that prayer, so that the\naccomplishment should be a consequence of the natural course of events.\nIt is thus that God answers the prayers of men without working a\nmiracle.\"[213]\n\n\"It is not impossible,\" says Dr. Wollaston, \"that such laws of Nature,\nand such a series of causes and effects, may be originally designed that\nnot only general provisions may be made for the several species of\nbeings, but even _particular cases_, at least many of them, may also be\nprovided for, without innovations or alterations in the course of\nNature. It is true this amounts to a prodigious scheme, in which all\nthings to come are, as it were, comprehended under one view, estimated\nand laid together: but when I consider what a mass of wonders the\nuniverse is in other regards, what a Being God is, incomprehensibly\ngreat and perfect, that He cannot be ignorant of anything, no not of the\nfuture wants and deportments of particular men, and that all things\nwhich derive from Him, as their First Cause, must do this so as to be\nconsistent with one another, and in such a manner as to make one compact\nsystem, befitting so great an Author; when I consider this, I cannot\ndeny such an adjustment of things to be within His power. The order of\nevents, proceeding from the settlement of Nature, may be as compatible\nwith the due and reasonable success of _my endeavors and prayers_ (as\ninconsiderable a part of the world as I am) as with any other thing or\nphenomena how great soever.... And thus the _prayers_ which good men\noffer to the all-knowing God, and the _neglects_ of others, may find\nfitting effects, already _forecasted_ in the course of Nature, which\npossibly may be extended to the _labors_ of men and their _behavior_ in\ngeneral.\"[214]\n\n\"If ever there was a future event,\" says Dr. Gordon, \"which might have\nbeen reckoned on with absolute certainty, and one, therefore, in the\naccomplishment of which it might appear that _prayer_ could have no room\nor efficacy, it was just the restoration of the Jewish captives to the\nland and city of their fathers. And yet, so far from supposing that\nthere was no place for prayer to occupy, among the various means that\nwere employed to bring about that event, it was just his firm belief in\nthe nearness and certainty of it that set Daniel upon fervent and\npersevering supplications for its accomplishment.... With regard to the\nrank which Daniel's prayer occupied among the various means or agencies\nthat were to be employed in bringing about the object of it, he had good\nreason to believe that it was neither without a definite place, nor in\nitself devoid of efficacy.... He had been honored to vindicate the power\nand assert the supremacy of the Lord God of Israel; by the wisdom of his\ncounsels and the weight of his personal character, he had paved the way\nfor that decision in favor of the people of God to which the King of\nPersia was soon to be brought; and the whole business of his active and\nmost laborious life was made to bear on the interests and the liberation\nof his afflicted brethren. And if God had thus assigned to _the outward\nactions_ of His servant an important place in carrying into effect His\nthoughts of peace towards his penitent people, is it conceivable that He\nhad no place in that scheme for _the holy and spiritual_ efforts of the\nsame servant? or that the aspirations of a sanctified spirit, the\ntravailing of a soul intent upon the accomplishment of the Divine will\nand the manifestation of the Divine glory, should be less efficient or\nless essential in the execution of the Divine counsels, than the outward\nand ordinary agency of human actions? The whole tenor and the most\nexplicit declarations of Scripture stand opposed to such a supposition;\nnor can I understand how a devout mind should have any difficulty in\nconceiving that it must be so. The agency of _prayer_ is, indeed, a less\nobvious and palpable thing than that outward cooeperation whereby mankind\nare rendered subservient to the accomplishment of the Divine purposes.\nBut is it not an agency of an unspeakably loftier character? Is it not\nthe cooeperation of an immortal spirit, bearing the impress of the Divine\nimage, and at the moment acting in unison with the Divine will? Is it\nnot befitting the character of God to set upon that cooeperation a\nspecial mark of His holy approbation, by assigning to it a more elevated\nplace among the secondary causes which He is pleased to employ? And must\nthere not be provision made, therefore, in the general principles of His\nadministration, for fulfilling the special promise of His word, 'The\nLord is nigh to all that call upon Him, to all that call upon him in\ntruth.'\"[215]\n\n\"We should blush,\" says Bishop Warburton, \"to be thought so uninstructed\nin the nature of _prayer_, as to fancy that it can work any temporary\nchange in the dispositions of the Deity, who is 'the same yesterday,\nto-day, and forever.' Yet we are not ashamed to maintain that God, _in\nthe chain of causes and effects_, which not only sustains each system,\nbut connects them all with one another, hath so wonderfully contrived,\nthat the temporary endeavors of pious men shall procure good and avert\nevil, by means of that 'preestablished harmony' which He hath willed to\nexist between _moral actions_ and _natural events_.\"\n\n    \"But should some frigid skeptic, therefore, dare\n    To doubt the all-prevailing power of prayer;\n    As if 'twere ours, with impious zeal, to try\n    To shake the purposes of Deity;\n    Pause, cold philosopher, nor snatch away\n    The last, the best, the wretched's surest stay.\n    Look round on life, and trace its checkered plan,\n    The griefs, the joys, the hopes, the fears of man;\n    Tell me, if each deliverance, each success,\n    Each transient golden dream of happiness,\n    Each palm that genius in the race acquires,\n    Each thrilling rapture virtuous pride inspires,\n    Tell me, if each and all were not combined\n    In the great purpose of the Eternal Mind?\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n    Thus while we humbly own the vast decree,\n    Formed in the bosom of Eternity,\n    And know all secondary causes tend\n    Each to contribute to one mighty end;\n    Yet while these causes firmly fixed remain--\n    Links quite unbroken in the endless chain,\n    So that could one be snapped, the whole must fail,\n    And wide confusion o'er the world prevail;\n    Why may not our petitions, which arise\n    In humble adoration to the skies,\n    Be foreordained the causes, whence shall flow\n    Our purest pleasures in this vale of woe?\n    Not that they move the purpose that hath stood\n    By time unchanged, immeasurably good,\n    _But that the event and prayer alike may be\n    United objects of the same decree._\"[216]\n\n\nOn the whole, we feel ourselves warranted, and even constrained, to\nconclude that the theory of \"government by natural law\" is defective in\nso far as it excludes the superintendence and control of God over all\nthe events of human life, and that neither the existence of second\ncauses nor the operation of physical laws should diminish our confidence\nin the care of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[181] CICERO, \"De Natura Deorum,\" lib. I. c. 44.\n\n[182] HOWE, \"Works,\" I. 104. CUDWORTH, \"Intellectual System,\" I. 120,\n144.\n\n[183] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" VI. 149, 247, 295. SPINOZA, \"Tractatus\nTheol.-politicus,\" pp. 57, 102, 122, 144, 150, 319.\n\n[184] DR. CHANNING, \"Memoirs,\" II. 439. ROBT. BOYLE, \"Free Inquiry into\nthe Notion of Nature,\" p. 7.\n\n[185] PROFESSOR SEDGWICK, \"Discourse,\" fifth edition, p. CLIII. MR.\nCOMBE, \"Constitution of Man,\" p. 417.\n\n[186] Proverbs 6: 27; Psalm 68: 2; 83: 14; James 3: 12; Matthew 7: 16;\nProverbs 8: 29; Job 38: 11, 33; Psalm 119: 90; Jeremiah 31: 35; 33: 25.\n\n[187] DR. M'COSH, \"On the Divine Government,\" pp. 126, 129, 149.\n\n[188] \"Westminster Confession,\" c. v., Sec. II., III.\n\n[189] M. COMTE, \"Cours,\" IV. 663, 669; V. 259, 277; VI. 702, 780. J. S.\nMILL, \"Logic,\" I. 397, 417, 422; II. 109, 471. LEWES, \"Biographical\nHistory,\" I. 14; III. 55; IV. 9, 42.\n\n[190] DR. REID, \"Essays,\" III. 44. DR. M'COSH, \"Divine Government,\" 88,\n91, 111, 114.\n\n[191] SIR JOHN HERSCHELL, \"Address to the British Association,\" 1845.\n\n[192] DR. THOS. BROWN, \"Essay on Cause and Effect,\" p. 86. DR. THOS.\nREID, \"Essays,\" I. 136. PIERRE POIRET, \"De Deo, Anima, et Malo.\"\n\n[193] DR. THOMAS BROWN, \"Essay on Cause and Effect,\" pp. 74, 83, 93,\n108, 191.\n\n[194] GEORGE COMBE, ESQ.\n\n[195] \"Reasoner,\" XII. 21, 23.\n\n[196] HOLYOAKE, \"Grant and Holyoake's Discussion,\" p. 40.\n\n[197] GEORGE COMBE, \"Constitution of Man,\" pp. 150, 155, 163, 165, 234,\n343, 358.\n\n[198] MR. COMBE, \"Constitution of Man,\" VI., IX., 25, 39, 41.\n\n[199] MR. SCOTT, \"Harmony of Phrenology with Scripture,\" pp. 82, 97.\n\n[200] CITIZEN KENNEDY, \"Nature and Revelation Harmonious,\" pp. 70, 122,\n124, 131.\n\n[201] MR. COMBE, \"Constitution of Man,\" pp. 25, 53, 306, 364.\n\n[202] F. B. BARTON, \"The Reasoner,\" XI. 24, 373.\n\n[203] VOLNEY, \"La Loi Naturelle,\" which has been translated, and is\nusually appended to his \"Ruins of Empires.\"\n\n[204] BUTLER'S \"Analogy,\" p. 1. c. 7.\n\n[205] WARBURTON'S \"Works,\" X. p. 8.\n\n[206] DR. PRICE'S \"Dissertations,\" p. 198.\n\n[207] DR. PRICE, \"Dissertations,\" pp. 208, 219.\n\n[208] Daniel 9: 2, 19.\n\n[209] Ezekiel 36: 37.\n\n[210] DR. CHALMERS, \"Works,\" II. 286.\n\n[211] Ibid., 325.\n\n[212] HON. ROB. BOYLE, \"Theolog. Works,\" II. 96, III. 230. PRESIDENT\nEDWARDS, \"Works,\" X. 1.\n\n[213] EULER, \"Letters to a German Princess,\" I. 271.\n\n[214] DR. WOLLASTON, \"Religion of Nature,\" p. 103.\n\n[215] DR. ROBT. GORDON, \"Sermons,\" p. 369.\n\n[216] It is with melancholy pleasure that the author recalls and\nreproduces, after an interval of thirty years, the lines of his early\ncollege companion,--WILLIAM FRIEND DURANT,--a young man of high promise,\nremoved, like his distinguished fellow-student, ROBERT POLLOCK, by what\nmight seem a premature death, but for the prospect of immortality.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE.\n\n\nWhen we survey the actual course of God's Providence, by which the\neternal purposes of the Divine Mind are carried into effect, we discern\nimmediately a marked difference between _two great classes of events_.\nThe one comprehends a multitude of events which are so regular, stable,\nand constant, that we feel ourselves warranted in reckoning on their\ninvariable recurrence, in the same circumstances in which they have been\nobserved; they seem to be governed by an unchangeable, or at least an\nestablished law. The other comprehends a different set of events, which\nare so irregular and variable that they occur quite unexpectedly, and\ncannot be reduced to any rule of rational computation; they\nappear,--perhaps from our ignorance,--to be purely accidental or\nfortuitous.\n\nIn exact accordance with this difference between the two great classes\nof Providential events, there is a similar difference in our _internal\nviews or sentiments_ in regard to them. We are conscious of two totally\ndissimilar feelings in contemplating them respectively. We have a\nfeeling of certainty, confidence, or assurance in regard to the one; and\na feeling of uncertainty, anxiety, and helplessness in regard to the\nother; while for an intermediate class of events, there is also an\nintermediate state of mind, equally removed from entire certainty and\nabsolute doubt, arising from the various degrees of _probability_ that\nmay seem to belong to them. These are at once natural and legitimate\nsentiments in the circumstances in which we are placed; for\nunquestionably there is much in these circumstances that is fitted to\nproduce and cherish them all; and when they are combined,--especially\nwhen they are duly proportioned, in the case of any individual, they\ninduce a habit or frame of mind most favorable to the recognition of\nGod's Providence, and most conducive to our welfare, by impressing us\nwith a sense both of our _dependence_ on His supreme will, and of our\n_duty to be diligent_ in the use of all appointed means. But when\n_either_ of the two classes of events is exclusively considered, or the\nsentiments appropriate to them inordinately cherished, there will be a\ntendency, in the absence of an enlightened belief in Providence, towards\none or other of two opposite extremes:--the extreme, on the one hand, of\nresolving all events into results of physical agencies and mechanical\nlaws, acting with the blind force of \"destiny,\" and leaving no room for\nthe interposition of an intelligent Moral Ruler; and the extreme, on the\nother hand, of ascribing all events to accidental or fortuitous\ninfluences, equally exempt from His control. The _former_ is the theory\nof \"Fate,\" the _latter_ is the theory of \"Chance;\" and both are equally\nopposed to the doctrine which affirms the eternal purpose and the actual\nprovidence of an omniscient and all-controlling Mind.\n\nIt matters little, with reference to our present purpose, whether or not\nevery department of Nature be supposed to be equally subject to \"natural\nlaws;\" for even were it so, still if these laws were either in part\nunknown and undiscoverable by us, or so related to each other that the\nresults of their manifold possible combinations could not be calculated\nor reckoned on by human wisdom or foresight, ample room would be left\nfor the exercise of _diligence_ within the limits of our ascertained\nknowledge, and yet for a sense of _dependence_ on a power which we feel\nourselves unable either to comprehend or control. On the ground of\nanalogy, we think it highly probable that every department of Nature\n_is_ subject to regular and stable laws; and on the same ground we may\nanticipate that, in the progressive advance of human knowledge, many new\nfields will yet be conquered, and added to the domain of Science. But\nsuppose every law were discovered,--suppose, even, that every individual\nevent should be shown to depend on some natural cause, there would still\nremain at least _two_ considerations which should remind us of our\n_dependence_. The first is our ignorance of the whole combination of\ncauses which may at any time be brought into action, and of the results\nwhich may flow from them in circumstances such as we can neither foresee\nnor provide against. The second is our ignorance, equally unavoidable\nand profound, of the intelligent and voluntary agencies which may be at\nwork, modifying, disposing, and directing that combination of causes, so\nas to accomplish the purposes of the Omniscient Mind. Our want of\nknowledge in either case is a reason for uncertainty; and our\nuncertainty in regard to events in which we may be deeply concerned is\nfitted to teach us our dependence on a higher Power. Let it not be\nthought, however, that our argument for God's Providence is drawn merely\nfrom man's _ignorance_, or that its strength must diminish in proportion\nas his knowledge of Nature is extended; on the contrary, it rests on the\nassumption that _man knows enough to be aware that he cannot know all_,\nand that as long as he is not omniscient, he must be dependent on Him\nwho alone \"knows the end from the beginning,\" and \"who ruleth among the\narmies of heaven\" as well as \"among the inhabitants of this earth.\"\n\nIt is in the invariable combination and marvellous mutual adjustment of\nthese two elements,--the regular and the variable, the constant and the\ncasual, the certain and the uncertain,--that we best discern the wisdom\nof that vast scheme of Providence, which is designed at once to secure\nour _diligence in the use of means_, and to impress us with a sense of\nour _dependence on a higher Power_. And the same remark may be equally\napplicable, _mutatis mutandis_, to the revealed constitution of things,\nsince Scripture itself exhibits certain definite truths surrounded with\na margin of mystery like \"lights shining in a dark place;\" and while it\nprescribes and encourages diligence in the use of means, teaches us at\nthe same time our dependence on the Divine blessing which alone can\nrender our efforts effectual. Both elements, therefore, must be taken\ninto account and kept steadily in view, if we would form a comprehensive\nconception of the method of the Divine government, or a correct estimate\nof the wisdom with which it is adapted to the case of created and\ndependent, but intelligent, active, and responsible beings. But when the\none is either dissevered from the other, or viewed apart and exclusively\nby itself, when the mind dwells on either, to the neglect of what is\nequally a part of the same comprehensive scheme, then we are in danger\nof adopting a partial and one-sided view of Providence, and of lapsing\ninto one or other of the opposite extremes,--the theory of \"Chance\" or\nthe theory of \"Fate.\"\n\nA few remarks on each of these theories may be neither unseasonable nor\nuseless, if they serve to illustrate the different kinds of Atheism\nwhich have sprung from them, and to place in a clear and strong light\nthe radical difference which subsists between both, and the doctrine of\nProvidence, as it is taught and exemplified in Scripture.\n\n1. The theory of \"Chance,\" which was once the stronghold of Atheism, is\nnow all but abandoned by speculative thinkers, and exists only, if at\nall, in the vague beliefs of uneducated and unreflecting men. This\nresult has been brought about, not so much by the Metaphysical or even\nthe Theological considerations which were urged against the theory, as\nby the steady advance of Science, and the slow but progressive growth of\na belief in \"law\" and \"order\" as existing in every department of\nNature. It has been undeniably the effect of scientific inquiry to\nbanish the idea of Chance, at least from as much of the domain as has\nbeen successfully explored, and to afford a strong presumption that the\nsame result would follow were our researches extended beyond the limits\nwithin which they are yet confined. To this extent there is truth in the\nreasonings of M. Comte as applied to _Chance_, while they have no\nvalidity or value as applied to _Providence_; and we deem it a noble\ntribute to Science when it can be said of her with truth, that she has\nbeen an effective auxiliary to Religion in overthrowing the once vaunted\nempire of that blind power.\n\nAt one time some ascribed all the works both of Creation and Providence\nto Chance, and spoke of a fortuitous concourse of _atoms_ in the one\ncase, and of a fortuitous concurrence of _events_ in the other. The\nAtomic theory, which, as a mere physiological hypothesis, is far from\nbeing necessarily Atheistic, and which has been adopted and defended by\nsuch writers as Gassendus and Dr. Goode,[217] was applied by Epicurus\nand Lucretius to account for the fortuitous origin of existing beings,\nand also for the fortuitous course of human affairs. No one now, in the\npresent advanced state of science, would seriously propose to account\neither for the creation of the world, or for the events of the world's\nhistory, by ascribing them to the operation of Chance; the current is\nflowing in another direction; it has set in, like a returning tide,\ntowards the universal recognition of \"general laws\" and \"natural\ncauses,\" such as, from their invariable regularity and uniformity, are\nutterly exclusive of everything like chance or accident in any\ndepartment of Nature. Instead of ascribing the creation of the world to\na fortuitous concourse of atoms, modern speculation would refer it to \"a\nlaw of development\" such as is able of itself to insure the production\nof astral systems in the firmament, and also of vegetable and animal\nraces on the earth, without any direct or immediate interposition of a\nhigher power; and instead of ascribing the events of history and the\n\"progress\" of humanity to a fortuitous or accidental origin, modern\nspeculation would refer them to \"a law of social or historical\ndevelopment,\" such as makes every succeeding state the natural, and,\nindeed, necessary product of a prior one, and places the whole order of\nsequences--whether physical, moral, political, or religious--under the\ngovernment of \"natural law,\" as contradistinguished from that of a\n\"supernatural will.\" There is thus a manifest tendency to resile from\nthe old theory of Chance, and to take refuge in the new asylum of Law,\nOrder, or Destiny. There is, apparently, a wide difference between the\ntwo contrasted systems; and yet the difference may be, after all, more\nseeming than real: for both the old doctrine of \"chance\" and the new\ntheory of \"development\" are compelled to assume certain conditions or\nqualities as belonging to the primordial elements of matter, without\nwhich it is felt that neither Chance nor Fate can afford a satisfactory\naccount of the works either of Creation or Providence. The one party\nspoke more of \"Chance,\" the other speaks more of \"Law;\" but both were\ncompelled to feel that neither Chance nor Law could _of themselves_\naccount for the established order of Nature, without presupposing\ncertain conditions, adjustments, and dispositions of matter, such as\ncould only be satisfactorily explained by ascribing them to a wise,\nforeseeing, and designing Mind.\n\nIn the present state of philosophical speculation, which evinces so\nstrong a tendency to reduce everything to the dominion of \"Law,\" it may\nseem unnecessary to refer to the doctrine of \"Chance\" at all; but\nbelieving as we do that there are, and ever must be, certain events in\nthe course of life, and certain facts in the complex experience of man,\nwhich will irresistibly suggest the idea of it, even where the doctrine\nis theoretically disowned, we think it right to lay down a distinct and\ndefinite position on this subject, such as may serve, if duly\nestablished, at once to neutralize whatever is false and noxious in the\ndoctrine of Chance, and at the same time to preserve whatever is true\nand wholesome in it, as having a tendency to illustrate the actual\nscheme of Divine Providence. And the position which we are disposed to\nstate and prepared to establish is this: That, with reference to God, as\nan omniscient Being, there is, and there can be, no such thing as\n\"Chance;\" while, with reference alike to men and angels, many events may\nbe fortuitous or accidental, not as being independent of causes, but as\ndepending on causes unknown, or on combinations of causes whose joint\noperation may result in effects absolutely undiscoverable by our limited\nintelligence.\n\nThis position consists of _two_ parts. It affirms that with reference to\nGod and His omniscient knowledge, there can be nothing that is\nfortuitous, accidental, or unexpected. It affirms, with reference to man\nand all created intelligences, that there may, or even must, be much\nuncertainty in regard to the products of natural causes, especially when\nthey act in combination, and come into play in circumstances which we\ncannot foresee or control. Many events may thus be casual, accidental,\nor unexpected to men, which are not so to the supreme governing\nIntelligence. The first part of the position is proved by the general\nevidence which warrants us in ascribing omniscience, and especially an\nunerring prescience, to the Divine Mind; and it cannot be denied,\nwithout virtually ascribing _ignorance_ to God. The second part of the\nposition is established by some of the most familiar facts of\nexperience. We know and feel that however certain all events are to the\nomniscient knowledge of the Most High, many of them are entirely beyond\nthe reach of our limited foresight; and this because they are either\ndependent on individual causes which are unknown to us, or on a\ncombination of various causes, too complex to admit of any rational\ncomputation in regard to their results.\n\nThe \"calculation of chances\" has been reduced to something like\nscientific accuracy;[218] and it has been applied, with beneficial\neffect, to the insurance of life and property on land and at sea. Even\nthe casual events of human history may be said, in a certain sense, to\nbe governed by fixed laws. The _aggregate result_ in such cases may be\ntolerably certain, while the _individual cases_ are very much the\nreverse; and hence human wisdom, proceeding on a well-ascertained body\nof _statistics_, may construct a scheme for securing some against the\nevils to which they would otherwise have been liable, by means of the\nsacrifices of others, who would not have been in fact, although they\nmight have been, for ought they know, liable to the same. But what is\nthis, if it be not a practical acknowledgement of the uncertainty in\nwhich all are placed in regard to some of the most important interests\nof the present life? or how can it be said that chance or accident is\naltogether, and in every sense, exploded, when large bodies of men are\nfound to combine, and that, too, at a considerable personal sacrifice,\nfor the express purpose of protecting themselves, so far as they can,\nfrom the hazards to which they are individually exposed?\n\nIn the sense above explained, we cannot consent to discard \"Chance\"\naltogether, either at the bidding of those who resolve everything into\n\"natural laws,\" or even in deference to the authority of others who\nascribe all events to Divine Providence. It may be true that all events,\nhowever apparently casual or fortuitous, are governed by \"natural laws;\"\nit may be equally true that all events are determined, directed, or\ncontrolled by Divine Providence: but as long as some events depend on\ncauses which are certainly known, and other events on causes which are\nnot known, or on a combination of causes whose results cannot be\nforeseen, so long will there be room for the distinction between the\n_regular_ and the _accidental_ phenomena of human experience. This\ndistinction, indeed, is explicitly recognized in Scripture itself; for\nwhile it speaks of all events as being infallibly known to God, it\nspeaks of some events that are _accidental_ with reference to man.[219]\nThe unknown, unforeseen, and unexpected incidents of life, which\nconstitute all that is apparently casual or accidental, may be, and we\nbelieve they are, really subject both to natural laws and to God's\nprovidential will; but they are removed far beyond our comprehension or\ncontrol; and being so, they are admirably fitted, as a part of the\ncomplex scheme of His natural and moral government, to serve one of the\nmost important practical ends for which it is designed, by impressing us\nwith a sense of constant dependence on a higher Power, and of dutiful\nsubjection to a superior Will.\n\nBut while, in this sense and to this extent, the doctrine of \"Chance\" is\nretained, it must be utterly rejected as a means of accounting either\nfor the creation or government of the world. For, on the supposition of\na Supreme Being, there can be no _chance_ with reference to Him; and\nwithout such a supposition, we cannot account for the regularity which\nprevails in the course of Nature, and which indicates a presiding\nIntelligence and a controlling Will. . 2. But this very regularity of\nNature, when viewed apart from the cross accidents of life, is apt to\nengender the opposite idea of \"Fate\" or \"Destiny,\" as if all events were\ndetermined by laws alike necessary and invariable, inherent in the\nconstitution of Nature, and independent of the concurrence or the\ncontrol of the Divine will. We are not sure, indeed, that the idea of\nFate or Destiny is suggested solely, or even mainly, by the regular\nsequences of the natural world; we rather think that it is more\nfrequently derived from those unexpected and crushing calamities which\noccur in spite of every precaution of human foresight and prudence, and\nthat thus it may be identified, in a great measure, with the doctrine of\nChance, or, at least, the one may run into and blend with the other. But\nif any attempt were made to establish it by proof, recourse would be had\nto the established order and regular sequences of Nature, as affording\nits most plausible verification, although they afford no real sanction\nto it, in so far as it differs from the Christian doctrine of\nProvidence.\n\nDr. Cudworth discusses this subject at great length, and makes mention\nof _three_ distinct forms of Fatalism. The first, which is variously\ndesignated as the Democritic, the Physiological, or the Atheistic Fate,\nis that which teaches the material or physical necessity of all things,\nand ascribes all natural phenomena to the mechanical laws of matter and\nmotion. The second, which is described as a species of Divine or\nTheistic Fate, is that which admits the existence and agency of God, but\nteaches that He both _decrees_ and _does_, _purposes_ and _performs_ all\nthings, whether good or evil, as if He were the only real agent in the\nuniverse, or as if He had no moral character, and were, as Cudworth\ngraphically expresses it, \"_mere arbitrary will omnipotent_:\" this he\ndescribes as a \"Divine Fate immoral and violent.\" The third, which is\nalso designated as a species of Divine or Theistic Fate, is that which\nrecognizes both the existence of God, and the agency of other beings in\nNature, together with the radical distinction between moral good and\nevil, but teaches that men are so far under necessity as to be incapable\nof moral and responsible action, and unfit subjects of praise or blame,\nof reward or punishment: this he describes as \"Divine Fate moral and\nnatural.\" These _three_ are all justly held to be erroneous or defective\nviews of the Divine government, and, as such, they are strenuously and\nsuccessfully opposed.[220]\n\nBut there is room for a _fourth_ doctrine, which may be designated as\nthe Christian doctrine of Providence, and which combines in itself all\nthe great fundamental truths for which Dr. Cudworth contends, while it\nleaves open, or, at least, does not necessarily determine, some of the\ncollateral questions on which he might have differed from many of its\ndefenders. This doctrine affirms, first, the existence and attributes of\nGod, as a holy and righteous Moral Governor; secondly, the real\nexistence and actual operation of \"second causes,\" distinct from, but\nnot independent of, \"the First Cause;\" thirdly, the operation of these\ncauses according to their several natures, so that, under God's\nProvidence, events fall out \"either necessarily, freely, or\ncontingently,\" according to the kind of intermediate agency by which\nthey are brought to pass; and, fourthly, that in the case of intelligent\nand moral agents, ample room is left for responsible action, and for the\nconsequent sentence of praise or blame, reward or punishment,\nnotwithstanding the eternal decree of God, and the constant control\nwhich He exercises over all His creatures and all their actions. These\nfour positions may be all harmoniously combined in one self-consistent\nand comprehensive statement; and, in point of fact, they are all\nincluded in the Christian doctrine of Providence, as that has been\nusually explained and defended by the various sections of the Catholic\nChurch. Not one of them is omitted or denied.[221] They seem fairly to\nmeet, or rather fully to exhaust, the demands of Dr. Cudworth himself,\nwhen he says: \"These three things are, as we conceive, the fundamentals\nor essentials of true religion, first, that all things in the world do\nnot float without a head or governor, but that there is a God, an\nomnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all; secondly, that this\nGod being essentially good and just, there is something in its own\nnature immutably and eternally just and unjust, and not by arbitrary\nwill, law, and command only; and lastly, that there is something [Greek:\neph' hemin], or that we are _so far forth_ principals or masters of our\nown actions as to be _accountable_ to justice for them, or to make us\nguilty or blameworthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve punishment\naccordingly.\" All these fundamentals of true religion are explicitly\nrecognized in the Christian doctrine of Providence, which stands out,\ntherefore, in striking contrast with the Atheistic, and even Theistic,\ntheories of Fate which he condemns; and they are as zealously maintained\n(whether with the same _consistency_ is a different question) by\nEdwards, Chalmers, and Woods, on the one side, as they ever were by\nCudworth, Clarke, and Tappan, on the other.\n\nIt may be said, however, that the doctrine of Providence, especially\nwhen taught in connection with that of Predestination, does unavoidably\nimply some kind of _necessity_, incompatible with free moral agency, and\nthat, to all practical intents, it amounts substantially to Fate or\nDestiny. But we are prepared to show that there is neither the same kind\nof _necessity_ in the one scheme which is implied in the other, nor the\nsame reason for denying moral and responsible agency in the case of\nintelligent beings. In doing so, we must carefully discriminate, in the\nfirst instance, between the various senses in which the term _necessity_\nis used. Dr. Waterland has given a comprehensive division of \"necessity\"\ninto _four_ kinds, denominated respectively, the Logical, the Moral, the\nPhysical, and the Metaphysical.\n\n\"Logical necessity\" exists wherever the contrary of what is affirmed\nwould imply a contradiction; and in this sense we call it _a necessary\ntruth_ that two and two make four, that a whole is greater than any of\nits parts, and that a circle neither is nor can be a square. It amounts\nto nothing more than the affirmation, that the same idea or thing _is\nwhat it is_; and it relates solely to the connection between one idea\nand another, or between one proposition and another, or between subject\nand predicate. This is \"logical necessity;\" we cannot, with our present\nlaws of thought, conceive the thing to be otherwise without implying a\ncontradiction.\n\n\"Moral necessity,\" again, denotes a connection, not between one idea and\nanother, or between the subject and predicate of a proposition, but\nbetween _means_ and _ends_. It is not necessary absolutely that any man\nshould continue to live; but it is necessary _morally_ that, if he would\ncontinue to live, he should eat and sleep, food and rest being,\naccording to the established constitution of Nature, a _necessary\ncondition_ or indispensable means for the support of life. There is in\nlike manner a \"moral necessity\" that we should be virtuous and obedient,\nif we would be truly happy, virtue and obedience being, according to the\nestablished constitution of Nature, an indispensable means of true and\npermanent happiness. This is \"moral necessity\" which has reference\nsolely to the connection between _means_ and _ends_, but that\nconnection, being ordained, is immutable and invariable.\n\n\"Physical necessity,\" again, exists wherever there is either a causal\nconnection between antecedents and consequents in the material world, or\neven a coactive and compulsory constraint in the moral world. It is\nphysically necessary that fire should burn substances that are\ncombustible, that water and other fluids should flow down a declivity,\nand rise again but only to a certain level; and there is the like kind\nof necessity, wherever a moral agent is forced to act under irresistible\ncompulsion,--as when the assassin seizes hold of another's arm, and\nthrusting a deadly weapon into his hand, directs it, by his own\novermastering will, to the brain or heart of his victim. In this latter\ncase, the unwilling instrument of his revenge or malice is not held to\nbe the guilty party, but the more powerful agent by whom that instrument\nwas employed. This is \"physical necessity,\" which relates solely to the\nconnection between cause and effect in the material world, and, in the\nmoral, to the compulsory action of one agent on another.\n\n\"Metaphysical necessity,\" again, can be predicated of God only, and\ndenotes the peculiar property or prerogative of His being, as existing\nnecessarily, immutably, and eternally, or, to use a scholastic phrase,\nthe necessary connection in His case between _essence_ and _existence_.\n\nOmitting the _last_, which does not fall properly within the limits of\nour present inquiry, we may say with regard to _the three first_, that\neach of them may exist, and that each of them does really operate, in\nthe present constitution of Nature. We are subject, unquestionably, to\ncertain \"laws of thought,\" which we can neither repeal nor resist, and\nwhich impose upon us a logical necessity to conceive, to reason, and to\ninfer, not according to our own whim or caprice, but according to\nestablished rules. We are equally subject to certain \"conditions of\nexistence,\"--arising partly from our own constitution, partly from the\nconstitution of external objects and the relations subsisting between\nthe two,--which lay us under a moral necessity of using suitable means\nfor the accomplishment of our purposes and plans. And we are still\nfurther subject to \"physical necessity,\" in so far as our material frame\nis liable to be affected by external influences, and even our muscular\npowers may be overmastered and subordinated by a more vigorous or\nresolute will than our own. These _three_ kinds of \"necessity\" exist;\nthey are all constituent parts of that vast scheme of government under\nwhich we are placed; and the question arises, Whether, when the\nexistence of these necessary laws is admitted, we can still maintain the\ndoctrine which affirms the providential government of God and the moral\nagency of man; or whether we must not resolve the whole series of\nevents, both in the natural and moral worlds, into the blind and\ninexorable dominion of Destiny or Fate?\n\nWe answer, first, that there is nothing in any one of these three kinds\nof necessity, nor in all of them combined, which, when rightly\nunderstood, should either exclude the idea of Divine Providence, or\nimpair our sense of moral and responsible agency. We may not be _so_\nfree, nor so totally exempt from the operation of established laws, as\nsome of the advocates of human liberty have supposed: but we may be free\nenough, notwithstanding, to be regarded and treated as moral and\naccountable beings. We may be subject to certain \"laws of thought,\" and\nyet may be responsible for our opinions and beliefs, in so far as these\ndepend on our voluntary acts, on our attention or inattention to the\ntruth and its evidence, on our use or neglect of the appropriate means,\non our love or our hatred to the light. And so we may be subject to\ncertain other laws, in various departments of our complex experience,\nwithout being either restrained or impelled by such external coaction as\nalone can exempt creatures, constituted as we know and feel ourselves to\nbe, from the righteous retributions of God.\n\nWe answer, secondly, that the doctrine of Providence, even when it is\ncombined with that of Predestination, represents all events as \"falling\nout according to the nature of second causes, necessarily, contingently,\nor freely;\" nay, as falling out so \"that no violence is offered to the\nwill of the creature, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes\ntaken away, but rather established.\" It follows that if there be either\non earth or in heaven any free cause, or any moral and responsible\nagent, his nature is not changed, nor is the character of his agency\naltered, by that providential government which God exercises over all\nHis creatures and all their actions; he still continues to develop,\nwithin certain limits imposed by unalterable laws, his own proper\nindividuality, or his personal character, in its relation to the law and\ngovernment of God.\n\nWe answer, thirdly, that the moral and responsible agency of man cannot\nbe justly held to be incompatible with the Providence and Supremacy of\nGod, unless it can be shown that, in the exercise of the latter, God\nacts in the way of physical coaction or irresistible constraint, and\nfurther, that man is not only controlled and governed in his actions,\nbut compelled to act in opposition to his own will. But no enlightened\nadvocate either of Providence or Predestination will affirm that there\nis any \"physical necessity,\" imposed by the Divine will, which\nconstrains men to commit sin, or that God is \"the author of sin.\" \"Let\nno man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be\ntempted of evil, neither tempteth He any man. But every man is tempted,\nwhen he is drawn away of his own lusts and enticed.\"[222]\n\nWe answer, fourthly, that when a \"moral necessity\" or _moral inability_\nis spoken of by divines as making sin certain and inevitable in the case\nof man, we must carefully distinguish between the _constitution_ and the\n_state_ of human nature,--its constitution as it was originally created,\nand its state as it at present exists. There might be nothing in the\noriginal constitution of human nature which could interfere in any way\nwith the freedom of man as an intelligent, moral, and responsible being;\nand yet, in consequence of the introduction of sin, his state may now be\nso far changed as to have become a state of moral bondage. But the\nconstitution of his nature, in virtue of which he was at the first, and\nmust ever continue to be, a moral and accountable being, remains\nunreversed; from being holy, he has become depraved, but he has not\nceased to be a subject of moral government, and the evils that are\nincident to his present position must be ascribed, not to God's\n_creative will_, but, in the first instance, to man's voluntary\ndisobedience, and, in the second, to a Divine _judicial sentence_\nfollowing thereupon.\n\nAnd finally, we answer that the theory which ascribes all events, both\nin the natural and moral worlds, to the blind and inexorable dominion of\nDestiny or Fate, leaves altogether unexplained many of the most certain\nand familiar facts of human experience. There are two large classes of\nfacts which no theory of Fate can possibly explain. The first comprises\nall those manifest indications of provident forethought, intelligent\ndesign, and moral purpose, which appear in the course of Nature, and\nwhich cannot be _accounted for_ by a blind, unintelligent, undesigning\ncause. The second comprises all those facts of consciousness which bear\nwitness to the moral nature and responsible agency of man, as the\nsubject of a government which rewards and punishes his actions, in some\nmeasure, even here, and which irresistibly suggests the idea of a future\nreckoning and retribution. These two classes of facts must either be\nignored, or left as insoluble, by any theory which advocates blind Fate\nor Destiny, in opposition to the overruling Providence and moral\ngovernment of God.\n\nThese answers are sufficient, if not to remove all mystery from the\nmethods of the Divine administration (for who would undertake to fathom\nthe counsels of Him \"whose judgments are unsearchable and His ways past\nfinding out?\"), yet to show at least that a Divine Providence is more\ncredible in itself, and better supported by evidence, than any theory of\nDestiny or Fate; that the facts to which the latter appeals may be\nexplained consistently with the former, while the facts on which the\nformer is founded must either be left altogether out of view, or at\nleast left unexplained, if the doctrine of Fate be substituted for that\nof Providence.\n\nWe have thus far compared the two theories of Chance and Fate, by which\nsome have attempted to explain the system of the universe, and have\ncontrasted both with the Christian doctrine of Providence. On a review\nof the whole discussion, we think it must be evident that the latter\ncombines whatever is true and valuable in each of these opposite\ntheories, while it eliminates and rejects whatever is unsound or noxious\nin either. It may seem strange that we should speak as if anything,\neither true or valuable, could be involved in the theories of Chance and\nDestiny; and, unquestionably, considered as theories designed to explain\nthe system of the world, and to supersede the doctrine of Providence,\nthey are, in all their distinctive peculiarities, utterly false and\nworthless. But it seldom, if ever, happens that any theory obtains a\nwide-spread and permanent influence, which does not stand connected with\nsome _partial truth_, or which cannot appeal to some _apparent natural\nevidence_. We have already seen that there are two distinct classes of\nevents in Nature, and two corresponding classes of sentiments and\nfeelings in the human mind; that the latter point, respectively, to the\nconstant and the variable, the certain and the doubtful, the causal and\nthe casual; and that were either of the two to acquire an absolute\nascendancy over us, it would naturally lead to one or other of two\nopposite extremes--the theory of Chance, or the theory of Fate. Now, the\ndoctrine of Providence takes account of _both_ these classes of\nphenomena and feelings, so as to combine whatever is true and useful in\neach of the two rival theories, while it strikes out and rejects\nwhatever is false in either, by placing all things under the government\nand control of a living, intelligent, personal God.\n\nIt is scarcely necessary to add that the views and sentiments which the\nChristian doctrine of Providence inspires are widely different from\nthose which must be generated by a belief either in Chance or in Fate,\nas the supreme arbiter of our destiny. The doctrine which teaches us to\nlook up and to say, with childlike confidence, \"Our FATHER which art in\nheaven,\" is worth more than all the philosophy in the world! Could we\nonly realize it as a truth, and have habitual recourse to it in all our\nanxieties and straits, we should feel that, if it be a deeply serious\nand solemn fact that \"the Lord reigneth,\" it is also, to all his\ntrusting and obedient children, alike cheering and consolatory; and he\nwho can relish the sweetness of our Lord's words when he spake of \"the\nbirds of the air\" and the \"flowers of the field,\" will see at once that\nStoicism is immeasurably inferior, both as a philosophy and a faith, to\nChristian Theism.[223]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[217] DR. CUDWORTH, \"Intellectual System,\" I. 75, 82, 106, 151; II. 77,\n334. GASSENDI, \"Syntagma.\" DR. J. M. GOODE, \"Lucretius,\" Preface.\n\n[218] LA PLACE, \"Des Probabilities.\"\n\n[219] Eccles. 9: 11; Luke 10: 31; Deut. 19: 5\n\n[220] DR. CUDWORTH, \"Intellectual System,\" I. 33. American Edition.\n\n[221] DR. JOHN COLLINGES, \"On Providence.\" Dr. Price, \"Dissertations.\"\nSAMUEL RUTHERFORD, \"De Providentia Dei.\" DR. CHARNOCK, \"On Providence.\"\n\n[222] James 1: 13, 14. See M'LAURIN'S profound discourse on this text.\n\n[223] MICHELET has presented a graphic portrait of a Stoic:--\"L'individu\nsous la forme du Stoicisme,--ramasse soi,--appuye sur soi,--ne demandant\nrien aux dieux,--ne les accusant point,--_ne daignant pas meme les\nnier_.\"--\"_Introduction a l'Historie Universelle_.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM.\n\n\nThe Eclectic method of Philosophy, which was first exemplified in the\ncelebrated School of Alexandria, and which has been recently revived\nunder the auspices of M. Cousin in the Schools of Paris, may be\nregarded, in one of its aspects, as the most legitimate, and, indeed, as\nthe only practicable course of successful intellectual research. If by\n\"eclecticism\" we were to understand the habit of culling from every\nsystem that portion or fragment of truth which may be contained in it,\nand of rejecting the error with which it may have been associated or\nalloyed,--in other words, the art of \"sifting the wheat from the chaff,\"\nso as to preserve the former, while the latter is dissipated and\ndispersed,--there could be no valid objection to it which would not\nequally apply to every method of Inductive Inquiry. But this is not the\nsense in which \"eclecticism\" has been adopted and eulogized by the\nParisian School. For, not content with affirming that the same system\nmay contain both truth and error, and that it is our duty to separate\nthe one from the other,--which is the only rational \"eclecticism,\"--M.\nCousin maintains that _error itself is only a partial or incomplete\ntruth_; that if it be an evil, it is a necessary evil, and an eventual\ngood, since it is a means, according to a fundamental law of human\ndevelopment, of evolving truth and advancing philosophy; and that thus\nthe grossest errors may exert a salutary influence, insomuch that\n_Atheism itself may be regarded as providential_.[224] In this form,\nEclecticism becomes a huge and heterogeneous system of SYNCRETISM,\nincluding all varieties of opinion, whether true or false; and it has a\nnatural and inevitable tendency to issue in a spirit of INDIFFERENCE to\nthe claims of truth, which may assume the form either of Philosophical\nSkepticism or of Religious Liberalism, according to the taste and\ntemperament of the individual who embraces it.\n\nIn the form of Religious Liberalism, it has often been exemplified in\nour own country by those who, averse from definite articles of faith,\nand prone to latitudinarian license, have studiously set themselves to\ndisparage the importance of the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, and\neven to obliterate the distinction between the various forms of\nReligion, natural and revealed, by representing them all as so many\nvarieties of the same religious sentiment, so many diverse, but not\nantagonistic, embodiments of the same radical principle. In the writings\nof Pope, several expressions occur which are easily susceptible of this\nconstruction, and which have often been quoted and applied in defence of\nReligious Liberalism, notwithstanding his explicit disavowal of it in\nhis letter to the younger Racine, prefixed to the collected edition of\nhis works. But on the continent of Europe, Syncretism has been much more\nfully developed, and fearlessly applied to every department of human\nthought. Pushed to its ultimate consequences, it obliterates the\ndistinction not only between truth and error, but also between virtue\nand vice, nay even between Religion and Atheism; and represents them all\nas constituent parts of a scheme, which is developed under a law of\n\"fatal necessity,\" but which is described also as a scheme of\n\"optimism.\" Its range is supposed to be unlimited: for it has been\napplied to the History of Philosophy, by Cousin, to the theory of the\nPassions, by Fourier, to the doctrines of Christianity, by Quinet and\nMichelet, and to the Philosophy of Religion, by Benjamin Constant. The\npractical result of such speculations is a growing _skepticism_ or\n_indifference_ in regard to the distinction between truth and error, and\na very faint impression of the difference between good and evil.[225]\nThe speculations of Pierre Leroux, the head, if not the founder, of the\nHumanitarian School, are strongly tinged with this spirit: they amount\nto a justification of evil, an apotheosis of man.[226]\n\nWe do not class these speculations among the formal systems of Atheism,\nalthough they have often been associated with it; but we advert to them\nas specimens of that style of thinking which has a natural tendency to\ninduce an atheistic frame of mind.[227] The profession of such\nsentiments is a symptom rather of incipient danger, than of confirmed\ndisease. But that danger is far from being either doubtful or\ninsignificant. For should the distinction between \"truth and error\" be\nobliterated or even feebly discerned, should it come to be regarded as a\nmatter of comparative indifference whether our beliefs be true or false,\nshould it, above all, become our prevailing habit to \"call good evil,\nand evil good,\" we can scarcely fail, in such circumstances, to fall\ninto a course of _practical Atheism_; and this, as all experience\ntestifies, will leave us an easy prey, especially in seasons of peculiar\ntemptation and trial, to any form of _speculative Infidelity_ that may\nhappen to acquire a temporary ascendancy. If there be no dogmatic\nAtheism involved in this state of mind, there is at least the germ of\n_skepticism_, which may soon grow and ripen into the open and avowed\ndenial of religious truth. At the very least, it will issue in that\nheartless _indifference_ to all creeds and all definite articles of\nfaith, which, under the plausible but surreptitious disguise of\n\"freethinking\" and \"liberalism,\" is the nearest practical approximation\nto utter Infidelity.[228]\n\nThe system which is known under the name of Religious Liberalism or\nIndifference has been recently avowed in our own country with a\nfrankness and boldness which can leave no room for doubt in regard to\nits ultimate tendency. The late Blanco White avowed it as his mature\nconviction, that \"to declare any one unworthy of the name of Christian\nbecause he does not agree with your belief, is to fall into the\nintolerance of the articled Churches; that the moment the name Christian\nis made necessarily to contain in its signification belief in certain\nhistorical or metaphysical propositions, that moment _the name itself\nbecomes a creed_,--the _length_ of that creed is of little\nconsequence.\"[229] This is the extreme on one side, and it plainly\nimplies that _no one article of faith_ is necessary, and that a man may\nbe a Christian who neither acknowledges an historical Christ, nor\nbelieves a single doctrine which He taught! But there is an extreme also\non the other side, which is exemplified in the singularly eloquent, but\nequally unsatisfactory, treatise of the Abbe Lamennais,[230] in which,\nas _then_ an ardent and somewhat arrogant advocate of the Romish Church,\nhe attempts to fasten the charge of _Indifference_ or _Liberalism_ on\nthe Protestant system, and to prove that there can be no true faith, and\nof course no salvation, beyond the Catholic pale. The chief interest of\nhis treatise depends on his peculiar \"theory of certitude,\" to which we\nshall have occasion to advert in the sequel; in the meantime, we may\nnotice briefly the grievous error into which he has fallen in treating\nof the faith which is necessary to salvation. He _overstates_ the case\nas much, at least, as it has been _understated_ by the abettors of\nLiberalism. The latter deny the necessity of _any_ articles of faith;\nthe former demands the implicit reception of _every_ doctrine propounded\nby the Romish Church. He repudiates the distinction between\n_fundamentals_ and _non-fundamentals_ in Religion, and insists that, as\nevery truth is declared by the same infallible authority, so every truth\nmust be received with the same unquestioning faith. He forgets that\nwhile all the truths of Scripture ought to be believed by reason of the\nDivine authority on which they rest, yet some truths are more directly\nconnected with our salvation than others, as well as more clearly and\nexplicitly revealed. Nor are we justly liable to the charge of\n\"Indifference\" or \"Liberalism\" when we tolerate a difference of opinion,\non some points, among men who are, in all important respects,\nsubstantially agreed: for true toleration is the fruit, not of unbelief\nor indifference, but of charity and candor; and it is sanctioned in\nScripture, which enjoins that we should \"receive those who are weak in\nthe faith, but not to doubtful disputations,\" and that \"every man should\nbe fully persuaded in his own mind.\"[231]\n\nBut it is not so much in its relation to the articles of the Christian\nfaith, as in its bearing on the different forms of true and false\nreligion, that the theory of Liberalism comes into collision with the\ncause of Theism, and evinces its infidel tendencies. If any one can\nregard with the same complacency, or with the same apathetic\nindifference, all the varieties of religious or superstitious belief and\nworship; if he can discern no radical or important difference between\nMonotheism and Polytheism, or between the Protestant and Popish systems;\nif he be disposed to treat each of these as equally true or equally\nfalse, as alike beneficial or injurious in their practical influence,\nthen this may be regarded as a sufficient proof that he is ignorant of\nthe evidence, and blind to the claims, of truth,--a mere skeptical\ndreamer, if not a speculative Atheist.\n\nAn attempt has recently been made to place the theory of Religious\nLiberalism on a philosophical basis, by representing religion as a mere\n_sentiment_, which may be equally elicited and exemplified in various\nforms of belief and worship. Several writers, following in the wake of\nSchleiermacher, who gave such a powerful impulse to the mind of Germany,\nhave made Religion to consist either in _a sense of dependence_, or in\n_a consciousness of the infinite_; and this sentiment, as well as the\nspontaneous intuitions of reason with which it is associated, is said to\nbe alike natural, universal, and invariable, the essential principle of\nall Religion, the root whence have sprung all the various forms of\nbelief and worship. These varieties are supposed to be more or less\nrational and salutary, according to the conception which they\nrespectively exhibit of the nature and character of God,--a conception\nwhich may be endlessly diversified by the intellect, or the imagination,\nor the passions of different men; while all the forms of belief are\nradically identical, since they all spring from the same\nground-principle, and are only so many distinct manifestations of it.\nThus Mr. Parker tells us that, stripping the \"religious sentiment\" in\nman \"of all accidental circumstances peculiar to the age, nation, sect,\nor individual, and pursuing a sharp and final analysis till the subject\nand predicate can no longer be separated, we find as the ultimate fact,\nthat the religious sentiment is this,--'_a sense of dependence_.' This\nsentiment does not itself disclose the character, and still less the\nnature and essence, of the object on which it depends, no more than the\nsenses declare the nature of _their_ objects. Like them it acts\nspontaneously and unconsciously, as soon as the outward occasion offers,\nwith no effort of will, forethought, or making up the mind. But the\nreligious sentiment implies its object; ... and there is but _one\nreligion_, though _many theologies_.\"[232]\n\nThere is, as it appears to us, a mixture of some truth with much grave\nand dangerous error, in these and similar speculations. It is an\nimportant truth, and one which has been too often overlooked in treating\nthe evidences of Natural Theology, that the _sentiments_ of the human\nmind, not less than its intuitive perceptions or logical processes, have\na close relation to the subject of inquiry; but it is an error to\nsuppose that _all_ the sentiments having a religious tendency can be\nreduced to _one_, whether it be called \"a sense of dependence\" or \"a\nconsciousness of the infinite,\" for there are other sentiments besides\nthese which are equally subservient to the uses of Religion, such as the\nsense of moral obligation, of the true, of the ideal, of the sublime,\nand of the beautiful. It is also an important truth, that there are\nspontaneous \"intuitions of reason,\" or fundamental and invariable \"laws\nof thought,\" which come into action at the first dawn of experience, and\nwhich have a close connection with the proof of the being and\nperfections of God; but it is an error to suppose that the proof depends\n_exclusively_ on these, or that it could be made out irrespective of the\nevidence afforded by the works of Creation and Providence. It is further\nan important truth, that the religious sentiment, or religious tendency,\nis natural to man, and that it may appear either in the form of Religion\nor Superstition: but it is an error to suppose that \"there is but _one\nreligion_, although _many theologies_;\" for these theologies must spring\nfrom fundamentally different \"conceptions of God,\" and what are these\nconceptions, in their ultimate analysis, but so many beliefs, doctrines,\nor dogmas, which, whether formally defined or not in articles of faith,\nhave in them the self-same essence which is supposed to belong only to\nthe bigotry of \"articled churches?\" But the fundamental, the fatal error\nof all these speculations, is the denial of any _stable and permanent\nstandard of objective truth_. Truth is made purely _subjective_, and, of\ncourse, it must also be progressive, insomuch that the truth of a former\nage may be an error in the present, and the supposed truth of the\npresent age may become obsolete hereafter. So that there is really\nnothing certain in human knowledge; and \"truth\" may be justly described\nas never existing, but only _becoming_, as never possessed, though ever\npursued; it is a _verite mobile_, a truth not in _esse_, but in _fieri_.\nHence we read in recent speculations of a \"new Christianity,\" of a \"new\nGospel,\" and of \"the Church of the Future,\" as if there could be any\nother Christianity than that of the New Testament, any other Gospel than\nthat of Jesus Christ, or any other Church than that of apostolic times.\n\nI have adverted to this theory, because, while it is of little value in\na speculative point of view, it is often found to exert a powerful\npractical influence, especially on \"men of affairs,\" men who have\ntravelled in various countries, or who have been employed in the arts of\ndiplomacy and government; and who, finding religious worship everywhere,\nbut clothed in different forms, and marking its subserviency to social\nand political interests, have been too prone to place all the varieties\nof belief in the same category, if not precisely on the same level, and\nto regard with indifference, perhaps even with indulgence, the grossest\ncorruptions both of Natural and Revealed Religion. The world is surely\nold enough, and its history sufficiently instructive, to prove, even to\nthe most indifferent statesmen, that truth is always salutary, and\nerror noxious, to the commonwealth, and that nowhere is society more\nsafe, orderly, or stable, than in those countries which are blessed with\n\"pure and undefiled religion.\" But let the opinion spread from the\nprince to the peasant, from the aristocracy to the artisans, from the\nphilosopher to the public, that there is either no difference, or only a\nslight and trivial one, between truth and error, that it matters little\nwhat a man believes, or whether he believes at all: let the general mind\nof the community become indoctrinated with such lessons, and it needs no\nprophetic foresight to predict a crisis of unprecedented peril, an era\nof reckless revolution. A philosophic dreamer may affect a calm\nindifference, a bland and benignant Liberalism; but a nation, a\ncommunity, cannot be neutral or inert in regard to matters of faith: it\nmust and will be either religious or irreligious, it must either love\nthe truth or hate it: it is too sharp-sighted, and too much guided by\nhomely common sense, to believe that systems so opposite as Paganism and\nChristianity, or Popery and Protestantism, are harmonious manifestations\nof the same religious principle, or equally beneficial to the State.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[224] M. COUSIN, \"Introduction,\" I. 318, 391, 405, 419; II. 134. Ibid.,\n\"Fragmens Philosophiques.\" Preface, VII.\n\n[225] VALROGER, \"Etudes Critiques,\" pp. 115, 126, 151, 308, 316. MARET,\n\"Essai sur Pantheisme,\" p. 249.\n\n[226] P. LEROUX, \"Sur l'Humanite,\" 2 vols.\n\n[227] BUDDAEUS, \"De Atheismo et Superstitione,\" pp. 184, 212.\n\n[228] RICHARD BENTLEY, \"On Freethinking,\" Boyle Lectures. VILLEMANDY,\n\"Scepticismus Debellatus,\" III. His words are remarkable:--\"Passim haec,\naliaque generis ejusdem, placita disseminantur,--neque verum neque\nbonum, qualia sunt in seipsis, posse dignosci; hinc que adeo sectandam\nesse duntaxat cum veri, tum boni, similitudinem: quae si stent ac\nvaleant,--illud omne erit verum, illud omne aequum,--illud omne pium et\nreligiosum,--illud omne utile, quod _cuiquam tale videatur_; privatam\ncujusque conscientiam supremam esse agendorum, vel non agendorum,\nnormam.\"\n\n[229] JAMES MARTINEAU, \"Rationale of Religious Inquiry,\" p. 108.\n\n[230] F. DE LAMENNAIS, \"Essai sur l'Indifference en matiere de la\nReligion,\" 4 vols. Paris, 1844.\n\n[231] Romans 14: 1, 5.\n\n[232] THEODORE PARKER, \"Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion,\"\npp. 14, 17.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHEORIES OF CERTITUDE AND SKEPTICISM.\n\n\nWe formerly adverted to the distinction between Dogmatic and Skeptical\nAtheism; and, believing that the _latter_ is the form in which it is\nmost prevalent, as well as most insidious and plausible, we now propose\nto review some recent theories both of Certitude and Skepticism, which\nhave sometimes been applied to throw doubt on the evidence of Christian\nTheism.\n\nThe Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in the French Institute\nannounced in 1843 the theory of Certitude as the subject of a Prize\nEssay, and issued the following _programme_ as a guide to the\ncompetitors in the selection of the principal topics of discussion:\n\n\"1. To determine the character of Certitude, and what distinguishes it\nfrom everything else. For example, Is Certitude the same with the\nhighest probability?\n\n\"2. What is the faculty, or what are the faculties, which give us\nCertitude? If several faculties of knowledge are supposed to exist, to\nstate with precision the differences between them.\n\n\"3. Of Truth and its foundations. Is truth the reality itself,--the\nnature of things falling under the knowledge of man?--or is it nothing\nbut an appearance,--a conception, necessary or arbitrary, of the human\nmind?\n\n\"4. To expound and discuss the most celebrated opinions, ancient and\nmodern, on the problem of Certitude, and to follow them out into their\ntheoretical and practical consequences. To subject to a critical and\nprofound examination the great monuments of Skepticism,--the writings of\nSextus, Huet, Hume, and Kant.\n\n\"5. To inquire what are, in spite of the assaults of Skepticism, the\ncertain truths which ought to subsist in the Philosophy of our times.\"\n\nSuch was the comprehensive _programme_ of the French Institute; and many\ncircumstances concurred at the time to impart a peculiar interest to the\ncompetition. M. Franck's volume[233] contains the Report of the Section\nof Philosophy on the papers which had been prepared, and offers a\ncareful analysis and critical estimate of their contents. Various other\nworks[234] not concerned in the competition appeared before and after\nit, showing how much the philosophical mind of France had been occupied\nwith this great theme, while in Britain it was attracting little or no\nattention.\n\nThis is the most recent discussion, on a great scale, of the theory of\nCertitude. But the question, far from being a new or modern speculation,\nis as old as Philosophy itself, and has been perpetually reproduced in\nevery age of intellectual activity. Plato discusses it, chiefly in the\nTheaetetus, Sophist, and Parmenides; it was agitated by Pyrrho,\nEnesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus, with that peculiar subtlety which\nbelonged to the mind of Greece; and in more recent times it has\nreappeared in the writings of Montaigne and Bayle, Huet and Pascal,\nGlanville, Hume, and Kant. Even during the middle age, the controversy\nbetween the Nominalists and Realists had an important bearing on this\nsubject: so that from the whole history of Philosophy we derive the\nimpression of its fundamental importance, an impression which is\ndeepened and confirmed by the transcendent interest of the themes to\nwhich it has been applied.\n\nIn our present argument, we are concerned with it only so far as it\nstands connected with the foundations of Theology, or as the right or\nwrong solution of the general question might affect the evidence for the\nBeing and Perfections of God. We do not propose, therefore, to offer a\nfull exposition of the philosophy of Certitude, still less to institute\na detailed examination of the various theories which have been\npropounded respecting it. It will be sufficient for our purpose if we\nmerely sketch a comprehensive outline of the subject, and select some of\nthe more prominent points which have the most direct bearing on the\ngrounds of our religious belief. Thus much may be accomplished by\nconsidering, _first_, the statement of the problem, and, _secondly_, the\nsolution of it.\n\nIn regard to the _statement_ of the problem, it is necessary, in the\nfirst instance, to ascertain its precise import, by determining the\nmeaning of the term Certitude. The programme of the Academy very\nproperly places this question on the foreground, Is Certitude the same\nwith the highest probability? And it is the more necessary to give\nprecedence to this part of the inquiry, because it is notorious that\nthere is a wide difference between the philosophical and the popular\nsense of Certitude,--a difference which has often occasioned mutual\nmisunderstanding between disputants, and a profitless warfare of words.\nIn the philosophical sense of the term, that only is said to be\n_certain_ which is either an axiomatic truth, intuitively discerned, or\na demonstrated truth, derived from the former by rigorous deduction;\nwhile all that part of our knowledge which is gathered from experience\nand observation, however credible in itself and however surely\nbelieved, is characterized as _probable_ only. In the popular sense of\nthe term, Certitude belongs to all those truths, of whatever kind and in\nwhatever way acquired, in regard to which we have no reason to be in\ndoubt or suspense, and which rest on sufficient and satisfactory\nevidence. A philosopher is _certain_, in his sense of the term, only of\nwhat he intuitively perceives or can logically demonstrate; a peasant is\n_certain_, in his sense of the term, of whatever he distinctly sees, or\nclearly remembers, or receives on authentic testimony. There is much\nreason, we think, to regret the existence of such a wide difference\nbetween the philosophical and the popular sense of an expression, which\nmust occur so often both in speculative discussion and in the\nintercourse of common life. It may be doubted whether the metaphysician\nis entitled to borrow the language of society, and to engraft upon it an\narbitrary definition of his own, different from and even inconsistent\nwith that which it bears in common usage. Nor can he plead necessity as\na sufficient excuse, or the accuracy of his definition as an effectual\nsafeguard, since, however needful it may be to discriminate between\n_different species_ of Certitude, by marking their peculiar\ncharacteristics and respective sources, surely this might be done more\nsafely and satisfactorily by designating one kind of it as Intuitive,\nanother as Demonstrative, another as Moral, or Experimental, or\nHistorical, than it can be by any arbitrary restriction of the _generic_\nterm to one or two of the many species which are comprehended under it.\nNo doubt there is a real distinction, and one of great practical\nimportance, between _certitude_ and _probability_; but this distinction\nis not overlooked in the language of common life;--it is only necessary\nto determine what truths belong respectively to each: whereas when all\nthe truths of Experience, and even, in some cases, those of scientific\nInduction, are ranked under the head of _probability_ merely, is it not\nevident that the language of Philosophy is in this respect at variance\nwith the prevailing sense of mankind?\n\nAn attempt has sometimes been made to draw a distinction between\n_popular_ and _philosophical_ Certitude, or, in other words, between the\nunreflecting belief of the many and the scientific belief of the few.\nThus, M. Franck distinguishes Certitude, first of all, from the blind\nfaith which commences with the earliest dawn of intelligence: then, from\nthe doubt which supervenes on the initial process of inquiry; and then,\nfrom that half-knowledge, that middle term between doubt and certainty,\nwhich is called _probability_. And M. Javari speaks of Certitude \"as the\ncomplete demonstration, acquired by reflection, of the legitimacy of any\njudgment, or of the reality of any object: this is definitive and\nscientific certitude, which is contrasted with that belief, however\nstrong, which springs, not from the _reflective_, but the _direct and\nspontaneous_ exercise of our faculties.\"[235] It must be evident that,\naccording to this definition of the term, Certitude, in the scientific\nsense of it, as the product of philosophical reflection, must be the\nprivilege and prerogative of the few, who have been led by taste or\neducation to cultivate the study of Psychology; while the vast majority\nof men, who are nevertheless as _certain_ of the truths which they\nbelieve, and, to say the very least, as little liable to doubt or\nskepticism, as any class of philosophers whatever, must be held to have\nno Certitude, just because they have no Science. It seems to be assumed\nthat Certitude is the creation of Science, the product of reflective\nthought; whereas it may be demonstrably shown that without Certitude,\nScience would be impossible, and that reflection can give forth nothing\nbut what it finds previously existing in the storehouse of human\nconsciousness. It surveys the streams of belief, and may trace up these\nstreams to their highest springs; but it does not, it cannot, create a\nnew truth, or give birth to a higher certitude. We have no disposition,\nassuredly, to underrate the value of philosophical reflection, or to\ndisparage the science of Psychology; the former may collect the\nmaterials and the latter may attempt the construction, of a goodly and\nsolid fabric: but we cannot admit that the certainty of all our\nknowledge depends upon either of them, or that it is confined\nexclusively to the metaphysical inquirer. Reflection adds nothing to the\ncontents of human consciousness: it examines our fundamental beliefs,\nbut originates none of them; it discerns the elements and sources of\ncertainty, but can neither produce nor alter them. Its sole province is\nto examine and report. If Certitude, in the philosophical sense of it,\nbelongs to the _reflex_, Certainty, in the popular sense, belongs to the\n_direct_ and _spontaneous_, operations of the human mind. We see and\nbelieve, we remember and believe, we compare and believe, we hear and\nbelieve, and that, too, with a feeling of confidence which needs no\nargument to confirm it, and to which all the philosophy in the world\ncould impart no additional strength. Certitude is not the creation of\nPhilosophy, but the object of its study; it exists independently of\nScience, and is only recognized by it; and it would still exist as a\nconstituent and indestructible element of human consciousness were\nMetaphysics scattered to the wind.\n\nIt appears, again, to have been assumed in some recent treatises, that\nCertitude belongs only to that portion of truth the denial of which\nwould imply a contradiction, or amount to the annihilation of reason. Is\nit, then, to be restricted to _necessary_ and _absolute_, as contrasted\nwith _contingent_ and _relative_ truths? Am I not as _certain_ that I\nsee four objects before me, as that two and two make four? Yet the\nformer is a _contingent_, the latter a _necessary_ truth. Is not my\npersonal consciousness infallibly certain? And yet can it be said to\nbelong to the head of necessary truth? Surely Certitude is unduly\nrestricted when we exclude from it many of our surest and strongest\nconvictions, which relate to truths attested by experience, but the\ndenial of which would involve no contradiction.\n\nThe question has been still further complicated by extreme opinions of\nanother kind. It seems to have been assumed that there can be no\nCertitude, unless we can explain the _rationale_ of our knowledge, and\neven account for the objects of our knowledge by tracing them up to\ntheir First Cause, as the ground and reason of their existence.[236]\nNow, if the question were, Can you account for your own existence, or\nfor the existence of the world around you, without having recourse to a\nsupreme First Cause? we would answer, No: but if the question be, Can\nthere be any Certitude prior to the idea of God, not deduced from it,\nand capable of existing without it? we would answer, Yes: the little\nchild is certain of its mother's existence before it is capable of\nknowing God, and the veriest Atheist is certain of his own existence and\nthat of his fellow-men, even when he professes to doubt or to disbelieve\nthe existence of God. It may be true that the essential nature and\nomniscient knowledge of God is the ultimate and eternal standard of\ntruth and certainty, or, in the words of Fenelon, that \"il n'y a qu'une\nseule verite, et qu'une seule maniere de bien juger, qui est, de juger\ncomme Dieu meme;\"[237] and yet it may not be true that all our knowledge\nis derived by deduction from our idea of God, or that its entire\ncertainty is dependent on our religious belief. Surely we may be\ncertainly assured of the facts of consciousness, of the phenomena of\nNature, and of many truths, both necessary and contingent, before we\nhave made any attempt to explain the _rationale_ of our knowledge, or to\nconnect it with the idea of the great First Cause; nay, it may be, and\nwe believe it is, by _means_ of these inferior and subordinate truths\nthat we rise to the belief of a supreme, omniscient Mind.\n\nSome writers seem to confound Certitude with _Infallibility,_ or at\nleast to hold that there can be no Certitude without it. The _impersonal\nreason_ of Cousin, the _common sense_ or _generic reason_ of Lamennais,\nand the _authoritative tradition_ of the Church, have all been severally\nresorted to, for the purpose of obtaining a ground of Certitude in the\nmatters both of Philosophy and Faith, such as is supposed to be\nunattainable by the exercise of our own proper faculties, or by the most\ncareful study of evidence. According to these theories, Certitude\nbelongs to our knowledge, only because that knowledge is derived from a\nreason superior to our own,--a reason not personal, but universal; not\nindividual, but generic. When they are applied, as they have been, to\nundermine the authority of private judgment, and to supersede the\nexercise of free inquiry; when they are urged as a reason why we should\ndefer to the authority of the Race in matters of Philosophy and to the\nauthority of the Church in matters of Faith; when we are told that the\ncertainty of our own existence depends on our knowledge of God, and that\nour knowledge of God depends on the _common consent_ or _invariable\ntraditions_ of mankind,--we do feel that the grounds of Certitude, so\nfar from being strengthened, are sapped and weakened by such\nspeculations, and that we have here a new and most unexpected\napplication of the Scottish doctrine of Common Sense, such as may be\nhighly serviceable to the Church of Rome. Protestant writers, indeed,\nhave sometimes appealed to _common consent_ as a collateral proof,\nauxiliary to that which is more direct and conclusive; but they have\ndone so merely because they regarded it as a _part of the evidence_,\nwell fitted to prove what Dr. Cudworth calls \"the naturality of the idea\nof God,\" and not because they confounded it with the _faculty_ by which\nalone that evidence can be discerned and appreciated. They never\nregarded it as the sole ground of certainty either in matters of\nPhilosophy or Faith. Nor can it be so considered by any thoughtful mind.\nFor how can I be more assured of an _impersonal reason_ than of my own?\nHow can I be more certain of the existence and the traditions of other\nmen, than of the facts of my own consciousness, and the spontaneous\nconvictions of my own understanding? or how can I be assured that, in\npassing from the impersonal reason to the individual mind, from the\ngeneric reason to the personal, the truth may not contract some taint of\nweakness or impurity from the vessel in which it is ultimately\ncontained,--from the finite faculties by which alone it is apprehended\nand believed?\n\nThe fact is that any attempt to prove the truth of our faculties must\nnecessarily fail. Did we set ourselves to the task of proving by\nargument or by authority that we are not wrong in believing in our own\nexistence or that of an external world, or did we attempt to establish\nthe trustworthiness of our faculties by resolving it into the veracity\nof God, our effort must needs be as abortive as it is superfluous, since\nit involves the necessity not only of proving the fact, but of _proving\nthe proof itself_, and that, too, by the aid of the very faculties whose\ntrustworthiness is in question! There are certain ultimate facts beyond\nwhich it is impossible to push our speculative inquiries; certain first\nor fundamental principles of Reason, which are in themselves\nindemonstrable, but which constitute the ground or condition of all\ndemonstration; certain intuitive perceptions, which are widely different\nfrom rational deductions, but which determine and govern every process\nof reasoning and every form of belief. To deny the _certainty_ of our\nintuitive perceptions, merely because we cannot prove by argument the\ntruth of our mental faculties, would virtually amount to a rejection of\nall evidence except such as comes to us only through _one_ channel, and\n_that_ the circuitous one of a process of reasoning; while, by the\nconstitution of our nature, we are qualified and privileged to draw it\nfresh, in many cases, at its spring and fountain-head. It may be as\nimpossible for man to prove the trustworthiness of his intellectual\nfaculties as it is for the bee to prove the truth of its marvellous\ninstinct; but, in either case, the reason may be that any such proof is\nunnecessary, that it is superseded by the laws of Instinct in the one,\nand by the laws of Thought in the other, and that by these laws a better\nand surer provision is made for our guidance than any that could have\nbeen found in a mere logical faculty,--a natural and irresistible\nauthority, which the Skeptic may dispute, but cannot destroy, and which,\nhowever disowned in theory, must be practically obeyed.\n\nIt must be evident that the _various meanings_ which have been attached\nto the term Certitude must materially affect both the statement and\nsolution of the general problem, and, more particularly, that they must\nhave an important bearing on the question, whether the doctrine which\naffirms the Being, Perfections, and Providence of God, should be ranked\nunder the head of _certain_, or only of _probable_, truth. If, in making\nuse of the term Certitude, I mean to denote by it something different\nfrom the certainty which belongs to the most assured convictions of the\nhuman mind, something that arises, not from the spontaneous and direct\nexercise of its faculties, but from a process of reflective thought or\nphilosophical speculation, something, in short, that is peculiar to the\nmetaphysical inquirer, and is not the common heritage of the race at\nlarge; then, unquestionably, the problem, as thus understood, must leave\nout of view many of the surest and most universal beliefs of\nmankind,--beliefs which may be illustrated and confirmed by Philosophy,\nbut which are anterior to it in respect to their origin, and independent\nof it in respect of the evidence on which they severally rest. In the\ncase of Certitude, just as in the case of every similar term expressive\nof a simple, elementary idea, the ultimate appeal must be made to\nindividual consciousness. No one can convey to another a conception of\nCertitude by means of words, apart from an experimental sense of it in\nthe mind of the latter, any more than he could give the idea of color to\nthe blind or of music to the deaf. It is because we have had experience\nof it in our own breasts that we recognize and respond to the\ndescriptions which others give of it. Every one knows what it is to be\n_certain_ in regard to many things, just because, constituted as he is,\nhe cannot doubt or disbelieve them. He is _certain_ of his own\nexistence, of the existence of other men, of the facts of his familiar\nconsciousness, of many events long since past which are still clearly\nremembered, of certain abstract truths which are intuitively discerned\nor logically demonstrated. These various objects of his thought may\ndiffer in other respects, and may occasion a corresponding difference in\nthe _kind_ of Certitude which is conceived to belong to them; but they\nall possess the same generic character, and admit, therefore, of being\nclassified under the same comprehensive category, as objects of our\n_certain_ knowledge.\n\nIn the current use both of philosophical and popular language, Certitude\nis spoken of in a twofold sense. We speak of a belief or conviction of\nour own minds as possessing the character of Certitude, when it is so\nstrong, and so firmly rooted that it excludes all doubt or\nhesitation;--we speak also of an object or event as possessing the same\ncharacter, when it is so presented to our minds as to produce the full\nassurance of its reality. Hence the distinction between _subjective_ and\n_objective_ Certitude. The former is a fact of consciousness; it is\nsimply the undoubting assent which we yield to certain judgments,\nwhether these judgments be true or false; it exists in us, and not in\nthe objects of thought; it denotes a condition of our minds, which may,\nor may not, be in accordance with the actual state of things. The latter\nis truth or certainty considered _objectively_, as existing in the\nobjects of our knowledge; it is independent of us and of our\nconceptions; it is _as_ it is, whether it be known or unknown to us; our\nbelief cannot add to its reality, nor can our unbelief diminish or\ndestroy it. Certitude, considered as a mental state, denotes simply the\nstrength of our conviction or belief, as distinguished from doubt or\nmere opinion; but, considered as an objective reality, it denotes the\nground or reason existing in the nature of things for the convictions\nwhich we cherish. _Subjective certitude_ is not always the index or the\nproof of _objective truth_, for men often believe with the strongest\nassurance what they find reason afterwards to doubt or to disbelieve;\nand the prevalence of many false beliefs, sincerely cherished and\nzealously maintained, raises the question, how we may best discriminate\nbetween truth and error? Hence the various theories of Certitude, and\nhence also the antagonist theories of Skepticism.\n\nThe theories of Certitude may be reduced to _three_ classes. The _first_\nplaces the ground of Certitude in _Reason_; the _second_ in _Authority_;\nthe _third_, in _Evidence_, including under that term both the external\nmanifestations of truth, and the internal principles or laws of thought\nby which we are determined in forming our judgments in regard to them.\nEach of these theories, however, has appeared in various phases in the\nhistory of philosophical speculation. The Individual Reason of\nMartineau, the Generic Reason of Lamennais, the Impersonal Reason of\nCousin, the Authority of the Race, and the Infallibility of the Church,\nare specimens of these varieties.\n\nThe theory which places the principle of Certitude in REASON has assumed\nat least two distinct shapes. In the one it discards all authority\nexcept that of private judgment or individual reason; in the other it\nappeals to a higher reason, which is said to be impersonal and\ninfallible, and which is supposed to regulate and determine the\nconvictions of the human mind. In the former shape, it appears in the\nspeculations of Martineau; in the latter, it is advocated by Cousin; and\nin one or other of these shapes it constitutes the ground-principle of\nRATIONALISM. The theory, again, which places the principle of Certitude\nin AUTHORITY has also assumed two distinct shapes. In the one it speaks\nof a universal consent or Generic Reason, the reason not of the\nindividual but of the race to which he belongs, and exhibits a singular\ncombination of the Philosophy of Common Sense as taught by Dr. Reid and\nthe Scottish School, with the principle of Authoritative Tradition as\ntaught in the Popish Church; in the other, it refers more specifically,\nnot to the infallibility of the race at large, but to the infallibility\nof a select body, regularly organized and invested with peculiar powers,\ninto whose hands has been committed the sacred deposit and the sole\nguardianship of truth, whether in matters of philosophy or faith. In\nboth forms it is presented in the writings of M. Gerbet and M.\nLamennais, and in both it is necessary for the full maintenance of the\nPopish system of doctrine. The theory, again, which places the principle\nof Certitude in EVIDENCE, admits of being exhibited in two very distinct\naspects. In the one, it has been treated as if Evidence were purely\n_subjective_, as if it belonged exclusively to thought, and not to the\nobject of thought, or as if it depended solely on the perceptions of our\nminds, and not at all on any objective reality which is independent of\nthem, and which is equally true whether it be perceived by our minds or\nnot. In this form it is a theory of Individualism, and has a strong\ntendency towards Skepticism. In the other aspect, Evidence is regarded\nas the sole and sufficient ground of Certitude, but it is viewed both\n_objectively_ and _subjectively_;--_objectively_, as having its ground\nand reason in a reality that is independent of our perceptions, and that\nmay or may not be perceived without being the less true or the less\ncertain in itself;--and yet _subjectively_ also, as being equally\ndependent on certain principles of reason or laws of thought, without\nwhich no external manifestation would suffice to create the ideas and\nbeliefs of the human mind, since the evidence which is exhibited\nexternally must not only exist, but must be perceived, discerned, and\nappreciated, before it can generate belief: but when perceived, it\nproduces conviction, varying in different cases in degree, and amounting\nin some to absolute certainty, which leaves no room either for denial or\ndoubt.\n\nSuch are the three grand theories of Certitude, and the several distinct\nforms or phases in which they have severally appeared. We have no\nhesitation in declaring our decided preference for the second form of\nthe third theory,--that which resolves the principle or ground of\nCertitude into EVIDENCE; but EVIDENCE considered both _objectively_ and\n_subjectively_,--_objectively_, as that which exists whether it is\nperceived or not, and is independent of the caprices of individual\nminds, and _subjectively_, as that which must be discerned before its\nproper impression can be produced, which must be judged of according to\nthe laws of human thought, and which, when so discerned and judged of,\nimparts a feeling of assurance which no sophistry can shake and no\nphilosophy strengthen.\n\nAccording to some recent theories, Certitude belongs to our knowledge,\nonly because that knowledge is derived from a reason superior to our\nown,--a reason not personal, but universal, not individual but generic,\nwhich, although not belonging to ourselves, is supposed to hold\ncommunication with our minds: and if this were meant merely to remind us\nof the limitation of our faculties, and of our consequent liability to\nerror, or even to teach us the duty of acknowledging our dependence on a\nhigher power, it might be alike unobjectionable and salutary; but when\nit is applied to undermine the authority of private judgment and to\nsupersede the exercise of free inquiry, they have a tendency to excite\nsuspicion and distrust in every thoughtful mind. The capital error which\npervades all these speculations consists in not distinguishing aright\nbetween the _evidence_ which constitutes the ground of our belief, and\nthe _faculty_ by which that evidence is discerned and appreciated. The\nGeneric Reason of Lamennais, as well as the uniform Tradition of the\nChurch, may constitute, when duly improved, a branch of the objective\nevidence for the truth, and as such they have been applied even by\nProtestant writers when they have appealed to _common consent_ as a\ncollateral proof, auxiliary to that which is more direct and conclusive;\nbut they cannot be regarded as the exclusive grounds of the certainty of\nhuman knowledge, since this arises from the fundamental, universal, and\ninvariable laws of human thought.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe term Skepticism, again, may denote either a mere _state of mind_,--a\nstate of suspense or doubt in regard to some particular fact or opinion;\nor _a system of speculative philosophy_, relating to the principles of\nhuman knowledge or the grounds of human belief. In the former sense, it\nimplies nothing more than the want of a sure and satisfactory conviction\nof the truth on the particular point in question. Were it expressed in\nwords, it would simply amount to a verdict of \"non liquet.\" In the\nlatter sense, it imports much more than this; it is not merely a _sense_\nof doubt respecting any one truth, but a _system_ of doubt in regard to\nthe grounds of our belief in all truth, a subtle philosophy which seeks\nto explain the phenomena of Belief by resolving them into their ultimate\nprinciples, and which often terminates--in explaining them away. In both\nforms, it has existed, either continuously or in ever-recurring cycles,\nfrom the earliest dawn of speculative inquiry; and while it has seemed\nto retard or arrest the progress of human knowledge, it has really been\noverruled as a means of quickening the intellectual powers, and\nimparting at once greater precision and comprehensiveness to the matured\nresults of Science.\n\nTheoretical Skepticism may be divided into _three_ distinct branches:\nFirst, Universal or Philosophical Skepticism, which professes to deny,\nor rather to doubt the certainty of all human knowledge; secondly,\nPartial or Religious Skepticism, which admits the possible certitude of\nhuman knowledge in other respects, but holds that religious truth is\neither altogether inaccessible to our faculties, or that it is not\nsupported by sufficient evidence; thirdly, a mongrel system, which\ncombines Philosophic Doubt with Ecclesiastical Dogmatism, and which may\nbe aptly characterized as the Skeptico-Dogmatic theory.[238]\n\nWe agree with Dr. Reid in thinking that Universal Skepticism is\nunanswerable _by argument_, and can only be effectively met by an\n_appeal to consciousness_.[239] It might be shown, indeed, that in so\nfar as it assumes, however slightly, the aspect of a positive or\ndogmatic system, it is self-contradictory and absurd; it might also be\nshown that doubt itself implies thought, and thought existence or\nreality: but the ultimate appeal must be to the facts of human\nconsciousness, and the laws of thought which operate in every human\nbreast. And when such an appeal is made, we can have no anxiety in\nregard to the result, nor any apprehension that philosophical skepticism\ncan ever become the prevailing creed of the popular mind. There is a\nrisk, however, of danger arising from a different source; it may not be\nalways remembered that the theory of Skepticism must be universal to be\neither consistent or consequent; and hence it may be _partially applied_\nto some truths, while it is practically abandoned in regard to other\ntruths, which are neither more certain nor less liable to objection than\nthe former. Thus the skeptical difficulties which have been raised\nagainst the doctrines of Ontology are of such a kind that if they have\nany validity or force, they bear as strongly against the reality of an\nexternal world and the existence of our fellow-men, as against the\ndoctrine which affirms the being of God: yet many will be found urging\nthem against the latter doctrine, who do not profess to have any doubt\nin regard to the two former; and it is of paramount importance to show\nthat this is a partial and therefore unfair application of their own\nprinciples, and that they cannot consistently admit the one without also\nadmitting the other.\n\nAtheism, in its skeptical form, must either be a mere _sense of doubt_\nin regard to the sufficiency of the evidence in favor of the being and\nperfections of God; or _a speculative system_, which attempts to justify\nthat doubt by some theory of philosophical skepticism, either partial or\nuniversal. In the _latter_ case, it may be best dealt with by showing\nthat it affects the certainty of our common knowledge, not less than\nthat of our religious belief, and that we cannot consistently reject\nTheology, and yet retain our convictions on other cognate subjects of\nthought. In the _former_ case, it should be treated as a case of\nignorance, by illustrating the evidence, and urging it on the attention\nof those who have hitherto been blind to its force; reminding them that\ntheir _not seeing_ it is no proof that it does not exist, and that\n_doubt_ itself on such a question, so nearly affecting their duty and\nwelfare, involves a solemn obligation to patient, candid, and\ndispassionate inquiry.\n\n\"A skeptic in religion,\" says Bishop Earle, \"is one that hangs in the\nbalance with all sorts of opinions, whereof not one but stirs him, and\nnone sways him. A man guiltier of credulity than he is taken to be; for\nit is out of his belief of everything that he fully believes nothing.\nEach religion scares him from its contrary, none persuades him to\nitself.... He finds reason in all opinions, truth in none; indeed, the\nleast reason perplexes him, and the best will not satisfy him.... He\nfinds doubts and scruples better than resolves them, and is always _too\nhard for himself_.... In sum, his whole life is a question, and his\nsalvation a greater, which death only concludes, and then he--is\nresolved.\"[240]\n\nThis second phase or form of Skepticism, which we have designated as\n_Partial_ or _Religious Skepticism_, admits the possible certitude of\nhuman knowledge in other respects, and especially in regard to secular\nand scientific pursuits, but holds that religious truth is either\naltogether inaccessible to man with his present faculties, or that its\ncertainty cannot be evinced by any legitimate process of reasoning.\n\nThese two positions are in some respects widely different, although they\nare often combined, and always conducive to the same result,--the\npractical negation of Religion. Many who never dream of doubting the\ncertainty of human knowledge, in so far as it relates to their secular\nor scientific pursuits, are prone to cherish a skeptical spirit in\nregard to religious or spiritual truths; and this, not because they have\nexamined and weighed the evidence to which Theology appeals, and found\nit wanting, but rather because they have a lurking suspicion that men,\nwith their present faculties, are incapable of rising to the knowledge\nof supernatural things, and that they could attain to no certainty,\nwhile they might expose themselves to much delusion, by entering on the\ninquiry at all. This is their apology for _ignoring_ Religion\naltogether, and contenting themselves with other branches of knowledge,\nwhich are supposed to be more certain in themselves as well as more\nconducive to their present welfare. In this respect, it is deeply\ninstructive to remark that Infidelity has been singularly at variance\nwith itself. At one time, in the age of Herbert, human reason was\nextolled, to the disparagement of Divine Revelation; it was held to be\nso thoroughly competent to deal with all the truths of Theology, and to\narrive, on mere natural grounds, at such an assured belief in them, that\nno supernatural message was needed either to illustrate, or confirm, or\nenforce the lessons of Nature: but now, when the lessons of Nature\nherself are called in question, human reason is disparaged as\nincompetent to the task of deciphering her dark hieroglyphics, and while\nshe can traverse with firm step every department of the material world,\nand soar aloft, as on eagle's wings, to survey the suns and systems of\nastronomy, she is held to be incapable alike of religious inquiry and of\ndivine instruction! There is, indeed, a striking contrast between the\nhigh pretensions of Reason in matters of philosophy, and the bastard\nhumility which it sometimes assumes in matters of faith.\n\nBut there is another, and a still more subtle, form of Partial or\nReligious Skepticism. It does not absolutely deny the possibility of\nreligious knowledge, nor does it dogmatically affirm that man, with his\npresent faculties, can have no religious convictions; it contents itself\nwith saying, and attempting to prove, that the certitude of religious\ntruth cannot be evinced by any legitimate process of reasoning. It\nexamines the proof, and detects flaws in it. It discusses, with a severe\nand critical logic, the arguments that have been employed to establish\nthe first and most fundamental article of Theology, the existence of\nGod; and discarding them one by one, it reaches the conclusion that,\nwhether true or not, it cannot be proved. Strange as it may appear,\nthese sentiments have been embraced and avowed by men who still continue\nto profess their belief in God and Religion. Some have held that proof\nby reasoning is impossible, but only because it is superfluous. They\ndistinguish between _reason_ and _reasoning_; and hold that while the\nlatter is incompetent to the task of proving the existence of God, the\nformer spontaneously suggests the idea of a Supreme Cause, and imparts\nto it all the certainty which belongs to a direct intellectual\nintuition. Others distinguish between the _Speculative_ and the\n_Practical_ Reason; and hold that while the former cannot prove by an\nunexceptionable argument the existence of God, the latter affords a\nsufficient groundwork for religious belief and worship. Others, again,\nspeak not so much of reason or reasoning, as of _sentiment and\ninstinct_, as the source of our religious beliefs; and instead of\naddressing arguments to the understanding, they would make their appeal\nto the feelings and affections of the heart. There is still another\nclass of writers who resolve all human knowledge, whether relating to\nthings secular or spiritual, into what they call the principle of faith\n(_foi_), and to this class belong two distinct parties who are widely\ndifferent from each other in almost everything else. It is important,\ntherefore, to mark the radical difference between their respective\nsystems, since it is apt to be concealed or disguised by the ambiguous\nuse of the same phraseology by both. The one party may be described as\nthe disciples of a _Faith-Philosophy of Reason_, the other of a\n_Faith-Philosophy of Revelation_: the former resolving all our knowledge\ninto the intuitive perceptions or first principles of the human\nintellect, considered as a kind of divine and infallible, though natural\ninspiration; the latter contending that in regard at least to the\nknowledge of theological truth, human reason is utterly powerless, and\ncan only arrive at certainty by faith in the divine testimony. The two\nare widely different, yet there are points of resemblance and agreement\nbetwixt them, and on this account they have sometimes been classed\ntogether under a wide and sweeping generalization.\n\nThe form of Partial Skepticism to which these remarks apply is perhaps\nmore common than it is generally supposed to be. On what other\nprinciple, indeed, can we account, at least in the case of religious\nmen, for the indifference and even aversion with which they turn away\nfrom any attempt to prove by natural evidence the existence and\nprovidence of God? The prevalence of such feelings even within the\nChristian community has been admitted and deplored by one of the most\nprofound spiritual teachers of modern times;[241] and it can only be\nexplained, where Religion is cherished and professed, on the supposition\nthat they regard _proof by argument_ as superfluous, either because it\nis superseded by the natural instincts and intuitions of the human mind,\nor by the authoritative teaching of Divine Revelation. But it ought to\nbe seriously considered, on the one hand, that the instincts and\nintuitions of human reason are not altogether independent of the natural\nevidence which is exhibited in the constitution and course of Nature;\nand, on the other hand, that Revelation itself refers to that natural\nevidence, and recommends it to our careful and devout study.\n\nBesides the theories of Partial Skepticism to which we have already\nreferred, there is a mongrel system which seems to combine the two\nopposite extremes of Doubt and Dogmatism, and which, for that reason,\nmay be not inaptly designated as _Skeptico-Dogmatic_.[242] Ever since\nthe era of the Reformation, when the principle of free inquiry, and the\nright or rather the duty of private judgment in matters of Religion,\nwere so strenuously affirmed and so successfully maintained, there has\nbeen a standing controversy between the Popish and Protestant Churches\nrespecting the rival claims of Reason and Authority as the ultimate\narbiter on points of faith. Extreme opinions on either side were\nadvanced. One party, repudiating all authority, whether human or divine,\nrejected alike the testimony of Scripture and the decrees of the Church,\nand, receiving only what was supposed to be in accordance with the\ndictates of Reason, sought to establish a scheme of Rationalism in\nconnection with at least a nominal profession of Christianity. The\nopposite party, not slow to detect the error into which extreme\nProtestants had fallen, and intent seemingly on fastening that error on\nall who had separated themselves from the Catholic Church, affirmed and\nendeavored to prove that Rationalism, in its most obnoxious sense, is\ninherent in and inseparable from the avowed principles of the\nReformation, and that the recognition of the right of private judgment\nis necessarily subversive of all authority in matters of faith. They did\nnot see, or if they did see, they were unwilling to acknowledge that\nRationalism is a very different thing from the legitimate use of Reason;\nand that while the former repudiates all authority, whether human or\ndivine, the latter may bow with profound reverence to the supreme\nauthority of the Inspired Word, and even listen with docility to the\nministerial authority of the Church, in so far as her teaching is in\naccordance with the lessons of Scripture. It may be safely affirmed that\nthe Confessions and Articles of all the Protestant Churches in Europe\nand America do recognize the authority both of God and the Church, and\nare as much opposed to Rationalism, considered as a system which makes\nReason the sole standard and judge, as they are to the opposite extreme\nof lordly domination over the faith and consciences of men. But such a\ncontroversy having arisen, it was to be expected that while eager\npartisans, on the one side, might unduly exalt and extol the powers and\nprerogatives of Reason, the adherents of Romanism, which claims the\nsanction of infallibility for her doctrines and decrees, would be\ntempted to follow an opposite course, and would seek to disparage the\nclaims of Reason with the view of exalting the authority of the Church.\nHence arose what has been called POPISH PYRRHONISM,--a system which\nattempts to combine Doubt with Dogmatism, and to establish the certitude\nof religious knowledge on the sole basis of authority, which is somehow\nsupposed to be more secure and stable when it rests on the ruins of\nhuman reason. Not a few significant symptoms of a tendency in this\ndirection have appeared from age to age. It was apparent in some of the\nwritings, otherwise valuable, of Huet, Bishop of Avranches; some traces\nof it are discernible in the profound \"Thoughts of Pascal;\" but it was\nreserved for the present age to elaborate this tendency into a theory,\nand to give it the form of a regular system. This task was fearlessly\nundertaken by the eloquent but versatile Lamennais, while as yet he held\noffice in the Church, and was publicly honored as one who was worthy to\nbe called \"the latest of the Fathers.\" His \"Essay on Indifference in\nMatters of Faith,\" exhibits many proofs of a profound and vigorous\nintellect, and contains many passages of powerful and impressive\neloquence. We heartily sympathize with it in so far as it is directed\nagainst that Liberalism which makes light of all definite articles of\nfaith; but we deplore the grievous error into which he has been seduced\nby his zeal for the authority of the Church, when he attempts to\nundermine the foundations of all belief in the trustworthiness of the\nhuman faculties. In opposition to the claims of private judgment, he\ncontends for the necessity of a Reason more elevated and more general as\nthe only ground of Certitude, the supreme rule and standard of belief.\nThis normal Reason he finds in the doctrine and decrees of an Infallible\nChurch, wherever the Church is known; but where the Church is yet\nunknown, or while it was yet non-existent in its present organized form,\nhe seeks this more general Reason in the common sense or unanimous\nconsent of the race at large, and affirms that this is the sole ground\nof Certitude, and the ultimate standard of appeal in every question\nrespecting the truth or falsity of our individual opinions.[243] He\nholds that the authority both of the Church and of the Race is\n_infallible_; and that its infallibility neither requires nor admits of\nproof.[244] With the view of establishing this one and exclusive\ncriterion of Certitude, he assails the evidence of sense, the evidence\nof consciousness, the evidence of memory, the evidence even of axiomatic\ntruths and first principles, and involves everything except\necclesiastical authority or general reason in the same abyss of\nSkepticism.[245] He ventures even to affirm that \"Geometry itself, the\nmost exact of all the Sciences, rests, like every other, on common\nconsent!\" No wonder, then, that he should also found exclusively on\n_authority_ our belief in the existence and government of God.\n\nAn intelligent member of his own communion propounds a very different,\nand much more reasonable, opinion: \"Il n'y a pas d'autorite morale qui\nn'ait besoin de se prouver ellememe, d'une maniere quelconque, et\nd'etablir sa legitimite. En definitive, c'est a l'individu qu'elle\ns'addresse, car on ne croit pas par masse, on croit chacun pour soi.\nL'individu reste donc toujours juge, et juge inevitable de l'autorite\nintellectuelle qu'il accepte, ou de celle qui s'offre a lui. Nous\nn'avons pas a examiner si cette disposition constitutive de l'esprit\nhumain est bonne ou mauvaise; la seule question que l'on en fait est\nvaine et sterile. Nous sommes necessairement amenes par l'observation\nphyschologique a constater qu'il faut que l'homme croie a la fidelite du\ntemoignage de ses sens individuels, et a la valeur de sa raison\npersonelle, avant de faire un pas au-dela.\"[246]\n\nWe think it unnecessary to enter into a detailed discussion of this\nstrange and startling theory, especially as the altered position of the\nwriter in his relation to the Church before his death may be held to\nindicate that to a large extent it had been abandoned by himself. Nor\nshould we have thought it worthy even of this transient notice, had we\nnot discerned symptoms of an incipient tendency in a similar direction\namong some writers in the Protestant ranks. It should be remembered by\ndivines of every communion that the rational faculties of man and their\ngeneral trustworthiness are necessarily presupposed in any Revelation\nwhich may be addressed to them; and that in Scripture itself frequent\nappeals are made to the works of Creation and Providence, as affording\nat once a body of natural evidence, and a signal manifestation of His\nadorable perfections. It were a vain thing to hope that _faith in God_\nmay be strengthened by a spirit of _Skepticism_ in regard to Reason,\nwhich constitutes part of His own image on the soul of man.\n\nIt is but common justice to add that the speculations of Lamennais, so\nfar from being sanctioned, were openly censured, by some of the most\ndistinguished of his fellow-ecclesiastics. Such writers as Valroger,\nGioberti, and the late Archbishop of Paris, gave forth their public\nprotest against them, and have thereby done much to vindicate their\nChurch from the imputation of conniving at the progress of Skepticism.\n\nValroger's testimony is strong and decided: \"M. de Lamennais pretendait\nque la raison individuelle est incapable de nous donner la Certitude.\nCette pretention est, suivant, nous absurde et funeste. N'est ce pas par\nnotre raison individuelle que la verite-arrive a nous et devient notre\nbien? Quel moyen plus immediat pourrons-nous avoir de saisir la verite?\nQuel principe de connaisance ou de Certitude pourrait-on placer entre\nnous et notre raison? Et comment pourrions-nous l'employer, si ce ne'est\navec notre raison? N'est ce pas une contradiction flagrante de vouloir\npersuader quelque chose a des hommes que l'on a declares incapables de\nconnaitre certainement quoi que ce soit? A quoi bon une methode, une\nautorite infaillible, un enseignement Divin, si nous n'avons que des\nfacultes trompeuses pour user de ces secours? Nous croyons, nous, que la\nraison individuelle peut connaitre avec certitude toutes les verites\nnecessaires a l'accomplissement de notre destinee. Si nous avons besoin\nde la Grace, de la Revelation, de la Tradition, et de l'Eglise pour\natteindre le but supreme de notre vie,--sur une foule de questions\nsubalternes, nous peuvons arriver a une certitude complete, sans\nrecourir a aucune exterieure, a aucun secours surnaturel.\"[247]\n\nGioberti is equally explicit: \"M. de Lamennais dans sa theorie sur la\nCertitude, confond les deux methodes, Ontologique et Physiologique; il\nles rejette toutes les deux, et leur substitue la seule methode\nd'Autorite. Mais la methode d'Autorite est impossible sans un fondement\nOntologique, et c'est une manifeste petition de principe que d'etabler\nl'Ontologie sur l'Autorite.\"[248]\n\nAnd the late Archbishop of Paris,--the same who fell before the\nbarricades, a martyr to Charity if not to Truth, and who seems to have\nhad a wakeful eye on the progress of philosophic speculation,--took\noccasion, in a preface to the Abbe Maret's \"Theodicee,\" to declare that\nLamennais' system was obnoxious to the Church, because of its opposition\nto the doctrine of Rational Certitude: \"Tout le monde sait que le clerge\nde France avait repousse le systeme de M. de Lamennais precisement a\ncause de son opposition a la Certitude Rationnelle constanment professee\ndans nos ecoles; et tout le monde peu savoir que les Bossuet, les\nFenelon, les Descartes out raisonne, et que nous aussi nous raisonnons\net discutons avec nos accusateurs,\" ... \"preuve irrecusable que LE\nRATIONALISME ET LA RAISON SONT DEUX CHOSES FORT DIFFERENTES.\"[249]\n\nPERRONE has given a similar testimony, and we cannot doubt that the more\nthoughtful adherents of Romanism must be sensible of the danger which is\ninvolved in any attempt to combine Rational Skepticism with Dogmatic\nAuthority.\n\nIt were well, however, if they would reconsider their position with\nreference to this whole question, in its more general bearings in\nconection with their doctrine as to the rule of faith; and weigh, with\ncandid impartiality, the arguments which have been adduced by Protestant\nwriters on the subject.[250]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[233] M. A. FRANCK, \"Rapport,\" Paris, 1847. M. A. JAVARY, \"Ouvrage\nCouronne par l'Institut,\" 1847.\n\n[234] M. ED. MERCIER, \"De la Certitude, dans ses Rapports avec la\nScience et la Foi,\" 1844. M. A. VERA, \"Probleme de la Certitude,\" 1843.\nABBE GERBET, \"Des Doctrines Philosophiques sur la Certitude, dans leur\nRapports avec les Fondemens de la Theologie.\" ABBE DE LAMENNAIS, \"Du\nFondement de la Certitude,\" 1826. Vols. II. and III. of the \"Essai sur\nl'Indifference en Matiere de la Religion.\" 4 vols., 1844.\n\n[235] M. FRANCK, p. 237. M. JAVARI, p. 28.\n\n[236] AMAND SAINTE, \"Vie de Spinoza,\" p. 201. ABBE LAMENNAIS, \"Essai sur\nl'Indifference,\" IV. 256.\n\n[237] FENELON, \"Oeuvres Spirituelles,\" I. _138_.\n\n[238] SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, \"Adversus Mathematicos,\" that is,\nDogmaticos--teachers of [Greek: mathemata]. GLANVILLE, \"Scepsis\nScientifica.\" HUME, and MONTAIGNE, \"Essays.\" H. O'CONNOR, \"Connected\nEssays and Tracts.\" VILLEMANDY, \"Scepticismus Debellatus; seu, Humanae\nCognitionis Ratio ab imis radicibus explicata; ejusdem Certitudo\nadversus Scepticos quosque veteres ac novos invicte asserta.\" LAMENNAIS,\n\"Essai sur l'Indifference.\"\n\n[239] DR. REID, Essays,--\"On First Principles,\" II. 249-252, 293, 300.\nSIR WM. HAMILTON, \"Reid,\" pp. 91, 101, 109.\n\n[240] BISHOP EARLE, \"Microcosmography,\" p. 120.\n\n[241] DR. JOHN LOVE, of Glasgow, \"Discourses.\"\n\n[242] COUSIN, \"Cours,\" II. 420, 422. MORELL, \"History of Philosophy,\" I.\n251; II. 221, 505, 522. SPINOZA, \"Tractatus Theolog.-Polit.,\" p. 267.\nLAMENNAIS, \"Essai sur l'Indifference,\" _passim_.\n\n[243] LAMENNAIS, \"Essai,\" II. 6, 7, 52, 60, 258.\n\n[244] Ibid., II. 9, 97, 110.\n\n[245] LAMENNAIS, \"Essai,\" II. 59, 72, 75, 78, 80, 84, 94; IV. 255.\n\n[246] BOUCHITTE, \"Histoire des Preuves,\" p. 478.\n\n[247] VALROGER, \"Etudes Critiques,\" p. 574.\n\n[248] GIOBERTI, \"Introduction a l'Etude de la Philosophie,\" I. 592.\n\n[249] MARET, \"Theodicee,\" Preface, p. VIII.\n\n[250] LA PLACETTE, \"De Insanabill Romanae Ecclesiae Scepticismo.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTHEORY OF SECULARISM.--G. J. HOLYOAKE.\n\n\nSuch is the new name under which Atheism has recently appeared among not\na few of the tradesmen and artisans of the metropolis and provincial\ntowns of Great Britain. In literature, it is represented by Mr. G. J.\nHolyoake, the author of an answer to Paley, the editor of \"The\nReasoner,\" and a popular lecturer and controversialist, whose public\ndiscussions are duly reported in that periodical, and occasionally\nreprinted in a separate form.[251] The extensive circulation which these\nand similar tracts have already obtained, the number of affiliated\nsocieties which have been formed in many of the chief centres of\nmanufactures and commerce, the zeal and boldness of popular itinerant\nlecturers, and the urgent demands which have been incessantly made for\nthe extension of their machinery by means of a _propaganda_ fund, are\nall indications of a tendency, in some quarters, towards a form of\nunbelief, less speculative and more practical, but only on that account\nmore attractive to the English mind, and neither less insidious nor\nless dangerous than any of the philosophical theories of Atheism.\n\nWe have often thought, indeed, that should Atheism ever threaten to\nbecome prevalent in England, this is the form which it is most likely to\nassume. The English mind is eminently practical; it has little sympathy\nwith the profundity of German or the subtlety of French speculation on\nsuch subjects. A few speculative spirits may be influenced for a time by\nthe reasonings of Comte, or the representations of \"The Vestiges;\" but\nthe general mind of the community will desiderate something more solid\nand substantial; not content with any scientific theory, however\ningenious, it will demand a practical system. And we are not sure that\n\"Secularism\" may not be made to appear, in the view of some, to be just\nsuch a system, since it dismisses or refuses to pronounce on many of the\nhighest problems of human thought, insists on the necessary limitation\nof the human faculties, and seeks to confine both our aspirations and\nour thoughts to the interests and the duties of the present life. In\nestimating the probable influence of such a system on the public mind,\nwe must not forget the large amount of practical irreligion which exists\neven in England, the strong temptation which is felt by many to escape\nfrom their occasional feelings of remorse and fear by embracing some\nplausible pretext for the neglect of prayer and other religious\nobservances, and the disposition, natural and almost irresistible in\nsuch circumstances, to lend a willing ear to any doctrine which promises\nto relieve them of all responsibility with relation to God and a future\nstate. The theory of Secularism is adapted to this state of mind; it\nchimes in with the instinctive tendencies of every ungodly mind; and it\nis the likeliest medium through which _practical Atheism_ may pass into\n_speculative Infidelity_.\n\nMr. Holyoake, it is true, abjures the name both of an _Atheist_ and\n_Infidel_. We admire the prudence of his policy, but cannot subscribe to\nthe correctness of his reasons for doing so. \"Mr. Southwell,\" he says,\n\"has taken an objection to the term Atheism. We are glad he has. We have\ndisused it a long time.... We disuse it, because Atheist is a worn-out\nword. Both the ancients and the moderns have understood by it _one\nwithout God, and also without morality_. Thus the term connotes more\nthan any well-informed and earnest person accepting it ever included in\nit; that is, the word carries with it associations of immorality, which\nhave been repudiated by the Atheist as seriously as by the Christian.\nNon-theism is a term less open to the same misunderstanding, as it\nimplies the simple non-acceptance of the Theist's explanation of the\norigin and government of the world.\"[252]\n\nBut \"Non-theism\" was afterwards exchanged for \"Secularism,\" as a term\nless liable to misconstruction, and more correctly descriptive of the\nreal import of the theory. \"_Secularists_ was, perhaps, the proper\ndesignation of all who dissented extremely from the religious opinions\nof the day.\"--\"Freethinking is the _Secular_ sphere; drawing its line of\ndemarcation between time and eternity, it works _for the welfare of man\nin this world_\"--\"The _Secularist_ is the larger and more comprehensive\ndesignation of the Atheist.\"[253] With all this coyness and\nfastidiousness about names, there can be no doubt that the character of\nthe system is essentially atheistic: \"We refuse to employ the term God,\nnot having any definite idea of it which we can explain to others,--not\nknowing any theory of such an existence as will enable us to defend that\ndogma to others. We therefore prefer the honest, though unusual\ndesignation of Atheist; not using it in the sense in which it is\ncommonly employed, as signifying _one without morality_, but in its\nstricter sense of describing those _without any determinate knowledge of\nDeity_.\"[254] \"That the Atheist does consider matter to be eternal is\nperfectly correct; and for this reason, no Atheist could make use of\nsuch a term as that matter _originally_ possessed, or _originally_ was;\nwhatever is eternal has no origin, beginning, or end.... Organized\nplants and animals--man also with his noble intellect--are not _now_ at\nleast produced by supernatural causes; and the Atheist, without\npositively asserting that there _must_ have been a beginning to life in\nthis earth, argues that if a plant, an animal, or a man, can be produced\nat this time without supernatural interference, so also a first plant, a\nfirst animal, or a first man, may have been naturally produced in this\nearth under the right circumstances,--circumstances which probably\ncannot occur in the present condition of our globe. Our difficulties and\nour ignorance are not in the least dispelled, but on the contrary\ncomplicated and increased, by the adoption of the ancient belief in a\nSupernatural Contriver and Maker, who, after existing from eternity in\nabsolute void and solitude, suddenly proceeded to create the universe\nout of nothing or out of himself.\"[255] The editor thinks \"the course to\nbe taken is to use the term Secularists as indicating general views, and\naccept the term Atheist at the point at which Ethics declines alliance\nwith Theology; always, however, explaining the term Atheist to mean 'not\nseeing God,' visually or inferentially; never suffering it to be taken\n(as Chalmers, Foster, and many others represent it) for Anti-theism,\nthat is, hating God, denying God, as _hating_ implies personal knowledge\nas the ground of dislike, and _denying_ implies infinite knowledge as\nthe ground of disproof.\"[256]\n\nThese extracts are sufficient to illustrate the peculiar character of\nthis popular form of Infidelity. It is not a philosophical system,\nalthough philosophical terms are often employed by its advocates; it\ndoes not even profess to solve, as the theory of Development does, any\nof the great problems of Nature. We shall offer a brief statement of its\ndistinctive peculiarities, as it is developed by Mr. Holyoake, and\nsuggest some considerations which should be seriously pondered by those\nwho may be tempted to exchange Christianity for Secularism.\n\n1. The theory of Secularism is a form, not of _dogmatic_, but of\n_skeptical_, Atheism; it is dogmatic only in _denying the sufficiency of\nthe evidence_ for the being and perfections of God. It does not deny, it\nonly does not believe, His existence. There may be a God\nnotwithstanding; there may even be sufficient evidence of His being,\nalthough some men cannot, or will not, see it. \"They do not deny the\nexistence of God, but only assert that they have not sufficient proof of\nHis existence.\"[257] \"The Non-theist takes this ground. He affirms that\nnatural reason has _not yet_ attained to (evidence of) Supernatural\nBeing. He does not deny that it _may do so_, because the capacity of\nnatural reason in the pursuit of evidence of Supernatural Being is not,\nso far as he is aware, fixed.\"--\"The power of reason is yet a growth. To\ndeny its power absolutely would be hazardous; and in the case of a\nspeculative question, not to admit that the opposite views may in some\nsense be tenable, is to assume your own infallibility,--a piece of\narrogance the public always punish by disbelieving you when you are in\nthe right.\"[258] Accordingly the thesis which Mr. Holyoake undertook to\nmaintain in public discussion was couched in these terms:--\"That we have\n_not sufficient evidence_ to believe in the existence of a Supreme Being\nindependent of Nature;\"[259] and so far from venturing to deny His\nexistence, he makes the important admission, that \"_denying implies\ninfinite knowledge as the ground of disproof_.\"\n\nIt is admitted, then, by the Secularist himself,--that there _may be_ a\nGod,--that there may be evidence of His existence,--that it may yet be\ndiscovered in the progress of natural reason,--and that to deny any one\nof these possibilities would be to assume \"infallibility,\" or to\narrogate \"infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof.\" Now, we humbly\nconceive that there is enough in these admissions, if not to disarm the\nSecular polemic, yet to shut up every seriously reflecting man, not,\nperhaps, to the instant recognition of a Divine Being, but certainly to\nthe duty of earnest, patient, and persevering inquiry. It was with this\nview that both Chalmers and Foster penned those powerful passages which\nseem to have left some impression on the mind even of Mr. Holyoake, not\nfor the purpose, as he seems to imagine, of confounding Atheism with\nAnti-theism, but for the very opposite purpose of discriminating between\nthe two, so as to show that, the one being impossible, the _other_ can\nafford no security against the possible truth of Religion. And every\nword of warning which they convey should tell with powerful effect on\nMr. Holyoake's conscience, after the admissions which he has\ndeliberately made, especially when he is engaged in the cheerless task\nof undermining the faith of multitudes in their \"Father which is in\nheaven.\"\n\nDr. Chalmers devotes a chapter of his \"Natural Theology\" to illustrate\n\"the duty which is laid upon men by the _possibility_ or even the\n_imagination_ of a God.\" He does not overlook, on the contrary he founds\nupon, the distinction between Skeptical and Dogmatic Atheism. \"Going\nback,\" he says, \"to the very earliest of our mental conceptions on this\nsubject, we advert first to the distinction, in point of real and\nlogical import, between unbelief and disbelief. There being no ground\nfor affirming that there is a God, is a different proposition from there\nbeing ground for affirming that there is no God.... The Atheist does not\nlabor to demonstrate that there is no God; but he labors to demonstrate\nthat there is no adequate proof of there being one. He does not\npositively affirm the position, that God is not; but he affirms the lack\nof evidence for the position, that God is. Judging from the tendency and\neffect of his arguments, an Atheist does not appear positively to refuse\nthat a God may be; but he insists that He has not discovered Himself,\nwhether by the utterance of His voice in audible revelation, or by the\nimpress of His hand upon visible nature. His verdict on the doctrine of\na God is only that it is not proven; it is not, that it is disproven. He\nis but an Atheist: he is not an Anti-theist.\"\n\nMr. Holyoake can scarcely fail to recognize in these words a correct and\ngraphic delineation of his own position and sentiments. Now, says Dr.\nChalmers, \"there is a certain _duteous_ movement which the mind _ought_\nto take, on the bare suggestion that a God _may be_.... The certainty of\nan actual God binds over to certain distinct and most undoubted\nproprieties. But so also may the imagination of a possible God; in which\ncase, the very idea of a God, even in its most hypothetical form, might\nlay a _responsibility even upon Atheists_.... The very idea of a God\nwill bring along with it an instant sense and recognition of the\nmoralities and duties that would be owing to Him. Should an actual God\nbe revealed, we clearly feel that there is a something which we _ought_\nto be and to do in regard to Him. But more than this: should a possible\nGod be imagined, there is a something not only which we feel that we\n_ought_, but there is a something which we actually ought to do or to\nbe, in consequence of our being visited by such an imagination.... To\nthis condition there attaches a most clear and incumbent morality. It is\nto go in quest of that unseen Benefactor, who, for aught I know, has\nushered me into existence, and spread so glorious a panorama around me.\nIt is to probe the secret of my being and my birth; and, if possible, to\nmake discovery whether it was indeed the hand of a Benefactor that\nbrought me forth from nonentity, and gave me place and entertainment in\nthat glowing territory which is lighted up with the hopes and happiness\nof living men. It is thus that _the very conception of a God throws a\nsolemn responsibility after it_.\"[260]\n\nIt is a dangerous mistake, then, to imagine either that we can ever know\n_that there is no God_, or that we can get rid of all responsibility by\nmerely _doubting_ His existence. Atheism, in so far as it is _dogmatic_,\nmust, in his own language, \"arrogate infinite knowledge as the ground of\ndisproof;\" and in so far as it is merely _skeptical_, it can afford no\nsecurity against the fears and forebodings which _doubt_ on such a\nsubject must necessarily awaken in every thoughtful mind. And this\nconsideration will become only the more solemn and impressive the longer\nwe reflect upon it. Mr. Holyoake, however, is far from being consistent\nin his various statements on this subject. For not content with saying,\n\"Most decidedly I believe that the present order of Nature is\ninsufficient to prove the existence of an intelligent Creator,\" he adds\nthat \"_no imaginable order_, that no contrivance, however mechanical,\nprecise, or clear, would be sufficient to prove it.\"[261] At one time he\ntells us that \"an increasing party respectfully and deferentially avow\ntheir inability to subscribe to the arguments supposed to establish the\nexistence of a Being distinct from Nature.\" At another, \"We have always\nheld that the existence of Deity is 'past finding out,' and we have held\nthat the time employed upon the investigation might more profitably be\ndevoted to the study of humanity.\" Again, \"That central point in all\nreligious belief--the existence of God--has not yet been approached in a\nfrank spirit. The very terms of the assertion are as _yet_ an enigma in\nlanguage, the fact is _yet_ a problem in philosophy; the world possesses\n_as yet_ no adequate logic for that province of our speculation which\nlies beyond our immediate experience.\"[262] \"Man must die to solve the\nproblem of Deity's existence.\"[263] \"The existence of God is a problem\nto which the mathematics of human intelligence _seems to me_ to furnish\nno solution,\"[264] \"a problem without a solution, a hieroglyphic without\nan interpretation, a gordian knot still untied, a question unanswered, a\nthread still unravelled, a labyrinth untrod.\"[265] That there is here a\nstrong expression of Skeptical Atheism is evident; but is there not\nsomething more? Does not Skeptical Atheism insensibly transform itself\ninto Dogmatic, when doubt respecting the sufficiency of the evidence is\ncombined with a denial of the possibility of any satisfactory proof, or\nof the capacity of the human mind to reach it, here or hereafter? Yet\nthe plea is the want of sufficient evidence now; and this plea is urged\nin connection with the admission that \"the power of reason is yet a\ngrowth,\" and that although \"it has not yet attained to evidence of\nSupernatural Being,\" the denial of it \"would imply infinite knowledge as\nthe ground of disproof.\" Mr. Holyoake does not deny that there _may be_\na God, distinct from Nature and superior to it; but he denies, first of\nall, the sufficiency of the evidence to which we appeal, embracing here\nthat form of Atheism which is merely skeptical; and he denies, secondly,\nthe possibility of any sufficient proof, for \"no imaginable order would\nbe sufficient,\" and the whole \"subject exceeds human comprehension,\"\nembracing, in this instance, that form of Atheism which is strictly\ndogmatic, if not in affirming that there is no God, yet in affirming\nthat it is impossible He can ever be known to exist. What then becomes\nof his cautious limitations,--\"The fact is _yet_ a problem in\nphilosophy.\"--\"The world possesses as _yet_ no adequate logic for that\nprovince of speculation\"--\"Men must die to solve the problem of Deity's\nexistence?\" Is it still a problem, and one, too, which may after all be\nsolved, and solved even in the affirmative? If it be, why may it not be\nsolved before death? or what _other_ evidence will there be after death?\nAnd as to the plea of insufficient evidence, what is its precise\nmeaning? Does it mean merely that it has hitherto failed to convince\nhimself and his associates? If so, how can he tell that it may not yet\nflash upon him with irresistible power, and that he too, like his former\nassociate, Mr. Knight, may be able to say, \"By the blessing of God, the\nexercise of those mental powers which He has bestowed upon me has led me\nto the conclusion that He exists. There is a God.\"[266] If it means more\nthan this, will he say that it is insufficient for others as well as for\nhim? But why, if others believe on the ground of that evidence, and if,\naccording to his favorite theory, belief is _the inevitable_ result of\nevidence? Is his belief, or theirs, the measure of truth? Does he not\nknow that multitudes have passed through the same dreary shade of\nunbelief in which he is still involved, and have afterwards emerged into\nthe clear light of faith, discovering what they now wonder they had\noverlooked before, and saying with heartfelt humility and gratitude,\n\"One thing I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see\"?[267] But what\nhas their belief, or his unbelief, to do with the great, the momentous\nfact? The truth, whatever it be, is independent of both: and it is the\n_truth_, and not our apprehensions of it, it is the _evidence_, and not\nour belief or doubt, that is the subject of inquiry. Will it be\naffirmed, then, either that the supposed existence of God is\nintrinsically incredible, and as such incapable of proof, or that the\nevidence is insufficient, in the sense of being illogical and\ninconclusive? This is the ultimate ground of atheistic unbelief, and\nhere the Skeptical unites and blends with the Dogmatic form of\nInfidelity.\n\nBut when driven to this last resort, and before taking up the position\nwhich it is concerned to defend, Secularism puts forth certain\npreliminary pleas, partly in the way of self-defence, and partly with\nthe view of exciting prejudice against the cause of Theism.[268] \"I make\nno pretence,\" says Mr. Holyoake, \"to account for everything. I do not\npretend to account for what I find in Nature. I do not feel called upon\nto account for it. I do not know that I am required to account for it.\"\n... \"A man will come to me and say, Can you account for this? Can you\naccount for that? Now he expects me to tell him all about everything,\njust as though I was present at the beginning of Nature, and knew all\nits manifestations. If I cannot do it, he will not admit my plea of\nignorance;--he will not admit the propriety of my saying, I do not\nknow.\" He is not bound to explain either the past or the future: \"What\nwent before and what will follow me I regard as two black impenetrable\ncurtains, which hang down at the two extremities of human life, and\nwhich no living man has yet drawn aside.... A deep silence reigns behind\nthis curtain; no one once within will answer those he has left without;\nall you can hear is a hollow echo of your question, as if you shouted\ninto a chasm.\"[269] And can a mind that is capable of writing thus be\ncontent to discard Religion from his thoughts on the sorry pretext that\nhe is not bound to account for the phenomena of Nature? One would expect\nat least a thoughtful, serious, and earnest spirit, even were it a\nspirit of doubt, in one surrounded with such solemn mysteries, gazing on\nthese black impenetrable curtains, listening to the hollow echo from\nthat awful chasm: nay, that seriousness might be expected to deepen into\nsadness, too intensely real to be soothed by the plea of ignorance, or\nassuaged otherwise than by the light of truth. But to say, \"I do not\npretend to account for what I find in Nature,\" what is this but to\ndiscard the whole question, to give it up as one insoluble, at least _by\nhim_, and to leave to others the problems which have ever exercised the\nnoblest and most gifted minds? Mr. Holyoake is not bound, indeed, to\nexplain everything, and he mistakes if he supposes that any one expects\nthis at his hand. There are many subjects on which even a man of science\nmust ingenuously confess his ignorance, and many more so little\nconnected with the interests and duties of life as to have only a very\nslight claim on his interest and attention. But Religion is not one of\nthese: it is so closely related to the welfare and the duty of men, and\nhas such a direct bearing on the conscience, that it demands and\ndeserves the serious attention of all; and no one who undertakes to\ninstruct his fellow-men, and especially when he attempts to overthrow\ntheir most sacred convictions, is entitled to turn round and say, \"I do\nnot pretend to account for what I find in Nature.\" He is bound to give\nsome intelligible answer to the question, What is the cause of these\nmarvellous phenomena which I behold? and what is the ground of that\nreligious belief which has always prevailed in the world?\n\nBut Mr. Holyoake is deterred from any attempt to answer such questions\nby its amazing presumption: \"The assumption is,--we may look through\nNature up to Nature's God. That seems to me to imply a power, a\ncapacity, an endowment, which repels me at the outset. If we are to deal\nwith the common sense of probability, I say I am repelled by the amazing\nprobability which is against me if I am to deal with the assumption of\ndistinctness,--that I can look from Nature up to Nature's God. Why, in\nthe presence of this shadowy form of things, before which all men stand\nin awe and dread, in the presence of so many mysteries and marvels which\nart is unable to unravel, which philosophy is unable to explain, it\nseems to me an immense endowment when a man can say with confidence, I\nlook through Nature, and beyond Nature, up to Nature's God. I say the\npresumption of the thing does repel me.\"--\"Let the profound sense of our\nown littleness, which here creeps in upon us, check the dogmatic spirit\nand arrest the presumptuous world; we stand in the great presence of\nNature, whose inspiration should be that of modesty, humility, and\nlove.\"--\"When my friend talks so much about matter, ... his reasoning\nproceeds upon this very great hypothesis, namely, that _he knows_ all\nthat matter can do, and all that it cannot do. If he does not know that,\nI wonder by what right he says so plainly that the wonders he observes\nin Nature are not the work of Nature, but of some Being above Nature.\nThat which repels me from that aspect of the argument is its amazing\npresumption, the amount of knowledge it implies.\"[270] Foster's argument\nagainst Dogmatic Atheism seems to have made some impression on Mr.\nHolyoake, since he makes the important admission that \"the denial of a\nGod implies infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof,\" but it is\nhere retorted against Dogmatic Theism; and Unbelief, at other times so\narrogant in its pretensions, so confident in the powers of reason, and\nso proud of the prerogatives of man, borrows the cloak of modesty from\nthe wardrobe of true science, and assumes an attitude of deep humility.\nAt other times Mr. Holyoake does not scruple to sit in judgment on what\nGod,--supposing such a Being to exist,--could or could not do; on what\nHe could or could not permit to be done;--He could not create a moral\nand responsible agent, and leave him to fall; He could not require or\nreceive any satisfaction for sin; He could not hear or answer the\nprayers of his people; He could not inflict penal suffering, or allow it\nto be permanent. There is no presumption, it would seem, in determining\nwhat God could or could not do; but \"when we stand in the great presence\nof Nature,\" her inspiration should be \"that of modesty and humility.\"\nBut presumption does not consist in looking at what we can see, or\naiming to know what may be known; and it is a bastard humility, not the\ntrue modesty of science, which would turn away from the contemplation of\nany truth, however sublime, that is exhibited in the light of its\nappropriate evidence. We are not concerned to deny that it is \"a great\nendowment\" which enables men to discern in Nature a manifestation of\nGod; it is a great endowment, but not too great for the mind of man, if\nhe was made in \"the image and likeness of God;\" a small mirror may\nreflect the sun. Is it presumptuous in the mind of man to scale the\nheavens, and trace the planets in their course, and calculate their\ndistances, their orbits, and their motions in the illimitable fields of\nspace? And if the sublime truths of Astronomy are not interdicted to our\nfaculties, simply because there is a natural evidence in the light of\nwhich they may be clearly discerned, why should it be presumptuous to\nlook from Nature up to Nature's God, if in Nature we behold a mirror in\nwhich His perfections are displayed? If there be presumption on either\nside, does it not lie rather with those who virtually deny _the power of\nGod to make Himself known_,--His power to create a world capable of\nexhibiting His perfections, and a mind adapted to that world capable of\ndiscerning the perfections which are therein displayed? There might be\nmodesty, there might be humility in the ingenuous confession of\nignorance, saying, \"I do not know;\" but there can be neither in the\nconfidence which affirms that \"no imaginable order would be sufficient\"\nto prove the existence of God, for what is this but to say that \"he\nknows all that matter _can_ do, and all that it _cannot_ do,\" or be made\nto do?\n\n2. Secularism admits the existence of a self-existent and eternal\nBeing, and thereby recognizes the fundamental law of _Causality_ on\nwhich the Theistic proof depends, while it forces upon us the question\nwhether these attributes should be ascribed to Nature or to God.\n\n\"I am driven,\" says Mr. Holyoake, \"to the conclusion that the great\naggregate of matter which we call 'nature' is eternal, because we are\nunable to conceive a state of things when nothing was. There must always\nhave been something, or there could be nothing now. This the dullest\nfeel. Hence we arrive at the idea of the eternity of matter. And in the\n_eternity_ of matter we are assured of the self-existence of matter, and\nself-existence is the most _majestic of attributes_, and _includes all\nothers_.\"[271] \"If Natural Theologians were content to stop where they\nprove a _superior something_ to exist, Atheists might be content to stop\nthere too, and allow Theologians to dream in quiet over their barren\nfoundling.\"[272] \"If I supposed that the Christian meant no more than\nthat something exists independently of Nature, that it may be boundless,\nthat it may be limited, that it may be one, that it may be many beings,\nif I supposed nothing more than that was meant, then surely I would not\noccupy your time or my own in discussing a question so barren of\npractical consequences.\"--\"If we reason about it, unless we take refuge\nin the idea of a creation which we cannot understand, we must come to\nthe conclusion that _Nature is self-existent_, and that attribute is so\nmajestic,--the power of being independent of any ruler,--the power of\nbeing independent of the law of other beings,--seems so majestic as\nfairly to be supposed to _include all others_; for that which has power\n_to be_ has power _to act_, for the power to be is the most majestic of\nall forms of action.\"[273]\n\nIt is here admitted that there must be a self-existent, independent,\nand eternal Being, that self-existence is an attribute so majestic that\nit may be fairly said to include all others, that the Being to whom it\nbelongs is exempt from the conditions of other beings, and that the\npower _to act_ is involved in the power _to be_. It is assumed, indeed,\nthat these attributes may belong to Nature, and that Nature is mere\nmatter; but, reserving this point for the present, are we not warranted\nin saying that his doctrine, as stated by himself, involves the same\nprofound mysteries, and is embarrassed by the same difficulties, which\nare often urged as objections to the theory of Religion, and that it is,\nat the very least, as _incomprehensible_, as the doctrine which affirms\nthe existence of God? Suppose there were simply an equality in this\nrespect between the Theistic and Atheistic hypothesis, that both were\nalike incomprehensible and incapable of an adequate explanation, still\nthe former might be more credible and more satisfactory to reason than\nthe latter, since in the one we have an intelligent and designing Cause,\nsuch as accounts for the existence of other minds and the manifold marks\nof design in Nature, whereas in the other all the phenomena of thought,\nand feeling, and volition, as well as all the instances of skilful\nadjustment and adaptation, must be resolved into the power of\nself-existent, but unintelligent and unconscious matter.\n\nFurther it is admitted, not only that we may, but that we _must_,\nproceed on the principle of Causality, the fundamental axiom of\nTheology; for \"there _must_ always have been something, or there _could\nbe_ nothing now.\" This principle or law of human thought leads him up to\na region which far transcends his present sensible experience, and\nguides him to the stupendous height of self-existent and eternal Being.\nIt is assumed and applied to prove the self-existence and eternity of\nmatter. But if it be a valid principle of reason, its application may be\nequally legitimate when it is employed, in conjunction with the manifest\nevidence of _moral_ as distinct from _physical_ causation, to prove the\nself-existence and eternity of a supreme intelligent Cause. A principle\nsuch as this cannot, from its very nature, be limited within the range\nof our present sensible experience. We are told, indeed, that \"if we\nlook over the nature of our own impressions, we find we always shall\nbegin with things which lie below reason, with things plainer than\nreason, with things which need no demonstration. Such is the nature of\nthe human mind, that we all begin in this sphere of equal knowledge, we\nbegin under the dominion of the senses, and whatever comes within that\nwants no demonstration, wants no proof, wants no logic; it is the\nconstant, it is the most indubitable, it is the most indisputable of all\nour knowledge. And if the question of the being of a God came within\nthat sphere, if it was found amongst those indisputable truths, if it\nwas found to be a matter of sense, then there would be no occasion for\nus to reason at all about it: it could not be a matter of controversy,\nbecause it never would be a matter of dispute.\"[274] Certain first\nprinciples of reason are admitted, but only, it would seem, with\nreference to matters of sense; but why, if there be such a principle of\nreason as compels the Atheist himself to acknowledge a Self-existent and\nEternal Being? Is this a matter of sense? Is it not a conclusion of\nreason,--founded, no doubt, on present sensible experience, but far\ntranscending it,--and yet self-evident and irresistible as intuition\nitself? And if reason may thus rise from the contingent and variable to\nthe conception and belief of the self-existent and eternal, why may it\nnot be equally valid as a proof of a supreme, intelligent First Cause?\n\nSpeaking of Nature as self-existent and eternal, Mr. Holyoake ascribes\nsuch attributes to it as might seem to imply a leaning towards\nPantheism, rather than the colder form of mere material Atheism. \"It\nseems to me,\" he says, \"that Nature and God are one; in other words,\nthat the God whom we seek is the Nature whom we know.\" But he afterwards\nstates, with clearness and precision, in what respects Secularism\naccords with, and differs from, Pantheism: \"The term, God, seems to me\ninapplicable to Nature. In the mouth of the Theist, God signifies an\nentity, spiritual and percipient, distinct from matter. With Pantheists,\nthe term God signifies the aggregate of Nature,--but Nature as _a being,\nintelligent and conscious_. It is my inability to subscribe to either of\nthese views which constitutes me an Atheist. I cannot rank myself with\nthe Theists, because I can conceive of nothing beyond Nature, distinct\nfrom it, and above it.... The Theist, therefore, I leave; but while I go\nwith the Pantheist so far as to accept the fact of Nature in the\nplenitude of its diverse, illimitable, and transcendent manifestations,\nI cannot go further and predicate with the Pantheist _the unity of its\nintelligence and consciousness_!\"[275] He holds, therefore, that\nself-existence is an attribute of Nature, that this attribute is so\nmajestic that it may be fairly held to include _all others_, and that,\nwhile intelligence and consciousness exist, he cannot affirm their\n_unity_ in Nature, or regard \"Nature as a being, intelligent and\nconscious.\" Whence it follows that he can give no other account of the\nliving, intelligent, active, and responsible beings which inhabit the\nworld, than that they came into existence, he knows not how, and that\nthey have the ultimate ground of their existence in a necessary,\nunderived, and eternal being, which is neither intelligent nor\nself-conscious!\n\n3. Secularism seeks to invalidate the proof from _marks of design_ in\nNature by attempting to show, either that it is _merely analogical_, and\ncan, therefore, afford no certainty, or that, if it were certain, it\ncould prove nothing, because, by an extension of the same principle, it\nmust prove too much.\n\nSuch is the pith and substance of Mr. Holyoake's argument in his\nsingular pamphlet entitled, \"Paley refuted in his own Words.\" He first\nof all endeavors to invalidate the proof from design by assuming that it\nis a mere argument from _analogy_, and that at the best analogy can\nafford no ground of _certainty_, although it may possibly suggest a\n_probable conjecture_: \"It may be said that _analogy_ fails to find out\nGod, and this must be admitted, it being no more than was to be\nexpected. The God of Theology being infinite, it is no subject for\nanalogy.... No conceivable analogy can prove a creation. Creation is\nwithout an analogy.... No analogy can prove creation, because no analogy\ncan prove what it does not contain, namely, an example of\ncreation.\"[276] \"Analogy, the specious precursor of reason, would\nsuggest the personality of the powers which awed and cheered man. Reason\nsends us to facts as the only positive grounds of positive conclusions;\nbut in the childhood of intellect and experience, _likelihood_ is\nmistaken for _certainty_, and _probability_ for _fact_. In the disturbed\nreflection of man's image on the wall, as it were, of the universe,\narose the idea of God.\" ... \"I say, if that is all you mean by your\nargument, that it is _merely a matter of analogy_, if it is only a\nmatter of partial resemblance, I say you can get from it no complete\nproof; that if you merely found it upon partial resemblance, there is no\ndemonstration there whatever, and your cause is no better, no sounder\nthan I have before described it,--as being merely _your conjecture_\nabout a Being independent of Nature; it is merely a conjecture, merely a\nsuggestion, just like my own conjecture, just like my own suggestion\nabout Nature being that one great Being about which we are all\nconcerned.\"[277]\n\nBut not content with assailing _analogy_ as incapable of leading to any\n_certain_ conclusion, he changes his tactics, and seems at least to do\nhomage to it, while he insists only on its _extension_. \"The argument of\n_design_,\" he says, \"is unquestionably the most popular ever developed,\nand the most seductive ever displayed. It has the rare merit of making\nthe existence of God, which is the most subtle of all problems, appear a\nmere truism,--and the proofs of such existence, which have puzzled the\nwisest of human heads, seem self-evident.\" This tribute, however, must\nbe read in the light of his chosen motto,--\"The existence of a watch\nproves the existence of a watch-maker; a picture indicates a painter; a\nhouse announces an architect. See here are arguments of terrible force\nfor children.\"[278] \"I took up,\" he says, \"Dr. Paley's book, ... and I\nagreed with myself to admit, as I read, whatever appeared plausible. I\ndid so, and my objection to my author was this: Upon the grounds of\nanalogy and experience I found Paley insisted that design implies a\ndesigner, that this designer must be a person, and that this person is\nGod: but the analogy which had been the guide to his feet, and the\nexperience which had been a lamp to his path, were suddenly abandoned,\nand at the very moment when their assistance seemed to promise curious\nrevelations.\"--\"Two modes of refutation are open; to attack the\n_principle_, or pursue the _analogy_. Geoffroy St. Hilaire has taken one\ncourse. I take the other. If, in the investigation of this question, it\nbe legitimate to employ analogy in one part, it must be legitimate to\nemploy it in like respects in another.... Analogy was Paley's alpha, it\nmust be made also his omega.\"[279] In pursuing this course, he makes\nlarge concessions, such as might seem at first sight to involve the very\nprinciples on which the Theistic proof depends. \"That design implies a\ndesigner, I am disposed to allow; and that this designer must be a\nperson, I am quite inclined to admit. Thus far goes Paley, and thus far\nI go with him.... His general position, that design proves a personal\ndesigner, is so _natural_, so _easy_, and so _plausible_, that it\ninvites one to admit it, to see where it will lead, and what it will\nprove.\"--\"Paley tells us that God is a person. He insists upon it as a\nlegitimate inference from his premises, nor _would it be easy to disturb\nhis conclusion_.... From Paley's premises, it is the clearest of all\ninferences. Design must have a designer, because whatever we know of\ndesigners has taught us that a designer is a person. All analogy is in\nfavor of this inference. This is Paley's reasoning upon the subject, and\nit is too _natural_, too _rigid_, and too _cogent_ to be escaped\nfrom.\"[280] Here we have an _apparent_ admission of the principle on\nwhich the argument of _design_ is based, but it is _apparent_ only, and\nis afterwards withdrawn. It was used to serve a temporary purpose, and\nas soon as that purpose was served, it was thrown aside, although it had\nbeen described as \"so natural, so easy, and so plausible, that it\ninvites one to admit it,\" as \"too _natural_, too _rigid_, and too\n_cogent_ to be escaped from.\" \"When I made the admission, I was going in\nthe footsteps of Paley, and adopting his own phraseology: then I came to\nthe conclusion to see whether it was right, and then _I gave it up_;\nwhen I found it led me to a contrary result, then I gave it up; what I\nsupposed to be _design_ in the opening of my argument is _no longer\ndesign_. My reverend friend is wrong in supposing that _I admit design_,\nand yet refuse to admit the force of the _design argument_.\"[281] And\nwhat is the reason which now induces him to deny the existence of\n_design_ in Nature, and to withdraw all the admissions he had previously\nmade? Why, simply because he conceives that, by a legitimate extension\nof the same analogy, the design argument may be pushed to a _reductio ad\nabsurdum_, so as to prove first the existence of an _organized person_,\n\"an animal God,\" and, secondly, an infinite series of such organized\npersons, since one such must necessarily presuppose another, and that\nagain another, and so on _in infinitum_. For there are two stages in his\nextension of the analogy. In the first, it is extended so far as to show\nthat the person to whom design is ascribed must necessarily be an\norganized Being: in the _second_, it is still further extended, so as to\nshow that, being organized, that person must also have had a designer or\nmaker, since organization is held to imply design, and design to imply a\ndesigner. And thus the analogy, when extended, does not lead up to one\nSupreme Mind, the Infinite and Eternal Creator of all things, but to an\norganized being, himself exhibiting marks of design in his organization,\nand requiring therefore, like every organism, a prior cause, and, by\nparity of reason, an eternal succession or infinite series of such\ncauses.\n\nThe following extracts will place the progressive steps of his argument\nin a clear, if not convincing light: \"By reasoning from analogy, Paley\ninfers that there is a personal, intelligent being, the author of all\ndesign, whom he christens Deity. But what kind of a person is a Deity?\nIf a person, is it organized like a person? Whence came it? How did it\noriginate? Was it formed, as it is said to have formed us?... I ask, has\nthe person of Deity an organization? because, if it be unreasonable to\nsuppose design without a designer, it is surely as unreasonable to\nsuppose a person without an organization, to the full contradiction of\nall analogy and all experience.\" ... \"Every person is organized. No\nperson was ever known without an organization. The term person implies\nit. All analogy, all experience are in favor of this truth. This is so\nplain as to be admitted almost before it is stated.... No person ever\nknew of consciousness separate from an organization in which it was\nproduced. No man ever knew of thought distinct from an organization in\nwhich it was generated.... Shelley says that 'Intelligence is only\nknown to us as a mode of _animal being_.' ... We have great\nauthority,--the authority of universal and uncontradicted\nexperience,--for limiting the properties of mind to organization.... If\nintelligence is without an organization, design may be without a\ndesigner; because there are the same experience and analogy to support\nthe organization, as there are to support the design argument.\"[282]\n\nBut \"organization proves _contrivance_.... If, then, every known\norganization is redolent with contrivance, and teems with marks of\ndesign, by what analogy can we conclude that _Deity's organization_ is\ndevoid of these properties?\"--\"Shelley thus states the case,--'From the\nfitness of the universe to its end, you infer the necessity of an\nintelligent Creator. But if the fitness of the universe to produce\ncertain effects be thus conspicuous and evident, how much more exquisite\nfitness to this end must exist in the author of this universe!... how\nmuch more clearly must we perceive the necessity of this very Creator's\ncreation, whose perfections comprehend an _arrangement_ far more\naccurate and just! The belief of an infinity of creative and created\ngods, each more eminently requiring an intelligent author of his being\nthan the foregoing, is a direct consequence of the premises.'\"--\"Hence\nfrom design, designers, and persons, we have stepped to organization and\ncontrivance, and arrive at a contriver again.\"[283]\n\nSuch is the outline of his argument. He seems to think that if there be\nany flaw in it, the only assailable point must be his _extension of the\nanalogy_: \"In the chain of analogies which Paley commenced, and which I\nhave continued, I believe there is no defective link. The principle of\nassailment, if any, is the _extension_ of the analogies beyond the Paley\npoint.... With the extension commences my responsibility. He who proves\nan irrelevancy in it answers my book.\" This is, no doubt, a vulnerable\npoint, but we venture to think that it is not the only one. His whole\nreasoning seems to proceed on an unsound view of the nature and\nconditions of the argument, and is radically defective in at least\n_three_ respects.\n\nIt is not correct to say that the argument of design, is _a mere\nargument from analogy_. Were it so, it might, like many another process\nof mere analogical reasoning, yield no more than a probable conclusion\nor a plausible conjecture. But in the case before us, the conclusion is\nstrictly and properly an _inductive inference_. It may be suggested by\nthe perception of _analogy_, but it is founded on the principle of\n_causality_. It is capable, therefore, of yielding, not a mere\n_probability_, but an absolute _certainty_. The fact that analogy is so\nfar concerned in the process cannot weaken a conclusion which rests\nultimately on a fundamental law of reason, the ground-principle of all\ninduction. It is true, no doubt, that were we destitute of the conscious\npossession of intelligence, will, and design, we should be utterly\nincapable of forming these conceptions, or applying them to the\ninterpretation of Nature; and in a loose sense, it may be said that we\nare guided by the analogy of our own experience to the belief in an\nintelligent First Cause; but mere analogy would not produce that belief\nwithout the great law of causality, which demands an adequate cause for\nevery effect, nor is this law deprived of its necessary and absolute\ncertainty merely because it comes into action along with, and is\nstimulated by, the perception of obvious analogies. Is it not equally\ntrue, that it is only by our own mental consciousness that we are\nqualified to conceive of other minds, and that we are, to a certain\nextent, guided by analogy to the belief that our fellow-men are\npossessed, like ourselves, of intelligence and design? But who would say\nthat this conclusion is no more than a _probable_ conjecture, or that,\ndepending as it does in part on the analogy of our own experience, it\ncannot yield absolute certainty? In so far as it is _merely_ analogical,\nit might be only more or less probable; but being founded also on the\nlaw of causality, it is an inductive inference, and, as such, one of the\nmost certain convictions of the human mind.\n\nAnd so the argument derived from marks of design in Nature may be stated\nin one or other of two ways:--it may be stated _analogically_ or\n_inductively_. The difference between analogy and induction, which is\nnot always duly considered, should be carefully marked. Analogy proceeds\non _partial_, induction on _perfect_ resemblance. The former marks a\nresemblance or agreement _in some respects_ between things which differ\n_in other respects_: the latter requires a strict and entire similarity\n_in those respects_ on which the inductive inference depends. The one by\nitself may only yield a _probable_ conjecture, but the other, when\ncombined with it, may produce a _certain_ conviction. Accordingly the\ndesign argument may be thrown either into the _analogical_ or the\n_inductive_ form. Stated _analogically_, it stands thus: \"There is an\nascertained partial resemblance between organs seen in art and organs\nseen in nature; as, for instance, between the telescope and the eye.\n\n\"It is probable from analogy that there is in some further respect a\npartial resemblance between organs seen in art and organs seen in\nnature: in art the telescope has been produced by a _contriver_, analogy\nmakes it probable that in nature the eye also will have been produced by\na _contriver_.\"\n\nBut stated inductively, it stands thus: \"If there be in nature the\nmanifestation of supernatural contrivance, there _must_ exist a\nsupernatural contriver.\n\n\"There is in nature the manifestation of supernatural contrivance.\n\n\"Therefore a supernatural contriver,--God,--must exist.\"[284]\n\nCombine the perfection of analogy with the principle of causality, and\nyou have not only the _verisimilitude_ or _likelihood_ which prepares\nthe way for belief, but also a positive proof resting on a fundamental\nlaw of reason. The inference of intelligence from marks of design in\nnature is not one of analogy, but of strict and proper _induction_; and\naccordingly we must either deny that there are marks of _design_ in\nnature, thereby discarding the _analogy_, or do violence to our own\nreason by resisting the fundamental law of causality, thereby discarding\nthe inductive inference. And of these two unavoidable alternatives, Mr.\nHolyoake seems to prefer the former: he will venture to deny the\nexistence of design in nature, rather than admit the existence of design\nand resist the inevitable inference of a designing cause; for he is\ncompelled in the long run to come round to this desperate confession,\n\"What I supposed to be _design_ in the opening of my argument is _no\nlonger design_. My reverend friend is wrong in supposing that I _admit\ndesign_, and yet refuse to admit the force of the _design argument_.\"\n\nBut if he mistakes the general nature and conditions of the argument\nwhen he speaks of it as if it were a mere argument from analogy, his\n_extension of the analogy_, and the reasonings founded on it, are\nequally unjustifiable and inconclusive. He forgets that analogy proceeds\non a partial resemblance in _some respects_, between things which differ\n_in other respects_, and that even induction itself requires a perfect\nresemblance only _in those respects_ on which the inference depends.\nThere may be such a resemblance between the marks of design in nature\nand in art as to warrant the inference of a contriver in both; and yet\n_in other respects_ there may be a dissimilarity which cannot in the\nleast affect the validity or the certainty of that inference. It is only\nwhen we _extend the analogy_ beyond the inductive point, that the\nconclusion becomes, in some cases, merely probable, in others altogether\ndoubtful. If we advance a step further than we are warranted to go by\nobvious and certain analogies, our conclusions must be purely\nconjectural, and cannot be accepted as inductive inferences. From what\nwe know of this world, and of God's design in it to make Himself known\nto His intelligent creatures, we may infer, with some measure of\nprobability, that other worlds may also be inhabited by beings capable,\nlike ourselves, of admiring His works, and adoring His infinite\nperfections; but if we go further, and infer either that all these\nworlds must _now_ be inhabited, or that the inhabitants must be _in all\nrespects_ constituted as we are, we pass far beyond the point to which\nour knowledge extends, and enter on the region of mere conjecture. And\nso when Mr. Holyoake extends the analogy, so as to include not only the\nmarks of design, on which the inductive inference rests, but also the\nforms of organization, with which in the case of man, intelligence is at\npresented associated, although not identified, he goes beyond the point\nat which analogy and induction combine to give a _certain_ conclusion,\nand introduces a conjectural element, which may well render his own\ninferences extremely doubtful, but which can have no effect in weakening\nthe grounds of our confidence in the fundamental law, which demands an\nadequate cause for the marks of design in nature.\n\nMr. Ferrier has shown that \"the senses are only _contingent conditions_\nof knowledge; in other words, it is possible that intelligences\ndifferent from the human (supposing that there are such) should\napprehend things under other laws, or in other ways, than those of\nseeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling; or more shortly, _our_\nsenses are not laws of cognition or modes of apprehension which are\nbinding on intelligence necessarily and universally.\"--\"A contingent law\nof knowledge\" is defined as \"one which, although complied with in\ncertain cases in the attainment of knowledge, is not enforced by reason\nas a condition which _must_ be complied with wherever knowledge is to\ntake place. Knowledge is thus possible under other conditions than the\ncontingent laws to which certain intelligences may be subject; in other\nwords, there is no contradiction in affirming that an intelligent being\nmay have knowledge of some kind or other without having such senses as\nwe have.\"[285]\n\nThe application of analogy as a principle of judgment is subject to\ncertain well-known limitations, which cannot be disregarded without\nserious risk of error. They are well stated by Dr. Hampden: \"There are\ntwo requisites in order to every analogical argument:--1. That the two,\nor several particulars concerned in the argument should be known to\nagree in some one point; for otherwise they could not be referable to\nany one class, and there would consequently be no basis to the\nsubsequent inference drawn in the conclusion. 2. That the conclusion\nmust be modified by a reference to the circumstances of the particular\n_to_ which we argue. For herein consists _the essential distinction\nbetween an analogical and an inductive argument_. Since, in an inductive\nargument, we draw a general conclusion, we have no concern with the\ncircumstantial peculiarity of individual instances, but simply with\ntheir abstract agreement. Whereas, on the contrary, in an analogical\nargument, we draw a particular conclusion, we must enter into a\nconsideration of the circumstantial peculiarity of the individual\ninstance, in order to exhibit the conclusion in that particular form\nwhich we would infer. Whence it follows, that whilst by induction we\nobtain absolute conclusions, by analogy we can only arrive at relative\nconclusions, or such as depend for their absolute and entire validity on\nthe coincidence of _all_ the circumstances of the particular inferred\nwith those of the particular from which the inference is drawn.\" Again:\n\"The circumstances _to_ which we reason may be considered of threefold\ncharacter. They are either known or unknown. If they are known, they are\neither (1.) Such as we have no reason to think different, in any respect\nfrom those under which our observations have been made; or (2.) Such as\ndiffer in certain _known_ respects from these last. (3.) They are\nunknown, where we reason concerning truths of which, from the state of\nour present knowledge, from the nature of our faculties, or from the\naccident of our situation as sojourners upon earth, we are totally\nignorant.\"[286]\n\nWith these necessary limitations, suggested by the different\ncircumstances in which analogy is applied, we shall have little\ndifficulty in disposing of Mr. Holyoake's _extension_ of Dr. Paley's\nargument. Not content with resemblance _in some respects_, he requires a\nsameness _in all_. He would exclude all dissimilarity, forgetting that\nanalogy denotes a certain relation between two or more things which in\nother respects may be entirely different. We may see a resemblance\nbetween the marks of design in nature and the ordinary effects of design\nin art; and that perception of design gives rise to an intuitive\nconviction or inductive inference of a designing cause: thus far we\nproceed under the guidance of analogy, but on the sure ground of\ninduction. If we go beyond this, and insist that the designing cause\nmust be _in all respects_ like ourselves, that if we be organized, He\nmust be organized, that if we act by material organs He must act by the\nsame, we exceed the limits of legitimate reasoning, and enter on the\nregion of pure conjecture. But such conjectures, groundless as they are,\nand revolting as every one must feel them to be, can have no effect in\nshaking our confidence in the valid induction by which we infer from\nmarks of _design_ in nature the existence of a designing Cause.\n\nIt can scarcely be necessary to enlarge on the gratuitous assumptions on\nwhich this _extension_ of the argument is made to rest;--such as that\n\"every person is organized,\" that \"all power is a mere attribute of\nmatter,\" that \"no man ever knew of thought distinct from an organization\nin which it was _generated_.\" The only fragment of truth that can be\ndetected in these assumptions is the fact that we have, in our present\nstate, no experience of intelligence apart from the organization with\nwhich it is here associated: but will this warrant the inference that\nintelligence _cannot_ exist apart from organization, or that the one is\nthe mere product of the other? It may be a good and valid inference from\nthe marks of design in nature, that a designing cause must exist; for\nthis inference, although suggested by analogy, is founded on induction,\nwhich requires a perfect resemblance only _in those respects_ on which\nthe inference depends. But to go beyond this, and to insist that the\ndesigning cause must be organized, because we have _no experience_ of\nintelligence apart from organization, is to make our experience the\nmeasure of possible being, and to exclude, surely on very insufficient\ngrounds, all notion of purely spiritual personality. In \"extending the\nanalogy beyond the Paley point,\" Mr. Holyoake is arguing from the\nparticular case of man to another case, which resembles it in some\nrespects, but may differ from it in others; and similar as they are in\nthe one point of living, designing intelligence, they may, for aught he\nknows, differ in many other respects. And this we hold to be a\nsufficient answer to his argument, especially when it is combined with\nthe consideration that the assumptions on which that argument is based\nare purely gratuitous, namely, that \"every person is organized,\" and\nthat there is no \"thought distinct from an organization in which it is\n_generated_.\" By these assumptions, his theory connects itself with the\ngrossest Materialism; and that subject has been sufficiently discussed\nin a separate chapter.\n\nBut in truth we regard the whole discussion on organization as a huge\nand unnecessary excrescence on his argument, for he would have come to\nhis point quite as effectually, and much more directly, had he said\nnothing at all about an organized being, and insisted merely on one,\nwhether material or spiritual, possessing powers of intelligence,\ncontrivance, and design; for it is evidently on the existence of such a\nbeing, and not on the arrangements or adaptations of his organic parts,\nthat his main argument depends, namely, that such a being implies also a\ncontriver, and that again another, and so on in an endless series.\nWhatever force belongs to his argument lies here: it consists, not in\nthe evidence of design arising from material organization, but in the\nnecessity of a cause adequate to account for a being possessing\nintelligence, purpose, and will. The existence of an endless series of\nsuch beings is impossible, and the supposition of it is absurd; and Mr.\nHolyoake himself admits a self-existent, underived, and eternal\nBeing,--a being exempt, therefore, from all the conditions of time and\ncausality to which others are subject,--while he ascribes the origin of\nintelligent, self-conscious beings to Nature, which is \"neither\nintelligent nor self-conscious,\" rather than to God, the father of\nspirits, Himself a Spirit, infinite, omniscient, and almighty. He\nascribes the existence of intelligent, self-conscious, personal moral\nagents to a power called _Nature_, which he cannot venture to call \"a\nperson,\" nor even \"an animal being,\" and of which he \"cannot predicate\nwith the Pantheist the unity of its intelligence and consciousness.\" His\ntheory, in so far as it is intelligible, seems to have a stronger\naffinity with Pantheism than he appears to suppose. Were he to define\nthe meaning of the word Nature,--a word so often used in a vague,\nindefinite sense,[287]--he would find that his idea bears a close\nresemblance to that of the German school,[288] who speak of the first\nbeing as the _Indifference of the different_,--a certain vague,\nundetermined, inexplicable entity, possessing no distinctive character\nor peculiar attributes, whose existence is necessary, but not as a\nliving, self-conscious, and active being, while it is the cause of all\nlife and intelligence and activity in the universe; in short, a mere\nabstraction of the human mind. To some such cause, if it can be called a\ncause, Mr. Holyoake ascribes all the phenomena of the universe; or he\nleaves them utterly unaccounted for, and takes refuge in an eternal\nseries of derived and dependent beings, without attempting to assign any\nreason for their existence. He undertakes to account for nothing. He\nleaves the great problem unsolved, and discards it as insoluble. \"Mr.\nHarrison demanded of me, where the first man came from? I said, I did\nnot know; I was not in the secrets of Nature.\" \"I cannot accept, says\none, the theory of progressive development, it is so intricate and\nunsatisfying.\" \"If something must be self-existent and eternal, says\nanother, why may not matter and all its properties be that something?\"\n\"The Atheist holds that the universe is an endless series of causes and\neffects _ad infinitum_, and therefore the idea of a _first_ cause is an\nabsurdity and a contradiction.\"[289] In short, the eternity of the world\nis assumed, the origin of new races is left unexplained, and no account\nwhatever is given of the order which everywhere exists in Nature. In the\nlast resort, he takes refuge in the plea of _ignorance_. His only answer\nis, \"I do not know, I am not in the secrets of Nature.\"\n\nBut how does his extension of Paley's argument justify the position\nwhich he now assumes? Or how can it invalidate the admissions which he\nhad previously made? That extension of the argument, even were it\nsupposed to be legitimate, amounts simply to this, that a designer must\nbe an organized being, and, as such, must have had a cause. But what\nanalogy suggests, or what law of reason requires, an _infinite series_\nof such causes? And what is there in this extension of the argument that\nshould exclude the idea of a First Cause? It is thought, indeed, that by\nconnecting intelligence with organization, we may succeed at least in\nexcluding His infinity, His omnipresence, and other attributes which are\nascribed to the Most High: but the main stress of the argument rests not\non the fact of organization, but on the supposed necessity of _an\nendless series_ of contrivers to account for the existence of any one\nintelligent being, whether organized or not is of little moment. Now,\nthis is a mere assumption, an assumption entirely destitute of proof, an\nassumption which is not necessarily involved even in the proposed\nextension of the analogy: for all that the analogy, however extended,\ncan possibly require is a cause adequate to the production of designing\nminds, and that cause may be a self-existent, underived, and eternal\nBeing. Let the analogy be extended ever so far, it must reach a point at\nwhich we are compelled, by the fundamental law of _causality_, to rise\nto a self-existent Being, exempt from all conditions of time, space, and\ncausality. Mr. Holyoake admits the very same truth in regard to Nature\nwhich we maintain in regard to God: \"I am driven to the conclusion that\nNature is eternal, because we are unable to conceive a state of things\nwhen nothing was.... And in the eternity of matter, we are assured _of\nthe self-existence_ of matter, and self-existence is the most majestic\nof all attributes, and includes all others;\" it is \"the power of being\n_independent of the law of other beings_.\" Now, what is there in the\nproposed extension of the analogy that should exclude the idea of a\nself-existent First Cause, or shut us up to the admission of an endless\nseries of designing causes? And still further, what is there in the\nproposed extension of the analogy which should invalidate the argument\nfrom design, or induce Mr. Holyoake to _give it up_, and to withdraw\nthe concessions which he had previously made in regard to it? These\nconcessions must be supposed to have been honestly made in deference to\nthe claims of truth, and they are not in the least affected by the\nextension of the analogy. It is still true, if it ever was, _that order\nprevails in Nature_; and this is admitted: \"If by Atheism is meant the\nbelief that all that we see in Nature is the result _of chance_, of a\nfortuitous concourse of atoms, nothing would be so absurd as Atheism.\nNothing can be more evident than that _law and order_ prevail in Nature,\nthat every species of matter, organic or inorganic, is impressed with\ncertain laws, according to which all its properties and movements are\nregulated.... In denying, therefore, the existence of a personal,\nintelligent Deity, we do not admit that there is any chance,\ncontingency, or disorder in Nature: we do not deny, but absolutely\naffirm, the constant and universal operation of _law and order_. This we\ndo, because it is a matter of fact of obvious and daily\nexperience.\"[290] Again, it is still true, if it ever was, that _design\nimplies a designer_; and this, says Mr. Holyoake, \"I am disposed to\nallow; and that this designer must be a person, I am quite inclined to\nadmit. Thus far goes Paley, and, therefore, thus far I go with him. His\ngeneral position, that design proves a personal designer, is so\n_natural_, so _easy_, and so _plausible_, that it invites one to admit\nit.... Paley insists upon it as a legitimate inference from his\npremises, nor would it be easy to disturb his conclusion.... This is\nPaley's reasoning upon the subject, and it is too _natural_, too\n_rigid_, and too _cogent_ to be escaped from.\" Now, what is there in the\nproposed extension of the analogy that can invalidate either of these\nadmissions, or that should induce us to set aside both? Extend the\nanalogy ever so far, it is still true that _law and order_ prevail in\nNature, that design implies a _designer_, and that a designer must be a\n_person_. And how does Mr. Holyoake save his consistency? Simply by\nstretching the analogy till it snaps asunder; he begins by extending,\nand ends in destroying it; he admits it at first, merely \"to see where\nit will lead and what it will prove,\" and finding that it must imply an\norganized designer, and an endless series of such beings, \"he gives it\nup,\" and denies the existence of _design_ altogether. There is a\n_hiatus,_ it would seem,--an impassable gulf,--between the admission\nthat _law and order_ prevail in Nature, and the conclusion that _law and\norder_ are manifestations of _design_: \"What I supposed to be design in\nthe opening of my argument is _no longer design_. My reverend friend is\nwrong in supposing that I admit DESIGN, and yet refuse to admit the\nforce of the _design argument_,\" On the supposition, then, that _law and\norder_ are manifestations of _design_, the design argument might be\nvalid and conclusive: but \"_no conceivable order_\" could prove the\nexistence of God; why? Because no conceivable order could be a\nmanifestation of _design_. But how is this proved by the extension of\nthe analogy? Does it not amount to a denial of the analogy itself? And\nis it not an instructive fact that his abortive attempt to disprove the\ndesign argument, results, not in the denial of the _inductive\ninference_, but in the exclusion of the very _analogy_ which he proposed\nto extend, not in shaking the validity of the proof, but in disputing\nthe fact on which it is based? The extension of the analogy cannot prove\neither that law and order are _not_ manifestations of design, or that\nthere may be design without a personal designer; all that it could\nprove, even were it legitimate, would be the existence of an _organized_\ninstead of a _spiritual_ Being, which, on the supposition of its\nself-existence,--a supposition which is not excluded by the argument,\nsince that majestic attribute, which may be fairly held to \"include all\nothers,\" is expressly admitted,--neither requires nor admits of an\ninfinite series of contrivers.\n\n4. Secularism denies the truth of a special Providence, and also the\nefficacy of Prayer, while it justly holds both to be indispensable for\nthe purposes of practical religion.\n\nThe importance of these doctrines is strongly declared, and sometimes\nillustrated with much apparent feeling, by Mr. Holyoake himself: \"There\nis more mixed up with the question than the mere fact as to whether some\nBeing exists independently of Nature; for instance, if any man would\ndebate whether there existed a Divine Being, whether a Providence, who\nwas the Father of His creatures, whom we could propitiate by prayer in\nour danger, from whom we could obtain light in darkness, and help in\ndistress,--if any man debated a proposition like this, I should say\nthere was much of great practical utility about it.... If you tell me\nGod exists, that he is a power, a principle, or spirit, or light, or\nlife, or love, or intelligence, or what you will,--if He be not a Father\nto whom His children may appeal, if He be not a Providence whom we may\npropitiate, and from whom we can obtain special help in the hour of\ndanger,--I say, practically, it does not matter to us whether He exists\nor not.\"[291] \"The great practical question is, whether there exists a\nDeity to whom we can appeal, who is the Father of his children, who is\nto be propitiated by prayer, and who will render us help in the hour of\ndanger and distress.\"\n\nWith the spirit of these remarks every believer will cordially\nsympathize. He knows that there can be no practical religion without\nfaith in Providence and confidence in prayer; for \"he that cometh to God\nmust believe that He is, and that He is _the rewarder_ of them that\ndiligently seek Him.\" Mr. Holyoake does not err in supposing that this\nis the general belief of Christians, or that it is explicitly sanctioned\nin Scripture. He may, and we think he does err in his interpretation of\nthe Bible doctrine, and the inferences which he deduces from it; but\nassuredly Christianity would be robbed of its most attractive and\nendearing attributes, were it represented as silent on the paternal\ncharacter of God and His providential care. He is right in saying that\n\"the Providence man needs, the Providence the old theologies gave him,\nwas a personal Providence, an available help.... I care only to add,\nthat there is hardly any feature in the Christian system which is so\nseductive as this doctrine of a special Providence.... Do you not know\nthat in all your appeals your success depends upon your telling all\norders of people that there is One in heaven who cares for them, that\nevery prayer will be answered, that every hair of their head is\nnumbered, that not a sparrow falls to the ground without their heavenly\nFather's knowledge, and are not they worth more than many\nsparrows?\"[292] He sees the necessity, and seems to feel the\nattractiveness, of the doctrine; yet he denies its truth: why? because\nit is contradicted, as he conceives, by experience. He adduces his own\npersonal experience, and then appeals to the experience of his\nfellow-men: \"I once prayed in all the fervency of this same religion. I\nbelieved once all these things. I put up prayers to Heaven which I\ncannot conceive how humanity could have refused to respond to,--prayers\nsuch as if put up to me I must have responded to. I saw those near and\ndear to me perishing around me; and I learned the secret I care no\nlonger to conceal, that man's dependence is upon his courage and his\nindustry, and dependence upon Heaven there seems to be none.\"[293] Such\nwas his private experience; and facts of public notoriety are appealed\nto in confirmation: \"It has long seemed to me the most serious libel on\nthe character of the Deity to assume for one moment that he interferes\nin human exigencies. A mountain of desolating facts rises up to shame\ninto silence the hazardous supposition? Was not the whole land a short\ntime ago convulsed with horror at the fate of the _Amazon_? There was\nnot a wretch in the whole country whose slumbering humanity would not\nhave been aroused in the presence of that dismal calamity.\" ... \"How is\nit that liberty is in chains all over Europe, if God be still\ninterposing in human affairs? If the older doctrine were true, if our\nbrother's blood still cried to God from the ground, the patriot would be\nreleased from the dungeon, and the tyrant would descend from the throne\nhe has polluted.\"--\"Science has shown us that we are under the dominion\nof general laws, and that there is no special providence, and that\nprayers are useless, and that propitiation is vain; that whether there\nbe a Deity independent of Nature, or whether Nature be God, it is still\n_the God of the iron foot_, that passes on without heeding, without\nfeeling, and without resting; that Nature acts with a fearful\nuniformity, stern as fate, absolute as tyranny, merciless as death; too\nvast to praise, too inexplicable to worship, too inexorable to\npropitiate, it has no ear for prayer, no heart for sympathy, no arm to\nsave.\"[294]\n\nIn these and similar appeals to the facts of individual or common\nexperience, the scriptural doctrine of Providence and Prayer is supposed\nto be very different from what it really is, and stated without any of\nthe qualifications which are expressly declared by the sacred writers.\n\n--It is nowhere declared in Scripture that _every_ prayer must receive\nan immediate answer, whatever may be the object for which it is\npresented, or the spirit in which it is offered. On the contrary it is\nexpressly written, \"If I regard iniquity in my heart, the Lord will not\nhear me.\" \"But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering; for he that\nwavereth is like a wave of the sea driven with the wind and tossed: For\nlet not that man think that he shall receive anything of the Lord.\" \"Ye\nask, and receive not, because ye ask amiss, that ye may consume it on\nyour lusts.\"[295]\n\n--It is nowhere declared in Scripture that man is to obtain whatever he\nasks, irrespective of that Sovereign Will which is guided by unerring\nwisdom as well as infinite love. On the contrary, prayer is an\nexpression of dependence and subjection, and must ever be qualified by\nsubmission to His sovereignty: \"Nevertheless not my will, but Thine be\ndone.\"[296]\n\n--It is nowhere declared in Scripture that Providence will suspend, or\nthat Prayer will counteract, the operation of the general laws of\nNature, excepting only in the case of those to whom a promise of\nmiraculous power was vouchsafed. On the contrary, these laws are\ndeclared to be stable and permanent: \"Thou hast established the earth,\nand it abideth: they continue this day according to thine ordinances:\nfor all are thy servants;\" and any wilful neglect or violation of these\nlaws is a sinful _tempting_ of Providence, even when it may seem to be\nsanctioned by a perverse application of Scripture itself; for the\nSaviour himself was solicited on this wise, \"If thou be the Son of God,\ncast thyself down; for _it is written_, He shall give his angels charge\nconcerning thee, and in their hands they shall bear thee up, lest at any\ntime thou dash thy foot against a stone;\" but he answered, \"_It is\nwritten_ again, Thou shalt not _tempt_ the Lord thy God.\"[297]\n\n--It is nowhere declared in Scripture that Providence will secure, or\nPrayer obtain, exemption from the afflictions and calamities of life. On\nthe contrary it is written, \"Many are the afflictions of the righteous,\nbut the Lord delivereth him out of them all.\" \"In the world ye shall\nhave tribulation: but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world.\" \"If\nye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons; for what son\nis he whom the father chasteneth not?\" \"Now no chastening for the\npresent seemeth to be joyous, but grievous; nevertheless afterward it\nyieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which are\nexercised thereby.\" \"We glory in tribulations also; knowing that\ntribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience\nhope.\" \"For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for\nus a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory.\" \"And we know that\n_all things_ work together for good to them that love God!... Who shall\nseparate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or\npersecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? Nay, in _all\nthese things_ we are more than conquerors through him that loved\nus.\"[298]\n\n--It is nowhere declared in Scripture that Providence will award, or\nthat Prayer may hope to secure, a regular and equal distribution of good\nand evil in the present life. On the contrary the present state is\ndescribed as a scene of probation, trial, and discipline, which is\npreparatory to a state of retribution hereafter: \"I saw under the sun\nthe place of judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of\nrighteousness, that iniquity was there. I said in mine heart, God shall\njudge the righteous and the wicked; for there is a time for every\npurpose and for every work.\" \"Because sentence against an evil work is\nnot executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully\nset in them to do evil. Though a sinner do evil a hundred times, and his\ndays be prolonged, yet surely I know that it shall be well with those\nthat fear God, which fear before Him: but it shall not be well with the\nwicked, neither shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow;\nbecause he feareth not before God.\"[299] \"This is the faith and patience\nof the saints;\" a faith which is often staggered, a patience which may\nbe ready to fail, in the view of the darker aspects of Providence; for\nmany a true believer may say, \"As for me, my feet were almost gone, my\nsteps had well-nigh slipped; for I was envious at the foolish, when I\nsaw the prosperity of the wicked;\" and even \"the spirits of just men\nmade perfect\" sing the song, \"O Lord! how long?\"\n\n--It is nowhere declared in Scripture that Providence excludes the aid\nof Science, or that Prayer supersedes the diligent use of ordinary\nmeans. On the contrary it is written, \"When wisdom entereth into thine\nheart, and knowledge is pleasant unto thy soul, discretion shall\npreserve thee, understanding shall keep thee;\" and believers are\nrequired to be \"not slothful in business,\" while they are \"fervent in\nspirit, serving the Lord.\"[300]\n\nOn all these points, so clearly involved in the Christian doctrine of\nProvidence and Prayer, Mr. Holyoake's argument rests on assumptions\nwhich are utterly groundless, and hence he imagines that the doctrine is\ncontradicted by experience, when a more scriptural view of it would be\nsufficient to obviate all his objections. He reasons as if there could\nbe no truth in the doctrine of a special Providence, and no efficacy in\nPrayer, unless _every_ petition were immediately heard and answered;\nunless the cry of nature in distress were sufficient to ward off the\nstroke of disease and bereavement, and to avert all the calamities of\nlife; unless the operation of the general laws of Nature were forthwith\nsuspended; unless the present state of trial and discipline were\nconverted into one of strict and impartial retribution; and unless man's\nwisdom and man's agency were to be superseded altogether by dependence\non a higher power. But not one of these suppositions has any place in\nthe doctrine of Scripture on the subject. It speaks of a special\nProvidence, but not such as is incompatible with the constant operation\nof natural laws; it ascribes a certain efficacy to Prayer, but not such\nas implies a miraculous interference with the ordinary course of Nature,\nand still less an exemption from affliction, or an equal distribution of\ngood and evil in the present life. If it be said that such being the\ndoctrine of Scripture, it can afford little or no consolation, since it\nholds out no hope of sure and instant relief in circumstances of\ndistress and danger, may we not ask, Is there no comfort in knowing that\nour affairs are under the superintendence of a Being everywhere present,\ninfinitely wise and good, whose ear is ever open to our cry, who is able\nto do for us exceeding abundantly above all that we can ask, and who has\npromised to sustain us in all our trials, to sanctify us by means of\nthem, and to make all things work together for our good? Is there no\ncomfort in being able to say, \"God is our refuge and strength, a very\npresent help in trouble, therefore will not we fear though the earth be\nremoved, and though the mountains be carried into the midst of the sea.\"\n\"The Lord is my Shepherd, I shall not want. Yea, though I walk through\nthe valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for Thou art\nwith me.\" \"The Lord shall deliver me from every evil work, and will\npreserve me unto His heavenly kingdom\"?[301] Is there not enough for all\nthe purposes of practical religion in the assurance, \"Ask, and it shall\nbe given you; seek, and ye shall find; ... for if ye, being evil, know\nhow to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your\nFather which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him?\" \"Your\nheavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. Seek ye\nfirst the kingdom of God, and His righteousness; and all these things\nshall be added unto you\"?[302] And when the believer is enabled in any\nmeasure to comply with the injunctions of Scripture,--\"Cast thy burden\non the Lord, and He will sustain it,\" \"Commit thy way unto Him, and He\nwill bring it to pass,\" \"Be careful for nothing, but in everything by\nprayer and supplication with thanksgiving, let your requests be made\nknown unto God, and the peace of God, which passeth all understanding,\nshall keep your hearts and minds through Christ Jesus,\"--does he not\nknow experimentally that it is faith in a living, personal God,--the God\nof providence, and the Hearer of prayer, and not the desolate doctrine\nof Nature,--\"the _God of the iron foot_, stern as fate, absolute as\ntyranny, and merciless as death,\"--that can sustain him under every\ntrial, and nerve him with fresh vigor for the \"battle of life\"?\n\nMr. Holyoake refers to his own experience, and appeals to the experience\nof his fellow-men, in confirmation of his _negative_ conclusion in\nregard to a special Providence and the efficacy of Prayer. But what\nweight is due to his testimony in such a case? Is it sufficient to\ncountervail the experience of all in every age--\"the great cloud of\nwitnesses\"--who have unanimously declared that \"the Lord hath not\nforsaken them that seek Him,\" and that \"He hath not said to the seed of\nJacob, Seek ye my face in vain\"? Which is entitled to the greater\nweight, the testimony of Mr. Holyoake, or that of the Psalmist, \"I\nwaited patiently for the Lord, and He inclined unto me, and heard my\ncry;\" or that of the prophet, \"I cried by reason of mine affliction unto\nthe Lord, and He heard me: out of the belly of hell cried I, and thou\nheardest my voice: When my soul fainted within me I remembered the Lord,\nand my prayer came in unto Thee into thine holy temple;\" or that of the\napostle, \"For this thing I besought the Lord thrice, that it might\ndepart from me; and He said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee,\nfor my strength is made perfect in weakness\"?[303] A cry for help may\nnot be \"the prayer of faith,\" but the utterance of an unsubdued and\nrebellious will, and can afford no test, therefore, of the truth of the\ndoctrine of Scripture.\n\nBut \"Science,\" says Mr. Holyoake, \"is the providence of life, and\nspiritual dependence may be attended with material destruction.\" He\nwould substitute, therefore, the Science of man for the Providence of\nGod, and secular _diligence_ for spiritual _dependence_. But is there no\nroom for both? Are they necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive?\nWhy should the Science of man be opposed to the Providence of God, or\nsecular industry to religious faith? All Christians combine the two; why\nshould Mr. Holyoake seek to divorce them? What is Science? It is \"the\nwell-devised method of using Nature; it is in this that Science is the\nprovidence of man. It is not pretended that Science is a perfect\ndependence; on the contrary, it is admitted to be narrow and but\npartially developed; but it is the only special dependence that man\nhas.\"[304] And is the _wise use of Nature_ inconsistent with Religion?\nis it the exclusive monopoly of Atheism? Or is spiritual dependence\nnecessarily incompatible with industrial pursuits? Who have been the\nmost scientific and the most industrious members of the community, the\nsmall band of Atheists, or the great body of Christians? To the latter\nbelong all the advantages which Science, or the wise use of Nature, can\nsecure, while they have _besides_ a Providence, distinct from Nature and\nsuperior to it, whose wakeful eye never slumbers, and whose ear is ever\nopen to their cry.\n\n5. Secularism seeks to supersede Religion, and to substitute _morality_\nin its stead,--but a _morality_ which leaves men irresponsible for their\nbelief, their passions, and even their actions, to any superior Power.\n\n\"The histories of all ages,\" says Mr. Holyoake, \"and the bitter\nexperience of mankind, prove the pernicious influence of piety. It seems\na more useful work cannot be performed than to sweep away the assumed\nfoundations of all religions.\" \"I deem it inimical to human welfare, and\nshould no more proceed to supply a new religion than the people who had\njust interred the cholera would think of raising a plague.... Religion\nis a distraction of social progress; once removed, no wise man will\ndesire its restoration.\"\n\n\"But one question remains to be answered, If Religion is not our proper\nbusiness, what is? I answer, _Morality_!... By Religion I understand a\nsystem of human duties, commencing from a God: by Morality a system of\nhuman duties, commencing from man. Religion asks but one question, Is an\nact pleasing to Deity? Morality makes the wiser inquiry, Is an act\nuseful to man? The standard of religion varies with fickle creeds; the\nstandard of morality is _utility_.\"[305] \"There exist (independently of\nScriptural Religion) guarantees of morality in human nature, in\nintelligence, and utility.\" \"Morality, that system of human duties\ncommencing from man, we will keep distinct from Religion, that system of\nhuman duties assumed to commence from God.\"[306] \"Nature refers us to\nscience for help, and to humanity for sympathy; love to the lovely is\nour only homage, study our only praise, quiet submission to the\ninevitable our _duty_, and work is our only worship.\"[307] \"We, by\nestablishing morals independently of scriptural authority, and basing\nthem on secular considerations,--more immediate, more demonstrative and\nuniversal,--attain a signal benefit; for when Inspiration is shaken, or\nMiracles fail you, or Prophecy eludes the believer, he breaks away, and\nprobably falls into vice; while we hold the thinker by the thousand\nrelations of Natural Affection, Utility, and Intelligence, which the\nChristian distrusts.... A man may do good because it is honest, because\nit is useful, because it is commanded by human law, because it is\nhumane, because it is polite, because it is a noble pleasure.\"[308] Of\ncourse, when Morality is thus divorced from Religion there can be no\nresponsibility to a higher Power, and man is not accountable to any one\nfor his belief, his passions, his will, his character or conduct, except\nin so far as his _actions_ may trench on the rights of others, and\nrender him amenable to civil or criminal law. And Mr. Holyoake, at one\ntime an associate and fellow-laborer of Robert Owen, still cleaves to\nthe doctrine that his belief is entirely dependent on evidence, and that\nhis character is, to a large extent, determined by the circumstances of\nhis condition.\n\nAn attempt is thus made to establish the Ethics of Atheism on the ruins\nof Religion. But to one who calmly reflects on the subject, it must be\nevident that a scheme of morals founded on the negation of all religious\nbelief can have none of that authority which belongs to the expression\nof a superior will, and must be utterly destitute of all sanctions\nexcepting such as may be found in the _natural_ consequences of our\nconduct. Its only standard is _utility_; and _utility_ must be\ninterpreted by every man for himself, according to his own taste and\ninclination. The word _duty_ is used, but there is nothing in the system\nto account for the _idea_ which that word is intended to convey, nothing\nto explain or justify the meaning of the phrase, _I ought_. For why\n_ought_ I to do this, or refrain from that? Because it is _useful_?\nbecause it is conducive to _happiness_? Because it will be followed by\ncertain natural consequences? But if I love the pleasures of sin, if I\nprefer them to every other kind of enjoyment, if I am willing to accept\nthe consequences and to say, \"Evil, be thou my good,\" what is there in\nthe system of secular ethics that should oblige me to forego my\nfavorite indulgences, or that can impress me with the conviction that I\n_ought_ to do so? True I may suffer, and suffer much, as the drunkard\nand the libertine do, in the way of natural consequence, and it may be\nprudent to be temperate in the indulgence of my sensual appetites; there\nmay even be a sense of inward degradation, and a politic regard to the\nopinions of my fellow-men, which will operate to some extent as a\nrestraining influence; but if I be destitute of a sense of _duty_, and\nwilling to brave all hazards and accept all consequences, Secularism has\nnothing to say to me, and is utterly powerless to govern or control me\notherwise than by physical coercion or the power of brute force. But\nadmit the idea of God as a Moral Governor, and of Conscience as His\nvicegerent in my soul, view the law of my moral nature as the\nauthoritative expression of His supreme will, and instantly I recognize\na Master whom I _ought_ to obey, and a course of conduct which it is my\n_duty_ to pursue, irrespective alike of my personal propensities and of\nall possible consequences. The \"categoric imperative\" within is felt to\nbe a far more solid ground, as well as a much stronger sanction, of\nduty, than any that can be found in the mere consequences of my actions;\nwhile it accounts for the innate sense of right and wrong, and the\nsentiments of remorse, and shame, and fear which conscious guilt\ninspires.\n\nBut Mr. Holyoake shifts the question from this broad general ground,\nwhich is common to all earnest inquirers after truth, and seeks to\nentangle us in a collateral, but subordinate, discussion respecting the\nrelation between Morality and Scripture. He proposes to show that \"there\nexist, _independently of Scriptural Religion_, guarantees of morality in\nhuman nature,\" and that \"morals may be established _independently of\nscriptural authority_.\" But this is not the question: the question is a\nwider and more comprehensive one, namely, whether a system of morals can\nbe established apart from the recognition of God, and independently of\n_any_ expression, natural or supernatural, of His supreme and\nauthoritative will? Mr. Holyoake is bound to return and defend an\naffirmative to _this_ question, and is not at liberty to take refuge in\nthe mere denial of the absolute dependence of morals on \"scriptural\nauthority.\" The idea of _duty_ may be involved in the principles of\nNatural Religion, and these may be presupposed and assumed in\nRevelation; but to make out his case, he must attempt to show that\nneither Natural nor Revealed Religion is necessary to establish and\nsanction a code of ethics, and that the natural consequences of our\nactions are sufficient _of themselves_, and without reference to the law\nof a Supreme Will, to awaken and sustain a sense of moral obligation. In\npoint of fact, Christianity does not represent the duties of morality as\ndependent on its own _sole_ authority. It sanctions these duties, it\nillustrates their nature, it enforces their observance by new and\npowerful motives; but it presupposes the existence of Conscience, as\nGod's vicegerent in the heart, and appeals to \"a law\" by which every man\nis \"a law to himself.\" The _law revealed_ in Scripture is binding by\nreason of the authority of the Lawgiver; but not more binding than the\nlaw written on the heart, without which we should be incapable alike of\nmoral instruction and of moral government. The question, then, is not\nwhether morality be entirely dependent on the authority of Scripture,\nbut whether it be so independent of Religion as to be equally\nauthoritative and binding with or without the recognition of God?\n\nAnd if this be the real question at issue, few will be bold enough to\naffirm either that the nature of moral duty is in no wise affected, or\nthat its foundation is in no degree weakened, by the non-recognition of\nGod and His supreme will. The will of God may not be the ultimate ground\nof duty, but it is the expression of the essential holiness of His\nnature, which is the unchangeable standard of rectitude. The supposition\nof His non-existence, therefore, or even the skeptical Atheism which\ndoubts, without venturing to deny, the reality of His being, deprives\nmorality of its only absolute support, and leaves it to depend on the\nfluctuating opinions or the capricious tastes of individual minds. It\naffects both the _nature_ and the _extent_ of moral duty, by resolving\nit into a mere regard to utility, and excluding a large class of duties\nwhich Religion sanctions, while it deprives every other class of their\nsacred character as acts of obedience to God. It shuts out some of the\nmost powerful and impressive motives to virtuous conduct, by relieving\nmen from a sense of responsibility to a higher Power, by excluding the\nidea of a future retribution, and still more by keeping out of sight the\nattributes, alike august and amiable, of a living personal God,\neverywhere present, beholding the evil and the good, an omniscient\nWitness and an impartial Judge. Christianity leaves all the _secular_\nmotives to morality intact and entire, and only superadds to these\ncertain _spiritual_ motives of far higher power. It neither supersedes\nthe lessons of experience nor abjures all regard to utility; but by\nrevealing our relation to God, it extends, and elevates, and purifies\nour sense of duty. In vain does Mr. Holyoake pretend that by basing\nmorals on secular considerations, he attains a signal benefit, and that\nhe \"holds the thinker by the thousand relations of Natural Affection,\nUtility, and Intelligence, _which the Christian distrusts_;\" for not one\nof these \"relations\" is excluded by the scheme of Revealed Religion, not\none of them is _denied_ by the Christian; and if he may be said to\n_distrust_ them, it is only because he holds them to be _insufficient_,\nwithout a belief in God, to maintain a pure morality in the world. But\nhe can say, with at least as much earnestness as any Secularism can\nfeel, \"Whatsoever things are _true_, whatsoever things are _honest_,\nwhatsoever things are _just_, whatsoever things are _pure_, whatsoever\nthings are _lovely_, whatsoever things are of _good report_; if there be\n_any_ virtue, and if there be _any_ praise, think of these things;\" and\nhe feels that far from weakening, he greatly enhances, the force of\nthat appeal, when he adds, \"and perfect holiness _in the fear of the\nLord_.\"\n\n6. Secularism professes to be \"the positive side of Atheism,\" and to be\nbetter than Religion at least for this world, because it pays a\npreeminent, if not an exclusive, regard to the _duties of the present\nlife_.\n\nThis is, perhaps, the most dangerous aspect of the doctrine. It\nprescribes a course of systematic ungodliness, a practical disregard of\nthe future, and an engrossing attention to things seen and temporal, as\nif these were virtues in which mankind are greatly deficient, and as if\ntheir general prevalence would be a prelude to a secular millennium, or\nthe commencement of an atheistic paradise. But the purely _negative_\npart of the system, however accordant with the natural tendencies of\nmen, is felt to be in itself somewhat unattractive; it must be\nassociated, therefore, with some _positive_ element, some _practical\naims_, such as may give it a hold on the interest and a claim on the\nzealous support of its adherents. \"Under this conviction,\" says Mr.\nHolyoake, \"the Secularist applied himself to the reinspection of the\ngeneral field of controversy, and the adoption of the following rules,\namong others, has been the consequence: 1. To disuse the term _Atheist_,\nsince the public understand by that word one who is without God and also\nwithout morality, and who wishes to be without both. 2. To disuse the\nterm _Infidel_, since Christians understand by that term one who is\nunfaithful or treacherous to the truth.... 3. To recognize, not as a\nmatter of policy merely, but as a matter of fact, the sincerity of the\nclergy and the good intentions of Christians generally.... 4. To seek\nthe maxims of duty in the relations of man to society and nature, and,\nas the _Christian Spectator_ did us the honor to admit, 'to preach\nnature and science, morality and art: nature, the only subject of\nknowledge; science, the providence of life; morality, the harmony of\naction; art, the culture of the individual and of society.'\" \"We\ntherefore resolved to choose a new name (Secularism), which should\nexpress the _practical and moral_ element always concealed in the word\nAtheism.... Secularism seeks the personal Law of duty, the Sphere of\nduty, and the Power by which duty may work independently. The Law is\nfound in natural, utilitarian, and artistic morals. The Sphere is this,\nto work with our first energies in this life, for this life,--for its\ngrowth, culture, development, and progress. The Power is discovered in\nScience, the providence of life, and intelligence.\"[309] \"By\n'Secularism' is meant giving the precedence to the duties of this life\nover those which pertain to another life;--attention to temporal things\nshould take precedence of considerations relating to a future\nexistence.\" \"The _positive_ side of our views is a more recent\ndevelopment of our own.\" \"We seek the cooeperation of all who can agree\nto promote present human improvement by present human means.\"[310] ...\n\"If there are other worlds to be inhabited after this life, those\npersons will best be fitted for the enjoyment of them who have made the\nwelfare of humanity their business in this. But if there are not other\nworlds, men are essentially losers by neglecting the enjoyment of this.\nHence Aristippus was truly wise, who agreed with Socrates in dismissing,\nas wholly unprofitable, all those speculations which have no connection\nwith the business of life.\" \"This life being the first in certainty, we\ngive it the first place in importance; and by giving human duties in\nrelation to men the _precedence_, we secure that all interpretations of\nspiritual duty shall be in harmony with human progress.\" \"Secularism is\nthe philosophy of the things of time. A Secularist is one who gives\nprimary attention to those subjects, the issues of which can be tested\nby the experience of this life. The Secularist principle requires that\nprecedence should be given to the duties of this life over those which\npertain to another world.\"[311]\n\nSecularism, then, professes to be the _positive_ or _practical_ side of\nAtheism, and it claims to be better than Religion at least for this\nworld, because it pays a preeminent, if not exclusive, regard to the\nduties of the present life. We cannot consider this \"new development\" of\nan old system, in connection with its recent change of name, and the\nreasons that are assigned for it, without seeing that the force of\npublic opinion, whether well or ill founded, has compelled its advocates\nto alter their tactics at least in two respects: they are anxious to\nwithdraw from offensive prominence the _negative_ articles of their\ncreed, and to put forward the _positive_ elements of truth which may\nstill survive after the ruin of Religion; and they evince a disposition,\nsomewhat new, to conciliate the Christian community, by admitting the\nsincerity of the clergy and the good intentions of believers generally,\nand inviting their cooeperation in plans of secular improvement. But\nAtheism still lurks under the disguise of Secularism; and men of earnest\nreligion are not likely to be tempted to any close alliance or active\ncooeperation with those who misrepresent the character of that God in\nwhom they believe, and of that Saviour in whom they trust. There may be\nsome nominal Christians, however, already as unconcerned about the\nfuture and devoted to the present life, as Mr. Holyoake himself could\nwish them to be, who will eagerly grasp at this \"new development,\" as a\nplausible pretext for continuing in their present course; for \"with the\nexception of those who compose the real Church of Christ, whose faith is\nnot a mere name and an unthinking assent to Christianity, but a real,\nliving, constant power over their life, the _whole world is practically\nsecularist_, and is living solely by the light of _the present_, and\nunder the impulse of the motives which it supplies.\"[312] For\n\"Secularism is only the Latin term for the old Saxon worldliness:\nSecularism has more elements of union than perhaps any other phase of\ninfidelity; it has the worldliness of mere nominal Christians, as well\nas of real infidels.\"[313] They are really _Secularists_, but as yet\nthey may not be at ease in their _Secularism_. There may be a secret\nmonitor within, which reminds them occasionally of death, and judgment,\nand eternity; and the rapid flight of time, or the incipient sense of\ndisease, or the ever-recurring instances of mortality, may awaken them\nto transient thoughts of another life for which it were well to be\nbetter prepared. What they want is a theory,--of plausible aspect and\neasy application,--which might serve to quell these rising thoughts, and\nallay their foreboding fears; and just such a theory they may seem to\nfind in the proverbial maxim of Secularism, \"Work _in_ this life, _for_\nthis life.\" We are not sure, however, that even with such men the zeal\nof the new _propaganda_ will be altogether successful. It may seem to\nsome to be out of place, and may even excite a sense of the ludicrous.\n\"Just fancy for a moment,\" says the author already quoted, \"some\nmissionary of this principle going into the Royal Exchange at London, or\nthe Stock Exchange at Leeds or Bradford, or the Cloth-halls of any of\nour manufacturing towns, summoning around him the merchants and the\nbrokers, and then beginning with much earnestness and point to urge them\n_not_ to live for eternity, but to be very careful about the present\nlife: insisting that it was very, very doubtful if earth were not\nall,--the present existence the whole of human existence; and that\ntherefore until there was more certainty they had better make the most\nof this; be industrious and prudent, and make themselves as comfortable\nas possible; get as much money as they could honestly, and by no means\nlet any dread of retribution hereafter fetter them in any of their\nactions here. Why, these merchants would turn away laughing and saying,\n'Either the man is mocking us, or he is mad: that is just what we are\ndoing with all our might.' They would see at least that Mr. Holyoake's\nteaching is very different from that of Him who said, 'Take no thought\nfor your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for\nyour body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the\nbody than raiment? But seek ye _first_ the kingdom of God and His\nrighteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.' 'For what\nis a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his soul?\nor what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?' And marking that\nvast difference, they will feel, at least, that no man is entitled to\naddress them as rational beings in the style of Secularism, unless he\ncan give them an _absolute assurance_ that there is and can be no future\nstate of existence,--that the _present_ is man's _only_ life, and that\ndeath is an eternal sleep.\"\n\nBut does Mr. Holyoake give, or pretend to give, any such _assurance_?\n\"We do not say,\" he tells us, \"that every man ought to give an\n_exclusive_ attention to this world, because that would be to commit the\nold sin of dogmatism, and exclude the possibility of another world, and\nof walking by a different light from that by which alone we are able to\nwalk. But as our _knowledge_ is confined to this life, and testimony,\nand conjecture, and probability are all that can be set forth with\nrespect to another life, we think we are justified in giving\n_precedence_ to the duties of this state, and of attaching _primary_\nimportance to the morality of man to man.\" It is not _certain_, then,\nthat there is no future life; it is even _possible_ that there may be\none; the supposition is not in itself incredible, it may even have\n\"testimony, conjecture, and probability\" in its favor:--some attention\nto it, therefore, cannot be forbidden without \"committing the old sin\nof dogmatism, and excluding the possibility of another world;\" but its\ncomparative uncertainty is urged as a reason for \"giving _precedence_ to\nthe duties of this state, and attaching _primary_ importance to the\nmorality of man to man.\" The question would seem to be, not whether\n_any_ attention should be bestowed on a future life, but whether it\nshould be less or more than the attention which we bestow on the present\nworld. It is a question of degree; and the settlement of that question\nis made to hinge entirely on the comparative uncertainty of our prospect\nafter death. Suppose it were more uncertain, might not the magnitude of\nthe interests that must be involved in a new and untried existence\nhereafter, and which must be measured on the scale of eternity, be more\nthan sufficient to counterbalance the difference? \"Let us be only fully\nconvinced that our present life is (or may be) the beginning of an\n_eternal duration_, and how irresistibly are we urged to a mode of\nconduct answerable to that _accession of importance_ which our present\ncondition in the world derives from the peculiar point of view in which\nwe then contemplate it!\"[314] But, in point of fact, can it be\nreasonably said that _the future of our present life_ is in any respect\nmore certain than our prospects after death: \"What is our life? is it\nnot like a vapor, which appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth\naway?\" And yet, in spite of its proverbial uncertainty, is it not a\nfundamental principle of Secularism that \"true life begins in\nrenunciation,\" and that \"the _future_ must rule the _present_?\" Extend\nthese maxims, which are of unquestionable authority with reference to\nthe present life, to our prospects beyond the grave, whether they be\nregarded as certain, or probable, or possible only, and they will\nabundantly vindicate the position that our conduct now and here should\nbe regulated to some extent by a regard to what may be before us. In\nboth cases alike, present gratification must give place to future\nsafety, and _self-denial_, according to the shrewd remark of Franklin,\nis neither more nor less in the case of a prudent man than\n_self-owning_, the recognition of his own dignity, and the preference of\na greater and more permanent to a smaller and transitory good. It might\nstill, therefore, be alike our interest and our duty to have _some_\nregard to a possible future in the scheme of our present life. And aware\nof this Mr. Holyoake solaces himself, and attempts to sustain the\nspirits of his friends with the assurance, \"Whatever is likely to secure\nyour best interests here will procure for you the same hereafter,\"--a\nstrange inversion of the scriptural maxim, for it practically amounts to\nthis, \"Seek first the things of this world, and the kingdom of heaven\nshall be added unto you.\" And he states the ground or reason of his\nconfidence in this respect: \"If there be other worlds to be inhabited\nafter this life, those persons will best be fitted for the enjoyment of\nthem who have made _the welfare of humanity their business in this_.\" To\nmake \"the welfare of humanity their business in this life,\" is a duty\nwhich may be discharged by the Christian not less than the Secularist,\nand perhaps with all the greater zeal in proportion to his estimate of\nmen as responsible and immortal beings, all passing on, like himself, to\nan interminable future. But if there be another state of being after\ndeath, will he be best prepared for it who lives \"without God\" in this\nworld, without serious forethought in regard to his eternal prospects,\nwithout any deliberate preparation for his certain and solemn change? Or\nwill it be a consolation to him _then_ to reflect that he disbelieved or\ndoubted now, and that he exerted his talents and spent his life on earth\nin undermining the faith of his fellow-men, and weakening their\nimpressions of things unseen and eternal?\n\nMr. Holyoake seems to imagine that whether there be or be not a future\nstate after death, Secularism is the \"safest side,\" and he puts the\nalternative thus: \"If there are other worlds to be inhabited after this\nlife, those persons will best be fitted for the enjoyment of them who\nhave made the welfare of humanity their business in this. But if there\nare not other worlds, men are essentially losers by neglecting the\nenjoyment of this.\" On either supposition, it would seem, the Secularist\nhas the advantage of the Christian: on the one, because he and not the\nChristian, \"makes the welfare of humanity his business;\" on the other,\nbecause he, and not the Christian, has the true \"enjoyment\" of the\npresent life. It might be difficult to prove either of these convenient\nassumptions, or to show that there is anything in Christianity to\nprevent, anything in Atheism to promote, the care of humanity on the one\nhand, or the enjoyment of life on the other. On the contrary, all\nexperience testifies that Religion is the only sure spring of\nphilanthropy, and that, on the whole, none have a sweeter enjoyment of\nthe present life than those who can look abroad on the works of Nature\nand say, \"My Father made them all,\" and who can look forward to death\nitself with \"a hope full of immortality.\" It is true, that the serious\nexpectation of a future state must impose a certain restraint on the\nindulgence of our appetites and passions; but is it such a restraint as\nis injurious even to our temporal welfare? is it not the dictate of\nenlightened prudence, were we to look no further than to the present\nlife? Mr. Holyoake himself repudiates the language which the apostle\nputs into the mouth of the unbeliever, \"Let us eat and drink, for\nto-morrow we die,\"--language which is expressive of what would be the\nnatural tendency of men, were they assured of non-existence hereafter,\nbut which Mr. Holyoake rejects, with something like virtuous\nindignation, saying, \"That is the sentiment of the sensualist: it is not\nthe sentiment of a man who is at all conscious that right and wrong are\ninherent in human nature, that there are wide distinctions between\nvirtue and vice.\" This is not the sentiment of the man who comprehends\nthat if we do well, it will be well with us, that if we do harm, the\nevil influence will follow us; who sees distinctly that \"our acts, if\ngood, our angels are,\" and \"if ill, our fatal shadows that walk by us\nstill.\"[315] It is not the apostle's sentiment nor the sentiment of any\nbeliever; it is, as Mr. Holyoake says, \"the sentiment of the\nsensualist;\" but it is represented as the natural offspring of unbelief\nin regard to a future state, just as sensualism is naturally generated\nand fostered by unbelief in regard to those moral principles which have\nrespect to the present life; and if these principles may and should\nexert a controlling influence over our conduct, even to the extent of\nimposing restraint and self-denial with a view to our welfare in time,\nmay they not be expected to be all the more powerful when we include\nalso our welfare in eternity? and may it not thus become manifest that\n\"godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, as well as of that\nwhich is to come?\" It would be difficult to say in what respect\nbelievers \"neglect the enjoyment of this life,\" or are \"essentially\nlosers\" by their religion. They will gratefully ascribe to it their\nhighest and purest happiness; and rather than part with it they will\ncheerfully submit to \"the loss of all other things,\" and even to\npersecution and martyrdom itself. But it is asked, \"If Christianity be\nfalse, is it nothing that you are troubled with a thousand anxieties and\ncares about what shall become of you after death? If Christianity be\nfalse, is it nothing that day after day you have the fear of death\nbefore your eyes? If Christianity be false, it makes you slaves while\nyou live, and cowards in death.\"[316] We might answer, If Christianity\nbe _true_, what then? but we prefer a different course: we say that the\nreality of a future state is in nowise dependent on the truth of\nChristianity, however much we may be indebted to Christianity for our\ncertain knowledge of it; that even on the principles of Atheism there is\nno security against the everlasting continuance of self-consciousness,\nany more than there is against the inevitable stroke of death; that\nChristianity in either case assumes the fact, and addresses men as dying\nyet immortal creatures, while it reveals a way in which those \"who\nthrough fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage\" may be\ndelivered from that fear, and raised to \"a hope full of immortality.\" As\ndeath is not created or called into being by Christianity, so neither is\nthe awful future which lies beyond it: the Secularist not less than the\nChristian has to do with it. Mr. Holyoake seems, at least occasionally,\nto be sensible of this solemn truth. \"I am as much concerned,\" he says,\n\"as this reverend gentleman can be, as to what shall be _the issue of my\nown condition in the future_; I am as much concerned _in the solution of\nthis question_ as he is himself; and I believe that the view I\nentertain, or that any of us may entertain, _conscientiously_, will be\nour justification in that issue, if we should come to want\njustification. When we pass through the inexorable gates of the future;\nwhen we pass through that vestibule where death stands opening his\neverlasting gates as widely to the pauper as to the king; when we pass\nout here into the _dim mysteries of the future_, to confront, it may be,\nthe interrogations of the Eternal,--I apprehend _every man's\nresponsibility will go with him_, and no second-hand opinions will\nanswer for us.\"[317] Is there not something here that should arrest the\nattention and awaken the anxiety even of the Secularist himself? He sees\nbefore him the inevitable event of death, and beyond it \"the dim\nmysteries of the future;\" he _may be_ called to \"confront the\ninterrogations of the Eternal,\" and then \"every man's responsibility\nwill go with him.\" Surely there is enough in the bare _possibility_ of\nsuch a prospect to justify more than all the interest which has ever\nbeen expended upon it even by the most \"anxious inquirer.\" But, haunted\nby these solemn thoughts, Mr. Holyoake takes refuge in the other\nalternative of his dilemma: \"If there are other worlds, those will best\nbe fitted for the enjoyment of them who have made the welfare of\nhumanity their business in this.\" Secular philanthropy is the best, and\nonly needful, preparation. With this any belief in regard to the future\nis unnecessary, without it no belief will be of any avail: for \"the view\nwhich any of us may entertain, conscientiously, will be our\njustification in that issue, if we should come to want justification;\"\n\"No second-hand opinions will answer for us. Nothing can justify us,\nnothing can give us confidence, but the _conscientious nature_ of our\nown conclusions; nothing can give us courage but _innocence_; nothing\ncan serve our turn but having believed according to _the best of our\njudgment_, and having followed those principles which _seem to us_ to be\nthe truth.\" He takes refuge, then, first in his _good works_, and\nsecondly in the _sincerity_ of his convictions, as the sole grounds of\nhis confidence in the prospect of \"confronting the interrogations of the\nEternal!\"\n\nIs it wonderful,--such being his only hope in death,--that when cholera\nappeared in London, and multitudes were suddenly removed by that\nappalling visitation, he should have felt it necessary to deliver a\nseries of Lectures,--now reprinted as \"The Logic of Death,\"--\"with a\nview to the assurance of his friends?\" Might there not be some among\nthem who would shrink from a future judgment on the ground of their\n\"innocence\" or \"good works,\" and many more who would feel that they were\nmaking an awful venture in leaving their eternity to depend on the mere\n_sincerity_ of their convictions, in whatever way these convictions may\nhave been formed, and whether they were _true or false_? And could they\nbe reassured or comforted by any other article of the Secular Creed?\nThey might be told, as Mr. Holyoake tells them, \"I am not an\nunbeliever, if that implies the rejection of Christian truth, since all\nI reject is Christian error:\" I reject \"the fall of man, the atonement,\nthe sin of unbelief, the doctrine of future punishment; a disbeliever in\nall these doctrines, why should I fear to die?\" But the more thoughtful\namong them, all who were really in earnest, might desiderate something\nmore; they might see that _disbelief_, however dogmatic, does not amount\nto _disproof_, and that the _real ground of fear_ is not in the least\nremoved by it. Does his question imply, that if these doctrines were\n_true_, he would have just reason to fear death? or does it mean merely,\nthat whether they be true or false, he can have no reason to fear death,\nsimply because he _disbelieves_ them? On the former supposition, how\nvast the difference between the Secularist and the Christian? The one\nwould have reason to fear because these doctrines are or may be true;\nthe other believes them to be true, and finds in that very belief a\ndeliverance from the fear of death, and a firm ground of confidence and\nhope! On the latter supposition,--which we believe to be the correct\none,--what an amazing confidence must that man possess in the\n_sincerity_ of his convictions, the _conscientiousness_ of his judgment,\nand the rigid _impartiality_ of his inquiries after truth, who can peril\nhis eternal prospects on the mere fact that he _disbelieves_ these\ndoctrines, whether they be _true_ or _false!_ Suppose that disbelief may\ndiminish the intensity of his fears, can it alter the real state of the\ncase, or remove the only just ground of apprehension and anxiety in\nregard to the future? The truth of these doctrines is not dependent\neither on our belief or disbelief; and in the way of _natural\nconsequence_, even were there no additional penal infliction, they may\nvindicate themselves hereafter in the case of those who neglect or\ndisbelieve them here, by leaving them destitute of all the advantages\nwhich flow only from the cordial reception of the truth. Thus much at\nleast would be in entire accordance with the analogy of our experience\nwith reference to the interests of the present life; for we do suffer,\neven now and here, in consequence of our ignorance, or neglect, or\npractical disbelief of truth,--and it may be so hereafter, in the way\nsimply of inevitable natural consequence, but much more in the way of\nrighteous penal retribution, if there be any truth in that _philosophy\nof unbelief_, so true to nature and so solemnly proclaimed, \"This is the\ncondemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness\nrather than light, because their deeds were evil; for every one that\ndoeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, _lest his\ndeeds should be reproved_.\"[318]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWe have endeavored to estimate the claims of Secularism, and to examine\nthe foundations on which it rests. In doing so, we have not denied\neither the right or the duty of any man to inquire and to decide for\nhimself on his own solemn responsibility. We admit as fully as Mr.\nHolyoake himself, that personal responsibility implies the right, or\nrather the duty, of inquiry. He has our entire sympathy when he says,\n\"It is my business to take care, if I walk _from time to eternity_, that\nI walk by that light which satisfies my own understanding. If it were\ntrue that any of you would take my place, _if we should eventually find\nourselves at the bar of God_, and I should find myself to be made\nanswerable for the opinions which I entertain, or for beliefs which I\nhad in time, if any of you, or all of you, would take my place, and\nanswer for me, then I might be content to take your opinions, then I\nmight stand on the side of the world: but what does it matter to me what\nNewton believed, what Locke believed, or what the world believes, unless\nthe world will answer for me if I believe as the world believes?\" But\nwhile the right of inquiry is frankly admitted, it can scarcely be\ndenied that the mind may be biased by prejudice and involved in error;\nand the ultimate question is, not, what are your opinions? but, what are\nthe grounds on which they rest?--not, what is your belief? but, what is\nthe truth? Mr. Holyoake is the Coryphaeus of his party. As a popular\nwriter and speaker, his talents and zeal, devoted to a better cause,\nmight have fitted him for extensive usefulness, and rendered him a\nbenefactor to his country. As it is, no man in England rests under a\nheavier load of responsibility. He has placed himself at the head of the\n_propaganda_ of popular infidelity. Is it yet too late for him to\nreconsider his opinions, and retrace his steps? For his own sake, for\nthe sake of those who are near and dear to him, for the sake of the\nmultitudes who must be influenced, for good or evil, by his speeches and\nwritings, let him lay to heart the solemn words of Sir Humphrey\nDavy;--\"I envy no quality of mind or intellect in others,--not genius,\npower, wit, or fancy: but if I could choose what would be most\ndelightful, and I believe most useful to me, I should prefer _a firm\nreligious belief_ to every other blessing; for it makes life a\ndiscipline of goodness, creates new hopes when all earthly hopes vanish,\nand throws over the decay, the destruction of existence, the most\ngorgeous of all lights, calling up the most delightful visions, where\nthe sensualist and skeptic view only gloom, decay, and annihilation.\"\n\n            \"Attempt how vain,--\n    With things of earthly sort, with aught but God,\n    With aught but moral excellence, truth, and love\n    To satisfy and fill the immortal soul!\n    To satisfy the ocean with a drop;--\n    To marry immortality to death;\n    And with the unsubstantial Shade of Time\n    To fill the embrace of all Eternity.\"\n\nTHE END.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[251] GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE, \"Paley Refuted in his own Words,\" Third\nEdition. London, 1850. TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"A Public Discussion on the\nBeing of a God,\" Third Thousand. London, 1852. GRANT AND HOLYOAKE,\n\"Christianity and Secularism; a Public Discussion held on six successive\nThursday evenings,\" Seventh Thousand. London, 1853.\n\n[252] \"The Reasoner,\" New Series, No. VIII. 115. Of this serial it is\nsaid (XII. 6, 81), \"The Reasoner, which was established in 1846, has\ncome to be regarded as the accredited organ of Freethinking in Great\nBritain. Indeed, for a long time, it has been the principal professed\nexponent of these views, _addressed to the working and thinking\nclasses_.\"\n\n[253] Ibid., XI. 15, 222; XII. 4, 6, 49, 81.\n\n[254] \"The Reasoner,\" XII. 4, 50.\n\n[255] Ibid., XI. 18, 271.\n\n[256] Ibid., XI. 15, 232.\n\n[257] \"The Reasoner,\" XII. 24, 376.\n\n[258] Ibid., New Series, pp. 9, 130.\n\n[259] Ibid., XI. 24, 368.\n\n[260] DR. CHALMERS' \"Works,\" I. 64.\n\n[261] \"Paley Refuted,\" p. 12.\n\n[262] GRANT AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" pp. 5. 8, 221.\n\n[263] \"The Reasoner Reasoned with,\" p. 13. \"Holyoake's Reply to Dr.\nForbes of Glasgow.\"\n\n[264] \"The Logic of 'Logic of Death,'\" p. 10.\n\n[265] \"Paley Refuted,\" p. 37.\n\n[266] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" p. 13.\n\n[267] \"The Converted Atheist's Testimony.\"\n\n[268] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" pp. 56, 57.\n\n[269] HOLYOAKE, \"Logic of Death.\"\n\n[270] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" pp. 22, 37, 55.\n\n[271] HOLYOAKE, \"Logic of Death.\"\n\n[272] \"Paley Refuted,\" p. 31.\n\n[273] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" pp. 17, 24.\n\n[274] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" p. 25.\n\n[275] HOLYOAKE, \"Logic of Death.\"\n\n[276] HOLYOAKE, \"Paley Refuted,\" p. 37.\n\n[277] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" pp. 23, 47.\n\n[278] DE GRIMM, Title page of \"Paley Refuted.\"\n\n[279] HOLYOAKE, \"Paley Refuted,\" pp. 8, 11.\n\n[280] HOLYOAKE, \"Paley Refuted,\" pp. 19, 23.\n\n[281] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" p. 27.\n\n[282] HOLYOAKE, \"Paley Refuted,\" pp. 19, 24, 25.\n\n[283] Ibid., pp. 26, 32, 39. See also TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE,\n\"Discussion,\" pp. 27, 29, 34, 43, 45.\n\n[284] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" pp. 7, 414.\n\n[285] PROF. FERRIER, \"Institutes of Metaphysic,\" Epistemology, Prop.\nXXII. p. 377, also pp. 381, 385, 506.\n\n[286] DR. HAMPDEN, \"Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of\nChristianity,\" pp. 60, 64.\n\n[287] ROBERT BOYLE, \"Theological Works,\" on the term \"Nature.\"\n\n[288] PROFESSOR NICOLAS, \"Quelques Considerations sur le Pantheisme,\"\npp. 30, 33, 35, 38.\n\n[289] \"The Reasoner,\" XI. 8, 119, 23, 356. New Series, pp. 9, 141.\n\n[290] \"The Reasoner,\" XI. 23, 357.\n\n[291] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" pp. 16, 59.\n\n[292] GRANT AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" pp. 80, 81.\n\n[293] Ibid., pp. 66, 80.\n\n[294] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion.\" p. 58.\n\n[295] Psalm 66: 18; James 1: 6; 4: 3.\n\n[296] Matt. 26: 39.\n\n[297] Psalm 119: 90; Matt. 4: 6.\n\n[298] Psalm 34: 19; John 16: 33; Heb. 12: 7, 11; Rom. 5: 3; 2 Cor. 4:\n17; Rom. 8: 28, 35, 37.\n\n[299] Eccles. 3: 16, 17; 8: 11.\n\n[300] Proverbs 2: 10; Rom. 12: 11.\n\n[301] Psalm 46: 1, 2; 23: 1, 4; 2 Tim. 4: 18.\n\n[302] Matt. 7: 7, 11; 6: 32, 33.\n\n[303] Psalm 40: 1; Jonah 2: 2, 7; 2 Cor. 12: 8.\n\n[304] GRANT AND HOLYOAKE, V. 8, 40, 50, 57.\n\n[305] \"Paley Refuted,\" p. 38, 43.\n\n[306] GRANT AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" pp. V. 7.\n\n[307] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" p. 58.\n\n[308] GRANT AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" p. 223.\n\n[309] GRANT AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" pp. 4, 221.\n\n[310] Ibid., V., VI. 7.\n\n[311] HOLYOAKE, \"Paley Refuted,\" p. 43. GRANT AND HOLYOAKE,\n\"Discussion,\" pp. 7, 8.\n\n[312] \"Modern Atheism, or the Pretensions of Secularism Examined,\" p.\n59.\n\n[313] Logic of \"Logic of Death,\" p. 4.\n\n[314] DR. HAMPDEN, \"Philosophical Evidence of Christianity,\" p. 28.\n\n[315] HOLYOAKE AND GRANT, \"Discussion,\" p. 125.\n\n[316] \"Modern Atheism,\" p. 14.\n\n[317] TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, \"Discussion,\" p. 18.\n\n[318] John 3: 20, 21.\n\n\n\n\nIMPORTANT\n\nLITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS,\n\nPUBLISHED BY\n\n_GOULD AND LINCOLN_,\n\n59 WASHINGTON STREET, BOSTON.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nANNUAL OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY;\n\nOr, Year Book of Facts in Science and Art. By DAVID A. WELLS, A. M. 12mo,\ncloth, $1.25.\n\nThis work, commenced in the year 1850, and issued in the month of\nJanuary, annually, embraces an enumeration and description of every\nimportant Invention, Discovery, or Scientific Theory, reported during\nthe year. 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M.,\nProfessor of Divinity, King's College, London. 16mo, cloth, 60 cts.\n\n\nSACRED RHETORIC;\n\nOr, Composition and Delivery of Sermons. By HENRY J. RIPLEY, Professor\nin Newton Theological Institution. Including Professor Ware's Hints on\nExtemporaneous Preaching. 12mo, 75 cts.\n\n\nTHE PREACHER AND THE KING;\n\nOr, Bourdalone in the Court of Louis XIV. An Account of that\ndistinguished Era, Translated from the French of L. F. BUNGENER. With an\nIntroduction by the REV. GEORGE POTTS, D. D. New edition, with a fine\nLikeness, and a Sketch of the Author's Life. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.\n\nIt combines substantial history with the highest charm of romance. Its\nattractions are so various that it can hardly fail to find readers of\nalmost every description.--[Puritan Recorder.\n\n\nTHE PRIEST AND THE HUGUENOT;\n\nOr, Persecution in the Age of Louis XV. Translated from the French of\nL. F. BUNGENER. 2 vols., 12mo, cloth, $2.25.\n\n==> This is truly a masterly production, full of interest, and may be set\ndown as one of the greatest Protestant works of the age.\n\n\nFOOTSTEPS OF OUR FOREFATHERS.\n\nWhat they Suffered and what they Sought. Describing Localities and\nportraying Personages and Events conspicuous in the Struggles for\nReligious Liberty. By JAMES G. MIALL. Thirty-six fine Illustrations.\n12mo, $1.00.\n\nAn exceedingly entertaining work. The reader soon becomes so deeply\nentertained that he finds it difficult to lay aside the book till\nfinished.--[Ch. Parlor Mag.\n\nA work absorbingly interesting, and very instructive.--[Western Lit.\nMagazine.\n\n\nMEMORIALS OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY.\n\nPresenting, in a graphic, compact, and popular form, Memorable Events of\nEarly Ecclesiastical History, etc. By JAMES G. MIALL. With numerous\nelegant Illustrations. 12mo, cloth, $1.00.\n\n==> This, like the \"Footsteps of our Forefathers,\" will be found a work\nof uncommon interest.\n\n\nWORKS BY JOHN HARRIS, D. D.\n\nTHE PRE-ADAMITE EARTH. Contributions to Theological Science. 12mo,\ncloth, $1.00.\n\nMAN PRIMEVAL; or, the Constitution and Primitive Condition of the Human\nBeing. With a fine Portrait of the Author. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.\n\nPATRIARCHY; or, THE FAMILY. Its Constitution and Probation; being the\n_third_ volume of \"Contributions to Theological Science.\" $1.25.\n\nTHE GREAT TEACHER; or, Characteristics of our Lord's Ministry. With an\nIntroductory Essay. By H. HUMPHREY, D. D. 12mo, cloth, 85 cts.\n\nTHE GREAT COMMISSION; or, the Christian Church constituted and charged\nto convey the Gospel to the World. Introductory Essay by W. R. WILLIAMS,\nD. D. 12mo, cloth, $1.00.\n\nZEBULON; Or, the Moral Claims of Seamen. 18mo, cloth, 25 cts.\n\n\nPHILIP DODDRIDGE.\n\nHis Life and Labors. By JOHN STOUGHTON, D. D., with beautiful\nIlluminated Title-page and Frontispiece. 16mo, cloth, 60 cents.\n\n\nTHE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY,\n\nAs exhibited in the writings of its apologists, down to Augustine. By\nW. J. BOLTON, of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. 12mo, cloth, 80\ncents.\n\n\nWORKS BY DR. TWEEDIE.\n\nGLAD TIDINGS; or, The Gospel of Peace. A series of Daily Meditations for\nChristian Disciples. By Rev. W. K. TWEEDIE, D. D. With elegant\nIllustrated Title-page. 16mo, cloth, 63 cts.\n\nTHE MORN OF LIFE; or, Examples of Female Excellence. A Book for Young\nLadies. 16mo, cloth. _In press._\n\nA LAMP TO THE PATH; or, the Bible in the Heart, the Home, and the Market\nPlace. With an elegant Illustrated Title-page. 16 mo, cloth, 63 cts.\n\nSEED TIME AND HARVEST; or, Sow Well and Reap Well. A Book for the Young.\nWith an elegant Illustrated Title-page. 16mo, cloth, 63 cts.\n\n==> The above works, by Dr. Tweedie, are of uniform size and style. They\nare most charming, pious, and instructive works, beautifully gotten up,\nand well adapted for \"gift-books.\"\n\n\nWORKS BY JOHN ANGELL JAMES.\n\nTHE CHURCH MEMBER'S GUIDE; Edited by J. O. CHOULES, D. D. New edition.\nWith an Introductory Essay by Rev. HUBBARD WINSLOW. Cloth, 33c.\n\nCHRISTIAN PROGRESS. A Sequel to the Anxious Inquirer. 18mo, cloth, 31c.\n\n==> one of the best and most useful works of this popular author.\n\nTHE CHURCH IN EARNEST. Seventh thousand. 18mo, cloth, 40 cents\n\n\nMOTHERS OF THE WISE AND GOOD.\n\nBy JABEZ BURNS, D. D. 16mo, cloth, 75 cents.\n\nWe wish it were in every family, and read by every mother in the\nland.--[Lutheran Observer.\n\n\nMY MOTHER;\n\nOr, Recollections of Material Influence. By a New England Clergyman.\nWith a beautiful Frontispiece. 12mo, cloth, 75 cents.\n\nThis is one of the most charming books that have issued from the press\nfor a long period. \"It is,\" says a distinguished author, \"one of those\nrare pictures painted from life with the exquisite skill of one of the\n'Old Masters,' which so seldom present themselves to the amateur.\"\n\n\nTHE EXCELLENT WOMAN.\n\nWith an Introduction by Rev. W. B. SPRAGUE, D. D. Containing twenty-four\nsplendid Illustrations. 12mo, cloth, $1.00; cloth, gilt, $1.75; extra\nTurkey, $2.50.\n\n==> This elegant volume is an appropriate and\nvaluable \"gift book\" for the husband to present the wife, or the child\nthe mother.\n\n\nMEMORIES OF A GRANDMOTHER.\n\nBy a Lady of Massachusetts. 16mo, cloth, 50 cents.\n\n\nTHE MARRIAGE RING;\n\nOr, How to make Home Happy. By JOHN ANGELL JAMES. Beautiful illustrated\nedition. 16mo, cloth, gilt, 75 cents.\n\nA beautiful volume, and a very suitable present to a newly-married\ncouple.--[N. Y. Christian Intelligencer.\n\n\nWORKS BY WILLIAM R. WILLIAMS, D. D.\n\nRELIGIOUS PROGRESS; Discourses on the Development of the Christian\nCharacter. 12mo, cloth, 85 cts.\n\nThis work is from the pen of one of the brightest lights of the American\npulpit. We scarcely know of any living writer who has a finer command of\npowerful thought and glowing, impressive language than he.--[DR.\nSPRAGUE, Alb. Atl.\n\nLECTURES ON THE LORD'S PRAYER Third edition. 12mo, cloth, 85 cts.\n\nTheir breadth of view, strength of logic, and stirring eloquence place\nthem among the very best homilitical efforts of the age. Every page is\nfull of suggestions as well as eloquence.--Ch. Parlor Mag.\n\nMISCELLANIES. New improved edition. _Price reduced._ 12mo, $1.25.\n\n\nAMOS LAWRENCE.\n\nDIARY AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE LATE AMOS LAWRENCE; with a brief account\nof some Incidents in his Life. Edited by his son, WILLIAM R. LAWRENCE,\nM. D. With fine steel Portraits of AMOS and ABBOTT LAWRENCE, an Engraving\nof their Birth-place, a Fac-simile page of Mr. Lawrence's Hand-writing,\nand a copious Index. Octavo edition, cloth, $1.60. Royal duodecimo\nedition, $1.00.\n\nThis work was first published in an elegant octavo volume, and sold at\nthe unusually low price of $1.50. At the solicitation of numerous\nbenevolent individuals who were desirous of circulating the work--so\nremarkably adapted to do good, especially to young men--_gratuitously_,\nand of giving those of moderate means, of every class, an opportunity of\npossessing it, the royal duodecimo, or \"_cheap edition_,\" was issued,\nvarying from the other edition, only in a reduction in the size\n(allowing less margin), and the _thickness_ of the paper.\n\nWithin six months after the first publication of this work, _twenty-two\nthousand_ copies had been sold. This extraordinary sale is to be\naccounted for by the character of the man and the merits of the book. It\nis the memoir of a Boston merchant, who became distinguished for his\ngreat wealth, but more distinguished for the manner in which he used it.\nIt is the memoir of a man, who, commencing business with only $20, gave\naway in public and private charities, _during his lifetime more_,\nprobably than any other person in America. It is substantially an\n_autobiography_, containing a full account of Mr. Lawrence's career as a\nmerchant, of his various multiplied charities, and of his domestic life.\n\n     \"We have by us another work, the 'Life of Amos Lawrence.' We\n     heard it once said in the pulpit, 'There is no work of art like\n     a noble life,' and for that reason he who has achieved one,\n     takes rank with the great artists and becomes the world's\n     property. WE ARE PROUD OF THIS BOOK. WE ARE WILLING TO LET IT\n     GO FORTH TO OTHER LANDS AS A SPECIMEN OF WHAT AMERICA CAN\n     PRODUCE. In the old world, reviewers have called Barnum THE\n     characteristic American man. We are willing enough to admit\n     that he is a characteristic American man: he is ONE fruit of\n     our soil, but Amos Lawrence is another. Let our country have\n     credit for him also. THE GOOD EFFECT WHICH THIS LIFE MAY HAVE\n     IN DETERMINING THE COURSE OF YOUNG MEN TO HONOR AND VIRTUE IS\n     INCALCULABLE.\"--MRS. STOWE, IN N. Y. INDEPENDENT.\n\n     \"We are glad to know that our large business houses are\n     purchasing copies of this work for each of their numerous\n     clerks. Its influence on young men cannot be otherwise than\n     highly salutory. As a business man, Mr. Lawrence was a pattern\n     for the young clerk.\"--BOSTON TRAVELLER.\n\n     \"We are thankful for the volume before us. It carries us back\n     to the farm-house of Mr. Lawrence's birth, and the village\n     store of his first apprenticeship. It exhibits a charity noble\n     and active, while the young merchant was still poor. And above\n     all, it reveals to us a beautiful cluster of sister graces, a\n     keen sense of honor, integrity which never knew the shadow of\n     suspicion, candor in the estimate of character, filial piety,\n     rigid fidelity in every domestic relation, and all these\n     connected with and flowing from steadfast religious principle,\n     profound sentiments of devotion, and a vivid realization of\n     spiritual truth.\"--NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.\n\n     \"We are glad that American Biography has been enriched by such\n     a contribution to its treasures. In all that composes the\n     career of 'the good man,' and the practical Christian, we have\n     read few memoirs more full of instruction, or richer in lessons\n     of wisdom and virtue. We cordially unite in the opinion that\n     the publication of this memoir was a duty owed to\n     society.\"--NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.\n\n     \"With the intention of placing it within the reach of a large\n     number, the mere cost price is charged, and a more beautifully\n     printed volume, or one calculated to do more good, has not been\n     issued from the press of late years.\"--EVENING GAZETTE.\n\n     \"This book, besides being of a different class from most\n     biographies, has another peculiar charm. It shows the inside\n     life of the man. You have, as it were, a peep behind the\n     curtain, and see Mr. Lawrence as he went in and out among\n     business men, as he appeared on change, as he received his\n     friends, as he poured out, 'with liberal hand and generous\n     heart,' his wealth for the benefit of others, as he received\n     the greetings and salutations of children, and as he appeared\n     in the bosom of his family at his own hearth stone.\"--BRUNSWICK\n     TELEGRAPH.\n\n     \"It is printed on new type, the best paper, and is illustrated\n     by four beautiful plates. How it can be sold for the price\n     named is a marvel.\"--NORFOLK CO. JOURNAL.\n\n     \"It was first privately printed, and a limited number of copies\n     were distributed among the relatives and near friends of the\n     deceased. This volume was read with the deepest interest by\n     those who were so favored as to obtain a copy, and it passed\n     from friend to friend as rapidly as it could be read. Dr.\n     Lawrence has yielded to the general wish, and made public the\n     volume. It will now be widely circulated, will certainly prove\n     a standard work, and be read over and over again.\"--BOSTON\n     DAILY ADVERTISER.\n\n     [June 1st, 1856.\n\nSUPPLEMENTARY CATALOGUE\n\nOF\n\nVALUABLE WORKS,\n\nRECENTLY PUBLISHED.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTHE CAMEL: His Organization, Habits and Uses, considered with reference\nto his Introduction into the United States. By GEORGE P. MARSH, late\nU. S. Minister at Constantinople. 16mo, cloth. 75 cents.\n\nThis book treats of a subject of great interest, especially at the\npresent time. It furnishes a more complete and reliable account of the\nCamel than any other in the language: Indeed, it is believed that there\nis no other. It is the result of long study, extensive research, and\nmuch personal observation on the part the author; and it has been\nprepared with special reference to the experiment of domesticating the\nCamel in this country, now going on under the auspices of the United\nStates government. It is written in a style worthy of the distinguished\nauthor's reputation for great learning and fine scholarship.\n\n\nDR. GRANT AND THE MOUNTAIN NESTORIANS. BY REV. THOMAS LAURIE. With a\nPortrait, Map of the Country, and Illustrations. 12mo, cloth. Price\n$1.25. Third edition revised.\n\nThis edition has been thoroughly revised by the author, with the view of\nmaking the work scrupulously accurate. The map is the first correct one\nof the Nestorian country yet published. The work itself is one of the\nmost permanently valuable of its class, while it presents a full view of\nthe life and labors of the heroic missionary whose name it bears; it\nalso makes the reader familiar with the striking features of a country\nwhich, both in ancient and modern times, has been memorable in history.\nIt embraces the scene of Xenophon's immortal Anabasis, the site of\nNineveh, that mighty seat of ancient civilization, and the cities of\nKars and Erzerum, so recently the scene of deadly strife between the\nRussians and the Allies.\n\n\nANALYTICAL CONCORDANCE TO THE HOLY SCRIPTURES;\n\nOr, THE BIBLE PRESENTED UNDER DISTINCT AND CLASSIFIED HEADS OR TOPICS.\n\nBY JOHN EADIE, D. D., LL. D.,\n\nAuthor of \"Biblical Cyclopedia,\" \"Ecclesiastical Cyclopedia,\" \"Early\nOriental History,\" \"Dictionary of the Bible,\" etc. etc. One volume.\nOctavo. P. 886. (IN PRESS.) The subjects are arranged as follows, viz.:\n\n     Agriculture,\n     Animals,\n     Architecture,\n     Army, Arms,\n     Body,\n     Canaan,\n     Covenant,\n     Diet and Dress,\n     Disease and Death,\n     Earth,\n     Family,\n     Genealogy,\n     God,\n     Heaven,\n     Idolatry, Idols,\n     Jesus Christ,\n     Jews,\n     Laws,\n     Magistrates,\n     Man,\n     Marriage,\n     Metals and Minerals,\n     Ministers of Religion,\n     Miracles,\n     Occupations,\n     Ordinances,\n     Parables and Emblems,\n     Persecution,\n     Praise and Prayer,\n     Prophecy,\n     Providence,\n     Redemption,\n     Sabbaths and Holy Days,\n     Sacrifice,\n     Scriptures,\n     Speech,\n     Spirits,\n     Tabernacle and Temple,\n     Vineyard and Orchard,\n     Visions and Dreams,\n     War,\n     Water.\n\nThe object of this Concordance is to present the entire Scriptures under\na certain classified and exhaustive heads. It differs from and ordinary\nConcordance, in that its arrangement depends no on words, but on\nsubjects, and the verses are printed in full. Its plan does not bring it\nat all into competition with such limited works as those of Gaston and\nWarden; for they select doctrinal topics principally, and do not profess\nto comprehend, as we do, the entire Bible. The work also contains a\nSynoptical Table of Contents of the whole work, presenting in brief a\nsystem of biblical antiquities and theology, with a very copious and\naccurate index.\n\nThe value of this work to ministers and Sabbath school teachers can\nhardly be over-estimated; and it needs but to be examined to secure the\napproval and patronage of every Bible student.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's List of Corrections\n\nLOCATION\n         ORIGINAL\n                  CORRECTED\n\nChapter I.\n         Abbe Lamennais\n                  Abbe Lamennais\n         Atheoi en tokosmo\n                  Atheoi en to kosmo\n         distinction beetween\n                  distinction between\n         Abbe Barruel\n                  Abbe Barruel\n\nChapter II.\n         It it\n                  It is\n         artifical\n                  artificial\n         Christain\n                  Christian\n\nChapter III.\n         en kai pan\n                  hen kai pan\n         puelques\n                  quelques\n\nChapter VIII.\n         puruits\n                  pursuits\n\nChapter IX.\n         endles\n                  endless","title":"Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":140601}