{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_2053/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_2053","id":"gutenberg_2053","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2053","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - American","Category: Politics","Constitutional history -- United States","Reconstruction (U.S. history, 1865-1877)","Secession -- United States","United States -- Politics and government -- 1815-1861 -- Philosophy"],"text":"THE\n\nAMERICAN REPUBLIC:\n\nITS\n\nCONSTITUTION, TENDENCIES, AND DESTINY.\n\n\nBY\n\nO. A. BROWNSON, LL. D.\n\n\n\n\n\nNEW YORK:\n\nP. O'SHEA, 104 BLEECKER STREET.\n\n1866.\n\n\n\nEntered according to Act of Congress, In the year 1865, By P. O'SHEA,\n\nIn the Clerk's office of the District Court of the United States for\nthe Southern District of New York.\n\n\n\n\n  TO THE\n  HON. GEORGE BANCROFT,\n  THE ERUDITE, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND ELOQUENT\n  Historian of the United States,\n\n  THIS FEEBLE ATTEMPT TO SET FORTH THE PRINCIPLES OF\n  GOVERNMENT, AND TO EXPLAIN AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF\n  THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,\n  IN MEMORY OF OLD FRIENDSHIP, AND AS A\n  SLIGHT HOMAGE TO GENIUS, ABILITY,\n  PATRIOTISM, PRIVATE WORTH,\n  AND PUBLIC SERVICE,\n  BY THE AUTHOR.\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n                                                             PAGE\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nINTRODUCTION                                                    1\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nGOVERNMENT                                                     15\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT                                           26\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT--Continued                                 43\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT--Continued                                71\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT--Concluded                               106\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nCONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT                                    136\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nCONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT--Concluded                         166\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTHE UNITED STATES                                             192\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nCONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES                             218\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nTHE CONSTITUTION--Continued                                   244\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nSECESSION                                                     277\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nRECONSTRUCTION                                                309\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nPOLITICAL TENDENCIES                                          348\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nDESTINY--POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS                              392\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nIn the volume which, with much diffidence, is here offered to the\npublic, I have given, as far as I have considered it worth giving, my\nwhole thought in a connected form on the nature, necessity, extent,\nauthority, origin, ground, and constitution of government, and the\nunity, nationality, constitution, tendencies, and destiny of the\nAmerican Republic.  Many of the points treated have been from time to\ntime discussed or touched upon, and many of the views have been\npresented, in my previous writings; but this work is newly and\nindependently written from beginning to end, and is as complete on the\ntopics treated as I have been able to make it.\n\nI have taken nothing bodily from my previous essays, but I have used\ntheir thoughts as far as I have judged them sound and they came within\nthe scope of my present work.  I have not felt myself bound to adhere\nto my own past thoughts or expressions any farther than they coincide\nwith my present convictions, and I have written as freely and as\nindependently as if I had never written or published any thing before.\nI have never been the slave of my own past, and truth has always been\ndearer to me than my own opinions.  This work is not only my latest,\nbut will be my last on politics or government, and must be taken as the\nauthentic, and the only authentic statement of my political views and\nconvictions, and whatever in any of my previous writings conflicts with\nthe principles defended in its pages, must be regarded as retracted,\nand rejected.\n\nThe work now produced is based on scientific principles; but it is an\nessay rather than a scientific treatise, and even good-natured critics\nwill, no doubt, pronounce it an article or a series of articles\ndesigned for a review, rather than a book.  It is hard to overcome the\nhabits of a lifetime.  I have taken some pains to exchange the reviewer\nfor the author, but am fully conscious that I have not succeeded.  My\nwork can lay claim to very little artistic merit.  It is full of\nrepetitions; the same thought is frequently recurring,--the result, to\nsome extent, no doubt, of carelessness and the want of artistic skill;\nbut to a greater extent, I fear, of \"malice aforethought.\"  In\ncomposing my work I have followed, rather than directed, the course of\nmy thought, and, having very little confidence in the memory or\nindustry of readers, I have preferred, when the completeness of the\nargument required it, to repeat myself to encumbering my pages with\nperpetual references to what has gone before.\n\nThat I attach some value to this work is evident from my consenting to\nits publication; but how much or how little of it is really mine, I am\nquite unable to say.  I have, from my youth up, been reading,\nobserving, thinking, reflecting, talking, I had almost said writing, at\nleast by fits and starts, on political subjects, especially in their\nconnection with philosophy, theology, history, and social progress, and\nhave assimilated to my own mind what it would assimilate, without\nkeeping any notes of the sources whence the materials assimilated were\nderived.  I have written freely from my own mind as I find it now\nformed; but how it has been so formed, or whence I have borrowed, my\nreaders know as well as I. All that is valuable in the thoughts set\nforth, it is safe to assume has been appropriated from others.  Where I\nhave been distinctly conscious of borrowing what has not become common\nproperty, I have given credit, or, at least, mentioned the author's\nname, with three important exceptions which I wish to note more\nformally.\n\nI am principally indebted for the view of the American nationality and\nthe Federal Constitution I present, to hints and suggestions furnished\nby the remarkable work of John C. Hurd, Esq., on The Law of Freedom and\nBondage in the United States, a work of rare learning and profound\nphilosophic views.  I could not have written my work without the aid\nderived from its suggestions, any more than I could without Plato,\nAristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Suarez, Pierre Leroux, and the\nAbbate Gioberti.  To these two last-named authors, one a humanitarian\nsophist, the other a Catholic priest, and certainly one of the\nprofoundest philosophical writers of this century, I am much indebted,\nthough I have followed the political system of neither.  I have taken\nfrom Leroux the germs of the doctrine I set forth on the solidarity of\nthe race, and from Gioberti the doctrine I defend in relation to the\ncreative act, which is, after all, simply that of the Credo and the\nfirst verse of Genesis.\n\nIn treating the several questions which the preparation of this volume\nhas brought up, in their connection, and in the light of first\nprinciples, I have changed or modified, on more than one important\npoint, the views I had expressed in my previous writings, especially on\nthe distinction between civilized and barbaric nations, the real basis\nof civilization itself, and the value to the world of the Graeco-Roman\ncivilization.  I have ranked feudalism under the head of barbarism,\nrejected every species of political aristocracy, and represented the\nEnglish constitution as essentially antagonistic to the American, not\nas its type.  I have accepted universal suffrage in principle, and\ndefended American democracy, which I define to be territorial\ndemocracy, and carefully distinguish from pure individualism on the one\nhand, and from pure socialism or humanitarianism on the other.\n\nI reject the doctrine of State sovereignty, which I held and defended\nfrom 1828 to 1861, but still maintain that the sovereignty of the\nAmerican Republic vests in the States, though in the States\ncollectively, or united, not severally, and thus escape alike\nconsolidation and disintegration.  I find, with Mr. Madison, our most\nphilosophic statesman, the originality of the American system in the\ndivision of powers between a General government having sole charge of\nthe foreign and general, and particular or State governments having,\nwithin their respective territories, sole charge of the particular\nrelations and interests of the American people; but I do not accept his\nconcession that this division is of conventional origin, and maintain\nthat it enters into the original Providential constitution of the\nAmerican state, as I have done in my Review for October, 1863, and\nJanuary and October, 1864.\n\nI maintain, after Mr.  Senator Sumner, one of the most philosophic and\naccomplished living American statesmen, that \"State secession is State\nsuicide,\" but modify the opinion I too hastily expressed that the\npolitical death of a State dissolves civil society within its territory\nand abrogates all rights held under it, and accept the doctrine that\nthe laws in force at the time of secession remain in force till\nsuperseded or abrogated by competent authority, and also that, till the\nState is revived and restored as a State in the Union, the only\nauthority, under the American system, competent to supersede or\nabrogate them is the United States, not Congress, far less the\nExecutive.  The error of the Government is not in recognizing the\nterritorial laws as surviving secession but in counting a State that\nhas seceded as still a State in the Union, with the right to be counted\nas one of the United States in amending the Constitution.  Such State\ngoes out of the Union, but comes under it.\n\nI have endeavored throughout to refer my particular political views; to\ntheir general principles, and to show that the general principles\nasserted have their origin and ground in the great, universal, and\nunchanging principles of the universe itself. Hence, I have labored to\nshow the scientific relations of political to theological principles,\nthe real principles of all science, as of all reality.  An atheist, I\nhave said, may be a politician; but if there were no God, there could\nbe no politics. This may offend the sciolists of the age, but I must\nfollow science where it leads, and cannot be arrested by those who\nmistake their darkness for light.\n\nI write throughout as a Christian, because I am a Christian; as a\nCatholic, because all Christian principles, nay, all real principles\nare catholic, and there is nothing sectarian either in nature or\nrevelation.  I am a Catholic by God's grace and great goodness, and\nmust write as I am.  I could not write otherwise if I would, and would\nnot if I could.  I have not obtruded my religion, and have referred to\nit only where my argument demanded it; but I have had neither the\nweakness nor the bad taste to seek to conceal or disguise it.  I could\nnever have written my book without the knowledge I have, as a Catholic,\nof Catholic theology, and my acquaintance, slight as it is, with the\ngreat fathers and doctors of the church, the great masters of all that\nis solid or permanent in modern thought, either with Catholics or\nnon-Catholics.\n\nMoreover, though I write for all Americans, without distinction of sect\nor party, I have had more especially in view the people of my own\nreligious communion.  It is no discredit to a man in the United States\nat the present day to be a firm, sincere, and devout Catholic.  The old\nsectarian prejudice may remain with a few, \"whose eyes,\" as Emerson\nsays, \"are in their hind-head, not in their fore-head;\" but the\nAmerican people are not at heart sectarian, and the nothingarianism so\nprevalent among them only marks their state of transition from\nsectarian opinions to positive Catholic faith.  At any rate, it can no\nlonger be denied that Catholics are an integral, living, and growing\nelement in the American population, quite too numerous, too wealthy,\nand too influential to be ignored.  They have played too conspicuous a\npart in the late troubles of the country, and poured out too freely and\ntoo much of their richest and noblest blood in defence of the unity of\nthe nation and the integrity of its domain, for that.  Catholics\nhenceforth must be treated as standing, in all respects, on a footing\nof equality with any other class of American citizens, and their views\nof political science, or of any other science, be counted of equal\nimportance, and listened to with equal attention.\n\nI have no fears that my book will be neglected because avowedly by a\nCatholic author, and from a Catholic publishing house.  They who are\nnot Catholics will read it, and it will enter into the current of\nAmerican literature, if it is one they must read in order to be up with\nthe living and growing thought of the age. If it is not a book of that\nsort, it is not worth reading by any one.\n\nFurthermore, I am ambitious, even in my old age, and I wish to exert an\ninfluence on the future of my country, for which I have made, or,\nrather, my family have made, some sacrifices, and which I tenderly\nlove.  Now, I believe that he who can exert the most influence on our\nCatholic population, especially in giving tone and direction to our\nCatholic youth, will exert the most influence in forming the character\nand shaping the future destiny of the American Republic.  Ambition and\npatriotism alike, as well as my own Catholic faith and sympathies,\ninduce me to address myself primarily to Catholics.  I quarrel with\nnone of the sects; I honor virtue wherever I see it, and accept truth\nwherever I find it; but, in my belief, no sect is destined to a long\nlife, or a permanent possession.  I engage in no controversy with any\none not of my religion, for, if the positive, affirmative truth is\nbrought out and placed in a clear light before the public, whatever is\nsectarian in any of the sects will disappear as the morning mists\nbefore the rising sun.\n\nI expect the most intelligent and satisfactory appreciation of my book\nfrom the thinking and educated classes among Catholics; but I speak to\nmy countrymen at large.  I could not personally serve my country in the\nfield: my habits as well as my infirmities prevented, to say nothing of\nmy age; but I have endeavored in this humble work to add my\ncontribution, small though it may be, to political science, and to\ndischarge, as far as I am able, my debt of loyalty and patriotism.  I\nwould the book were more of a book, more worthy of my countrymen, and a\nmore weighty proof of the love I beat them, and with which I have\nwritten it.  All I can say is, that it is an honest book, a sincere\nbook, and contains my best thoughts on the subjects treated.  If well\nreceived, I shall be grateful; if neglected, I shall endeavor to\npractise resignation, as I have so often done.\n\n\nO. A. BROWNSON.\n\nELIZABETH, N. J., September 16, 1865.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe ancients summed up the whole of human wisdom in the maxim, Know\nThyself, and certainly there is for an individual no more important as\nthere is no more difficult knowledge, than knowledge of himself, whence\nhe comes, whither he goes, what he is, what he is for, what he can do,\nwhat he ought to do, and what are his means of doing it.\n\nNations are only individuals on a larger scale.  They have a life, an\nindividuality, a reason, a conscience, and instincts of their own, and\nhave the same general laws of development and growth, and, perhaps, of\ndecay, as the individual man.  Equally important, and no less difficult\nthan for the individual, is it for a nation to know itself, understand\nits own existence, its own powers and faculties, rights and duties,\nconstitution, instincts, tendencies, and destiny.  A nation has a\nspiritual as well as a material, a moral as well as a physical\nexistence, and is subjected to internal as well as external conditions\nof health and virtue, greatness and grandeur, which it must in some\nmeasure understand and observe, or become weak and infirm, stunted in\nits growth, and end in premature decay and death.\n\nAmong nations, no one has more need of full knowledge of itself than\nthe United States, and no one has hitherto had less.  It has hardly had\na distinct consciousness of its own national existence, and has lived\nthe irreflective life of the child, with no severe trial, till the\nrecent rebellion, to throw it back on itself and compel it to reflect\non its own constitution, its own separate existence, individuality,\ntendencies, and end.  The defection of the slaveholding States, and the\nfearful struggle that has followed for national unity and integrity,\nhave brought it at once to a distinct recognition of itself, and forced\nit to pass from thoughtless, careless, heedless, reckless adolescence\nto grave and reflecting manhood.  The nation has been suddenly\ncompelled to study itself, and henceforth must act from reflection,\nunderstanding, science, statesmanship, not from instinct, impulse,\npassion, or caprice, knowing well what it does, and wherefore it does\nit.  The change which four years of civil war have wrought in the\nnation is great, and is sure to give it the seriousness, the gravity,\nthe dignity, the manliness it has heretofore lacked.\n\nThough the nation has been brought to a consciousness of its own\nexistence, it has not, even yet, attained to a full and clear\nunderstanding of its own national constitution.  Its vision is still\nobscured by the floating mists of its earlier morning, and its judgment\nrendered indistinct and indecisive by the wild theories and fancies of\nits childhood.  The national mind has been quickened, the national\nheart has been opened, the national disposition prepared, but there\nremains the important work of dissipating the mists that still linger,\nof brushing away these wild theories and fancies, and of enabling it to\nform a clear and intelligent judgment of itself, and a true and just\nappreciation of its own constitution tendencies,--and destiny; or, in\nother words, of enabling the nation to understand its own idea, and the\nmeans of its actualization in space and time.\n\nEvery living nation has an idea given it by Providence to realize, and\nwhose realization is its special work, mission, or destiny.  Every\nnation is, in some sense, a chosen people of God. The Jews were the\nchosen people of God, through whom the primitive traditions were to be\npreserved in their purity and integrity, and the Messiah was to come.\nThe Greeks were the chosen people of God, for the development and\nrealization of the beautiful or the divine splendor in art, and of the\ntrue in science and philosophy; and the Romans, for the development of\nthe state, law, and jurisprudence.  The great despotic nations of Asia\nwere never properly nations; or if they were nations with a mission,\nthey proved false to it--, and count for nothing in the progressive\ndevelopment of the human race.  History has not recorded their mission,\nand as far as they are known they have contributed only to the abnormal\ndevelopment or corruption of religion and civilization.  Despotism is\nbarbaric and abnormal.\n\nThe United States, or the American Republic, has a mission, and is\nchosen of God for the realization of a great idea.  It has been chosen\nnot only to continue the work assigned to Greece and Rome, but to\naccomplish a greater work than was assigned to either.  In art, it will\nprove false to its mission if it do not rival Greece; and in science\nand philosophy, if it do not surpass it.  In the state, in law, in\njurisprudence, it must continue and surpass Rome.  Its idea is liberty,\nindeed, but liberty with law, and law with liberty.  Yet its mission is\nnot so much the realization of liberty as the realization of the true\nidea of the state, which secures at once the authority of the public\nand the freedom of the individual--the sovereignty of the people\nwithout social despotism, and individual freedom without anarchy.  In\nother words, its mission is to bring out in its life the dialectic\nunion of authority and liberty, of the natural rights of man and those\nof society.  The Greek and Roman republics asserted the state to the\ndetriment of individual freedom; modern republics either do the same,\nor assert individual freedom to the detriment of the state.  The\nAmerican republic has been instituted by Providence to realize the\nfreedom of each with advantage to the other.\n\nThe real mission of the United States is to introduce and establish a\npolitical constitution, which, while it retains all the advantages of\nthe constitutions of states thus far known, is unlike any of them, and\nsecures advantages which none of them did or could possess.  The\nAmerican constitution has no prototype in any prior constitution.  The\nAmerican form of government can be classed throughout with none of the\nforms of government described by Aristotle, or even by later\nauthorities.  Aristotle knew only four forms of government: Monarchy,\nAristocracy, Democracy, and Mixed Governments.  The American form is\nnone of these, nor any combination of them.  It is original, a new\ncontribution to political science, and seeks to attain the end of all\nwise and just government by means unknown or forbidden to the ancients,\nand which have been but imperfectly comprehended even by American\npolitical writers themselves.  The originality of the American\nconstitution has been overlooked by the great majority even of our own\nstatesmen, who seek to explain it by analogies borrowed from the\nconstitutions of other states rather than by a profound study of its\nown principles.  They have taken too low a view of it, and have rarely,\nif ever, appreciated its distinctive and peculiar merits.\n\nAs the United States have vindicated their national unity and\nintegrity, and are preparing to take a new start in history, nothing is\nmore important than that they should take that new start with a clear\nand definite view of their national constitution, and with a distinct\nunderstanding of their political mission in the future of the world.\nThe citizen who can help his countrymen to do this will render them an\nimportant service and deserve well of his country, though he may have\nbeen unable to serve in her armies and defend her on the battle-field.\nThe work now to be done by American statesmen is even more difficult\nand more delicate than that which has been accomplished by our brave\narmies.  As yet the people are hardly better prepared for the political\nwork to be done than they were at the outbreak of the civil war for the\nmilitary work they have so nobly achieved.  But, with time, patience,\nand good-will, the difficulties may be overcome, the errors of the past\ncorrected, and the Government placed on the right track for the future.\n\nIt will hardly be questioned that either the constitution of the United\nStates is very defective or it has been very grossly misinterpreted by\nall parties.  If the slave States had not held that the States are\nseverally sovereign, and the Constitution of the United States a simple\nagreement or compact, they would never have seceded; and if the Free\nStates had not confounded the Union with the General government, and\nshown a tendency to make it the entire national government, no occasion\nor pretext for secession would have been given.  The great problem of\nour statesmen has been from the first, How to assert union without\nconsolidation, and State rights without disintegration?  Have they, as\nyet, solved that problem?  The war has silenced the State sovereignty\ndoctrine, indeed, but has it done so without lesion to State rights?\nHas it done it without asserting the General government as the supreme,\ncentral, or national government?  Has it done it without striking a\ndangerous blow at the federal element of the constitution?  In\nsuppressing by armed force the doctrine that the States are severally\nsovereign, what barrier is left against consolidation?  Has not one\ndanger been removed only to give place to another?\n\nBut perhaps the constitution itself, if rightly understood, solves the\nproblem; and perhaps the problem itself is raised precisely through\nmisunderstanding of the constitution.  Our statesmen have recognized no\nconstitution of the American people themselves; they have confined\ntheir views to the written constitution, as if that constituted the\nAmerican people a state or nation, instead of being, as it is, only a\nlaw ordained by the nation already existing and constituted.  Perhaps,\nif they had recognized and studied the constitution which preceded that\ndrawn up by the Convention of 1787, and which is intrinsic, inherent in\nthe republic itself, they would have seen that it solves the problem,\nand asserts national unity without consolidation, and the rights of the\nseveral States without danger of disintegration. The whole controversy,\npossibly, has originated in a misunderstanding of the real constitution\nof the United States, and that misunderstanding itself in the\nmisunderstanding of the origin and constitution of government in\ngeneral.  The constitution, as will appear in the course of this essay\nis not defective; and all that is necessary to guard against either\ndanger is to discard all our theories of the constitution, and return\nand adhere to the constitution itself, as it really is and always has\nbeen.\n\nThere is no doubt that the question of Slavery had much to do with the\nrebellion, but it was not its sole cause.  The real cause must be\nsought in the program that had been made, especially in the States\nthemselves, in forming and administering their respective governments,\nas well as the General government, in accordance with political\ntheories borrowed from European speculators on government, the\nso-called Liberals and Revolutionists, which have and can have no\nlegitimate application in the United States.  The tendency of American\npolitics, for the last thirty or forty years, has been, within the\nseveral States themselves, in the direction of centralized democracy,\nas if the American people had for their mission only the reproduction\nof ancient Athens.  The American system is not that of any of the\nsimple forms of government, nor any combination of them.  The attempt\nto bring it under any of the simple or mixed forms of government\nrecognized by political writers, is an attempt to clothe the future in\nthe cast-off garments of the past.  The American system, wherever\npracticable, is better than monarchy, better than aristocracy, better\nthan simple democracy, better than any possible combination of these\nseveral forms, because it accords more nearly with the principles of\nthings, the real order of the universe.\n\nBut American statesmen have studied the constitutions of other states\nmore than that of their own, and have succeeded in obscuring the\nAmerican system in the minds of the people, and giving them in its\nplace pure and simple democracy, which is its false development or\ncorruption.  Under the influence of this false development, the people\nwere fast losing sight of the political truth that, though the people\nare sovereign, it is the organic, not the inorganic people, the\nterritorial people, not the people as simple population, and were\nbeginning to assert the absolute God-given right of the majority to\ngovern.  All the changes made in the bosom of the States themselves\nhave consisted in removing all obstacles to the irresponsible will of\nthe majority, leaving minorities and individuals at their mercy. This\ntendency to a centralized democracy had more to do with provoking\nsecession and rebellion than the anti-slavery sentiments of the\nNorthern, Central, and Western States.\n\nThe failure of secession and the triumph of the National cause, in\nspite of the short-sightedness and blundering of the Administration,\nhave proved the vitality and strength of the national constitution, and\nthe greatness of the American people. They say nothing for or against\nthe democratic theory of our demagogues, but every thing in favor of\nthe American system or constitution of government, which has found a\nfirmer support in American instincts than in American statesmanship.\nIn spite of all that had been done by theorists, radicals, and\nrevolutionists, no-government men, non-resistants, humanitarians, and\nsickly sentimentalists to corrupt the American people in mind, heart,\nand body, the native vigor of their national constitution has enabled\nthem to come forth triumphant from the trial.  Every American patriot\nhas reason to be proud of his country-men, and every American lover of\nfreedom to be satisfied with the institutions of his country.  But\nthere is danger that the politicians and demagogues will ascribe the\nmerit, not to the real and living national constitution, but to their\nmiserable theories of that constitution, and labor to aggravate the\nseveral evils and corrupt tendencies which caused the rebellion it has\ncost so much to suppress.  What is now wanted is, that the people,\nwhose instincts are right, should understand the American constitution\nas it is, and so understand it as to render it impossible for political\ntheorists, no matter of what school or party, to deceive them again as\nto its real import, or induce them to depart from it in their political\naction.\n\nA work written with temper, without passion or sectional prejudice, in\na philosophical spirit, explaining to the American people their own\nnational constitution, and the mutual relations of the General\ngovernment and the State governments, cannot, at this important crisis\nin our affairs, be inopportune, and, if properly executed, can hardly\nfail to be of real service.  Such a work is now attempted--would it\nwere by another and abler hand--which, imperfect as it is, may at least\noffer some useful suggestions, give a right direction to political\nthought, although it should fail to satisfy the mind of the reader.\n\nThis much the author may say, in favor of his own work, that it sets\nforth no theory of government in general, or of the United States in\nparticular.  The author is not a monarchist, an aristocrat, a democrat,\na feudalist, nor an advocate of what are called mixed governments like\nthe English, at least for his own country; but is simply an American,\ndevoted to the real, living, and energizing constitution of the\nAmerican republic as it is, not as some may fancy it might be, or are\nstriving to make it. It is, in his judgment, what it ought to be, and\nhe has no other ambition than to present it as it is to the\nunderstanding and love of his countrymen.\n\nPerhaps simple artistic unity and propriety would require the author to\ncommence his essay directly with the United States; but while the\nconstitution of the United States is original and peculiar, the\ngovernment of the United States has necessarily something in common\nwith all legitimate governments, and he has thought it best to precede\nhis discussion of the American republic, its constitution, tendencies,\nand destiny, by some considerations on government in general.  He does\nthis because he believes, whether rightly or not, that while the\nAmerican people have received from Providence a most truly profound and\nadmirable system of government, they are more or less infected with the\nfalse theories of government which have been broached during the last\ntwo centuries.  In attempting to realize these theories, they have\nalready provoked or rendered practicable a rebellion which has\nseriously threatened the national existence, and come very near putting\nan end to the American order of civilization itself.  These theories\nhave received already a shock in the minds of all serious and thinking\nmen; but the men who think are in every nation a small minority, and it\nis necessary to give these theories a public refutation, and bring back\nthose who do not think, as well as those who do, from the world of\ndreams to the world of reality.  It is hoped, therefore, that any\napparent want of artistic unity or symmetry in the essay will be\npardoned for the sake of the end the author has had in view.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nGOVERNMENT.\n\n\nMan is a dependent being, and neither does nor can suffice for himself.\nHe lives not in himself, but lives and moves and has his being in God.\nHe exists, develops, and fulfils his existence only by communion with\nGod, through which he participates of the divine being and life.  He\ncommunes with God through the divine creative act and the Incarnation\nof the Word, through his kind, and through the material world.\nCommunion with God through Creation and Incarnation is religion,\ndistinctively taken, which binds man to God as his first cause, and\ncarries him onward to God as his final cause; communion through the\nmaterial world is expressed by the word property; and communion with\nGod through humanity is society.  Religion, society, property, are the\nthree terms that embrace the whole of man's life, and express the\nessential means and conditions of his existence, his development, and\nhis perfection, or the fulfilment of his existence, the attainment of\nthe end for which he is created.\n\nThough society, or the communion of man with his Maker through his\nkind, is not all that man needs in order to live, to grow, to actualize\nthe possibilities of his nature, and to attain to his beatitude, since\nhumanity is neither God nor the material universe, it is yet a\nnecessary and essential condition of his life, his progress, and the\ncompletion of his existence.  He is born and lives in society, and can\nbe born and live nowhere else. It is one of the necessities of his\nnature.  \"God saw that it was not good for man to be alone.\"  Hence,\nwherever man is found he is found in society, living in more or less\nstrict intercourse with his kind.\n\nBut society never does and never can exist without government of some\nsort.  As society is a necessity of man's nature, so is government a\nnecessity of society.  The simplest form of society is the family--Adam\nand Eve.  But though Adam and Eve are in many respects equal, and have\nequally important though different parts assigned them, one or the\nother must be head and governor, or they cannot form the society called\nfamily.  They would be simply two individuals of different sexes, and\nthe family would fail for the want of unity.\n\nChildren cannot be reared, trained, or educated without some degree of\nfamily government, of some authority to direct, control, restrain, or\nprescribe.  Hence the authority of the husband and father is recognized\nby the common consent of mankind.  Still more apparent is the necessity\nof government the moment the family develops and grows into the tribe,\nand the tribe into the nation.  Hence no nation exists without\ngovernment; and we never find a savage tribe, however low or degraded,\nthat does not assert somewhere in the father, in the elders, or in the\ntribe itself, the rude outlines or the faint reminiscences of some sort\nof government, with authority to demand obedience and to punish the\nrefractory.  Hence, as man is nowhere found out of society, so nowhere\nis society found without government.\n\nGovernment is necessary: but let it be remarked by the way, that its\nnecessity does not grow exclusively or chiefly out of the fact that the\nhuman race by sin has fallen from its primitive integrity, or original\nrighteousness.  The fall asserted by Christian theology, though often\nmisinterpreted, and its effects underrated or exaggerated, is a fact\ntoo sadly confirmed by individual experience and universal history; but\nit is not the cause why government is necessary, though it may be an\nadditional reason for demanding it.  Government would have been\nnecessary if man had not sinned, and it is needed for the good as well\nas for the bad.  The law was promulgated in the Garden, while man\nretained his innocence and remained in the integrity of his nature.  It\nexists in heaven as well as on earth, and in heaven in its perfection.\nIts office is not purely repressive, to restrain violence, to redress\nwrongs, and to punish the transgressor.  It has something more to do\nthan to restrict our natural liberty, curb our passions, and maintain\njustice between man and man.  Its office is positive as well as\nnegative.  It is needed to render effective the solidarity of the\nindividuals of a nation, and to render the nation an organism, not a\nmere organization--to combine men in one living body, and to strengthen\nall with the strength of each, and each with the strength of all--to\ndevelop, strengthen, and sustain individual liberty, and to utilize and\ndirect it to the promotion of the common weal--to be a social\nprovidence, imitating in its order and degree the action of the divine\nprovidence itself, and, while it provides for the common good of all,\nto protect each, the lowest and meanest, with the whole force and\nmajesty of society. It is the minister of wrath to wrong-doers, indeed,\nbut its nature is beneficent, and its action defines and protects the\nright of property, creates and maintains a medium in which religion can\nexert her supernatural energy, promotes learning, fosters science and\nart, advances civilization, and contributes as a powerful means to the\nfulfilment by man of the Divine purpose in his existence.  Next after\nreligion, it is man's greatest good; and even religion without it can\ndo only a small portion of her work. They wrong it who call it a\nnecessary evil; it is a great good, and, instead of being distrusted,\nhated, or resisted, except in its abuses, it should be loved,\nrespected, obeyed, and if need be, defended at the cost of all earthly\ngoods, and even of life itself.\n\nThe nature or essence of government is to govern.  A government that\ndoes not govern, is simply no government at all.  If it has not the\nability to govern and governs not, it may be an agency, an instrument\nin the bands of individuals for advancing their private interests, but\nit is not government.  To be government it must govern both individuals\nand the community.  If it is a mere machine for making prevail the will\nof one man, of a certain number of men, or even of the community, it\nmay be very effective sometimes for good, sometimes for evil, oftenest\nfor evil, but government in the proper sense of the word it is not.  To\ngovern is to direct, control, restrain, as the pilot controls and\ndirects his ship.  It necessarily implies two terms, governor and\ngoverned, and a real distinction between them.  The denial of all real\ndistinction between governor and governed is an error in politics\nanalogous to that in philosophy or theology of denying all real\ndistinction between creator and creature, God and the universe, which\nall the world knows is either pantheism or pure atheism--the supreme\nsophism.  If we make governor and governed one and the same, we efface\nboth terms; for there is no governor nor governed, if the will that\ngoverns is identically the will that is governed.  To make the\ncontroller and the controlled the same is precisely to deny all\ncontrol.  There must, then, if there is government at all, be a power,\nforce, or will that governs, distinct from that which is governed.  In\nthose governments in which it is held that the people govern, the\npeople governing do and must act in a diverse relation from the people\ngoverned, or there is no real government.\n\nGovernment is not only that which governs, but that which has the right\nor authority to govern.  Power without right is not government.\nGovernments have the right to use force at need, but might does not\nmake right, and not every power wielding the physical force of a nation\nis to be regarded as its rightful government.  Whatever resort to\nphysical force it may be obliged to make, either in defence of its\nauthority or of the rights of the nation, the government itself lies in\nthe moral order, and politics is simply a branch of ethics--that branch\nwhich treats of the rights and duties of men in their public relations,\nas distinguished from their rights and duties in their private\nrelations.\n\nGovernment being not only that which governs, but that which has the\nright to govern, obedience to it becomes a moral duty, not a mere\nphysical necessity.  The right to govern and the duty to obey are\ncorrelatives, and the one cannot exist or be conceived without the\nother.  Hence loyalty is not simply an amiable sentiment but a duty, a\nmoral virtue.  Treason is not merely a difference in political opinion\nwith the governing authority, but a crime against the sovereign, and a\nmoral wrong, therefore a sin against God, the Founder of the moral Law.\nTreason, if committed in other Countries, unhappily, has been more\nfrequently termed by our countrymen Patriotism and loaded with honor\nthan branded as a crime, the greatest of crimes, as it is, that human\ngovernments have authority to punish.  The American people have been\nchary of the word loyalty, perhaps because they regard it as the\ncorrelative of royalty; but loyalty is rather the correlative of law,\nand is, in its essence, love and devotion to the sovereign authority,\nhowever constituted or wherever lodged.  It is as necessary, as much a\nduty, as much a virtue in republics as in monarchies; and nobler\nexamples of the most devoted loyalty are not found in the world's\nhistory than were exhibited in the ancient Greek and Roman republics,\nor than have been exhibited by both men and women in the young republic\nof the United States. Loyalty is the highest, noblest, and most\ngenerous of human virtues, and is the human element of that sublime\nlove or charity which the inspired Apostle tells us is the fulfilment\nof the law. It has in it the principle of devotion, of self-sacrifice,\nand is, of all human virtues, that which renders man the most Godlike.\nThere is nothing great, generous, good, or heroic of which a truly\nloyal people are not capable, and nothing mean, base, cruel, brutal,\ncriminal, detestable, not to be expected of a really disloyal people.\nSuch a people no generous sentiment can move, no love can bind.  It\nmocks at duty, scorns virtue, tramples on all rights, and holds no\nperson, no thing, human or divine, sacred or inviolable.  The assertion\nof government as lying in the moral order, defines civil liberty, and\nreconciles it with authority.  Civil liberty is freedom to do whatever\none pleases that authority permits or does not forbid.  Freedom to\nfollow in all things one's own will or inclination, without any civil\nrestraint, is license, not liberty.  There is no lesion to liberty in\nrepressing license, nor in requiring obedience to the commands of the\nauthority that has the right to command.  Tyranny or oppression is not\nin being subjected to authority, but in being subjected to usurped\nauthority--to a power that has no right to command, or that commands\nwhat exceeds its right or its authority.  To say that it is contrary to\nliberty to be forced to forego our own will or inclination in any case\nwhatever, is simply denying the right of all government, and falling\ninto no-governmentism.  Liberty is violated only when we are required\nto forego our own will or inclination by a power that has no right to\nmake the requisition; for we are bound to obedience as far as authority\nhas right to govern, and we can never have the right to disobey a\nrightful command.  The requisition, if made by rightful authority,\nthen, violates no right that we have or can have, and where there is no\nviolation of our rights there is no violation of our liberty.  The\nmoral right of authority, which involves the moral duty of obedience,\npresents, then, the ground on which liberty and authority may meet in\npeace and operate to the same end.\n\nThis has no resemblance to the slavish doctrine of passive obedience,\nand that the resistance to power can never be lawful. The tyrant may be\nlawfully resisted, for the tyrant, by force of the word itself, is a\nusurper, and without authority.  Abuses of power may be resisted even\nby force when they become too great to be endured, when there is no\nlegal or regular way of redressing them, and when there is a reasonable\nprospect that resistance will prove effectual and substitute something\nbetter in their place.  But it is never lawful to resist the rightful\nsovereign, for it can never be right to resist right, and the rightful\nsovereign in the constitutional exercise of his power can never be said\nto abuse it.  Abuse is the unconstitutional or wrongful exercise of a\npower rightfully held, and when it is not so exercised there is no\nabuse or abuses to redress.  All turns, then, on the right of power, or\nits legitimacy.  Whence does government derive its right to govern?\nWhat is the origin and ground of sovereignty?  This question is\nfundamental and without a true answer to it politics cannot be a\nscience, and there can be no scientific statesmanship.  Whence, then,\ncomes the sovereign right to govern?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT\n\n\nGovernment is both a fact and a right.  Its origin as a fact, is simply\na question of history; its origin as a right or authority to govern, is\na question of ethics.  Whether a certain territory and its population\nare a sovereign state or nation, or not--whether the actual ruler of a\ncountry is its rightful ruler, or not--is to be determined by the\nhistorical facts in the case; but whence the government derives its\nright to govern, is a question that can be solved only by philosophy,\nor, philosophy failing, only by revelation.\n\nPolitical writers, not carefully distinguishing between the fact and\nthe right, have invented various theories as to the origin of\ngovernment, among which may be named--\n\nI. Government originates in the right of the father to govern his child.\n\nII. It originates in convention, and is a social compact.\n\nIII. It originates in the people, who, collectively taken, are\nsovereign.\n\nIV. Government springs from the spontaneous development of nature.\n\nV. It derives its right from the immediate and express appointment of\nGod;--\n\nVI. From God through the Pope, or visible head of the spiritual\nsociety;--\n\nVII. From God through the people;--\n\nVIII. From God through the natural law.\n\nI. The first theory is sound, if the question is confined to the origin\nof government as a fact.  The patriarchal system is the earliest known\nsystem of government, and unmistakable traces of it are found in nearly\nall known governments--in the tribes of Arabia and Northern Africa, the\nIrish septs and the Scottish clans, the Tartar hordes, the Roman\nqentes, and the Russian and Hindoo villages.  The right of the father\nwas held to be his right to govern his family or household, which, with\nhis children, included his wife and servants.  From the family to the\ntribe the transition is natural and easy, as also from the tribe to the\nnation.  The father is chief of the family; the chief of the eldest\nfamily is chief of the tribe; the chief of the eldest tribe becomes\nchief of the nation, and, as such, king or monarch. The heads of\nfamilies collected in a senate form an aristocracy, and the families\nthemselves, represented by their delegates, or publicly assembling for\npublic affairs, constitute a democracy. These three forms, with their\nseveral combinations, to wit, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and\nmixed governments, are all the forms known to Aristotle, and have\ngenerally been held to be all that are possible.\n\nHistorically, all governments have, in some sense, been developed from\nthe patriarchal, as all society has been developed from the family.\nEven those governments, like the ancient Roman and the modern feudal,\nwhich seem to be founded on landed property, may be traced back to a\npatriarchal origin.  The patriarch is sole proprietor, and the\npossessions of the family are vested in him, and he governs as\nproprietor as well as father.  In the tribe, the chief is the\nproprietor, and in the nation, the king is the landlord, and holds the\ndomain.  Hence, the feudal baron is invested with his fief by the\nsuzerain, holds it from him, and to him it escheats when forfeited or\nvacant.  All the great Asiatic kings of ancient or modern times hold\nthe domain and govern as proprietors; they have the authority of the\nfather and the owner; and their subjects, though theoretically their\nchildren, are really their slaves.\n\nIn Rome, however, the proprietary right undergoes an important\ntransformation.  The father retains all the power of the patriarch\nwithin his family, the patrician in his gens or house, but, outside of\nit, is met and controlled by the city or state. The heads of houses are\nunited in the senate, and collectively constitute and govern the state.\nYet, not all the heads of houses have seats in the senate, but only the\ntenants of the sacred territory of the city, which has been surveyed\nand marked by the god Terminus.  Hence the great plebeian houses, often\nricher and nobler than the patrician, were excluded from all share in\nthe government and the honors of the state, because they were not\ntenants of any portion of the sacred territory.  There is here the\nintroduction of an element which is not patriarchal, and which\ntransforms the patriarch or chief of a tribe into the city or state,\nand founds the civil order, or what is now called civilization.  The\ncity or state takes the place of the private proprietor, and\nterritorial rights take the place of purely personal rights.\n\nIn the theory of the Roman law, the land owns the man, not the man the\nland.  When land was transferred to a new tenant, the practice in early\ntimes was to bury him in it, in order to indicate that it took\npossession of him, received, accepted, or adopted him; and it was only\nsuch persons as were taken possession of, accepted or adopted by the\nsacred territory or domain that, though denizens of Rome, were citizens\nwith full political rights.  This, in modern language, means that the\nstate is territorial, not personal, and that the citizen appertains to\nthe state, not the state to the citizen.  Under the patriarchal, the\ntribal, and the Asiatic monarchical systems, there is, properly\nspeaking, no state, no citizens, and the organization is economical\nrather than political.  Authority--even the nation itself--is personal,\nnot territorial.  The patriarch, the chief of the tribe, or the king,\nis the only proprietor.  Under the Graeco-Roman system all this is\ntransformed.  The nation is territorial as well as personal, and the\nreal proprietor is the city or state.  Under the Empire, no doubt, what\nlawyers call the eminent domain was vested in the emperor, but only as\nthe representative and trustee of the city or state.\n\nWhen or by what combination of events this transformation was effected,\nhistory does not inform us.  The first-born of Adam, we are told, built\na city, and called it after his son Enoch; but there is no evidence\nthat it was constituted a municipality.  The earliest traces of the\ncivil order proper are found in the Greek and Italian republics, and\nits fullest and grandest developments are found in Rome, imperial as\nwell as republican.  It was no doubt preceded by the patriarchal\nsystem, and was historically developed from it, but by way of accretion\nrather than by simple explication.  It has in it an element that, if it\nexists in the patriarchal constitution, exists there only in a\ndifferent form, and the transformation marks the passage from the\neconomical order to the political, from the barbaric to the civil\nconstitution of society, or from barbarism to civilization.\n\nThe word civilization stands opposed to barbarism, and is derived from\ncivitas--city or state.  The Greeks and Romans call all tribes and\nnations in which authority is vested in the chief, as distinguished\nfrom the state, barbarians.  The origin of the word barbarian,\nbarbarus, or ........, is unknown, and its primary sense can be only\nconjectured.  Webster regards its primary sense as foreign, wild,\nfierce; but this could not have been its original sense; for the Greeks\nand Romans never termed all foreigners barbarians, and they applied the\nterm to nations that had no inconsiderable culture and refinement of\nmanners, and that had made respectable progress in art and\nsciences--the Indians, Persians, Medians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians.\nThey applied the term evidently in a political, not an ethical or an\naesthetical sense, and as it would seem to designate a social order in\nwhich the state was not developed, and in which the nation was\npersonal, not territorial, and authority was held as a private right,\nnot as a public trust, or in which the domain vests in the chief or\ntribe, and not in the state; for they never term any others barbarians.\n\nRepublic is opposed not to monarchy, in the modern European sense, but\nto monarchy in the ancient or absolute sense. Lacedaemon had kings; yet\nit was no less republican than Athens; and Rome was called and was a\nrepublic under the emperors no less than under the consuls.  Republic,\nrespublica, by the very force of the term, means the public wealth, or,\nin good English, the commonwealth; that is, government founded not on\npersonal or private wealth, but on the public wealth, public territory,\nor domain, or a Government that vests authority in the nation, and\nattaches the nation to a certain definite territory.  France, Spain,\nItaly, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, even Great Britain in substance\nthough not in form, are all, in the strictest sense of the word,\nrepublican states; for the king or emperor does not govern in his own\nprivate right, but solely as representative of the power and majesty of\nthe state.  The distinctive mark of republicanism is the substitution\nof the state for the personal chief, and public authority for personal\nor private right. Republicanism is really civilization as opposed to\nbarbarism, and all civility, in the old Sense of the word, or Civilian\nin Italian, is republican, and is applied in modern times to breeding\nor refinement of manners, simply because these are characteristics of a\nrepublican, or polished [from ....., city] people.  Every people that\nhas a real civil order, or a fully developed state or polity, is a\nrepublican people; and hence the church and her great doctors when they\nspeak of the state as distinguished from the church, call it the\nrepublic, as may be seen by consulting even a late Encyclical of Pius\nIX., which some have interpreted wrongly in an anti-republican sense.\n\nAll tribes and nations in which the patriarchal system remains, or is\ndeveloped without transformation, are barbaric, and really so regarded\nby all Christendom.  In civilized nations the patriarchal authority is\ntransformed into that of the city or state, that is, of the republic;\nbut in all barbarous nations it retains its Private and personal\ncharacter.  The nation is only the family or tribe, and is called by\nthe name of its ancestor, founder, or chief, not by a geographical\ndenomination.  Race has not been supplanted by country; they are a\npeople, not a state. They are not fixed to the soil, and though we may\nfind in them ardent love of family, the tribe, or the chief, we never\nfind among them that pure love of country or patriotism which so\ndistinguished the Greeks and Romans, and is no less marked among modern\nChristian nations.  They have a family, a race, a chief or king, but no\npatria, or country.  The barbarians who overthrew the Roman Empire,\nwhether of the West or the East, were nations, or confederacies of\nnations, but not states.  The nation with them was personal, not\nterritorial.  Their country was wherever they fed their flocks and\nherds, pitched their tents, and encamped for the night.  There were\nGermans, but no German state, and even to-day the German finds his\n\"father-land\" wherever the German speech is spoken.  The Polish,\nSclavonian, Hungarian, Illyrian, Italian, and other provinces held by\nGerman states, in which the German language is not the mother-tongue,\nare excluded from the Germanic Confederation.  The Turks, or Osmanlis,\nare a race, not a state, and are encamped, not settled, on the site of\nthe Eastern Roman or Greek Empire.\n\nEven when the barbaric nations have ceased to be nomadic, pastoral, or\npredatory nations, as the ancient Assyrians and Persians or modern\nChinese, and have their geographical boundaries, they have still no\nstate, no country.  The nation defines the boundaries, not the\nboundaries the nation.  The nation does not belong to the territory,\nbut the territory to the nation or its chief.  The Irish and\nAnglo-Saxons, in former times, held the land in gavelkind, and the\nterritory belonged to the tribe or sept; but if the tribe held it as\nindivisible, they still held it as private property.  The shah of\nPersia holds the whole Persian territory as private property, and the\nlandholders among his subjects are held to be his tenants.  They hold\nit from him, not from the Persian state.\n\nThe public domain of the Greek empire is in theory the private domain\nof the Ottoman emperor or Turkish sultan.  There is in barbaric states\nno republic, no commonwealth; authority is parental, without being\ntempered by parental affection.  The chief is a despot, and rules with\nthe united authority of the father and the harshness of the proprietor.\nHe owns the land and his subjects.\n\nFeudalism, established in Western Europe after the downfall of the\nRoman Empire, however modified by the Church and by reminiscences of\nGraeco-Roman civilization retained by the conquered, was a barbaric\nconstitution.  The feudal monarch, as far as he governed at all,\ngoverned as proprietor or landholder, not as the representative of the\ncommonwealth.  Under feudalism there are estates, but no state.  The\nking governs as an estate, the nobles hold their power as an estate,\nand the commons are represented as an estate.  The whole theory of\npower is, that it is an estate; a private right, not a public trust.\nIt is not without reason, then that the common sense of civilized\nnations terms the ages when it prevailed in Western Europe barbarous\nages.\n\nIt may seem a paradox to class democracy with the barbaric\nconstitutions, and yet as it is defended by many stanch democrats,\nespecially European democrats and revolutionists, and by French and\nGermans settled in our own country, it is essentially barbaric and\nanti-republican.  The characteristic principle of barbarism is, that\npower is a private or personal right, and when democrats assert that\nthe elective franchise is a natural right of man, or that it is held by\nvirtue of the fact that the elector is a man, they assert the\nfundamental principle of barbarism and despotism.  This says nothing in\nfavor of restricted suffrage, or against what is called universal\nsuffrage. To restrict suffrage to property-holders helps nothing,\ntheoretically or practically.  Property has of itself advantages\nenough, without clothing its holders with exclusive political rights\nand privileges, and the laboring classes any day are as trustworthy as\nthe business classes.  The wise statesman will never restrict suffrage,\nor exclude the poorer and more numerous classes from all voice in the\ngovernment of their country. General suffrage is wise, and if Louis\nPhilippe had had the sense to adopt it, and thus rally the whole nation\nto the support of his government, he would never have had to encounter\nthe revolution of 1848.  The barbarism, the despotism, is not in\nuniversal suffrage, but in defending the elective franchise as a\nprivate or personal right.  It is not a private, but a political right,\nand, like all political rights, a public trust.  Extremes meet, and\nthus it is that men who imagine that they march at the head of the\nhuman race and lead the civilization of the age, are really in\nprinciple retrograding to the barbarism of the past, or taking their\nplace with nations on whom the light of civilization has never yet\ndawned.  All is not gold that glisters.\n\nThe characteristic of barbarism is, that it makes all authority a\nprivate or personal right; and the characteristic of civilization is,\nthat it makes it a public trust.  Barbarism knows only persons;\ncivilization asserts and maintains the state.  With barbarians the\nauthority of the patriarch is developed simply by way of explication;\nin civilized states it is developed by way of transformation.  Keeping\nin mind this distinction, it may be maintained that all systems of\ngovernment, as a simple historical fact, have been developed from the\npatriarchal.  The patriarchal has preceded them all, and it is with the\npatriarchal that the human race has begun its career.  The family or\nhousehold is not a state, a civil polity, but it is a government, and,\nhistorically considered, is the initial or inchoate state as well as\nthe initial or inchoate nation.  But its simple direct development\ngives us barbarism, or what is called Oriental despotism, and which\nnowhere exists, or can exist, in Christendom. It is found only in pagan\nand Mohammedan nations; Christianity in the secular order is\nrepublican, and continues and completes the work of Greece and Rome.\nIt meets with little permanent success in any patriarchal or despotic\nnation, and must either find or create civilization, which has been\ndeveloped from the patriarchal system by way of transformation.\n\nBut, though the patriarchal system is the earliest form of government,\nand all governments have been developed or modified from it, the right\nof government to govern cannot be deduced from the right of the father\nto govern his children, for the parental right itself is not ultimate\nor complete.  All governments that assume it to be so, and rest on it\nas the foundation of their authority, are barbaric or despotic, and,\ntherefore, without any legitimate authority.  The right to govern rests\non ownership or dominion.  Where there is no proprietorship, there is\nno dominion; and where there is no dominion, there is no right to\ngovern. Only he who is sovereign proprietor is sovereign lord.\n\nProperty, ownership, dominion rests on creation.  The maker has the\nright to the thing made.  He, so far as he is sole creator, is sole\nproprietor, and may do what he will with it.  God is sovereign lord and\nproprietor of the universe because He is its sole creator.  He hath the\nabsolute dominion, because He is absolute maker.  He has made it, He\nowns it; and one may do what he will with his own.  His dominion is\nabsolute, because He is absolute creator, and He rightly governs as\nabsolute and universal lord; yet is He no despot, because He exercises\nonly His sovereign right, and His own essential wisdom, goodness,\njustness, rectitude, and immutability, are the highest of all\nconceivable guaranties that His exercise of His power will always be\nright, wise, just, and good.  The despot is a man attempting to be God\nupon earth, and to exercise a usurped power.  Despotism is based on,\nthe parental right, and the parental right is assumed to be absolute.\nHence, your despotic rulers claim to reign, and to be loved and\nworshipped as gods.  Even the Roman emperors, in the fourth and fifth\ncenturies, were addressed as divinities; and Theodosius the Great, a\nChristian, was addressed as \"Your Eternity,\" Eternitas vestras--so far\ndid barbarism encroach on civilization, even under Christian emperors.\n\nThe right of the father over his child is an imperfect right, for he is\nthe generator, not the creator of his child.  Generation is in the\norder of second causes, and is simply the development or explication of\nthe race.  The early Roman law, founded on the confusion of generation\nwith creation, gave the father absolute authority over the child--the\nright of life and death, as over his servants or slaves; but this was\nrestricted under the Empire, and in all Christian nations the authority\nof the father is treated, like all power, as a trust.  The child, like\nthe father himself, belongs to the state, and to the state the father\nis answerable for the use he makes of his authority.  The law fixes the\nage of majority, when the child is completely emancipated; and even\nduring his nonage, takes him from the father and places him under\nguardians, in case the father is incompetent to fulfil or grossly\nabuses his trust.  This is proper, because society contributes to the\nlife of the child, and has a right as well as an interest in him.\nSociety, again, must suffer if the child is allowed to grow up a\nworthless vagabond or a criminal; and has a right to intervene, both in\nbehalf of itself and of the child, in case his parents neglect to train\nhim up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, or are training him\nup to be a liar, a thief, a drunkard, a murderer, a pest to the\ncommunity.  How, then, base the right of society on the right of the\nfather, since, in point of fact, the right of society is paramount to\nthe right of the parent?\n\nBut even waiving this, and granting what is not the fact that the\nauthority of the father is absolute, unlimited, it cannot be the ground\nof the right of society to govern.  Assume the parental right to be\nperfect and inseparable from the parental relation, it is no right to\ngovern where no such relation exists.  Nothing true, real, solid in\ngovernment can be founded on what Carlyle calls a \"sham.\"  The\nstatesman, if worthy of the name, ascertains and conforms to the\nrealities, the verities of things; and all jurisprudence that accepts\nlegal fictions is imperfect, and even censurable.  The presumptions or\nassumptions of law or politics must have a real and solid basis, or\nthey are inadmissible.  How, from the right of the father to govern his\nown child, born from his loins, conclude his right to govern one not\nhis child?  Or how, from my right to govern my child, conclude the\nright of society to found the state, institute government, and exercise\npolitical authority over its members?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT--CONTINUED.\n\n\nII. Rejecting the patriarchal theory as untenable, and shrinking from\nasserting the divine origin of government, lest they should favor\ntheocracy, and place secular society under the control of the clergy,\nand thus disfranchise the laity, modern political writers have sought\nto render government purely human, and maintain that its origin is\nconventional, and that it is founded in compact or agreement.  Their\ntheory originated in the seventeenth century, and was predominant in\nthe last century and the first third of the present.  It has been, and\nperhaps is yet, generally accepted by American politicians and\nstatesmen, at least so far as they ever trouble their heads with the\nquestion at all, which it must be confessed is not far.\n\nThe moral theologians of the Church have generally spoken of government\nas a social pact or compact, and explained the reciprocal rights and\nobligations of subjects and rulers by the general law of contracts; but\nthey have never held that government originates in a voluntary\nagreement between the people and their rulers, or between the several\nindividuals composing the community.  They have never held that\ngovernment has only a conventional origin or authority.  They have\nsimply meant, by the social compact, the mutual relations and\nreciprocal rights and duties of princes and their subjects, as implied\nin the very existence and nature of civil society.  Where there are\nrights and duties on each side, they treat the fact, not as an\nagreement voluntarily entered into, and which creates them, but as a\ncompact which binds alike sovereign and subject; and in determining\nwhether either side has sinned or not, they inquire whether either has\nbroken the terms of the social compact.  They were engaged, not with\nthe question whence does government derive its authority, but with its\nnature, and the reciprocal rights and duties of governors and the\ngoverned.  The compact itself they held was not voluntarily formed by\nthe people themselves, either individually or collectively, but was\nimposed by God, either immediately, or mediately, through the law of\nnature.  \"Every man,\" says Cicero, \"is born in society, and remains\nthere.\"  They held the same, and maintained that every one born into\nsociety contracts by that fact certain obligations to society, and\nsociety certain obligations to him; for under the natural law, every\none has certain rights, as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,\nand owes certain duties to society for the protection and assistance it\naffords him.\n\nBut modern political theorists have abused the phrase borrowed from the\ntheologians, and made it cover a political doctrine which they would\nhave been the last to accept.  These theorists or political speculators\nhave imagined a state of nature antecedently to civil society, in which\nmen lived without government, law, or manners, out of which they\nfinally came by entering into a voluntary agreement with some one of\ntheir number to be king and to govern them, or with one another to\nsubmit to the rule of the majority.  Hobbes, the English materialist,\nis among the earliest and most distinguished of the advocates of this\ntheory.  He held that men lived, prior to the creation of civil\nsociety, in a state of nature, in which all were equal, and every one\nhad an equal right to every thing, and to take any thing on which he\ncould lay his hands and was strong enough to hold.  There was no law\nbut the will of the strongest.  Hence, the state of nature was a state\nof continual war.  At length, wearied and disgusted, men sighed for\npeace, and, with one accord, said to the tallest, bravest, or ablest\namong them: Come, be our king, our master, our sovereign lord, and\ngovern us; we surrender our natural rights and our natural independence\nto you, with no other reserve or condition than that you maintain peace\namong us, keep us from robbing and plundering one another or cutting\neach other's throats.\n\nLocke followed Hobbes, and asserted virtually the same theory, but\nasserted it in the interests of liberty, as Hobbes had asserted it in\nthe interests of power.  Rousseau, a citizen of Geneva, followed in the\nnext century with his Contrat Social, the text-book of the French\nrevolutionists--almost their Bible--and put the finishing stroke to the\ntheory.  Hitherto the compact or agreement had been assumed to be\nbetween the governor and the governed; Rousseau supposes it to be\nbetween the people themselves, or a compact to which the people are the\nonly parties. He adopts the theory of a state of nature in which men\nlived, antecedently to their forming themselves into civil society,\nwithout government or law.  All men in that state were equal, and each\nwas independent and sovereign proprietor of himself.  These equal,\nindependent, sovereign individuals met, or are held to have met, in\nconvention, and entered into a compact with themselves, each with all,\nand all with each, that they would constitute government, and would\neach submit to the determination and authority of the whole,\npractically of the fluctuating and irresponsible majority.  Civil\nsociety, the state, the government, originates in this compact, and the\ngovernment, as Mr. Jefferson asserts in the Declaration of American\nIndependence, \"derives its just powers from the consent of the\ngoverned.\"\n\nThis theory, as so set forth, or as modified by asserting that the\nindividual delegates instead of surrendering his rights to civil\nsociety, was generally adopted by the American people in the last\ncentury, and is still the more prevalent theory with those among them\nwho happen to have any theory or opinion on the subject.  It is the\npolitical tradition of the country.  The state, as defined by the elder\nAdams, is held to be a voluntary association of individuals.\nIndividuals create civil society, and may uncreate it whenever they\njudge it advisable.  Prior to the Southern Rebellion, nearly every\nAmerican asserted with Lafayette, \"the sacred right of insurrection\" or\nrevolution, and sympathized with insurrectionists, rebels, and\nrevolutionists, wherever they made their appearance.  Loyalty was held\nto be the correlative of royalty, treason was regarded as a virtue, and\ntraitors were honored, feasted, and eulogized as patriots, ardent\nlovers of liberty, and champions of the people.  The fearful struggle\nof the nation against a rebellion which threatened its very existence\nmay have changed this.\n\nThat there is, or ever was, a state of nature such as the theory\nassumes, may be questioned.  Certainly nothing proves that it is, or\never was, a real state.  That there is a law of nature is undeniable.\nAll authorities in philosophy, morals, politics, and jurisprudence\nassert it; the state assumes it as its own immediate basis, and the\ncodes of all nations are founded on it; universal jurisprudence, the\njus qentium of the Romans, embodies it, and the courts recognize and\nadminister it.  It is the reason and conscience of civil society, and\nevery state acknowledges its authority.  But the law of nature is as\nmuch in force in civil society as out of it.  Civil law does not\nabrogate or supersede natural law, but presupposes it, and supports\nitself on it as its own ground and reason.  As the natural law, which\nis only natural justice and equity dictated by the reason common to all\nmen, persists in the civil law, municipal or international, as its\ninforming soul, so does the state of nature persist in the civil state,\nnatural society in civil society, which simply develops, applies, and\nprotects it.  Man in civil society is not out of nature, but is in\nit--is in his most natural state; for society is natural to him, and\ngovernment is natural to society, and in some form inseparable from it.\nThe state of nature under the natural law is not, as a separate state,\nan actual state, and never was; but an abstraction, in which is\nconsidered, apart from the concrete existence called society, what is\nderived immediately from the natural law.  But as abstractions have no\nexistence, out of the mind that forms them, the state of nature has no\nactual existence in the world of reality as a separate state.\n\nBut suppose with the theory the state of nature to have been a real and\nseparate state, in which men at first lived, there is great difficulty\nin understanding how they ever got out of it. Can a man divest himself\nof his nature, or lift himself above it? Man is in his nature, and\ninseparable from it.  If his primitive state was his natural state, and\nif the political state is supernatural, preternatural, or subnatural,\nhow passed he alone, by his own unaided powers, from the former to the\nlatter?  The ancients, who had lost the primitive tradition of\ncreation, asserted, indeed, the primitive man as springing from the\nearth, and leading a mere animal life, living in eaves or hollow trees,\nand feeding on roots and nuts, without speech, without science, art,\nlaw, or sense of right and wrong; but prior to the prevalence of the\nEpicurean philosophy, they never pretended, that man could come out of\nthat state alone by his own unaided efforts.  They ascribed the\ninvention of language, art, and science, the institution of civil\nsociety, government, and laws, to the intervention of the gods.  It\nremained for the Epicureans--who, though unable, like their modern\nsuccessors, the Positivists or Developmentists, to believe in a first\ncause, believed in effects without causes, or that things make or take\ncare of themselves--to assert that men could, by their own unassisted\nefforts, or by the simple exercise of reason, come out of the primitive\nstate, and institute what in modern times is called civilta, civility,\nor civilization.\n\nThe partisans of this theory of the state of nature from which men have\nemerged by the voluntary and deliberate formation of civil society,\nforget that if government is not the sole condition, it is one of the\nessential conditions of progress. The only progressive nations are\ncivilized or republican nations. Savage and barbarous tribes are\nunprogressive.  Ages on ages roll over them without changing any thing\nin their state; and Niebuhr has well remarked with others, that history\nrecords no instance of a savage tribe or people having become civilized\nby its own spontaneous or indigenous efforts.  If savage tribes have\never become civilized, it has been by influences from abroad, by the\naid of men already civilized, through conquest, colonies, or\nmissionaries; never by their own indigenous efforts, nor even by\ncommerce, as is so confidently asserted in this mercantile age. Nothing\nin all history indicates the ability of a savage people to pass of\nitself from the savage state to the civilized.  But the primitive man,\nas described by Horace in his Satires, and asserted by Hobbes, Locke,\nRousseau, and others, is far below the savage.  The lowest, most\ndegraded, and most debased savage tribe that has yet been discovered\nhas at least some rude outlines or feeble reminiscences of a social\nstate, of government, morals, law, and religion, for even in\nsuperstition the most gross there is a reminiscence of true religion;\nbut the people in the alleged state of nature have none.\n\nThe advocates of the theory deceive themselves by transporting into\ntheir imaginary state of nature the views, habits, and capacities of\nthe civilized man.  It is, perhaps, not difficult for men who have been\ncivilized, who have the intelligence, the arts, the affections, and the\nhabits of civilization, if deprived by some great social convulsion of\nsociety, and thrown back on the so-called state of nature, or cast away\non some uninhabited island in the ocean, and cut off from all\nintercourse with the rest of mankind, to reconstruct civil society, and\nre-establish and maintain civil government.  They are civilized men,\nand bear civil society in their own life.  But these are no\nrepresentatives of the primitive man in the alleged state of nature.\nThese primitive men have no experience, no knowledge, no conception\neven of civilized life, or of any state superior to that in which they\nhave thus far lived.  How then can they, since, on the theory, civil\nsociety has no root in nature, but is a purely artificial creation,\neven conceive of civilization, much less realize it?\n\nThese theorists, as theorists always do, fail to make a complete\nabstraction of the civilized state, and conclude from what they feel\nthey could do in case civil society were broken up, what men may do and\nhave done in a state of nature.  Men cannot divest themselves of\nthemselves, and, whatever their efforts to do it, they think, reason,\nand act as they are.\n\nEvery writer, whatever else he writes, writes himself.  The advocates\nof the theory, to have made their abstraction complete, should have\npresented their primitive man as below the lowest known savage,\nunprogressive, and in himself incapable of developing any progressive\nenergy.  Unprogressive, and, without foreign assistance, incapable of\nprogress, how is it possible for your primitive man to pass, by his own\nunassisted efforts, from the alleged state of nature to that of\ncivilization, of which he has no conception, and towards which no\ninnate desire, no instinct, no divine inspiration pushes him?\n\nBut even if, by some happy inspiration, hardly supposable without\nsupernatural intervention repudiated by the theory--if by some happy\ninspiration, a rare individual should so far rise above the state of\nnature as to conceive of civil society and of civil government, how\ncould he carry his conception into execution? Conception is always\neasier than its realization, and between the design and its execution\nthere is always a weary distance.  The poetry of all nations is a wail\nover unrealized ideals.  It is little that even the wisest and most\npotent statesman can realize of what he conceives to be necessary for\nthe state: political, legislative or judicial reforms, even when loudly\ndemanded, and favored by authority, are hard to be effected, and not\nseldom generations come and go without effecting them.  The republics\nof Plato, Sir Thomas More, Campanella, Harrington, as the communities\nof Robert Owen and M. Cabet, remain Utopias, not solely because\nintrinsically absurd, though so in fact, but chiefly because they are\ninnovations, have no support in experience, and require for their\nrealization the modes of thought, habits, manners, character, life,\nwhich only their introduction and realization can supply.  So to be\nable to execute the design of passing from the supposed state of nature\nto civilization, the reformer would need the intelligence, the habits,\nand characters in the public which are not possible without\ncivilization itself.  Some philosophers suppose men have invented\nlanguage, forgetting that it requires language to give the ability to\ninvent language.\n\nMen are little moved by mere reasoning, however clear and convincing it\nmay be.  They are moved by their affections, passions, instincts, and\nhabits.  Routine is more powerful with them than logic.  A few are\ngreedy of novelties, and are always for trying experiments; but the\ngreat body of the people of all nations have an invincible repugnance\nto abandon what they know for what they know not.  They are, to a great\nextent, the slaves of their own vis inertiae, and will not make the\nnecessary exertion to change their existing mode of life, even for a\nbetter.  Interest itself is powerless before their indolence,\nprejudice, habits, and usages.  Never were philosophers more ignorant\nof human nature than they, so numerous in the last century, who\nimagined that men can be always moved by a sense of interest, and that\nenlightened self-interest, L'interet bien entendu, suffices to found\nand sustain the state.  No reform, no change in the constitution of\ngovernment or of society, whatever the advantages it may promise, can\nbe successful, if introduced, unless it has its root or germ in the\npast.  Man is never a creator; he can only develop and continue,\nbecause he is himself a creature, and only a second cause.  The\nchildren of Israel, when they encountered the privations of the\nwilderness that lay between them and the promised land flowing with\nmilk and honey, fainted in spirit, and begged Moses to lead them back\nto Egypt, and permit them to return to slavery.\n\nIn the alleged state of nature, as the philosophers describe it, there\nis no germ of civilization, and the transition to civil society would\nnot be a development, but a complete rupture with the past, and an\nentire new creation.  When it is with the greatest difficulty that\nnecessary reforms are introduced in old and highly civilized nations\nand when it can seldom be done at all without terrible political and\nsocial convulsions, how can we suppose men without society, and knowing\nnothing of it, can deliberately, and, as it were, with \"malice\naforethought,\" found society?  Without government, and destitute alike\nof habits of obedience and habits of command, how can they initiate,\nestablish, and sustain government?  To suppose it, would be to suppose\nthat men in a state of nature, without culture, without science,\nwithout any of the arts, even the most simple and necessary, are\ninfinitely superior to the men formed under the most advanced\ncivilization.  Was Rousseau right in asserting civilization as a fall,\nas a deterioration of the race?\n\nBut suppose the state of nature, even suppose that men, by some miracle\nor other, can get out of it and found civil society, the origin of\ngovernment as authority in compact is not yet established.  According\nto the theory, the rights of civil society are derived from the rights\nof the individuals who form or enter into the compact.  But individuals\ncannot give what they have not, and no individual has in himself the\nright to govern another.  By the law of nature all men have equal\nrights, are equals, and equals have no authority one over another.  Nor\nhas an individual the sovereign right even to himself, or the right to\ndispose of himself as he pleases.  Man is not God, independent,\nself-existing and self-sufficing.  He is dependent, and dependent not\nonly on his Maker, but on his fellow-men, on society, and even on\nnature, or the material world.  That on which he depends in the measure\nin which be depends on it, contributes to his existence, to his life,\nand to his well-being, and has, by virtue of its contribution, a right\nin him and to him; and hence it is that nothing is more painful to the\nproud spirit than to receive a favor that lays him under an obligation\nto another.  The right of that on which man depends, and by communion\nwith which he lives, limits his own right over himself.\n\nMan does not depend exclusively on society, for it is not his only\nmedium of communion with God, and therefore its right to him is neither\nabsolute nor unlimited; but still be depends on it, lives in it, and\ncannot live without it.  It has, then, certain lights over him, and he\ncannot enter into any compact, league, or alliance that society does\nnot authorize, or at least permit. These rights of society override his\nrights to himself, and he can neither surrender them nor delegate them.\nOther rights, as the rights of religion and property, which are held\ndirectly from God and nature, and which are independent of society, are\nincluded in what are called the natural rights of man; and these rights\ncannot be surrendered in forming civil society, for they are rights of\nman only before civil society, and therefore not his to cede, and\nbecause they are precisely the rights that government is bound to\nrespect and protect.  The compact, then, cannot be formed as pretended,\nfor the only rights individuals could delegate or surrender to society\nto constitute the sum of the rights of government are hers already, and\nthose which are not hers are those which cannot be delegated or\nsurrendered, and in the free and full enjoyment of which, it is the\nduty, the chief end of government to protect each and every individual.\n\nThe convention not only is not a fact, but individuals have no\nauthority without society, to meet in convention, and enter into the\nalleged compact, because they are not independent, sovereign\nindividuals.  But pass over this: suppose the convention, suppose the\ncompact, it must still be conceded that it binds and can bind only\nthose who voluntarily and deliberately enter into it.  This is conceded\nby Mr. Jefferson and the American Congress of 1776, in the assertion\nthat government derives its \"just powers from the consent of the\ngoverned.\"  This consent, as the matter is one of life and death, must\nbe free, deliberate, formal, explicit, not simply an assumed, implied,\nor constructive consent.  It must be given personally, and not by one\nfor another without his express authority.\n\nIt is usual to infer the consent or the acceptance of the terms of the\ncompact from the silence of the individual, and also from his continued\nresidence in the country and submission to its government.  But\nresidence is no evidence of consent, because it may be a matter of\nnecessity.  The individual may be unable to emigrate, if he would; and\nby what right can individuals form an agreement to which I must consent\nor else migrate to some strange land?\n\nCan my consent, under such circumstances, even if given, be any thing\nbut a forced consent, a consent given under duress, and therefore\ninvalid?  Nothing can be inferred from one's silence, for he may have\nmany reasons for being silent besides approval of the government.  He\nmay be silent because speech would avail nothing; because to protest\nmight be dangerous--cost him his liberty, if not his life; because he\nsees and knows nothing better, and is ignorant that he has any choice\nin the case; or because, as very likely is the fact with the majority,\nhe has never for moment thought of the matter, or ever had his\nattention called to it, and has no mind on the subject.\n\nBut however this may be, there certainly must be excluded from the\ncompact or obligation to obey the government created by it all the\nwomen of a nation, all the children too young to be capable of giving\ntheir consent, and all who are too ignorant, too weak of mind to be\nable to understand the terms of the contract.  These several classes\ncannot be less than three-fourths of the population of any country.\nWhat is to be done with them? Leave them without government?  Extend\nthe power of the government over them?  By what right?  Government\nderives its just powers from the consent of the governed, and that\nconsent they have not given.  Whence does one-fourth of the population\nget its right to govern the other three-fourths?\n\nBut what is to be done with the rights of minorities?  Is the rule of\nunanimity to be insisted on in the convention and in the government,\nwhen it goes into operation?  Unanimity is impracticable, for where\nthere are many men there will be differences of opinion.  The rule of\nunanimity gives to each individual a veto on the whole proceeding,\nwhich was the grand defect of the Polish constitution.  Each member of\nthe Polish Diet, which included the whole body of the nobility, had an\nabsolute veto, and could, alone, arrest the whole action of the\ngovernment.  Will you substitute the rule of the majority, and say the\nmajority must govern?  By what right?  It is agreed to in the\nconvention.  Unanimously, or only by a majority?  The right of the\nmajority to have their will is, on the social compact theory, a\nconventional right, and therefore cannot come into play before the\nconvention is completed, or the social compact is framed and accepted.\nHow, in settling the terms of the compact, will you proceed?  By\nmajorities?  But suppose a minority objects, and demands two-thirds,\nthree-fourths, or four-fifths, and votes against the majority rule,\nwhich is carried only by a simple plurality of votes, will the\nproceedings of the convention bind the dissenting minority?  What gives\nto the majority the right to govern the minority who dissent from its\naction?\n\nOn the supposition that society has rights not derived from\nindividuals, and which are intrusted to the government, there is a good\nreason why the majority should prevail within the legitimate sphere of\ngovernment, because the majority is the best representative practicable\nof society itself; and if the constitution secures to minorities and\ndissenting individuals their natural rights and their equal rights as\ncitizens, they have no just cause of complaint, for the majority in\nsuch case has no power to tyrannize over them or to oppress them.  But\nthe theory under examination denies that society has any rights except\nsuch as it derives from individuals who all have equal rights.\nAccording to it, society is itself conventional, and created by free,\nindependent, equal, sovereign individuals. Society is a congress of\nsovereigns, in which no one has authority over another, and no one can\nbe rightfully forced to submit to any decree against his will.  In such\na congress the rule of the majority is manifestly improper,\nillegitimate, and invalid, unless adopted by unanimous consent.\n\nBut this is not all.  The individual is always the equal of himself,\nand if the government derives its powers from the consent of the\ngoverned, he governs in the government, and parts with none of his\noriginal sovereignty.  The government is not his master, but his agent,\nas the principal only delegates, not surrenders, his rights and powers\nto the agent.  He is free at any time he pleases to recall the powers\nhe has delegated, to give new instructions, or to dismiss him.  The\nsovereignty of the individual survives the compact, and persists\nthrough all the acts of his agent, the government.  He must, then, be\nfree to withdraw from the compact whenever he judges it advisable.\nSecession is perfectly legitimate if government is simply a contract\nbetween equals.  The disaffected, the criminal, the thief the\ngovernment would send to prison, or the murderer it would hang, would\nbe very likely to revoke his consent, and to secede from the state.\nAny number of individuals large enough to count a majority among\nthemselves, indisposed to pay the government taxes, or to perform the\nmilitary service exacted, might hold a convention, adopt a secession\nordinance, and declare themselves a free, independent, sovereign state,\nand bid defiance to the tax-collector and the provost-marshall, and\nthat, too, without forfeiting their estates or changing their domicile.\nWould the government employ military force to coerce them back to their\nallegiance?  By what right?  Government is their agent, their creature,\nand no man owes allegiance to his own agent, or creature.\n\nThe compact could bind only temporarily, and could at any moment be\ndissolved.  Mr. Jefferson saw this, and very consistently maintained\nthat one generation has no power to bind another; and, as if this was\nnot enough, he asserted the right of revolution, and gave it as his\nopinion that in every nation a revolution once in every generation is\ndesirable, that is, according to his reckoning, once every nineteen\nyears.  The doctrine that one generation has no power to bind its\nsuccessor is not only a logical conclusion from the theory that\ngovernments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,\nsince a generation cannot give its consent before it is born, but is\nvery convenient for a nation that has contracted a large national debt;\nyet, perhaps, not so convenient to the public creditor, since the new\ngeneration may take it into its head not to assume or discharge the\nobligations of its predecessor, but to repudiate them.  No man,\ncertainly, can contract for any one but himself; and how then can the\nson be bound, without his own personal or individual consent, freely\ngiven, by the obligations entered into by his father?\n\nThe social compact is necessarily limited to the individuals who form\nit, and as necessarily, unless renewed, expires with them. It thus\ncreates no state, no political corporation, which survives in all its\nrights and powers, though individuals die. The state is on this theory\na voluntary association, and in principle, except that it is not a\nsecret society, in no respect differs from the Carbonari, or the\nKnights of the Golden Circle. When Orsini attempted to execute the\nsentence of death on the Emperor of the French, in obedience to the\norder of the Carbonari, of which the Emperor was a member, he was, if\nthe theory of the origin of government in compact be true, no more an\nassassin than was the officer who executed on the gallows the rebel\nspies and incendiaries Beal and Kennedy.\n\nCertain it is that the alleged social compact has in it no social or\ncivil element.  It does not and cannot create society.  It can give\nonly an aggregation of individuals, and society is not an aggregation\nnor even an organization of individuals.  It is an organism, and\nindividuals live in its life as well as it in theirs.  There is a real\nliving solidarity, which makes individuals members of the social body,\nand members one of another. There is no society without individuals,\nand there are no individuals without society; but in society there is\nthat which is not individual, and is more than all individuals.  The\nsocial compact is an attempt to substitute for this real living\nsolidarity, which gives to society at once unity of life and diversity\nof members, an artificial solidarity, a fictitious unity for a real\nunity, and membership by contract for real living membership, a cork\nleg for that which nature herself gives. Real government has its ground\nin this real living solidarity, and represents the social element,\nwhich is not individual, but above all individuals, as man is above\nmen.  But the theory substitutes a simple agency for government, and\nmakes each individual its principal.  It is an abuse of language to\ncall this agency a government.  It has no one feature or element of\ngovernment.  It has only an artificial unity, based on diversity; its\nauthority is only personal, individual, and in no sense a public\nauthority, representing a public will, a public right, or a public\ninterest.  In no country could government be adopted and sustained if\nmen were left to the wisdom or justness of their theories, or in the\ngeneral affairs of life, acted on them. Society, and government as\nrepresenting society, has a real existence, life, faculties, and organs\nof its own, not derived or derivable from individuals.  As well might\nit be maintained that the human body consists in and derives all its\nlife from the particles of matter it assimilates from its food, and\nwhich are constantly escaping as to maintain that society derives its\nlife, or government its powers, from individuals.  No mechanical\naggregation of brute matter can make a living body, if there is no\nliving and assimilating principle within; and no aggregation of\nindividuals, however closely bound together by pacts or oaths, can make\nsociety where there is no informing social principle that aggregates\nand assimilates them to a living body, or produce that mystic existence\ncalled a state or commonwealth.\n\nThe origin of government in the Contrat Social supposes the nation to\nbe a purely personal affair.  It gives the government no territorial\nstatus, and clothes it with no territorial rights or jurisdiction.  The\ngovernment that could so originate would be, if any thing, a barbaric,\nnot a republican government.  It has only the rights conferred on it,\nsurrendered or delegated to it by individuals, and therefore, at best,\nonly individual rights. Individuals can confer only such rights as they\nhave in the supposed state of nature.  In that state there is neither\nprivate nor public domain.  The earth in that state is not property,\nand is open to the first occupant, and the occupant can lay no claim to\nany more than he actually occupies.  Whence, then, does government\nderive its territorial jurisdiction, and its right of eminent domain\nclaimed by all national governments?  Whence its title to vacant or\nunoccupied lands?  How does any particular government fix its\nterritorial boundaries, and obtain the right to prescribe who may\noccupy, and on what conditions the vacant lands within those\nboundaries? Whence does it get its jurisdiction of navigable rivers,\nlakes, bays, and the seaboard within its territorial limits, as\nappertaining to its domain?  Here are rights that it could not have\nderived from individuals, for individuals never possessed them in the\nso-called state of nature.  The concocters of the theory evidently\noverlooked these rights, or considered them of no importance.  They\nseem never to have contemplated the existence of territorial states, or\nthe division of mankind into nations fixed to the soil.  They seem not\nto have supposed the earth could be appropriated; and, indeed, many of\ntheir followers pretend that it cannot be, and that the public lands of\na nation are open lands, and whoso chooses may occupy them, without\nleave asked of the national authority or granted.  The American people\nretain more than one reminiscence of the nomadic and predatory habits\nof their Teutonic or Scythian ancestors before they settled on the\nbanks of the Don or the Danube, on the Northern Ocean, in Scania, or\ncame in contact with the Graeco-Roman civilization.\n\nYet mankind are divided into nations, and all civilized nations are\nfixed to the soil.  The territory is defined, and is the domain of the\nstate, from which all private proprietors hold their title-deeds.\nIndividual proprietors hold under the state, and often hold more, than\nthey occupy; but it retains in all private estates the eminent domain,\nand prohibits the alienation of land to one who is not a citizen.  It\ndefends its domain, its public unoccupied lands, and the lands owned by\nprivate individuals, against all foreign powers.  Now whence, if\ngovernment has only the rights ceded it by individuals, does it get\nthis domain, and hold the right to treat settlers on even its\nunoccupied lands as trespassers?  In the state of nature the\nterritorial rights of individuals, if any they have, are restricted to\nthe portion of land they occupy with their rude culture, and with their\nflocks and herds, and in civilized nations to what they hold from the\nstate, and, therefore, the right as held and defended by all nations,\nand without which the nation has no status, no fixed dwelling, and is\nand can be no state, could never have been derived from individuals.\nThe earliest notices of Rome show the city in possession of the sacred\nterritory, to which the state and all political power are attached.\nWhence did Rome become a landholder, and the governing people a\nterritorial people?  Whence does any nation become a territorial nation\nand lord of the domain?  Certainly never by the cession of individuals,\nand hence no civilized government ever did or could originate in the\nso-called social compact.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT--CONTINUED.\n\n\nIII. The tendency of the last century was to individualism; that of the\npresent is to socialism.  The theory of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and\nJefferson, though not formally abandoned, and still held by many, has\nlatterly been much modified, if not wholly transformed.  Sovereignty,\nit is now maintained, is inherent in the people; not individually,\nindeed, but collectively, or the people as society.  The constitution\nis held not to be simply a compact or agreement entered into by the\npeople as individuals creating civil society and government, but a law\nordained by the sovereign people, prescribing the constitution of the\nstate and defining its rights and powers.\n\nThis transformation, which is rather going on than completed, is, under\none aspect at least, a progress, or rather a return to the sounder\nprinciples of antiquity.  Under it government ceases to be a mere\nagency, which must obtain the assassin's consent to be hung before it\ncan rightfully hang him, and becomes authority, which is one and\nimperative.  The people taken collectively are society, and society is\na living organism, not a mere aggregation of individuals.  It does not,\nof course, exist without individuals, but it is something more than\nindividuals, and has rights not derived from them, and which are\nparamount to theirs. There is more truth, and truth of a higher order,\nin this than in the theory of the social compact.  Individuals, to a\ncertain extent, derive their life from God through society, and so far\nthey depend on her, and they are hers; she owns them, and has the right\nto do as she will with them.  On this theory the state emanates from\nsociety, and is supreme.  It coincides with the ancient Greek and Roman\ntheory, as expressed by Cicero, already cited.  Man is born in society\nand remains there, and it may be regarded as the source of ancient\nGreek and Roman patriotism, which still commands the admiration of the\ncivilized world.  The state with Greece and Rome was a living reality,\nand loyalty a religion.  The Romans held Rome to be a divinity, gave\nher statues and altars, and offered her divine worship.  This was\nsuperstition, no doubt, but it had in it an element of truth.  To every\ntrue philosopher there is something divine in the state, and truth in\nall theories.  Society stands nearer to God, and participates more\nimmediately of the Divine essence, and the state is a more lively image\nof God than the individual.  It was man, the generic and reproductive\nman, not the isolated individual, that was created in the image and\nlikeness of his Maker.  \"And God created man in his own image; in the\nimage of God created he him; male and female created he them.\"\n\nThis theory is usually called the democratic theory, and it enlists in\nits support the instincts, the intelligence, the living forces, and\nactive tendencies of the age.  Kings, kaisers, and hierarchies are\npowerless before it, and war against it in vain.  The most they can do\nis to restrain its excesses, or to guard against its abuses.  Its\nadvocates, in returning to it, sometimes revive in its name the old\npagan superstition.  Not a few of the European democrats recognize in\nthe earth, in heaven, or in hell, no power superior to the people, and\nsay not only people-king but people-God.  They say absolutely, without\nany qualification, the voice of the people is the voice of God, and\nmake their will the supreme law, not only in politics, but in religion,\nphilosophy, morals, science, and the arts.  The people not only found\nthe state, but also the church.  They inspire or reveal the truth,\nordain or prohibit worships, judge of doctrines, and decide cases of\nconscience.  Mazzini said, when at the head of the Roman Republic in\n1848, the question of religion must be remitted to the judgment of the\npeople.  Yet this theory is the dominant theory of the age, and is in\nall civilized nations advancing with apparently irresistible force.\n\nBut this theory has its difficulties.  Who are the collective people\nthat have the rights of society, or, who are the sovereign people?  The\nword people is vague, and in itself determines nothing.  It may include\na larger or a smaller number; it may mean the political people, or it\nmay mean simply population; it may mean peasants, artisans,\nshopkeepers, traders, merchants, as distinguished from the nobility;\nhired laborers or workmen as distinguished from their employer, or\nslaves as distinguished from their master or owner.  In which of these\nsenses is the word to be taken when it is said, \"The people are\nsovereign?\"  The people are the population or inhabitants of one and\nthe same country.  That is something.  But who or what determines the\ncountry?  Is the country the whole territory of the globe?  That will\nnot be said, especially since the dispersion of mankind and their\ndivision into separate nations.  Is the territory indefinite or\nundefined?  Then indefinite or undefined are its inhabitants, or the\npeople invested with the rights of society. Is it defined and its\nboundaries fixed?  Who has done it?  The people.  But who are the\npeople?  We are as wise as we were at starting.  The logicians say that\nthe definition of idem per idem, or the same by the same, is simply no\ndefinition at all.\n\nThe people are the nation, undoubtedly, if you mean by the people the\nsovereign people.  But who are the people constituting the nation?  The\nsovereign people?  This is only to revolve in a vicious circle.  The\nnation is the tribe or the people living under the same regimen, and\nborn of the same ancestor, or sprung from the same ancestor or\nprogenitor.  But where find a nation in this the primitive sense of the\nword?  Migration, conquest, and intermarriage, have so broken up and\nintermingled the primitive races, that it is more than doubtful if a\nsingle nation, tribe, or family of unmixed blood now exists on the face\nof the earth. A Frenchman, Italian, Spaniard, German, or Englishman,\nmay have the blood of a hundred different races coursing in his veins.\nThe nation is the people inhabiting the same country, and united under\none and the same government, it is further answered.  The nation, then,\nis not purely personal, but also territorial. Then, again, the question\ncomes up, who or what determines the territory?  The government?  But\nnot before it is constituted, and it cannot be constituted till its\nterritorial limits are determined.  The tribe doubtless occupies\nterritory, but is not fixed to it, and derives no jurisdiction from it,\nand therefore is not territorial.  But a nation, in the modern or\ncivilized sense, is fixed to the territory, and derives from it its\njurisdiction, or sovereignty; and, therefore, till the territory is\ndetermined, the nation is not and cannot be determined.\n\nThe question is not an idle question.  It is one of great practical\nimportance; for, till it is settled, we can neither determine who are\nthe sovereign people, nor who are united under one and the same\ngovernment.  Laws have no extra-territorial force, and the officer who\nshould attempt to enforce the national laws beyond the national\nterritory would be a trespasser.  If the limits are undetermined, the\ngovernment is not territorial, and can claim as within its jurisdiction\nonly those who choose to acknowledge its authority.  The importance of\nthe question has been recently brought home to the American people by\nthe secession of eleven or more States from the Union.  Were these\nStates a part of the American nation, or were they not?  Was the war\nwhich followed secession, and which cost so many lives and so much\ntreasure, a civil war or a foreign war?  Were the secessionists\ntraitors and rebels to their sovereign, or were they patriots fighting\nfor the liberty and independence of their country and the right of\nself-government?  All on both sides agreed that the nation is\nsovereign; the dispute was as to the existence of the nation itself,\nand the extent of its jurisdiction.  Doubtless, when a nation has a\ngenerally recognized existence as an historical fact, most of the\ndifficulties in determining who are the sovereign people can be got\nover; but the question here concerns the institution of government, and\ndetermining who constitute society and have the right to meet in\nperson, or by their delegates in convention, to institute it.  This\nquestion, so important, and at times so difficult, the theory of the\norigin of government in the people collectively, or the nation, does\nnot solve, or furnish any means of solving.\n\nBut suppose this difficulty surmounted there is still another, and a\nvery grave one, to overcome.  The theory assumes that the people\ncollectively, \"in their own native right and might,\" are sovereign.\nAccording to it the people are ultimate, and free to do whatever they\nplease.  This sacrifices individual freedom. The origin of government\nin a compact entered into by individuals, each with all and all with\neach, sacrificed the rights of society, and assumed each individual to\nbe in himself an independent sovereignty.  If logically carried out,\nthere could be no such crime as treason, there could be no state, and\nno public authority.  This new theory transfers to society the\nsovereignty which that asserted for the individual, and asserts social\ndespotism, or the absolutism of the state.  It asserts with sufficient\nenergy public authority, or the right of the people to govern; but it\nleaves no space for individual rights, which society must recognize,\nrespect, and protect.  This was the grand defect of the ancient\nGraeco-Roman civilization.  The historian explores in vain the records\nof the old Greek and Roman republics for any recognition of the rights\nof individuals not held as privileges or concessions from the state.\nSociety recognized no limit to her authority, and the state claimed\nover individuals all the authority of the patriarch over his household,\nthe chief over his tribe, or the absolute monarch over his subjects.\nThe direct and indirect influence of the body of freemen admitted to a\nvoice in public affairs, in determining the resolutions and action of\nthe state, no doubt tempered in practice to some extent the authority\nof the state, and prevented acts of gross oppression; but in theory the\nstate was absolute, and the people individually were placed at the\nmercy of the people collectively, or, rather, the majority of the\ncollective people.\n\nUnder ancient republicanism, there were rights of the state and rights\nof the citizen, but no rights of man, held independently of society,\nand not derived from God through the state.  The recognition of these\nrights by modern society is due to Christianity: some say to the\nbarbarians, who overthrew the Roman empire; but this last opinion is\nnot well founded.  The barbarian chiefs and nobles had no doubt a\nlively sense of personal freedom and independence, but for themselves\nonly.  They had no conception of personal freedom as a general or\nuniversal right, and men never obtain universal principles by\ngeneralizing particulars.  They may give a general truth a particular\napplication, but not a particular truth--understood to be a particular\ntruth--a general or universal application.  They are too good logicians\nfor that.  The barbarian individual freedom and personal independence\nwas never generalized into the doctrine of the rights of man, any more\nthan the freedom of the master has been generalized into the right of\nhis slaves to be free.  The doctrine of individual freedom before the\nstate is due to the Christian religion, which asserts the dignity and\nworth of every human soul, the accountability to God of each man for\nhimself, and lays it down as law for every one that God is to be obeyed\nrather than men.  The church practically denied the absolutism of the\nstate, and asserted for every man rights not held from the state, in\nconverting the empire to Christianity, in defiance of the state\nauthority, and the imperial edicts punishing with death the profession\nof the Christian faith.  In this she practically, as well as\ntheoretically, overthrew state absolutism, and infused into modern\nsociety the doctrine that every individual, even the lowest and\nmeanest, has rights which the state neither confers nor can abrogate;\nand it will only be by extinguishing in modern society the Christian\nfaith, and obliterating all traces of Christian civilization, that\nstate absolutism can be revived with more than a partial and temporary\nsuccess.\n\nThe doctrine of individual liberty may be abused, and so explained as\nto deny the rights of society, and to become pure individualism; but no\npolitical system that runs to the opposite extreme, and absorbs the\nindividual in the state, stands the least chance of any general or\npermanent success till Christianity is extinguished.  Yet the assertion\nof principles which logically imply state absolutism is not entirely\nharmless, even in Christian countries.  Error is never harmless, and\nonly truth can give a solid foundation on which to build. Individualism\nand socialism are each opposed to the other, and each has only a\npartial truth.  The state founded on either cannot stand, and society\nwill only alternate between the two extremes.  To-day it is torn by a\nrevolution in favor of socialism; to-morrow it will be torn by another\nin favor of individualism, and without effecting any real progress by\neither revolution.  Real progress can be secured only by recognizing\nand building on the truth, not as it exists in our opinions or in our\ntheories, but as it exists in the world of reality, and independent of\nour opinions.\n\nNow, social despotism or state absolutism is not based on truth or\nreality.  Society has certain rights over individuals, for she is a\nmedium of their communion with God, or through which they derive life\nfrom God, the primal source of all life; but she is not the only medium\nof man's life.  Man, as was said in the beginning, lives by communion\nwith God, and he communes with God in the creative act and the\nIncarnation, through his kind, and, through nature.  This threefold\ncommunion gives rise to three institutions--religion or the church,\nsociety or the state, and property.  The life that man derives from God\nthrough religion and property, is not derived from him through society,\nand consequently so much of his life be holds independently of society;\nand this constitutes his rights as a man as distinguished from his\nrights as a citizen.  In relation to society, as not held from God\nthrough her, these are termed his natural rights, which, she must hold\ninviolable, and government protect for every one, whatever his\ncomplexion or his social position.  These rights--the rights of\nconscience and the rights of property, with all their necessary\nimplications--are limitations of the rights of society, and the\nindividual has the right to plead them against the state.  Society does\nnot confer them, and it cannot take them away, for they are at least as\nsacred and as fundamental as her own.\n\nBut even this limitation of popular sovereignty is not all.  The people\ncan be sovereign only in the sense in which they exist and act.  The\npeople are not God, whatever some theorists may pretend--are not\nindependent, self-existent, and self-sufficing. They are as dependent\ncollectively as individually, and therefore can exist and act only as\nsecond cause, never as first cause. They can, then, even in the limited\nsphere of their sovereignty, be sovereign only in a secondary sense,\nnever absolute sovereign in their own independent right.  They are\nsovereign only to the extent to which they impart life to the\nindividual members of society, and only in the sense in which she\nimparts it, or is its cause.  She is not its first cause or creator,\nand is the medial cause or medium through which they derive it from\nGod, not its efficient cause or primary source.  Society derives her\nown life from God, and exists and acts only as dependent on him.  Then\nshe is sovereign over individuals only as dependent on God.  Her\ndominion is then not original and absolute, but secondary and\nderivative.\n\nThis third theory does not err in assuming that the people collectively\nare more than the people individually, or in denying society to be a\nmere aggregation of individuals with no life, and no rights but what it\nderives from them; nor even in asserting that the people in the sense\nof society are sovereign, but in asserting that they are sovereign in\ntheir own native or underived right and might.  Society has not in\nherself the absolute right to govern, because she has not the absolute\ndominion either of herself or her members.  God gave to man dominion\nover the irrational creation, for he made irrational creatures for man;\nbut he never gave him either individually or collectively the dominion\nover the rational creation.  The theory that the people are absolutely\nsovereign in their own independent right and might, as some zealous\ndemocrats explain it, asserts the fundamental principle of despotism,\nand all despotism is false, for it identifies the creature with the\nCreator.  No creature is creator, or has the rights of creator, and\nconsequently no one in his own right is or can be sovereign. This third\ntheory, therefore, is untenable.\n\nIV. A still more recent class of philosophers, if philosophers they may\nbe called, reject the origin of government in the people individually\nor collectively.  Satisfied that it has never been instituted by a\nvoluntary and deliberate act of the people, and confounding government\nas a fact with government as authority, maintain that government is a\nspontaneous development of nature. Nature develops it as the liver\nsecretes bile, as the bee constructs her cell, or the beaver builds his\ndam.  Nature, working by her own laws and inherent energy, develops\nsociety, and society develops government.  That is all the secret.\nQuestions as to the origin of government or its rights, beyond the\nsimple positive fact, belong to the theological or metaphysical stage\nof the development of nature, but are left behind when the race has\npassed beyond that stage, and has reached the epoch of positive\nscience, in which all, except the positive fact, is held to be unreal\nand non-existent. Government, like every thing else in the universe, is\nsimply a positive development of nature.  Science explains the laws and\nconditions of the development, but disdains to ask for its origin or\nground in any order that transcends the changes of the world of space\nand time.\n\nThese philosophers profess to eschew all theory, and yet they only\noppose theory to theory.  The assertion that reality for the human mind\nis restricted to the positive facts of the sensible order, is purely\ntheoretic, and is any thing but a positive fact. Principles are as\nreally objects of science as facts, and it is only in the light of\nprinciples that facts themselves are intelligible.  If the human mind\nhad no science of reality that transcends the sensible order, or the\npositive fact, it could have no science at all.  As things exist only\nin their principles or causes, so can they be known only in their\nprinciples and causes; for things can be known only as they are, or as\nthey really exist.  The science that pretends to deduce principles from\nparticular facts, or to rise from the fact by way of reasoning to an\norder that transcends facts, and in which facts have their origin, is\nundoubtedly chimerical, and as against that the positivists are\nunquestionably right.  But to maintain that man has no intelligence of\nany thing beyond the fact, no intuition or intellectual apprehension of\nits principle or cause, is equally chimerical.  The human mind cannot\nhave all science, but it has real science as far as it goes, and real\nscience is the knowledge of things as they are, not as they are not.\nSensible facts are not intelligible by themselves, because they do not\nexist by themselves; and if the human mind could not penetrate beyond\nthe individual fact, beyond the mimetic to the methexic, or\ntranscendental principle, copied or imitated by the individual fact, it\ncould never know the fact itself.  The error of modern philosophers, or\nphilosopherlings, is in supposing the principle is deduced or inferred\nfrom the fact, and in denying that the human mind has direct and\nimmediate intuition of it.\n\nSomething that transcends the sensible order there must be, or there\ncould be no development; and if we had no science of it, we could never\nassert that development is development, or scientifically explain the\nlaws and conditions of development. Development is explication, and\nsupposes a germ which precedes it, and is not itself a development; and\ndevelopment, however far it may be carried, can never do more than\nrealize the possibilities of the germ.  Development is not creation,\nand cannot supply its own germ.  That at least must be given by the\nCreator, for from nothing nothing can be developed.  If authority has\nnot its germ in nature, it cannot be developed from nature\nspontaneously or otherwise.  All government has a governing will; and\nwithout a will that commands, there is no government; and nature has in\nher spontaneous developments no will, for she has no personality.\nReason itself, as distinguished from will, only presents the end and\nthe means, but does not govern; it prescribes a rule, but cannot ordain\na law.  An imperative will, the will of a superior who has the right to\ncommand what reason dictates or approves, is essential to government;\nand that will is not developed from nature, because it has no germ in\nnature. So something above and beyond nature must be asserted, or\ngovernment itself cannot be asserted, even as a development. Nature is\nno more self-sufficing than are the people, or than is the individual\nman.\n\nNo doubt there is a natural law, which is law in the proper sense of\nthe word law; but this is a positive law under which nature is placed\nby a sovereign above herself, and is never to be confounded with those\nlaws of nature so-called, according to which she is productive as\nsecond cause, or produces her effects, which are not properly laws at\nall.  Fire burns, water flows, rain falls, birds fly, fishes swim, food\nnourishes, poisons kill, one substance has a chemical affinity for\nanother, the needle points to the pole, by a natural law, it is said;\nthat is, the effects are produced by an inherent and uniform natural\nforce. Laws in this sense are simply physical forces, and are nature\nherself.  The natural law, in an ethical sense, is not a physical law,\nis not a natural force, but a law impose by the Creator on all moral\ncreatures, that is, all creatures endowed with reason and free-will,\nand is called natural because promulgated in natural reason, or the\nreason common and essential to all moral creatures.  This is the moral\nlaw.  It is what the French call le droit naturell, natural right, and,\nas the theologians teach us, is the transcript of the eternal law, the\neternal will or reason of God.  It is the foundation of all law, and\nall acts of a state that contravene it are, as St. Augustine maintains,\nviolences rather than laws.  The moral law is no development of nature,\nfor it is above nature, and is imposed on nature.  The only development\nthere is about it is in our understanding of it.\n\nThere is, of course, development in nature, for nature considered as\ncreation has been created in germ, and is completed only in successive\ndevelopments.  Hence the origin of space and time. There would have\nbeen no space if there had been no external creation, and no time if\nthe creation had been completed externally at once, as it was in\nrelation to the Creator.  Ideal space is simply the ability of God to\nexternize his creative act, and actual space is the relation of\ncoexistence in the things created; ideal time is the ability of God to\ncreate existences with the capacity of being completed by successive\ndevelopments, and actual time is the relation of these in the order of\nsuccession, and when the existence is completed or consummated\ndevelopment ceases, and time is no more.  In relation to himself the\nCreator's works are complete from the first, and hence with him there\nis no time, for there is no succession.  But in relation to itself\ncreation is incomplete, and there is room for development, which may be\ncontinued till the whole possibility of creation is actualized.  Here\nis the foundation of what is true in the modern doctrine of progress.\nMan is progressive, because the possibilities of his nature are\nsuccessively unfolded and actualized.\n\nDevelopment is a fact, and its laws and conditions may be\nscientifically ascertained and defined.  All generation is development,\nas is all growth, physical, moral, or intellectual. But everything is\ndeveloped in its own order, and after its kind. The Darwinian theory of\nthe development of species is not sustained by science. The development\nstarts from the germ, and in the germ is given the law or principle of\nthe development. From the acorn is developed the oak, never the pine or\nthe linden.  Every kind generates its kind, never another.  But no\ndevelopment is, strictly speaking, spontaneous, or the result alone of\nthe inherent energy or force of the germ developed. There is not only a\nsolidarity of race, but in some sense of all races, or species; all\ncreated things are bound to their Creator, and to one another.  One and\nthe same law or principle of life pervades all creation, binding the\nuniverse together in a unity that copies or imitates the unity of the\nCreator.  No creature is isolated from the rest, or absolutely\nindependent of others.  All are parts of one stupendous whole, and each\ndepends on the whole, and the whole on each, and each on each.  All\ncreatures are members of one body, and members one of another.  The\ngerm of the oak is in the acorn, but the acorn left to itself alone can\nnever grow into the oak, any more than a body at rest can place itself\nin motion.  Lay the acorn away in your closet, where it is absolutely\ndeprived of air, heat, and moisture, and in vain will you watch for its\ngermination.  Germinate it cannot without some external influence, or\ncommunion, so to speak, with the elements from which it derives its\nsustenance and support.\n\nThere can be no absolutely spontaneous development.  All things are\ndoubtless active, for nothing exists except in so far as it is an\nactive force of some sort; but only God himself alone suffices for his\nown activity.  All created things are dependent, have not their being\nin themselves, and are real only as they participate, through the\ncreative act, of the Divine being.  The germ can no more be developed\nthan it could exist without God, and no more develop itself than it\ncould create itself.  What is called the law of development is in the\ngerm; but that law or force can operate only in conjunction with\nanother force or other forces.  All development, as all growth, is by\naccretion or assimilation.  The assimilating force is, if you will, in\nthe germ, but the matter assimilated comes and must come from abroad.\nEvery herdsman knows it, and knows that to rear his stock he must\nsupply them with appropriate food; every husbandman knows it, and knows\nthat to raise a crop of corn, he must plant the seed in a soil duly\nprepared, and which will supply the gases needed for its germination,\ngrowth, flowering, boiling, and ripening.  In all created things, in\nall things not complete in themselves, in all save God, in whom there\nis no development possible, for He is, as say the schoolmen, most pure\nact, in whom there is no unactualized possibility, the same law holds\ngood.  Development is always the resultant of two factors, the one the\nthing itself, the other some external force co-operating with it,\nexciting it, and aiding it to act.\n\nHence the praemotio physica of the Thomists, and the praevenient and\nadjuvant grace of the theologians, without which no one can begin the\nChristian life, and which must needs be supernatural when the end is\nsupernatural.  The principle of life in all orders is the same, and\nhuman activity no more suffices for itself in one order than in another.\n\nHere is the reason why the savage tribe never rises to a civilized\nstate without communion in some form with a people already civilized,\nand why there is no moral or intellectual development and progress\nwithout education and instruction, consequently without instructors and\neducators.  Hence the value of tradition; and hence, as the first man\ncould not instruct himself, Christian theologians, with a deeper\nphilosophy than is dreamed of by the sciolists of the age, maintain\nthat God himself was man's first teacher, or that he created Adam a\nfull-grown man, with all his faculties developed, complete, and in full\nactivity.  Hence, too, the heathen mythologies, which always contain\nsome elements of truth, however they may distort, mutilate, or travesty\nthem, make the gods the first teachers of the human race, and ascribe\nto their instruction even the most simple and ordinary arts of\nevery-day life. The gods teach men to plough, to plant, to reap, to\nwork in iron, to erect a shelter from the storm, and to build a fire to\nwarm them and to cook their food.  The common sense, as well as the\ncommon traditions of mankind, refuses to accept the doctrine that men\nare developed without foreign aid, or progressive without divine\nassistance. Nature of herself can no more develop government than it\ncan language.  There can be no language without society, and no society\nwithout language.  There can be no government without society, and no\nsociety without government of some sort.\n\nBut even if nature could spontaneously develop herself, she could never\ndevelop an institution that has the right to govern, for she has not\nherself that right.  Nature is not God, has not created us, therefore\nhas not the right of property in us.  She is not and cannot be our\nsovereign.  We belong not to her, nor does she belong to herself, for\nshe is herself creature, and belongs to her Creator.  Not being in\nherself sovereign, she cannot develop the right to govern, nor can she\ndevelop government as a fact, to say nothing of its right, for\ngovernment, whether we speak of it as fact or as authority, is distinct\nfrom that which is governed; but natural developments are nature, and\nindistinguishable from her.  The governor and the governed, the\nrestrainer and the restrained, can never as such be identical.\nSelf-government, taken strictly, is a contradiction in terms.  When an\nindividual is said to govern himself, he is never understood to govern\nhimself in the sense in which he is governed.  He by his reason and\nwill governs or restrains his appetites and passions.  It is man as\nspirit governing man as flesh, the spiritual mind governing the carnal\nmind.\n\nNatural developments cannot in all cases be even allowed to take their\nown course without injury to nature herself.  \"Follow nature\" is an\nunsafe maxim, if it means, leave nature to develop herself as she will,\nand follow thy natural inclinations.  Nature is good, but inclinations\nare frequently bad.  All our appetites and passions are given us for\ngood, for a purpose useful and necessary to individual and social life,\nbut they become morbid and injurious if indulged without restraint.\nEach has its special object, and naturally seeks it exclusively, and\nthus generates discord and war in the individual, which immediately\nfind expression in society, and also in the state, if the state be a\nsimple natural development.  The Christian maxim, Deny thyself, is far\nbetter than the Epicurean maxim, Enjoy thyself, for there is no real\nenjoyment without self-denial.  There is deep philosophy in Christian\nasceticism, as the Positivists themselves are aware, and even insist.\nBut Christian asceticism aims not to destroy nature, as voluptuaries\npretend, but to regulate, direct, and restrain its abnormal\ndevelopments for its own good.  It forces nature in her developments to\nsubmit to a law which is not in her, but above her.  The Positivists\npretend that this asceticism is itself a natural development, but that\ncannot be a natural development which directs, controls, and restrains\nnatural development.\n\nThe Positivists confound nature at one time with the law of nature, and\nat another the law of nature with nature herself, and take what is\ncalled the natural law to be a natural development. Here is their\nmistake, as it is the mistake of all who accept naturalistic theories.\nSociety, no doubt, is authorized by the law of nature to institute and\nmaintain government.  But the law of nature is not a natural\ndevelopment, nor is it in nature, or any part of nature.  It is not a\nnatural force which operates in nature, and which is the developing\nprinciple of nature.  Do they say reason is natural, and the law of\nnature is only reason? This is not precisely the fact.  The natural law\nis law proper, and is reason only in the sense that reason includes\nboth intellect and will, and nobody can pretend that nature in her\nspontaneous developments acts from intelligence and volition. Reason,\nas the faculty of knowing, is subjective and natural; but in the sense\nin which it is coincident with the natural law, it is neither\nsubjective nor natural, but objective and divine, and is God affirming\nhimself and promulgating his law to his creature, man.  It is, at\nleast, an immediate participation of the divine by which He reveals\nhimself and His will to the human understanding, and is not natural,\nbut supernatural, in the sense that God himself is supernatural.  This\nis wherefore reason is law, and every man is bound to submit or conform\nto reason.\n\nThat legitimate governments are instituted under the natural law is\nfrankly conceded, but this is by no means the concession of government\nas a natural development.  The reason and will of which the natural law\nis the expression are the reason and will of God.  The natural law is\nthe divine law as much as the revealed law itself, and equally\nobligatory.  It is not a natural force developing itself in nature,\nlike the law of generation, for instance, and therefore proceeding from\nGod as first cause, but it proceeds from God as final cause, and is,\ntherefore, theological, and strictly a moral law, founding moral rights\nand duties.  Of course, all morality and all legitimate government rest\non this law, or, if you will, originate in it.  But not therefore in\nnature, but in the Author of nature.  The authority is not the\nauthority of nature, but of Him who holds nature in the hollow of His\nhand.\n\nV. In the seventeenth century a class of political writers who very\nwell understood that no creature, no man, no number of men, not even,\nnature herself, can be inherently sovereign, defended the opinion that\ngovernments are founded, constituted, and clothed with their authority\nby the direct and express appointment of God himself.  They denied that\nrulers hold their power from the nation; that, however oppressive may\nbe their rule, that they are justiciable by any human tribunal, or that\npower, except by the direct judgment of God, is amissible.  Their\ndoctrine is known in history as the doctrine of \"the divine right of\nkings, and passive obedience.\"  All power, says St. Paul, is from God,\nand the powers that be are ordained of God, and to resist them is to\nresist the ordination of God.  They must be obeyed for conscience' sake.\n\nIt would, perhaps, be rash to say that this doctrine had never been\nbroached before the seventeenth century, but it received in that\ncentury, and chiefly in England, its fullest and most systematic\ndevelopments.  It was patronized by the Anglican divines, asserted by\nJames I. of England, and lost the Stuarts the crown of three kingdoms.\nIt crossed the Channel, into France, where it found a few hesitating\nand stammering defenders among Catholics, under Louis XIV., but it has\nnever been very generally held, though it has had able and zealous\nsupporters. In England it was opposed by all the Presbyterians,\nPuritans, Independents, and Republicans, and was forgotten or abandoned\nby the Anglican divines themselves in the Revolution of 1688, that\nexpelled James II. and crowned William and Mary.  It was ably refuted\nby the Jesuit Suarez in his reply to a Remonstrance for the Divine\nRight of Kings by the James I.; and a Spanish monk who had asserted it\nin Madrid, under Philip II., was compelled by the Inquisition to\nretract it publicly in the place where he had asserted it.  All\nrepublicans reject it, and the Church has never sanctioned it.  The\nSovereign Pontiffs have claimed and exercised the right to deprive\nprinces of their principality, and to absolve their subjects from the\noath of fidelity.  Whether the Popes rightly claimed and exercised that\npower is not now the question; but their having claimed and exercised\nit proves that the Church does not admit the inamissibility of power\nand passive obedience; for the action of the Pope was judicial, not\nlegislative.  The Pope has never claimed the right to depose a prince\ntill by his own act he has, under the moral law or the constitution of\nhis state, forfeited his power, nor to absolve subjects from their\nallegiance till their oath, according to its true intent and meaning,\nhas ceased to bind.  If the Church has always asserted with the Apostle\nthere is no power but from God--non est potestas nisi a Deo--she has\nalways through her doctors maintained that it is a trust to be\nexercised for the public good, and is forfeited when persistently\nexercised in a contrary sense.  St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and Suarez\nall maintain that unjust laws are violences rather than laws, and do\nnot oblige, except in charity or prudence, and that the republic may\nchange its magistrates, and even its constitution, if it sees proper to\ndo so.\n\nThat God, as universal Creator, is Sovereign Lord and proprietor of all\ncreated things or existences, visible or invisible, is certain; for the\nmaker has the absolute right to the thing made; it is his, and he may\ndo with it as he will.  As he is sole creator, he alone hath dominion;\nand as he is absolute creator, he has absolute dominion over all the\nthings which he has made. The guaranty against oppression is his own\nessential nature, is in the plenitude of his own being, which is the\nplenitude of wisdom and goodness.  He cannot contradict himself, be\nother than he is, or act otherwise than according to his own essential\nnature.  As he is, in his own eternal and immutable essence, supreme\nreason and supreme good, his dominion must always in its exercise be\nsupremely good and supremely reasonable, therefore supremely just and\nequitable.  From him certainly is all power; he is unquestionably King\nof kings, and Lord of lords.  By him kings reign and magistrates decree\njust things.  He may, at his will, set up or pull down kings, rear or\noverwhelm empires, foster the infant colony, and make desolate the\npopulous city. All this is unquestionably true, and a simple dictate of\nreason common to all men.  But in what sense is it true?  Is it true in\na supernatural sense?  Or is it true only in the sense that it is true\nthat by him we breathe, perform any or all of our natural functions,\nand in him live, and move, and have our being?\n\nViewed in their first cause, all things are the immediate creation of\nGod, and are supernatural, and from the point of view of the first\ncause the Scriptures usually speak, for the great purpose and paramount\nobject of the sacred writers, as of religion itself, is to make\nprominent the fact that God is universal creator, and supreme governor,\nand therefore the first and final cause of all things.  But God creates\nsecond causes, or substantial existences, capable themselves of acting\nand producing effects in a secondary sense, and hence he is said to be\ncausa causarum, cause of causes.  What is done by these second causes\nor creatures is done eminently by him, for they exist only by his\ncreative act, and produce only by virtue of his active presence, or\neffective concurrence.  What he does through them or through their\nagency is done by him, not immediately, but mediately, and is said to\nbe done naturally, as what he does immediately is said to be done\nsupernaturally.  Natural is what God does through second causes, which\nhe creates; supernatural is that which he does by himself alone,\nwithout their intervention or agency.  Sovereignty, or the right to\ngovern, is in him, and he may at his will delegate it to men either\nmediately or immediately, by a direct and express appointment, or\nmediately through nature.  In the absence of all facts proving its\ndelegation direct and express, it must be assumed to be mediate,\nthrough second causes.  The natural is always to be presumed, and the\nsupernatural is to be admitted only on conclusive proof.\n\nThe people of Israel had a supernatural vocation, and they received\ntheir law, embracing their religious and civil constitution and their\nritual directly from God at the hand of Moses, and various individuals\nfrom time to time appear to have been specially called to be their\njudges, rulers, or kings.  Saul was so called, and so was David. David\nand his line appear, also, to have been called not only to supplant\nSaul and his line, but to have been supernaturally invested with the\nkingdom forever; but it does not appear that the royal power with which\nDavid and his line were invested was inamissible.  They lost it in the\nBabylonish captivity, and never afterwards recovered it.  The Asmonean\nprinces were of another line, and when our Lord came the sceptre was in\nthe hands of Herod, an Idumean Or Edomite.  The promise made, to David\nand his house is generally held by Christian commentators to have\nreceived its fulfilment in the everlasting spiritual royalty of the\nMessiah, sprung through Mary from David's line.\n\nThe Christian Church is supernaturally constituted and supernaturally\ngoverned, but the persons selected to exercise powers supernaturally\ndefined, from the Sovereign Pontiff down to the humblest parish priest\nare selected and inducted into office through human agency.  The\nGentiles very generally claimed to have received their laws from the\ngods, but it does not appear, save in exceptional cases, that they\nclaimed that their princes were designated and held their powers by the\ndirect and express appointment of the god.  Save in the case of the\nJews, and that of the Church, there is no evidence that any particular\ngovernment exists or ever has existed by direct or express appointment,\nor otherwise than by the action of the Creator through second causes,\nor what is called his ordinary providence. Except David and his line,\nthere is no evidence of the express grant by the Divine Sovereign to\nany individual or family, class or caste of the government of any\nnation or country.  Even those Christian princes who professed to reign\n\"by the grace of God,\" never claimed that they received their\nprincipalities from God otherwise than through his ordinary providence,\nand meant by it little more than an acknowledgment of their dependence\non him, their obligation to use their power according to his law and\ntheir accountability to him for the use they make of it.\n\nThe doctrine is not favorable to human liberty, for it recognizes no\nrights of man in face of civil society.  It consecrates tyranny, and\nmakes God the accomplice of the tyrant, if we suppose all governments\nhave actually existed by his express appointment.  It puts the king in\nthe place of God, and requires us to worship in him the immediate\nrepresentative of the Divine Being.  Power is irresponsible and\ninamissible, and however it may be abused, or however corrupt and\noppressive may be its exercise, there is no human redress.  Resistance\nto power is resistance to God.  There is nothing for the people but\npassive obedience and unreserved submission.  The doctrine, in fact,\ndenies all human government, and allows the people no voice in the\nmanagement of their own affairs, and gives no place for human activity.\nIt stands opposed to all republicanism, and makes power an hereditary\nand indefeasible right, not a trust which he who holds it may forfeit,\nand of which he may be deprived if he abuses it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT--CONCLUDED.\n\n\nVI. The theory which derives the right of government from the direct\nand express appointment of God is sometimes modified so as to mean that\ncivil authority is derived from God through the spiritual authority.\nThe patriarch combined in his person both authorities, and was in his\nown household both priest and king, and so originally was in his own\ntribe the chief, and in his kingdom the king.  When the two offices\nbecame separated is not known.  In the time of Abraham they were still\nunited. Melchisedech, king of Salem, was both priest and king, and the\nearliest historical records of kings present them as offering\nsacrifices.  Even the Roman emperor was Pontifex Maximus as well as\nImperator, but that was so not because the two offices were held to be\ninseparable, but because they were both conferred on the same person by\nthe republic.  In Egypt, in the time of Moses, the royal authority and\nthe priestly were separated and held by different persons.  Moses, in\nhis legislation for his nation, separated them, and instituted a\nsacerdotal order or caste.  The heads of tribes and the heads of\nfamilies are, under his law, princes, but not priests, and the\npriesthood is conferred on and restricted to his own tribe of Levi, and\nmore especially the family of his own brother Aaron.\n\nThe priestly office by its own nature is superior to the kingly, and in\nall primitive nations with a separate, organized priesthood, whether a\ntrue priesthood or a corrupt, the priest is held to be above the king,\nelects or establishes the law by which is selected the temporal chief,\nand inducts him into his office, as if he received his authority from\nGod through the priesthood. The Christian priesthood is not a caste,\nand is transmitted by the election of grace, not as with the Israelites\nand all sacerdotal nations, by natural Generation.  Like Him whose\npriests they are, Christian priests are priests after the order of\nMelchisedech, who was without priestly descent, without father or\nmother of the priestly line.  But in being priests after the order of\nMelchisedech, they are both priests and kings, as Melchisedech was, and\nas was our Lord himself, to whom was given by his Father all power in\nheaven and in earth.  The Pope, or Supreme Pontiff, is the vicar of our\nLord on earth, his representative--the representative not only of him\nwho is our invisible High-Priest, but of him who is King of kings and\nLord of lords, therefore of both the priestly and the kingly power.\nConsequently, no one can have any mission to govern in the state any\nmore than in the church, unless derived from God directly or indirectly\nthrough the Pope or Supreme Pontiff.  Many theologians and canonists in\nthe Middle Ages so held, and a few perhaps hold so still.  The bulls\nand briefs of several Popes, as Gregory VII., Innocent Ill., Gregory\nIX., Innocent IV., and Boniface VIII., have the appearance of favoring\nit.\n\nAt one period the greater part of the medieval kingdoms and\nprincipalities were fiefs of the Holy See, and recognized the Holy\nFather as their suzerain.  The Pope revived the imperial dignity in the\nperson of Charlemagne, and none could claim that dignity in the Western\nworld unless elected and crowned by him, that is, unless elected\ndirectly by the Pope or by electors designated by him, and acting under\nhis authority.  There can be no question that the spiritual is superior\nto the temporal, and that the temporal is bound in the very nature of\nthings to conform to the spiritual, and any law enacted by the civil\npower in contravention of the law of God is null and void from the\nbeginning.  This is what Mr. Seward meant by the higher law, a law\nhigher even than the Constitution of the United States. Supposing this\nhigher law, and supposing that kings and princes hold from God through\nthe spiritual society, it is very evident that the chief of that\nsociety would have the right to deprive them, and to absolve their\nsubjects, as on several occasions he actually has done.\n\nBut this theory has never been a dogma of the Church, nor, to any great\nextent, except for a brief period, maintained by theologians or\ncanonists.  The Pope conferred the imperial dignity on Charlemagne and\nhis successors, but not the civil power, at least out of the Pope's own\ntemporal dominions.  The emperor of Germany was at first elected by the\nPope, and afterwards by hereditary electors designated or accepted by\nhim, but the king of the Germans with the full royal authority could be\nelected and enthroned without the papal intervention or permission.\nThe suzerainty of the Holy See over Italy, Naples, Aragon, Muscovy,\nEngland, and other European states, was by virtue of feudal relations,\nnot by virtue of the spiritual authority of the Holy See or the\nvicarship of the Holy Father.  The right to govern under feudalism was\nsimply an estate, or property; and as the church could acquire and hold\nproperty, nothing prevented her holding fiefs, or her chief from being\nsuzerain.  The expressions in the papal briefs and bulls, taken in\nconnection with the special relations existing between the Pope and\nemperor in the Middle Ages, and his relations with other states as\ntheir feudal sovereign, explained by the controversies concerning\nrights growing out of these relations, will be found to give no\ncountenance to the theory in question.\n\nThese relations really existed, and they gave the Pope certain temporal\nrights in certain states, even the temporal supremacy, as he has still\nin what is left him of the States of the Church; but they were\nexceptional or accidental relations, not the universal and essential\nrelations between the church and the state.  The rights that grew out\nof these relations were real rights, sacred and inviolable, but only\nwhere and while the relations subsisted.  They, for the most part, grew\nout of the feudal system introduced into the Roman empire by its\nbarbarian conquerors, and necessarily ceased with the political order\nin which they originated.  Undoubtedly the church consecrated civil\nrulers, but this did not imply that they received their power or right\nto govern from God through her; but implied that their persons were\nsacred, and that violence to them would be sacrilege; that they held\nthe Christian faith, and acknowledged themselves bound to protect it,\nand to govern their subjects justly, according to the law of God.\n\nThe church, moreover, has always recognized the distinction of the two\npowers, and although the Pope owes to the fact that he is chief of the\nspiritual society, his temporal principality, no theologian or canonist\nof the slightest respectability would argue that he derives his rights\nas temporal sovereign from his rights as pontiff.  His rights as\npontiff depend on the express appointment of God; his rights as\ntemporal prince are derived from the same source from which other\nprinces derive their rights, and are held by the same tenure.  Hence\ncanonists have maintained that the subjects of other states may even\nengage in war with the Pope as prince, without breach of their fidelity\nto him as pontiff or supreme visible head of the church.\n\nThe church not only distinguishes between the two powers, but\nrecognizes as legitimate, governments that manifestly do not derive\nfrom God through her.  St. Paul enjoins obedience to the Roman emperors\nfor conscience' sake, and the church teaches that infidels and heretics\nmay have legitimate government; and if she has ever denied the right of\nany infidel or heretical prince, it has been on the ground that the\nconstitution and laws of his principality require him to profess and\nprotect the Catholic faith.  She tolerates resistance in a non-Catholic\nstate no more than in a Catholic state to the prince; and if she has\nnot condemned and cut off from her communion the Catholics who in our\nstruggle have joined the Secessionists and fought in their ranks\nagainst the United States, it is because the prevalence of the doctrine\nof State sovereignty has seemed to leave a reasonable doubt whether\nthey were really rebels fighting against their legitimate sovereign or\nnot.\n\nNo doubt, as the authority of the church is derived immediately from\nGod in a supernatural manner, and as she holds that the state derives\nits authority only mediately from him, in a natural mode, she asserts\nthe superiority of her authority, and that, in case of conflict between\nthe two powers, the civil must yield. But this is only saying that\nsupernatural is above natural. But--and this is the important\npoint--she does not teach, nor permit the faithful to hold, that the\nsupernatural abrogates the natural, or in any way supersedes it.\nGrace, say the theologians, supposes nature, gratia supponit naturam.\nThe church in the matter of government accepts the natural, aids it,\nelevates it, and is its firmest support.\n\nVII. St. Augustine, St. Gregory Magnus, St. Thomas, Bellarmin, Suarez,\nand the theologians generally, hold that princes derive their power\nfrom God through the people, or that the people, though not the source,\nare the medium of all political authority, and therefore rulers are\naccountable for the use they make of their power to both God and the\npeople.\n\nThis doctrine agrees with the democratic theory in vesting sovereignty\nin the people, instead of the king or the nobility, a particular\nindividual, family, class, or caste; and differs from it, as democracy\nis commonly explained, in understanding by the people, the people\ncollectively, not individually--the organic people, or people fixed to\na given territory, not the people as a mere population--the people in\nthe republican sense of the word nation, not in the barbaric or\ndespotic sense; and in deriving the sovereignty from God, from whom is\nall power, and except from whom there is and can be no power, instead\nof asserting it as the underived and indefeasible right of the people\nin their \"own native right and might.\"  The people not being God, and\nbeing only what philosophers call a second cause, they are and can be\nsovereign only in a secondary and relative sense.  It asserts the\ndivine origin of power, while democracy asserts its human origin. But\nas, under the law of nature, all men are equal, or have equal rights as\nmen, one man has and can have in himself no right to govern another;\nand as man is never absolutely his own, but always and everywhere\nbelongs to his Creator, it is clear that no government originating in\nhumanity alone can be a legitimate government.  Every such government\nis founded on the assumption that man is God, which is a great\nmistake--is, in fact, the fundamental sophism which underlies every\nerror and every sin.\n\nThe divine origin of government, in the sense asserted by Christian\ntheologians, is never found distinctly set forth in the political\nwritings of the ancient Greek and Roman writers. Gentile philosophy had\nlost the tradition of creation, as some modern philosophers, in\nso-called Christian nations, are fast losing it, and were as unable to\nexplain the origin of government as they were the origin of man himself.\n\nEven Plato, the profoundest of all ancient philosophers, and the most\nfaithful to the traditionary wisdom of the race, lacks the conception\nof creation, and never gets above that of generation and formation.\nThings are produced by the Divine Being impressing his own ideas,\neternal in his own mind, on a pre-existing matter, as a seal on wax.\nAristotle teaches substantially the same doctrine.  Things eternally\nexist as matter and form, and all the Divine Intelligence does, is to\nunite the form to the matter, and change it, as the schoolmen say, from\nmateria informis to materia formata.  Even the Christian Platonists and\nPeripatetics never as philosophers assert creation; they assert it,\nindeed, but as theologians, as a fact of revelation, not as a fact of\nscience; and hence it is that their theology and their philosophy never\nthoroughly harmonize, or at least are not shown to harmonize throughout.\n\nSpeaking generally, the ancient Gentile philosophers were pantheists,\nand represented the universe either as God or as an emanation from God.\nThey had no proper conception of Providence, or the action of God in\nnature through natural agencies, or as modern physicists say, natural\nlaws.  If they recognized the action of divinity at all, it was a\nsupernatural or miraculous intervention of some god.  They saw no\ndivine intervention in any thing naturally explicable, or explicable by\nnatural laws. Having no conception of the creative act, they could have\nnone of its immanence, or the active and efficacious presence of the\nCreator in all his works, even in the action of second causes\nthemselves.  Hence they could not assert the divine origin of\ngovernment, or civil authority, without supposing it supernaturally\nfounded, and excluding all human and natural agencies from its\ninstitution.  Their writings may be studied with advantage on the\nconstitution of the state, on the practical workings of different forms\nof government, as well as on the practical administration of affairs,\nbut never on the origin of the state, and the real ground of its\nauthority.\n\nThe doctrine is derived from Christian theology, which teaches that\nthere is no power except from God, and enjoins civil obedience as a\nreligious duty.  Conscience is accountable to God alone, and civil\ngovernment, if it had only a natural or human origin, could not bind\nit.  Yet Christianity makes the civil law, within its legitimate\nsphere, as obligatory on conscience as the divine law itself, and no\nman is blameless before God who is not blameless before the state.  No\nman performs faithfully his religious duties who neglects his civil\nduties, and hence, the law of the church allows no one to retire from\nthe world and enter a religious order, who has duties that bind him or\nher to the family or the state; though it is possible that the law is\nnot always strictly observed, and that individuals sometimes enter a\nconvent for the sake of getting rid of those duties, or the equally\nimportant duty of taking care of themselves.  But by asserting the\ndivine origin of government, Christianity consecrates civil authority,\nclothes it with a religious character, and makes civil disobedience,\nsedition, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, civil turbulence of any\nsort or degree, sins against God as well as crimes against the state.\nFor the same reason she makes usurpation, tyranny, oppression of the\npeople by civil rulers, offences against God as well as against\nsociety, and cognizable by the spiritual authority.\n\nAfter the establishment of the Christian church, after its public\nrecognition, and when conflicting claims arose between the two\npowers--the civil and the ecclesiastical--this doctrine of the divine\norigin of civil government was abused, and turned against the church\nwith most disastrous consequences.  While the Roman Empire of the West\nsubsisted, and even after its fall, so long as the emperor of the East\nasserted and practically maintained his authority in the Exarchate of\nRavenna and the Duchy of Rome, the Popes comported themselves, in civil\nmatters, as subjects of the Roman emperor, and set forth no claim to\ntemporal independence. But when the emperor had lost Rome, and all his\npossessions in Italy, had abandoned them, or been deprived of them by\nthe barbarians, and ceased to make any efforts to recover them, the\nPope was no longer a subject, even in civil matters, of the emperor,\nand owed him no civil allegiance.  He became civilly independent of the\nRoman Empire, and had only spiritual relations with it.  To the new\npowers that sprang up in Europe he appears never to have acknowledged\nany civil subjection, and uniformly asserted, in face of them, his\ncivil as well as spiritual independence.\n\nThis civil independence the successors of Charlemagne, who pretended to\nbe the successors of the Roman Emperors of the West, and called their\nempire the Holy Roman Empire, denied, and maintained that the Pope owed\nthem civil allegiance, or that, in temporals, the emperor was the\nPope's superior.  If, said the emperor, or his lawyers for him, the\ncivil power is from God, as it must be, since non est potestas nisi a\nDeo, the state stands on the same footing with the church, and the\nimperial power emanates from as high a source as the Pontifical. The\nemperor is then as supreme in temporals as the Pope in spirituals, and\nas the emperor is subject to the pope in spirituals, so must the Pope\nbe subject to the emperor in temporals.  As at the time when the\ndispute arose, the temporal interests of churchmen were so interwoven\nwith their spiritual rights, the pretensions of the emperor amounted\npractically to the subjection in spirituals as well as temporals of the\necclesiastical authority to the civil, and absorbed the church in the\nstate, the reasoning was denied, and churchmen replied: The Pope\nrepresents the spiritual order, which is always and everywhere supreme\nover the temporal, since the spiritual order is the divine sovereignty\nitself.  Always and everywhere, then, is the Pope independent of the\nemperor, his superior, and to subject him in any thing to the emperor\nwould be as repugnant to reason as to subject the soul to the body, the\nspirit to the flesh, heaven to earth, or God to man.\n\nIf the universal supremacy claimed for the Pope, rejoined the\nimperialists, be conceded, the state would be absorbed in the church,\nthe autonomy of civil society would be destroyed, and civil rulers\nwould have no functions but to do the bidding of the clergy.  It would\nestablish a complete theocracy, or, rather, clerocracy, of all possible\ngovernments the government the most odious to mankind, and the most\nhostile to social progress.  Even the Jews could not, or would not,\nendure it, and prayed God to give them a king, that they might be like\nother nations.\n\nIn the heat of the controversy neither party clearly and distinctly\nperceived the true state of the question, and each was partly right and\npartly wrong.  The imperialists wanted room for the free activity of\ncivil society, the church wanted to establish in that society the\nsupremacy of the moral order, or the law of God, without which\ngovernments can have no stability, and society no real well-being.  The\nreal solution of the difficulty was always to be found in the doctrine\nof the church herself, and had been given time and again by her most\napproved theologians.  The Pope, as the visible head of the spiritual\nsociety, is, no doubt, superior to the emperor, not precisely because\nhe represents a superior order, but because the church, of which he is\nthe visible chief, is a supernatural institution, and holds immediately\nfrom God; whereas civil society, represented by the emperor, holds from\nGod only mediately, through second causes, or the people.  Yet, though\nderived from God only through the people, civil authority still holds\nfrom God, and derives its right from Him through another channel than\nthe church or spiritual society, and, therefore, has a right, a\nsacredness, which the church herself gives not, and must recognize and\nrespect.  This she herself teaches in teaching that even infidels, as\nwe have seen, may have legitimate government, and since, though she\ninterprets and applies the law of God, both natural and revealed, she\nmakes neither.\n\nNevertheless, the imperialists or the statists insisted on their false\ncharge against the Pope, that he labored to found a purely theocratic\nor clerocratic government, and finding themselves unable to place the\nrepresentative of the civil society on the same level with the\nrepresentative of the spiritual, or to emancipate the state from the\nlaw of God while they conceded the divine origin or right of\ngovernment, they sought to effect its independence by asserting for it\nonly a natural or purely human origin.  For nearly two centuries the\nmost popular and influential writers on government have rejected the\ndivine origin and ground of civil authority, and excluded God from the\nstate. They have refused to look beyond second causes, and have labored\nto derive authority from man alone.  They have not only separated the\nstate from the church as an external corporation, but from God as its\ninternal lawgiver, and by so doing have deprived the state of her\nsacredness, inviolability, or hold on the conscience, scoffed at\nloyalty as a superstition, and consecrated not civil authority, but\nwhat is called \"the right of insurrection.\"  Under their teaching the\nage sympathizes not with authority in its efforts to sustain itself and\nprotect society, but with those who conspire against it--the\ninsurgents, rebels, revolutionists seeking its destruction.  The\nestablished government that seeks to enforce respect for its legitimate\nauthority and compel obedience to the laws, is held to be despotic,\ntyrannical, oppressive, and resistance to it to be obedience to God,\nand a wild howl rings through Christendom against the prince that will\nnot stand still and permit the conspirators to cut his throat. There is\nhardly a government now in the civilized world that can sustain itself\nfor a moment without an armed force sufficient to overawe or crush the\nparty or parties in permanent conspiracy against it.\n\nThis result is not what was aimed at or desired, but it is the logical\nor necessary result of the attempt to erect the state on atheistical\nprinciples.  Unless founded on the divine sovereignty, authority can\nsustain itself only by force, for political atheism recognizes no right\nbut might.  No doubt the politicians have sought an atheistical, or\nwhat is the same thing, a purely human, basis for government, in order\nto secure an open field for human freedom and activity, or individual\nor social progress.  The end aimed at has been good, laudable even, but\nthey forgot that freedom is possible only with authority that protects\nit against license as well as against despotism, and that there can be\nno progress where there is nothing that is not progressive.  In civil\nsociety two things are necessary--stability and movement. The human is\nthe element of movement, for in it are possibilities that can be only\nsuccessively actualized.  But the element of stability can be found\nonly in the divine, in God, in whom there is no unactualized\npossibility, who, therefore, is immovable, immutable, and eternal.  The\ndoctrine that derives authority from God through the people, recognizes\nin the state both of these elements, and provides alike for stability\nand progress.\n\nThis doctrine is not mere theory; it simply states the real order of\nthings.  It is not telling what ought to be, but what is in the real\norder.  It only asserts for civil government the relation to God which\nnature herself holds to him, which the entire universe holds to the\nCreator.  Nothing in man, in nature, in the universe, is explicable\nwithout the creative act of God, for nothing exists without that act.\nThat God \"in the beginning created heaven and earth,\" is the first\nprinciple of all science as of all existences, in politics no less than\nin theology.  God and creation comprise all that is or exists, and\ncreation, though distinguishable from God as the act from the actor, is\ninseparable from him, \"for in Him we live and move and have our being.\"\nAll creatures are joined to him by his creative act, and exist only as\nthrough that act they participate of his being. Through that act he is\nimmanent as first cause in all creatures and in every act of every\ncreature.  The creature deriving from his creative act can no more\ncontinue to exist than it could begin to exist without it.  It is as\nbad philosophy as theology, to suppose that God created the universe,\nendowed it with certain laws of development or activity, wound it up,\ngave it a jog, set it agoing, and then left it to go of itself.  It\ncannot go of itself, because it does not exist of itself.  It did not\nmerely not begin to exist, but it cannot continue to exist, without the\ncreative act.  Old Epicurus was a sorry philosopher, or rather, no\nphilosopher at all.  Providence is as necessary as creation, or rather,\nProvidence is only continuous creation, the creative act not suspended\nor discontinued, or not passing over from the creature and returning to\nGod.\n\nThrough the creative act man participates of God, and he can continue\nto exist, act, or live only by participating through it of his divine\nbeing.  There is, therefore, something of divinity, so to speak, in\nevery creature, and therefore it is that God is worshipped in his works\nwithout idolatry.  But he creates substantial existences capable of\nacting as second causes.  Hence, in all living things there is in their\nlife a divine element and a natural element; in what is called human\nlife, there are the divine and the human, the divine as first and the\nhuman as second cause, precisely what the doctrine of the great\nChristian theologians assert to be the fact with all legitimate or real\ngovernment.  Government cannot exist without the efficacious presence\nof God any more than man himself, and men might as well attempt to\nbuild up a world as to attempt to found a state without God.  A\ngovernment founded on atheistical principles were less than a castle in\nthe air.  It would have nothing to rest on, would not be even so much\nas \"the baseless fabric of a vision,\" and they who imagine that they\nreally do exclude God from their politics deceive themselves; for they\naccept and use principles which, though they know it not, are God.\nWhat they call abstract principles, or abstract forms of reason,\nwithout which there were no logic, are not abstract, but the real,\nliving God himself. Hence government, like man himself, participates of\nthe divine being, and, derived from God through the people, it at the\nsame time participates of human reason and will, thus reconciling\nauthority with freedom, and stability with progress.\n\nThe people, holding their authority from God, hold it not as an\ninherent right, but as a trust from Him, and are accountable to Him for\nit.  It is not their own.  If it were their own they might do with it\nas they pleased, and no one would have any right to call them to an\naccount; but holding it as a trust from God, they are under his law,\nand bound to exercise it as that law prescribes.  Civil rulers, holding\ntheir authority from God through the people, are accountable for it\nboth to Him and to them.  If they abuse it they are justiciable by the\npeople and punishable by God himself.\n\nHere is the guaranty against tyranny, oppression, or bad government, or\nwhat in modern times is called the responsibility of power.  At the\nsame time the state is guarantied against sedition, insurrection,\nrebellion, revolution, by the elevation of the civic virtues to the\nrank of religious, virtues, and making loyalty a matter of conscience.\nReligion is brought to the aid of the state, not indeed as a foreign\nauxiliary, but as integral in the political order itself.  Religion\nsustains the state, not because it externally commands us to obey the\nhigher powers, or to be submissive to the powers that be, not because\nit trains the people to habits of obedience, and teaches them to be\nresigned and patient under the grossest abuses of power, but because it\nand the state are in the same order, and inseparable, though distinct,\nparts of one and the same whole.  The church and the state, as\ncorporations or external governing bodies, are indeed separate in their\nspheres, and the church does not absorb the state, nor does the state\nthe church; but both are from God, and both work to the same end, and\nwhen each is rightly understood there is no antithesis or antagonism\nbetween them. Men serve God in serving the state as directly as in\nserving the church.  He who dies on the battle-field fighting for his\ncountry ranks with him who dies at the stake for his faith.  Civic\nvirtues are themselves religious virtues, or at least virtues without\nwhich there are no religious virtues, since no man who loves not his\nbrother does or can love God.\n\nThe guaranties offered the state or authority are ample, because it has\nnot only conscience, moral sentiment, interest, habit, and the via\ninertia of the mass, but the whole physical force of the nation, at its\ncommand.  The individual has, indeed, only moral guaranties against the\nabuse of power by the sovereign people, which may no doubt sometimes\nprove insufficient.  But moral guaranties are always better than none,\nand there are none where the people are held to be sovereign in their\nown native right and might, organized or unorganized, inside or outside\nof the constitution, as most modern democratic theorists maintain;\nsince, if so, the will of the people, however expressed, is the\ncriterion of right and wrong, just and unjust, true and false, is\ninfallible and impeccable, and no moral right can ever be pleaded\nagainst it; they are accountable to nobody, and, let them do what they\nplease, they can do no wrong.  This would place the individual at the\nmercy of the state, and deprive him of all right to complain, however\noppressed or cruelly treated.  This would establish the absolute\ndespotism of the state, and deny every thing like the natural rights of\nman, or individual and personal freedom, as has already been shown.\nNow as men do take part in government, and as men, either individually\nor collectively, are neither infallible nor impeccable, it is never to\nbe expected, under any possible constitution or form of government,\nthat authority will always be wisely and justly exercised, that wrong\nwill ever be done, and the rights of individuals never in any instance\nbe infringed; but with the clear understanding that all power is of\nGod, that the political sovereignty is vested in the people or the\ncollective body, that the civil rulers hold from God through them and\nare responsible to Him through them, and justiciable by them, there is\nall the guaranty against the abuse of power by the nation, the\npolitical or organic people, that the nature of the case admits.  The\nnation may, indeed, err or do wrong, but in the way supposed you get in\nthe government all the available wisdom and virtue the nation has, and\nmore is never, under any form or constitution of government,\npracticable or to be expected.\n\nIt is a maxim with constitutional statesmen, that \"the king reigns, not\ngoverns.\"  The people, though sovereign under God, are not the\ngovernment.  The government is in their name and by virtue of authority\ndelegated from God through them, but they are not it, are not their own\nministers.  It is only when the people forget this and undertake to be\ntheir own ministers and to manage their own affairs immediately by\nthemselves instead of selecting agents to do it for them, and holding\ntheir agents to a strict account for their management, that they are\nlikely to abuse their power or to sanction injustice.  The nation may\nbe misled or deceived for a moment by demagogues, those popular\ncourtiers, but as a rule it is disposed to be just and to respect all\nnatural rights.  The wrong is done by individuals who assume to speak\nin their name, to wield their power, and to be themselves the state.\nL'etat, c'est moi. I am the state, said Louis XIV. of France, and while\nthat was conceded the French nation could have in its government no\nmore wisdom or virtue than he possessed, or at least no more than he\ncould appreciate.  And under his government France was made responsible\nfor many deeds that the nation would never have sanctioned, if it bad\nbeen recognized as the depositary of the national sovereignty, or as\nthe French state, and answerable to God for the use it made of\npolitical power, or the conduct of its government.\n\nBut be this as it may, there evidently can be no physical force in the\nnation to coerce the nation itself in case it goes wrong, for if the\nsovereignty vests in the nation, only the nation can rightly command or\nauthorize the employment of force, and all commissions must run in its\nname.  Written constitutions alone will avail little, for they emanate\nfrom the people, who can disregard them, if they choose, and alter or\nrevoke them at will. The reliance for the wisdom and justice of the\nstate must after all be on moral guaranties.  In the very nature of the\ncase there are and can be no other.  But these, placed in a clear\nlight, with an intelligent and religious people, will seldom be found\ninsufficient.  Hence the necessity for the protection, not of authority\nsimply or chiefly, but of individual rights and the liberty of religion\nand intelligence in the nation, of the general understanding that the\nnation holds its power to govern as a trust from God, and that to God\nthrough the people all civil rulers are strictly responsible.  Let the\nmass of the people in any nation lapse into the ignorance and barbarism\nof atheism, or lose themselves in that supreme sophism called\npantheism, the grand error of ancient as well as of modern gentilism,\nand liberty, social or political, except that wild kind of liberty, and\nperhaps not even that should be excepted, which obtains among savages,\nwould be lost and irrecoverable.\n\nBut after all, this theory does not meet all the difficulties of the\ncase.  It derives sovereignty from God, and thus asserts the divine\norigin of government in the sense that the origin of nature is divine;\nit derives it from God through the people, collectively, or as society,\nand therefore concedes it a natural, human, and social element, which\ndistinguishes it from pure theocracy.  It, however, does not explain\nhow authority comes from God to the people.  The ruler, king, prince,\nor emperor, holds from God through the people, but how do the people\nthemselves hold from God?  Mediately or immediately?  If mediately,\nwhat is the medium?  Surely not the people themselves. The people can\nno more be the medium than the principle of their own sovereignty. If\nimmediately, then God governs in them as he does in the church, and no\nman is free to think or act contrary to popular opinion, or in any case\nto question the wisdom or justice of any of the acts of the state,\nwhich is arriving at state absolutism by another process.  Besides,\nthis would theoretically exclude all human or natural activity, all\nhuman intelligence and free-will from the state, which were to fall\ninto either pantheism or atheism.\n\nVIII. The right of government to govern, or political authority, is\nderived by the collective people or society, from God through the law\nof nature.  Rulers hold from God through the people or nation, and the\npeople or nation hold from God through the natural law.  How nations\nare founded or constituted, or a particular people becomes a sovereign\npolitical people, invested with the rights of society, will be\nconsidered in following chapters.  Here it suffices to say that\nsupposing a political people or nation, the sovereignty vests in the\ncommunity, not supernaturally, or by an external supernatural\nappointment, as the clergy hold their authority, but by the natural\nlaw, or law by which God governs the whole moral creation.\n\nThey who assert the origin of government in nature are right, so far as\nthey derive it from God through the law of nature, and are wrong only\nwhen they understand by the law of nature the physical force or forces\nof nature, which are not laws in the primary and proper sense of the\nterm.  The law of nature is not the order or rule of the divine action\nin nature which is rightfully called providence, but is, as has been\nsaid, law in its proper and primary sense, ordained by the Author of\nnature, as its sovereign and supreme Lawgiver, and binds all of his\ncreatures who are endowed with reason and free-will, and is called\nnatural, because promulgated through the reason common to all men.\nUndoubtedly, it was in the first instance, to the first man,\nsupernaturally promulgated, as it is republished and confirmed by\nChristianity, as an integral part of the Christian code itself.  Man\nneeds even yet instruction in relation to matters lying within the\nrange of natural reason, or else secular schools, colleges, and\nuniversities would be superfluous, and manifestly the instructor of the\nfirst man could have been only the Creator himself.\n\nThe knowledge of the natural law has been transmitted from Adam to us\nthrough two channels--reason, which is in every man, and in immediate\nrelation with the Creator, and the traditions of the primitive\ninstruction embodied in language and what the Romans call jus gentium,\nor law common to all civilized nations.  Under this law, whose\nprescriptions are promulgated through reason and embodied in universal\njurisprudence, nations are providentially constituted, and invested\nwith political sovereignty; and as they are constituted under this law\nand hold from God through it, it defines their respective rights and\npowers, their limitation and their extent.\n\nThe political sovereignty, under the law of nature, attaches to the\npeople, not individually, but collectively, as civil or political\nsociety.  It is vested in the political community or nation, not in an\nindividual, or family, or a class, because, under the natural law, all\nmen are equal, as they are under the Christian law, and one man has, in\nhis own right, no authority over another.  The family has in the father\na natural chief, but political society has no natural chief or chiefs.\nThe authority of the father is domestic, not political, and ceases when\nhis children have attained to majority, have married and become heads\nof families themselves, or have ceased to make part of the paternal\nhousehold.  The recognition of the authority of the father beyond the\nlimits of his own household, is, if it ever occurs, by virtue of the\nordinance, the consent, express or tacit, of the political society.\nThere are no natural-born political chiefs, and wherever we find men\nclaiming or acknowledged to be such, they are either usurpers, what the\nGreeks called tyrants, or they are made such by the will or\nconstitution of the people or the nation.\n\nBoth monarchy and aristocracy were, no doubt, historically developed\nfrom the authority of the patriarchs, and have unquestionably been\nsustained by an equally false development of the right of property,\nespecially landed property.  The owner of the land, or he who claimed\nto own it, claimed as an incident of his ownership the right to govern\nit, and consequently to govern all who occupied it.  But however valid\nmay be the landlord's title to the soil, and it is doubtful if man can\nown any thing in land beyond the usufruct, it can give him under the\nlaw of nature no political right.  Property, like all natural rights,\nis entitled by the natural law to protection, but not to govern.\nWhether it shall be made a basis of political power or not is a\nquestion of political prudence, to be determined by the supreme\npolitical authority.  It was the basis, and almost exclusive basis, in\nthe Middle Ages, under feudalism, and is so still in most states.\nFrance and the United States are the principal exceptions in\nChristendom.  Property alone, or coupled with birth, is made elsewhere\nin some form a basis of political power, and where made so by the\nsovereign authority, it is legitimate, but not wise nor desirable; for\nit takes from the weak and gives to the strong.  The rich have in their\nriches advantages enough over the poor, without receiving from the\nstate any additional advantage.  An aristocracy, in the sense of\nfamilies distinguished by birth, noble and patriotic services, wealth,\ncultivation, refinement, taste, and manners, is desirable in every\nnation, is a nation's ornament, and also its chief support, but they\nneed and should receive no political recognition.  They should form no\nprivileged class in the state or political society.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nCONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT.\n\n\nThe Constitution is twofold: the constitution of the state or nation,\nand the constitution of the government.  The constitution of the\ngovernment is, or is held to be, the work of the nation itself; the\nconstitution of the state, or the people of the state, is, in its\norigin at least, providential, given by God himself, operating through\nhistorical events or natural causes. The one originates in law, the\nother in historical fact.  The nation must exist, and exist as a\npolitical community, before it can give itself a constitution; and no\nstate, any more than an individual, can exist without a constitution of\nsome sort.\n\nThe distinction between the providential constitution of the people and\nthe constitution of the government, is not always made.  The\nillustrious Count de Maistre, one of the ablest political philosophers\nwho wrote in the last century, or the first quarter of the present, in\nhis work on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions,\nmaintains that constitutions are generated, not made, and excludes all\nhuman agency from their formation and growth.  Disgusted with French\nJacobinism, from which he and his kin and country had suffered so much,\nand deeply wedded to monarchy in both  church and state, he had the\ntemerity to maintain that God creates expressly royal families for the\ngovernment of nations, and that it is idle for a nation to expect a\ngood government without a king who has descended from one of those\ndivinely created royal families.  It was with some such thought, most\nlikely, that a French journalist, writing home from the United States,\ncongratulated the American people on having a Bonaparte in their army,\nso that when their democracy failed, as in a few years it was sure to\ndo, they would have a descendant of a royal house to be their king or\nemperor.  Alas! the Bonaparte has left us, and besides, he was not the\ndescendant of a royal house, and was, like the present Emperor of the\nFrench, a decided parvenu.  Still, the Emperor of the French, if only a\nparvenu, bears himself right imperially among sovereigns, and has no\npeer among any of the descendants of the old royal families of Europe.\n\nThere is a truth, however, in De Maistre's doctrine that constitutions\nare generated, or developed, not created de novo, or made all at once.\nBut nothing is more true than that a nation can alter its constitution\nby its own deliberate and voluntary action, and many nations have done\nso, and sometimes for the better, as well as for the worse.  If the\nconstitution once given is fixed and unalterable, it must be wholly\ndivine, and contain no human element, and the people have and can have\nno hand in their own government--the fundamental objection to the\ntheocratic constitution of society.  To assume it is to transfer to\ncivil society, founded by the ordinary providence of God, the\nconstitution of the church, founded by his gracious or supernatural\nprovidence, and to maintain that the divine sovereignty governs in\ncivil society immediately and supernaturally, as in the spiritual\nsociety.  But such is not the fact.  God governs the nation by the\nnation itself, through its own reason and free-will.  De Maistre is\nright only as to the constitution the nation starts with, and as to the\ncontrol which that constitution necessarily exerts over the\nconstitutional changes the nation can successfully introduce.\n\nThe disciples of Jean Jacques Rousseau recognize no providential\nconstitution, and call the written instrument drawn up by a convention\nof sovereign individuals the constitution, and the only constitution,\nboth of the people and the government.  Prior to its adoption there is\nno government, no state, no political community or authority.\nAntecedently to it the people are an inorganic mass, simply\nindividuals, without any political or national solidarity.  These\nindividuals, they suppose, come together in their own native right and\nmight, organize themselves into a political community, give themselves\na constitution, and draw up and vote rules for their government, as a\nnumber of individuals might meet in a public hall and resolve\nthemselves into a temperance society or a debating club.  This might do\nvery well if the state were, like the temperance society or debating\nclub, a simple voluntary association, which men are free to join or not\nas they please, and which they are bound to obey no farther and no\nlonger than suits their convenience.  But the state is a power, a\nsovereignty; speaks to all within its jurisdiction with an imperative\nvoice; commands, and may use physical force to compel obedience, when\nnot voluntarily yielded. Men are born its subjects, and no one can\nwithdraw from it without its express or tacit permission, unless for\ncauses that would justify resistance to its authority.  The right of\nsubjects to denationalize or expatriate themselves, except to escape a\ntyranny or an oppression which would forfeit the rights of power and\nwarrant forcible resistance to it, does not exist, any more than the\nright of foreigners to become citizens, unless by the consent and\nauthorization of the sovereign; for the citizen or subject belongs to\nthe state, and is bound to it.\n\nThe solidarity of the individuals composing the population of a\nterritory or country under one political head is a truth; but \"the\nsolidarity of peoples,\" irrespective of the government or political\nauthority of their respective countries, so eloquently preached a few\nyears since by the Hungarian Kossuth, is not only a falsehood, but a\nfalsehood destructive of all government and of all political\norganization.  Kossuth's doctrine supposes the people, or the\npopulations of all countries, are, irrespective of their governments,\nbound together in solido, each for all and all for each, and therefore\nnot only free, but bound, wherever they find a population struggling\nnominally for liberty against its government, to rush with arms in\ntheir hands to its assistance--a doctrine clearly incompatible with any\nrecognition of political authority or territorial rights.  Peoples or\nnations commune with each other only through the national authorities,\nand when the state proclaims neutrality or non-intervention, all its\nsubjects are bound to be neutral, and to abstain from all intervention\non either side.  There may be, and indeed there is, a solidarity, more\nor less distinctly recognized, of Christian nations, but of the\npopulations with and through their governments, not without them.\nStill more strict is the solidarity of all the individuals of one and\nthe same nation.  These are all bound together, all for each and each\nfor all.  The individual is born into society and under the government,\nand without the authority of the government, which represents all and\neach, he cannot release himself from his obligations.  The state is\nthen by no means a voluntary association.  Every one born or adopted\ninto it is bound to it, and cannot without its permission withdraw from\nit, unless, as just said, it is manifest that he can have under it no\nprotection for his natural rights as a man, more especially for his\nrights of conscience.  This is Vattel's doctrine, and the dictate of\ncommon sense.\n\nThe constitution drawn up, ordained, and established by a nation for\nitself is a law--the organic or fundamental law, if you will, but a\nlaw, and is and must be the act of the sovereign power. That sovereign\npower must exist before it can act, and it cannot exist, if vested in\nthe people or nation, without a constitution, or without some sort of\npolitical organization of the people or nation.  There must, then, be\nfor every state or nation a constitution anterior to the constitution\nwhich the nation gives itself, and from which the one it gives itself\nderives all its vitality and legal force.\n\nLogic and historical facts are here, as elsewhere, coincident, for\ncreation and providence are simply the expression of the Supreme Logic,\nthe Logos, by whom all things are made.  Nations have originated in\nvarious ways, but history records no instance of a nation existing as\nan inorganic mass organizing itself into a political community.  Every\nnation, at its first appearance above the horizon, is found to have an\norganization of some sort. This is evident from the only ways in which\nhistory shows us nations originating.  These ways are: 1. The union of\nfamilies in the tribe. 2. The union of tribes in the nation. 3. The\nmigration of families, tribes, or nations in search of new settlements.\n4. Colonization, military, agricultural, commercial, industrial,\nreligious, or penal. 5. War and conquest. 6. The revolt, separation,\nand independence of provinces. 7. The intermingling of the conquerors\nand conquered, and by amalgamation forming a new people.  These are all\nthe ways known to history, and in none of these ways does a people,\nabsolutely destitute of all organization, constitute itself a state,\nand institute and carry on civil government.\n\nThe family, the tribe, the colony are, if incomplete, yet incipient\nstates, or inchoate nations, with an organization, individuality, and a\ncentre of social life of their own.  The families and tribes that\nmigrate in search of new settlements carry with them their family and\ntribal organizations, and retain it for a long time.  The Celtic tribes\nretained it in Gaul till broken up by the Roman conquest, under Caesar\nAugustus; in Ireland, till the middle of the seventeenth century; and\nin Scotland, till the middle of the eighteenth.  It subsists still in\nthe hordes of Tartary, the Arabs of the Desert, and the Berbers or\nKabyles of Africa.\n\nColonies, of whatever description, have been founded, if not by, at\nleast under, the authority of the mother country, whose political\nconstitution, laws, manners, and customs they carry with them.  They\nreceive from the parent state a political organization, which, though\nsubordinate, yet constitutes them embryonic states, with a unity,\nindividuality, and centre of public life in themselves, and which, when\nthey are detached and recognized as independent, render them complete\nstates.  War and conquest effect great national changes, but do not,\nstrictly speaking, create new states.  They simply extend and\nconsolidate the power of the conquering state.\n\nProvinces revolt and become independent states or nations, but only\nwhen they have previously existed as such, and have retained the\ntradition of their old constitution and independence; or when the\nadministration has erected them into real though dependent political\ncommunities.  A portion of the people of a state not so erected or\norganized, that has in no sense had a distinct political existence of\nits own, has never separated from the national body and formed a new\nand independent nation.  It cannot revolt; it may rise up against the\ngovernment, and either revolutionize and take possession of the state,\nor be put down by the government as an insurrection.  The amalgamation\nof the conquering and the conquered forms a new people, and modifies\nthe institutions of both, but does not necessarily form a new nation or\npolitical community.  The English of to-day are very different from\nboth the Normans and the Saxons, or Dano-Saxons, of the time of Richard\nCoeur de Lion, but they constitute the same state or political\ncommunity.  England is still England.\n\nThe Roman empire, conquered by the Northern barbarians, has been cut up\ninto several separate and independent nations, but because its several\nprovinces had, prior to their conquest by the Roman arms, been\nindependent nations or tribes, and more especially because the\nconquerors themselves were divided into several distinct nations or\nconfederacies.  If the barbarians had been united in a single nation or\nstate, the Roman empire most likely would have changed masters, indeed,\nbut have retained its unity and its constitution, for the Germanic\nnations that finally seated themselves on its ruins had no wish to\ndestroy its name or nationality, for they were themselves more than\nhalf Romanized before conquering Rome.  But the new nations into which\nthe empire has been divided have never been, at any moment, without\npolitical or governmental organization, continued from the constitution\nof the conquering tribe or nation, modified more or less by what was\nretained from the empire.\n\nIt is not pretended that the constitutions of states cannot be altered,\nor that every people starts with a constitution fully developed, as\nwould seem to be the doctrine of De Maistre.  The constitution of the\nfamily is rather economical than political, and the tribe is far from\nbeing a fully developed state. Strictly speaking, the state, the modern\nequivalent for the city of the Greeks and Romans, was not fully formed\ntill men began to build and live in cities, and became fixed to a\nnational territory.  But in the first place, the eldest born of the\nhuman race, we are told, built a city, and even in cities we find\ntraces of the family and tribal organization long after their municipal\nexistence--in Athens down to the Macedonian conquest, and in Rome down\nto the establishment of the Empire; and, in the second place, the\npastoral nations, though they have not precisely the city or state\norganization, yet have a national organization, and obey a national\nauthority.  Strictly speaking, no pastoral nation has a civil or\npolitical constitution, but they have what in our modern tongues can be\nexpressed by no other term.  The feudal regime, which was in full vigor\neven in Europe from the tenth to the close of the fourteenth century,\nhad nothing to do with cities, and really recognized no state proper;\nyet who hesitates to speak of it as a civil or political system, though\na very imperfect one?\n\nThe civil order, as it now exists, was not fully developed in the early\nages.  For a long time the national organizations bore unmistakable\ntraces of having been developed from the patriarchal, and modelled from\nthe family or tribe, as they do still in all the non-Christian world.\nReligion itself, before the Incarnation, bore traces of the same\norganization.  Even with the Jews, religion was transmitted and\ndiffused, not as under Christianity by conversion, but by natural\ngeneration or family adoption. With all the Gentile tribes or nations,\nit was the same.  At first the father was both priest and king, and when\nthe two offices were separated, the priests formed a distinct and\nhereditary class or caste, rejected by Christianity, which, as we have\nseen, admits priests only after the order of Melchisedech. The Jews had\nthe synagogue, and preserved the primitive revelation in its purity and\nintegrity; but the Greeks and Romans, more fully than any other ancient\nnations, preserved or developed the political order that best conforms\nto the Christian religion; and Christianity, it is worthy of remark,\nfollowed in the track of the Roman armies, and it gains a permanent\nestablishment only where was planted, or where it is able to plant, the\nGraeco-Roman civilization.  The Graeco-Roman republics were hardly less\na schoolmaster to bring the world to Christ in the civil order, than\nthe Jewish nation was to bring it to Him in the spiritual order, or in\nfaith and worship.  In the Christian order nothing is by hereditary\ndescent, but every thing is by election of grace.  The Christian\ndispensation is teleological, palingenesiac, and the whole order, prior\nto the Incarnation, was initial, genesiac, and continued by natural\ngeneration, as it is still in all nations and tribes outside of\nChristendom.  No non-Christian people is a civilized people, and,\nindeed, the human race seems not anywhere, prior to the Incarnation, to\nhave attained to its majority: and it is, perhaps, because the race\nwere not prepared for it, that the Word was not sooner incarnated. He\ncame only in the fulness of time, when the world was ready to receive\nhim.\n\nThe providential constitution is, in fact, that with which the nation\nis born, and is, as long as the nation exists, the real living and\nefficient constitution of the state.  It is the source of the vitality\nof the state, that which controls or governs its action, and determines\nits destiny.  The constitution which a nation is said to give itself,\nis never the constitution of the state, but is the law ordained by the\nstate for the government instituted under it.  Thomas Paine would admit\nnothing to be the constitution but a written document which he could\nfold up and put in his pocket, or file away in a pigeon-hole.  The Abbe\nSieyes pronounced politics a science which he had finished, and he was\nready to turn you out constitutions to order, with no other defect than\nthat they had, as Carlyle wittily says, no feet, and could not go.\nMany in the last century, and some, perhaps, in the present, for folly\nas well as wisdom has her heirs, confounded the written instrument with\nthe constitution itself. No constitution can be written on paper or\nengrossed on parchment. What the convention may agree upon, draw up,\nand the people ratify by their votes, is no constitution, for it is\nextrinsic to the nation, not inherent and living in it--is, at best,\nlegislative instead of constitutive.  The famous Magna Charta drawn up\nby Cardinal Langton, and wrung from John Lackland by the English barons\nat Runnymede, was no constitution of England till long after the date\nof its concession, and even then was no constitution of the state, but\na set of restrictions on power. The constitution is the intrinsic or\ninherent and actual constitution of the people or political community\nitself; that which makes the nation what it is, and distinguishes it\nfrom every other nation, and varies as nations themselves vary from one\nanother.\n\nThe constitution of the state is not a theory, nor is it drawn up and\nestablished in accordance with any preconceived theory.  What is\ntheoretic in a constitution is unreal.  The constitutions conceived by\nphilosophers in their closets are constitutions only of Utopia or\nDreamland.  This world is not governed by abstractions, for\nabstractions are nullities.  Only the concrete is real, and only the\nreal or actual has vitality or force.  The French people adopted\nconstitution after constitution of the most approved pattern, and amid\nbonfires, beating of drums, sound of trumpets, roar of musketry, and\nthunder of artillery, swore, no doubt, sincerely as well as\nenthusiastically, to observe them, but all to no effect; for they had\nno authority for the nation, no hold on its affections, and formed no\nelement of its life. The English are great constitution-mongers--for\nother nations. They fancy that a constitution fashioned after their own\nwill fit any nation that can be persuaded, wheedled, or bullied into\ntrying it on; but, unhappily, all that have tried it on have found it\nonly an embarrassment or encumbrance.  The doctor might as well attempt\nto give an individual a new constitution, or the constitution of\nanother man, as the statesman to give a nation any other constitution\nthan that which it has, and with which it is born.\n\nThe whole history of Europe, since the fall of the Roman empire, proves\nthis thesis.  The barbarian conquest of Rome introduced into the\nnations founded on the site of the empire, a double constitution--the\nbarbaric and the civil--the Germanic and the Roman in the West, and the\nTartaric or Turkish and the Graeco-Roman in the East.  The key to all\nmodern history is in the mutual struggles of these two constitutions\nand the interests respectively associated with them, which created two\nsocieties on the same territory, and, for the most part, under the same\nnational denomination.  The barbaric was the constitution of the\nconquerors; they had the power, the government, rank, wealth, and\nfashion, were reinforced down to the tenth century by fresh hordes of\nbarbarians, and had even brought the external ecclesiastical society to\na very great extent into harmony with itself.  The Pope became a feudal\nsovereign, and the bishops and mitred abbots feudal princes and barons.\nYet, after eight hundred years of fierce struggle, the Roman\nconstitution got the upper hand, and the barbaric constitution, as far\nas it could not be assimilated to the Roman, was eliminated.  The\noriginal Empire of the West is now as thoroughly Roman in its\nconstitution, its laws, and its civilization, as it ever was under any\nof its Christian emperors before the barbarian conquest.\n\nThe same process is going on in the East, though it has not advanced so\nfar, having begun there several centuries later, and the Graeco-Roman\nconstitution was far feebler there than in the West at the epoch of the\nconquest.  The Germanic tribes that conquered the West had long had\nclose relations with the empire, had served as its allies, and even in\nits armies, and were partially Romanized.  Most of their chiefs had\nreceived a Roman culture; and their early conversion to the Christian\nfaith facilitated the revival and permanence of the old Roman\nconstitution.  In the East it was different.  The conquerors had no\ntouch of Roman civilization, and, followers of the Prophet, they were\nanimated with an intense hatred, which, after the conquest, was changed\ninto a superb contempt, of Christians and Romans.  They had their civil\nconstitution in the Koran; and the Koran, in its principles, doctrines,\nand spirit, is exclusive and profoundly intolerant.  The Graeco-Roman\nconstitution was always much weaker in the East, and had far greater\nobstacles to overcome there than in the West; yet it has survived the\nshock of the conquest.  Throughout the limits of the ancient Empire of\nthe East, the barbaric constitution has received and is daily receiving\nrude blows, and, but as reenforced by barbarians lying outside of the\nboundaries of that empire, would be no longer able to sustain itself.\nThe Greek or Christian populations of the empire are no longer in\ndanger of being exterminated or absorbed by the Mohammedan state or\npopulation.  They are the only living and progressive people of the\nOttoman Empire, and their complete success in absorbing or expelling\nthe Turk is only a question of time.  They will, in all present\nprobability, reestablish a Christian and Roman East in much less time\nfrom the fall of Constantinople in 1453, than it took the West from the\nfall of Rome in 476 to put an end to the feudal or barbaric\nconstitution founded by its Germanic invaders.\n\nIndeed, the Roman constitution, laws, and civilization not only gain\nthe mastery in the nations seated within the limits of the old Roman\nEmpire, but extend their power through out the whole civilized world.\nThe Graeco-Roman civilization is, in fact, the only civilization now\nrecognized, and nations are accounted civilized only in proportion as\nthey are Romanized and Christianized.  The Roman law, as found in the\nInstitutes, Pandects, and Novellae of Justinian, or the Corpus Legis\nCivilis, is the basis of the law and jurisprudence of all Christendom.\nThe Graeco-Roman civilization, called not improperly Christian\ncivilization, is the only progressive civilization.  The old feudal\nsystem remains in England little more than an empty name. The king is\nonly the first magistrate of the kingdom, and the House of Lords is\nonly an hereditary senate.  Austria is hard at work in the Roman\ndirection, and finds her chief obstacle to success in Hungary, with the\nMagyars whose feudalism retains almost the full vigor of the Middle\nAges.  Russia is moving in the same direction; and Prussia and the\nsmaller Germanic states obey the same impulse.  Indeed, Rome has\nsurvived the conquest--has conquered her conquerors, and now invades\nevery region from which they came.  The Roman Empire may be said to be\nacknowledged and obeyed in lands lying far beyond the farthest limits\nreached by the Roman eagles, and to be more truly the mistress of the\nworld than under Augustus, Trajan, or the Antonines.  Nothing can stand\nbefore the Christian and Romanized nations, and all pagandom and\nMohammedom combined are too weak to resist their onward march.\n\nAll modern European revolutions result only in reviving the Roman\nEmpire, whatever the motives, interests, passions, or theories that\ninitiate them.  The French Revolution of the last century and that of\nthe present prove it.  France, let people say what they will, stands at\nthe head of the European civilized world, and displays en grand all its\ngood and all its bad tendencies. When she moves, Europe moves; when she\nhas a vertigo, all European nations are dizzy; when she recovers her\nhealth, her equilibrium, and good sense, others become sedate, steady,\nand reasonable.  She is the head, nay, rather, the heart of\nChristendom--the head is at Rome--through which circulates the pure and\nimpure blood of the nations.  It is in vain Great Britain, Germany, or\nRussia disputes with her the hegemony of European civilization.  They\nare forced to yield to her at last, to be content to revolve around her\nas the centre of the political system that masters them.  The reason\nis, France is more completely and sincerely Roman than any other\nnation.  The revolutions that have shaken the world have resulted in\neliminating the barbaric elements she had retained, and clearing away\nall obstacles to the complete triumph of Imperial Rome. Napoleon III.\nis for France what Augustus was for Rome.  The revolutions in Spain and\nItaly have only swept away the relics of the barbaric constitution, and\naided the revival of Roman imperialism.  In no country do the\nrevolutionists succeed in establishing their own theories; Caesar\nremains master of the field.  Even in the United States, a revolution\nundertaken in favor of the barbaric system has resulted in the\ndestruction of what remained of that system--in sweeping away the last\nrelics of disintegrating feudalism, and in the complete establishment\nof the Graeco-Roman system, with important improvements, in the New\nWorld.\n\nThe Roman system is republican, in the broad sense of the term, because\nunder it power is never an estate, never the private for the public\ngood.  As it existed under the Caesars, and is revived in modern times,\nwhether under the imperial or the democratic form, it, no doubt, tends\nto centralism, to the concentration of all the powers and forces of the\nstate in one central government, from which all local authorities and\ninstitutions emanate.  Wise men oppose it as affording no guaranties to\nindividual liberty against the abuses of power. This it may not do, but\nthe remedy is not in feudalism.  The feudal lord holds his authority as\nan estate, and has over the people under him all the power of Caesar\nand all the rights of the proprietor.  He, indeed, has a guaranty\nagainst his liege-lord, sometimes a more effective guaranty than his\nliege-lord has against him; but against his centralized power his\nvassals and serfs have only the guaranty that a slave has against his\nowner.\n\nFeudalism is alike hostile to the freedom of public authority and of\nthe people.  It is essentially a disintegrating element in the nation.\nIt breaks the unity and individuality of the state, embarrasses the\nsovereign, and guards against the abuse of public authority by\noverpowering and suppressing it.  Every feudal lord is a more thorough\ndespot in his own domain than Caesar ever was or could be in the\nempire; and the monarch, even if strong enough, is yet not competent to\nintervene between him and his people, any more than the General\ngovernment in the United States was to intervene between the negro\nslave and his master.  The great vassals of the crown singly, or, if\nnot singly, in combination--and they could always combine in the\ninterest of their order--were too strong for the king, or to be brought\nunder any public authority, and could issue from their fortified\ncastles and rob and plunder to their hearts' content, with none to call\nthem to an account.  Under the most thoroughly centralized government\nthere is far more liberty for the people, and a far greater security\nfor person and property, except in the case of the feudal nobles\nthemselves, than was even dreamed of while the feudal regime was in\nfull vigor.  Nobles were themselves free, it is conceded, but not the\npeople.  The king was too weak, too restricted in his action by the\nfeudal constitution to reach them, and the higher clergy were ex\nofficio sovereigns, princes, barons, or feudal lords, and were led by\ntheir private interests to act with the feudal nobility, save when that\nnobility threatened the temporalities of the church. The only reliance,\nunder God, left in feudal times to the poor people was in the lower\nranks of the clergy, especially of the regular clergy.  All the great\nGerman emperors in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, who saw the\nevils of feudalism, and attempted to break it up and revive imperial\nRome, became involved in quarrels with the chiefs of the religious\nsociety, and failed, because the interest of the Popes, as feudal\nsovereigns and Italian princes, and the interests of the dignified\nclergy, were for the time bound up with the feudal society, though\ntheir Roman culture and civilization made them at heart hostile to it.\nThe student of history, however strong his filial affection towards the\nvisible head of the church, cannot help admiring the grandeur of the\npolitical views of Frederic the Second, the greatest and last of the\nHohenstaufen, or refrain from dropping a tear over his sad failure.  He\nhad great faults as a man, but he had rare genius as a statesman; and\nit is some consolation to know that he died a Christian death, in\ncharity with all men, after having received the last sacraments of his\nreligion.\n\nThe Popes, under the circumstances, were no doubt justified in the\npolicy they pursued, for the Swabian emperors failed to respect the\nacknowledged rights of the church, and to remember their own\nincompetency in spirituals; but evidently their political views and\naims were liberal, far-reaching, and worthy of admiration. Their\nsuccess, if it could have been effected without lesion to the church,\nwould have set Europe forward some two or three hundred years, and\nprobably saved it from the schisms of the fourteenth and sixteenth\ncenturies.  But it is easy to be wise after the event.  The fact is,\nthat during the period when feudalism was in full vigor, the king was\nmerely a shadow; the people found their only consolation in religion,\nand their chief protectors in the monks, who mingled with them, saw\ntheir sufferings, and sympathized with them, consoled them, carried\ntheir cause to the castle before the feudal lord and lady, and did,\nthank God, do something to keep alive religious sentiments and\nconvictions in the bosom of the feudal society itself.  Whatever\nopinions may be formed of the monastic orders in relation to the\npresent, this much is certain, that they were the chief civilizers of\nEurope, and the chief agents in delivering European society from feudal\nbarbarism.\n\nThe aristocracy have been claimed as the natural allies of the throne,\nbut history proves them to be its natural enemies, whenever it cannot\nbe used in their service, and kings do not consent to be their\nministers and to do their bidding.  A political aristocracy has at\nheart only the interests of its order, and pursues no line of policy\nbut the extension or preservation of its privileges.  Having little to\ngain and much to lose, it opposes every political change that would\neither strengthen the crown or elevate the people.  The nobility in the\nFrench Revolution were the first to desert both the king and the\nkingdom, and kings have always found their readiest and firmest allies\nin the people.  The people in Europe have no such bitter feelings\ntowards royalty as they have towards the feudal nobility--for kings\nhave never so grievously oppressed them.  In Rome the patrician order\nopposed alike the emperor and the people, except when they, as\nchivalric nobles sometimes will do, turned courtiers or demagogues.\nThey were the people of Rome and the provinces that sustained the\nemperors, and they were the emperors who sustained the people, and gave\nto the provincials the privileges of Roman citizens.\n\nGuaranties against excessive centralism are certainly needed, but the\nstatesman will not seek them in the feudal organization of society--in\na political aristocracy, whether founded on birth or private wealth,\nnor in a privileged class of any sort.  Better trust Caesar than\nBrutus, or even Cato.  Nor will he seek them in the antagonism of\ninterests intended to neutralize or balance each other, as in the\nEnglish constitution.  This was the great error of Mr. Calhoun.  No man\nsaw more clearly than Mr. Calhoun the utter worthlessness of simple\npaper constitutions, on which Mr. Jefferson placed such implicit\nreliance, or that the real constitution is in the state itself, in the\nmanner in which the people themselves are organized; but his reliance\nwas in constituting, as powers in the state, the several popular\ninterests that exist, and pitting them against each other--the famous\nsystem of checks and balances of English states men.  He was led to\nthis, because he distrusted power, and was more intention guarding\nagainst its abuses than on providing for its free, vigorous, and\nhealthy action, going on the principle that \"that is the best\ngovernment which governs least.\" But, if the opposing interests could\nbe made to balance one another perfectly, the result would be an\nequilibrium, in which power would be brought to a stand-still; and if\nnot, the stronger would succeed and swallow up all the rest.  The\ntheory of checks and balances is admirable if the object be to trammel\npower, and to have as little power in the government as possible; but\nit is a theory which is born from passions engendered by the struggle\nagainst despotism or arbitrary power, not from a calm and philosophical\nappreciation of government itself.  The English have not succeeded in\nestablishing their theory, for, after all, their constitution does not\nwork so well as they pretend.  The landed interest controls at one\ntime, and the mercantile and manufacturing interest at another.  They\ndo not perfectly balance one another, and it is not difficult to see\nthat the mercantile and manufacturing interest, combined with the\nmoneyed interest, is henceforth to predominate.  The aim of the real\nstatesman is to organize all the interests and forces of the state\ndialectically, so that they shall unite to add to its strength, and\nwork together harmoniously for the common good.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nCONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT--CONCLUDED.\n\n\nThough the constitution of the people is congenital, like the\nconstitution of an individual, and cannot be radically changed without\nthe destruction of the state, it must not be supposed that it is wholly\nwithdrawn from the action of the reason and free-will of the nation,\nnor from that of individual statesmen. All created things are subject\nto the law of development, and may be developed either in a good sense\nor in a bad; that is, may be either completed or corrupted.  All the\npossibilities of the national constitution are given originally in the\nbirth of the nation, as all the possibilities of mankind were given in\nthe first man.  The germ must be given in the original constitution.\nBut in all constitutions there is more than one element, and the\nseveral elements maybe developed pari passu, or unequally, one having\nthe ascendency and suppressing the rest.  In the original constitution\nof Rome the patrician element was dominant, showing that the\npatriarchal organization of society still retained no little force.\nThe king was only the presiding officer of the senate and the leader of\nthe army in war.  His civil functions corresponded very nearly to those\nof a mayor of the city of New York, where all the effective power is in\nthe aldermen, common council, and heads of departments.  Except in name\nhe was little else than a pageant.  The kings, no doubt, labored to\ndevelop and extend the royal element of the constitution.  This was\nnatural; and it was equally natural that they should be resisted by the\npatricians.  Hence when the Tarquins, or Etruscan dynasty, undertook to\nbe kings in fact as well as in name, and seemed likely to succeed, the\npatricians expelled them, and supplied their place by two consuls\nannually elected.  Here was a modification, but no real change of the\nconstitution.  The effective Power, as before, remained in the senate.\n\nBut there was from early times a plebeian element in the population of\nthe city, though forming at first no part of the political people.\nTheir origin is not very certain, nor their original position in the\ncity.  Historians give different accounts of them.  But that they\nshould, as they increased in numbers, wealth, and importance, demand\nadmission into the political society, religious or solemn marriage, a\nvoice in the government, and the faculty of holding civil and military\noffices, was only in the order of regular development.  At first the\npatricians fought them, and, failing to subdue them by force, effected\na compromise, and bought up their leaders.  The concession which\nfollowed of the tribunitial veto was only a further development.  By\nthat veto the plebeians gained no initiative, no positive power,\nindeed, but their tribunes, by interposing it, could stop the\nproceedings of the government. They could not propose the measures they\nliked, but they could prevent the legal adoption of measures they\ndisliked--a faculty Mr. Calhoun asserted for the several States of the\nAmerican Union in his doctrine of nullification, or State veto, as he\ncalled it. It was simply an obstructive power.\n\nBut from a power to obstruct legislative action to the power to\noriginate or propose it, and force the senate to adopt it through fear\nof the veto of measures the patricians had at heart, was only a still\nfurther development.  This gained, the exclusively patrician\nconstitution had disappeared, and Marius, the head of a great plebeian\nhouse, could be elected consul and the plebeians in turn threaten to\nbecome predominant, which Sylla or Sulla, as dictator, seeing, tried in\nvain to prevent.  The dictator was provided for in the original\nconstitution.  Retain the dictatorship for a time, strengthen the\nplebeian element by ruthless proscriptions of patricians and by\nrecruits from the provinces, unite the tribunitial, pontifical, and\nmilitary powers in the imperator designated by the army, all elements\nexisting in the constitution from an early day, and already developed\nin the Roman state, and you have the imperial constitution, which\nretained to the last the senate and consuls, though with less and less\npractical power.  These changes are very great, but are none of them\nradical, dating from the recognition of the plebs as pertaining to the\nRoman people.  They are normal developments, not corruptions, and the\ntransition from the consular republic to the imperial was\nunquestionably a real social and political progress.  And yet the Roman\npeople, had they chosen, could have given a different direction to the\ndevelopments of their constitution.  There was Providence in the course\nof events, but no fatalism.\n\nSulla was a true patrician, a blind partisan of the past.  He sought to\narrest the plebeian development led by Marius, and to restore the\nexclusively patrician government.  But it was too late. His\nproscriptions, confiscations, butcheries, unheard-of cruelties which\nanticipated and surpassed those of the French Revolution of 1793,\navailed nothing.  The Marian or plebeian movement, apparently checked\nfor a moment, resumed its march with renewed vigor under Julius, and\ntriumphed at Pharsalia.  In vain Cicero, only accidentally associated\nwith the patrician party, which distrusted him--in vain Cicero\ndeclaims, Cato scolds, or parades his impractical virtues, Brutus and\nCassius seize the assassin's dagger, and strike to the earth \"the\nforemost man of all the world;\" the plebeian cause moves on with\nresistless force, triumphs anew at Philippi, and young Octavius avenges\nthe murder of his uncle, and proves to the world that the assassination\nof a ruler is a blunder as well as a crime.  In vain does Mark Antony\ndesert the movement, rally Egypt and the barbaric East, and seek to\ntransfer the seat of empire from the Tiber to the banks of the Nile or\nthe Orontes; plebeian and imperial Rome wins a final victory at Actium,\nand definitively secures the empire of the civilized world to the West.\n\nThus far the developments were normal, and advanced civilization. But\nRome still retained the barbaric element of slavery in her bosom, and\nhad conquered more barbaric nations than she had assimilated.  These\nnations she at first governed as tributary states, with their own\nconstitutions and national chiefs; afterwards as Roman provinces, by\nher own proconsuls and prefects. When the emperors threw open the gates\nof the city to the provincials, and conceded them the rights and\nprivileges of Roman citizens, they introduced not only a foreign\nelement into the state, destitute of Roman patriotism, but the barbaric\nand despotic elements retained by the conquered nations as yet only\npartially assimilated.  These elements became germs of anti-republican\ndevelopments, rather of corruptions, and prepared the downfall of the\nempire.  Doubtless these corruptions might have been arrested, and\nwould have been, if Roman patriotism had survived the changes effected\nin the Roman population by the concession of Roman citizenship to\nprovincials; but it did not, and they were favored as time went on by\nthe emperors themselves, and more especially by Dioclesian, a real\nbarbarian, who hated Rome, and by Constantine, surnamed the Great, a\nreal despot, who converted the empire from a republican to a despotic\nempire. Rome fell from the force of barbarism developed from within,\nfar more than from the force of the barbarians hovering on her\nfrontiers and invading her provinces.\n\nThe law of all possible developments is in the providential or\ncongenital constitution; but these possible developments are many and\nvarious, and the reason and free-will of the nation as well as of\nindividuals are operative in determining which of them shall be\nadopted.  The nation, under the direction of wise and able statesmen\nwho understood their age and country, who knew how to discern between\nnormal developments and barbaric corruptions, placed at the head of\naffairs in season, might have saved Rome from her fate, eliminated the\nbarbaric and assimilated the foreign elements, and preserved Rome as a\nChristian and republican empire to this day, and saved the civilized\nworld from the ten centuries of barbarism which followed her conquest\nby the barbarians of the North.  But it rarely happens that the real\nstatesmen of a nation are placed at the head of affairs.\n\nRome did not fall in consequence of the strength of her external\nenemies, nor through the corruption of private morals and manners,\nwhich was never greater than under the first Triumvirate.  She fell\nfrom the want of true statesmanship in her public men, and patriotism\nin her people.  Private virtues and private vices are of the last\nconsequence to individuals, both here and hereafter; but private\nvirtues never saved, private vices never ruined a nation.  Edward the\nConfessor was a saint, and yet he prepared the way for the Norman\nconquest of England; and France owes infinitely less to St. Louis than\nto Louis XI., Richelieu, and Napoleon, who, though no saints, were\nstatesmen.  What is specially needed in statesmen is public spirit,\nintelligence, foresight, broad views, manly feelings, wisdom, energy,\nresolution; and when statesmen with these qualities are placed at the\nhead of affairs, the state, if not already lost, can, however far gone\nit may be, be recovered, restored, reinvigorated, advanced, and private\nvice and corruption disappear in the splendor of public virtue.\nProvidence is always present in the affairs of nations, but not to work\nmiracles to counteract the natural effects of the ignorance, ineptness,\nshort-sightedness, narrow views, public stupidity, and imbecility of\nrulers, because they are irreproachable and saintly in their private\ncharacters and relations, as was Henry VI. of England, or, in some\nrespects, Louis XVI. of France.  Providence is God intervening through\nthe laws he by his creative act gives to creatures, not their\nsuspension or abrogation.  It was the corruption of the statesmen, in\nsubstituting the barbaric element for the proper Roman, to which no one\ncontributed more than Constantine, the first Christian emperor, that\nwas the real cause of the downfall of Rome, and the centuries of\nbarbarism that followed, relieved only by the superhuman zeal and\ncharity of the church to save souls and restore civilization.\n\nBut in the constitution of the government, as distinguished from the\nstate, the nation is freer and more truly sovereign.  The constitution\nof the state is that which gives to the people of a given territory\npolitical existence, unity, and individuality, and renders it capable\nof political action.  It creates political or national solidarity, in\nimitation of the solidarity of the race, in which it has its root.  It\nis the providential charter of national existence, and that which gives\nto each nation its peculiar character, and distinguishes it from every\nother nation. The constitution of government is the constitution by the\nsovereign authority of the nation of an agency or ministry for the\nmanagement of its affairs, and the letter of instructions according to\nwhich the agent or minister is to act and conduct the matters intrusted\nto him.  The distinction which the English make between the sovereign\nand the ministry is analogous to that between the state and the\ngovernment, only they understand by the sovereign the king or queen,\nand by the ministry the executive, excluding, or not decidedly\nincluding, the legislature and the judiciary.  The sovereign is the\npeople as the state or body politic, and as the king holds from God\nonly through the people, he is not properly sovereign, and is to be\nranked with the ministry or government.  Yet when the state delegates\nthe full or chief governing power to the king, and makes him its sole\nor principal representative, he may, with sufficient accuracy for\nordinary purposes, be called sovereign.  Then, understanding by the\nministry or government the legislative and judicial, as well as the\nexecutive functions, whether united in one or separated into distinct\nand mutually independent departments, the English distinction will\nexpress accurately enough, except for strictly scientific purposes, the\ndistinction between the state and the government.\n\nStill, it is only in despotic states, which are not founded on right,\nbut force, that the king can say, L'etat, c'est moi, I am the state;\nand Shakespeare's usage of calling the king of France simply France,\nand the king of England simply England, smacks of feudalism, under\nwhich monarchy is an estate, property, not a public trust.  It\ncorresponds to the Scottish usage of calling the proprietor by the name\nof his estate.  It is never to be forgotten that in republican states\nthe king has only a delegated sovereignty, that the people, as well as\nGod, are above him.  He holds his power, as the Emperor of the French\nprofesses to hold his, by the grace of God and the national will--the\nonly title by which a king or emperor can legitimately hold power.\n\nThe king or emperor not being the state, and the government, whatever\nits form or constitution, being a creature of the state, he can be\ndethroned, and the whole government even virtually overthrown, without\ndissolving the state or the political society. Such an event may cause\nmuch evil, create much social confusion, and do grave injury to the\nnation, but the political society may survive it; the sovereign remains\nin the plenitude of his rights, as competent to restore government as\nhe was originally to institute it.  When, in 1848, Louis Philippe was\ndethroned by the Parisian mob, and fled the kingdom, there was in\nFrance no legitimate government, for all commissions ran in the king's\nname; but the organic or territorial people of France, the body\npolitic, remained, and in it remained the sovereign power to organize\nand appoint a new government.  When, on the 2d of December, 1851, the\npresident, by a coup d'etat, suppressed the legislative assembly and\nthe constitutional government, there was no legitimate government\nstanding, and the power assumed by the president was unquestionably a\nusurpation; but the nation was competent to condone his usurpation and\nlegalize his power, and by a plebiscitum actually did so.  The wisdom\nor justice of the coup d'etat is another question, about which men may\ndiffer; but when the French nation, by its subsequent act, had condoned\nit, and formally conferred dictatorial powers on the prince-president,\nthe principal had approved the act of his agent, and given him\ndiscretionary powers, and nothing more was to be said.  The imperial\nconstitution and the election of the president to be emperor, that\nfollowed on December 2d, 1852, were strictly legal, and, whatever men\nmay think of Napoleon III., it must be conceded that there is no legal\nflaw in his title, and that he holds his power by a title as high and\nas perfect as there is for any prince or ruler.\n\nBut the plebiscitum cannot be legally appealed to or be valid when and\nwhere there is a legal government existing and in the full exercise of\nits constitutional functions, as was decided by the Supreme Court of\nthe United States in a case growing out of what is known as the Dorr\nrebellion in Rhode Island.  A suffrage committee, having no political\nauthority, drew up and presented a new constitution of government to\nthe people, plead a plebiscitum in its favor, and claimed the officers\nelected under it as the legally elected officers of the state.  The\ncourt refused to recognize the plebiscitum, and decided that it knew\nRhode Island only as represented through the government, which had\nnever ceased to exist.  New States in Territories have been organized\non the strength of a plebiscitum when the legal Territorial government\nwas in force, and were admitted as States into the Union, which, though\nirregular and dangerous, could be done without revolution, because\nCongress, that admitted them, is the power to grant the permission to\norganize as States and apply for admission.  Congress is competent to\ncondone an offence against its own rights.  The real danger of the\npractice is, that it tends to create a conviction that sovereignty\ninheres in the people individually, or as population, not as the body\npolitic or organic people attached to a sovereign domain; and the\npeople who organize under a plebiscitum are not, till organized and\nadmitted into the Union, an organic or a political people at all.  When\nLouis Napoleon made his appeal to a vote of the French people, he made\nan appeal to a people existing as a sovereign people, and a sovereign\npeople without a legal government.  In his case the plebiscitum was\nproper and sufficient, even if it be conceded that it was through his\nown fault that France at the moment was found without a legal\ngovernment.  When a thing is done, though wrongly done, you cannot act\nas if it were not done, but must accept it as a fact and act\naccordingly.\n\nThe plebiscitum, which is simply an appeal to the people outside of\ngovernment, is not valid when the government has not lapsed, either by\nits usurpations or by its dissolution, nor is it valid either in the\ncase of a province, or of a population that has no organic existence as\nan independent sovereign state.  The plebiscitum in France was valid,\nbut in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duchies of Modena, Parma, and\nLucca, and in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies it was not valid, for\ntheir legal governments had not lapsed; nor was it valid in the\nAemilian provinces of the Papal States, because they were not a nation\nor a sovereign people, but only a portion of such nation or people. In\nthe case of the states and provinces--except Lombardy, ceded to France\nby Austria, and sold to the Sardinian king--annexed to Piedmont to form\nthe new kingdom of Italy, the plebiscitum was invalid, because implying\nthe right of the people to rebel against the legal authority, and to\nbreak the unity and individuality of the state of which they form an\nintegral part. The nation is a whole, and no part has the right to\nsecede or separate, and set up a government for itself, or annex itself\nto another state, without the consent of the whole.  The solidarity of\nthe nation is both a fact and a law.  The secessionists from the United\nStates defended their action only on the ground that the States of the\nAmerican Union are severally independent sovereign states, and they\nonly obeyed the authority of their respective states.\n\nThe plebiscitum, or irregular appeal to what is called universal\nsuffrage, since adopted by Louis Napoleon in France after the coup\nd'etat, is becoming not a little menacing to the stability of\ngovernments and the rights and integrity of states, and is not less\ndangerous to the peace and order of society than \"the solidarity of\npeoples\" asserted by Kossuth, the revolutionary ex-governor of Hungary,\nthe last stronghold of feudal barbarism in Christian Europe; for Russia\nhas emancipated her serfs.\n\nThe nation, as sovereign, is free to constitute government according to\nits own judgment, under any form it pleases--monarchical, aristocratic,\ndemocratic, or mixed--vest all power in an hereditary monarch, in a\nclass or hereditary nobles, in a king and two houses of parliament, one\nhereditary, the other elective, or both elective; or it may establish a\nsingle, dual, or triple executive, make all officers of government\nhereditary or all elective, and if elective, elective for a longer or a\nshorter time, by universal suffrage or a select body of electors.  Any\nof these forms and systems, and many others besides, are or may be\nlegitimate, if established and maintained by the national will.  There\nis nothing in the law of God or of nature, antecedently to the national\nwill, that gives any one of them a right to the exclusion of any one of\nthe others. The imperial system in France is as legitimate as the\nfederative system in the United States.  The only form or system that\nis necessarily illegal is the despotic.  That can never be a truly\ncivilized government, nor a legitimate government, for God has given to\nman no dominion over man.  He gave men, as St. Augustine says, and Pope\nSt. Gregory the Great repeats, dominion over the irrational creation,\nnot over the rational, and hence the primitive rulers of men were\ncalled pastors or shepherds, not lords.  It may be the duty of the\npeople subjected to a despotic government to demean themselves quietly\nand peaceably towards it, as a matter of prudence, to avoid sedition,\nand the evils that would necessarily follow an attempted revolution,\nbut not because, founded as it is on mere force, it has itself any\nright or legality.\n\nAll other forms of government are republican in their essential\nconstitution, founded on public right, and held under God from and for\nthe commonwealth, and which of them is wisest and best for the\ncommonwealth is, for the most part, an idle question. \"Forms of\ngovernment,\" somebody has said, \"are like shoes--that is the best form\nwhich best fit the feet that are to wear them.\" Shoes are to be fitted\nto the feet, not the feet to the shoes, and feet vary in size and\nconformation.  There is, in regard to government, as distinguished from\nthe state, no antecedent right which binds the people, for antecedently\nto the existence of the government as a fact, the state is free to\nadopt any form that it finds practicable, or judges the wisest and best\nfor itself. Ordinarily the form of the government practicable for a\nnation is determined by the peculiar providential constitution of the\nterritorial people, and a form of government that would be practicable\nand good in one country may be the reverse in another. The English\ngovernment is no doubt the best practicable in Great Britain, at\npresent at least, but it has proved a failure wherever else it has been\nattempted.  The American system has proved itself, in spite of the\nrecent formidable rebellion to overthrow it, the best and only\npracticable government for the United States, but it is impracticable\neverywhere else, and all attempts by any European or other American\nstate to introduce it can end only in disaster.  The imperial system\napparently works well in France, but though all European states are\ntending to it, it would not work well at all on the American continent,\ncertainly not until the republic of the United States has ceased to\nexist.  While the United States remain the great American power, that\nsystem, or its kindred system, democratic centralism, can never become\nan American system, as Maximilian's experiment in Mexico is likely to\nprove.\n\nPolitical propagandism, except on the Roman plan, that is, by\nannexation and incorporation, is as impracticable as it is wanting in\nthe respect that one independent people owes to another.  The old\nFrench Jacobins tried to propagate, even with fire and sword, their\nsystem throughout Europe, as the only system compatible with the rights\nof man.  The English, since 1688, have been great political\npropagandists, and at one time it seemed not unlikely that every\nEuropean state would try the experiment of a parliamentary government,\ncomposed of an hereditary crown, an hereditary house of lords, and an\nelective house of commons.  The democratic Americans are also great\npolitical propagandists, and are ready to sympathize with any\nrebellion, insurrection, or movement in behalf of democracy in any part\nof the world, however mean or contemptible, fierce or bloody it may be;\nbut all this is as unstatesmanlike as unjust; unstatesmanlike, for no\nform of government can bear transplanting, and because every\nindependent nation is the sole judge of what best comports with its own\ninterests, and its judgment is to be respected by the citizens as well\nas by the governments of other states.  Religious propagandism is a\nright and a duty, because religion is catholic and of universal\nobligation; and so is the jus gentium of the Romans, which is only the\napplication to individuals and nations of the great principles of\nnatural justice; but no political propagandism is ever allowable,\nbecause no one form of government is catholic in its nature, or of\nuniversal obligation.\n\nThoughtful Americans are opposed to political propagandism, and respect\nthe right of every nation to choose its own form of government; but\nthey hold that the American system is the best in itself, and that if\nother nations were as enlightened as the American, they would adopt it.\nBut though the American system, rightly understood, is the best, as\nthey hold, it is not because other nations are less enlightened, which\nis by no means a fact, that they do not adopt, or cannot bear it, but\nsolely because their providential constitutions do not require or admit\nit, and an attempt to introduce it in any of them would prove a failure\nand a grave evil.\n\nFit your shoes to your feet.  The law of the governmental constitution\nis in that of the nation.  The constitution of the government must grow\nout of the constitution of the state, and accord with the genius, the\ncharacter, the habits, customs, and wants of the people, or it will not\nwork well, or tend to secure the legitimate ends of government.  The\nconstitutions imagined by philosophers are for Utopia, not for any\nactual, living, breathing people.  You must take the state as it is,\nand develop your governmental constitution from it, and harmonize it\nwith it. Where there is a discrepancy between the two constitutions,\nthe government has no support in the state, in the organic people, or\nnation, and can sustain itself only by corruption or physical force.  A\ngovernment may be under the necessity of using force to suppress an\ninsurrection or rebellion against the national authority, or the\nintegrity of the national territory, but no government that can sustain\nitself, not the state, only by physical force or large standing armies,\ncan be a good government, or suited to the nation.  It must adopt the\nmost stringent repressive measures, suppress liberty of speech and of\nconscience, outrage liberty in what it has the most intimate and\nsacred, and practise the most revolting violence and cruelty, for it\ncan govern only by terror.  Such a government is unsuited to the nation.\n\nThis is seen in all history: in the attempt of the dictator Sulla to\npreserve the old patrician government against the plebeian power that\ntime and events had developed in the Roman state, and which was about\nto gain the supremacy, as we have seen, at Pharsalia, Philippi, and\nActium; in the efforts to establish a Jacobinical government in France\nin 1793; in Rome in 1848, and the government of Victor Emmanuel in\nNaples in 1860 and 1861. These efforts, proscriptions, confiscations,\nmilitary executions, assassinations, massacres, are all made in the\nname of liberty, or in defence of a government supposed to guaranty the\nwell-being of the state and the rights of the people.  They are\nrendered inevitable by the mad attempt to force on a nation a\nconstitution of government foreign to the national constitution, or\nrepugnant to the national tastes, interests, habits, convictions, or\nwhole interior life.  The repressive policy, adopted to a certain\nextent by nearly all European governments, grows out of the madness of\na portion of the people of the several states in seeking to force upon\nthe nation an anti-national constitution. The sovereigns may not be\nvery wise, but they are wiser, more national, more patriotic than the\nmad theorists who seek to revolutionize the state and establish a\ngovernment that has no hold in the national traditions, the national\ncharacter, or the national life; and the statesman, the patriot, the\ntrue friend of liberty sympathizes with the national authorities, not\nwith the mad theorists and revolutionists.\n\nThe right of a nation to change its form of government, and its\nmagistrates or representatives, by whatever name called, is\nincontestable.  Hence the French constitution of 1789, which involved\nthat of 1793, was not illegal, for though accompanied by some\nirregularities, it was adopted by the manifest will of the nation, and\nconsented to by all orders in the state.  Not its legality but its\nwisdom is to be questioned, together with the false and dangerous\ntheories of government which dictated it. There is no compact or mutual\nstipulation between the state and the government.  The state, under\nGod, is sovereign, and ordains and establishes the government, instead\nof making a contract, a bargain, or covenant, with it.  The common\ndemocratic doctrine on this point is right, if by people is understood\nthe organic people attached to a sovereign domain, not the people as\nindividuals or as a floating or nomadic multitude.  By people in the\npolitical sense, Cicero, and St. Augustine after him, understood the\npeople as the republic, organized in reference to the common or public\ngood.  With this understanding, the sovereignty persists in the people,\nand they retain the supreme authority over the government.  The powers\ndelegated are still the powers of the sovereign delegating them, and\nmay be modified, altered, or revoked, as the sovereign judges proper.\nThe nation does not, and cannot abdicate or delegate away its own\nsovereignty, for sovereign it is, and cannot but be, so long as it\nremains a nation not subjected to another nation.\n\nBy the imperial constitution of the French government, the imperial\npower is vested in Napoleon III., and made hereditary in his family, in\nthe male line of his legitimate descendants.  This is legal, but the\nnation has not parted with its sovereignty or bound itself by contract\nforever to a Napoleonic dynasty. Napoleon holds the imperial power \"by\nthe grace of God and the will of the nation,\" which means simply that\nhe holds his authority from God, through the French people, and is\nbound to exercise it according to the law of God and the national will.\nThe nation is as competent to revoke this constitution as the\nlegislature is to repeal any law it is competent to enact, and in doing\nso breaks no contract, violates no right, for Napoleon and his\ndescendants hold their right to the imperial throne subject to the\nnational will from which it is derived.  In case the nation should\nrevoke the powers delegated, he or they would have no more valid claim\nto the throne than have the Bourbons, whom the nation has unmistakably\ndismissed from its service.\n\nThe only point here to be observed is, that the change must be by the\nnation itself, in its sovereign capacity; not by a mob, nor by a part\nof the nation conspiring, intriguing, or rebelling, without any\ncommission from the nation.  The first Napoleon governed by a legal\ntitle, but he was never legally dethroned, and the government of the\nBourbons, whether of the elder branch or the younger, was never a legal\ngovernment, for the Bourbons had lost their original rights by the\nelection of the first Napoleon, and never afterwards had the national\nwill in their favor.  The republic of 1848 was legal, in the sense that\nthe nation acquiesced in it as a temporary necessity; but hardly\nanybody believed in it or wanted it, and the nation accepted it as a\nsort of locum tenens, rather than willed or ordained it. Its overthrow\nby the coup d'etat may not be legally defensible, but the election of\nNapoleon III. condoned the illegality, if there was any, and gave the\nemperor a legal title, that no republican, that none but a despot or a\nno-government man can dispute.  As the will of the nation, in so far as\nit contravenes not the law of God or the law of nature, binds every\nindividual of the nation, no individual or number of individuals has,\nor can have, any right to conspire against him, or to labor to oust him\nfrom his place, till his escheat has been pronounced by the voice of\nthe nation.  The state, in its sovereign capacity, willing it, is the\nonly power competent to revoke or to change the form and constitution\nof the imperial government.  The same must be said of every nation that\nhas a lawful government; and this, while it preserves the national\nsovereignty, secures freedom of progress, condemns all sedition,\nconspiracy, rebellion, revolution, as does the Christian law itself.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTHE UNITED STATES\n\n\nSovereignty, under God, inheres in the organic people, or the people as\nthe republic; and every organic people fixed to the soil, and\npolitically independent of every other people, is a sovereign people,\nand, in the modern sense, an independent sovereign nation.\n\nSovereign states may unite in an alliance, league, or confederation,\nand mutually agree to exercise their sovereign powers or a portion of\nthem in common, through a common organ or agency; but in this agreement\nthey part with none of their sovereignty, and each remains a sovereign\nstate or nation as before.  The common organ or agency created by the\nconvention is no state, is no nation, has no inherent sovereignty, and\nderives all its vitality and force from the persisting sovereignty of\nthe states severally that have united in creating it.  The agreement no\nmore affects the sovereignty of the several states entering into it,\nthan does the appointment of an agent affect the rights and powers of\nthe principal.  The creature takes nothing from the Creator, exhausts\nnot, lessens not his creative energy, and it is only by his retaining\nand continuously exerting his creative power that the creature\ncontinues to exist.\n\nAn independent state or nation may, with or without its consent, lose\nits sovereignty, but only by being merged in or subjected to another.\nIndependent sovereign states cannot by convention, or mutual agreement,\nform themselves into a single sovereign state, or nation.  The compact,\nor agreement, is made by sovereign states, and binds by virtue of the\nsovereign power of each of the contracting parties.  To destroy that\nsovereign power would be to annul the compact, and render void the\nagreement.  The agreement can be valid and binding only on condition\nthat each of the contracting parties retains the sovereignty that\nrendered it competent to enter into the compact, and states that retain\nseverally their sovereignty do not form a single sovereign state or\nnation.  The states in convention cannot become a new and single\nsovereign state, unless they lose their several sovereignty, and merge\nit in the new sovereignty; but this they cannot do by agreement,\nbecause the moment the parties to the agreement cease to be sovereign,\nthe agreement, on which alone depends the new sovereign state, is\nvacated, in like manner as a contract is vacated by the death of the\ncontracting parties.\n\nThat a nation may voluntarily cede its sovereignty is frankly admitted,\nbut it can cede it only to something or somebody actually existing, for\nto cede to nothing and not to cede is one and the same thing.  They can\npart with their own sovereignty by merging themselves in another\nnational existence, but not by merging themselves in nothing; and, till\nthey have parted with their own sovereignty, the new sovereign state\ndoes not exist.  A prince can abdicate his power, because by abdicating\nhe simply gives back to the people the trust he had received from them;\nbut a nation cannot, save by merging itself in another.  An independent\nstate not merged in another, or that is not subject to another, cannot\ncease to be a sovereign nation, even if it would.\n\nThat no sovereign state can be formed by agreement or compact has\nalready been shown in the refutation of the theory of the origin of\ngovernment in convention, or the so-called social compact.  Sovereign\nstates are as unable to form themselves into a single sovereign state\nby mutual compact as are the sovereign individuals imagined by\nRousseau.  The convention, either of sovereign states or of sovereign\nindividuals, with the best will in the world, can form only a compact\nor agreement between sovereigns, and an agreement or compact, whatever\nits terms or conditions, is only an alliance, a league, or a\nconfederation, which no one can pretend is a sovereign state, nation,\nor republic.\n\nThe question, then, whether the United States are a single sovereign\nstate or nation, or a confederacy of independent sovereign states\ndepends on the question whether the American people originally existed\nas one people or as several independent states.  Mr. Jefferson\nmaintains that before the convention of 1787 they existed as several\nindependent sovereign states, but that since that convention, or the\nratification of the constitution it proposed, they exist as one\npolitical people in regard to foreign nations, and several sovereign\nstates in regard to their internal and domestic relations.  Mr. Webster\nconcedes that originally the States existed as severally sovereign\nstates, but contends that by ratifying the constitution they have been\nmade one sovereign political people, state, or nation, and that the\nGeneral government is a supreme national government, though with a\nreservation in favor of State rights.  But both are wrong. If the\nseveral States of the Union were severally sovereign states when they\nmet in the convention, they are so now; and the constitution is only an\nagreement or compact between sovereigns, and the United States are, as\nMr. Calhoun maintained, only a confederation of sovereign states, and\nnot a single state or one political community.\n\nBut if the sovereignty persists in the States severally, any State,\nsaving its faith, may whenever it chooses to do so, withdraw from the\nUnion, absolve its subjects from all obligation to the Federal\nauthorities, and make it treason in them to adhere to the Federal\ngovernment.  Secession is, then, an incontestable right; not a right\nheld under the constitution or derived from the convention but a right\nheld prior to it, independently of it, inherent in the State\nsovereignty, and inseparable from it.  The State is bound by the\nconstitution of the Union only while she is in it, and is one of the\nStates united.  In ratifying the constitution she did not part with her\nsovereignty, or with any portion of it, any more than France has parted\nwith her sovereignty, and ceased to be an independent sovereign nation,\nby vesting the imperial power in Napoleon III. and his legitimate heirs\nmale.  The principal parts not with his power to his agent, for the\nagent is an agent only by virtue of the continued power of the\nprincipal.  Napoleon is emperor by the will of the French people, and\ngoverns only by the authority of the French nation, which is as\ncompetent to revoke the powers it has conferred on him, when it judges\nproper, as it was to confer them.  The Union exists and governs, if the\nStates are sovereign, only by the will of the State, and she is as\ncompetent to revoke the powers she has delegated as she was to delegate\nthem.  The Union, as far as she is concerned, is her creation, and what\nshe is competent to make she is competent to unmake.\n\nIn seceding or withdrawing from the Union a State may act very\nunwisely, very much against her own interests and the interests of the\nother members of the confederacy; but, if sovereign, she in doing so\nonly exercises her unquestionable right.  The other members may regret\nher action, both for her sake and their own, but they cannot accuse her\nor her citizens of disloyalty in seceding, nor of rebellion, if in\nobedience to her authority they defend their independence by force of\narms against the Union. Neither she nor they, on the supposition, ever\nowed allegiance to the Union.  Allegiance is due from the citizen to\nthe sovereign state, but never from a sovereign state or from its\ncitizens to any other sovereign state.  While the State is in the Union\nthe citizen owes obedience to the United States, but only because his\nState has, in ratifying the Federal constitution, enacted that it and\nall laws and treaties made under it shall be law within her territory.\nThe repeal by the State of the act of ratification releases the citizen\nfrom the obligation even of obedience, and renders it criminal for him\nto yield it without her permission.\n\nIt avails nothing, on the hypothesis of the sovereignty of the States\nas distinguished from that of the United States, to appeal to the\nlanguage or provisions of the Federal constitution.  That constitutes\nthe government, not the state or the sovereign.  It is ordained by the\nsovereign, and if the States were severally independent and sovereign\nstates, that sovereign is the States severally, not the States united.\nThe constitution is law for the citizens of a State only so long as the\nState remains one of the United States.  No matter, then, how clear and\nexpress the language, or stringent the provisions of the constitution,\nthey bind only the citizens of the States that enact the constitution.\nThe written constitution is simply a compact, and obliges only while\nthe compact is continued by the States, each for itself. The\nsovereignty of the United States as a single or political people must\nbe established before any thing in the constitution can be adduced as\ndenying the right of secession.\n\nThat this doctrine would deprive the General government of all right to\nenforce the laws of the Union on a State that secedes, or the citizens\nthereof, is no doubt true; that it would weaken the central power and\nmake the Union a simple voluntary association of states, no better than\na rope of sand, is no less true; but what then?  It is simply saying\nthat a confederation is inferior to a nation, and that a federal\ngovernment lacks many of the advantages of a national government.\nConfederacies are always weak in the centre, always lack unity, and are\nliable to be dissolved by the influence of local passions, prejudices,\nand interests.  But if the United States are a confederation of states\nor nations, not a single nation or sovereign state, then there is no\nremedy.\n\nIf the Anglo-American colonies, when their independence of Great\nBritain was achieved and acknowledged, were severally sovereign states,\nit has never since been in their power to unite and form a single\nsovereign state, or to form themselves into one indivisible sovereign\nnation.  They could unite only by mutual agreement, which gives only a\nconfederation, in which each retains its own sovereignty, as two\nindividuals, however closely united, retain each his own individuality.\nNo sovereignty is of conventional origin, and none can emerge from the\nconvention that did not enter it.  Either the states are one sovereign\npeople or they are not.  If they are not, it is undoubtedly a great\ndisadvantage; but a disadvantage that must be accepted, and submitted\nto without a murmur.\n\nWhether the United States are one sovereign people or only a\nconfederation is a question of very grave importance.  If they are only\na confederation of states--and if they ever were severally sovereign\nstates, only a confederation they certainly are--state secession is an\ninalienable right, and the government has had no right to make war on\nthe secessionists as rebels, or to treat them, when their military\npower is broken, as traitors, or disloyal persons.  The honor of the\ngovernment, and of the people who have sustained it, is then deeply\ncompromised.\n\nWhat then is the fact?  Are the United States politically one people,\nnation, state, or republic, or are they simply independent sovereign\nstates united in close and intimate alliance, league, or federation, by\na mutual pact or agreement? Were the people of the United States who\nordained and established the written constitution one people, or were\nthey not?  If they were not before ordaining and establishing the\ngovernment, they are not now; for the adoption of the constitution did\nnot and could not make them one.  Whether they are one or many is then\nsimply a question of fact, to be decided by the facts in the case, not\nby the theories of American statesmen, the opinion of jurists, or even\nby constitutional law itself.  The old Articles of Confederation and\nthe later Constitution can serve here only as historical documents.\nConstitutions and laws presuppose the existence of a national sovereign\nfrom which they emanate, and that ordains them, for they are the formal\nexpression of a sovereign will.  The nation must exist as an historical\nfact, prior to the possession or exercise of sovereign power, prior to\nthe existence of written Constitutions and laws of any kind, and its\nexistence must be established before they can be recognized as having\nany legal force or vitality.\n\nThe existence of any nation, as an independent sovereign nation, is a\npurely historical fact, for its right to exist as such is in the simple\nfact that it does so exist.  A nation de facto is a nation de jure, and\nwhen we have ascertained the fact, we have ascertained the right.\nThere is no right in the case separate from the fact--only the fact\nmust be really a fact.  A people hitherto a part of another people, or\nsubject to another sovereign, is not in fact a nation, because they\nhave declared themselves independent, and have organized a government,\nand are engaged in what promises to be a successful struggle for\nindependence.  The struggle must be practically over; the former\nsovereign must have practically abandoned the effort to reduce them to\nsubmission, or to bring them back under his authority, and if he\ncontinues it, does it as a matter of mere form; the postulant must have\nproved his ability to maintain civil government, and to fulfil within\nand without the obligations which attach to every civilized nation,\nbefore it can be recognized as an independent sovereign nation; because\nbefore it is not a fact that it is a sovereign nation.  The prior\nsovereign, when no longer willing or able to vindicate his right, has\nlost it, and no one is any longer bound to respect it, for humanity\ndemands not martyrs to lost causes.\n\nThis doctrine may seem harsh, and untenable even, to those sickly\nphilanthropists who are always weeping over extinct or oppressed\nnationalities; but nationality in modern civilization is a fact, not a\nright antecedent to the fact.  The repugnance felt to this assertion\narises chiefly from using the word nation sometimes in a strictly\npolitical sense, and sometimes in its original sense of tribe, and\nunderstanding by it not simply the body politic, but a certain relation\nof origin, family, kindred, blood, or race.  But God has made of one\nblood, or race, all the nations of men; and, besides, no political\nrights are founded by the law of nature on relations of blood, kindred,\nor family.  Under the patriarchal or tribal system, and, to some\nextent, under feudalism, these relations form the basis of government,\nbut they are economical relations rather than civil or political, and,\nunder Christian and modern civilization, are restricted to the\nhousehold, are domestic relations, and enter not the state or body\npolitic, except by way of reminiscence or abuse.  They are protected by\nthe state, but do not found or constitute it.  The vicissitudes of\ntime, the revolutions of states and empires, migration, conquest, and\nintermixture of families and races, have rendered it impracticable,\neven if it were desirable, to distribute people into nations according\nto their relations of blood or descent.\n\nThere is no civilized nation now existing that has been, developed from\na common ancestor this side of Adam, and the most mixed are the most\ncivilized.  The nearer a nation approaches to a primitive people of\npure unmixed blood, the farther removed it is from civilization.  All\ncivilized nations are political nations, and are founded in the fact,\nnot on rights antecedent to the fact.  A hundred or more lost\nnationalities went to form the Roman empire, and who can tell us how\nmany layers of crushed nationalities, superposed one upon another,\nserve for the foundation of the present French, English, Russian,\nAustrian, or Spanish nationalities?  What other title to independence\nand sovereignty, than the fact, can you plead in behalf of any European\nnation?  Every one has absorbed and extinguished--no one can say how\nmany--nationalities, that once had as good a right to be as it has, or\ncan have.  Whether those nationalities have been justly extinguished or\nnot, is no question for the statesman; it is the secret of Providence.\nFailure in this world is not always a proof of wrong; nor success, of\nright.  The good is sometimes overborne, and the bad sometimes\ntriumphs; but it is consoling, and even just, to believe that the good\noftener triumphs than the bad.\n\nIn the political order, the fact, under God, precedes the law. The\nnation holds not from the law, but the law holds from the nation.\nDoubtless the courts of every civilized nation recognize and apply both\nthe law of nature and the law of nations, but only on the ground that\nthey are included, or are presumed to be included, in the national law,\nor jurisprudence.  Doubtless, too, the nation holds from God, under the\nlaw of nature, but only by virtue of the fact that it is a nation; and\nwhen it is a nation dependent on no other, it holds from God all the\nrights and powers of any independent sovereign nation.  There is no\nright behind the fact needed to legalize the fact, or to put the nation\nthat is in fact a nation in possession of full national rights. In the\ncase of a new nation, or people, lately an integral part of another\npeople, or subject to another people@ the right of the prior sovereign\nmust be extinguished indeed, but the extinction of that right is\nnecessary to complete the fact, which otherwise would be only an\ninitial, inchoate fact, not a fait accompli. But that right ceases when\nits claimant, willingly or unwillingly, formally or virtually, abandons\nit; and he does so when he practically abandons the struggle, and shows\nno ability or intention of soon renewing it with any reasonable\nprospect of success.\n\nThe notion of right, independent of the fact as applied to sovereignty,\nis founded in error.  Empty titles to states and kingdoms are of no\nvalidity.  The sovereignty is, under God, in the nation and the title\nand the possession are inseparable.  The title of the Palaeologi to the\nRoman Empire of the East, of the king of Sicily, the king of Sardinia,\nor the king of Spain--for they are all claimants--to the kingdom of\nJerusalem founded by Godfrey and his crusaders, of the Stuarts to the\nthrones of England, Ireland, and Scotland, or of the Bourbons to the\nthrone of France, are vacated and not worth the parchment on which they\nare engrossed.  The contrary opinion, so generally entertained, belongs\nto barbarism, not to civilization.  It is in modern society a relic of\nfeudalism, which places the state in the government, and makes the\ngovernment a private estate--a private, and not a public right--a right\nto govern the public, not a right to govern held from or by the public.\n\nThe proprietor may be dispossessed in fact of his estate by violence,\nby illegal or unjust means, without losing his right, and another may\nusurp it, occupy it, and possess it in fact without acquiring any right\nor legal title to it.  The man who holds the legal title has the right\nto oust him and re-enter upon his estate whenever able to do so.  Here,\nin the economical order, the fact and the right are distinguishable,\nand the actual occupant may be required to show his title-deeds.\nHolding sovereignty to be a private estate, the feudal lawyers very\nproperly distinguish between governments de facto and governments de\njure, and argue very logically that violent dispossession of a prince\ndoes not invalidate his title.  But sovereignty, it has been shown, is\nnot in the government, but in the state, and the state is inseparable\nfrom the public domain.  The people organized and held by the domain or\nnational territory, are under God the sovereign nation, and remain so\nas long as the nation subsists without subjection to another.  The\ngovernment, as distinguished from the state or nation, has only a\ndelegated authority, governs only by a commission from the nation.  The\nrevocation of the commission vacates, its title and extinguishes its\nrights.  The nation is always sovereign, and every organic people fixed\nto the soil, and actually independent of every other, is a nation.\nThere can then be no independent nation de facto that is not an\nindependent nation de jure, nor de jure that is not de facto.  The\nmoment a people cease to be an independent nation in fact, they cease\nto be sovereign, and the moment they become in fact an independent\nnation, they are so of right. Hence in the political order the fact and\nthe right are born and expire together; and when it is proved that a\npeople, are in fact an independent nation, there is no question to be\nasked as to their right to be such nation.\n\nIn the case of the United States there is only the question of fact.\nIf they are in fact one people they are so in right, whatever the\nopinions and theories of statesmen, or even the decisions of courts;\nfor the courts hold from the national authority, and the theories and\nopinions of statesmen may be erroneous.  Certain it is that the States\nin the American Union have never existed and acted as severally\nsovereign states. Prior to independence, they were colonies under the\nsovereignty of Great Britain, and since independence they have existed\nand acted only as states united.  The colonists, before separation and\nindependence, were British subjects, and whatever rights the colonies\nhad they held by charter or concession from the British crown.  The\ncolonists never pretended to be other than British subjects, and the\nalleged ground of their complaint against the mother country was not\nthat she had violated their natural rights as men, but their rights as\nBritish subjects--rights, as contended by the colonists, secured by the\nEnglish constitution to all Englishmen or British subjects.  The denial\nto them of these common rights of Englishmen they called tyranny, and\nthey defended themselves in throwing off their allegiance to George\nIII., on the ground that he had, in their regard, become a tyrant, and\nthe tyranny of the prince absolves the subject from his allegiance.\n\nIn the Declaration of Independence they declared themselves independent\nstates indeed, but not severally independent.  The declaration was not\nmade by the states severally, but by the states jointly, as the United\nStates.  They unitedly declared their independence; they carried on the\nwar for independence, won it, and were acknowledged by foreign powers\nand by the mother country as the United States, not as severally\nindependent sovereign states.  Severally they have never exercised the\nfull powers of sovereign states; they have had no flag--symbol of\nsovereignty--recognized by foreign powers, have made no foreign\ntreaties, held no foreign relations, had no commerce foreign or\ninterstate, coined no money, entered into no alliances or confederacies\nwith foreign states or with one another, and in several respects have\nbeen more restricted in their powers in the Union than they were as\nBritish colonies.\n\nColonies are initial or inchoate states, and become complete states by\ndeclaring and winning their independence; and if the English colonies,\nnow the United States, had separately declared and won their\nindependence, they would unquestionably have become separately\nindependent states, each invested by the law of nature with all the\nrights and powers of a sovereign nation.  But they did not do this.\nThey declared and won their independence jointly, and have since\nexisted and exercised sovereignty only as states united, or the United\nStates, that is, states sovereign in their union, but not in their\nseparation.  This is of itself decisive of the whole question.\n\nBut the colonists have not only never exercised the full powers of\nsovereignty save as citizens of states united, therefore as one people,\nbut they were, so far as a people at all, one people even before\nindependence.  The colonies were all erected and endowed with their\nrights and powers by one and the same national authority, and the\ncolonists were subjects of one and the same national sovereign.  Mr.\nQuincy Adams, who almost alone among our prominent statesmen maintains\nthe unity of the colonial people, adds indeed to their subjection to\nthe same sovereign authority, community of origin, of language,\nmanners, customs, and law.  All these, except the last, or common law,\nmay exist without national unity in the modern political sense of the\nterm nation.  The English common law was recognized by the colonial\ncourts, and in force in all the colonies, not by virtue of colonial\nlegislation, but by virtue of English authority, as expressed in\nEnglish jurisprudence.  The colonists were under the Common Law,\nbecause they were Englishmen, and subjects of the English sovereign.\nThis proves that they were really one people with the English people,\nthough existing in a state of colonial dependence, and not a separate\npeople having nothing politically in common with them but in the\naccident of having the same royal person for their king.  The union\nwith the mother country was national, not personal, as was the union\nexisting between England and Hanover, or that still existing between\nthe empire of Austria, formerly Germany, and the kingdom of Hungary;\nand hence the British parliament claimed, and not illegally, the right\nto tax the colonies for the support of the empire, and to bind them in\nall cases whatsoever--a claim the colonies themselves admitted in\nprinciple by recognizing and observing the British navigation laws.\nThe people of the several colonies being really one people before\nindependence, in the sovereignty of the mother country, must be so\nstill, unless they have since, by some valid act, divided themselves or\nbeen divided into separate and independent states.\n\nThe king, say the jurists, never dies, and the heralds cry, \"The king\nis dead!  Live the king!\" Sovereignty never lapses, is never in\nabeyance, and the moment it ceases in one people it is renewed in\nanother.  The British sovereignty ceased in the colonies with\nindependence, and the American took its place.  Did the sovereignty,\nwhich before independence was in Great Britain, pass from Great Britain\nto the States severally, or to the States united?  It might have passed\nto them severally, but did it? There is no question of law or\nantecedent right in the case, but a simple question of fact, and the\nfact is determined by determining who it was that assumed it, exercised\nit, and has continued to exercise it.  As to this there is no doubt.\nThe sovereignty as a fact has been assumed and exercised by the United\nStates, the States united, and never by the States separately or\nseverally.  Then as a fact the sovereignty that before independence was\nin Great Britain, passed, on independence to the States united, and\nreappears in all its vigor in the United States, the only successor to\nGreat Britain known to or recognized by the civilized world.\n\nAs the colonial people were, though distributed in distinct colonies,\nstill one people, the people of the United States, though distributed\ninto distinct and mutually independent States, are yet one sovereign\npeople, therefore a sovereign state or nation, and not a simple league\nor confederacy of nations.\n\nThere is no doubt that all the powers exercised by the General\nGovernment, though embracing all foreign relations and all general\ninterests and relations of all the States, might have been exercised by\nit under the authority of a mutual compact of the several States, and\npractically the difference between the compact theory and the national\nview would be very little, unless in cases like that of secession.  On\nthe supposition that the American people are one political people, the\ngovernment would have the right to treat secession, in the sense in\nwhich the seceders understand it, as rebellion, and to suppress it by\nemploying all the physical force at its command; but on the compact\ntheory it would have no such right.  But the question now under\ndiscussion turns simply on what has been and is the historical fact.\nBefore the States could enter into the compact and delegate sovereign\npowers to the Union, they must have severally possessed them.  It is\nhistorically certain that they did not possess them before\nindependence; they did not obtain them by independence, for they did\nnot severally succeed to the British sovereignty, to which they\nsucceeded only as States united.  When, then, and by what means did\nthey or could they become severally sovereign States?  The United\nStates having succeeded to the British sovereignty in the\nAnglo-American colonies, they came into possession of full national\nsovereignty, and have alone held and exercised it ever since\nindependence became a fact.  The States severally succeeding only to\nthe colonies, never held, and have never been competent to delegate\nsovereign powers.\n\nThe old Articles of Confederation, it is conceded, were framed on the\nassumption that the States are severally sovereign; but the several\nStates, at the same time, were regarded as forming one nation, and,\nthough divided into separate States, the people were regarded as one\npeople.  The Legislature of New York, as early as 1782, calls for an\nessential change In the Articles of Confederation, as proved to be\ninadequate to secure the peace, security, and prosperity of \"the\nnation.\"  All the proceedings that preceded and led to the call of the\nconvention of 1781 were based on the assumption that the people of the\nUnited States were one people.  The States were called united, not\nconfederated States, even in the very Articles of Confederation\nthemselves, and officially the United States were called \"the Union.\"\nThat the united colonies by independence became united States, and\nformed really one and only one people, was in the thought, the belief,\nthe instinct of the great mass of the people.  They acted as they\nexisted through State as they had previously acted through colonial\norganization, for in throwing off the British authority there was no\nother organization through which they could act.  The States, or people\nof the States, severally sent their delegates to the Congress of the\nUnited States, and these delegates adopted the rule of voting in\nCongress by States, a rule that might be revived without detriment to\nnational unity. Nothing was more natural, then, than that Congress,\ncomposed of delegates elected or appointed by States, should draw up\narticles of confederation rather than articles of union, in order, if\nfor no other reason, to conciliate the smaller States, and to prevent\ntheir jealousy of the larger States such as Virginia, Massachusetts,\nand Pennsylvania.\n\nMoreover, the Articles of Confederation were drawn up and adopted\nduring the transition from colonial dependence to national\nindependence.  Independence was declared in 1776, but it was not a fact\ntill 1782, when the preliminary treaty acknowledging it was signed at\nParis.  Till then the United States were not an independent nation;\nthey were only a people struggling to become an independent nation.\nPrior to that preliminary treaty, neither the Union nor the States\nseverally were sovereign.  The articles were agreed on in Congress in\n1777, but they were not ratified by all the States till May, 1781, and\nin 1782 the movement was commenced in the Legislature of New York for\ntheir amendment. Till the organization under the constitution ordained\nby the people of the United States in 1787, and which went into\noperation in 1789, the United States had in reality only a provisional\ngovernment, and it was not till then that the national government was\ndefinitively organized, and the line of demarcation between the General\nGovernment and the particular State governments was fixed.\n\nThe Confederation was an acknowledged failure, and was rejected by the\nAmerican people, precisely because it was not in harmony with the\nunwritten or Providential constitution of the nation; and it was not in\nharmony with that constitution precisely because it recognized the\nStates as severally sovereign, and substituted confederation for union.\nThe failure of confederation and the success of union are ample proofs\nof the unity of the American nation.  The instinct of unity rejected\nState sovereignty in 1787 as it did in 1861.  The first and the last\nattempt to establish State sovereignty have failed, and the failure\nvindicates the fact that the sovereignty is in the States united, not\nin the States severally.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nCONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES\n\n\nThe constitution of the United States is twofold, written and\nunwritten, the constitution of the people and the constitution of the\ngovernment.\n\nThe written constitution is simply a law ordained by the nation or\npeople instituting and organizing the government; the unwritten\nconstitution is the real or actual constitution of the people as a\nstate or sovereign community, and constituting them such or such a\nstate.  It is Providential, not made by the nation, but born with it.\nThe written constitution is made and ordained by the sovereign power,\nand presupposes that power as already existing and constituted.\n\nThe unwritten or Providential constitution of the United States is\npeculiar, and difficult to understand, because incapable of being fully\nexplained by analogies borrowed from any other state historically\nknown, or described by political philosophers.  It belongs to the\nGraeco-Roman family, and is republican as distinguished from despotic\nconstitutions, but it comes under the head of neither monarchical nor\naristocratic, neither democratic nor mixed constitutions, and creates a\nstate which is neither a centralized state nor a confederacy.  The\ndifficulty of understanding it is augmented by the peculiar use under\nit of the word state, which does not in the American system mean a\nsovereign community or political society complete in itself, like\nFrance, Spain, or Prussia, nor yet a political society subordinate to\nanother political society and dependent on it. The American States are\nall sovereign States united, but, disunited, are no States at all.  The\nrights and powers of the States are not derived from the United States,\nnor the rights and powers of the United States derived from the States.\n\nThe simple fact is, that the political or sovereign people of the\nUnited States exists as united States, and only as united States. The\nUnion and the States are coeval, born together, and can exist only\ntogether.  Separation is dissolution--the death of both. The United\nStates are a state, a single sovereign state; but this single sovereign\nstate consists in the union and solidarity of States instead of\nindividuals.  The Union is in each of the States, and each of the\nStates is in the Union.\n\nIt is necessary to distinguish in the outset between the United States\nand the government of the United States, or the so-called Federal\ngovernment, which the convention refused, contrary to its first\nintention to call the national government.  That government is not a\nsupreme national government, representing all the powers of the United\nStates, but a limited government, restricted by its constitution to\ncertain specific relations and interests.  The United States are\nanterior to that government, and the first question to be settled\nrelates to their internal and inherent Providential constitution as one\npolitical people or sovereign state.  The written constitution, in its\npreamble, professes to be ordained by \"We, the people of the United\nStates.\"  Who are this people?  How are they constituted, or what the\nmode and conditions of their political existence?  Are they the people\nof the States severally?  No; for they call themselves the people of\nthe United States.  Are they a national people, really existing outside\nand independently of their organization into distinct and mutually\nindependent States?  No; for they define themselves to be the people of\nthe United States.  If they had considered themselves existing as\nStates only, they would have said \"We, the States,\" and if\nindependently of State organization, they would have said \"We, the\npeople,\" do ordain, &c.\n\nThe key to the mystery is precisely in this appellation United States,\nwhich is not the name of the country, for its distinctive name is\nAmerica, but a name expressive of its political organization.  In it\nthere are no sovereign people without States, and no States without\nunion, or that are not united States.  The term united is not part of a\nproper name, but is simply an adjective qualifying States, and has its\nfull and proper sense.  Hence while the sovereignty is and must be in\nthe States, it is in the States united, not in the States severally,\nprecisely as we have found the sovereignty of the people is in the\npeople collectively or as society, not in the people individually.  The\nlife is in the body, not in the members, though the body could not\nexist if it had no members; so the sovereignty is in the Union, not in\nthe States severally; but there could be no sovereign union without the\nStates, for there is no union where there is nothing united.\n\nThis is not a theory of the constitution, but the constitutional fact\nitself.  It is the simple historical fact that precedes the law and\nconstitutes the law-making power.  The people of the United States are\none people, as has already been proved: they were one people, as far as\na people at all, prior to independence, because under the same Common\nLaw and subject to the same sovereign, and have been so since, for as\nunited States they gained their independence and took their place among\nsovereign nations, and as united States they have possessed and still\npossess the government.  As their existence before independence in\ndistinct colonies did not prevent their unity, so their existence since\nin distinct States does not hinder them from being one people.  The\nStates severally simply continue the colonial organizations, and united\nthey hold the sovereignty that was originally in the mother country.\nBut if one people, they are one people existing in distinct State\norganizations, as before independence they were one people existing in\ndistinct colonial organizations.  This is the original, the unwritten,\nand Providential constitution of the people of the United States.\n\nThis constitution is not conventional, for it existed before the people\nmet or could meet in convention.  They have not, as an independent\nsovereign people, either established their union, or distributed\nthemselves into distinct and mutually independent States.  The union\nand the distribution, the unity and the distinction, are both original\nin their constitution, and they were born United States, as much and as\ntruly so as the son of a citizen is born a citizen, or as every one\nborn at all is born a member of society, the family, the tribe, or the\nnation.  The Union and the States were born together, are inseparable\nin their constitution, have lived and grown up together; no serious\nattempt till the late secession movement has been made to separate\nthem; and the secession movement, to all persons who knew not the real\nconstitution of the United States, appeared sure to succeed, and in\nfact would have succeeded if, as the secessionists pretended, the Union\nhad been only a confederacy, and the States had been held together only\nby a conventional compact, and not by a real and living bond of unity.\nThe popular instinct of national unity, which seemed so weak, proved to\nbe strong enough to defeat the secession forces, to trample out the\nconfederacy, and maintain the unity of the nation and the integrity of\nits domain.\n\nThe people can act only as they exist, as they are, not as they are\nnot.  Existing originally only as distributed in distinct and mutually\nindependent colonies, they could at first act only through their\ncolonial organizations, and afterward only through their State\norganizations.  The colonial people met in convention, in the person of\nrepresentatives chosen by colonies, and after independence in the\nperson of representatives chosen by States.  Not existing outside of\nthe colonial or State organizations, they could not act outside or\nindependently of them.  They chose their representatives or delegates\nby colonies or States, and called at first their convention a Congress;\nbut by an instinct surer than their deliberate wisdom, they called it\nnot the Congress of the confederate, but of the United States,\nasserting constitutional unity as well as constitutional multiplicity.\nIt is true, in their first attempt to organize a general government,\nthey called the constitution they devised Articles of Confederation,\nbut only because they had not attained to full consciousness of\nthemselves; and that they really meant union, not confederation, is\nevident from their adopting, as the official style of the nation or new\npower, united, not confederate States.\n\nThat the sovereignty vested in the States united, and was represented\nin some sort by the Congress, is evident from the fact that the several\nStates, when they wished to adopt State constitutions in place of\ncolonial charters, felt not at liberty to do so without asking and\nobtaining the permission of Congress, as the elder Adams informs us in\nhis Diary, kept at the time; that is, they asked and obtained the\nequivalent of what has since, in the case of organizing new States,\nbeen called an \"enabling act.\"  This proves that the States did not\nregard themselves as sovereign States out of the Union, but as\ncompletely sovereign only in it.  And this again proves that the\nArticles of Confederation did not correspond to the real, living\nconstitution of the people.  Even then it was felt that the\norganization and constitution of a State in the Union could be\nregularly effected only by the permission of Congress; and no Territory\ncan, it is well known, regularly organize itself as a State, and adopt\na State constitution, without an enabling act by Congress, or its\nequivalent.\n\nNew States, indeed, have been organized and been admitted into the\nUnion without an enabling act of Congress; but the case of Kansas, if\nnothing else, proves that the proceeding is irregular, illicit,\ninvalid, and dangerous.  Congress, of course, can condone the wrong and\nvalidate the act, but it were better that the act should be validly\ndone, and that there should be no wrong to condone.  Territories have\norganized as States, adopted State constitutions, and instituted State\ngovernments under what has been called \"squatter sovereignty;\" but such\nsovereignty has no existence, because sovereignty is attached to the\ndomain; and the domain is in the United States.  It is the offspring of\nthat false view of popular sovereignty which places it in the people\npersonally or generically, irrespective of the domain, which makes\nsovereignty a purely personal right, not a right fixed to the soil, and\nis simply a return to the barbaric constitution of power.  In all\ncivilized nations, sovereignty is inseparable from the state, and the\nstate is inseparable from the domain.  The will of the people, unless\nthey are a state, is no law, has no force, binds nobody, and justifies\nno act.\n\nThe regular process of forming and admitting new States explains\nadmirably the mutual relation of the Union and the several States.  The\npeople of a Territory belonging to the United States or included in the\npublic domain not yet erected into a State and admitted into the Union,\nare subjects of the United States, without any political rights\nwhatever, and, though a part of the population, are no part of the\nsovereign people of the United States.  They become a part of that\npeople, with political rights and franchises, only when they are\nerected into a State, and admitted into the Union as one of the United\nStates.  They may meet in convention, draw up and adopt a constitution\ndeclaring or assuming them to be a State, elect State officers,\nsenators, and representatives in the State legislature, and\nrepresentatives and senators in Congress, but they are not yet a State,\nand are, as before, under the Territorial government established by the\nGeneral Government.  It does not exist as a State till recognized by\nCongress and admitted into the Union.  The existence of the State, and\nthe rights and powers of the people within the State, depend on their\nbeing a State in the Union, or a State united. Hence a State erected on\nthe national domain, but itself outside of the Union, is not an\nindependent foreign State, but simply no State at all, in any sense of\nthe term.  As there is no union outside of the States, so is there no\nState outside of the Union; and to be a citizen either of a State or of\nthe United States, it is necessary to be a citizen of a State, and of a\nState in the Union.  The inhabitants of Territories not yet erected\ninto States are subjects, not citizens--that is, not citizens with\npolitical rights.  The sovereign people are not the people outside of\nState organization, nor the people of the States severally, but the\ndistinct people of the several States united, and therefore most\nappropriately called the people of the United States.\n\nThis is the peculiarity of the American constitution and is\nsubstantially the very peculiarity noted and dwelt upon by Mr. Madison\nin his masterly letter to Edward Everett, published in the \"North\nAmerican Review,\" October, 1830.\n\n\"I In order to understand the true character of the constitution of the\nUnited States,\" says Mr. Madison, \"the error, not uncommon, must be\navoided of viewing it through the medium either of a consolidated\ngovernment or of a confederated government, whilst it is neither the\none nor the other, but a mixture of both.  And having, in no model, the\nsimilitudes and analogies applicable to other systems of government, it\nmust, more than any other, be its own interpreter, according to its\ntext and the facts in the case.\n\n\"From these it will be seen that the characteristic peculiarities of\nthe constitution are: 1. The mode of its formation. 2. The division of\nthe supreme powers of government between the States in their united\ncapacity and the States in their individual capacities.\n\n\"1. It was formed not by the governments of the component States, as\nthe Federal Government, for which it was substituted, was formed; nor\nwas it formed by a majority of the people of the United States as a\nsingle community, in the manner of a consolidated government.  It was\nformed by the States; that is, by the people in each of the States,\nacting in their highest sovereign capacity, and formed consequently by\nthe same authority which formed the State constitution.\n\n\"Being thus derived from the same source as the constitutions of the\nStates, it has within each State the same authority as the constitution\nof the State, and is as much a constitution in the strict sense of the\nterm, within its prescribed sphere, as the constitutions of the States\nare within their respective spheres; but with this obvious and\nessential difference, that, being a compact among the States in their\nhighest capacity, and constituting the people thereof one people for\ncertain purposes, it cannot be altered or annulled at the will of the\nStates individually, as the constitution of a State may be at its\nindividual will.\n\n\"2. And that it divides the supreme powers of government between the\ngovernment of the United States and the governments of the individual\nStates, is stamped on the face of the instrument; the powers of war and\nof taxation, of commerce and treaties, and other enumerated powers\nvested in the government of the United States, are of high and\nsovereign a character as any of the powers reserved to the State\ngovernments.\"\n\nMr. Jefferson, Mr. Webster, Chancellor Kent, Judge Story, and nearly\nall the old Republicans, and even the old Federalists, on the question\nas to what is the actual constitution of the United States, took\nsubstantially the same view; but they all, as well as Mr. Madison\nhimself, speak of the written constitution, which on their theory has\nand can have only a conventional value. Mr. Madison evidently\nrecognizes no constitution of the people prior to the written\nconstitution, from which the written constitution, or the constitution\nof the government, derives all its force and vitality.  The\norganization of the American people, which he knew well--no man\nbetter,--and which he so justly characterizes, he supposes to have been\ndeliberately formed by the people themselves, through the\nconvention--not given them by Providence as their original and inherent\nconstitution.  But this was merely the effect of the general doctrine\nwhich he had adopted, in common with nearly all his contemporaries, of\nthe origin of the state in compact, and may be eliminated from his view\nof what the constitution actually is, without affecting that view\nitself.\n\nMr. Madison lays great stress on the fact that though the constitution\nof the Union was formed by the States, it was formed, not by the\ngovernments, but by the people of the several States; but this makes no\nessential difference, if the people are the people of the States, and\nsovereign in their severalty, and not in their union.  Had it been\nformed by the State governments with the acquiescence of the people, it\nwould have rested on as high authority as if formed by the people of\nthe State in convention assembled.  The only difference is, that if the\nState ratified it by the legislature, she could abrogate it by the\nlegislature; if in convention, she could abrogate it only in\nconvention.  Mr. Madison, following Mr. Jefferson, supposes the\nconstitution makes the people of the several States one people for\ncertain specific purposes, and leaves it to be supposed that in regard\nto all other matters, or in all other relations, they are sovereign;\nand hence he makes the government a mixture of a consolidated\ngovernment and a confederated government, but neither the one nor the\nother exclusively.  Say the people of the United States were one people\nin all respects, and under a government which is neither a consolidated\nnor a confederated government, nor yet a mixture of the two, but a\ngovernment in which the powers of government are divided between a\ngeneral government and particular governments, each emanating from the\nsame source, and you will have the simple fact, and precisely what Mr.\nMadison means, when is eliminated what is derived from his theory of\nthe origin of government in compact.  It is this theory of the\nconventional origin of the constitution, and which excludes the\nProvidential or real constitution of the people, that has misled him\nand so many other eminent statesmen and constitutional lawyers.\n\nThe convention did not create the Union or unite the States, for it was\nassembled by the authority of the United States who were present in it.\nThe United States or Union existed before the convention, as the\nconvention itself affirms in declaring one of its purposes to be \"to\nprovide for a more perfect union.\"  If there had been no union, it\ncould not and would not have spoken of providing for a more perfect\nunion, but would have stated its purpose to be to create or form a\nunion.  The convention did not form the Union, nor in fact provide for\na more perfect union; it simply provided for the more perfect\nrepresentation or expression in the General government of the Union\nalready existing.  The convention, in common with the statesmen at the\ntime, recognized no unwritten or Providential constitution of a people,\nand regarded the constitution of government as the constitution of the\nstate, and consequently sometimes put the state for the government.  In\ninterpreting its language, it is necessary to distinguish between its\nact and its theory.  Its act is law, its theory is not.  The convention\nmet, among other things, to organize a government which should more\nperfectly represent the union of the States than did the government\ncreated by the Articles of Confederation.\n\nThe convention, certainly, professes to grant or concede powers to the\nUnited States, and to prohibit powers to the States; but it simply puts\nthe state for the government.  The powers of the United States are,\nindeed, grants or trusts, but from God through the law of nature, and\nare grants, trusts, or powers always conceded to every nation or\nsovereign people.  But none of them are grants from the convention.\nThe powers the convention grants or concedes to the United States are\npowers granted or conceded by the United States to the General\ngovernment it assembled to organize and establish, which, as it extends\nover the whole population and territory of the Union, and, as the\ninterests it is charged with relate to all the States in common, or to\nthe people as a whole, is with no great impropriety called the\ngovernment of the United States, in contradistinction from the State\ngovernments, which have each only a local jurisdiction. But the more\nexact term is, for the one, the general government, and for the others,\nparticular governments, as having charge only of the particular\ninterests of the State; and the two together constitute the government\nof the United States, or the complete national government; for neither\nthe General government nor the State government is complete in itself.\nThe convention developed a general government, and prescribed its\npowers, and fixed their limits and extent, as well as the bounds of the\npowers of the State or particular governments; but they are the United\nStates assembled in convention that do all this, and, therefore,\nstrictly speaking, no powers are conceded to the United States that\nthey did not previously possess.  The convention itself, in the\nconstitution it ordained, defines very clearly from whom the General\ngovernment holds its powers.  It holds them, as we I have seen, from\n\"We, the people of the United States;\" not we, the people of the States\nseverally, but of the States united.  If it had meant the States\nseverally, it would have said, We, the States; if it had recognized and\nmeant the population of the country irrespective of its organization\ninto particular States, it would have said simply, We, the people.  By\nsaying \"We, the people of the United States,\" it placed the sovereign\npower where it is, in the people of the States united.\n\nThe convention ordains that the powers not conceded to the General\ngovernment or prohibited to the particular governments, \"are reserved\nto the States respectively, or to the people.\" But the powers reserved\nto the States severally are reserved by order of the United States, and\nthe powers not so reserved are reserved to the people.  What people?\nThe first thought is that they are the people of the States severally;\nfor the constitution understands by people the state as distinguished\nfrom the state government; but if this had been its meaning in this\nplace, it would have said, \"are reserved to the States respectively, or\nto the people\" thereof.  As it does not say so, and does not define the\npeople it means, it is necessary to understand by them the people\ncalled in the preamble \"the people of the United States.\" This is\nconfirmed by the authority reserved to amend the constitution, which\ncertainly is not reserved to the States severally, but necessarily to\nthe power that ordains the constitution--\"We, the people of the United\nStates.\"  No power except that which ordains is or can be competent to\namend a constitution of government.  The particular mode prescribed by\nthe convention in which the constitution of the government may be\namended has no bearing on the present argument, because it is\nprescribed by the States united, not severally, and the power to amend\nis evidently reserved, not indeed to the General government, but to the\nUnited States; for the ratification by any State or Territory not in\nthe Union counts for nothing.  The States united, can, in the way\nprescribed, give more or less power to the General government, and\nreserve more or less power to the States individually.  The so-called\nreserved powers are really reserved to the people of the United States,\nwho can make such disposition of them as seems to them good.\n\nThe conclusion, then, that the General government holds from the States\nunited, not from the States severally, is not invalidated by the fact\nthat its constitution was completed only by the ratification of the\nStates in their individual capacity.  The ratification was made\nnecessary by the will of the people in convention assembled; but the\nconvention was competent to complete it and put it in force without\nthat ratification, had it so willed.  The general practice under the\nAmerican system is for the convention to submit the constitution it has\nagreed on to the people, to be accepted or rejected by a plebiscitum;\nbut such submission, though it may be wise and prudent, is not\nnecessary. The convention is held to be the convention of the people,\nand to be clothed with the full authority of the sovereign people, and\nit is in this that it differs from the congress or the legislature.  It\nis not a congress of delegates or ministers who are obliged to act\nunder instructions, to report their acts to their respective sovereigns\nfor approval or rejection; it is itself sovereign, and may do whatever\nthe people themselves can do.  There is no necessity for it to appeal\nto a plebiscitum to complete its acts.  That the convention, on the\nscore of prudence, is wise in doing so, nobody questions; but the\nconvention is always competent, if it chooses, to ordain the\nconstitution without appeal.  The power competent to ordain the\nconstitution is always competent to change, modify, or amend it. That\namendments to the constitution of the government can be adopted only by\nbeing proposed by a convention of all the States in the Union, or by\nbeing proposed, by a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress, and\nratified by three-fourths of the States, is simply a conventional\nordinance, which the convention can change at its pleasure.  It proves\nnothing as it stands but the will of the convention.\n\nThe term ratification itself, because the term commonly used in\nreference to treaties between sovereign powers, has been seized on,\nsince sometimes used by the convention, to prove that the constitution\nemanates from the States severally, and is a treaty or compact between\nsovereign states, not an organic or fundamental law ordained by a\nsingle sovereign will; but this argument is inadmissible, because, as\nwe have just seen, the convention is competent to ordain the\nconstitution without submitting it for ratification, and because the\nconvention uses sometimes the word adopt instead of the word ratify.\nThat the framers of the constitution held it to be a treaty, compact,\nor agreement among sovereigns, there is no doubt, for they so held in\nregard to all constitution of government; and there is just as little\ndoubt that they intended to constitute, and firmly believed that they\nwere constituting a real government. Mr. Madison's authority on this\npoint is conclusive.  They unquestionably regarded the States, prior to\nthe ratification of the constitution they proposed, as severally\nsovereign, as they were declared to be by the old Articles of\nConfederation, but they also believed that all individuals are\nsovereign prior to the formation of civil society.  Yet very few, if\nany, of them believed that they remained sovereign after the adoption\nof the constitution; and we may attribute to their belief in the\nconventional origin of all government,--the almost universal belief of\nthe time among political philosophers,--the little account which they\nmade of the historical facts that prove that the people of the United\nStates were always one people, and that the States never existed as\nseverally sovereign states.\n\nThe political philosophers of the present day do not generally accept\nthe theory held by our fathers, and it has been shown in these pages to\nbe unsound and incompatible with the essential nature of government.\nThe statesmen of the eighteenth century believed that the state is\nderived from the people individually, and held that sovereignty is\ncreated by the people in convention. The rights and powers of the\nstate, they held, were made up of the rights held by individuals under\nthe law of nature, and which the individuals surrendered to civil\nsociety on its formation. So they supposed that independent sovereign\nstates might meet in convention, mutually agree to surrender a portion\nof their rights, organize their surrendered rights into a real\ngovernment, and leave the convention shorn, at least, of a portion of\ntheir sovereignty.  This doctrine crops out everywhere in the writings\nof the elder Adams, and is set forth with rare ability by Mr. Webster,\nin his great speech in the Senate against the State sovereignty\ndoctrine of General Hayne and Mr. Calhoun, which won for him the\nhonorable title of Expounder of the Constitution--and expound it he, no\ndoubt, did in the sense of its framers.  He boldly concedes that prior\nto the adoption of the constitution, the people of the United States\nwere severally sovereign states, but by the constitution they were made\none sovereign political community or people, and that the States,\nthough retaining certain rights, have merged their several sovereignty\nin the Union.\n\nThe subtle mind of Mr. Calhoun, who did not hold that a state can\noriginate in compact, proved to Mr. Webster that his theory could not\nstand; that, if the States went into the convention sovereign States,\nthey came out of it sovereign States; and that the constitution they\nformed could from the nature of the case be only a treaty, compact, or\nagreement between sovereigns.  It could create an agency, but not a\ngovernment.  The sovereign States could only delegate the exercise of\ntheir sovereign powers, not the sovereign powers themselves.  The\nStates could agree to exercise certain specific powers of sovereignty\nonly in common, but the force and vitality of the agreement depended on\nthe States, parties to the agreement retaining respectively their\nsovereignty.  Hence, he maintained that sovereignty, after as before\nthe convention, vested in the States severally.  Hence State\nsovereignty, and hence his doctrine that in all cases that cannot come\nproperly before the Supreme Court of the United States for decision,\neach State is free to decide for itself, on which he based the right of\nnullification, or the State veto of acts of Congress whose\nconstitutionality the State denies. Mr. Calhoun was himself no\nsecessionist, but he laid down the premises from which secession is the\nlogical deduction; and large numbers of young men, among the most open,\nthe most generous, and the most patriotic in the country, adopted his\npremises, without being aware of this fact any more than he himself\nwas, and who have been behind none in their loyalty to the Union, and\nin their sacrifices to sustain it, in the late rebellion.\n\nThe formidable rebellion which is now happily suppressed, and which\nattempted to justify itself by the doctrine of State sovereignty, has\nthrown, in many minds, new light on the subject, and led them to\nre-examine the historical facts in the case from a different point of\nview, to see if Mr. Calhoun's theory is not as unfounded as he had\nproved Mr. Webster's theory to be.  The facts in the case really\nsustain neither, and both failed to see it: Mr. Calhoun because he had\npurposes to accomplish which demanded State sovereignty, and Mr.\nWebster because he examined them in the distorting medium of the theory\nor understanding of the statesmen of the eighteenth century.  The civil\nwar has vindicated the Union, and defeated the armed forces of the\nState sovereignty men; but it has not refuted their doctrine, and as\nfar as it has had any effect, it has strengthened the tendency to\nconsolidation or centralism.\n\nBut the philosophy, the theory of government, the understanding of the\nframers of the constitution, must be considered, if the expression will\nbe allowed, as obiter dicta, and be judged on their merits.  What binds\nis the thing done, not the theory on which it was done, or on which the\nactors explained their work either to themselves or to others.  Their\npolitical philosophy, or their political theory, may sometimes affect\nthe phraseology they adopt, but forms no rule for interpreting their\nwork.  Their work was inspired by and accords with the historical facts\nin the case, and is authorized and explained by them.  The American\npeople were not made one people by the written constitution, as Mr.\nJefferson, Mr. Madison, Mr. Webster, and so many others supposed, but\nwere made so by the unwritten constitution, born with and inherent in\nthem.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nTHE CONSTITUTION--CONTINUED.\n\n\nProvidence, or God operating through historical facts, constituted the\nAmerican people one political or sovereign people, existing and acting\nin particular communities, organizations, called states.  This one\npeople organized as states, meet in convention, frame and ordain the\nconstitution of government, or institute a general government in place\nof the Continental Congress; and the same people, in their respective\nState organizations, meet in convention in each State, and frame and\nordain a particular government for the State individually, which, in\nunion with the General government, constitutes the complete and supreme\ngovernment within the States, as the General government, in union with\nall the particular governments, constitutes the complete and supreme\ngovernment of the nation or whole country.  This is clearly the view\ntaken by Mr. Madison in his letter to Mr. Everett, when freed from his\ntheory of the origin of government in compact.\n\nThe constitution of the people as one people, and the distinction at\nthe same time of this one people into particular States, precedes the\nconvention, and is the unwritten constitution, the Providential\nconstitution, of the American people or civil society, as distinguished\nfrom the constitution of the government, which, whether general or\nparticular, is the ordination of civil society itself.  The unwritten\nconstitution is the creation or constitution of the sovereign, and the\nsovereign providentially constituted constitutes in turn the\ngovernment, which is not sovereign, but is clothed with just so much\nand just so little authority as the sovereign wills or ordains.\n\nThe sovereign in the republican order is the organic people, or State,\nand is with us the United States, for with us the organic people exist\nonly as organized into States united, which in their union form one\ncompact and indissoluble whole.  That is to say, the organic American\npeople do not exist as a consolidated people or state; they exist only\nas organized into distinct but inseparable States.  Each State is a\nliving member of the one body, and derives its life from its union with\nthe body, so that the American state is one body with many members; and\nthe members, instead of being simply individuals, are States, or\nindividuals organized into States.  The body consists of many members,\nand is one body, because the members are all members of it, and members\none of another.  It does not exist as separate or distinct from the\nmembers, but exists in their solidarity or membership one of another.\nThere is no sovereign people or existence of the United States\ndistinguishable from the people or existence of the particular States\nunited.  The people of the United States, the state called the United\nStates, are the people of the particular States united.  The solidarity\nof the members constitutes the unity of the body.  The difference\nbetween this view and Mr. Madison's is, that while his view supposes\nthe solidarity to be conventional, originating and existing in compact,\nor agreement, this supposes it to be real, living, and prior to the\nconvention, as much the work of Providence as the existence in the\nhuman body of the living solidarity of its members.  One law, one life,\ncirculates through all the members, constituting them a living\norganism, binding them in living union, all to each and each to all.\n\nSuch is the sovereign people, and so far the original unwritten\nconstitution.  The sovereign, in order to live and act, must have an\norgan through which he expresses his will.  This organ under the\nAmerican system, is primarily the Convention.  The convention is the\nsupreme political body, the concrete sovereign authority, and exercises\npractically the whole sovereign power of the people.  The convention\npersists always, although not in permanent session.  It can at any time\nbe convened by the ordinary authority of the government, or, in its\nfailure, by a plebiscitum.\n\nNext follows the Government created and constituted by the convention.\nThe government is constituted in such manner, and has such and only\nsuch powers, as the convention ordains.  The government has, in the\nstrict sense, no political authority under the American system, which\nseparates the government from the convention.  All political questions\nproper, such as the elective franchise, eligibility, the constitution\nof the several departments of government, as the legislative, the\njudicial, and the executive, changing, altering, or amending the\nconstitution of government, enlarging, or contracting its powers, in a\nword, all those questions that arise on which it is necessary to take\nthe immediate orders of the sovereign, belong not to the government,\nbut to the convention; and where the will of the sovereign is not\nsufficiently expressed in the constitution, a new appeal to the\nconvention is necessary, and may always be had. The constitution of\nGreat Britain makes no distinction between the convention and the\ngovernment.  Theoretically the constitution of Great Britain is feudal,\nand there is, properly speaking, no British state; there are only the\nestates, king, lords, and commons, and these three estates constitute\nthe Parliament, which is held to be omnipotent; that is, has the\nplenitude of political sovereignty.  The British Parliament, composed\nof the three estates, possesses in itself all the powers of the\nconvention in the American constitution, and is at once the convention\nand the government.  The imperial constitution of France recognizes no\nconvention, but clothes the senate with certain political functions,\nwhich, in some respects, subjects theoretically the sovereign to his\ncreature. The emperor confessedly holds his power by the grace of God\nand the will of the nation, which is a clear acknowledgment that the\nsovereignty vests in the French people as the French state; but the\nimperial constitution, which is the constitution of the government, not\nof the state, studies, while acknowledging the sovereignty of the\npeople, to render it nugatory, by transferring it, under various subtle\ndisguises, to the government, and practically to the emperor as chief\nof the government.  The senate, the council of state, the legislative\nbody, and the emperor, are all creatures of the French state, and have\nproperly no political functions, and to give them such functions is to\nplace the sovereign under his own subjects!  The real aim of the\nimperial constitution is to secure despotic power under the guise of\nrepublicanism.  It leaves and is intended to leave the nation no way of\npractically asserting its sovereignty but by either a revolution or a\nplebiscitum, and a plebiscitum is permissible only where there is no\nregular government.\n\nThe British constitution is consistent with itself, but imposes no\nrestriction on the power of the government.  The French imperial\nconstitution is illogical, inconsistent with itself as well as with the\nfree action of the nation.  The American constitution has all the\nadvantages of both, and the disadvantages of neither.  The convention\nis not the government like the British Parliament, nor a creature of\nthe state like the French senate, but the sovereign state itself, in a\npractical form.  By means of the convention the government is\nrestricted to its delegated powers, and these, if found in practice\neither too great or too small, can be enlarged or contracted in a\nregular, orderly way, without resorting to a revolution or to a\nplebiscitum.  Whatever political grievances there may be, there is\nalways present the sovereign convention competent to redress them.  The\nefficiency of power is thus secured without danger to liberty, and\nfreedom without danger to power.  The recognition of the convention,\nthe real political sovereign of the country and its separation from and\nindependence of the ordinary government, is one of the most striking\nfeatures of the American constitution.\n\nThe next thing to be noted, after the convention, is the constitution\nby the convention of the government.  This constitution, as Mr. Madison\nwell observes, divides the powers conceded by the convention to\ngovernment between the General Government and the particular State\ngovernments.  Strictly speaking, the government is one, and its powers\nonly are divided and exercised by two sets of agents or ministries.\nThis division of the powers of government could never have been\nestablished by the convention if the American people had not been\nprovidentially constituted one people, existing and acting through\nparticular State organizations.  Here the unwritten constitution, or\nthe constitution written in the people themselves, rendered practicable\nand dictated the written constitution, or constitution ordained by the\nconvention and engrossed on parchment.  It only expresses in the\ngovernment the fact which pre-existed in the national organization and\nlife.\n\nThis division of the powers of government is peculiar to the United\nStates, and is an effective safeguard against both feudal\ndisintegration and Roman centralism.  Misled by their prejudices and\npeculiar interests, a portion of the people of the United States,\npleading in their justification the theory of State sovereignty,\nattempted disintegration, secession, and national independence separate\nfrom that of the United States, but the central force of the\nconstitution was too strong for them to succeed.  The unity of the\nnation was too strong to be effectually broken.  No doubt the reaction\nagainst secession and disintegration will strengthen the tendency to\ncentralism, but centralism can succeed no better than disintegration\nhas succeeded because the General government has no subsistentia, no\nsuppositum, to borrow a theological term, outside or independent of the\nStates.  The particular governments are stronger, if there be any\ndifference, to protect the States against centralism than the General\ngovernment is to protect the Union against disintegration; and after\nswinging for a time too far toward one extreme and then too far toward\nthe other, the public mind will recover its equilibrium, and the\ngovernment move on in its constitutional path.\n\nRepublican Rome attempted to guard against excessive centralism by the\ntribunitial veto, or by the organization of a negative or obstructive\npower.  Mr. Calhoun thought this admirable, and wished to effect the\nsame end here, where it is secured by other, more effective, and less\nobjectionable means, by a State veto on the acts of Congress, by a dual\nexecutive, and by substituting concurrent for numerical majorities.\nImperial Rome gradually swept away the tribunitial veto, concentrated\nall power in the hands of the emperor, became completely centralized,\nand fell.  The British constitution seeks the same end by substituting\nestates for the state, and establishing a mixed government, in which\nmonarchy, aristocracy, and democracy temper, check, or balance each\nother; but practically the commons estate has become supreme, and the\nnobility govern not in the house of lords, and can really influence\npublic affairs only through the house of commons.  The principle of the\nBritish constitution is not the division of the powers of government,\nbut the antagonism of estates, or rather of interests, trusting to the\nobstructive influence of that antagonism to preserve the government\nfrom pure centralism.  Hence the study of the British statesman is to\nmanage diverse and antagonistic parties and interests so as to gain the\nability to act, which he can do only by intrigue, cajolery, bribery in\none form or another, and corruption of every sort.  The British\ngovernment cannot be carried on by fair, honest, and honorable means,\nany more than could the Roman under the antagonism created by the\ntribunitial veto.  The French tried the English system of organized\nantagonism in 1789, as a cure for the centralism introduced by\nRichelieu and Louis XIV., and again under the Restoration and Louis\nPhilippe, and called it the system of constitutional guarantees; but\nthey could never manage it, and they have taken refuge in unmitigated\ncentralism under Napoleon III., who, however well disposed, finds no\nmeans in the constitution of the French nation of tempering it.  The\nEnglish system, called the constitutional, and sometimes the\nparliamentary system, will not work in France, and indeed works really\nwell nowhere.\n\nThe American system, sometimes called the Federal system, is not\nfounded on antagonism of classes, estates, or interests, and is in no\nsense a system of checks and balances.  It needs and tolerates no\nobstructive forces.  It does not pit section against section, the\nStates severally against the General government, nor the General\ngovernment against the State governments, and nothing is more hurtful\nthan the attempt to explain it and work it on the principles of British\nconstitutionalism.  The convention created no antagonistic powers; it\nsimply divided the powers of government, and gave neither to the\nGeneral government nor to the State governments all the powers of\ngovernment, nor in any instance did it give to the two governments\njurisdiction in the same matters. Hence each has its own sphere, in\nwhich it can move on without colliding with that of the other.  Each is\nindependent and complete in relation to its own work, incomplete and\ndependent on the other for the complete work of government.\n\nThe division of power is not between a NATIONAL government and State\ngovernments, but between a GENERAL government and particular\ngovernments.  The General government, inasmuch as it extends to matters\ncommon to all the States, is usually called the Government of the\nUnited States, and sometimes the Federal government, to distinguish it\nfrom the particular or State governments, but without strict propriety;\nfor the government of the United States, or the Federal government,\nmeans, in strictness, both the General government and the particular\nGovernments, since neither is in itself the complete government of the\ncountry.  The General government has authority within each of the\nStates, and each of the State governments has authority in the Union.\nThe line between the Union and the States severally, is not precisely\nthe line between the General government and the particular governments.\nAs, for instance, the General government lays direct taxes on the\npeople of the States, and collects internal revenue within them; and\nthe citizens of a particular State, and none others, are electors of\nPresident and Vice-President of the United States, and representatives\nin the lower house of Congress, while senators in Congress are elected\nby the State legislatures themselves.\n\nThe line that distinguishes the two governments is that which\ndistinguishes the general relations and interests from the particular\nrelations and interests of the people of the United States.  These\ngeneral relations and interests are placed under the General\ngovernment, which, because its jurisdiction is coextensive with the\nUnion, is called the Government of the United States; the particular\nrelations and interests are placed under particular governments, which,\nbecause their jurisdiction is only coextensive, with the States\nrespectively, are called State governments.  The General government\ngoverns supremely all the people of the United States and Territories\nbelonging to the Union, in all their general relations and interests,\nor relations and interests common alike to them all; the particular or\nState government governs supremely the people of a particular State, as\nMassachusetts, New York, or New Jersey, in all that pertains to their\nparticular or private rights, relations, and interests.  The powers of\neach are equally sovereign, and neither are derived from the other.\nThe State governments are not subordinate to the General government,\nnor the General government to the State governments.  They are\nco-ordinate governments, each standing on the same level, and deriving\nits powers from the same sovereign authority.  In their respective\nspheres neither yields to the other.  In relation to the matters within\nits jurisdiction, each government is independent and supreme in regard\nof the other, and subject only to the convention.\n\nThe powers of the General government are the power--\n\nTo lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the\ndebts and provide for the general welfare of the United States; to\nborrow money on the credit of the United States; to regulate commerce\nwith foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian\ntribes; to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws\non the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States; to coin\nmoney and regulate the value thereof, and fix the standard of weights\nand measures; to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the\nsecurities and current coin of the United States; to establish\npost-offices and post-roads; to promote the progress of science and of\nthe useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors\nthe exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries; to\ndefine and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and\noffences against the law of nations; to declare war, grant letters of\nmarque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and\nwater; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to\nmake rules for the government of the land and naval forces; to provide\nfor calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union,\nsuppress insurrections, and repel invasions; to provide for organizing,\narming, and disciplining the militia, and of governing such part of\nthem as may be employed in the service of the United States; to\nexercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such\ndistrict, not exceeding ten miles square, as may by cession of\nparticular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of\nthe government of the United States, and to exercise a like authority\nover all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the\nState in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,\narsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings; and to make all laws\nwhich shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the\nforegoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in\nthe government of the United States, or in any department or office\nthereof.\n\nIn addition to these, the General government is clothed with the\ntreaty-making power, and the whole charge of the foreign relations of\nthe country; with power to admit new States into the Union; to dispose\nof and make all needful rules and regulations concerning the territory\nand all other property belonging to the United States; to declare, with\ncertain restrictions, the punishment of treason, the constitution\nitself defining what is treason against the United States; and to\npropose, or to call, on the application of the legislatures of\ntwo-thirds of all the states, a convention for proposing amendments to\nthis constitution; and is vested with supreme judicial power, original\nor appellate, in all cases of law and equity arising under this\nconstitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or to be\nmade under their authority, in all cases affecting ambassadors, other\npublic ministers, and consuls, in all cases of admiralty and maritime\njurisdiction, in all controversies to which the United States shall be\na party, all controversies between two or more States, between a State\nand citizens of another State, between citizens of different States,\nbetween citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of\ndifferent States, and between a State or the citizens thereof and\nforeign states, citizens, or subjects.\n\nThese, with what is incidental to them, and what is necessary and\nproper to carry them into effect, are all the positive powers with\nwhich the convention vests the General government, or government of the\nUnited States, as distinguished from the governments of the particular\nStates; and these, with the exception of what relates to the district\nin which it has its seat, and places of forts, magazines, &c., are of a\ngeneral nature, and restricted to the common relations and interests of\nthe people, or at least to interests and relations which extend beyond\nthe limits of a particular State.  They are all powers that regard\nmatters which extend beyond not only the individual citizen, but the\nindividual State, and affect alike the relations and interests of all\nthe States, or matters which cannot be disposed of by a State\ngovernment without the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction.\nThey give the government no jurisdiction of questions which affect\nindividuals or citizens only in their private and domestic relations\nwhich lie wholly within a particular State.  The General government\ndoes not legislate concerning private rights, whether of persons or\nthings, the tenure of real estate, marriage, dower, inheritance, wills,\nthe transferrence or transmission of property, real or personal; it can\ncharter no private corporations, out of the District of Columbia, for\nbusiness, literary, scientific, or eleemosynary purposes, establish no\nschools, found no colleges or universities, and promote science and the\nuseful arts only by securing to authors and inventors for a time the\nexclusive right to their writings and discoveries.  The United States\nBank was manifestly unconstitutional, as probably are the present\nso-called national banks.  The United States Bank was a private or\nparticular corporation, and the present national banks are only\ncorporations of the same sort, though organized under a general law.\nThe pretence that they are established to supply a national currency,\ndoes not save their constitutionality, for the convention has not given\nthe General government the power nor imposed on it the duty of\nfurnishing a national currency. To coin money, and regulate the value\nthereof, is something very different from authorizing private companies\nto issue bank notes, on the basis of the public stocks held as private\nproperty, or even on what is called a specie basis.  To claim the power\nunder the general welfare clause would be a simple mockery of good\nsense.  It is no more for the general welfare than any other successful\nprivate business.  The private welfare of each is, no doubt, for the\nwelfare of all, but not therefore is it the \"general welfare,\" for what\nis private, particular in its nature, is not and cannot be general.  To\nunderstand by general welfare that which is for the individual welfare\nof all or the greater number, would be to claim for the General\ngovernment all the powers of government, and to deny that very division\nof powers which is the crowning merit of the American system.  The\ngeneral welfare, by the very force of the words themselves, means the\ncommon as distinguished from the private or individual welfare.  The\nsystem of national banks may or may not be a good and desirable system,\nbut it is difficult to understand the constitutional power of the\nGeneral government to establish it.\n\nOn the ground that its powers are general, not particular, the General\ngovernment has no power to lay a protective tariff.  It can lay a\ntariff for revenue, not for protection of home manufactures or home\nindustry; for the interests fostered, even though indirectly\nadvantageous to the whole people, are in their nature private or\nparticular, not general interests, and chiefly interests of private\ncorporations and capitalists.  Their incidental or even consequential\neffects do not change their direct and essential nature.  So with\ndomestic slavery.  Slavery comes under the head of private rights,\nwhether regarded on the side of the master or on the side of the slave.\nThe right of a citizen to hold a slave, if a right at all, is the\nprivate right of property, and the right of the slave to his freedom is\na private and personal right, and neither is placed under the safeguard\nof the General government, which has nowhere, unless in the District of\nColumbia and the places over which it has exclusive legislative power\nin all cases whatsoever, either the right to establish it or to abolish\nit, except perhaps under the war power, as a military necessity, an\nindemnity for the past, or a security for the future.\n\nThis applies to what are called Territories as well as to the States.\nThe right of the government to govern the Territories in regard to\nprivate and particular rights and interests, is derived from no express\ngrant of power, and is held only ex necessitate--the United States\nowning the domain, and there being no other authority competent to\ngovern them.  But, as in the case of all powers held ex necessitate,\nthe power is restricted to the absolute necessity in the case.  What\nare called Territorial governments, to distinguish them from the State\ngovernments, are only provisional governments, and can touch private\nrights and interests no further than is necessary to preserve order and\nprepare the way for the organization and installation of a regular\nState government.  Till then the law governing private rights is the\nlaw that was in force, if any such there was, when the territory became\nby purchase, by conquest, or by treaty, attached to the domain of the\nUnited States.\n\nHence the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the ordinance of\n1787, prohibiting slavery in what was called the territory of the\nNorthwest, and the so-called Missouri Compromise, prohibiting slavery\nnorth of the parallel 36\u00b0 30'.  The Wilmot proviso was for the same\nreason unconstitutional.  The General government never had and has not\nany power to exclude slavery from the Territories, any more than to\nabolish it in the States. But slavery being a local institution,\nsustained neither by the law of nature nor the law of nations, no\ncitizen migrating from a slave State could carry his slaves with him,\nand hold them as slaves in the Territory.  Rights enacted by local law\nare rights only in that locality, and slaves carried by their masters\ninto a slave State even, are free, unless the State into which they are\ncarried enacts to the contrary.  The only persons that could be held as\nslaves in a Territory would be those who were slaves or the children of\nthose who were slaves in the Territory when it passed to the United\nStates.  The whole controversy on, slavery in the Territories, and\nwhich culminated in the civil war, was wholly unnecessary, and never\ncould have occurred had the constitution been properly understood and\nadhered to by both sides.  True, Congress could not exclude slavery\nfrom the Territory, but neither could citizens migrating to them hold\nslaves in them; and so really slavery was virtually excluded, for the\ninhabitants in nearly all of them, not emigrants from the States after\nthe cession to the United States, were too few to be counted.\n\nThe General government has power to establish a uniform rule of\nnaturalization, to which all the States must conform, and it was very\nproper that it should have this power, so as to prevent one State from\ngaining by its naturalization laws an undue advantage over another; but\nthe General government has itself no power to naturalize a single\nforeigner, or in any case to say who shall or who shall not be\ncitizens, either of a State or of the United States, or to declare who\nmay or may not be electors even of its own officers.  The convention\nordains that members of the house of representatives shall be chosen by\nelectors who have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most\nnumerous branch of the State legislature, but the State determines\nthese qualifications, and who do or do not possess them; that the\nsenators shall be chosen by the State legislatures, and that the\nelectors of President and Vice-President shall be appointed in such\nmanner as the respective State legislatures may direct.  The whole\nquestion of citizenship, what shall or shall not be the qualifications\nof electors, who shall or shall not be freemen, is reserved to the\nStates, as coming under the head of personal or private rights and\nfranchises.  In practice, the exact line of demarcation may not always\nhave been strictly observed either by the General government or by the\nState governments; but a careful study of the constitution cannot fail\nto show that the division of powers is the division or distinction\nbetween the public and general relations and interests, rights and\nduties of the people, and their private and particular relations and\ninterests, rights and duties.  As these two classes of relations and\ninterests, rights and duties, though distinguishable, are really\ninseparable in nature, it follows that the two governments are\nessential to the existence of a complete government, or to the\nexistence of a real government in its plenitude and integrity.  Left to\neither alone, the people would have only an incomplete, an initial, or\ninchoate government.  The General government is the complement of the\nState governments, and the State governments are the complement of the\nGeneral government.\n\nThe consideration of the powers denied by the convention to the General\ngovernment and to the State governments respectively, will lead to the\nsame conclusion.  To the General government is denied expressly or by\nnecessary implication all jurisdiction in matters of private rights and\ninterests, and to the State government is denied all jurisdiction in\nright, or interests which extend, as has been said, beyond the\nboundaries of the State.  \"No State shall enter into any treaty,\nalliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin\nmoney, emit bills of credit, make any thing but gold and silver coin a\ntender in the payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post\nfacto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any\ntitle of nobility.  No State shall, without the consent of Congress,\nlay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be\nabsolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws and the net\nproduce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports and\nexports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and\nall such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress.\nNo State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of\ntonnage, keep troops or ships-of-war in time of peace, enter into any\nagreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or\nengage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as\nwill not admit of delay.\"\n\nThe powers denied to the States in some matters which are rather\nprivate and particular, such as bills of attainder, ex post facto laws,\nlaws impairing the obligation of contracts, granting titles of\nnobility, are denied equally to the General government. There is\nevidently a profound logic in the constitution, and there is not a\nsingle provision in it that is arbitrary, or anomalous, or that does\nnot harmonize dialectically with the whole, and with the real\nconstitution of the American people.  At first sight the reservation to\nthe State of the appointment of the officers of the militia might seem\nan anomaly; but as the whole subject of internal police belongs to the\nState, it should have some military force at its command.  The subject\nof bankruptcies, also, might seem to be more properly within the\nprovince of the State, and so it would be if commerce between the\nseveral States had not been placed under Congress, or if trade were\nconfined to the citizens of the State and within its boundaries; but as\nsuch is not the case, it was necessary to place it under the General\ngovernment, in order that laws on the subject might be uniform\nthroughout the Union, and that the citizens of all the States, and\nforeigners trading with them, should be placed on an equal footing, and\nhave the same remedies. The subject follows naturally in the train of\ncommerce, for bankruptcies, as understood at the time, were confined to\nthe mercantile class, bankers, and brokers; and since the regulation of\ncommerce, foreign and inter-state, was to be placed under the sole\ncharge of the General government, it was necessary that bankruptcy\nshould be included.  The subject of patents is placed under the General\ngovernment, though the patent is a private right, because it was the\nwill of the convention that the patent should be good in all the\nStates, as affording more encouragement to science and the useful arts\nthan if good only within a single State, or if the power were left to\neach State to recognize or not patents granted by another.  The right\ncreated, though private in its nature, is Yet general or common to all\nthe States in its enjoyment or exercise.\n\nThe division of the powers of government between a General government\nand particular governments, rendered possible and practicable by the\noriginal constitution of the people themselves, as one people existing\nand acting through State organizations, is the American method of\nguarding against the undue centralism to which Roman imperialism\ninevitably tends; and it is far simpler and more effective than any of\nthe European systems of mixed governments, which seek their end by\norganizing an antagonism of interests or classes.  The American method\ndemands no such antagonism, no neutralizing of one social force by\nanother, but avails itself of all the forces of society, organizes them\ndialectically, not antagonistically, and thus protects with, equal\nefficiency both public authority and private rights.  The General\ngovernment can never oppress the people as individuals, or abridge\ntheir private rights or personal freedom and independence, because\nthese are not within its jurisdiction, but are placed in charge, within\neach State, of the State government, which, within its sphere, governs\nas supremely as the General government: the State governments cannot\nweaken the public authority of the nation or oppress the people in\ntheir general rights and interests, for these are withdrawn from State\njurisdiction, and placed under charge of a General government, which,\nin its sphere, governs as supremely as the State government.  There is\nno resort to a system of checks and balances; there is no restraint on\npower, and no systematic distrust of power, but simply a division of\npowers between two co-ordinate governments, distinct but inseparable,\nmoving in distinct spheres, but in the same direction, or to a common\nend. The system is no invention of man, is no creation of the\nconvention, but is given us by Providence in the living constitution of\nthe American people.  The merit of the statesmen of 1787 is that they\ndid not destroy or deface the work of Providence, but accepted it, and\norganized the government in harmony with the real orders the real\nelements given them.  They suffered themselves in all their positive\nsubstantial work to be governed by reality, not by theories and\nspeculations.  In this they proved themselves statesmen, and their work\nsurvives; and the republic, laugh as sciolists may, is, for the present\nand future, the model republic--as much so as was Rome in her day; and\nit is not simply national pride nor American self-conceit that\npronounces its establishment the beginning of a new and more advanced\norder of civilization; such is really the fact.\n\nThe only apparently weak point in the system is in the particular\nStates themselves.  Feudalism protected the feudal aristocracy\neffectively for a time against both the king and the people, but left\nthe king and the people without protection against the aristocracy, and\nhence it fell.  It was not adequate to the wants of civil society, did\nnot harmonize all social elements, and protect all social and\nindividual rights and interests, and therefore could not but fail.  The\nGeneral government takes care of public authority and rights; the State\nprotects private rights and personal freedom as against the General\ngovernment: but what protects the citizens in their private rights,\ntheir personal freedom and independence, against the particular State\ngovernment?  Universal suffrage, answers the democrat.  Armed with the\nballot, more powerful than the sword, each citizen is able to protect\nhimself.  But this is theory, not reality.  If it were true, the\ndivision of the powers of government between two co-ordinate,\ngovernments would be of no practical importance.  Experience does not\nsustain the theory, and the power of the ballot to protect the\nindividual may be rendered ineffective by the tyranny of party.\nExperience proves that the ballot is far less effective in securing the\nfreedom and independence of the individual citizen than is commonly\npretended.  The ballot of an isolated individual counts for nothing.\nThe individual, though armed with the ballot, is as powerless, if he\nstands alone, as if he had it not.  To render it of any avail he must\nassociate himself with a party, and look for his success in the success\nof his party; and to secure the success of his party, he must give up\nto it his own private convictions and free will.  In practice,\nindividuals are nothing individually, and parties are every thing.\nEven the suppression of the late rebellion, and the support of the\nAdministration in doing it, was made a party question, and the\ngovernment found the leaders of the party opposed to the Republican\nparty an obstacle hardly less difficult to surmount than the chiefs of\nthe armies of the so-called Confederate States.\n\nParties are formed, one hardly knows how, and controlled, no one knows\nby whom; but usually by demagogues, men who have some private or\npersonal purposes, for which they wish, through party to use the\ngovernment.  Parties have no conscience, no responsibility, and their\nvery reason of being is, the usurpation and concentration of power.\nThe real practical tendency of universal suffrage is to democratic,\ninstead of an imperial, centralism.  What is to guard against this\ncentralism? Not universal suffrage, for that tends to create it; and if\nthe government is left to it, the government becomes practically the\nwill of an ever shifting and irresponsible majority.  Is the remedy in\nwritten or paper constitutions?  Party can break through them, and by\nmaking the judges elective by party, for short terms, and re-eligible,\ncan do so with impunity.  In several of the States, the dominant\nmajority have gained the power to govern at will, without any let or\nhindrance.  Besides, constitutions can be altered, and have been\naltered, very nearly at the will of the majority.  No mere paper\nconstitutions are any protection against the usurpations of party, for\nparty will always grasp all the power it can.\n\nYet the evil is not so great as it seems, for in most of the States the\nprinciple of division of powers is carried into the bosom of the State\nitself; in some States further than in others, but in all it obtains to\nsome extent.  In what are called the New England States, the best\ngoverned portion of the Union, each town is a corporation, having\nimportant powers and the charge of all purely local matters--chooses\nits own officers, manages its own finances, takes charge of its own\npoor, of its own roads and bridges, and of the education of its own\nchildren.  Between these corporations and the State government are the\ncounties, that take charge of another class of interests, more general\nthan those under the charge of the town, but less general than those of\nthe State.  In the great central and Northwestern States the same\nsystem obtains, though less completely carried out.  In the Southern\nand Southwestern States, the town corporations hardly exist, and the\nrights and interests of the poorer classes of persons have been less\nwell protected in them than in the Northern and Eastern States.  But\nwith the abolition of slavery, and the lessening of the influence of\nthe wealthy slaveholding class, with the return of peace and the\nrevival of agricultural, industrial, and commercial prosperity, the New\nEngland system, in its main features, is pretty sure to be gradually\nintroduced, or developed, and the division of powers in the State to be\nas effectively and as systematically carried out as it is between the\nGeneral government and the particular or State governments. So, though\nuniversal suffrage, good as far as it goes, is not alone sufficient,\nthe division of powers affords with it a not inadequate protection.\n\nNo government, whose workings are intrusted to men, ever is or can be\npractically perfect--secure all good, and guard against all evil.  In\nall human governments there will be defects and abuses, and he is no\nwise man who expects perfection from imperfection.  But the American\nconstitution, taken as a whole, and in all its parts, is the least\nimperfect that has ever existed, and under it individual rights,\npersonal freedom and independence, as well as public authority or\nsociety, are better protected than under any other; and as the few\nbarbaric elements retained from the feudal ages are eliminated, the\nstandard of education elevated, and the whole population Americanized,\nmoulded by and to the American system, it will be found to effect all\nthe good, with as little of the evil, as can be reasonably expected\nfrom any possible civil government or political constitution of society.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nSECESSION.\n\n\nThe doctrine that a State has a right to secede and carry with it its\npopulation and domain, has been effectually put down, and the unity and\nintegrity of the United States as a sovereign nation have been\neffectively asserted on the battle-field; but the secessionists, though\ndisposed to submit to superior force, and demean themselves henceforth\nas loyal citizens, most likely hold as firmly to the doctrine as before\nfinding themselves unable to reduce it to practice, and the Union\nvictory will remain incomplete till they are convinced in their\nunderstandings that the Union has the better reason as well as the\nsuperior military resources.  The nation has conquered their bodies,\nbut it is hardly less important for our statesmen to conquer their\nminds and win their hearts.\n\nThe right of secession is not claimed as a revolutionary right, or even\nas a conventional right.  The secessionists disclaim revolutionary\nprinciples, and hold that the right of secession is anterior to the\nconvention, a right which the convention could neither give, nor take\naway, because inherent in the very conception of a sovereign State.\nSecession is simply the repeal by the State of the act of accession to\nthe Union; and as that act was a free, voluntary act of the State, she\nmust always be free to repeal it.  The Union is a copartnership; a\nState in the Union is simply a member of the firm, and has the right to\nwithdraw when it judges it for its interest to do so.  There is no\npower in a firm to compel a copartner to remain a member any longer\nthan be pleases.  He is undoubtedly holden for the obligations\ncontracted by the firm while he remains a member; but for none\ncontracted after he has withdrawn and given due notice thereof.\n\nSo of a sovereign State in the Union.  The Union itself, apart from the\nsovereign States that compose it, is a mere abstraction, a nullity, and\nbinds nobody.  All its substance and vitality are in the agreement by\nwhich the States constitute themselves a firm or copartnership, for\ncertain specific purposes, and for which they open an office and\nestablish an agency under express instructions for the management of\nthe general affairs of the firm.  The State is held jointly and\nseverally for all the legal obligations of the Union, contracted while\nshe is in it but no further; and is free to withdraw when she pleases,\nprecisely as an individual may withdraw from an ordinary business firm.\nThe remaining copartners have no right of compulsion or coercion\nagainst the seceding member, for he, saving the obligations already\ncontracted, is as free to withdraw as they are to remain.\n\nThe population is fixed to the domain and goes with it; the domain is\nattached to the State, and secedes in the secession of the State.\nSecession, then, carries the entire State government, people, and\ndomain out of the Union, and restores ipso facto the State to its\noriginal position of a sovereign State, foreign to the United States.\nBeing an independent sovereign State, she may enter into a new\nconfederacy, form a new copartnership, or merge herself in some other\nforeign state, as she judges proper or finds opportunity.  The States\nthat seceded formed among themselves a new confederacy, more to their\nmind than the one formed in 1787, as they had a perfect right to do,\nand in the war just ended they were not rebels nor revolutionists, but\na people fighting for the right of self-government, loyal citizens and\ntrue patriots defending the independence and inviolability of their\ncountry against foreign invaders.  They are to be honored for their\nloyalty and patriotism, and not branded as rebels and punished as\ntraitors.\n\nThis is the secession argument, which rests on no assumption of\nrevolutionary principles or abstract rights of man, and on no\nallegation of real or imaginary wrongs received from the Union, but\nsimply on the original and inherent rights of the several States as\nindependent sovereign States.  The argument is conclusive, and the\ndefence complete, if the Union is only a firm or copartnership, and the\nsovereignty vests in the States severally.  The refutation of the\nsecessionists is in the facts adduced that disprove the theory of State\nsovereignty, and prove that the sovereignty vests not in the States\nseverally, but in the States united, or that the Union is sovereign,\nand not the States individually.  The Union is not a firm, a\ncopartnership, nor an artificial or conventional union, but a real,\nliving, constitutional union, founded in the original and indissoluble\nunity of the American people, as one sovereign people.  There is,\nindeed, no such people, if we abstract the States, but there are no\nStates if we abstract this sovereign people or the Union. There is no\nUnion without the States, and there are no States without the Union.\nThe people are born States, and the States are born United States.  The\nUnion and the States are simultaneous, born together, and enter alike\ninto the original and essential constitution of the American state.\nThis the facts and reasonings adduced fully establish.\n\nBut this one sovereign people that exists only as organized into\nStates, does not necessarily include the whole population or territory\nincluded within the jurisdiction of the United States. It is restricted\nto the people and territory or domain organized into States in the\nUnion, as in ancient Rome the ruling people were restricted to the\ntenants of the sacred territory, which had been surveyed, and its\nboundaries marked by the god Terminus, and which by no means included\nall the territory held by the city, and of which she was both the\nprivate proprietor and the public sovereign.  The city had vast\npossessions acquired by confiscation, by purchase, by treaty, or by\nconquest, and in reference to which her celebrated agrarian laws were\nenacted, and which have their counterpart in our homestead and kindred\nlaws. In this class of territory, of which the city was the private\nowner, was the territory of all the Roman provinces, which was held to\nbe only leased to its occupants, who were often dispossessed, and their\nlands given as a recompense by the consul or imperator to his disbanded\nlegionaries.  The provincials were subjects of Rome, but formed no part\nof the Roman people, and had no share in the political power of the\nstate, till at a late period the privileges of Roman citizens were\nextended to them, and the Roman people became coextensive with the\nRoman empire. So the United States have held and still hold large\nterritorial possessions, acquired by the acknowledgment of their\nindependence by Great Britain, the former sovereign, the cession of\nparticular states, and purchase from France, Spain, and Mexico.  Till\nerected into States and admitted into the Union, this territory, with\nits population, though subject to the United States, makes no part of\nthe political or sovereign territory and people of the United States.\nIt is under the Union, not in it, as is indicated by the phrase\nadmitting into the Union--a legal phrase, since the constitution\nordains that \"new States may be admitted by the Congress into this\nUnion.\"\n\nThere can be no secession that separates a State from the national\ndomain, and withdraws it from the territorial sovereignty or\njurisdiction of the United States; yet what hinders a State from going\nout of the Union in the sense that it comes into it, and thus ceasing\nto belong to the political people of the United States?\n\nIf the view of the constitution taken in the preceding chapters be\ncorrect, and certainly no facts tend to disprove it, the accession of a\nTerritory as a State in the Union is a free act of the territorial\npeople.  The Territory cannot organize and apply for admission as a\nState, without what is called an \"enabling act\" of Congress or its\nequivalent; but that act is permissive, not mandatory, and nothing\nobliges the Territory to organize under it and apply for admission.  It\nmay do so or not, as it chooses. What, then, hinders the State once in\nthe Union from going out or returning to its former condition of\nterritory subject to the Union?  The original States did not need to\ncome in under an enabling act, for they were born States in the Union,\nand were never territory outside of the Union and subject to it.  But\nthey and the new States, adopted or naturalized States, once in the\nUnion, stand on a footing of perfect equality, and the original States\nare no more and no less bound than they to remain States in the Union.\nThe ratification of the constitution by the original States was a free\nact, as much so as the accession of a new State formed from territory\nsubject to the Union is a free act, and a free act is an act which one\nis free to do or not to do, as he pleases.  What a State is free to do\nor not to do, it is free to undo, if it chooses.  There is nothing in\neither the State constitution or in that of the United States that\nforbids it.\n\nThis is denied.  The population and domain are inseparable in the\nState; and if the State could take itself out of the Union, it would\ntake them out, and be ipso facto a sovereign State foreign to the\nUnion.  It would take the domain and the population out of the Union,\nit is conceded and even maintained, but not therefore would it take\nthem out of the jurisdiction of the Union, or would they exist as a\nState foreign to the Union; for population and territory may coexist,\nas Dacota, Colorado, or New Mexico, out of the Union, and yet be\nsubject to the Union, or within the jurisdiction of the United States.\n\nBut the Union is formed by the surrender by each of the States of its\nindividual sovereignty, and each State by its admission into the Union\nsurrenders its individual sovereignty, or binds itself by a\nconstitutional compact to merge its individual sovereignty in that of\nthe whole.  It then cannot cease to be a State in the Union without\nbreach of contract.  Having surrendered its sovereignty to the Union,\nor bound itself by the constitution to exercise its original\nsovereignty only as one of the United States, it can unmake itself of\nits state character, only by consent of the United States, or by a\nsuccessful revolution.  It is by virtue of this fact that secession is\nrebellion against the United States, and that the General government,\nas representing the Union, has the right and the duty to suppress it by\nall the forces at its command.\n\nThere can be no rebellion where there is no allegiance.  The States in\nthe Union cannot owe allegiance to the Union, for they are it, and for\nany one to go out of it is no more an act of rebellion than it is for a\nking to abdicate his throne.  The Union is not formed by the surrender\nto it by the several States of their respective individual sovereignty.\nSuch surrender could, as we have seen, form only an alliance, or a\nconfederation, not one sovereign people; and from an alliance, or\nconfederation, the ally or confederate has, saving its faith, the\ninherent right to secede.  The argument assumes that the States were\noriginally each in its individuality a sovereign state, but by the\nconvention which framed the constitution, each surrendered its\nsovereignty to the whole, and thus several sovereign states became one\nsovereign political people, governing in general matters through the\nGeneral government, and in particular matters through particular or\nState governments.  This is Mr. Madison's theory, and also Mr.\nWebster's; but it has been refuted in the refutation of the theory that\nmakes government originate in compact.  A sovereign state can,\nundoubtedly, surrender its sovereignty, but can surrender it only to\nsomething or somebody that really exists; for to Surrender to no one or\nto nothing is, as has been shown, the same thing as not to surrender at\nall; and the Union, being formed only by the surrender, is nothing\nprior to it, or till after it is made, and therefore can be no\nrecipient of the surrender.\n\nBesides, the theory is the reverse of the fact.  The State does not\nsurrender or part with its sovereignty by coming into the Union, but\nacquires by it all the rights it holds as a State. Between the original\nStates and the new States there is a difference of mode by which they\nbecome States in the Union, but none in their powers, or the tenure by\nwhich they hold them.  The process by which new States are actually\nformed and admitted into the Union, discloses at once what it is that\nis gained or lost by admission.  The domain and population, before the\norganization of the Territory into one of the United States, are\nsubject to the United States, inseparably attached to the domain of the\nUnion, and under its sovereignty.  The Territory so remains, organized\nor unorganized, under a Territorial Government created by Congress.\nCongress, by an enabling act, permits it to organize as a State, to\ncall a convention to form a State constitution, to elect under it, in\nsuch way as the convention ordains, State officers, a State\nlegislature, and, in the way prescribed by the Constitution of the\nUnited States, senators and representatives in Congress.  Here is a\ncomplete organization as a State, yet, though called a State, it is no\nState at all, and is simply territory, without a single particle of\npolitical power.  To be a State it must be recognized and admitted by\nCongress as a State in the Union, and when so recognized and admitted\nit possesses, in union with the other United States, supreme political\nsovereignty, jointly in all general matters, and individually in all\nprivate and particular matters.\n\nThe Territory gives up no sovereign powers by coming into the Union,\nfor before it came into the Union it had no sovereignty, no political\nrights at all.  All the rights and powers it holds are held by the\nsimple fact that it has become a State in the Union.  This is as true\nof the original States as of the new States; for it has been shown in\nthe chapter on The United States, that the original British sovereignty\nunder which the colonies were organized and existed passed, on the fact\nof independence, to the States United, and not to the States severally.\nHence if nine States had ratified the constitution, and the other four\nhad stood out, and refused to do it, which was within their competency,\nthey would not have been independent sovereign States, outside of the\nUnion, but Territories under the Union.\n\nTexas forms the only exception to the rule that the States have never\nbeen independent of the Union.  All the other new States have been\nformed from territory subject to the Union.  This is true of all the\nStates formed out of the Territory of the Northwest, and out of the\ndomain ceded by France, Spain, and Mexico to the United States.  All\nthese cessions were held by the United States as territory immediately\nsubject to the Union, before being erected into States; and by far the\nlarger part is so held even yet.  But Texas was an independent foreign\nstate, and was annexed as a State without having been first subjected\nas territory to the United States.  It of course lost by annexation its\nseparate sovereignty.  But this annexation was held by many to be\nunconstitutional; it was made when the State sovereignty theory had\ngained possession of the Government, and was annexed as a State instead\nof being admitted as a State formed from territory belonging to the\nUnited States, for the very purpose of committing the nation to that\ntheory.  Its annexation was the prologue, as the Mexican war was the\nfirst act in the secession drama, and as the epilogue is the\nsuppression of the rebellion on Texan soil.  Texas is an exceptional\ncase, and forms no precedent, and cannot be adduced as invalidating the\ngeneral rule.  Omitting Texas, the simple fact is, the States acquire\nall their sovereign powers by being States in the Union, instead of\nlosing or surrendering them.\n\nOur American statesmen have overlooked or not duly weighed the facts in\nthe case, because, holding the origin of government in compact, they\nfelt no need of looking back of the constitution to find the basis of\nthat unity of the American people which they assert.  Neither Mr.\nMadison nor Mr. Webster felt any difficulty in asserting it as created\nby the convention of 1787, or in conceding the sovereignty of the\nStates prior to the Union, and denying its existence after the\nratification of the constitution. If it were not that they held that\nthe State originates in convention or the social compact, there would\nbe unpardonable presumption on the part of the present writer in\nventuring to hazard an assertion contrary to theirs.  But, if their\ntheory was unsound, their practical doctrine was not; for they\nmaintained that the American people are one sovereign people, and Mr.\nQuincy Adams, an authority inferior to neither, maintained that they\nwere always one people, and that the States hold from the Union, not\nthe Union from the States.  The States without the Union cease to exist\nas political communities: the Union without the States ceases to be a\nUnion, and becomes a vast centralized and consolidated state, ready to\nlapse from a civilized into a barbaric, from a republican to a despotic\nnation.\n\nThe State, under the American system, as distinguished from Territory,\nis not in the domain and population fixed to it, nor yet in its\nexterior organization, but solely in the political powers, rights, and\nfranchises which it holds from the United States, or as one of the\nUnited States.  As these are rights, not obligations, the State may\nresign or abdicate them and cease to be a State, on the same principle\nthat any man may abdicate or forego his rights.  In doing so, the State\nbreaks no oath of allegiance, fails to fulfil no obligation she\ncontracted as a State: she simply forgoes her political rights and\nfranchises. So far, then, secession is possible, feasible, and not\nunconstitutional or unlawful.  But it is, as Mr. Sumner and others have\nmaintained, simply State suicide.  Nothing hinders a State from\ncommitting suicide, if she chooses, any more than there was something\nwhich compelled the Territory to become a State in the Union against\nits will.\n\nIt is objected to, this conclusion that the States were, prior to the\nUnion, independent sovereign States, and secession would not destroy\nthe State, but restore it to its original sovereignty and independence,\nas the secessionists maintain.  Certainly, if the States were, Prior to\nthe Union, sovereign States; but this is precisely what has been denied\nand disproved; for prior to the Union there were no States.  Secession\nrestores, or reduces, rather, the State to the condition it was in\nbefore its admission into the Union; but that condition is that of\nTerritory, or a Territory subject to the United States, and not that of\nan independent sovereign state.  The State holds all its political\nrights and powers in the Union from the Union, and has none out of it,\nor in the condition in which its population and domain were before\nbeing a State in the Union.\n\nState suicide, it has been urged, releases its population and territory\nfrom their allegiance to the Union, and as there is no rebellion where\nthere is no allegiance, resistance by its population and territory to\nthe Union, even war against the Union, would not be rebellion, but the\nsimple assertion of popular sovereignty.  This is only the same\nobjection in another form.  The lapse of the State releases the\npopulation and territory from no allegiance to the Union; for their\nallegiance to the Union was not contracted by their becoming a State,\nand they have never in their State character owed allegiance to the\nUnited States.  A State owes no allegiance to the United States, for it\nis one of them, and is jointly sovereign.  The relation between the\nUnited States and the State is not the relation of suzerain and\nliegeman or vassal.  A State owes no allegiance, for it is not subject\nto the Union; it is never in their State capacity that its population\nand territory do or can rebel. Hence, the Government has steadily\ndenied that, in the late rebellion, any State as such rebelled.\n\nBut as a State cannot rebel, no State can go out of the Union; and\ntherefore no State in the late rebellion has seceded, and the States\nthat passed secession ordinances are and all along have been States in\nthe Union.  No State can rebel, but it does not follow therefrom that\nno State can secede or cease to exist as a State: it only follows that\nsecession, in the sense of State suicide, or the abdication by the\nState of its political rights and powers, is not rebellion.  Nor does\nit follow from the fact that no State has rebelled, that no State has\nceased to be a State; or that the States that passed secession\nordinances have been all along States in the Union.\n\nThe secession ordinances were illegal, unconstitutional, not within the\ncompetency of the State, and therefore null and void from the\nbeginning.  Unconstitutional, illegal, and not within the competency of\nthe State, so far as intended to alienate any portion of the national\ndomain and population thereto annexed, they certainly were, and so far\nwere void and of no effect; but so far as intended to take the State\nsimply as a State out of the Union, they were within the competency of\nthe State, were not illegal or unconstitutional, and therefore not null\nand void. Acts unconstitutional in some parts and constitutional in\nothers are not wholly void.  The unconstitutionality vitiates only the\nunconstitutional parts; the others are valid, are law, and recognized\nand enforced as such by the courts.\n\nThe secession ordinances are void, because they were never passed by\nthe people of the State, but by a faction that overawed them and\nusurped the authority of the State.  This argument implies that, if a\nsecession ordinance is passed by the people proper of the State, it is\nvalid; which is more than they who urge it against the State suicide\ndoctrine are prepared to concede.  But the secession ordinances were in\nevery instance passed by the people of the State in convention legally\nassembled, therefore by them in their highest State capacity--in the\nsame capacity in which they ordain and ratify the State constitution\nitself; and in nearly all the States they were in addition ratified and\nconfirmed, if the facts have been correctly reported, by a genuine\nplebiscitum, or direct vote of the people.  In all cases they were\nadopted by a decided majority of the political people of the State, and\nafter their adoption they were acquiesced in and indeed actively\nsupported by very nearly the whole people. The people of the States\nadopting the secession ordinances were far more unanimous in supporting\nsecession than the people of the other States were in sustaining the\nGovernment in its efforts to suppress the rebellion by coercive\nmeasures.  It will not do, then, to ascribe the secession ordinances to\na faction.  The people are never a faction, nor is a faction ever the\nmajority.\n\nThere has been a disposition at the North, encouraged by the few Union\nmen at the South, to regard secession as the work of a few ambitious\nand unprincipled leaders, who, by their threats, their violence, and\ntheir overbearing manner, forced the mass of the people of their\nrespective States into secession against their convictions and their\nwill.  No doubt there were leaders at the South, as there are in every\ngreat movement at the North; no doubt there were individuals in the\nseceding States that held secession wrong in principle, and were\nconscientiously attached to the Union; no doubt, also, there were men\nwho adhered to the Union, not because they disapproved secession, but\nbecause they disliked the men at the head of the movement, or because\nthey were keen-sighted enough to see that it could not succeed, that\nthe Union must be the winning side, and that by adhering to it they\nwould become the great and leading men of their respective States,\nwhich they certainly could not be under secession. Others sympathized\nfully with what was called the Southern cause, held firmly the right of\nsecession, and hated cordially the Yankees, but doubted either the\npracticability or the expediency of secession, and opposed it till\nresolved on, but, after it was resolved on, yielded to none in their\nearnest support of it. These last comprised the immense majority of\nthose who voted against secession.  Never could those called the\nSouthern leaders have carried the secession ordinances, never could\nthey have carried on the war with the vigor and determination, and with\nsuch formidable armies as they collected and armed for four years,\nmaking at times the destiny of the Union well nigh doubtful, if they\nhad not had the Southern heart with them, if they had not been most\nheartily supported by the overwhelming mass of the people.  They led a\npopular, not a factious movement.\n\nNo State, it is said again, has seceded, or could secede.  The State is\nterritorial, not personal, and as no State can carry its territory and\npopulation out of the Union, no State can secede. Out of the\njurisdiction of the Union, or alienate them from the sovereign or\nnational domain, very true; but out of the Union as a State, with\nrights, powers, or franchises in the Union, not true.  Secession is\npolitical, not territorial.\n\nBut the State holds from the territory or domain.  The people are\nsovereign because attached to a sovereign territory, not the domain\nbecause held by a sovereign people, as was established by the analysis\nof the early Roman constitution.  The territory of the States\ncorresponds to the sacred territory of Rome, to which was attached the\nRoman sovereignty.  That territory, once surveyed and consecrated,\nremained sacred and the ruling territory, and could not be divested of\nits sacred and governing character.  The portions of the territory of\nthe United States once erected into States and consecrated as ruling\nterritory can never be deprived, except by foreign conquest or\nsuccessful revolution, of its sacred character and inviolable rights.\n\nThe State is territorial, not personal, and is constituted by public,\nnot by private wealth, and is always respublica or commonwealth, in\ndistinction from despotism or monarchy in its oriental sense, which is\nfounded on private wealth, or which assumes that the authority to\ngovern, or sovereignty, is the private estate of the sovereign.  All\npower is a domain, but there is no domain without a dominus or lord.\nIn oriental monarchies the dominus is the monarch; in republics it is\nthe public or people fixed to the soil or territory, that is, the\npeople in their territorial, and not in their personal or genealogical\nrelation.  The people of The United States are sovereign only within\nthe territory or domain of the United States, and their sovereignty is\na state, because fixed, attached, or limited to that specific\nterritory.  It is fixed to the soil, not nomadic.  In barbaric nations\npower is nomadic and personal, or genealogical, confined to no\nlocality, but attaches to the chief, and follows wherever he goes.  The\nGothic chiefs hold their power by a personal title, and have the same\nauthority in their tribes on the Po or the Rhone as on the banks of the\nElbe or the Danube.  Power migrates with the chief and his people, and\nmay be exercised wherever he and they find themselves, as a Swedish\nqueen held when she ordered the execution of one of her subjects at\nParis, without asking permission of the territorial lord.  In these\nnations, power is a personal right, or a private estate, not a state\nwhich exists only as attached to the domain, and, as attached to the\ndomain, exists independently of the chief or the government.  The\ndistinction is between public domain and private domain.\n\nThe American system is republican, and, contrary to what some\ndemocratic politicians assert, the American democracy is territorial,\nnot personal; not territorial because the majority of the people are\nagriculturists or landholders, but because all political rights,\npowers, or franchises are territorial.  The sovereign people of the\nUnited States are sovereign only within the territory of the United\nStates.  The great body of the freemen have the elective franchise, but\nno one has it save in his State, his county, his town, his ward, his\nprecinct.  Out of the election district in which he is domiciled, a\ncitizen of the United States has no more right to vote than has the\ncitizen or subject of a foreign state.  This explains what is meant by\nthe attachment of power to the territory, and the dependence of the\nstate on the domain.  The state, in republican states, exists only as\ninseparably united with the public domain; under feudalism, power was\njoined to territory or domain, but the domain was held as a private,\nnot as a public domain.  All sovereignty rests on domain or\nproprietorship, and is dominion. The proprietor is the dominus or lord,\nand in republican states the lord is society, or the public, and the\ndomain is held for the common or public good of all.  All political\nrights are held from society, or the dominus, and therefore it is the\nelective franchise is held from society, and is a civil right, as\ndistinguished from a natural, or even a purely personal right.\n\nAs there is no domain without a lord or dominus, territory alone cannot\npossess any political rights or franchises, for it is not a domain.  In\nthe American system, the dominus or lord is not the particular State,\nbut the United States, and, the domain of the whole territory, whether\nerected into particular States or not, is in the United States alone.\nThe United States do not part with the dominion of that portion of the\nnational domain included within a particular State.  The State holds\nthe domain not separately but jointly, as inseparably one of the United\nStates: separated, it has no dominion, is no State, and is no longer a\njoint sovereign at all, and the territory that it included falls into\nthe condition of any other territory held by the United States not\nerected into one of the United States.\n\nLawyers, indeed, tell us that the eminent domain is in the particular\nState, and that all escheats are to the State, not to the United\nStates.  All escheats of private estates, but no public or general\nescheats.  But this has nothing to do with the public domain.  The\nUnited States are the dominus, but they have, by the constitution,\ndivided the powers of government between a General government and\nparticular State governments, and ordained that all matters of a\ngeneral nature, common to all the States, should be placed under the\nsupreme control of the former, and all matters of a private or\nparticular character under the supreme control of the latter.  The\neminent domain of private estates is in the particular State, but the\nsovereign authority in the particular State is that of the United\nStates expressing itself through the State government.  The United\nStates, in the States as well as out of them, is the dominus, as the\nStates respectively would soon find if they were to undertake to\nalienate any part of their domain to a foreign power, or even to the\ncitizens or subjects of a foreign State, as is also evident from the\nfact that the United States, in the way prescribed by the constitution,\nmay enlarge or contract at will the rights and powers of the States.\nThe mistake on this point grows out of the habit of restricting the\naction of the United States to the General government, and not\nrecollecting that the United States govern one class of subjects\nthrough the General government and another class through State\ngovernments, but that it is one and the same authority that governs in\nboth.\n\nThe analogy borrowed from the Roman constitution, as far as applicable,\nproves the reverse of what is intended.  The dominus of the sacred\nterritory was the city, or the Roman state, not the sacred territory\nitself.  The territory received the tenant, and gave him as tenant the\nright to a seat in the senate; but the right of the territory was\nderived not from the domain, but from the dominus, that is, the city.\nBut the city could revoke its grant, as it practically did when it\nconferred the privileges of Roman citizenship on the provincials, and\ngave to plebeians seats in the senate.  Moreover, nothing in Roman\nhistory indicates that to the validity of a senatus consultum it was\nnecessary to count the vacant domains of the sacred territory.  The\nparticular domain must, under the American system, be counted when it\nis held by a State, but of itself alone, or even with its population,\nit is not a State, and therefore as a State domain is vacant and\nwithout any political rights or powers whatever.\n\nTo argue that the territory and population once a State in the Union\nmust needs always be so, would be well enough if a State in the Union\nwere individually a sovereign state; for territory, with its population\nnot subject to another, is always a sovereign state, even though its\ngovernment has been subverted.  But this is not the fact, for territory\nwith its population does not constitute a State in the Union; and,\ntherefore, when of a State nothing remains but territory and\npopulation, the State has evidently disappeared.  It will not do then\nto maintain that State suicide is impossible, and that the States that\nadopted secession ordinances have never for a moment ceased to be\nStates in the Union, and are free, whenever they choose, to send their\nrepresentatives and senators to occupy their vacant seats in Congress.\nThey must be reorganized first.\n\nThere would also be some embarrassment to the government in holding\nthat the States that passed the secession ordinance remain,\nnotwithstanding, States in the Union.  The citizens of a State in the\nUnion cannot be rebels to the United States, unless they are rebels to\ntheir State; and rebels to their State they are not, unless they resist\nits authority and make war on it. The authority of the State in the\nUnion is a legal authority, and the citizen in obeying it is disloyal\nneither to the State nor to the Union.  The citizens in the States that\nmade war on the United States did not resist their State, for they\nacted by its authority.  The only men, on this supposition, in them,\nwho have been traitors or rebels, are precisely the Union men who have\nrefused to go with their respective States, and have resisted, even\nwith armed force, the secession ordinances.  The several State\ngovernments, under which the so-called rebels carried on the war for\nthe destruction of the Union, if the States are in the Union, were\nlegal and loyal governments of their respective States, for they were\nlegally elected and installed, and conformed to their respective State\nconstitutions.  All the acts of these governments have been\nconstitutional.  Their entering into a confederacy for attaining a\nseparate nationality has been legal, and the debts contracted by the\nStates individually, or by the confederacy legally formed by them, have\nbeen legally contracted, stand good against them, and perhaps against\nthe United States.  The war against them has been all wrong, and the\nconfederates killed in battle have been murdered by the United States.\nThe blockade has been illegal, for no nation can blockade its own\nports, and the captures and seizures under it, robberies.  The Supreme\nCourt has been wrong in declaring the war a territorial civil war, as\nwell as the government in acting accordingly.  Now, all these\nconclusions are manifestly false and absurd, and therefore the\nassumption that the States in question have all along been States in\nthe Union cannot be sustained.\n\nIt is easy to understand the resistance the Government offers to the\ndoctrine that a State may commit suicide, or by its own act abdicate\nits rights and cease to be a State in the Union.  It is admissible on\nno theory of the constitution that has been widely entertained.  It is\nnot admissible on Mr. Calhoun's theory of State sovereignty, for on\nthat theory a State in going out of the Union does not cease to be a\nState but simply resumes the powers it had delegated to the General\ngovernment.  It cannot be maintained on Mr. Madison's or Mr. Webster's\ntheory, that the States prior to the Union were severally sovereign,\nbut by the Union were constituted one people; for, if this one people\nare understood to be a federal people, State secession would not be\nState suicide, but State independence; and if understood to be one\nconsolidated or centralized people, it would be simply insurrection or\nrebellion against the national authority, laboring to make itself a\nrevolution.  The government seems to have understood Mr. Madison's\ntheory in both senses--in the consolidated sense, in declaring the\nsecessionists insurgents and rebels, and in the federal sense, in\nmaintaining that they have never seceded, and are still States in the\nUnion, in full possession of all their political or State rights.\nPerhaps, if the government, instead of borrowing from contradictory\ntheories of the constitution which have gained currency, had examined\nin the light of historical facts the constitution itself, it would have\nbeen as constitutional in its doctrine as it has been loyal and\npatriotic, energetic and successful in its military administration.\n\nAnother reason why the doctrine that State secession is State suicide\nhas appeared so offensive to many, is the supposition entertained at\none time by some of its friends, that the dissolution of the State\nvacates all rights and franchises held under it.  But this is a\nmistake.  The principle is well known and recognized by the\njurisprudence of all civilized nations, that in the transfer of a\nterritory from one territorial sovereign to another, the laws in force\nunder the old sovereign remain in force after the change, till\nabrogated, or others are enacted in their place by the new sovereign,\nexcept such as are necessarily abrogated by the change itself of the\nsovereign; not, indeed, because the old sovereign retains any\nauthority, but, because such is presumed by the courts to be the will\nof the new sovereign.  The principle applies in the case of the death\nof a State in the Union.  The laws of the State are territorial, till\nabrogated by competent authority, remain the lex loci, and are in full\nforce.  All that would be vacated would be the public rights of the\nState, and in no case the private rights of citizens, corporations, or\nlaws affecting them.\n\nBut the same conclusion is reached in another way.  In the lapse of a\nState or its return to the condition of a Territory, there is really no\nchange of sovereignty.  The sovereignty, both before and after, is the\nUnited States.  The sovereign authority that governs in the State\ngovernment, as we have seen, though independent of the General\ngovernment, is the United States.  The United States govern certain\nmatters through a General government, and others through particular\nState governments.  The private rights and interests created,\nregulated, or protected by the particular State, are created,\nregulated, or protected by the United States, as much and as plenarily\nas if done by the General government, and the State laws creating,\nregulating, or protecting them can be abrogated by no power known to\nthe constitution, but either the State itself, or the United States in\nconvention legally assembled.  If this were what is meant by the States\nthat have seceded, or professed to secede, remaining States in the\nUnion, they would, indeed, be States still in the Union,\nnotwithstanding secession and the government would be right in saying\nthat no State can secede.  But this is not what is meant, at least not\nall that is meant.  It is meant not only that the private rights of\ncitizens and corporations remain, but the citizens retain all the\npublic rights of the State, that is, the right to representation in\nCongress and in the electoral college, and the right to sit in the\nconvention, which is not true.\n\nBut the correction of the misapprehension that the private rights and\ninterests are lost by the lapse of the State may remove the graver\nprejudices against the doctrine of State suicide, and dispose loyal and\nhonest Union men to bear the reasons by which it is supported, and\nwhich nobody has refuted or can refute on constitutional grounds.  A\nTerritory by coming into the Union becomes a State; a State by going\nout of the Union becomes a Territory.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nRECONSTRUCTION.\n\n\nThe question of reconstructing the States that seceded will be\npractically settled before these pages can see the light, and will\ntherefore be considered here only so far as necessary to complete the\nview of the constitution of the United States.  The manner in which the\ngovernment proposed to settle, has settled, or will settle the\nquestion, proves that both it and the American people have only\nconfused views of the rights and powers of the General government, but\nimperfectly comprehend the distinction between the legislative and\nexecutive departments of that Government, and are far more familiar\nwith party tactics than with constitutional law.\n\nIt would be difficult to imagine any thing more unconstitutional, more\ncrude, or more glaringly impolitic than the mode of reconstruction\nindicated by the various executive proclamations that have been issued,\nbearing on the subject, or even by the bill for guaranteeing the States\nrepublican governments, that passed Congress, but which failed to\nobtain the President's signature.  It is, in some measure,\ncharacteristic of the American government to understand how things\nought to be done only when they are done and it is too late to do them\nin the right way.  Its wisdom comes after action, as if engaged in a\nseries of experiments.  But, happily for the nation, few blunders are\ncommitted that with our young life and elasticity are irreparable, and\nthat, after all, are greater than are ordinarily committed by older and\nmore experienced nations.  They are not of the most fatal character,\nand are, for the most part, such as are incident to the conceit, the\nheedlessness, the ardor, and the impatience of youth, and need excite\nno serious alarm for the future.\n\nThere has been no little confusion in the public mind, and in that of\nthe government itself, as to what reconstruction is, who has the power\nto reconstruct, and how that power is to be exercised.  Are the States\nthat seceded States in the Union, with no other disability than that of\nhaving no legal governments? or are they Territories subject to the\nUnion?  Is their reconstruction their erection into new States, or\ntheir restoration as States previously in the Union?  Is the power to\nreconstruct in the States themselves? or is it in the General\ngovernment?  If partly in the people and partly in the General\ngovernment, is the part in the General government in Congress, or in\nthe Executive?  If in Congress, can the Executive, without the\nauthority of Congress, proceed to reconstruct, simply leaving it for\nCongress to accept or reject the reconstructed State?   If the power is\npartly in the people of the disorganized States who or what defines\nthat people, decides who may or may not vote in the reorganization?  On\nall these questions there has been much crude, if not erroneous,\nthinking, and much inconsistent and contradictory action.\n\nThe government started with the theory that no State had seceded or\ncould secede, and held that, throughout, the States in rebellion\ncontinued to be States in the Union.  That is, it held secession to be\na purely personal and not a territorial insurrection.  Yet it\nproclaimed eleven States to be in insurrection against the United\nStates, blockaded their ports, and interdicted all trade and\nintercourse of any kind with them. The Supreme Court, in order to\nsustain the blockade and interdict as legal, decided the war to be not\na war against simply individual or personal insurgents but \"a\nterritorial civil war.\" This negatived the assumption that the States\nthat took up arms against the United States remained all the while\npeaceable and loyal States, with all their political rights and powers\nin the Union.  The States in the Union are integral elements of the\npolitical sovereignty, for the sovereignty of the American nation vests\nin the States finite; and it is absurd to pretend that the eleven\nStates that made the rebellion and were carrying on a formidable war\nagainst the United States, were in the Union, an integral element of\nthat sovereign authority which was carrying on a yet more formidable\nwar against them.  Nevertheless, the government still held to its first\nassumption, that the States in rebellion continued to be States in the\nUnion--loyal States, with all their rights and franchises unimpaired!\n\nThat the government should at first have favored or acquiesced in the\ndoctrine that no State had ceased to be a State in the Union, is not to\nbe wondered at.  The extent and determination of the secession movement\nwere imperfectly understood, and the belief among the supporters of the\ngovernment, and, perhaps, of the government itself, was, that it was a\nspasmodic movement for a temporary purpose, rather than a fixed\ndetermination to found an independent separate nationality; that it was\nand would be sustained by the real majority of the people of none of\nthe States, with perhaps the exception of South Carolina; that the true\npolicy of the government would be to treat the seceders with great\nforbearance, to avoid all measures likely to exasperate them or to\nembarrass their loyal fellow-citizens, to act simply on the defensive,\nand to leave the Union men in the several seceding States to gain a\npolitical victory at the polls over the secessionists, and to return\ntheir States to their normal position in the Union.\n\nThe government may not have had much faith in this policy, and Mr.\nLincoln's personal authority might be cited to the effect that it had\nnot, but it was urged strongly by the Union men of the Border States.\nThe administration was hardly seated in office, and its members were\nnew men, without administrative experience; the President, who had been\nlegally elected indeed, but without a majority of the popular votes,\nwas far from having the full confidence even of the party that elected\nhim; opinions were divided; party spirit ran high; the excitement was\ngreat, the crisis was imminent, the government found itself left by its\npredecessor without an army or a navy, and almost without arms or\nordnance; it knew not how far it could count on popular support, and\nwas hardly aware whom it could trust or should distrust; all was hurry\nand confusion; and what could the government do but to gain time, keep\noff active war as long as possible, conciliate all it could, and take\nground which at the time seemed likely to rally the largest number of\nthe people to its support?  There were men then, warm friends of the\nadministration, and still warmer friends of their country, who believed\nthat a bolder, a less timid, a less cautious policy would have been\nwiser, that in revolutionary times boldness, what in other times would\nbe rashness, is the highest prudence, on the side of the government as\nwell as on the side of the revolution; that when once it has shown\nitself, the rebellion that hesitates, deliberates, consults, is\ndefeated and so is the government.  The seceders owed from the first\ntheir successes not to their superior organization, to their better\npreparation, or to the better discipline and appointment of their\narmies, but to their very rashness, to their audacity even, and the\nhesitancy, cautious and deliberation of the government.  Napoleon owed\nhis successes as general and civilian far more to the air of power he\nassumed, and the conviction he produced of his invincibility in the\nminds of his opponents, than to his civil or military strategy and\ntactics, admirable as they both were.  But the government believed it\nwisest to adopt a conciliatory and, in many respects, a temporizing\npolicy, and to rely more on weakening the secessionists in their\nrespective States than on strengthening the hands and hearts of its own\nstaunch and uncompromising supporters.  It must strengthen the Union\nparty in the insurrectionary States, and as this party hoped to succeed\nby political manipulation rather than by military force, the government\nmust rely rather on a show of military power than on gaining any\ndecisive battle.  As it hoped, or affected to hope, to suppress the\nrebellion in the States that seceded through their loyal citizens, it\nwas obliged to assume that secession was the work of a faction, of a\nfew ambitious and disappointed politicians, and that the States were\nall in the Union, and continued in the loyal portion of their\ninhabitants.  Hence its aid to the loyal Virginians to organize as the\nState of Virginia, and its subsequent efforts to organize the Union men\nin Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee, and its disposition to recognize\ntheir organization in each of those States as the State itself, though\nincluding only a small minority of the territorial people.  Had the\nfacts been as assumed, the government might have treated the loyal\npeople of each State as the State itself, without any gross usurpation\nof power; but, unhappily, the facts assumed were not facts, and it was\nsoon found that the Union party in all the States that seceded, except\nthe western part of Virginia and the eastern section of Tennessee,\nafter secession had been carried by the popular vote, went almost\nunanimously with the secessionists; for they as well as the\nsecessionists held the doctrine of State sovereignty; and to treat the\nhandful of citizens that remained loyal in each State as the State\nitself, became ridiculous, and the government should have seen and\nacknowledged it.\n\nThe rebellion being really territorial, and not personal, the State\nthat seceded was no more continued in the loyal than in the disloyal\npopulation.  While the war lasted, both were public enemies of the\nUnited States, and neither had or could have any rights as a State in\nthe Union.  The law recognizes a solidarity of all the citizens of a\nState, and assumes that, when a State is at war, all its citizens are\nat war, whether approving the war or not.  The loyal people in the\nStates that seceded incurred none of the pains and penalties of\ntreason, but they retained none of the political rights of the State in\nthe Union, and, in reorganizing the State after the suppression of the\nrebellion, they have no more right to take part than the secessionists\nthemselves.  They, as well as the secessionists, have followed the\nterritory.  It was on this point that the government committed its\ngravest mistake.  As to the reorganization or reconstruction of the\nState, the whole territorial people stood on the same footing.\n\nTaking the decision of the Supreme Court as conclusive on the subject,\nthe rebellion was territorial, and, therefore, placed all the States as\nStates out of the Union, and retained them only as population and\nterritory, under or subject to the Union.  The States ceased to exist,\nthat is, as integral elements of the national sovereignty.  The\nquestion then occurred, are they to be erected into new States, or are\nthey to be reconstructed and restored to the Union as the identical old\nStates that seceded? Shall their identity be revived and preserved, or\nshall they be new States, regardless of that identity?  There can be no\nquestion that the work to be done was that of restoration, not of\ncreation; no tribe should perish from Israel, no star be struck from\nthe firmament of the Union.  Every inhabitant of the fallen States, and\nevery citizen of the United States must desire them to be revived and\ncontinued with their old names and boundaries, and all true Americans\nwish to continue the constitution as it is, and the Union as it was.\nWho would see old Virginia, the Virginia of revolutionary fame, of\nWashington, Jefferson, Madison, of Monroe, the \"Old Dominion,\" once the\nleading State of the Union, dead without hope of resurrection? or South\nCarolina, the land of Rutledge, Moultrie, Laurens, Hayne, Sumter, and\nMarion?  There is something grating to him who values State\nassociations, and would encourage State emulation and State pride, in\nthe mutilation of the Old Dominion and the erection within her borders\nof the new State called West Virginia.  States in the Union are not\nmere prefectures, or mere dependencies on the General government,\ncreated for the convenience of administration.  They have an\nindividual, a real existence of their own, as much so as have the\nindividual members of society. They are free members, not of a\nconfederation indeed, but of a higher political community, and\nreconstruction should restore the identity of their individual life,\nsuspended for a moment by secession, but capable of resuscitation.\n\nThese States had become, indeed, for a moment, territory under the\nUnion; but in no instance had they or could they become territory that\nhad never existed as States.  The fact that the territory and people\nhad existed as a State, could with regard to none of them be\nobliterated, and, therefore, they could not be erected into absolutely\nnew States.  The process of reconstructing them could not be the same\nas that of creating new States.  In creating a new State, Congress, ex\nnecessitate, because there is no other power except the national\nconvention competent to do it, defines the boundaries of the new State,\nand prescribes the electoral people, or who may take part in the\npreliminary organization but in reconstructing States it does neither,\nfor both are done by a law Congress is not competent to abrogate or\nmodify, and which can be done only by the United States in convention\nassembled, or by the State itself after its restoration.  The\ngovernment has conceded this, and, in part, has acted on it.  It\npreserves, except in Virginia, the old boundaries, and recognizes, or\nrather professes to recognize the old electoral law, only it claims the\nright to exclude from the electoral people those who have voluntarily\ntaken part in the rebellion.\n\nThe work to be done in States that have seceded is that of\nreconstruction, not creation; and this work is not and cannot be done,\nexclusively nor chiefly by the General government, either by the\nExecutive or by Congress.  That government can appoint military, or\neven provisional governors, who may designate the time and place of\nholding the convention of the electoral people of the disorganized\nState, as also the time and place of holding the elections of delegates\nto it, and superintend the elections so far as to see the polls are\nopened, and that none but qualified electors vote, but nothing more.\nAll the rest is the work of the territorial electoral people\nthemselves, for the State within its own sphere must, as one of the\nUnited States, be a self-governing community.  The General government\nmay concede or withhold permission to the disorganized State to\nreorganize, as it judges advisable, but it cannot itself reorganize it.\nIf it concedes the permission, it must leave the whole electoral people\nunder the preexisting electoral law free to take part in the work of\nreorganization, and to vote according to their own judgment. It has no\nauthority to purge the electoral people, and say who may or may not\nvote, for the whole question of suffrage and the qualifications of\nelectors is left to the State, and can be settled neither by an act of\nCongress nor by an Executive proclamation.\n\nIf the government theory were admissible, that the disorganized States\nremain States in the Union, the General government could have nothing\nto say on the subject, and could no more interfere with elections in\nany one of them than it could with elections in Massachusetts or New\nYork.  But even on the doctrine here defended it can interfere with\nthem only by way of general superintendence.  The citizens have,\nindeed, lost their political rights, but not their private rights.\nSecession has not dissolved civil society, or abrogated any of the laws\nof the disorganized State that were in force at the time of secession.\nThe error of the government is not in maintaining that these laws\nsurvive the secession ordinances, and remain the territorial law, or\nlex loci, but in maintaining that they do so by will of the State, that\nhas, as a State, really lapsed.  They do so by will of the United\nStates, which enacted them through the individual State, and which has\nnot in convention abrogated them, save the law authorizing slavery, and\nits dependent laws.\n\nThis point has already been made, but as it is one of the niceties of\nthe American constitution, it may not be amiss to elaborate it at\ngreater length.  The doctrine of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and the\nmajority of our jurists, would see to be that the States, under God,\nare severally sovereign in all matters not expressly confided to the\nGeneral government, and therefore that the American sovereignty is\ndivided, and the citizen owes a double allegiance--allegiance to his\nState, and allegiance to the United States--as if there was a United\nStates distinguishable from the States.  Hence Mr. Seward, in an\nofficial dispatch to our minister at the court of St. James, says: \"The\ncitizen owes allegiance to the State and to the United States.\"  And\nnearly all who hold allegiance is due to the Union at all, hold that it\nis also due to the States, only that which is due to the United States\nis paramount, as that under feudalism due to the overlord.  But this is\nnot the case.  There is no divided sovereignty, no divided allegiance.\nSovereignty is one, and vests not in the General government or in the\nState government, but in the United States, and allegiance is due to\nthe United States, and to them alone.  Treason can be committed only\nagainst the United States, and against a State only because against the\nUnited States, and is properly cognizable only by the Federal courts.\nHence the Union men committed no treason in refusing to submit to the\nsecession ordinances of their respective States, and in sustaining the\nnational arms against secession.\n\nThere are two very common mistakes: the one that the States\nindividually possess all the powers not delegated to the General\ngovernment; and the other that the Union, or United States, have only\ndelegated powers.  But the United States possess all the powers of a\nsovereign state, and the States individually and the General government\npossess only such powers as the United States in convention delegate to\nthem respectively.  The sovereign is neither the General government nor\nthe States severally, but the United States in convention.  The United\nStates are the one indivisible sovereign, and this sovereign governs\nalike general matters in the General government, and particular matters\nin the several State governments.  All legal authority in either\nemanates from this one indivisible and plenary sovereign, and hence the\nlaw enacted by a State are really enacted by the United States, and\nderive from them their force and vitality as laws. Hence, as the United\nStates survive the particular State, the lapse of the State does not\nabrogate the State laws, or dissolve civil society within its\njurisdiction.\n\nThis is evidently so, because civil society in the particular State\ndoes not rest on the State alone, nor on Congress, but on the United\nStates.  Hence all civil rights of every sort created by the individual\nState are really held from the United States, and therefore it was that\nthe people of non-slaveholding States were, as citizens of the United\nStates, responsible for the existence of slavery in the States that\nseceded.  There is a solidarity of States in the Union as there is of\nindividuals in each of the States.  The political error of the\nAbolitionists was not in calling upon the people of the United States\nto abolish slavery, but in calling upon them to abolish it through the\nGeneral government, which had no jurisdiction in the case; or in their\nsole capacity as men, on purely humanitarian grounds, which were the\nabrogation of all government and civil society itself, instead of\ncalling upon them to do it as the United States in convention\nassembled, or by an amendment to the constitution of the United States\nin the way ordained by that constitution itself.  This understood, the\nconstitution and laws of a defunct State remain in force by virtue of\nthe will of the United States, till the State is raised from the dead,\nrestored to life and activity, and repeals or alters them, or till they\nare repealed or altered by the United States or the national\nconvention.  But as the defunct State could not, and the convention had\nnot repealed or altered them, save in the one case mentioned, the\nGeneral government had no alternative but to treat them and all rights\ncreated by them as the territorial law, and to respect them as such.\n\nWhat then do the people of the several States that seceded lose by\nsecession?  They lose, besides incurring, so far as disloyal, the pains\nand penalties of treason, their political rights, or right, as has just\nbeen said, to be in their own department self-governing communities,\nwith the right of representation in Congress and the electoral\ncolleges, and to sit in the national convention, or of being counted in\nthe ratification of amendments to the constitution--precisely what it\nwas shown a Territorial people gain by being admitted as a State into\nthe Union.  This is the difference between the constitutional doctrine\nand that adopted by Mr. Lincoln's and Mr. Johnson's Administrations.\nBut what authority, on this constitutional doctrine, does the General\ngovernment gain over the people of States that secede, that it has not\nover others!  As to their internal constitution, their private rights\nof person or property, it gains none.  It has over them, till they are\nreconstructed and restored to the Union, the right to institute for\nthem provisional governments, civil or military, precisely as it has\nfor the people of a territory that is not and has never been one of the\nUnited States; but in their reconstruction it has less, for the\ngeographical boundaries and electoral people of each are already\ndefined by a law which does not depend on its will, and which it can\nneither abrogate nor modify.  Here is the difference between the\nconstitutional doctrine and that of the so-called radicals.  The State\nhas gone, but its laws remain, so far as the United States in\nconvention does not abrogate them; not because the authority of the\nState survives, but because the United States so will, or are presumed\nto will.  The United States have by a constitutional amendment\nabrogated the laws of the several States authorizing slavery, and\nprohibited slavery forever within the jurisdiction of the Union; and no\nState can now be reconstructed and be admitted into the Union with a\nconstitution that permits slavery, for that would be repugnant to the\nconstitution of the United States.  If the constitutional amendment is\nnot recognized as ratified by the requisite number of States, it is the\nfault of the government in persisting in counting as States what are no\nStates.  Negro suffrage, as white suffrage, is at present a question\nfor States.\n\nThe United States guarantee to such State a republican form of\ngovernment.  And this guarantee, no doubt, authorizes Congress to\nintervene in the internal constitution of a State so far as to force it\nto adopt a republican form of government, but not so far as to organize\na government for a State, or to compel a territorial people to accept\nor adopt a State constitution for themselves.  If a State attempts to\norganize a form of government not republican, it can prevent it; and if\na Territory adopts an unrepublican form, it can force it to change its\nconstitution to one that is republican, or compel it to remain a\nTerritory under a provisional government.  But this gives the General\ngovernment no authority in the organization or re-organization of\nStates beyond seeing that the form of government adopted by the\nterritorial people is republican.  To press it further, to make the\nconstitutional clause a pretext for assuming the entire control of the\norganization or re-organization of a State, is a manifest abuse--a\npalpable violation of the constitution and of the whole American\nsystem.  The authority given by the clause is specific, and is no\nauthority for intervention in the general reconstruction of the lapsed\nState.  It gives authority in no question raised by secession or its\nconsequences, and can give none, except, from within or from without,\nthere is an overt attempt to organize a State in the Union with an\nunrepublican form of government.\n\nThe General government gives permission to the territorial people of\nthe defunct State to re-organize, or it contents itself with suffering\nthem, without special recognition, to reorganize in their own way, and\napply to Congress for admission, leaving it to Congress to admit them\nas a State, or not, according to its own discretion, in like manner as\nit admits a new State; but the re-organization itself must be the work\nof the territorial people themselves, under their old electoral law.\nThe power that reconstructs is in the people themselves; the power that\nadmits them, or receives them into the Union, is Congress.  The\nExecutive, therefore, has no authority in the matter, beyond that of\nseeing that the laws are duly complied with; and whatever power he\nassumes, whether by proclamation or by instructions given to the\nprovisional governors, civil or military, is simply a usurpation of the\npower of Congress, which it rests with Congress to condone or not, as\nit may see fit.  Executive proclamations, excluding a larger or a\nsmaller portion of the electoral or territorial people from the\nexercise of the elective franchise in reorganizing the State, and\nexecutive efforts to throw the State into the hands of one political\nparty or another, are an unwarrantable assumption of power, for the\nPresident, in relation to reconstruction, acts only under the peace\npowers of the constitution, and simply as the first executive officer\nof the Union.  His business is to execute the laws, not to make them.\nHis legislative authority is confined to his qualified veto on the acts\nof Congress, and to the recommendation to Congress of such measures as\nhe believes are needed by the country.\n\nIn reconstructing a disorganized State, neither Congress nor the\nExecutive has any power that either has not in time of peace. The\nExecutive, as commander-in-chief of the army, may ex necessitate, pace\nit ad interim under a military governor, but he cannot appoint even a\nprovisional civil governor till Congress has created the office and\ngiven him authority to fill it; far less can be legally give\ninstructions to the civil governor as to the mode or manner of\nreconstructing the disorganized State, or decide who may or may not\nvote in the preliminary reorganization. The Executive could do nothing\nof the sort, even in regard to a Territory never erected into a State.\nIt belongs to Congress, not to the Executive, to erect Territorial or\nprovisional governments, like those of Dacotah, Colorado, Montana,\nNebraska, and New Mexico; and, Congress, not the executive, determines\nthe boundaries of the Territory, passes the enabling act, and defines\nthe electoral people, till the State is organized and able to act\nherself.  Even Congress, in reconstructing and restoring to life and\nvigor in the Union a disorganized State, has nothing to say as to its\nboundaries or its electoral people, nor any right to interfere between\nparties in the State, to throw the reconstructed State into the hands\nof one or another party.  All that Congress can insist on is, that the\nterritorial people shall reconstruct with a government republican in\nform; that its senators and representatives in Congress, and the\nmembers of the State legislature, and all executive and judicial\nofficers of the State shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support\nand defend the constitution of the United States.  In the whole work\nthe President has nothing to do with reconstruction, except to see that\npeace is preserved and the laws are fully executed.\n\nIt may be at least doubted that the Executive has power to proclaim\namnesty and pardon to rebels after the civil war has ceased, and ceased\nit has when the rebels have thrown down their arms and submitted; for\nhis pardoning power is only to pardon after conviction and judgment of\nthe court: it is certain that he has no power to proscribe or punish\neven traitors, except by due process of law.  When the war is over he\nhas only his ordinary peace powers.  He cannot then disfranchise any\nportion of the electoral people of a State that seceded, even though\nthere is no doubt that they have taken part in the rebellion, and may\nstill be suspected of disloyal sentiments.  Not even Congress can do\nit, and no power known to the constitution till the State is\nreconstructed can do it without due process of law, except the national\nconvention.  Should the President do any of the things supposed, he\nwould both abuse the power he has and usurp power that he has not, and\nrender himself liable to impeachment.  There are many things very\nproper, and even necessary to be done, which are high crimes when done\nby an improper person or agent.  The duty of the President, when there\nare steps to be taken or things to be done which he believes very\nnecessary, but which are not within his competency, is, if Congress is\nnot in session, to call it together at the earliest practicable moment,\nand submit the matter to its wisdom and discretion.\n\nIt must be remembered that the late rebellion was not a merely personal\nbut a territorial rebellion.  In such a rebellion, embracing eleven\nStates, and, excluding slaves, a population of at least seven millions,\nacting under an organized territorial government, preserving internal\ncivil order, supporting an army and navy under regularly commissioned\nofficers, and carrying on war as a sovereign nation--in such a\nterritorial rebellion no one in particular can be accused and punished\nas a traitor.  The rebellion is not the work of a few ambitious or\nreckless leaders, but of the people, and the responsibility of the\ncrime, whether civil or military, is not individual, but common to the\nwhole territorial people engaged in it; and seven millions, or the half\nof them, are too many to ban to exile, or even to disfranchise Their\ndefeat and the failure of their cause must be their punishment.  The\ninterest of the country, as well the sentiment of the civilized\nworld--it might almost be said the law of nations--demands their\npermission to return to their allegiance, to be treated according to\ntheir future merits, as an integral portion of the American people.\n\nThe sentiment of the civilized world has much relaxed from its former\nseverity toward political offenders.  It regards with horror the savage\ncruelties of Great Britain to the unfortunate Jacobites, after their\ndefeat under Charles Edward, at Culloden, in 1746, their barbarous\ntreatment of the United Irishmen in 1798, and her brutality to the\nmutinous Hindoos in 1857-'58; the harshness of Russia toward the\ninsurgent Poles, defeated in their mad attempts to recover their lost\nnationality; the severity of Austria, under Haynau, toward the defeated\nMagyars.  The liberal press kept up for years, especially in England\nand the United States, a perpetual howl against the Papal and\nNeapolitan governments for arresting and imprisoning men who conspired\nto overthrow them.  Louis Kossuth was no less a traitor than Jefferson\nDavis, and yet the United States solicited his release from a Turkish\nprison, and sent a national ship to bring him hither as the nation's\nguest.  The people of the United States have held from the first \"the\nright of insurrection,\" and have given their moral support to every\ninsurrection in the Old or New World they discovered, and for them to\ntreat with severity any portion of the Southern secessionists, who, at\nthe very worst, only acted on the principles the nation had uniformly\navowed and pronounced sacred, would be regarded, and justly, by the\ncivilized world as little less than infamous.\n\nNot only the fair fame, but the interest of the Union forbids any\nseverity toward the people lately in arms against the government. The\ninterest of the nation demands not the death or the expulsion of the\nsecessionists, and, least of all, of those classes proscribed by the\nPresident's proclamation of the 29th of May, 1865, nor even their\ndisfranchisement, perpetual or temporary; but their restoration to\ncitizenship, and their loyal co-operation with all true-hearted\nAmericans, in hearing the wounds inflicted on the whole country by the\ncivil war.  There need be no fear to trust them.  Their cause is lost;\nthey may or may not regret it, but lost it is, and lost forever.  They\nappealed to the ballot-box, and were defeated; they appealed from the\nballot-box to arms, to war, and have been again defeated, terribly\ndefeated.  They know it and feel it.  There is no further appeal for\nthem; the judgment of the court of last resort has been rendered, and\nrendered against them.  The cause is finished, the controversy closed,\nnever to be re-opened. Henceforth the Union is invincible, and it is\nworse than idle to attempt to renew the war against it.  Henceforth\ntheir lot is bound up with that of the nation, and all their hopes and\ninterests, for themselves and their children, and their children's\nchildren, depend on their being permitted to demean themselves\nhenceforth as peaceable and loyal American citizens. They must seek\ntheir freedom, greatness, and glory in the freedom, greatness, and\nglory of the American republic, in which, after all, they can be far\nfreer, greater, more glorious than in a separate and independent\nconfederacy.  All the arguments and considerations urged by Union men\nagainst their secession, come back to them now with redoubled force to\nkeep them henceforth loyal to the Union.\n\nThey cannot afford to lose the nation, and the nation cannot afford to\nlose them.  To hang or exile them, and depopulate and suffer to run to\nwaste the lands they had cultivated, were sad thrift, sadder than that\nof deporting four millions of negroes and colored men.  To exchange\nonly those excepted from amnesty and pardon by President Johnson,\nembracing some two millions or more, the very pars sanior of the\nSouthern population, for what would remain or flock in to supply their\nplace, would be only the exchange of Glaucus and Diomed, gold for\nbrass; to disfranchise them, confiscate their estates, and place them\nunder the political control of the freedmen, lately their slaves, and\nthe ignorant and miserable \"white trash,\" would be simply to render\nrebellion chronic, and to convert seven millions of Americans, willing\nand anxious to be free, loyal American citizens, eternal enemies.  They\nhave yielded to superior numbers and resources; beaten, but not\ndisgraced, for they have, even in rebellion, proved themselves what\nthey are--real Americans.  They are the product of the American soil,\nthe free growth of the American republic, and to disgrace them were to\ndisgrace the whole American character and people.\n\nThe wise Romans never allowed a triumph to a Roman general for\nvictories, however brilliant, won over Romans.  In civil war, the\nvictory won by the government troops is held to be a victory for the\ncountry, in which all parties are victors, and nobody is vanquished.\nIt was as truly for the good of the secessionists to fail, as it was\nfor those, who sustained the government to succeed; and the government\nhaving forced their submission and vindicated its own authority, it\nshould now leave them to enjoy, with others, the victory which it his\nwon for the common good of all.  When war becomes a stern necessity,\nwhen it breaks out, and while it lasts, humanity requires it to be\nwaged in earnest, prosecuted with vigor, and made as damaging, as\ndistressful to the enemy as the laws of civilized nations permit.  It\nis the way to bring it to a speedy close, and to save life and\nproperty. But when it is over, when the enemy submits, and peace\nreturns, the vanquished should be treated with gentleness and love.  No\nrancor should remain, no vengeance should be sought; they who met in\nmortal conflict on the battle-field should be no longer enemies, but\nembrace as comrades, as friends, as brothers.  None but a coward kicks\na fallen foe; a brave people is generous, and the victors in the late\nwar can afford to be generous generously. They fought for the Union,\nand the Union has no longer an enemy; their late enemies are willing\nand proud to be their countrymen, fellow-citizens, and friends; and\nthey should look to it that small politicians do not rob them in the\neyes of the world, by unnecessary and ill-timed severity to the\nsubmissive, of the glory of being, as they are, a great, noble,\nchivalric, generous, and magnanimous people.\n\nThe government and the small politicians, who usually are the most\ninfluential with all governments, should remember that none of the\nsecessionists, however much in error they have been, have committed the\nmoral crime of treason.  They held, with the majority of the American\npeople, the doctrine of State sovereignty, and on that doctrine they\nhad a right to secede, and have committed no treason, been guilty of no\nrebellion.  That was, indeed, no reason why the government should not\nuse all its force, if necessary, to preserve the national unity and the\nintegrity of the national domain; but it is a reason, and a sufficient\nreason, why no penalty of treason should be inflicted on secessionists\nor their leaders, after their submission, and recognition of the\nsovereignty of the United States as that to which they owe allegiance.\nNone of the secessionists have been rebels or traitors, except in\noutward act, and there can, after the act has ceased, be no just\npunishment where there has been no criminal intent.  Treason is the\nhighest crime, and deserves exemplary punishment; but not where there\nhas been no treasonable intent, where they who committed it did not\nbelieve it was treason, and on principles held by the majority of their\ncountrymen, and by the party that had generally held the government,\nthere really was no treason.  Concede State sovereignty, and Jefferson\nDavis was no traitor in the war he made on the United States, for he\nmade none till his State had seceded.  He could not then be arraigned\nfor his acts after secession, and at most, only for conspiracy, if at\nall, before secession.\n\nBut, if you permit all to vote in the re-organization of the State who,\nunder the old electoral law, have the elective franchise, you throw the\nState into the hands of those who have been disloyal to the Union.  If\nso, and you cannot trust them, the remedy is not in disfranchising the\nmajority, but in prohibiting re-organization, and in holding the\nterritorial people still longer under the provisional government, civil\nor military.  The old electoral law disqualifies all who have been\nconvicted of treason either to the State or the United States, and\nneither Congress nor the Executive can declare any others disqualified\non account of disloyalty.  But you must throw the State into the hands\nof those who took part, directly or indirectly, in the rebellion, if\nyou reconstruct the States at all, for they are undeniably the great\nbody of the territorial people in all the States that seceded.  These\npeople having submitted, and declared their intention to reconstruct\nthe State as a State in the Union, you must amend the constitution of\nthe United States, unless they are convicted of a disqualifying crime\nby due process of law, before you can disfranchise them.  It is\nimpossible to reconstruct any one of the disorganized States with those\nalone, or as the dominant party, who have adhered to the Union\nthroughout the fearful struggle, as self-governing States. The State,\nresting on so small a portion of the people, would have no internal\nstrength, no self-support, and could stand only as upheld by federal\narms, which would greatly impair the free and healthy action of the\nwhole American system.\n\nThe government attempted to do it in Virginia, Louisiana, Arkansas, and\nTennessee, before the rebellion was suppressed, but without authority\nand without success.  The organizations, effected at great expense, and\nsustained only by military force, were neither States nor State\ngovernments, nor capable of being made so by any executive or\ncongressional action.  If the disorganized States, as the government\nheld, were still States in the Union, these organizations were\nflagrantly revolutionary, as effected not only without, but in defiance\nof State authority; if they had seceded and ceased to be States, as was\nthe fact, they were equally unconstitutional and void of authority,\nbecause not created by the free suffrage of the territorial people, who\nalone are competent to construct or reconstruct a state.\n\nIf the Unionists had retained the State organization and government,\nhowever small their number, they would have held the State, and the\ngovernment would have been bound to recognize and to defend them as\nsuch with all the force of the Union.  The rebellion would then have\nbeen personal, not territorial.  But such was not the case.  The State\norganization, the State government, the whole State authority rebelled,\nmade the rebellion territorial, not personal, and left the Unionists,\nvery respectable persons assuredly, residing, if they remained at home,\nin rebel territory, traitors in the eye of their respective States, and\nshorn of all political status or rights.  Their political status was\nsimply that of the old loyalists, or adherents of the British crown in\nthe American war for Independence, and it was as absurd to call them\nthe State, as it would have been for Great Britain to have called the\nold Tories the colonies.\n\nThe theory on which the government attempted to re-organize the\ndisorganized States rested on two false assumptions: first, that the\npeople are personally sovereign; and, second, that all the power of the\nUnion vests in the General government.  The first, as we have seen, is\nthe principle of so-called \"squatter sovereignty,\" embodied in the\nfamous Kansas-Nebraska Bill, which gave birth, in opposition, to the\nRepublican party of 1856.  The people are sovereign only as the State,\nand the State is inseparable from the domain.  The Unionists without\nthe State government, without any State organization, could not hold\nthe domain, which, when the State organization is gone, escheats to the\nUnited States, that is to say, ceases to exist.  The American democracy\nis territorial, not personal.\n\nThe General government, in time of war or rebellion, is indeed\ninvested, for war purposes, with all the power of the Union. This is\nthe war power.  But, though apparently unlimited, the war power is yet\nrestricted to war purposes, and expires by natural limitation when\npeace returns; and peace returns, in a civil war, when the rebels have\nthrown down their arms and submitted to the national authority, and\nwithout any formal declaration. During the war, or while the rebellion\nlasts, it can suspend the civil courts, the civil laws, the State\nconstitutions, any thing necessary to the success of the war--and of\nthe necessity the military authorities are the judges; but it cannot\nabolish, abrogate, or reconstitute them.  On the return of peace they\nrevive of themselves in all their vigor.  The emancipation proclamation\nof the President, if it emancipated the slaves in certain States and\nparts of States, and if those whom it emancipated could not be\nre-enslaved, did not anywhere abolish slavery, or change the laws\nauthorizing it; and if the Government should be sustained by Congress\nor by the Supreme Court in counting the disorganized States as States\nin the Union, the legal status of slavery throughout the Union, with\nthe exception of Maryland, and perhaps Missouri, is what it was before\nthe war.[1]\n\nThe Government undoubtedly supposed, in the reconstructions it\nattempted, that it was acting under the war power; but as\nreconstruction can never be necessary for war purposes, and as it is in\nits very nature a work of peace, incapable of being effected by\nmilitary force, since its validity depends entirely on its being the\nfree action of the territorial people to be reconstructed, the General\ngovernment had and could have, with regard to it, only its ordinary\npeace powers.  Reconstruction is jure pacis, not jure belli.\n\nYet such illegal organizations, though they are neither States nor\nState governments, and incapable of being legalized by any action of\nthe Executive or of Congress, may, nevertheless, be legalized by being\nindorsed or acquiesced in by the territorial people.  They are wrong,\nas are all usurpations; they are undemocratic, inasmuch as they attempt\nto give the minority the power to rule the majority; they are dangerous\ninasmuch as they place the State in the hands of a party that can stand\nonly as supported by the General government, and thus destroy the\nproper freedom and independence of the State, and open the door to\ncorruption, tend to keep alive rancor and ill feeling, and to retard\nthe period of complete pacification, which might be effected in three\nmonths as well as in three years, or twenty years; yet they can become\nlegal, as other governments illegal in their origin become legal, with\ntime and popular acquiescence. The right way is always the shortest and\neasiest; but when a government must oftener follow than lead the\npublic, it is not always easy to hit the right way, and still less easy\nto take it. The general instincts of the people are right as to the end\nto be gained, but seldom right as to the means of gaining it; and\npoliticians of the Union party, as well as of the late secession party,\nhave an eye in reconstructing, to the future political control of the\nState when it is reconstructed.\n\nThe secessionists, if permitted to retain their franchise, would, even\nif they accepted abolition, no doubt re-organize their respective\nStates on the basis of white suffrage, and so would the Unionists, if\nleft to themselves.  There is no party at the South prepared to adopt\nnegro suffrage, and there would be none at the North if the negroes\nconstituted any considerable portion of the population.  As the\nreconstruction of a State cannot be done under the war power, the\nGeneral government can no more enfranchise than it can disfranchise any\nportion of the territorial people, and the question of negro suffrage\nmust be left, where the constitution leaves it--to the States\nseverally, each to dispose of it for itself.  Negro suffrage will, no\ndoubt, come in time, as soon as the freedmen are prepared for it, and\nthe danger is that it will be attempted too soon.\n\nIt would be a convenience to have the negro vote in the reconstruction\nof the States disorganized by secession, for it would secure their\nre-construction with antislavery constitutions, and also make sure of\nthe proposed antislavery amendment to the Constitution of the United\nStates; but there is no power in Congress to enfranchise the negroes in\nthe States needing reconstruction, and, once assured of their freedom,\nthe freedmen would care little for the Union, of which they understand\nnothing.  They would vote, for the most part, with their former\nmasters, their employers, the wealthier and more intelligent classes,\nwhether loyal or disloyal; for, as a rule, these will treat them with\ngreater personal consideration and kindness than others.  The dislike\nof the negro, and hostility to negro equality, increase as you descend\nin the social scale.  The freedmen, without political instruction or\nexperience, who have had no country, no domicile, understand nothing of\nloyalty or of disloyalty.  They have strong local attachments, but they\ncan have no patriotism.  If they adhered to the Union in the rebellion,\nfought for it, bled for it, it was not from loyalty, but because they\nknew that their freedom could come only from the success of the Union\narms.  That freedom secured, they have no longer any interest in the\nUnion, and their local attachments, personal associations, habits,\ntastes, likes and dislikes, are Southern, not Northern.  In any contest\nbetween the North and the South, they would take, to a man, the\nSouthern side.  After the taunts of the women, the captured soldiers of\nthe Union found, until nearly the last year of the war, nothing harder\nto bear, when marched as prisoners into Richmond, than the antics and\nhootings of the negroes.  Negro suffrage on the score of loyalty, is at\nbest a matter of indifference to the Union, and as the elective\nfranchise is not a natural right, but a civil trust, the friends of the\nnegro should, for the present, be contented with securing him simply\nequal rights of person and property.\n\n\n[1] This was the case in August, 1865.  It may be quite otherwise\nbefore these pages see the light.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nPOLITICAL TENDENCIES.\n\n\nThe most marked political tendency of the American people has been,\nsince 1825, to interpret their government as a pure and simple\ndemocracy, and to shift it from a territorial to a purely popular\nbasis, or from the people as the state, inseparably united to the\nnational territory or domain, to the people as simply population,\neither as individuals or as the race.  Their tendency has\nunconsciously, therefore, been to change their constitution from a\nrepublican to a despotic, or from a civilized to a barbaric\nconstitution.\n\nThe American constitution is democratic, in the sense that the people\nare sovereign that all laws and public acts run in their name; that the\nrulers are elected by them, and are responsible to them; but they are\nthe people territorially constituted and fixed to the soil,\nconstituting what Mr. Disraeli, with more propriety perhaps than he\nthinks, calls a \"territorial democracy.\"  To this territorial\ndemocracy, the real American democracy, stand opposed two other\ndemocracies--the one personal and the other humanitarian--each alike\nhostile to civilization, and tending to destroy the state, and capable\nof sustaining government only on principles common to all despotisms.\n\nIn every man there is a natural craving for personal freedom and\nunrestrained action--a strong desire to be himself, not another--to be\nhis own master, to go when and where he pleases, to do what he chooses,\nto take what he wants, wherever he can find it, and to keep what he\ntakes.  It is strong in all nomadic tribes, who are at once pastoral\nand predatory, and is seldom weak in our bold frontier-men, too often\nreal \"border ruffians.\" It takes different forms in different stages of\nsocial development, but it everywhere identifies liberty with power.\nRestricted in its enjoyment to one man, it makes him chief, chief of\nthe family, the tribe, or the nation; extended in its enjoyment to the\nfew, it founds an aristocracy, creates a nobility--for nobleman meant\noriginally only freeman, as it does his own consent, express or\nconstructive.  This is the so-called Jeffersonian democracy, in which\ngovernment has no powers but such as it derives from the consent of the\ngoverned, and is personal democracy or pure individualism\nphilosophically considered, pure egoism, which says, \"I am God.\"  Under\nthis sort of democracy, based on popular, or rather individual\nsovereignty, expressed by politicians when they call the electoral\npeople, half seriously, half mockingly, \"the sovereigns,\" there\nobviously can be no state, no social rights or civil authority; there\ncan be only a voluntary association, league, alliance, or\nconfederation, in which individuals may freely act together as long as\nthey find it pleasant, convenient, or useful, but from which they may\nseparate or secede whenever they find it for their interest or their\npleasure to do so.  State sovereignty and secession are based on the\nsame democratic principle applied to the several States of the Union\ninstead of individuals.\n\nThe tendency to this sort of democracy has been strong in large\nsections of the American people from the first, and has been greatly\nstrengthened by the general acceptance of the theory that government\noriginates in compact.  The full realization of this tendency, which,\nhappily, is impracticable save in theory, would be to render every man\nindependent alike of every other man and of society, with full right\nand power to make his own will prevail.  This tendency was strongest in\nthe slaveholding States, and especially, in those States, in the\nslaveholding class, the American imitation of the feudal nobility of\nmediaeval Europe; and on this side the war just ended was, in its most\ngeneral expression, a war in defence of personal democracy or the\nsovereignty of the people individually, against the humanitarian\ndemocracy, represented by the abolitionists, and the territorial\ndemocracy, represented by the Government.  This personal democracy has\nbeen signally defeated in the defeat of the late confederacy, and can\nhardly again become strong enough to be dangerous.\n\nBut the humanitarian democracy, which scorns all geographical lines,\neffaces all in individualities, and professes to plant itself on\nhumanity alone, has acquired by the war new strength, and is not\nwithout menace to our future.  The solidarity of the race, which is the\ncondition of all human life, founds, as we have seen, society, and\ncreates what are called social rights, the rights alike of society in\nregard to individuals, and of individuals in regard to society.\nTerritorial divisions or circumscriptions found particular societies,\nstates, or nations; yet as the race is one and all its members live by\ncommunion with God through it and by communion one with another, these\nparticular states or nations are never absolutely independent of each\nother but, bound together by the solidarity of the race, so that there\nis a real solidarity of nations as well as of individuals--the truth\nunderlying Kossuth's famous declaration of the solidarity of peoples.\n\nThe solidarity of nations is the basis of international law, binding on\nevery particular nation, and which every civilized nation recognizes\nand enforces on its own subjects or citizens through its own courts as\nan integral part of its own municipal or national law.\n\nThe personal or individual right is therefore restricted by the rights\nof society, and the rights of the particular society or nation are\nlimited by international law, or the rights of universal society--the\ntruth the ex-governor of Hungary overlooked.  The grand error of\nGentilism was in denying the unity and therefore the solidarity of the\nrace, involved in its denial or misconception of the unity of God.  It\ntherefore was never able to assign any solid basis to international\nlaw, and gave it only a conventional or customary authority, thus\nleaving the jus gentium, which it recognized in deed, without any real\nfoundation in the constitution of things, or authority in the real\nworld.  Its real basis is in the solidarity of the race, which has its\nbasis in the unity of God, not the dead or abstract unity asserted by\nthe old Eleatics, the Neo-Platonists, or the modern Unitarians, but the\nliving unity consisting in the threefold relation in the Divine\nEssence, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as asserted by Christian\nrevelation, and believed, more or less intelligently, by all\nChristendom.\n\nThe tendency in the Southern States has been to overlook the social\nbasis of the state, or the rights of society founded on the solidarity\nof the race, and to make all rights and powers personal, or individual;\nand as only the white race has been able to assert and maintain its\npersonal freedom, only men of that race are held to have the right to\nbe free.  Hence the people of those States felt no scruple in holding\nthe black or colored race as slaves. Liberty, said they, is the right\nonly of those who have the ability to assert and maintain it.  Let the\nnegro prove that he has this ability by asserting and maintaining his\nfreedom, and he will prove his right to be free, and that it is a gross\noutrage, a manifest injustice, to enslave him; but, till then, let him\nbe my servant, which is best for him and for me. Why ask me to free\nhim?  I shall by doing so only change the form of his servitude.  Why\nappeal to me!  Am I my brother's keeper? Nay, is he my brother?  Is\nthis negro, more like an ape or a baboon than a human being, of the\nsame race with myself?  I believe it not.  But in some instances, at\nleast, my dear slaveholder, your slave is literally your brother, and\nsometimes even your son, born of your own daughter.  The tendency of\nthe Southern democrat was to deny the unity of the race, as well as all\nobligations of society to protect the weak and helpless, and therefore\nall true civil society.\n\nAt the North there has been, and is even yet, an opposite tendency--a\ntendency to exaggerate the social element, to overlook the territorial\nbasis of the state, and to disregard the rights of individuals.  This\ntendency has been and is strong in the people called abolitionists.\nThe American abolitionist is so engrossed with the unity that he loses\nthe solidarity of the race, which supposes unity of race and\nmultiplicity of individuals; and falls to see any thing legitimate and\nauthoritative in geographical divisions or territorial\ncircumscriptions.  Back of these, back of individuals, he sees\nhumanity, superior to individuals, superior to states, governments, and\nlaws, and holds that he may trample on them all or give them to the\nwinds at the call of humanity or \"the higher law.\"  The principle on\nwhich he acts is as indefensible as the personal or egoistical\ndemocracy of the slaveholders and their sympathizers.  Were his\nsocialistic tendency to become exclusive and realized, it would found\nin the name of humanity a complete social despotism, which, proving\nimpracticable from its very generality, would break up in anarchy, in\nwhich might makes right, as in the slaveholder's democracy.\n\nThe abolitionists, in supporting themselves on humanity in its\ngenerality, regardless of individual and territorial rights, can\nrecognize no state, no civil authority, and therefore are as much out\nof the order of civilization, and as much in that of barbarism, as is\nthe slaveholder himself.  Wendell Phillips is as far removed from true\nChristian civilization as was John C. Calhoun, and William Lloyd\nGarrison is as much of a barbarian and despot in principle and tendency\nas Jefferson Davis.  Hence the great body of the people in the\nnon-slaveholding States, wedded to American democracy as they were and\nare could never, as much as they detested slavery, be induced to make\ncommon cause with the abolitionists, and their apparent union in the\nlate civil war was accidental, simply owing to the fact that for the\ntime the social democracy and the territorial coincides or had the same\nenemy.  The great body of the loyal people instinctively felt that pure\nsocialism is as incompatible with American democracy as pure\nindividualism; and the abolitionists are well aware that slavery has\nbeen abolished, not for humanitarian or socialistic reasons but really\nfor reasons of state, in order to save the territorial democracy.  The\nterritorial democracy would not unite to eliminate even so barbaric an\nelement as slavery, till the rebellion gave them the constitutional\nright to abolish it; and even then so scrupulous were they, that they\ndemanded a constitutional amendment, so as to be able to make clean\nwork of it, without any blow to individual or State rights.\n\nThe abolitionists were right in opposing slavery, but not in demanding\nits abolition on humanitarian or socialistic grounds. Slavery is really\na barbaric element, and is in direct antagonism to American\ncivilization.  The whole force of the national life opposes it, and\nmust finally eliminate it, or become itself extinct and it is no mean\nproof of their utter want of sympathy with all the living forces of\nmodern civilization, that the leading men of the South and their\nprominent friends at the North really persuaded themselves that with\ncotton, rice, and tobacco, they could effectually resist the\nanti-slavery movement, and perpetuate their barbaric democracy.  They\nstudied the classics, they admired Greece and Rome, and imagined that\nthose nations became great by slavery, instead of being great even in\nspite of slavery.  They failed to take into the account the fact that\nwhen Greece and Rome were in the zenith of their glory, all\ncontemporary nations were also slaveholding nations, and that if they\nwere the greatest and most highly civilized nations of their times,\nthey were not fitted to be the greatest and most highly civilized\nnations of all times.  They failed also to perceive that, if the\nGraeco-Roman republic did not include the whole territorial people in\nthe political people, it yet recognized both the social and the\nterritorial foundation of the state, and never attempted to rest it on\npure individualism; they forgot, too, that Greece and Rome both fell,\nand fell precisely through internal weakness caused by the barbarism\nwithin, not through the force of the barbarism beyond their frontiers.\nThe world has changed since the time when ten thousand of his slaves\nwere sacrificed as a religious offering to the manes of a single Roman\nmaster.  The infusion of the Christian dogma of the unity and\nsolidarity of the race into the belief, the life, the laws, the\njurisprudence of all civilized nations, has doomed slavery and every\nspecies of barbarism; but this our slaveholding countrymen saw not.\n\nIt rarely happens that in any controversy, individual or national, the\nreal issue is distinctly presented, or the precise question in debate\nis clearly and distinctly understood by either party.  Slavery was only\nincidentally involved in the late war. The war was occasioned by the\ncollision of two extreme parties; but it was itself a war between\ncivilization and barbarism, primarily between the territorial democracy\nand the personal democracy, and in reality, on the part of the nation,\nas much a war against the socialism of the abolitionist as against the\nindividualism of the slaveholder.  Yet the victory, though complete\nover the former, is only half won over the latter, for it has left the\nhumanitarian democracy standing, and perhaps for the moment stronger\nthan ever.  The socialistic democracy was enlisted by the territorial,\nnot to strengthen the government at home, as it imagines, for that it\ndid not do, and could not do, since the national instinct was even more\nopposed to it than to the personal democracy; but under its antislavery\naspect, to soften the hostility of foreign powers, and ward off foreign\nintervention, which was seriously threatened.  The populations of\nEurope, especially of France and England, were decidedly anti-slavery,\nand if the war here appeared to them a war, not solely for the unity of\nthe nation and the integrity of its domain, as it really was, in which\nthey took and could take no interest, but a war for the abolition of\nslavery, their governments would not venture to intervene.  This was\nthe only consideration that weighed with Mr. Lincoln, as he himself\nassured the author, and induced him to issue his Emancipation\nProclamation; and Europe rejoices in our victory over the rebellion\nonly so far as it has liberated the slaves, and honors the late\nPresident only as their supposed liberator, not as the preserver of the\nunity and integrity of the nation.  This is natural enough abroad, and\nproves the wisdom of the anti-slavery policy of the government, which\nhad become absolutely necessary to save the Republic long before it was\nadopted; yet it is not as the emancipator of some two or three millions\nof slaves that the American patriot cherishes the memory of Abraham\nLincoln, but, aided by the loyal people, generals of rare merit, and\ntroops of unsurpassed bravery and endurance, as the saviour of the\nAmerican state, and the protector of modern civilization.  His\nanti-slavery policy served this end, and therefore was wise, but he\nadopted it with the greatest possible reluctance.\n\nThere were greater issues in the late war than negro slavery or negro\nfreedom.  That was only an incidental issue, as the really great men of\nthe Confederacy felt, who to save their cause were willing themselves\nat last to free and arm their own negroes, and perhaps were willing to\ndo it even at first.  This fact alone proves that they had, or believed\nthey had, a far more important cause than the preservation of negro\nslavery.  They fought for personal democracy, under the form of State\nsovereignty, against social democracy; for personal freedom and\nindependence against social or humanitarian despotism; and so far their\ncause was as good as that against which they took up arms; and if they\nhad or could have fought against that, without fighting at the same\ntime against the territorial, the real American, the only civilized\ndemocracy, they would have succeeded.  It is not socialism nor\nabolitionism that has won; nor is it the North that has conquered.  The\nUnion itself has won no victories over the South, and it is both\nhistorically and legally false to say that the South has been\nsubjugated.  The Union has preserved itself and American civilization,\nalike for North and South, East and West. The armies that so often met\nin the shock of battle were not drawn up respectively by the North and\nthe South, but by two rival democracies, to decide which of the two\nshould rule the future.  They were the armies of two mutually\nantagonistic systems, and neither army was clearly and distinctly\nconscious of the cause for which it was shedding its blood; each obeyed\ninstinctively a power stronger than itself, and which at best it but\ndimly discerned.  On both sides the cause was broader and deeper than\nnegro slavery, and neither the proslavery men nor the abolitionists\nhave won.  The territorial democracy alone has won, and won what will\nprove to be a final victory over the purely personal democracy, which\nhad its chief seat in the Southern States, though by no means confined\nto them.  The danger to American democracy from that quarter is forever\nremoved, and democracy \u00e0 la Rousseau has received a terrible defeat\nthroughout the world, though as yet it is far from being aware of it.\n\nBut in this world victories are never complete.  The socialistic\ndemocracy claims the victory which has been really won by the\nterritorial democracy, as if it had been socialism, not patriotism,\nthat fired the hearts and nerved the arms of the brave men led by\nMcClellan, Grant, and Sherman.  The humanitarians are more dangerous in\nprinciple than the egoists, for they have the appearance of building on\na broader and deeper foundation, of being more Christian, more\nphilosophic, more generous and philanthropic; but Satan is never more\nsuccessful than under the guise of an angel of light.  His favorite\nguise in modern times is that of philanthropy.  He is a genuine\nhumanitarian, and aims to persuade the world that humanitarianism is\nChristianity, and that man is God; that the soft and charming sentiment\nof philanthropy is real Christian charity; and he dupes both\nindividuals and nations, and makes them do his work, when they believe\nthey are earnestly and most successfully doing the work of God.  Your\nleading abolitionists are as much affected by satanophany as your\nleading confederates, nor are they one whit more philosophical or less\nsophistical.  The one loses the race, the other the individual, and\nneither has learned to apply practically that fundamental truth that\nthere is never the general without the particular, nor the particular\nwithout the general, the race without individuals, nor individuals\nwithout the race.  The whole race was in Adam, and fell in him, as we\nare taught by the doctrine of original sin, or the sin of the race, and\nAdam was an individual, as we are taught in the fact that original sin\nwas in him actual or personal sin.\n\nThe humanitarian is carried away by a vague generality, and loses men\nin humanity, sacrifices the rights of men in a vain endeavor to secure\nthe rights of man, as your Calvinist or his brother Jansenist\nsacrifices the rights of nature in order to secure the freedom of\ngrace.  Yesterday he agitated for the abolition of slavery, to-day he\nagitates for negro suffrage, negro equality, and announces that when he\nhas secured that he will agitate for female suffrage and the equality\nof the sexes, forgetting or ignorant that the relation of equality\nsubsists only between individuals of the same sex; that God made the\nman the head of the woman, and the woman for the man, not the man for\nthe woman. Having obliterated all distinction of sex in politics, in\nsocial, industrial, and domestic arrangements, he must go farther, and\nagitate for equality of property.  But since property, if recognized at\nall, will be unequally acquired and distributed, he must go farther\nstill, and agitate for the total abolition of property, as an\ninjustice, a grievous wrong, a theft, with M. Proudhon, or the\nEnglishman Godwin.  It is unjust that one should have what another\nwants, or even more than another.  What right have you to ride in your\ncoach or astride your spirited barb while I am forced to trudge on\nfoot?  Nor can our humanitarian stop there.  Individuals are, and as\nlong as there are individuals will be, unequal: some are handsomer and\nsome are uglier, some wiser or sillier, more or less gifted, stronger\nor weaker, taller or shorter, stouter or thinner than others, and\ntherefore some have natural advantages which others have not. There is\ninequality, therefore injustice, which can be remedied only by the\nabolition of all individualities, and the reduction of all individuals\nto the race, or humanity, man in general.  He can find no limit to his\nagitation this side of vague generality, which is no reality, but a\npure nullity, for he respects no territorial or individual\ncircumscriptions, and must regard creation itself as a blunder.  This\nis not fancy, for he has gone very nearly as far as it is here shown,\nif logical, he must go.\n\nThe danger now is that the Union victory will, at home and abroad, be\ninterpreted as a victory won in the interest of social or humanitarian\ndemocracy.  It was because they regarded the war waged on the side of\nthe Union as waged in the interest of this terrible democracy, that our\nbishops and clergy sympathized so little with the Government in\nprosecuting it; not, as some imagined, because they were disloyal,\nhostile to American or territorial democracy, or not heartily in favor\nof freedom for all men, whatever their race or complexion.  They had no\nwish to see slavery prolonged, the evils of which they, better than any\nother class of men, knew, and more deeply deplored; none would have\nregretted more than they to have seen the Union broken up; but they\nheld the socialistic or humanitarian democracy represented by Northern\nabolitionists as hostile alike to the Church and to civilization.  For\nthe same reason that they were backward or reserved in their sympathy,\nall the humanitarian sects at home and abroad were forward and even\nostentatious in theirs.  The Catholics feared the war might result in\nencouraging La Republiques democratique et sociale; the humanitarian\nsects trusted that it would.  If the victory of the Union should turn\nout to be a victory for the humanitarian democracy, the civilized world\nwill have no reason to applaud it.\n\nThat there is some danger that for a time the victory will be taken as\na victory for humanitarianism or socialism, it would be idle to deny.\nIt is so taken now, and the humanitarian party throughout the world are\nin ecstasies over it.  The party claim it.  The European Socialists and\nRed Republicans applaud it, and the Mazzinis and the Garibaldis inflict\non us the deep humiliation of their congratulations.  A cause that can\nbe approved by the revolutionary leaders of European Liberals must be\nstrangely misunderstood, or have in it some infamous element. It is no\ncompliment to a nation to receive the congratulations of men who assert\nnot only people-king, but people-God; and those Americans who are\ndelighted with them are worse enemies to the American democracy than\never were Jefferson Davis and his fellow conspirators, and more\ncontemptible, as the swindler is more contemptible than the highwayman.\n\nBut it is probable the humanitarians have reckoned without their host.\nNot they are the real victors.  When the smoke of battle has cleared\naway, the victory, it will be seen, has been won by the Republic, and\nthat that alone has triumphed.  The abolitionists, in so far as they\nasserted the unity of the race and opposed slavery as a denial of that\nunity, have also won; but in so far as they denied the reality or\nauthority of territorial and individual circumscriptions, followed a\npurely socialistic tendency, and sought to dissolve patriotism into a\nwatery sentimentality called philanthropy, have in reality been\ncrushingly defeated, as they will find when the late insurrectionary\nStates are fully reconstructed.  The Southern or egoistical democrats,\nso far as they denied the unity and solidarity of the race, the rights\nof society over individuals, and the equal rights of each and every\nindividual in face of the state, or the obligations of society to\nprotect the weak and help the helpless, have been also defeated; but so\nfar as they asserted personal or individual rights which society\nneither gives nor can take away, and so far as they asserted, not State\nsovereignty, but State rights, held independently of the General\ngovernment, and which limit its authority and sphere of action, they\nshare in the victory, as the future will prove.\n\nEuropean Jacobins, revolutionists, conspiring openly or secretly\nagainst all legitimate authority, whether in Church or State, have no\nlot or part in the victory of the American people: not for them nor for\nmen with their nefarious designs or mad dreams, have our brave soldiers\nfought, suffered and bled for four years of the most terrible war in\nmodern times, and against troops as brave and as well led as\nthemselves; not for them has the country sacrificed a million of lives,\nand contracted a debt of four thousand millions of dollars, besides the\nwaste and destruction that it will take years of peaceful industry to\nrepair.  They and their barbaric democracy have been defeated, and\ncivilization has won its most brilliant victory in all history.  The\nAmerican democracy has crushed, actually or potentially, every species\nof barbarism in the New World, asserted victoriously the state, and\nplaced the government definitively on the side of legitimate authority,\nand made its natural association henceforth with all civilized\ngovernments--not with the revolutionary movements to overthrow them.\nThe American people will always be progressive as well as conservative;\nbut they have learned a lesson, which they much needed against false\ndemocracy: civil war has taught them that \"the sacred right of\ninsurrection\" is as much out of place in a democratic state as in an\naristocratic or a monarchical state; and that the government should\nalways be clothed with ample authority to arrest and punish whoever\nplots its destruction.  They must never be delighted again to have\ntheir government send a national ship to bring hither a noted traitor\nto his own sovereign as the nation's guest.  The people of the Northern\nStates are hardly less responsible for the late rebellion than the\npeople of the Southern States.  Their press had taught them to call\nevery government a tyranny that refused to remain quiet while the\ntraitor was cutting its throat or assassinating the nation, and they\nhad nothing but mad denunciations of the Papal, the Austrian, and the\nNeapolitan governments for their severity against conspirators and\ntraitors. But their own government has found it necessary for the\npublic safety to be equally arbitrary, prompt, and severe, and they\nwill most likely require it hereafter to co-operate with the\ngovernments of the Old World in advancing civilization, instead of\nlending all its moral support, as heretofore, to the Jacobins,\nrevolutionists, socialists, and humanitarians, to bring back the reign\nof barbarism.\n\nThe tendency to individualism has been sufficiently checked by the\nfailure of the rebellion, and no danger from the disintegrating\nelement, either in the particular State or in the United States, is\nhenceforth to be apprehended.  But the tendency in the opposite\ndirection may give the American state some trouble.  The tendency now\nis, as to the Union, consolidation, and as to the particular state,\nhumanitarianism, socialism, or centralized democracy.  Yet this\ntendency, though it may do much mischief, will hardly become exclusive.\nThe States that seceded, when restored, will always, even in abandoning\nState sovereignty, resist it, and still assert State rights.  When\nthese States are restored to their normal position, they will always be\nable to protect themselves against any encroachments on their special\nrights by the General government.  The constitution, in the\ndistribution of the powers of government, provides the States severally\nwith ample means to protect their individuality against the\ncentralizing tendency of the General government, however strong it may\nbe.\n\nThe war has, no doubt, had a tendency to strengthen the General\ngovernment, and to cause the people, to a great extent, to look upon it\nas the supreme and exclusive national government, and to regard the\nseveral State governments as subordinate instead of co-ordinate\ngovernments.  It is not improbable that the Executive, since the\noutbreak of the rebellion, has proceeded throughout on that\nsupposition, and hence his extraordinary assumptions of power; but when\nonce peace is fully re-established and the States have all resumed\ntheir normal position in the Union, every State will be found prompt\nenough to resist any attempt to encroach on its constitutional rights.\nIts instinct of self-preservation will lead it to resist, and it will\nbe protected by both its own judiciary and that of the United States.\n\nThe danger that the General government will usurp the rights of the\nStates is far less than the danger that the Executive will usurp all\nthe powers of Congress and the judiciary.  Congress, during the\nrebellion, clothed the President, as far as it could, with dictatorial\npowers, and these powers the Executive continues to exercise even after\nthe rebellion is suppressed.  They were given and held under the rights\nof war, and for war purposes only, and expired by natural limitation\nwhen the war ceased; but the Executive forgets this, and, instead of\ncalling Congress together and submitting the work of reconstruction of\nthe States that seceded to its wisdom and authority, undertakes to\nreconstruct them himself, as if he were an absolute sovereign; 372 and\nthe people seem to like it.  He might and should, as commander-in-chief\nof the army and navy, govern them as military departments, by his\nlieutenants, till Congress could either create provisional civil\ngovernments for them or recognize them as self-governing States in the\nUnion; but he has no right, under the constitution nor under the war\npower, to appoint civil governors, permanent or provisional; and every\nact he has done in regard to reconstruction is sheer usurpation, and\ndone without authority and without the slightest plea of necessity.\nHis acts in this respect, even if wise and just in themselves, are\ninexcusable, because done by one who has no legal right to do them.\nYet his usurpation is apparently sustained by public sentiment, and a\ndeep wound is inflicted on the constitution, which will be long in\nhealing.\n\nThe danger in this respect is all the greater because it did not\noriginate with the rebellion, but had manifested itself for a long time\nbefore.  There is a growing disposition on the part of Congress to\nthrow as much of the business of government as possible into the hands\nof the Executive.  The patronage the Executive wields, even in times of\npeace, is so large that he has indirectly an almost supreme control\nover the legislative branch of the government.  For this, which is,\nand, if not checked will continue to be, a growing evil, there is no\nobvious remedy, unless the President is chosen for a longer term of\noffice and made ineligible for a second term, and the mischievous\ndoctrine of rotation in office is rejected as incompatible with the\ntrue interests of the public.  Here is matter for the consideration of\nthe American statesman.  But as to the usurpations of the Executive in\nthese unsettled times, they will be only temporary, and will cease when\nthe States are all restored.  They are abuses, but only temporary\nabuses, and the Southern States, when restored to the Union, will\nresume their rights in their own sphere, as self-governing communities,\nand legalize or undo the unwarrantable acts of the Federal Executive.\n\nThe socialistic and centralizing tendency in the bosom of the\nindividual States is the most dangerous, but it will not be able to\nbecome predominant; for philanthropy, unlike charity, does not begin at\nhome, and is powerless unless it operates at a distance. In the States\nin which the humanitarian tendency is the strongest, the territorial\ndemocracy has its most effective organization.  Prior to the outbreak\nof the rebellion the American people had asserted popular sovereignty,\nbut had never rendered an account to themselves in what sense the\npeople are or are not sovereign.  They had never distinguished the\nthree sorts of democracy from one another, asked themselves which of\nthe three is the distinctively American democracy.  For them, democracy\nwas democracy, and those who saw dangers ahead sought to avoid them\neither by exaggerating one or the other of the two exclusive\ntendencies, or else by restraining democracy itself through\nrestrictions on suffrage.  The latter class began to distrust universal\nsuffrage, to lose faith in the people, and to dream of modifying the\nAmerican constitution so as to make it conform more nearly to the\nEnglish model.  The war has proved that the were wrong, for nothing is\nmore certain than that the people have saved the national unity and\nintegrity almost in spite of their government.  The General government\neither was not disposed or was afraid to take a decided stand against\nsecession, till forced to do it by the people themselves.  No wise\nAmerican can henceforth distrust American democracy.  The people may be\ntrusted.  So much is settled.  But as the two extremes were equally\ndemocratic, as the secessionists acted in the name of popular\nsovereignty, and as the humanitarians were not unwilling to allow\nseparation, and would not and did not engage in the war against\nsecession for the sake of the Union and the integrity of the national\ndomain, the conviction becomes irresistible that it was not democracy\nin the sense of either of the extremes that made the war and came out\nof it victorious; and hence the real American democracy must differ\nfrom them both, and is neither a personal nor a humanitarian, but a\nterritorial democracy.  The true idea of American democracy thus comes\nout, for the first time, freed from the two extreme democracies which\nhave been identified with it, and henceforth enters into the\nunderstandings as well as the hearts of the people.  The war has\nenlightened patriotism, and what was sentiment or instinct becomes\nreason--a well-defined, and clearly understood constitutional\nconviction.\n\nIn the several States themselves there are many things to prevent the\nsocialistic tendency from becoming exclusive.  In the States that\nseceded socialism has never had a foothold, and will not gain it, for\nit is resisted by all the sentiments, convictions, and habits of the\nSouthern people, and the Southern people will not be exterminated nor\nswamped by migrations either from the North or from Europe.  They are\nand always will be an agricultural people, and an agricultural people\nare and always will be opposed to socialistic dreams, unless\nunwittingly held for a moment to favor it in pursuit of some special\nobject in which they take a passionate interest.  The worst of all\npolicies is that of hanging, exiling, or disfranchising the wealthy\nlandholders of the South, in order to bring up the poor and depressed\nwhites, shadowed forth in the Executive proclamation of the 29th of\nMay, 1865.  Of course that policy will not be carried out, and if the\nnegroes are enfranchised, they will always vote with the wealthy\nlandholding class, and aid them in resisting all socialistic\ntendencies.  The humanitarians will fail for the want of a good social\ngrievance against which they can declaim.\n\nIn the New England States the humanitarian tendency is strong as a\nspeculation, but only in relation to objects at a distance.  It is\naided much by the congregational constitution of their religion; yet it\nis weak at home, and is resisted practically by the territorial\ndivision of power.  New England means Massachusetts, and nowhere is the\nsubdivision of the powers of government carried further, or the\nconstitution of the territorial democracy more complete, than in that\nState. Philanthropy seldom works in private against private vices and\nevils: it is effective only against public grievances, and the farther\nthey are from home and the less its right to interfere with them, the\nmore in earnest and the more effective for evil does it become.  Its\nnature is to mind every one's business but its own.  But now that\nslavery is abolished, there is nowhere in the United States a social\ngrievance of magnitude enough to enlist any considerable number of the\npeople, even of Massachusetts, in a movement to redress it.  Negro\nenfranchisement is a question of which the humanitarians can make\nsomething and they will make the most of it; but as it is a question\nthat each State will soon settle for itself, it will not serve their\npurpose of prolonged agitation.  They could not and never did carry\naway the nation, even on the question of slavery itself, and\nabolitionism had comparatively little direct influence in abolishing\nslavery; and the exclusion of negro suffrage can never be made to\nappear to the American people as any thing like so great a grievance as\nwas slavery.\n\nBesides, in all the States that did not secede, Catholics are a\nnumerous and an important portion of the population.  Their increasing\nnumbers, wealth, and education secure them, as much as the majority may\ndislike their religion, a constantly increasing influence, and it is\nidle to leave them out in counting the future of the country.  They\nwill, in a very few years, be the best and most thoroughly educated\nclass of the American people; and, aside from their religion, or,\nrather, in consequence of their religion, the most learned,\nenlightened, and intelligent portion of the American population; and as\nmuch as they have disliked the abolitionists, they have, in the army\nand elsewhere, contributed their full share to the victory the nation\nhas won.  The best things written on the controversy have been written\nby Catholics, and Catholics are better fitted by their religion to\ncomprehend the real character of the American constitution than any\nother class of Americans, the moment they study it in the light of\ntheir own theology.  The American constitution is based on that of\nnatural society, on the solidarity of the race, and the difference\nbetween natural society and the church or Christian society is, that\nthe one is initial and the other teleological.  The law of both is the\nsame; Catholics, as such, must resist both extremes, because each is\nexclusive, and whatever is exclusive or one-sided is uncatholic. If\nthey have been backward in their sympathy with the government, it has\nbeen through their dislike of the puritanic spirit and the humanitarian\nor socialistic elements they detected in the Republican party, joined\nwith a prejudice against political and social negro equality.  But\ntheir church everywhere opposes the socialistic movements of the age,\nall movements in behalf of barbarism, and they may always be counted on\nto resist the advance of the socialistic democracy.  If the country has\nhad reason to complain of some of them in the late war, it will have,\nin the future, far stronger reason to be grateful; not to them, indeed,\nfor the citizen owes his life to his country, but to their religion,\nwhich has been and is the grand protectress of modern society and\ncivilization.\n\nFrom the origin of the government there has been a tendency to the\nextension of suffrage, and to exclude both birth and private property\nas bases of political rights or franchises.  This tendency has often\nbeen justified on the ground that the elective franchise is a natural\nright; which is not true, because the elective franchise is political\npower, and political power is always a civil trust, never a natural\nright, and the state judges for itself to whom it will or will not\nconfide the trust; but there can be no doubt that it is a normal\ntendency, and in strict accordance with the constitution of American\ncivil society, which rests on the unity of the race, and public instead\nof private property.  All political distinctions founded on birth,\nrace, or private wealth are anomalies in the American system, and are\nnecessarily eliminated by its normal developments.  To contend that\nnone but property-holders may vote, or none but persons of a particular\nrace may be enfranchised, is unamerican and contrary, to the order of\ncivilization the New World is developing.  The only qualification for\nthe elective franchise the American system can logically insist on is\nthat the elector belong to the territorial people--that is, be a\nnatural-born or a naturalized citizen, be a major in full possession of\nhis natural faculties, and unconvicted of any infamous offence.  The\nState is free to naturalize foreigners or not, and under such\nrestrictions as it judges proper; but, having naturalized them, it must\ntreat them as standing on the same footing with natural-born citizens.\n\nThe naturalization question is one of great national importance. The\nmigration of foreigners hither has added largely to the national\npopulation, and to the national wealth and resources, but less,\nperhaps, to the development of patriotism, the purity of elections, or\nthe wisdom and integrity of the government.  It is impossible that\nthere should be perfect harmony between the national territorial\ndemocracy and individuals born, brought up, and formed under a\npolitical order in many respects widely different from it; and there is\nno doubt that the democracy, in its objectionable sense, has been\ngreatly strengthened by the large infusion of naturalized citizens.\nThere can be no question that, if the laboring classes, in whom the\nnational sentiment is usually the strongest, had been composed almost\nwholly of native Americans, instead of being, as they were, at least in\nthe cities, large towns, and villages, composed almost exclusively of\npersons foreign born, the Government would have found far less\ndifficulty in filling up the depleted ranks of its armies.  But to\nleave so large a portion of the actual population as the foreign born\nresiding in the country without the rights of citizens, would have been\na far graver evil, and would, in the late struggle, have given the\nvictory to secession.  There are great national advantages derived from\nthe migration hither of foreign labor, and if the migration be\nencouraged or permitted, naturalization on easy and liberal terms is\nthe wisest, the best, and only safe policy.  The children of\nforeign-born parents are real Americans.\n\nEmigration has, also, a singular effect in developing the latent powers\nof the emigrant, and the children of emigrants are usually more active,\nmore energetic than the children of the older inhabitants of the\ncountry among whom they settle.  Some of our first men in civil life\nhave been sons of foreign-born parents, and so are not a few of our\ngreatest and most successful generals.  The most successful of our\nmerchants have been foreign-born.  The same thing has been noticed\nelsewhere, especially in the emigration of the French Huguenots to\nHolland, Germany, England, and Ireland.  The immigration of so many\nmillions from the Old World has, no doubt, given to the American people\nmuch of their bold, energetic, and adventurous character, and made them\na superior people on the whole to what they would otherwise have been.\nThis has nothing to do with superiority or inferiority of race or\nblood, but is a natural effect of breaking men away from routine, and\nthrowing them back on their own individual energies and personal\nresources.\n\nResistance is offered to negro suffrage, and justly too, till the\nrecently emancipated slaves have served an apprenticeship to freedom;\nbut that resistance cannot long stand before the onward progress of\nAmerican democracy, which asserts equal rights for all, and not for a\nrace or class only.  Some would confine suffrage to landholders, or, at\nleast, to property-holders; but that is inconsistent with the American\nidea, and is a relic of the barbaric constitution which founds power on\nprivate instead of public wealth.  Nor are property-owners a whit more\nlikely to vote for the public good than are those who own no property\nbut their own labor.  The men of wealth, the business men,\nmanufacturers and merchants, bankers and brokers, are the men who exert\nthe worst influence on government in every country, for they always\nstrive to use it as an instrument of advancing their own private\ninterests.  They act on the beautiful maxim, \"Let government take care\nof the rich, and the rich will take care of the poor,\" instead of the\nfar safer maxim, \"Let government take care of the weak, the strong can\ntake care of themselves.\" Universal suffrage is better than restricted\nsuffrage, but even universal suffrage is too weak to prevent private\nproperty from having an undue political influence.\n\nThe evils attributed to universal suffrage are not inseparable from it,\nand, after all, it is doubtful if it elevates men of an inferior class\nto those elevated by restricted suffrage.  The Congress of 1860, or of\n1862. was a fair average of the wisdom, the talent, and the virtue of\nthe country, and not inferior to that of 1776, or that of 1789; and the\nExecutive during the rebellion was at least as able and as efficient as\nit was during the war of 1812, far superior to that of Great Britain,\nand not inferior to that of France during the Crimean war.  The Crimean\nwar developed and placed in high command, either with the English or\nthe French, no generals equal to Halleck, Grant, and Sherman, to say\nnothing of others.  The more aristocratic South proved itself, in both\nstatesmanship and generalship, in no respect superior to the\nterritorial democracy of the North and West.\n\nThe great evil the country experiences is not from universal suffrage,\nbut from what may be called rotation in office.  The number of\npolitical aspirants is so great that, in the Northern and Western\nStates especially, the representatives in Congress are changed every\ntwo or four years, and a member, as soon as he has acquired the\nexperience necessary to qualify him for his position, is dropped, not\nthrough the fickleness of his constituency, but to give place to\nanother whose aid had been necessary to his first or second election.\nEmployes are \"rotated,\" not because they are incapable or unfaithful,\nbut because there are others who want their places.  This is all bad,\nbut it springs not from universal suffrage, but from a wrong public\nopinion, which might be corrected by the press, but which is mainly\nformed by it.  There is, no doubt, a due share of official corruption,\nbut not more than elsewhere, and that would be much diminished by\nincreasing the salaries of the public servants, especially in the\nhigher offices of the government, both General and State.  The pay to\nthe lower officers and employes of the government, and to the privates\nand non-commissioned officers in the army, is liberal, and, in general,\ntoo liberal; but the pay of the higher grades in both the civil and\nmilitary service is too low, and relatively far lower than it was when\nthe government was first organized.\n\nThe worst tendency in the country, and which is not encouraged at all\nby the territorial democracy, manifests itself in hostility to the\nmilitary spirit and a standing army.  The depreciation of the military\nspirit comes from the humanitarian or sentimental democracy, which,\nlike all sentimentalisms, defeats itself, and brings about the very\nevils it seeks to avoid.  The hostility to standing armies is inherited\nfrom England, and originated in the quarrels between king and\nparliament, and is a striking evidence of the folly of that bundle of\nantagonistic forces called the British constitution.  In feudal times\nmost of the land was held by military service, and the reliance of\ngovernment was on the feudal militia; but no real progress was made in\neliminating barbarism till the national authority got a regular army at\nits command, and became able to defend itself against its enemies. It\nis very doubtful if English civilization has not, upon the whole, lost\nmore than it has gained by substituting parliamentary for royal\nsupremacy, and exchanging the Stuarts for the Guelfs.\n\nNo nation is a living, prosperous nation that has lost the military\nspirit, or in which the profession of the soldier is not held in honor\nand esteem; and a standing army of reasonable size is public economy.\nIt absorbs in its ranks a class of men who are worth more there than\nanywhere else; it creates honorable places for gentlemen or the sons of\ngentlemen without wealth, in which they can serve both themselves and\ntheir country.  Under a democratic government the most serious\nembarrassment to the state is its gentlemen, or persons not disposed or\nnot fitted to support themselves by their own hands, more necessary in\na democratic government than in any other.  The civil service,\ndivinity, law, and medicine, together with literature, science, and\nart, cannot absorb the whole of this ever-increasing class, and the\narmy and navy would be an economy and a real service to the state were\nthey maintained only for the sake of the rank and position they give to\ntheir officers, and the wholesome influence these officers would exert\non society and the politics of the country--this even in case there\nwere no wars or apprehension of wars.  They supply an element needed in\nall society, to sustain in it the chivalric and heroic spirit,\nperpetually endangered by the mercantile and political spirit, which\nhas in it always something low and sordid.\n\nBut wars are inevitable, and when a nation has no surrounding nations\nto fight, it will, as we have just proved, fight itself. When it can\nhave no foreign war, it will get up a domestic war; for the human\nanimal, like all animals, must work off in some way its fighting humor,\nand the only sure way of maintaining peace is always to be prepared for\nwar.  A regular standing army of forty thousand men would have\nprevented the Mexican war, and an army of fifty thousand\nwell-disciplined and efficient troops at the command of the President\non his inauguration in March, 1861, would have prevented the rebellion,\nor have instantly suppressed it.  The cost of maintaining a land army\nof even a hundred thousand men, and a naval force to correspond, would\nhave been, in simple money value, only a tithe of what the rebellion\nhas cost the nation, to say nothing of the valuable lives that have\nbeen sacrificed for the losses on the rebel side, as well as those on\nthe side of the government, are equally to be counted. The actual\nlosses to the country have been not less than six or eight thousand\nmillions of dollars, or nearly one-half the assessed value of the whole\nproperty of the United States according to the census returns of 1860,\nand which has only been partially cancelled by actual increase of\nproperty since.  To meet the interest on the debt incurred will require\na heavier sum to be raised annually by taxation, twice over, without\ndischarging a cent of the principal, than would have been necessary to\nmaintain an army and navy adequate to the protection of peace and the\nprevention of the rebellion.\n\nThe rebellion is now suppressed, and if the government does not blunder\nmuch more in its civil efforts at pacification than it did in its\nmilitary operations, before 1868 things will settle down into their\nnormal order; but a regular army--not militia or volunteers, who are\ntoo expensive--of at least a hundred thousand men of all arms, and a\nnavy nearly as large as that of England or France, will be needed as a\npeace establishment.  The army of a hundred thousand men must form a\ncadre of an army of three times that number, which will be necessary to\nplace the army on a war footing.  Less will answer neither for peace\nnor war, for the nation has, in spite of herself, to maintain\nhenceforth the rank of a first-class military and maritime power, and\ntake a leading part in political movements of the civilized world, and,\nto a great extent, hold in her hand the peace of Europe.\n\nCanning boasted that he had raised up the New World to redress the\nbalance of the Old: a vain boast, for he simply weakened Spain and gave\nthe hegemony of Europe to Russia, which the Emperor of the French is\ntrying, by strengthening Italy and Spain, and by a French protectorate\nin Mexico, to secure to France, both in the Old World and the New--a\nmagnificent dream, but not to be realized.  His uncle judged more\nwisely when he sold Louisiana, left the New World to itself, and sought\nonly to secure to France the hegemony of the Old.  But the hegemony of\nthe New World henceforth belongs to the United States, and she will\nhave a potent voice in adjusting the balance of power even in Europe.\nTo maintain this position, which is imperative on her, she must always\nhave a large armed force, either on foot or in reserve, which she can\ncall out and put on a war footing at short notice.  The United States\nmust henceforth be a great military and naval power, and the old\nhostility to a standing army and the old attempt to bring the military\ninto disrepute must be abandoned, and the country yield to its destiny.\n\nOf the several tendencies mentioned, the humanitarian tendency,\negoistical at the South, detaching the individual from the race and\nsocialistic at the North, absorbing the individual in the race, is the\nmost dangerous.  The egoistical form is checked, sufficiently weakened\nby the defeat of the rebels; but the social form believes that it has\ntriumphed, and that individuals are effaced in society, and the States\nin the Union.  Against this, more especially should public opinion and\nAmerican statesmanship be now directed, and territorial democracy and\nthe division of the powers of government be asserted and vigorously\nmaintained. The danger is that while this socialistic form of democracy\nis conscious of itself, the territorial democracy has not yet arrived,\nas the Germans say, at self consciousness--_selbsbewusstseyn_--and\noperates only instinctively. All the dominant theories and\nsentimentalities are against it, and it is only Providence that can\nsustain it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nDESTINY--POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS.\n\n\nIt has been said in the Introduction to this essay that every living\nnation receives from Providence a special work or mission in the\nprogress of society, to accomplish which is its destiny, or the end for\nwhich it exists; and that the special mission of the United States is\nto continue and complete in the political order the Graeco-Roman\ncivilization.\n\nOf all the states or colonies on this continent, the American Republic\nalone has a destiny, or the ability to add any thing to the\ncivilization of the race.  Canada and the other British Provinces,\nMexico and Central America, Columbia and Brazil, and the rest of the\nSouth American States, might be absorbed in the United States without\nbeing missed by the civilized world.  They represent no idea, and the\nwork of civilization could go on without them as well as with them.  If\nthey keep up with the progress of civilization, it is all that can be\nexpected of them. France, England, Germany, and Italy might absorb the\nrest of Europe, and all Asia and Africa, without withdrawing a single\nlaborer from the work of advancing the civilization of the race; and it\nis doubtful if these nations themselves can severally or jointly\nadvance it much beyond the point reached by the Roman Empire, except in\nabolishing slavery and including in the political people the whole\nterritorial people.  They can only develop and give a general\napplication to the fundamental principles of the Roman constitution.\nThat indeed is much, but it adds no new element nor new combination of\npreexisting elements.  But nothing of this can be said of the United\nStates.\n\nIn the Graeco-Roman civilization is found the state proper, and the\ngreat principle of the territorial constitution of power, instead of\nthe personal or the genealogical, the patriarchal or the monarchical;\nand yet with true civil or political principles it mixed up nearly all\nthe elements of the barbaric constitution. The gentile system of Rome\nrecalls the patriarchal, and the relation that subsisted between the\npatron and his clients has a striking resemblance to that which\nsubsists between the feudal lord and his retainers, and may have had\nthe same origin.  The three tribes, Ramnes, Quirites, and Luceres, into\nwhich the Roman people were divided before the rise of the plebs, may\nhave been, as Niebuhr contends, local, not genealogical, in their\norigin, but they were not strictly territorial distinctions, and the\ndivision of each tribe into a hundred houses or gentes was not local,\nbut personal, if not, as the name implies, genealogical. No doubt the\nindividuals or families composing the house or gens were not all of\nkindred blood, for the Oriental custom of adoption, so frequent with\nour North American Indians, and with all people distributed into\ntribes, septs, or clans, obtained with the Romans.  The adopted member\nwas considered a child of the house, and took its name and inherited\nits goods.  Whether, as Niebuhr maintains, all the free gentiles of the\nthree tribes were called patres or patricians or whether the term was\nrestricted to the heads of houses, it is certain that the head of the\nhouse represented it in the senate, and the vote in the curies was by\nhouses, not by individuals en masse.  After all, practically the Roman\nsenate was hardly less an estate than the English house of lords, for\nno one could sit in it unless a landed proprietor and of noble blood.\nThe plebs, though outside of the political people proper, as not being\nincluded in the three tribes, when they came to be a power in the\nrepublic under the emperors, and the old distinction of plebs and\npatricians was forgotten, were an estate, and not a local or\nterritorial people.\n\nThe republican element was in the fact that the land, which gave the\nright to participate in political power, was the domain of the state,\nand the tenant held it from the state.  The domain was vested in the\nstate, not in the senator nor the prince, and was therefore respublica,\nnot private property--the first grand leap of the human race from\nbarbarism.  In all other respects the Roman constitution was no more\nrepublican than the feudal. Athens went farther than Rome, and\nintroduced the principle of territorial democracy.  The division into\ndemes or wards, whence comes the word democracy, was a real territorial\ndivision, not personal nor genealogical.  And if the equality of all\nmen was not recognized, all who were included in the political class\nstood on the same footing.  Athens and other Greek cities, though\nconquered by Rome, exerted after their conquest a powerful influence on\nRoman civilization, which became far more democratic under the emperors\nthan it had been under the patrician senate, which the assassins of\nJulius Caesar, and the superannuated conservative party they\nrepresented, tried so hard to preserve. The senate and the consulship\nwere opened to the representatives of the great plebeian houses, and\nthe provincials were clothed with the rights of Roman citizens, and\nuniform laws were established throughout the empire.\n\nThe grand error, as has already been said, of the Graeco-Roman or\ngentile civilization, was in its denial or ignorance of the unity of\nthe human race, as well as the Unity of God, and in its including in\nthe state only a particular class of the territorial people, while it\nheld all the rest as slaves, though in different degrees of servitude.\nIt recognized and sustained a privileged class, a ruling order; and if,\nas subsequently did the Venetian aristocracy, it recognized democratic\nequality within that order, it held all outside of it to be less than\nmen and without political rights.  Practically, power was an attribute\nof birth and of private wealth.  Suffrage was almost universal among\nfreemen, but down almost to the Empire, the people voted by orders, and\nwere counted, not numerically, but by the rank of the order, and the\ncomitia curiata could always carry the election over the comitia\ncenturiata, and thus power remained always in the hands of the rich and\nnoble few.\n\nThe Roman Law, as digested by jurists under Justinian in the sixth\nCentury, indeed, recognizes the unity of the race, asserts the equality\nof all men by the natural law, and undertakes to defend slavery on\nprinciples not incompatible with that equality. It represents it as a\ncommutation of the punishment of death, which the emperor has the right\nto inflict on captives taken in war, to perpetual servitude; and as\nservitude is less severe than death, slavery was really a proof of\nimperial clemency.  But it has never yet been proved that the emperor\nhas the right under the natural law to put captives taken even in a\njust war to death, and the Roman poet himself bids us \"humble the\nproud, but spare the submissive.\"  In a just war the emperor may kill\non the battle-field those in arms against him, but the jus gentium, as\nnow interpreted by the jurisprudence of every civilized nation, does\nnot allow him to put them to death after they have ceased resistance,\nhave thrown down their arms, and surrendered.  But even if it did, it\ngives him a right only over the persons captured, not over their\ninnocent children, and therefore no right to establish hereditary\nslavery, for the child is not punishable for the offences of the\nparent.  The law, indeed, assumed that the captive ceased to exist as a\nperson and treated him as a thing, or mere property of the conqueror,\nand being property, he could beget only property, which would accrue\nonly to his owner.  But there is no power in heaven or earth that can\nmake a person a thing, a mere piece of merchandise, and it is only by a\nclumsy fiction, or rather by a bare-faced lie, that the law denies the\nslave his personality and treats him as a thing. I the unity of all men\nhad been clearly seen and vividly felt, the law would never have\nattempted to justify perpetual slavery on the ground of its penal\ncharacter, or indeed on any ground whatever.  All men are born under\nthe law of nature with equal rights, and the civil law can justly\ndeprive no man of his liberty, but for a crime, committed by him\npersonally, that justly forfeits his liberty to society.\n\nThese defects of the Graeco-Roman civilization the European nations\nhave in part remedied, and may completely remedy.  They can carry out\npractically the Christian dogma of the unity of the human race, abolish\nslavery in every form, make all men equal before the law, and the\npolitical people commensurate with the territorial people.  Indeed,\nFrance has already done it.  She has abolished slavery, villenage,\nserfage, political aristocracy, asserted the equality of all men before\nthe law, vindicated the sovereignty of the people, and established\nuniversal suffrage, complete social and territorial democracy.  The\nother nations may do as much, but hardly can any of them do more or\nadvance farther.  Yet in France, territorial democracy the most\ncomplete results only in establishing the most complete imperial\ncentralism, usually called Caesarism.\n\nThe imperial constitution of France recognizes that the emperor reigns\n\"by the grace of God and the will of the nation,\" and therefore, that\nby the grace of God and the will of the nation he may cease to reign;\nbut while he reigns he is supreme, and his will is law.  The\nconstitution imposes no real or effective restraint on his power: while\nhe sits upon the throne he is practically France, and the ministers are\nhis clerks; the council of state, the senate, and the legislative body\nare merely his agents in governing the nation.  This may, indeed, be\nchanged, but only to substitute for imperial centralism democratic\ncentralism, which were no improvement, or to go back to the system of\nantagonisms, checks and balances, called constitutionalism, or\nparliamentary government, of which Great Britain is the model, and\nwhich were a return toward barbarism, or mediaeval feudalism.\n\nThe human race has its life in God, and tends to realize in all orders\nthe Divine Word or Logos, which is Ionic itself, and the principle of\nall conciliation, of the dialectic union of all opposites or extremes.\nMankind will be logical; and the worst of all tyrannies is that which\nforbids them to draw from their principles their last logical\nconsequences, or that prohibits them the free explication and\napplication of the Divine Idea, in which consists their life, their\nprogress.  Such tyranny strikes at the very existence of society, and\nwars against the reality of things.  It is supremely sophistical, and\nits success is death; for the universe in its constitution is supremely\nlogical, and man, individually and socially, is rational.  God is the\nauthor and type of all created things; and all creatures, each in its\norder, imitate or copies the Divine Being, who is intrinsically Father,\nSon, and Holy Ghost, principle, medium, and end.  The Son or Word is\nthe medium, which unites the two extremes, whence God is living God a\nreal, active, living Being--living, concrete, not abstract or dead\nunity, like the unity of old Xenophanes, Plotinus, and Proclus.  In the\nHoly Trinity is the principle and prototype of all society, and what is\ncalled the solidarity of the race is only the outward expression, or\ncopy in the external order, of what theologians term the circumsession\nof the three Divine Persons of the Godhead.\n\nNow, human society, when it copies the Divine essence and nature either\nin the distinction of persons alone, or in the unity alone, is\nsophistical, and wants the principle of all life and reality.  It sins\nagainst God, and must fail of its end.  The English system, which is\nbased on antagonistic elements, on opposites, without the middle term\nthat conciliates them, unites them, and makes them dialectically one,\ncopies the Divine model in its distinctions alone, which, considered\nalone, are opposites or contraries.  It denies, if Englishmen could but\nsee it, the unity of God.  The French, or imperial system, which\nexcludes the extremes, instead of uniting them, denies all opposites,\ninstead of conciliating them--denies the distinctions in the model, and\ncopies only the unity, which is the supreme sophism called pantheism.\nThe English constitution has no middle term, and the French no\nextremes, and each in its way denies the Divine Trinity, the original\nbasis and type of the syllogism.  The human race can be contented with\nneither, for neither allows it free scope for its inherent life and\nactivity.  The English system tends to pure individualism; the French\nto pure socialism or despotism, each endeavoring to suppress an element\nof the one living and indissoluble TRUTH.\n\nThis is not fancy, is not fine-spun speculation, or cold and lifeless\nabstraction, but the highest theological and philosophical truth,\nwithout which there were no reason, no man, no society; for God is the\nfirst principle of all being, all existence, all science, all life, and\nit is in Him that we live and move and have our being.  God is at the\nbeginning, in the middle, and at the end of all things--the universal\nprinciple, medium, and end; and no truth can be denied without His\nexistence being directly or indirectly impugned.  In a deeper sense\nthan is commonly understood is it true that nisi Dominus aedificaverit\ndomum, in vanum laboraverunt qui aedificant eam.  The English\nconstitution is composed of contradictory elements, incapable of\nreconciliation, and each element is perpetually struggling with the\nothers for the mastery.  For a long time the king labored, intrigued,\nand fought to free himself from the thraldom in which he was held by\nthe feudal barons; in 1688 the aristocracy and people united and\nhumbled the crown; and now the people are at work seeking to sap both\nthe crown and the nobles.  The state is constituted to nobody's\nsatisfaction; and though all may unite in boasting its excellences, all\nare at work trying to alter or amend it.  The work of constituting the\nstate with the English is ever beginning, never ending.  Hence the\neternal clamor for parliamentary reform.\n\nGreat Britain and other European states may sweep away all that remains\nof feudalism, include the whole territorial people with the equal\nrights of all in the state or political people, concede to birth and\nwealth no political rights, but they will by so doing only establish\neither imperial centralism, as has been done in France, or democratic\ncentralism, clamored for, conspired for, and fought for by the\nrevolutionists of Europe.  The special merit of the American system is\nnot in its democracy alone, as too many at home and abroad imagine; but\nalong with its democracy in the division of the powers of government,\nbetween a General government and particular State governments, which\nare not antagonistic governments, for they act on different matters,\nand neither is nor can be subordinated to the other.\n\nNow, this division of power, which decentralizes the government without\ncreating mutually hostile forces, can hardly be introduced into any\nEuropean state.  There may be a union of states in Great Britain, in\nGermany, in Italy, perhaps in Spain, and Austria is laboring hard to\neffect it in her heterogeneous empire; but the union possible in any of\nthem is that of a Bund or confederation, like the Swiss or German Bund,\nsimilar to what the secessionists in the United States so recently\nattempted and have so signally failed to establish.  An intelligent\nConfederate officer remarked that their Confederacy had not been in\noperation three months before it became evident that the principle on\nwhich it was founded, if not rejected, would insure its defeat. It was\nthat principle of State sovereignty, for which the States seceded, more\nthan the superior resources and numbers of the Government, that caused\nthe collapse of the Confederacy.  The numbers were relatively about\nequal, and the military resources of the Confederacy were relatively\nnot much inferior to those of the Government.  So at least the\nConfederate leaders thought, and they knew the material resources of\nthe Government as well as their own, and had calculated them with as\nmuch care and accuracy as any men could.  Foreign powers also, friendly\nas well as unfriendly, felt certain that the secessionists would gain\ntheir independence, and so did a large part of the people even of the\nloyal States.  The failure is due to the disintegrating principle of\nState sovereignty, the very principle of the Confederacy.  The war has\nproved that united states are, other things being equal, an overmatch\nfor confederated states.\n\nThe European states must unite either as equals or as unequals. As\nequals, the union can be only a confederacy, a sort of Zollverein, in\nwhich each state retains its individual sovereignty; if as unequals,\nthen someone among them will aspire to the hegemony, and you have over\nagain the Athenian Confederation, formed at the conclusion of the\nPersian war, and its fate.  A union like the American cannot be created\nby a compact, or by the exercise of supreme power.  The Emperor of the\nFrench cannot erect the several Departments of France into states, and\ndivide the powers of government between them as individual and as\nunited states.  They would necessarily hold from the imperial\ngovernment, which, though it might exercise a large part of its\nfunctions through them, would remain, as now, the supreme central\ngovernment, from which all governmental powers emanate, as our\nPresident is apparently attempting, in his reconstruction policy, to\nmake the government of the United States.  The elements of a state\nconstituted like the American do not exist in any European nation, nor\nin the constitution of European society; and the American constitution\nwould have been impracticable even here had not Providence so ordered\nit that the nation was born with it, and has never known any other.\n\nRome recognized the necessity of the federal principle, and applied it\nin the best way she could.  At first it was a single tribe or people\ndistributed into distinct gentes or houses; after the Sabine war, a\nsecond tribe was added on terms of equality, and the state was dual,\ncomposed of two tribes, the Ramnes and the Tities or Quirites, and,\nafterward, in the time of Tullus Hostilius, were added the Lucertes or\nLuceres, making the division into three ruling tribes, each divided\ninto one hundred houses or gentes.  Each house in each tribe was\nrepresented by its chief or decurion in the senate, making the number\nof senators exactly three hundred, at which number the senate was\nfixed.  Subsequently was added, by Ancus, the plebs, who remained\nwithout authority or share in the government of the city of Rome\nitself, though they might aspire to the first rank in the allied\ncities.  The division into tribes, and the division of the tribes into\ngentes or houses, and the vote in the state by tribes, and in the\ntribes by houses, effectually excluded democratic centralism; but the\ndivision was not a division of the powers of government between two\nco-ordinate governments, for the senate had supreme control, like the\nBritish parliament, over all matters, general and particular.\n\nThe establishment, after the secession of the plebs, of the tribunitial\nveto, which gave the plebeians a negative power in the state, there was\nan incipient division of the powers of government; but only a division\nbetween the positive and negative powers, not between the general and\nthe particular.  The power accorded to the plebs, or commons, as\nNiebuhr calls them--who is, perhaps, too fond of explaining the early\nconstitution of Rome by analogies borrowed from feudalism, and\nespecially from the constitution of his native Ditmarsch--was simply an\nobstructive power; and when it, by development, became a positive\npower, it absorbed all the powers of government, and created the Empire.\n\nThere was, indeed, a nearer approach to the division of powers in the\nAmerican system, between imperial Rome and her allied or confederated\nmunicipalities.  These municipalities, modelled chiefly after that of\nRome, were elective, and had the management of their own local affairs;\nbut their local powers were not co-ordinate in their own sphere with\nthose exercised by the Roman municipality, but subordinate and\ndependent.  The senate had the supreme power over them, and they held\ntheir rights subject to its will.  They were formally, or virtually,\nsubjugated states, to which the Roman senate, and afterward the Roman\nemperors, left the form of the state and the mere shadow of freedom.\nRome owed much to her affecting to treat them as allies rather than as\nsubjects, and at first these municipal organizations secured the\nprogress of civilization in the provinces; but at a later period, under\nthe emperors, they served only the imperial treasury, and were crushed\nby the taxes imposed and the contributions levied on them by the fiscal\nagents of the empire.  So heavy were the fiscal burdens imposed on the\nburgesses, if the term may be used, that it needed an imperial edict to\ncompel them to enter the municipal government; and it became, under the\nlater emperors, no uncommon thing for free citizens to sell themselves\ninto slavery, to escape the fiscal burdens imposed.  There are actually\nimperial edicts extant forbidden freemen to sell themselves as slaves.\nThus ended the Roman federative system, and it is difficult to discover\nin Europe the elements of a federative system that could have a more\nfavorable result.\n\nNow, the political destiny or mission of the United States is, in\ncommon with the European nations, to eliminate the barbaric elements\nretained by the Roman constitution, and specially to realize that\nphilosophical division of the powers of government which distinguish it\nfrom both imperial and democratic centralism on the one hand, and, on\nthe other, from the checks and balances or organized antagonisms which\nseek to preserve liberty by obstructing the exercise of power.  No\ngreater problem in statesmanship remains to be solved, and no greater\ncontribution to civilization to be made.  Nowhere else than in this New\nWorld, and in this New World only in the United States, can this\nproblem be solved, or this contribution be made, and what the\nGraeco-Roman republic began be completed.\n\nBut the United States have a religious as well as a political destiny,\nfor religion and politics go together.  Church and state, as\ngovernments, are separate indeed, but the principles on which the state\nis founded have their origin and ground in the spiritual order--in the\nprinciples revealed or affirmed by religion--and are inseparable from\nthem.  There is no state without God, any more than there is a church\nwithout Christ or the Incarnation.  An atheist may be a politician, but\nif there were no God there could be no politics, theological principles\nare the basis of political principles.  The created universe is a\ndialectic whole, distinct but inseparable from its Creator, and all its\nparts cohere and are essential to one another.  All has its origin and\nprototype in the Triune God, and throughout expresses unity in\ntriplicity and triplicity in unity, without which there is no real\nbeing and no actual or possible life. Every thing has its principle,\nmedium, and end.  Natural society is initial, civil government is\nmedial, the church is teleological, but the three are only distinctions\nin one indissoluble whole.\n\nMan, as we have seen, lives by communion with God through the Divine\ncreative act, and is perfected or completed only through the\nIncarnation, in Christ, the Word made flesh.  True, he communes with\nGod through his kind, and through external nature, society in which he\nis born and reared, and property through which he derives sustenance\nfor his body; but these are only media of his communion with God, the\nsource of life--not either the beginning or the end of his communion.\nThey have no life in themselves, since their being is in God, and, of\nthemselves, can impart none.  They are in the order of second causes,\nand second causes, without the first cause, are nought.  Communion\nwhich stops with them, which takes them as the principle and end,\ninstead of media, as they are, is the communion of death, not of life.\nAs religion includes all that relates to communion with God, it must in\nsome form be inseparable from every living act of man, both\nindividually and socially; and, in the long run, men must conform\neither their politics to their religion or their religion to their\npolitics.  Christianity is constantly at work, moulding political\nsociety in its own image and likeness, and every political system\nstruggles to harmonize Christianity with itself.  If, then, the United\nStates have a political destiny, they have a religious destiny\ninseparable from it.\n\nThe political destiny of the United States is to conform the state to\nthe order of reality, or, so to speak, to the Divine Idea in creation.\nTheir religious destiny is to render practicable and to realize the\nnormal relations between church and state, religion and politics, as\nconcreted in the life of the nation.\n\nIn politics, the United States are not realizing a political theory of\nany sort whatever.  They, on the contrary, are successfully refuting\nall political theories, making away with them, and establishing the\nstate--not on a theory, not on an artificial basis or a foundation laid\nby human reason or will, but on reality, the eternal and immutable\nprinciples in relation to which man is created.  They are doing the\nsame in regard to religious theories.  Religion is not a theory, a\nsubjective view, an opinion, but is, objectively, at once a principle,\na law, and a fact, and, subjectively, it is, by the aid of God's grace,\npractical conformity to what is universally true and real.  The United\nStates, in fulfilment of their destiny, are making as sad havoc with\nreligious theories as with political theories, and are pressing on with\nirresistible force to the real or the Divine order which is expressed\nin the Christian mysteries, which exists independent of man's\nunderstanding and will, and which man can neither make nor unmake.\n\nThe religious destiny of the United States is not to create a new\nreligion nor to found a new church.  All real religion is catholic, and\nis neither new nor old, but is always and everywhere true.  Even our\nLord came neither to found a new church nor to create a new religion,\nbut to do the things which had been foretold, and to fulfil in time\nwhat had been determined in eternity.  God has himself founded the\nchurch on catholic principles, or principles always and everywhere real\nprinciples. His church is necessarily catholic, because founded on\ncatholic dogmas, and the dogmas are catholic, because they are\nuniversal and immutable principles, having their origin and ground in\nthe Divine Being Himself, or in the creative act by which He produces\nand sustains all things.  Founded on universal and immutable\nprinciples, the church can never grow old or obsolete, but is the\nchurch for all times and Places, for all ranks and conditions of men.\nMan cannot change either the church or the dogmas of faith, for they\nare founded in the highest reality, which is above him, over him, and\nindependent of him.  Religion is above and independent of the state,\nand the state has nothing to do with the church or her dogmas, but to\naccept and conform to them as it does to any of the facts or principles\nof science, to a mathematical truth, or to a physical law.\n\nBut while the church, with her essential constitution, and her dogmas\nare founded in the Divine order, and are catholic and unalterable, the\nrelations between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities may be\nchanged or modified by the changes of time and place.  These relations\nhave not been always the same, but have differed in different ages and\ncountries.  During the first three centuries of our era the church had\nno legal status, and was either connived at or persecuted by the state.\nUnder the Christian emperors she was recognized by the civil law; her\nprelates had exclusive jurisdiction in mixed civil and ecclesiastical\nquestions, and were made, in some sense, civil magistrates, and paid as\nsuch by the empire.  Under feudalism, the prelates received investiture\nas princes and barons, and formed alone, or in connection with the\ntemporal lords, an estate in the kingdom.  The Pope became a temporal\nprince and suzerain, at one time, of a large part of Europe, and\nexercised the arbitratorship in all grave questions between Christian\nsovereigns themselves, and between them and their subjects. Since the\ndownfall of feudalism and the establishment of modern centralized\nmonarchy, the church has been robbed of the greater part of her\ntemporal possessions, and deprived, in most countries, of all civil\nfunctions, and treated by the state either as an enemy or as a slave.\n\nIn all the sectarian and schismatic states of the Old World, the\nnational church is held in strict subjection to the civil authority, as\nin Great Britain and Russia, and is the slave of the state; in the\nother states of Europe, as France, Austria, Spain, and Italy, she is\ntreated with distrust by the civil government, and allowed hardly a\nshadow of freedom and independence.  In France, which has the proud\ntitle of eldest daughter of the church, Catholics, as such, are not\nfreer than they are in Turkey.  All religious are said to be free, and\nall are free, except the religion of the majority of Frenchmen.  The\nemperor, because nominally a Catholic, takes it upon himself to concede\nthe church just as much and just as little freedom in the empire as he\njudges expedient for his own secular interests.  In Italy, Spain,\nPortugal, Mexico, and the Central and South American states, the policy\nof the civil authorities is the same, or worse.  It may be safely\nasserted that, except in the United States, the church is either held\nby the civil power in subjection, or treated as an enemy.  The relation\nis not that of union and harmony, but that of antagonism, to the grave\ndetriment of both religion and civilization.\n\nIt is impossible, even if it were desirable, to restore the mixture of\ncivil and ecclesiastical governments which obtained in the Middle Ages;\nand a total separation of church and state, even as corporations,\nwould, in the present state of men's minds in Europe, be construed, if\napproved by the church, into a sanction by her of political atheism, or\nthe right of the civil power to govern according to its own will and\npleasure in utter disregard of the law of God, the moral order, or the\nimmutable distinctions between right and wrong.  It could only favor\nthe absolutism of the state, and put the temporal in the place of the\nspiritual. Hence, the Holy Father includes the proposition of the\nentire separation of church and state in the Syllabus of Errors\ncondemned in his Encyclical, dated at Rome, December 8, 1864. Neither\nthe state nor the people, elsewhere than in the United States, can\nunderstand practically such separation in any other sense than the\ncomplete emancipation of our entire secular life from the law of God,\nor the Divine order, which is the real order.  It is not the union of\nchurch and state--that is, the union, or identity rather, of religious\nand political principles--that it is desirable to get rid of, but the\ndisunion or antagonism of church and state.  But this is nowhere\npossible out of the United States; for nowhere else is the state\norganized on catholic principles, or capable of acting, when acting\nfrom its own constitution, in harmony with a really catholic church, or\nthe religious order really existing, in relation to which all things\nare created and governed.  Nowhere else is it practicable, at present,\nto maintain between the two powers their normal relations.\n\nBut what is not practicable in the Old World is perfectly practicable\nin the New.  The state here being organized in accordance with catholic\nprinciples, there can be no antagonism between it and the church.\nThough operating in different spheres, both are, in their respective\nspheres, developing and applying to practical life the one and the same\nDivine Idea.  The church can trust the state, and the state can trust\nthe church. Both act from the same principle to one and the same end.\nEach by its own constitution co-operates with, aids, and completes the\nother.  It is true the church is not formally established as the civil\nlaw of the land, nor is it necessary that she should be; because there\nis nothing in the state that conflicts with her freedom and\nindependence, with her dogmas or her irreformable canons.  The need of\nestablishing the church by law, and protecting her by legal pains and\npenalties, as is still done in most countries, can exist only in a\nbarbarous or semi-barbarous state of society, where the state is not\norganized on catholic principles, or the civilization is based on false\nprinciples, and in its development tends not to the real or Divine\norder of things.  When the state is constituted in harmony with that\norder, it is carried onward by the force of its own internal\nconstitution in a catholic direction, and a church establishment, or\nwhat is called a state religion, would be an anomaly, or a superfluity.\nThe true religion is in the heart of the state, as its informing\nprinciple and real interior life.  The external establishment, by legal\nenactment of the church, would afford her no additional protection, add\nnothing to her power and efficacy, and effect nothing for faith or\npiety--neither of which can be forced, because both must, from their\nnature, be free-will offerings to God.\n\nIn the United States, false religions are legally as free as the true\nreligion; but all false religions being one-sided, sophistical, and\nuncatholic, are opposed by the principles of the state, which tend, by\ntheir silent but effective workings, to eliminate them.  The American\nstate recognizes only the catholic religion.  It eschews all\nsectarianism, and none of the sects have been able to get their\npeculiarities incorporated into its constitution or its laws.  The\nstate conforms to what each holds that is catholic, that is always and\neverywhere religion; and what ever is not catholic it leaves, as\noutside of its province, to live or die, according to its own inherent\nvitality or want of vitality.  The state conscience is catholic, not\nsectarian; hence it is that the utmost freedom can be allowed to all\nreligions, the false as well as the true; for the state, being catholic\nin its constitution, can never suffer the adherents of the false to\noppress the consciences of the adherents of the true.  The church being\nfree, and the state harmonizing with her, catholicity has, in the\nfreedom of both, all the protection it needs, all the security it can\nask, and all the support it can, in the nature of the case receive from\nexternal institutions, or from social and political organizations.\n\nThis freedom may not be universally wise or prudent, for all nations\nmay not be prepared for it: all may not have attained their majority.\nThe church, as well as the state, must deal with men and nations as\nthey are, not as they are not.  To deal with a child as with an adult,\nor with a barbarous nation as with a civilized nation, would be only\nacting a lie.  The church cannot treat men as free men where they are\nnot free men, nor appeal to reason in those in whom reason is\nundeveloped.  She must adapt her discipline to the age, condition, and\nculture of individuals, and to the greater or less progress of nations\nin civilization. She herself remains always the same in her\nconstitution, her authority, and her faith; but varies her discipline\nwith the variations of time and place.  Many of her canons, very proper\nand necessary in one age, cease to be so in another, and many which are\nneeded in the Old World would be out of place in the New World.  Under\nthe American system, she can deal with the people as free men, and\ntrust them as freemen, because free men they are.  The freeman asks,\nwhy? and the reason why must be given him, or his obedience fails to be\nsecured.  The simple reason that the church commands will rarely\nsatisfy him; he would know why she commands this or that.  The\nfull-grown free man revolts at blind obedience, and he regards all\nobedience as in some measure blind for which he sees only an extrinsic\ncommand. Blind obedience even to the authority of the church cannot be\nexpected of the people reared under the American system, not because\nthey are filled with the spirit of disobedience, but because they\ninsist that obedience shall be rationabile obsequium, an act of the\nunderstanding, not of the will or the affections alone.  They are\ntrained to demand a reason for the command given them, to distinguish\nbetween the law and the person of the magistrate.  They can obey God,\nbut not man, and they must see that the command given has its reason in\nthe Divine order, or the intrinsic catholic reason of things, or they\nwill not yield it a full, entire, and hearty obedience.  The reason\nthat suffices for the child does not suffice for the adult, and the\nreason that suffices for barbarians does not suffice for civilized men,\nor that suffices for nations in the infancy of their civilization does\nnot suffice for them in its maturity.  The appeal to external authority\nwas much less frequent under the Roman Empire than in the barbarous\nages that followed its downfall, when the church became mixed up with\nthe state.\n\nThis trait of the American character is not uncatholic.  An\nintelligent, free, willing obedience, yielded from personal conviction,\nafter seeing its reasonableness, its justice, its logic in the Divine\norder--the obedience of a free man, not of a slave--is far more\nconsonant to the spirit of the church, and far more acceptable to God,\nthan simple, blind obedience; and a people capable of yielding it stand\nfar higher in the scale of civilization than the people that must be\ngoverned as children or barbarians.  It is possible that the people of\nthe Old World are not prepared for the regimen of freedom in religion\nany more than they are prepared for freedom in politics; for they have\nbeen trained only to obey external authority, and are not accustomed to\nlook on religion as having its reason in the real order, or in the\nreason of things.  They understand no reason for obedience beyond the\nexternal command, and do not believe it possible to give or to\nunderstand the reason why the command itself is given. They regard the\nauthority of the church as a thing apart, and see no way by which faith\nand reason can be harmonized.  They look upon them as antagonistic\nforces rather than as integral elements of one and the same whole.\nConcede them the regimen of freedom, and their religion has no support\nbut in their good-will, their affections, their associations, their\nhabits, and their prejudices.  It has no root in their rational\nconvictions, and when they begin to reason they begin to doubt.  This\nis not the state of things that is desirable, but it cannot be remedied\nunder the political regime established elsewhere than in the United\nStates.  In every state in the world, except the American, the civil\nconstitution is sophistical, and violates, more or less, the logic of\nthings; and, therefore, in no one of them can the people receive a\nthoroughly dialectic training, or an education in strict conformity to\nthe real order.  Hence, in them all, the church is more or less\nobstructed in her operations, and prevented from carrying out in its\nfulness her own Divine Idea. She does the best she can in the\ncircumstances and with the materials with which she is supplied, and\nexerts herself continually to bring individuals and nations into\nharmony with her Divine law: but still her life in the midst of the\nnations is a struggle, a warfare.\n\nThe United States being dialectically constituted, and founded on real\ncatholic, not sectarian or sophistical principles, presents none of\nthese obstacles, and must, in their progressive development or\nrealization of their political idea, put an end to this warfare, in so\nfar as a warfare between church and state, and leave the church in her\nnormal position in society, in which she can, without let or hindrance,\nexert her free spirit, and teach and govern men by the Divine law as\nfree men.  She may encounter unbelief, misbelief, ignorance, and\nindifference in few, or in many; but these, deriving no support from\nthe state, which tends constantly to eliminate them, must gradually\ngive way before her invincible logic, her divine charity, the truth and\nreality of things, and the intelligence, activity, and zeal of her\nministers.  The American people are, on the surface, sectarians or\nindifferentists; but they are, in reality, less uncatholic than the\npeople of any other country because they are, in their intellectual and\nmoral development, nearer to the real order, or, in the higher and\nbroader sense of the word more truly civilized.  The multitude of sects\nthat obtain may excite religious compassion for those who are carried\naway by them, for men can be saved or attain to their eternal destiny\nonly by truth, or conformity to Him who said, \"I am the way, the truth,\nand the life;\" but in relation to the national destiny they need excite\nno alarm, no uneasiness, for underlying them all is more or less of\ncatholic truth, and the vital forces of the national life repel them,\nin so far as they are sectarian and not catholic, as substances that\ncannot be assimilated to the national life.  The American state being\ncatholic in its organic principles, as is all real religion, and the\nchurch being free, whatever is anticatholic, or uncatholic, is without\nany support in either, and having none, either in reality or in itself,\nit must necessarily fall and gradually disappear.\n\nThe sects themselves have a half unavowed conviction that they cannot\nsubsist forever as sects, if unsupported by the civil authority.  They\nare free, but do not feel safe in the United States.  They know the\nreal church is catholic, and that they themselves are none of them\ncatholic.  The most daring among them even pretends to be no more than\na \"branch\" of the catholic church.  They know that only the catholic\nchurch can withstand the pressure of events and survive the shocks of\ntime, and hence everywhere their movements to get rid of their\nsectarianism and to gain a catholic character.  They hold conventions\nof delegates from the whole sectarian world, form \"unions,\"\n\"alliances,\" and \"associations;\" but, unhappily for their success, the\ncatholic church does not originate in convention, but is founded by the\nWord made flesh, and sustained by the indwelling Holy Ghost.  The most\nthey can do, even with the best dispositions in the world, is to create\na confederation, and confederated sects are something very different\nfrom a church inherently one and catholic.  It is no more the catholic\nchurch than the late Southern Confederacy was the American state.  The\nsectarian combinations may do some harm, may injure many souls, and\nretard, for a time, the progress of civilization; but in a state\norganized in accordance with catholic principles, and left to\nthemselves, they are powerless against the national destiny, and must\nsoon wither and die as branches severed from the vine.\n\nSuch being the case, no sensible Catholic can imagine that the church\nneeds any physical force against the sects, except to repel actual\nviolence, and protect her in that freedom of speech and possession\nwhich is the right of all before the state.  What are called religious\nestablishments are needed only where either the state is barbarous or\nthe religion is sectarian.  Where the state, in its intrinsic\nconstitution, is in accordance with catholic principles, as in the\nUnited States, the church has all she needs or can receive.  The state\ncan add nothing more to her power or her security in her moral and\nspiritual warfare with sectarianism, and any attempt to give her more\nwould only weaken her as against the sects, place her in a false light,\npartially justify their hostility to her, render effective their\ndeclamations against her, mix her up unnecessarily with political\nchanges, interests, and passions, and distract the attention of her\nministers from their proper work as churchmen, and impose on them the\nduties of politicians and statesmen.  Where there is nothing in the\nstate hostile to the church, where she is free to act according to her\nown constitution and laws, and exercise her own discipline on her own\nspiritual subjects, civil enactments in her favor or against the sects\nmay embarrass or impede her operations, but cannot aid her, for she can\nadvance no farther than she wins the heart and convinces the\nunderstanding.  A spiritual work can, in the nature of things, be\neffected only by spiritual means.  The church wants freedom in relation\nto the state--nothing more; for all her power comes immediately from\nGod, without any intervention or mediation of the state.\n\nThe United States, constituted in accordance with the real order of\nthings, and founded on principles which have their origin and ground in\nthe principles on which the church herself is founded, can never\nestablish any one of the sects as the religion of the state, for that\nwould violate their political constitution, and array all the other\nsects, as well as the church herself, against the government.  They\ncannot be called upon to establish the church by law, because she is\nalready in their constitution as far as the state has in itself any\nrelation with religion, and because to establish her in any other sense\nwould be to make her one of the civil institutions of the land, and to\nbring her under the control of the state, which were equally against\nher interest and her nature.\n\nThe religious mission of the United States is not then to establish the\nchurch by external law, or to protect her by legal disabilities, pains,\nand penalties against the sects, however uncatholic they may be; but to\nmaintain catholic freedom, neither absorbing the state in the church\nnor the church in the state, but leaving each to move freely, according\nto its own nature, in the sphere assigned it in the eternal order of\nthings.  Their mission separates church and state as external governing\nbodies, but unites them in the interior principles from which each\nderives its vitality and force.  Their union is in the intrinsic unity\nof principle, and in the fact that, though moving in different spheres,\neach obeys one and the same Divine law.  With this the Catholic, who\nknows what Catholicity means, is of course satisfied, for it gives the\nchurch all the advantage over the sects of the real over the unreal;\nand with this the sects have no right to be dissatisfied, for it\nsubjects them to no disadvantage not inherent in sectarianism itself in\npresence of Catholicity, and without any support from the civil\nauthority.\n\nThe effect of this mission of our country fully realized, would be to\nharmonize church and state, religion and politics, not by absorbing\neither in the other, or by obliterating the natural distinction between\nthem, but by conforming both to the real or Divine order, which is\nsupreme and immutable.  It places the two powers in their normal\nrelation, which has hitherto never been done, because hitherto there\nnever has been a state normally constituted.  The nearest approach made\nto the realization of the proper relations of church and state, prior\nto the birth of the American Republic, was in the Roman Empire under\nthe Christian emperors; but the state had been perverted by paganism,\nand the emperors, inheriting the old pontifical power, could never be\nmade to understand their own incompetency in spirituals, and persisted\nto the last in treating the church as a civil institution under their\nsupervision and control, as does the Emperor of the French in France,\neven yet.  In the Middle Ages the state was so barbarously constituted\nthat the church was obliged to supervise its administration, to mix\nherself up with the civil government, in order to infuse some\nintelligence into civil matters, and to preserve her own rightful\nfreedom and independence.  When the states broke away from feudalism,\nthey revived the Roman constitution, and claimed the authority in\necclesiastical matters that had been exercised by the Roman Caesars,\nand the states that adopted a sectarian religion gave the sect adopted\na civil establishment, and subjected it to the civil government, to\nwhich the sect not unwillingly consented, on condition that the civil\nauthority excluded the church and all other sects, and made it the\nexclusive religion of the state, as in England, Scotland, Sweden,\nDenmark, Russia, and the states of Northern Germany.  Even yet the\nnormal relations of church and state are nowhere practicable in the Old\nWorld; for everywhere either the state is more or less barbaric in its\nconstitution, or the religion is sectarian, and the church as well as\ncivilization is obliged, to struggle with antagonistic forces, for\nself-preservation.\n\nThere are formidable parties all over Europe at work to introduce what\nthey take to be the American system; but constitutions are generated,\nnot made--providential, not conventional.  Statesmen can only develop\nwhat is in the existing constitutions of their respective countries,\nand no European constitution contains all the elements of the American.\nEuropean Liberals mistake the American system, and, were they to\nsucceed in their efforts, would not introduce it, but something more\nhostile to it than the governments and institutions they are warring\nagainst.  They start from narrow, sectarian, or infidel premises, and\nseek not freedom of worship, but freedom of denial.  They suppress the\nfreedom of religion as the means of securing what they call religious\nliberty--imagine that they secure freedom of thought by extinguishing\nthe light without which no thought is possible, and advance\ncivilization by undermining its foundation.  The condemnation of their\nviews and movements by the Holy Father in the Encyclical, which has\nexcited so much hostility, may seem to superficial and unthinking\nAmericans even, as a condemnation of our American system--indeed, as\nthe condemnation of modern science, intelligence, and civilization\nitself; but whoever looks below the surface, has some insight into the\ncourse of events, understands the propositions and movements censured,\nand the sense in which they are censured, is well assured that the Holy\nFather has simply exercised his pastoral and teaching authority to save\nreligion, society, science, and civilization from utter corruption or\ndestruction.  The opinions, tendencies, and movements, directly or by\nimplication censured, are the effect of narrow and superficial\nthinking, of partial and one-sided views, and are sectarian,\nsophistical, and hostile to all real progress, and tend, as far as they\ngo, to throw society back into the barbarism from which, after\ncenturies of toil and struggle, it is just beginning to emerge.  The\nHoly Father has condemned nothing that real philosophy, real science\ndoes not also condemn; nothing, in fact, that is not at war with the\nAmerican system itself.  For the mass of the people, it were desirable\nthat fuller explanations should be given of the sense in which the\nvarious propositions censured are condemned, for some of them are not,\nin every sense, false; but the explanations needed were expected by the\nHoly Father to be given by the bishops and prelates, to whom, not to\nthe people, save through them, the Encyclical was addressed.  Little is\nto be hoped, and much is to be feared, for liberty, science, and\ncivilization from European Liberalism, which has no real affinity with\nAmerican territorial democracy and real civil and religious freedom.\nBut God and reality are present in the Old World as, well as in the\nNew, and it will never do to restrict their power or freedom.\n\nWhether the American people will prove faithful to their mission, and\nrealize their destiny, or not, is known only to Him from whom nothing\nis hidden.  Providence is free, and leaves always a space for human\nfree-will.  The American people can fail, and will fail if they neglect\nthe appointed means and conditions of success; but there is nothing in\ntheir present state or in their past history to render their failure\nprobable.  They have in their internal constitution what Rome wanted,\nand they are in no danger of being crushed by exterior barbarism.\nTheir success as feeble colonies of Great Britain in achieving their\nnational independence, and especially in maintaining, unaided, and\nagainst the real hostility of Great Britain and France, their national\nunity and integrity against a rebellion which, probably, no other\npeople could have survived, gives reasonable assurance for their\nfuture.  The leaders of the rebellion, than whom none better knew or\nmore nicely calculated the strength and resources of the Union, counted\nwith certainty on success, and the ablest, the most experienced, and\nbest informed statesmen of the Old World felt sure that the Republic\nwas gone, and spoke of it as the late United States.  Not a few, even\nin the loyal States, who had no sympathy with the rebellion, believed\nit idle to think of suppressing it by force, and advised peace on the\nbest terms that could be obtained.  But Ilium fuit was chanted too\nsoon; the American people were equal to the emergency, and falsified\nthe calculations and predictions of their enemies, and surpassed the\nexpectations of their friends.\n\nThe attitude of the real American people during the fearful struggle\naffords additional confidence in their destiny.  With larger armies on\nfoot than Napoleon ever commanded, with their line of battle stretching\nfrom ocean to ocean, across the whole breadth of the continent, they\nnever, during four long years of alternate victories and defeats--and\nboth unprecedentedly bloody--for a moment lost their equanimity, or\nappeared less calm, collected, tranquil, than in the ordinary times of\npeace. They not for a moment interrupted their ordinary routine of\nbusiness or pleasure, or seemed conscious of being engaged in any\nserious struggle which required an effort.  There was no hurry, no\nbustle, no excitement, no fear, no misgiving.  They seemed to regard\nthe war as a mere bagatelle, not worth being in earnest about.  The\non-looker was almost angry with their apparent indifference, apparent\ninsensibility, and doubted if they moved at all, Yet move they did:\nguided by an unerring instinct, they moved quietly on with an elemental\nforce, in spite of a timid and hesitating administration, in spite of\ninexperienced, over-cautious, incompetent, or blundering military\ncommanders, whom they gently brushed aside, and desisted not till their\nobject was gained, and they saw the flag of the Union floating anew in\nthe breeze from the capitol of every State that dared secede.  No man\ncould contemplate them without feeling that there was in them a latent\npower vastly superior to any which they judged it necessary to put\nforth.  Their success proves to all that what, prior to the war, was\ntreated as American arrogance or self-conceit, was only the outspoken\nconfidence in their destiny as a Providential people, conscious that to\nthem is reserved the hegemony of the world.\n\nCount de Maistre predicted early in the century the failure of the\nUnited States, because they have no proper name; but his prediction\nassumed what is not the fact.  The United States have a proper name by\nwhich all the world knows and calls them.  The proper name of the\ncountry is America: that of the people is Americans.  Speak of\nAmericans simply, and nobody understands you to mean the people of\nCanada, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, but everybody\nunderstands you to mean the people of the United States.  The fact is\nsignificant, and foretells for the people of the United States a\ncontinental destiny, as is also foreshadowed in the so-called \"Monroe\ndoctrine,\" which France, during our domestic troubles, was permitted,\non condition of not intervening in our civil war in favor of the\nrebellion, to violate.\n\nThere was no statesmanship in proclaiming the \"Monroe doctrine,\" for\nthe statesman keeps always, as far as possible, his government free to\nact according to the exigencies of the case when it comes up,\nunembarrassed by previous declarations of principles.  Yet the doctrine\nonly expresses the destiny of the American people, and which nothing\nbut their own fault can prevent them from realizing in its own good\ntime.  Napoleon will not succeed in his Mexican policy, and Mexico will\nadd some fifteen or twenty new States to the American Union as soon as\nit is clearly for the interests of all parties that it should be done,\nand it can be done by mutual consent, without war or violence.  The\nUnion will fight to maintain the integrity of her domain and the\nsupremacy of her laws within it, but she can never, consistently with\nher principles or her interests, enter upon a career of war and\nconquest.  Her system is violated, endangered, not extended, by\nsubjugating her neighbors, for subjugation and liberty go not together.\nAnnexation, when it takes place, must be on terms of perfect equality\nand by the free act of the state annexed.  The Union can admit of no\ninequality of rights and franchises between the States of which it is\ncomposed.  The Canadian Provinces and the Mexican and Central American\nStates, when annexed, must be as free as the original States of the\nUnion, sharing alike in the power and the protection of the\nRepublic--alike in its authority, its freedom, its grandeur, and its\nglory, as one free, independent, self-governing people.  They may gain\nmuch, but must lose nothing by annexation.\n\nThe Emperor Napoleon and his very respectable protege, Maximilian, an\nable man and a liberal-minded prince, can change nothing in the destiny\nof the United States, or of Mexico herself; no imperial government can\nbe permanent beside the American Republic, no longer liable, since the\nabolition of slavery, to be distracted by sectional dissensions.  The\nStates that seceded will soon, in some way, be restored to their rights\nand franchises in the Union, forming not the least patriotic portion of\nthe American people; the negro question will be settled, or settle\nitself, as is most likely, by the melting away of the negro population\nbefore the influx of white laborers; all traces of the late contest in\na very few years will be wiped out, the national debt paid, or greatly\nreduced, and the prosperity and strength of the Republic be greater\nthan ever.  Its moral force will sweep away every imperial throne on\nthe continent, without any effort or action on the part of the\ngovernment. There can be no stable government in Mexico till every\ntrace of the ecclesiastical policy established by the Council of the\nIndies is obliterated, and the church placed there on the same footing\nas in the United States; and that can hardly be done without\nannexation.  Maximilian cannot divest the church of her temporal\npossessions and place Protestants and Catholics on the same footing,\nwithout offending the present church party and deeply injuring\nreligion, and that too without winning the confidence of the republican\nparty.  In all Spanish and Portuguese America the relations between the\nchurch and state are abnormal, and exceedingly hurtful to both.\nReligion is in a wretched condition, and politics in a worse condition\nstill. There is no effectual remedy for either but in religious\nfreedom, now impracticable, and to be rendered practicable by no\nEuropean intervention, for that subjects religion to the state, the\nvery source of the evils that now exist, instead of emancipating it\nfrom the state, and leaving it to act according to its own constitution\nand laws, as under the American system.\n\nBut the American people need not trouble themselves about their\nexterior expansion.  That will come of itself as fast as desirable.\nLet them devote their attention to their internal destiny, to the\nrealization of their mission within, and they will gradually see the\nWhole continent coming under their system, forming one grand nation, a\nreally catholic nation, great, glorious, and free.","title":"The American Republic: Its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":94013}