{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_20694/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_20694","id":"gutenberg_20694","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/20694","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Category: Sociology","Peace","World War I","World War, 1914-1918 -- Peace"],"text":"Produced by Irma Spehar, Graeme Mackreth and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net. (This\nfile made using scans of public domain works at the\nUniversity of Georgia.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAN INQUIRY INTO\n\nTHE NATURE OF PEACE\n\nAND\n\nTHE TERMS OF ITS PERPETUATION\n\nBY\n\nTHORSTEIN VEBLEN\n\n\nNew York\nB.W. HUEBSCH\n1919\n\n_All rights reserved_\n\n\n\n\nCOPYRIGHT, 1917.\nBY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.\n\nPublished April, 1917:\nReprinted August, 1917.\n\nNew edition published by\nB.W. HUEBSCH.\nJanuary, 1919.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nIt is now some 122 years since Kant wrote the essay, _Zum ewigen\nFrieden_. Many things have happened since then, although the Peace to\nwhich he looked forward with a doubtful hope has not been among them.\nBut many things have happened which the great critical philosopher, and\nno less critical spectator of human events, would have seen with\ninterest. To Kant the quest of an enduring peace presented itself as an\nintrinsic human duty, rather than as a promising enterprise. Yet through\nall his analysis of its premises and of the terms on which it may be\nrealised there runs a tenacious persuasion that, in the end, the regime\nof peace at large will be installed. Not as a deliberate achievement of\nhuman wisdom, so much as a work of Nature the Designer of\nthings--_Natura daedala rerum_.\n\nTo any attentive reader of Kant's memorable essay it will be apparent\nthat the title of the following inquiry--On the nature of peace and the\nterms of its perpetuation--is a descriptive translation of the caption\nunder which he wrote. That such should be the case will not, it is\nhoped, be accounted either an unseemly presumption or an undue\ninclination to work under a borrowed light. The aim and compass of any\ndisinterested inquiry in these premises is still the same as it was in\nKant's time; such, indeed, as he in great part made it,--viz., a\nsystematic knowledge of things as they are. Nor is the light of Kant's\nleading to be dispensed with as touches the ways and means of\nsystematic knowledge, wherever the human realities are in question.\n\nMeantime, many things have also changed since the date of Kant's essay.\nAmong other changes are those that affect the direction of inquiry and\nthe terms of systematic formulation. _Natura daedala rerum_ is no longer\nallowed to go on her own recognizances, without divulging the ways and\nmeans of her workmanship. And it is such a line of extension that is\nhere attempted, into a field of inquiry which in Kant's time still lay\nover the horizon of the future.\n\nThe quest of perpetual peace at large is no less a paramount and\nintrinsic human duty today than it was, nor is it at all certain that\nits final accomplishment is nearer. But the question of its pursuit and\nof the conditions to be met in seeking this goal lies in a different\nshape today; and it is this question that concerns the inquiry which is\nhere undertaken,--What are the terms on which peace at large may\nhopefully be installed and maintained? What, if anything, is there in\nthe present situation that visibly makes for a realisation of these\nnecessary terms within the calculable future? And what are the\nconsequences presumably due to follow in the nearer future from the\ninstallation of such a peace at large? And the answer to these questions\nis here sought not in terms of what ought dutifully to be done toward\nthe desired consummation, but rather in terms of those known factors of\nhuman behaviour that can be shown by analysis of experience to control\nthe conduct of nations in conjunctures of this kind.\n\nFebruary 1917\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTORY: ON THE STATE AND ITS RELATION TO WAR\nAND PEACE                                                            1\n\nThe inquiry is not concerned with the intrinsic merits\nof peace or war, 2.\n\n--But with the nature, causes and consequences of the\npreconceptions favoring peace or war, 3.\n\n--A breach of the peace is an act of the government,\nor State, 3.\n\n--Patriotism is indispensable to furtherance of warlike\nenterprise, 4.\n\n--All the peoples of Christendom are sufficiently patriotic, 6.\n\n--Peace established by the State, an armistice--the State\nis an instrumentality for making peace, not for perpetuating it, 7.\n\n--The governmental establishments and their powers in all\nthe Christian nations are derived from the feudal establishments\nof the Middle Ages, 9.\n\n--Still retain the right of coercively controlling the actions\nof their citizens, 11.\n\n--Contrast of Icelandic Commonwealth, 12.\n\n--The statecraft of the past half century has been\none of competitive preparedness, 14.\n\n--Prussianised Germany has forced the pace in this\ncompetitive preparedness, 20.\n\n--An avowedly predatory enterprise no longer meets\nwith approval, 21.\n\n--When a warlike enterprise has been entered upon, it\nwill have the support of popular sentiment even if it\nis an aggressive war, 22.\n\n--The moral indignation of both parties to the quarrel\nis to be taken for granted, 23.\n\n--The spiritual forces of any Christian nation may be\nmobilised for war by either of two pleas: (1) The\npreservation or furtherance of the community's material\ninterests, real or fancied, and (2) vindication of the\nNational Honour; as perhaps also perpetuation of the\nnational \"Culture,\" 23.\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nON THE NATURE AND USES OF PATRIOTISM                                31\n\nThe nature of Patriotism, 31.\n\n--Is a spirit of Emulation, 33.\n\n--Must seem moral, if only to a biased populace, 33.\n\n--The common man is sufficiently patriotic but is hampered\nwith a sense of right and honest dealing, 38.\n\n--Patriotism is at cross purposes with modern life, 38.\n\n--Is an hereditary trait? 41.\n\n--Variety of racial stocks in Europe, 43.\n\n--Patriotism a ubiquitous trait, 43.\n\n--Patriotism disserviceable, yet men hold to it, 46.\n\n--Cultural evolution of Europeans, 48.\n\n--Growth of a sense of group solidarity, 49.\n\n--Material interests of group falling into abeyance\nas class divisions have grown up, until prestige\nremains virtually the sole community interest, 51.\n\n--Based upon warlike prowess, physical magnitude and\npecuniary traffic of country, 54.\n\n--Interests of the master class are at cross purposes\nwith the fortunes of the common man, 57.\n\n--Value of superiors is a \"prestige value,\" 57.\n\n--The material benefits which this ruling class contribute\nare: defense against aggression, and promotion of the\ncommunity's material gain, 60.\n\n--The common defense is a remedy for evils due to the\npatriotic spirit, 61.\n\n--The common defense the usual blind behind which events\nare put in train for eventual hostilities, 62.\n\n--All the nations of warring Europe convinced that they\nare fighting a defensive war, 62.\n\n--Which usually takes the form of a defense of the National\nHonour, 63.\n\n--Material welfare is of interest to the Dynastic statesman\nonly as it conduces to political success, 64.\n\n--The policy of national economic self-sufficiency, 67.\n\n--The chief material use of patriotism is its use to a\nlimited number of persons in their quest of private gain, 67.\n\n--And has the effect of dividing the nations on lines of\nrivalry, 76.\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nON THE CONDITIONS OF A LASTING PEACE                                77\n\nThe patriotic spirit of modern peoples is the abiding\nsource of contention among nations, 77.\n\n--Hence any calculus of the Chances of Peace will be\na reckoning of forces which may be counted on to keep\na patriotic nation in an unstable equilibrium of peace, 78.\n\n--The question of peace and war at large is a question of\npeace and war among the Powers, which are of two contrasted\nkinds: those which may safely be counted on spontaneously\nto take the offensive and those which will fight on provocation, 79.\n\n--War not a question of equity but of opportunity, 81.\n\n--The Imperial designs of Germany and Japan as the prospective\ncause of war, 82.\n\n--Peace can be maintained in two ways: submission to\ntheir dominion, or elimination of these two Powers;\nNo middle course open, 84.\n\n--Frame of mind of states; men and popular sentiment in\na Dynastic State, 84.\n\n--Information, persuasion and reflection will not subdue\nnational animosities and jealousies; Peoples of Europe\nare racially homogeneous along lines of climatic latitude, 88.\n\n--But loyalty is a matter of habituation, 89.\n\n--Derivation and current state of German nationalism, 94.\n\n--Contrasted with the animus of the citizens of a commonwealth,\n103;--A neutral peace-compact may be practicable in the\nabsence of Germany and Japan, but it has no chance in\ntheir presence, 106.\n\n--The national life of Germany: the Intellectuals, 108.\n\n--Summary of chapter, 116.\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nPEACE WITHOUT HONOUR                                               118\n\nSubmission to the Imperial Power one of the conditions\nprecedent to a peaceful settlement, 118.\n\n--Character of the projected tutelage, 118.\n\n--Life under the _Pax Germanica_ contrasted with\nthe Ottoman and Russian rule, 124.\n\n--China and biological and cultural success, 130.\n\n--Difficulty of non-resistant subjection is of a psychological\norder, 131.\n\n--Patriotism of the bellicose kind is of the nature of\nhabit, 134.\n\n--And men may divest themselves of it, 140.\n\n--A decay of the bellicose national spirit must be of\nthe negative order, the disuse of the discipline out\nof which it has arisen, 142.\n\n--Submission to Imperial authorities necessitates\nabeyance of national pride among the other peoples, 144.\n\n--Pecuniary merits of the projected Imperial dominion, 145.\n\n--Pecuniary class distinctions in the commonwealths and\nthe pecuniary burden on the common man, 150.\n\n--Material conditions of life for the common man under\nthe modern rule of big business, 156.\n\n--The competitive regime, \"what the traffic will bear,\"\nand the life and labor of the common man, 158.\n\n--Industrial sabotage by businessmen, 165.\n\n--Contrasted with the Imperial usufruct and its material\nadvantages to the common man, 174.\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nPEACE AND NEUTRALITY                                               178\n\nPersonal liberty, not creature comforts, the ulterior\nsprings of action of the common man of the democratic\nnations, 178.\n\n--No change of spiritual state to be looked for in the\nlife-time of the oncoming generation, 185.\n\n--The Dynastic spirit among the peoples of the Empire\nwill, under the discipline of modern economic conditions,\nfall into decay, 187.\n\n--Contrast of class divisions in Germany and England, 192.\n\n--National establishments are dependent for their\ncontinuance upon preparation for hostilities, 196.\n\n--The time required for the people of the Dynastic\nStates to unlearn their preconceptions will be longer\nthan the interval required for a new onset, 197.\n\n--There can be no neutral course between peace by\nunconditional surrender and submission or peace by\nthe elimination of Imperial Germany and Japan, 202.\n\n--Peace by submission not practicable for the modern\nnations, 203.\n\n--Neutralisation of citizenship, 205.\n\n--Spontaneous move in that direction not to be looked for, 213.\n\n--Its chances of success, 219.\n\n--The course of events in America, 221.\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nELIMINATION OF THE UNFIT                                           233\n\nA league of neutrals, its outline, 233.\n\n--Need of security from aggression of Imperial Germany, 234.\n\n--Inclusion of the Imperial States in the league, 237.\n\n--Necessity of elimination of Imperial military clique, 239.\n\n--Necessity of intermeddling in internal affairs of Germany even\nif not acceptable to the German people, 240.\n\n--Probability of pacific nations taking measures to insure peace, 244-298.\n\n--The British gentleman and his control of the English government, 244.\n\n--The shifting of control out of the hands of the gentleman into\nthose of the underbred common man, 251.\n\n--The war situation and its probable effect on popular habits\nof thought in England, 252.\n\n--The course of such events and their bearing on the chances\nof a workable pacific league, 255.\n\n--Conditions precedent to a successful pacific league\nof neutrals, 258.\n\n--Colonial possessions, 259.\n\n--Neutralisation of trade relations, 263.\n\n--Futility of economic boycott, 266.\n\n--The terms of settlement, 269.\n\n--The effect of the war and the chances of the British people\nbeing able to meet the exigencies of peace, 273.\n\n--Summary of the terms of settlement, 280.\n\n--Constitutional monarchies and the British gentlemanly\ngovernment, 281.\n\n--The American national establishment, a government\nby businessmen, and its economic policy, 292.\n\n--America and the league, 294.\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nPEACE AND THE PRICE SYSTEM                                         299\n\nThe different conceptions of peace, 299.\n\n--Psychological effects of the war, 303.\n\n--The handicraft system and the machine industry,\nand their psychological effect on political preconceptions, 306.\n\n--The machine technology and the decay of patriotic loyalty, 310.\n\n--Summary, 313.\n\n--Ownership and the right of contract, 315.\n\n--Standardised under handicraft system, 319.\n\n--Ownership and the machine industry. 320.\n\n--Business control and sabotage, 322.\n\n--Governments of pacific nations controlled by privileged classes, 326.\n\n--Effect of peace on the economic situation, 328.\n\n--Economic aspects of a regime of peace, especially as related\nto the development of classes, 330.\n\n--The analogy of the Victorian Peace, 344.\n\n--The case of the American Farmer, 348.\n\n--The leisure class, 350.\n\n--The rising standard of living, 354.\n\n--Culture, 355.\n\n--The eventual cleavage of classes, those who own and those\nwho do not, 360.\n\n--Conditioned by peace at large, 366.\n\n--Necessary conditions of a lasting peace, 367.\n\n\nAN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF PEACE AND THE TERMS OF ITS PERPETUATION\n\n\n\n\nON THE NATURE OF PEACE AND THE TERMS OF ITS PERPETUATION\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTORY: ON THE STATE AND ITS RELATION TO WAR AND PEACE\n\n\nTo many thoughtful men ripe in worldly wisdom it is known of a verity\nthat war belongs indefeasibly in the Order of Nature. Contention, with\nmanslaughter, is indispensable in human intercourse, at the same time\nthat it conduces to the increase and diffusion of the manly virtues. So\nlikewise, the unspoiled youth of the race, in the period of adolescence\nand aspiring manhood, also commonly share this gift of insight and back\nit with a generous commendation of all the martial qualities; and women\nof nubile age and no undue maturity gladly meet them half way.\n\nOn the other hand, the mothers of the people are commonly unable to see\nthe use of it all. It seems a waste of dear-bought human life, with a\nlarge sum of nothing to show for it. So also many men of an elderly\nturn, prematurely or otherwise, are ready to lend their countenance to\nthe like disparaging appraisal; it may be that the spirit of prowess in\nthem runs at too low a tension, or they may have outlived the more vivid\nappreciation of the spiritual values involved. There are many, also,\nwith a turn for exhortation, who find employment for their best\nfaculties in attesting the well-known atrocities and futility of war.\n\nIndeed, not infrequently such advocates of peace will devote their\notherwise idle powers to this work of exhortation without stipend or\nsubsidy. And they uniformly make good their contention that the\ncurrently accepted conception of the nature of war--General Sherman's\nformula--is substantially correct. All the while it is to be admitted\nthat all this axiomatic exhortation has no visible effect on the course\nof events or on the popular temper touching warlike enterprise. Indeed,\nno equal volume of speech can be more incontrovertible or less\nconvincing than the utterances of the peace advocates, whether\nsubsidised or not. \"War is Bloodier than Peace.\" This would doubtless be\nconceded without argument, but also without prejudice. Hitherto the\npacifists' quest of a basis for enduring peace, it must be admitted, has\nbrought home nothing tangible--with the qualification, of course, that\nthe subsidised pacifists have come in for the subsidy. So that, after\nsearching the recesses of their imagination, able-bodied pacifists whose\nloquacity has never been at fault hitherto have been brought to ask:\n\"What Shall We Say?\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nUnder these circumstances it will not be out of place to inquire into\nthe nature of this peace about which swings this wide orbit of opinion\nand argument. At the most, such an inquiry can be no more gratuitous and\nno more nugatory than the controversies that provoke it. The intrinsic\nmerits of peace at large, as against those of warlike enterprise, it\nshould be said, do not here come in question. That question lies in the\ndomain of preconceived opinion, so that for the purposes of this\ninquiry it will have no significance except as a matter to be inquired\ninto; the main point of the inquiry being the nature, causes and\nconsequences of such a preconception favoring peace, and the\ncircumstances that make for a contrary preconception in favor of war.\n\nBy and large, any breach of the peace in modern times is an official act\nand can be taken only on initiative of the governmental establishment,\nthe State. The national authorities may, of course, be driven to take\nsuch a step by pressure of warlike popular sentiment. Such, e.g., is\npresumed to have been the case in the United States' attack on Spain\nduring the McKinley administration; but the more that comes to light of\nthe intimate history of that episode, the more evident does it become\nthat the popular war sentiment to which the administration yielded had\nbeen somewhat sedulously \"mobilised\" with a view to such yielding and\nsuch a breach. So also in the case of the Boer war, the move was made\nunder sanction of a popular war spirit, which, again, did not come to a\nhead without shrewd surveillance and direction. And so again in the\ncurrent European war, in the case, e.g., of Germany, where the\ninitiative was taken, the State plainly had the full support of popular\nsentiment, and may even be said to have precipitated the war in response\nto this urgent popular aspiration; and here again it is a matter of\nnotoriety that the popular sentiment had long been sedulously nursed and\n\"mobilised\" to that effect, so that the populace was assiduously kept in\nspiritual readiness for such an event. The like is less evident as\nregards the United Kingdom, and perhaps also as regards the other\nAllies.\n\nAnd such appears to have been the common run of the facts as regards all\nthe greater wars of the last one hundred years,--what may be called the\n\"public\" wars of this modern era, as contrasted with the \"private\" or\nadministrative wars which have been carried on in a corner by one and\nanother of the Great Powers against hapless barbarians, from time to\ntime, in the course of administrative routine.\n\nIt is also evident from the run of the facts as exemplified in these\nmodern wars that while any breach of the peace takes place only on the\ninitiative and at the discretion of the government, or State,[1] it is\nalways requisite in furtherance of such warlike enterprise to cherish\nand eventually to mobilise popular sentiment in support of any warlike\nmove. Due fomentation of a warlike animus is indispensable to the\nprocuring and maintenance of a suitable equipment with which eventually\nto break the peace, as well as to ensure a diligent prosecution of such\nenterprise when once it has been undertaken. Such a spirit of militant\npatriotism as may serviceably be mobilised in support of warlike\nenterprise has accordingly been a condition precedent to any people's\nentry into the modern Concert of Nations. This Concert of Nations is a\nConcert of Powers, and it is only as a Power that any nation plays its\npart in the concert, all the while that \"power\" here means eventual\nwarlike force.\n\n[Footnote 1: A modern nation constitutes a State only in respect of or\nwith ulterior bearing on the question of International peace or war.]\n\nSuch a people as the Chinese, e.g., not pervaded with an adequate\npatriotic spirit, comes into the Concert of Nations not as a Power but\nas a bone of contention. Not that the Chinese fall short in any of the\nqualities that conduce to efficiency and welfare in time of peace, but\nthey appear, in effect, to lack that certain \"solidarity of prowess\" by\nvirtue of which they should choose to be (collectively) formidable\nrather than (individually) fortunate and upright; and the modern\ncivilised nations are not in a position, nor in a frame of mind, to\ntolerate a neighbor whose only claim on their consideration falls under\nthe category of peace on earth and good-will among men. China appears\nhitherto not to have been a serviceable people for warlike ends, except\nin so far as the resources of that country have been taken over and\nconverted to warlike uses by some alien power working to its own ends.\nSuch have been the several alien dynasties that have seized upon that\ncountry from time to time and have achieved dominion by usufruct of its\nunwarlike forces. Such has been the nature of the Manchu empire of the\nrecent past, and such is the evident purpose of the prospective Japanese\nusufruct of the same country and its populace. Meantime the Chinese\npeople appear to be incorrigibly peaceable, being scarcely willing to\nfight in any concerted fashion even when driven into a corner by\nunprovoked aggression, as in the present juncture. Such a people is very\nexceptional. Among civilised nations there are, broadly speaking, none\nof that temper, with the sole exception of the Chinese,--if the Chinese\nare properly to be spoken of as a nation.\n\nModern warfare makes such large and direct use of the industrial arts,\nand depends for its successful prosecution so largely on a voluminous\nand unremitting supply of civilian services and wrought goods, that any\ninoffensive and industrious people, such as the Chinese, could doubtless\nnow be turned to good account by any warlike power that might have the\ndisposal of their working forces. To make their industrial efficiency\ncount in this way toward warlike enterprise and imperial dominion, the\nusufruct of any such inoffensive and unpatriotic populace would have to\nfall into the hands of an alien governmental establishment. And no alien\ngovernment resting on the support of a home population trained in the\nhabits of democracy or given over to ideals of common honesty in\nnational concerns could hopefully undertake the enterprise. This work of\nempire-building out of unwarlike materials could apparently be carried\nout only by some alien power hampered by no reserve of scruple, and\nbacked by a servile populace of its own, imbued with an impeccable\nloyalty to its masters and with a suitably bellicose temper, as, e.g.,\nImperial Japan or Imperial Germany.\n\nHowever, for the commonplace national enterprise the common run will do\nvery well. Any populace imbued with a reasonable measure of patriotism\nwill serve as ways and means to warlike enterprise under competent\nmanagement, even if it is not habitually prone to a bellicose temper.\nRightly managed, ordinary patriotic sentiment may readily be mobilised\nfor warlike adventure by any reasonably adroit and single-minded body of\nstatesmen,--of which there is abundant illustration. All the peoples of\nChristendom are possessed of a sufficiently alert sense of nationality,\nand by tradition and current usage all the national governments of\nChristendom are warlike establishments, at least in the defensive sense;\nand the distinction between the defensive and the offensive in\ninternational intrigue is a technical matter that offers no great\ndifficulty. None of these nations is of such an incorrigibly peaceable\ntemper that they can be counted on to keep the peace consistently in the\nordinary course of events.\n\nPeace established by the State, or resting in the discretion of the\nState, is necessarily of the nature of an armistice, in effect\nterminable at will and on short notice. It is maintained only on\nconditions, stipulated by express convention or established by custom,\nand there is always the reservation, tacit or explicit, that recourse\nwill be had to arms in case the \"national interests\" or the punctilios\nof international etiquette are traversed by the act or defection of any\nrival government or its subjects. The more nationally-minded the\ngovernment or its subject populace, the readier the response to the call\nof any such opportunity for an unfolding of prowess. The most peaceable\ngovernmental policy of which Christendom has experience is a policy of\n\"watchful waiting,\" with a jealous eye to the emergence of any occasion\nfor national resentment; and the most irretrievably shameful dereliction\nof duty on the part of any civilised government would be its eventual\ninsensibility to the appeal of a \"just war.\" Under any governmental\nauspices, as the modern world knows governments, the keeping of the\npeace comes at its best under the precept, \"Speak softly and carry a big\nstick.\" But the case for peace is more precarious than the wording of\nthe aphorism would indicate, in as much as in practical fact the \"big\nstick\" is an obstacle to soft speech. Evidently, in the light of recent\nhistory, if the peace is to be kept it will have to come about\nirrespective of governmental management,--in spite of the State rather\nthan by its good offices. At the best, the State, or the government, is\nan instrumentality for making peace, not for perpetuating it.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAnyone who is interested in the nature and derivation of governmental\ninstitutions and establishments in Europe, in any but the formal\nrespect, should be able to satisfy his curiosity by looking over the\nshoulders of the professed students of Political Science. Quite properly\nand profitably that branch of scholarship is occupied with the authentic\npedigree of these institutions, and with the documentary instruments in\nthe case; since Political Science is, after all, a branch of theoretical\njurisprudence and is concerned about a formally competent analysis of\nthe recorded legal powers. The material circumstances from which these\ninstitutions once took their beginning, and the exigencies which have\ngoverned the rate and direction of their later growth and mutation, as\nwell as the _de facto_ bearing of the institutional scheme on the\nmaterial welfare or the cultural fortunes of the given community,--while\nall these matters of fact may be germane to the speculations of\nPolitical Theory, they are not intrinsic to its premises, to the logical\nsequence of its inquiry, or to its theoretical findings. The like is\nalso true, of course, as regards that system of habits of thought, that\ncurrent frame of mind, in which any given institutional scheme\nnecessarily is grounded, and without the continued support of which any\ngiven scheme of governmental institutions or policy would become\nnugatory and so would pass into the province of legal fiction. All these\nare not idle matters in the purview of the student of Political Science,\nbut they remain after all substantially extraneous to the structure of\npolitical theory; and in so far as matters of this class are to be\nbrought into the case at all, the specialists in the field can not\nfairly be expected to contribute anything beyond an occasional _obiter\ndictum_. There can be no discourteous presumption, therefore, in\naccepting the general theorems of current political theory without\nprejudice, and looking past the received theoretical formulations for a\nview of the substantial grounds on which the governmental establishments\nhave grown into shape, and the circumstances, material and spiritual,\nthat surround their continued working and effect.\n\nBy lineal descent the governmental establishments and the powers with\nwhich they are vested, in all the Christian nations, are derived from\nthe feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which, in turn, are of a\npredatory origin and of an irresponsible character.[2] In nearly all\ninstances, but more particularly among the nations that are accounted\ncharacteristically modern, the existing establishments have been greatly\naltered from the mediaeval pattern, by concessive adaptation to later\nexigencies or by a more or less revolutionary innovation. The degree of\ntheir modernity is (conventionally) measured, roughly, by the degree in\nwhich they have departed from the mediaeval pattern. Wherever the\nunavoidable concessions have been shrewdly made with a view to\nconserving the autonomy and irresponsibility of the governmental\nestablishment, or the \"State,\" and where the state of national sentiment\nhas been led to favor this work of conservation, as, e.g., in the case\nof Austria, Spain or Prussia, there the modern outcome has been what may\nbe called a Dynastic State. Where, on the other hand, the run of\nnational sentiment has departed notably from the ancient holding ground\nof loyal abnegation, and has enforced a measure of revolutionary\ninnovation, as in the case of France or of the English-speaking peoples,\nthere the modern outcome has been an (ostensibly) democratic\ncommonwealth of ungraded citizens. But the contrast so indicated is a\ncontrast of divergent variants rather than of opposites. These two\ntype-forms may be taken as the extreme and inclusive limits of variation\namong the governmental establishments with which the modern world is\nfurnished.[3]\n\n[Footnote 2: The partial and dubious exception of the Scandinavian\ncountries or of Switzerland need raise no question on this head.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Cf., e.g., Eduard Meyer, _England: its political\norganisation and development_. ch. ii.]\n\nThe effectual difference between these two theoretically contrasted\ntypes of governmental establishments is doubtless grave enough, and for\nmany purposes it is consequential, but it is after all not of such a\nnature as need greatly detain the argument at this point. The two differ\nless, in effect, in that range of their functioning which comes in\nquestion here than in their bearing on the community's fortunes apart\nfrom questions of war and peace. In all cases there stand over in this\nbearing certain primary characteristics of the ancient regime, which all\nthese modern establishments have in common, though not all in an equal\ndegree of preservation and effectiveness. They are, e.g., all vested\nwith certain attributes of \"sovereignty.\" In all cases the citizen still\nproves on closer attention to be in some measure a \"subject\" of the\nState, in that he is invariably conceived to owe a \"duty\" to the\nconstituted authorities in one respect and another. All civilised\ngovernments take cognizance of Treason, Sedition, and the like; and all\ngood citizens are not only content but profoundly insistent on the clear\nduty of the citizen on this head. The bias of loyalty is not a matter on\nwhich argument is tolerated. By virtue of this bias of loyalty, or\n\"civic duty\"--which still has much of the color of feudal\nallegiance--the governmental establishment is within its rights in\ncoercively controlling and directing the actions of the citizen, or\nsubject, in those respects that so lie within his duty; as also in\nauthoritatively turning his abilities to account for the purposes that\nso lie within the governmental discretion, as, e.g., the Common Defense.\n\nThese rights and powers still remain to the governmental establishment\neven at the widest democratic departure from that ancient pattern of\nmasterful tutelage and usufruct that marked the old-fashioned\npatrimonial State,--and that still marks the better preserved ones among\nits modern derivatives. And so intrinsic to these governmental\nestablishments are these discretionary powers, and by so unfailing a\npopular bias are they still accounted a matter of course and of\naxiomatic necessity, that they have invariably been retained also among\nthe attributes of those democratic governments that trace their origin\nto a revolutionary break with the old order.\n\nTo many, all this will seem a pedantic taking note of commonplaces,--as\nif it were worth while remarking that the existing governments are\nvested with the indispensable attributes of government. Yet history\nrecords an instance at variance with this axiomatic rule, a rule which\nis held to be an unavoidable deliverance of common sense. And it is by\nno means an altogether unique instance. It may serve to show that these\ncharacteristic and unimpeachable powers that invest all current\ngovernmental establishments are, after all, to be rated as the marks of\na particular species of governments, and not characteristics of the\ngenus of governmental establishments at large. These powers answer to an\nacquired bias, not to an underlying trait of human nature; a matter of\nhabit, not of heredity.\n\nSuch an historical instance is the so-called Republic, or Commonwealth,\nof Iceland--tenth to thirteenth centuries. Its case is looked on by\nstudents of history as a spectacular anomaly, because it admitted none\nof these primary powers of government in its constituted authorities.\nAnd yet, for contrast with these matter-of-course preconceptions of\nthese students of history, it is well to note that in the deliberations\nof those ancients who installed the Republic for the management of their\njoint concerns, any inclusion of such powers in its competency appears\nnever to have been contemplated, not even to the extent of its being\nrejected. This singularity--as it would be rated by modern statesmen and\nstudents--was in no degree a new departure in state-making on the part\nof the founders of the Republic. They had no knowledge of such powers,\nduties and accountabilities, except as unwholesome features of a novel\nand alien scheme of irresponsible oppression that was sought to be\nimposed on them by Harald Fairhair, and which they incontinently made it\ntheir chief and immediate business to evade. They also set up no joint\nor collective establishment with powers for the Common Defense, nor does\nit appear that such a notion had occurred to them.\n\nIn the history of its installation there is no hint that the men who set\nup this Icelandic Commonwealth had any sense of the need, or even of the\nfeasibility, of such a coercive government as would be involved in\nconcerted preparation for the common defense. Subjection to personal\nrule, or to official rule in any degree of attenuation, was not\ncomprised in their traditional experience of citizenship; and it was\nnecessarily out of the elements comprised in this traditional experience\nthat the new structure would have to be built up. The new commonwealth\nwas necessarily erected on the premises afforded by the received scheme\nof use and wont; and this received scheme had come down out of\npre-feudal conditions, without having passed under the discipline of\nthat regime of coercion which the feudal system had imposed on the rest\nof Europe, and so had established as an \"immemorial usage\" and a \"second\nnature\" among the populations of Christendom. The resulting character of\nthe Icelandic Commonwealth is sufficiently striking when contrasted with\nthe case of the English commonwealth of the seventeenth century, or the\nlater French and American republics. These, all and several, came out of\na protracted experience in feudalistic state-making and State policy;\nand the common defense--frequently on the offensive--with its necessary\ncoercive machinery and its submissive loyalty, consequently would take\nthe central place in the resulting civic structure.\n\nTo close the tale of the Icelandic commonwealth it may be added that\ntheir republic of insubordinate citizens presently fell into default,\nsystematic misuse, under the disorders brought on by an accumulation of\nwealth, and that it died of legal fiction and constitutional formalities\nafter some experience at the hands of able and ambitious statesmen in\ncontact with an alien government drawn on the coercive plan. The clay\nvessel failed to make good among the iron pots, and so proved its\nunfitness to survive in the world of Christian nations,--very much as\nthe Chinese are today at the mercy of the defensive rapacity of the\nPowers.\n\n     And the mercy that we gave them\n   Was to sink them in the sea,\n   Down on the coast of High Barbarie.\n\nNo doubt, it will be accepted as an axiomatic certainty that the\nestablishment of a commonwealth after the fashion of the Icelandic\nRepublic, without coercive authority or provision for the common\ndefense, and without a sense of subordination or collective\nresponsibility among its citizens, would be out of all question under\nexisting circumstances of politics and international trade. Nor would\nsuch a commonwealth be workable on the scale and at the pace imposed by\nmodern industrial and commercial conditions, even apart from\ninternational jealousy and ambitions, provided the sacred rights of\nownership were to be maintained in something like their current shape.\nAnd yet something of a drift of popular sentiment, and indeed something\nof deliberate endeavour, setting in the direction of such a harmless and\nhelpless national organisation is always visible in Western Europe,\nthroughout modern times; particularly through the eighteenth and the\nearly half of the nineteenth centuries; and more particularly among the\nEnglish-speaking peoples and, with a difference, among the French. The\nDutch and the Scandinavian countries answer more doubtfully to the same\ncharacterisation.\n\nThe movement in question is known to history as the Liberal,\nRationalistic, Humanitarian, or Individualistic departure. Its ideal,\nwhen formulated, is spoken of as the System of Natural Rights; and its\ngoal in the way of a national establishment has been well characterised\nby its critics as the Police State, or the Night-Watchman State. The\ngains made in this direction, or perhaps better the inroads of this\nanimus in national ideals, are plainly to be set down as a shift in the\ndirection of peace and amity; but it is also plain that the shift of\nground so initiated by this strain of sentiment has never reached a\nconclusion and never has taken effect in anything like an effectual\nworking arrangement. Its practical consequences have been of the nature\nof abatement and defection in the pursuit of national ambitions and\ndynastic enterprise, rather than a creative work of installing any\ninstitutional furniture suitable to its own ends. It has in effect gone\nno farther than what would be called an incipient correction of abuses.\nThe highest rise, as well as the decline, of this movement lie within\nthe nineteenth century.\n\nIn point of time, the decay of this amiable conceit of _laissez-faire_\nin national policy coincides with the period of great advance in the\ntechnology of transport and communication in the nineteenth century.\nPerhaps, on a larger outlook, it should rather be said that the run of\nnational ambitions and animosities had, in the eighteenth and nineteenth\ncenturies, suffered a degree of decay through the diffusion of this\nsentimental predilection for Natural Liberty, and that this decline of\nthe manlier aspirations was then arrested and corrected by help of these\nimprovements in the technological situation; which enabled a closer and\nmore coercive control to be exercised over larger areas, and at the same\ntime enabled a more massive aggregate of warlike force to strike more\neffectively at a greater distance. This whole episode of the rise and\ndecline of _laissez-faire_ in modern history is perhaps best to be\nconceived as a transient weakening of nationalism, by neglect; rather\nthan anything like the growth of a new and more humane ideal of national\nintercourse. Such would be the appraisal to be had at the hands of those\nwho speak for a strenuous national life and for the arbitrament of\nsportsmanlike contention in human affairs. And the latterday growth of\nmore militant aspirations, together with the more settled and sedulous\nattention to a development of control and of formidable armaments, such\nas followed on through the latter half of the nineteenth century, would\nthen be rated as a resumption of those older aims and ideals that had\nbeen falling somewhat into abeyance in the slack-water days of\nLiberalism.\n\nThere is much to be said for this latter view; and, indeed, much has\nbeen said for it, particularly by the spokesmen of imperialist politics.\nThis bias of Natural Liberty has been associated in history with the\nEnglish-speaking peoples, more intimately and more extensively than with\nany other. Not that this amiable conceit is in any peculiar degree a\nrace characteristic of this group of peoples; nor even that the history\nof its rise and decline runs wholly within the linguistic frontiers\nindicated by this characterisation. The French and the Dutch have borne\ntheir share, and at an earlier day Italian sentiment and speculation\nlent its impulsion to the same genial drift of faith and aspiration.\nBut, by historical accident, its center of gravity and of diffusion has\nlain with the English-speaking communities during the period when this\nbias made history and left its impress on the institutional scheme of\nthe Western civilisation. By grace of what may, for the present purpose,\nbe called historical accident, it happens that the interval of history\nduring which the bias of Natural Liberty made visible headway was also a\nperiod during which these English-speaking peoples, among whom its\neffects are chiefly visible, were relatively secure from international\ndisturbance, by force of inaccessibility. Little strain was put upon\ntheir sense of national solidarity or national prowess; so little,\nindeed, that there was some danger of their patriotic animosity falling\ninto decay by disuse; and then they were also busy with other things.\nPeaceable intercourse, it is true, was relatively easy, active and\nfar-reaching--eighteenth and nineteenth centuries--as compared with what\nhad been the case before that time; but warlike intercourse on such a\nscale as would constitute a substantial menace to any large nation was\nnearly out of the question, so far as regards the English-speaking\npeoples. The available means of aggression, as touches the case of these\nparticular communities, were visibly and consciously inadequate as\ncompared with the means of defense. The means of internal or\nintra-national control or coercion were also less well provided by the\nstate of the arts current at that time than the means of peaceable\nintercourse. These means of transport and communication were, at that\nstage of their development, less well suited for the purposes of\nfar-reaching warlike strategy and the exercise of surveillance and\ncoercion over large spaces than for the purposes of peaceable traffic.\n\nBut the continued improvement in the means of communication during the\nnineteenth century presently upset that situation, and so presently\nbegan to neutralise the geographical quarantine which had hedged about\nthese communities that were inclined to let well enough alone. The\nincreasing speed and accuracy of movement in shipping, due to the\nsuccessful introduction of steam, as well as the concomitant increasing\nsize of the units of equipment, all runs to this effect and presently\nsets at naught the peace barriers of sea and weather. So also the\ndevelopment of railways and their increasing availability for strategic\nuses, together with the far-reaching coordination of movement made\npossible by their means and by the telegraph; all of which is further\nfacilitated by the increasing mass and density of population.\nImprovements in the technology of arms and armament worked to the like\neffect, of setting the peace of any community on an increasingly\nprecarious footing, through the advantage which this new technology gave\nto a ready equipment and a rapid mobilisation. The new state of the\nindustrial arts serviceable for warlike enterprise put an increasingly\nheavy premium on readiness for offense or defense, but more particularly\nit all worked increasingly to the advantage of the offensive. It put the\nFabian strategy out of date, and led to the doctrine of a defensive\noffense.\n\nGradually it came true, with the continued advance in those industrial\narts that lend themselves to strategic uses, and it came also to be\nrealised, that no corner of the earth was any longer secure by mere\nfavor of distance and natural difficulty, from eventual aggression at\nthe hands of any provident and adventurous assailant,--even by help of a\nmodicum of defensive precaution. The fear of aggression then came\ndefinitively to take the place of international good-will and became the\nchief motive in public policy, so fast and so far as the state of the\nindustrial arts continued to incline the balance of advantage to the\nside of the aggressor. All of which served greatly to strengthen the\nhands of those statesmen who, by interest or temperament, were inclined\nto imperialistic enterprise. Since that period all armament has\nconventionally been accounted defensive, and all statesmen have\nprofessed that the common defense is their chief concern. Professedly\nall armament has been designed to keep the peace; so much of a shadow of\nthe peaceable bias there still stands over.\n\nThroughout this latest phase of modern civilisation the avowed fear of\naggression has served as apology, possibly as provocation in fact, to\nnational armaments; and throughout the same period any analysis of the\nsituation will finally run the chain of fear back to Prussia as the\nputative or actual, center of disturbance and apprehension. No doubt,\nPrussian armament has taken the lead and forced the pace among the\nnations of Christendom; but the Prussian policy, too, has been\ndiligently covered with the same decorous plea of needful provision for\nthe common defense and an unremitting solicitude for international\npeace,--to which has been added the canny afterthought of the \"defensive\noffense.\"\n\nIt is characteristic of this era of armed peace that in all these\nextensive preparations for breaking the peace any formal avowal of other\nthan a defensive purpose has at all times been avoided as an\ninsufferable breach of diplomatic decorum. It is likewise characteristic\nof the same era that armaments have unremittingly been increased, beyond\nanything previously known; and that all men have known all the while\nthat the inevitable outcome of this avowedly defensive armament must\neventually be war on an unprecedented scale and of unexampled ferocity.\nIt would be neither charitable nor otherwise to the point to call\nattention to the reflection which this state of the case throws on the\ncollective sagacity or the good faith of the statesmen who have had the\nmanagement of affairs. It is not practicable to imagine how such an\noutcome as the present could have been brought about by any degree of\nstupidity or incapacity alone, nor is it easier to find evidence that\nthe utmost sagacity of the statecraft engaged has had the slightest\nmitigating effect on the evil consummation to which the whole case has\nbeen brought. It has long been a commonplace among observers of public\nevents that these professedly defensive warlike preparations have in\neffect been preparations for breaking the peace; against which, at\nleast ostensibly, a remedy had been sought in the preparation of still\nheavier armaments, with full realisation that more armament would\nunfailingly entail a more unsparing and more disastrous war,--which sums\nup the statecraft of the past half century.\n\nPrussia, and afterwards Prussianised Germany, has come in for the\ndistinction of taking the lead and forcing the pace in this competitive\npreparation--or \"preparedness\"--for war in time of peace. That such has\nbeen the case appears in good part to be something of a fortuitous\ncircumstance. The season of enterprising force and fraud to which that\ncountry owes its induction into the concert of nations is an episode of\nrecent history; so recent, indeed, that the German nation has not yet\nhad time to live it down and let it be forgotten; and the Imperial State\nis consequently burdened with an irritably uneasy sense of odium and an\nestablished reputation for unduly bad faith. From which it has followed,\namong other things, that the statesmen of the Empire have lived in the\nexpectation of having their unforgotten derelictions brought home, and\nso have, on the one hand, found themselves unable to credit any pacific\nintentions professed by the neighboring Powers, while on the other hand\nthey have been unable to gain credence for their own voluble professions\nof peace and amity. So it has come about that, by a fortuitous\nconjuncture of scarcely relevant circumstances, Prussia and the Empire\nhave been thrown into the lead in the race of \"preparedness\" and have\nbeen led assiduously to hasten a breach which they could ill afford. It\nis, to say the least, extremely doubtful if the event would have been\nsubstantially different in the absence of that special provocation to\ncompetitive preparedness that has been injected into the situation by\nthis German attitude; but the rate of approach to a warlike climax has\ndoubtless been hastened by the anticipatory policy of preparedness which\nthe Prussian dynasty has seen itself constrained to pursue. Eventually,\nthe peculiar circumstances of its case--embarrassment at home and\ndistaste and discredit abroad--have induced the Imperial State to take\nthe line of a defensive offense, to take war by the forelock and\nretaliate on presumptive enemies for prospective grievances. But in any\ncase, the progressive improvement in transport and communication, as\nwell as in the special technology of warfare, backed by greatly enhanced\nfacilities for indoctrinating the populace with militant\nnationalism,--these ways and means, working under the hand of patriotic\nstatesmen must in course of the past century have brought the peace of\nEurope to so precarious a footing as would have provoked a material\nincrease in the equipment for national defense; which would unavoidably\nhave led to competitive armament and an enhanced international distrust\nand animosity, eventually culminating in hostilities.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt may well be that the plea of defensive preparation advanced by the\nstatesmen, Prussian and others, in apology for competitive armaments is\na diplomatic subterfuge,--there are indications that such has commonly\nbeen the case; but even if it commonly is visibly disingenuous, the need\nof making such a plea to cover more sinister designs is itself an\nevidence that an avowedly predatory enterprise no longer meets with the\nrequisite popular approval. Even if an exception to this rule be\nadmitted in the recent attitude of the German people, it is to be\nrecalled that the exception was allowed to stand only transiently, and\nthat presently the avowal of a predatory design in this case was\nurgently disclaimed in the face of adversity. Even those who speak most\nfluently for the necessity of war, and for its merits as a needed\ndiscipline in the manly virtues, are constrained by the prevailing\nsentiment to deprecate its necessity.\n\nYet it is equally evident that when once a warlike enterprise has been\nentered upon so far as to commit the nation to hostilities, it will have\nthe cordial support of popular sentiment even if it is patently an\naggressive war. Indeed, it is quite a safe generalisation that when\nhostilities have once been got fairly under way by the interested\nstatesmen, the patriotic sentiment of the nation may confidently be\ncounted on to back the enterprise irrespective of the merits of the\nquarrel. But even if the national sentiment is in this way to be counted\nin as an incidental matter of course, it is also to be kept in mind in\nthis connection that any quarrel so entered upon by any nation will\nforthwith come to have the moral approval of the community. Dissenters\nwill of course be found, sporadically, who do not readily fall in with\nthe prevailing animus; but as a general proposition it will still hold\ntrue that any such quarrel forthwith becomes a just quarrel in the eyes\nof those who have so been committed to it.\n\nA corollary following from this general theorem may be worth noting in\nthe same connection. Any politician who succeeds in embroiling his\ncountry in a war, however nefarious, becomes a popular hero and is\nreputed a wise and righteous statesman, at least for the time being.\nIllustrative instances need perhaps not, and indeed can not gracefully,\nbe named; most popular heroes and reputed statesmen belong in this\nclass.\n\nAnother corollary, which bears more immediately on the question in hand,\nfollows also from the same general proposition: Since the ethical values\ninvolved in any given international contest are substantially of the\nnature of afterthought or accessory, they may safely be left on one side\nin any endeavour to understand or account for any given outbreak of\nhostilities. The moral indignation of both parties to the quarrel is to\nbe taken for granted, as being the statesman's chief and necessary ways\nand means of bringing any warlike enterprise to a head and floating it\nto a creditable finish. It is a precipitate of the partisan animosity\nthat inspires both parties and holds them to their duty of\nself-sacrifice and devastation, and at its best it will chiefly serve as\na cloak of self-righteousness to extenuate any exceptionally profligate\nexcursions in the conduct of hostilities.\n\nAny warlike enterprise that is hopefully to be entered on must have the\nmoral sanction of the community, or of an effective majority in the\ncommunity. It consequently becomes the first concern of the warlike\nstatesman to put this moral force in train for the adventure on which he\nis bent. And there are two main lines of motivation by which the\nspiritual forces of any Christian nation may so be mobilised for warlike\nadventure: (1) The preservation or furtherance of the community's\nmaterial interests, real or fancied, and (2) vindication of the national\nhonour. To these should perhaps be added as a third, the advancement and\nperpetuation of the nation's \"Culture;\" that is to say, of its habitual\nscheme of use and wont. It is a nice question whether, in practical\neffect, the aspiration to perpetuate the national Culture is\nconsistently to be distinguished from the vindication of the national\nhonour. There is perhaps the distinction to be made that \"the\nperpetuation of the national Culture\" lends a readier countenance to\ngratuitous aggression and affords a broader cover for incidental\natrocities, since the enemies of the national Culture will necessarily\nbe conceived as an inferior and obstructive people, falling beneath the\nrules of commonplace decorum.\n\nThose material interests for which modern nations are in the habit of\ntaking to arms are commonly of a fanciful character, in that they\ncommonly have none but an imaginary net value to the community at large.\nSuch are, e.g., the national trade or the increase of the national\nterritory. These and the like may serve the warlike or dynastic\nambitions of the nation's masters; they may also further the interests\nof office-holders, and more particularly of certain business houses or\nbusinessmen who stand to gain some small advantage by help of the powers\nin control; but it all signifies nothing more to the common man than an\nincreased bill of governmental expense and a probable increase in the\ncost of living.\n\nThat a nation's trade should be carried in vessels owned by its citizens\nor registered in its ports will doubtless have some sentimental value to\nthe common run of its citizens, as is shown by the fact that\ndisingenuous politicians always find it worth their while to appeal to\nthis chauvinistic predilection. But it patently is all a completely idle\nquestion, in point of material advantage, to anyone but the owners of\nthe vessels; and to these owners it is also of no material consequence\nunder what flag their investments sail, except so far as the government\nin question may afford them some preferential opportunity for\ngain,--always at the cost of their fellow citizens. The like is equally\ntrue as regards the domicile and the national allegiance of the\nbusinessmen who buy and sell the country's imports and exports. The\ncommon man plainly has no slightest material interest in the nationality\nor the place of residence of those who conduct this traffic; though all\nthe facts go to say that in some puzzle-headed way the common man\ncommonly persuades himself that it does make some occult sort of\ndifference to him; so that he is commonly willing to pay something\nsubstantial toward subsidising businessmen of his own nationality, in\nthe way of a protective tariff and the like.\n\nThe only material advantage to be derived from such a preferential trade\npolicy arises in the case of international hostilities, in which case\nthe home-owned vessels and merchants may on occasion count toward\nmilitary readiness; although even in that connection their value is\ncontingent and doubtful. But in this way they may contribute in their\ndegree to a readiness to break off peaceable relations with other\ncountries. It is only for warlike purposes, that is to say for the\ndynastic ambitions of warlike statesmen, that these preferential\ncontrivances in economic policy have any substantial value; and even in\nthat connection their expediency is always doubtful. They are a source\nof national jealousy, and they may on occasion become a help to military\nstrategy when this national jealousy eventuates in hostilities.\n\nThe run of the facts touching this matter of national trade policy is\nsomething as follows: At the instance of businessmen who stand to gain\nby it, and with the cordial support of popular sentiment, the\nconstituted authorities sedulously further the increase of shipping and\ncommerce under protection of the national power. At the same time they\nspend substance and diplomatic energy in an endeavor to extend the\ninternational market facilities open to the country's businessmen, with\na view always to a preferential advantage in favor of these\nbusinessmen, also with the sentimental support of the common man and at\nhis cost. To safeguard these commercial interests, as well as\nproperty-holdings of the nation's citizens in foreign parts, the nation\nmaintains naval, military, consular and diplomatic establishments, at\nthe common expense. The total gains derivable from these commercial and\ninvestment interests abroad, under favorable circumstances, will never\nby any chance equal the cost of the governmental apparatus installed to\nfurther and safeguard them. These gains, such as they are, go to the\ninvestors and businessmen engaged in these enterprises; while the costs\nincident to the adventure are borne almost wholly by the common man, who\ngets no gain from it all. Commonly, as in the case of a protective\ntariff or a preferential navigation law, the cost to the common man is\naltogether out of proportion to the gain which accrues to the\nbusinessmen for whose benefit he carries the burden. The only other\nclass, besides the preferentially favored businessmen, who derive any\nmaterial benefit from this arrangement is that of the office-holders who\ntake care of this governmental traffic and draw something in the way of\nsalaries and perquisites; and whose cost is defrayed by the common man,\nwho remains an outsider in all but the payment of the bills. The common\nman is proud and glad to bear this burden for the benefit of his\nwealthier neighbors, and he does so with the singular conviction that in\nsome occult manner he profits by it. All this is incredible, but it is\neveryday fact.\n\nIn case it should happen that these business interests of the nation's\nbusinessmen interested in trade or investments abroad are jeopardised by\na disturbance of any kind in these foreign parts in which these\nbusiness interests lie, then it immediately becomes the urgent concern\nof the national authorities to use all means at hand for maintaining the\ngainful traffic of these businessmen undiminished, and the common man\npays the cost. Should such an untoward situation go to such sinister\nlengths as to involve actual loss to these business interests or\notherwise give rise to a tangible grievance, it becomes an affair of the\nnational honour; whereupon no sense of proportion as between the\nmaterial gains at stake and the cost of remedy or retaliation need\nlonger be observed, since the national honour is beyond price. The\nmotivation in the case shifts from the ground of material interest to\nthe spiritual ground of the moral sentiments.\n\nIn this connection \"honour\" is of course to be taken in the euphemistic\nsense which the term has under the _code duello_ governing \"affairs of\nhonour.\" It carries no connotation of honesty, veracity, equity,\nliberality, or unselfishness. This national honour is of the nature of\nan intangible or immaterial asset, of course; it is a matter of\nprestige, a sportsmanlike conception; but that fact must not be taken to\nmean that it is of any the less substantial effect for purposes of a\n_casus belli_ than the material assets of the community. Quite the\ncontrary: \"Who steals my purse, steals trash,\" etc. In point of fact, it\nwill commonly happen that any material grievance must first be converted\ninto terms of this spiritual capital, before it is effectually turned to\naccount as a stimulus to warlike enterprise.\n\nEven among a people with so single an eye to the main chance as the\nAmerican community it will be found true, on experiment or on review of\nthe historical evidence, that an offense against the national honour\ncommands a profounder and more unreserved resentment than any\ninfraction of the rights of person or property simply. This has latterly\nbeen well shown in connection with the manoeuvres of the several\nEuropean belligerents, designed to bend American neutrality to the\nservice of one side or the other. Both parties have aimed to intimidate\nand cajole; but while the one party has taken recourse to effrontery and\nhas made much and ostentatious use of threats and acts of violence\nagainst person and property, the other has constantly observed a\ndeferential attitude toward American national self-esteem, even while\nengaged on a persistent infraction of American commercial rights. The\nfirst named line of diplomacy has convicted itself of miscarriage and\nhas lost the strategic advantage, as against the none too adroit finesse\nof the other side. The statesmen of this European war power were so ill\nadvised as to enter on a course of tentatively cumulative intimidation,\nby threats and experimentally graduated crimes against the property and\npersons of American citizens, with a view to coerce American cupidity\nand yet to avoid carrying these manoeuvres of terrorism far enough to\narouse an unmanageable sense of outrage. The experiment has served to\nshow that the breaking point in popular indignation will be reached\nbefore the terrorism has gone far enough to raise a serious question of\npecuniary caution.\n\nThis national honour, which so is rated a necessary of life, is an\nimmaterial substance in a peculiarly high-wrought degree, being not only\nnot physically tangible but also not even capable of adequate statement\nin pecuniary terms,--as would be the case with ordinary immaterial\nassets. It is true, where the point of grievance out of which a question\nof the national honour arises is a pecuniary discrepancy, the national\nhonour can not be satisfied without a pecuniary accounting; but it needs\nno argument to convince all right-minded persons that even at such a\njuncture the national honour that has been compromised is indefinitely\nand indefinably more than what can be made to appear on an accountant's\npage. It is a highly valued asset, or at least a valued possession, but\nit is of a metaphysical, not of a physical nature, and it is not known\nto serve any material or otherwise useful end apart from affording a\npracticable grievance consequent upon its infraction.\n\nThis national honour is subject to injury in divers ways, and so may\nyield a fruitful grievance even apart from offences against the person\nor property of the nation's businessmen; as, e.g., through neglect or\ndisregard of the conventional punctilios governing diplomatic\nintercourse, or by disrespect or contumelious speech touching the Flag,\nor the persons of national officials, particularly of such officials as\nhave only a decorative use, or the costumes worn by such officials, or,\nagain, by failure to observe the ritual prescribed for parading the\nnational honour on stated occasions. When duly violated the national\nhonour may duly be made whole again by similarly immaterial\ninstrumentalities; as, e.g., by recital of an appropriate formula of\nwords, by formal consumption of a stated quantity of ammunition in the\nway of a salute, by \"dipping\" an ensign, and the like,--procedure which\ncan, of course, have none but a magical efficacy. The national honour,\nin short, moves in the realm of magic, and touches the frontiers of\nreligion.\n\nThroughout this range of duties incumbent on the national defense, it\nwill be noted, the offenses or discrepancies to be guarded against or\ncorrected by recourse to arms have much of a ceremonial character.\nWhatever may be the material accidents that surround any given concrete\ngrievance that comes up for appraisal and redress, in bringing the case\ninto the arena for trial by combat it is the spiritual value of the\noffense that is played up and made the decisive ground of action,\nparticularly in so far as appeal is made to the sensibilities of the\ncommon man, who will have to bear the cost of the adventure. And in such\na case it will commonly happen that the common man is unable, without\nadvice, to see that any given hostile act embodies a sacrilegious\ninfraction of the national honour. He will at any such conjuncture\nscarcely rise to the pitch of moral indignation necessary to float a\nwarlike reprisal, until the expert keepers of the Code come in to\nexpound and certify the nature of the transgression. But when once the\nlesion to the national honour has been ascertained, appraised and duly\nexhibited by those persons whose place in the national economy it is to\nlook after all that sort of thing, the common man will be found nowise\nbehindhand about resenting the evil usage of which he so, by force of\ninterpretation, has been a victim.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nON THE NATURE AND USES OF PATRIOTISM\n\n\nPatriotism may be defined as a sense of partisan solidarity in respect\nof prestige. What the expert psychologists, and perhaps the experts in\nPolitical Science, might find it necessary to say in the course of an\nexhaustive analysis and definition of this human faculty would\npresumably be something more precise and more extensive. There is no\ninclination here to forestall definition, but only to identify and\ndescribe the concept that loosely underlies the colloquial use of this\nterm, so far as seems necessary to an inquiry into the part played by\nthe patriotic animus in the life of modern peoples, particularly as it\nbears on questions of war and peace.\n\nOn any attempt to divest this concept of all extraneous or adventitious\nelements it will be found that such a sense of an undivided joint\ninterest in a collective body of prestige will always remain as an\nirreducible minimum. This is the substantial core about which many and\ndivers subsidiary interests cluster, but without which these other\nclustering interests and aspirations will not, jointly or severally,\nmake up a working palladium of the patriotic spirit.\n\nIt is true, seen in some other light or rated in some other bearing or\nconnection, one and another of these other interests, ideals,\naspirations, beatitudes, may well be adjudged nobler, wiser, possibly\nmore urgent than the national prestige; but in the forum of patriotism\nall these other necessaries of human life--the glory of God and the good\nof man--rise by comparison only to the rank of subsidiaries,\nauxiliaries, amenities. He is an indifferent patriot who will let \"life,\nliberty and the pursuit of happiness\" cloud the issue and get in the way\nof the main business in hand.\n\nThere once were, we are told, many hardy and enterprising spirits banded\ntogether along the Spanish Main for such like ends, just as there are in\nour day an even greater number of no less single-minded spirits bent on\ntheir own \"life, liberty and pursuit of happiness,\" according to their\nlight, in the money-markets of the modern world; but for all their\nadmirable qualities and splendid achievements, their passionate quest of\nthese amenities has not entitled these Gentlemen Adventurers to claim\nrank as patriots. The poet says:\n\n   \"Strike for your altars and your fires!\n   Strike for the green graves of your sires!\n     God and your native land!\"\n\nBut, again, a temperate scrutiny of the list of desiderata so enumerated\nin the poet's flight, will quickly bring out the fact that any or all of\nthem might drop out of the situation without prejudice to the plain call\nof patriotic duty. In the last resort, when the patriotic spirit falls\nback on its naked self alone, it is not reflection on the merits of\nthese good and beautiful things in Nature that gives him his cue and\nenforces the ultimate sacrifice. Indeed it is something infinitely more\nfutile and infinitely more urgent,--provided only that the man is imbued\nwith the due modicum of patriotic devotion; as, indeed, men commonly\nare. It is not faith, hope or charity that abide as the irreducible\nminimum of virtue in the patriot's scheme of things; particularly not\nthat charity that has once been highly spoken of as being the greatest\nof these. It may be that, viewed in the light of reason, as Doctor\nKatzenberger would say, patriotic devotion is the most futile thing in\nthe world; but, for good or ill, the light of reason has nothing to do\nwith the case,--no more than \"The flowers that bloom in the spring.\"\n\nThe patriotic spirit is a spirit of emulation, evidently, at the same\ntime that it is emulation shot through with a sense of solidarity. It\nbelongs under the general caption of sportsmanship, rather than of\nworkmanship. Now, any enterprise in sportsmanship is bent on an\ninvidious success, which must involve as its major purpose the defeat\nand humiliation of some competitor, whatever else may be comprised in\nits aim. Its aim is a differential gain, as against a rival; and the\nemulative spirit that comes under the head of patriotism commonly, if\nnot invariably, seeks this differential advantage by injury of the rival\nrather than by an increase of home-bred well-being.\n\nIndeed, well-being is altogether out of the perspective, except as\nunderpinning for an edifice of national prestige. It is, at least, a\nsafe generalisation that the patriotic sentiment never has been known to\nrise to the consummate pitch of enthusiastic abandon except when bent on\nsome work of concerted malevolence. Patriotism is of a contentious\ncomplexion, and finds its full expression in no other outlet than\nwarlike enterprise; its highest and final appeal is for the death,\ndamage, discomfort and destruction of the party of the second part.\n\nIt is not that the spirit of patriotism will tolerate no other\nsentiments bearing on matters of public interest, but only that it will\ntolerate none that traverse the call of the national prestige. Like\nother men, the patriot may be moved by many and divers other\nconsiderations, besides that of the national prestige; and these other\nconsiderations may be of the most genial and reasonable kind, or they\nmay also be as foolish and mischievous as any comprised in the range of\nhuman infirmities. He may be a humanitarian given over to the kindliest\nsolicitude for the common good, or a religious devotee hedged about in\nall his motions by the ever present fear of God, or taken up with\nartistic, scholarly or scientific pursuits; or, again, he may be a\nspendthrift devotee of profane dissipation, whether in the slums or on\nthe higher levels of gentility, or he may be engaged on a rapacious\nquest of gain, as a businessman within the law or as a criminal without\nits benefit, or he may spend his best endeavors in advancing the\ninterests of his class at the cost of the nation at large. All that is\nunderstood as a matter of course and is beside the point. In so far as\nhe is a complete patriot these other interests will fall away from him\nwhen the one clear call of patriotic duty comes to enlist him in the\ncause of the national prestige. There is, indeed, nothing to hinder a\nbad citizen being a good patriot; nor does it follow that a good\ncitizen--in other respects--may not be a very indifferent patriot.\n\nMany and various other preferences and considerations may coincide with\nthe promptings of the patriotic spirit, and so may come in to coalesce\nwith and fortify its driving force; and it is usual for patriotic men to\nseek support for their patriotic impulses in some reasoned purpose of\nthis extraneous kind that is believed to be served by following the call\nof the national prestige,--it may be a presumptive increase and\ndiffusion of culture at large, or the spread and enhancement of a\npresumptively estimable religious faith, or a prospective liberation of\nmankind from servitude to obnoxious masters and outworn institutions;\nor, again, it may be the increase of peace and material well-being among\nmen, within the national frontiers or impartially throughout the\ncivilised world. There are, substantially, none of the desirable things\nin this world that are not so counted on by some considerable body of\npatriots to be accomplished by the success of their own particular\npatriotic aspirations. What they will not come to an understanding about\nis the particular national ascendency with which the attainment of these\nadmirable ends is conceived to be bound up.\n\nThe ideals, needs and aims that so are brought into the patriotic\nargument to lend a color of rationality to the patriotic aspiration in\nany given case will of course be such ideals, needs and aims as are\ncurrently accepted and felt to be authentic and self-legitimating among\nthe people in whose eyes the given patriotic enterprise is to find\nfavor. So one finds that, e.g., among the followers of Islam, devout and\nresolute, the patriotic statesman (that is to say the politician who\ndesigns to make use of the popular patriotic fervor) will in the last\nresort appeal to the claims and injunctions of the faith. In a similar\nway the Prussian statesman bent on dynastic enterprise will conjure in\nthe name of the dynasty and of culture and efficiency; or, if worse\ncomes to worst, an outbreak will be decently covered with a plea of\nmortal peril and self-defense. Among English-speaking peoples much is to\nbe gained by showing that the path of patriotic glory is at the same\ntime the way of equal-handed justice under the rule of free\ninstitutions; at the same time, in a fully commercialised community,\nsuch as the English-speaking commonly are, material benefits in the way\nof trade will go far to sketch in a background of decency for any\nenterprise that looks to the enhancement of the national prestige.\n\nBut any promise of gain, whether in the nation's material or immaterial\nassets, will not of itself carry full conviction to the commonplace\nmodern citizen; or even to such modern citizens as are best endowed with\na national spirit. By and large, and overlooking that appreciable\ncontingent of morally defective citizens that is to be counted on in any\nhybrid population, it will hold true that no contemplated enterprise or\nline of policy will fully commend itself to the popular sense of merit\nand expediency until it is given a moral turn, so as to bring it to\nsquare with the dictates of right and honest dealing. On no terms short\nof this will it effectually coalesce with the patriotic aspiration. To\ngive the fullest practical effect to the patriotic fervor that animates\nany modern nation, and so turn it to use in the most effective way, it\nis necessary to show that the demands of equity are involved in the\ncase. Any cursory survey of modern historical events bearing on this\npoint, among the civilised peoples, will bring out the fact that no\nconcerted and sustained movement of the national spirit can be had\nwithout enlisting the community's moral convictions. The common man must\nbe persuaded that right is on his side. \"Thrice is he armed who knows\nhis quarrel just.\" The grounds of this conviction may often be tawdry\nenough, but the conviction is a necessary factor in the case.\n\nThe requisite moral sanction may be had on various grounds, and, on the\nwhole, it is not an extremely difficult matter to arrange. In the\nsimplest and not infrequent case it may turn on a question of equity in\nrespect of trade or investment as between the citizens or subjects of\nthe several rival nations; the Chinese \"Open Door\" affords as sordid an\nexample as may be desired. Or it may be only an envious demand for a\nshare in the world's material resources--\"A Place in the Sun,\" as a\npicturesque phrase describes it; or \"The Freedom of the Seas,\" as\nanother equally vague and equally invidious demand for international\nequity phrases it. These demands are put forward with a color of\ndemanding something in the way of equitable opportunity for the\ncommonplace peaceable citizen; but quite plainly they have none but a\nfanciful bearing on the fortunes of the common man in time of peace, and\nthey have a meaning to the nation only as a fighting unit; apart from\ntheir prestige value, these things are worth fighting for only as\nprospective means of fighting. The like appeal to the moral\nsensibilities may, again, be made in the way of a call to self-defense,\nunder the rule of Live and let live; or it may also rest on the more\ntenuous obligation to safeguard the national integrity of a weaker\nneighbor, under a broader interpretation of the same equitable rule of\nLive and let live. But in one way or another it is necessary to set up\nthe conviction that the promptings of patriotic ambition have the\nsanction of moral necessity.\n\nIt is not that the line of national policy or patriotic enterprise so\nentered upon with the support of popular sentiment need be right and\nequitable as seen in dispassionate perspective from the outside, but\nonly that it should be capable of being made to seem right and equitable\nto the biased populace whose moral convictions are requisite to its\nprosecution; which is quite another matter. Nor is it that any such\npatriotic enterprise is, in fact, entered on simply or mainly on these\nmoral grounds that so are alleged in its justification, but only that\nsome such colorable ground of justification or extenuation is necessary\nto be alleged, and to be credited by popular belief.\n\nIt is not that the common man is not sufficiently patriotic, but only\nthat he is a patriot hampered with a plodding and uneasy sense of right\nand honest dealing, and that one must make up one's account with this\nmoral bias in looking to any sustained and concerted action that draws\non the sentiment of the common man for its carrying on. But the moral\nsense in the case may be somewhat easily satisfied with a modicum of\nequity, in case the patriotic bias of the people is well pronounced, or\nin case it is reenforced with a sufficient appeal to self-interest. In\nthose cases where the national fervor rises to an excited pitch, even\nvery attenuated considerations of right and justice, such as would under\nordinary conditions doubtfully bear scrutiny as extenuating\ncircumstances, may come to serve as moral authentication for any\nextravagant course of action to which the craving for national prestige\nmay incite. The higher the pitch of patriotic fervor, the more tenuous\nand more thread-bare may be the requisite moral sanction. By cumulative\nexcitation some very remarkable results have latterly been attained\nalong this line.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPatriotism is evidently a spirit of particularism, of aliency and\nanimosity between contrasted groups of persons; it lives on invidious\ncomparison, and works out in mutual hindrance and jealousy between\nnations. It commonly goes the length of hindering intercourse and\nobstructing traffic that would patently serve the material and cultural\nwell-being of both nationalities; and not infrequently, indeed\nnormally, it eventuates in competitive damage to both.\n\nAll this holds true in the world of modern civilisation, at the same\ntime that the modern civilised scheme of life is, notoriously, of a\ncosmopolitan character, both in its cultural requirements and in its\neconomic structure. Modern culture is drawn on too large a scale, is of\ntoo complex and multiform a character, requires the cooperation of too\nmany and various lines of inquiry, experience and insight, to admit of\nits being confined within national frontiers, except at the cost of\ninsufferable crippling and retardation. The science and scholarship that\nis the peculiar pride of civilised Christendom is not only\ninternational, but rather it is homogeneously cosmopolitan; so that in\nthis bearing there are, in effect, no national frontiers; with the\nexception, of course, that in a season of patriotic intoxication, such\nas the current war has induced, even the scholars and scientists will be\ntemporarily overset by their patriotic fervour. Indeed, with the best\nefforts of obscurantism and national jealousy to the contrary, it\nremains patently true that modern culture is the culture of Christendom\nat large, not the culture of one and another nation in severalty within\nthe confines of Christendom. It is only as and in so far as they partake\nin and contribute to the general run of Western civilisation at large\nthat the people of any one of these nations of Christendom can claim\nstanding as a cultured nation; and even any distinctive variation from\nthis general run of civilised life, such as may give a \"local colour\" of\nideals, tastes and conventions, will, in point of cultural value, have\nto be rated as an idle detail, a species of lost motion, that serves no\nbetter purpose than a transient estrangement.\n\nSo also, the modern state of the industrial arts is of a like\ncosmopolitan character, in point of scale, specialisation, and the\nnecessary use of diversified resources, of climate and raw materials.\nNone of the countries of Europe, e.g., is competent to carry on its\nindustry by modern technological methods without constantly drawing on\nresources outside of its national boundaries. Isolation in this\nindustrial respect, exclusion from the world market, would mean\nintolerable loss of efficiency, more pronounced the more fully the given\ncountry has taken over this modern state of the industrial arts.\nExclusion from the general body of outlying resources would seriously\ncripple any one or all of them, and effectually deprive them of the\nusufruct of this technology; and partial exclusion, by prohibitive or\nprotective tariffs and the like, unavoidably results in a partial\nlowering of the efficiency of each, and therefore a reduction of the\ncurrent well-being among them all together.\n\nInto this cultural and technological system of the modern world the\npatriotic spirit fits like dust in the eyes and sand in the bearings.\nIts net contribution to the outcome is obscuration, distrust, and\nretardation at every point where it touches the fortunes of modern\nmankind. Yet it is forever present in the counsels of the statesmen and\nin the affections of the common man, and it never ceases to command the\nregard of all men as the prime attribute of manhood and the final test\nof the desirable citizen. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that no\nother consideration is allowed in abatement of the claims of patriotic\nloyalty, and that such loyalty will be allowed to cover any multitude of\nsins. When the ancient philosopher described Man as a \"political animal,\"\nthis, in effect, was what he affirmed; and today the ancient maxim is as\ngood as new. The patriotic spirit is at cross purposes with modern life,\nbut in any test case it is found that the claims of life yield before\nthose of patriotism; and any voice that dissents from this order of things\nis as a voice crying in the wilderness.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo anyone who is inclined to moralise on the singular discrepancies of\nhuman life this state of the case will be fruitful of much profound\nspeculation. The patriotic animus appears to be an enduring trait of\nhuman nature, an ancient heritage that has stood over unshorn from time\nimmemorial, under the Mendelian rule of the stability of racial types.\nIt is archaic, not amenable to elimination or enduring suppression, and\napparently not appreciably to be mitigated by reflection, education,\nexperience or selective breeding.\n\nThroughout the historical period, and presumably through an incalculable\nperiod of the unrecorded past, patriotic manslaughter has consistently\nbeen weeding out of each successive generation of men the most patriotic\namong them; with the net result that the level of patriotic ardor today\nappears to be no lower than it ever was. At the same time, with the\nadvance of population, of culture and of the industrial arts, patriotism\nhas grown increasingly disserviceable; and it is to all appearance as\nubiquitous and as powerful as ever, and is held in as high esteem.\n\nThe continued prevalence of this archaic animus among the modern\npeoples, as well as the fact that it is universally placed high among\nthe virtues, must be taken to argue that it is, in its elements, an\nhereditary trait, of the nature of an inborn impulsive propensity,\nrather than a product of habituation. It is, in substance, not\nsomething that can be learned and unlearned. From one generation to\nanother, the allegiance may shift from one nationality to another, but\nthe fact of unreflecting allegiance at large remains. And it all argues\nalso that no sensible change has taken effect in the hereditary\nendowment of the race, at least in this respect, during the period known\nby record or by secure inference,--say, since the early Neolithic in\nEurope; and this in spite of the fact that there has all this while been\nopportunity for radical changes in the European population by\ncross-breeding, infiltration and displacement of the several racial\nstocks that go to make up this population. Hence, on slight reflection\nthe inference has suggested itself and has gained acceptance that this\ntrait of human nature must presumably have been serviceable to the\npeoples of the earlier time, on those levels of savagery or of the lower\nbarbarism on which the ancestral stocks of the European population first\nmade good their survival and proved their fitness to people that quarter\nof the earth. Such, indeed, is the common view; so common as to pass for\nmatter-of-course, and therefore habitually to escape scrutiny.\n\nStill it need not follow, as more patient reflection will show. All the\nEuropean peoples show much the same animus in this respect; whatever\ntheir past history may have been, and whatever the difference in past\nexperience that might be conceived to have shaped their temperament. Any\ndifference in the pitch of patriotic conceit and animosity, between the\nseveral nationalities or the several localities, is by no means wide,\neven in cases where the racial composition of the population is held to\nbe very different, as, e.g., between the peoples on the Baltic seaboard\nand those on the Mediterranean. In point of fact, in this matter of\npatriotic animus there appears to be a wider divergence,\ntemperamentally, between individuals within any one of these communities\nthan between the common run in any one community and the corresponding\ncommon run in any other. But even such divergence of individual temper\nin respect of patriotism as is to be met with, first and last, is after\nall surprisingly small in view of the scope for individual variation\nwhich this European population would seem to offer.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThese peoples of Europe, all and several, are hybrids compounded out of\nthe same run of racial elements, but mixed in varying proportions. On\nany parallel of latitude--taken in the climatic rather than in the\ngeometric sense--the racial composition of the west-European population\nwill be much the same, virtually identical in effect, although always of\na hybrid complexion; whereas on any parallel of longitude--also in the\nclimatic sense--the racial composition will vary progressively, but\nalways within the limits of the same general scheme of hybridisation,--the\nvariation being a variation in the proportion in which the several racial\nelements are present in any given case. But in no case does a notable\ndifference in racial composition coincide with a linguistic or national\nfrontier. But in point of patriotic animus these European peoples are one\nas good as another, whether the comparison be traced on parallels of\nlatitude or of longitude. And the inhabitants of each national territory,\nor of each detail locality, appear also to run surprisingly uniform in\nrespect of their patriotic spirit.\n\nHeredity in any such community of hybrids will, superficially, appear to\nrun somewhat haphazard. There will, of course, be no traceable\ndifference between social or economic classes, in point of heredity,--as\nis visibly the case in Christendom. But variation--of an apparently\nhaphazard description--will be large and ubiquitous among the\nindividuals of such a populace. Indeed, it is a matter of course and of\neasy verification that individual variation within such a hybrid stock\nwill greatly exceed the extreme differences that may subsist between the\nseveral racial types that have gone to produce the hybrid stock. Such is\nthe case of the European peoples. The inhabitants vary greatly among\nthemselves, both in physical and in mental traits, as would be expected;\nand the variation between individuals in point of patriotic animus\nshould accordingly also be expected to be extremely wide,--should, in\neffect, greatly exceed the difference, if any, in this respect between\nthe several racial elements engaged in the European population. Some\nappreciable difference in this respect there appears to be, between\nindividuals; but individual divergence from the normal or average\nappears always to be of a sporadic sort,--it does not run on class\nlines, whether of occupation, status or property, nor does it run at all\nconsistently from parent to child. When all is told the argument returns\nto the safe ground that these variations in point of patriotic animus\nare sporadic and inconsequential, and do not touch the general\nproposition that, one with another, the inhabitants of Europe and the\nEuropean Colonies are sufficiently patriotic, and that the average\nendowment in this respect runs with consistent uniformity across all\ndifferences of time, place and circumstance. It would, in fact, be\nextremely hazardous to affirm that there is a sensible difference in the\nordinary pitch of patriotic sentiment as between any two widely diverse\nsamples of these hybrid populations, in spite of the fact that the\ndiversity in visible physical traits may be quite pronounced.\n\nIn short, the conclusion seems safe, on the whole, that in this respect\nthe several racial stocks that have gone to produce the existing\npopulations of Christendom have all been endowed about as richly one as\nanother. Patriotism appears to be a ubiquitous trait, at least among the\nraces and peoples of Christendom. From which it should follow, that\nsince there is, and has from the beginning been, no differential\nadvantage favoring one racial stock or one fashion of hybrid as against\nanother, in this matter of patriotic animus, there should also be no\nground of selective survival or selective elimination on this account as\nbetween these several races and peoples. So that the undisturbed and\nundiminished prevalence of this trait among the European population,\nearly or late, argues nothing as to its net serviceability or\ndisserviceability under any of the varying conditions of culture and\ntechnology to which these Europeans have been subjected, first and last;\nexcept that it has, in any case, not proved so disserviceable under the\nconditions prevailing hitherto as to result in the extinction of these\nEuropeans, one with another.[4]\n\n[Footnote 4: For a more extended discussion of this matter, cf.\n_Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution_, ch. i. and\nSupplementary Notes i. and ii.]\n\nThe patriotic frame of mind has been spoken of above as if it were an\nhereditary trait, something after the fashion of a Mendelian unit\ncharacter. Doubtless this is not a competent account of the matter; but\nthe present argument scarcely needs a closer analysis. Still, in a\nmeasure to quiet title and avoid annoyance, it may be noted that this\npatriotic animus is of the nature of a \"frame of mind\" rather than a\nMendelian unit character; that it so involves a concatenation of\nseveral impulsive propensities (presumably hereditary); and that both\nthe concatenation and the special mode and amplitude of the response are\na product of habituation, very largely of the nature of conventionalised\nuse and wont. What is said above, therefore, goes little farther than\nsaying that the underlying aptitudes requisite to this patriotic frame\nof mind are heritable, and that use and wont as bearing on this point\nrun with sufficient uniformity to bring a passably uniform result. It\nmay be added that in this concatenation spoken of there seems to be\ncomprised, ordinarily, that sentimental attachment to habitat and custom\nthat is called love of home, or in its accentuated expression,\nhome-sickness; so also an invidious self-complacency, coupled with a\ngregarious bent which gives the invidious comparison a group content;\nand further, commonly if not invariably, a bent of abnegation,\nself-abasement, subservience, or whatever it may best be called, that\ninclines the bearer unreasoningly and unquestioningly to accept and\nserve a prescriptive ideal given by custom or by customary authority.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe conclusion would therefore provisionally run to the effect that\nunder modern conditions the patriotic animus is wholly a disserviceable\ntrait in the spiritual endowment of these peoples,--in so far as bears\non the material conditions of life unequivocally, and as regards the\ncultural interests more at large presumptively; whereas there is no\nassured ground for a discriminating opinion as touches its possible\nutility or disutility at any remote period in the past. There is, of\ncourse, always room for the conservative estimate that, as the\npossession of this spiritual trait has not hitherto resulted in the\nextinction of the race, so it may also in the calculable future\ncontinue to bring no more grievous results than a degree of mischief,\nwithout even stopping or greatly retarding the increase of population.\n\nAll this, of course, is intended to apply only so far as it goes. It\nmust not be taken as intending to say any least word in derogation of\nthose high qualities that inspire the patriotic citizen. In its\neconomic, biological and cultural incidence patriotism appears to be an\nuntoward trait of human nature; which has, of course, nothing to say as\nto its moral excellence, its aesthetic value, or its indispensability to\na worthy life. No doubt, it is in all these respects deserving of all\nthe esteem and encomiums that fall to its share. Indeed, its well-known\nmoral and aesthetic value, as well as the reprobation that is visited on\nany shortcomings in this respect, signify, for the purposes of the\npresent argument, nothing more than that the patriotic animus meets the\nunqualified approval of men because they are, all and several, infected\nwith it. It is evidence of the ubiquitous, intimate and ineradicable\npresence of this quality in human nature; all the more since it\ncontinues untiringly to be held in the highest esteem in spite of the\nfact that a modicum of reflection should make its disserviceability\nplain to the meanest understanding. No higher praise of moral\nexcellence, and no profounder test of loyalty, can be asked than this\ncurrent unreserved commendation of a virtue that makes invariably for\ndamage and discomfort. The virtuous impulse must be deep-seated and\nindefeasible that drives men incontinently to do good that evil may come\nof it. \"Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him.\"\n\nIn the light--and it is a dim and wavering light--of the archaeological\nevidence, helped out by circumstantial evidence from such parallel or\nanalogous instances as are afforded by existing communities on a\ncomparable level of culture, one may venture more or less confidently on\na reconstruction of the manner of life among the early Europeans, of\nearly neolithic times and later.[5] And so one may form some conception\nof the part played by this patriotic animus among those beginnings,\nwhen, if not the race, at least its institutions were young; and when\nthe native temperament of these peoples was tried out and found fit to\nsurvive through the age-long and slow-moving eras of stone and bronze.\nIn this connection, it appears safe to assume that since early neolithic\ntimes no sensible change has taken effect in the racial complexion of\nthe European peoples; and therefore no sensible change in their\nspiritual and mental make-up. So that in respect of the spiritual\nelements that go to make up this patriotic animus the Europeans of today\nwill be substantially identical with the Europeans of that early time.\nThe like is true as regards those other traits of temperament that come\nin question here, as being included among the stable characteristics\nthat still condition the life of these peoples under the altered\ncircumstances of the modern age.\n\n[Footnote 5: Cf. _Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution_, as\nabove.]\n\nThe difference between prehistoric Europe and the present state of these\npeoples resolves itself on analysis into a difference in the state of\nthe industrial arts, together with such institutional changes as have\ncome on in the course of working out this advance in the industrial\narts. The habits and the exigencies of life among these peoples have\ngreatly changed; whereas in temperament and capacities the peoples that\nnow live by and under the rule of this altered state of the industrial\narts are the same as they were. It is to be noted, therefore, that the\nfact of their having successfully come through the long ages of\nprehistory by the use of this mental and spiritual endowment can not be\ntaken to argue that these peoples are thereby fit to meet the exigencies\nof this later and gravely altered age; nor will it do to assume that\nbecause these peoples have themselves worked out this modern culture and\nits technology, therefore it must all be suitable for their use and\nconducive to their biological success. The single object lesson of the\nmodern urban community, with its endless requirements in the way of\nsanitation, police, compulsory education, charities,--all this and many\nother discrepancies in modern life should enjoin caution on anyone who\nis inclined off-hand to hold that because modern men have created these\nconditions, therefore these must be the most suitable conditions of life\nfor modern mankind.\n\nIn the beginning, that is to say in the European beginning, men lived in\nsmall and close groups. Control was close within the group, and the\nnecessity of subordinating individual gains and preferences to the\ncommon good was enjoined on the group by the exigencies of the case, on\npain of common extinction. The situation and usages of existing Eskimo\nvillages may serve to illustrate and enforce the argument on this head.\nThe solidarity of sentiment necessary to support the requisite\nsolidarity of action in the case would be a prime condition of survival\nin any racial stock exposed to the conditions which surrounded these\nearly Europeans. This needful sense of solidarity would touch not simply\nor most imperatively the joint prestige of the group, but rather the\njoint material interests; and would enforce a spirit of mutual support\nand dependence. Which would be rather helped than hindered by a jealous\nattitude of joint prestige; so long as no divergent interests of members\nwithin the group were in a position to turn this state of the common\nsentiment to their own particular advantage.\n\nThis state of the case will have lasted for a relatively long time; long\nenough to have tested the fitness of these peoples for that manner of\nlife,--longer, no doubt, than the interval that has elapsed since\nhistory began. Special interests--e.g., personal and family\ninterests--will have been present and active in these days of the\nbeginning; but so long as the group at large was small enough to admit\nof a close neighborly contact throughout its extent and throughout the\nworkday routine of life, at the same time that it was too small and\nfeeble to allow any appreciable dissipation of its joint energies in\nsuch pursuit of selfish gains as would run counter to the paramount\nbusiness of the common livelihood, so long the sense of a common\nlivelihood and a joint fortune would continue to hold any particularist\nambitions effectually in check. Had it fallen out otherwise, the story\nof the group in question would have been ended, and another and more\nsuitably endowed type of men would have taken the place vacated by its\nextinction.\n\nWith a sensible advance in the industrial arts the scale of operations\nwould grow larger, and the group more numerous and extensive. The margin\nbetween production and subsistence would also widen and admit additional\nscope for individual ambitions and personal gains. And as this process\nof growth and increasing productive efficiency went on, the control\nexercised by neighborly surveillance, through the sentiment of the\ncommon good as against the self-seeking pursuits of individuals and\nsub-groups, would gradually slacken; until by progressive disuse it\nwould fall into a degree of abeyance; to be called into exercise and\nincite to concerted action only in the face of unusual exigencies\ntouching the common fortunes of the group at large, or on persuasion\nthat the collective interest of the group at large was placed in\njeopardy in the molestation of one and another of its members from\nwithout. The group's prestige at least would be felt to suffer in the\ndefeat or discourtesy suffered by any of its members at the hands of any\nalien; and, under compulsion of the ancient sense of group solidarity,\nwhatever material hardship or material gain might so fall to individual\nmembers in their dealings with the alien would pass easy scrutiny as\nmaterial detriment or gain inuring to the group at large,--in the\napprehension of men whose sense of community interest is inflamed with a\njealous disposition to safeguard their joint prestige.\n\nWith continued advance in the industrial arts the circumstances\nconditioning life will undergo a progressive change of such a character\nthat the joint interest of the group at large, in the material respect,\nwill progressively be less closely bound up with the material fortunes\nof any particular member or members; until in the course of time and\nchange there will, in effect, in ordinary times be no general and\ninclusive community of material interest binding the members together in\na common fortune and working for a common livelihood. As the rights of\nownership begin to take effect, so that the ownership of property and\nthe pursuit of a livelihood under the rules of ownership come to govern\nmen's economic relations, these material concerns will cease to be a\nmatter of undivided joint interest, and will fall into the shape of\ninterest in severalty. So soon and so far as this institution of\nownership or property takes effect, men's material interests cease to\nrun on lines of group solidarity. Solely, or almost solely, in the\nexceptional case of defense against a predatory incursion from outside,\ndo the members of the group have a common interest of a material kind.\nProgressively as the state of the arts advances, the industrial\norganisation advances to a larger scale and a more extensive\nspecialisation, with increasing divergence among individual interests\nand individual fortunes; and intercourse over larger distances grows\neasier and makes a larger grouping practicable; which enables a larger,\nprompter and more effective mobilisation of forces with which to defend\nor assert any joint claims. But by the same move it also follows, or at\nleast it appears uniformly to have followed in the European case, that\nthe accumulation of property and the rights of ownership have\nprogressively come into the first place among the material interests of\nthese peoples; while anything like a community of usufruct has\nimperceptibly fallen into the background, and has presently gone\nvirtually into abeyance, except as an eventual recourse _in extremis_\nfor the common defense. Property rights have displaced community of\nusufruct; and invidious distinctions as between persons, sub-groups, and\nclasses have displaced community of prestige in the workday routine of\nthese peoples; and the distinctions between contrasted persons or\nclasses have come to rest, in an ever increasing degree, directly or\nindirectly, on invidious comparisons in respect of pecuniary standing\nrather than on personal affiliation with the group at large.\n\nSo, with the advance of the industrial arts a differentiation of a new\ncharacter sets in and presently grows progressively more pronounced and\nmore effectual, giving rise to a regrouping on lines that run regardless\nof those frontiers that divide one community from another for purposes\nof patriotic emulation. So far as it comes chiefly and typically in\nquestion here, this regrouping takes place on two distinct but somewhat\nrelated principles of contrast: that of wealth and poverty, and that of\nmaster and servant, or authority and obedience. The material interests\nof the population in this way come to be divided between the group of\nthose who own and those who command, on the one hand, and of those who\nwork and who obey, on the other hand.\n\nNeither of these two contrasted categories of persons have any direct\nmaterial interest in the maintenance of the patriotic community; or at\nany rate no such interest as should reasonably induce them to spend\ntheir own time and substance in support of the political (patriotic)\norganisation within which they live. It is only in so far as one or\nanother of these interests looks for a more than proportionate share in\nany prospective gain from the joint enterprise, that the group or class\nin question can reasonably be counted on to bear its share in the joint\nventure. And it is only when and in so far as their particular material\nor self-regarding interest is reenforced by patriotic conceit, that they\ncan be counted on to spend themselves in furtherance of the patriotic\nenterprise, without the assurance of a more than proportionate share in\nany gains that may be held in prospect from any such joint enterprise;\nand it is only in its patriotic bearing that the political community\ncontinues to be a joint venture. That is to say, in more generalised\nterms, through the development of the rights of property, and of such\nlike prescriptive claims of privilege and prerogative, it has come\nabout that other community interests have fallen away, until the\ncollective prestige remains as virtually the sole community interest\nwhich can hold the sentiment of the group in a bond of solidarity.\n\nTo one or another of these several interested groups or classes within\nthe community the political organisation may work a benefit; but only to\none or another, not to each and several, jointly or collectively. Since\nby no chance will the benefit derived from such joint enterprise on the\npart of the community at large equal the joint cost; in as much as all\njoint enterprise of the kind that looks to material advantage works by\none or another method of inhibition and takes effect, if at all, by\nlowering the aggregate efficiency of the several countries concerned,\nwith a view to the differential gain of one at the cost of another. So,\ne.g., a protective tariff is plainly a conspiracy in restraint of trade,\nwith a view to benefit the conspirators by hindering their competitors.\nThe aggregate cost to the community at large of such an enterprise in\nretardation is always more than the gains it brings to those who may\nbenefit by it.\n\nIn so speaking of the uses to which the common man's patriotic devotion\nmay be turned, there is no intention to underrate its intrinsic value as\na genial and generous trait of human nature. Doubtless it is best and\nchiefly to be appreciated as a spiritual quality that beautifies and\nennobles its bearer, and that endows him with the full stature of\nmanhood, quite irrespective of ulterior considerations. So it is to be\nconceded without argument that this patriotic animus is a highly\nmeritorious frame of mind, and that it has an aesthetic value scarcely\nto be overstated in the farthest stretch of poetic license. But the\nquestion of its serviceability to the modern community, in any other\nthan this decorative respect, and particularly its serviceability to the\ncurrent needs of the common man in such a modern community, is not\ntouched by such an admission; nor does this recognition of its generous\nspiritual nature afford any help toward answering a further question as\nto how and with what effect this animus may be turned to account by\nanyone who is in position to make use of the forces which it sets free.\n\nAmong Christian nations there still is, on the whole, a decided\npredilection for that ancient and authentic line of national repute that\nsprings from warlike prowess. This repute for warlike prowess is what\nfirst comes to mind among civilised peoples when speaking of national\ngreatness. And among those who have best preserved this warlike ideal of\nworth, the patriotic ambition is likely to converge on the prestige of\ntheir sovereign; so that it takes the concrete form of personal loyalty\nto a master, and so combines or coalesces with a servile habit of mind.\n\nBut peace hath its victories no less renowned than war, it is said; and\npeaceable folk of a patriotic temper have learned to make the best of\ntheir meager case and have found self-complacency in these victories of\nthe peaceable order. So it may broadly be affirmed that all nations look\nwith complacency on their own peculiar Culture--the organised complex of\nhabits of thought and of conduct by which their own routine of life is\nregulated--as being in some way worthier than the corresponding habits\nof their neighbors. The case of the German Culture has latterly come\nunder a strong light in this way. But while it may be that no other\nnation has been so naive as to make a concerted profession of faith to\nthe effect that their own particular way of life is altogether\ncommendable and is the only fashion of civilisation that is fit to\nsurvive; yet it will scarcely be an extravagance to assert that in their\nown secret mind these others, too, are blest with much the same\nconsciousness of unique worth. Conscious virtue of this kind is a good\nand sufficient ground for patriotic inflation, so far as it goes. It\ncommonly does not go beyond a defensive attitude, however. Now and\nagain, as in the latterday German animation on this head, these\nphenomena of national use and wont may come to command such a degree of\npopular admiration as will incite to an aggressive or proselyting\ncampaign.\n\nIn all this there is nothing of a self-seeking or covetous kind. The\ncommon man who so lends himself to the aggressive enhancement of the\nnational Culture and its prestige has nothing of a material kind to gain\nfrom the increase of renown that so comes to his sovereign, his\nlanguage, his countrymen's art or science, his dietary, or his God.\nThere are no sordid motives in all this. These spiritual assets of\nself-complacency are, indeed, to be rated as grounds of high-minded\npatriotism without afterthought. These aspirations and enthusiasms would\nperhaps be rated as Quixotic by men whose horizon is bounded by the main\nchance; but they make up that substance of things hoped for that\ninflates those headlong patriotic animosities that stir universal\nadmiration.\n\nSo also, men find an invidious distinction in such matters of physical\nmagnitude as their country's area, the number of its population, the\nsize of its cities, the extent of its natural resources, its aggregate\nwealth and its wealth per capita, its merchant marine and its foreign\ntrade. As a ground of invidious complacency these phenomena of physical\nmagnitude and pecuniary traffic are no better and no worse than such\nimmaterial assets as the majesty of the sovereign or the perfections of\nthe language. They are matters in which the common man is concerned\nonly by the accident of domicile, and his only connection with these\nthings is an imaginary joint interest in their impressiveness. To these\nthings he has contributed substantially nothing, and from them he\nderives no other merit or advantage than a patriotic inflation. He takes\npride in these things in an invidious way, and there is no good reason\nwhy he should not; just as there is also no good reason why he should,\napart from the fact that the common man is so constituted that he,\nmysteriously, takes pride in these things that concern him not.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOf the several groups or classes of persons within the political\nfrontiers, whose particular interests run systematically at cross\npurposes with those of the community at large under modern conditions,\nthe class of masters, rulers, authorities,--or whatever term may seem\nmost suitable to designate that category of persons whose characteristic\noccupation is to give orders and command deference,--of the several\norders and conditions of men these are, in point of substantial motive\nand interest, most patently at variance with all the rest, or with the\nfortunes of the common man. The class will include civil and military\nauthorities and whatever nobility there is of a prescriptive and\nprivileged kind. The substantial interest of these classes in the common\nwelfare is of the same kind as the interest which a parasite has in the\nwell-being of his host; a sufficiently substantial interest, no doubt,\nbut there is in this relation nothing like a community of interest. Any\ngain on the part of the community at large will materially serve the\nneeds of this group of personages, only in so far as it may afford them\na larger volume or a wider scope for what has in latterday colloquial\nphrase been called \"graft.\" These personages are, of course, not to be\nspoken of with disrespect or with the slightest inflection of\ndiscourtesy. They are all honorable men. Indeed they afford the\nconventional pattern of human dignity and meritorious achievement, and\nthe \"Fountain of Honor\" is found among them. The point of the argument\nis only that their material or other self-regarding interests are of\nsuch a nature as to be furthered by the material wealth of the\ncommunity, and more particularly by the increasing volume of the body\npolitic; but only with the proviso that this material wealth and this\nincrement of power must accrue without anything like a corresponding\ncost to this class. At the same time, since this class of the superiors\nis in some degree a specialised organ of prestige, so that their value,\nand therefore their tenure, both in the eyes of the community and in\ntheir own eyes, is in the main a \"prestige value\" and a tenure by\nprestige; and since the prestige that invests their persons is a shadow\ncast by the putative worth of the community at large, it follows that\ntheir particular interest in the joint prestige is peculiarly alert and\ninsistent. But it follows also that these personages cannot of their own\nsubstance or of their own motion contribute to this collective prestige\nin the same proportion in which it is necessary for them to draw on it\nin support of their own prestige value. It would, in other words, be a\npatent absurdity to call on any of the current ruling classes,\ndynasties, nobility, military and diplomatic corps, in any of the\nnations of Europe, e.g., to preserve their current dignity and command\nthe deference that is currently accorded them, by recourse to their own\npowers and expenditure of their own substance, without the usufruct of\nthe commonalty whose organ of dignity they are. The current prestige\nvalue which they enjoy is beyond their unaided powers to create or\nmaintain, without the usufruct of the community. Such an enterprise does\nnot lie within the premises of the case.\n\nIn this bearing, therefore, the first concern with which these\npersonages are necessarily occupied is the procurement and retention of\na suitable usufruct in the material resources and good-will of a\nsufficiently large and industrious population. The requisite good-will\nin these premises is called loyalty, and its retention by the line of\npersonages that so trade on prestige rests on a superinduced association\nof ideas, whereby the national honour comes to be confounded in popular\napprehension with the prestige of these personages who have the keeping\nof it. But the potentates and the establishments, civil and military, on\nwhom this prestige value rests will unavoidably come into invidious\ncomparison with others of their kind; and, as invariably happens in\nmatters of invidious comparison, the emulative needs of all the\ncompetitors for prestige are \"indefinitely extensible,\" as the phrase of\nthe economists has it. Each and several of them incontinently needs a\nfurther increment of prestige, and therefore also a further increment of\nthe material assets in men and resources that are needful as ways and\nmeans to assert and augment the national honor.\n\nIt is true, the notion that their prestige value is in any degree\nconditioned by the material circumstances and the popular imagination of\nthe underlying nation is distasteful to many of these vicars of the\nnational honour. They will incline rather to the persuasion that this\nprestige value is a distinctive attribute, of a unique order, intrinsic\nto their own persons. But, plainly, any such detached line of magnates,\nnotables, kings and mandarins, resting their notability on nothing more\nsubstantial than a slightly sub-normal intelligence and a moderately\nscrofulous habit of body could not long continue to command that eager\ndeference that is accounted their due. Such a picture of majesty would\nbe sadly out of drawing. There is little conviction and no great dignity\nto be drawn from the unaided pronouncement:\n\n   \"We're here because,\n   We're here because,\n   We're here because\n   We're here,\"\n\neven when the doggerel is duly given the rhetorical benefit of a \"Tenure\nby the Grace of God.\" The personages that carry this dignity require the\nbacking of a determined and patriotic populace in support of their\nprestige value, and they commonly have no great difficulty in procuring\nit. And their prestige value is, in effect, proportioned to the volume\nof material resources and patriotic credulity that can be drawn on for\nits assertion. It is true, their draught on the requisite sentimental\nand pecuniary support is fortified with large claims of serviceability\nto the common good, and these claims are somewhat easily, indeed\neagerly, conceded and acted upon; although the alleged benefit to the\ncommon good will scarcely be visible except in the light of glory shed\nby the blazing torch of patriotism.\n\nIn so far as it is of a material nature the benefit which the\nconstituted authorities so engage to contribute to the common good, or\nin other words to confer on the common man, falls under two heads:\ndefense against aggression from without; and promotion of the\ncommunity's material gain. It is to be presumed that the constituted\nauthorities commonly believe more or less implicitly in their own\nprofessions in so professing to serve the needs of the common man in\nthese respects. The common defense is a sufficiently grave matter, and\ndoubtless it claims the best affections and endeavour of the citizen;\nbut it is not a matter that should claim much attention at this point in\nthe argument, as bearing on the service rendered the common man by the\nconstituted authorities, taken one with another. Any given governmental\nestablishment at home is useful in this respect only as against another\ngovernmental establishment elsewhere. So that on the slightest\nexamination it resolves itself into a matter of competitive patriotic\nenterprise, as between the patriotic aspirations of different\nnationalities led by different governmental establishments; and the\nservice so rendered by the constituted authorities in the aggregate\ntakes on the character of a remedy for evils of their own creation. It\nis invariably a defense against the concerted aggressions of other\npatriots. Taken in the large, the common defense of any given nation\nbecomes a detail of the competitive struggle between rival nationalities\nanimated with a common spirit of patriotic enterprise and led by\nauthorities constituted for this competitive purpose.\n\nExcept on a broad basis of patriotic devotion, and except under the\ndirection of an ambitious governmental establishment, no serious\ninternational aggression is to be had. The common defense, therefore, is\nto be taken as a remedy for evils arising out of the working of the\npatriotic spirit that animates mankind, as brought to bear under a\ndiscretionary authority; and in any balance to be struck between the\nutility and disutility of this patriotic spirit and of its service in\nthe hands of the constituted authorities, it will have to be cancelled\nout as being at the best a mitigation of some of the disorders brought\non by the presence of national governments resting on patriotic loyalty\nat large.\n\nBut this common defense is by no means a vacant rubric in any attempted\naccount of modern national enterprise. It is the commonplace and\nconclusive plea of the dynastic statesmen and the aspiring warlords, and\nit is the usual blind behind which events are put in train for eventual\nhostilities. Preparation for the common defense also appears unfailingly\nto eventuate in hostilities. With more or less _bona fides_ the\nstatesmen and warriors plead the cause of the common defense, and with\npatriotic alacrity the common man lends himself to the enterprise aimed\nat under that cover. In proportion as the resulting equipment for\ndefense grows great and becomes formidable, the range of items which a\npatriotically biased nation are ready to include among the claims to be\ndefended grows incontinently larger, until by the overlapping of\ndefensive claims between rival nationalities the distinction between\ndefense and aggression disappears, except in the biased fancy of the\nrival patriots.\n\nOf course, no reflections are called for here on the current American\ncampaign of \"Preparedness.\" Except for the degree of hysteria it appears\nto differ in no substantial respect from the analogous course of\nauto-intoxication among the nationalities of Europe, which came to a\nhead in the current European situation. It should conclusively serve the\nturn for any self-possessed observer to call to mind that all the\ncivilised nations of warring Europe are, each and several, convinced\nthat they are fighting a defensive war.\n\nThe aspiration of all right-minded citizens is presumed to be \"Peace\nwith Honour.\" So that first, as well as last, among those national\ninterests that are to be defended, and in the service of which the\nsubstance and affections of the common man are enlisted under the aegis\nof the national prowess, comes the national prestige, as a matter of\ncourse. And the constituted authorities are doubtless sincere and\nsingle-minded in their endeavors to advance and defend the national\nhonour, particularly those constituted authorities that hold their place\nof authority on grounds of fealty; since the national prestige in such a\ncase coalesces with the prestige of the nation's ruler in much the same\ndegree in which the national sovereignty devolves upon the person of its\nruler. In so defending or advancing the national prestige, such a\ndynastic or autocratic overlord, together with the other privileged\nelements assisting and dependent on him, is occupied with his own\ninterest; his own tenure is a tenure by prestige, and the security of\nhis tenure lies in the continued maintenance of that popular fancy that\ninvests his person with this national prestige and so constitutes him\nand his retinue of notables and personages its keeper.\n\nBut it is uniformly insisted by the statesmen--potentates, notables,\nkings and mandarins--that this aegis of the national prowess in their\nhands covers also many interests of a more substantial and more tangible\nkind. These other, more tangible interests of the community have also a\nvalue of a direct and personal sort to the dynasty and its hierarchy of\nprivileged subalterns, in that it is only by use of the material forces\nof the nation that the dynastic prestige can be advanced and maintained.\nThe interest of such constituted authorities in the material welfare of\nthe nation is consequently grave and insistent; but it is evidently an\ninterest of a special kind and is subject to strict and peculiar\nlimitations. The common good, in the material respect, interests the\ndynastic statesman only as a means to dynastic ends; that is to say,\nonly in so far as it can be turned to account in the achievement of\ndynastic aims. These aims are \"The Kingdom, the Power and the Glory,\" as\nthe sacred formula phrases the same conception in another bearing.\n\nThat is to say, the material welfare of the nation is a means to the\nunfolding of the dynastic power; provided always that this material\nwelfare is not allowed to run into such ramifications as will make the\ncommonwealth an unwieldy instrument in the hands of the dynastic\nstatesmen. National welfare is to the purpose only in so far as it\nconduces to political success, which is always a question of warlike\nsuccess in the last resort. The limitation which this consideration\nimposes on the government's economic policy are such as will make the\nnation a self-sufficient or self-balanced economic commonwealth. It must\nbe a self-balanced commonwealth at least in such measure as will make it\nself-sustaining in case of need, in all those matters that bear directly\non warlike efficiency.\n\nOf course, no community can become fully self-sustaining under modern\nconditions, by use of the modern state of the industrial arts, except by\nrecourse to such drastic measures of repression as would reduce its\ntotal efficiency in an altogether intolerable degree. This will hold\ntrue even of those nations who, like Russia or the United States, are\npossessed of extremely extensive territories and extremely large and\nvaried resources; but it applies with greatly accentuated force to\nsmaller and more scantily furnished territorial units. Peoples living\nunder modern conditions and by use of the modern state of the industrial\narts necessarily draw on all quarters of the habitable globe for\nmaterials and products which they can procure to the best advantage\nfrom outside their own special field so long as they are allowed access\nto these outlying sources of supply; and any arbitrary limitation on\nthis freedom of traffic makes the conditions of life that much harder,\nand lowers the aggregate efficiency of the community by that much.\nNational self-sufficiency is to be achieved only by a degree of economic\nisolation; and such a policy of economic isolation involves a degree of\nimpoverishment and lowered efficiency, but it will also leave the nation\nreadier for warlike enterprise on such a scale as its reduced efficiency\nwill compass.\n\nSo that the best that can be accomplished along this line by the\ndynastic statesmen is a shrewd compromise, embodying such a degree of\nisolation and inhibition as will leave the country passably\nself-sufficient in case of need, without lowering the national\nefficiency to such a point as to cripple its productive forces beyond\nwhat will be offset by the greater warlike readiness that is so\nattained. The point to which such a policy of isolation and sufficiency\nwill necessarily be directed is that measure of inhibition that will\nyield the most facile and effective ways and means of warlike\nenterprise, the largest product of warlike effectiveness to be had on\nmultiplying the nation's net efficiency into its readiness to take the\nfield.\n\nInto any consideration of this tactical problem a certain subsidiary\nfactor enters, in that the patriotic temper of the nation is always more\nor less affected by such an economic policy. The greater the degree of\neffectual isolation and discrimination embodied in the national policy,\nthe greater will commonly be its effect on popular sentiment in the way\nof national animosity and spiritual self-sufficiency; which may be an\nasset of great value for the purposes of warlike enterprise.\n\nPlainly, any dynastic statesman who should undertake to further the\ncommon welfare regardless of its serviceability for warlike enterprise\nwould be defeating his own purpose. He would, in effect, go near to\nliving up to his habitual professions touching international peace,\ninstead of professing to live up to them, as the exigencies of his\nnational enterprise now conventionally require him to do. In effect, he\nwould be _functus officio_.\n\nThere are two great administrative instruments available for this work\nof repression and national self-sufficiency at the hands of the\nimperialistic statesman: the protective tariff, and commercial\nsubvention. The two are not consistently to be distinguished from one\nanother at all points, and each runs out into a multifarious convolution\nof variegated details; but the principles involved are, after all,\nfairly neat and consistent. The former is of the nature of a conspiracy\nin restraint of trade by repression; the latter, a conspiracy to the\nlike effect by subsidised monopoly; both alike act to check the pursuit\nof industry in given lines by artificially increasing the cost of\nproduction for given individuals or classes of producers, and both alike\nimpose a more than proportionate cost on the community within which they\ntake effect. Incidentally, both of these methods of inhibition bring a\ndegree, though a less degree, of hardship, to the rest of the industrial\nworld.\n\nAll this is matter of course to all economic students, and it should,\nreasonably, be plain to all intelligent persons; but its voluble denial\nby interested parties, as well as the easy credulity with which\npatriotic citizens allow themselves to accept the sophistries offered in\ndefense of these measures of inhibition, has made it seem worth while\nhere to recall these commonplaces of economic science.\n\nThe ground of this easy credulity is not so much infirmity of intellect\nas it is an exuberance of sentiment, although it may reasonably be\nbelieved that its more pronounced manifestations--as, e.g., the high\nprotective tariff--can be had only by force of a formidable cooperation\nof the two. The patriotic animus is an invidious sentiment of joint\nprestige; and it needs no argument or documentation to bear out the\naffirmation that its bias will lend a color of merit and expediency to\nany proposed measure that can, however speciously, promise an increase\nof national power or prestige. So that when the statesmen propose a\npolicy of inhibition and mitigated isolation on the professed ground\nthat such a policy will strengthen the nation economically by making it\neconomically self-supporting, as well as ready for any warlike\nadventure, the patriotic citizen views the proposed measures through the\nrosy haze of national aspirations and lets the will to believe persuade\nhim that whatever conduces to a formidable national battle-front will\nalso contribute to the common good. At the same time all these national\nconspiracies in restraint of trade are claimed, with more or less\nreason, to inflict more or less harm on rival nationalities with whom\neconomic relations are curtailed; and patriotism being an invidious\nsentiment, the patriotic citizen finds comfort in the promise of\nmischief to these others, and is all the more prone to find all kinds of\nmerit in proposals that look to such an invidious outcome. In any\ncommunity imbued with an alert patriotic spirit, the fact that any given\ncircumstance, occurrence or transaction can be turned to account as a\nmeans of invidious distinction or invidious discrimination against\nhumanity beyond the national pale, will always go far to procure\nacceptance of it as being also an article of substantial profit to the\ncommunity at large, even though the slightest unbiased scrutiny would\nfind it of no ascertainable use in any other bearing than that of\ninvidious mischief. And whatever will bear interpretation as an\nincrement of the nation's power or prowess, in comparison with rival\nnationalities, will always be securely counted as an item of joint\ncredit, and will be made to serve the collective conceit as an invidious\ndistinction; and patriotic credulity will find it meritorious also in\nother respects.\n\nSo, e.g., it is past conception that such a patent imbecility as a\nprotective tariff should enlist the support of any ordinarily\nintelligent community except by the help of some such chauvinistic\nsophistry. So also, the various royal establishments of Europe, e.g.,\nafford an extreme but therefore all the more convincing illustration of\nthe same logical fallacy. These establishments and personages are great\nand authentic repositories of national prestige, and they are therefore\nunreflectingly presumed by their several aggregations of subjects to be\nof some substantial use also in some other bearing; but it would be a\nhighly diverting exhibition of credulity for any outsider to fall into\nthat amazing misconception. But the like is manifestly true of\ncommercial turnover and export trade among modern peoples; although on\nthis head the infatuation is so ingrained and dogmatic that even a rank\noutsider is expected to accept the fallacy without reflection, on pain\nof being rated as unsafe or unsound. Such matters again, as the\ndimensions of the national territory, or the number of the population\nand the magnitude of the national resources, are still and have perhaps\nalways been material for patriotic exultation, and are fatuously\nbelieved to have some great significance for the material fortunes of\nthe common man; although it should be plain on slight reflection that\nunder modern conditions of ownership, these things, one and all, are of\nno consequence to the common man except as articles of prestige to\nstimulate his civic pride. The only conjuncture under which these and\nthe like national holdings can come to have a meaning as joint or\ncollective assets would arise in case of a warlike adventure carried to\nsuch extremities as would summarily cancel vested rights of ownership\nand turn them to warlike uses. While the rights of ownership hold, the\ncommon man, who does not own these things, draws no profit from their\ninclusion in the national domain; indeed, he is at some cost to\nguarantee their safe tenure by their rightful owners.\n\nIn so pursuing their quest of the Kingdom, the Power and the Glory, by\nuse of the national resources and by sanction of the national spirit,\nthe constituted authorities also assume the guardianship of sundry\nmaterial interests that are presumed to touch the common good; such as\nsecurity of person and property in dealings with aliens, whether at home\nor abroad; security of investment and trade, and vindication of their\ncitizens before the law in foreign parts; and, chiefly and ubiquitously,\nfurtherance and extension of the national trade into foreign parts,\nparticularly of the export trade, on terms advantageous to the traders\nof the nation.\n\nThe last named of these advantages is the one on which stress is apt to\nfall in the argument of all those who advocate an unfolding of national\npower, as being a matter of vital material benefit to the common man.\nThe other items indicated above, it is plain on the least reflection,\nare matters of slight if any material consequence to him. The common\nman--that is ninety-nine and a fraction in one hundred of the nation's\ncommon men--has no dealings with aliens in foreign parts, as capitalist,\ntrader, missionary or wayfaring man, and has no occasion for security of\nperson or property under circumstances that raise any remotest question\nof the national prowess or the national prestige; nor does he seek or\naspire to trade to foreign parts on any terms, equitable or otherwise,\nor to invest capital among aliens under foreign rule, or to exploit\nconcessions or take orders, for acceptance or delivery; nor, indeed,\ndoes he at all commonly come into even that degree of contact with\nabroad that is implied in the purchase of foreign securities. Virtually\nthe sole occasion on which he comes in touch with the world beyond the\nfrontier is when, and if, he goes away from home as an emigrant, and so\nceases to enjoy the tutelage of the nation's constituted authorities.\nBut the common man, in point of fact, is a home-keeping body, who\ntouches foreign parts and aliens outside the national frontiers only at\nthe second or third remove, if at all, in the occasional purchase of\nforeign products, or in the sale of goods that may find their way abroad\nafter he has lost sight of them. The exception to this general rule\nwould be found in the case of those under-sized nations that are too\nsmall to contain the traffic in which their commonplace population are\nengaged, and that have neither national prowess nor national prestige to\nfall back on in a conceivable case of need,--and whose citizens,\nindividually, appear to be as fortunately placed in their workday\nforeign relations, without a background of prowess and prestige, as the\ncitizens of the great powers who are most abundantly provided in these\nrespects.\n\nWith wholly negligible exceptions, these matters touch the needs or the\nsensibilities of the common man only through the channel of the\nnational honour, which may be injured in the hardships suffered by his\ncompatriots in foreign parts, or which may, again, be repaired or\nenhanced by the meritorious achievements of the same compatriots; of\nwhose existence he will commonly have no other or more substantial\nevidence, and in whose traffic he has no share other than this vicarious\nsuffering of vague and remote indignity or vainglory by force of the\nwholly fortuitous circumstance that they are (inscrutably) his\ncompatriots. These immaterial goods of vicarious prestige are, of\ncourse, not to be undervalued, nor is the fact to be overlooked or\nminimised that they enter into the sum total of the common citizen's\n\"psychic income,\" for whatever they may foot up to; but evidently their\nconsideration takes us back to the immaterial category of prestige\nvalue, from which the argument just now was hopefully departing with a\nview to consideration of the common man's material interest in that\nnational enterprise about which patriotic aspirations turn.\n\nThese things, then, are matters in which the common man has an interest\nonly as they have a prestige value. But there need be no question as to\ntheir touching his sensibilities and stirring him to action, and even to\nacts of bravery and self-sacrifice. Indignity or ill treatment of his\ncompatriots in foreign parts, even when well deserved, as is not\ninfrequently the case, are resented with a vehemence that is greatly to\nthe common man's credit, and greatly also to the gain of those patriotic\nstatesmen who find in such grievances their safest and most reliable raw\nmaterials for the production of international difficulty. That he will\nso respond to the stimulus of these, materially speaking irrelevant,\nvicissitudes of good or ill that touch the fortunes of his compatriots,\nas known to him by hearsay, bears witness, of course, to the high\nquality of his manhood; but it falls very far short of arguing that\nthese promptings of his patriotic spirit have any value as traits that\ncount toward his livelihood or his economic serviceability in the\ncommunity in which he lives. It is all to his credit, and it goes to\nconstitute him a desirable citizen, in the sense that he is properly\namenable to the incitements of patriotic emulation; but it is none the\nless to be admitted, however reluctantly, that this trait of impulsively\nvicarious indignation or vainglory is neither materially profitable to\nhimself nor an asset of the slightest economic value to the community in\nwhich he lives. Quite the contrary, in fact. So also is it true that the\ncommon man derives no material advantage from the national success along\nthis line, though he commonly believes that it all somehow inures to his\nbenefit. It would seem that an ingrown bias of community interest,\nblurred and driven by a jealously sensitive patriotic pride, bends his\nfaith uncritically to match his inclination. His persuasion is a work of\npreconception rather than of perception.\n\nBut the most substantial and most unqualified material benefit currently\nbelieved to be derivable from a large unfolding of national prowess and\na wide extension of the national domain is an increased volume of the\nnation's foreign trade, particularly of the export trade. \"Trade follows\nthe Flag.\" And this larger trade and enhanced profit is presumed to\ninure to the joint benefit of the citizens. Such is the profession of\nfaith of the sagacious statesmen and such is also the unreflecting\nbelief of the common man.\n\nIt may be left an open question if an unfolding of national prowess and\nprestige increases the nation's trade, whether in imports or in\nexports. There is no available evidence that it has any effect of the\nkind. What is not an open question is the patent fact that such an\nextension of trade confers no benefit on the common man, who is not\nengaged in the import or export business. More particularly does it\nyield him no advantage at all commensurate with the cost involved in any\nendeavour so to increase the volume of trade by increasing the nation's\npower and extending its dominion. The profits of trade go not to the\ncommon man at large but to the traders whose capital is invested; and it\nis a completely idle matter to the common citizen whether the traders\nwho profit by the nation's trade are his compatriots or not.[6]\n\n[Footnote 6: All this, which should be plain without demonstration, has\nbeen repeatedly shown in the expositions of various peace advocates,\ntypically by Mr. Angell.]\n\nThe pacifist argument on the economic futility of national ambitions\nwill commonly rest its case at this point; having shown as unreservedly\nas need be that national ambition and all its works belong of right\nunder that rubric of the litany that speaks of Fire, Flood and\nPestilence. But an hereditary bent of human nature is not to be put out\nof the way with an argument showing that it has its disutilities. So\nwith the patriotic animus; it is a factor to be counted with, rather\nthan to be exorcised.\n\nAs has been remarked above, in the course of time and change the advance\nof the industrial arts and of the institutions of ownership have taken\nsuch a turn that the working system of industry and business no longer\nruns on national lines and, indeed, no longer takes account of national\nfrontiers,--except in so far as the national policies and legislation,\narbitrarily and partially, impose these frontiers on the workings of\ntrade and industry. The effect of such regulation for political ends is,\nwith wholly negligible exceptions, detrimental to the efficient working\nof the industrial system under modern conditions; and it is therefore\ndetrimental to the material interests of the common citizen. But the\ncase is not the same as regards the interests of the traders. Trade is a\ncompetitive affair, and it is to the advantage of the traders engaged in\nany given line of business to extend their own markets and to exclude\ncompeting traders. Competition may be the soul of trade, but monopoly is\nnecessarily the aim of every trader. And the national organisation is of\nservice to its traders in so far as it shelters them, wholly or partly,\nfrom the competition of traders of other nationalities, or in so far as\nit furthers their enterprise by subvention or similar privileges as\nagainst their competitors, whether at home or abroad. The gain that so\ncomes to the nation's traders from any preferential advantage afforded\nthem by national regulations, or from any discrimination against traders\nof foreign nationality, goes to the traders as private gain. It is of no\nbenefit to any of their compatriots; since there is no community of\nusufruct that touches these gains of the traders. So far as concerns his\nmaterial advantage, it is an idle matter to the common citizen whether\nhe deals with traders of his own nationality or with aliens; both alike\nwill aim to buy cheap and sell dear, and will charge him \"what the\ntraffic will bear.\" Nor does it matter to him whether the gains of this\ntrade go to aliens or to his compatriots; in either case equally they\nimmediately pass beyond his reach, and are equally removed from any\ntouch of joint interest on his part. Being private property, under\nmodern law and custom he has no use of them, whether a national frontier\ndoes or does not intervene between his domicile and that of their owner.\n\nThese are facts that every man of sound mind knows and acts on without\ndoubt or hesitation in his own workday affairs. He would scarcely even\nfind amusement in so futile a proposal as that his neighbor should share\nhis business profits with him for no better reason than that he is a\ncompatriot. But when the matter is presented as a proposition in\nnational policy and embroidered with an invocation of his patriotic\nloyalty the common citizen will commonly be found credulous enough to\naccept the sophistry without abatement. His archaic sense of group\nsolidarity will still lead him at his own cost to favor his trading\ncompatriots by the imposition of onerous trade regulations for their\nprivate advantage, and to interpose obstacles in the way of alien\ntraders. All this ingenious policy of self-defeat is greatly helped out\nby the patriotic conceit of the citizens; who persuade themselves to see\nin it an accession to the power and prestige of their own nation and a\ndisadvantage to rival nationalities. It is, indeed, more than doubtful\nif such a policy of self-defeat as is embodied in current international\ntrade discriminations could be insinuated into the legislation of any\ncivilized nation if the popular intelligence were not so clouded with\npatriotic animosity as to let a prospective detriment to their foreign\nneighbors count as a gain to themselves.\n\nSo that the chief material use of the patriotic bent in modern\npopulations, therefore, appears to be its use to a limited class of\npersons engaged in foreign trade, or in business that comes in\ncompetition with foreign industry. It serves their private gain by\nlending effectual countenance to such restraint of international trade\nas would not be tolerated within the national domain. In so doing it has\nalso the secondary and more sinister effect of dividing the nations on\nlines of rivalry and setting up irreconcilable claims and ambitions, of\nno material value but of far-reaching effect in the way of provocation\nto further international estrangement and eventual breach of the peace.\n\nHow all this falls in with the schemes of militant statesmen, and\nfurther reacts on the freedom and personal fortunes of the common man,\nis an extensive and intricate topic, though not an obscure one; and it\nhas already been spoken of above, perhaps as fully as need be.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nON THE CONDITIONS OF A LASTING PEACE\n\n\nThe considerations set out in earlier chapters have made it appear that\nthe patriotic spirit of modern peoples is the abiding source of\ncontention among nations. Except for their patriotism a breach of the\npeace among modern peoples could not well be had. So much will doubtless\nbe assented to as a matter of course. It is also a commonplace of\ncurrent aphoristic wisdom that both parties to a warlike adventure in\nmodern times stand to lose, materially; whatever nominal--that is to say\npolitical--gains may be made by one or the other. It has also appeared\nfrom these considerations recited in earlier passages that this\npatriotic spirit prevails throughout, among all civilised peoples, and\nthat it pervades one nation about as ubiquitously as another. Nor is\nthere much evidence of a weakening of this sinister proclivity with the\npassage of time or the continued advance in the arts of life. The only\ncivilized nations that can be counted on as habitually peaceable are\nthose who are so feeble or are so placed as to be cut off from hope of\ngain through contention. Vainglorious arrogance may run at a higher\ntension among the more backward and boorish nations; but it is not\nevident that the advance guard among the civilised peoples are imbued\nwith a less complete national self-complacency. If the peace is to be\nkept, therefore, it will have to be kept by and between peoples made up,\nin effect, of complete patriots; which comes near being a contradiction\nin terms. Patriotism is useful for breaking the peace, not for keeping\nit. It makes for national pretensions and international jealously and\ndistrust, with warlike enterprise always in perspective; as a way to\nnational gain or a recourse in case of need. And there is commonly no\nsettled demarkation between these two contrasted needs that urge a\npatriotic people forever to keep one eye on the chance of a recourse to\narms.\n\nTherefore any calculus of the Chances of Peace appears to become a\nreckoning of the forces which may be counted on to keep a patriotic\nnation in an unstable equilibrium of peace for the time being. As has\njust been remarked above, among civilised peoples only those nations can\nbe counted on consistently to keep the peace who are so feeble or\notherwise so placed as to be cut off from hope of national gain. And\nthese can apparently be so counted on only as regards aggression, not as\nregards the national defense, and only in so far as they are not drawn\ninto warlike enterprise, collectively, by their more competent\nneighbors. Even the feeblest and most futile of them feels in honour\nbound to take up arms in defense of such national pretensions as they\nstill may harbour; and all of them harbour such pretensions. In certain\nextreme cases, which it might seem invidious to specify more explicitly,\nit is not easy to discover any specific reasons for the maintenance of a\nnational establishment, apart from the vindication of certain national\npretensions which would quietly lapse in the absence of a national\nestablishment on whom their vindication is incumbent.\n\nOf the rest, the greater nations that are spoken of as Powers no such\ngeneral statement will hold. These are the peoples who stand, in\nmatters of national concern, on their own initiative; and the question\nof peace and war at large is in effect, a question of peace and war\namong these Powers. They are not so numerous that they can be sifted\ninto distinct classes, and yet they differ among themselves in such a\nway that they may, for the purpose in hand, fairly be ranged under two\ndistinguishable if not contrasted heads: those which may safely be\ncounted on spontaneously to take the offensive, and those which will\nfight on provocation. Typically of the former description are Germany\nand Japan. Of the latter are the French and British, and less\nconfidently the American republic. In any summary statement of this kind\nRussia will have to be left on one side as a doubtful case, for reasons\nto which the argument may return at a later point; the prospective\ncourse of things in Russia is scarcely to be appraised on the ground of\nits past. Spain and Italy, being dubious Powers at the best, need not\ndetain the argument; they are, in the nature of things, subsidiaries who\nwait on the main chance. And Austria, with whatever the name may cover,\nis for the immediate purpose to be counted under the head of Germany.\n\nThere is no invidious comparison intended in so setting off these two\nclasses of nations in contrast to one another. It is not a contrast of\nmerit and demerit or of prestige. Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan\nare, in the nature of things as things go, bent in effect on a\ndisturbance of the peace,--with a view to advance the cause of their own\ndominion. On a large view of the case, such as many German statesmen\nwere in the habit of professing in the years preceding the great war, it\nmay perhaps appear reasonable to say--as they were in the habit of\nsaying--that these Imperial Powers are as well within the lines of fair\nand honest dealing in their campaign of aggression as the other Powers\nare in taking a defensive attitude against their aggression. Some sort\nof international equity has been pleaded in justification of their\ndemand for an increased share of dominion. At least it has appeared that\nthese Imperial statesmen have so persuaded themselves after very mature\ndeliberation; and they have showed great concern to persuade others of\nthe equity of their Imperial claim to something more than the law would\nallow. These sagacious, not to say astute, persons have not only reached\na conviction to this effect, but they have become possessed of this\nconviction in such plenary fashion that, in the German case, they have\ncome to admit exceptions or abatement of the claim only when and in so\nfar as the campaign of equitable aggression on which they had entered\nhas been proved impracticable by the fortunes of war.\n\nWith some gift for casuistry one may, at least conceivably, hold that\nthe felt need of Imperial self-aggrandisement may become so urgent as to\njustify, or at least to condone, forcible dispossession of weaker\nnationalities. This might, indeed it has, become a sufficiently\nperplexing question of casuistry, both as touches the punctilios of\nnational honour and as regards an equitable division between rival\nPowers in respect of the material means of mastery. So in private life\nit may become a moot question--in point of equity--whether the craving\nof a kleptomaniac may not on occasion rise to such an intolerable pitch\nof avidity as to justify him in seizing whatever valuables he can safely\nlay hands on, to ease the discomfort of ungratified desire. In private\nlife any such endeavour to better oneself at one's neighbors' cost is\nnot commonly reprobated if it takes effect on a decently large scale\nand shrewdly within the flexibilities of the law or with the connivance\nof its officers. Governing international endeavours of this class there\nis no law so inflexible that it can not be conveniently made over to fit\nparticular circumstances. And in the absence of law the felt need of a\nformal justification will necessarily appeal to the unformulated\nequities of the case, with some such outcome as alluded to above. All\nthat, of course, is for the diplomatists to take care of.\n\nBut any speculation on the equities involved in the projected course of\nempire to which these two enterprising nations are committing themselves\nmust run within the lines of diplomatic parable, and will have none but\na speculative interest. It is not a matter of equity. Accepting the\nsituation as it stands, it is evident that any peace can only have a\nqualified meaning, in the sense of armistice, so long as there is\nopportunity for national enterprise of the character on which these two\nenterprising national establishments are bent, and so long as these and\nthe like national establishments remain. So, taking the peaceable\nprofessions of their spokesmen at a discount of one hundred percent, as\none necessarily must, and looking to the circumstantial evidence of the\ncase, it is abundantly plain that at least these two imperial Powers may\nbe counted on consistently to manoeuvre for warlike advantage so long as\nany peace compact holds, and to break the peace so soon as the strategy\nof Imperial enterprise appears to require it.\n\nThere has been much courteous make-believe of amiable and upright\nsolicitude on this head the past few years, both in diplomatic\nintercourse and among men out of doors; and since make-believe is a\nmatter of course in diplomatic intercourse it is right and seemly, of\ncourse, that no overt recognition of unavowed facts should be allowed\nto traverse this run of make-believe within the precincts of diplomatic\nintercourse. But in any ingenuous inquiry into the nature of peace and\nthe conditions of its maintenance there can be no harm in conveniently\nleaving the diplomatic make-believe on one side and looking to the\ncircumstances that condition the case, rather than to the formal\nprofessions designed to mask the circumstances.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nChief among the relevant circumstances in the current situation are the\nimperial designs of Germany and Japan. These two national establishments\nare very much alike. So much so that for the present purpose a single\nline of analysis will passably cover both cases. The same line of\nanalysis will also apply, with slight adaptation, to more than one of\nthe other Powers, or near-Powers, of the modern world; but in so far as\nsuch is held to be the case, that is not a consideration that weakens\nthe argument as applied to these two, which are to be taken as the\nconsummate type-form of a species of national establishments. They are,\nbetween them, the best instance there is of what may be called a\nDynastic State.\n\nExcept as a possible corrective of internal disorders and discontent,\nneither of the two States \"desires\" war; but both are bent on dominion,\nand as the dominion aimed at is not to be had except by fighting for it,\nboth in effect are incorrigibly bent on warlike enterprise. And in\nneither case will considerations of equity, humanity, decency, veracity,\nor the common good be allowed to trouble the quest of dominion. As lies\nin the nature of the dynastic State, imperial dominion, in the ambitions\nof both, is beyond price; so that no cost is too high so long as\nultimate success attends the imperial enterprise. So much is commonplace\nknowledge among all men who are at all conversant with the facts.\n\nTo anyone who harbors a lively sentimental prejudice for or against\neither or both of the two nations so spoken of, or for or against the\nmanner of imperial enterprise to which both are committed, it may seem\nthat what has just been said of them and their relation to the world's\npeace runs on something of a bias and conveys something of dispraise and\nreprobation. Such is not the intention, however, though the appearance\nis scarcely to be avoided. It is necessary for the purposes of the\nargument unambiguously to recognise the nature of these facts with which\nthe inquiry is concerned; and any plain characterisation of the facts\nwill unavoidably carry a fringe of suggestions of this character,\nbecause current speech is adapted for their reprobation. The point aimed\nat is not this inflection of approval or disapproval. The facts are to\nbe taken impersonally for what they are worth in their causal bearing on\nthe chance of peace or war; not at their sentimental value as traits of\nconduct to be appraised in point of their goodness or expediency.\n\nSo seen without prejudice, then, if that may be, this Imperial\nenterprise of these two Powers is to be rated as the chief circumstance\nbearing on the chances of peace and conditioning the terms on which any\npeace plan must be drawn. Evidently, in the presence of these two\nImperial Powers any peace compact will be in a precarious case; equally\nso whether either or both of them are parties to such compact or not. No\nengagement binds a dynastic statesman in case it turns out not to\nfurther the dynastic enterprise. The question then recurs: How may peace\nbe maintained within the horizon of German or Japanese ambitions? There\nare two obvious alternatives, neither of which promises an easy way out\nof the quandary in which the world's peace is placed by their presence:\nSubmission to their dominion, or Elimination of these two Powers. Either\nalternative would offer a sufficiently deterrent outlook, and yet any\nproject for devising some middle course of conciliation and amicable\nsettlement, which shall be practicable and yet serve the turn, scarcely\nhas anything better to promise. The several nations now engaged on a war\nwith the greater of these Imperial Powers hold to a design of\nelimination, as being the only measure that merits hopeful\nconsideration. The Imperial Power in distress bespeaks peace and\ngood-will.\n\nThose advocates, whatever their nationality, who speak for negotiation\nwith a view to a peace compact which is to embrace these States intact,\nare aiming, in effect, to put things in train for ultimate submission to\nthe mastery of these Imperial Powers. In these premises an amicable\nsettlement and a compact of perpetual peace will necessarily be\nequivalent to arranging a period of recuperation and recruiting for a\nnew onset of dynastic enterprise. For, in the nature of the case, no\ncompact binds the dynastic statesman, and no consideration other than\nthe pursuit of Imperial dominion commands his attention.\n\nThere is, of course, no intention to decry this single-mindedness that\nis habitually put in evidence by the dynastic statesmen. Nor should it\nbe taken as evidence of moral obliquity in them. It is rather the result\nof a peculiar moral attitude or bent, habitual to such statesmen, and in\nits degree also habitual to their compatriots, and is indispensably\ninvolved in the Imperial frame of mind. The consummation of Imperial\nmastery being the highest and ubiquitously ulterior end of all\nendeavour, its pursuit not only relieves its votaries from the\nobservance of any minor obligations that run counter to its needs, but\nit also imposes a moral obligation to make the most of any opportunity\nfor profitable deceit and chicanery that may offer. In short, the\ndynastic statesman is under the governance of a higher morality, binding\nhim to the service of his nation's ambition--or in point of fact, to the\npersonal service of his dynastic master--to which it is his dutiful\nprivilege loyally to devote all his powers of force and fraud.\n\nDemocratically-minded persons, who are not moved by the call of loyalty\nto a gratuitous personal master, may have some difficulty in\nappreciating the force and the moral austerity of this spirit of\ndevotion to an ideal of dynastic aggrandisement, and in seeing how its\nparamount exigence will set aside all meticulous scruples of personal\nrectitude and veracity, as being a shabby with-holding of service due.\n\nTo such of these doubters as still have retained some remnants of their\nreligious faith this attitude of loyalty may perhaps be made\nintelligible by calling to mind the analogous self-surrender of the\nreligious devotee. And in this connection it may also be to the purpose\nto recall that in point of its genesis and derivation that unreserved\nself-abasement and surrender to the divine ends and guidance, which is\nthe chief grace and glory of the true believer, is held by secular\nstudents of these matters to be only a sublimated analogue or\ncounterfeit of this other dutiful abasement that constitutes loyalty to\na temporal master. The deity is currently spoken of as The Heavenly\nKing, under whose dominion no sinner has a right that He is bound to\nrespect; very much after the fashion in which no subject of a dynastic\nstate has a right which the State is bound to respect. Indeed, all these\ndynastic establishments that so seek the Kingdom, the Power and the\nGlory are surrounded with a penumbra of divinity, and it is commonly a\nbootless question where the dynastic powers end and the claims of\ndivinity begin. There is something of a coalescence.[7]\n\n[Footnote 7: \"To us the state is the most indispensable as well as the\nhighest requisite to our earthly existence.... All individualistic\nendeavor ... must be unreservedly subordinated to this lofty claim....\nThe state ... eventually is of infinitely more value than the sum of all\nthe individuals within its jurisdiction.\" \"This conception of the state,\nwhich is as much a part of our life as is the blood in our veins, is\nnowhere to be found in the English Constitution, and is quite foreign to\nEnglish thought, and to that of America as well.\"--Eduard Meyer,\n_England, its Political Organisation and Development and the War against\nGermany_, translated by H.S. White. Boston 1916. pp. 30-31.]\n\nThe Kaiser holds dominion by divine grace and is accountable to none but\nGod, if to Him. The whole case is in a still better state of repair as\ntouches the Japanese establishment, where the Emperor is a lineal\ndescendant of the supreme deity, Amaterazu (_o mi Kami_), and where, by\nconsequence, there is no line of cleavage between a divine and a secular\nmastery. Pursuant to this more unqualified authenticity of autocratic\nrule, there is also to be found in this case a correspondingly\nunqualified devotion in the subjects and an unqualified subservience to\ndynastic ends on the part of the officers of the crown. The coalescence\nof dynastic rule with the divine order is less complete in the German\ncase, but all observers bear witness that it all goes far enough also in\nthe German case. This state of things is recalled here as a means of\nmaking plain that the statesmen of these Imperial Powers must in the\nnature of the case, and without blame, be drawn out from under the\ncustomary restraint of those principles of vulgar morality that are\nembodied in the decalogue. It is not that the subject, or--what comes to\nthe same thing--the servant of such a dynastic State may not be upright,\nveracious and humane in private life, but only that he must not be\naddicted to that sort of thing in such manner or degree as might hinder\nhis usefulness for dynastic purposes. These matters of selfishly\nindividual integrity and humanity have no weight as against the\nexigencies of the dynastic enterprise.\n\nThese considerations may not satisfy all doubters as to the moral\nsufficiency of these motives that so suffice to decide the dynastic\nstatesmen on their enterprise of aggression by force and fraud; but it\nshould be evident that so long as these statesmen continue in the frame\nof mind spoken of, and so long as popular sentiment in these countries\ncontinues, as hitherto, to lend them effectual support in the pursuit of\nsuch Imperial enterprise, so long it must also remain true that no\nenduring peace can be maintained within the sweep of their Imperial\nambition. Any peace compact would necessarily be, in effect, an\narmistice terminable at will and serving as a season of preparation to\nmeet a deferred opportunity. For the peaceable nations it would, in\neffect, be a respite and a season of preparation for eventual submission\nto the Imperial rule.\n\nBy advocates of such a negotiated compact of perpetual peace it has been\nargued that the populace underlying these Imperial Powers will readily\nbe brought to realise the futility and inexpediency of such dynastic\nenterprise, if only the relevant facts are brought to their knowledge,\nand that so these Powers will be constrained to keep the peace by\ndefault of popular support for their warlike projects. What is required,\nit is believed by these sanguine persons, is that information be\ncompetently conveyed to the common people of these warlike nations,\nshowing them that they have nothing to apprehend in the way of\naggression or oppressive measures from the side of their more peaceable\nneighbours; whereupon their warlike animus will give place to a\nreasonable and enlightened frame of mind. This argument runs tacitly or\nexplicitly, on the premise that these peoples who have so\nenthusiastically lent themselves to the current warlike enterprise are\nfundamentally of the same racial complexion and endowed with the same\nhuman nature as their peaceable neighbours, who would be only too glad\nto keep the peace on any terms of tolerable security from aggression. If\nonly a fair opportunity is offered for the interested peoples to come to\nan understanding, it is held, a good understanding will readily be\nreached; at least so far as to result in a reasonable willingness to\nsubmit questions in dispute to an intelligent canvass and an equitable\narbitration.\n\nProjects for a negotiated peace compact, to include the dynastic States,\ncan hold any prospect of a happy issue only if this line of argument, or\nits equivalent, is pertinent and conclusive; and the argument is to the\npoint only in so far as its premises are sound and will carry as far as\nthe desired conclusion. Therefore a more detailed attention to the\npremises on which it runs will be in place, before any project of the\nkind is allowed to pass inspection.\n\nAs to homogeneity of race and endowment among the several nations in\nquestion, the ethnologists, who are competent to speak of that matter,\nare ready to assert that this homogeneity goes much farther among the\nnations of Europe than any considerable number of peace advocates would\nbe ready to claim. In point of race, and broadly speaking, there is\nsubstantially no difference between these warring nations, along any\neast-and-west line; while the progressive difference in racial\ncomplexion that is always met with along any north-and-south line,\nnowhere coincides with a national or linguistic frontier. In no case\ndoes a political division between these nations mark or depend on a\ndifference of race or of hereditary endowment. And, to give full\nmeasure, it may be added that also in no case does a division of classes\nwithin any one of these nations, into noble and base, patrician and\nplebeian, lay and learned, innocent and vicious, mark or rest on any\nslightest traceable degree of difference in race or in heritable\nendowment. On the point of racial homogeneity there is no fault to find\nwith the position taken.\n\nIf the second postulate in this groundwork of premises on which the\nadvocates of negotiable peace base their hopes were as well taken there\nneed be no serious misgiving as to the practicability of such a plan.\nThe plan counts on information, persuasion and reflection to subdue\nnational animosities and jealousies, at least in such measure as would\nmake them amenable to reason. The question of immediate interest on this\nhead, therefore, would be as to how far this populace may be accessible\nto the contemplated line of persuasion. At present they are,\nnotoriously, in a state of obsequious loyalty to the dynasty,\nsingle-minded devotion to the fortunes of the Fatherland, and\nuncompromising hatred of its enemies. In this frame of mind there is\nnothing that is new, except the degree of excitement. The animus, it\nwill be recalled, was all there and on the alert when the call came, so\nthat the excitement came on with the sweep of a conflagration on the\nfirst touch of a suitable stimulus. The German people at large was\nevidently in a highly unstable equilibrium, so that an unexampled\nenthusiasm of patriotic self-sacrifice followed immediately on the first\nincitement to manslaughter, very much as if the nation had been held\nunder an hypnotic spell. One need only recall the volume of overbearing\nmagniloquence that broke out all over the place in that beginning, when\nThe Day was believed to be dawning.\n\nSuch a popular frame of mind is not a transient episode, to be created\nat short notice and put aside for a parcel of salutary advice. The\nnation that will make such a massive concerted move with the alacrity\nshown in this instance must be living in a state of alert readiness for\njust such an onset. Yet this is not to be set down as anything in the\nway of a racial trait specifically distinguishing the German people from\nthose other adjacent nationalities that are incapable of a similarly\nswift and massive response to the appeal of patriotism. These adjacent\nnationalities are racially identical with the German people, but they do\nnot show the same warlike abandon in nearly the same degree.\n\nBut for all that, it is a national trait, not to be acquired or put away\nby taking thought. It is just here that the line of definition runs: it\nis a national trait, not a racial one. It is not Nature, but it is\nSecond Nature. But a national trait, while it is not heritable in the\nsimple sense of that term, has the same semblance, or the same degree,\nof hereditary persistence that belongs to the national institutions,\nusages, conventionalities, beliefs, which distinguish the given nation\nfrom its neighbors. In this instance it may be said more specifically\nthat this eager loyalty is a heritage of the German people at large in\nthe same sense and with the same degree of permanence as the institution\nof an autocratic royalty has among them, or a privileged nobility.\nIndeed, it is the institutional counterfoil of these establishments. It\nis of an institutional character, just as the corresponding sense of\nnational solidarity and patriotic devotion is among the neighboring\npeoples with whom the German nation comes in comparison. And an\ninstitution is an historical growth, with just so much of a character of\npermanence and continuity of transmission as is given it by the\ncircumstances out of which it has grown. Any institution is a product of\nhabit, or perhaps more accurately it is a body of habits of thought\nbearing on a given line of conduct, which prevails with such generality\nand uniformity throughout the group as to have become a matter of common\nsense.\n\nSuch an article of institutional furniture is an outcome of usage, not\nof reflection or deliberate choice; and it has consequently a character\nof self-legitimation, so that it stands in the accredited scheme of\nthings as intrinsically right and good, and not merely as a shrewdly\nchosen expedient _ad interim_. It affords a norm of life, inosculating\nwith a multiplicity of other norms, with which it goes to make up a\nbalanced scheme of ends, ways and means governing human conduct; and no\none such institutional item, therefore, is materially to be disturbed,\ndiscarded or abated except at the cost of serious derangement to the\nbalanced scheme of things in which it belongs as an integral\nconstituent. Nor can such a detail norm of conduct and habitual\npropensity come into bearing and hold its place, except by force of\nhabituation which is at the same time consonant with the common run of\nhabituation to which the given community is subject. It follows that\nthe more rigorous, comprehensive, unremitting and long-continued the\nhabituation to which a given institutional principle owes its vogue, the\nmore intimately and definitively will it be embedded in the common sense\nof the community, the less chance is there of its intrinsic necessity\nbeing effectually questioned or doubted, and the less chance is there of\ncorrecting it or abating its force in case circumstances should so\nchange as to make its continued rule visibly inexpedient. Its abatement\nwill be a work not of deliberation and design, but of defection through\ndisuse.\n\nNot that reflection and sane counsel will count for nothing in these\npremises, but only that these exertions of intelligence will count for\nrelatively very little by comparison with the run of habituation as\nenforced by the circumstances conditioning any given case; and further,\nthat wise counsel and good resolutions can take effect in the way of\namending any untoward institutional bent only by way of suitable\nhabituation, and only at such a rate of change as the circumstances\ngoverning habituation will allow. It is, at the best, slow work to shift\nthe settled lines of any community's scheme of common sense. Now,\nnational solidarity, and more particularly an unquestioning loyalty to\nthe sovereign and the dynasty, is a matter of course and of commonsense\nnecessity with the German people. It is not necessary to call to mind\nthat the Japanese nation, which has here been coupled with the German,\nare in the same case, only more so.\n\nDoubtless it would be exceeding the premises to claim that it should\nnecessarily take the German people as long-continued and as harsh a\nschooling to unlearn their excess of chauvinism, their servile stooping\nto gratuitous authority, and their eager subservience to the dynastic\nambitions of their masters, as that which has in the course of history\ninduced these habits in them. But it would seem reasonable to expect\nthat there should have to be some measure of proportion between what it\nhas cost them in time and experience to achieve their current frame of\nmind in this bearing and what it would cost to divest themselves of it.\nIt is a question of how long a time and how exacting a discipline would\nbe required so far to displace the current scheme of commonsense values\nand convictions in force in the Fatherland as to neutralise their\ncurrent high-wrought principles of servility, loyalty and national\nanimosity; and on the solution of this difficulty appear to depend the\nchances of success for any proposed peace compact to which the German\nnation shall be made a party, on terms of what is called an \"honorable\npeace.\"\n\nThe national, or rather the dynastic and warlike, animus of this people\nis of the essence of their social and political institutions. Without\nsuch a groundwork of popular sentiment neither the national\nestablishment, nor the social order on which it rests and through which\nit works, could endure. And with this underlying national sentiment\nintact nothing but a dynastic establishment of a somewhat ruthless\norder, and no enduring system of law and order not based on universal\nsubmission to personal rule, could be installed. Both the popular animus\nand the correlative coercive scheme of law and order are of historical\ngrowth. Both have been learned, acquired, and are in no cogent sense\noriginal with the German people. But both alike and conjointly have come\nout of a very protracted, exacting and consistent discipline of mastery\nand subjection, running virtually unbroken over the centuries that have\npassed since the region that is now the Fatherland first passed under\nthe predaceous rule of its Teutonic invaders,--for no part of the\n\"Fatherland\" is held on other tenure than that of forcible seizure in\nancient times by bands of invaders, with the negligible exception of\nHolstein and a slight extent of territory adjoining that province to the\nsouth and south-west. Since the time when such peoples as were overtaken\nin this region by the Germanic barbarian invasions, and were reduced to\nsubjection and presently merged with their alien masters, the same\ngeneral fashion of law and order that presently grew out of that\nbarbarian conquest has continued to govern the life of those peoples,\nwith relatively slight and intermittent relaxation of its rigors.\nContrasted with its beginnings, in the shameful atrocities of the Dark\nAges and the prehistoric phases of this German occupation, the later\nstages of this system of coercive law and order in the Fatherland will\nappear humane, not to say genial; but as compared with the degree of\nmitigation which the like order of things presently underwent elsewhere\nin western Europe, it has throughout the historical period preserved a\nremarkable degree of that character of arrogance and servility which it\nowes to its barbarian and predatory beginnings.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe initial stages of this Germanic occupation of the Fatherland are\nsufficiently obscure under the cloud of unrecorded antiquity that covers\nthem; and then, an abundance of obscurantism has also been added by the\nvapours of misguided vanity that have surrounded so nearly all\nhistorical inquiry on the part of patriotic German scholars. Yet there\nare certain outstanding features in the case, in history and prehistory,\nthat are too large or too notorious to be set aside or to be covered\nover, and these may suffice to show the run of circumstances which have\nsurrounded the German peoples and shaped their civil and political\ninstitutions, and whose discipline has guided German habits of thought\nand preserved the German spirit of loyalty in the shape in which it\nunderlies the dynastic State of the present day.\n\nAmong the most engaging of those fables that make the conventional\nbackground of German history is the academic legend of a free\nagricultural village community made up of ungraded and masterless men.\nIt is not necessary here to claim that such a village community never\nplayed a part in the remoter prehistoric experiences out of which the\nGerman people, or their ruling classes, came into the territory of the\nFatherland; such a claim might divert the argument. But it is\nsufficiently patent to students of those matters today that no such\ncommunity of free and ungraded men had any part in the Germanic\nbeginnings; that is to say, in the early experiences of the Fatherland\nunder German rule. The meager and ambiguous remarks of Tacitus on the\nstate of domestic and civil economy among the inhabitants of Germany\nneed no longer detain anyone, in the presence of the available\narchaeological and historical evidence. The circumstantial evidence of\nthe prehistoric antiquities which touch this matter, as well as the\nslight allusions of historical records in antiquity, indicate\nunambiguously enough that when the Germanic immigrants moved into the\nterritories of the Fatherland they moved in as invaders, or rather as\nmarauders, and made themselves masters of the people already living on\nthe land. And history quite as unambiguously declares that when the\nFatherland first comes under its light it presents a dark and bloody\nground of tumultuous contention and intrigue; where princes and\nprincelings, captains of war and of rapine as well as the captains of\nsuperstition, spend the substance of an ignominiously sordid and servile\npopulace in an endless round of mutual raiding, treachery,\nassassinations and supersession.\n\nTaken at their face value, the recorded stories of that early time would\nleave one to infer that the common people, whose industry supported this\nsuperstructure of sordid mastery, could have survived only by oversight.\nBut touched as it is with poetic license and devoted to the admirable\nlife of the master class--admirable in their own eyes and in those of\ntheir chroniclers, as undoubtedly also in the eyes of the subject\npopulace--the history of that time doubtless plays up the notable\nexploits and fortunes of its conspicuous personages, somewhat to the\nneglect of the obscure vicissitudes of life and fortune among that human\nraw material by use of which the admirable feats of the master class\nwere achieved, and about the use of which the dreary traffic of greed\nand crime went on among the masters.\n\nOf the later history, what covers, say, the last one thousand years,\nthere is no need to speak at length. With transient, episodic,\ninterruptions it is for the Fatherland a continuation out of these\nbeginnings, leading out into a more settled system of subjection and\nmastery and a progressively increased scale of princely enterprise,\nresting on an increasingly useful and increasingly loyal populace. In\nall this later history the posture of things in the Fatherland is by no\nmeans unique, nor is it even strikingly peculiar, by contrast with the\nrest of western Europe, except in degree. It is of the same general kind\nas the rest of what has gone to make the historical advance of medieval\nand modern times; but it differs from the generality in a more sluggish\nmovement and a more tenacious adherence to what would be rated as the\nuntoward features of mediaevalism. The approach to a modern scheme of\ninstitutions and modern conceptions of life and of human values has been\nslow, and hitherto incomplete, as compared with those communities that\nhave, for good or ill, gone farthest along the ways of modernity.\nHabituation to personal subjection and subservience under the rigorous\nand protracted discipline of standardised service and fealty has\ncontinued later, and with later and slighter mitigation, in the\nFatherland; so as better to have conserved the spiritual attitude of the\nfeudal order. Law and order in the Fatherland has in a higher degree\ncontinued to mean unquestioning obedience to a personal master and\nunquestioning subservience to the personal ambitions of the master. And\nsince freedom, in the sense of discretionary initiative on the part of\nthe common man, does not fit into the framework of such a system of\ndependence on personal authority and surveillance, any degree of such\nfree initiative will be \"licence\" in the eyes of men bred into the\nframework of this system; whereas \"liberty,\" as distinct from \"licence,\"\nis not a matter of initiative and self-direction, but of latitude in the\nservice of a master. Hence no degree of curtailment in this delegated\n\"liberty\" will be resented or repudiated by popular indignation, so long\nas the master to whom service is due can give assurance that it is\nexpedient for his purposes.\n\nThe age-long course of experience and institutional discipline out of\nwhich the current German situation has come may be drawn schematically\nto the following effect: In the beginning a turmoil of conquest, rapine,\nservitude, and contention between rival bands of marauders and their\ncaptains, gradually, indeed imperceptibly, fell into lines of settled\nand conventionalised exploitation; with repeated interruptions due to\nnew incursions and new combinations of rapacious chieftains. Out of it\nall in the course of time came a feudal regime, under which personal\nallegiance and service to petty chiefs was the sole and universal\naccredited bond of solidarity. As the outcome of further unremitting\nintrigue and contention among feudal chiefs, of high and low degree, the\npopulace fell into larger parcels, under the hands of feudal lords of\nlarger dominion, and the bias of allegiance and service came to hold\nwith some degree of permanence and uniformity, or at least of\nconsistency, over a considerable reach of country, including its\ninhabitants. With the rise of States came allegiance to a dynasty, as\ndistinguished from the narrower and more ephemeral allegiance to the\nsemi-detached person of a victorious prince; and the relative permanence\nof territorial frontiers under this rule gave room for an effectual\nrecrudescence of the ancient propensity to a sentimental group\nsolidarity; in which the accredited territorial limits of the dynastic\ndominion served to outline the group that so was felt to belong together\nunder a joint dispensation and with something of a joint interest in\nmatters of fame and fortune. As the same notion is more commonly and\nmore suggestively expressed, a sense of nationality arose within the\nsweep of the dynastic rule. This sense of community interest that is\ncalled nationality so came in to reenforce the sense of allegiance to\nthe dynastic establishment and so has coalesced with it to produce that\nhigh-wrought loyalty to the State, that draws equally on the sentiment\nof community interest in the nation and on the prescriptive docility to\nthe dynastic head. The sense of national solidarity and of feudal\nloyalty and service have coalesced, to bring this people to that climax\nof patriotic devotion beyond which there lies no greater height along\nthis way. But this is also as far as the German people have gone; and it\nis scarcely to be claimed that the Japanese have yet reached this stage;\nthey would rather appear to be, essentially, subjects of the emperor,\nand only inchoately a Japanese nation. Of the German people it seems\nsafe to say that they have achieved such a coalescence of unimpaired\nfeudal fealty to a personal master and a full-blown sense of national\nsolidarity, without any perceptible slackening in either strand of the\ndouble tie which so binds them in the service of the dynastic State.\n\nGermany, in other words, is somewhat in arrears, as compared with those\nEuropeans that have gone farthest along this course of institutional\ngrowth, or perhaps rather institutional permutation. It is not that this\nretardation of the German people in this matter of national spirit is to\nbe counted as an infirmity, assuredly not as a handicap in the pursuit\nof that national prestige on which all patriotic endeavour finally\nconverges. For this purpose the failure to distinguish between the\nambitions of the dynastic statesmen and the interests of the\ncommonwealth is really a prodigious advantage, which their rivals, of\nmore mature growth politically, have lost by atrophy of this same\ndynastic axiom of subservience. These others, of whom the French and the\nEnglish-speaking peoples make up the greater part and may be taken as\nthe typical instance, have had a different history, in part. The\ndiscipline of experience has left a somewhat different residue of habits\nof thought embedded in their institutional equipment and effective as\naxiomatic premises in their further apprehension of what is worth while,\nand why.\n\nIt is not that the difference between these two contrasted strains of\nthe Western civilisation is either profound or very pronounced; it is\nperhaps rather to be stated as a difference of degree than of kind; a\nretardation of spiritual growth, in respect of the prevalent and\ncontrolling habits of thought on certain heads, in the one case as\nagainst the other. Therefore any attempt to speak with sufficient\ndefinition, so as to bring out this national difference of animus in any\nconvincing way, will unavoidably have an appearance of overstatement, if\nnot also of bias. And in any case, of course, it is not to be expected\nthat the national difference here spoken for can be brought home to the\napprehension of any unspoiled son of the Fatherland, since it does not\nlie within that perspective.\n\nIt is not of the nature of a divergence, but rather a differential in\npoint of cultural maturity, due to a differential in the rate of\nprogression through that sequence of institutional phases through which\nthe civilised peoples of Europe, jointly and severally, have been led by\nforce of circumstance. In this movement out of the Dark Ages and onward,\ncircumstances have fallen out differently for those Europeans that\nchanced to live within the confines of the Fatherland, different with\nsuch effect as to have in the present placed these others at a farther\nremove from the point of departure, leaving them furnished with less of\nthat archaic frame of mind that is here in question. Possessed of less,\nbut by no means shorn of all--perhaps not of the major part--of that\nbarbaric heritage.\n\nCircumstances have so fallen out that these--typically the French and\nthe English-speaking peoples--have left behind and partly forgotten that\ninstitutional phase in which the people of Imperial Germany now live and\nmove and have their being. The French partly because they--that is the\ncommon people of the French lands--entered the procession with a very\nsubstantial lead, having never been put back to a point abreast of their\nneighbors across the Rhine, in that phase of European civilisation from\nwhich the peoples of the Fatherland tardily emerged into the feudal age.\nSo, any student who shall set out to account for the visible lead which\nthe French people still so obstinately maintain in the advance of\nEuropean culture, will have to make up his account with this notable\nfact among the premises of his inquiry, that they have had a shorter\ncourse to cover and have therefore, in the sporting phrase, had the\ninside track. They measure from a higher datum line. Among the\nadvantages which so have come, in a sense unearned, to the French\npeople, is their uninterrupted retention, out of Roman--and perhaps\npre-Roman--times, of the conception of a commonwealth, a community of\nmen with joint and mutual interests apart from any superimposed\ndependence on a joint feudal superior. The French people therefore\nbecame a nation, with unobtrusive facility, so soon as circumstances\npermitted, and they are today the oldest \"nation\" in Europe. They\ntherefore were prepared from long beforehand, with an adequate principle\n(habit of thought) of national cohesion and patriotic sentiment, to make\nthe shift from a dynastic State to a national commonwealth whenever the\noccasion for such a move should arise; that is to say, whenever the\ndynastic State, by a suitable conjunction of infirmity and irksomeness,\nshould pass the margin of tolerance in this people's outraged sense of\nnational shame. The case of the German people in their latterday\nattitude toward dynastic vagaries may afford a term of comparison. These\nappear yet incapable of distinguishing between national shame and\ndynastic ambition.\n\nBy a different course and on lines more nearly parallel with the\nlife-history of the German peoples, the English-speaking peoples have\nreached what is for the present purpose much the same ground as the\nFrench, in that they too have made the shift from the dynastic State to\nthe national commonwealth. The British started late, but the discipline\nof servitude and unmitigated personal rule in their case was relatively\nbrief and relatively ineffectual; that is to say, as compared with what\ntheir German cousins had to endure and to learn in the like connection.\nSo that the British never learned the lesson of dynastic loyalty fully\nby heart; at least not the populace; whatever may be true for the\nprivileged classes, the gentlemen, whose interests were on the side of\nprivilege and irresponsible mastery. Here as in the French case it was\nthe habits of thought of the common man, not of the class of gentlemen,\nthat made the obsolescence of the dynastic State a foregone conclusion\nand an easy matter--as one speaks of easy achievement in respect of\nmatters of that magnitude. It is now some two and a half centuries since\nthis shift in the national point of view overtook the English-speaking\ncommunity. Perhaps it would be unfair to say that that period, or that\nperiod plus what further time may yet have to be added, marks the\ninterval by which German habits of thought in these premises are in\narrears, but it is not easy to find secure ground for a different and\nmore moderate appraisal.\n\nThe future, of course, is not to be measured in terms of the past, and\nthe tempo of the present and of the calculable future is in many\nbearings very different from that which has ruled even in the recent\nhistorical past. But then, on the other hand, habituation always\nrequires time; more particularly such habituation as is to take effect\nthroughout a populous nation and is counted on to work a displacement of\na comprehensive institutional system and of a people's outlook on life.\n\nGermany is still a dynastic State. That is to say, its national\nestablishment is, in effect, a self-appointed and irresponsible\nautocracy which holds the nation in usufruct, working through an\nappropriate bureaucratic organisation, and the people is imbued with\nthat spirit of abnegation and devotion that is involved in their\nenthusiastically supporting a government of that character. Now, it is\nin the nature of a dynastic State to seek dominion, that being the whole\nof its nature. And a dynastic establishment which enjoys the unqualified\nusufruct of such resources as are placed at its disposal by the\nfeudalistic loyalty of the German people runs no chance of keeping the\npeace, except on terms of the unconditional surrender of all those whom\nit may concern. No solemn engagement and no pious resolution has any\nweight in the balance against a cultural fatality of this magnitude.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis account of the derivation and current state of German nationalism\nwill of course appear biased to anyone who has been in the habit of\nrating German Culture high in all its bearings, and to whom at the same\ntime the ideals of peace and liberty appeal. Indeed, such a critic,\ngifted with the due modicum of asperity, might well be provoked to call\nit all a more or less ingenious diatribe of partisan malice. But it can\nbe so construed only by those who see the question at issue as a point\nof invidious distinction between this German animus on the one hand and\nthe corresponding frame of mind of the neighboring peoples on the other\nhand. There may also appear to the captious to be some air of\ndeprecation about the characterisation here offered of the past history\nof political traffic within the confines of the Fatherland. All of\nwhich, of course, touches neither the veracity of the characterisation\nnor the purpose with which so ungrateful a line of analysis and\nexposition has been entered upon. It is to be regretted if facts that\nmay flutter the emotions of one and another among the sensitive and\nunreflecting can not be drawn into such an inquiry without having their\ncogency discounted beforehand on account of the sentimental value\nimputed to them. Of course no offense is intended and no invidious\ncomparison is aimed at.\n\nEven if the point of it all were an invidious comparison it would\nimmediately have to be admitted that the net showing in favor of these\nothers, e.g., the French or the English-speaking peoples, is by no means\nso unreservedly to their credit as such a summary statement of the\nGerman case might seem to imply. As bearing on the chances of a peace\ncontingent upon the temper of the contracting nationalities, it is by no\nmeans a foregone conclusion that such a peace compact would hold\nindefinitely even if it depended solely on the pacific animus of these\nothers that have left the dynastic State behind. These others, in fact,\nare also not yet out of the woods. They may not have the same gift of\ngratuitous and irresponsible truculence as their German cousins, in the\nsame alarming degree; but as was said in an earlier passage, they too\nare ready to fight on provocation. They are patriotic to a degree;\nindeed to such a degree that anything which visibly touches the national\nprestige will readily afford a _casus belli_. But it remains true that\nthe popular temper among them is of the defensive order; perhaps of an\nunnecessarily enthusiastic defensive order, but after all in such a\nframe of mind as leaves them willing to let well enough alone, to live\nand let live.\n\nAnd herein appears to lie the decisive difference between those peoples\nwhose patriotic affections center about the fortunes of an impersonal\ncommonwealth and those in whom is superadded a fervent aspiration for\ndynastic ascendency. The latter may be counted on to break the peace\nwhen a promising opportunity offers.\n\nThe contrast may be illustrated, though not so sharply as might be\ndesirable, in the different temper shown by the British people in the\nBoer war on the one hand, as compared with the popularity of the\nFrench-Prussian war among the German people on the other hand. Both were\naggressive wars, and both were substantially unprovoked. Diplomatically\nspeaking, of course, sufficient provocation was found in either case, as\nhow should it not? But in point of substantial provocation and of\nmaterial inducement, both were about equally gratuitous. In either case\nthe war could readily have been avoided without material detriment to\nthe community and without perceptible lesion to the national honour.\nBoth were \"engineered\" on grounds shamelessly manufactured _ad hoc_ by\ninterested parties; in the one case by a coterie of dynastic statesmen,\nin the other by a junta of commercial adventurers and imperialistic\npoliticians. In neither case had the people any interest of gain or loss\nin the quarrel, except as it became a question of national prestige. But\nboth the German and the British community bore the burden and fought the\ncampaign to a successful issue for those interested parties who had\nprecipitated the quarrel. The British people at large, it is true, bore\nthe burden; which comes near being all that can be said in the way of\npopular approval of this war, which political statesmen have since then\nrated as one of the most profitable enterprises in which the forces of\nthe realm have been engaged. On the subject of this successful war the\ncommon man is still inclined to cover his uneasy sense of decency with a\nrecital of extenuating circumstances. What parallels all this in the\nGerman case is an outbreak of patriotic abandon and an admirable spirit\nof unselfish sacrifice in furtherance of the dynastic prestige, an\nintoxication of patriotic blare culminating in the triumphant coronation\nat Versailles. Nor has the sober afterthought of the past forty-six\nyears cast a perceptible shadow of doubt across the glorious memory of\nthat patriotic debauch.\n\nSuch is the difference of animus between a body of patriotic citizens in\na modern commonwealth on the one hand and the loyal subjects of a\ndynastic State on the other hand. There need be no reflections on the\nintrinsic merits of either. Seen in dispassionate perspective from\noutside the turmoil, there is not much to choose, in point of sane and\nself-respecting manhood, between the sluggish and shamefaced abettor of\na sordid national crime, and a ranting patriot who glories in serving as\ncat's-paw to a syndicate of unscrupulous politicians bent on dominion\nfor dominion's sake. But the question here is not as to the relative\nmerits or the relative manhood contents of the two contrasted types of\npatriot. Doubtless both and either have manhood enough and to spare; at\nleast, so they say. But the point in question is the simpler and nowise\ninvidious one, as to the availability of both or either for the\nperpetuation of the world's peace under a compact of vigilant\nneutrality. Plainly the German frame of mind admits of no neutrality;\nthe quest of dominion is not compatible with neutrality, and the\nsubstantial core of German national life is still the quest of dominion\nunder dynastic tutelage. How it stands with the spirit that has\nrepeatedly come in sight in the international relations of the British\ncommunity is a question harder to answer.\n\nIt may be practicable to establish a peace of neutrals on the basis of\nsuch national spirit as prevails among these others--the French and\nEnglish-speaking peoples, together with the minor nationalities that\ncluster about the North Sea--because their habitual attitude is that of\nneutrality, on the whole and with allowance for a bellicose minority in\nall these countries. By and large, these peoples have come to the\ntolerant attitude that finds expression in the maxim, Live and let live.\nBut they are all and several sufficiently patriotic. It may, indeed,\nprove that they are more than sufficiently patriotic for the purposes of\na neutral peace. They stand for peace, but it is \"peace with honour;\"\nwhich means, in more explicit terms, peace with undiminished national\nprestige. Now, national prestige is a very particular commodity, as has\nbeen set out in earlier passages of this inquiry; and a peace which is\nto be kept only on terms of a jealous maintenance of the national honour\nis likely to be in a somewhat precarious case. If, and when, the\nnational honour is felt to require an enhanced national ascendancy, the\ncase for a neutral peace immediately becomes critical. And the greater\nthe number and diversity of pretensions and interests that are conceived\nto be bound up with the national honour, the more unstable will the\nresulting situation necessarily be.\n\nThe upshot of all this recital of considerations appears to be that a\nneutral peace compact may, or it may not, be practicable in the absence\nof such dynastic States as Germany and Japan; whereas it has no chance\nin the presence of these enterprising national establishments.\n\nNo one will be readier or more voluble in exclaiming against the falsity\nof such a discrimination as is here attempted, between the democratic\nand the dynastic nations of the modern world, than the spokesmen of\nthese dynastic Powers. No one is more outspoken in professions of\nuniversal peace and catholic amity than these same spokesmen of the\ndynastic Powers; and nowhere is there more urgent need of such\nprofessions. Official and \"inspired\" professions are, of course, to be\noverlooked; at least, so charity would dictate. But there have, in the\nhistoric present, been many professions of this character made also by\ncredible spokesmen of the German, and perhaps of the Japanese, people,\nand in all sincerity. By way of parenthesis it should be said that this\nis not intended to apply to expressions of conviction and intention that\nhave come out of Germany these two years past (December 1916). Without\nquestioning the credibility of these witnesses that have borne witness\nto the pacific and genial quality of national sentiment in the German\npeople, it will yet be in place to recall the run of facts in the\nnational life of Germany in this historical present and the position of\nthese spokesmen in the German community.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe German nation is of a peculiar composition in respect of its social\nstructure. So far as bears on the question in hand, it is made up of\nthree distinctive constituent factors, or perhaps rather categories or\nconditions of men. The populace is of course the main category, and in\nthe last resort always the main and decisive factor. Next in point of\nconsequence as well as of numbers and initiative is the personnel of the\ncontrol,--the ruling class, the administration, the official community,\nthe hierarchy of civil and political servants, or whatever designation\nmay best suit; the category comprises that pyramidal superstructure of\nprivilege and control whereof the sovereign is the apex, and in whom,\nunder any dynastic rule, is in effect vested the usufruct of the\npopulace. These two classes or conditions of men, the one of which\norders and the other obeys, make up the working structure of the nation,\nand they also between them embody the national life and carry forward\nthe national work and aim. Intermediate between them, or rather beside\nthem and overlapping the commissure, is a third category whose life\narticulates loosely with both the others at the same time that it still\nruns along in a semi-detached way. This slighter but more visible, and\nparticularly more audible, category is made up of the \"Intellectuals,\"\nas a late, and perhaps vulgar, designation would name them.\n\nThese are they who chiefly communicate with the world outside, and at\nthe same time they do what is academically called thinking. They are in\nintellectual contact and communication with the world at large, in a\ncontact of give and take, and they think and talk in and about those\nconcepts that go in under the caption of the humanities in the world at\nlarge. The category is large enough to constitute an intellectual\ncommunity, indeed a community of somewhat formidable magnitude, taken in\nabsolute terms, although in percentages of the population at large their\nnumbers will foot up to only an inconsiderable figure. Their contact\nwith the superior class spoken of above is fairly close, being a\ncontact, in the main, of service on the one side and of control on the\nother. With the populace their contact and communion is relatively\nslight, the give and take in the case being neither intimate nor\nfar-reaching. More particularly is there a well-kept limit of moderation\non any work of indoctrination or intellectual guidance which this class\nmay carry down among the people at large, dictated and enforced by\ndynastic expediency. This category, of the Intellectuals, is\nsufficiently large to live its own life within itself, without drawing\non the spiritual life of the community at large, and of sufficiently\nsubstantial quality to carry its own peculiar scheme of intellectual\nconventions and verities. Of the great and highly meritorious place and\nwork of these Intellectuals in the scheme of German culture it is\nneedless to speak. What is to the point is that they are the accredited\nspokesmen of the German nation in all its commonplace communication with\nthe rest of civilised Europe.\n\nThe Intellectuals have spoken with conviction and sincerity of the\nspiritual state of the German people, but in so doing, and in so far as\nbears on the character of German nationalism, they have been in closer\ncontact, intellectually and sympathetically, with the intellectual and\nspiritual life of civilised Europe at large than with the movements of\nthe spirit among the German populace. And their canvassing of the\nconcepts which so have come under their attention from over the national\nfrontiers has been carried forward--so far, again, as bears on the\nquestions that are here in point--with the German-dynastic principles,\nlogic and mechanism of execution under their immediate observation and\nsupplying the concrete materials for inquiry. Indeed, it holds true, by\nand large, that nothing else than this German-dynastic complement of\nways and means has, or can effectually, come under their observation in\nsuch a degree of intimacy as to give body and definition to the somewhat\nabstract theorems on cultural aims and national preconceptions that have\ncome to them from outside. In short, they have borrowed these\ntheoretical formulations from abroad, without the concrete apparatus of\nways and means in which these theorems are embodied in their foreign\nhabitat, and have so found themselves construing these theoretical\nborrowings in the only concrete terms of which they have had first-hand\nand convincing knowledge. Such an outcome would be fairly unavoidable,\ninasmuch as these Intellectuals, however much they are, in the spirit,\ncitizens of the cosmopolitan republic of knowledge and intelligence,\nthey are after all, _in propria persona_, immediately and unremittingly\nsubjects of the German-dynastic State; so that all their detail thinking\non the aims, ways and means of life, in all its civil and political\nbearings, is unavoidably shaped by the unremitting discipline of their\nworkday experience under this dynastic scheme. The outcome has been that\nwhile they have taken up, as they have understood them, the concepts\nthat rule the civic life of these other, maturer nations, they have\napprehended and developed these theorems of civic life in the terms and\nby the logic enforced in that system of control and surveillance known\nto them by workday experience,--the only empirical terms at hand.\n\nThe apex of growth and the center of diffusion as regards the modern\nculture in respect of the ideals and logic of civic life--other phases\nof this culture than this its civil aspect do not concern the point here\nin question--this apex of growth and center of diffusion lie outside the\nFatherland, in an environment alien to the German institutional scheme.\nYet so intrinsic to the cultural drift of modern mankind are these aims\nand this logic, that in taking over and further enriching the\nintellectual heritage of this modern world the Intellectuals of the\nFatherland have unavoidably also taken over those conceptions of civil\ninitiative and masterless self-direction that rule the logic of life in\na commonwealth of ungraded men. They have taken these over and\nassimilated them as best their experience would permit. But workday\nexperience and its exigencies are stubborn things; and in this process\nof assimilation of these alien conceptions of right and honest living,\nit is the borrowed theorems concerning civic rights and duties that have\nundergone adaptation and revision, not the concrete system of ways and\nmeans in which these principles, so accepted, are to be put in practice.\nNecessarily so, since in the German scheme of law and order the major\npremise is the dynastic State, whereas the major premise of the modern\ncivilised scheme of civic life is the absence of such an organ. So, the\ndevelopment and elaboration of these modern principles of civic\nliberty--and this elaboration has taken on formidable dimensions--under\nthe hand of the German Intellectuals has uniformly run out into\nPickwickian convolutions, greatly suggestive of a lost soul seeking a\nplace to rest. With unquestionably serious purpose and untiring\nendeavour, they have sought to embody these modern civilised\npreconceptions in terms afforded by, or in terms compatible with, the\ninstitutions of the Fatherland; and they have been much concerned and\nmagniloquently elated about the German spirit of freedom that so was to\nbe brought to final and consummate realisation in the life of a free\npeople. But at no point and in no case have either the proposals or\ntheir carrying out taken shape as a concrete application of the familiar\nprinciple of popular self-direction. It has always come to something in\nthe way of a concessive or expedient mitigation of the antagonistic\nprinciple of personal authority. Where the forms of self-government or\nof individual self-direction have concessively been installed, under the\nImperial rule, they have turned out to be an imitative structure with\nsome shrewd provision for their coercion or inhibition at the discretion\nof an irresponsible authority.\n\nNeither the sound intelligence nor the good faith of these Intellectuals\nof the Fatherland is to be impugned. That the--necessarily vague and\ncircumlocutory--expositions of civic institutions and popular liberty\nwhich they have so often and so largely promulgated should have been\nused as a serviceable blind of dynastic statecraft is not to be set down\nto their discredit. Circumstances over which they could have no control,\nsince they were circumstances that shaped their own habits of thought,\nhave placed it beyond their competence to apprehend or to formulate\nthese alien principles (habits of thought) concretely in those alien\ninstitutional details and by the alien logic with which they could have\nno working acquaintance.\n\nTo one and another this conception of cultural solidarity within the\nnation, and consequent cultural aliency between nations, due to the\ndifferent habits of life and of thought enforced by the two diverse\ninstitutional systems, may be so far unfamiliar as to carry no\nconviction. It may accordingly not seem out of place to recall that the\ninstitutional system of any given community, particularly for any\ncommunity living under a home-bred and time-tried system of its own,\nwill necessarily be a balanced system of interdependent and mutually\nconcordant parts working together in one comprehensive plan of law and\norder. Through such an institutional system, as, e.g., the German\nImperial organisation, there will run a degree of logical consistency,\nconsonant with itself throughout, and exerting a consistent discipline\nthroughout the community; whereby there is enforced a consistent drift\nor bent in the prevalent habits of life, and a correlative bent in the\nresulting habits of thought prevalent in the community. It is, in fact,\nthis possession of a common scheme of use and wont, and a consequent\ncommon outlook and manner of thinking, that constitutes the most\nintrinsic bond of solidarity in any nationality, and that finally marks\nit off from any other.\n\nIt is equally a matter of course that any other given community, living\nunder the rule of a substantially different, or divergent, system of\ninstitutions, will be exposed to a course of workday discipline running\nto a different, perhaps divergent, effect; and that this other community\nwill accordingly come in for a characteristically different discipline\nand fall under the rule of a different commonsense outlook. Where an\ninstitutional difference of this kind is somewhat large and consistent,\nso as to amount in effect to a discrepancy, as may fairly be said of the\ndifference between Imperial Germany and its like on the one hand, and\nthe English-speaking nations on the other hand, there the difference in\neveryday conceptions may readily make the two peoples mutually\nunintelligible to one another, on those points of institutional\nprinciple that are involved in the discrepancy. This is the state of the\ncase as between the German people, including the Intellectuals, and the\npeoples against whom their preconceptions of national destiny have\narrayed them. And the many vivid expressions of consternation,\nabhorrence and incredulity that have come out of this community of\nIntellectuals in the course of the past two years of trial and error,\nbear sufficient testimony to the rigorous constraint which these German\npreconceptions and their logic exercise over the Intellectuals, no less\nthan over the populace.\n\nConversely, of course, it is nearly as impracticable for those who have\ngrown up under the discipline of democratic institutions to comprehend\nthe habitual outlook of the commonplace German patriot on national\ninterests and aims; not quite, perhaps, because the discipline of use\nand wont and indoctrination is neither so rigorous nor so consistent in\ntheir case. But there is, after all, prevalent among them a sufficiently\nevident logical inability to understand and appreciate the paramount\nneed of national, that is to say dynastic, ascendancy that actuates all\nGerman patriots; just as these same patriots are similarly unable to\nconsider national interests in any other light than that of dynastic\nascendancy.\n\nGoing simply on the face value of the available evidence, any outsider\nmight easily fall into the error of believing that when the great\nadventure of the war opened up before them, as well as when presently\nthe shock of baffled endeavour brought home its exasperating futility,\nthe Intellectuals of the Fatherland distinguished themselves above all\nother classes and conditions of men in the exuberance of their patriotic\nabandon. Such a view would doubtless be almost wholly erroneous. It is\nnot that the Intellectuals reached a substantially superior pitch of\nexaltation, but only that, being trained in the use of language, they\nwere able to express their emotions with great facility. There seems no\nreason to believe that the populace fell short of the same measure in\nrespect of their prevalent frame of mind.\n\nTo return to the workings of the Imperial dynastic State and the forces\nengaged. It plainly appears that the Intellectuals are to be counted as\nsupernumeraries, except so far as they serve as an instrument of\npublicity and indoctrination in the hands of the discretionary\nauthorities. The working factors in the case are the dynastic\norganisation of control, direction and emolument, and the populace at\nlarge by use of whose substance the traffic in dynastic ascendancy and\nemolument is carried on. These two are in fairly good accord, on the\nancient basis of feudal loyalty. Hitherto there is no evident ground for\nbelieving that this archaic tie that binds the populace to the dynastic\nambitions has at all perceptibly weakened. And the possibility of\ndynastic Germany living at peace with the world under any compact,\ntherefore translates itself into the possibility of the German people's\nunlearning its habitual deference and loyalty to the dynasty.\n\nAs its acquirement has been a work of protracted habituation, so can its\nobsolescence also come about only through more or less protracted\nhabituation under a system of use and wont of a different or divergent\norder. The elements of such a systematic discipline running to an effect\nat cross purposes with this patriotic animus are not absent from the\ncurrent situation in the Fatherland; the discipline of the modern\nindustrial system, for instance, runs to such a divergent effect; but\nthis, and other conceivable forces which may reenforce it, will after\nall take time, if they are to work a decisive change in the current\nframe of mind of the patriotic German community. During the interval\nrequired for such a change in the national temper, the peace of the\nworld would be conditioned on the inability of the dynastic State to\nbreak it. So that the chances of success for any neutral peace league\nwill vary inversely as the available force of Imperial Germany, and it\ncould be accounted secure only in the virtual elimination of the\nImperial State as a national Power.\n\nIf the gradual obsolescence of the spirit of militant loyalty in the\nGerman people, through disuse under a regime of peace, industry, self\ngovernment and free trade, is to be the agency by force of which\ndynastic imperialism is to cease, the chance of a neutral peace will\ndepend on the thoroughness with which such a regime of self-direction\ncan be installed in this case, and on the space of time required for\nsuch obsolescence through disuse. Obviously, the installation of a\nworkable regime of self-government on peaceable lines would in any case\nbe a matter of great difficulty among a people whose past experience has\nso singularly incapacitated them for self-government; and obviously,\ntoo, the interval of time required to reach secure ground along this\nline of approach would be very considerable. Also, in view of these\nconditions, obviously, this scheme for maintaining the peace of nations\nby a compact of neutrals based on a compromise with an aspiring dynastic\nState resolves itself into the second of the two alternatives spoken of\nat the outset, viz., a neutral peace based on the elimination of Germany\nas a war power, together with the elimination of any materials suitable\nfor the formation of a formidable coalition. And then, with Imperial\nGermany supposedly eliminated or pacified, there would still remain the\nJapanese establishment, to which all the arguments pertinent in the case\nof Germany will apply without abatement; except that, at least hitherto,\nthe dynastic statesmen of Japan have not had the disposal of so massive\na body of resources, in population, industry, or raw materials.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nPEACE WITHOUT HONOUR\n\n\nThe argument therefore turns back to a choice between the two\nalternatives alluded to: peace in submission to the rule of the German\ndynastic establishment (and to Japan), or peace through elimination of\nthese enterprising Powers. The former alternative, no doubt, is\nsufficiently unattractive, but it is not therefore to be put aside\nwithout a hearing. As goes without saying, it is repugnant to the\npatriotic sentiments of those peoples whom the Imperial German\nestablishment have elected for submission. But if this unreflecting\npatriotic revulsion can once be made amenable to reason, there is always\nsomething to be said in favor of such a plan of peaceable submission, or\nat least in extenuation of it; and if it is kept in mind that the\nulterior necessity of such submission must always remain in perspective\nas a condition precedent to a peaceful settlement, so long as one or\nboth of these enterprising Powers remains intact, it will be seen that a\nsane appraisal of the merits of such a regime of peace is by no means\nuncalled for. For neither of these two Powers is there a conclusive\nissue of endeavour short of paramount dominion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThere should also be some gain of insight and sobriety in recalling that\nthe Intellectuals of the Fatherland, who have doubtless pondered this\nmatter longer and more dispassionately than all other men, have spoken\nvery highly of the merits of such a plan of universal submission to the\nrule of this German dynastic establishment. They had, no doubt, been\nconsidering the question both long and earnestly, as to what would, in\nthe light of reason, eventually be to the best interest of those peoples\nwhose manifest destiny was eventual tutelage under the Imperial crown;\nand there need also be no doubt that in that time (two years past) they\ntherefore spoke advisedly and out of the fulness of the heart on this\nhead. The pronouncements that came out of the community of Intellectuals\nin that season of unembarrassed elation and artless avowal are doubtless\nto be taken as an outcome of much thoughtful canvassing of what had best\nbe done, not as an enforced compromise with untoward necessities but as\nthe salutary course freely to be pursued with an eye single to the best\ngood of all concerned.\n\nIt is true, the captious have been led to speak slightingly of the many\nutterances of this tenure coming out of the community of Intellectuals,\nas, e.g., the lay sermons of Professor Ostwald dating back to that\nseason; but no unprejudiced reader can well escape the persuasion that\nthese, as well as the very considerable volume of similar pronouncements\nby many other men of eminent scholarship and notable for benevolent\nsentiments, are faithfully to be accepted as the expressions of a\nprofound conviction and a consciously generous spirit. In so speaking of\nthe advantages to be derived by any subject people from submission to\nthe German Imperial rule, these Intellectuals are not to be construed as\nformulating the drift of vulgar patriotic sentiment among their\ncompatriots at large, but rather as giving out the deliverances of their\nown more sensitive spirit and maturer deliberation, as men who are in a\nposition to see human affairs and interests in a larger perspective.\nSuch, no doubt, would be their own sense of the matter.\n\nReflection on the analogous case of the tutelage exercised by the\nAmerican government over the subject Philippinos may contribute to a\njust and temperate view of what is intended in the regime of tutelage\nand submission so spoken for by the German Intellectuals,--and, it may\nbe added, found good by the Imperial statesmen. There would, of course,\nbe the difference, as against the case of the Philippinos, that whereas\nthe American government is after all answerable, in the last resort and\nin a somewhat random fashion, to a popular opinion that runs on\ndemocratic preconceptions, the German Imperial establishment on the\nother hand is answerable to no one, except it be to God, who is\nconceived to stand in somewhat the relation of a silent partner, or a\nminority stockholder in this dynastic enterprise.\n\nYet it should not be overlooked that any presumptive hard usage which\nthe vassal peoples might look for at the hands of the German dynasty\nwould necessarily be tempered with considerations of expediency as\ndictated by the exigencies of usufruct. The Imperial establishment has\nshown itself to be wise, indeed more wise than amiable, but wise at\nleast in its intentions, in the use which it has made of subject peoples\nhitherto. It is true, a somewhat accentuated eagerness on the part of\nthe Imperial establishment to get the maximum service in a minimum of\ntime and at a minimum cost from these subject populations,--as, e.g., in\nSilesia and Poland, in Schleswig-Holstein, in Alsace-Lorraine, or in its\nAfrican and Oceanic possessions,--has at times led to practices\naltogether dubious on humanitarian grounds, at the same time that in\npoint of thrifty management they have gone beyond \"what the traffic will\nbear.\" Yet it is not to be overlooked--and in this connection it is a\npoint of some weight--that, so far as the predatory traditions of its\nstatecraft will permit, the Imperial establishment has in all these\nmatters been guided by a singularly unreserved attention to its own\nmaterial advantage. Where its management in these premises has yielded a\nless profitable usufruct than the circumstances would reasonably admit,\nthe failure has been due to an excess of cupidity rather than the\nreverse.\n\nThe circumstantial evidence converges to the effect that the Imperial\nestablishment may confidently be counted on to manage the affairs of its\nsubject peoples with an eye single to its own material gain, and it may\nwith equal confidence be counted on that in the long run no unadvised\nexcesses will be practised. Of course, an excessive adventure in\natrocity and predation, due to such human infirmity in its agents or in\nits directorate as has been shown in various recent episodes, is to be\nlooked for now and again; but these phenomena would come in by way of\nfluctuating variations from the authentic routine, rather than as\nsystematic features of it.\n\nThat superfluity of naughtiness that has given character to the current\nGerman Imperial policy in Belgium, e.g., or that similarly has\ncharacterised the dealings of Imperial Japan in Korea during the late\n\"benevolent assimilation\" of that people into Japanese-Imperial\nusufruct, is not fairly to be taken to indicate what such an Imperial\nestablishment may be expected to do with a subject people on a footing\nof settled and long-term exploitation. At the outset, in both instances,\nthe policy of frightfulness was dictated by a well-advised view to\neconomy of effort in reducing the subject people to an abject state of\nintimidation, according to the art of war as set forth in the manuals;\nwhereas latterly the somewhat profligate excesses of the government of\noccupation--decently covered with diplomatic parables on benevolence and\nlegality--have been dictated by military convenience, particularly by\nthe need of forced labor and the desirability of a reduced population in\nthe acquired territory. So also the \"personally conducted\" dealings with\nthe Armenians by use of the Turks should probably also best be explained\nas an endeavour to reduce the numbers of an undesirable population\nbeforehand, without incurring unnecessary blame. All these things are,\nat the most, misleading indications of what the Imperial policy would be\nlike under settled conditions and in the absence of insubordination.\n\nBy way of contrast, such as may serve to bring the specific traits of\nthis prospective Imperial tutelage of nations into a better light, the\nOttoman usufruct of the peoples of the Turkish dominions offers an\ninstructive instance. The Ottoman tutelage is today spoken of by its\napologists in terms substantially identical with the sketches of the\nfuture presented by hopeful German patriots in the early months of the\ncurrent war. But as is so frequently the case in such circumstances,\nthese expressions of the officers have to be understood in a diplomatic\nsense; not as touching the facts in any other than a formal way. It is\nsufficiently evident that the Ottoman management of its usufruct has\nthroughout been ill-advised enough persistently to charge more than the\ntraffic would bear, probably due in great part to lack of control over\nits agents or ramifications, by the central office. The Ottoman\nestablishment has not observed, or enforced, the plain rules of economy\nin its utilisation of the subject peoples, and finds itself today\nbankrupt in consequence. What may afford more of a parallel to the\nprospective German tutelage of the nations is the procedure of the\nJapanese establishment in Korea, Manchuria, or China; which is also duly\ncovered with an ostensibly decent screen of diplomatic parables, but the\nnature and purpose of which is overt enough in all respects but the\nnomenclature. It is not unlikely that even this Japanese usufruct and\ntutelage runs on somewhat less humane and complaisant lines than a\nwell-advised economy of resources would dictate for the prospective\nGerman usufruct of the Western nations.\n\nThere is the essential difference between the two cases that while Japan\nis over-populated, so that it becomes the part of a wise government to\nfind additional lands for occupancy, and that so it is constrained by its\nimperial ambitions to displace much of the population in its subject\nterritories, the Fatherland on the other hand is under-populated--\nnotoriously, though not according to the letter of the diplomatic\nparables on this head--and for the calculable future must continue to be\nunder-populated; provided that the state of the industrial arts\ncontinues subject to change in the same general direction as hitherto,\nand provided that no radical change affects the German birth-rate. So,\nsince the Imperial government has no need of new lands for occupancy by\nits home population, it will presumably be under no inducement to take\nmeasures looking to the partial depopulation of its subject territories.\n\nThe case of Belgium and the measures looking to a reduction of its\npopulation may raise a doubt, but probably not a well taken doubt. It is\nrather that since it has become evident that the territory can not be\nheld, it is thought desirable to enrich the Fatherland with whatever\nproperty can be removed, and to consume the accumulated man-power of the\nBelgian people in the service of the war. It would appear that it is a\nwar-measure, designed to make use of the enemy's resources for his\ndefeat. Indeed, under conditions of settled occupation or subjection,\nany degree of such depopulation would entail an economic loss, and any\nwell-considered administrative policy would therefore look to the\nmaintenance of the inhabitants of the acquired territories in\nundiminished numbers and unimpaired serviceability.\n\nThe resulting scheme of Imperial usufruct should accordingly be of a\nconsiderate, not to say in effect humane, character,--always provided\nthat the requisite degree of submission and subservience (\"law and\norder\") can be enforced by a system of coercion so humane as not to\nreduce the number of the inhabitants or materially to lower their\nphysical powers. Such would, by reasonable expectation, be the character\nof this projected Imperial tutelage and usufruct of the nations of\nChristendom. In its working-out this German project should accordingly\ndiffer very appreciably from the policy which its imperial ambitions\nhave constrained the Japanese establishment to pursue in its dealings\nwith the life and fortunes of its recently, and currently, acquired\nsubject peoples.\n\nThe better to appreciate in some concrete fashion what should, by\nreasonable expectation, be the terms on which life might so be carried\non _sub pace germanica_, attention may be invited to certain typical\ninstances of such peace by abnegation among contemporary peoples.\nPerhaps at the top of the list stands India, with its many and varied\nnative peoples, subject to British tutelage, but, the British apologists\nsay, not subject to British usufruct. The margin of tolerance in this\ninstance is fairly wide, but its limits are sharply drawn. India is\nwanted and held, not for tribute or revenue to be paid into the Imperial\ntreasury, nor even for exclusive trade privileges or preferences, but\nmainly as a preserve to provide official occupation and emoluments for\nBritish gentlemen not otherwise occupied or provided for; and\nsecondarily as a means of safeguarding lucrative British investments,\nthat is to say, investments by British capitalists of high and low\ndegree. The current British professions on the subject of this\noccupation of India, and at times the shamefaced apology for it, is that\nthe people of India suffer no hardship by this means; the resulting\ngovernmental establishment being no more onerous and no more expensive\nto them than any equally, or even any less, competent government of\ntheir own would necessarily be. The fact, however, remains, that India\naffords a much needed and very considerable net revenue to the class of\nBritish gentlemen, in the shape of official salaries and pensions, which\nthe British gentry at large can on no account forego. Narrowed to these\nproportions it is readily conceivable that the British usufruct of India\nshould rest with no extraordinary weight on the Indian people at large,\nhowever burdensome it may at times become to those classes who aspire to\ntake over the usufruct in case the British establishment can be\ndislodged. This case evidently differs very appreciably from the\nprojected German usufruct of neighboring countries in Europe.\n\nA case that may be more nearly in point would be that of any one of the\ncountries subject to the Turkish rule in recent times; although these\ninstances scarcely show just what to expect under the projected German\nregime. The Turkish rule has been notably inefficient, considered as a\nworking system of dynastic usufruct; whereas it is confidently expected\nthat the corresponding German system would show quite an exceptional\ndegree of efficiency for the purpose. This Turkish inefficiency has had\na two-fold effect, which should not appear in the German case. Through\nadministrative abuses intended to serve the personal advantage of the\nirresponsible officials, the underlying peoples have suffered a\nprogressive exhaustion and dilapidation; whereby the central authority,\nthe dynastic establishment, has also grown progressively, cumulatively\nweaker and therefore less able to control its agents; and, in the second\nplace, on the same grounds, in the pursuit of personal gain, and\nprompted by personal animosities, these irresponsible agents have\npersistently carried their measures of extortion beyond reasonable\nbounds,--that is to say beyond the bounds which a well considered plan\nof permanent usufruct would countenance. All this would be otherwise and\nmore sensibly arranged under German Imperial auspices.\n\nOne of the nations that have fallen under Turkish rule--and Turkish\npeace--affords a valuable illustration of a secondary point that is to\nbe considered in connection with any plan of peace by submission. The\nArmenian people have in later time come partly under Russian dominion,\nand so have been exposed to the Russian system of bureaucratic\nexploitation; and the difference between Russian and Turkish Armenia is\ninstructive. According to all credible--that is unofficial--accounts,\nconditions are perceptibly more tolerable in Russian Armenia. Well\ninformed persons relate that the cause for this more lenient, or less\nextreme, administration of affairs under Russian officials is a\nselective death rate among them, such that a local official who\npersistently exceeds a certain ill-defined limit of tolerance is removed\nby what would under other circumstances be called an untimely death. No\nadequate remedy has been found, within the large limits which Russian\nbureaucratic administration habitually allows itself in questions of\ncoercion. The Turk, on the other hand, less deterred by considerations\nof long-term expediency, and, it may be, less easily influenced by\noutside opinion on any point of humanity, has found a remedy in the\nsystematic extirpation of any village in which an illicit death occurs.\nOne will incline to presume that on this head the German Imperial\nprocedure would be more after the Russian than after the Turkish\npattern; although latterday circumstantial evidence will throw some\nsinister doubt on the reasonableness of such an expectation.\n\nIt is plain, however, that the Turkish remedy for this form of\ninsubordination is a wasteful means of keeping the peace. Plainly, to\nthe home office, the High Command, the extinction of a village with its\npopulation is a more substantial loss than the unseasonable decease of\none of its administrative agents; particularly when it is called to mind\nthat such a decease will presumably follow only on such profligate\nexcesses of naughtiness as are bound to be inexcusably unprofitable to\nthe central authority. It may be left an open question how far a\ncorrective of this nature can hopefully be looked to as applicable, in\ncase of need, under the projected German Imperial usufruct.\n\nIt may, I apprehend, be said without offense that there is no depth of\ndepravity below the ordinary reach of the Russian bureaucracy; but this\norganisation finds itself constrained, after all, to use circumspection\nand set some limits on individual excursions beyond the bounds of\ndecency and humanity, so soon as these excesses touch the common or\njoint interest of the organisation. Any excess of atrocity, beyond a\ncertain margin of tolerance, on the part of any one of its members is\nlikely to work pecuniary mischief to the rest; and then, the\nbureaucratic conduct of affairs is also, after all, in an uncertain\ndegree subject to some surveillance by popular sentiment at home or\nabroad. The like appears not to hold true of the Turkish official\norganisation. The difference may be due to a less provident spirit among\nthe latter, as already indicated. But a different tradition, perhaps an\noutgrowth of this lack of providence and of the consequent growth of a\npolicy of \"frightfulness,\" may also come in for a share in the outcome;\nand there is also a characteristic difference in point of religious\nconvictions, which may go some way in the same direction. The followers\nof Islam appear on the whole to take the tenets of their faith at their\nface value--servile, intolerant and fanatic--whereas the Russian\nofficial class may perhaps without undue reproach be considered to have\non the whole outlived the superstitious conceits to which they yield an\nexpedient _pro forma_ observance. So that when worse comes to worst, and\nthe Turk finds himself at length with his back against the last\nconsolations of the faith that makes all things straight, he has the\nassured knowledge that he is in the right as against the unbelievers;\nwhereas the Russian bureaucrat in a like case only knows that he is in\nthe wrong. The last extremity is a less conclusive argument to the man\nin whose apprehension it is not the last extremity. Again, there is some\nshadow of doubt falls on the question as to which of these is more\nnearly in the German Imperial spirit.\n\nOn the whole, the case of China is more to the point. By and large, the\npeople of China, more particularly the people of the coastal-plains\nregion, have for long habitually lived under a regime of peace by\nnon-resistance. The peace has been broken transiently from time to time,\nand local disturbances have not been infrequent; but, taken by and\nlarge, the situation has habitually been of the peaceful order, on a\nground of non-resisting submission. But this submission has not commonly\nbeen of a whole-hearted kind, and it has also commonly been associated\nwith a degree of persistent sabotage; which has clogged and retarded the\nadministration of governmental law and order, and has also been\nconducive to a large measure of irresponsible official corruption. The\nhabitual scheme of things Chinese in this bearing may fairly be\ndescribed as a peace of non-resistance tempered with sabotage and\nassassination. Such was the late Manchu regime, and there is no reason\nin China for expecting a substantially different outcome from the\nJapanese invasion that is now under way. The nature of this Japanese\nincursion should be sufficiently plain. It is an enterprise in\nstatecraft after the order of Macchiavelli, Metternich, and Bismarck. Of\ncourse, the conciliatory fables given out by the diplomatic service, and\nby the other apologists, are to be taken at the normal discount of\none-hundred percent. The relatively large current output of such fables\nmay afford a hint as to the magnitude of the designs which the fables\nare intended to cover.\n\nThe Chinese people have had a more extended experience in peace of this\norder than all others, and their case should accordingly be instructive\nbeyond all others. Not that a European peace by non-resistance need be\nexpected to run very closely on the Chinese lines, but there should be\na reasonable expectation that the large course of things would be\nsomewhat on the same order in both cases. Neither the European\ntraditions and habitual temperament nor the modern state of the\nindustrial arts will permit one to look for anything like a close\nparallel in detail; but it remains true, when all is said, that the\nChinese experience of peace under submission to alien masters affords\nthe most instructive illustration of such a regime, as touches its\npracticability, its methods, its cultural value, and its effect on the\nfortunes of the subject peoples and of their masters.\n\nNow, it may be said by way of preliminary generalisation that the\nlife-history of the Chinese people and their culture is altogether the\nmost imposing achievement which the records of mankind have to show;\nwhereas the history of their successive alien establishments of mastery\nand usufruct is an unbroken sequence of incredibly shameful\nepisodes,--always beginning in unbounded power and vainglory, running by\nway of misrule, waste and debauchery, to an inglorious finish in abject\ncorruption and imbecility. Always have the gains in civilisation,\nindustry and in the arts, been made by the subject Chinese, and always\nhave their alien masters contributed nothing to the outcome but misrule,\nwaste, corruption and decay. And yet in the long run, with all this\nhandicap and misrule, the Chinese people have held their place and made\nheadway in those things to which men look with affection and esteem when\nthey come to take stock of what things are worth while. It would be a\nhopeless task to count up how many dynasties of masterful barbarians,\nhere and there, have meanwhile come up and played their ephemeral role\nof vainglorious nuisance and gone under in shame and confusion, and\ndismissed with the invariable verdict of \"Good Riddance!\"\n\nIt may at first sight seem a singular conjuncture of circumstances, but\nit is doubtless a consequence of the same conjuncture, that the Chinese\npeople have also kept their hold through all history on the Chinese\nlands. They have lived and multiplied and continued to occupy the land,\nwhile their successive alien masters have come and gone. So that today,\nas the outcome of conquest, and of what would be rated as defeat, the\npeople continue to be Chinese, with an unbroken pedigree as well as an\nunbroken line of home-bred culture running through all the ages of\nhistory. In the biological respect the Chinese plan of non-resistance\nhas proved eminently successful.\n\nAnd, by the way, much the same, though not in the same degree, is true\nfor the Armenian people; who have continued to hold their hill country\nthrough good days and evil, apparently without serious or enduring\nreduction of their numbers and without visible lapse into barbarism,\nwhile the successive disconnected dynasties of their conquering rulers\nhave come and gone, leaving nothing but an ill name. \"This fable\nteaches\" that a diligent attention to the growing of crops and children\nis the sure and appointed way to the maintenance of a people and its\nculture even under the most adverse conditions, and that eventual death\nand shameful destruction inexorably wait on any \"ruling race.\" Hitherto\nthe rule has not failed. The rule, indeed, is grounded in the heritable\ntraits of human nature, from which there is no escape.\n\nFor its long-term biological success, as well as for the continued\nintegrity of a people's culture, a peace of non-resistance, under good\nor evil auspices, is more to be desired than imperial dominion. But\nthese things are not all that modern peoples live for, perhaps it is\nsafe to say that in no case are these chief among the things for which\ncivilised Europeans are willing to live. They urgently need also freedom\nto live their own life in their own way, or rather to live within the\nbonds of convention which they have come in for by use and wont, or at\nleast they believe that such freedom is essential to any life that shall\nbe quite worth while. So also they have a felt need of security from\narbitrary interference in their pursuit of a livelihood and in the free\ncontrol of their own pecuniary concerns. And they want a discretionary\nvoice in the management of their joint interests, whether as a nation or\nin a minor civil group. In short, they want personal, pecuniary and\npolitical liberty, free from all direction or inhibition from without.\nThey are also much concerned to maintain favorable economic conditions\nfor themselves and their children. And last, but chiefly rather than\nleast, they commonly are hide-bound patriots inspired with an\nintractable felt need of national prestige.\n\nIt is an assemblage of peoples in such a frame of mind to whom the\npacifists are proposing, in effect, a plan for eventual submission to an\nalien dynasty, under the form of a neutral peace compact to include the\nwarlike Powers. There is little likelihood of such a scheme being found\nacceptable, with popular sentiment running as it now does in the\ncountries concerned. And yet, if the brittle temper in which any such\nproposal is rejected by popular opinion in these countries today could\nbe made to yield sufficiently to reflection and deliberate appraisal, it\nis by no means a foregone conclusion that its acceptance would not be\nthe best way out of a critical situation. The cost of disabling and\neliminating the warlike Power whose dominion is feared, or even of\nstaving off the day of surrender, is evidently serious enough. The\nmerits of the alternative should be open to argument, and should,\nindeed, be allowed due consideration. And any endeavour to present them\nwithout heat should presumably find a hearing. It appears to have been\nmuch of the fault of the pacifists who speak for the Peace League that\nthey have failed or refused to recognise these ulterior consequences of\nthe plan which they advocate; so that they appear either not to know\nwhat they are talking about, or to avoid talking about what they know.\n\nIt will be evident from beforehand that the grave difficulty to be met\nin any advocacy of peace on terms of non-resistant subjection to an\nalien dynastic rule--\"peace at any price\"--is a difficulty of the\npsychological order. Whatever may be conceived to hold true for the\nChinese people, such submission is repugnant to the sentiments of the\nWestern peoples. Which in turn evidently is due to the prevalence of\ncertain habitual preconceptions among modern civilised men,--certain\nacquired traits of temper and bias, of the nature of fixed ideas. That\nsomething in the way of a reasonably contented and useful life is\npossible under such a regime as is held in prospect, and even some\ntolerable degree of well-being, is made evident in the Chinese case. But\nthe Chinese tolerance of such a regime goes to argue that they are\ncharged with fewer preconceptions at variance with the exigencies of\nlife under these conditions. So, it is commonly accepted, and presumably\nto be accepted, that the Chinese people at large have little if any\neffectual sense of nationality; their patriotism appears to be nearly a\nnegligible quantity. This would appear to an outsider to have been their\nbesetting weakness, to which their successful subjection by various and\nsundry ambitious aliens has been due. But it appears also to have been\nthe infirmity by grace of which this people have been obliged to learn\nthe ways of submission, and so have had the fortune to outlive their\nalien masters, all and sundry, and to occupy the land and save the\nuncontaminated integrity of their long-lived civilisation.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSome account of the nature and uses of this spirit of patriotism that is\nheld of so great account among Western nations has already been set out\nin an earlier passage. One or two points in the case, that bear on the\nargument here, may profitably be recalled. The patriotic spirit, or the\ntie of nationalism, is evidently of the nature of habit, whatever\nproclivity to the formation of such a habit may be native to mankind.\nMore particularly is it a matter of habit--it might even be called a\nmatter of fortuitous habit--what particular national establishment a\ngiven human subject will become attached to on reaching what is called\n\"years of discretion\" and so becoming a patriotic citizen.\n\nThe analogy of the clam may not be convincing, but it may at least serve\nto suggest what may be the share played by habituation in the matter of\nnational attachment. The young clam, after having passed the\nfree-swimming phase of his life, as well as the period of attachment to\nthe person of a carp or similar fish, drops to the bottom and attaches\nhimself loosely in the place and station in life to which he has been\nled; and he loyally sticks to his particular patch of ooze and sand\nthrough good fortune and evil. It is, under Providence, something of a\nfortuitous matter where the given clam shall find a resting place for\nthe sole of his foot, but it is also, after all, \"his own, his native\nland\" etc. It lies in the nature of a clam to attach himself after this\nfashion, loosely, to the bottom where he finds a living, and he would\nnot be a \"good clam and true\" if he failed to do so; but the particular\nspot for which he forms this attachment is not of the essence of the\ncase. At least, so they say.\n\nIt may be, as good men appear to believe or know, that all men of sound,\nor at least those of average, mind will necessarily be of a patriotic\ntemper and be attached by ties of loyalty to some particular national\nestablishment, ordinarily the particular establishment which is formally\nidentified with the land in which they live; although it is always\npossible that a given individual may be an alien in the land, and so may\nowe allegiance to and be ruled by a patriotic attachment to another\nnational establishment, to which the conventionalities governing his\nspecial case have assigned him as his own proper nation. The analogy of\nthe clam evidently does not cover the case. The patriotic citizen is\nattached to his own proper nationality not altogether by the accident of\ndomicile, but rather by the conventions, legal or customary, which\nassign him to this or that national establishment according to certain\nprinciples of use and wont.\n\nMere legal citizenship or allegiance does not decide the matter either;\nat least not by any means unavoidably; as appears in the case of the\nChinese subject under Manchu or Japanese rule; and as appears perhaps\nmore perspicuously in the case of the \"hyphenate\" American citizen,\nwhose formal allegiance is to the nation in whose land he prefers to\nlive, all the while that his patriotic affection centers on his\nspiritual Fatherland in whose fortunes he has none but a non-resident\ninterest. Indeed, the particular national tie that will bind the\naffections--that is to say the effectual patriotic attachment--of any\ngiven individual may turn out on closer scrutiny to be neither that of\ndomicile or of formal legal allegiance, nor that of putative origin or\npedigree, but only a reflex of certain national animosities; which may\nalso turn out on examination to rest on putative grounds--as illustrated\nby a subsidiary class of hyphenate American citizens whose affections\nhave come to be bound up in the national fortunes of one foreign Power\nfor the simple, but sufficient, reason that, on conventional grounds,\nthey bear malice against another equally foreign Power.\n\nEvidently there is much sophistication, not to say conventionalised\naffectation, in all this national attachment and allegiance. It will\nperhaps not do to say that it is altogether a matter of sophistication.\nYet it may not exceed the premises to say that the particular choice,\nthe concrete incidence, of this national attachment is in any given case\na matter of sophistication, largely tempered with fortuity. One is born\ninto a given nationality--or, in case of dynastic allegiance, into\nservice and devotion to a (fortuitously) given sovereign--or at least so\nit is commonly believed. Still one can without blame, and without\nexcessive shame, shift one's allegiance on occasion. What is not\ncountenanced among civilised men is to shift out of allegiance to any\ngiven nationality or dynasty without shifting into the like complication\nof gainless obligations somewhere else. Such a shifting of national or\ndynastic base is not quite reputable, though it is also not precisely\ndisreputable. The difficulty in the case appears to be a moral\ndifficulty, not a mental or a pecuniary one, and assuredly not a\nphysical difficulty, since the relation in question is not a physical\nrelation. It would appear to be of the moral order of things, in that\nsense of the term in which conventional proprieties are spoken of as\nmoral. That is to say, it is a question of conforming to current\nexpectations under a code of conventional proprieties. Like much of the\nconventional code of behavior this patriotic attachment has the benefit\nof standardised decorum, and its outward manifestations are enjoined by\nlaw. All of which goes to show how very seriously the whole matter is\nregarded.\n\nAnd yet it is also a matter of common notoriety that large aggregates of\nmen, not to speak of sporadic individuals, will on occasion shift their\nallegiance with the most felicitous effect and with no sensible loss of\nself-respect or of their good name. Such a shift is to be seen in\nmultiple in the German nation within the past half-century, when, for\ninstance, the Hanoverians, the Saxons, and even the Holsteiners in very\nappreciable numbers, not to mention the subjects of minuscular\nprincipalities whose names have been forgotten in the shuffle, all\nbecame good and loyal subjects of the Empire and of the Imperial\ndynasty,--good and loyal without reservation, as has abundantly\nappeared. So likewise within a similar period the inhabitants of the\nSouthern States repudiated their allegiance to the Union, putting in its\nplace an equivalent loyalty to their new-made country; and then, when\nthe new national establishment slipped out from under their feet they\nreturned as whole-heartedly as need be to their earlier allegiance. In\neach of these moves, taken with deliberation, it is not to be doubted\nthat this body of citizens have been moved by an unimpeachable spirit of\npatriotic honour. No one who is in any degree conversant with the facts\nis likely to question the declaration that it would be a perversion, not\nto say an inversion, of fact to rate their patriotic devotion to the\nUnion today lower than that of any other section of the country or any\nother class or condition of men.\n\nBut there is more, and in a sense worse, to be found along the same\ngeneral line of evidence touching this sublimated sentiment of group\nsolidarity that is called nationalism. The nation, of course, is large;\nthe larger the better, it is believed. It is so large, indeed, that\nconsidered as a group or community of men living together it has no\nsensible degree of homogeneity in any of their material circumstances or\ninterests; nor is anything more than an inconsiderable fraction of the\naggregate population, territory, industry, or daily life known to any\none of these patriotic citizens except by remote and highly dubious\nhearsay. The one secure point on which there is a (constructive)\nuniformity is the matter of national allegiance; which grows stronger\nand more confident with every increase in aggregate mass and volume. It\nis also not doubtful, e.g., that if the people of the British Dominions\nin North America should choose to throw in their national lot with the\nUnion, all sections and classes, except those whose pecuniary interest\nin a protective tariff might be conceived to suffer, would presently\nwelcome them; nor is it doubtful that American nationality would cover\nthe new and larger aggregate as readily as the old. Much the same will\nhold true with respect to the other countries colonised under British\nauspices. And there is no conclusive reason for drawing the limit of\nadmissible national extension at that point.\n\nSo much, however, is fairly within the possibilities of the calculable\nfuture; its realisation would turn in great measure on the\ndiscontinuance of certain outworn or disserviceable institutional\narrangements; as, e.g., the remnants of a decayed monarchy, and the\nlegally protected vested interests of certain business enterprises and\nof certain office-holding classes. What more and farther might\npracticably be undertaken in this way, in the absence of marplot\noffice-holders, office-seekers, sovereigns, priests and monopolistic\nbusiness concerns sheltered under national animosities and restraints of\ntrade, would be something not easy to assign a limit to. All the minor\nneutrals, that cluster about the North Sea, could unquestionably be\ndrawn into such a composite nationality, in the absence, or with due\ndisregard, of those classes, families and individuals whose pecuniary or\ninvidious gain is dependent on or furthered by the existing division of\nthese peoples.\n\nThe projected defensive league of neutrals is, in effect, an inchoate\ncoalescence of the kind. Its purpose is the safeguarding of the common\npeace and freedom, which is also the avowed purpose and justification of\nall those modern nations that have outlived the regime of dynastic\nambition and so of enterprise in dominion for dominion's sake, and have\npassed into the neutral phase of nationality; or it should perhaps\nrather be said that such is the end of endeavour and the warrant of\nexistence and power for these modern national establishments in so far\nas they have outlived and repudiated such ambitions of a dynastic or a\nquasi-dynastic order, and so have taken their place as intrinsically\nneutral commonwealths.\n\nIt is only in the common defense (or in the defense of the like\nconditions of life for their fellowmen elsewhere) that the citizens of\nsuch a commonwealth can without shame entertain or put in evidence a\nspirit of patriotic solidarity; and it is only by specious and\nsophistical appeal to the national honour--a conceit surviving out of\nthe dynastic past--that the populace of such a commonwealth can be\nstirred to anything beyond a defense of their own proper liberties or\nthe liberties of like-minded men elsewhere, in so far as they are not\nstill imbued with something of the dynastic animus and the chauvinistic\nanimosities which they have formally repudiated in repudiating the\nfeudalistic principles of the dynastic State.\n\nThe \"nation,\" without the bond of dynastic loyalty, is after all a\nmake-shift idea, an episodic half-way station in the sequence, and\nloyalty, in any proper sense, to the nation as such is so much of a\nmake-believe, that in the absence of a common defense to be safeguarded\nany such patriotic conceit must lose popular assurance and, with the\npassing of generations, fall insensibly into abeyance as an archaic\naffectation. The pressure of danger from without is necessary to keep\nthe national spirit alert and stubborn, in case the pressure from\nwithin, that comes of dynastic usufruct working for dominion, has been\nwithdrawn. With further extension of the national boundaries, such that\nthe danger of gratuitous infraction from without grows constantly less\nmenacing, while the traditional regime of international animosities\nfalls more and more remotely into the background, the spirit of\nnationalism is fairly on the way to obsolescence through disuse. In\nother words, the nation, as a commonwealth, being a partisan\norganisation for a defensive purpose, becomes _functa officio_ in\nrespect of its nationalism and its patriotic ties in somewhat the same\nmeasure as the national coalition grows to such a size that partisanship\nis displaced by a cosmopolitan security.\n\nDoubtless the falling into abeyance through disuse of so pleasing a\nvirtue as patriotic devotion will seem an impossibly distasteful\nconsummation; and about tastes there is no disputing, but tastes are\nmainly creations of habit. Except for the disquieting name of the thing,\nthere is today little stands in the way of a cosmopolitan order of\nhuman intercourse unobtrusively displacing national allegiance; except\nfor vested interests in national offices and international\ndiscriminations, and except for those peoples among whom national life\nstill is sufficiently bound up with dynastic ambition.\n\nIn an earlier passage the patriotic spirit has been defined as a sense\nof partisan solidarity in point of prestige, and sufficient argument has\nbeen spent in confirming the definition and showing its implications.\nWith the passing of all occasion for a partisan spirit as touches the\ncommon good, through coalescence of the parts between which partisan\ndiscrepancies have hitherto been kept up, there would also have passed\nall legitimate occasion for or provocation to an intoxication of\ninvidious prestige on national lines,--and there is no prestige that is\nnot of an invidious nature, that being, indeed, the whole of its nature.\nHe would have to be a person of praeternatural patriotic sensibilities\nwho could fall into an emotional state by reason of the national\nprestige of such a coalition commonwealth as would be made up, e.g., of\nthe French and English-speaking peoples, together with those other\nneutrally and peaceably inclined European communities that are of a\nsufficiently mature order to have abjured dynastic ambitions of\ndominion, and perhaps including the Chinese people as well. Such a\ncoalition may now fairly be said to be within speaking distance, and\nwith its consummation, even in the inchoate shape of a defensive league\nof neutrals, the eventual abeyance of that national allegiance and\nnational honour that bulks so large in the repertory of current\neloquence would also come in prospect.\n\nAll this is by no means saying that love of country, and of use and wont\nas it runs in one's home area and among one's own people, would suffer\ndecay, or even abatement. The provocation to nostalgia would presumably\nbe as good as ever. It is even conceivable that under such a\n(contemplated) regime of unconditional security, attachment to one's own\nhabitat and social circumstances might grow to something more than is\ncommonly seen in the precarious situation in which the chances of a\nquiet life are placed today. But nostalgia is not a bellicose distemper,\nnor does it make for gratuitous disturbance of peaceable alien peoples;\nneither is it the spirit in which men lend themselves to warlike\nenterprise looking to profitless dominion abroad. Men make patriotic\nsacrifices of life and substance in spite of home-sickness rather than\nby virtue of it.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe aim of this long digression has been to show that patriotism, of\nthat bellicose kind that seeks satisfaction in inflicting damage and\ndiscomfort on the people of other nations, is not of the essence of\nhuman life; that it is of the nature of habit, induced by circumstances\nin the past and handed on by tradition and institutional arrangements\ninto the present; and that men can, without mutilation, divest\nthemselves of it, or perhaps rather be divested of it by force of\ncircumstances which will set the current of habituation the contrary\nway.\n\nThe change of habituation necessary to bring about such a decay of the\nbellicose national spirit would appear to be of a negative order, at\nleast in the main. It would be an habituation to unconditional peace and\nsecurity; in other words, to the absence of provocation, rather than a\ncoercive training away from the bellicose temper. This bellicose temper,\nas it affects men collectively, appears to be an acquired trait; and it\nshould logically disappear in time in the absence of those conditions by\nimpact of which it has been acquired. Such obsolescence of patriotism,\nhowever, would not therefore come about abruptly or swiftly, since the\npatriotic spirit has by past use and wont, and by past indoctrination,\nbeen so thoroughly worked into the texture of the institutional fabric\nand into the commonsense taste and morality, that its effectual\nobsolescence will involve a somewhat comprehensive displacement and\nmutation throughout the range of institutions and popular conceits that\nhave been handed down. And institutional changes take time, being\ncreations of habit. Yet, again, there is the qualification to this last,\nthat since the change in question appears to be a matter, not of\nacquiring a habit and confirming it in the shape of an article of\ngeneral use and wont, but of forgetting what once was learned, the time\nand experience to be allowed for its decay need logically not equal that\nrequired for its acquirement, either in point of duration or in point of\nthe strictness of discipline necessary to inculcate it.\n\nWhile the spirit of nationalism is such an acquired trait, and while it\nshould therefore follow that the chief agency in divesting men of it\nmust be disuse of the discipline out of which it has arisen, yet a\npositive, and even something of a drastic discipline to the contrary\neffect need not be altogether ineffectual in bringing about its\nobsolescence. The case of the Chinese people seems to argue something of\nthe sort. Not that the Chinese are simply and neutrally unpatriotic;\nthey appear also to be well charged with disloyalty to their alien\nrulers. But along with a sense of being on the defensive in their common\nconcerns, there is also the fact that they appear not to be appreciably\npatriotic in the proper sense; they are not greatly moved by a spirit\nof nationality. And this failure of the national spirit among them can\nscarcely be set down to a neutral disuse of that discipline which has on\nthe other hand induced a militant nationalism in the peoples of\nChristendom; it should seem more probable, at least, that this relative\nabsence of a national ambition is traceable in good part to its having\nbeen positively bred out of them by the stern repression of all such\naspirations under the autocratic rule of their alien masters.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPeace on terms of submission and non-resistance to the ordinary\nexactions and rulings of those Imperial authorities to whom such\nsubmission may become necessary, then, will be contingent on the virtual\nabeyance of the spirit of national pride in the peoples who so are to\ncome under Imperial rule. A sufficient, by no means necessarily a total,\nelimination or decadence of this proclivity will be the condition\nprecedent of any practicable scheme for a general peace on this footing.\nHow large an allowance of such animus these prospectively subject\npeoples might still carry, without thereby assuring the defeat of any\nsuch plan, would in great measure depend on the degree of clemency or\nrigor with which the superior authority might enforce its rule. It is\nnot that a peace plan of this nature need precisely be considered to\nfall outside the limits of possibility, on account of this necessary\ncondition, but it is at the best a manifestly doubtful matter. Advocates\nof a negotiated peace should not fail to keep in mind and make public\nthat the plan which they advocate carries with it, as a sequel or\nsecondary phase, such an unconditional surrender and a consequent regime\nof non-resistance, and that there still is grave doubt whether the\npeoples of these Western nations are at present in a sufficiently\ntolerant frame of mind, or can in the calculable future come in for such\na tolerantly neutral attitude in point of national pride, as to submit\nin any passable fashion to any alien Imperial rule.\n\nIf the spiritual difficulty presented by this prevalent spirit of\nnational pride--sufficiently stubborn still, however inane a conceit it\nmay seem on sober reflection--if this animus of factional\ninsubordination could be overcome or in some passable measure be\nconciliated or abated, there is much to be said in favor of such a plan\nof peaceable submission to an extraneous and arbitrary authority, and\ntherefore also for that plan of negotiated peace by means of which\nevents would be put in train for its realisation.\n\nAny passably dispassionate consideration of the projected regime will\ncome unavoidably to the conclusion that the prospectively subject\npeoples should have no legitimate apprehension of loss or disadvantage\nin the material respect. It is, of course, easy for an unreflecting\nperson to jump to the conclusion that subjection to an alien power must\nbring grievous burdens, in the way of taxes and similar impositions. But\nreflection will immediately show that no appreciable increase, over the\neconomic burdens already carried by the populace under their several\nnational establishments, could come of such a move.\n\nAs bearing on this question it is well to call to mind that the\ncontemplated imperial dominion is designed to be very wide-reaching and\nwith very ample powers. Its nearest historical analogue, of course, is\nthe Roman imperial dominion--in the days of the Antonines--and that the\nnearest analogue to the projected German peace is the Roman peace, in\nthe days of its best security. There is every warrant for the\npresumption that the contemplated Imperial dominion is to be\nsubstantially all-inclusive. Indeed there is no stopping place for the\nprojected enterprise short of an all-inclusive dominion. And there will\nconsequently be no really menacing outside power to be provided against.\nConsequently there will be but little provision necessary for the common\ndefense, as compared, e.g., with the aggregate of such provision found\nnecessary for self-defense on the part of the existing nations acting in\nseveralty and each jealously guarding its own national integrity.\nIndeed, compared with the burden of competitive armament to which the\npeoples of Europe have been accustomed, the need of any armed force\nunder the new regime should be an inconsiderable matter, even when there\nis added to the necessary modicum of defensive preparation the more\nimperative and weightier provision of force with which to keep the peace\nat home.\n\nInto the composition of this necessary modicum of armed force slight if\nany contingents of men would be drawn from the subject peoples, for the\nreason that no great numbers would be needed; as also because no devoted\nloyalty to the dynasty could reasonably be looked for among them, even\nif no positive insecurity were felt to be involved in their employment.\nOn this head the projected scheme unambiguously commends itself as a\nmeasure of economy, both in respect of the pecuniary burdens demanded\nand as regards the personal annoyance of military service.\n\nAs a further count, it is to be presumed that the burden of the Imperial\ngovernment and its bureaucratic administration--what would be called the\ncost of maintenance and repairs of the dynastic establishment and its\napparatus of control--would be borne by the subject peoples. Here again\none is warranted in looking for a substantial economy to be effected by\nsuch a centralised authority, and a consequent lighter aggregate burden\non the subjects. Doubtless, the \"overhead charges\" would not be reduced\nto their practicable minimum. Such a governmental establishment, with\nits bureaucratic personnel, its \"civil list\" and its privileged classes,\nwould not be conducted on anything like a parsimonious footing. There is\nno reason to apprehend any touch of modesty in the exactions of such a\ndynastic establishment for itself or in behalf of its underlying\nhierarchy of gentlefolk.\n\nThere is also to be counted in, in the concrete instance on which the\nargument here turns, a more or less considerable burden of contributions\ntoward the maintenance and augmentation of that culture that has been\nthe topic of so many encomiums. At this point it should be recalled that\nit is the pattern of Periclean Athens that is continually in mind in\nthese encomiums. Which brings up, in this immediate connection, the\ndealings of Periclean Athens with the funds of the League, and the\nsource as well as the destination of these surplus funds. Out of it all\ncame the works on the Acropolis, together with much else of intellectual\nand artistic life that converged upon and radiated from this Athenian\ncenter of culture. The vista of _Denkmaeler_ that so opens to the vision\nof a courageous fancy is in itself such a substance of things hoped for\nas should stir the heart of all humane persons.[8] The cost of this\nsubvention of Culture would doubtless be appreciable, but those grave\nmen who have spent most thought on this prospective cultural gain to be\nhad from the projected Imperial rule appear to entertain no doubt as to\nits being worth all that it would cost.\n\n[Footnote 8: _Denk 'mall_]\n\nAny one who is inclined to rate the prospective pecuniary costs and\nlosses high would doubtless be able to find various and sundry items of\nminor importance to add to this short list of general categories on the\nside of cost; but such additional items, not fairly to be included under\nthese general captions, would after all be of minor importance, in the\naggregate or in detail, and would not appreciably affect the grand\nbalance of pecuniary profit and loss to be taken account of in any\nappraisal of the projected Imperial regime. There should evidently be\nlittle ground to apprehend that its installation would entail a net loss\nor a net increase of pecuniary burdens. There is, of course, the\nill-defined and scarcely definable item of expenditure under the general\nhead of Gentility, Dignity, Distinction, Magnificence, or whatever term\nmay seem suitable to designate that consumption of goods and services\nthat goes to maintain the high repute of the Court and to keep the\nunderlying gentlefolk in countenance. In its pecuniary incidence this\nline of (necessary) expenditure belongs under the rubric of Conspicuous\nWaste; and one will always have to face the disquieting flexibility of\nthis item of expenditure. The consumptive demand of this kind is in an\neminent degree \"indefinitely extensible,\" as the phrasing of the\neconomists would have it, and as various historical instances of courtly\nsplendor and fashionable magnificence will abundantly substantiate.\nThere is a constant proclivity to advance this conventional \"standard of\nliving\" to the limit set by the available means; and yet these\nconventional necessities will ordinarily not, in the aggregate, take up\nall the available means; although now and again, as under the _Ancien\nRegime_, and perhaps in Imperial Rome, the standard of splendid living\nmay also exceed the current means in hand and lead to impoverishment of\nthe underlying community.\n\nAn analysis of the circumstances governing this flexibility of the\nconventional standard of living and of pecuniary magnificence can not be\ngone into here. In the case under consideration it will have to be left\nas an indeterminate but considerable item in the burden of cost which\nthe projected Imperial rule may be counted on to impose on the\nunderlying peoples. The cost of the Imperial court, nobility, and civil\nservice, therefore, would be a matter of estimate, on which no close\nagreement would be expected; and yet, here as in an earlier connection,\nit seems a reasonable expectation that sufficient dignity and\nmagnificence could be put in evidence by such a large-scale\nestablishment at a lower aggregate cost than the aggregate of\nexpenditures previously incurred for the like ends by various nations\nworking in severalty and at cross purposes.\n\nDoubtless it would be altogether a mistaken view of this production of\ndignity by means of a lavish expenditure on superfluities, to believe\nthat the same principle of economy should apply here as was found\napplicable in the matter of armament for defense. With the installation\nof a collective national establishment, to include substantially all the\npreviously competing nations, the need of defensive armament should in\nall reason decline to something very inconsiderable indeed. But it would\nbe hasty to conclude that with the coalescence of these nations under\none paramount control the need of creating notoriety and prestige for\nthis resulting central establishment by the consumption of decorative\nsuperfluities would likewise decline. The need of such dignity and\nmagnificence is only in part, perhaps a minor part, of a defensive\ncharacter. For the greater part, no doubt, the motive to this\nconspicuously wasteful consumption is personal vanity, in Imperial\npolicy as well as in the private life of fashion,--or perhaps one should\nmore deferentially say that it is a certain range of considerations\nwhich would be identified as personal vanity in case they were met with\namong men beneath the Imperial level. And so far as the creation of this\nform of \"good-will\" by this manner of advertising is traceable to such,\nor equivalent, motives of a personal incidence, the provocation to\neconomy along this line would presumably not be a notable factor in the\ncase. And one returns perforce to the principle already spoken of above,\nthat the consumptive need of superfluities is indefinitely extensible,\nwith the resulting inference that nothing conclusive is to be said as to\nthe prospective magnitude of this item in the Imperial bill of expense,\nor of the consequent pecuniary burdens which it would impose on the\nunderlying peoples.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSo far the argument has run on the pecuniary incidence of this projected\nImperial dominion as it falls on the underlying community as a whole,\nwith no attempt to discriminate between the divergent interests of the\ndifferent classes and conditions of men that go to make up any modern\ncommunity. The question in hand is a question of pecuniary burdens, and\ntherefore of the pecuniary interests of these several distinguishable\nclasses or conditions of men. In all these modern nations that now stand\nin the article of decision between peace by submission or a doubtful and\nmelancholy alternative,--in all of them men are by statute and custom\ninviolably equal before the law, of course; they are ungraded and\nmasterless men before the law. But these same peoples are also alike in\nthe respect that pecuniary duties and obligations among them are\nsimilarly sacred and inviolable under the dispassionate findings of the\nlaw. This pecuniary equality is, in effect, an impersonal equality\nbetween pecuniary magnitudes; from which it follows that these citizens\nof the advanced nations are not ungraded men in the pecuniary respect;\nnor are they masterless, in so far as a greater pecuniary force will\nalways, under this impersonal equality of the law, stand in a relation\nof mastery toward a lesser one.\n\nClass distinctions, except pecuniary distinctions, have fallen away. But\nall these modern nations are made up of pecuniary classes, differing\nfrom one another by minute gradations in the marginal cases, but\nfalling, after all, and in the large, into two broadly and securely\ndistinguishable pecuniary categories: those who have more and those who\nhave less. Statisticians have been at pains to ascertain that a\nrelatively very small numerical minority of the citizens in these modern\nnations own all but a relatively very small proportion of the aggregate\nwealth in the country. So that it appears quite safe to say that in such\na country as America, e.g., something less than ten percent of the\ninhabitants own something more than ninety percent of the country's\nwealth. It would scarcely be a wild overstraining of its practical\nmeaning to say that this population is made up of two classes: those who\nown the country's wealth, and those who do not. In strict accuracy, as\nbefore the law, this characterisation will not hold; whereas in\npractical effect, it is a sufficiently close approximation. This latter\nclass, who have substantially no other than a fancied pecuniary interest\nin the nation's material fortunes, are the category often spoken of as\nThe Common Man. It is not necessary, nor is it desired, to find a\ncorresponding designation for the other category, those who own.\n\nThe articulate recognition of this division into contrasted pecuniary\nclasses or conditions, with correspondingly (at least potentially)\ndivergent pecuniary interests, need imply no degree of approval or\ndisapproval of the arrangement which is so recognised. The recognition\nof it is necessary to a perspicuous control of the argument, as bears on\nthe possible systematic and inherent discrepancy among these men in\nrespect of their material interests under the projected Imperial rule.\nSubstantially, it is a distinction between those who have and those who\nhave not, and in a question of prospective pecuniary loss the man who\nhas nothing to lose is differently placed from the one who has. It would\nperhaps seem flippant, and possibly lacking in the courtesy due one's\nprospective lord paramount, to say with the poet, _Cantabit vacuus coram\nlatrone viator_.\n\nBut the whole case is not so simple. It is only so long as the projected\npecuniary inroad is conceived as a simple sequestration of wealth in\nhand, that such a characterisation can be made to serve. The Imperial\naim is not a passing act of pillage, but a perpetual usufruct; and the\nwhole question takes on a different and more complex shape when it so\ntouches the enduring conditions of life and livelihood. The citizen who\nhas nothing, or who has no capitalisable source of unearned income, yet\nhas a pecuniary interest in a livelihood to be gained from day to day,\nand he is yet vulnerable in the pecuniary respect in that his livelihood\nmay with the utmost facility be laid under contribution by various and\nsundry well-tried contrivances. Indeed, the common man who depends for\nhis livelihood on his daily earnings is in a more immediately\nprecarious position than those who have something appreciable laid up\nagainst a rainy day, in the shape of a capitalised source of income.\nOnly that it is still doubtful if his position is precarious in such a\nfashion as to lay him open to a notable increase of hardship, or to loss\nof the amenities of life, in the same relative degree as his well-to-do\nneighbour.\n\nIn point of fact it may well be doubted if this common man has anything\nto apprehend in the way of added hardship or loss of creature comforts\nunder the contemplated regime of Imperial tutelage. He would presumably\nfind himself in a precarious case under the arbitrary and irresponsible\nauthority of an alien master working through an alien master class. The\ndoubt which presents itself is as to whether this common man would be\nmore precariously placed, or would come in for a larger and surer sum of\nhard usage and scant living, under this projected order of things, than\nwhat he already is exposed to in his pecuniary relations with his\nwell-to-do compatriots under the current system of law and order.\n\nUnder this current regime of law and order, according to the equitable\nprinciples of Natural Rights, the man without means has no pecuniary\nrights which his well-to-do pecuniary master is bound to respect. This\nmay have been an unintended, as it doubtless was an unforeseen, outcome\nof the move out of feudalism and prescriptive rights and immunities,\ninto the system of individual liberty and manhood franchise; but as\ncommonly happens in case of any substantial change in the scheme of\ninstitutional arrangements, unforeseen consequences come in along with\nthose that have been intended. In that period of history when Western\nEurope was gathering that experience out of which the current habitual\nscheme of law and order has come, the right of property and free\ncontract was a complement and safeguard to that individual initiative\nand masterless equality of men for which the spokesmen of the new era\ncontended. That it is no longer so at every turn, or even in the main,\nin later time, is in great part due to changes of the pecuniary order,\nthat have come on since then, and that seem not to have cast their\nshadow before.\n\nIn all good faith, and with none but inconsequential reservations, the\nmaterial fortunes of modern civilised men--together with much else--have\nso been placed on a pecuniary footing, with little to safeguard them at\nany point except the inalienable right of pecuniary self-direction and\ninitiative, in an environment where virtually all the indispensable\nmeans of pecuniary self-direction and initiative are in the hands of\nthat contracted category of owners spoken of above. A numerical\nminority--under ten percent of the population--constitutes a conclusive\npecuniary majority--over ninety percent of the means--under a system of\nlaw and order that turns on the inalienable right of owners to dispose\nof the means in hand as may suit their convenience and profit,--always\nbarring recourse to illegal force or fraud. There is, however, a very\nappreciable margin of legal recourse to force and of legally protected\nfraud available in case of need. Of course the expedients here referred\nto as legally available force and fraud in the defense of pecuniary\nrights and the pursuit of pecuniary gain are not force and fraud _de\njure_ but only _de facto_. They are further, and well known,\nillustrations of how the ulterior consequences of given institutional\narrangements and given conventionalised principles (habits of thought)\nof conduct may in time come to run at cross purposes with the initial\npurpose that led to the acceptance of these institutions and to the\nconfirmation and standardisation of these habitual norms of conduct. For\nthe time being, however, they are \"fundamentally and eternally right and\ngood.\"\n\nBeing a pecuniary majority--what may be called a majority of the\ncorporate stock--of the nation, it is also fundamentally and eternally\nright and good that the pecuniary interests of the owners of the\nmaterial means of life should rule unabated in all those matters of\npublic policy that touch on the material fortunes of the community at\nlarge. Barring a slight and intermittent mutter of discontent, this\narrangement has also the cordial approval of popular sentiment in these\nmodern democratic nations. One need only recall the paramount importance\nwhich is popularly attached to the maintenance and extension of the\nnation's trade--for the use of the investors--or the perpetuation of a\nprotective tariff--for the use of the protected business concerns--or,\nagain, the scrupulous regard with which such a body of public servants\nas the Interstate Commerce Commission will safeguard the legitimate\nclaim of the railway companies to a \"reasonable\" rate of earnings on the\ncapitalised value of the presumed earning-capacity of their property.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAgain, in view of the unaccustomed freedom with which it is here\nnecessary to speak of these delicate matters, it may be in place to\ndisclaim all intention to criticise the established arrangements on\ntheir merits as details of public policy. All that comes in question\nhere, touching these and the like features of the established law and\norder, is the bearing of all this on the material fortunes of the common\nman under the current regime, as contrasted with what he would\nreasonably have to look for under the projected regime of Imperial\ntutelage that would come in, consequent upon this national surrender to\nImperial dominion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn these democratic countries public policy is guided primarily by\nconsiderations of business expediency, and the administration, as well\nas the legislative power, is in the hands of businessmen, chosen\navowedly on the ground of their businesslike principles and ability.\nThere is no power in such a community that can over-rule the exigencies\nof business, nor would popular sentiment countenance any exercise of\npower that should traverse these exigencies, or that would act to\nrestrain trade or discourage the pursuit of gain. An apparent exception\nto the rule occurs in wartime, when military exigencies may over-rule\nthe current demands of business traffic; but the exception is in great\npart only apparent, in that the warlike operations are undertaken in\nwhole or in part with a view to the protection or extension of business\ntraffic.\n\nNational surveillance and regulation of business traffic in these\ncountries hitherto, ever since and in so far as the modern democratic\norder of things has taken effect, has uniformly been of the nature of\ninterference with trade and investment in behalf of the nation's\nmercantile community at large, as seen in port and shipping regulations\nand in the consular service, or in behalf of particular favored groups\nor classes of business concerns, as in protective tariffs and subsidies.\nIn all this national management of pecuniary affairs, under modern\ndemocratic principles, the common man comes into the case only as raw\nmaterial of business traffic,--as consumer or as laborer. He is one of\nthe industrial agencies by use of which the businessman who employs him\nsupplies himself with goods for the market, or he is one of the units\nof consumptive demand that make up this market in which the business man\nsells his goods, and so \"realises\" on his investment. He is, of course,\nfree, under modern principles of the democratic order, to deal or not to\ndeal with this business community, whether as laborer or as consumer, or\nas small-scale producer engaged in purveying materials or services on\nterms defined by the community of business interests engaged on so large\na scale as to count in their determination. That is to say, he is free\n_de jure_ to take or leave the terms offered. _De facto_ he is only free\nto take them--with inconsequential exceptions--the alternative being\nobsolescence by disuse, not to choose a harsher name for a distasteful\neventuality.\n\nThe general ground on which the business system, as it works under the\nover-ruling exigencies of the so-called \"big business,\" so defines the\nterms of life for the common man, who works and buys, is the ground\nafforded by the principle of \"charging what the traffic will bear;\" that\nis to say, fixing the terms of hiring, buying and selling at such a\nfigure as will yield the largest net return to the business concerns in\nwhom, collectively or in severalty, the discretion vests. Discretion in\nthese premises does not vest in any business concern that does not\narticulate with the system of \"big business,\" or that does not dispose\nof resources sufficient to make it a formidable member of the system.\nWhether these concerns act in severalty or by collusion and conspiracy,\nin so defining the pecuniary terms of life for the community at large,\nis substantially an idle question, so far as bears on the material\ninterest of the common man. The base-line is still what the traffic will\nbear, and it is still adhered to, so nearly as the human infirmity of\nthe discretionary captains of industry will admit, whether the due\napproximation to this base-line is reached by a process of competitive\nbidding or by collusive advisement.\n\nThe generalisation so offered, touching the material conditions of life\nfor the common man under the modern rule of big business, may seem\nunwarrantably broad. It may be worth while to take note of more than one\npoint in qualification of it, chiefly to avoid the appearance of having\noverlooked any of the material circumstances of the case. The \"system\"\nof large business, working its material consequences through the system\nof large-scale industry, but more particularly by way of the large-scale\nand wide-reaching business of trade in the proper sense, draws into the\nnet of its control all parts of the community and all its inhabitants,\nin some degree of dependence. But there is always, hitherto, an\nappreciable fraction of the inhabitants--as, e.g., outlying agricultural\nsections that are in a \"backward\" state--who are by no means closely\nbound in the orderly system of business, or closely dependent on the\nmarkets. They may be said to enjoy a degree of independence, by virtue\nof their foregoing as much as may be of the advantages offered by modern\nindustrial specialisation. So also there are the minor and interstitial\ntrades that are still carried on by handicraft methods; these, too, are\nstill somewhat loosely held in the fabric of the business system. There\nis one thing and another in this way to be taken account of in any\nexhaustive survey, but the accounting for them will after all amount to\nnothing better than a gleaning of remnants and partial exceptions, such\nas will in no material degree derange the general proposition in hand.\n\nAgain, there runs through the length and breadth of this business\ncommunity a certain measure of incompetence or inefficiency of\nmanagement, as seen from the point of view of the conceivable perfect\nworking of the system as a whole. It may be due to a slack attention\nhere and there; or to the exigencies of business strategy which may\nconstrain given business concerns to an occasional attitude of \"watchful\nwaiting\" in the hope of catching a rival off his guard; or to a lack of\nperfect mutual understanding among the discretionary businessmen, due\nsometimes to an over-careful guarding of trade secrets or advance\ninformation; or, as also happens, and quite excusably, to a lack of\nperfect mutual confidence among these businessmen, as to one another's\nentire good faith or good-will. The system is after all a competitive\none, in the sense that each of the discretionary directors of business\nis working for his own pecuniary gain, whether in cooperation with his\nfellows or not. \"An honest man will bear watching.\" As in other\ncollusive organisations for gain, confederates are apt to fall out when\nit comes to a division of what is in hand. In one way and another the\nsystem is beset with inherent infirmities, which hinder its perfect\nwork; and in so far it will fall short of the full realisation of that\nrule of business that inculcates charging what the traffic will bear,\nand also in so far the pressure which the modern system of business\nmanagement brings to bear on the common man will also fall short of the\nlast straw--perhaps even of the next-to-the-last. Again it turns out to\nbe a question not of the failure of the general proposition as\nformulated, but rather as to the closeness of approximation to its\ntheoretically perfect work. It may be remarked by the way that vigilant\nand impartial surveillance of this system of business enterprise by an\nexternal authority interested only in aggregate results, rather than in\nthe differential gains of the interested individuals, might hopefully\nbe counted on to correct some of these shortcomings which the system\nshows when running loose under the guidance of its own multifarious\nincentives.\n\nOn the opposite side of the account, it is also worth noting that, while\nmodern business management may now and again fall short of what the\ntraffic will bear, it happens more commonly that its exactions will\nexceed that limit. This will particularly be true in businessmen's\ndealings with hired labour, as also and perhaps with equally\nfar-reaching consequences in an excessive recourse to sophistications\nand adulterants and an excessively parsimonious provision for the\nsafety, health or comfort of their customers--as, e.g., in passenger\ntraffic by rail, water or tramway. The discrepancy to which attention is\ninvited here is due to a discrepancy between business expediency, that\nis expediency for the purpose of gain by a given businessman, on the one\nhand, and serviceability to the common good, on the other hand. The\nbusiness concern's interest in the traffic in which it engages is a\nshort-term interest, or an interest in the short-term returns, as\ncontrasted with the long-term or enduring interest which the community\nat large has in the public service over which any such given business\nconcern disposes. The business incentive is that afforded by the\nprospective net pecuniary gain from the traffic, substantially an\ninterest in profitable sales; while the community at large, or the\ncommon man that goes to make up such a community, has a material\ninterest in this traffic only as regards the services rendered and the\nenduring effects that follow from it.\n\nThe businessman has not, or at least is commonly not influenced by, any\ninterest in the ulterior consequences of the transactions in which he\nis immediately engaged. This appears to hold true in an accentuated\ndegree in the domain of that large-scale business that draws its gains\nfrom the large-scale modern industry and is managed on the modern\nfooting of corporation finance. This modern fashion of business\norganisation and management apparently has led to a substantial\nshortening of the term over which any given investor maintains an\neffective interest in any given corporate enterprise, in which his\ninvestments may be placed for the time being. With the current practice\nof organising industrial and mercantile enterprises on a basis of\nvendible securities, and with the nearly complete exemption from\npersonal responsibility and enduring personal attachment to any one\ncorporate enterprise which this financial expedient has brought, it has\ncome about that in the common run of cases the investor, as well as the\ndirectorate, in any given enterprise, has an interest only for the time\nbeing. The average term over which it is (pecuniarily) incumbent on the\nmodern businessman to take account of the working of any given\nenterprise has shortened so far that the old-fashioned accountability,\nthat once was depended on to dictate a sane and considerate management\nwith a view to permanent good-will, has in great measure become\ninoperative.\n\nBy and large, it seems unavoidable that the pecuniary interests of the\nbusinessmen on the one hand and the material interests of the community\non the other hand are diverging in a more and more pronounced degree,\ndue to institutional circumstances over which no prompt control can be\nhad without immediate violation of that scheme of personal rights in\nwhich the constitution of modern democratic society is grounded. The\nquandary in which these communities find themselves, as an outcome of\ntheir entrance upon \"the simple and obvious system of Natural Liberty,\"\nis shown in a large and instructive way by what is called \"labor\ntrouble,\" and in a more recondite but no less convincing fashion by the\nfortunes of the individual workman under the modern system.\n\nThe cost of production of a modern workman has constantly increased,\nwith the advance of the industrial arts. The period of preparation, of\neducation and training, necessary to turn out competent workmen, has\nbeen increasing; and the period of full workmanlike efficiency has been\nshortening, in those industries that employ the delicate and exacting\nprocesses of the modern technology. The shortening of this working-life\nof the workman is due both to a lengthening of the necessary period of\npreparation, and to the demand of these processes for so full a use of\nthe workman's forces that even the beginning of senescence will count as\na serious disability,--in many occupations as a fatal disability. It is\nalso a well ascertained fact that effectual old age will be brought on\nat an earlier period by overwork; overwork shortens the working\nlife-time of the workman. Thorough speeding-up (\"Scientific\nManagement\"?) will unduly shorten this working life-time, and so it may,\nsomewhat readily, result in an uneconomical consumption of the\ncommunity's man-power, by consuming the workmen at a higher rate of\nspeed, a higher pressure, with a more rapid rate of deterioration, than\nwould give the largest net output of product per unit of man-power\navailable, or per unit of cost of production of such man-power.\n\nOn this head the guiding incentives of the businessman and the material\ninterest of the community at large--not to speak of the selfish interest\nof the individual workman--are systematically at variance. The cost of\nproduction of workmen does not fall on the business concern which\nemploys them, at least not in such definite fashion as to make it appear\nthat the given business concern or businessman has a material interest\nin the economical consumption of the man-power embodied in this given\nbody of employees. Some slight and exceptional qualification of this\nstatement is to be noted, in those cases where the processes in use are\nsuch as to require special training, not to be had except by a working\nhabituation to these processes in the particular industrial plant in\nquestion. So far as such special training, to be had only as employees\nof the given concern, is a necessary part of the workman's equipment for\nthis particular work, so far the given employer bears a share and an\ninterest in the cost of production of the workmen employed; and so far,\ntherefore, the employer has also a pecuniary interest in the economical\nuse of his employees; which usually shows itself in the way of some\nspecial precautions being taken to prevent the departure of these\nworkmen so long as there is a clear pecuniary loss involved in replacing\nthem with men who have not yet had the special training required.\nEvidently this qualifying consideration covers no great proportion of\nthe aggregate man-power consumed in industrial enterprises under\nbusiness management. And apart from the instances, essentially\nexceptional, where such a special consideration comes in, the\nbusinessmen in charge will, quite excusably as things go, endeavour to\nconsume the man-power of which they dispose in the persons of their\nemployees, not at the rate that would be most economical to the\ncommunity at large, in view of the cost of their replacement, nor at\nsuch a rate as would best suit the taste or the viability of the\nparticular workman, but at such a rate as will yield the largest net\npecuniary gain to the employer.\n\nThere is on record an illustrative, and indeed an illustrious, instance\nof such cannily gainful consumption of man-power carried out\nsystematically and with consistently profitable effect in one of the\nstaple industries of the country. In this typical, though exceptionally\nthoroughgoing and lucrative enterprise, the set rule of the management\nwas, to employ none but select workmen, in each respective line of work;\nto procure such select workmen and retain them by offering wages\nslightly over the ordinary standard; to work them at the highest pace\nand pressure attainable with such a picked body; and to discharge them\non the first appearance of aging or of failing powers. In the rules of\nthe management was also included the negative proviso that the concern\nassumed no responsibility for the subsequent fortunes of discharged\nworkmen, in the way of pension, insurance or the like.\n\nThis enterprise was highly successful and exceedingly profitable, even\nbeyond the high average of profits among enterprises in the same line of\nbusiness. Out of it came one of the greater and more illustrious\nfortunes that have been accumulated during the past century; a fortune\nwhich has enabled one of the most impressive and most gracious of this\ngeneration's many impressive philanthropists, never weary in well-doing;\nbut who, through this cannily gainful consumption of man-power, has been\nplaced in the singular position of being unable, in spite of avowedly\nunremitting endeavour, to push his continued disbursements in the\nservice of humanity up to the figure of his current income. The case in\nquestion is one of the most meritorious known to the records of modern\nbusiness, and while it will conveniently serve to illustrate many an\nother, and perhaps more consequential truth come to realisation in the\nmarch of Triumphant Democracy, it will also serve to show the\ngainfulness of an unreservedly canny consumption of man-power with an\neye single to one's own net gain in terms of money.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEvidently this is a point in the articulation of the modern economic\nsystem where a sufficiently ruthless outside authority, not actuated by\na primary regard for the pecuniary interests of the employers, might\nconceivably with good effect enforce a more economical consumption of\nthe country's man-power. It is not a matter on which one prefers to\ndwell, but it can do no harm to take note of the fact for once in a way,\nthat these several national establishments of the democratic order, as\nthey are now organised and administered, do somewhat uniformly and\npervasively operate with an effectual view to the advantage of a class,\nso far as may plausibly be done. They are controlled by and administered\nin behalf of those elements of the population that, for the purpose in\nhand, make up a single loose-knit class,--the class that lives by income\nrather than by work. It may be called the class of the business\ninterests, or of capital, or of gentlemen. It all comes to much the\nsame, for the purpose in hand.\n\nThe point in speaking of this contingent whose place in the economy of\nhuman affairs it is to consume, or to own, or to pursue a margin of\nprofit, is simply that of contrasting this composite human contingent\nwith the common man; whose numbers account for some nine-tenths or more\nof the community, while his class accounts for something less than\none-tenth of the invested wealth, and appreciably less than that\nproportion of the discretionary national establishment,--the government,\nnational or local, courts, attorneys, civil service, diplomatic and\nconsular, military and naval. The arrangement may be called a\ngentlemen's government, if one would rather have it that way; but a\ngentleman is necessarily one who lives on free income from invested\nwealth--without such a source of free, that is to say unearned, income\nhe becomes a decayed gentleman. Again, pushing the phrasing back a step\nfarther toward the ground facts, there are those who would speak of the\ncurrent establishments as \"capitalistic;\" but this term is out of line\nin that it fails to touch the human element in the case, and\ninstitutions, such as governmental establishments and their functioning,\nare after all nothing but the accustomed ways and means of human\nbehaviour; so that \"capitalistic\" becomes a synonym for \"businessmen's\"\ngovernment so soon as it is designated in terms of the driving\nincentives and the personnel. It is an organisation had with a view to\nthe needs of business (i.e. pecuniary) enterprise, and is made up of\nbusinessmen and gentlemen, which comes to much the same, since a\ngentleman is only a businessman in the second or some later generation.\nExcept for the slightly odious suggestion carried by the phrase, one\nmight aptly say that the gentleman, in this bearing, is only a\nbusinessman gone to seed.\n\nBy and large, and taking the matter naively at the simple face value of\nthe material gain or loss involved, it should seem something of an idle\nquestion to the common man whether his collective affairs are to be\nmanaged by a home-bred line of businessmen and their successive filial\ngenerations of gentlemen, with a view to accelerate the velocity and\nincrease the volume of competitive gain and competitive spending, on\nthe one hand, or by an alien line of officials, equally aloof from his\ncommon interests, and managing affairs with a view to the usufruct of\nhis productive powers in furtherance of the Imperial dominion.\n\nNot that the good faith or the generous intentions of these governments\nof gentlemen is questioned or is in any degree questionable; what is\nhere spoken of is only the practical effect of the policies which they\npursue, doubtless with benevolent intentions and well-placed\ncomplacency. In effect, things being as they are today in the civilised\nworld's industry and trade, it happens, as in some sort an unintended\nbut all-inclusive accident, that the guidance of affairs by business\nprinciples works at cross purposes with the material interests of the\ncommon man.\n\nSo ungraceful a view of the sacred core of this modern democratic\norganisation will need whatever evidence can be cited to keep it in\ncountenance. Therefore indulgence is desired for one further count in\nthis distasteful recital of ineptitudes inherent in this institutional\nscheme of civilised life. This count comes under the head of what may be\ncalled capitalistic sabotage. \"Sabotage\" is employed to designate a\nwilful retardation, interruption or obstruction of industry by\npeaceable, and ordinarily by legally defensible, measures. In its\npresent application, particularly, there is no design to let the term\ndenote or insinuate a recourse to any expedients or any line of conduct\nthat is in any degree legally dubious, or that is even of questionable\nlegitimacy.\n\nSabotage so understood, as not comprising recourse to force or fraud, is\na necessary and staple expedient of business management, and its\nemployment is grounded in the elementary and indefeasible rights of\nownership. It is simply that the businessman, like any other owner, is\nvested with the right freely to use or not to use his property for any\ngiven purpose. His decision, for reasons of his own, not to employ the\nproperty at his disposal in a particular way at a particular time, is\nwell and blamelessly within his legitimate discretion, under the rights\nof property as universally accepted and defended by modern nations. In\nthe particular instance of the American nation he is protected in this\nright by a constitutional provision that he must not be deprived of his\nproperty without due process of law. When the property at his disposal\nis in the shape of industrial plant or industrial material, means of\ntransportation or stock of goods awaiting distribution, then his\ndecision not to employ this property, or to limit its use to something\nless than full capacity, in the way for which it is adapted, becomes\nsabotage, normally and with negligible exceptions. In so doing he\nhinders, retards or obstructs the working of the country's industrial\nforces by so much. It is a matter of course and of absolute necessity to\nthe conduct of business, that any discretionary businessman must be free\nto deal or not to deal in any given case; to limit or to withhold the\nequipment under his control, without reservation. Business discretion\nand business strategy, in fact, has no other means by which to work out\nits aims. So that, in effect, all business sagacity reduces itself in\nthe last analysis to a judicious use of sabotage. Under modern\nconditions of large business, particularly, the relation of the\ndiscretionary businessman to industry is that of authoritative\npermission and of authoritative limitation or stoppage, and on his\nshrewd use of this authority depends the gainfulness of his enterprise.\n\nIf this authority were exercised with an eye single to the largest and\nmost serviceable output of goods and services, or to the most economical\nuse of the country's material resources and man-power, regardless of\npecuniary consequences, the course of management so carried out would be\nnot sabotage but industrial strategy. But business is carried on for\npecuniary gain, not with an unreserved view to the largest and most\nserviceable output or to the economical use of resources. The volume and\nserviceability of the output must wait unreservedly on the very\nparticular pecuniary question of what quantity and what degree of\nserviceability will yield the largest net return in terms of price.\nUneconomical use of equipment, labor and resources is necessarily an\neveryday matter under these circumstances, as in the duplication of\nplant and processes between rival concerns, and in the wasteful use of\nall resources that do not involve expenditure on the part of the given\nconcern.\n\nIt has been the traditional dogma among economists and publicists in\nthese modern communities that free competition between the businessmen\nin charge will indefeasibly act to bring the productiveness of industry\nto the highest practicable pitch and would lead to the most unreserved\nand vigilant endeavour to serve the community's material needs at all\npoints. The reasons for the failure of this genial expectation,\nparticularly under latterday business management, might be shown in some\ndetail, if that were needed to enforce the argument as it runs in the\npresent connection. But a summary indication of the commoner varieties\nand effects of sabotage as it is systematically applied in the\nbusinesslike conduct of industry will serve the purpose as well and with\nless waste of words and patience.\n\nIt is usual to notice, and not unusual to deplore the duplication of\nplant and appliances in many lines of industry, due to competitive\nmanagement, as in factories engaged in the same class of manufacture, in\nparallel or otherwise competing railways and boat lines, in retail\nmerchandising, and in some degree also in the wholesale trade. The\nresult, of course, is sabotage; in the sense that this volume of\nappliances, materials and workmen are not employed to the best advantage\nfor the community. One effect of the arrangement is an increased\nnecessary cost of the goods and services supplied by these means. The\nreason for it is competition for gain to be got from the traffic. That\nall this is an untoward state of things is recognised on all hands; but\nno lively regret is commonly spent on the matter, since it is commonly\nrecognised that under the circumstances there is no help for it except\nat the cost of a more untoward remedy.\n\nThe competitive system having been tried and found good--or at least so\nit is assumed--it is felt that the system will have to be accepted with\nthe defects of its qualities. Its characteristic qualities are held to\nbe good, acceptable to the tastes of modern men whose habits of thought\nhave been standardised in its terms; and it would be only reluctantly\nand by tardy concession that these modern men could bring themselves to\ngive up that scheme of \"Natural Liberty\" within the framework of which\nruns this competitive system of business management and its wasteful\nmanifolding of half-idle equipment and nugatory work. The common man, at\nthe worst, comforts himself and his neighbour with the sage reflection\nthat \"It might have been worse.\" The businessmen, on the other hand,\nhave also begun to take note of this systematic waste by duplication\nand consequent incompetence, and have taken counsel how to intercept the\nwaste and divert it to their own profit. The businessmen's remedy is\nconsolidation of competing concerns, and monopoly control.\n\nTo the common man, with his preconceptions on the head of \"restraint of\ntrade,\" the proposed remedy seems more vicious than the evil it is\ndesigned to cure. The fault of the remedy plainly is not that the\nmismanagement of affairs due to competitive business can not be\ncorrected by recourse to monopoly, but only that the community, it is\npresumed, would still suffer all the burdens and discomforts of the\nregime of competition and sabotage, with, possibly, further\ninconveniences and impositions at the hands of the businesslike\nmonopoly; which, men are agreed, may fairly be depended on to use its\nadvantage unsparingly under the business principle of charging what the\ntraffic will bear.\n\nThere is also this other singular phenomenon in this modern industrial\nworld, that something not very far short of one-half the industrial\nequipment systematically lies idle for something approaching one-half\nthe time, or is worked only to one-half its capacity half the time; not\nbecause of competition between these several industrial concerns, but\nbecause business conditions will not allow its continued productive use;\nbecause the volume of product that would be turned out if the equipment\nwere working uninterruptedly at its full capacity could not be sold at\nremunerative prices. From time to time one establishment and another\nwill shut down during a period of slack times, for the same reason.\n\nThis state of things is singular only as seen from the point of view of\nthe community's material interest, not that it is in any degree\nunfamiliar or that any serious fault is found with the captains of\nindustry for so shutting off the industrial process and letting the\nindustrial equipment lie waste. As all men know, the exigencies of\nbusiness will not tolerate production to supply the community's needs\nunder these circumstances; although, as is equally notorious, these\nslack times, when production of goods is unadvisable on grounds of\nbusiness expediency, are commonly times of wide-spread privation, \"hard\ntimes,\" in the community at large, when the failure of the supply is\nkeenly felt.\n\nIt is not that the captains of industry are at fault in so failing, or\nrefusing, to supply the needs of the community under these\ncircumstances, but only that they are helpless under the exigencies of\nbusiness. They can not supply the goods except for a price, indeed not\nexcept for a remunerative price, a price which will add something to the\ncapital values which they are venturing in their various enterprises. So\nlong as the exigencies of price and of pecuniary gain rule the case,\nthere is manifestly no escaping this enforced idleness of the country's\nproductive forces.\n\nIt may not be out of place also to remark, by way of parenthesis, that\nthis highly productive state of the industrial arts, which is embodied\nin the industrial plant and processes that so are systematically and\nadvisedly retarded or arrested under the rule of business, is at the\nsame time the particular pride of civilised men and the most tangible\nachievement of the civilised world.\n\nA conservative estimate of this one item of capitalistic sabotage could\nscarcely appraise it at less than a twenty-five percent reduction from\nthe normally possible productive capacity of the community, at an\naverage over any considerable period; and a somewhat thorough review of\nthe pertinent facts would probably persuade any impartial observer that,\none year with another, such businesslike enforced idleness of plant and\npersonnel lowers the actual output of the country's industry by\nsomething nearer fifty percent of its ordinary capacity when fully\nemployed. To many, such an assertion may seem extravagant, but with\nfurther reflection on the well-known facts in the case it will seem less\nso in proportion as the unfamiliarity of it wears off.\n\nHowever, the point of attention in the case is not the precise, nor the\napproximate, percentages of this arrest and retardation, this partial\nneutralisation of modern improvements in the industrial arts; it is only\nthe notorious fact that such arrest occurs, systematically and\nadvisedly, under the rule of business exigencies, and that there is no\ncorrective to be found for it that will comport with those fundamental\narticles of the democratic faith on which the businessmen necessarily\nproceed. Any effectual corrective would break the framework of\ndemocratic law and order, since it would have to traverse the\ninalienable right of men who are born free and equal, each freely to\ndeal or not to deal in any pecuniary conjuncture that arises.\n\nBut it is at the same time plain enough that this, in the larger sense\nuntoward, discrepancy between productive capacity and current productive\noutput can readily be corrected, in some appreciable degree at least, by\nany sufficient authority that shall undertake to control the country's\nindustrial forces without regard to pecuniary profit and loss. Any\nauthority competent to take over the control and regulate the conduct of\nthe community's industry with a view to maximum output as counted by\nweight and tale, rather than by net aggregate price-income over\nprice-cost, can readily effect an appreciable increase in the effectual\nproductive capacity; but it can be done only by violating that\ndemocratic order of things within which business enterprise runs. The\nseveral belligerent nations of Europe are showing that it can be done,\nthat the sabotage of business enterprise can be put aside by\nsufficiently heroic measures. And they are also showing that they are\nall aware, and have always been aware, that the conduct of industry on\nbusiness principles is incompetent to bring the largest practicable\noutput of goods and services; incompetent to such a degree, indeed, as\nnot to be tolerable in a season of desperate need, when the nation\nrequires the full use of its productive forces, equipment and man-power,\nregardless of the pecuniary claims of individuals.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNow, the projected Imperial dominion is a power of the character\nrequired to bring a sufficient corrective to bear, in case of need, on\nthis democratic situation in which the businessmen in charge necessarily\nmanage the country's industry at cross purposes with the\ncommunity's--that is the common man's--material interest. It is an\nextraneous power, to whom the continued pecuniary gain of these nations'\nbusinessmen is a minor consideration, a negligible consideration in case\nit shall appear that the Imperial usufruct of the underlying nation's\nproductive forces is in any degree impaired by the businessmen's\nmanagement of it for their own net gain. It is difficult to see on what\ngrounds of self-interest such an Imperial government could consent to\ntolerate the continued management of these underlying nations'\nindustries on business principles, that is to say on the principle of\nthe maximum pecuniary gain to the businesslike managers; and recent\nexperience seems to teach that no excessive, that is to say no\ninconvenient, degree of consideration for vested rights, and the like,\nwould long embarrass the Imperial government in its administration of\nits usufruct.\n\nIt should be a reasonable expectation that, without malice and with an\nunprejudiced view to its own usufruct of these underlying countries, the\nImperial establishment would take due care that no systematically, and\nin its view gratuitously, uneconomical methods should continue in the\nordinary conduct of their industry. Among other considerations of weight\nin this connection is the fact that a contented, well-fed, and not\nwantonly over-worked populace is a valuable asset in such a case.\nSimilarly, by contraries, as an asset in usufruct to such an alien\npower, a large, wealthy, spendthrift, body of gentlefolk, held in high\nesteem by the common people, would have but a slight value, conceivably\neven a negative value, in such a case. A wise administration would\npresumably look to their abatement, rather than otherwise. At this point\nthe material interest of the common man would seem to coincide with that\nof the Imperial establishment. Still, his preconceived notions of the\nwisdom and beneficence of his gentlefolk would presumably hinder his\nseeing the matter in that reasonable light.\n\nUnder the paramount surveillance of such an alien power, guided solely\nby its own interest in the usufruct of the country and its population,\nit is to be presumed that class privileges and discrimination would be\ngreatly abated if not altogether discontinued. The point is in some\ndoubt, partly because this alien establishment whose dominion is in\nquestion is itself grounded in class prerogatives and discrimination,\nand so, not improbably, it would carry over into its supervision of the\nunderlying nations something of a bias in favor of class privileges. And\na similar order of things might also result by choice of a class-system\nas a convenient means of control and exploitation. The latter\nconsideration is presumably the more cogent, since the Imperial\nestablishment in question is already, by ancient habit, familiar with\nthe method of control by class and privilege; and, indeed, unfamiliar\nwith any other method. Such a government, which governs without\neffectual advice or formal consent of the governed, will almost\nnecessarily rest its control of the country on an interested class, of\nsufficient strength and bound by sufficiently grave interest to abet the\nImperial establishment effectually in all its adventures and\nenterprises.\n\nBut such a privileged order, that is to be counted in to share dynastic\nusufruct and liabilities, in good days and evil, will be of a\nfeudalistic complexion rather than something after the fashion of a\nmodern business community doing business by investment and pecuniary\nfinesse. It would still be a reasonable expectation that discrimination\nbetween pecuniary classes should fall away under this projected alien\ntutelage; more particularly all such discrimination as is designed to\nbenefit any given class or interest at the cost of the whole, as, e.g.,\nprotective tariffs, monopolistic concessions and immunities, engrossing\nof particular lines of material resources, and the like.\n\nThe character of the economic policy to be pursued should not be\ndifficult of apprehension, if only these underlying peoples are\nconceived as an estate in tail within the dynastic line of descent. The\nImperial establishment which so is prospectively to take over the\nsurveillance of these modern peoples under this projected enterprise in\ndominion, may all the more readily be conceived as handling its new and\nlarger resources somewhat unreservedly as an estate to be administered\nwith a shrewd eye to the main chance, since such has always been its\nrelation to the peoples and territories whose usufruct it already\nenjoys. It is only that the circumstances of the case will admit a freer\nand more sagacious application of those principles of usufruct that lie\nat the root of the ancient Culture of the Fatherland.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis excessively long, and yet incomplete, review of the presumptive\nmaterial advantages to accrue to the common man under a regime of peace\nby unconditional surrender to an alien dynasty, brings the argument\napparently to the conclusion that such an eventuality might be fortunate\nrather than the reverse; or at least that it has its compensations, even\nif it is not something to be desired. Such should particularly appear to\nbe the presumption in case one is at all inclined to make much of the\ncultural gains to be brought in under the new regime. And more\nparticularly should a policy of non-resistant submission to the\nprojected new order seem expedient in view of the exceedingly high, not\nto say prohibitive, cost of resistance, or even of materially retarding\nits fulfillment.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nPEACE AND NEUTRALITY\n\n\nConsidered simply on the face of the tangible material interests\ninvolved, the choice of the common man in these premises should seem\nvery much of a foregone conclusion, if he could persuade himself to a\nsane and perspicuous consideration of these statistically apparent\nmerits of the case alone. It is at least safely to be presumed that he\nhas nothing to lose, in a material way, and there is reason to look for\nsome slight gain in creature comforts and in security of life and limb,\nconsequent upon the elimination, or at least the partial\ndisestablishment, of pecuniary necessity as the sole bond and criterion\nof use and wont in economic concerns.\n\nBut man lives not by bread alone. In point of fact, and particularly as\ntouches the springs of action among that common run that do not\nhabitually formulate their aspirations and convictions in extended and\ngrammatically defensible documentary form, and the drift of whose\nimpulses therefore is not masked or deflected by the illusive\nconsistencies of set speech,--as touches the common run, particularly,\nit will hold true with quite an unacknowledged generality that the\nmaterial means of life are, after all, means only; and that when the\nquestion of what things are worth while is brought to the final test, it\nis not these means, nor the life conditioned on these means, that are\nseen to serve as the decisive criterion; but always it is some\nulterior, immaterial end, in the pursuit of which these material means\nfind their ulterior ground of valuation. Neither the overt testimony nor\nthe circumstantial evidence to this effect is unequivocal; but seen in\ndue perspective, and regard being had chiefly to the springs of\nconcerted action as shown in any massive movement of this common run of\nmankind, there is, after all, little room to question that the things\nwhich commend themselves as indefeasibly worth while are the things of\nthe human spirit.\n\nThese ideals, aspirations, aims, ends of endeavour, are by no means of a\nuniform or homogeneous character throughout the modern communities,\nstill less throughout the civilised world, or throughout the checkered\nrange of classes and conditions of men; but, with such frequency and\namplitude that it must be taken as a major premise in any attempted\ninsight into human behaviour, it will hold true that they are of a\nspiritual, immaterial nature.\n\nThe caution may, parenthetically, not be out of place, that this\ncharacterisation of the ulterior springs of action as essentially not of\nthe nature of creature comforts, need be taken in no wider extension\nthan that which so is specifically given it. It will be found to apply\nas touches the conduct of the common run; what modification of it might\nbe required to make it at all confidently applicable to the case of one\nand another of those classes into whose scheme of life creature comforts\nenter with more pronounced effect may be more of a delicate point. But\nsince it is the behaviour, and the grounds of behaviour, of the common\nrun that are here in question, the case of their betters in this respect\nmay conveniently be left on one side.\n\nThe question in hand touches the behavior of the common man, taken in\nthe aggregate, in face of the quandary into which circumstances have led\nhim; since the question of what these modern peoples will do is after\nall a question of what the common man in the aggregate will do, of his\nown motion or by persuasion. His betters may be in a position to guide,\npersuade, cajole, mislead, and victimise him; for among the many\nsingular conceits that beset the common man is the persuasion that his\nbetters are in some way better than he, wiser, more beneficent. But the\ncourse that may so be chosen, with or without guidance or persuasion\nfrom the superior classes, as well as the persistence and energy with\nwhich this course is pursued, is conditioned on the frame of mind of the\ncommon run.\n\nJust what will be the nature and the concrete expression of these ideal\naspirations that move the common run is a matter of habitual\npreconceptions; and habits of thought vary from one people to another\naccording to the diversity of experience to which they have been\nexposed. Among the Western nations the national prestige has come to\nseem worth while as an ulterior end, perhaps beyond all else that is\ncomprised in the secular scheme of things desirable to be had or to be\nachieved. And in the apprehension of such of them as have best preserved\nthe habits of thought induced by a long experience in feudal subjection,\nthe service of the sovereign or the dynasty still stands over as the\nsubstantial core of the cultural scheme, upon which sentiment and\nendeavour converge. In the past ages of the democratic peoples, as well\nas in the present-day use and wont among subjects of the dynastic\nStates--as e.g., Japan or Germany--men are known to have resolutely\nrisked, and lost, their life for the sake of the sovereign's renown, or\neven to save the sovereign's life; whereas, of course, even the\nslightest and most nebulous reflection would make it manifest that in\npoint of net material utility the sovereign's decease is an idle matter\nas compared with the loss of an able-bodied workman. The sovereign may\nalways be replaced, with some prospect of public advantage, or failing\nthat, it should be remarked that a regency or inter-regnum will commonly\nbe a season of relatively economical administration. Again, religious\nenthusiasm, and the furtherance of religious propaganda, may come to\nserve the same general purpose as these secular ideals, and will perhaps\nserve it just as well. Certain \"principles,\" of personal liberty and of\nopportunity for creative self-direction and an intellectually worthy\nlife, perhaps may also become the idols of the people, for which they\nwill then be willing to risk their material fortune; and where this has\nhappened, as among the democratic peoples of Christendom, it is not\nselfishly for their own personal opportunity to live untroubled under\nthe light of these high principles that these opinionated men are ready\nto contend, but rather impersonally for the human right which under\nthese principles is the due of all mankind, and particularly of the\nincoming and of later generations.\n\nOn these and the like intangible ends the common man is set with such\ninveterate predilection that he will, on provocation, stick at nothing\nto put the project through. For such like ends the common man will lay\ndown his life; at least, so they say. There may always be something of\nrhetorical affectation in it all; but, after all, there is sufficient\nevidence to hand of such substance and tenacity in the common man's hold\non these ideal aspirations, on these idols of his human spirit, as to\nwarrant the assertion that he is, rather commonly, prepared to go to\ngreater lengths in the furtherance of these immaterial gains that are to\ninure to someone else than for any personal end of his own, in the way\nof creature comforts or even of personal renown.\n\nFor such ends the common man, in democratic Christendom is, on\nprovocation, willing to die; or again, the patient and perhaps more\nfar-seeing common man of pagan China is willing to live for these idols\nof an inveterate fancy, through endless contumely and hard usage. The\nconventional Chinese preconceptions, in the way of things that are worth\nwhile in their own right, appear to differ from those current in the\nOccident in such a way that the preconceived ideal is not to be realised\nexcept by way of continued life. The common man's accountability to the\ncause of humanity, in China, is of so intimately personal a character\nthat he can meet it only by tenaciously holding his place in the\nsequence of generations; whereas among the peoples of Christendom there\nhas arisen out of their contentious past a preconception to the effect\nthat this human duty to mankind is of the nature of a debt, which can be\ncancelled by bankruptcy proceedings, so that the man who unprofitably\ndies fighting for the cause has thereby constructively paid the\nreckoning in full.\n\nEvidently, if the common man of these modern nations that are\nprospectively to be brought under tutelage of the Imperial government\ncould be brought to the frame of mind that is habitual with his Chinese\ncounterpart, there should be a fair hope that pacific counsels would\nprevail and that Christendom would so come in for a regime of peace by\nsubmission under this Imperial tutelage. But there are always these\npreconceptions of self-will and insubordination to be counted with\namong these nations, and there is the ancient habit of a contentious\nnational solidarity in defense of the nation's prestige, more urgent\namong these peoples than any sentiment of solidarity with mankind at\nlarge, or any ulterior gain in civilisation that might come of continued\ndiscipline in the virtues of patience and diligence under distasteful\ncircumstances.\n\nThe occidental conception of manhood is in some considerable measure\ndrawn in negative terms. So much so that whenever a question of the\nmanly virtues comes under controversy it presently appears that at least\nthe indispensable minimum, and indeed the ordinary marginal modicum, of\nwhat is requisite to a worthy manner of life is habitually formulated in\nterms of what not. This appearance is doubtless misleading if taken\nwithout the universally understood postulate on the basis of which\nnegative demands are formulated. There is a good deal of what would be\ncalled historical accident in all this. The indispensable demands of\nthis modern manhood take the form of refusal to obey extraneous\nauthority on compulsion; of exemption from coercive direction and\nsubservience; of insubordination, in short. But it is always understood\nas a matter of course that this insubordination is a refusal to submit\nto irresponsible or autocratic rule. Stated from the positive side it\nwould be freedom from restraint by or obedience to any authority not\nconstituted by express advice and consent of the governed. And as near\nas it may be formulated, when reduced to the irreducible minimum of\nconcrete proviso, this is the final substance of things which neither\nshame nor honour will permit the modern civilised man to yield. To no\narrangement for the abrogation of this minimum of free initiative and\nself-direction will he consent to be a party, whether it touches the\nconditions of life for his own people who are to come after, or as\ntouches the fortunes of such aliens as are of a like mind on this head\nand are unable to make head against invasion of these human rights from\noutside.\n\nAs has just been remarked, the negative form so often taken by these\ndemands is something of an historical accident, due to the fact that\nthese modern peoples came into their highly esteemed system of Natural\nLiberty out of an earlier system of positive checks on self-direction\nand initiative; a system, in effect, very much after the fashion of that\nImperial jurisdiction that still prevails in the dynastic States--as,\ne.g., Germany or Japan--whose projected dominion is now the immediate\nobject of apprehension and repugnance. How naively the negative\nformulation gained acceptance, and at the same time how intrinsic to the\nnew dispensation was the aspiration for free initiative, appears in the\nconfident assertion of its most genial spokesman, that when these\npositive checks are taken away, \"The simple and obvious system of\nNatural Liberty establishes itself of its own accord.\"\n\nThe common man, in these modern communities, shows a brittle temper when\nany overt move is made against this heritage of civil liberty. He may\nnot be altogether well advised in respect of what liberties he will\ndefend and what he will submit to; but the fact is to be counted with in\nany projected peace, that there is always this refractory residue of\nterms not open to negotiation or compromise. Now it also happens, also\nby historical accident, that these residual principles of civil liberty\nhave come to blend and coalesce with a stubborn preconception of\nnational integrity and national prestige. So that in the workday\napprehension of the common man, not given to analytic excursions, any\ninfraction of the national integrity or any abatement of the national\nprestige has come to figure as an insufferable infringement on his\npersonal liberty and on those principles of humanity that make up the\ncategorical articles of the secular creed of Christendom. The fact may\nbe patent on reflection that the common man's substantial interest in\nthe national integrity is slight and elusive, and that in sober common\nsense the national prestige has something less than a neutral value to\nhim; but this state of the substantially pertinent facts is not greatly\nof the essence of the case, since his preconceptions in these premises\ndo not run to that effect, and since they are of too hard and fast a\ntexture to suffer any serious abatement within such a space of time as\ncan come in question here and now.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe outlook for a speedy settlement of the world's peace on a plan of\nunconditional surrender to the projected Imperial dominion seems\nunpromisingly dubious, in view of the stubborn temper shown by these\nmodern peoples wherever their preconceived ideas of right and honest\nliving appear to be in jeopardy; and the expediency of entering into any\nnegotiated compact of diplomatic engagements and assurances designed to\nserve as groundwork to an eventual enterprise of that kind must\ntherefore also be questionable in a high degree. It is even doubtful if\nany allowance of time can be counted on to bring these modern peoples to\na more reasonable, more worldly-wise, frame of mind; so that they would\ncome to see their interest in such an arrangement, or would divest\nthemselves of their present stubborn and perhaps fantastic prejudice\nagainst an autocratic regime of the kind spoken for. At least for the\npresent any such hope of a peaceable settlement seems illusive. What\nmay be practicable in this way in the course of time is of course still\nmore obscure; but argument on the premises which the present affords\ndoes not point to a substantially different outcome in the calculable\nfuture.\n\nFor the immediate future--say, within the life-time of the oncoming\ngeneration--the spiritual state of the peoples concerned in this\ninternational quandary is not likely to undergo so radical a change as\nto seriously invalidate an argument that proceeds on the present lie of\nthe land in this respect. Preconceptions are a work of habit impinging\non a given temperamental bent; and where, as in these premises, the\npreconceptions have taken on an institutionalised form, have become\nconventionalised and commonly accepted, and so have been woven into the\ntexture of popular common sense, they must needs be a work of protracted\nand comprehensive habituation impinging on a popular temperamental bent\nof so general a prevalence that it may be called congenital to the\ncommunity at large. A heritable bent pervading the group within which\ninheritance runs, does not change, so long as the racial complexion of\nthe group remains passably intact; a conventionalised, commonly\nestablished habit of mind will change only slowly, commonly not without\nthe passing of at least one generation, and only by grace of a\nsufficiently searching and comprehensive discipline of experience. For\ngood or ill, the current situation is to be counted on not to lose\ncharacter over night or with a revolution of the seasons, so far as\nconcerns these spiritual factors that make or mar the fortunes of\nnations.\n\nAt the same time these spiritual assets, being of the nature of habit,\nare also bound to change character more or less radically, by insensible\nshifting of ground, but incontinently,--provided only that the\nconditions of life, and therefore the discipline of experience, undergo\nany substantial change. So the immediate interest shifts to the\npresumptive rate and character of those changes that are in prospect,\ndue to the unremitting change of circumstances under which these modern\npeoples live and to the discipline of which they are unavoidably\nexposed. For the present and for the immediate future the current state\nof things is a sufficiently stable basis of argument; but assurance as\nto the sufficiency of the premises afforded by the current state of\nthings thins out in proportion as the perspective of the argument runs\nout into the succeeding years. The bearing of it all is two-fold, of\ncourse. This progressive, cumulative habituation under changing\ncircumstances affects the case both of those democratic peoples whose\nfortunes are in the hazard, and also of those dynastic States by whom\nthe projected enterprise in dominion is to be carried into effect.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe case of the two formidable dynastic States whose names have been\ncoupled together in what has already been said is perhaps the more\nimmediately interesting in the present connection. As matters stand, and\nin the measure in which they continue so to stand, the case of these is\nin no degree equivocal. The two dynastic establishments seek dominion,\nand indeed they seek nothing else, except incidentally to and in\nfurtherance of the main quest. As has been remarked before, it lies in\nthe nature of a dynastic State to seek dominion, that being the whole of\nits nature in so far as it runs true to form. But a dynastic State, like\nany other settled, institutionalised community of men, rests on and\ndraws its effectual driving force from the habit of mind of its\nunderlying community, the common man in the aggregate, his\npreconceptions and ideals as to what things are worth while. Without a\nsuitable spiritual ground of this kind such a dynastic State passes out\nof the category of formidable Powers and into that of precarious\ndespotism.\n\nIn both of the two States here in question the dynastic establishment\nand its bodyguard of officials and gentlefolk may be counted on to\npersevere in the faith that now animates them, until an uneasy\ndisplacement of sentiment among the underlying populace may in time\ninduce them judiciously to shift their footing. Like the ruling classes\nelsewhere, they are of a conservative temper and may be counted on so to\ncontinue. They are also not greatly exposed to the discipline of\nexperience that makes for adaptive change in habits of life, and\ntherefore in the correlated habits of thought. It is always the common\nman that is effectually reached by any exacting or wide-reaching change\nin the conditions of life. He is relatively unsheltered from any forces\nthat make for adaptive change, as contrasted with the case of his\nbetters; and however sluggish and reluctant may be his response to such\ndiscipline as makes for a displacement of outworn preconceptions, yet it\nis always out of the mass of this common humanity that those movements\nof disaffection and protest arise, which lead, on occasion, to any\nmaterial realignment of the institutional fabric or to any substantial\nshift in the line of policy to be pursued under the guidance of their\nbetters.\n\nThe common mass of humanity, it may be said in parenthesis, is of course\nnot a homogeneous body. Uncommon men, in point of native gifts of\nintelligence, sensibility, or personal force, will occur as frequently,\nin proportion to the aggregate numbers, among the common mass as among\ntheir betters. Since in any one of these nations of Christendom, with\ntheir all-inclusive hybridisation, the range, frequency and amplitude of\nvariations in hereditary endowment is the same throughout all classes.\nClass differentiation is a matter of habit and convention; and in\ndistinction from his betters the common man is common only in point of\nnumbers and in point of the more general and more exacting conditions to\nwhich he is exposed. He is in a position to be more hardly ridden by the\ndiscipline of experience, and is at the same time held more consistently\nto such a body of preconceptions, and to such changes only in this body\nof preconceptions, as fall in with the drift of things in a larger mass\nof humanity. But all the while it is the discipline which impinges on\nthe sensibilities of this common mass that shapes the spiritual attitude\nand temper of the community and so defines what may and what may not be\nundertaken by the constituted leaders. So that, in a way, these dynastic\nStates are at the mercy of that popular sentiment whose creatures they\nare, and are subject to undesired changes of direction and efficiency in\ntheir endeavors, contingent on changes in the popular temper; over which\nthey have only a partial, and on the whole a superficial control.\n\nA relatively powerful control and energetic direction of the popular\ntemper is and has been exercised by these dynastic establishments, with\na view to its utilisation in the pursuit of the dynastic enterprise; and\nmuch has visibly been accomplished in that way; chiefly, perhaps, by\nmilitary discipline in subordination to personal authority, and also by\nan unsparing surveillance of popular education, with a view to fortify\nthe preconceptions handed down from the passing order as well as to\neliminate all subversive innovation. Yet in spite of all the\nwell-conceived and shrewdly managed endeavors of the German Imperial\nsystem in this direction, e.g., there has been evidence of an obscurely\ngrowing uneasiness, not to say disaffection, among the underlying mass.\nSo much so that hasty observers, and perhaps biased, have reached the\ninference that one of the immediate contributory causes that led to the\npresent war was the need of a heroic remedy to correct this untoward\ndrift of sentiment.\n\nFor the German people the government of the present dynastic incumbent\nhas done all that could (humanly speaking) be expected in the way of\nendeavoring to conserve the passing order and to hold the popular\nimagination to the received feudalistic ideals of loyal service. And yet\nthe peoples of the Empire are already caught in the net of that newer\norder which they are now endeavoring to break by force of arms. They are\ninextricably implicated in the cultural complex of Christendom; and\nwithin this Western culture those peoples to whom it fell to lead the\nexodus out of the Egypt of feudalism have come quite naturally to set\nthe pace in all the larger conformities of civilised life. Within the\nconfines of Christendom today, for good or ill, whatever usage or\ncustomary rule of conduct falls visibly short of the precedent set by\nthese cultural pioneers is felt to fall beneath the prescriptive\ncommonplace level of civilisation. Failure to adopt and make use of\nthose tried institutional expedients on which these peoples of the\nadvance guard have set their mark of authentication is today\npresumptively a mistake and an advantage foregone; and a people who are\ndenied the benefit of these latterday ways and means of civic life are\nuneasy with a sense of grievance at the hands of their rulers. Besides\nwhich, the fashion in articles of institutional equipage so set by the\nauthentic pioneers of culture has also come to be mandatory, as a\npunctilio of the governmental proprieties; so that no national\nestablishment which aspires to a decorous appearance in the eyes of the\ncivilised world can longer afford to be seen without them. The forms at\nleast must be observed. Hence the \"representative\" and\npseudo-representative institutions of these dynastic States.\n\nThese dynastic States among the rest have partly followed the dictates\nof civilised fashion, partly yielded to the, more or less intelligent,\nsolicitations of their subjects, or the spokesmen of their subjects, and\nhave installed institutional apparatus of this modern pattern--more in\npoint of form than of substance, perhaps. Yet in time the adoption of\nthe forms is likely to have an effect, if changing circumstances favor\ntheir taking effect. Such has on the whole been the experience of those\npeoples who have gone before along this trail of political advance. As\ninstance the growth of discretionary powers under the hands of\nparliamentary representatives in those cases where the movement has gone\non longest and farthest; and these instances should not be considered\nidle, as intimations of what may presumptively be looked for under the\nImperial establishments of Germany or Japan. It may be true that\nhitherto, along with the really considerable volume of imitative\ngestures of discretionary deliberation delegated to these parliamentary\nbodies, they have as regards all graver matters brought to their notice\nonly been charged with a (limited) power to talk. It may be true that,\nfor the present, on critical or weighty measures the parliamentary\ndiscretion extends no farther than respectfully to say: \"_Ja wohl_!\" But\nthen, _Ja wohl_ is also something; and there is no telling where it may\nall lead to in the long course of years. One has a vague apprehension\nthat this \"_Ja wohl_!\" may some day come to be a customarily necessary\nform of authentication, so that with-holding it (_Behuet' es Gott_!) may\neven come to count as an effectual veto on measures so pointedly\nneglected. More particularly will the formalities of representation and\nself-government be likely to draw the substance of such like \"free\ninstitutions\" into the effectual conduct of public affairs if it turns\nout that the workday experiences of these people takes a turn more\nconducive to habits of insubordination than has been the case hitherto.\n\nIndications are, again, not wanting, that even in the Empire the\ndiscipline of workday experience is already diverging from that line\nthat once trained the German subjects into the most loyal and unrepining\nsubservience to dynastic ambitions. Of course, just now, under the\nshattering impact of warlike atrocities and patriotic clamour, the\nworkday spirit of insubordination and critical scrutiny is gone out of\nsight and out of hearing.\n\nSomething of this inchoate insubordination has showed itself repeatedly\nduring the present reign, sufficient to provoke many shrewd protective\nmeasures on the side of the dynastic establishment, both by way of\npolitical strategy and by arbitrary control. Disregarding many minor and\ninconsequential divisions of opinion and counsel among the German people\nduring this eventful reign, the political situation has been moving on\nthe play of three, incipiently divergent, strains of interest and\nsentiment: (a) the dynasty (together with the Agrarians, of whom in a\nsense the dynasty is a part); (b) the businessmen, or commercial\ninterest (including investors); and (c) the industrial workmen.\nDoubtless it would be easier to overstate than to indicate with any nice\nprecision what has been the nature, and especially the degree, of this\nalienation of sentiment and divergence of conscious interest among these\nseveral elements. It is not that there has at any point been a\nperceptible faltering in respect of loyalty to the crown as such. But\nsince the crown belongs, by origin, tradition, interest and spiritual\nidentity, in the camp of the Agrarians, the situation has been such as\nwould inevitably take on a character of disaffection toward the dynastic\nestablishment, in the conceivable absence of that strong surviving\nsentiment of dynastic loyalty that still animates all classes and\nconditions of men in the Fatherland. It would accordingly, again, be an\noverstatement to say that the crown has been standing precariously at\nthe apex of a political triangle, the other two corners of which are\noccupied by these two divided and potentially recalcitrant elements of\nthe body politic, held apart by class antipathy and divergent pecuniary\ninterest, and held in check by divided counsels; but something after\nthat fashion is what would have resulted under similar conditions of\nstrain in any community where the modern spirit of insubordination has\ntaken effect in any large measure.\n\nBoth of these elements of incipient disturbance in the dynastic economy,\nthe modern commercial and working classes, are creatures of the new era;\nand they are systematically out of line with the received dynastic\ntradition of fealty, both in respect of their pecuniary interests and in\nrespect of that discipline of experience to which their workday\nemployment subjects them. They are substantially the same two classes or\ngroupings that came forward in the modernisation of the British\ncommunity, with a gradual segregation of interest and a consequent\ninduced solidarity of class sentiment and class animosities. But with\nthe difference that in the British case the movement of changing\ncircumstances was slow enough to allow a fair degree of habituation to\nthe altered economic conditions; whereas in the German case the move\ninto modern economic conditions has been made so precipitately as to\nhave carried the mediaeval frame of mind over virtually intact into this\nera of large business and machine industry. In the Fatherland the\ncommercial and industrial classes have been called on to play their part\nwithout time to learn their lines.\n\nThe case of the English-speaking peoples, who have gone over this course\nof experience in more consecutive fashion than any others, teaches that\nin the long run, if these modern economic conditions persist, one or the\nother or both of these creatures of the modern era must prevail, and\nmust put the dynastic establishment out of commission; although the\nsequel has not yet been seen in this British case, and there is no\nground afforded for inference as to which of the two will have the\nfortune to survive and be invested with the hegemony. Meantime the\nopportunity of the Imperial establishment to push its enterprise in\ndominion lies in the interval of time so required for the discipline of\nexperience under modern conditions to work out through the growth of\nmodern habits of thought into such modern (i.e. civilised) institutional\nforms and such settled principles of personal insubordination as will\nput any effectual dynastic establishment out of commission. The same\ninterval of time, that must so be allowed for the decay of the dynastic\nspirit among the German people under the discipline of life by the\nmethods of modern trade and industry, marks the period during which no\npeace compact will be practicable, except with the elimination of the\nImperial establishment as a possible warlike power. All this, of\ncourse, applies to the case of Japan as well, with the difference that\nwhile the Japanese people are farther in arrears, they are also a\nsmaller, less formidable body, more exposed to outside forces, and their\nmediaevalism is of a more archaic and therefore more precarious type.\n\nWhat length of time will be required for this decay of the dynastic\nspirit among the people of the Empire is, of course, impossible to say.\nThe factors of the case are not of a character to admit anything like\ncalculation of the rate of movement; but in the nature of the factors\ninvolved it is also contained that something of a movement in this\ndirection is unavoidable, under Providence. As a preliminary\nconsideration, these peoples of the Empire and its allies, as well as\ntheir enemies in the great war, will necessarily come out of their\nwarlike experience in a more patriotic and more vindictive frame of mind\nthan that in which they entered on this adventure. Fighting makes for\nmalevolence. The war is itself to be counted as a set-back. A very large\nproportion of those who have lived through it will necessarily carry a\nwarlike bent through life. By that much, whatever it may count for, the\ndecay of the dynastic spirit--or the growth of tolerance and equity in\nnational sentiment, if one chooses to put it that way--will be retarded\nfrom beforehand. So also the Imperial establishment, or whatever is left\nof it, may be counted on to do everything in its power to preserve the\npopular spirit of loyalty and national animosity, by all means at its\ndisposal; since the Imperial establishment finally rests on the\neffectual body of national animosity. What hindrance will come in from\nthis agency of retardation can at least vaguely be guessed at, in the\nlight of what has been accomplished in that way under the strenuously\nreactionary rule of the present reign.\n\nAgain, there is the chance, as there always is a chance of human folly,\nthat the neighboring peoples will undertake, whether jointly or\nseverally, to restrict or prohibit trade relations between the people of\nthe Empire and their enemies in the present war; thereby fomenting\ninternational animosity, as well as contributing directly to the\neconomic readiness for war both on their own part and on that of the\nEmpire. This is also, and in an eminent degree, an unknown factor in the\ncase, on which not even a reasonable guess can be made beforehand. These\nare, all and several, reactionary agencies, factors of retardation,\nmaking for continuation of the current international situation of\nanimosity, distrust, chicane, trade rivalry, competitive armament, and\neventual warlike enterprise.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo offset these agencies of conservatism there is nothing much that can\nbe counted on but that slow, random, and essentially insidious working\nof habituation that tends to the obsolescence of the received\npreconceptions; partly by supplanting them with something new, but more\neffectually by their falling into disuse and decay. There is, it will\nhave to be admitted, little of a positive character that can be done\ntoward the installation of a regime of peace and good-will. The\nendeavours of the pacifists should suffice to convince any dispassionate\nobserver of the substantial futility of creative efforts looking to such\nan end. Much can doubtless be done in the way of precautionary measures,\nmostly of a negative character, in the way especially of removing\nsources of infection and (possibly) of so sterilising the apparatus of\nnational life that its working shall neither maintain animosities and\ninterests at variance with the conditions of peace nor contribute to\ntheir spread and growth.\n\nThere is necessarily little hope or prospect that any national\nestablishment will contribute materially or in any direct way to the\nobsolescence of warlike sentiments and ambitions; since such\nestablishments are designed for the making of war by keeping national\njealousies intact, and their accepted place in affairs is that of\npreparation for eventual hostilities, defensive or offensive. Except for\nthe contingency of eventual hostilities, no national establishment could\nbe kept in countenance. They would all fall into the decay of desuetude,\njust as has happened to the dynastic establishments among those peoples\nwho have (passably) lost the spirit of dynastic aggression.\n\nThe modern industrial occupations, the modern technology, and that\nmodern empirical science that runs so close to the frontiers of\ntechnology, all work at cross purposes with the received preconceptions\nof the nationalist order; and in a more pronounced degree they are at\ncross purposes with that dynastic order of preconceptions that converges\non Imperial dominion. The like is true, with a difference, of the ways,\nmeans and routine of business enterprise as it is conducted in the\ncommercialised communities of today. The working of these agencies runs\nto this effect not by way of deliberate and destructive antagonism, but\nalmost wholly by force of systematic, though unintended and incidental,\nneglect of those values, standards, verities, and grounds of\ndiscrimination and conviction that make up the working realities of the\nnational spirit and of dynastic ambition. The working concepts of this\nnew, essentially mechanistic, order of human interests, do not\nnecessarily clash with those of the old order, essentially the order of\npersonages and personalities; the two are incommensurable, and they are\nincompatible only in the sense and degree implied in that state of the\ncase. The profoundest and most meritorious truths of dynastic politics\ncan on no provocation and by no sleight of hand be brought within the\nlogic of that system of knowledge and appraisal of values by which the\nmechanistic technology proceeds. Within the premises of this modern\nmechanistic industry and science all the best values and verities of the\ndynastic order are simply \"incompetent, irrelevant and impertinent.\"\n\nThere is accordingly no unavoidable clash and no necessary friction\nbetween the two schemes of knowledge or the two habits of mind that\ncharacterise the two contrasted cultural eras. It is only that a given\nindividual--call him the common man--will not be occupied with both of\nthese incommensurable systems of logic and appreciation at the same time\nor bearing on the same point; and further that in proportion as his\nwaking hours and his mental energy are fully occupied within the lines\nof one of these systems of knowledge, design and employment, in much the\nsame measure he will necessarily neglect the other, and in time he will\nlose proficiency and interest in its pursuits and its conclusions. The\nman who is so held by his daily employment and his life-long attention\nwithin the range of habits of thought that are valid in the mechanistic\ntechnology, will, on an average and in the long run, lose his grip on\nthe spiritual virtues of national prestige and dynastic primacy; \"for\nthey are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they\nare spiritually discerned.\"\n\nNot that the adepts in this modern mechanistic system of knowledge and\ndesign may not also be very good patriots and devoted servants of the\ndynasty. The artless and, on the whole, spontaneous riot of dynastic\navidity displayed to the astonished eyes of their fellow craftsmen in\nthe neutral countries by the most eminent scientists of the Fatherland\nduring the early months of the war should be sufficient warning that the\narchaic preconceptions do not hurriedly fly out of the window when the\nhabits of thought of the mechanistic order come in at the door. But with\nthe passage of time, pervasively, by imperceptible displacement, by the\ndecay of habitual disuse, as well as by habitual occupation with these\nother and unrelated ways and means of knowledge and belief, dynastic\nloyalty and the like conceptions in the realm of religion and magic pass\nout of the field of attention and fall insensibly into the category of\nthe lost arts. Particularly will this be true of the common man, who\nlives, somewhat characteristically, in the mass and in the present, and\nwhose waking hours are somewhat fully occupied with what he has to do.\n\nWith the commercial interests the Imperial establishment can probably\nmake such terms as to induce their support of the dynastic enterprise,\nsince they can apparently always be made to believe that an extension of\nthe Imperial dominion will bring correspondingly increased opportunities\nof trade. It is doubtless a mistake, but it is commonly believed by the\ninterested parties, which is just as good for the purpose as if it were\ntrue. And it should be added that in this, as in other instances of the\nquest of larger markets, the costs are to be paid by someone else than\nthe presumed commercial beneficiaries; which brings the matter under the\ndearest principle known to businessmen: that of getting something for\nnothing. It will not be equally easy to keep the affections of the\ncommon man loyal to the dynastic enterprise when he begins to lose his\ngrip on the archaic faith in dynastic dominion and comes to realise that\nhe has also--individually and in the mass--no material interest even in\nthe defense of the Fatherland, much less in the further extension of\nImperial rule.\n\nBut the time when this process of disillusionment and decay of ideals\nshall have gone far enough among the common run to afford no secure\nfooting in popular sentiment for the contemplated Imperial\nenterprise,--this time is doubtless far in the future, as compared with\nthe interval of preparation required for a new onset. Habituation takes\ntime, particularly such habituation as can be counted on to derange the\nhabitual bent of a great population in respect of their dearest\npreconceptions. It will take a very appreciable space of time even in\nthe case of a populace so accessible to new habits of thought as the\nGerman people are by virtue of their slight percentage of illiteracy,\nthe very large proportion engaged in those modern industries that\nconstantly require some intelligent insight into mechanistic facts, the\ndensity of population and the adequate means of communication, and the\nextent to which the whole population is caught in the web of\nmechanically standardised processes that condition their daily life at\nevery turn. As regards their technological situation, and their exposure\nto the discipline of industrial life, no other population of nearly the\nsame volume is placed in a position so conducive to a rapid acquirement\nof the spirit of the modern era. But, also, no other people comparable\nwith the population of the Fatherland has so large and well-knit a body\nof archaic preconceptions to unlearn. Their nearest analogue, of course,\nis the Japanese nation.\n\nIn all this there is, of course, no inclination to cast a slur on the\nGerman people. In point of racial characteristics there is no difference\nbetween them and their neighbours. And there is no reason to question\ntheir good intentions. Indeed, it may safely be asserted that no people\nis more consciously well-meaning than the children of the Fatherland. It\nis only that, with their archaic preconceptions of what is right and\nmeritorious, their best intentions spell malevolence when projected into\nthe civilised world as it stands today. And by no fault of theirs. Nor\nis it meant to be intimated that their rate of approach to the accepted\nOccidental standard of institutional maturity will be unduly slow or\nunduly reluctant, so soon as the pertinent facts of modern life begin\neffectively to shape their habits of thought. It is only that, human\nnature--and human second nature--being what it always has been, the rate\nof approach of the German people to a passably neutral complexion in\nmatters of international animosity and aggression must necessarily be\nslow enough to allow ample time for the renewed preparation of a more\nunsparing and redoubtable endeavour on the part of the Imperial\nestablishment.\n\nWhat makes this German Imperial establishment redoubtable, beyond\ncomparison, is the very simple but also very grave combination of\ncircumstances whereby the German people have acquired the use of the\nmodern industrial arts in the highest state of efficiency, at the same\ntime that they have retained unabated the fanatical loyalty of feudal\nbarbarism.[9] So long, and in so far, as this conjunction of forces\nholds there is no outlook for peace except on the elimination of\nGermany as a power capable of disturbing the peace.\n\n[Footnote 9: For an extended discussion of this point, see _Imperial\nGermany and the Industrial Revolution_, especially ch. v. and vi.]\n\nIt may seem invidious to speak so recurrently of the German Imperial\nestablishment as the sole potential disturber of the peace in Europe.\nThe reason for so singling out the Empire for this invidious\ndistinction--of merit or demerit, as one may incline to take it--is that\nthe facts run that way. There is, of course, other human material, and\nno small volume of it in the aggregate, that is of much the same\ncharacter, and serviceable for the same purposes as the resources and\nman-power of the Empire. But this other material can come effectually\ninto bearing as a means of disturbance only in so far as it clusters\nabout the Imperial dynasty and marches under his banners. In so speaking\nof the Imperial establishment as the sole enemy of a European peace,\ntherefore, these outlying others are taken for granted, very much as one\ntakes the nimbus for granted in speaking of one of the greater saints of\nGod.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSo the argument returns to the alternative: Peace by unconditional\nsurrender and submission, or peace by elimination of Imperial Germany\n(and Japan). There is no middle course apparent. The old-fashioned--that\nis to say nineteenth-century--plan of competitive defensive armament and\na balance of powers has been tried, and it has not proved to be a\nsuccess, even so early in the twentieth century. This plan offers a\nsubstitute (_Ersatz_) for peace; but even as such it has become\nimpracticable. The modern, or rather the current late-modern, state of\nthe industrial arts does not tolerate it. Technological knowledge has\nthrown the advantage in military affairs definitively to the offensive,\nparticularly to the offensive that is prepared beforehand with the\nsuitable appliances and with men ready matured in that rigorous and\nprotracted training by which alone they can become competent to make\nwarlike use of these suitable appliances provided by the modern\ntechnology. At the same time, and by grace of the same advance in\ntechnology, any well-designed offensive can effectually reach any given\ncommunity, in spite of distance or of other natural obstacles. The era\nof defensive armaments and diplomatic equilibration, as a substitute for\npeace, has been definitively closed by the modern state of the\nindustrial arts.\n\nOf the two alternatives spoken of above, the former--peace by submission\nunder an alien dynasty--is presumably not a practicable solution, as has\nappeared in the course of the foregoing argument.\n\nThe modern nations are not spiritually ripe for it. Whether they have\nreached even that stage of national sobriety, or neutrality, that would\nenable them to live at peace among themselves after elimination of the\nImperial Powers is still open to an uneasy doubt. It would be by a\nprecarious margin that they can be counted on so to keep the peace in\nthe absence of provocation from without the pale. Their predilection for\npeace goes to no greater lengths than is implied in the formula: Peace\nwith Honour; which assuredly does not cover a peace of non-resistance,\nand which, in effect, leaves the distinction between an offensive and a\ndefensive war somewhat at loose ends. The national prestige is still a\nlive asset in the mind of these peoples; and the limit of tolerance in\nrespect of this patriotic animosity appears to be drawn appreciably\ncloser than the formula cited above would necessarily presume. They will\nfight on provocation, and the degree of provocation required to upset\nthe serenity of these sportsmanlike modern peoples is a point on which\nthe shrewdest guesses may diverge. Still, opinion runs more and more\nconsistently to the effect that if these modern--say the French and the\nEnglish-speaking--peoples were left to their own devices the peace might\nfairly be counted on to be kept between them indefinitely, barring\nunforeseen contingencies.\n\nExperience teaches that warlike enterprise on a moderate scale and as a\nside interest is by no means incompatible with such a degree of neutral\nanimus as these peoples have yet acquired,--e.g., the Spanish-American\nwar, which was made in America, or the Boer war, which was made in\nEngland. But these wars, in spite of the dimensions which they presently\ntook on, were after all of the nature of episodes,--the one chiefly an\nextension of sportsmanship, which engaged the best attention of only the\nmore sportsmanlike elements, the other chiefly engineered by certain\nbusiness interests with a callous view to getting something for nothing.\nBoth episodes came to be serious enough, both in their immediate\nincidence and in their consequences; but neither commanded the\ndeliberate and cordial support of the community at large. There is a\nmeretricious air over both; and there is apparent a popular inclination\nto condone rather than to take pride in these _faits accomplis_. The one\nexcursion was a product of sportsmanlike bravado, fed on boyish\nexuberance, fomented for mercenary objects by certain business interests\nand place-hunting politicians, and incited by meretricious newspapers\nwith a view to increase their circulation. The other was set afoot by\ninterested businessmen, backed by politicians, seconded by newspapers,\nand borne by the community at large, in great part under\nmisapprehension and stung by wounded pride.\n\nOpinions will diverge widely as to the chances of peace in a community\nof nations among whom episodes of this character, and of such\ndimensions, have been somewhat more than tolerated in the immediate\npast. But the consensus of opinion in these same countries appears to be\nsetting with fair consistency to the persuasion that the popular spirit\nshown in these and in analogous conjunctures in the recent past gives\nwarrant that peace is deliberately desired and is likely to be\nmaintained, barring unforeseen contingencies.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the large, the measures conducive to the perpetuation of peace, and\nnecessary to be taken, are simple and obvious; and they are largely of a\nnegative character, exploits of omission and neglect. Under modern\nconditions, and barring aggression from without, the peace is kept by\navoiding the breaking of it. It does not break of itself,--in the\nabsence of such national establishments as are organised with the sole\nulterior view of warlike enterprise. A policy of peace is obviously a\npolicy of avoidance,--avoidance of offense and of occasion for\nannoyance.\n\nWhat is required to insure the maintenance of peace among pacific\nnations is the neutralisation of all those human relations out of which\ninternational grievances are wont to arise. And what is necessary to\nassure a reasonable expectation of continued peace is the neutralisation\nof so much of these relations as the patriotic self-conceit and\ncredulity of these peoples will permit. These two formulations are by no\nmeans identical; indeed, the disparity between what could advantageously\nbe dispensed with in the way of national rights and pretensions, and\nwhat the common run of modern patriots could be induced to relinquish,\nis probably much larger than any sanguine person would like to believe.\nIt should be plain on slight reflection that the greater part, indeed\nsubstantially the whole, of those material interests and demands that\nnow engage the policy of the nations, and that serve on occasion to set\nthem at variance, might be neutralised or relinquished out of hand,\nwithout detriment to any one of the peoples concerned.\n\nThe greater part of these material interests over which the various\nnational establishments keep watch and hold pretensions are, in point of\nhistorical derivation, a legacy from the princely politics of what is\ncalled the \"Mercantilist\" period; and they are uniformly of the nature\nof gratuitous interference or discrimination between the citizens of the\ngiven nation and outsiders. Except (doubtfully) in the English case,\nwhere mercantilist policies are commonly believed to have been adopted\ndirectly for the benefit of the commercial interest, measures of this\nnature are uniformly traceable to the endeavours of the crown and its\nofficers to strengthen the finances of the prince and give him an\nadvantage in warlike enterprise. They are kept up essentially for the\nsame eventual end of preparation for war. So, e.g., protective tariffs,\nand the like discrimination in shipping, are still advocated as a means\nof making the nation self-supporting, self-contained, self-sufficient;\nwith a view to readiness in the event of hostilities.\n\nA nation is in no degree better off in time of peace for being\nself-sufficient. In point of patent fact no nation can be industrially\nself-sufficient except at the cost of foregoing some of the economic\nadvantages of that specialisation of industry which the modern state of\nthe industrial arts enforces. In time of peace there is no benefit\ncomes to the community at large from such restraint of trade with the\noutside world, or to any class or section of the community except those\ncommercial concerns that are favored by the discrimination; and these\ninvariably gain their special advantage at the cost of their\ncompatriots. Discrimination in trade--export, import or shipping--has no\nmore beneficial effect when carried out publicly by the national\nauthorities than when effected surreptitiously and illegally by a\nprivate conspiracy in restraint of trade within a group of interested\nbusiness concerns.\n\nHitherto the common man has found it difficult to divest himself of an\nhabitual delusion on this head, handed down out of the past and\ninculcated by interested politicians, to the effect that in some\nmysterious way he stands to gain by limiting his own opportunities. But\nthe neutralisation of international trade, or the abrogation of all\ndiscrimination in trade, is the beginning of wisdom as touches the\nperpetuation of peace. The first effect of such a neutral policy would\nbe wider and more intricately interlocking trade relations, coupled with\na further specialisation and mutual dependence of industry between the\nseveral countries concerned; which would mean, in terms of international\ncomity, a lessened readiness for warlike operations all around.\n\nIt used to be an argument of the free-traders that the growth of\ninternational commercial relations under a free-trade policy would\ngreatly conduce to a spirit of mutual understanding and forbearance\nbetween the nations. There may or may not be something appreciable in\nthe contention; it has been doubted, and there is no considerable\nevidence to be had in support of it. But what is more to the point is\nthe tangible fact that such specialisation of industry and consequent\nindustrial interdependence would leave all parties to this relation less\ncapable, materially and spiritually, to break off amicable relations. So\nagain, in time of peace and except with a view to eventual hostilities,\nit would involve no loss, and presumably little pecuniary gain, to any\ncountry, locality, town or class, if all merchant shipping were\nregistered indiscriminately under neutral colors and sailed under the\nneutral no-man's flag, responsible indiscriminately to the courts where\nthey touched or where their business was transacted.\n\nNeither producers, shippers, merchants nor consumers have any slightest\ninterest in the national allegiance of the carriers of their freight,\nexcept such as may artificially be induced by discriminatory shipping\nregulations. In all but the name--in time of peace--the world's merchant\nshipping already comes near being so neutralised, and the slight further\nsimplification required to leave it on a neutral peace footing would be\nlittle else than a neglect of such vexatious discrimination as is still\nin force. If no nation could claim the allegiance, and therefore the\nusufruct, of any given item of merchant shipping in case of eventual\nhostilities, on account of the domicile of the owners or the port of\nregistry, that would create a further handicap on eventual warlike\nenterprise and add so much to the margin of tolerance. At the same time,\nin the event of hostilities, shipping sailing under the neutral no-man's\nflag and subject to no national allegiance would enjoy such immunities\nas still inure to neutral shipping. It is true, neutrality has not\ncarried many immunities lately.\n\nCumulatively effective usage and the exigencies of a large, varied,\nshifting and extensive maritime trade have in the course of time\nbrought merchant shipping to something approaching a neutral footing.\nFor most, one might venture to say for virtually all, routine purposes\nof business and legal liability the merchant shipping comes under the\njurisdiction of the local courts, without reservation. It is true, there\nstill are formalities and reservations which enable questions arising\nout of incidents in the shipping trade to become subject of\ninternational conference and adjustment, but they are after all not such\nas would warrant the erection of national apparatus to take care of them\nin case they were not already covered by usage to that effect. The\nvisible drift of usage toward neutralisation in merchant shipping, in\nmaritime trade, and in international commercial transactions, together\nwith the similarly visible feasibility of a closer approach to\nunreserved neutralisation of this whole range of traffic, suggests that\nmuch the same line of considerations should apply as regards the\npersonal and pecuniary rights of citizens traveling or residing abroad.\nThe extreme,--or, as seen from the present point of view, the\nultimate--term in the relinquishment of national pretensions along this\nline would of course be the neutralisation of citizenship.\n\nThis is not so sweeping a move as a patriotically-minded person might\nimagine on the first alarm, so far as touches the practical status of\nthe ordinary citizen in his ordinary relations, and particularly among\nthe English-speaking peoples. As an illustrative instance, citizenship\nhas sat somewhat lightly on the denizens of the American republic, and\nwith no evident damage to the community at large or to the inhabitants\nin detail. Naturalisation has been easy, and has been sought with no\nmore eagerness, on the whole, than the notably low terms of its\nacquirement would indicate. Without loss or discomfort many law-abiding\naliens have settled in this country and spent the greater part of a\nlife-time under its laws without becoming citizens, and no one the worse\nor the wiser for it. Not infrequently the decisive inducement to\nnaturalisation on the part of immigrant aliens has been, and is, the\ndesirability of divesting themselves of their rights of citizenship in\nthe country of their origin. Not that the privilege and dignity of\ncitizenship, in this or in any other country, is to be held of little\naccount. It is rather that under modern civilised conditions, and among\na people governed by sentiments of humanity and equity, the stranger\nwithin our gates suffers no obloquy and no despiteful usage for being a\nstranger. It may be admitted that of late, with the fomentation of a\nmore accentuated nationalism by politicians seeking a _raison d'etre_,\nadditional difficulties have been created in the way of naturalisation\nand the like incidents. Still, when all is told of the average American\ncitizen, _qua_ citizen, there is not much to tell. The like is true\nthroughout the English-speaking peoples, with inconsequential allowance\nfor local color. A definitive neutralisation of citizenship within the\nrange of these English-speaking countries would scarcely ripple the\nsurface of things as they are--in time of peace.\n\nAll of which has not touched the sore and sacred spot in the received\nscheme of citizenship and its rights and liabilities. It is in the event\nof hostilities that the liabilities of the citizen at home come into the\nforeground, and it is as a source of patriotic grievance looking to\nwarlike retaliation that the rights of the citizen abroad chiefly come\ninto the case.\n\nIf, as was once, almost inaudibly, hinted by a well-regarded statesman,\nthe national establishment should refuse to jeopardise the public peace\nfor the safeguarding of the person and property of citizens who go out\n_in partes infidelium_ on their own private concerns, and should so\nleave them under the uncurbed jurisdiction of the authorities in those\ncountries into which they have intruded, the result might in many cases\nbe hardship to such individuals. This would, of course, be true almost\nexclusively of such instances only as occur in such localities as are,\ntemporarily or permanently, outside the pale of modern law and order.\nAnd, it may be in place to remark, instances of such hardship, with the\naccompanying hazard of national complications, would, no doubt, greatly\ndiminish in frequency consequent upon the promulgation of such a\ndisclaimer of national responsibility for the continued well-being of\ncitizens who so expatriate themselves in the pursuit of their own\nadvantage or amusement. Meantime, let it not seem inconsiderate to\nrecall that to the community at large the deplorable case of such\nexpatriates under hardship involves no loss or gain in the material\nrespect; and that, except for the fortuitous circumstance of his being a\ncompatriot, the given individual's personal or pecuniary fortune in\nforeign parts has no special claim on his compatriots' sympathy or\nassistance; from which it follows also that with the definitive\nneutralisation of citizenship as touches expatriates, the sympathy which\nis now somewhat unintelligently confined to such cases, on what may\nwithout offense be called extraneous grounds, would somewhat more\nimpartially and humanely extend to fellowmen in distress, regardless of\nnativity or naturalisation.\n\nWhat is mainly to the point here, however, is the fact that if\ncitizenship were so neutralised within the range of neutral countries\nhere contemplated, one further source of provocation to international\njealousy and distrust would drop out of the situation. And it is not\neasy to detect any element of material loss involved in such a move. In\nthe material respect no individual would be any the worse off, with the\ndoubtful and dubious exception of the expatriate fortune-hunter, who\naims to fish safely in troubled waters at his compatriots' expense. But\nthe case stands otherwise as regards the balance of immaterial assets.\nThe scaffolding of much highly-prized sentiment would collapse, and the\nworld of poetry and pageantry--particularly that of the tawdrier and\nmore vendible poetry and pageantry--would be poorer by so much. The Man\nWithout a Country would lose his pathetic appeal, or would at any rate\nlose much of it. It may be, of course, that in the sequel there would\nresult no net loss even in respect of these immaterial assets of\nsentimental animation and patriotic self-complacency, but it is after\nall fairly certain that something would be lost, and it is by no means\nclear what if anything would come in to fill its place.\n\nAn historical parallel may help to illustrate the point. In the movement\nout of what may be called the royal age of dynasties and chivalric\nservice, those peoples who have moved out of that age and out of its\nspiritual atmosphere have lost much of the conscious magnanimity and\nconviction of merit that once characterised that order of things, as it\nstill continues to characterise the prevalent habit of mind in the\ncountries that still continue under the archaic order of dynastic\nmastery and service. But it is also to be noted that these peoples who\nso have moved out of the archaic order appear to be well content with\nthis change of spiritual atmosphere, and they are even fairly well\npersuaded, in the common run, that the move has brought them some net\ngain in the way of human dignity and neighbourly tolerance, such as to\noffset any loss incurred on the heroic and invidious side of life. Such\nis the tempering force of habit. Whereas, e.g., on the other hand, the\npeoples of these surviving dynastic States, to which it is necessary\ncontinually to recur, who have not yet moved out of that realm of\nheroics, find themselves unable to see anything in such a prospective\nshift but net loss and headlong decay of the spirit; that modicum of\nforbearance and equity that is requisite to the conduct of life in a\ncommunity of ungraded masterless men is seen by these stouter stomachs\nas a loosening of the moral fiber and a loss of nerve.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhat is here tentatively projected under the phrase, \"neutralization of\ncitizenship,\" is only something a little more and farther along the same\ngeneral line of movement which these more modern peoples have been\nfollowing in all that sequence of institutional changes that has given\nthem their present distinctive character of commonwealths, as contrasted\nwith the dynastic States of the mediaeval order. What may be in\nprospect--if such a further move away from the mediaeval landmarks is to\ntake effect--may best be seen in the light of the later moves in the\nsame direction hitherto, more particularly as regards the moral and\naesthetic merits at large of such an institutional mutation. As touches\nthis last previous shifting of ground along this line, just spoken of,\nthe case stands in this singular but significant posture, in respect of\nthe spiritual values and valuations involved: These peoples who have,\neven in a doubtful measure, made this transition from the archaic\ninstitutional scheme, of fealty and dynastic exploit and coercion, to\nthe newer scheme of the ungraded commonwealth, are convinced, to the\npoint of martyrdom, that anything like a return to the old order is\nmorally impossible as well as insufferably shameful and irksome; whereas\nthose people, of the retarded division of the race, who have had no\nexperience of this new order, are equally convinced that it is all quite\nincompatible with a worthy life.\n\nEvidently, there should be no disputing about tastes. Evidently, too,\nthese retarded others will not move on into the later institutional\nphase, of the ungraded commonwealth, by preconceived choice; but only,\nif at all, by such schooling of experience as will bring them insensibly\nto that frame of mind out of which the ideal of the ungraded\ncommonwealth emerges by easy generalisation of workday practice.\nMeantime, having not yet experienced that phase of sentiment and opinion\non civic rights and immunities that is now occupied by their\ninstitutionally maturer neighbours, the subjects of the Imperial\nFatherland, e.g., in spite of the most laudable intentions and the best\nendeavour, are, by failure of this experience, unable to comprehend\neither the ground of opposition to their well-meaning projects of\ndominion or the futility of trying to convert these their elder brothers\nto their own prescriptive acceptation of what is worth while. In time,\nand with experience, this retarded division of Christendom may come to\nthe same perspective on matters of national usage and ideals as has been\nenforced on the more modern peoples by farther habituation. So, also, in\ntime and with experience, if the drift of circumstance shall turn out to\nset that way, the further move away from mediaeval discriminations and\nconstraint and into the unspectacular scheme of neutralisation may come\nto seem as right, good and beautiful as the democratic commonwealth now\nseems to the English-speaking peoples, or as the Hohenzollern Imperial\nState now seems to the subjects of the Fatherland. There is, in effect,\nno disputing about tastes.\n\nThere is little that is novel, and nothing that is to be rated as\nconstructive innovation, in this sketch of what might not inaptly be\ncalled peace by neglect. The legal mind, which commonly takes the\ninitiative in counsels on what to do, should scarcely be expected to\nlook in that direction for a way out, or to see its way out in that\ndirection in any case; so that it need occasion no surprise if the many\ncurrent projects of pacification turn on ingenious and elaborate\nprovisions of apparatus and procedure, rather than on that simpler line\nof expedients which the drift of circumstance, being not possessed of a\nlegal mind, has employed in the sequence of institutional change\nhitherto. The legal mind that dominates in the current deliberations on\npeace is at home in exhaustive specifications and meticulous\ndemarkations, and it is therefore prone to seek a remedy for the burden\nof supernumerary devices by recourse to further excesses of regulation.\n\nThis trait of the legal mind is not a bad fault at the worst, and the\nquality in which this defect inheres is of the greatest moment in any\nproject of constructive engineering on the legal and political plane.\nBut it is less to the purpose, indeed it is at cross purposes, in such a\nconjuncture as the present; when the nations are held up in their quest\nof peace chiefly by an accumulation of institutional apparatus that has\nout-stayed its usefulness. It is the fortune even of good institutions\nto become imbecile with the change of conditioning circumstances, and it\nthen becomes a question of their disestablishment, not of their\nrehabilitation. If there is anywhere a safe negative conclusion, it is\nthat an institution grown mischievous by obsolescence need not be\nreplaced by a substitute.\n\nInstances of such mischievous institutional arrangements, obsolete or in\nprocess of obsolescence, would be, e.g., the French monarchy of the\nancient regime, the Spanish Inquisition, the British corn laws and the\n\"rotten boroughs,\" the Barbary pirates, the Turkish rule in Armenia, the\nBritish crown, the German Imperial Dynasty, the European balance of\npowers, the Monroe Doctrine. In some sense, at least in the sense and\ndegree implied in their selective survival, these various articles of\ninstitutional furniture, and many like them, have once presumably been\nsuitable to some end, in the days of their origin and vigorous growth;\nand they have at least in some passable fashion met some felt want; but\nif they ever had a place and use in the human economy they have in time\ngrown imbecile and mischievous by force of changing circumstances, and\nthe question is not how to replace them with something else to the same\npurpose after their purpose is outworn. A man who loses a wart off the\nend of his nose does not apply to the _Ersatz_ bureau for a convenient\nsubstitute.\n\nNow, a large proportion, perhaps even substantially the whole, of the\nexisting apparatus of international rights, pretensions,\ndiscriminations, covenants and provisos, visibly fall in that class, in\nso far as concerns their material serviceability to the nation at large,\nand particularly as regards any other than a warlike purpose, offensive\nor defensive. Of course, the national dignity and diplomatic punctilio,\nand the like adjuncts and instrumentalities of the national honour, all\nhave their prestige value; and they are not likely to be given up out of\nhand. In point of fact, however solicitous for a lasting peace these\npatriotically-minded modern peoples may be, it is doubtful if they could\nbe persuaded to give up any appreciable share of these appurtenances of\nnational jealousy even when their retention implies an imminent breach\nof the peace. Yet it is plain that the peace will be secure in direct\nproportion to the measure in which national discrimination and prestige\nare allowed to pass into nothingness and be forgot.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBy so much as it might amount to, such neutralisation of outstanding\ninterests between these pacific nations should bring on a degree of\ncoalescence of these nationalities. In effect, they are now held apart\nin many respects by measures of precaution against their coming to a\ncommon plan of use and wont. The degree of coalescence would scarcely be\nextreme; more particularly it could not well become onerous, since it\nwould rest on convenience, inclination and the neglect of artificial\ndiscrepancies. The more intimate institutions of modern life, that\ngovern human conduct locally and in detail, need not be affected, or not\ngreatly affected, for better or worse. Yet something appreciable in that\nway might also fairly be looked for in time.\n\nThe nature, reach and prescriptive force of this prospective coalescence\nthrough neutralisation may perhaps best be appreciated in the light of\nwhat has already come to pass, without design or mandatory guidance, in\nthose lines of human interest where the national frontiers interpose no\nbar, or at least no decisive bar, whether by force of unconcern or\nthrough impotence. Fashions of dress, equipage and decorous usage, e.g.,\nrun with some uniformity throughout these modern nations, and indeed\nwith some degree of prescriptive force. There is, of course, nothing\nmandatory, in the simpler sense, about all this; nor is the degree of\nconformity extreme or uniform throughout. But it is a ready-made\ngeneralisation that only those communities are incorporated in this\ncosmopolitan coalescence of usage that are moved by their own\nincitement, and only so far as they have an effectually felt need of\nconformity in these premises. It is true, a dispassionate outsider, if\nsuch there be, would perhaps be struck by the degree of such painstaking\nconformity to canons of conduct which it frequently must cost serious\neffort even to ascertain in such detail as the case calls for.\nDoubtless, or at least presumably, conformity under the jurisdiction of\nthe fashions, and in related provinces of decorum, is obligatory in a\ndegree that need not be looked for throughout the scheme of use and wont\nat large, even under the advisedly established non-interference of the\nauthorities. Still, on a point on which the evidence hitherto is\nextremely scant it is the part of discretion to hold no settled opinion.\n\nA more promising line of suggestion is probably that afforded by the\ncurrent degree of contact and consistency among the modern nations in\nrespect of science and scholarship, as also in the aesthetic or the\nindustrial arts. Local color and local pride, with one thing and another\nin the way of special incitement or inhibition, may come in to vary the\nrun of things, or to blur or hinder a common understanding and mutual\nfurtherance and copartnery in these matters of taste and intellect. Yet\nit is scarcely misleading to speak of the peoples of Christendom as one\ncommunity in these respects. The sciences and the arts are held as a\njoint stock among these peoples, in their elements, and measurably also\nin their working-out. It is true, these interests and achievements of\nthe race are not cultivated with the same assiduity or with identical\neffect throughout; but it is equally true that no effectual bar could\nprofitably be interposed, or would be tolerated in the long run in this\nfield, where men have had occasion to learn that unlimited collusion is\nmore to the purpose than a clannish discrimination.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is, no doubt, beyond reasonable hope that these democratic peoples\ncould be brought forthwith to concerted action on the lines of such a\nplan of peace by neutralisation of all outstanding national pretensions.\nBoth the French and the English-speaking peoples are too eagerly set on\nnational aims and national prestige, to allow such a plan to come to a\nhearing, even if something of the kind should be spoken for by their\nmost trusted leaders. By settled habit they are thinking in terms of\nnationality, and just now they are all under the handicap of an inflamed\nnational pride. Advocacy of such a plan, of course, does not enter\nseriously into the purpose of this inquiry; which is concerned with the\nconditions under which peace is sought today, with the further\nconditions requisite to its perpetuation, and with the probable effects\nof such a peace on the fortunes of these peoples in case peace is\nestablished and effectually maintained.\n\nIt is a reasonable question, and one to which a provisional answer may\nbe found, whether the drift of circumstances in the present and for the\nimmediate future may be counted on to set in the direction of a\nprogressive neutralisation of the character spoken of above, and\ntherefore possibly toward a perpetuation of that peace that is to follow\nthe present season of war. So also is it an open and interesting\nquestion whether the drift in that direction, if such is the set of it,\ncan be counted on to prove sufficiently swift and massive, so as not to\nbe overtaken and overborne by the push of agencies that make for\ndissension and warlike enterprise.\n\nAnything like a categorical answer to these questions would have to be a\nwork of vaticination or of effrontery,--possibly as much to the point\nthe one as the other. But there are certain conditions precedent to a\nlasting peace as the outcome of events now in train, and there are\ncertain definable contingencies conditioned on such current facts as the\nexisting state of the industrial arts and the state of popular\nsentiment, together with the conjuncture of circumstances under which\nthese factors will come into action.\n\nThe state of the industrial arts, as it bears on the peace and its\nviolation, has been spoken of above. It is of such a character that a\njudiciously prepared offensive launched by any Power of the first rank\nat an opportune time can reach and lay waste any given country of the\nhabitable globe. The conclusive evidence of this is at hand, and it is\nthe major premise underlying all current proposals and projects of\npeace, as well as the refusal of the nations now on the defensive to\nenter into negotiations looking to an \"inconclusive peace.\" This state\nof the case is not commonly recognised in so many words, but it is well\nenough understood. So that all peace projects that shall hope to find a\nhearing must make up their account with it, and must show cause why they\nshould be judged competent to balk any attempted offensive. In an\ninarticulate or inchoate fashion, perhaps, but none the less with\never-increasing certitude and increasing apprehension, this state of the\ncase is also coming to be an article of popular \"knowledge and belief,\"\nwherever much or little thought is spent on the outlook for peace. It\nhas already had a visible effect in diminishing the exclusiveness of\nnationalities and turning the attention of the pacific peoples to the\nquestion of feasible ways and means of international cooperation in case\nof need; but it has not hitherto visibly lessened the militant spirit\namong these nations, nor has it lowered the tension of their national\npride, at least not yet; rather the contrary, in fact.\n\nThe effect, upon the popular temper, of this inchoate realisation of the\nfatality that so lies in the modern state of the industrial arts, varies\nfrom one country to another, according to the varying position in which\nthey are placed, or in which they conceive themselves to be placed.\nAmong the belligerent nations it has put the spur of fear to their need\nof concerted action as well as to their efforts to strengthen the\nnational defense. But the state of opinion and sentiment abroad in the\nnation in time of war is no secure indication of what it will be after\nthe return to peace. The American people, the largest and most\nimmediately concerned of the neutral nations, should afford more\nsignificant evidence of the changes in the popular attitude likely to\nfollow from a growing realisation of this state of the case, that the\nadvantage has passed definitively to any well prepared and resolute\noffensive, and that no precautions of diplomacy and no practicable\nmeasures of defensive armament will any longer give security,--provided\nalways that there is anywhere a national Power actuated by designs of\nimperial dominion.\n\nIt is, of course, only little by little that the American people and\ntheir spokesmen have come to realise their own case under this\nlate-modern situation, and hitherto only in an imperfect degree. Their\nfirst response to the stimulus has been a display of patriotic\nself-sufficiency and a move to put the national defense on a\nwar-footing, such as would be competent to beat off all aggression.\nThose elements of the population who least realise the gravity of the\nsituation, and who are at the same time commercially interested in\nmeasures of armament or in military preferment, have not begun to shift\nforward beyond this position of magniloquence and resolution; nor is\nthere as yet much intimation that they see beyond it, although there is\nan ever-recurring hint that they in a degree appreciate the practical\ndifficulty of persuading a pacific people to make adequate preparation\nbeforehand, in equipment and trained man-power, for such a plan of\nself-sufficient self-defense. But increasingly among those who are, by\nforce of temperament or insight or by lack of the pecuniary and the\nplaceman's interest, less confident of an appeal to the nation's\nprowess, there is coming forward an evident persuasion that warlike\npreparations--\"preparedness\"--alone and carried through by the Republic\nin isolation, will scarcely serve the turn.\n\nThere are at least two lines of argument, or of persuasion, running to\nthe support of such a view; readiness for a warlike defense, by\nproviding equipment and trained men, might prove a doubtfully effectual\nmeasure even when carried to the limit of tolerance that will always be\nreached presently in any democratic country; and then, too, there is\nhope of avoiding the necessity of such warlike preparation, at least in\nthe same extreme degree, by means of some practicable working\narrangement to be effected with other nations who are in the same case.\nHitherto the farthest reach of these pacific schemes for maintaining the\npeace, or for the common defense, has taken the shape of a projected\nleague of neutral nations to keep the peace by enforcement of specified\ninternational police regulations or by compulsory arbitration of\ninternational disputes. It is extremely doubtful how far, if at all,\npopular sentiment of any effectual force falls in with this line of\nprecautionary measures. Yet it is evident that popular sentiment, and\npopular apprehension, has been stirred profoundly by the events of the\npast two years, and the resulting change that is already visible in the\nprevailing sentiment as regards the national defense would argue that\nmore far-reaching changes in the same connection are fairly to be looked\nfor within a reasonable allowance of time.\n\nIn this American case the balance of effectual public opinion hitherto\nis to all appearance quite in doubt, but it is also quite unsettled. The\nfirst response has been a display of patriotic emotion and national\nself-assertion. The further, later and presumably more deliberate,\nexpressions of opinion carry a more obvious note of apprehension and\nless of stubborn or unreflecting national pride. It may be too early to\nanticipate a material shift of base, to a more neutral, or less\nexclusively national footing in matters of the common defense.\n\nThe national administration has been moving at an accelerated rate in\nthe direction not of national isolation and self-reliance resting on a\nwarlike equipment formidable enough to make or break the peace at\nwill--such as the more truculent and irresponsible among the politicians\nhave spoken for--but rather in the direction of moderating or curtailing\nall national pretensions that are not of undoubted material consequence,\nand of seeking a common understanding and concerted action with those\nnationalities whose effectual interests in the matters of peace and war\ncoincide with the American. The administration has grown visibly more\npacific in the course of its exacting experience,--more resolutely, one\nmight even say more aggressively pacific; but the point of chief\nattention in all this strategy of peace has also visibly been shifting\nsomewhat from the maintenance of a running equilibrium between\nbelligerents and a keeping of the peace from day to day, to the ulterior\nand altogether different question of what is best to be done toward a\nconclusive peace at the close of hostilities, and the ways and means of\nits subsequent perpetuation.\n\nThis latter is, in effect, an altogether different question from that of\npreserving neutrality and amicable relations in the midst of importunate\nbelligerents, and it may even, conceivably, perhaps not unlikely, come\nto involve a precautionary breach of the current peace and a taking of\nsides in the war with an urgent view to a conclusive outcome. It would\nbe going too far to impute to the administration, at the present stage,\nsuch an aggressive attitude in its pursuit of a lasting peace as could\nbe called a policy of defensive offense; but it will shock no one's\nsensibilities to say that such a policy, involving a taking of sides and\na renouncing of national isolation, is visibly less remote from the\ncounsels of the administration today than it has been at any earlier\nperiod.\n\nIn this pacific attitude, increasingly urgent and increasingly\nfar-reaching and apprehensive, the administration appears to be speaking\nfor the common man rather than for the special interests or the\nprivileged classes. Such would appear, on the face of the returns, to be\nthe meaning of the late election. It is all the more significant on that\naccount, since in the long run it is after all the common man that will\nhave to pass on the expediency of any settled line of policy and to bear\nthe material burden of carrying it into effect.\n\nIt may seem rash to presume that a popularly accredited administration\nin a democratic country must approximately reflect the effectual changes\nof popular sentiment and desire. Especially would it seem rash to anyone\nlooking on from the point of view of an undemocratic nation, and\ntherefore prone to see the surface fluctuations of excitement and\nshifting clamor. But those who are within the democratic pale will know\nthat any administration in such a country, where official tenure and\ncontinued incumbency of the party rest on a popular vote,--any such\nadministration is a political organisation and is guided by political\nexpediency, in the tawdry sense of the phrase. Such a political\nsituation has the defects of its qualities, as has been well and\nfrequently expounded by its critics, but it has also the merits of its\nshortcomings. In a democracy of this modern order any incumbent of high\noffice is necessarily something of a politician, quite indispensably so;\nand a politician at the same time necessarily is something of a\ndemagogue. He yields to the popular drift, or to the set of opinion and\ndemands among the effective majority on whom he leans; and he can not\neven appear to lead, though he may surreptitiously lead opinion in\nadroitly seeming to reflect it and obey it. Ostensible leadership, such\nas has been staged in this country from time to time, has turned out to\nbe ostensible only. The politician must be adroit; but if he is also to\nbe a statesman he must be something more. He is under the necessity of\nguessing accurately what the drift of events and opinion is going to be\non the next reach ahead; and in taking coming events by the forelock he\nmay be able to guide and shape the drift of opinion and sentiment\nsomewhat to his own liking. But all the while he must keep within the\nlines of the long-term set of the current as it works out in the habits\nof thought of the common man.\n\nSuch foresight and flexibility is necessary to continued survival, but\nflexibility of convictions alone does not meet the requirements. Indeed,\nit has been tried. It is only the minor politicians--the most numerous\nand long-lived, it is true--who can hold their place in the crevices of\nthe party organisation, and get their livelihood from the business of\nparty politics, without some power of vision and some hazard of\nforecast. It results from this state of the case that the drift of\npopular sentiment and the popular response to the stimulus of current\nevents is reflected more faithfully and more promptly by the short-lived\nadministrations of a democracy than by the stable and formally\nirresponsible governmental establishments of the older order. It should\nalso be noted that these democratic administrations are in a less\nadvantageous position for the purpose of guiding popular sentiment and\nshaping it to their own ends.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNow, it happens that at no period within the past half-century has the\ncourse of events moved with such celerity or with so grave a bearing on\nthe common good and the prospective contingencies of national life as\nduring the present administration. This apparent congruity of the\nadministration's policy with the drift of popular feeling and belief\nwill incline anyone to put a high rating on the administration's course\nof conduct, in international relations as well as in national measures\nthat have a bearing on international relations, as indicating the course\ntaken by sentiment and second thought in the community at large,--for,\nin effect, whether or not in set form, the community at large reflects\non any matters of such gravity and urgency as to force themselves upon\nthe attention of the common man.\n\nTwo main lines of reflection have visibly been enforced on the\nadministration by the course of events in the international field. There\nhas been a growing apprehension, mounting in the later months to\nsomething like the rank of a settled conviction, that the Republic has\nbeen marked down for reduction to a vassal state by the dynastic Empire\nnow engaged with its European adversaries. In so saying that the\nRepublic has been marked down for subjection it is not intended to\nintimate that deliberate counsel has been had by the Imperial\nestablishment on that prospective enterprise; still less that a\nresolution to such effect, with specification of ways and means, has\nbeen embodied in documentary form and deposited for future reference in\nthe Imperial archives. All that is intended, and all that is necessary\nto imply, is that events are in train to such effect that the\nsubjugation of the American republic will necessarily find its place in\nthe sequence presently, provided that the present Imperial adventure is\nbrought to a reasonably auspicious issue; though it does not follow that\nthis particular enterprise need be counted on as the next large\nadventure in dominion to be undertaken when things again fall into\npromising shape. This latter point would, of course, depend on the\nconjuncture of circumstances, chief of which would have to be the\nexigencies of imperial dominion shaping the policy of the Empire's\nnatural and necessary ally in the Far East. All this has evidently been\ncoming more and more urgently into the workday deliberations of the\nAmerican administration. Of course, it is not spoken of in set terms to\nthis effect in official utterances, perhaps not even within doors; that\nsort of thing is not done. But it can do no harm to use downright\nexpressions in a scientific discussion of these phenomena, with a view\nto understanding the current drift of things in this field.\n\nBeyond this is the similar apprehension, similarly though more slowly\nand reluctantly rising to the level of settled conviction, that the\nAmerican commonwealth is not fit to take care of its own case\nsingle-handed. This apprehension is enforced more and more unmistakably\nwith every month that passes on the theatre of war. And it is reenforced\nby the constantly more obvious reflection that the case of the American\ncommonwealth in this matter is the same as that of the democratic\ncountries of Europe, and of the other European colonies. It is not, or\nat least one may believe it is not yet, that in the patriotic\napprehension of the common man, or of the administration which speaks\nfor him, the resources of the country would be inadequate to meet any\ncontingencies of the kind that might arise, whether in respect of\nindustrial capacity or in point of man-power, if these resources were\nturned to this object with the same singleness of purpose and the same\ndrastic procedure that marks the course of a national establishment\nguided by no considerations short of imperial dominion. The doubt\npresents itself rather as an apprehension that the cost would be\nextravagantly high, in all respects in which cost can be counted; which\nis presently seconded, on very slight reflection and review of\nexperience, by recognition of the fact that a democracy is, in point of\nfact, not to be persuaded to stand under arms interminably in mere\nreadiness for a contingency, however distasteful the contingency may be.\n\nIn point of fact, a democratic commonwealth is moved by other interests\nin the main, and the common defense is a secondary consideration, not a\nprimary interest,--unless in the exceptional case of a commonwealth so\nplaced under the immediate threat of invasion as to have the common\ndefense forced into the place of paramount consequence in its workday\nhabits of thought. The American republic is not so placed. Anyone may\nsatisfy himself by reasonable second thought that the people of this\nnation are not to be counted on to do their utmost in time of peace to\nprepare for war. They may be persuaded to do much more than has been\ntheir habit, and adventurous politicians may commit them to much more\nthan the people at large would wish to undertake, but when all is done\nthat can be counted on for a permanency, up to the limit of popular\ntolerance, it would be a bold guess that should place the result at more\nthan one-half of what the country is capable of. Particularly would the\npeople's patience balk at the extensive military training requisite to\nput the country in an adequate position of defense against a sudden and\nwell-prepared offensive. It is otherwise with a dynastic State, to the\ndirectorate of which all other interests are necessarily secondary,\nsubsidiary, and mainly to be considered only in so far as they are\ncontributory to the nation's readiness for warlike enterprise.\n\nAmerica at the same time is placed in an extra-hazardous position,\nbetween the two seas beyond which to either side lie the two Imperial\nPowers whose place in the modern economy of nations it is to disturb the\npeace in an insatiable quest of dominion. This position is no longer\ndefensible in isolation, under the later state of the industrial arts,\nand the policy of isolation that has guided the national policy hitherto\nis therefore falling out of date. The question is as to the manner of\nits renunciation, rather than the fact of it. It may end in a defensive\ncopartnership with other nations who are placed on the defensive by the\nsame threatening situation, or it may end in a bootless struggle for\nindependence, but the choice scarcely extends beyond this alternative.\nIt will be said, of course, that America is competent to take care of\nitself and its Monroe doctrine in the future as in the past. But that\nview, spoken for cogently by thoughtful men and by politicians looking\nfor party advantage, overlooks the fact that the modern technology has\ndefinitively thrown the advantage to the offensive, and that intervening\nseas can no longer be counted on as a decisive obstacle. On this latter\nhead, what was reasonably true fifteen years ago is doubtful today, and\nit is in all reasonable expectation invalid for the situation fifteen\nyears hence.\n\nThe other peoples that are of a neutral temper may need the help of\nAmerica sorely enough in their endeavours to keep the peace, but\nAmerica's need of cooperation is sorer still, for the Republic is coming\ninto a more precarious place than any of the others. America is also, at\nleast potentially, the most democratic of the greater Powers, and is\nhandicapped with all the disabilities of a democratic commonwealth in\nthe face of war. America is also for the present, and perhaps for the\ncalculable future, the most powerful of these greater Powers, in point\nof conceivably available resources, though not in actually available\nfighting-power; and the entrance of America unreservedly into a neutral\nleague would consequently be decisive both of the purposes of the league\nand of its efficiency for the purpose; particularly if the\nneutralisation of interests among the members of the league were carried\nso far as to make withdrawal and independent action disadvantageous.\n\nOn the establishment of such a neutral league, with such neutralisation\nof national interests as would assure concerted action in time of\nstress, the need of armament on the part of the American republic would\ndisappear, at least to the extent that no increase of armed force would\nbe advisable. The strength of the Republic lies in its large and varied\nresources and the unequalled industrial capacity of its population,--a\ncapacity which is today seriously hampered by untoward business\ninterests and business methods sheltered under national discrimination,\nbut which would come more nearly to its own so soon as these national\ndiscriminations were corrected or abrogated in the neutralisation of\nnational pretensions. The neutrally-minded countries of Europe have been\nconstrained to learn the art of modern war, as also to equip themselves\nwith the necessary appliances, sufficient to meet all requirements for\nkeeping the peace through such a period as can or need be taken into\naccount,--provided the peace that is to come on the conclusion of the\npresent war shall be placed on so \"conclusive\" a footing as will make it\nanything substantially more than a season of recuperation for that\nwarlike Power about whose enterprise in dominion the whole question\nturns. Provided that suitably \"substantial guarantees\" of a reasonable\nquiescence on the part of this Imperial Power are had, there need be no\nincrease of the American armament. Any increased armament would in that\ncase amount to nothing better than an idle duplication of plant and\npersonnel already on hand and sufficient to meet the requirements.\n\nTo meet the contingencies had in view in its formation, such a league\nwould have to be neutralised to the point that all pertinent national\npretensions would fall into virtual abeyance, so that all the necessary\nresources at the disposal of the federated nations would automatically\ncome under the control of the league's appointed authorities without\nloss of time, whenever the need might arise. That is to say, national\ninterests and pretensions would have to give way to a collective control\nsufficient to insure prompt and concerted action. In the face of such a\nneutral league Imperial Japan alone would be unable to make a really\nserious diversion or to entertain much hope of following up its quest of\ndominion. The Japanese Imperial establishment might even be persuaded\npeaceably to let its unoffending neighbours live their own life\naccording to their own light. It is, indeed, possibly the apprehension\nof some such contingency that has hurried the rapacity of the Island\nEmpire into the headlong indecencies of the past year or two.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nELIMINATION OF THE UNFIT\n\n\nIt may seem early (January 1917) to offer a surmise as to what must be\nthe manner of league into which the pacific nations are to enter and by\nwhich the peace will be kept, in case such a move is to be made. But the\ncircumstances that are to urge such a line of action, and that will\ncondition its carrying out in case it is entered on, have already come\ninto bearing and should, on the whole, no longer be especially obscure\nto anyone who will let the facts of the case rather than his own\npredilections decide what he will believe. By and large, the pressure of\nthese conditioning circumstances may be seen, and the line of least\nresistance under this pressure may be calculated, with due allowance of\na margin of error owing to unknown contingencies of time and minor\nvariables.\n\nTime is of the essence of the case. So that what would have been\ndismissed as idle vapour two years ago has already become subject of\ngrave deliberation today, and may rise to paramount urgency that far\nhence. Time is needed to appreciate and get used to any innovation of\nappreciable gravity, particularly where the innovation depends in any\ndegree on a change in public sentiment, as in this instance. The present\noutlook would seem to be that no excess of time is allowed in these\npremises; but it should also be noted that events are moving with\nunexampled celerity, and are impinging on the popular apprehension with\nunexampled force,--unexampled on such a scale. It is hoped that a\nrecital of these circumstances that provoke to action along this line\nwill not seem unwarrantably tedious, and that a tentative definition of\nthe line of least resistance under pressure of these circumstances may\nnot seem unwarrantably presumptuous.\n\nThe major premise in the case is the felt need of security from\naggression at the hands of Imperial Germany and its auxiliary Powers;\nseconded by an increasingly uneasy apprehension as to the prospective\nline of conduct on the part of Imperial Japan, bent on a similar quest\nof dominion. There is also the less articulate apprehension of what, if\nanything, may be expected from Imperial Russia; an obscure and scarcely\ndefinable factor, which comes into the calculation chiefly by way of\nreenforcing the urgency of the situation created by the dynastic\nambitions of these other two Imperial States. Further, the pacific\nnations, the leading ones among them being the French and\nEnglish-speaking peoples, are coming to recognise that no one among them\ncan provide for its own security single-handed, even at the cost of\ntheir utmost endeavour in the way of what is latterly called\n\"preparedness;\" and they are at the same time unwilling to devote their\nforce unreservedly to warlike preparation, having nothing to gain. The\nsolution proposed is a league of the pacific nations, commonly spoken of\nat the present stage as a league to enforce peace, or less ambitiously\nas a league to enforce arbitration. The question being left somewhat at\nloose ends, whether the projected league is to include the two or three\nImperial Powers whose pacific intentions are, euphemistically, open to\ndoubt.\n\nSuch is the outline of the project and its premises. An attempt to fill\nin this outline will, perhaps, conduce to an appreciation of what is\nsought and of what the conditioning circumstances will enforce in the\ncourse of its realisation. As touches the fear of aggression, it has\nalready been indicated, perhaps with unnecessary iteration, that these\ntwo Imperial Powers are unable to relinquish the quest of dominion\nthrough warlike enterprise, because as dynastic States they have no\nother ulterior aim; as has abundantly appeared in the great volume of\nexpository statements that have come out of the Fatherland the past few\nyears, official, semi-official, inspired, and spontaneous. \"Assurance of\nthe nation's future\" is not translatable into any other terms. The\nImperial dynasty has no other ground to stand on, and can not give up\nthe enterprise so long as it can muster force for any formidable\ndiversion, to get anything in the way of dominion by seizure, threat or\nchicane.\n\nThis is coming to be informally and loosely, but none the less\ndefinitively, realised by the pacific nations; and the realisation of it\nis gaining in clearness and assurance as time passes. And it is backed\nby the conviction that, in the nature of things, no engagement on the\npart of such a dynastic State has any slightest binding force, beyond\nthe material constraint that would enforce it from the outside. So the\ndemand has been diplomatically phrased as a demand for \"substantial\nguarantees.\" Any gain in resources on the part of these Powers is to be\ncounted as a gain in the ways and means of disturbing the peace, without\nreservation.\n\nThe pacific nations include among them two large items, both of which\nare indispensable to the success of the project, the United States and\nthe United Kingdom. The former brings in its train, virtually without\nexception or question, the other American republics, none of which can\npracticably go in or stay out except in company and collusion with the\nUnited States. The United Kingdom after the same fashion, and with\nscarcely less assurance, may be counted on to carry the British\ncolonies. Evidently, without both of these groups the project would not\neven make a beginning. Beyond this is to be counted in as elements of\nstrength, though scarcely indispensable, France, Belgium, the\nNetherlands and the Scandinavian countries. The other west-European\nnations would in all probability be found in the league, although so far\nas regards its work and its fortunes their adhesion would scarcely be a\nmatter of decisive consequence; they may therefore be left somewhat on\none side in any consideration of the circumstances that would shape the\nleague, its aims and its limitations. The Balkan states, in the wider\nacceptance, they that frequent the Sign of the Double Cross, are\nsimilarly negligible in respect of the organisation of such a league or\nits resources and the mutual concessions necessary to be made between\nits chief members. Russia is so doubtful a factor, particularly as\nregards its place and value in industry, culture and politics, in the\nnear future, as to admit nothing much more than a doubt on what its\nrelation to the situation will be. The evil intentions of the\nImperial-bureaucratic establishment are probably no more to be\nquestioned than the good intentions of the underlying peoples of Russia.\nChina will have to be taken in, if for no other reason than the use to\nwhich the magnificent resources of that country would be turned by its\nImperial neighbour in the absence of insurmountable interference from\noutside. But China will come in on any terms that include neutrality and\nsecurity.\n\nThe question then arises as to the Imperial Powers whose dynastic\nenterprise is primarily to be hedged against by such a league.\nReflection will show that if the league is to effect any appreciable\npart of its purpose, these Powers will also be included in the league,\nor at least in its jurisdiction. A pacific league not including these\nPowers, or not extending its jurisdiction and surveillance to them and\ntheir conduct, would come to the same thing as a coalition of nations in\ntwo hostile groups, the one standing on the defensive against the\nwarlike machinations of the other, and both groups bidding for the favor\nof those minor Powers whose traditions and current aspirations run to\nnational (dynastic) aggrandizement by way of political intrigue. It\nwould come to a more articulate and accentuated form of that balance of\npower that has latterly gone bankrupt in Europe, with the most corrupt\nand unreliable petty monarchies of eastern Europe vested with a casting\nvote; and it would also involve a system of competitive armaments of the\nsame general character as what has also shown itself bankrupt. It would,\nin other words, mean a virtual return to the _status quo ante_, but with\nan overt recognition of its provisional character, and with the lines of\ndivision more sharply drawn. That is to say, it would amount to\nreinstating the situation which the projected league is intended to\navert. It is evidently contained in the premises that the projected\nleague must be all-inclusive, at least as regards its jurisdiction and\nsurveillance. The argument will return to this point presently.\n\nThe purpose of the projected league is peace and security, commonly\nspoken of under patriotic preconceptions as \"national\" peace and\nsecurity. This will have to mean a competent enforcement of peace, on\nsuch a footing of overmastering force at the disposal of the associated\npacific nations as to make security a matter of ordinary routine. It is\ntrue, the more genial spokesmen of the project are given to the view\nthat what is to come of it all is a comity of neutral nations, amicably\nadjusting their own relations among themselves in a spirit of peace and\ngood-will. But this view is over-sanguine, in that it overlooks the\npoint that into this prospective comity of nations Imperial Germany (and\nImperial Japan) fit like a drunken savage with a machine gun. It also\noverlooks the patent fatality that these two are bound to come into a\ncoalition at the next turn, with whatever outside and subsidiary\nresources they can draw on; provided only that a reasonable opening for\nfurther enterprise presents itself. The league, in other terms, must be\nin a position to enforce peace by overmastering force, and to anticipate\nany move at cross purposes with the security of the pacific nations.\n\nThis end can be reached by either one of two ways. If the dynastic\nStates are left to their own devices, it will be incumbent on the\nassociated nations to put in the field a standing force sufficient to\nprevent a recourse to arms; which means competitive armament and\nuniversal military rule. Or the dynastic States may be taken into\npartnership and placed under such surveillance and constraint as to\npractically disarm them; which would admit virtual disarmament of the\nfederated nations. The former arrangement has nothing in its favour,\nexcept the possibility that no better or less irksome arrangement can be\nhad under existing circumstances; that is to say that the pacific\nnations may not be able to bring these dynastic states to terms of\ndisarmament under surveillance. They assuredly can not except by force;\nand this is the precise point on which the continued hostilities in\nEurope turn today. In diplomatic parable the German Imperial spokesmen\nsay that they can accept (or as they prefer to phrase it, grant) no\nterms that do not fully safeguard the Future of the Fatherland; and in\nsimilarly diplomatic parable the spokesmen of the Entente insist that\nPrussian militarism must be permanently put out of commission; but it\nall means the same thing, viz. that the Imperial establishment is to be\n(or is not to be) disabled beyond the possibility of its entering on a\nsimilar warlike enterprise again, when it has had time for recuperation.\nThe dynastic statesmen, and the lay subjects of the Imperial\nestablishment, are strenuously set on securing a fair opportunity for\nrecuperation and a wiser endeavour to achieve that dominion which the\npresent adventure promises to defeat; while the Entente want no\nrecurrence, and are persuaded that a recurrence can be avoided only on\nthe footing of a present collapse of the Imperial power and a\nscrupulously enforced prostration of it henceforth.\n\nWithout the definitive collapse of the Imperial power no pacific league\nof nations can come to anything much more than armistice. On the basis\nof such a collapse the league may as well administer its affairs\neconomically by way of an all-around reduction of armaments, as by the\ncostlier and more irksome way of \"preparedness.\" But a sensible\nreduction of armaments on the part of the neutral nations implies\ndisarmament of the dynastic States. Which would involve a neutral\nsurveillance of the affairs of these dynastic States in such detail and\nwith such exercise of authority as would reduce their governments to the\neffective status of local administrative officials. Out of which, in\nturn, would arise complications that would lead to necessary\nreadjustments all along the line. It would involve the virtual, if not\nalso the formal, abolition of the monarchy, since the monarchy has no\nother use than that of international war and intrigue; or at least it\nwould involve the virtual abrogation of its powers, reducing it to the\nsame status of _faineantise_ as now characterises the British crown.\nEvidently this means a serious intermeddling in the domestic concerns\nand arrangements of the Fatherland, such as is not admissible under the\ndemocratic principle that any people must be left free to follow their\nown inclinations and devices in their own concerns; at the same time\nthat this degree of interference is imperative if the peace is to be\nkept on any other footing than that of eternal vigilance and superior\narmed force, with a people whose own inclinations and devices are of the\nkind now grown familiar in the German case,--all of which also applies,\nwith accentuation, in the case of Imperial Japan.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSome such policy of neutral surveillance in the affairs of these peoples\nwhose pacific temper is under suspicion, is necessarily involved in a\nplan to enforce peace by concert of the pacific nations, and it will\nnecessarily carry implications and farther issues, touching not only\nthese supposedly recalcitrant peoples, but also as regards the pacific\nnations themselves. Assuming always that the prime purpose and\nconsistent aim of the projected league is the peace and security of\nthose pacific nations on whose initiative it is to be achieved, then it\nshould be reasonable to assume that the course of procedure in its\norganisation, administration and further adaptations and adjustments\nmust follow the logic of necessities leading to that end. He who wills\nthe end must make up his account with the means.\n\nThe end in this case is peace and security; which means, for practical\npurposes, peace and good-will. Ill-will is not a secure foundation of\npeace. Even the military strategists of the Imperial establishment\nrecommend a programme of \"frightfulness\" only as a convenient military\nexpedient, essentially a provisional basis of tranquility. In the long\nrun and as a permanent peace measure it is doubtless not to the point.\nSecurity is finally to be had among or between modern peoples only on\nthe ground of a common understanding and an impartially common basis of\nequity, or something approaching that basis as nearly as circumstances\nwill permit. Which means that in so far as the projected peace-compact\nis to take effect in any enduring way, and leave the federated nations\nsome degree of freedom from persistent apprehension and animosity, as\nwell as from habitual insecurity of life and limb, the league must not\nonly be all-inclusive, but it must be inclusively uniform in all its\nrequirements and regulations.\n\nThe peoples of the quondam Imperial nations must come into the league on\na footing of formal equality with the rest. This they can not do without\nthe virtual abdication of their dynastic governmental establishments and\na consequent shift to a democratic form of organisation, and a formal\nabrogation of class privileges and prerogatives.\n\nHowever, a virtual abdication or cancelment of the dynastic rule, such\nas to bring it formally into the same class with the British crown,\nwould scarcely meet the requirements in the case of the German Imperial\nestablishment; still more patently not in the case of Imperial Japan.\nIf, following the outlines of the decayed British crown, one or the\nother of these Imperial establishments were by formal enactment reduced\nto a state of nominal desuetude, the effect would be very appreciably\ndifferent from what happens in the British community, where the crown\nhas lost its powers by failure of the requisite subordination on the\npart of the people, and not by a formal abdication of rights. In the\nGerman case, and even more in the Japanese case, the strength of the\nImperial establishment lies in the unimpaired loyalty of the populace;\nwhich would remain nearly intact at the outset, and would thin out only\nby insensible degrees in the sequel; so that if only the Imperial\nestablishment were left formally standing it would command the fealty of\nthe common run in spite of any formal abrogation of its powers, and the\ncourse of things would, in effect, run as before the break. In effect,\nto bring about a shift to a democratic basis the dynastic slate would\nhave to be wiped very clean indeed. And this shift would be\nindispensable to the successful conduct of such a pacific league of\nnations, since any other than an effectually democratic national\nestablishment is to be counted on unfailingly to intrigue for dynastic\naggrandizement, through good report and evil.\n\nIn a case like that of Imperial Germany, with its federated States and\nsubsidiaries, where royalty and nobility still are potent preconceptions\ninvesting the popular imagination, and where loyal abnegation in the\npresence of authority still is the chief and staple virtue of the common\nman,--in all such cases virtual abdication of the dynastic initiative\nunder constitutional forms can be had only by a formal and scrupulously\ncomplete abrogation of all those legal and customary arrangements on\nwhich this irresponsible exercise of authority has rested and through\nwhich it has taken effect. Neutralisation in these instances will mean\nreduction to an unqualified democratic footing; which will, at least at\nthe outset, not be acceptable to the common people, and will be wholly\nintolerable to the ruling classes. Such a regime, therefore, while it is\nindispensable as a working basis for a neutral league of peace, would\nfrom the outset have to be enforced against the most desperate\nresistance of the ruling classes, headed by the dynastic statesmen and\nwarlords, and backed by the stubborn loyalty of the subject populace. It\nwould have to mean the end of things for the ruling classes and the most\ndistasteful submission to an alien scheme of use and wont for the\npopulace. And yet it is also an indispensable element in any scheme of\npacification that aims at permanent peace and security. In time, it may\nwell be believed, the people of the Fatherland might learn to do well\nenough without the gratuitous domination of their ruling classes, but at\nthe outset it would be a heartfelt privation.\n\nIt follows that a league to enforce peace would have to begin its regime\nwith enforcing peace on terms of the unconditional surrender of the\nformidable warlike nations; which could be accomplished only by the\nabsolute and irretrievable defeat of these Powers as they now stand. The\nquestion will, no doubt, present itself, Is the end worth the cost? That\nquestion can, of course, not be answered in absolute terms, inasmuch as\nit resolves itself into a question of taste and prepossession. An answer\nto it would also not be greatly to the purpose here, since it would have\nno particular bearing on the course of action likely to be pursued by\nthese pacific nations in their quest of a settled peace. It is more to\nthe point to ask what is likely to be the practical decision of these\npeoples on that head when the question finally presents itself in a\nconcrete form.\n\nAgain it is necessary to call to mind that any momentous innovation\nwhich rests on popular sentiment will take time; that consequently\nanything like a plebiscite on the question today would scarcely give a\nsafe index of what the decision is likely to be when presently put to\nthe test; and that as things go just now, swiftly and urgent, any\ntime-allowance counts at something more than its ordinary workday\ncoefficient. What can apparently be said with some degree of confidence\nis that just now, during these two years past, sentiment has been moving\nin the direction indicated, and that any growing inclination of the kind\nis being strongly reenforced by a growing realisation that nothing but\nheroic remedies will avail at this juncture. If it comes to be currently\nrecognised that a settled peace can be had only at the cost of\neradicating privilege and royalty from the warlike nations, it would\nseem reasonable to expect, from their present state of mind, that the\npacific nations will scarcely hesitate to apply that remedy,--provided\nalways that the fortunes of war fall out as that measure would require,\nand provided also that the conflict lasts long enough and severe enough\nto let them make up their mind to anything so drastic.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThere is a certain side issue bearing on this question of the ulterior\nprobabilities of popular sentiment and national policy as to what is to\nbe done with the warlike nations in the event that the allied nations\nwho fight for neutrality have the disposal of such matters. This side\nissue may seem remote, and it may not unlikely be overlooked among the\nmass of graver and more tangible considerations. It was remarked above\nthat the United Kingdom is one of the two chief pillars of the projected\nhouse of peace; and it may be added without serious fear of\ncontradiction or annoyance that the United Kingdom is also the one among\nthese pacific nations that comes nearest being capable, in the event of\nsuch an emergency, to take care of its own case single-handed. For\nbetter or worse, British adhesion to the project is indispensable, and\nthe British are in a position virtually to name their own terms of\nadhesion. The British commonwealth--a very inclusive phrase in this\nconnection--must form the core of the pacific league, if any, and\nBritish sentiment will have a very great place in the terms of its\nformation and in the terms which it will be inclined to offer the\nImperial coalition at the settlement.\n\nNow, it happens that the British community entered on this war as a\ndemocratic monarchy ruled and officered by a body of gentlemen--doubtless\nthe most correct and admirable muster of gentlemen, of anything approaching\nits volume, that the modern world can show. But the war has turned out not\nto be a gentlemen's war. It has on the contrary been a war of technological\nexploits, reenforced with all the beastly devices of the heathen. It is a\nwar in which all the specific traits of the well-bred and gently-minded man\nare a handicap; in which veracity, gallantry, humanity, liberality are\nconducive to nothing but defeat and humiliation. The death-rate among the\nBritish gentlemen-officers in the early months, and for many months, ran\nextravagantly high, for the most part because they were gallant\ngentlemen as well as officers imbued with the good, old class spirit of\n_noblesse oblige_, that has made half the tradition and more than half\nthe working theory of the British officer in the field,--good, but old,\nhopelessly out of date. That generation of officers died, for the most\npart; being unfit to survive or to serve the purpose under these modern\nconditions of warfare, to which their enemy on the other hand had\nadapted themselves with easy facility from beforehand. The gentlemanly\nqualifications, and the material apparatus of gentility, and, it will\nperhaps have to be admitted, the gentlemen, have fallen into the\nbackground, or perhaps rather have measurably fallen into abeyance,\namong the officers of the line. There may be more doubt as to the state\nof things in respect of the gentility of the staff, but the best that\ncan confidently be said is that it is a point in doubt.\n\nIt is hoped that one may say without offense that in the course of time\nthe personnel has apparently worked down to the level of vulgarity\ndefined by the ways and means of this modern warfare; which means the\nlevel on which runs a familiar acquaintance with large and complex\nmechanical apparatus, railway and highway transport and power,\nreenforced concrete, excavations and mud, more particularly mud,\nconcealment and ambush, and unlimited deceit and ferocity. It is not\nprecisely that persons of pedigree and gentle breeding have ceased to\nenter or seek entrance to employment as officers, still less that\nmeasures have been taken to restrain their doing so or to eliminate from\nthe service those who have come into it--though there may present itself\na doubt on this point as touches the more responsible discretionary\npositions--but only that the stock of suitable gentlemen, uncommonly\nlarge as it is, has been overdrawn; that those who have latterly gone\ninto service, or stayed in, have perforce divested themselves of their\ngentility in some appreciable measure, particularly as regards class\ndistinction, and have fallen on their feet in the more commonplace role\nof common men.\n\nServiceability in this modern warfare is conditioned on much the same\ntraits of temperament and training that make for usefulness in the\nmodern industrial processes, where large-scale coordinations of movement\nand an effective familiarity with precise and far-reaching mechanical\nprocesses is an indispensable requirement,--indispensable in the same\nmeasure as the efficient conduct of this modern machine industry is\nindispensable. But the British gentleman, in so far as he runs true to\ntype, is of no use to modern industry; quite the contrary, in fact.\nStill, the British gentleman is, in point of heredity, the same thing\nover again as the British common man; so that, barring the misdirected\ntraining that makes him a gentleman, and which can largely be undone\nunder urgent need and pressure, he can be made serviceable for such uses\nas the modern warfare requires. Meantime the very large demand for\nofficers, and the insatiable demand for capable officers, has brought\nthe experienced and capable common man into the case and is in a fair\nway to discredit gentility as a necessary qualification of field\nofficers.\n\nBut the same process of discredit and elimination is also extending to\nthe responsible officials who have the administration of things in hand.\nIndeed, the course of vulgarisation among the responsible officials has\nnow been under way for some appreciable time and with very perceptible\neffect, and the rate of displacement appears to be gathering velocity\nwith every month that passes. Here, as in the field operations, it also\nappears that gentlemanly methods, standards, preconceptions, and\nknowledge of men and things, is no longer to the purpose. Here, too, it\nis increasingly evident that this is not a gentlemen's war. And the\ntraditional qualifications that have sufficed in the past, at least to\nthe extent of enabling the British management to \"muddle through,\" as\nthey are proudly in the habit of saying,--these qualifications are of\nslight account in this technological conjuncture of the nation's\nfortunes. It would perhaps be an under-statement to say that these\ngentlemanly qualifications are no longer of any account, for the purpose\nimmediately in hand, and it would doubtless not do to say that they are\nwholly and unreservedly disserviceable as things run today; but captious\ncritics might find at least a precarious footing of argument on such a\nproposition.\n\nThrough the course of the nineteenth century the British government had\nprogressively been taking on the complexion of a \"gentlemen's\nagreement;\" a government by gentlemen, for gentlemen, and of gentlemen,\ntoo, beyond what could well be alleged in any other known instance,\nthough never wholly so. No government could be a government of gentlemen\nexclusively, since there is no pecuniary profit in gentlemen as such,\nand therefore no object in governing them; more particularly could there\nnever be any incentive in it for gentlemen, whose livelihood is, in the\nnature of the case, drawn from some one else. A gentlemen's government\ncan escape death by inanition only in so far as it serves the material\ninterest of its class, as contrasted with the underlying population from\nwhich the class draws its livelihood. This British arrangement of a\ngovernment by prudent and humane gentlemen with a view to the\nconservation of that state of things that best conduced to the material\nwell-being of their own class, has on the whole had the loyal support of\nthe underlying populace, with an occasional floundering protest. But\nthe protest has never taken the shape of an expressed distrust of\ngentlemen, considered as the staple ways and means of government; nor\nhas the direction of affairs ever descended into the hands of any other\nor lower class or condition of men.\n\nOn the whole, this British arrangement for the control of national\naffairs by a body of interested gentlemen-investors has been, and\nperhaps still is, just as well at home in the affectionate\npreconceptions of the nineteenth-century British as the corresponding\nGerman usufruct by self-appointed swaggering aristocrats has been among\nthe underlying German population, or as the American arrangement of\nnational control by business men for business ends. The British and the\nAmerican arrangements run very much to the same substantial effect, of\ncourse, inasmuch as the British gentlemen represent, as a class, the\nfilial generations of a business community, and their aims and standards\nof conduct continue to be such as are enforced by the pecuniary\ninterests on which their gentility is conditioned. They continue to draw\nthe ways and means of a worthy life from businesslike arrangements of a\n\"vested\" character, made and provided with a view to their nourishment\nand repose. Their resulting usufruct of the community's productive\nefforts rests on a vested interest of a pecuniary sort, sanctioned by\nthe sacred rights of property; very much as the analogous German\ndynastic and aristocratic usufruct rests on personal prerogative,\nsanctioned by the sacred rights of authentic prescription, without\nafterthought. The two, it will be noted are very much alike, in effect,\n\"under the skin.\" The great distinguishing mark being that the German\nusufructuary gentlemen are, in theory at least, gentlemen-adventurers of\nprowess and proud words, whose place in the world's economy it is to\nglorify God and disturb the peace; whereas their British analogues are\ngentlemen-investors, of blameless propriety, whose place it is more\nsimply to glorify God and enjoy Him forever.\n\nAll this arrangement of a usufruct with a view to the reputable\nconsumption of the community's superfluous production has had the\ncordial support of British sentiment, perhaps fully as cordial as the\nGerman popular subservience in the corresponding German scheme; both\nbeing well embedded in the preconceptions of the common man. But the war\nhas put it all to a rude test, and has called on the British gentlemen's\nexecutive committee to take over duties for which it was not designed.\nThe exigencies of this war of technological exploits have been almost\nwholly, and very insistently, of a character not contemplated in the\nconstitution of such an executive committee of gentlemen-investors\ndesigned to safeguard class interests and promote their pecuniary class\nadvantage by a blamelessly inconspicuous and indirect management of\nnational affairs. The methods are of the class known colloquially among\nthe vulgar-spoken American politicians as \"pussyfooting\" and\n\"log-rolling\"; but always with such circumstance of magnitude,\nauthenticity and well-bred deference to precedent, as to give the\nresulting routine of subreption, trover and conversion, an air not only\nof benevolent consideration but of austere morality.\n\nBut the most austere courtesy and the most authentically dispassionate\ndivision of benefits will not meet the underbred exigencies of a war\nconducted on the mechanistic lines of the modern state of the industrial\narts. So the blameless, and for the purpose imbecile, executive\ncommittee of gentlemen-investors has been insensibly losing the\nconfidence and the countenance of the common man; who, when all is said,\nwill always have to do what is to be done. The order of gentlemanly\nparleying and brokery has, therefore, with many apprehensions of\ncalamity, been reluctantly and tardily giving ground before something\nthat is of a visibly underbred order. Increasingly underbred, and\nthereby insensibly approaching the character of this war situation, but\naccepted with visible reluctance and apprehension both by the ruling\nclass and by the underlying population. The urgent necessity of going to\nsuch a basis, and of working out the matter in hand by an unblushing\nrecourse to that matter-of-fact logic of mechanical efficiency, which\nalone can touch the difficulties of the case, but which has no respect\nof persons,--this necessity has been present from the outset and has\nbeen vaguely apprehended for long past, but it is only tardily and after\nthe chastening of heavy penalties on this gentlemanly imbecility that a\nsubstantial move in that direction has been made. It has required much\nBritish resolution to overcome the night-fear of going out into the\nunhallowed ground of matter-of-fact, where the farthest earlier\nexcursions of the governmental agencies had taken them no farther than\nsuch financial transactions as are incident to the accomplishment of\nanything whatever in a commercial nation. And then, too, there is a\npecuniary interest in being interested in financial transactions.\n\nThis shifting of discretionary control out of the hands of the gentlemen\ninto those of the underbred common run, who know how to do what is\nnecessary to be done in the face of underbred exigencies, may\nconceivably go far when it has once been started, and it may go forward\nat an accelerated rate if the pressure of necessity lasts long enough.\nIf time be given for habituation to this manner of directorate in\nnational affairs, so that the common man comes to realise how it is\nfeasible to get along without gentlemen-investors holding the\ndiscretion, the outcome may conceivably be very grave. It is a point in\ndoubt, but it is conceivable that in such a case the gentlemanly\nexecutive committee administering affairs in the light of the\ngentlemanly pecuniary interest, will not be fully reinstated in the\ndiscretionary control of the United Kingdom for an appreciable number of\nyears after the return of peace. Possibly, even, the regime may be\npermanently deranged, and there is even a shadowy doubt possible to be\nentertained as to whether the vested pecuniary rights, on which the\nclass of gentlemen rests, may not suffer some derangement, in case the\ncontrol should pass into the hands of the underbred and unpropertied for\nso long a season as to let the common man get used to thinking that the\nvested interests and the sacred rights of gentility are so much ado\nabout nothing.\n\nSuch an outcome would be extreme, but as a remote contingency it is to\nbe taken into account. The privileged classes of the United Kingdom\nshould by this time be able to see the danger there may be for them and\ntheir vested interests, pecuniary and moral, in an excessive\nprolongation of the war; in such postponement of peace as would afford\ntime for a popular realisation of their incompetence and\ndisserviceability as touches the nation's material well-being under\nmodern conditions. To let the nation's war experience work to such an\noutcome, the season of war would have to be prolonged beyond what either\nthe hopes or the fears of the community have yet contemplated; but the\npoint is after all worth noting, as being within the premises of the\ncase, that there is herein a remote contingency of losing, at least for\na time, that unformulated clause in the British constitution which has\nhitherto restricted the holding of responsible office to men of pedigree\nand of gentle breeding, or at least of very grave pecuniary weight; so\ngrave as to make the incumbents virtual gentlemen, with a virtual\npedigree, and with a virtual gentleman's accentuated sense of class\ninterest. Should such an eventuality overtake British popular sentiment\nand belief there is also the remote contingency that the rights of\nownership and investment would lose a degree of sanctity.\n\nIt seems necessary to note a further, and in a sense more improbable,\nline of disintegration among modern fixed ideas. Among the best\nentrenched illusions of modern economic preconceptions, and in economic\nas well as legal theory, has been the indispensability of funds, and the\nhard and fast limitation of industrial operations by the supply or\nwith-holding of funds. The war experience has hitherto gone tentatively\nto show that funds and financial transactions, of credit, bargain, sale\nand solvency, may be dispensed with under pressure of necessity; and\napparently without seriously hindering that run of mechanical fact, on\nwhich interest in the present case necessarily centers, and which must\nbe counted on to give the outcome. Latterly the case is clearing up a\nlittle further, on further experience and under further pressure of\ntechnological exigencies, to the effect that financial arrangements are\nindispensable in this connection only because and in so far as it has\nbeen arranged to consider them indispensable; as in international trade.\nThey are an indispensable means of intermediation only in so far as\npecuniary interests are to be furthered or safeguarded in the\nintermediation. When, as has happened with the belligerents in the\npresent instance, the national establishment becomes substantially\ninsolvent, it is beginning to appear that its affairs can be taken care\nof with less difficulty and with better effect without the use of\nfinancial expedients. Of course, it takes time to get used to doing\nthings by the more direct method and without the accustomed\ncircumlocution of accountancy, or the accustomed allowance for profits\nto go to interested parties who, under the financial regime, hold a\npower of discretionary permission in all matters that touch the use of\nthe industrial arts. Under these urgent material exigencies, investment\ncomes to have much of the appearance of a gratuitous drag and drain on\nthe processes of industry.\n\nHere, again, is a sinister contingency; sinister, that is, for those\nvested rights of ownership by force of which the owners of \"capital\" are\nenabled to permit or withhold the use of the industrial arts by the\ncommunity at large, on pain of privation in case the accustomed toll to\nthe owners of capital is not paid. It is, of course, not intended to\nfind fault with this arrangement; which has the sanction of \"time\nimmemorial\" and of a settled persuasion that it lies at the root of all\ncivilised life and intercourse. It is only that in case of extreme need\nthis presumed indispensable expedient of industrial control has broken\ndown, and that experience is proving it to be, in these premises, an\nitem of borrowed trouble. Should experience continue to run on the same\nlines for an appreciable period and at a high tension, it is at least\nconceivable that the vested right of owners to employ unlimited sabotage\nin the quest of profits might fall so far into disrepute as to leave\nthem under a qualified doubt on the return of \"normal\" conditions. The\ncommon man, in other words, who gathers nothing but privation and\nanxiety from the owners' discretionary sabotage, may conceivably stand\nto lose his preconception that the vested rights of ownership are the\ncornerstone of his life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe considerations recited in this lengthy excursion on the war\nsituation and its probable effects on popular habits of thought in the\nUnited Kingdom go to say that when peace comes to be negotiated, with\nthe United Kingdom as the chief constituent and weightiest spokesman of\nthe allied nations and of the league of pacific neutrals, the\nrepresentatives of British aims and opinions are likely to speak in a\ndifferent, chastened, and disillusioned fashion, as contrasted with what\nthe British attitude was at the beginning of hostilities. The\ngentlemanly British animus of arrogant self-sufficiency will have been\nsomewhat sobered, perhaps somewhat subdued. Concession to the claims and\npretensions of the other pacific nations is likely to go farther than\nmight once have been expected, particularly in the way of concession to\nany demand for greater international comity and less international\ndiscrimination; essentially concession looking to a reduction of\nnational pretensions and an incipient neutralisation of national\ninterests. Coupled with this will presumably be a less conciliatory\nattitude toward the members of the dynastic coalition against whom the\nwar has been fought, owing to a more mature realisation of the\nimpossibility of a lasting peace negotiated with a Power whose\nsubstantial core is a warlike and irresponsible dynastic establishment.\nThe peace negotiations are likely to run on a lower level of diplomatic\ndeference to constituted authorities, and with more of a view to the\ninterests and sentiments of the underlying population, than was evident\nin the futile negotiations had at the outbreak of hostilities. The\ngentle art of diplomacy, that engages the talents of exalted personages\nand well-bred statesmen, has been somewhat discredited; and if it turns\nout that the vulgarisation of the directorate in the United Kingdom and\nits associated allies and neutrals will have time to go on to something\nlike dominance and authenticity, then the deference which the spokesmen\nof these nations are likely to show for the prescriptive rights of\ndynasty, nobility, bureaucracy, or even of pecuniary aristocracy, in the\ncountries that make up the party of the second part, may be expected to\nhave shrunk appreciably, conceivably even to such precarious dimensions\nas to involve the virtual neglect or possible downright abrogation of\nthem, in sum and substance.\n\nIndeed, the chances of a successful pacific league of neutrals to come\nout of the current situation appear to be largely bound up with the\ndegree of vulgarisation due to overtake the several directorates of the\nbelligerent nations as well as the popular habits of thought in these\nand in the neutral countries, during the further course of the war. It\nis too broad a generalisation, perhaps, to say that the longer the war\nlasts the better are the chances of such a neutral temper in the\ninterested nations as will make a pacific league practicable, but the\ncontrary would appear a much less defensible proposition. It is, of\ncourse, the common man that has the least interest in warlike\nenterprise, if any, and it is at the same time the common man that bears\nthe burden of such enterprise and has also the most immediate interest\nin keeping the peace. If, slowly and pervasively, in the course of hard\nexperience, he learns to distrust the conduct of affairs by his betters,\nand learns at the same move to trust to his own class to do what is\nnecessary and to leave undone what is not, his deference to his betters\nis likely to suffer a decline, such as should show itself in a somewhat\nunguarded recourse to democratic ways and means.\n\nIn short, there is in this progressive vulgarisation of effectual use\nand wont and of sentiment, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, some\nslight ground for the hope, or the apprehension, that no peace will be\nmade with the dynastic Powers of the second part until they cease to be\ndynastic Powers and take on the semblance of democratic commonwealths,\nwith dynasties, royalties and privileged classes thrown in the discard.\n\nThis would probably mean some prolongation of hostilities, until the\ndynasties and privileged classes had completely exhausted their\navailable resources; and, by the same token, until the privileged\nclasses in the more modern nations among the belligerents had also been\ndisplaced from direction and discretion by those underbred classes on\nwhom it is incumbent to do what is to be done; or until a juncture were\nreached that comes passably near to such a situation. On the contingency\nof such a course of events and some such outcome appears also to hang\nthe chance of a workable pacific league. Without further experience of\nthe futility of upper-class and pecuniary control, to discredit\nprecedent and constituted authority, it is scarcely conceivable, e.g.,\nthat the victorious allies would go the length of coercively discarding\nthe German Imperial dynasty and the kept classes that with it constitute\nthe Imperial State, and of replacing it with a democratic organisation\nof the people in the shape of a modern commonwealth; and without a\nchange of that nature, affecting that nation and such of its allies as\nwould remain on the map, no league of pacific neutrals would be able to\nmanage its affairs, even for a time, except on a war-footing that would\ninvolve a competitive armament against future dynastic enterprises from\nthe same quarter. Which comes to saying that a lasting peace is possible\non no other terms than the disestablishment of the Imperial dynasty and\nthe abrogation of all feudalistic remnants of privilege in the\nFatherland and its allies, together with the reduction of those\ncountries to the status of commonwealths made up of ungraded men.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is easy to speculate on what the conditions precedent to such a\npacific league of neutrals must of necessity be; but it is not therefore\nless difficult to make a shrewd guess as to the chances of these\nconditions being met. Of these conditions precedent, the chief and\nforemost, without which any other favorable circumstances are\ncomparatively idle, is a considerable degree of neutralisation,\nextending to virtually all national interests and pretensions, but more\nparticularly to all material and commercial interests of the federated\npeoples; and, indispensably and especially, such neutralisation would\nhave to extend to the nations from whom aggression is now apprehended,\nas, e.g., the German people. But such neutralisation could not\nconceivably reach the Fatherland unless that nation were made over in\nthe image of democracy, since the Imperial State is, by force of the\nterms, a warlike and unneutral power. This would seem to be the\nostensibly concealed meaning of the allied governments in proclaiming\nthat their aim is to break German militarism without doing harm to the\nGerman people.\n\nAs touches the neutralisation of the democratically rehabilitated\nFatherland, or in default of that, as touches the peace terms to be\noffered the Imperial government, the prime article among the\nstipulations would seem to be abolition of all trade discrimination\nagainst Germany or by Germany against any other nationality. Such\nstipulation would, of course, cover all manner of trade\ndiscrimination,--e.g., import, export and excise tariff, harbor and\nregistry dues, subsidy, patent right, copyright, trade mark, tax\nexemption whether partial or exclusive, investment preferences at home\nand abroad,--in short it would have to establish a thoroughgoing\nneutralisation of trade relations in the widest acceptation of the term,\nand to apply in perpetuity. The like applies, of course, to all that\nfringe of subsidiary and outlying peoples on whom Imperial Germany\nrelies for much of its resources in any warlike enterprise. Such a move\nalso disposes of the colonial question in a parenthesis, so far as\nregards any special bond of affiliation between the Empire, or the\nFatherland, and any colonial possessions that are now thought desirable\nto be claimed. Under neutralisation, colonies would cease to be\n\"colonial possessions,\" being necessarily included under the general\nabrogation of commercial discriminations, and also necessarily exempt\nfrom special taxation or specially favorable tax rates.\n\nColonies there still would be, though it is not easy to imagine what\nwould be the meaning of a \"German Colony\" in such a case. Colonies would\nbe free communities, after the fashion of New Zealand or Australia, but\nwith the further sterilisation of the bond between colony and mother\ncountry involved in the abolition of all appointive offices and all\nresponsibility to the crown or the imperial government. Now, there are\nno German colonies in this simpler British sense of the term, which\nimplies nothing more than community of blood, institutions and language,\ntogether with that sense of solidarity between the colony and the mother\ncountry which this community of pedigree and institutions will\nnecessarily bring; but while there are today no German colonies, in the\nsense of the term so given, there is no reason to presume that no such\nGerman colonies would come into bearing under the conditions of this\nprospective regime of neutrality installed by such a pacific league,\nwhen backed by the league's guarantee that no colony from the Fatherland\nwill be exposed to the eventual risk of coming under the discretionary\ntutelage of the German Imperial establishment and so falling into a\nrelation of step-childhood to the Imperial dynasty.\n\nAs is well known, and as has by way of superfluous commonplace been set\nforth by a sometime Colonial Secretary of the Empire, the decisive\nreason for there being no German colonies in existence is the\nconsistently impossible colonial policy of the German government,\nlooking to the usufruct of the colonies by the government, and the fear\nof further arbitrary control and nepotic discrimination at the pleasure\nof the self-seeking dynastic establishment. It is only under Imperial\nrule that no German colony, in this modern sense of the term, is\npossible; and only because Imperial rule does not admit of a free\ncommunity being formed by colonists from the Fatherland; or of an\nostensibly free community of that kind ever feeling secure from\nunsolicited interference with its affairs.\n\nThe nearest approach to a German Colony, as contrasted with a \"Colonial\nPossession,\" hitherto have been the very considerable, number of\nescaped German subjects who have settled in English-speaking or\nLatin-speaking countries, particularly in North and South America. And\nconsidering that the chief common trait among them is their successful\nevasion of the Imperial government's heavy hand, they show an admirable\nfilial piety toward the Imperial establishment; though troubled with no\nslightest regret at having escaped from the Imperial surveillance and no\nslightest inclination to return to the shelter of the Imperial tutelage.\nA colloquialism--\"hyphenate\"--has latterly grown up to meet the need of\na term to designate these evasive and yet patriotic colonists. It is\nscarcely misleading to say that the German-American hyphenate, e.g., in\nso far as he runs true to form, is still a German subject with his\nheart, but he is an American citizen with his head. All of which goes to\nargue that if the Fatherland were to fall into such a state of\ndemocratic tolerance that no recidivist need carry a defensive hyphen to\nshield him from the importunate attentions of the Imperial government,\nGerman colonies would also come into bearing; although, it is true, they\nwould have no value to the German government.\n\nIn the Imperial colonial policy colonies are conceived to stand to their\nImperial guardian or master in a relation between that of a step-child\nand that of an indentured servant; to be dealt with summarily and at\ndiscretion and to be made use of without scruple. The like attitude\ntoward colonies was once familiar matter-of-course with the British and\nSpanish statesmen. The British found the plan unprofitable, and also\nunworkable, and have given it up. The Spanish, having no political\noutlook but the dynastic one, could of course not see their way to\nrelinquish the only purpose of their colonial enterprise, except in\nrelinquishing their colonial possessions. The German (Imperial) colonial\npolicy is and will be necessarily after the Spanish pattern, and\nnecessarily, too, with the Spanish results.\n\nUnder the projected neutral scheme there would be no colonial policy,\nand of course, no inducement to the acquisition of colonies, since\nthere would be no profit to be derived, or to be fancied, in the case.\nBut while no country, as a commonwealth, has any material interest in\nthe acquisition or maintenance of colonies, it is otherwise as regards\nthe dynastic interests of an Imperial government; and it is also\notherwise, at least in the belief of the interested parties, as regards\nspecial businessmen or business concerns who are in a position to gain\nsomething by help of national discrimination in their favor. As regards\nthe pecuniary interests of favored businessmen or business concerns, and\nof investors favored by national discrimination in colonial relations,\nthe case falls under the general caption of trade discrimination, and\ndoes not differ at all materially from such expedients as a protective\ntariff, a ship subsidy, or a bounty on exports. But as regards the\nwarlike, that is to say dynastic, interest of an Imperial government the\ncase stands somewhat different.\n\nColonial Possessions in such a case yield no material benefit to the\ncountry at large, but their possession is a serviceable plea for warlike\npreparations with which to retain possession of the colonies in the face\nof eventualities, and it is also a serviceable means of stirring the\nnational pride and keeping alive a suitable spirit of patriotic\nanimosity. The material service actually to be derived from such\npossessions in the event of war is a point in doubt, with the\nprobabilities apparently running against their being of any eventual net\nuse. But there need be no question that such possessions, under the hand\nof any national establishment infected with imperial ambitions, are a\nfruitful source of diplomatic complications, excuses for armament,\ninternational grievances, and eventual aggression. A pacific league of\nneutrals can evidently not tolerate the retention of colonial\npossessions by any dynastic State that may be drawn into the league or\nunder its jurisdiction, as, e.g., the German Empire in case it should be\nleft on an Imperial footing. Whereas, in case the German peoples are\nthrown back on a democratic status, as neutralised commonwealths without\na crown or a military establishment, the question of their colonial\npossessions evidently falls vacant.\n\nAs to the neutralisation of trade relations apart from the question of\ncolonies, and as bears on the case of Germany under the projected\njurisdiction of a pacific league of neutrals, the considerations to be\ntaken account of are of much the same nature. As it would have to take\neffect, e.g., in the abolition of commercial and industrial\ndiscriminations between Germany and the pacific nations, such\nneutralisation would doubtless confer a lasting material benefit on the\nGerman people at large; and it is not easy to detect any loss or\ndetriment to be derived from such a move so long as peace prevails.\nProtective, that is to say discriminating, export, import, or excise\nduties, harbor and registry dues, subsidies, tax exemptions and trade\npreferences, and all the like devices of interference with trade and\nindustry, are unavoidably a hindrance to the material interests of any\npeople on whom they are imposed or who impose these disabilities on\nthemselves. So that exemption from these things by a comprehensive\nneutralisation of trade relations would immediately benefit all the\nnations concerned, in respect of their material well-being in times of\npeace. There is no exception and no abatement to be taken account of\nunder this general statement, as is well known to all men who are\nconversant with these matters.\n\nBut it is otherwise as regards the dynastic interest in the case, and as\nregards any national interest in warlike enterprise. It is doubtless\ntrue that all restraint of trade between nations, and between classes or\nlocalities within the national frontiers, unavoidably acts to weaken and\nimpoverish the people on whose economic activities this restraint is\nlaid; and to the extent to which this effect is had it will also be true\nthat the country which so is hindered in its work will have a less\naggregate of resources to place at the disposal of its enterprising\nstatesmen for imperialist ends. But these restraints may yet be useful\nfor dynastic, that is to say warlike, ends by making the country more\nnearly a \"self-contained economic whole.\" A country becomes a\n\"self-contained economic whole\" by mutilation, in cutting itself off\nfrom the industrial system in which industrially it belongs, but in\nwhich it is unwilling nationally to hold its place. National frontiers\nare industrial barriers. But as a result of such mutilation of its\nindustrial life such a country is better able--it has been believed--to\nbear the shock of severing its international trade relations entirely,\nas is likely to happen in case of war.\n\nIn a large country, such as America or Russia, which comprises within\nits national boundaries very extensive and very varied resources and a\nwidely distributed and diversified population, the mischief suffered\nfrom restraints of trade that hinder industrial relations with the world\nat large will of course be proportionately lessened. Such a country\ncomes nearer being a miniature industrial world; although none of the\ncivilised nations, large or small, can carry on its ordinary industrial\nactivities and its ordinary manner of life without drawing on foreign\nparts to some appreciable extent. But a country of small territorial\nextent and of somewhat narrowly restricted natural resources, as, e.g.,\nGermany or France, can even by the most drastic measures of restraint\nand mutilation achieve only a very mediocre degree of industrial\nisolation and \"self-sufficiency,\"--as has, e.g., appeared in the present\nwar. But in all cases, though in varying measure, the mitigated\nisolation so enforced by these restraints on trade will in their degree\nimpair the country's industrial efficiency and lower the people's\nmaterial well-being; yet, if the restrictions are shrewdly applied this\npartial isolation and partial \"self-sufficiency\" will go some way toward\npreparing the nation for the more thorough isolation that follows on the\noutbreak of hostilities.\n\nThe present plight of the German people under war conditions may serve\nto show how nearly that end may be attained, and yet how inadequate even\nthe most unreserved measures of industrial isolation must be in face of\nthe fact that the modern state of the industrial arts necessarily draws\non the collective resources of the world at large. It may well be\ndoubted, on an impartial view, if the mutilation of the country's\nindustrial system by such measures of isolation does not after all\nrather weaken the nation even for warlike ends; but then, the\ndiscretionary authorities in the dynastic States are always, and it may\nbe presumed necessarily, hampered with obsolete theories handed down\nfrom that cameralistic age, when the little princes of the Fatherland\nwere making dynastic history. So, e.g., the current, nineteenth and\ntwentieth century, economic policy of the Prussian-Imperial statesmen is\nstill drawn on lines within which Frederick II, called the Great, would\nhave felt well at home.\n\nLike other preparation for hostilities this reduction of the country to\nthe status of a self-contained economic organisation is costly, but\nlike other preparation for hostilities it also puts the nation in a\nposition of greater readiness to break off friendly relations with its\nneighbors. It is a war measure, commonly spoken for by its advocates as\na measure of self-defense; but whatever the merits of the\nself-defenders' contention, this measure is a war measure. As such it\ncan reasonably claim no hearing in the counsels of a pacific league of\nneutrals, whose purpose it is to make war impracticable. Particularly\ncan there be no reasonable question of admitting a policy of trade\ndiscrimination and isolation on the part of a nation which has, for\npurposes of warlike aggression, pursued such a policy in the past, and\nwhich it is the immediate purpose of the league to bind over to keep the\npeace.\n\nThere has been a volume of loose talk spent on the justice and\nexpediency of boycotting the trade of the peoples of the Empire after\nthe return of peace, as a penalty and as a preventive measure designed\nto retard their recovery of strength with which to enter on a further\nwarlike enterprise. Such a measure would necessarily be somewhat futile;\nsince \"Business is business,\" after all, and the practical limitations\nimposed on an unprofitable boycott by the moral necessity to buy cheap\nand sell dear that rests on all businessmen would surreptitiously\nmitigate it to the point of negligibility. It is inconceivable--or it\nwould be inconceivable in the absence of imbecile politicians and\nself-seeking businessmen--that measures looking to the trade isolation\nof any one of these countries could be entertained as a point of policy\nto be pursued by a league of neutrals. And it is only in so far as\npatriotic jealousy and vindictive sentiments are allowed to displace the\naspiration for peace and security, that such measures can claim\nconsideration. Considered as a penalty to be imposed on the erring\nnations who set this warlike adventure afoot, it should be sufficiently\nplain that such a measure as a trade boycott could not touch the chief\noffenders, or even their responsible abettors. It would, rather, play\ninto the hands of the militarist interests by keeping alive the spirit\nof national jealousy and international hatred, out of which wars arise\nand without which warlike enterprise might hopefully be expected to\ndisappear out of the scheme of human intercourse. The punishment would\nfall, as all economic burdens and disabilities must always fall, on the\ncommon man, the underlying population.\n\nThe chief relation of this common run, this underlying population of\nGerman subjects, to the inception and pursuit of this Imperial warlike\nenterprise, is comprised in the fact that they are an underlying\npopulation of subjects, held in usufruct by the Imperial establishment\nand employed at will. It is true, they have lent themselves unreservedly\nto the uses for which the dynasty has use for them, and they have\nentered enthusiastically into the warlike adventure set afoot by the\ndynastic statesmen; but that they have done so is their misfortune\nrather than their fault. By use and wont and indoctrination they have\nfor long been unremittingly, and helplessly, disciplined into a spirit\nof dynastic loyalty, national animosity and servile abnegation; until it\nwould be nothing better than a pathetic inversion of all the equities of\nthe case to visit the transgressions of their masters upon the common\nrun; whose fault lies, after all, in their being an underlying\npopulation of subjects, who have not had a chance to reach that\nspiritual level on which they could properly be held accountable for the\nuses to which they are turned. It is true, men are ordinarily punished\nfor their misfortunes; but the warlike enterprise of the Imperial\ndynasty has already brought what might fairly be rated as a good measure\nof punishment on this underlying populace, whose chief fault and chief\nmisfortune lies in an habitual servile abnegation of those traits of\ninitiative and discretion in man that constitute him an agent\nsusceptible of responsibility or retribution.\n\nIt would be all the more of a pathetic mockery to visit the\ntransgressions of their masters on these victims of circumstance and\ndynastic mendacity, since the conventionalities of international equity\nwill scarcely permit the high responsible parties in the case to be\nchastised with any penalty harsher than a well-mannered figure of\nspeech. To serve as a deterrent, the penalty must strike the point where\nvests the discretion; but servile use and wont is still too well intact\nin these premises to let any penalty touch the guilty core of a\nprofligate dynasty. Under the wear and tear of continued war and its\nincident continued vulgarisation of the directorate and responsible\nstaff among the pacific allies, the conventional respect of persons is\nlikely to suffer appreciable dilapidation; but there need be no\napprehension of such a loss of decent respect for personages as would\ncompromise the creature comforts of that high syndicate of personages on\nwhose initiative the Fatherland entered upon this enterprise in\ndominion.\n\nBygone shortcomings and transgressions can have no reasonable place in\nthe arrangements by which a pacific league of neutrals designs to keep\nthe peace. Neither can bygone prerogatives and precedents of\nmagnificence and of mastery, except in so far as they unavoidably must\ncome into play through the inability of men to divest themselves of\ntheir ingrained preconceptions, by virtue of which a Hohenzollern or a\nHapsburger is something more formidable and more to be considered than a\nrecruiting sergeant or a purveyor of light literature. The league can do\nits work of pacification only by elaborately forgetting differences and\ndiscrepancies of the kind that give rise to international grievances.\nWhich is the same as saying that the neutralisation of national\ndiscriminations and pretensions will have to go all the way, if it is to\nserve. But this implies, as broadly as need be, that the pacific nations\nwho make the league and provisionally administer its articles of\nagreement and jurisdiction, can not exempt themselves from any of the\nleveling measures of neutralisation to which the dynastic suspects among\nthem are to be subject. It would mean a relinquishment of all those\nundemocratic institutional survivals out of which international\ngrievances are wont to arise. As a certain Danish adage would have it,\nthe neutrals of the league must all be shorn over the same comb.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhat is to be shorn over this one comb of neutralisation and democracy\nis all those who go into the pacific league of neutrals and all who come\nunder its jurisdiction, whether of their own choice or by the\nnecessities of the case. It is of the substance of the case that those\npeoples who have been employed in the campaigns of the German-Imperial\ncoalition are to come in on terms of impartial equality with those who\nhave held the ground against them; to come under the jurisdiction, and\nprospectively into the copartnery, of the league of neutrals--all on the\npresumption that the Imperial coalition will be brought to make peace on\nterms of unconditional surrender.\n\nLet it not seem presumptuous to venture on a recital of summary\nspecifications intended to indicate the nature of those concrete\nmeasures which would logically be comprised in a scheme of pacification\ncarried out with such a view to impartial equality among the peoples who\nare to make up the projected league. There is a significant turn of\nexpression that recurs habitually in the formulation of terms put forth\nby the spokesmen of the Entente belligerents, where it is insisted that\nhostilities are carried on not against the German people or the other\npeoples associated with them, but only against the Imperial\nestablishments and their culpable aids and abettors in the enterprise.\nSo it is further insisted that there is no intention to bring pains and\npenalties on these peoples, who so have been made use of by their\nmasters, but only on the culpable master class whose tools these peoples\nhave been. And later, just now (January 1917), and from a responsible\nand disinterested spokesman for the pacific league, there comes the\ndeclaration that a lasting peace at the hands of such a league can be\ngrounded only in a present \"peace without victory.\"\n\nThe mutual congruity of these two declarations need not imply collusion,\nbut they are none the less complementary propositions and they are none\nthe less indicative of a common trend of convictions among the men who\nare best able to speak for those pacific nations that are looked to as\nthe mainstay of the prospective league. They both converge to the point\nthat the objective to be achieved is not victory for the Entente\nbelligerents but defeat for the German-Imperial coalition; that the\npeoples underlying the defeated governments are not to be dealt with as\nvanquished enemies but as fellows in undeserved misfortune brought on by\ntheir culpable masters; and that no advantage is designed to be taken of\nthese peoples, and no gratuitous hardship to be imposed on them. Their\nmasters are evidently to be put away, not as defeated antagonists but as\na public nuisance to be provided against as may seem expedient for the\npeace and security of those nations whom they have been molesting.\n\nTaking this position as outlined, it should not be extremely difficult\nto forecast the general line of procedure which it would logically\ndemand,--barring irrelevant regard for precedents and overheated\nresentment, and provided that the makers of these peace terms have a\nfree hand and go to their work with an eye single to the establishment\nof an enduring peace. The case of Germany would be typical of all the\nrest; and the main items of the bill in this case would seem logically\nto run somewhat as follows:\n\n(1) The definitive elimination of the Imperial establishment, together\nwith the monarchical establishments of the several states of the Empire\nand the privileged classes;\n\n(2) Removal or destruction of all warlike equipment, military and naval,\ndefensive and offensive;\n\n(3) Cancelment of the public debt, of the Empire and of its\nmembers--creditors of the Empire being accounted accessory to the\nculpable enterprise of the Imperial government;\n\n(4) Confiscation of such industrial equipment and resources as have\ncontributed to the carrying on of the war, as being also accessory;\n\n(5) Assumption by the league at large of all debts incurred, by the\nEntente belligerents or by neutrals, for the prosecution or by reason of\nthe war, and distribution of the obligation so assumed, impartially\namong the members of the league, including the peoples of the defeated\nnations;\n\n(6) Indemnification for all injury done to civilians in the invaded\nterritories; the means for such indemnification to be procured by\nconfiscation of all estates in the defeated countries exceeding a\ncertain very modest maximum, calculated on the average of property\nowned, say, by the poorer three-fourths of the population,--the kept\nclasses being properly accounted accessory to the Empire's culpable\nenterprise.\n\nThe proposition to let the war debt be shared by all members of the\nleague on a footing of impartial equality may seem novel, and perhaps\nextravagant. But all projects put forth for safeguarding the world's\npeace by a compact among the pacific nations run on the patent, though\noften tacit, avowal that the Entente belligerents are spending their\nsubstance and pledging their credit for the common cause. Among the\nAmericans, the chief of the neutral nations, this is coming to be\nrecognised more and more overtly. So that, in this instance at least, no\ninsurmountable reluctance to take over their due share of the common\nburden should fairly be looked for, particularly when it appears that\nthe projected league, if it is organised on a footing of neutrality,\nwill relieve the republic of virtually all outlay for their own defense.\n\nOf course, there is, in all this, no temerarious intention to offer\nadvice as to what should be done by those who have it to do, or even to\nsketch the necessary course which events are bound to take. As has been\nremarked in another passage, that would have to be a work of prophesy or\nof effrontery, both of which, it is hoped, lie equally beyond the\nhorizon of this inquiry; which is occupied with the question of what\nconditions will logically have to be met in order to an enduring peace,\nnot what will be the nature and outcome of negotiations entered into by\nastute delegates pursuing the special advantage, each of his own nation.\nAnd yet the peremptory need of reaching some practicable arrangement\nwhereby the peace may be kept, goes to say that even the most astute\nnegotiations will in some degree be controlled by that need, and may\nreasonably be expected to make some approach to the simple and obvious\nrequirements of the situation.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTherefore the argument returns to the United Kingdom and the probable\nlimit of tolerance of that people, in respect of what they are likely to\ninsist on as a necessary measure of democratisation in the nations of\nthe second part, and what measure of national abnegation they are likely\nto accommodate themselves to. The United Kingdom is indispensable to the\nformation of a pacific league of neutrals. And the British terms of\nadhesion, or rather of initiation of such a league, therefore, will have\nto constitute the core of the structure, on which details may be\nadjusted and to which concessive adjustments will have to be made by all\nthe rest. This is not saying that the projected league must or will be\ndominated by the United Kingdom or administered in the British interest.\nIndeed, it can not well be made to serve British particular interests in\nany appreciable degree, except at the cost of defeat to its main\npurpose; since the purposes of an enduring peace can be served only by\nan effectual neutralisation of national claims and interests. But it\nwould mean that the neutralisation of national interests and\ndiscriminations to be effected would have to be drawn on lines\nacceptable to British taste in these matters, and would have to go\napproximately so far as would be dictated by the British notions of what\nis expedient, and not much farther. The pacific league of neutrals would\nhave much of a British air, but \"British\" in this connection is to be\ntaken as connoting the English-speaking countries rather than as\napplying to the United Kingdom alone; since the entrance of the British\ninto the league would involve the entrance of the British colonies, and,\nindeed, of the American republic as well.\n\nThe temper and outlook of this British community, therefore, becomes a\nmatter of paramount importance in any attempted analysis of the\nsituation resulting after the war, or of any prospective course of\nconduct to be entered on by the pacific nations. And the question\ntouches not so much the temper and preconceptions of the British\ncommunity as known in recent history, but rather as it is likely to be\nmodified by the war experience. So that the practicability of a neutral\nleague comes to turn, in great measure, on the effect which this war\nexperience is having on the habits of thought of the British people, or\non that section of the British population which will make up the\neffectual majority when the war closes. The grave interest that attaches\nto this question must serve as justification for pursuing it farther,\neven though there can be no promise of a definite or confident answer to\nbe found beforehand.\n\nCertain general assertions may be made with some confidence. The\nexperiences of the war, particularly among the immediate participants\nand among their immediate domestic connections--a large and increasing\nproportion of the people at large--are plainly impressing on them the\nuselessness and hardship of such a war. There can be no question but\nthey are reaching a conviction that a war of this modern kind and scale\nis a thing to be avoided if possible. They are, no doubt, willing to go\nto very considerable lengths to make a repetition of it impossible, and\nthey may reasonably be expected to go farther along that line before\npeace returns. But the lengths to which they are ready to go may be in\nthe way of concessions, or in the way of contest and compulsion. There\nneed be no doubt but a profound and vindictive resentment runs through\nthe British community, and there is no reason to apprehend that this\nwill be dissipated in the course of further hostilities; although it\nshould fairly be expected to lose something of its earlier exuberant\nmalevolence and indiscrimination, more particularly if hostilities\ncontinue for some time. It is not too much to expect, that this popular\ntemper of resentment will demand something very tangible in the way of\nsummary vengeance on those who have brought the hardships of war upon\nthe nation.\n\nThe manner of retribution which would meet the popular demand for\n\"justice\" to be done on the enemy is likely to be affected by the\nfortunes of war, as also the incidence of it. Should the governmental\nestablishment and the discretion still vest in the gentlemanly classes\nat the close of hostilities, the retribution is likely to take the\naccustomed gentlemanly shape of pecuniary burdens imposed on the people\nof the defeated country, together with diplomatically specified\nsurrender of territorial and colonial possessions, and the like; such as\nto leave the _de facto_ enemy courteously on one side, and to yield\nsomething in the way of pecuniary benefit to the gentlemen-investors in\ncharge, and something more in the way of new emoluments of office to the\noffice-holding class included in the same order of gentlemen. The\nretribution in the case would manifestly fall on the underlying\npopulation in the defeated country, without seriously touching the\nresponsible parties, and would leave the defeated nation with a new\ngrievance to nourish its patriotic animosity and with a new incentive\nto a policy of watchful waiting for a chance of retaliation.\n\nBut it is to be noted that under the stress of the war there is going\nforward in the British community a progressive displacement of\ngentlemanly standards and official procedure by standards and procedure\nof a visibly underbred character, a weakening of the hold of the\ngentlemanly classes on the control of affairs and a weakening of the\nhold which the sacred rights of property, investment and privilege have\nlong had over the imagination of the British people. Should hostilities\ncontinue, and should the exigencies of the war situation continue to\nkeep the futility of these sacred rights, as well as the fatuity of\ntheir possessors, in the public eye, after the same fashion as hitherto,\nit would not be altogether unreasonable to expect that the discretion\nwould pass into the hands of the underbred, or into the hands of men\nimmediately and urgently accountable to the underbred. In such a case,\nand with a constantly growing popular realisation that the directorate\nand responsible enemy in the war is the Imperial dynasty and its\npedigreed aids and abettors, it is conceivable that the popular\nresentment would converge so effectually on these responsible\ninstigators and directors of misfortune as to bring the incidence of the\nrequired retribution effectually to bear on them. The outcome might, not\ninconceivably, be the virtual erasure of the Imperial dynasty, together\nwith the pedigreed-class rule on which it rests and the apparatus of\nirresponsible coercion through which it works, in the Fatherland and in\nits subsidiaries and dependencies.\n\nWith a sufficiently urgent realisation of their need of peace and\nsecurity, and with a realisation also that the way to avoid war is to\navoid the ways and means of international jealousy and of the national\ndiscriminations out of which international jealousy grows, it is\nconceivable that a government which should reflect the British temper\nand the British hopes might go so far in insisting on a neutralisation\nof the peoples of the Fatherland as would leave them without the\ndynastic apparatus with which warlike enterprise is set afoot, and so\nleave them also perforce in a pacific frame of mind. In time, in the\nabsence of their dearly beloved leavings of feudalism, an enforced\nreliance on their own discretion and initiative, and an enforced respite\nfrom the rant and prance of warlike swagger, would reasonably be\nexpected to grow into a popular habit. The German people are by no means\nless capable of tolerance and neighbourly decorum than their British or\nScandinavian neighbours of the same blood,--if they can only be left to\ntheir own devices, untroubled by the maggoty conceit of national\ndomination.\n\nThere is no intention herewith to express an expectation that this\nout-and-out neutralisation of the Fatherland's international relations\nand of its dynastic government will come to pass on the return of peace,\nor that the German people will, as a precaution against recurrent\nImperial rabies, be organised on a democratic pattern by constraint of\nthe pacific nations of the league. The point is only that this measure\nof neutralisation appears to be the necessary condition, in the absence\nof which no such neutral league can succeed, and that so long as the war\ngoes on there is something of a chance that the British community may in\ntime reach a frame of mind combining such settled determination to\nsafeguard the peace at all costs, with such a degree of disregard for\noutworn conventions, that their spokesmen in the negotiations may push\nthe neutralisation of these peoples to that length.\n\nThe achievement of such an outcome would evidently take time as well as\nharsh experience, more time and harsher experience, perhaps, than one\nlikes to contemplate.\n\nMost men, therefore, would scarcely rate the chance of such an outcome\nat all high. And yet it is to be called to mind that the war has lasted\nlong and the effect of its demands and its experience has already gone\nfar, and that the longer it lasts the greater are the chances of its\nprolongation and of its continued hardships, at least to the extent that\nwith every month of war that passes the prospect of the allied nations\nmaking peace on any terms short of unconditional surrender grows less.\nAnd unconditional surrender is the first step in the direction of an\nunconditional dispossession of the Imperial establishment and its war\nprophets,--depending primarily on the state of mind of the British\npeople at the time. And however unlikely, it is also always possible, as\nsome contend, that in the course of further war experience the common\nman in the Fatherland may come to reflect on the use and value of the\nImperial establishment, with the result of discarding and disowning it\nand all its works. Such an expectation would doubtless underrate the\nforce of ancient habit, and would also involve a misapprehension of the\npsychological incidence of a warlike experience. The German people have\nsubstantially none of those preconceptions of independence and\nself-direction to go on, in the absence of which an effectual revulsion\nagainst dynastic rule can not come to pass.\n\nEmbedded in the common sense of the British population at large is a\ncertain large and somewhat sullen sense of fair dealing. In this they\nare not greatly different from their neighbours, if at all, except that\nthe body of common sense in which this British sense of fair dealing\nlies embedded is a maturer fashion of common sense than that which\nserves to guide the workday life of many of their neighbours. And the\nmaturity in question appears to be chiefly a matter of their having\nunlearned, divested themselves of, or been by force of disuse divested\nof, an exceptionally large proportion of that burden of untoward\nconceits which western Europe, and more particularly middle Europe, at\nlarge has carried over from the Middle Ages. They have had time and\noccasion to forget more of what the exigencies of modern life make it\nexpedient to have forgotten. And yet they are reputed slow,\nconservative. But they have been well placed for losing much of what\nwould be well lost.\n\nAmong other things, their preconception of national animosity is not\nsecure, in the absence of provocation. They are now again in a position\nto learn to do without some of the useless legacy out of the\npast,--useless, that is, for life as it runs today, however it may be\nrated in the setting in which it was all placed in that past out of\nwhich it has come. And the question is whether now, under the pressure\nof exigencies that make for a disestablishment of much cumbersome\ninherited apparatus for doing what need not be done, they will be ruled\nby their sense of expediency and of fair dealing to the extent of\ncancelling out of their own scheme of life so much of this legacy of\nconventional preconceptions as has now come visibly to hinder their own\nmaterial well-being, and at the same time to defeat that peace and\nsecurity for which they have shown themselves willing to fight. It is,\nof course, a simpler matter to fight than it is to put away a\npreconceived, even if it is a bootless, superstition; as, e.g., the\nprestige of hereditary wealth, hereditary gentility, national\nvainglory, and perhaps especially national hatred. But if the school is\nhard enough and the discipline protracted enough there is no reason in\nthe nature of things why the common run of the British people should not\nunlearn these futilities that once were the substance of things under an\nolder and outworn order. They have already shown their capacity for\ndivesting themselves of outworn institutional bonds, in discarding the\nmain substance of dynastic rule; and when they now come to face the\nexigencies of this new situation it should cause no great surprise if\nthey are able to see their way to do what further is necessary to meet\nthese exigencies.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAt the hands of this British commonwealth the new situation requires the\nputting away of the German Imperial establishment and the military\ncaste; the reduction of the German peoples to a footing of unreserved\ndemocracy with sufficient guarantees against national trade\ndiscriminations; surrender of all British tutelage over outlying\npossessions, except what may go to guarantee their local autonomy;\ncancelment of all extra-territorial pretensions of the several nations\nentering into the league; neutralisation of the several national\nestablishments, to comprise virtual disarmament, as well as cancelment\nof all restrictions on trade and of all national defense of\nextra-territorial pecuniary claims and interests on the part of\nindividual citizens. The naval control of the seas will best be left in\nBritish hands. No people has a graver or more immediate interest in the\nfreedom and security of the sea-borne trade; and the United Kingdom has\nshown that it is to be trusted in that matter. And then it may well be\nthat neither the national pride nor the apprehensions of the British\npeople would allow them to surrender it; whereas, if the league is to\nbe formed it will have to be on terms to which the British people are\nwilling to adhere. A certain provision of armed force will also be\nneeded to keep the governments of unneutral nations in check,--and for\nthe purpose in hand all effectively monarchical countries are to be\ncounted as congenitally unneutral, whatever their formal professions and\nwhether they are members of the league or not. Here again it will\nprobably appear that the people of the United Kingdom, and of the\nEnglish-speaking countries at large, will not consent to this armed\nforce and its discretionary use passing out of British hands, or rather\nout of French-British hands; and here again the practical decision will\nhave to wait on the choice of the British people, all the more because\nthe British community has no longer an interest, real or fancied, in the\ncoercive use of this force for their own particular ends. No other power\nis to be trusted, except France, and France is less well placed for the\npurpose and would assuredly also not covet so invidious an honour and so\nthankless an office.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe theory, i.e. the logical necessities, of such a pacific league of\nneutral nations is simple enough, in its elements. War is to be avoided\nby a policy of avoidance. Which signifies that the means and the motives\nto warlike enterprise and warlike provocation are to be put away, so far\nas may be. If what may be, in this respect, does not come up to the\nrequirements of the case, the experiment, of course, will fail. The\npreliminary requirement,--elimination of the one formidable dynastic\nState in Europe,--has been spoken of. Its counterpart in the Far East\nwill cease to be formidable on the decease of its natural ally in\nCentral Europe, in so far as touches the case of such a projected\nleague. The ever increasingly dubious empire of the Czar would appear to\nfall in the same category. So that the pacific league's fortunes would\nseem to turn on what may be called its domestic or internal\narrangements.\n\nNow, the means of warlike enterprise, as well as of unadvised\nembroilment, is always in the last analysis the patriotic spirit of the\nnation. Given this patriotic spirit in sufficient measure, both the\nmaterial equipment and the provocation to hostilities will easily be\nfound. It should accordingly appear to be the first care of such a\npacific league to reduce the sources of patriotic incitement to the\npracticable minimum. This can be done, in such measure as it can be done\nat all, by neutralisation of national pretensions. The finished outcome\nin this respect, such as would assure perpetual peace among the peoples\nconcerned, would of course be an unconditional neutralisation of\ncitizenship, as has already been indicated before. The question which,\nin effect, the spokesmen for a pacific league have to face is as to how\nnearly that outcome can be brought to pass. The rest of what they may\nundertake, or may come to by way of compromise and stipulation, is\nrelatively immaterial and of relatively transient consequence.\n\nA neutralisation of citizenship has of course been afloat in a somewhat\nloose way in the projects of socialistic and other \"undesirable\"\nagitators, but nothing much has come of it. Nor have specific projects\nfor its realisation been set afoot. That anything conclusive along that\nline could now be reached would seem extremely doubtful, in view of the\nardent patriotic temper of all these peoples, heightened just now by the\nexperience of war. Still, an undesigned and unguided drift in that\ndirection has been visible in all those nations that are accounted the\nvanguard among modern civilised peoples, ever since the dynastic rule\namong them began to be displaced by a growth of \"free\" institutions,\nthat is to say institutions resting on an accepted ground of\ninsubordination and free initiative.\n\nThe patriotism of these peoples, or their national spirit, is after all\nand at the best an attenuated and impersonalised remnant of dynastic\nloyalty, and it amounts after all, in effect, to nothing much else than\na residual curtailment or partial atrophy of that democratic habit of\nmind that embodies itself in the formula: Live and let live. It is, no\ndoubt, both an ancient and a very meritorious habit. It is easily\nacquired and hard to put away. The patriotic spirit and the national\nlife (prestige) on which it centers are the subject of untiring eulogy;\nbut hitherto its encomiasts have shown no cause and put forward no claim\nto believe that it all is of any slightest use for any purpose that does\nnot take it and its paramount merit for granted. It is doubtless a very\nmeritorious habit; at least so they all say. But under the circumstances\nof modern civilised life it is fruitful of no other net material result\nthan damage and discomfort. Still it is virtually ubiquitous among\ncivilised men, and in an admirable state of repair; and for the\ncalculable future it is doubtless to be counted in as an enduring\nobstacle to a conclusive peace, a constant source of anxiety and\nunremitting care.\n\nThe motives that work out through this national spirit, by use of this\npatriotic ardor, fall under two heads: dynastic ambition, and business\nenterprise. The two categories have the common trait that neither the\none nor the other comprises anything that is of the slightest material\nbenefit to the community at large; but both have at the same time a\nhigh prestige value in the conventional esteem of modern men. The\nrelation of dynastic ambition to warlike enterprise, and the uses of\nthat usufruct of the nation's resources and man-power which the nation's\npatriotism places at the disposal of the dynastic establishment, have\nalready been spoken of at length above, perhaps at excessive length, in\nthe recurrent discussion of the dynastic State and its quest of dominion\nfor dominion's sake. What measures are necessary to be taken as regards\nthe formidable dynastic States that threaten the peace, have also been\noutlined, perhaps with excessive freedom.\n\nBut it remains to call attention to that mitigated form of dynastic rule\ncalled a constitutional monarchy. Instances of such a constitutional\nmonarchy, designed to conserve the well-beloved abuses of dynastic rule\nunder a cover of democratic formalities, or to bring in effectual\ndemocratic insubordination under cover of the ancient dignities of an\noutworn monarchical system,--the characterisation may run either way\naccording to the fancy of the speaker, and to much the same practical\neffect in either case,--instances illustrative of this compromise\nmonarchy at work today are to be had, as felicitously as anywhere, in\nthe Balkan states; perhaps the case of Greece will be especially\ninstructive. At the other, and far, end of the line will be found such\nother typical instances as the British, the Dutch, or, in pathetic and\ndroll miniature, the Norwegian.\n\nThere is, of course, a wide interval between the grotesque effrontery\nthat wears the Hellenic crown and the undeviatingly decorous\nself-effacement of the Dutch sovereign; and yet there is something of a\ncommon complexion runs through the whole range of establishments, all\nthe way from the quasi-dynastic to the pseudo-dynastic. For reasons\nunavoidable and persistent, though not inscribed in the constituent law,\nthe governmental establishment associated with such a royal concern will\nbe made up of persons drawn from the kept classes, the nobility or\nlesser gentlefolk, and will be imbued with the spirit of these \"better\"\nclasses rather than that of the common run.\n\nWith what may be uncanny shrewdness, or perhaps mere tropismatic\nresponse to the unreasoned stimulus of a \"consciousness of kind,\" the\nBritish government--habitually a syndicate of gentlefolk--has uniformly\ninsisted on the installation of a constitutional monarchy at the\nformation of every new national organisation in which that government\nhas had a discretionary voice. And the many and various constitutional\ngovernments so established, commonly under British auspices in some\ndegree, have invariably run true to form, in some appreciable degree.\nThey may be quasi-dynastic or pseudo-dynastic, but at this nearest\napproach to democracy they always, and unavoidably, include at least a\ncircumlocution office of gentlefolk, in the way of a ministry and court\nestablishment, whose place in the economy of the nation's affairs it is\nto adapt the run of these affairs to the needs of the kept classes.\n\nThere need be no imputation of sinister designs to these gentlefolk, who\nso are elected by force of circumstances to guard and guide the nation's\ninterests. As things go, it will doubtless commonly be found that they\nare as well-intentioned as need be. But a well-meaning gentleman of good\nantecedents means well in a gentlemanly way and in the light of good\nantecedents. Which comes unavoidably to an effectual bias in favor of\nthose interests which honorable gentlemen of good antecedents have at\nheart. And among these interests are the interests of the kept classes,\nas contrasted with that common run of the population from which their\nkeep is drawn.\n\nUnder the auspices, even if they are only the histrionic and decorative\nauspices, of so decorous an article of institutional furniture as\nroyalty, it follows of logical necessity that the personnel of the\neffectual government must also be drawn from the better classes, whose\nplace and station and high repute will make their association with the\nFirst Gentleman of the Realm not too insufferably incongruous. And then,\nthe popular habit of looking up to this First Gentleman with that\ndeference that royalty commands, also conduces materially to the\nattendant habitual attitude of deference to gentility more at large.\n\nEven in so democratic a country, and with so exanimate a crown as is to\nbe found in the United Kingdom, the royal establishment visibly, and\ndoubtless very materially, conduces to the continued tenure of the\neffectual government by representatives of the kept classes; and it\ntherefore counts with large effect toward the retardation of the\ncountry's further move in the direction of democratic insubordination\nand direct participation in the direction of affairs by the underbred,\nwho finally pay the cost. And on the other hand, even so moderately\nroyal an establishment as the Norwegian has apparently a sensible effect\nin the way of gathering the reins somewhat into the hands of the better\nclasses, under circumstances of such meagerness as might be expected to\npreclude anything like a \"better\" class, in the conventional acceptation\nof that term. It would appear that even the extreme of pseudo-dynastic\nroyalty, sterilised to the last degree, is something of an effectual\nhindrance to democratic rule, and in so far also a hindrance to the\nfurther continued neutralisation of nationalist pretensions, as also an\neffectual furtherance of upper-class rule for upper-class ends.\n\nNow, a government by well-meaning gentlemen-investors will, at the\nnearest, come no nearer representing the material needs and interests of\nthe common run than a parable comes to representing the concrete facts\nwhich it hopes to illuminate. And as bears immediately on the point in\nhand, these gentlemanly administrators of the nation's affairs who so\ncluster about the throne, vacant though it may be of all but the bodily\npresence of majesty, are after all gentlemen, with a gentlemanly sense\nof punctilio touching the large proprieties and courtesies of political\nlife. The national honor is a matter of punctilio, always; and out of\nthe formal exigencies of the national honor arise grievances to be\nredressed; and it is grievances of this character that commonly afford\nthe formal ground of a breach of the peace. An appeal on patriotic\ngrounds of wounded national pride, to the common run who have no trained\nsense of punctilio, by the gentlemanly responsible class who have such a\nsense, backed by assurances that the national prestige or the national\ninterests are at stake, will commonly bring a suitable response. It is\nscarcely necessary that the common run should know just what the stir is\nabout, so long as they are informed by their trusted betters that there\nis a grievance to redress. In effect, it results that the democratic\nnation's affairs are administered by a syndicate composed of the least\ndemocratic class in the population.\n\nExcepting what is to be excepted, it will commonly hold true today that\nthese gentlemanly governments are conducted in a commendably clean and\nupright fashion, with a conscious rectitude and a benevolent intention.\nBut they are after all, in effect, class governments, and they\nunavoidably carry the bias of their class. The gentlemanly officials and\nlaw-givers come, in the main, from the kept classes, whose living comes\nto them in the way of income from investments, at home or in foreign\nparts, or from an equivalent source of accumulated wealth or official\nemolument. The bias resulting from this state of the case need not be of\nan intolerant character in order to bring its modicum of mischief into\nthe national policy, as regards amicable relations with other\nnationalities. A slight bias running on a ground of conscious right and\nunbroken usage may go far. So, e.g., anyone of these gentlemanly\ngovernments is within its legitimate rights, or rather within its\nimperative duty, in defending the foreign investments of its citizens\nand enforcing due payment of its citizens' claims to income or principal\nof such property as they may hold in foreign parts; and it is within its\nordinary lines of duty in making use of the nation's resources--that is\nto say of the common man and his means of livelihood--in enforcing such\nclaims held by the investing classes. The community at large has no\ninterest in the enforcement of such claims; it is evidently a class\ninterest, and as evidently protected by a code of rights, duties and\nprocedure that has grown out of a class bias, at the cost of the\ncommunity at large.\n\nThis bias favoring the interests of invested wealth may also, and indeed\nit commonly does, take the aggressive form of aggressively forwarding\nenterprise in investment abroad, particularly in commercially backward\ncountries abroad, by extension of the national jurisdiction and the\nactive countenancing of concessions in foreign parts, by subventions,\nor by creation of offices to bring suitable emoluments to the younger\nsons of deserving families. The protective tariffs to which recourse is\nsometimes had, are of the same general nature and purpose. Of course, it\nis in this latter, aggressive or excursive, issue of the well-to-do bias\nin favor of investment and invested wealth that its most pernicious\neffect on international relations is traceable.\n\nFree income, that is to say income not dependent on personal merit or\nexertion of any kind, is the breath of life to the kept classes; and as\na corollary of the \"First Law of Nature,\" therefore, the invested wealth\nwhich gives a legally equitable claim to such income has in their eyes\nall the sanctity that can be given by Natural Right. Investment--often\nspoken of euphemistically as \"savings\"--is consequently a meritorious\nact, conceived to be very serviceable to the community at large, and\nproperly to be furthered by all available means. Invested wealth is so\nmuch added to the aggregate means at the community's disposal, it is\nbelieved. Of course, in point of fact, income from investment in the\nhands of these gentlefolk is a means of tracelessly consuming that much\nof the community's yearly product; but to the kept classes, who see the\nmatter from the point of view of the recipient, the matter does not\npresent itself in that light. To them it is the breath of life. Like\nother honorable men they are faithful to their bread; and by authentic\ntradition the common man, in whose disciplined preconceptions the kept\nclasses are his indispensable betters, is also imbued with the\nuncritical faith that the invested wealth which enables these betters\ntracelessly to consume a due share of the yearly product is an addition\nto the aggregate means in hand.\n\nThe advancement of commercial and other business enterprise beyond the\nnational frontiers is consequently one of the duties not to be\nneglected, and with which no trifling can be tolerated. It is so bound\nup with national ideals, under any gentlemanly government, that any\ninvasion or evasion of the rights of investors in foreign parts, or of\nother business involved in dealings with foreign parts, immediately\ninvolves not only the material interest of the nation but the national\nhonour as well. Hence international jealousies and eventual embroilment.\n\nThe constitutional monarchy that commonly covers a modern democratic\ncommunity is accordingly a menace to the common peace, and any pacific\nleague of neutrals will be laying up trouble and prospective defeat for\nitself in allowing such an institution to stand over in any instance.\nActing with a free hand, if such a thing were possible, the projected\nleague should logically eliminate all monarchical establishments,\nconstitutional or otherwise, from among its federated nations. It is\ndoubtless not within reason to look for such a move in the negotiations\nthat are to initiate the projected league of neutrals; but the point is\ncalled to mind here chiefly as indicating one of the difficult passages\nwhich are to be faced in any attempted formation of such a league, as\nwell as one of the abiding sources of international irritation with\nwhich the league's jurisdiction will be burdened so long as a decisive\nmeasure of the kind is not taken.\n\nThe logic of the whole matter is simple enough, and the necessary\nmeasures to be taken to remedy it are no less simple--barring\nsentimental objections which will probably prove insuperable. A\nmonarchy, even a sufficiently inane monarchy, carries the burden of a\ngentlemanly governmental establishment--a government by and for the\nkept classes; such a government will unavoidably direct the affairs of\nstate with a view to income on invested wealth, and will see the\nmaterial interests of the country only in so far as they present\nthemselves under the form of investment and business enterprise designed\nto eventuate in investment; these are the only forms of material\ninterest that give rise to international jealousies, discriminations and\nmisunderstanding, at the same time that they are interests of\nindividuals only and have no material use or value to the community at\nlarge. Given a monarchical establishment and the concomitant gentlemanly\ngovernmental corps, there is no avoiding this sinister prime mover of\ninternational rivalry, so long as the rights of invested wealth continue\nin popular apprehension to be held inviolable.\n\nQuite obviously there is a certain _tu quoque_ ready to the hand of\nthese \"gentlemen of the old school\" who see in the constitutional\nmonarchy a God-given shelter from the unreserved vulgarisation of life\nat the hands of the unblest and unbalanced underbred and underfed. The\nformally democratic nations, that have not retained even a\npseudo-dynastic royalty, are not much more fortunately placed in respect\nof national discrimination in trade and investment. The American\nrepublic will obviously come into the comparison as the type-form of\neconomic policy in a democratic commonwealth. There is little to choose\nbetween the economic policy pursued by such republics as France or\nAmerica on the one side and their nearest counterparts among the\nconstitutional monarchies on the other. It is even to be admitted out of\nhand that the comparison does no credit to democratic institutions as\nseen at work in these republics. They are, in fact, somewhat the crudest\nand most singularly foolish in their economic policy of any peoples in\nChristendom. And in view of the amazing facility with which these\ndemocratic commonwealths are always ready to delude themselves in\neverything that touches their national trade policies, it is obvious\nthat any league of neutrals whose fortunes are in any degree contingent\non their reasonable compliance with a call to neutralise their trade\nregulations for the sake of peace, will have need of all the persuasive\npower it can bring to bear.\n\nHowever, the powers of darkness have one less line of defense to shelter\nthem and their work of malversation in these commonwealths than in the\nconstitutional monarchies. The American national establishment, e.g.,\nwhich may be taken as a fairly characteristic type-form in this bearing,\nis a government of businessmen for business ends; and there is no tabu\nof axiomatic gentility or of certified pedigree to hedge about this\nworking syndicate of business interests. So that it is all nearer by one\nremove to the disintegrating touch of the common man and his commonplace\ncircumstances. The businesslike regime of these democratic politicians\nis as undeviating in its advocacy and aid of enterprise in pursuit of\nprivate gain under shelter of national discrimination as the\ncircumstances will permit; and the circumstances will permit them to do\nmuch and go far; for the limits of popular gullibility in all things\nthat touch the admirable feats of business enterprise are very wide in\nthese countries. There is a sentimental popular belief running to the\ncurious effect that because the citizens of such a commonwealth are\nungraded equals before the law, therefore somehow they can all and\nseveral become wealthy by trading at the expense of their neighbours.\n\nYet, the fact remains that there is only the one line of defense in\nthese countries where the business interests have not the countenance of\na time-honored order of gentlefolk, with the sanction of royalty in the\nbackground. And this fact is further enhanced by one of its immediate\nconsequences. Proceeding upon the abounding faith which these peoples\nhave in business enterprise as a universal solvent, the unreserved\nvenality and greed of their businessmen--unhampered by the gentleman's\n_noblesse oblige_--have pushed the conversion of public law to private\ngain farther and more openly here than elsewhere. The outcome has been\ndivers measures in restraint of trade or in furtherance of profitable\nabuses, of such a crass and flagrant character that if once the popular\napprehension is touched by matter-of-fact reflection on the actualities\nof this businesslike policy the whole structure should reasonably be\nexpected to crumble. If the present conjuncture of circumstances should,\ne.g., present to the American populace a choice between exclusion from\nthe neutral league, and a consequent probable and dubious war of\nself-defense, on the one hand; as against entrance into the league, and\nsecurity at the cost of relinquishing their national tariff in restraint\nof trade, on the other hand, it is always possible that the people might\nbe brought to look their protective tariff in the face and recognise it\nfor a commonplace conspiracy in restraint of trade, and so decide to\nshuffle it out of the way as a good riddance. And the rest of the\nRepublic's businesslike policy of special favors would in such a case\nstand a chance of going in the discard along with the protective tariff,\nsince the rest is of substantially the same disingenuous character.\n\nNot that anyone need entertain a confident expectation of such an\nexploit of common sense on the part of the American voters. There is\nlittle encouragement for such a hope in their past career of gullibility\non this head. But this is again a point of difficulty to be faced in\nnegotiations looking to such a pacific league of neutrals. Without a\nsomewhat comprehensive neutralisation of national trade regulations, the\noutlook for lasting peace would be reduced by that much; there would be\nso much material for international jealousy and misunderstanding left\nstanding over and requiring continued readjustment and compromise,\nalways with the contingency of a breach that much nearer. The\ninfatuation of the Americans with their protective tariff and other\nbusinesslike discriminations is a sufficiently serious matter in this\nconnection, and it is always possible that their inability to give up\nthis superstition might lead to their not adhering to this projected\nneutral league. Yet it is at least to be said that the longer the time\nthat passes before active measures are taken toward the organisation of\nsuch a league--that is to say, in effect, the longer the great war\nlasts--the more amenable is the temper of the Americans likely to be,\nand the more reluctantly would they see themselves excluded. Should the\nwar be protracted to some such length as appears to be promised by\nlatterday pronunciamentos from the belligerents, or to something\npassably approaching such a duration; and should the Imperial designs\nand anomalous diplomacy of Japan continue to force themselves on the\npopular attention at the present rate; at the same time that the\noperations in Europe continue to demonstrate the excessive cost of\ndefense against a well devised and resolute offensive; then it should\nreasonably be expected that the Americans might come to such a\nrealisation of their own case as to let no minor considerations of trade\ndiscrimination stand in the way of their making common cause with the\nother pacific nations.\n\nIt appears already to be realised in the most responsible quarter that\nAmerica needs the succor of the other pacific nations, with a need that\nis not to be put away or put off; as it is also coming to be realised\nthat the Imperial Powers are disturbers of the peace, by force of their\nImperial character. Of course, the politicians who seek their own\nadvantage in the nation's embarrassment are commonly unable to see the\nmatter in that light. But it is also apparent that the popular sentiment\nis affected with the same apprehension, more and more as time passes and\nthe aims and methods of the Imperial Powers become more patent.\n\nHitherto the spokesmen of a pacific federation of nations have spoken\nfor a league of such an (indeterminate) constitution as to leave all the\nfederated nations undisturbed in all their conduct of their own affairs,\ndomestic or international; probably for want of second thought as to the\ncomplications of copartnership between them in so grave and unwonted an\nenterprise. They have also spoken of America's share in the project as\nbeing that of an interested outsider, whose interest in any\nprecautionary measures of this kind is in part a regard for his own\ntranquility as a disinterested neighbour, but in greater part a humane\nsolicitude for the well-being of civilised mankind at large. In this\nview, somewhat self-complacent it is to be admitted, America is\nconceived to come into the case as initiator and guide, about whom the\npacific nations are to cluster as some sort of queen-bee.\n\nNow, there is not a little verisimilitude in this conception of America\nas a sort of central office and a tower of strength in the projected\nfederation of neutral nations, however pharisaical an appearance it may\nall have in the self-complacent utterances of patriotic Americans. The\nAmerican republic is, after all, the greatest of the pacific nations of\nChristendom, in resources, population and industrial capacity; and it is\nalso not to be denied that the temper of this large population is, on\nthe whole, as pacific as that of any considerable people--outside of\nChina. The adherence of the American republic would, in effect, double\nthe mass and powers of the projected league, and would so place it\nbeyond all hazard of defeat from without, or even of serious outside\nopposition to its aims.\n\nYet it will not hold true that America is either disinterested or\nindispensable. The unenviable position of the indispensable belongs to\nthe United Kingdom, and carries with it the customary suspicion of\ninterested motives that attaches to the stronger party in a bargain. To\nAmerica, on the other hand, the league is indispensable, as a refuge\nfrom otherwise inevitable dangers ahead; and it is only a question of a\nmoderate allowance of time for the American voters to realise that\nwithout an adequate copartnership with the other pacific nations the\noutlook of the Republic is altogether precarious. Single-handed, America\ncan not defend itself, except at a prohibitive cost; whereas in\ncopartnership with these others the national defense becomes a virtually\nnegligible matter. It is for America a choice between a policy of\nextravagant armament and aggressive diplomacy, with a doubtful issue, on\nthe one side, and such abatement of national pretensions as would\nobviate bootless contention, on the other side.\n\nYet, it must be admitted, the patriotic temper of the American people is\nof such a susceptible kind as to leave the issue in doubt. Not that the\nAmericans will not endeavor to initiate some form of compact for the\nkeeping of the peace, when hostilities are concluded; barring unforeseen\ncontingencies, it is virtually a foregone conclusion that the attempt\nwill be made, and that the Americans will take an active part in its\npromotion. But the doubt is as to their taking such a course as will\nlead to a compact of the kind needed to safeguard the peace of the\ncountry. The business interests have much to say in the counsels of the\nAmericans, and these business interests look to short-term\ngains--American business interests particularly--to be derived from the\ncountry's necessities. It is likely to appear that the business\ninterests, through representatives in Congress and elsewhere, will\ndisapprove of any peace compact that does not involve an increase of the\nnational armament and a prospective demand for munitions and an\nincreased expenditure of the national funds.\n\nWith or without the adherence of America, the pacific nations of Europe\nwill doubtless endeavour to form a league or alliance designed to keep\nthe peace. If America does not come into the arrangement it may well\ncome to nothing much more than a further continued defensive alliance of\nthe belligerent nations now opposed to the German coalition. In any case\nit is still a point in doubt whether the league so projected is to be\nmerely a compact of defensive armament against a common enemy--in which\ncase it will necessarily be transient, perhaps ephemeral--or a more\ninclusive coalition of a closer character designed to avoid any breach\nof the peace, by disarmament and by disallowance and disclaimer of such\nnational pretensions and punctilio as the patriotic sentiment of the\ncontracting parties will consent to dispense with. The nature of the\nresulting peace, therefore, as well as its chances of duration, will in\ngreat measure be conditioned on the fashion of peace-compact on which it\nis to rest; which will be conditioned in good part on the degree in\nwhich the warlike coalition under German Imperial control is effectually\nto be eliminated from the situation as a prospective disturber of the\npeace; which, in turn, is a question somewhat closely bound up with the\nfurther duration of the war, as has already been indicated in an earlier\npassage.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nPEACE AND THE PRICE SYSTEM\n\n\nEvidently the conception of peace on which its various spokesmen are\nproceeding is by no means the same for all of them. In the current\nGerman conception, e.g., as seen in the utterances of its many and\nurgent spokesmen, peace appears to be of the general nature of a truce\nbetween nations, whose God-given destiny it is, in time, to adjust a\nclaim to precedence by wager of battle. They will sometimes speak of it,\neuphemistically, with a view to conciliation, as \"assurance of the\nnational future,\" in which the national future is taken to mean an\nopportunity for the extension of the national dominion at the expense of\nsome other national establishment. In the same connection one may recall\nthe many eloquent passages on the State and its paramount place and\nvalue in the human economy. The State is useful for disturbing the\npeace. This German notion may confidently be set down as the lowest of\nthe current conceptions of peace; or perhaps rather as the notion of\npeace reduced to the lowest terms at which it continues to be\nrecognisable as such. Next beyond in that direction lies the notion of\narmistice; which differs from this conception of peace chiefly in\nconnoting specifically a definite and relatively short interval between\nwarlike operations.\n\nThe conception of peace as being a period of preparation for war has\nmany adherents outside the Fatherland, of course. Indeed, it has\nprobably a wider vogue and a readier acceptance among men who interest\nthemselves in questions of peace and war than any other. It goes hand in\nhand with that militant nationalism that is taken for granted,\nconventionally, as the common ground of those international relations\nthat play a part in diplomatic intercourse. It is the diplomatist's\n_metier_ to talk war in parables of peace. This conception of peace as a\nprecarious interval of preparation has come down to the present out of\nthe feudal age and is, of course, best at home where the feudal range of\npreconceptions has suffered least dilapidation; and it carries the\nfeudalistic presumption that all national establishments are competitors\nfor dominion, after the scheme of Macchiavelli. The peace which is had\non this footing, within the realm, is a peace of subjection, more or\nless pronounced according as the given national establishment is more or\nless on the militant order; a warlike organisation being necessarily of\na servile character, in the same measure in which it is warlike.\n\nIn much the same measure and with much the same limitations as the\nmodern democratic nations have departed from the feudal system of civil\nrelations and from the peculiar range of conceptions which characterise\nthat system, they have also come in for a new or revised conception of\npeace. Instead of its being valued chiefly as a space of time in which\nto prepare for war, offensive or defensive, among these democratic and\nprovisionally pacific nations it has come to stand in the common\nestimation as the normal and stable manner of life, good and commendable\nin its own right. These modern, pacific, commonwealths stand on the\ndefensive, habitually. They are still pugnaciously national, but they\nhave unlearned so much of the feudal preconceptions as to leave them in\na defensive attitude, under the watch-word: Peace with honour. Their\nquasi-feudalistic national prestige is not to be trifled with, though it\nhas lost so much of its fascination as ordinarily not to serve the\npurposes of an aggressive enterprise, at least not without some shrewd\nsophistication at the hands of militant politicians and their diplomatic\nagents. Of course, an exuberant patriotism may now and again take on the\nancient barbarian vehemence and lead such a provisionally pacific nation\ninto an aggressive raid against a helpless neighbour; but it remains\ncharacteristically true, after all, that these peoples look on the\ncountry's peace as the normal and ordinary course of things, which each\nnation is to take care of for itself and by its own force.\n\nThe ideal of the nineteenth-century statesmen was to keep the peace by a\nbalance of power; an unstable equilibrium of rivalries, in which it was\nrecognised that eternal vigilance was the price of peace by\nequilibration. Since then, by force of the object-lesson of the\ntwentieth-century wars, it has become evident that eternal vigilance\nwill no longer keep the peace by equilibration, and the balance of power\nhas become obsolete. At the same time things have so turned that an\neffective majority of the civilised nations now see their advantage in\npeace, without further opportunity to seek further dominion. These\nnations have also been falling into the shape of commonwealths, and so\nhave lost something of their national spirit.\n\nWith much reluctant hesitation and many misgivings, the statesmen of\nthese pacific nations are accordingly busying themselves with schemes\nfor keeping the peace on the unfamiliar footing of a stable equilibrium;\nthe method preferred on the whole being an equilibration of\nmake-believe, in imitation of the obsolete balance of power. There is a\nmeticulous regard for national jealousies and discriminations, which it\nis thought necessary to keep intact. Of course, on any one of these\nslightly diversified plans of keeping the peace on a stable footing of\ncopartnery among the pacific nations, national jealousies and national\nintegrity no longer have any substantial meaning. But statesmen think\nand plan in terms of precedent; which comes to thinking and planning in\nterms of make-believe, when altered circumstances have made the\nprecedents obsolete. So one comes to the singular proposal of the\nstatesmen, that the peace is to be kept in concert among these pacific\nnations by a provision of force with which to break it at will. The\npeace that is to be kept on this footing of national discriminations and\nnational armaments will necessarily be of a precarious kind; being, in\neffect, a statesmanlike imitation of the peace as it was once kept even\nmore precariously by the pacific nations in severalty.\n\nHitherto the movement toward peace has not gone beyond this conception\nof it, as a collusive safeguarding of national discrepancies by force of\narms. Such a peace is necessarily precarious, partly because armed force\nis useful for breaking the peace, partly because the national\ndiscrepancies, by which these current peace-makers set such store, are a\nconstant source of embroilment. What the peace-makers might logically be\nexpected to concern themselves about would be the elimination of these\ndiscrepancies that make for embroilment. But what they actually seem\nconcerned about is their preservation. A peace by collusive neglect of\nthose remnants of feudalistic make-believe that still serve to divide\nthe pacific nations has hitherto not seriously come under advisement.\n\nEvidently, hitherto, and for the calculable future, peace is a relative\nmatter, a matter of more or less, whichever of the several working\nconceptions spoken of above may rule the case. Evidently, too, a peace\ndesigned to strengthen the national establishment against eventual war,\nwill count to a different effect from a collusive peace of a defensive\nkind among the pacific peoples, designed by its projectors to conserve\nthose national discrepancies on which patriotic statesmen like to dwell.\nDifferent from both would be the value of a peace by neglect of such\nuseless national discriminations as now make for embroilment. A\nprotracted season of peace should logically have a somewhat different\ncultural value according to the character of the public policy to be\npursued under its cover. So that a safe and sane conservation of the\nreceived law and order should presumably best be effected under cover of\na collusive peace of the defensive kind, which is designed to retain\nthose national discrepancies intact that count for so much in the\nnational life of today, both as a focus of patriotic sentiment and as an\noutlet for national expenditures. This plan would involve the least\nderangement of the received order among the democratic peoples, although\nthe plan might itself undergo some change in the course of time.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAmong the singularities of the latterday situation, in this connection,\nand brought out by the experiences of the great war, is a close\nresemblance between latterday warlike operations and the ordinary\nprocesses of industry. Modern warfare and modern industry alike are\ncarried on by technological processes subject to surveillance and\ndirection by mechanical engineers, or perhaps rather experts in\nengineering science of the mechanistic kind. War is not now a matter of\nthe stout heart and strong arm. Not that these attributes do not have\ntheir place and value in modern warfare; but they are no longer the\nchief or decisive factors in the case. The exploits that count in this\nwarfare are technological exploits; exploits of technological science,\nindustrial appliances, and technological training. As has been remarked\nbefore, it is no longer a gentlemen's war, and the gentleman, as such,\nis no better than a marplot in the game as it is played.\n\nCertain consequences follow from this state of the case. Technology and\nindustrial experience, in large volume and at a high proficiency, are\nindispensable to the conduct of war on the modern plan, as well as a\nlarge, efficient and up-to-date industrial community and industrial\nplant to supply the necessary material of this warfare. At the same time\nthe discipline of the campaign, as it impinges on the rank and file as\nwell as on the very numerous body of officers and technicians, is not at\ncross purposes with the ordinary industrial employments of peace, or not\nin the same degree as has been the case in the past, even in the recent\npast. The experience of the campaign does not greatly unfit the men who\nsurvive for industrial uses; nor does it come in as a sheer interruption\nof their industrial training, or break the continuity of that range of\nhabits of thought which modern industry of the technological order\ninduces; not in the same degree as was the case under the conditions of\nwar as carried on in the nineteenth century. The cultural, and\nparticularly the technological, incidence of this modern warfare should\nevidently be appreciably different from what has been experienced in the\npast, and from what this past experience has induced students of these\nmatters to look for among the psychological effects of warlike\nexperience.\n\nIt remains true that the discipline of the campaign, however impersonal\nit may tend to become, still inculcates personal subordination and\nunquestioning obedience; and yet the modern tactics and methods of\nfighting bear somewhat more on the individual's initiative, discretion,\nsagacity and self-possession than once would have been true. Doubtless\nthe men who come out of this great war, the common men, will bring home\nan accentuated and acrimonious patriotism, a venomous hatred of the\nenemies whom they have missed killing; but it may reasonably be doubted\nif they come away with a correspondingly heightened admiration and\naffection for their betters who have failed to make good as foremen in\ncharge of this teamwork in killing. The years of the war have been\ntrying to the reputation of officials and officers, who have had to meet\nuncharted exigencies with not much better chance of guessing the way\nthrough than their subalterns have had.\n\nBy and large, it is perhaps not to be doubted that the populace now\nunder arms will return from the experience of the war with some net gain\nin loyalty to the nation's honour and in allegiance to their masters;\nparticularly the German subjects,--the like is scarcely true for the\nBritish; but a doubt will present itself as to the magnitude of this net\ngain in subordination, or this net loss in self-possession. A doubt may\nbe permitted as to whether the common man in the countries of the\nImperial coalition, e.g., will, as the net outcome of this war\nexperience, be in a perceptibly more pliable frame of mind as touches\nhis obligations toward his betters and subservience to the irresponsible\nauthority exercised by the various governmental agencies, than he was at\nthe outbreak of the war. At that time, there is reason to believe, there\nwas an ominous, though scarcely threatening, murmur of discontent\nbeginning to be heard among the working classes of the industrial towns.\nIt is fair to presume, however, that the servile discipline of the\nservice and the vindictive patriotism bred of the fight should combine\nto render the populace of the Fatherland more amenable to the\nirresponsible rule of the Imperial dynasty and its subaltern royal\nestablishments, in spite of any slight effect of a contrary character\nexercised by the training in technological methods and in self-reliance,\nwith which this discipline of the service has been accompanied. As to\nthe case of the British population, under arms or under compulsion of\nnecessity at home, something has already been said in an earlier\npassage; and much will apparently depend, in their case, on the further\nduration of the war. The case of the other nationalities involved, both\nneutrals and belligerents, is even more obscure in this bearing, but it\nis also of less immediate consequence for the present argument.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe essentially feudal virtues of loyalty and bellicose patriotism would\nappear to have gained their great ascendency over all men's spirit\nwithin the Western civilisation by force of the peculiarly consistent\ncharacter of the discipline of life under feudal conditions, whether in\nwar or peace; and to the same uniformity of these forces that shaped the\nworkday habits of thought among the feudal nations is apparently due\nthat profound institutionalisation of the preconceptions of patriotism\nand loyalty, by force of which these preconceptions still hold the\nmodern peoples in an unbreakable web of prejudice, after the conditions\nfavoring their acquirement have in great part ceased to operate. These\npreconceptions of national solidarity and international enmity have come\ndown from the past as an integral part of the unwritten constitution\nunderlying all these modern nations, even those which have departed most\nwidely from the manner of life to which the peoples owe these ancient\npreconceptions. Hitherto, or rather until recent times, the workday\nexperience of these peoples has not seriously worked at cross purposes\nwith the patriotic spirit and its bias of national animosity; and what\ndiscrepancy there has effectively been between the discipline of workday\nlife and the received institutional preconceptions on this head, has\nhitherto been overborne by the unremitting inculcation of these virtues\nby interested politicians, priests and publicists, who speak habitually\nfor the received order of things.\n\nThat order of things which is known on its political and civil side as\nthe feudal system, together with that era of the dynastic States which\nsucceeds the feudal age technically so called, was, on its industrial or\ntechnological side, a system of trained man-power organised on a plan of\nsubordination of man to man. On the whole, the scheme and logic of that\nlife, whether in its political (warlike) or its industrial doings,\nwhether in war or peace, runs on terms of personal capacity, proficiency\nand relations. The organisation of the forces engaged and the\nconstraining rules according to which this organisation worked, were of\nthe nature of personal relations, and the impersonal factors in the case\nwere taken for granted. Politics and war were a field for personal\nvalor, force and cunning, in practical effect a field for personal force\nand fraud. Industry was a field in which the routine of life, and its\noutcome, turned on \"the skill, dexterity and judgment of the individual\nworkman,\" in the words of Adam Smith.\n\nThe feudal age passed, being done to death by handicraft industry,\ncommercial traffic, gunpowder, and the state-making politicians. But the\npolitical States of the statemakers, the dynastic States as they may\nwell be called, continued the conduct of political life on the personal\nplane of rivalry and jealousy between dynasties and between their\nStates; and in spite of gunpowder and the new military engineering,\nwarfare continued also to be, in the main and characteristically, a\nfield in which man-power and personal qualities decided the outcome, by\nvirtue of personal \"skill, dexterity and judgment.\" Meantime industry\nand its technology by insensible degrees underwent a change in the\ndirection of impersonalisation, particularly in those countries in which\nstate-making and its warlike enterprise had ceased, or were ceasing, to\nbe the chief interests and the controlling preconception of the people.\n\nThe logic of the new, mechanical industry which has supplanted\nhandicraft in these countries, is a mechanistic logic, which proceeds in\nterms of matter-of-fact strains, masses, velocities, and the like,\ninstead of the \"skill, dexterity and judgment\" of personal agents. The\nnew industry does not dispense with the personal agencies, nor can it\neven be said to minimise the need of skill, dexterity and judgment in\nthe personal agents employed, but it does take them and their attributes\nfor granted as in some sort a foregone premise to its main argument. The\nlogic of the handicraft system took the impersonal agencies for granted;\nthe machine industry takes the skill, dexterity and judgment of the\nworkmen for granted. The processes of thought, and therefore the\nconsistent habitual discipline, of the former ran in terms of the\npersonal agents engaged, and of the personal relations of discretion,\ncontrol and subordination necessary to the work; whereas the\nmechanistic logic of the modern technology, more and more consistently,\nruns in terms of the impersonal forces engaged, and inculcates an\nhabitual predilection for matter-of-fact statement, and an habitual\npreconception that the findings of material science alone are\nconclusive.\n\nIn those nations that have made up the advance guard of Western\ncivilisation in its movement out of feudalism, the disintegrating effect\nof this matter-of-fact animus inculcated by the later state of the\nindustrial arts has apparently acted effectively, in some degree, to\ndiscredit those preconceptions of personal discrimination on which\ndynastic rule is founded. But in no case has the discipline of this\nmechanistic technology yet wrought its perfect work or come to a\ndefinitive conclusion. Meantime war and politics have on the whole\ncontinued on the ancient plane; it may perhaps be fair to say that\npolitics has so continued because warlike enterprise has continued still\nto be a matter of such personal forces as skill, dexterity and judgment,\nvalor and cunning, personal force and fraud. Latterly, gradually, but\nincreasingly, the technology of war, too, has been shifting to the\nmechanistic plane; until in the latest phases of it, somewhere about the\nturn of the century, it is evident that the logic of warfare too has\ncome to be the same mechanistic logic that makes the modern state of the\nindustrial arts.\n\nWhat, if anything, is due by consequence to overtake the political\nstrategy and the political preconceptions of the new century, is a\nquestion that will obtrude itself, though with scant hope of finding a\nready answer. It may even seem a rash, as well as an ungraceful,\nundertaking to inquire into the possible manner and degree of\nprospective decay to which the received political ideals and virtues\nwould appear to be exposed by consequence of this derangement of the\nancient discipline to which men have been subjected. So much, however,\nwould seem evident, that the received virtues and ideals of patriotic\nanimosity and national jealousy can best be guarded against untimely\ndecay by resolutely holding to the formal observance of all outworn\npunctilios of national integrity and discrimination, in spite of their\nincreasing disserviceability,--as would be done, e.g., or at least\nsought to be done, in the installation of a league of neutral nations to\nkeep the peace and at the same time to safeguard those \"national\ninterests\" whose only use is to divide these nations and keep them in a\nstate of mutual envy and distrust.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThose peoples who are subject to the constraining governance of this\nmodern state of the industrial arts, as all modern peoples are in much\nthe same measure in which they are \"modern,\" are, therefore, exposed to\na workday discipline running at cross purposes with the received law and\norder as it takes effect in national affairs; and to this is to be added\nthat, with warlike enterprise also shifted to this same\nmechanistic-technological ground, war can no longer be counted on so\nconfidently as before to correct all the consequent drift away from the\nancient landmarks of dynastic, pseudo-dynastic, and national enterprise\nin dominion.\n\nAs has been noted above, modern warfare not only makes use of, and\nindeed depends on, the modern industrial technology at every turn of the\noperations in the field, but it draws on the ordinary industrial\nresources of the countries at war in a degree and with an urgency never\nequalled. No nation can hope to make a stand in modern warfare, much\nless to make headway in warlike enterprise, without the most\nthoroughgoing exploitation of the modern industrial arts. Which\nsignifies for the purpose in hand that any Power that harbors an\nimperial ambition must take measures to let its underlying population\nacquire the ways and means of the modern machine industry, without\nreservation; which in turn signifies that popular education must be\ntaken care of to such an extent as may be serviceable in this manner of\nindustry and in the manner of life which this industrial system\nnecessarily imposes; which signifies, of course, that only the\nthoroughly trained and thoroughly educated nations have a chance of\nholding their place as formidable Powers in this latterday phase of\ncivilisation. What is needed is the training and education that go to\nmake proficiency in the modern fashion of technology and in those\nmaterial sciences that conduce to technological proficiency of this\nmodern order. It is a matter of course that in these premises any\nappreciable illiteracy is an intolerable handicap. So is also any\ntraining which discourages habitual self-reliance and initiative, or\nwhich acts as a check on skepticism; for the skeptical frame of mind is\na necessary part of the intellectual equipment that makes for advance,\ninvention and understanding in the field of technological proficiency.\n\nBut these requirements, imperatively necessary as a condition of warlike\nsuccess, are at cross purposes with that unquestioning respect of\npersons and that spirit of abnegation that alone can hold a people to\nthe political institutions of the old order and make them a willing\ninstrument in the hands of the dynastic statesmen. The dynastic State is\napparently caught in a dilemma. The necessary preparation for warlike\nenterprise on the modern plan can apparently be counted on, in the long\nrun, to disintegrate the foundations of the dynastic State. But it is\nonly in the long run that this effect can be counted on; and it is\nperhaps not securely to be counted on even in a moderately long run of\nthings as they have run hitherto, if due precautions are taken by the\ninterested statesmen,--as would seem to be indicated by the successful\nconservation of archaic traits in the German peoples during the past\nhalf century under the archaising rule of the Hohenzollern. It is a\nmatter of habituation, which takes time, and which can at the same time\nbe neutralised in some degree by indoctrination.\n\nStill, when all is told, it will probably have to be conceded that,\ne.g., such a nation as Russia will fall under this rule of inherent\ndisability imposed by the necessary use of the modern industrial arts.\nWithout a fairly full and free command of these modern industrial\nmethods on the part of the Russian people, together with the virtual\ndisappearance of illiteracy, and with the facile and far-reaching system\nof communication which it all involves, the Russian Imperial\nestablishment would not be a formidable power or a serious menace to the\npacific nations; and it is not easy to imagine how the Imperial\nestablishment could retain its hold and its character under the\nconditions indicated.\n\nThe case of Japan, taken by itself, rests on somewhat similar lines as\nthese others. In time, and in this case the time-allowance should\npresumably not be anything very large, the Japanese people are likely to\nget an adequate command of the modern technology; which would, here as\nelsewhere, involve the virtual disappearance of the present high\nilliteracy, and the loss, in some passable measure, of the current\nsuperstitiously crass nationalism of that people. There are indications\nthat something of that kind, and of quite disquieting dimensions, is\nalready under way; though with no indication that any consequent\ndisintegrating habits of thought have yet invaded the sacred close of\nJapanese patriotic devotion.\n\nAgain, it is a question of time and habituation. With time and\nhabituation the emperor may insensibly cease to be of divine pedigree,\nand the syndicate of statesmen who are doing business under his\nsignature may consequently find their measures of Imperial expansion\nquestioned by the people who pay the bills. But so long as the Imperial\nsyndicate enjoy their present immunity from outside obstruction, and can\naccordingly carry on an uninterrupted campaign of cumulative predation\nin Korea, China and Manchuria, the patriotic infatuation is less likely\nto fall off, and by so much the decay of Japanese loyalty will be\nretarded. Yet, even if allowed anything that may seem at all probable in\nthe way of a free hand for aggression against their hapless neighbours,\nthe skepticism and insubordination to personal rule that seems\ninseparable in the long run from addiction to the modern industrial arts\nshould be expected presently to overtake the Japanese spirit of loyal\nservitude. And the opportunity of Imperial Japan lies in the interval.\nSo also does the menace of Imperial Japan as a presumptive disturber of\nthe peace at large.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAt the cost of some unavoidable tedium, the argument as regards these\nand similar instances may be summarised. It appears, in the (possibly\ndoubtful) light of the history of democratic institutions and of modern\ntechnology hitherto, as also from the logical character of this\ntechnology and its underlying material sciences, that consistent\naddiction to the peculiar habits of thought involved in its carrying on\nwill presently induce a decay of those preconceptions in which dynastic\ngovernment and national ambitions have their ground. Continued addiction\nto this modern scheme of industrial life should in time eventuate in a\ndecay of militant nationalism, with a consequent lapse of warlike\nenterprise. At the same time, popular proficiency in the modern\nindustrial arts, with all that that implies in the way of intelligence\nand information, is indispensable as a means to any successful warlike\nenterprise on the modern plan. The menace of warlike aggression from\nsuch dynastic States, e.g., as Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan is\ndue to their having acquired a competent use of this modern technology,\nwhile they have not yet had time to lose that spirit of dynastic loyalty\nwhich they have carried over from an archaic order of things, out of\nwhich they have emerged at a very appreciably later period (last half of\nthe nineteenth century) than those democratic peoples whose peace they\nnow menace. As has been said, they have taken over this modern state of\nthe industrial arts without having yet come in for the defects of its\nqualities. This modern technology, with its underlying material\nsciences, is a novel factor in the history of human culture, in that\naddiction to its use conduces to the decay of militant patriotism, at\nthe same time that its employment so greatly enhances the warlike\nefficiency of even a pacific people, at need, that they can not be\nseriously molested by any other peoples, however valorous and numerous,\nwho have not a competent use of this technology. A peace at large among\nthe civilised nations, by loss of the militant temper through addiction\nto this manner of arts of peace, therefore, carries no risk of\ninterruption by an inroad of warlike barbarians,--always provided that\nthose existing archaic peoples who might pass muster as barbarians are\nbrought into line with the pacific nations on a footing of peace and\nequality. The disparity in point of outlook as between the resulting\npeace at large by neglect of bootless animosities, on the one hand, and\nthose historic instances of a peaceable civilisation that have been\noverwhelmed by warlike barbarian invasions, on the other hand, should be\nevident.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is always possible, indeed it would scarcely be surprising to find,\nthat the projected league of neutrals or of nations bent on peace can\nnot be brought to realisation at this juncture; perhaps not for a long\ntime yet. But it should at the same time seem reasonable to expect that\nthe drift toward a peaceable settlement of national discrepancies such\nas has been visible in history for some appreciable time past will, in\nthe absence of unforeseen hindrances, work out to some such effect in\nthe course of further experience under modern conditions. And whether\nthe projected peace compact at its inception takes one form or another,\nprovided it succeeds in its main purpose, the long-term drift of things\nunder its rule should logically set toward some ulterior settlement of\nthe general character of what has here been spoken of as a peace by\nneglect or by neutralisation of discrepancies.\n\nIt should do so, in the absence of unforeseen contingencies; more\nparticularly if there were no effectual factor of dissension included in\nthe fabric of institutions within the nation. But there should also,\ne.g., be no difficulty in assenting to the forecast that when and if\nnational peace and security are achieved and settled beyond recall, the\ndiscrepancy in fact between those who own the country's wealth and those\nwho do not is presently due to come to an issue. Any attempt to forecast\nthe form which this issue is to take, or the manner, incidents,\nadjuncts and sequelae of its determination, would be a bolder and a more\nambiguous, undertaking. Hitherto attempts to bring this question to an\nissue have run aground on the real or fancied jeopardy to paramount\nnational interests. How, if at all, this issue might affect national\ninterests and international relations, would obviously depend in the\nfirst instance on the state of the given national establishment and the\ncharacter of the international engagements entered into in the formation\nof this projected pacific league. It is always conceivable that the\ntransactions involving so ubiquitous an issue might come to take on an\ninternational character and that they might touch the actual or fanciful\ninterests of these diverse nations with such divergent effect as to\nbring on a rupture of the common understanding between them and of the\npeace-compact in which the common understanding is embodied.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the beginning, that is to say in the beginnings out of which this\nmodern era of the Western civilisation has arisen, with its scheme of\nlaw and custom, there grew into the scheme of law and custom, by settled\nusage, a right of ownership and of contract in disposal of\nownership,--which may or may not have been a salutary institutional\narrangement on the whole, under the circumstances of the early days.\nWith the later growth of handicraft and the petty trade in Western\nEurope this right of ownership and contract came to be insisted on,\nstandardised under legal specifications, and secured against molestation\nby the governmental interests; more particularly and scrupulously among\nthose peoples that have taken the lead in working out that system of\nfree or popular institutions that marks the modern civilised nations. So\nit has come to be embodied in the common law of the modern world as an\ninviolable natural right. It has all the prescriptive force of legally\nauthenticated immemorial custom.\n\nUnder the system of handicraft and petty trade this right of property\nand free contract served the interest of the common man, at least in\nmuch of its incidence, and acted in its degree to shelter industrious\nand economical persons from hardship and indignity at the hands of their\nbetters. There seems reason to believe, as is commonly believed, that so\nlong as that relatively direct and simple scheme of industry and trade\nlasted, the right of ownership and contract was a salutary custom, in\nits bearing on the fortunes of the common man. It appears also, on the\nwhole, to have been favorable to the fuller development of the\nhandicraft technology, as well as to its eventual outgrowth into the new\nline of technological expedients and contrivances that presently gave\nrise to the machine industry and the large-scale business enterprise.\n\nThe standard theories of economic science have assumed the rights of\nproperty and contract as axiomatic premises and ultimate terms of\nanalysis; and their theories are commonly drawn in such a form as would\nfit the circumstances of the handicraft industry and the petty trade,\nand such as can be extended to any other economic situation by shrewd\ninterpretation. These theories, as they run from Adam Smith down through\nthe nineteenth century and later, appear tenable, on the whole, when\ntaken to apply to the economic situation of that earlier time, in\nvirtually all that they have to say on questions of wages, capital,\nsavings, and the economy and efficiency of management and production by\nthe methods of private enterprise resting on these rights of ownership\nand contract and governed by the pursuit of private gain. It is when\nthese standard theories are sought to be applied to the later situation,\nwhich has outgrown the conditions of handicraft, that they appear\nnugatory or meretricious. The \"competitive system\" which these standard\ntheories assume as a necessary condition of their own validity, and\nabout which they are designed to form a defensive hedge, would, under\nthose earlier conditions of small-scale enterprise and personal contact,\nappear to have been both a passably valid assumption as a premise and a\npassably expedient scheme of economic relations and traffic. At that\nperiod of its life-history it can not be said consistently to have\nworked hardship to the common man; rather the reverse. And the common\nman in that time appears to have had no misgivings about the excellence\nof the scheme or of that article of Natural Rights that underlies it.\n\nThis complexion of things, as touches the effectual bearing of the\ninstitution of property and the ancient customary rights of ownership,\nhas changed substantially since the time of Adam Smith. The \"competitive\nsystem,\" which he looked to as the economic working-out of that \"simple\nand obvious system of natural liberty\" that always engaged his best\naffections, has in great measure ceased to operate as a routine of\nnatural liberty, in fact; particularly in so far as touches the fortunes\nof the common man, the impecunious mass of the people. _De jure_, of\ncourse, the competitive system and its inviolable rights of ownership\nare a citadel of Natural Liberty; but _de facto_ the common man is now,\nand has for some time been, feeling the pinch of it. It is law, and\ndoubtless it is good law, grounded in immemorial usage and authenticated\nwith statute and precedent. But circumstances have so changed that this\ngood old plan has in a degree become archaic, perhaps unprofitable, or\neven mischievous, on the whole, and especially as touches the conditions\nof life for the common man. At least, so the common man in these modern\ndemocratic and commercial countries is beginning to apprehend the\nmatter.\n\nSome slight and summary characterisation of these changing circumstances\nthat have affected the incidence of the rights of property during modern\ntimes may, therefore, not be out of place; with a view to seeing how far\nand why these rights may be due to come under advisement and possible\nrevision, in case a state of settled peace should leave men's attention\nfree to turn to these internal, as contrasted with national interests.\n\nUnder that order of handicraft and petty trade that led to the\nstandardisation of these rights of ownership in the accentuated form\nwhich belongs to them in modern law and custom, the common man had a\npracticable chance of free initiative and self-direction in his choice\nand pursuit of an occupation and a livelihood, in so far as rights of\nownership bore on his case. At that period the workman was the main\nfactor in industry and, in the main and characteristically, the question\nof his employment was a question of what he would do. The material\nequipment of industry--the \"plant,\" as it has come to be called--was\nsubject of ownership, then as now; but it was then a secondary factor\nand, notoriously, subsidiary to the immaterial equipment of skill,\ndexterity and judgment embodied in the person of the craftsman. The body\nof information, or general knowledge, requisite to a workmanlike\nproficiency as handicraftsman was sufficiently slight and simple to fall\nwithin the ordinary reach of the working class, without special\nschooling; and the material equipment necessary to the work, in the way\nof tools and appliances, was also slight enough, ordinarily, to bring it\nwithin the reach of the common man. The stress fell on the acquirement\nof that special personal skill, dexterity and judgment that would\nconstitute the workman a master of his craft. Given a reasonable measure\nof pertinacity, the common man would be able to compass the material\nequipment needful to the pursuit of his craft, and so could make his way\nto a livelihood; and the inviolable right of ownership would then serve\nto secure him the product of his own industry, in provision for his own\nold-age and for a fair start in behalf of his children. At least in the\npopular conception, and presumably in some degree also in fact, the\nright of property so served as a guarantee of personal liberty and a\nbasis of equality. And so its apologists still look on the institution.\n\nIn a very appreciable degree this complexion of things and of popular\nconceptions has changed since then; although, as would be expected, the\nchange in popular conceptions has not kept pace with the changing\ncircumstances. In all the characteristic and controlling lines of\nindustry the modern machine technology calls for a very considerable\nmaterial equipment; so large an equipment, indeed, that this plant, as\nit is called, always represents a formidable amount of invested wealth;\nand also so large that it will, typically, employ a considerable number\nof workmen per unit of plant. On the transition to the machine\ntechnology the plant became the unit of operation, instead of the\nworkman, as had previously been the case; and with the further\ndevelopment of this modern technology, during the past hundred and fifty\nyears or so, the unit of operation and control has increasingly come to\nbe not the individual or isolated plant but rather an articulated group\nof such plants working together as a balanced system and keeping pace in\ncommon, under a collective business management; and coincidently the\nindividual workman has been falling into the position of an auxiliary\nfactor, nearly into that of an article of supply, to be charged up as an\nitem of operating expenses. Under this later and current system,\ndiscretion and initiative vest not in the workman but in the owners of\nthe plant, if anywhere. So that at this point the right of ownership has\nceased to be, in fact, a guarantee of personal liberty to the common\nman, and has come to be, or is coming to be, a guarantee of dependence.\nAll of which engenders a feeling of unrest and insecurity, such as to\ninstill a doubt in the mind of the common man as to the continued\nexpediency of this arrangement and of the prescriptive rights of\nproperty on which the arrangement rests.\n\nThere is also an insidious suggestion, carrying a sinister note of\ndiscredit, that comes in from ethnological science at this point; which\nis adapted still further to derange the common man's faith in this\nreceived institution of ownership and its control of the material\nequipment of industry. To students interested in human culture it is a\nmatter of course that this material equipment is a means of utilising\nthe state of the industrial arts; that it is useful in industry and\nprofitable to its owners only because and in so far as it is a creation\nof the current technological knowledge and enables its owner to\nappropriate the usufruct of the current industrial arts. It is likewise\na matter of course that this technological knowledge, that so enables\nthe material equipment to serve the purposes of production and of\nprivate gain, is a free gift of the community at large to the owners of\nindustrial plant; and, under latterday conditions, to them exclusively.\nThe state of the industrial arts is a joint heritage of the community at\nlarge, but where, as in the modern countries, the work to be done by\nthis technology requires a large material equipment, the usufruct of\nthis joint heritage passes, in effect, into the hands of the owners of\nthis large material equipment.\n\nThese owners have, ordinarily, contributed nothing to the technology,\nthe state of the industrial arts, from which their control of the\nmaterial equipment of industry enables them to derive a gain. Indeed, no\nclass or condition of men in the modern community--with the possible\nexception of politicians and the clergy--can conceivably contribute less\nto the community's store of technological knowledge than the large\nowners of invested wealth. By one of those singular inversions due to\nproduction being managed for private gain, it happens that these\ninvestors are not only not given to the increase and diffusion of\ntechnological knowledge, but they have a well-advised interest in\nretarding or defeating improvements in the industrial arts in detail.\nImprovements, innovations that heighten productive efficiency in the\ngeneral line of production in which a given investment is placed, are\ncommonly to be counted on to bring \"obsolescence by supersession\" to the\nplant already engaged in that line; and therefore to bring a decline in\nits income-yielding capacity, and so in its capital or investment value.\n\nInvested capital yields income because it enjoys the usufruct of the\ncommunity's technological knowledge; it has an effectual monopoly of\nthis usufruct because this machine technology requires large material\nappliances with which to do its work; the interest of the owners of\nestablished industrial plant will not tolerate innovations designed to\nsupersede these appliances. The bearing of ownership on industry and on\nthe fortunes of the common man is accordingly, in the main, the bearing\nwhich it has by virtue of its monopoly control of the industrial arts,\nand its consequent control of the conditions of employment and of the\nsupply of vendible products. It takes effect chiefly by inhibition and\nprivation; stoppage of production in case it brings no suitable profit\nto the investor, refusal of employment and of a livelihood to the\nworkmen in case their product does not command a profitable price in the\nmarket.\n\nThe expediency of so having the nation's industry managed on a footing\nof private ownership in the pursuit of private gain, by persons who can\nshow no equitable personal claim to even the most modest livelihood, and\nwhose habitual method of controlling industry is sabotage--refusal to\nlet production go on except it affords them an unearned income--the\nexpediency of all this is coming to be doubted by those who have to pay\nthe cost of it. And it does not go far to lessen their doubts to find\nthat the cost which they pay is commonly turned to no more urgent or\nuseful purpose than a conspicuously wasteful consumption of\nsuperfluities by the captains of sabotage and their domestic\nestablishments.\n\nThis may not seem a veracious and adequate account of these matters; it\nmay, in effect, fall short of the formulation: The truth, the whole\ntruth, and nothing but the truth; nor does the question here turn on its\nadequacy as a statement of fact. Without prejudice to the question of\nits veracity and adequacy, it is believed to be such an account of these\nmatters as will increasingly come easy and seem convincing to the common\nman who, in an ever increasing degree, finds himself pinched with\nprivation and insecurity by a run of facts which will consistently bear\nthis construction, and who perforce sees these facts from the prejudiced\nstandpoint of a loser. To such a one, there is reason to believe, the\nview so outlined will seem all the more convincing the more attentively\nthe pertinent facts and their bearing on his fortunes are considered.\nHow far the contrary prejudice of those whose interest or training\ninclines them the other way may lead them to a different construction of\nthese pertinent facts, does not concern the present argument; which has\nto do with this run of facts only as they bear on the prospective frame\nof mind of that unblest mass of the population who will have opportunity\nto present their proposals when peace at large shall have put national\ninterests out of their preferential place in men's regard.\n\nAt the risk of what may seem an excessively wide digression, there is\nsomething further to be said of the capitalistic sabotage spoken of\nabove. The word has by usage come to have an altogether ungraceful air\nof disapproval. Yet it signifies nothing more vicious than a deliberate\nobstruction or retardation of industry, usually by legitimate means, for\nthe sake of some personal or partisan advantage. This morally colorless\nmeaning is all that is intended in its use here. It is extremely common\nin all industry that is designed to supply merchantable goods for the\nmarket. It is, in fact, the most ordinary and ubiquitous of all\nexpedients in business enterprise that has to do with supplying the\nmarket, being always present in the businessman's necessary\ncalculations; being not only a usual and convenient recourse but quite\nindispensable as an habitual measure of business sagacity. So that no\npersonal blame can attach to its employment by any given businessman or\nbusiness concern. It is only when measures of this nature are resorted\nto by employees, to gain some end of their own, that such conduct\nbecomes (technically) reprehensible.\n\nAny businesslike management of industry is carried on for gain, which is\nto be got only on condition of meeting the terms of the market. The\nprice system under which industrial business is carried on will not\ntolerate production in excess of the market demand, or without due\nregard to the expenses of production as determined by the market on the\nside of the supplies required. Hence any business concern must adjust\nits operations, by due acceleration, retardation or stoppage, to the\nmarket conditions, with a view to what the traffic will bear; that is to\nsay, with a view to what will yield the largest obtainable net gain. So\nlong as the price system rules, that is to say so long as industry is\nmanaged on investment for a profit, there is no escaping this necessity\nof adjusting the processes of industry to the requirements of a\nremunerative price; and this adjustment can be taken care of only by\nwell-advised acceleration or curtailment of the processes of industry;\nwhich answers to the definition of sabotage. Wise business management,\nand more particularly what is spoken of as safe and sane business\nmanagement, therefore, reduces itself in the main to a sagacious use of\nsabotage; that is to say a sagacious limitation of productive processes\nto something less than the productive capacity of the means in hand.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo anyone who is inclined to see these matters of usage in the light of\ntheir history and to appraise them as phenomena of habituation,\nadaptation and supersession in the sequence of cultural proliferation,\nthere should be no difficulty in appreciating that this institution of\nownership that makes the core of the modern institutional structure is\na precipitate of custom, like any other item of use and wont; and that,\nlike any other article of institutional furniture, it is subject to the\ncontingencies of supersession and obsolescence. If prevalent habits of\nthought, enforced by the prevalent exigencies of life and livelihood,\ncome to change in such a way as to make life under the rule imposed by\nthis institution seem irksome, or intolerable, to the mass of the\npopulation; and if at the same time things turn in such a way as to\nleave no other and more urgent interest or exigency to take precedence\nof this one and hinder its being pushed to an issue; then it should\nreasonably follow that contention is due to arise between the unblest\nmass on whose life it is a burden and the classes who live by it. But it\nis, of course, impossible to state beforehand what will be the precise\nline of cleavage or what form the division between the two parties in\ninterest will take. Yet it is contained in the premises that, barring\nunforeseen contingencies of a formidable magnitude, such a cleavage is\ndue to follow as a logical sequel of an enduring peace at large. And it\nis also well within the possibilities of the case that this issue may\nwork into an interruption or disruption of the peace between the\nnations.\n\nIn this connection it may be called to mind that the existing\ngovernmental establishments in these pacific nations are, in all cases,\nin the hands of the beneficiary, or kept classes,--beneficiaries in the\nsense in which a distinction to that effect comes into the premises of\nthe case at this point. The responsible officials and their chief\nadministrative officers,--so much as may at all reasonably be called the\n\"Government\" or the \"Administration,\"--are quite invariably and\ncharacteristically drawn from these beneficiary classes; nobles,\ngentlemen, or business men, which all comes to the same thing for the\npurpose in hand; the point of it all being that the common man does not\ncome within these precincts and does not share in these counsels that\nassume to guide the destiny of the nations.\n\nOf course, sporadically and ephemerally, a man out of the impecunious\nand undistinguished mass may now and again find his way within the\ngates; and more frequently will a professed \"Man of the People\" sit in\ncouncil. But that the rule holds unbroken and inviolable is sufficiently\nevident in the fact that no community will let the emoluments of office\nfor any of its responsible officials, even for those of a very scant\nresponsibility, fall to the level of the habitual livelihood of the\nundistinguished populace, or indeed to fall below what is esteemed to be\na seemly income for a gentleman. Should such an impecunious one be\nthrown up into a place of discretion in the government, he will\nforthwith cease to be a common man and will be inducted into the rank of\ngentleman,--so far as that feat can be achieved by taking thought or by\nassigning him an income adequate to a reputably expensive manner of\nlife. So obvious is the antagonism between a vulgar station in life and\na position of official trust, that many a \"selfmade man\" has advisedly\ntaken recourse to governmental position, often at some appreciable cost,\nfrom no apparent motive other than its known efficacy as a Levitical\ncorrective for a humble origin. And in point of fact, neither here nor\nthere have the underbred majority hitherto learned to trust one of their\nown kind with governmental discretion; which has never yet, in the\npopular conviction, ceased to be a perquisite of the gently-bred and the\nwell-to-do.\n\nLet it be presumed that this state of things will continue without\nsubstantial alteration, so far as regards the complexion of the\ngovernmental establishments of these pacific nations, and with such\nallowance for overstatement in the above characterisation as may seem\ncalled for. These governmental establishments are, by official position\nand by the character of their personnel, committed more or less\nconsistently to the maintenance of the existing law and order. And\nshould no substantial change overtake them as an effect of the war\nexperience, the pacific league under discussion would be entered into by\nand between governments of this complexion. Should difficulties then\narise between those who own and those who do not, in any one of these\ncountries, it would become a nice question whether the compact to\nmaintain the peace and national integrity of the several nations\ncomprised in the league should be held to cover the case of internal\ndissensions and possible disorders partaking of the character of revolt\nagainst the established authorities or against the established\nprovisions of law. A strike of the scope and character of the one\nrecently threatened, and narrowly averted, on the American railroads,\ne.g., might easily give rise to disturbances sufficiently formidable to\nraise a question of the peace league's jurisdiction; particularly if\nsuch a disturbance should arise in a less orderly and less isolated\ncountry than the American republic; so as unavoidably to carry the\neffects of the disturbance across the national frontiers along the lines\nof industrial and commercial intercourse and correlation. It is always\nconceivable that a national government standing on a somewhat\nconservative maintenance of the received law and order might feel itself\nbound by its conception of the peace to make common cause with the\nkeepers of established rights in neighboring states, particularly if\nthe similar interests of their own nation were thought to be placed in\njeopardy by the course of events.\n\nAntecedently it seems highly probable that the received rights of\nownership and disposal of property, particularly of investment, will\ncome up for advisement and revision so soon as a settled state of peace\nis achieved. And there should seem to be little doubt but this revision\nwould go toward, or at least aim at the curtailment or abrogation of\nthese rights; very much after the fashion in which the analogous vested\nrights of feudalism and the dynastic monarchy have been revised and in\ngreat part curtailed or abrogated in the advanced democratic countries.\nNot much can confidently be said as to the details of such a prospective\nrevision of legal rights, but the analogy of that procedure by which\nthese other vested rights have been reduced to a manageable disability,\nsuggests that the method in the present case also would be by way of\ncurtailment, abrogation and elimination. Here again, as in analogous\nmovements of disuse and disestablishment, there would doubtless be much\nconservative apprehension as to the procuring of a competent substitute\nfor the supplanted methods of doing what is no longer desirable to be\ndone; but here as elsewhere, in a like conjuncture, the practicable way\nout would presumably be found to lie along the line of simple disuse and\ndisallowance of class prerogative. Taken at its face value, without\nunavoidable prejudice out of the past, this question of a substitute to\nreplace the current exploitation of the industrial arts for private gain\nby capitalistic sabotage is not altogether above a suspicion of\ndrollery.\n\nYet it is not to be overlooked that private enterprise on the basis of\nprivate ownership is the familiar and accepted method of conducting\nindustrial affairs, and that it has the sanction of immemorial usage, in\nthe eyes of the common man, and that it is reenforced with the urgency\nof life and death in the apprehension of the kept classes. It should\naccordingly be a possible outcome of such a peace as would put away\ninternational dissension, that the division of classes would come on in\na new form, between those who stand on their ancient rights of\nexploitation and mastery, and those who are unwilling longer to submit.\nAnd it is quite within the possibilities of the case that the division\nof opinion on these matters might presently shift back to the old\nfamiliar ground of international hostilities; undertaken partly to put\ndown civil disturbances in given countries, partly by the more archaic,\nor conservative, peoples to safeguard the institutions of the received\nlaw and order against inroads from the side of the iconoclastic ones.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the apprehension of those who are speaking for peace between the\nnations and planning for its realisation, the outlook is that of a\nreturn to, or a continuance of, the state of things before the great war\ncame on, with peace and national security added, or with the danger of\nwar eliminated. Nothing appreciable in the way of consequent innovation,\ncertainly nothing of a serious character, is contemplated as being among\nthe necessary consequences of such a move into peace and security.\nNational integrity and autonomy are to be preserved on the received\nlines, and international division and discrimination is to be managed as\nbefore, and with the accustomed incidents of punctilio and pecuniary\nequilibration. Internationally speaking, there is to dawn an era of\ndiplomacy without afterthought, whatever that might conceivably mean.\n\nThere is much in the present situation that speaks for such an\narrangement, particularly as an initial phase of the perpetual peace\nthat is aimed at, whatever excursive variations might befall presently,\nin the course of years. The war experience in the belligerent countries\nand the alarm that has disturbed the neutral nations have visibly raised\nthe pitch of patriotic solidarity in all these countries; and patriotism\ngreatly favors the conservation of established use and wont; more\nparticularly is it favorable to the established powers and policies of\nthe national government. The patriotic spirit is not a spirit of\ninnovation. The chances of survival, and indeed of stabilisation, for\nthe accepted use and wont and for the traditional distinctions of class\nand prescriptive rights, should therefore seem favorable, at any rate in\nthe first instance.\n\nPresuming, therefore, as the spokesmen of such a peace-compact are\nsingularly ready to presume, that the era of peace and good-will which\nthey have in view is to be of a piece with the most tranquil decades of\nthe recent past, only more of the same kind, it becomes a question of\nimmediate interest to the common man, as well as to all students of\nhuman culture, how the common man is to fare under this regime of law\nand order,--the mass of the population whose place it is to do what is\nto be done, and thereby to carry forward the civilisation of these\npacific nations. It may not be out of place to recall, by way of\nparenthesis, that it is here taken for granted as a matter of course\nthat all governmental establishments are necessarily conservative in all\ntheir dealings with this heritage of culture, except so far as they may\nbe reactionary. Their office is the stabilisation of archaic\ninstitutions, the measure of archaism varying from one to another.\n\nWith due stabilisation and with a sagacious administration of the\nestablished scheme of law and order, the common man should find himself\nworking under conditions and to results of the familiar kind; but with\nthe difference that, while legal usage and legal precedent remain\nunchanged, the state of the industrial arts can confidently be expected\nto continue its advance in the same general direction as before, while\nthe population increases after the familiar fashion, and the investing\nbusiness community pursues its accustomed quest of competitive gain and\ncompetitive spending in the familiar spirit and with cumulatively\naugmented means. Stabilisation of the received law and order will not\ntouch these matters; and for the present it is assumed that these\nmatters will not derange the received law and order. The assumption may\nseem a violent one to the students of human culture, but it is a simple\nmatter of course to the statesmen.\n\nTo this piping time of peace the nearest analogues in history would seem\nto be the Roman peace, say, of the days of the Antonines, and passably\nthe British peace of the Victorian era. Changes in the scheme of law and\norder supervened in both of these instances, but the changes were, after\nall, neither unconscionably large nor were they of a subversive nature.\nThe scheme of law and order, indeed, appears in neither instance to have\nchanged so far as the altered circumstances would seem to have called\nfor. To the common man the Roman peace appears to have been a peace by\nsubmission, not widely different from what the case of China has\nlatterly brought to the appreciation of students. The Victorian peace,\nwhich can be appreciated more in detail, was of a more genial character,\nas regards the fortunes of the common man. It started from a reasonably\nlow level of hardship and _de facto_ iniquity, and was occupied with\nmany prudent endeavours to improve the lot of the unblest majority; but\nit is to be admitted that these prudent endeavours never caught up with\nthe march of circumstances. Not that these prudent measures of\namelioration were nugatory, but it is clear that they were not an\naltogether effectual corrective of the changes going on; they were, in\neffect, systematically so far in arrears as always to leave an uncovered\nmargin of discontent with current conditions. It is a fact of history\nthat very appreciable sections of the populace were approaching an\nattitude of revolt against what they considered to be intolerable\nconditions when that era closed. Much of what kept them within bounds,\nthat is to say within legal bounds, was their continued loyalty to the\nnation; which was greatly, and for the purpose needfully, reenforced by\na lively fear of warlike aggression from without. Now, under the\nprojected _pax orbis terrarum_ all fear of invasion, it is hopefully\nbelieved, will be removed; and with the disappearance of this fear\nshould also disappear the drag of national loyalty on the counsels of\nthe underbred.\n\nIf this British peace of the nineteenth century is to be taken as a\nsignificant indication of what may be looked for under a regime of peace\nat large, with due allowance for what is obviously necessary to be\nallowed for, then what is held in promise would appear to be an era of\nunexampled commercial prosperity, of investment and business enterprise\non a scale hitherto not experienced. These developments will bring their\nnecessary consequences affecting the life of the community, and some of\nthe consequences it should be possible to foresee. The circumstances\nconditioning this prospective era of peace and prosperity will\nnecessarily differ from the corresponding circumstances that\nconditioned the Victorian peace, and many of these points of difference\nit is also possible to forecast in outline with a fair degree of\nconfidence. It is in the main these economic factors going to condition\nthe civilisation of the promised future that will have to be depended on\nto give the cue to any student interested in the prospective unfolding\nof events.\n\nThe scheme of law and order governing all modern nations, both in the\nconduct of their domestic affairs and in their national policies, is in\nits controlling elements the scheme worked out through British (and\nFrench) experience in the eighteenth century and earlier, as revised and\nfurther accommodated in the nineteenth century. Other peoples,\nparticularly the Dutch, have of course had their part in the derivation\nand development of this modern scheme of institutional principles, but\nit has after all been a minor part; so that the scheme at large would\nnot differ very materially, if indeed it should differ sensibly, from\nwhat it is, even if the contribution of these others had not been had.\nThe backward nations, as e.g., Germany, Russia, Spain, etc., have of\ncourse contributed substantially nothing but retardation and\nmaladjustment to this modern scheme of civil life; whatever may be due\nto students resident in those countries, in the way of scholarly\nformulation. This nineteenth century scheme it is proposed to carry over\ninto the new era; and the responsible spokesmen of the projected new\norder appear to contemplate no provision touching this scheme of law and\norder, beyond the keeping of it intact in all substantial respects.\n\nWhen and in so far as the projected peace at large takes effect,\ninternational interests will necessarily fall somewhat into the\nbackground, as being no longer a matter of precarious equilibration,\nwith heavy penalties in the balance; and diplomacy will consequently\nbecome even more of a make-believe than today--something after the\nfashion of a game of bluff played with irredeemable \"chips.\" Commercial,\nthat is to say business, enterprise will consequently come in for a more\nundivided attention and be carried on under conditions of greater\nsecurity and of more comprehensive trade relations. The population of\nthe pacified world may be expected to go on increasing somewhat as in\nthe recent past; in which connection it is to be remarked that not more\nthan one-half, presumably something less than one-half, of the available\nagricultural resources have been turned to account for the civilised\nworld hitherto. The state of the industrial arts, including means of\ntransport and communication, may be expected to develop farther in the\nsame general direction as before, assuming always that peace conditions\ncontinue to hold. Popular intelligence, as it is called,--more properly\npopular education,--may be expected to suffer a further advance;\nnecessarily so, since it is a necessary condition of any effectual\nadvance in the industrial arts,--every appreciable technological advance\npresumes, as a requisite to its working-out in industry, an augmented\nstate of information and of logical facility in the workmen under whose\nhands it is to take effect.\n\nOf the prescriptive rights carried over into the new era, under the\nreceived law and order, the rights of ownership alone may be expected to\nhave any material significance for the routine of workday life; the\nother personal rights that once seemed urgent will for everyday purposes\nhave passed into a state of half-forgotten matter-of-course. As now, but\nin an accentuated degree, the rights of ownership will, in effect,\ncoincide and coalesce with the rights of investment and business\nmanagement. The market--that is to say the rule of the price-system in\nall matters of production and livelihood--may be expected to gain in\nvolume and inclusiveness; so that virtually all matters of industry and\nlivelihood will turn on questions of market price, even beyond the\ndegree in which that proposition holds today. The progressive extension\nand consolidation of investments, corporate solidarity, and business\nmanagement may be expected to go forward on the accustomed lines, as\nillustrated by the course of things during the past few decades. Market\nconditions should accordingly, in a progressively increased degree, fall\nunder the legitimate discretionary control of businessmen, or syndicates\nof businessmen, who have the disposal of large blocks of invested\nwealth,--\"big business,\" as it is called, should reasonably be expected\nto grow bigger and to exercise an increasingly more unhampered control\nof market conditions, including the money market and the labor market.\n\nWith such improvements in the industrial arts as may fairly be expected\nto come forward, and with the possible enhancement of industrial\nefficiency which should follow from a larger scale of organisation, a\nwider reach of transport and communication, and an increased\npopulation,--with these increasing advantages on the side of productive\nindustry, the per-capita product as well as the total product should be\nincreased in a notable degree, and the conditions of life should\npossibly become notably easier and more attractive, or at least more\nconducive to efficiency and personal comfort, for all concerned. Such\nwould be the first and unguarded inference to be drawn from the premises\nof the case as they offer themselves in the large; and something of that\nkind is apparently what floats before the prophetic vision of the\nadvocates of a league of nations for the maintenance of peace at large.\nThese premises, and the inferences so drawn from them, may be further\nfortified and amplified in the same sense on considering that certain\nvery material economies also become practicable, and should take effect\n\"in the absence of disturbing causes,\" on the establishment of such a\npeace at large. It will of course occur to all thoughtful persons that\narmaments must be reduced, perhaps to a minimum, and that the cost of\nthese things, in point of expenditures as well as of man-power spent in\nthe service, would consequently fall off in a corresponding measure. So\nalso, as slight further reflection will show, would the cost of the\ncivil service presumably fall off very appreciably; more particularly\nthe cost of this service per unit of service rendered. Some such climax\nof felicities might be looked for by hopeful persons, in the absence of\ndisturbing causes.\n\nUnder the new dispensation the standard of living, that is to say the\nstandard of expenditure, would reasonably be expected to advance in a\nvery appreciable degree, at least among the wealthy and well-to-do; and\nby pressure of imitative necessity a like effect would doubtless also be\nhad among the undistinguished mass. It is not a question of the standard\nof living considered as a matter of the subsistence minimum, or even a\nstandard of habitually prevalent creature comfort, particularly not\namong the wealthy and well-to-do. These latter classes have long since\nleft all question of material comfort behind in their accepted standards\nof living and in the continued advance of these standards. For these\nclasses who are often spoken of euphemistically as being \"in easy\ncircumstances,\" it is altogether a question of a standard of reputable\nexpenditure, to be observed on pain of lost self-respect and of lost\nreputation at large. As has been remarked in an earlier passage, wants\nof this kind are indefinitely extensible. So that some doubt may well be\nentertained as to whether the higher productive efficiency spoken of\nwill necessarily make the way of life easier, in view of this need of a\nhigher standard of expenditure, even when due account is taken of the\nmany economies which the new dispensation is expected to make\npracticable.\n\nOne of the effects to be looked for would apparently be an increased\npressure on the part of aspiring men to get into some line of business\nenterprise; since it is only in business, as contrasted with the\nindustrial occupations, that anyone can hope to find the relatively\nlarge income required for such an expensive manner of life as will bring\nany degree of content to aspirants for pecuniary good repute. So it\nshould follow that the number of businessmen and business concerns would\nincrease up to the limit of what the traffic could support, and that the\ncompetition between these rival, and in a sense over-numerous, concerns\nwould push the costs of competition to the like limit. In this respect\nthe situation would be of much the same character as what it now is,\nwith the difference that the limit of competitive expenditures would be\nrather higher than at present, to answer to the greater available margin\nof product that could be devoted to this use; and that the competing\nconcerns would be somewhat more numerous, or at least that the aggregate\nexpenditure on competitive enterprise would be somewhat larger; as,\ne.g., costs of advertising, salesmanship, strategic litigation,\nprocuration of legislative and municipal grants and connivance, and the\nlike.\n\nIt is always conceivable, though it may scarcely seem probable, that\nthese incidents of increased pressure of competition in business traffic\nmight eventually take up all the slack, and leave no net margin of\nproduct over what is available under the less favorable conditions of\nindustry that prevail today; more particularly when this increased\ncompetition for business gains is backed by an increased pressure of\ncompetitive spending for purposes of a reputable appearance. All this\napplies in retail trade and in such lines of industry and public service\nas partakes of the nature of retail trade, in the respect that\nsalesmanship and the costs of salesmanship enter into their case in an\nappreciable measure; this is an extensive field, it is true, and\nincontinently growing more extensive with the later changes in the\ncustomary methods of marketing products; but it is by no means anything\nlike the whole domain of industrial business, and by no means a field in\nwhich business is carried on without interference of a higher control\nfrom outside its own immediate limits.\n\nAll this generously large and highly expensive and profitable field of\ntrade and of trade-like industry, in which the businessmen in charge\ndeal somewhat directly with a large body of customers, is always subject\nto limitations imposed by the condition of the market; and the condition\nof the market is in part not under the control of these businessmen, but\nis also in part controlled by large concerns in the background; which in\ntheir turn are after all also not precisely free agents; in fact not\nmuch more so than their cousins in the retail trade, being confined in\nall their motions by the constraint of the price-system that dominates\nthe whole and gathers them all in its impersonal and inexorable net.\n\nThere is a colloquial saying among businessmen, that they are not doing\nbusiness for their health; which being interpreted means that they are\ndoing business for a price. It is out of a discrepancy in price, between\npurchase and sale, or between transactions which come to the same result\nas purchase and sale, that the gains of business are drawn; and it is in\nterms of price that these gains are rated, amassed and funded. It is\nnecessary, for a business concern to achieve a favorable balance in\nterms of price; and the larger the balance in terms of price the more\nsuccessful the enterprise. Such a balance can not be achieved except by\ndue regard to the conditions of the market, to the effect that dealings\nmust not go on beyond what will yield a favorable balance in terms of\nprice between income and outgo. As has already been remarked above, the\nprescriptive and indispensable recourse in all this conduct of business\nis sabotage, limitation of supply to bring a remunerative price result.\n\nThe new dispensation offers two new factors bearing on this businesslike\nneed of a sagacious sabotage, or rather it brings a change of\ncoefficients in two factors already familiar in business management: a\ngreater need, for gainful business, of resorting to such limitation of\ntraffic; and a greater facility of ways and means for enforcing the\nneeded restriction. So, it is confidently to be expected that in the\nprospective piping time of peace the advance in the industrial arts will\ncontinue at an accelerated rate; which may confidently be expected to\naffect the practicable increased production of merchantable goods; from\nwhich it follows that it will act to depress the prices of these goods;\nfrom which it follows that if a profitable business is to be done in the\nconduct of productive industry a greater degree of continence than\nbefore will have to be exercised in order not to let prices fall to an\nunprofitable figure; that is to say, the permissible output must be held\nshort of the productive capacity of such industry by a wider margin than\nbefore. On the other hand, it is well known out of the experience of the\npast few decades that a larger coalition of invested capital,\ncontrolling a larger proportion of the output, can more effectually\nlimit the supply to a salutary maximum, such as will afford reasonable\nprofits. And with the new dispensation affording a freer scope for\nbusiness enterprise on conditions of greater security, larger coalitions\nthan before are due to come into bearing. So that the means will be at\nhand competently to meet this more urgent need of a stricter limitation\nof the output, in spite of any increased productive capacity conferred\non the industrial community by any conceivable advance in the industrial\narts. The outcome to be looked for should apparently be such an\neffectual recourse to capitalistic sabotage as will neutralise any added\nadvantage that might otherwise accrue to the community from its\ncontinued improvements in technology.\n\nIn spite of this singularly untoward conjuncture of circumstances to be\nlooked for, there need be no serious apprehension that capitalistic\nsabotage, with a view to maintaining prices and the rate of profits,\nwill go all the way, to the result indicated, at least not on the\ngrounds so indicated alone. There is in the modern development of\ntechnology, and confidently to be counted on, a continued flow of new\ncontrivances and expedients designed to supersede the old; and these are\nin fact successful, in greater or less measure, in finding their way\ninto profitable use, on such terms as to displace older appliances,\nunderbid them in the market, and render them obsolete or subject to\nrecapitalisation on a lowered earning-capacity. So far as this\nunremitting flow of innovations has its effect, that is to say so far as\nit can not be hindered from having an effect, it acts to lower the\neffectual cost of products to the consumer. This effect is but a partial\nand somewhat uncertain one, but it is always to be counted in as a\npersistent factor, of uncertain magnitude, that will affect the results\nin the long run.\n\nAs has just been spoken of above, large coalitions of invested wealth\nare more competent to maintain, or if need be to advance, prices than\nsmaller coalitions acting in severalty, or even when acting in\ncollusion. This state of the case has been well illustrated by the very\nsuccessful conduct of such large business organisations during the past\nfew decades; successful, that is, in earning large returns on the\ninvestments engaged. Under the new dispensation, as has already been\nremarked, coalitions should reasonably be expected to grow to a larger\nsize and achieve a greater efficiency for the same purpose.\n\nThe large gains of the large corporate coalitions are commonly ascribed\nby their promoters, and by sympathetic theoreticians of the ancient\nline, to economies of production made practicable by a larger scale of\nproduction; an explanation which is disingenuous only so far as it needs\nbe. What is more visibly true on looking into the workings of these\ncoalitions in detail is that they are enabled to maintain prices at a\nprofitable, indeed at a strikingly profitable, level by such a control\nof the output as would be called sabotage if it were put in practice by\ninterested workmen with a view to maintain wages. The effects of this\nsagacious sabotage become visible in the large earnings of these\ninvestments and the large gains which, now and again, accrue to their\nmanagers. Large fortunes commonly are of this derivation.\n\nIn cases where no recapitalisation has been effected for a considerable\nseries of years the yearly earnings of such businesslike coalitions have\nbeen known to approach fifty percent on the capitalised value. Commonly,\nhowever, when earnings rise to a striking figure, the business will be\nrecapitalised on the basis of its earning-capacity, by issue of a stock\ndividend, by reincorporation in a new combination with an increased\ncapitalisation, and the like. Such augmentation of capital not unusually\nhas been spoken of by theoretical writers and publicists as an increase\nof the community's wealth, due to savings; an analysis of any given case\nis likely to show that its increased capital value represents an\nincreasingly profitable procedure for securing a high price above cost,\nby stopping the available output short of the productive capacity of the\nindustries involved. Loosely speaking, and within the limits of what the\ntraffic will bear, the gains in such a case are proportioned to the\ndeficiency by which the production or supply under control falls short\nof productive capacity. So that the capitalisation in the case comes to\nbear a rough proportion to the material loss which this organisation of\nsabotage is enabled to inflict on the community at large; and instead of\nits being a capitalisation of serviceable means of production it may,\nnow and again, come to little else than a capitalisation of chartered\nsabotage.\n\nUnder the new dispensation of peace and security at large this manner of\ncapitalisation and business enterprise might reasonably be expected to\ngain something in scope and security of operation. Indeed, there are few\nthings within the range of human interest on which an opinion may more\nconfidently be formed beforehand. If the rights of property, in their\nextent and amplitude, are maintained intact as they are before the law\ntoday, the hold which business enterprise on the large scale now has on\nthe affairs and fortunes of the community at large is bound to grow\nfirmer and to be used more unreservedly for private advantage under the\nnew conditions contemplated.\n\nThe logical result should be an accelerated rate of accumulation of the\ncountry's wealth in the hands of a relatively very small class of\nwealthy owners, with a relatively inconsiderable semi-dependent middle\nclass of the well-to-do, and with the mass of the population even more\nnearly destitute than they are today. At the same time it is scarcely to\nbe avoided that this wholly dependent and impecunious mass of the\npopulation must be given an appreciably better education than they have\ntoday. The argument will return to the difficulties that are liable to\narise out of this conjuncture of facts, in the way of discontent and\npossible disturbance.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMeantime, looking to the promise of the pacific future in the light of\nthe pacific past, certain further consequences, particularly\nconsequences of the economic order, that may reasonably be expected to\nfollow will also merit attention. The experience of the Victorian peace\nis almost as pointed in its suggestion on this head as if it had been an\nexperiment made _ad hoc_; but with the reservation that the scale of\neconomic life, after all, was small in the Victorian era, and its pace\nwas slack, compared with what the twentieth century should have to offer\nunder suitable conditions of peace and pecuniary security. In the light\nof this most instructive modern instance, there should appear to be in\nprospect a growth of well-bred families resting on invested wealth and\nso living on unearned incomes; larger incomes and consequently a more\nimposingly well-bred body of gentlefolk, sustained and vouched for by a\nmore munificent expenditure on superfluities, than the modern world has\nwitnessed hitherto. Doubtless the resulting growth of gentlemen and\ngentlewomen would be as perfect after their kind as these unexampled\nopportunities of gentle breeding might be expected to engender; so that\neven their British precursors on the trail of respectability would fall\nsomewhat into insignificance by comparison, whether in respect of\ngentlemanly qualities or in point of cost per unit.\n\nThe moral, and even more particularly the aesthetic, value of such a\nline of gentlefolk, and of the culture which they may be expected to\nplace on view,--this cultural side of the case, of course, is what one\nwould prefer to dwell on, and on the spiritual gains that might be\nexpected to accrue to humanity at large from the steady contemplation of\nthis meritorious respectability so displayed at such a cost.\n\nBut the prosaic necessity of the argument turns back to the economic and\ncivil bearing of this prospective development, this virtual bifurcation\nof the pacified nation into a small number of gentlemen who own the\ncommunity's wealth and consume its net product in the pursuit of\ngentility, on the one hand, and an unblest mass of the populace who do\nthe community's work on a meager livelihood tapering down toward the\nsubsistence minimum, on the other hand. Evidently, this prospective\nposture of affairs may seem \"fraught with danger to the common weal,\" as\na public spirited citizen might phrase it. Or, as it would be expressed\nin less eloquent words, it appears to comprise elements that should\nmake for a change. At the same time it should be recalled, and the\nstatement will command assent on slight reflection, that there is no\navoiding substantially such a posture of affairs under the promised\nregime of peace and security, provided only that the price-system stands\nover intact, and the current rights of property continue to be held\ninviolate. If the known principles of competitive gain and competitive\nspending should need enforcement to that effect by an illustrative\ninstance, the familiar history of the Victorian peace is sufficient to\nquiet all doubts.\n\nOf course, the resulting articulation of classes in the community will\nnot be expected to fall into such simple lines of sheer contrast as this\nscheme would indicate. The class of gentlefolk, the legally constituted\nwasters, as they would be rated from the economic point of view, can not\nbe expected personally to take care of so large a consumption of\nsuperfluities as this posture of affairs requires at their hands. They\nwould, as the Victorian peace teaches, necessarily have the assistance\nof a trained corps of experts in unproductive consumption, the first and\nmost immediate of whom would be those whom the genial phrasing of Adam\nSmith designates \"menial servants.\" Beyond these would come the\npurveyors of superfluities, properly speaking, and the large, indeed\nredundant, class of tradespeople of high and low degree,--dependent in\nfact but with an illusion of semi-dependence; and farther out again the\nlegal and other professional classes of the order of stewards, whose\nduty it will be to administer the sources of income and receive,\napportion and disburse the revenues so devoted to a traceless\nextinguishment.\n\nThere would, in other words, be something of a \"substantial middle\nclass,\" dependent on the wealthy and on their expenditure of wealth, but\npresumably imbued with the Victorian middle-class illusion that they are\nof some account in their own right. Under the due legal forms and\nsanctions this, somewhat voluminous, middle-class population would\nengage in the traffic which is their perquisite, and would continue to\nbelieve, in some passable fashion, that they touch the substance of\nthings at something nearer than the second remove. They would in great\npart appear to be people of \"independent means,\" and more particularly\nwould they continue in the hope of so appearing and of some time making\ngood the appearance. Hence their fancied, and therefore their\nsentimental, interest would fall out on the side of the established law\nand order; and they would accordingly be an element of stability in the\ncommonwealth, and would throw in their weight, and their voice, to\nsafeguard that private property and that fabric of prices and credit\nthrough which the \"income stream\" flows to the owners of preponderant\ninvested wealth.\n\nJudged on the state of the situation as it runs in our time, and\nallowing for the heightened efficiency of large-scale investment and\nconsolidated management under the prospective conditions of added\npecuniary security, it is to be expected that the middle-class\npopulation with \"independent means\" should come in for a somewhat meager\nlivelihood, provided that they work faithfully at their business of\nmanaging pecuniary traffic to the advantage of their pecuniary\nbetters,--meager, that is to say, when allowance is made for the\nconventionally large expenditure on reputable appearances which is\nnecessarily to be included in their standard of living. It lies in the\nnature of this system of large-scale investment and enterprise that the\n(pecuniarily) minor agencies engaged on a footing of ostensible\nindependence will come in for only such a share in the aggregate gains\nof the community as it is expedient for the greater business interests\nto allow them as an incentive to go on with their work as purveyors of\ntraffic to these greater business interests.\n\nThe current, and still more this prospective, case of the\nquasi-self-directing middle class may fairly be illustrated by the case\nof the American farmers, of the past and present. The American farmer\nrejoices to be called \"The Independent Farmer.\" He once was independent,\nin a meager and toil-worn fashion, in the days before the price-system\nhad brought him and all his works into the compass of the market; but\nthat was some time ago. He now works for the market, ordinarily at\nsomething like what is called a \"living wage,\" provided he has\n\"independent means\" enough to enable him by steady application to earn a\nliving wage; and of course, the market being controlled by the paramount\ninvestment interests in the background, his work, in effect, inures to\ntheir benefit; except so much as it may seem necessary to allow him as\nincentive to go on. Also of course, these paramount investment interests\nare in turn controlled in all their manoeuvres by the impersonal\nexigencies of the price-system, which permits no vagaries in violation\nof the rule that all traffic must show a balance of profit in terms of\nprice.\n\nThe Independent Farmer still continues to believe that in some occult\nsense he still is independent in what he will do and what not; or\nperhaps rather that he can by shrewd management retain or regain a\ntolerable measure of such independence, after the fashion of what is\nheld to have been the posture of affairs in the days before the coming\nof corporation finance; or at least he believes that he ought to have,\nor to regain or reclaim, some appreciable measure of such independence;\nwhich ought then, by help of the \"independent means\" which he still\ntreasures, to procure him an honest and assured livelihood in return for\nan honest year's work. Latterly he, that is the common run of the\nfarmers, has been taking note of the fact that he is, as he apprehends\nit, at a disadvantage in the market; and he is now taking recourse to\nconcerted action for the purpose of what might be called \"rigging the\nmarket\" to his own advantage. In this he overlooks the impregnable\nposition which the party of the second part, the great investment\ninterests, occupy; in fact, he is counting without his host. Hitherto he\nhas not been convinced of his own helplessness. And with a fine fancy he\nstill imagines that his own interest is on the side of the propertied\nand privileged classes; so that the farmer constituency is the chief\npillar of conservative law and order, particularly in all that touches\nthe inviolable rights of property and at every juncture where a division\ncomes on between those who live by investment and those who live by\nwork. In pecuniary effect, the ordinary American farmer, who legally\nowns a moderate farm of the common sort, belongs among those who work\nfor a livelihood; such a livelihood as the investment interests find it\nworth while to allow him under the rule of what the traffic will bear;\nbut in point of sentiment and class consciousness he clings to a belated\nstand on the side of those who draw a profit from his work.\n\nSo it is also with the menial servants and the middle-class people of\n\"independent means,\" who are, however, in a position to see more clearly\ntheir dependence on the owners of predominant wealth. And such, with a\nfurther accentuation of the anomaly, may reasonably be expected to be\nthe further run of these relations under the promised regime of peace\nand security. The class of well-kept gentlefolk will scarcely be called\non to stand alone, in case of a division between those who live by\ninvestment and those who live by work; inasmuch as, for the calculable\nfuture, it should seem a reasonable expectation that this very\nconsiderable fringe of dependents and pseudo-independents will abide by\ntheir time-tried principles of right and honest living, through good\ndays and evil, and cast in their lot unreservedly with that reputable\nbody to whom the control of trade and industry by investment assigns the\nusufruct of the community's productive powers.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSomething has already been said of the prospective breeding of pedigreed\ngentlefolk under the projected regime of peace. Pedigree, for the\npurpose in hand, is a pecuniary attribute and is, of course, a product\nof funded wealth, more or less ancient. Virtually ancient pedigree can\nbe procured by well-advised expenditure on the conspicuous amenities;\nthat is to say pedigree effectually competent as a background of current\ngentility. Gentlefolk of such syncopated pedigree may have to walk\ncircumspectly, of course; but their being in this manner put on their\ngood behavior should tend to heighten their effectual serviceability as\ngentlefolk, by inducing a single-mindedness of gentility beyond what can\nfairly be expected of those who are already secure in their tenure.\n\nExcept conventionally, there is no hereditary difference between the\nstandard gentlefolk and, say, their \"menial servants,\" or the general\npopulation of the farms and the industrial towns. This is a\nwell-established commonplace among ethnological students; which has, of\ncourse, nothing to say with respect to the conventionally distinct lines\nof descent of the \"Best Families.\" These Best Families are nowise\ndistinguishable from the common run in point of hereditary traits; the\ndifference that makes the gentleman and the gentlewoman being wholly a\nmatter of habituation during the individual's life-time. It is something\nof a distasteful necessity to call attention to this total absence of\nnative difference between the well-born and the common, but it is a\nnecessity of the argument in hand, and the recalling of it may,\ntherefore, be overlooked for once in a way. There is no harm and no\nannoyance intended. The point of it all is that, on the premises which\nthis state of the case affords, the body of gentlefolk created by such\nan accumulation of invested wealth will have no less of an effectual\ncultural value than they would have had if their virtually ancient\npedigree had been actual.\n\nAt this point, again, the experience of the Victorian peace and the\nfunctioning of its gentlefolk come in to indicate what may fairly be\nhoped for in this way under this prospective regime of peace at large.\nBut with the difference that the scale of things is to be larger, the\npace swifter, and the volume and dispersion of this prospective leisure\nclass somewhat wider. The work of this leisure class--and there is\nneither paradox nor inconsistency in the phrase--should be patterned on\nthe lines worked out by their prototypes of the Victorian time, but with\nsome appreciable accentuation in the direction of what chiefly\ncharacterised the leisure class of that era of tranquility. The\ncharacteristic feature to which attention naturally turns at this\nsuggestion is the tranquility that has marked that body of gentlefolk\nand their code of clean and honest living. Another word than\n\"tranquility\" might be hit upon to designate this characteristic animus,\nbut any other word that should at all adequately serve the turn would\ncarry a less felicitous suggestion of those upper-class virtues that\nhave constituted the substantial worth of the Victorian gentleman. The\nconscious worth of these gentlefolk has been a beautifully complete\nachievement. It has been an achievement of \"faith without works,\" of\ncourse; but, needless to say, that is as it should be, also of course.\nThe place of gentlefolk in the economy of Nature is tracelessly to\nconsume the community's net product, and in doing so to set a standard\nof decent expenditure for the others emulatively to work up to as near\nas may be. It is scarcely conceivable that this could have been done in\na more unobtrusively efficient manner, or with a more austerely virtuous\nconviction of well-doing, than by the gentlefolk bred of the Victorian\npeace. So also, in turn, it is not to be believed that the prospective\nbreed of gentlefolk derivable from the net product of the pacific\nnations under the promised regime of peace at large will prove in any\ndegree less effective for the like ends. More will be required of them\nin the way of a traceless consumption of superfluities and an unexampled\nexpensive standard of living. But this situation that so faces them may\nbe construed as a larger opportunity, quite as well as a more difficult\ntask.\n\nA theoretical exposition of the place and cultural value of a leisure\nclass in modern life would scarcely be in place here; and it has also\nbeen set out in some detail elsewhere.[10] For the purpose in hand it\nmay be sufficient to recall that the canons of taste and the standards\nof valuation worked out and inculcated by leisure-class life have in all\nages run, with unbroken consistency, to pecuniary waste and personal\nfutility. In its economic bearing, and particularly in its immediate\nbearing on the material well-being of the community at large, the\nleadership of the leisure class can scarcely be called by a less\nderogatory epithet than \"untoward.\" But that is not the whole of the\ncase, and the other side should be heard. The leisure-class life of\ntranquility, running detached as it does above the turmoil out of which\nthe material of their sustenance is derived, enables a growth of all\nthose virtues that mark, or make, the gentleman; and that affect the\nlife of the underlying community throughout, pervasively, by imitation;\nleading to a standardisation of the everyday proprieties on a\npresumably, higher level of urbanity and integrity than might be\nexpected to result in the absence of this prescriptive model.\n\n[Footnote 10: Cf. _The Theory of the Leisure Class_, especially ch.\nv.-ix. and xiv.]\n\n_Integer vitae scelerisque purus_, the gentleman of assured station\nturns a placid countenance to all those petty vexations of breadwinning\nthat touch him not. Serenely and with an impassive fortitude he faces\nthose common vicissitudes of life that are impotent to make or mar his\nmaterial fortunes and that can neither impair his creature comforts nor\nput a slur on his good repute. So that without afterthought he deals\nfairly in all everyday conjunctures of give and take; for they are at\nthe most inconsequential episodes to him, although the like might spell\nirremediable disaster to his impecunious counterfoil among the common\nmen who have the community's work to do. In short, he is a gentleman, in\nthe best acceptation of the word,--unavoidably, by force of\ncircumstance. As such his example is of invaluable consequence to the\nunderlying community of common folk, in that it keeps before their eyes\nan object lesson in habitual fortitude and visible integrity such as\ncould scarcely have been created except under such shelter from those\ndisturbances that would go to mar habitual fortitude and integrity.\nThere can be little doubt but the high example of the Victorian\ngentlefolk has had much to do with stabilising the animus of the British\ncommon man on lines of integrity and fair play. What else and more in\nthe way of habitual preconceptions he may, by competitive imitation, owe\nto the same high source is not immediately in question here.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nRecalling once more that the canon of life whereby folk are gentlefolk\nsums itself up in the requirements of pecuniary waste and personal\nfutility, and that these requirements are indefinitely extensible, at\nthe same time that the management of the community's industry by\ninvestment for a profit enables the owners of invested wealth to divert\nto their own use the community's net product, wherewith to meet these\nrequirements, it follows that the community at large which provides this\noutput of product will be allowed so much as is required by their\nnecessary standard of living,--with an unstable margin of error in the\nadjustment. This margin of error should tend continually to grow\nnarrower as the businesslike management of industry grows more efficient\nwith experience; but it will also continually be disturbed in the\ncontrary sense by innovations of a technological nature that require\ncontinual readjustment. This margin is probably not to be got rid of,\nthough it may be expected to become less considerable under more settled\nconditions.\n\nIt should also not be overlooked that the standard of living here spoken\nof as necessarily to be allowed the working population by no means\ncoincides with the \"physical subsistence minimum,\" from which in fact it\nalways departs by something appreciable. The necessary standard of\nliving of the working community is in fact made up of two\ndistinguishable factors: the subsistence minimum, and the requirements\nof decorously wasteful consumption--the \"decencies of life.\" These\ndecencies are no less requisite than the physical necessaries, in point\nof workday urgency, and their amount is a matter of use and wont. This\ncomposite standard of living is a practical minimum, below which\nconsumption will not fall, except by a fluctuating margin of error; the\neffect being the same, in point of necessary consumption, as if it were\nall of the nature of a physical subsistence minimum.\n\nLoosely speaking, the arrangement should leave nothing appreciable over,\nafter the requirements of genteel waste and of the workday standard of\nconsumption have been met. From which in turn it should follow that the\nrest of what is comprised under the general caption of \"culture\" will\nfind a place only in the interstices of leisure-class expenditure and\nonly at the hands of aberrant members of the class of the gently-bred.\nThe working population should have no effectual margin of time, energy\nor means for other pursuits than the day's work in the service of the\nprice-system; so that aberrant individuals in this class, who might by\nnative propensity incline, e.g., to pursue the sciences or the fine\narts, should have (virtually) no chance to make good. It would be a\nvirtual suppression of such native gifts among the common folk, not a\ndefinitive and all-inclusive suppression. The state of the case under\nthe Victorian peace may, again, be taken in illustration of the point;\nalthough under the presumably more effectual control to be looked for in\nthe pacific future the margin might reasonably be expected to run\nsomewhat narrower, so that this virtual suppression of cultural talent\namong the common men should come nearer a complete suppression.\n\nThe working of that free initiative that makes the advance of\ncivilisation, and also the greater part of its conservation, would in\neffect be allowed only in the erratic members of the kept classes; where\nat the same time it would have to work against the side-draught of\nconventional usage, which discountenances any pursuit that is not\nvisibly futile according to some accepted manner of futility. Now under\nthe prospective perfect working of the price-system, bearers of the\nbanners of civilisation could effectually be drawn only from the kept\nclasses, the gentlefolk who alone would have the disposal of such free\nincome as is required for work that has no pecuniary value. And\nnumerically the gentlefolk are an inconsiderable fraction of the\npopulation. The supply of competently gifted bearers of the community's\nculture would accordingly be limited to such as could be drawn by\nself-selection from among this inconsiderable proportion of the\ncommunity at large.\n\nIt may be recalled that in point of heredity, and therefore in point of\nnative fitness for the maintenance and advance of civilisation, there is\nno difference between the gentlefolk and the populace at large; or at\nleast there is no difference of such a nature as to count in abatement\nof the proposition set down above. Some slight, but after all\ninconsequential, difference there may be, but such difference as there\nis, if any, rather counts against the gentlefolk as keepers of the\ncultural advance. The gentlefolk are derived from business; the\ngentleman represents a filial generation of the businessman; and if the\nclass typically is gifted with any peculiar hereditary traits,\ntherefore, they should presumably be such as typically mark the\nsuccessful businessman--astute, prehensile, unscrupulous. For a\ngeneration or two, perhaps to the scriptural third and fourth\ngeneration, it is possible that a diluted rapacity and cunning may\ncontinue to mark the businessman's well-born descendants; but these are\nnot serviceable traits for the conservation and advancement of the\ncommunity's cultural heritage. So that no consideration of special\nhereditary fitness in the well-born need be entertained in this\nconnection.\n\nAs to the limitation imposed by the price-system on the supply of\ncandidates suited by native gift for the human work of civilisation; it\nwould no doubt, be putting the figure extravagantly high to say that the\ngentlefolk, properly speaking, comprise as much as ten percent of the\ntotal population; perhaps something less than one-half of that\npercentage would still seem a gross overstatement. But, to cover loose\nends and vagrant cases, the gentlefolk may for the purpose be credited\nwith so high a percentage of the total population. If ten percent be\nallowed, as an outside figure, it follows that the community's\nscientists, artists, scholars, and the like individuals given over to\nthe workday pursuits of the human spirit, are by conventional\nrestriction to be drawn from one-tenth of the current supply of persons\nsuited by native gift for these pursuits. Or as it may also be\nexpressed, in so far as the projected scheme takes effect it should\nresult in the suppression of nine (or more) out of every ten persons\navailable for the constructive work of civilisation. The cultural\nconsequences to be looked for, therefore, should be quite markedly of\nthe conservative order.\n\nOf course, in actual effect, the retardation or repression of\ncivilisation by this means, as calculated on these premises, should\nreasonably be expected to count up to something appreciably more than\nnine-tenths of the gains that might presumably be achieved in the\nconceivable absence of the price-system and the regime of investment.\nAll work of this kind has much of the character of teamwork; so that the\nefforts of isolated individuals count for little, and a few working in\nmore or less of concert and understanding will count for proportionally\nmuch less than many working in concert. The endeavours of the\nindividuals engaged count cumulatively, to such effect that doubling\ntheir forces will more than double the aggregate efficiency; and\nconversely, reducing the number will reduce the effectiveness of their\nwork by something more than the simple numerical proportion. Indeed, an\nundue reduction of numbers in such a case may lead to the total defeat\nof the few that are left, and the best endeavours of a dwindling remnant\nmay be wholly nugatory. There is needed a sense of community and\nsolidarity, without which the assurance necessary to the work is bound\nto falter and dwindle out; and there is also needed a degree of popular\ncountenance, not to be had by isolated individuals engaged in an\nunconventional pursuit of things that are neither to be classed as\nspendthrift decorum nor as merchantable goods. In this connection an\nisolated one does not count for one, and more than the critical minimum\nwill count for several per capita. It is a case where the \"minimal dose\"\nis wholly inoperative.\n\nThere is not a little reason to believe that consequent upon the\ninstallation of the projected regime of peace at large and secure\ninvestment the critical point in the repression of talent will very\nshortly be reached and passed, so that the principle of the \"minimal\ndose\" will come to apply. The point may readily be illustrated by the\ncase of many British and American towns and neighbourhoods during the\npast few decades; where the dominant price-system and its commercial\nstandards of truth and beauty have over-ruled all inclination to\ncultural sanity and put it definitively in abeyance. The cultural, or\nperhaps the conventional, residue left over in these cases where\ncivilisation has gone stale through inefficiency of the minimal dose is\nnot properly to be found fault with; it is of a blameless character,\nconventionally; nor is there any intention here to cast aspersion on the\ndesolate. The like effects of the like causes are to be seen in the\nAmerican colleges and universities, where business principles have\nsupplanted the pursuit of learning, and where the commercialisation of\naims, ideals, tastes, occupations and personnel is following much the\nsame lines that have led so many of the country towns effectually\noutside the cultural pale. The American university or college is coming\nto be an outlier of the price-system, in point of aims, standards and\npersonnel; hitherto the tradition of learning as a trait of\ncivilisation, as distinct from business, has not been fully displaced,\nalthough it is now coming to face the passage of the minimal dose. The\nlike, in a degree, is apparently true latterly for many English, and\nstill more evidently for many German schools.\n\nIn these various instances of what may be called dry-rot or local blight\non the civilised world's culture the decline appears to be due not to a\npositive infection of a malignant sort, so much as to a failure of the\nactive cultural ferment, which has fallen below the critical point of\nefficacy; perhaps through an unintended refusal of a livelihood to\npersons given over to cultivating the elements of civilisation; perhaps\nthrough the conventional disallowance of the pursuit of any other ends\nthan competitive gain and competitive spending. Evidently it is\nsomething much more comprehensive in this nature that is reasonably to\nbe looked for under the prospective regime of peace, in case the\nprice-system gains that farther impetus and warrant which it should come\nin for if the rights of ownership and investment stand over intact, and\nso come to enjoy the benefit of a further improved state of the\nindustrial arts and a further enlarged scale of operation and enhanced\nrate of turnover.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo turn back to the point from which this excursion branched off. It has\nbeen presumed all the while that the technological equipment, or the\nstate of the industrial arts, must continue to advance under the\nconditions offered by this regime of peace at large. But the last few\nparagraphs will doubtless suggest that such a single-minded addiction to\ncompetitive gain and competitive spending as the stabilised and\namplified price-system would enjoin, must lead to an effectual\nretardation, perhaps to a decline, of those material sciences on which\nmodern technology draws; and that the state of the industrial arts\nshould therefore cease to advance, if only the scheme of investment and\nbusinesslike sabotage can be made sufficiently secure. That such may be\nthe outcome is a contingency which the argument will have to meet and to\nallow for; but it is after all a contingency that need not be expected\nto derange the sequence of events, except in the way of retardation.\nEven without further advance in technological expedients or in the\nrelevant material sciences, there will still necessarily ensue an\neffectual advance in the industrial arts, in the sense that further\norganisation and enlargement of the material equipment and industrial\nprocesses on lines already securely known and not to be forgotten must\nbring an effectually enhanced efficiency of the industrial process as a\nwhole.\n\nIn illustration, it is scarcely to be assumed even as a tentative\nhypothesis that the system of transport and communication will not\nundergo extension and improvement on the lines already familiar, even in\nthe absence of new technological contrivances. At the same time a\ncontinued increase of population is to be counted on; which has, for the\npurpose in hand, much the same effect as an advance in the industrial\narts. Human contact and mutual understanding will necessarily grow wider\nand closer, and will have its effect on the habits of thought prevalent\nin the communities that are to live under the promised regime of peace.\nThe system of transport and communication having to handle a more\nvoluminous and exacting traffic, in the service of a larger and more\ncompact population, will have to be organised and administered on\nmechanically drawn schedules of time, place, volume, velocity, and\nprice, of a still more exacting accuracy than hitherto. The like will\nnecessarily apply throughout the industrial occupations that employ\nextensive plant or processes, or that articulate with industrial\nprocesses of that nature; which will necessarily comprise a larger\nproportion of the industrial process at large than hitherto.\n\nAs has already been remarked more than once in the course of the\nargument, a population that lives and does its work, and such play as is\nallowed it, in and by an exactingly articulate mechanical system of this\nkind will necessarily be an \"intelligent\" people, in the colloquial\nsense of the word; that is to say it will necessarily be a people that\nuses printed matter freely and that has some familiarity with the\nelements of those material sciences that underlie this mechanically\norganised system of appliances and processes. Such a population lives by\nand within the framework of the mechanistic logic, and is in a fair way\nto lose faith in any proposition that can not be stated convincingly in\nterms of this mechanistic logic. Superstitions are liable to lapse by\nneglect or disuse in such a community; that is to say propositions of a\nnon-mechanistic complexion are liable to insensible disestablishment in\nsuch a case; \"superstition\" in these premises coming to signify whatever\nis not of this mechanistic, or \"materialistic\" character. An exception\nto this broad characterisation of non-mechanistic propositions as\n\"superstition\" would be matters that are of the nature of an immediate\ndeliverance of the senses or of the aesthetic sensibilities.\n\nBy a simile it might be said that what so falls under the caption of\n\"superstition\" in such a case is subject to decay by inanition. It\nshould not be difficult to conceive the general course of such a decay\nof superstitions under this unremitting discipline of mechanistic habits\nof life. The recent past offers an illustration, in the unemotional\nprogress of decay that has overtaken religious beliefs in the more\ncivilised countries, and more particularly among the intellectually\ntrained workmen of the mechanical industries. The elimination of such\nnon-mechanistic propositions of the faith has been visibly going on, but\nit has not worked out on any uniform plan, nor has it overtaken any\nlarge or compact body of people consistently or abruptly, being of the\nnature of obsolescence rather than of set repudiation. But in a slack\nand unreflecting fashion the divestment has gone on until the aggregate\neffect is unmistakable.\n\nA similar divestment of superstitions is reasonably to be looked for\nalso in that domain of preconceptions that lies between the supernatural\nand the mechanistic. Chief among these time-warped preconceptions--or\nsuperstitions--that so stand over out of the alien past among these\ndemocratic peoples is the institution of property. As is true of\npreconceptions touching the supernatural verities, so here too the\narticle of use and wont in question will not bear formulation in\nmechanistic terms and is not congruous with that mechanistic logic that\nis incontinently bending the habits of thought of the common man more\nand more consistently to its own bent. There is, of course, the\ndifference that while no class--apart from the servants of the\nchurch--have a material interest in the continued integrity of the\narticles of the supernatural faith, there is a strong and stubborn\nmaterial interest bound up with the maintenance of this article of the\npecuniary faith; and the class in whom this material interest vests are\nalso, in effect, invested with the coercive powers of the law.\n\nThe law, and the popular preconceptions that give the law its binding\nforce, go to uphold the established usage and the established\nprerogatives on this head; and the disestablishment of the rights of\nproperty and investment therefore is not a simple matter of obsolescence\nthrough neglect. It may confidently be counted on that all the apparatus\nof the law and all the coercive agencies of law and order, will be\nbrought in requisition to uphold the ancient rights of ownership,\nwhenever any move is made toward their disallowance or restriction. But\nthen, on the other hand, the movement to disallow or diminish the\nprerogatives of ownership is also not to take the innocuous shape of\nunstudied neglect. So soon, or rather so far, as the common man comes to\nrealise that these rights of ownership and investment uniformly work to\nhis material detriment, at the same time that he has lost the \"will to\nbelieve\" in any argument that does not run in terms of the mechanistic\nlogic, it is reasonable to expect that he will take a stand on this\nmatter; and it is more than likely that the stand taken will be of an\nuncompromising kind,--presumably something in the nature of the stand\nonce taken by recalcitrant Englishmen in protest against the\nirresponsible rule of the Stuart sovereign. It is also not likely that\nthe beneficiaries under these proprietary rights will yield their ground\nat all amicably; all the more since they are patently within their\nauthentic rights in insisting on full discretion in the disposal of\ntheir own possessions; very much as Charles I or James II once were\nwithin their prescriptive right,--which had little to say in the\noutcome.\n\nEven apart from \"time immemorial\" and the patent authenticity of the\ninstitution, there were and are many cogent arguments to be alleged in\nfavor of the position for which the Stuart sovereigns and their\nspokesmen contended. So there are and will be many, perhaps more, cogent\nreasons to be alleged for the maintenance of the established law and\norder in respect of the rights of ownership and investment. Not least\nurgent, nor least real, among these arguments is the puzzling question\nof what to put in the place of these rights and of the methods of\ncontrol based on them, very much as the analogous question puzzled the\npublic-spirited men of the Stuart times. All of which goes to argue that\nthere may be expected to arise a conjuncture of perplexities and\ncomplications, as well as a division of interests and claims. To which\nshould be added that the division is likely to come to a head so soon as\nthe balance of forces between the two parties in interest becomes\ndoubtful, so that either party comes to surmise that the success of its\nown aims may depend on its own efforts. And as happens where two\nantagonistic parties are each convinced of the justice of its cause, and\nin the absence of an umpire, the logical recourse is the wager of\nbattle.\n\nGranting the premises, there should be no reasonable doubt as to this\neventual cleavage between those who own and those who do not; and of the\npremises the only item that is not already an accomplished fact is the\ninstallation of peace at large. The rest of what goes into the argument\nis the well-known modern state of the industrial arts, and the equally\nwell-known price-system; which, in combination, give its character to\nthe modern state of business enterprise. It is only an unusually broad\ninstance of an institutional arrangement which has in the course of time\nand changing conditions come to work at cross purposes with that\nunderlying ground of institutional arrangements that takes form in the\ncommonplace aphorism, Live and let live. With change setting in the\ndirection familiar to all men today, it is only a question of limited\ntime when the discrepancy will reach a critical pass, and the\ninstallation of peace may be counted on to hasten this course of things.\n\nThat a decision will be sought by recourse to forcible measures, is also\nscarcely open to question; since the established law and order provides\nfor a resort to coercion in the enforcement of these prescriptive\nrights, and since both parties in interest, in this as in other cases,\nare persuaded of the justice of their claims. A decision either way is\nan intolerable iniquity in the eyes of the losing side. History teaches\nthat in such a quarrel the recourse has always been to force.\n\nHistory teaches also, but with an inflection of doubt, that the outworn\ninstitution in such a conjuncture faces disestablishment. At least, so\nmen like to believe. What the experience of history does not leave in\ndoubt is the grave damage, discomfort and shame incident to the\ndisplacement of such an institutional discrepancy by such recourse to\nforce. What further appears to be clear in the premises, at least to the\npoint of a strong presumption, is that in the present case the decision,\nor the choice, lies between two alternatives: either the price-system\nand its attendant business enterprise will yield and pass out; or the\npacific nations will conserve their pecuniary scheme of law and order at\nthe cost of returning to a war footing and letting their owners preserve\nthe rights of ownership by force of arms.\n\nThe reflection obviously suggests itself that this prospect of\nconsequences to follow from the installation of peace at large might\nwell be taken into account beforehand by those who are aiming to work\nout an enduring peace. It has appeared in the course of the argument\nthat the preservation of the present pecuniary law and order, with all\nits incidents of ownership and investment, is incompatible with an\nunwarlike state of peace and security. This current scheme of\ninvestment, business, and sabotage, should have an appreciably better\nchance of survival in the long run if the present conditions of warlike\npreparation and national insecurity were maintained, or if the projected\npeace were left in a somewhat problematical state, sufficiently\nprecarious to keep national animosities alert, and thereby to the\nneglect of domestic interests, particularly of such interests as touch\nthe popular well-being. On the other hand, it has also appeared that the\ncause of peace and its perpetuation might be materially advanced if\nprecautions were taken beforehand to put out of the way as much as may\nbe of those discrepancies of interest and sentiment between nations and\nbetween classes which make for dissension and eventual hostilities.\n\nSo, if the projectors of this peace at large are in any degree inclined\nto seek concessive terms on which the peace might hopefully be made\nenduring, it should evidently be part of their endeavours from the\noutset to put events in train for the present abatement and eventual\nabrogation of the rights of ownership and of the price-system in which\nthese rights take effect. A hopeful beginning along this line would\nmanifestly be the neutralisation of all pecuniary rights of citizenship,\nas has been indicated in an earlier passage. On the other hand, if peace\nis not desired at the cost of relinquishing the scheme of competitive\ngain and competitive spending, the promoters of peace should logically\nobserve due precaution and move only so far in the direction of a\npeaceable settlement as would result in a sufficiently unstable\nequilibrium of mutual jealousies; such as might expeditiously be upset\nwhenever discontent with pecuniary affairs should come to threaten this\nestablished scheme of pecuniary prerogatives.\n\n\nBOOKS BY THORSTEIN VEBLEN\n\n\nTHE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS\n\nTHE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE\n\nTHE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP\n\nIMPERIAL GERMANY\nAND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION\n\nTHE NATURE OF PEACE\nAND THE TERMS OF ITS PERPETUATION\n\nTHE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA","title":"An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":110076}