{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_21077/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_21077","id":"gutenberg_21077","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/21077","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Mind and body","Psychology"],"text":"E-text prepared by Curtis Weyant, Sankar Viswanathan, and the Project\nGutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from\npage images generously made available by Digital Case, the Kelvin Smith\nLibrary, Case Western Reserve University\n(http://library.case.edu/digitalcase/)\n\n\n\nNote: Images of the original pages are available through\n      Digital Case, the Kelvin Smith Library, Case Western\n      Reserve University. See\n      http://digitalcase.case.edu:9000/fedora/get/ksl:binmin00/binmin00.pdf\n\n\nTranscriber's Note:\n\n   References are made to footnotes in other footnotes and index.\n   The footnotes are serially numbered and placed at the end of\n   each chapter. Consequently the references in the footnotes\n   and index have been corrected to indicate the footnote number.\n\n\n\n\nInternational Scientific Series.\n\nVolume LXXXIX.\n\n(The International Scientific Series)\n\nEdited by F. Legge\n\nTHE MIND AND THE BRAIN\n\nby\n\nALFRED BINET\n\nDirecteur du Laboratoire de Psychologie\na la Sorbonne\n\nBeing the Authorised Translation of\n\n_L'Ame et le Corps_\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nLondon\nKegan Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co. Ltd\nDryden House, Gerrard Street, W.\n1907\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nBOOK I\n\nTHE DEFINITION OF MATTER\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nThe distinction between mind and matter--Knowable not\nhomogeneous--Criterion employed, enumeration not concepts\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nOUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS ONLY SENSATION\n\nModern theories of matter--Outer world only known to us by our\nsensations--Instances--Mill's approval of proposition, and its\ndefects--Nervous system only intermediary between self and outer\nworld--The great X of Matter--Nervous system does not give us true\nimage--Mueller's law of specificity of the nerves--The nervous system\nitself a sensation--Relations of sensation with the unknowable the\naffair of metaphysics\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE MECHANICAL THEORIES OF MATTER ARE ONLY SYMBOLS\n\nPhysicists vainly endeavour to reduce the role of\nsensation--Mathematical, energetical, and mechanical theories of\nuniverse--Mechanical model formed from sensation--Instance of\ntuning-fork--No one sensation any right to hegemony over others\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nANSWERS TO SOME OBJECTIONS, AND SUMMARY\n\nObjections of spiritualists--Of German authors who contend that\nnervous system does give true image--Of metaphysicians--Common ground\nof objection that nervous system not intermediary--Answer to\nthis--Summary of preceding chapters\n\n\nBOOK II\n\nTHE DEFINITION OF MIND\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COGNITION AND ITS OBJECT\n\nNecessity for inventory of mental phenomena--Objects of cognition and\nacts of cognition--Definition of consciousness\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nDEFINITION OF SENSATION\n\nSensation defined by experimental psychology--A state of\nconsciousness--Considered self-evident by Mill, Renouvier, and\nHume--Psycho-physical according to Reid and Hamilton--Reasons in\nfavour of last definition--Other opinions examined and refuted\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nDEFINITION OF THE IMAGE\n\nPerception and ideation cannot be separated--Perception constituted by\naddition of image to sensation--Hallucinations--Objections anticipated\nand answered\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nDEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS\n\nContrary opinions as to nature of emotions--Emotion a phenomenon _sui\ngeneris_--Intellectualist theory of emotion supported by Lange and\nJames--Is emotion only a perception? Is effort?--Question left\nunanswered\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE RELATION SUBJECT-OBJECT\n\nCan thoughts be divided into subject and object?--This division cannot\napply to the consciousness--Subject of cognition itself an\nobject--James' opinion examined--Opinion that subject is spiritual\nsubstance and consciousness its faculty refuted\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--CATEGORIES OF THE UNDERSTANDING\n\nPrinciple of relativity doubted--Tables of categories: Aristotle, Kant,\nand Renouvier--Kantian idealism--Phenomenism of Berkeley examined and\nrejected--Argument of _a priorists_--The intelligence only an inactive\nconsciousness--Huxley's epiphenomenal consciousness--Is the\nconsciousness necessary?--Impossibility of answering this question\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE SEPARABILITY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS\nFROM ITS OBJECT--DISCUSSION OF IDEALISM\n\nCan the consciousness be separated from its object?--Idealists\nconsider the object a modality of the consciousness and thus\ninseparable, from it--Futility of this doctrine--Object can exist\nwithout consciousness\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE SEPARATION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS\nFROM ITS OBJECT--THE UNCONSCIOUS\n\nCan ideas exist without consciousness?--No consciousness without an\nobject--Can the consciousness die?--Enfeeblement of consciousness how\naccounted for--Doubling of consciousness in hysterics--Relations of\nphysiological phenomena to consciousness--Consciousness cannot become\nunconscious and yet exist\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nDEFINITIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY\n\nDifficulty of defining psychology--Definition by substance--Psychology not\nthe science of the soul--Definition by enumeration: its error--Definition\nby method contradicts idea of consciousness--Externospection and\nintrospection sometimes confused--Definition by content--Facts cannot be\ndivided into those of consciousness and of unconsciousness--Descartes'\ndefinition of psychology insufficient--\"Within and without\" simile\nunanalogous--Definition by point of view--Inconsistencies of Ebbinghaus'\ncontention--W. James' teleological theory--Definition by the peculiar\nnature of mental laws only one possible: why?\n\n\nBOOK III\n\nTHE UNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE MIND HAS AN INCOMPLETE LIFE\n\nProblem of union of mind and body stated--Axiom of heterogeneity must\nbe rejected--Phenomena of consciousness incomplete--Aristotle's\n_relatum_ and _correlatum_ applied to the terms mind and matter\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nSPIRITUALISM AND IDEALISM\n\nSpiritualist view that death cuts link between soul and\nbody--Explanation of link fatal to system--Consciousness cannot\nexercise functions without objects of cognition--Idealism a\nkaleidoscopic system--Four affirmations of idealism: their\ninconsistency--Advantages of historical method\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nMATERIALISM AND PARALLELISM\n\nMaterialism oldest doctrine of all: many patristic authors lean\ntowards it--Modern form of, receives impulse from advance of physical\nscience--Karl Vogt's comparison of secretions of brain with that of\nkidneys--All materialist doctrines opposed to principle of\nheterogeneity--Modern materialism would make object generate\nconsciousness--Materialists cannot demonstrate how molecular\nvibrations can be transformed into objects--Parallelism avoids issue\nby declaring mind to be function of brain--Parallelists declare\nphysical and psychical life to be two parallel currents--Bain's\nsupport of this--Objections to: most important that it postulates\nconsciousness as a complete whole\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nMODERN THEORIES\n\nBerkeley's idealism revived by Bergson, though with different\nstandpoint--Admirable nature of Bergson's exposition--Fallacy of, part\nassigned to sensory nerves--Conscious sensations must be subsequent to\nexcitement of sensory nerves and dependent on their integrity\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nAuthor's own theory only a hypothesis--Important conditions for\nsolution of problem--Manifestations of consciousness conditioned by\nbrain, but this last unconscious--Consciousness perceives only\nexternal object--Specificity of nerves not absolute--Why repeated\nexcitements of nerve tend to become unconscious--Formation of habit\nand \"instinct\"--Resemblance to and distinction of this from\nparallelism--Advantages of new theory\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nRECAPITULATION\n\nDescription of matter--Definition of mind--Objections to,\nanswered--Incomplete existence of mind--Other theories--Nervous system\nmust add its own effect to that of its excitant\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBOOK I\n\nTHE DEFINITION OF MATTER\n\n\n\n\nTHE MIND AND THE BRAIN[1]\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThis book is a prolonged effort to establish a distinction between\nwhat is called mind and what is called matter. Nothing is more simple\nthan to realise this distinction when you do not go deeply into it;\nnothing is more difficult when you analyse it a little. At first\nsight, it seems impossible to confuse things so far apart as a thought\nand a block of stone; but on reflection this great contrast vanishes,\nand other differences have to be sought which are less apparent and of\nwhich one has not hitherto dreamed.\n\nFirst let us say how the question presents itself to us. The fact\nwhich we must take as a starting point, for it is independent of\nevery kind of theory, is that there exists something which is\n\"knowable.\" Not only science, but ordinary life and our everyday\nconversation, imply that there are things that we know. It is with\nregard to these things that we have to ask ourselves if some belong to\nwhat we call the mind and others to what we call matter.\n\nLet us suppose, by way of hypothesis, the knowable to be entirely and\nabsolutely homogeneous. In that case we should be obliged to set aside\nthe question as one already decided. Where everything is homogeneous,\nthere is no distinction to be drawn. But this hypothesis is, as we all\nknow, falsified by observation. The whole body of the knowable is\nformed from an agglomeration of extremely varied elements, amongst\nwhich it is easy to distinguish a large number of divisions. Things\nmay be classified according to their colour, their shape, their\nweight, the pleasure they give us, their quality of being alive or\ndead, and so on; one much given to classification would only be\ntroubled by the number of possible distinctions.\n\nSince so many divisions are possible, at which shall we stop and say:\nthis is the one which corresponds exactly to the opposition of mind\nand matter? The choice is not easy to make; for we shall see that\ncertain authors put the distinction between the physical and the\nmental in one thing, others in another. Thus there have been a very\nlarge number of distinctions proposed, and their number is much\ngreater than is generally thought. Since we propose to make ourselves\njudges of these distinctions, since, in fact, we shall reject most of\nthem in order to suggest entirely new ones, it must be supposed that\nwe shall do so by means of a criterion. Otherwise, we should only be\nacting fantastically. We should be saying peremptorily, \"In my opinion\nthis is mental,\" and there would be no more ground for discussion\nthan, if the assertion were \"I prefer the Romanticists to the\nClassicists,\" or \"I consider prose superior to poetry.\"\n\nThe criterion which I have employed, and which I did not analyse until\nthe unconscious use I had made of it revealed its existence to me, is\nbased on the two following rules:--\n\n1. _A Rule of Method._--The distinction between mind and matter must\nnot only apply to the whole of the knowable, but must be the deepest\nwhich can divide the knowable, and must further be one of a permanent\ncharacter. _A priori_, there is nothing to prove the existence of such\na distinction; it must be sought for and, when found, closely\nexamined.\n\n2. _An Indication of the Direction in which the Search must be\nMade._--Taking into account the position already taken up by the\nmajority of philosophers, the manifestation of mind, if it exists,\nmust be looked for in the domain of facts dealt with by psychology,\nand the manifestation of matter in the domain explored by physicists.\n\nI do not conceal from myself that there may be much that is arbitrary\nin my own criterion; but this does not seem to me possible to avoid.\nWe must therefore appeal to psychology, and ask whether it is\ncognisant of any phenomenon offering a violent, lasting, and\nineffaceable contrast with all the rest of the knowable.\n\n_The Method of Concepts and the Method of Enumeration._--Many authors\nare already engaged in this research, and employ a method which I\nconsider very bad and very dangerous--the method of concepts. This\nconsists in looking at real and concrete phenomena in their most\nabstract form. For example, in studying the mind, they use this word\n\"mind\" as a general idea which is supposed to contain all the\ncharacteristics of psychical phenomena; but they do not wait to\nenumerate these characteristics or to realise them, and they remain\nsatisfied with the extremely vague idea springing from an unanalysed\nconcept. Consequently they use the word \"mind\" with the imprudence of\na banker who should discount a trade bill without ascertaining\nwhether the payment of that particular piece of paper had been\nprovided for. This amounts to saying that the discussion of\nphilosophical problems takes especially a verbal aspect; and the more\ncomplex the phenomena a concept thus handled, contains, the more\ndangerous it is. A concept of the colour red has but a very simple\ncontent, and by using it, this content can be very clearly\nrepresented. But how can the immense meaning of the word \"mind\" be\nrealised every time that it is used? For example, to define mind and\nto separate it from the rest of the knowable which is called matter,\nthe general mode of reasoning is as follows: all the knowable which is\napparent to our senses is essentially reduced to motion; \"mind,\" that\nsomething which lives, feels, and judges, is reduced to \"thought.\" To\nunderstand the difference between matter and mind, it is necessary to\nask one's self whether there exists any analogy in nature between\nmotion and thought. Now this analogy does not exist, and what we\ncomprehend, on the contrary, is their absolute opposition. Thought is\nnot a movement, and has nothing in common with a movement. A movement\nis never anything else but a displacement, a transfer, a change of\nplace undergone by a particle of matter. What relation of similarity\nexists between this geometrical fact and a desire, an emotion, a\nsensation of bitterness? Far from being identical, these two facts\nare as distinct as any facts can be, and their distinction is so deep\nthat it should be raised to the height of a principle, the principle\nof heterogeneity.\n\nThis is almost exactly the reasoning that numbers of philosophers have\nrepeated for several years without giving proof of much originality.\nThis is what I term the metaphysics of concept, for it is a\nspeculation which consists in juggling with abstract ideas. The moment\nthat a philosopher opposes thought to movement, I ask myself under\nwhat form he can think of a \"thought,\" I suppose he must very\npoetically and very vaguely represent to himself something light and\nsubtle which contrasts with the weight and grossness of material\nbodies. And thus our philosopher is punished in the sinning part; his\ncontempt of the earthly has led him into an abuse of abstract\nreasoning, and this abuse has made him the dupe of a very naive\nphysical metaphor.\n\nAt bottom I have not much faith in the nobility of many of our\nabstract ideas. In a former psychological study[2] I have shown that\nmany of our abstractions are nothing else than embryonic, and, above\nall, loosely defined concrete ideas, which can satisfy only an\nindolent mind, and are, consequently, full of snares.\n\nThe opposition between mind and matter appears to me to assume a very\ndifferent meaning if, instead of repeating ready-made formulas and\nwasting time on the game of setting concept against concept, we take\nthe trouble to return to the study of nature, and begin by drawing up\nan inventory of the respective phenomena of mind and matter, examining\nwith each of these phenomena the characteristics in which the\nfirst-named differ from the second. It is this last method, more slow\nbut more sure than the other, that we shall follow; and we will\ncommence by the study of matter.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 1: _L'Ame et la Corps._--Disagreeable as it is to alter an\nauthor's title, the words \"Soul and Body\" had to be abandoned because\nof their different connotation in English. The title \"Mind and Body\"\nwas also preoccupied by Bain's work of that name in this series. The\ntitle chosen has M. Binet's approval.--ED.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Etude experimentale de l'Intelligence._ Paris:\nSchleicher.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nOUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS IS ONLY SENSATIONS\n\n\nOf late years numerous studies have been published on the conception\nof matter, especially by physicists, chemists, and mathematicians.\nAmong these recent contributions to science I will quote the articles\nof Duhem on the Evolution of Mechanics published in 1903 in the _Revue\ngenerale des Sciences_, and other articles by the same author, in\n1904, in the _Revue de Philosophie_. Duhem's views have attracted much\nattention, and have dealt a serious blow at the whole theory of the\nmechanics of matter. Let me also quote that excellent work of Dastre,\n_La Vie et la Mort_, wherein the author makes so interesting an\napplication to biology of the new theories on energetics; the\ndiscussion between Ostwald and Brillouin on matter, in which two rival\nconceptions find themselves engaged in a veritable hand-to-hand\nstruggle (_Revue generale des Sciences_, Nov. and Dec. 1895); the\ncurious work of Dantec on _les Lois Naturelles_, in which the author\ningeniously points out the different sensorial districts into which\nscience is divided, although, through a defect in logic, he accepts\nmechanics as the final explanation of things. And last, it is\nimpossible to pass over, in silence, the rare works of Lord Kelvin, so\nfull, for French readers, of unexpected suggestions, for they show us\nthe entirely practical and empirical value which the English attach to\nmechanical models.\n\nMy object is not to go through these great studies in detail. It is\nthe part of mathematical and physical philosophers to develop their\nideas on the inmost nature of matter, while seeking to establish\ntheories capable of giving a satisfactory explanation of physical\nphenomena. This is the point of view they take up by preference, and\nno doubt they are right in so doing. The proper role of the natural\nsciences is to look at phenomena taken by themselves and apart from\nthe observer.\n\nMy own intention, in setting forth these same theories on matter, is\nto give prominence to a totally different point of view. Instead of\nconsidering physical phenomena in themselves, we shall seek to know\nwhat idea one ought to form of their nature when one takes into\naccount that they are observed phenomena. While the physicist\nwithdraws from consideration the part of the observer in the\nverification of physical phenomena, our role is to renounce this\nabstraction, to re-establish things in their original complexity, and\nto ascertain in what the conception of matter consists when it is\nborne in mind that all material phenomena are known only in their\nrelation to ourselves, to our bodies, our nerves, and our\nintelligence.\n\nThis at once leads us to follow, in the exposition of the facts, an\norder which the physicist abandons. Since we seek to know what is the\nphysical phenomenon we perceive, we must first enunciate this\nproposition, which will govern the whole of our discussion: to wit--\n\n_Of the outer world we know nothing except our sensations._\n\nBefore demonstrating this proposition, let us develop it by an example\nwhich will at least give us some idea of its import. Let us take as\nexample one of those investigations in which, with the least possible\nrecourse to reasoning, the most perfected processes of observation are\nemployed, and in which one imagines that one is penetrating almost\ninto the very heart of nature. We are, let us suppose, dissecting an\nanimal. After killing it, we lay bare its viscera, examine their\ncolour, form, dimensions, and connections; then we dissect the organs\nin order to ascertain their internal nature, their texture, structure,\nand function; then, not content with ocular anatomy, we have recourse\nto the perfected processes of histology: we take a fragment of the\ntissues weighing a few milligrammes, we fix it, we mount it, we make\nit into strips of no more than a thousandth of a millimetre thick, we\ncolour it and place it under the microscope, we examine it with the\nmost powerful lenses, we sketch it, and we explain it. All this work\nof complicated and refined observation, sometimes lasting months and\nyears, results in a monograph containing minute descriptions of\norgans, of cells, and of intra-cellular structures, the whole\nrepresented and defined in words and pictures. Now, these descriptions\nand drawings are the display of the various sensations which the\nzoologist has experienced in the course of his labours; to those\nsensations are added the very numerous interpretations derived from\nthe memory, reasoning, and often, also, from the imagination on the\npart of the scholar, the last a source at once of errors and of\ndiscoveries. But everything properly experimental in the work of the\nzoologist proceeds from the sensations he has felt or might have felt,\nand in the particular case treated of, these sensations are almost\nsolely visual.\n\nThis observation might be repeated with regard to all objects of the\nouter world which enter into relation with us. Whether the knowledge\nof them be of the common-place or of a scientific order matters\nlittle. Sensation is its limit, and all objects are known to us by\nthe sensations they produce in us, and are known to us solely in this\nmanner. A landscape is nothing but a cluster of sensations. The\noutward form of a body is simply sensation; and the innermost and most\ndelicate material structure, the last visible elements of a cell, for\nexample, are all, in so far as we observe them with the microscope,\nnothing but sensation.\n\nThis being understood, the question is, why we have just\nadmitted--with the majority of authors--that we cannot really know a\nsingle object as it is in itself, and in its own nature, otherwise\nthan by the intermediary of the sensations it provokes in us? This\ncomes back to saying that we here require explanations on the two\nfollowing points: why do we admit that we do not really perceive the\nobjects, but only something intermediate between them and us; and why\ndo we call this something intermediate a sensation? On this second\npoint I will offer, for the time being, one simple remark: we use the\nterm sensation for lack of any other to express the intermediate\ncharacter of our perception of objects; and this use does not, on our\npart, imply any hypothesis. Especially do we leave completely in\nsuspense the question whether sensation is a material phenomenon or a\nstate of being of the mind. These are questions we will deal with\nlater. For the present it must be understood that the word sensation\nis simply a term for the something intermediate between the object and\nour faculty of cognition.[3] We have, therefore, simply to state why\nwe have admitted that the external perception of objects is produced\nmediately or by procuration.\n\nThere are a few philosophers, and those not of the lowest rank, who have\nthought that this intermediate character of all perception was so\nevident that there was no need to insist further upon it. John Stuart\nMill, who was certainly and perhaps more than anything a careful\nlogician, commences an exposition of the idealist thesis to which he was\nso much attached, by carelessly saying: \"It goes without saying that\nobjects are known to us through the intermediary of our senses.... The\nsenses are equivalent to our sensations;\"[4] and on those propositions\nhe rears his whole system, \"It goes without saying ...\" is a trifle\nthoughtless. I certainly think he was wrong in not testing more\ncarefully the solidity of his starting point.\n\nIn the first place, this limit set to our knowledge of the objects\nwhich stimulate our sensations is only accepted without difficulty by\nwell-informed persons; it much astonishes the uninstructed when first\nexplained to them. And this astonishment, although it may seem so, is\nnot a point that can be neglected, for it proves that, in the first\nand simple state of our knowledge, we believe we directly perceive\nobjects as they are. Now, if we, the cultured class, have, for the\nmost part,[5] abandoned this primitive belief, we have only done so on\ncertain implicit conditions, of which we must take cognisance. This is\nwhat I shall now demonstrate as clearly as I can.\n\nTake the case of an unlearned person. To prove to him that he knows\nsensations alone and not the bodies which excite them, a very striking\nargument may be employed which requires no subtle reasoning and which\nappeals to his observation. This is to inform him, supposing he is not\naware of the fact, that, every time he has the perception of an\nexterior object, there is something interposed between the object and\nhimself, and that that something is his nervous system.\n\nIf we were not acquainted with the existence of our nervous system, we\nshould unhesitatingly admit that our perception of objects consisted\nin some sort of motion towards the places in which they were fixed.\nNow, a number of experiments prove to us that objects are known to us\nas excitants of our nervous system which only act on this system by\nentering into communication, or coming into contact with, its terminal\nextremities. They then produce, in the interior of this system, a\npeculiar modification which we are not yet able to define. It is this\nmodification which follows the course of the nerves and is carried to\nthe central parts of the system. The speed of the propagation of this\nnerve modification has been measured by certain precise experiments in\npsychometry; the journey is made slowly, at the rate of 20 to 30\nmetres per second, and it is of interest that this rate of speed lets\nus know at what moment and, consequently, by what organic excitement,\nthe phenomenon of consciousness is produced. This happens when the\ncerebral centres are affected; the phenomenon of consciousness is\ntherefore posterior to the fact of the physical excitement.\n\nI believe it has required a long series of accepted observations for\nus to have arrived at this idea, now so natural in appearance, that\nthe modifications produced within our nervous system are the only\nstates of which we can have a direct consciousness; and as\nexperimental demonstration is always limited, there can be no absolute\ncertainty that things never happen otherwise, that we never go outside\nourselves, and that neither our consciousness nor our nervous influx\ncan exteriorise itself, shoot beyond our material organs, and travel\nafar in pursuit of objects in order to know or to modify them.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBefore going further, we must make our terminology more precise. We\nhave just seen the necessity of drawing a distinction between the\nsensations of which we are conscious and the unknown cause which\nproduces these sensations by acting on our nervous systems. This\nexciting cause I have several times termed, in order to be understood,\nthe external object. But under the name of external object are\ncurrently designated groups of sensations, such as those which make up\nfor us a chair, a tree, an animal, or any kind of body. I see a dog\npass in the street. I call this dog an external object; but, as this\ndog is formed, for me who am looking at it, of my sensations, and as\nthese sensations are states of my nervous centres, it happens that the\nterm external object has two meanings. Sometimes it designates our\nsensations; at another, the exciting cause of our sensations. To avoid\nall confusion we will call this exciting cause, which is unknown to\nus, the _X_ of matter.\n\nIt is, however, not entirely unknown, for we at least know two facts\nwith regard to it. We know, first, that this _X_ exists, and in the\nsecond place, that its image must not be sought in the sensations it\nexcites in us. How can we doubt, we say, that it exists? The same\nexternal observation proves to us at once that there exists an object\ndistinct from our nerves, and that our nerves separate us from it. I\ninsist on this point, for the reason that some authors, after having\nunreservedly admitted that our knowledge is confined to sensations,\nhave subsequently been hard put to it to demonstrate the reality of\nthe excitant distinct from the sensations.[6] Of this we need no\ndemonstration, and the testimony of our senses suffices. We have seen\nthe excitant, and it is like a friend who should pass before us in\ndisguise so well costumed and made up that we can attribute to his\nreal self nothing of what we see of him, but yet we know that it is\nhe.\n\nAnd, in fact, let us remember what it is that we have argued\nupon--viz. on an observation. I look at my hand, and I see an object\napproaching it which gives me a sensation of feeling. I at first say\nthat this object is an excitant. It is pointed out to me that I am in\nerror. This object, which appears to me outside my nervous system, is\ncomposed, I am told, of sensations. Be it so, I have the right to\nanswer; but if all that I perceive is sensation, my nervous system\nitself is a sensation; if it is only that, it is no longer an\nintermediary between the excitant and myself, and it is the fact that\nwe perceive things as they are. For it to be possible to prove that I\nperceive, not the object, but that _tertium quid_ which is sensation,\nit has to be admitted that the nervous system is a reality external to\nsensation and that objects which assume, in relation to it, the role\nof excitants and of which we perceive the existence, are likewise\nrealities external to sensation.\n\nThis is what is demonstrated by abstract reasoning, and this reasoning\nis further supported by a common-sense argument. The outer world\ncannot be summarised in a few nervous systems suspended like spiders\nin empty space. The existence of a nervous system implies that of a\nbody in which it is lodged. This body must have complicated organs;\nits limbs presuppose the soil on which the animal rests, its lungs the\nexistence of oxygen vivifying its blood, its digestive tube, aliments\nwhich it digests and assimilates to its substance, and so on. We may\nindeed admit that this outer world is not, in itself, exactly as we\nperceive it; but we are compelled to recognise that it exists by the\nsame right as the nervous system, in order to put it in its proper\nplace.\n\nThe second fact of observation is that the sensations we feel do not\ngive us the true image of the material _X_ which produces them. The\nmodification made in our substance by this force _X_ does not\nnecessarily resemble in its nature the nature of that force. This is\nan assertion opposed to our natural opinions, and must consequently be\ndemonstrated. It is generally proved by the experiments which reveal\nwhat is called \"the law of the specific energy of the nerves.\" This is\nan important law in physiology discovered by Mueller two centuries ago,\nand consequences of a philosophical order are attached to it. The\nfacts on which this law is based are these. It is observed that, if\nthe sensory nerves are agitated by an excitant which remains constant,\nthe sensations received by the patient differ according to the nerve\naffected. Thus, the terminals of an electric current applied to the\nball of the eye give the sensation of a small luminous spark; to the\nauditory apparatus, the current causes a crackling sound; to the hand,\nthe sensation of a shock; to the tongue, a metallic flavour.\nConversely, excitants wholly different, but affecting the same nerve,\ngive similar sensations; whether a ray of light is projected into the\neye, or the eyeball be excited by the pressure of a finger; whether an\nelectric current is directed into the eye, or, by a surgical\noperation, the optic nerve is severed by a bistoury, the effect is\nalways the same, in the sense that the patient always receives a\nsensation of light. To sum up, in addition to the natural excitant of\nour sensory nerves, there are two which can produce the same sensory\neffects, that is to say, the mechanical and the electrical excitants.\nWhence it has been concluded that the peculiar nature of the sensation\nfelt depends much less on the nature of the excitant producing it than\non that of the sensory organ which collects it, the nerve which\npropagates it, or the centre which receives it. It would perhaps be\ngoing a little too far to affirm that the external object has no kind\nof resemblance to the sensations it gives us. It is safer to say that\nwe are ignorant of the degree in which the two resemble or differ from\neach other.\n\nOn thinking it over, it will be found that this contains a very great\nmystery, for this power of distinction (_specificite_) of our nerves\nis not connected with any detail observable in their structure. It is\nvery probably the receiving centres which are specific. It is owing to\nthem and to their mechanism that we ought to feel, from the same\nexcitant, a sensation of sound or one of colour, that is to say,\nimpressions which appear, when compared, as the most different in the\nworld. Now, so far as we can make out, the histological structure of\nour auditory centre is the same as that of our visual centre. Both are\na collection of cells diverse in form, multipolar, and maintained by\na conjunctive pellicule (_stroma_). The structure of the fibres and\ncells varies slightly in the motor and sensory regions, but no means\nhave yet been discovered of perceiving a settled difference between\nthe nerve-cells of the optic centre and those of the auditory centre.\nThere should be a difference, as our mind demands it; but our eye\nfails to note it.\n\nLet us suppose, however, that to-morrow, or several centuries hence,\nan improved _technique_ should show us a material difference between\nthe visual and the auditory neurone. There is no absurdity in this\nsupposition; it is a possible discovery, since it is of the order of\nmaterial facts. Such a discovery, however, would lead us very far, for\nwhat terribly complicates this problem is that we cannot directly know\nthe structure of our nervous system. Though close to us, though, so to\nspeak, inside us, it is not known to us otherwise than is the object\nwe hold in our hands, the ground we tread, or the landscape which\nforms our horizon.\n\nFor us it is but a sensation, a real sensation when we observe it in\nthe dissection of an animal, or the autopsy of one of our own kind; an\nimaginary and transposed sensation, when we are studying anatomy by\nmeans of an anatomical chart; but still a sensation. It is by the\nintermediary of our nervous system that we have to perceive and\nimagine what a nervous system is like; consequently we are ignorant as\nto the modification impressed on our perceptions and imaginations by\nthis intermediary, the nature of which we are unable to grasp.\n\nTherefore, when we attempt to understand the inmost nature of the\nouter world, we stand before it as before absolute darkness. There\nprobably exists in nature, outside of ourselves, neither colour,\nodour, force, resistance, space, nor anything that we know as\nsensation. Light is produced by the excitement of the optic nerve, and\nit shines only in our brain; as to the excitement itself, there is\nnothing to prove that it is luminous; outside of us is profound\ndarkness, or even worse, since darkness is the correlation of light.\nIn the same way, all the sonorous excitements which assail us, the\ncreakings of machines, the sounds of nature, the words and cries of\nour fellows are produced by excitements of our acoustic nerve; it is\nin our brain that noise is produced, outside there reigns a dead\nsilence. The same may be said of all our other senses.\n\nNot one of our senses, absolutely none, is the revealer of external\nreality. From this point of view there is no higher and no lower\nsense. The sensations of sight, apparently so objective and so\nsearching, no more take us out of ourselves than do the sensations of\ntaste which are localised in the tongue.\n\nIn short, our nervous system, which enables us to communicate with\nobjects, prevents us, on the other hand, from knowing their nature. It\nis an organ of relation with the outer world; it is also, for us, a\ncause of isolation. We never go outside ourselves. We are walled in.\nAnd all we can say of matter and of the outer world is, that it is\nrevealed to us solely by the sensations it affords us, that it is the\nunknown cause of our sensations, the inaccessible excitant of our\norgans of the senses, and that the ideas we are able to form as to the\nnature and the properties of that excitant, are necessarily derived\nfrom our sensations, and are subjective to the same degree as those\nsensations themselves.\n\nBut we must make haste to add that this point of view is the one which\nis reached when we regard the relations of sensation with its unknown\ncause the great _X_ of matter.[7] Positive science and practical life\ndo not take for an objective this relation of sensation with the\nUnknowable; they leave this to metaphysics. They distribute themselves\nover the study of sensation and examine the reciprocal relations of\nsensations with sensations. Those last, condemned as misleading\nappearances when we seek in them the expression of the Unknowable,\nlose this illusory character when we consider them in their reciprocal\nrelations. Then they constitute for us reality, the whole of reality\nand the only object of human knowledge. The world is but an assembly\nof present, past, and possible sensations; the affair of science is to\nanalyse and co-ordinate them by separating their accidental from their\nconstant relations.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 3: _Connaissance._--The word cognition is used throughout as\nthe English equivalent of this, except in places where the context\nshows that it means acquaintance merely.--ED.]\n\n[Footnote 4: J. S. MILL, _An Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's\nPhilosophy_, pp. 5 and 6. London. 1865.]\n\n[Footnote 5: A few subtle philosophers have returned to it, as I shall\nshow later in chapter iv.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Thus, the perplexity in which John Stuart Mill finds\nhimself is very curious. Having admitted unreservedly that our\nknowledge is confined to sensations, he is powerless to set up a\nreality outside this, and acknowledges that the principle of causality\ncannot legitimately be used to prove that our sensations have a cause\nwhich is not a sensation, because this principle cannot be applied\noutside the world of phenomena.]\n\n[Footnote 7: See p. 18, _sup_.--ED.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE MECHANICAL THEORIES OF MATTER ARE ONLY SYMBOLS\n\n\nIf we keep firmly in mind the preceding conclusion--a conclusion which\nis neither exclusively my own, nor very new--we shall find a certain\nsatisfaction in watching the discussions of physicists on the essence\nof matter, on the nature of force and of energy, and on the relations\nof ponderable and imponderable matter. We all know how hot is the\nfight raging on this question. At the present time it is increasing in\nintensity, in consequence of the disturbance imported into existing\ntheories by the new discoveries of radio-activity.[8] We psychologists\ncan look on very calmly at these discussions, with that selfish\npleasure we unavowedly feel when we see people fighting while\nourselves safe from knocks. We have, in fact, the feeling that, come\nwhat may from the discussions on the essence of matter, there can be\nno going beyond the truth that matter is an excitant of our nervous\nsystem, and is only known in connection with, the perception we have\nof this last.\n\nIf we open a work on physics or physiology we shall note with\nastonishment how the above considerations are misunderstood. Observers\nof nature who seek, and rightly, to give the maximum of exactness to\ntheir observations, show that they are obsessed by one constant\nprejudice: they mistrust sensation.\n\nA great part of their efforts consists, by what they say, in reducing\nthe role of sensation to its fitting part in science; and the\ninvention of mechanical aids to observation is constantly held up as a\nmeans of remedying the imperfection of our senses. In physics the\nthermometer replaces the sensation of heat that our skin--our hand,\nfor example--experiences by the measurable elevation of a column of\nmercury, and the scale-pan of a precise balance takes the place of the\nvague sensation of trifling weights; in physiology a registering\napparatus replaces the sensation of the pulse which the doctor feels\nwith the end of his forefinger by a line on paper traced with\nindelible ink, of which the duration and the intensity, as well as the\nvaried combinations of these two elements, can be measured line by\nline.\n\nLearned men who pride themselves on their philosophical attainments\nvaunt in very eloquent words the superiority of the physical\ninstrument over mere sensation. Evidently, however, the earnestness of\nthis eulogy leads them astray. The most perfect registering apparatus\nmust, in the long-run, after its most scientific operations, address\nitself to our senses and produce in us some small sensation. The\nreading of the height reached by the column of mercury in a\nthermometer when heated is accomplished by a visual sensation, and it\nis by the sight that the movements of the balance are controlled; and\nthat the traces of the sphygmograph are analysed. We may readily admit\nto physicists and physiologists all the advantages of these apparatus.\nThis is not the question. It simply proves that there are sensations\nand sensations, and that certain of these are better and more precise\nthan others. The visual sensation of relation in space seems to be\n_par excellence_ the scientific sensation which it is sought to\nsubstitute for all the rest. But, after all, it is but a sensation.\n\nLet us recognise that there is, in all this contempt on the part of\nphysicists for sensation, only differences in language, and that a\nparaphrase would suffice to correct them without leaving any trace. Be\nit so. But something graver remains. When one is convinced that our\nknowledge of the outer world is limited to sensations, we can no\nlonger understand how it is possible to give oneself up, as physicists\ndo, to speculations upon the constitution of matter.\n\nUp to the present there have been three principal ways of explaining\nthe physical phenomena of the universe. The first, the most abstract,\nand the furthest from reality, is above all verbal. It consists in the\nuse of formulas in which the quality of the phenomena is replaced by\ntheir magnitude, in which this magnitude, ascertained by the most\nprecise processes of measurement, becomes the object of abstract\nreasoning which allows its modifications to be foreseen under given\nexperimental conditions. This is pure mathematics, a formal science\ndepending upon logic. Another conception, less restricted than the\nabove, and of fairly recent date, consists in treating all\nmanifestations of nature as forms of energy. This term \"energy\" has a\nvery vague content. At the most it expresses but two things: first, it\nis based on a faint recollection of muscular force, and it reminds one\ndimly of the sensation experienced when clenching the fists; and,\nsecondly, it betrays a kind of very natural respect for the forces of\nnature which, in all the images man has made of them, constantly\nappear superior to his own. We may say \"the energy of nature;\" but we\nshould never say, what would be experimentally correct; \"the weakness\nof nature.\" The word \"weakness\" we reserve for ourselves. Apart from\nthese undecided suggestions, the term energy is quite the proper term\nto designate phenomena, the intimate nature of which we do not seek to\npenetrate, but of which we only wish to ascertain the laws and measure\nthe degrees.\n\nA third conception, more imaginative and bolder than the others, is\nthe mechanical or kinetic theory. This last absolutely desires that we\nshould represent to ourselves, that we should imagine, how phenomena\nreally take place; and in seeking for the property of nature the most\nclearly perceived, the easiest to define and analyse, and the most apt\nto lend itself to measurement and calculation, it has chosen motion.\nConsequently all the properties of matter have been reduced to this\none, and in spite of the apparent contradiction of our senses, it has\nbeen supposed that the most varied phenomena are produced, in the last\nresort, by the displacement of material particles. Thus, sound, light,\nheat, electricity, and even the nervous influx would be due to\nvibratory movements, varying only by their direction and their\nperiods, and all nature is thus explained as a problem of animated\ngeometry. This last theory, which has proved very fertile in\nexplanations of the most delicate phenomena of sound and light, has so\nstrongly impressed many minds that it has led them to declare that\nthe explanation of phenomena by the laws of mechanics alone has the\ncharacter of a scientific explanation. Even recently, it seemed heresy\nto combat these ideas.\n\nStill more recently, however, a revulsion of opinion has taken place.\nAgainst the physicists, the mathematicians in particular have risen\nup, and taking their stand on science, have demonstrated that all the\nmechanisms invented have crowds of defects. First, in each particular\ncase, there is such a complication that that which is defined is much\nmore simple than the definition; then there is such a want of unity\nthat quite special mechanisms adapted to each phenomenal detail have\nto be imagined; and, lastly--most serious argument of all--so much\ncomprehensiveness and suppleness is employed, that no experimental law\nis found which cannot be understood mechanically, and no fact of\nobservation which shows an error in the mechanical explanation--a sure\nproof that this mode of explanation has no meaning.\n\nMy way of combating the mechanical theory starts from a totally\ndifferent point of view. Psychology has every right to say a few words\nhere, as upon the value of every kind of scientific theory; for it is\nacquainted with the nature of the mental needs of which these theories\nare the expression and which these theories seek to satisfy. It has\nnot yet been sufficiently noticed that psychology does not allow\nitself to be confined, like physics or sociology, within the logical\ntable of human knowledge, for it has, by a unique privilege, a right\nof supervision over the other sciences. We shall see that the\npsychological discussion of mechanics has a wider range than that of\nthe mathematicians.\n\nSince our cognition cannot go beyond sensation, shall we first recall\nwhat meaning can be given to an explanation of the inmost nature of\nmatter? It can only be an artifice, a symbol, or a process convenient\nfor classification in order to combine the very different qualities of\nthings in one unifying synthesis--a process having nearly the same\ntheoretical value as a _memoria technica_, which, by substituting\nletters for figures, helps us to retain the latter in our minds. This\ndoes not mean that figures are, in fact, letters, but it is a\nconventional substitution which has a practical advantage. What\n_memoria technica_ is to the ordinary memory, the theory of mechanics\nshould be for our needed unification.\n\nUnfortunately, this is not so. The excuse we are trying to make for\nthe mechanicians is illusory. There is no mistaking their ambition,\nNotwithstanding the prudence of some and the equivocations in which\nothers have rejoiced, they have drawn their definition in the absolute\nand not in the relative. To take their conceptions literally, they\nhave thought the movement of matter to be something existing outside\nour eye, our hands, and our sense; in a word, something _noumenal_, as\nKant would have said. The proof that this is their real idea, is that\nmovement is presented to us as the true outer and explanatory cause of\nour sensations, the external excitement to our nerves. The most\nelementary works on physics are impregnated with this disconcerting\nconception. If we open a description of acoustics, we read that sound\nand noise are subjective states which have no reality outside our\nauditory apparatus; that they are sensations produced by an external\ncause, which is the vibratory movement of sonorous bodies--whence the\nconclusion that this vibratory movement is not itself a sensation. Or,\nshall we take another proof, still more convincing. This is the\nvibratory and silent movement which is invoked by physicists to\nexplain the peculiarities of subjective sensation; so that the\ninterferences, the pulsations of sound, and, in fine, the whole\nphysiology of the ear, is treated as a problem in kinematics, and is\nexplained by the composition of movements.\n\nWhat kind of reality do physicists then allow to the displacements of\nmatter? Where do they place them, since they recognise otherwise that\nthe essence of matter is unknown to us? Are we to suppose that,\noutside the world of _noumena_, outside the world of phenomena and\nsensations, there exists a third world, an intermediary between the\ntwo former, the world of atoms and that of mechanics?\n\nA short examination will, moreover, suffice to show of what this\nmechanical model is formed which is presented to us as constituting\nthe essence of matter. This can be nothing else than the sensations,\nsince we are incapable of perceiving or imagining anything else. It is\nthe sensations of sight, of touch, and even of the muscular sense.\nMotion is a fact seen by the eye, felt by the hand; it enters into us\nby the perception we have of the solid masses visible to the naked eye\nwhich exist in our field of observation, of their movements and their\nequilibrium and the displacement we ourselves effect with our bodies.\nHere is the sensory origin, very humble and very gross, of all the\nmechanics of the atoms. Here is the stuff of which our lofty\nconception is formed. Our mind can, it is true, by a work of\npurification, strip movement of most of its concrete qualities,\nseparate it even from the perception of the object in motion, and make\nof it a something or other ideal and diagrammatic; but there will\nstill remain a residuum of visual, tactile, and muscular sensations,\nand consequently it is still nothing else than a subjective state,\nbound to the structure of our organs. We are, for the rest, so\nwrapped up in sensations that none of our boldest conceptions can\nbreak through the circle.\n\nBut it is not the notion of movement alone which proceeds from\nsensation. There is also that of exteriority, of space, of position,\nand, by opposition, that of external or psychological events. Without\ndeclaring it to be certain, I will remind you that it is infinitely\nprobable that these notions are derived from our muscular experience.\nFree motion, arrested motion, the effort, the speed, and the direction\nof motion, such are the sensorial elements, which, in all probability,\nconstitute the foundation of our ideas on space and its properties.\nAnd those are so many subjective notions which we have no right to\ntreat as objects belonging to the outer world.\n\nWhat is more remarkable, also, is that even the ideas of object, of\nbody, and of matter, are derived from visual and tactile sensations\nwhich have been illegitimately set up as entities. We have come, in\nfact, to consider matter as a being separate from sensations, superior\nto our sensations, distinct from the properties which enable us to\nknow it, and binding together these properties, as it were, in a\nsheaf. Here again is a conception at the base of visualisation and\nmuscularisation; it consists in referring to the visual and other\nsensations, raised for the occasion to the dignity of external and\npermanent causes, the other sensations which are considered as the\neffects of the first named upon our organs of sense.\n\nIt demands a great effort to clear our minds of these familiar\nconceptions which, it is plain are nothing but naive realism. Yes! the\nmechanical conception of the universe is nothing but naive realism.\n\nTo recapitulate our idea, and, to make it more plain by an\nillustration, here is a tuning-fork on the table before me. With a\nvigorous stroke of the bow I set it vibrating. The two prongs\nseparate, oscillate rapidly, and a sound of a certain tone is heard. I\nconnect this tuning-fork, by means of electric wires, with a Deprez\nrecording apparatus which records the vibrations on the blackened\nsurface of a revolving cylinder; and we can thus, by an examination of\nthe trace made under our eyes, ascertain all the details of the\nmovement which animates it. We see, parallel to each other, two\ndifferent orders of phenomena; the visual phenomena which show us that\nthe tuning-fork is vibrating, and the auditory phenomena which convey\nto us the fact that it is making a sound.\n\nThe physicist, asked for an explanation of all this, will answer: \"It\nis the vibration of the tuning-fork which, transmitted by the air, is\ncarried to our auditory apparatus, causes a vibration in the\ntympanum, the movements of which are communicated to the small bones\nof the middle ear, thence (abridging details) to the terminations of\nthe auditory nerve, and so produces in us the subjective sensation of\nsound.\" Well, in so saying, the physicist commits an error of\ninterpretation; outside our ears there exists something we do not know\nwhich excites them; this something cannot be the vibratory movement of\nthe tuning-fork, for this vibratory movement which we can see is\nlikewise a subjective sensation; it no more exists outside our sight\nthan sound exists outside our ears. In any case, it is as absurd to\nexplain a sensation of sound by one of sight, as a sensation of sight\nby one of sound.\n\nOne would be neither further from nor nearer to the truth if we\nanswered that physicist as follows: \"You give the preponderance to\nyour eye; I myself give it to my ear. This tuning-fork appears to you\nto vibrate. Wrong! This is how the thing occurs. This tuning-fork\nproduces a sound which, by exciting our retina, gives us a sense of\nmovement. This visual sensation of vibration is a purely subjective\none, the external cause of the phenomenon is the sound. The outer\nworld is a concert of sounds which rises in the immensity of space.\nMatter is noise and nothingness is silence.\"\n\nThis theory of the above experiment is not absurd; but, as a matter\nof fact, it is probable that no one would or could accept it, except\nverbally for amusement, as a challenge, or for the pleasure of talking\nmetaphysics. The reason is that all our evolution, for causes which\nwould take too long to detail, has established the hegemony of certain\nof our senses over the others. We have, above all, become visual and\nmanual beings. It is the eye and the hand which give us the\nperceptions of the outer world of which we almost exclusively make use\nin our sciences; and we are now almost incapable of representing to\nourselves the foundation of phenomena otherwise than by means of these\norgans. Thus all the preceding experiment from the stroke of the bow\nto the final noise presents itself to us in visual terms, and further,\nthese terms are not confined to a series of detached sensations.\n\nVisual sensation combines with the tactile and muscular sensations,\nand forms sensorial constructions which succeed each, other, continue,\nand arrange themselves logically: in lieu of sensations, there are\nobjects and relations of space between these objects, and the actions\nwhich connect them, and the phenomena which pass from one to the\nother. All that is only sensation, if you will; but merely as the\nagglutinated molecules of cement and of stone are a palace.\n\nThus the whole series of visual events which compose our experiment\nwith the tuning-fork can be coherently explained. One understands that\nIt is the movement of my hand equipped with the bow which is\ncommunicated to the tuning-fork. One understands that this movement\npassing into the fork has changed its form and rhythm, that the waves\nproduced by the fork transmit themselves, by the oscillations of the\nair-molecules, to our tympanum, and so on. There is in all this series\nof experiments an admirable continuity which fully satisfies our\nminds. However much we might be convinced by the theoretical reasons\ngiven above, that we have quite as much right to represent the same\nseries of events in an auditory form, we should be incapable of\nrealising that form to ourselves.\n\nWhat would be the structure of the ear to any one who only knew it\nthrough the sense of hearing? What would become of the tympanum, the\nsmall bones, the cochlea, and the terminations of the acoustic nerve,\nif it were only permitted to represent them in the language of sound?\nIt is very difficult to imagine.\n\nSince, however, we are theorising, let us not be stopped by a few\ndifficulties of comprehension. Perhaps a little training might enable\nus to overcome them. Perhaps musicians, who discern as much reality in\nwhat one hears as in what one sees, would be more apt than other folk\nto understand the necessary transposition. Some of them, in their\nautobiographies, have made, by the way, very suggestive remarks on the\nimportance they attribute to sound: and, moreover, the musical world,\nwith its notes, its intervals, and its orchestration, lives and\ndevelops in a manner totally independent of vibration.\n\nPerhaps we can here quote one or two examples which may give us a\nlead. To measure the length of a body instead of applying to it a\nyard-wand, one might listen to its sound; for the pitch of the sound\ngiven by two cords allows us to deduce their difference of length, and\neven the absolute length of each. The chemical composition of a body\nmight be noted by its electric resistance and the latter verified by\nthe telephone; that is to say, by the ear. Or, to take a more subtle\nexample. We might make calculations with sounds of which we have\nstudied the harmonic relations as we do nowadays with figures. A sum\nin rule of three might even be solved sonorously; for, given three\nsounds, the ear can find a fourth which should have the same relation\nto the third as the second to the first. Every musical ear performs\nthis operation easily; now, this fourth sound, what else is it but the\nfourth term in a rule of three? And by taking into consideration the\nnumber of its vibrations a numerical solution would be found to the\nproblem. This novel form of calculating machine might serve to fix\nthe price of woollen stuffs, to calculate brokerages and percentages,\nand the solution would be obtained without the aid of figures, without\ncalculation, without visualisation, and by the ear alone.\n\nBy following up this idea, also, we might go a little further. We\nmight arrive at the conviction that our present science is human,\npetty, and contingent; that it is closely linked with the structure of\nour sensory organs; that this structure results from the evolution\nwhich fashioned these organs; that this evolution has been an accident\nof history; that in the future it may be different; and that,\nconsequently, by the side or in the stead of our modern science, the\nwork of our eyes and hands--and also of our words--there might have\nbeen constituted, there may still be constituted, sciences entirely\nand extraordinarily new--auditory, olfactory, and gustatory sciences,\nand even others derived from other kinds of sensations which we can\nneither foresee nor conceive because they are not, for the moment,\ndifferentiated in us. Outside the matter we know, a very special\nmatter fashioned of vision and touch, there may exist other matter\nwith totally different properties.\n\nBut let us bring our dream to an end. The interest of our discussion\ndoes not lie in the hypothetical substitution of hearing or any other\nsense for sight. It lies in the complete suppression of all\nexplanation of the noumenal object in terms borrowed from the language\nof sensation. And that is our last word. We must, by setting aside the\nmechanical theory, free ourselves from a too narrow conception of the\nconstitution of matter. And this liberation will be to us a great\nadvantage which we shall soon reap. We shall avoid the error of\nbelieving that mechanics is the only real thing and that all that\ncannot be explained by mechanics must be incomprehensible. We shall\nthen gain more liberty of mind for understanding what the union of the\nsoul with the body[9] may be.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 8: I would draw attention to a recent volume by GUSTAVE LE\nBON, on _Evolution de la Matiere_, a work full of original and bold\nideas.]\n\n[Footnote 9: See [Note 1] on p. 3.--ED.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nANSWERS TO SOME OBJECTIONS, AND SUMMARY\n\n\nI have set forth the foregoing ideas by taking the road which to me\nseemed the best. On reflection it has occurred to me that my manner of\nexposition and demonstration may be criticised much more than my\nconclusion. Now, as it is the conclusion alone which here is of\nimportance, it is expedient not to make it responsible for the\narguments by which I have supported it.\n\nThese arguments resolve themselves into the attestation that between\nobjects and our consciousness there exists an intermediary, our\nnervous system. We have even established that the existence of this\nintermediary is directly proved by observation, and from this I have\nconcluded that we do not directly perceive the object itself but a\n_tertium quid_, which is our sensations.\n\nSeveral objections to this might be made. Let us enumerate them.\n\n1. It is not inconceivable that objects may act directly on our\nconsciousness without taking the intermediary of our nervous system.\nSome authors, the spiritualists notably, believe in the possibility\nof disembodied souls, and they admit by implication that these souls\nremain in communication with the terrestrial world, witness our\nactions, and hear our speech. Since they no longer have organs of\nsense, we must suppose that these wandering souls, if they exist, can\ndirectly perceive material objects. It is evident that such hypotheses\nhave, up till now, nothing scientific in them, and that the\ndemonstrations of them which are given raise a feeling of scepticism\nmore than anything else. Nevertheless, we have not the right to\nexclude, by _a priori_ argument, the possibility of this category of\nphenomena.\n\n2. Several German authors have maintained in recent years, that if the\nnervous system intervenes in the perception of external objects, it is\na faithful intermediary which should not work any change on those\nphysical actions which it gathers from outside to transmit to our\nconsciousness. From this, point of view colour would exist as colour,\noutside our eyes, sound would exist as sound, and in a general way\nthere would not be, in matter, any mysterious property left, since we\nshould perceive matter as it is. This is a very unexpected\ninterpretation, by which men of science have come to acknowledge the\ncorrectness of the common belief: they rehabilitate an opinion which\nphilosophers have till now turned to ridicule, under the name of\nnaive realism. All which proves that the naivete of some may be the\nexcessive refinement of others.\n\nTo establish scientifically this opinion they batter down the theory\nof the specific energy of the nerves. I have recalled in a previous\npage[10] of what this theory consists. I have shown that if, by\nmechanical or electrical means, our different sensory nerves are\nexcited, notwithstanding the identity of the excitant, a different\nsensation is provoked in each case--light when the optic nerve is\nstimulated, sound when the acoustic, and so on. It is now answered to\nthis argument based on fact that the nature of these excitants must be\ncomplex. It is not impossible, it is thought, that the electric force\ncontains within itself both luminous and sonorous actions; it is not\nimpossible that a mechanical excitement should change the electric\nstate of the nerve affected, and that, consequently, these subsidiary\neffects explain how one and the same agent may, according to the\nnerves employed, produce different effects.\n\n3. After the spiritualists and the experimentalists, let us take the\nmetaphysicians. Among them one has always met with the most varying\nspecimens of opinions and with arguments for and against all possible\ntheories.\n\nThus it is, for example, with the external perception. Some have\nsupposed it indirect, others, on the contrary, that it acts directly\non the object. Those who uphold the direct theory are inspired by\nBerkeley, who asserts that the sensitive qualities of the body have no\nexistence but in our own minds, and consist really in representative\nideas. This doctrine is expressly based on this argument--that thought\ndiffers too much in nature from matter for one to be able to suppose\nany link between these two substances. In this particular, some\nauthors often make an assertion without endeavouring to prove it. They\nare satisfied with attesting, or even with supposing, that mind can\nhave no consciousness of anything but its own states. Other\nphilosophers, as I have said, maintain that \"things which have a real\nexistence are the very things we perceive.\" It is Thomas Reid who has\nupheld, in some passages of his writings at all events, the theory of\ninstantaneous perception, or intuition. It has also been defended by\nHamilton in a more explicit manner.[11] It has been taken up again in\nrecent years, by a profound and subtle philosopher, M. Bergson, who,\nunable to admit that the nervous system is a _substratum of knowledge_\nand serves us as a percipient, takes it to be solely a motor organ,\nand urges that the sensory parts of the system--that is to say, the\ncentripetal, optic, acoustic, &c, nerves--do not call forth, when\nexcited, any kind of sensation, their sole purpose being to convey\ndisturbances from periphery to periphery, or, say, from external\nobjects to the muscles of the body. This hypothesis, surely a little\ndifficult to comprehend, places, if I mistake not, the mind, as a\npower of perception and representation, within the interval comprised\nbetween the external object and the body, so that the mind is in\ndirect contact with external objects and knows them as they are.\n\nIt will be noticed that these three interpretations, the\nspiritualistic, the experimental, and the metaphysical, are in formal\nopposition with that which I have set forth earlier in these pages.\nThey deny the supposition that the nervous system serves us as an\nintermediary with nature, and that it transforms nature before\nbringing it to our consciousness. And it might seem that by\ncontradicting my fundamental proposition, those three new hypotheses\nmust lead to a totally different conclusion.\n\nNow, this is not so at all. The conclusion I have enunciated remains\nentirely sound, notwithstanding this change in the starting point, and\nfor the following reason. It is easy to see that we cannot represent\nto ourselves the inner structure of matter by using all our sensations\nwithout distinction, because it is impossible to bring all these\nsensations within one single and identical synthetic construction: for\nthis they are too dissimilar. Thus, we should try in vain to unite in\nany kind of scheme a movement of molecules and an odour; these\nelements are so heterogeneous that there is no way of joining them\ntogether and combining them.\n\nThe physicists have more or less consciously perceived this, and, not\nbeing able to overcome by a frontal attack the difficulty created by\nthe heterogeneity of our sensations, they have turned its flank. The\ningenious artifice they have devised consists in retaining only some\nof these sensations, and in rejecting the remainder; the first being\nconsidered as really representing the essence of matter, and the\nlatter as the effects of the former on our organs of sense; the first\nbeing reputed to be true, we may say, and the second being reputed\nfalse--that is subjective, that is not representing the _X_ of\nmatter.[12] I have refuted this argument by showing that all our\nsensations without exception are subjective and equally false in\nregard to the _X_ of matter, and that no one of them, consequently,\nhas any claim to explain the others.\n\nNow, by a new interpretation; we are taught that all sensations are\nequally true, and that all faithfully represent the great _X._ If they\nbe all equally true, it is absolutely the same as if they were all\nfalse; no one sensation can have any privilege over the others, none\ncan be truer than the others, none can be capable of explaining the\nothers, none can usurp to itself the sole right of representing the\nessence of matter; and we thus find ourselves, in this case, as in the\npreceding, in presence of the insurmountable difficulty of creating a\nsynthesis with heterogeneous elements.\n\nAll that has been said above is summed up in the following points:--\n\n1. Of the external world, we only know our sensations. All the\nphysical properties of matter resolve themselves for us into\nsensations, present, past, or possible. We may not say that it is by\nthe intermediary, by the means of sensation, that we know these\nproperties, for that would mean that the properties are distinct from\nthe sensations. Objects are to us in reality only aggregates of\nsensations.\n\n2. The sensations belong to the different organs of the senses--sight,\nhearing, touch, the muscular sense, &c. Whatever be the sense\naffected, one sensation has the same rights as the others, from the\npoint of view of the cognition of external objects. It is impossible\nto distinguish them into subjective and objective, by giving to this\ndistinction the meaning that certain sensations represent objects as\nthey are, while certain others simply represent our manner of feeling.\nThis is an illegitimate distinction, since all sensations have the\nsame physiological condition, the excitement of a sensory nerve, and\nresult from the properties of this nerve when stimulated.\n\n3. Consequently, it is impossible for us to form a conception of\nmatter in terms of movement, and to explain by the modalities of\nmovement the properties of bodies; for this theory amounts to giving\nto certain sensations, especially those of the muscular sense, the\nhegemony over the others. We cannot explain, we have not the right to\nexplain, one sensation by another, and the mechanical theory of matter\nhas simply the value of a symbol.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 10: See p. 22, _sup._--ED.]\n\n[Footnote 11: See J. S. MILL'S _Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's\nPhilosophy_, chap. x. p. 176, _et. seq._]\n\n[Footnote 12: See p. 18, _sup._--ED.]\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II\n\nTHE DEFINITION OF MIND\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COGNITION[13] AND ITS OBJECT\n\n\nAfter having thus studied matter and reduced it to sensations, we\nshall apply the same method of analysis to mind, and inquire whether\nmind possesses any characteristic which allows it to be distinguished\nfrom matter.\n\nBefore going any further, let me clear up an ambiguity. All the first\npart of this work has been devoted to the study of what is known to us\nin and by sensation; and I have taken upon myself, without advancing\nany kind of justifying reason, to call that which is known to us, by\nthis method, by the name of matter, thus losing sight of the fact that\nmatter only exists by contra-distinction and opposition to mind, and\nthat if mind did not exist, neither would matter. I have thus appeared\nto prejudge the question to be resolved.\n\nThe whole of this terminology must now be considered as having simply\na conventional value, and must be set aside for the present. These\nare the precise terms in which this question presents itself to my\nmind. A part of the knowable consists in sensations. We must,\ntherefore, without troubling to style this aggregate of sensations\n_matter_ rather than _mind_, make an analysis of the phenomena known\nby the name of mind, and see whether they differ from the preceding\nones. Let us, therefore, make an inventory of mind. By the process of\nenumeration, we find quoted as psychological phenomena, the\nsensations, the perceptions, the ideas, the recollections, the\nreasonings, the emotions, the desires, the imaginations, and the acts\nof attention and of will. These appear to be, at the first glance, the\nelements of mind; but, on reflection, one perceives that these\nelements belong to two distinct categories, of which it is easy to\nrecognise the duality, although, in fact and in reality, these two\nelements are constantly combined. The first of these elements may\nreceive the generic name of objects of cognition, or objects known,\nand the second that of acts of cognition.\n\nHere are a few examples of concrete facts, which only require a rapid\nanalysis to make their double nature plain. In a sensation which we\nfeel are two things: a particular state, or an object which one knows,\nand the act of knowing it, of feeling it, of taking cognisance of it;\nin other words, every sensation comprises an impression and a\ncognition. In a recollection there is, in like manner, a certain image\nof the past and the fact consisting in the taking cognisance of this\nimage. It is, in other terms, the distinction between the intelligence\nand the object. Similarly, all reasoning has an object; there must be\nmatter on which to reason, whether this matter be supplied by the\nfacts or the ideas. Again, a desire, a volition, an act of reflection,\nhas need of a point of application. One does not will in the air, one\nwills something; one does not reflect in the void, one reflects over a\nfact or over some difficulty.\n\nWe may then provisionally distinguish in an inventory of the mind a\nsomething which is perceived, understood, desired, or willed, and,\nbeyond that, the fact of perceiving, of understanding, or desiring, or\nof willing.\n\nTo illustrate this distinction by an example, I shall say that an\nanalogous separation can be effected in an act of vision, by showing\nthat the act of vision, which is a concrete operation, comprises two\ndistinct elements: the object seen and the eye which sees. But this\nis, of course, only a rough comparison, of which we shall soon see the\nimperfections when we are further advanced in the study of the\nquestion.\n\nTo this activity which exists and manifests itself in the facts of\nfeeling, perceiving, &c., we can give a name in order to identify and\nrecognise it: we will call it the consciousness[14] (_la conscience_),\nand we will call object everything which is not the act of\nconsciousness.\n\nAfter this preliminary distinction, to which we shall often refer, we\nwill go over the principal manifestations of the mind, and we will\nfirst study the objects of cognition, reserving for another chapter\nthe study of the acts of cognition--that is to say, of consciousness.\nWe will thus examine successively sensation, idea, emotion, and will.\n\nIt has been often maintained that the peculiar property of mind is to\nperceive sensations. It has also been said that thought--that is, the\nproperty of representing to one's self that which does not\nexist--distinguishes mind from matter. Lastly, it has not failed to be\naffirmed that one thing which the mind brings into the material world\nis its power of emotion; and moralists, choosing somewhat arbitrarily\namong certain emotions, have said that the mind is the creator of\ngoodness. We will endeavour to analyse these different affirmations.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 13: See [Note 3], _sup._ on p. 15.--ED.]\n\n[Footnote 14: The word \"_conscience_\" is one of those which has been\nused in the greatest number of different meanings. Let it be, at\nleast, understood that _I_ use it here in an intellectual and not a\nmoral sense. I do not attach to the conscience the idea of a moral\napprobation or disapprobation, of a duty, of a remorse. The best\nexample to illustrate conscience has, perhaps, been formed by LADD. It\nis the contrast between a person awake and sleeping a dreamless sleep.\nThe first has consciousness of a number of things; the latter has\nconsciousness of nothing. Let me now add that we distinguish from\nconsciousness that multitude of things of which one has consciousness\nof. Of these we make the object of consciousness. [_Conscience_ has\nthroughout been rendered \"consciousness.\"--ED.]]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nDEFINITION OF SENSATION\n\n\nWhen making the analysis of matter we impliedly admitted two\npropositions: first, that sensation is the _tertium quid_ which is\ninterposed between the excitant of our sensory nerves and ourselves;\nsecondly, that the aggregate of our sensations is all we can know of\nthe outer world, so that it is correct to define this last as the\ncollection of our present, past, and possible sensations. It is not\nclaimed that the outer world is nothing else than this, but it is\nclaimed with good reason that the outer world is nothing else _to us_.\n\nIt would be possible to draw from the above considerations a clear\ndefinition of sensation, and especially it would be possible to decide\nhenceforth from the foregoing whether sensation is a physical or a\nmental phenomenon, and whether it belongs to matter or to mind. This\nis the important point, the one which we now state, and which we will\nendeavour to resolve. To make the question clearer, we will begin it\nafresh, as if it were new, and as if the facts hitherto analysed did\nnot already prejudge the solution. Let us begin by giving a definition\nof sensation from the point of view of experimental psychology.\n\nSensation, then, is the phenomenon which is produced and which one\nexperiences when an excitant has just acted on one of our organs of\nsense. This phenomenon is therefore composed of two parts: an action\nexercised from outside by some body or other on our nervous substance;\nand, then, the fact of feeling this action.\n\nThis fact of feeling, this state of consciousness, is necessary to\nconstitute sensation; when it does not exist, it is preferable to give\nthe phenomenon another name, otherwise the fault is committed of\nmixing up separate facts. Physiologists have, on this point, some\nfaults of terminology with which to reproach themselves: for they have\nemployed the word sensibility with too little of the critical spirit.\nSensibility, being capacity for sensation, presupposes, like sensation\nitself, consciousness. It has, therefore, been wrong, in physiology,\nto speak of the sensibility of the tissues and organs, which, like the\nvegetable tissues or the animal organs of vegetative life, properly\nspeaking, feel nothing, but react by rapid or slow movements to the\nexcitements they are made to receive. Reaction, by a movement or any\nkind of modification, to an excitement, does not constitute a\nsensation unless consciousness is joined with it, and, consequently,\nit would be wiser to give unfelt excitements and reactions the name of\nexcitability.\n\nThe clearest examples of sensation are furnished by the study of man,\nand are taken from cases where we perceive an external object. The\nobject produces upon us an action, and this action is felt; only, in\nsuch cases, the fact of sensation comprises but a very small part of\nthe event. It only corresponds, by definition, to the actual action of\nthe object. Analysis after analysis has shown that we constantly\nperceive far beyond this actual action of objects. Our mind, as we\nsay, outruns our senses. To our sensations, images come to attach\nthemselves which result from sensations anteriorly felt in analogous\ncircumstances. These images produce in us an illusion, and we take\nthem for sensations, so that we think we perceive something which is\nbut a remembrance or an idea; the reason being that our mind cannot\nremain in action in the presence of a sensation, but unceasingly\nlabours to throw light upon it, to sound it, and to arrive at its\nmeaning, and consequently alters it by adding to it. This addition is\nso constant, so unavoidable, that the existence of an isolated\nsensation which should be perceived without the attachment of images,\nwithout modification or interpretation, is well-nigh unrealisable in\nthe consciousness of an adult. It is a myth.\n\nLet us, however, imagine this isolation to be possible, and that we\nhave before us a sensation free from any other element. What is this\nsensation? Does it belong to the domain of physical or of moral\nthings? Is it a state of matter or of mind?\n\nI can neither doubt nor dispute that sensation is, in part, a\npsychological phenomenon, since I have admitted, by the very\ndefinition I have given of it, that sensation implies consciousness.\nWe must, therefore, acknowledge those who define it as _a state of\nconsciousness_ to be right, but it would be more correct to call it\nthe _consciousness of a state_, and it is with regard to the nature of\nthis state that the question presents itself. It is only this state\nwhich we will now take into consideration. It is understood that\nsensation contains both an impression and a cognition. Let us leave\ntill later the study of the act of cognition, and deal with the\nimpression. Is this impression now of a physical or a mental nature?\nBoth the two opposing opinions have been upheld. In this there is\nnothing astonishing, for in metaphysics one finds the expression of\nevery possible opinion. But a large, an immense majority of\nphilosophers has declared in favour of the psychological nature of the\nimpression. Without even making the above distinction between the\nimpression and the act of cognition, it has been admitted that the\nentire sensation, taken _en bloc_, is a psychological phenomenon, a\nmodification of our consciousness and a peculiar state of our minds.\nDescartes has even employed this very explicit formula: \"The objects\nwe perceive are within our understanding.\" It is curious to see how\nlittle trouble authors take to demonstrate this opinion; they declare\nit to be self-evident, which is a convenient way of avoiding all\nproof. John Stuart Mill has no hesitation in affirming that: \"The\nmind, in perceiving external objects, can only take notice of its own\nconditions.\" And Renouvier expresses the same arbitrary assertion with\ngreater obscurity when he writes: \"The monad is constituted by this\nrelation: the connection of the subject with the object within the\nsubject.\"[15] In other words, it is laid down as an uncontrovertible\nprinciple that \"the mental can only enter into direct relations with\nthe mental.\" That is what may be called \"the principle of Idealism.\"\n\nThis principle seems to me very disputable, and it is to me an\nastonishing thing that the most resolute of sceptics--Hume, for\nexample--should have accepted it without hesitation. I shall first\nenunciate my personal opinion, then make known another which only\ndiffers from mine by a difference of words, and finally I will discuss\na third opinion, which seems to me radically wrong.\n\nMy personal opinion is that sensation is of a mixed nature. It is\npsychical in so far as it implies an act of consciousness, and\nphysical otherwise. The impression on which the act of cognition\noperates, that impression which is directly produced by the excitant\nof the nervous system, seems to me, without any doubt, to be of an\nentirely physical nature. This opinion, which I make mine own, has\nonly been upheld by very few philosophers--Thomas Reid perhaps, and\nWilliam Hamilton for certain; but neither has perceived its deep-lying\nconsequences.\n\nWhat are the arguments on which I rely? They are of different orders,\nand are arguments of fact and arguments of logic. I shall first appeal\nto the natural conviction of those who have never ventured into\nmetaphysics. So long as no endeavour has been made to demonstrate the\ncontrary to them, they believe, with a natural and naive belief, that\nmatter is that which is seen, touched and felt, and that,\nconsequently, matter and our senses are confounded. They would be\ngreatly astonished to be informed that when we appear to perceive the\nouter world, we simply perceive our ideas; that when we take the train\nfor Lyons we enter into one state of consciousness in order to attain\nanother state of consciousness.\n\nNow, the adherents of this natural and naive opinion have, as they say\nin the law, the right of possession (_possession d'etat_); they are\nnot plaintiffs but defendants; it is not for them to prove they are in\nthe right, it has to be proved against them that they are in the\nwrong. Until this proof is forthcoming they have a presumption in\ntheir favour.\n\nAre we here making use of the argument of common opinion of mankind,\nof which ancient philosophy made so evident an abuse? Yes, and no.\nYes, for we here adopt the general opinion. No, for we only adopt it\ntill the contrary be proved. But who can exhibit this proof to the\ncontrary? On a close examination of the question, it will be perceived\nthat sensation, taken as an object of cognition, becomes confused with\nthe properties of physical nature, and is identified with them, both\nby its mode of apparition and by its content. By its mode of\napparition, sensation holds itself out as independent of us, for it is\nat every instant an unexpected revelation, a source of fresh\ncognitions, and it offers a development which takes place without and\nin spite of our will; while its laws of co-existence and of succession\ndeclare to us the order and march of the material universe. Besides,\nby its content, sensation is confounded with matter. When a\nphilosopher seeks to represent to himself the properties of a material\nobject,--of a brain, for example--in order to contrast them with the\nproperties of a psychical activity, it is the properties of sensation\nthat he describes as material; and, in fact, it is by sensation, and\nsensation alone, that we know these properties. Sensation is so little\ndistinct from them that it is an error to consider it as a means, a\nprocess, an instrument for the knowledge of matter. All that we know\nof matter is not known in or by sensation, but constitutes sensation\nitself; it is not by the aid of sensation that we know colour; colour\nis a sensation, and the same may be said of form, resistance, and the\nwhole series of the properties of matter. They are only our sensations\nclothed with external bodies. It is therefore absolutely legitimate to\nconsider a part of our sensations, the object part, as being of\nphysical nature. This is the opinion to which I adhere.\n\nWe come to the second opinion we have formulated. It is, in appearance\nat least, very different from the first. Its supporters agree that the\nentire sensation, taken _en bloc_ and unanalysed, is to be termed a\npsychological phenomenon. In this case, the act of consciousness,\nincluded in the sensation, continues to represent a psychical element.\nThey suppose, besides, that the object on which this act operates is\npsychical; and finally, they suppose that this object or this\nimpression was provoked in us by a physical reality which is kept in\nconcealment, which we do not perceive, and which remains unknowable.\n\nThis opinion is nowise absurd in itself: but let us examine its\nconsequences. If we admit this thesis, that sensations are\nmanifestations of mind which, although provoked by material causes,\nare of a purely mental nature, we are forced to the conclusion that we\nknow none of the properties of material bodies, since we do not enter\ninto relations with these bodies. The object we apprehend by\nperception is, according to this hypothesis, solely mental. To draw\ntherefrom any notion on material objects, it would have to be supposed\nthat, by some mysterious action, the mental which we know resembles\nthe physical which we do not know, that it retains the reflection of\nit, or even that it allows its colour and form to pass, like a\ntransparent pellicle applied on the contour of bodies. Here are\nhypotheses very odd in their realism. Unless we accept them, how is it\ncomprehensible that we can know anything whatever of physical nature?\nWe should be forced to acknowledge, following the example of several\nphilosophers, that the perception of the physical is an illusion.\n\nAs a compensation, that which this system takes from matter it\nattributes to mind, which turns our familiar conceptions upside down.\nThe qualities of sensation detached from matter will, when applied to\nmind, change its physiognomy. There are sensations of extent, weight,\nspace, and form. If these sensations are turned into psychical events,\nwe shall have to grant to these events, to these manifestations of the\nmind, the properties of extent, of weight, of form. We shall have to\nsay that mind is a resisting thing, and that it has colour.\n\nIt may be said that this fantasy of language is not very serious. So\nbe it. But then what remains of the dualism of mind and matter? It is\nat least singularly compromised. We may continue to suppose that\nmatter exists, and even that it is matter which provokes in our mind\nthose events which we call our sensations; but we cannot know if by\nits nature, its essence, this matter differs from that of mind, since\nwe shall be ignorant of all its properties. Our ignorance on this\npoint will be so complete that we shall not even be able to know\nwhether any state which we call mental may not be physical. The\ndistinction between physical and mental will have lost its _raison\nd'etre_, since the existence of the physical is necessary to give a\nmeaning to the existence of the mental. We are brought, whether we\nlike it or not, to an experimental monism, which is neither psychical\nnor physical; panpsychism and panmaterialism will have the same\nmeaning.[16]\n\nBut this monism can be only transitory, for it is more in the words\nthan in the thing itself. It is brought about by the terminology\nadopted, by the resolution to call mental all the phenomena that it is\npossible to know. Luckily, our speculations are not at the mercy of\nsuch trifling details as the details of language. Whatever names may\nbe given to this or that, it will remain none the less true that\nnature will continue to present to us a contrast between phenomena\nwhich are flints, pieces of iron, clods of earth, brains--and some\nother phenomena which we call states of consciousness. Whatever be the\nvalue of this dualism, it will have to be discussed even in the\nhypothesis of panpsychism.[17] As for myself, I shall also continue to\nmake a distinction between what I have called objects of cognition and\nacts of cognition, because this is the most general distinction that\ncan be traced in the immense field of our cognitions. There is no\nother which succeeds, to the same degree, in dividing this field into\ntwo, moreover, this distinction is derived directly from observation,\nand does not depend for its validity on the physical or mental nature\nof the objects. Here is, then, a duality, and this duality, even when\nit does not bear the names physical and moral, should necessarily play\nthe same part, since it corresponds to the same distinction of fact.\n\nIn the end, nothing will be changed, and this second opinion must\ngradually merge into the one first stated by me, and of which I take\nthe responsibility. We may, therefore, put it out of consideration.\n\nI have mentioned a third opinion, stating that it appeared to me to be\nradically false. Outwardly it is the same as the last; looked at\nsuperficially it seems even confused with it; but, in reality it is of\na totally different nature. It supposes that sensation is an entirely\npsychological phenomenon. Then, having laid down this thesis, it\nundertakes to demonstrate it by asserting that sensation differs from\nthe physical fact, which amounts to supposing that we cannot know\nanything but sensations, and that physical facts are known to us\ndirectly and by another channel. This is where the contradiction comes\nin. It is so apparent that one wonders how it has been overlooked by\nso many excellent minds. In order to remove it, it will be sufficient\nto recollect that we do not know anything other than sensations; it is\ntherefore impossible to make any distinction between the physical\nobject and the object of cognition contained in every sensation. The\nline of demarcation between the physical and the moral cannot pass\nthis way, since it would separate facts which are identical.\n\nWe can, therefore, only deplore the error of all those who, to express\nthe difference between mind and matter, have sought a contrast between\nsensation and physical facts. Physiologists, with hardly an exception,\nhave fallen into this error; when contemplating in imagination the\nmaterial working of the brain, they have thought that between the\nmovement of cerebral matter and sensation there was a gulf fixed. The\ncomparison, to have been correct, required to be presented in quite\nanother way. A parallel, for instance, should have been drawn between\na certain cerebral movement and the act of consciousness, and there\nshould have been said: \"The cerebral motion is the physical\nphenomenon, the act of consciousness the psychical.\" But this\ndistinction has not been made. It is sensation _en bloc_ which is\ncompared to the cerebral movement, as witness a few passages I will\nquote as a matter of curiosity, which are borrowed from philosophers\nand, especially, from physiologists.\n\nWhile philosophers take as a principle of idealism, that the mental\ncan only know the mental, physiologists take, as a like principle,\nthe heterogeneity existing, or supposed to exist, between the nerve\nimpression and the sensation. \"However much we may follow the\nexcitement through the whole length of the nerve,\" writes Lotze,[18]\n\"or cause it to change its form a thousand times and to metamorphose\nitself into more and more delicate and subtle movements, we shall\nnever succeed in showing that a movement thus produced can, by its\nvery nature, cease to exist as movement and be reborn in the shape of\nsensation....\" It will be seen that it is on the opposition between\nmolecular movement and sensation, that Lotze insists. In like manner\nFerrier: \"But how is it that the molecular modifications in the\ncerebral cells coincide with the modifications of the consciousness;\nhow, for instance, do luminous vibrations falling upon the retina\nexcite the modification of consciousness called _visual sensation_?\nThese are problems we cannot solve. We may succeed in determining the\nexact nature of the molecular changes which take place in the cerebral\ncells when a sensation is felt, but this will not bring us an inch\nnearer to the explanation of the fundamental nature of sensation.\"\nFinally, Du Bois Reymond, in his famous discussion in 1880, on the\nseven enigmas of the world, speaks somewhat as follows: \"The\nastronomical knowledge of the encephalon, that is, the most intimate\nto which we can aspire, only reveals to us matter in motion. But no\narrangement nor motion of material particles can act as a bridge by\nwhich we can cross over into the domain of intelligence.... What\nimaginable link is there between certain movements of certain\nmolecules in my brain, on the one hand, and on the other hand\nprimitive, undefinable, undeniable facts such as: I have the sensation\nof softness, I smell the odour of a rose, I hear the sound of an\norgan, I see a red colour, &c....\"\n\nThese three quotations show very conclusively that their authors\nthought they could establish the heterogeneity of the two phenomena by\nopposing matter to sensation. It must be recognised that they have\nfallen into a singular error; for matter, whatever it may be, is for\nus nothing but sensation; matter in motion, I have often repeated, is\nonly a quite special kind of sensation; the organic matter of the\nbrain, with its whirling movements of atoms, is only sensation.\nConsequently, to oppose the molecular changes in the brain to the\nsensation of red, blue, green, or to an undefined sensation of any\nsort, is not crossing a gulf, and bringing together things which\ncannot be compared, it is simply comparing one sensation to another\nsensation.\n\nThere is evidently something equivocal in all this; and I pointed this\nout when outlining and discussing the different theories of matter. It\nconsists in taking from among the whole body of sensations certain of\nthem which are considered to be special, and which are then invested\nwith the privilege of being more important than the rest and the\ncauses of all the others. This is about as illegitimate as to choose\namong men a few individuals to whom is attributed the privilege of\ncommanding others by divine right. These privileged sensations which\nbelong to the sight, the touch, and the muscular sense, and which are\nof large extent, are indeed extensive. They have been unduly\nconsidered as objective and as representing matter because they are\nbetter known and measurable, while the other sensations, the\nunextensive sensations of the other senses, are considered as\nsubjective for the reasons that they are less known and less\nmeasurable: and they are therefore looked on as connected with our\nsensibility, our Ego, and are used to form the moral world.\n\nWe cannot subscribe to this way of establishing the contrast between\nmatter and thought, since it is simply a contrast between two\ncategories of sensations, and I have already asserted that the\npartitioning-out of sensations into two groups having different\nobjective values, is arbitrary.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 15: CH. RENOUVIER et L. PRAT, _La Nouvelle Monadologie_, p.\n148.]\n\n[Footnote 16: An American author, MORTON PRINCE, lately remarked this:\n_Philosophical Review_, July 1904, p. 450.]\n\n[Footnote 17: This FLOURNOY recently has shown very wittily. See in\n_Arch. de Psychol._, Nov. 1904, his article on Panpsychism.]\n\n[Footnote 18: This extract, together with the two subsequent, are\nborrowed from an excellent lecture by FLOURNOY, on _Metaphysique et\nPhysiologie_. Georg: Geneva, 1890.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nDEFINITION OF THE IMAGE\n\n\nGoing on with our inventory, after sensations come images, ideas, and\nconcepts; in fact, quite a collection of phenomena, which, are\ngenerally considered as essentially psychological.\n\nSo long as one does not carefully analyse the value of ideas, one\nremains under the impression that ideas form a world apart, which is\nsharply distinguished from the physical world, and behaves towards it\nas an antithesis. For is not conception the contrary of perception?\nand is not the ideal in opposition to reality?\n\nThoughts have some characteristics of fancy, of freedom, even of\nunreality, which are wanting to the prosaicness of heavy material\nthings. Thoughts sport with the relations of time and space; they fly\nin a moment across the gulf between the most distant objects; they\ntravel back up the course of time; they bring near to us events\ncenturies away; they conceive objects which are unreal; they imagine\ncombinations which upset all physical laws, and, further, these\nconceptions remain invisible to others as well as to ourselves. They\nare outside the grip of reality, and constitute a world which becomes,\nfor any one with the smallest imagination, as great and as important\nas the world called real. One may call in evidence the poets,\nnovelists, artists, and the dreamers of all kinds. When life becomes\ntoo hard for us, we fly to the ideal world, there to seek\nforgetfulness or compensation.\n\nIt is, therefore, easy to understand, that it should have been\nproposed to carry into ideation the dichotomy between the physical and\nthe moral. Many excellent authors have made the domain of the mind\nbegin in the ideal. Matter is that which does not think. Descartes, in\nhis _Discours de la Methode_ (4th part), remarking that he may pretend\n\"not to have a body, and that there is no world or place in which he\nexists, but that he cannot pretend that he does not think,\" concludes\nby saying that the mind is \"a substance, all whose essence or nature\nis merely to think, and which has no need of either place or any other\nmaterial thing, in order to exist;\" in short, that \"the soul is\nabsolutely distinct from the body.\"[19]\n\nLet us, then, examine in what measure this separation between\nperception and ideation can be legitimately established. If we accept\nthis separation, we must abandon the distinction I proposed between\nacts and objects of cognition, or, at least, admit that this\ndistinction does not correspond to that between the physical and the\nmoral, since thoughts, images, recollections, and even the most\nabstract conceptions, all constitute, in a certain sense, objects of\ncognition. They are phenomena which, when analysed, are clearly\ncomposed of two parts, an object and a cognition. Their logical\ncomposition is, indeed, that of an external perception, and there is\nin ideation exactly the same duality as in sensation. Consequently, if\nwe maintain the above distinction as a principle of classification for\nall knowable phenomena, we shall be obliged to assign the same\nposition to ideas as to sensations.\n\nThe principal difference we notice between sensation and idea is, it\nwould seem, the character of unreality in the last named; but this\nopposition has not the significance we imagine. Our mental vision\nonly assumes this wholly special character of unreality under\nconditions in which it is unable to harmonise with the real vision.\nTaine has well described the phases of the reduction of the image by\nsensation: it is at the moment when it receives the shock of an image\nwhich contradicts it, that the image appears as illusory.[20] Let us\nsuppose that we are sitting down dreaming and watching the passing by\nof our images. If, at this moment, a sudden noise calls us back to\nreality, the whole of our mental phantasmagoria disappears as if by\nthe wave of a magic wand, and it is by thus vanishing that the image\nshows its falsity. It is false because it does not accord with the\npresent reality.\n\nBut, when we do not notice a disagreement between these two modes of\ncognition, both alike give us the impression of reality. If I evoke a\nreminiscence and dwell attentively on the details, I have the\nimpression that I am in face of the reality itself. \"I feel as if I\nwere there still,\" is a common saying; and, among the recollections I\nevoke, there are some which give me the same certitude as the\nperception of the moment. Certain witnesses would write their\ndepositions with their blood. One does not see this every day; but\nstill one does see it.\n\nFurther, there are thousands of circumstances where the ideation is\nneither in conflict with the perception nor isolated from it, but in\nlogical continuity with it. This continuity must even be considered as\nthe normal condition. We think in the direction of that which we\nperceive. The image seems to prepare the adaptation of the individual\nto his surroundings; it creates the foresight, the preparation of the\nmeans, and, in a word, everything which constitutes for us a final\ncause. Now, it is very necessary that the image appear real to be\nusefully the substitute of the sensation past or to come.\n\nLet us establish one thing more. Acting as a substitute, the image not\nonly appears as real as the sensation, it appears to be of the same\nnature; and the proof is that they are confounded one with the other,\nand that those who are not warned of the fact take one for the other.\nEvery time a body is perceived, as I previously explained, there are\nimages which affix themselves to the sensation unnoticed. We think we\nperceive when we are really remembering or imagining. This addition of\nthe image to the sensation is not a petty and insignificant accessory;\nit forms the major part, perhaps nine-tenths, of perception. Hence\narise the illusions of the senses, which are the result, not of\nsensations but of ideas. From this also comes the difficulty of\nknowing exactly what, under certain circumstances, is observation or\nperception, where the fact perceived ends, and where conjecture\nbegins. Once acquainted with all these possibilities of errors, how\ncan we suppose a radical separation between the sensation and the\nimage?\n\nExamined more closely, images appear to us to be divisible into as\nmany kinds as sensations: visual images correspond to visual\nsensations, tactile to tactile, and so on with all the senses.\n\nThat which we experience in the form of sensation, we can experience\nover again in the form of image, and the repetition, generally weaker\nin intensity and poorer in details, may, under certain favourable\ncircumstances, acquire an exceptional intensity, and even equal\nreality: as is shown by hallucinations. Here, certainly, are very\nsound reasons for acknowledging that the images which are at the\nbottom of our thoughts, and form the object of them, are the\nrepetition, the modification, the transposition, the analysis or the\nsynthesis of sensations experienced in the past, and possessing, in\nconsequence, all the characteristics of bodily states. I believe that\nthere is neither more nor less spirituality in the idea than in the\nsensation. That which forms its spirituality is the implied act of\ncognition; but its object is material.\n\nI foresee a final objection: I shall be told that even when the\nunreality of the image is not the rule, and appears only under certain\ncircumstances, it nevertheless exists. This is an important fact. It\nhas been argued from the unreality of dreams and hallucinations in\nwhich we give a body to our ideas, that we do not in reality perceive\nexternal bodies, but simply psychical states and modifications of our\nsouls. If our ideas consist--according to the hypothesis I uphold--in\nphysical impressions which are felt, we shall be told that these\nparticular impressions must participate in the nature of everything\nphysical; that they are real, and always real; that they cannot be\nunreal, fictitious, and mendacious, and that, consequently, the\nfictitious character of ideation becomes inexplicable.\n\nTwo words of answer are necessary to this curious argument, which is\nnothing less than an effort to define the mental by the unreal, and to\nsuppose that an appearance cannot be physical. No doubt, we say, every\nimage, fantastical as it may seem as signification, is real in a\ncertain sense, since it is the perception of a physical impression;\nbut this physical nature of images does not prevent our making a\ndistinction between true and false images. To take an analogous\nexample: we are given a sheet of proofs to correct, we delete certain\nredundant letters, and, although they are printed with the same type\nas the other letters, we have the right to say they are false. Again,\nin a musical air, we may hear a false note, though it is as real as\nthe others, since it has been played. This distinction between reality\nand truth ought to be likewise applied to mental images. All are real,\nbut some are false. They are false when they do not accord with the\nwhole reality; they are true when they agree; and every image is\npartly false because, being an image, it does not wholly accord with\nthe actual perceptions. It creates a belief in a perception which does\nnot occur; and by developing these ideas we could easily demonstrate\nhow many degrees of falsehood there are.\n\nPhysiologically, we may very easily reconcile the falsity of the image\nwith the physical character of the impression on which it is based.\nThe image results from a partial cerebral excitement, which sensation\nresults from an excitement which also acts upon the peripheral sensory\nnerves, and corresponds to an external object--an excitant which the\nimage does not possess. This difference explains how it is that the\nimage, while resulting from a physical impression, may yet be in a\ngreat number of cases declared false--that is to say, may be\nrecognised as in contradiction to the perceptions.\n\nTo other minds, perhaps, metaphysical reasoning will be more\nsatisfactory. For those, we propose to make a distinction between two\nnotions, Existence or Reality, on the one hand, and Truth, on the\nother.\n\nExistence or Reality is that of which we have an immediate\napprehension. This apprehension occurs in several ways. In perception,\nin the first place. I perceive the reality of my body, of a table, the\nsky, the earth, in proportion to my perception of them. They exist,\nfor if they did not, I could not perceive them. Another way of\nunderstanding reality is conception or thought. However much I may\nrepresent a thing to myself as imaginary, it nevertheless exists in a\ncertain manner, since I can represent it to myself. I therefore, in\nthis case, say that it is real or it exists. It is of course\nunderstood, that in these definitions I am going against the ordinary\nacceptation of the terms; I am taking the liberty of proposing new\nmeanings. This reality is, then, perceived in one case and conceived\nin the other. Perceptibility or conceivability are, then, the two\nforms which reality may assume. But _reality_ is not synonymous with\n_truth_; notwithstanding the custom to the contrary, we may well\nintroduce a difference between these two terms. Reality is that which\nis perceived or conceived; truth is that which accords with the whole\nof our knowledge. Reality is a function of the senses or of ideation;\ntruth is a function of reasoning or of the reason.\n\nFor cognition to be complete, it requires the aid of all these\nfunctions. And, in fact, what does conception by itself give? It\nallows us to see if a thing is capable of representation. This is not\na common-place thing, I will observe in passing; for many things we\nname are not capable of representation, and there is often a criticism\nto be made; we think we are representing, and we are not. What is\ncapable of representation exists as a representation, but is it true?\nSome philosophers have imagined so, but they are mistaken; what we\nsucceed in conceiving is alone possible.\n\nLet us now take the Perceptible. Is what one perceives true? Yes, in\nmost cases it is so in fact; but an isolated perception may be false,\nand disturbed by illusions of all kinds. It is all very well to say,\n\"I see, I touch.\" There is no certainty through the senses alone in\nmany circumstances that the truth has been grasped. If I am shown the\nspirit of a person I know to be dead, I shall not, notwithstanding the\ntestimony of my eyes, believe it to be true, for this apparition would\nupset all my system of cognitions.\n\nTruth is that which, being deemed conceivable, and being really\nperceived, has also the quality of finding its place, its relation,\nand its confirmation in the whole mass of cognitions previously\nacquired.\n\nThese distinctions,[21] if developed, would readily demonstrate that\nthe advantages of observation are not eclipsed by those of\nspeculation; and that those of speculation, in their turn, do not\ninterfere with those of observation. But we have not time to develop\nthese rules of logic; it will be sufficient to point out their\nrelation to the question of the reality of mental images. Here are my\nconclusions in two words. Physical phenomena and images are always\nreal, since they are perceived or conceived; what is sometimes wanting\nto them, and makes them false, is that they do not accord with the\nrest of our cognitions.[22]\n\nThus, then, are all objections overruled, in my opinion at least. We\ncan now consider the world of ideas as a physical world; but it is\none of a peculiar nature, which is not, like the other, accessible to\nall, and is subject to its own laws, which are laws of association. By\nthese very different characteristics, it separates itself so sharply\nfrom the outer world that all endeavour to bring the two together\nseems shocking; and it is very easy to understand that many minds\nshould wish to remain faithful to the conception that ideas form a\nmental or moral world. No metaphysical reasoning could prevail against\nthis sentiment, and we must give up the idea of destroying it. But we\nthink we have shown that idea, like sensation, comprises at the same\ntime the physical and the mental.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 19: Let me say, in passing, that this separation that\nDESCARTES thinks he can establish between perception and ideation, is\nonly conceivable on condition that it be not too closely examined, and\nthat no exact definition of ideation be given. If we remark, in fact,\nthat all thought is a reproduction, in some degree, of a sensation, we\narrive at this conclusion: that a thought operated by a soul distinct\nfrom the body would be a thought completely void and without object,\nit would be the thought of nothingness. It is not, therefore,\nconceivable. Consequently the criterion, already so dangerous, which\nDESCARTES constantly employs--to wit: that what we clearly conceive is\ntrue--cannot apply to thought, if we take the trouble to analyse it\nand to replace a purely verbal conception by intuition.]\n\n[Footnote 20: I somewhat regret that TAINE fell into the common-place\nidea of the opposition of the brain and thought; he took up again this\nold idea without endeavouring to analyse it, and only made it his own\nby the ornamentation of his style. And as his was a mind of powerful\nsystematisation, the error which he committed led him into much wider\nconsequences than the error of a more common mind would have done.]\n\n[Footnote 21: I have just come across them again in an ingenious note\nof C. L. HERRICK: _The Logical and Psychological Distinction between\nthe True and the Real_ (_Psych. Rev._, May 1904). I entirely agree\nwith this author. But it is not he who exercised a suggestion over my\nmind; it was M. BERGSON. See _Matiere et Memoire_, p. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 22: In order to remain brief, I have not thought fit to\nallude in the text to a question of metaphysics which closely depends\non the one broached by me: the existence of an outer world.\nPhilosophers who define sensation as a modality of our Ego are much\nembarrassed later in demonstrating the existence of an outer world.\nHaving first admitted that our perception of it is illusory, since,\nwhen we think we perceive this world, we have simply the feeling of\nthe modalities of our Ego, they find themselves powerless to\ndemonstrate that this illusion corresponds to a truth, and invoke in\ndespair, for the purpose of their demonstration, instinct,\nhallucination, or some _a priori_ law of the mind. The position we\nhave taken in the discussion is far more simple. Since every sensation\nis a fragment of matter perceived by a mind, the aggregate of\nsensations constitutes the aggregate of matter. There is in this no\ndeceptive appearance, and consequently no need to prove a reality\ndistinct from appearances. As to the argument drawn from dreams and\nhallucinations which might be brought against this, I have shown how\nit is set aside by a distinction between perceptibility and truth. It\nis no longer a matter of perception, but of reasoning. In other words,\nall that we see, even in dreams, is real, but is not in its due\nplace.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nDEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS\n\n\nAfter sensations and images, we have to name among the phenomena of\nconsciousness, the whole series of affective states--our pleasures and\nour pains, our joys and our griefs, our sentiments, our emotions, and\nour passions. It is universally admitted that these states are of a\nmental nature, for several reasons. (1) We never objectivate them as\nwe do our sensations, but we constantly consider them as indwelling or\nsubjective states. This rule, however, allows an exception for the\npleasure and the pain termed physical, which are often localised in\nparticular parts of our bodies, although the position attributed to\nthem is less precise than with indifferent sensations. (2) We do not\nalienate them as we do our indifferent sensations. The sensations of\nweight, of colour, and of form serve us for the construction of bodies\nwhich appear to us as perceived by us, but as being other than\nourselves. On the contrary, we constantly and without hesitation refer\nour emotional states to our _Ego_. It is I who suffer, we say, I who\ncomplain, I who hope. It is true that this attribution is not\nabsolutely characteristic of mental phenomena, for it happens that we\nput a part of our Ego into material objects, such as our bodies, and\neven into objects separate from our bodies, and whose sole relation to\nus is that of a legal proprietorship. We must guard against the\nsomewhat frequent error of identifying the Ego with the psychical.\n\nThese two reasons sufficiently explain the tendency to see only\npsychological states in the emotional ones; and, in fact, those\nauthors who have sought to oppose mind to matter have not failed to\nintroduce emotion into their parallel as representing the essence of\nmind. On this point I will recall the fine ironical image used by\nTyndall, the illustrious English physicist, to show the abyss which\nseparates thought from the molecular states of the brain. \"Let us\nsuppose,\" he says, \"that the sentiment love, for example, corresponds\nto a right-hand spiral movement of the molecules of the brain and the\nsentiment hatred to a left-hand spiral movement. We should then know\nthat when we love, a movement is produced in one direction, and when\nwe hate, in another. But the Why would remain without an answer.\"\n\nThe question of knowing what place in our metaphysical theory we ought\nto secure for emotion seems difficult to resolve, and we even find\nsome pleasure in leaving it in suspense, in order that it may be\nunderstood that a metaphysician is not compelled to explain\neverything. Besides, the difficulties which atop us here are\npeculiarly of a psychological order. They proceed from the fact that\nstudies on the nature of the emotions are still very little advanced.\nThe physical conditions of these states are pretty well known, and\ntheir psychical and social effects have been abundantly described; but\nvery little is known as to what distinguishes an emotion from a\nthought.\n\nTwo principal opinions may be upheld in the actual state of our\nacquaintance with the psychology of the feelings. When we endeavour to\npenetrate their essential and final nature, we have a choice between\ntwo contrary theories.\n\nThe first and traditional one consists in seeing in emotion a\nphenomenon _sui generis_; this is very simple, and leaves nothing more\nto be said.\n\nThe second bears the name of the intellectualist theory. It consists\nin expunging the characteristic of the affective states. We consider\nthem as derivative forms of particular modes of cognition, and they\nare only \"confused intelligence.\" This intellectualist thesis is of\nearly date; it will be found in Herbart, who, by-the-by, gave it a\npeculiar form, by causing the play of images to intervene in the\nformation of the feelings. However, this particular point is of slight\nImportance. The intellectualist theory is more vast than Herbartism;\nit exists in all doctrines in which the characteristic difference\nbetween thought and feeling is expunged and feeling is brought back to\nthought. One of the clearest means of so doing consists in only seeing\nin the feeling the fact of perceiving something. To perceive is, in\nfact, the property of intelligence; to reason, to imagine, to judge,\nto understand, is always, in a certain sense, to perceive. It has been\nimagined that emotion is nothing else than a perception of a certain\nkind, an intellectual act strictly comparable to the contemplation of\na landscape. Only, in the place of a landscape with placid features\nyou must put a storm, a cataclysm of nature; and, instead of supposing\nthis storm outside us, let it burst within us, let it reach us, not by\nthe outer senses of sight and condition, but by the inner senses. What\nwe then perceive will be an emotion.\n\nSuch is the theory that two authors--W. James and Lange--happened to\ndiscover almost at the same time, Lange treating it as a physiologist\nand W. James as a philosopher. Their theory, at first sight, appears\nsingular, like everything which runs counter to our mental habits. It\nlays down that the symptoms which we all till now have considered as\nthe physiological consequence, the translation, and the distant\neffects of the emotions, constitute their essential base. These\neffects are: the expression of the physiognomy, the gesture, the cry,\nand the speech; or the reflex action on the circulation, the pallor or\nblushing, the heat mounting to the head, or the cold of the shiver\nwhich passes over the body. Or it is the heart, which hastens or\nslackens its beats, or makes them irregular, or enfeebles, or augments\nthem. Or the respiration, which changes its rhythm, or increases, or\nis suspended. Or else it is the secretion of the saliva or of the\nsweat, which flows in abundance or dries up. Or the muscular force,\nwhich is increased or decays. Or the almost undefinable organic\ntroubles revealed to us by the singing in the ears, constriction of\nthe epigastrium, the jerks, the trembling, vertigo, or nausea--all\nthis collection of organic troubles which comes more or less\nconfusedly to our consciousness under the form of tactile, muscular,\nthermal, and other sensations. Until now this category of phenomena\nhas been somewhat neglected, because we saw in it effects and\nconsequences of which the role in emotion itself seemed slight, since,\nif they could have been suppressed, it was supposed that emotion would\nstill remain. The new theory commences by changing the order of\nevents. It places the physical symptoms of the emotions at the very\nbeginning, and considers them the direct effects of the external\nexcitant, which is expressed by this elegant formula: \"It used to be\nsaid, 'I perceive a danger; I am frightened, I tremble.' Now we must\nsay, 'I tremble before a danger, first, and it is after having\ntrembled that I am frightened.'\" This is not a change in order only;\nit is something much more serious. The change is directed to the\nnature of emotion. It is considered to exist in the organic\nderangements indicated above. These derangements are the basis of\nemotion, its physical basis, and to be moved is to perceive them. Take\naway from the consciousness this physical reflex, and emotion ceases.\nIt is no longer anything but an idea.\n\nThis theory has at least the merit of originality. It also pleases one\nby its great clearness--an entirely intellectual clearness, we may\nsay; for it renders emotion comprehensible by enunciating it in terms\nof cognition. It eliminates all difference which may exist between a\nperception and an emotion. Emotion is no longer anything but a certain\nkind of perception, the perception of the organic sensations.\n\nThis reduction, if admitted, would much facilitate the introduction of\nemotion into our system, which, being founded on the distinction\nbetween the consciousness and the object, is likewise an\nintellectualist system. The definition of emotion, as it is taught by\nW. James, seems expressly made for us who are seeking to resolve all\nintellectual states into physical impressions accompanied by\nconsciousness.\n\nBy the side of emotion we may place, as demanding the same analytical\nstudy, the feeling of effort. We ought to inquire with effort, as has\nbeen done with emotion, what is the psychological nature of this\nphenomenon; and in the same way that there exists an intellectualist\ntheory of the emotions, viz. that of James, who reduces all the\nhistory of the emotions to intelligence, so there exists an\nintellectualist theory of effort, which likewise tends to bring back,\nall will to intelligence. It is again the same author, that true\ngenius, W. James, who has attempted this reduction. I do not know\nwhether he has taken into account the parallelism of the two theories,\nbut it is nevertheless evident. Effort, that basis of activity, that\nstate of consciousness which so many psychologists have described as\nsomething _sui generis_, becomes to James a phenomenon of perception.\nIt is the perception of sensations proceeding from the muscles, the\ntendons, the articulations, the skin, and from all the organs directly\nor indirectly concerned in the execution of movement. To be conscious\nof an effort would then be nothing else than to receive all these\ncentripetal sensations; and what proves this is, that the\nconsciousness of effort when most clearly manifested is accompanied by\nsome muscular energy, some strong contraction, or some respiratory\ntrouble, and yields if we render the respiration again regular and put\nthe muscles back into repose.\n\nTo my great regret I can state nothing very clear regarding these\nproblems. The attempt to intellectualise all psychical problems is\ninfinitely interesting, and leads to a fairly clear conception, by\nwhich everything is explained by a mechanism reflected in a mirror,\nwhich is the consciousness. But we remain perplexed, and we ask\nourselves whether this clearness of perception is not somewhat\nartificial, whether affectivity, emotivity, tendency, will, are really\nall reduced to perceptions, or whether they are not rather irreducible\nelements which should be added to the consciousness. Does not, for\ninstance, desire represent a complement of the consciousness? Do not\ndesire and consciousness together represent a something which does not\nbelong to the physical domain and which forms the moral world? This\nquestion I leave unanswered.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE RELATION SUBJECT-OBJECT\n\n\nAfter having separated from the consciousness that which it is not,\nlet us try to define what it is. This and the two following chapters\nare devoted to this study.\n\nA theory has often been maintained with regard to the consciousness;\nnamely, that it supposes a relation between two terms--a subject and\nan object, and that it consists exactly in the feeling of this\nrelation. By subject is understood the something that has\nconsciousness; the object is the something of which we are conscious.\nEvery thought, we are told, implies subject and object, the\nrepresenter and the represented, the _sentiens_ and the _sensum_--the\none active, the other passive, the active acting on the passive, the\n_ego_ opposed to the _non ego_.\n\nThis opinion is almost legitimised by current language. When speaking\nof our states of consciousness, we generally say, \"I am conscious; it\nis I who have consciousness,\" and we attribute to our I, to our Ego,\nto our personality, the role of subject. But this is not a peremptory\nargument in favour of the above opinion; it is only a presumption,\nand, closely examined, this presumption seems very weak.\n\nHitherto, when analysing the part of mind, we have employed\nnon-committal terms: we have said that sensation implied\nconsciousness, and not that sensation implied something which is\nconscious.[23] The difference may appear too subtle, but it is not; it\nconsists in taking from consciousness the notion of a subject being\nconscious and replacing it by the very act of consciousness.\n\nMy description applies very exactly, I think, to the facts. When we\nare engaged in a sensation, or when we perceive something, a\nphenomenon occurs which simply consists in having consciousness of a\nthing. If to this we add the idea of the subject, which has\nconsciousness, we distort the event. At the very moment when it is\ntaking place, it is not so complicated; we complicate it by adding to\nit the work of reflection. It is reflection which constructs the\nnotion of the subject, and it is this which afterwards introduces this\nconstruction into the states of consciousness; in this way the state\nof consciousness, by receiving this notion of subject, acquires a\ncharacter of duality it did not previously possess. There are, in\nshort, two separate acts of consciousness, and one is made the subject\nof the other. \"Primitively,\" says Rabier, \"there is neither\nrepresentative nor represented; there are sensations, representations,\nfacts of consciousness, and that is all. Nothing is more exact, in my\nopinion, than this view of Condillac's:--that primitively, the\ninanimate statue is entirely the sensation that it feels. To itself it\nis all odour and all savour; it is nothing more, and this sensation\nincludes no duality for the consciousness. It is of an absolute\nsimplicity.\"\n\nTwo arguments may be advanced in favour of this opinion. The first is\none of logic. We have divided all knowledge into two groups--objects\nof cognition, and acts of cognition. What is the subject of cognition?\nDoes it form a new group? By no means; it forms part of the first\ngroup, of the object group; for it is something to be known.\n\nOur second argument is one of fact. It consists in remembering that\nwhich in practice we understand by the subject of cognition; or\nrather, metaphorically we represent this subject to ourselves as an\norgan--the eye that sees or the hand that touches--and we represent to\nourselves the relation subject-object in the shape of a material\nrelation between two distinct bodies which are separated by an\ninterval and between which some action is produced which unites them.\nOr else, confusing the subject and the Ego, which are nevertheless two\ndifferent notions, we place the Ego in the consciousness of the\nmuscular effort struggling against something which resists. Or,\nfinally and still more frequently, we represent the subject to\nourselves by confusing it with our own personality; it is a part of\nour biography, our name, our profession, our social status, our body,\nour past life foreshortened, our character, or, in a word, our civil\npersonality, which becomes the subject of the relation subject-object.\nWe artificially endow this personality with the faculty of having\nconsciousness; and it results from this that the entity consciousness,\nso difficult to define and to imagine, profits by all this factitious\naddition and becomes a person, visible and even very large, in flesh\nand bone, distinct from the object of cognition, and capable of living\na separate life.\n\nIt is not difficult to explain that all this clearness in the\nrepresentation of ideas is acquired by a falsification of the facts.\nSo sensorial a representation of consciousness is very unfaithful;\nfor our biography does not represent what we have called acts of\nconsciousness, but a large slice of our past experience--that is to\nsay, a synthesis of bygone sensations and images, a synthesis of\nobjects of consciousness; therefore a complete confusion between the\nacts of consciousness and their objects. The formation of the\npersonality seems to me to have, above all, a legal and social\nimportance.[24] It is a peculiar grouping of states of consciousness\nimposed by our relations with other individuals. But, metaphysically,\nthe subject thus understood is not distinguished from the object, and\nthere is nothing to add to our distinction between the object and the\nact of consciousness.\n\nThose who defend the existence of the subject point out that this\nsubject properly constitutes the Ego, and that the distinction of the\nsubject and the object corresponds to the distinction of the Ego and\nnon-Ego, and furnishes the separation between the physical and the\nmoral so long sought.\n\nIt is evidently very enticing to make of the Ego thus a primitive\nnotion of the consciousness; but this view of the Ego as opposed to\nthe non-Ego in no way corresponds to that of the mental and the\nphysical. The notion of the Ego is much larger, much more extensible,\nthan that of the mental; it is as encroaching as human pride, it\ngrasps in its conquering talons all that belongs to us; for we do not,\nin life, make any great difference between what is _we_ and what is\n_ours_--an insult to our dog, our dwelling, or our work wounds us as\nmuch as an insult to ourselves. The possessive pronoun expresses both\npossession and possessor. In fact, we consider our body as being\nourselves.\n\nHere, then, are numbers of material things introducing themselves into\nthe category of mental things. If we wished to expel them and to\nreduce the domain of the Ego to the domain of the mental, we could\nonly do so if we already possessed the criterion of what is\nessentially mental. The notion of the Ego cannot therefore supply us\nwith this criterion.\n\nAnother opinion consists in making of the subject a spiritual\nsubstance, of which the consciousness becomes a faculty. By substance\nis understood an entity which possesses the two following principal\ncharacteristics, unity and identity, this latter merging into unity,\nfor it is nothing else but the persistence of unity through the course\nof time. Certain philosophers have asserted that through intuition we\ncan all establish that we are a spiritual substance. I am compelled to\nreject this idea, because I think the expression _spiritual substance_\nhas no meaning; nothing but the sonorous value of six syllables. It\nhas also been supposed, that there exists a corporeal substance hidden\nunder the sensations, in which are implanted the qualities of bodies,\nas the various organs of a flower are in its calyx. I will return\nlater to this conception of a material substance. That of a spiritual\nsubstance cannot be defended, and the chief and fatal argument I urge\nagainst it is, that we cannot represent it to our minds, we cannot\nthink it, and we cannot see in these words \"spiritual substance\" any\nintelligible idea; for that which is mental is limited to \"that which\nis of the consciousness.\" So soon as we endeavour to go beyond the\nfact of having consciousness to imagine a particular state which must\nbe mental, one of two things happen; either we only grasp the void, or\nelse we construct a material and persistent object in which we\nrecognise psychical attributes. These are two conclusions which ought\nto be rejected.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 23: This second method of expression, which I consider\ninexact, is constantly found in DESCARTES. Different philosophers have\nexplicitly admitted that every act of cognition implies a relation\nsubject-object. This is one of the corner-stones of the neo-criticism\nof RENOUVIER. He asserts that all representation is double-faced, and\nthat what is known to us presents itself in the character of both\nrepresentative and represented. He follows this up by describing\nseparately the phenomena and laws of the representative and of the\nrepresented respectively.]\n\n[Footnote 24: The preceding ten lines in the text I wrote after\nreading a recent article of WILLIAM JAMES, who wishes to show that the\nconsciousness does not exist, but results simply from the relation or\nthe opposition raised between one part of our experience (the actual\nexperience, for instance, in the example of the perception of an\nobject) and another part, the remembrance of our person. But the\nargument of JAMES goes too far; he is right in contesting the relation\nsubject-object, but not in contesting the existence of the\nconsciousness (W. JAMES: \"Does consciousness exist?\" in _J. of\nPhilosophy, &c._, Sept. 1904).]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--CATEGORIES OF THE UNDERSTANDING\n\n\nIt has often been said that the role of intelligence consists in\nuniting or grasping the relations of things. An important question,\ntherefore, to put, is, if we know whereof these relations consist, and\nwhat is the role of the mind in the establishment of a relation?\n\nIt now and then happens to us to perceive an isolated object, without\ncomparing it with any other, or endeavouring to find out whether it\ndiffers from or resembles another, or presents with any other a\nrelation of cause to effect, or of sign to thing signified, or of\nco-existence in time and space. Thus, I may see a red colour, and\noccupy all the intellect at my disposal in the perception of this\ncolour, seeing nothing but it, and thinking of nothing but it.\nTheoretically, this is not impossible to conceive, and, practically, I\nask myself if these isolated and solitary acts of consciousness do not\nsometimes occur.\n\nIt certainly seems to me that I have noticed in myself moments of\nintellectual tonelessness, when in the country, during the vacation,\nI look at the ground, or the grass, without thinking of anything--or\nat least, of anything but what I am looking at, and without comparing\nmy sensation with anything. I do not think we should admit in\nprinciple, as do many philosophers, that \"we take no cognisance save\nof relations.\" This is the _principle of relativity_, to which so much\nattention has been given. Taken in this narrow sense, it seems to me\nin no way imperative for our thoughts. We admit that it is very often\napplied, but without feeling obliged to admit that it is of perpetual\nand necessary application.\n\nThese reserves once made, it remains to remark, that the objects we\nperceive very rarely present themselves in a state of perfect\nisolation. On the contrary, they are brought near to other objects by\nmanifold relations of resemblance, of difference, or of connection in\ntime or space; and, further, they are compared with the ideas which\ndefine them best. We do not have consciousness of an object, but of\nthe relations existing between several objects. Relation is the new\nstate produced by the fact that one perceives a plurality of objects,\nand perceives them in a group.\n\nShow me two colours in juxtaposition, and I do not see two colours\nonly, but, in addition, their resemblance in colour or value. Show me\ntwo lines, and I do not see only their respective lengths but their\ndifference in length. Show me two points marked on a white sheet of\npaper, and I do not see only the colour, form, and dimension of the\npoints, but their distance from each other. In our perceptions, as in\nour conceptions, we have perpetually to do with the relations between\nthings. The more we reflect, the more we understand things, the more\nclearly we see their relations; the multiplication of relations is the\nmeasure of the depth of cognition.[25]\n\nThe nature of these relations is more difficult to ascertain than that\nof objects. It seems to be more subtle. When two sounds make\nthemselves heard in succession, there is less difficulty in making the\nnature of these two sounds understood than the nature of the fact that\none occurs before the other. It would appear that, in the perception\nof objects, our mind is passive and reduced to the state of reception,\nworking like a registering machine or a sensitive surface, while in\nthe perception of relations it assumes a more important part.\n\nTwo principal theories have been advanced, of which one puts the\nrelations in the things perceived, and the other makes them a work of\nthe mind. Let us begin with this last opinion. It consists in\nsupposing that the relations are given to things by the mind itself.\nThese relations have been termed categories. The question of\ncategories plays an important part in the history of philosophy. Three\ngreat philosophers, Aristotle, Kant, and Renouvier have drawn up a\nlist, or, as it is called, a table of them, and this table is very\nlong. To give a slight idea of it, I will quote a few examples, such\nas time, space, being, resemblance, difference, causality, becoming,\nfinality, &c.\n\nBy making the categories the peculiar possession of the mind, we\nattribute to these cognitions the essential characteristic of being\nanterior to sensation, or, as it is also termed, of existing _a\npriori_: we are taught that not only are they not derived from\nexperience, nor taught us by observation, but further that they are\npresupposed by all observation, for they set up, in scholastic jargon,\nthe conditions which make experience possible. They represent the\npersonal contribution of the mind to the knowledge of nature, and,\nconsequently, to admit them is to admit that the mind is not, in the\npresence of the world, reduced to the passive state of a _tabula\nrasa_, and that the faculties of the mind are not a transformation of\nsensation. Only these categories do not supplement sensation, they do\nnot obviate it, nor allow it to be conjectured beforehand. They remain\nempty forms so long as they are not applied to experience; they are\nthe rules of cognition and not the objects of cognition, the means of\nknowing and not the things known; they render knowledge possible, but\ndo not of themselves constitute it, Experience through the senses\nstill remains a necessary condition to the knowledge of the external\nworld. It may be said that the senses give the matter of knowledge,\nand that the categories of the understanding give the form of it.\nMatter cannot exist without form, nor form without matter; it is the\nunion of the two which produces cognition.\n\nSuch is the simplest idea that can be given of the Kantian theory of\ncategories, or, if it is preferred to employ the term often used and\nmuch discussed, such is the theory of the Kantian idealism, This\ntheory, I will say frankly, hardly harmonises with the ideas I have\nset forth up to this point. To begin with, let us scrutinise the\nrelation which can exist between the subject and the object. We have\nseen that the existence of the subject is hardly admissible, for it\ncould only be an object in disguise. Cognition is composed in reality\nof an object and an act of consciousness. Now, how can we know if this\nact of consciousness, by adding itself to the object, modifies it and\ncauses it to appear other than it is?\n\nThis appears to me an insoluble question, and probably, even, a\nfactitious one. The idea that an object can be modified in its nature\nor in its aspect comes to us through the perception of bodies. We see\nthat, by attacking a metal with acids, this metal is modified, and\nthat by heating a body its colour and form become changed; or that by\nelectrifying a thread it acquires new properties; or that when we\nplace glasses before our eyes we change the visible aspect of objects;\nor that, if we have inflammation of the eyelids, light is painful, and\nso on. All these familiar experiments represent to us the varied\nchanges that a body perceived can undergo; but it must be carefully\nremarked that in cases of this kind the alteration in the body is\nproduced by the action of a second body, that the effect is due to an\nintercourse between two objects. On the contrary, when we take the\nKantian hypothesis, that the consciousness modifies that which it\nperceives, we are attributing to the consciousness an action which has\nbeen observed in the case of the objects, and are thus transporting\ninto one domain that which belongs to a different one; and we are\nfalling into the very common error which consists in losing sight of\nthe proper nature of the consciousness and making out of it an object.\n\nIf we set aside this incorrect assimilation, there no longer remains\nany reason for refusing to admit that we perceive things as they are,\nand that the consciousness, by adding itself to objects, does not\nmodify them.\n\nPhenomena and appearances do not, then, strictly speaking, exist. Till\nproof to the contrary, we shall admit that everything we perceive is\nreal, that we perceive things always as they are, or, in other words,\nthat we always perceive _noumena_.[26]\n\nAfter having examined the relations of the consciousness with its\nobjects, let us see what concerns the perception, by the\nconsciousness, of the relations existing between these objects\nthemselves. The question is to ascertain whether the _a priorists_ are\nright in admitting that the establishment of these relations is the\nwork of the consciousness. The role of synthetic power that is thus\nattributed to consciousness is difficult to conceive unless we alter\nthe definition of consciousness to fit the case. In accordance with\nthe definition we have given and the idea we have of it, the\nconsciousness makes us acquainted with what a thing is, but it adds\nnothing to it. It is not a power which begets objects, nor is it a\npower which begets relations.\n\nLet us carefully note the consequence at which we should arrive, if,\nwhile admitting, on the one hand, that our consciousness lights up and\nreveals the objects without creating them, we were, on the other hand,\nto admit that it makes up for this passivity by creating relations\nbetween objects. We dare not go so far as to say that this creation of\nrelations is arbitrary and corresponds in no way to reality; or that,\nwhen we judge two neighbouring or similar objects, the relations of\ncontiguity and resemblance are pure inventions of our consciousness,\nand that these objects are really neither contiguous nor similar.\n\nIt must therefore be supposed that the relation is already, in some\nmanner, attracted into the objects; it must be admitted that our\nintelligence does not apply its categories haphazard or from the\ncaprice of the moment; and it must be admitted that it is led to apply\nthem because it has perceived in the objects themselves a sign and a\nreason which are an invitation to this application, and its\njustification. On this hypothesis, therefore, contiguity and\nresemblance must exist in the things themselves, and must be\nperceived; for without this we should run the risk of finding similar\nthat which is different, and contiguous that which has no relation of\ntime or space. Whence it results, evidently, that our consciousness\ncannot create the connection completely, and then we are greatly\ntempted to conclude that it only possesses the faculty of perceiving\nit when it exists in the objects.[27]\n\nAccording to this conception, the role of the consciousness in the\nperception of a connection is that of a witness, as in the perception\nof objects. The consciousness does not create, but it verifies.\nResemblance is a physical property of objects, like colour; and\ncontiguity is a physical property of objects, like form. The\nconnections between the objects form part of the group object and not\nof the group consciousness, and they are just as independent of\nconsciousness as are the objects themselves.\n\nAgainst this conclusion we must anticipate several objections. One of\nthem will probably consist in accentuating the difference existing\nbetween the object and the connection from the dynamical point of\nview. That the object may be passively contemplated by the\nconsciousness can be understood, it will be said; but the relation is\nnot only an object of perception--it is, further, a principle of\naction, a power of suggestion, and an agent of change.\n\nIt might, then, he supposed that the consciousness here finds a\ncompensation for the role that has been withdrawn from it. If it is\nnot the thing that creates the relation, it will be said, at least it\nis that which creates its efficacity of suggestion. Many psychologists\nhave supposed that a relation has the power of evocation only when it\nhas been perceived. The perception of resemblance precedes the action\nof resemblance. It is consequently the consciousness which assembles\nthe ideas and gives them birth by perceiving their relations.\n\nThis error, for it is one, has long been wide-spread--indeed, it still\npersists.[28] We have, however, no difficulty in understanding that\nthe perception of a resemblance between two terms supposes them to be\nknown; so long as only one of the terms is present to the\nconsciousness, this perception does not exist; it cannot therefore\npossess the property of bringing to light the second term. Suggestion\nis therefore distinct from recognition; it is when suggestion has\nacted, when the resemblance in fact has brought the two terms\ntogether, that the consciousness, taking cognisance of the work\naccomplished, verifies the existence of a resemblance, and that this\nresemblance explains the suggestion.\n\nSecond objection: we are told that the relations between the\nobjects--that is, the principal categories--must be of a mental\nnature, because they are _a priori_. That they are _a priori_ means\nthat they are at once anterior and superior to the experience. Let us\nsee what this argument is worth.\n\nIt appears that it is somewhat misused. With regard to many of the\ncategories, we are content to lay down the necessity of an abstract\nidea in order to explain the comprehension of a concrete one. It is\nsaid, for example: how can it be perceived that two sensations are\nsuccessive, if we do not already possess the idea of time? The\nargument is not very convincing, because, for every kind of concrete\nperception it is possible to establish an abstract category.\n\nIt might be said of colour that it is impossible to perceive it unless\nit is known beforehand what colour is; and so on for a heap of other\nthings. A more serious argument consists in saying that relations are\n_a priori_ because they have a character of universality and of\nnecessity which is not explained by experience, this last being always\ncontingent and peculiar. But it is not necessary that a function\nshould be mental for it to be _a priori_. The identification of the _a\npriori_ with the mental is entirely gratuitous. We should here draw a\ndistinction between the two senses of the _a priori_: anteriority and\nsuperiority.\n\nA simple physical mechanism may be _a priori_, in the sense of\nanteriority. A house is _a priori_, in regard to the lodgers it\nreceives; this book is _a priori_, in regard to its future readers.\nThere is no difficulty in imagining the structure of our nervous\nsystem to be _a priori_, in regard to the excitements which are\npropagated in it. A nerve cell is formed, with its protoplasm, its\nnucleus and its nucleoli before being irritated; its properties\nprecede its functions. If it be possible to admit that as a\nconsequence of ancestral experiences the function has created the\norgan, the latter is now formed, and this it is which in its turn\nbecomes anterior to the function. The notion of _a priori_ has\ntherefore nothing in it which is repugnant to physical nature.\n\nLet us now take the _a priori_ in the sense of superiority. Certain\njudgments of ours are, we are told, universal and necessary, and\nthrough this double character go beyond the evidence of experience.\nThis is an exact fact which deserves to be explained, but it is not\nindispensable to explain it by allowing to the consciousness a source\nof special cognitions. The English school of philosophy have already\nattacked this problem in connection with the origin of axioms. The\nprinciple of their explanation lies in the virtue of what they have\ntermed \"inseparable association.\" They have supposed that when an\nassociation is often repeated it creates a habit of thought against\nwhich no further strife is possible. The mechanism of association\nitself should then add a special virtue to the contingency of facts. A\nhundred repetitions of related facts, for example, would give rise to\nso firm an association, that no further repetition would increase it.\n\nI consider this explanation a very sound one in principle. It is right\nto put into association something more than into experience. I would\nonly suggest a slight correction in detail. It is not the association\nforged by repetition which has this virtue of conveying the idea of\nnecessity and universality, it is simply the uncontradicted\nassociation. It has been objected, in fact, and with reason, to the\nsolution of Mill, that it insists on a long duration of experience,\nwhile axioms appear to be of an irresistible and universal\ntruthfulness the moment they are conceived. And this is quite just. I\nshould prefer to lay down as a law that every representation appears\ntrue, and that every link appears necessary and universal as soon as\nit is formed. This is its character from the first. It preserves it so\nlong as no contradiction in fact, in reasoning, or in idea, comes to\ndestroy it.[29]\n\nWhat seems to stand out most clearly after all these explanations is\nthe role which we ought to attribute to the consciousness. Two rival\ntheories have been maintained: that of the mirror-consciousness and\nthat of the focus-consciousness. It would seem--I merely say it would\nseem--that the first of these best harmonises with the preceding\nfacts. For what seems most probable is, that the consciousness\nilluminates and reveals but does not act. The theory of the\nfocus-consciousness adapts itself less to the mechanism of the\nassociation of ideas.\n\nFrom this we come quite naturally to see in the intelligence only an\ninactive consciousness; at one moment it apprehends an object, and it\nis a perception or an idea; at another time it perceives a connection,\nand it is a judgment; at yet another, it perceives connections between\nconnections, and it is an act of reason. But however subtle the object\nit contemplates may become, it does not depart from its contemplative\nattitude, and cognition is but a consciousness.\n\nOne step further, and we should get so far as to admit that the\nconsciousness serves no purpose whatever, and that it is a useless\nluxury, since, if all efficacious virtue is to be found in the\nsensations and the ideas which we consider as material facts, the\nconsciousness which reveals them adds nothing to, takes nothing from\nand modifies nothing in them; and everything would go on the same, nor\nwould anything in this world be changed, if one day the light of\nconsciousness were, by chance, to be put out. We might imagine a\ncollection of automatons forming a human society as complicated as,\nand not different in appearance from, that of conscious beings; these\nautomatons would make the same gestures, utter the same words as\nourselves, would dispute, complain, cry, and make love like us; we\nmight even imagine them capable, like us, of psychology. This is the\nthesis of the epiphenomenal consciousness which Huxley has boldly\ncarried to its uttermost conclusions.\n\nI indicate here these possible conclusions, without discussing them.\nIt is a question I prefer to leave in suspense; it seems to me that\none can do nothing on this subject but form hypotheses.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 25: At the risk of being deemed too subtle, I ask whether we\nare conscious of a relation between objects, or whether that which\noccurs is not rather the perception of an object which has been\nmodified in its nature by its relation with another object.]\n\n[Footnote 26: This conclusion may seem contradictory to that which I\nenunciated when studying the constitution of matter. I then asserted\nthat we only know our sensations and not the excitants which produce\nthem. But these sensations are matter; they are matter modified by\nother matter, viz. our nervous centres.\n\nWe therefore take up very distinctly an opposite standpoint to the\nprinciple of _relativity_: in other terms, we reject the phenomenism\nof Berkeley.\n\nWhen we go into metaphysics we are continually astounded to see how\ndifferent conceptions of things which have a classic value are\nindependent of each other. In general, phenomenism is opposed to\nsubstantialism, and it is supposed that those who do not accept the\nformer doctrine must accept the latter, while, on the contrary, those\nwho reject substantialism must be phenomenists. We know that it is in\nthis manner that Berkeley conquered corporeal substantialism and\ntaught phenomenism; while Hume, more radical than he, went so far as\nto question the substantialism of mind. On reflection, it seems to me\nthat, after having rejected phenomenism, we are in no way constrained\nto accept substance. By saying that we perceive things as they are,\nand not through a deluding veil, we do not force ourselves to\nacknowledge that we perceive the substance of bodies--that is to say,\nthat something which should be hidden beneath its qualities and should\nbe distinct from it. The distinction between the body and its\nqualities is a thing useful in practice, but it answers to no\nperception or observation. The body is only a group, a sheaf of\nqualities. If the qualities seem unable to exist of themselves and to\nrequire a subject, this is only a grammatical difficulty, which is due\nto the fact that, while calling certain sensations qualities, we\nsuppose a subject to be necessary. On the other hand, the\nrepresentation which we make to ourselves of a material substance and\nits role as the support of the qualities, is a very naive and\nmechanical representation, thanks to which certain sensations become\nthe supports of other and less important sensations. It would suffice\nto insist on the detail of this representation and on its origin to\nshow its artificial character. The notion we have of the stability of\nbodies and of the persistence of their identity, notwithstanding\ncertain superficial changes, is the reason for which I thought proper\nto attribute a substance to them, that is to say, an invariable\nelement. But we can attain the same end without this useless\nhypothesis; we have only to remark that the identity of the object\nlies in the aggregate of its properties, including the name it bears.\nIf the majority of its properties, especially of those most important\nto us, subsists without alteration, or if this alteration, though of\nvery great extent, takes place insensibly and by slow degrees, we\ndecide that the object remains the same. We have no need for that\npurpose to give it a substance one and indestructible. Thus we are\nneither adherents of phenomenism, nor of substantialism.]\n\n[Footnote 27: I borrow from RABIER this argument, which has thoroughly\nconvinced me (see _Psychologie_, p. 281).]\n\n[Footnote 28: PILON is the psychologist who has the most forcibly\ndemonstrated that resemblance acts before being perceived. I refer the\nreaders to my _Psychologie du Raisonnement_, where I have set forth\nthis little problem in detail.]\n\n[Footnote 29: We think spontaneously of the general and the necessary.\nIt is this which serves as a basis for the suggestion and the\ncatchword (_reclame_), and it explains how minds of slender culture\nalways tend towards absolute assertions and hasty generalisations.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE SEPARABILITY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS\nFROM ITS OBJECT--DISCUSSION OF IDEALISM\n\n\nOne last question suggests itself with regard to the consciousness. In\nwhat measure is it separable from the object? Do the consciousness and\nits object form two things or only one?\n\nUnder observation these two terms constantly show themselves united.\nWe experience a sensation and have consciousness of it; it is the same\nfact expressed in two different ways. All facts of our perception thus\npresent themselves, and they are one. But our reason may outstrip our\nobservation. We are able to make a distinction between the two\nelements _being_ and _being perceived_. This is not an experimental\nbut an ideological distinction, and an abstraction that language makes\neasy.\n\nCan we go further, and suppose one of the parts thus analysed capable\nof existing without the other? Can sensation exist as physical\nexpression, as an object; without being illuminated by the\nconsciousness? Can the consciousness exist without having an object?\n\nLet us first speak of the existence of the object when considered as\nseparated from the consciousness. The problem is highly complicated.\n\nIt has sometimes been connected with the idealist thesis according to\nwhich the object of consciousness, being itself a modality of the\nconsciousness, cannot exist apart from it--that is to say, outside the\nperiods in which it is perceived. It would therefore result from this\nthat this separation between existence and perception might be made,\nwhen it is admitted (contrary to the idealist hypothesis) that the\nobject perceived is material and the consciousness which perceives it\nmental. In this case, it will be thought, there is no link of\nsolidarity between the consciousness and its continuity. But I am not\nof that opinion. The union of the consciousness and its object is one\nof fact, which presents itself outside any hypothesis on the nature of\nthe object. It is observation which demonstrates to us that we must\nperceive an object to be assured of its existence; the reason,\nmoreover, confirms the necessity of this condition, which remains true\nwhatever may be the \"stuff\" of the object.\n\nHaving stated this, the question is simply to know whether this\nobservation of fact should be generalised or not. We may, it seems to\nme, decline to generalise it without falling into a contradiction in\nterms. It may be conceived that the objects which we are looking at\ncontinue to exist, without change, during the moments when we have\nlost sight of them. This seems reasonable enough, and is the opinion\nof \"common\" sense.[30]\n\nThe English philosophers, Bain and Mill, have combated this\nproposition with extraordinary ardour, like believers combating a\nheresy. But notwithstanding their attacks it remains intelligible, and\nthe distinction between _being_ and _being perceived_ preserves its\nlogical legitimacy. This may be represented, or may be thought; but\ncan it be realised?\n\nSo far as regards external objects, I think we all, in fact, admit it.\nWe all admit a distinction, between the existence of the outer world\nand the perception we have of it; its existence is one thing, and our\nperception of it is another. The existence of the world continues\nwithout interruption; our perception is continually interrupted by the\nmost fortuitous causes, such as change of position, or even the\nblinking of the eyes; its existence is general, universal, independent\nof time and space; our perception is partial, particular, local,\nlimited by the horizon of our senses, determined by the geographical\nposition of our bodies, riddled by the distractions of our\nintelligence, deceived by the illusions of our minds, and above all\ndiminished by the infirmity of our intelligence, which is able to\ncomprehend so little of what it perceives. This is what we all admit\nin practice; the smallest of our acts implies the belief in something\nperceptible which is wider and more durable than our astonished\nperceptions. I could not write these lines unless I implicitly\nsupposed that my inkstand, my paper, my pen, my room, and the\nsurrounding world subsist when I do not see them. It is a postulate of\npractical life. It is also a postulate of science, which requires for\nits explanations of phenomena the supposition in them of an indwelling\ncontinuity. Natural science would become unintelligible if we were\nforced to suppose that with every eclipse of our perceptions material\nactions were suspended. There would be beginnings without sequences,\nand ends without beginnings.\n\nLet us note also that acquired notions on the working of our nervous\nsystem allow us to give this postulate a most precise form: the\nexternal object is distinct from the nervous system and from the\nphenomena of perception which are produced when the nervous system is\nexcited; it is therefore very easy to understand that this object\ncontinues to exist and to develop its properties, even when no brain\nvibrates in its neighbourhood.\n\nMight we not, with the view of strengthening this conclusion as to\nthe continuous existence of things, dispense with this postulate,\nwhich seems to have the character of a grace, of an alms granted to\nus? Might not this continuous existence of objects during the eclipses\nof our acts of consciousness, be demonstrated? It does not seem to me\nimpossible. Let us suppose for a moment the correctness of the\nidealist thesis: all our legitimate knowledge of objects is contained\nwithin the narrow limits of actual sensation; then, we may ask, of\nwhat use is the reason? What is the use of the memory? These functions\nhave precisely for their object the enlarging of the sphere of our\nsensations, which is limited in two principal ways, by time and by\nspace. Thanks to the reason, we manage to see in some way that which\nour senses are unable to perceive, either because it is too distant\nfrom us, or because there are obstacles between us and the object, or\nbecause it is a past event or an event which has not yet taken place\nwhich is in question.\n\nThat the reason may be deceived is agreed. But will it be asserted\nthat it is always deceived? Shall we go so far as to believe that this\nis an illegitimate mode of cognition? The idealist thesis, if\nconsistent, cannot refuse to extend itself to this extreme conclusion;\nfor a reasoned conclusion contains, when it has a meaning, a certain\nassertion on the order of nature, and this assertion is not a\nperception, since its precise object is to fill up the gaps in our\nperceptions. Not being a perception, it must be rejected, if one is an\nidealist.\n\nThe idealist will therefore keep strictly to the perception of the\nmoment, and this is so small a thing when deprived of all the\nconjectures which enrich it, that the world, if reduced to this alone,\nwould be but the skeleton of a world. There would then be no more\nscience, no possibility of knowledge. But who could make up his mind\nthus to shut himself up in perception?\n\nI suppose, indeed, that there will here be quibbling. This objection\nwill be made: that in the hypothesis of a discontinuous existence of\nthings, reason may continue to do its work, provided the intervention\nof a possible perception be supposed. Thus, I notice this morning, on\ngoing into my garden, that the pond which was dry yesterday is full of\nwater. I conclude from this, \"It has rained in the night.\" To be\nconsistent with idealism, one must simply add: \"If some one had been\nin the garden last night, he would have seen it rain.\" In this manner\none must re-establish every time the rights of perception.\n\nBe it so. But let us notice that this addition has no more importance\nthan a prescribed formula in a notarial act; for instance, the\npresence of a second notary prescribed by the law, but always\ndispensed with in practice. This prescribed formula can always be\nimagined or even understood. We shall be in accord with idealism by\nthe use of this easy little formula, \"If some one had been there,\" or\neven by saying, \"For a universal consciousness....\" The difference of\nthe realist and idealist theory becomes then purely verbal. This\namounts to saying that it disappears. But there is always much\nverbalism in idealism.\n\nOne more objection: if this witness--the consciousness--suffices to\ngive objects a continuity of existence, we may content ourselves with\na less important witness. Why a man? The eyes of a mollusc would\nsuffice, or those of infusoria, or even of a particle of protoplasm:\nliving matter would become a condition of the existence of dead\nmatter. This, we must acknowledge, is a singular condition, and this\nconclusion condemns the doctrine.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 30: That is to say, the sense of the multitude.--ED.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE SEPARATION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS\nFROM ITS OBJECT--THE UNCONSCIOUS\n\n\nI ask myself whether it is possible, by going further along this road\nof the separation between the consciousness and its object, to admit\nthat ideas may subsist during the periods when we are not conscious of\nthem. It is the problem of unconsciousness that I am here stating.\n\nOne of the most simple processes of reasoning consists in treating\nideas in the same manner as we have treated the external objects. We\nhave admitted that the consciousness is a thing superadded to the\nexternal objects, like the light which lights up a landscape, but does\nnot constitute it and may be extinguished without destroying it. We\ncontinue the same interpretation by saying that ideas prolong their\nexistence while they are not being thought, in the same way and for\nthe same motive that material bodies continue theirs while they are\nnot being perceived. All that it seems permissible to say is that this\nconception is not unrealisable.\n\nLet us now place ourselves at the point of view of the consciousness.\nWe have supposed up to the present the suppression of the\nconsciousness, and have seen that we can still imagine the object\ncontinuing to exist. Is the converse possible? Let us suppose that the\nobject is suppressed. Can the consciousness then continue to exist? On\nthis last point it seems that doubt is not possible, and we must\nanswer in the negative. A consciousness without an object, an empty\nconsciousness, in consequence, cannot be conceived; it would be a\nzero--a pure nothingness; it could not manifest itself. We might\nadmit, in strictness, that such a consciousness might exist virtually\nas a power which is not exercised, a reserve, a potentiality, or a\npossibility of being; but we cannot comprehend that this power can\nrealise or actualize itself. There is therefore no actual\nconsciousness without an object.\n\nThe problem we have just raised, that of the separability of the\nelements which compose an act of consciousness, is continued by\nanother problem--that of unconsciousness. It is almost the same\nproblem, for to ask one's self what becomes of a known thing when we\nseparate from it the consciousness which at first accompanied it, is\nto ask one's self in what an unconscious phenomenon consists.\n\nWe have, till now, considered the two principal forms of\nunconsciousness--that in nature and that in thought. The first named\nunconsciousness does not generally bear that name, but is rather\ndiscussed under the name of idealism and realism. Whatever be their\nnames, these two kinds of unconsciousness are conceivable, and the\nmore so that they both belong to physical nature.\n\nIf we allow ourselves to be guided by the concept of separability, we\nshall now find that we have exhausted the whole series of possible\nproblems, for we have examined all the possible separations between\nthe consciousness and its objects; but if we use another concept, that\nof unconsciousness, we can go further and propound a new problem: can\nthe consciousness become unconscious? But it is proper first to make a\nfew distinctions. It is the role of metaphysics to make\ndistinctions.[31]\n\nUnconsciousness presupposes a death of the consciousness; but this\ndeath has its degrees, and before complete extinction we may conceive\nit to undergo many attenuations. There is, first, the diminution of\nconsciousness.\n\nConsciousness is a magnitude capable of increase and decrease, like\nsensation itself. According to the individual, consciousness may have\na very large or a very small field, and may embrace at the same time a\nvariable number of objects. I can pay attention to several things at\nthe same time, but when I am tired it becomes more difficult to me. I\nlose in extension, or, as is still said, the field of consciousness is\nrestricted. It may also lose not only in extent of surface, but in\ndepth. We have all of us observed in our own selves moments of obscure\nconsciousness when we understand dimly, and moments of luminous\nconsciousness which carry one almost to the very bottom of things. It\nis difficult to consider those in the wrong who admit, with Leibnitz,\nthe existence of small states of consciousness. The lessening of the\nconsciousness is already our means of understanding the unconscious;\nunconsciousness is the limit of this reduction.[32]\n\nThis singular fact has also been noticed, that, in the same individual\nthere may co-exist several kinds of consciousness which do not enter\ninto communication with each other and which are not acquainted with\neach other. There is a principal consciousness which speaks, and, in\naddition, accessory kinds of consciousness which do not speak, but\nreveal their existence by the use of other modes of expression, of\nwhich the most frequent is writing.\n\nThis doubling or fractionation of the consciousness and personality\nhave often been described in the case of hysterical subjects. They\nsometimes occur quite spontaneously, but mostly they require a little\nsuggestion and cultivation. In any case, that they are produced in one\nway or other proves that they are possible, and, for the theory, this\npossibility is essential. Facts of this kind do not lead to a theory\nof the unconscious, but they enable us to understand how certain\nphenomena, unconscious in appearance, are conscious to themselves,\nbecause they belong to states of consciousness which have been\nseparated from each other.\n\nA third thesis, more difficult of comprehension than the other two,\nsupposes that the consciousness may be preserved in an unconscious\nform. This is difficult to admit, because unconsciousness is the\nnegation of consciousness. It is like saying that light can be\npreserved when darkness is produced, or that an object still exists\nwhen, by the hypothesis, it has been radically destroyed. This idea\nconveys no intelligible meaning, and there is no need to dwell on it.\n\nWe have not yet exhausted all the concepts whereby we may get to\nunconsciousness. Here is another, the last I shall quote, without,\nhowever, claiming that it is the last which exists. We might call it\nthe physiological concept, for it is the one which the physiologists\nemploy for choice. It is based upon the observation of the phenomena\nwhich are produced in the nervous system during our acts of\nconsciousness; these phenomena precede consciousness as a rule, and\ncondition it. According to a convenient figure which has been long in\nuse, the relations of the physiological phenomenon to the\nconsciousness are represented as follows: the physiological phenomenon\nconsists in an excitement which, at one time, follows a direct and\nshort route from the door by which it enters the nervous system to the\ndoor by which it makes its exit. In this case, it works like a simple\nmechanical phenomenon; but sometimes it makes a longer journey, and\ntakes a circuitous road by which it passes into the higher nerve\ncentres, and it is at the moment when it takes this circuitous road\nthat the phenomenon of consciousness is produced. The use of this\nfigure does not prejudge any important question.\n\nGoing further, many contemporary authors do not content themselves\nwith the proposition that the consciousness is conditioned by the\nnervous phenomenon, but suggest also that it is continually\naccompanied by it. Every psychical fact of perception, of emotion, or\nof idea should have, it is supposed, a physiological basis. It would\ntherefore be, taken in its entirety, psycho-physiological. This is\ncalled the parallelist theory.\n\nWe cannot discuss this here, as we shall meet with it again in the\nthird part of this book. It has the advantage of leading to a very\nsimple definition of unconsciousness. The unconscious is that which is\npurely physiological. We represent to ourselves the mechanical part of\nthe total phenomenon continuing to produce itself, in the absence of\nthe consciousness, as if this last continued to follow and illuminate\nit.\n\nSuch are the principal conceptions that may be formed of the\nunconscious. They are probably not the only ones, and our list is not\nexhaustive.\n\nAfter having indicated what the unconscious is, we will terminate by\npointing out what it is not and what it cannot be.\n\nWe think, or at least we have impliedly supposed in the preceding\ndefinitions, that the unconscious is only something unknown, which may\nhave been known, or which might become known under certain conditions,\nand which only differs from the known by the one characteristic of not\nbeing actually known. If this notion be correct, one has really not\nthe right to arm this unconsciousness with formidable powers. It has\nthe power of the reality to which it corresponds, but its character\nof unconsciousness adds nothing to this. It is the same with it as\nwith the science of the future. No scholar will hesitate to admit that\nthat science will be deeper and more refined than that already formed.\nBut it is not from the fact that it is unknown that it will deserve\nits superiority: it is from the phenomena that it will embrace. To\ngive to that which is unconscious, as we here understand it, an\noverwhelming superiority over the conscious as such, we must admit\nthat the consciousness is not only a useless luxury, but the\ndethronement of the forces that it accompanies.\n\nIn the next place, I decline to admit that the consciousness itself\ncan become unconscious, and yet continue in some way under an\nunconscious form. This would be, in my opinion, bringing together two\nconceptions which contradict each other, and thus denying after having\naffirmed. From the moment that the consciousness dies, there remains\nnothing of it, unless it be the conditions of its appearance,\nconditions which are distinct from itself. Between two moments of\nconsciousness separated by time or by a state of unconsciousness,\nthere does not and cannot exist any link. I feel incapable of\nimagining of what this link could be composed, unless it were\nmaterial--that is to say, unless it were supplied from the class of\nobjects. I have already said that the substantialist thesis\nendeavours to establish a continuity between one consciousness and\nanother separated by time, by supposing a something durable, of which\nthe consciousness would be a property of intermittent manifestation.\nThey would thus explain the interruptions of consciousness as the\ninterruptions in the light of a lamp. When the light is extinguished,\nthe lamp remains in darkness, but is still capable of being lighted.\nLet us discard this metaphor, which may lead to illusion. The concept\nof consciousness can furnish no link and no mental state which remains\nwhen the consciousness is not made real; if this link exists, it is in\nthe permanence of the material objects and of the nervous organism\nwhich allows the return of analogous conditions of matter.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 31: In metaphysics we reason, not on facts, but most often\non conceptions. Now just as facts are precise so conceptions are vague\nin outline. Facts are like crystallised bodies, ideas like liquids and\ngases. We think we have an idea, and it changes form without our\nperceiving it. We fancy we recognise one idea, and it is but another,\nwhich differs slightly from the preceding one. By means of\ndistinctions we ought to struggle against this flowing away and flight\nof ideas.]\n\n[Footnote 32: I think I have come across in ARISTOTLE the ingenious\nidea that the enfeeblement of the consciousness and its disorder may\nbe due to the enfeeblement and disorder of the object. It is a theory\nwhich is by no means improbable.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nDEFINITIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY\n\n\nLet us resume the study of the preceding ideas in another form. Since,\nmoreover, to define mind is at the same time to define psychology, let\nus seek for the truth which we can glean from the definitions of this\nscience. Our object is not to discover an exact definition, but to\nmake use of those already existing.\n\nTo define psychology is to describe the features of the domain over\nwhich this science holds sway, and at the same time to indicate the\nboundaries which separate it from its neighbours. At first sight this\nis an affair of geometric survey, presenting no kind of difficulty;\nfor psychology does not merge by insensible transitions into the\nneighbouring sciences, as physics does with chemistry, for example, or\nchemistry with biology.\n\nTo all the sciences of external nature psychology offers the violent\nopposition of the moral to the physical world. It cannot be put in\nline with the physical sciences. It occupies, on the contrary, a\nposition apart. It is the starting point, the most abstract and simple\nof the moral sciences; and it bears the same relation to them that\nmechanics does to the physical.\n\nAll this is doubtless true; and yet a very great difficulty has been\nexperienced in condensing into a clear definition the essence of\npsychology. This is proved by the multiplicity of definitions\nattempted. They are so many because none of them has proved completely\nsatisfactory. Their abundance shows their insufficiency. I will try to\nintroduce a little order into these attempts, and propose to\ndistribute the definitions of psychology into the following\ncategories:--\n\n     1. The definition by substance; the metaphysical definition\n          _par excellence_.\n\n     2. The definition by enumeration.\n\n     3.  \"      \"         method.\n\n     4.  \"      \"         degree of certainty.\n\n     5.  \"      \"         content.\n\n     6.  \"      \"         point of view.\n\n     7.  \"      \"         the peculiar nature of mental laws.\n\nWe will rapidly run through this series of efforts at definition, and\nshall criticise and reject nearly the whole of them; for the last\nalone seems exact--that is to say, in harmony with the ideas laid down\nabove.\n\nMetaphysical definition has to-day taken a slightly archaistic turn.\nPsychology used to be considered as the _science of the soul_. This\nis quite abandoned. Modern authors have adopted the expression and\nalso the idea of Lange,[33] who was, I think, the first to declare\nthat we ought to cultivate a _soulless psychology_. This categorical\ndeclaration caused an uproar, and a few ill-informed persons\ninterpreted it to mean that the new psychology which has spread in\nFrance under cover of the name of Ribot, sought to deny the existence\nof the soul, and was calculated to incline towards materialism. This\nis an error.\n\nIt is very possible, indeed, that several adepts of the new or\nexperimental psychology may be materialists from inward conviction.\nThe exclusive cultivation of external facts, of phenomena termed\nmaterial, evidently tends--this is a mystery to none--to incline the\nmind towards the metaphysical doctrine of materialism. But, after\nmaking this avowal, it is right to add at once that psychology, as a\nscience of facts, is the vassal of no metaphysical doctrine. It is\nneither spiritualist, materialist, nor monist, but a science of facts\nsolely. Ribot and his pupils have proclaimed this aloud at every\nopportunity. Consequently it must be recognised that the rather\namphibological expression \"soulless psychology\" implies no negation of\nthe existence of the soul. It is--and this is quite a different\nthing--rather an attitude of reserve in regard to this problem. We do\nnot solve this problem; we put it on one side.\n\nAnd, certainly, we are right to do so. The soul, viewed as a\nsubstance--that is, as a something distinct from psychical phenomena,\nwhich, while being their cause and support, yet remains inaccessible\nto our direct means of cognition--is only an hypothesis, and it cannot\nserve as objective to a science of facts. This would imply a\ncontradiction in terms.\n\nUnfortunately; we must confess that if it be right to relegate to\nmetaphysics the discussion on the concept of the soul, it does not\nreally suffice to purge our minds of all metaphysics; and a person who\nbelieves himself to be a simple and strict experimentalist is often a\nmetaphysician without knowing it. These excommunications of\nmetaphysics also seem rather childish at the present day. There is\nless risk than some years ago in declaring that: \"Here metaphysics\ncommence and positive science ends, and I will go no further.\" There\nis even a tendency in modern psychologists to interest themselves in\nthe highest philosophical problems, and to take up a certain position\nwith regard to them.\n\nThe second kind of definition is, we have said, that by enumeration.\nIt consists in placing before the eyes of the reader an assortment of\npsychological phenomena and then saying: \"These are the things\npsychology studies.\" One will take readily as samples the ideas,\nreasonings, emotions, and other manifestations of mental life. If this\nis only a strictly provisional definition, a simple introduction to\nthe subject, we accept it literally. It may serve to give us a first\nimpression of things, and to refresh the memories of those who, by a\nrather extraordinary chance, would not doubt that psychology studies\nour thoughts. But whatever may be the number of these deeply ignorant\npersons, they constitute, I think, a negligible quantity; and, after\nthese preliminaries, we must come to a real definition and not juggle\nwith the problem, which consists in indicating in what the spiritual\nis distinguished from the material. Let us leave on one side,\ntherefore, the definitions by enumeration.\n\nNow comes the definition by method. Numbers of authors have supposed\nthat it is by its method that psychology is distinguished from the\nother sciences.\n\nTo the mind is attached the idea of the within, to nature the idea of\nbeing without the mind, of constituting a \"without\" (_un dehors_). It\nis a vague idea, but becomes precise in a good many metaphors, and has\ngiven rise to several forms of speech. Since the days of Locke, we\nhave always spoken of the internal life of the mind as contrasted\nwith the external life, of subjective reality as contrasted with\nobjective reality; and in the same way we oppose the external senses\nto the inner sense (the internal perception), which it has at times\nbeen proposed to erect into a sixth sense. Though no longer quite the\nCartesian dualism, this is still a dualism.\n\nIt has also been said that psychology is the science of introspection,\nand, in addition, that scientific psychology is a controlled\nintrospection. This science of the \"internal facts of man\" would thus\nbe distinguished from the other natural sciences which are formed by\nthe use of our outer senses, by external observation--that is to say,\nto use a neologism, by externospection. This verbal symmetry may\nsatisfy for a moment minds given to words, but on reflection it is\nperceived that the distinction between introspection and\nexternospection does not correspond to a fundamental and constant\ndifference in the nature of things or in the processes of cognition. I\nacknowledge it with some regret, and thus place myself in\ncontradiction with myself; for I for a long time believed, and have\neven said in print, that psychology is the science of introspection.\nMy error arose from my having made too many analyses of detail, and\nnot having mounted to a sufficiently wide-reaching conception.\n\nThe definition I have given of consciousness is the implied\ncondemnation of the above ideas. Consciousness, being nothing but an\nact of revelation, has neither a within nor a without; it does not\ncorrespond to a special domain which would be an inner one with regard\nto another domain.\n\nEvery consideration on the position of things is borrowed from the\nsphere of the object, and remains foreign to the sphere of the\nconsciousness. It is by an abuse of language that we speak of the\nouter world in relation to the world of consciousness, and it is pure\nimagination on the part of philosophers to have supposed that our\nsensations are first perceived as internal states and states of\nconsciousness, and are subsequently projected without to form the\nouter world. The notion of internal and external is only understood\nfor certain objects which we compare by position to certain others.\n\nIn fact, we find that the opposition between an external and an\ninternal series is generally founded on two characteristics: sensation\nis considered external in relation to the idea, and an object of\ncognition is considered as internal when it is accessible only to\nourselves. When these two characteristics are isolated from each\nother, one may have doubts; but when they co-exist, then the\noutwardness or inwardness appears fully evidenced. We see then that\nthis distinction has nothing to do with the value of consciousness,\nand has nothing mental about it.\n\nIt is thus that our ideas are judged from internal events. It is our\nmicrocosm opposed to the macrocosm. It is the individual opposed to\nthe social. Looking at an external object, we remain in communion with\nour fellows, for we receive, or think we receive, identical\nsensations. At all events, we receive corresponding sensations. On the\nother hand, my thought is mine, and is known to me alone; it is my\nsanctuary, my private closet, where others do not enter. Every one can\nsee what I see, but no one knows what I think.\n\nBut this difference in the accessibility of phenomena is not due to\ntheir peculiar nature. It is connected with a different fact, with the\nmodes of excitement which call them forth. If the visual sensation is\ncommon to all, it is because the exciting cause of the sensation is an\nobject external to our nervous systems, and acting at a distance on\nall.[34] The tactile sensation is at the beginning more personal to\nthe one who experiences it, since it requires contact; and the lower\nsensations are in this intimacy still in progress. And then, the same\nobject can give rise, in common-place circumstances, to a sensation\neither common to all beings or special to one alone. The capsule of\nantipyrine which I swallow is, before my doing so, visible to all\neyes; once in my mouth, I am the only one to perceive it. It is\ntherefore possible that the same sensation, according to the\ndisplacements of the object which excites it, may make part of the\ninternal or of the external series; and as all psychic life is\nsensation, even effort, and, as we are assured, emotion, it follows\nthat our argument extends to all the psychical elements.\n\nFinally, the internal or external character of events, which might be\ncalled their geographical position, is a characteristic which has no\ninfluence upon the method destined to take cognisance of it. The\nmethod remains one. Introspection does not represent a source of\ncognition distinct from externospection, for the same faculties of the\nmind--reason, attention, and reflection--act on sensation, the source\nof the so-called external sciences, and on the idea, the source of the\nso-called inner science. A fact can be studied by essentially the same\nprocess, whether regarded by the eyes or depicted by the memory. The\nconsciousness changes its object and orientation, not its nature. It\nis as if, with the same opera-glass, we looked in turn at the wall of\nthe room and through the window.\n\nI can even quote on this point a significant fact: there are observers\nwho are organised in such a way that they especially observe by\nmemory. Placed before the sensorial phenomenon which strikes their\nsenses, they are sometimes amazed, as if hypnotised; they require to\nget away from it to regain consciousness of themselves, to analyse the\nfact, and to master it, and it is by means of the memory that they\nstudy it, on condition, of course, of afterwards coming back to verify\ntheir conclusions by a fresh observation from nature. Will it be said\nthat the physicist, the chemist, or the biologist who follows this\nslow method, and who thus observes retroactively, practises physics\nand biology by introspection? Evidently this would be ridiculous.\n\nConversely, introspection may, in certain cases, adopt the procedure\nof externospection. No doubt it would be inexact to say that the\nperception of one of our ideas always takes place through the same\nmechanism as the perception of one of our sensations. To give an\naccount of what we think does not imply the same work as in the case\nof what we see; for, generally, our thoughts and our images do not\nappear to us spontaneously. They are first sought for by us, and are\nonly realised after having been wished for. We go from the vague to\nthe precise, from the confused to the clear; the direction of thought\nprecedes, then, its realisation in images; and the latter, being\nexpected, is necessarily comprehended when it is formed. But we may\ncome across curious circumstances in which it is the image which has\nprecedence over its appearance, and in that case it is exact to say\nthat this uninvoked image must be interpreted and recognised as if it\nwere an external object. In cases of this kind, there passes through\nour mind something which surprises us. I see, by internal vision, a\nface with a red nose, and I have to search my memory for a long time,\neven for days, in order to give precision to the vague feeling that I\nhave seen it before, so as to finally say with confidence, \"It is So\nand So!\" Or else I hear in my inner ear a certain voice, with a\nmetallic tone and authoritative inflections: this voice pronounces\nscientific phrases, gives a series of lectures, but I know not to whom\nit belongs, and it costs me a long effort to reach the interpretation:\nit is the voice of M. Dastre! There is, then, a certain space of time,\nmore or less long, in which we can correctly assert that we are not\naware of what we are thinking; we are in the presence of a thought in\nthe same state of uncertainty as in that of an external, unknown, and\nnovel object. The labour of classification and of interpretation cast\nupon us is of the same order; and, when this labour is effected\nincorrectly, it may end in an illusion. Therefore illusions of\nthought are quite as possible as illusions of the senses, though rarer\nfor the reasons above stated. But the question of frequency has no\ntheoretical importance.\n\nI have shown elsewhere, by experiments on hysterics, that it is\npossible by the intermediary of their insensibility to touch to\nsuggest ideas on the value of which the patients make mistakes. For\ninstance, you take the finger in which they have no sensation, you\ntouch it, you bend it. The patient, not seeing what is done, does not\nfeel it, but the tactile sensation unfelt by their principal\nconsciousness somehow awakes the visual image of the finger; this\nenters into the field of consciousness, and most often is not\nrecognised by the subject, who describes the occurrence in his own\nway; he claims, for instance, that he thinks of sticks or of columns.\nIn reality he does not know of what he is thinking, and we know better\nthan he. He is thinking of his finger, and does not recognise it.\n\nAll these examples show that the clearly defined characteristics into\nwhich it is sought to divide extrospection and introspection do not\nexist. There is, however, a reason for preserving the distinction,\nbecause it presents a real interest for the psychology of the\nindividual. These two words introspection and extrospection admirably\nconvey the difference in the manner of thinking between those who\nfrom preference look, and those who from preference reflect. On the\none hand, the observers, who are often men of action; on the other,\nthe speculators, who are often mystics. But it would be no more\nlegitimate by this means to separate psychology and physics than to\nsay, for instance, \"There are two kinds of geology: one is the geology\nof France, for one is acquainted with it without going from home, and\nthe other is that of the rest of the world, because in order to know\nit one must cross the frontier.\"\n\nWe reject, therefore, the definition drawn from the difference of\nmethod. At bottom there is no difference of method, but only\ndifferences of process, of _technique_. The method is always the same,\nfor it is derived from the application of a certain number of laws to\nthe objects of cognition, and these laws remain the same in all\nspheres of application.\n\nHere is another difference of method which, if it were true, would\nhave an incalculable importance. Psychology, we are told, is a science\nof direct and immediate experiment; it studies facts as they present\nthemselves to our consciousness, while the natural sciences are\nsciences of indirect and mediate experiment, for they are compelled to\ninterpret the facts of consciousness and draw from them conclusions on\nnature. It has also been said, in a more ambitious formula, \"The\nscience of physical objects is relative; logical science is absolute.\"\n\nLet us examine this by the rapid analysis of any perception taken at\nhaphazard. What I perceive directly, immediately, we are told, is not\nthe object, it is my state of consciousness; the object is inferred;\nconcluded, and taken cognisance of through the intermediary of my\nstate of consciousness. We only know it, says Lotze, _circa rem_. It\nis therefore apprehended less immediately, and every natural science\nemploys a more roundabout method than that of psychology. This last,\nby studying states of consciousness, which alone are known to us\ndirectly, comprehends reality itself, absolute reality. \"There is more\nabsolute reality,\" M. Rabier boldly says, \"in the simple feeling that\na man, or even an animal, has of its pain when beaten than in all the\ntheories of physics, for, beyond these theories, it can be asked, what\nare the things that exist. But it is an absurdity to ask one's self\nif, beyond the pain of which one is conscious, there be not another\npain different from that one.\"[35]\n\nLet us excuse in psychologists this petty and common whim for\nexaggerating the merit of the science they pursue. But here the limit\nis really passed, and no scholar will admit that the perception and\nrepresentation of a body, as it may take place in the brain of a\nBerthelot, can present any inferiority as a cognition of the absolute,\nto the pain felt by the snail I crush under my foot. Nobody except\nmetaphysicians will acknowledge that psychology is a more precise and\ncertain science than physics or chemistry.\n\nThe criterion furnished by the development of the respective sciences\nwould prove just the contrary. The observations of psychology are\nalways rather unprecise. Psychological phenomena, notwithstanding the\nefforts of Fechner and his school, are not yet measured with the same\nstrictness and ease as the tangible reality. To speak plainly, the\npsychologist who vaunts the superiority of his method, and only shows\ninferior results, places himself in a somewhat ridiculous and\ncontradictory position; he deserves to be compared to those\nspiritualists who claim the power of evoking the souls of the\nillustrious dead and only get from them platitudes.\n\nIn the main the arguments of the metaphysicians given above appear to\nme to contain a grave error. This consists in supposing that the\nnatural sciences study the reality hidden beneath sensation, and only\nmake use of this fact as of a sign which enables them to get back from\neffect to cause. This is quite inexact. That the natural sciences are\nlimited by sensation is true; but they do not go outside it, they\neffect their constructions with sensation alone. And the reason is\nvery simple: it is the only thing they know. To the metaphysical\npsychologist, who claims sensation as his own property, saying, \"But\nthis sensation is a state of my consciousness, it is mine, it is\nmyself,\" the physicist has the right to answer: \"I beg your pardon!\nthis sensation is the external object that I am studying; it is my\ncolumn of mercury, my spring, my precipitate, my amoeba; I\ncomprehend these objects directly, and I want no other.\" Psychology\nfinds itself, therefore, exactly on the same footing as the other\nsciences in the degree in which it studies sensations that it\nconsiders as its own property. I have already said that the sensations\nproper to psychology are hardly represented otherwise than by the\nemotional sensations produced by the storms in the apparatus of\norganic life.\n\nWe now come to the definitions by content. They have been numerous,\nbut we shall only quote a few. The most usual consists in saying, that\n_Psychology studies the facts of consciousness_. This formula passes,\nin general, as satisfactory. The little objection raised against it\nis, that it excludes the unconscious facts which play so important a\npart in explaining the totality of mental life; but it only requires\nsome usual phrase to repair this omission. One might add, for\ninstance, to the above formula: conscious facts and those which,\nwhile unconscious under certain conditions, are yet conscious in\nothers.\n\nThis is not, however, the main difficulty, which is far more serious.\nOn close examination, it is seen that the term, _fact of\nconsciousness_, is very elastic, and that for a reason easy to state.\nThis is, that all facts which exist and are revealed to us reach us by\nthe testimony of the consciousness, and are, consequently, facts of\nconsciousness. If I look at a locomotive, and analyse its machinery, I\nact like a mechanic; if I study under the microscope the structure of\ninfusoria, I practise biology; and yet the sight of the locomotive,\nthe perception of the infusoria, are just facts of consciousness, and\nshould belong to psychology, if one takes literally the above\ndefinition, which is so absolute that it absorbs the entire world into\nthe science of the mind. It might, indeed, be remarked that certain\nphenomena would remain strictly psychological, such as, for instance,\nthe emotions, the study of which would not be disputed by any physical\nscience; for the world of nature offers us nothing comparable to an\nemotion or an effort of will, while, on the other hand, everything\nwhich is the object of physical science--that is, everything which can\nbe perceived by our external senses--may be claimed by psychology.\nTherefore, it is very evident the above definition is much too wide,\nand does not agree with _solo definito_. It does not succeed in\ndisengaging the essential characteristic of physics. This\ncharacteristic indeed exists, and we foresee it, but we do not\nformulate it.\n\nAnother definition by content has not been much more happy. To\nseparate the material from the moral, the conception of Descartes was\nremembered, and we were told that: \"Psychology is the science of what\nexists only in time, while physics is the science of what exists at\nonce in time and in space.\"\n\nTo this theoretical reasoning it might already be objected that, in\nfact, and in the life we lead, we never cease to localise in space,\nthough somewhat vaguely, our thought, our Ego, and our intellectual\nwhole. At this moment I am considering myself, and taking myself as an\nexample. I am writing these lines in my study, and no metaphysical\nargument can cause me to abandon my firm conviction that my\nintellectual whole is in this room, on the second floor of my house at\nMeudon. I am here, and not elsewhere. My body is here; and my soul, if\nI have one, is here. I am where my body is; I believe even that I am\nwithin my body.\n\nThis localisation, which certainly has not the exactness nor even the\ncharacteristics of the localisation of a material body in space, seems\nto me to result from the very great importance we attach, to the\nexistence of our body in perception and in movement. Our body\naccompanies all our perceptions; its changes of position cause these\nperceptions to vary; the accidents which happen to it bring us\npleasure or pain. Some of its movements are under our orders; we\nobserve that others are the consequences of our thoughts and our\nemotions. It occupies, therefore, among the objects of cognition a\nprivileged place, which renders it more intimate and more dear to us\nthan other objects. There is no need to inquire here whether, in\nabsolute reality, I am lodged within it, for this \"I\" is an artificial\nproduct manufactured from memories. I have before explained what is\nthe value of the relation subject-object. It is indisputable that in\nthe manufacture of the subject we bring in the body. This is too\nimportant an element for it not to have the right to form part of the\nsynthesis; it is really its nucleus. As, on the other hand, all the\nother elements of the synthesis are psychical, invisible, and reduced\nto being faculties and powers, it may be convenient to consider them\nas occupying the centre of the body or of the brain. There is no need\nto discuss this synthesis, for it is one of pure convenience. As well\ninquire whether the personality of a public company is really\nlocalised at its registered offices, round the green baize cover\nwhich adorns the table in the boardroom.\n\nAnother definition of psychology, which is at once a definition by\ncontent and a definition by method, has often been employed by\nphilosophers and physiologists. It consists in supposing that there\nreally exist two ways of arriving at the cognition of objects: the\nwithin and the without. These two ways are as opposed to each other as\nthe right and wrong side of a stuff. It is in this sense that\npsychology is the science of the within and looks at the wrong side of\nthe stuff, while the natural sciences look at the right side. And it\nis so true, they add, that the same phenomenon appears under two\nradically different forms according as we look at it from the one or\nthe other point of view. Thus, it is pointed out to us, every one of\nour thoughts is in correlation with a particular state of our cerebral\nmatter; our thought is the subjective and mental face; the\ncorresponding cerebral process is the objective and material face.\n\nThen the difference between representation, which is a purely\npsychological phenomenon, and a cerebral state which is a material\none, and reducible to movement, is insisted upon; and it is declared\nthat these two orders of phenomena are separated by irreducible\ndifferences.\n\nLastly, to take account of the meaning of these differences, and to\nexplain them, it is pointed out that they are probably connected with\nthe modes of cognition which intervene to comprehend the mental and\nthe physical. The mental phenomenon, we are told, is comprehended by\nitself, and as it is; it is known without any mystery, and in its\nabsolute reality. The physical phenomenon, on the contrary, only\nreaches us through the intermediary of our nerves, more or less\ntransformed in consequence by the handling in transport. It is an\nindirect cognition which causes us to comprehend matter; we have of\nthis last only a relative and apparent notion, which sufficiently\nexplains how it may differ from a phenomenon of thought.\n\nI have already had occasion to speak of this dualism, when we were\nendeavouring to define sensation. We return to its criticism once\nmore, for it is a conception which in these days has become classic;\nand it is only by repeatedly attacking it that it will be possible to\ndemonstrate its error.\n\nTo take an example: I look at the plain before me, and see a flock of\nsheep pass over it. At the same time an observer is by my side and is\nnot looking at the same thing as myself. It is not at the plain that\nhe looks; it is, I will suppose, within my brain. Armed with a\nmicroscope _a la_ Jules Verne, he succeeds in seeing what is passing\nbeneath my skull, and he notices within my fibres and nerve cells\nthose phenomena of undulation which physiologists have hitherto\ndescribed hypothetically. This observer notices then, that, while I am\nlooking over the plain, my optic nerve conveys a certain kind of\nmovements--these are, I suppose, displacements of molecules which\nexecute a complicated kind of dance. The movement follows the course\nof the optic nerve, traverses the chiasma, goes along the fascia,\npasses the internal capsule, and finally arrives at the visual centres\nof the occipital region. Here, then, are the two terms of comparison\nconstituted: on the one hand, we have a certain representation--that\nis, my own; and on the other hand, coinciding with this representation\nwe have the dynamic changes in the nerve centres. These are the two\nthings constituting the right and wrong side of the stuff. We shall be\ntold: \"See how little similarity there is here! A representation is a\nphysical fact, a movement of molecules a material fact.\" And further,\n\"If these two facts are so little like each other, it is because they\nreach us by two different routes.\"\n\nI think both these affirmations equally disputable. Let us begin with\nthe second. Where does one see that we possess two different sources\nof knowledge? Or that we can consider an object under two different\naspects? Where are our duplicate organs of the senses, of which the\none is turned inward and the other outward? In the example chosen for\nthis discussion, I have supposed two persons, each of whom\nexperiences a visual perception. One looks at one object, the other at\nanother; but both are looking with the same organs of sense, that is,\nwith their eyes. How is it possible to understand that these eyes can,\nin turn, according to the necessity of the moment, see the two faces,\nphysical and mental, of the same object?\n\nThey are the two faces of an identical object, is the answer made to\nus, because the two visions, although applied to the same object, are\nessentially different. On the one hand is a sensation of displacement,\nof movement, of a dance executed by the molecules of some proteid\nsubstance; on the other hand is a flock of sheep passing over the\nplain at a distance of a hundred metres away.\n\nIt seems to me that here also the argument advanced is not sound. In\nthe first place, it is essential to notice that not only are the two\npaths of cognition identical, but also that the perceptions are of the\nsame nature. There is in this no opposition between the physical and\nthe mental. What is compared are the two phenomena, which are both\nmixed and are physico-mental--physical, through the object to which\nthey are applied, mental, through the act of cognition they imply. To\nperceive an object in the plain and to perceive a dynamic state of the\nbrain are two operations which each imply an act of cognition; and,\nin addition, the object of this knowledge is as material in the one as\nin the other case. A flock of sheep is matter just as much as my\nbrain.\n\nNo doubt, here are objects which differ; my observer and myself have\nnot the same perception. I acknowledge, but do not wonder at it. How\ncould our two perceptions be similar? I look at the sheep, and he at\nthe interior of my brain. It is not astonishing that, looking at such\ndifferent objects, we should receive images also different. Or, again,\nif this other way of putting it be preferred, I would say: the\nindividual A looks at the flock through the intermediary of his\nnervous system, while B looks at it through that of two nervous\nsystems, put as it were end to end (though not entirely), his own\nnervous system first, and then that of A. How, then, could they\nexperience the same sensation?\n\nThey could only have an identical sensation if the idea of the\nancients were to be upheld, who understood the external perception of\nbodies to result from particles detaching themselves from their\nbodies, and after a more or less lengthy flight, striking and entering\ninto our organs of sense.[36]\n\nLet us imagine, just for a moment, one of our nerves--the optic\nnerve, for instance--transformed into a hollow tube, along which the\nemissions of miniatures should wend their way. In this case,\nevidently, if so strange a disposition were to be realised, and if B\ncould see what was flowing in the optic nerve of A, he would\nexperience a sensation almost analogous to that of A. Whenever the\nlatter saw a dog, a sheep, or a shepherd, B would likewise see in the\noptic canal minute dogs, microscopic sheep, and Lilliputian shepherds.\nAt the cost of such a childish conception, a parity of content in the\nsensations of our two spectators A and B might be supposed. But I will\nnot dwell on this.\n\nThe above considerations seem to me to explain the difference\ngenerally noticed between thought and the physiological process. It is\nnot a difference of nature, an opposition of two essences, or of two\nworlds--it is simply a difference of object; just that which separates\nmy visual perception of a tree and my visual perception of a dog.\nThere remains to know in what manner we understand the relation of\nthese two processes: this is another problem which we will examine\nlater.\n\nSince the content does not give us the differentiation we desire, we\nwill abandon the definitions of psychology by content. What now\nremains? The definitions from the point of view. The same fact may he\nlooked at, like a landscape, from different points of view, and\nappears different with the changes therein. It is so with the facts we\nconsider psychical, and the autonomy of psychology would thus be a\nmatter of point of view.\n\nIt has, then, been supposed--and this is a very important\nproposition--that the distinctive feature of psychical facts does not\nconsist in their forming a class of particular events. On the\ncontrary, their characteristic is to be studied in their dependency on\nthe persons who bring them about. This interesting affirmation is not\nnew: it may be read in the works of Mach, Kuelpe, Muensterberg, and,\nespecially, of Ebbinghaus, from whom I quote the following lines of\nquite remarkable clearness: \"Psychology is not distinguished from\nsciences like physics and biology, which are generally and rightly\nopposed to it, by a different content, in the way that, for instance,\nzoology is distinguished from mineralogy or astronomy. It has the same\ncontent, but considers it from a different point of view and with a\ndifferent object. It is the science, not of a given part of the world,\nbut of the whole world, considered, however, in a certain relation. It\nstudies, in the world, those formations, processes, and relations, the\nproperties of which are essentially determined by the properties and\nfunctions of an organism, of an organised individual.... Psychology,\nin short, considers the world from an individual and subjective point\nof view, while the science of physics studies it as if it were\nindependent of us.\"\n\nOver these definitions by point of view, one might quibble a little;\nfor those who thus define psychology are not always consistent with\nthemselves. In other passages of their writings they do not fail to\noppose psychical to physiological phenomena, and they proclaim the\nirreducible heterogeneity of these two orders of phenomena and the\nimpossibility of seeing in physics the producing cause of the moral.\nEbbinghaus is certainly one of the modern writers who have most\nstrongly insisted on this idea of opposition between the physiological\nand the psychical, and he is a convinced dualist. Now I do not very\nclearly understand in what the principle of heterogeneity can consist\nto a mind which admits, on the other hand, that psychology does not\ndiffer from the physical sciences by its content.\n\nHowever, I confine myself here to criticising the consequences and not\nthe starting point. The definition of the psychical phenomenon by the\npoint of view seems to me correct, although it has more concision than\nclearness; for it rests especially upon a material metaphor, and the\nexpression \"point of view\" hardly applies except to the changes of\nperspective furnished by visible objects.\n\nIt would be more exact to say that psychology specially studies\ncertain objects of cognition, such as those which have the character\nof representations (reminiscences, ideas, concepts), the emotions, the\nvolitions, and the reciprocal influences of these objects among\nthemselves. It studies, then, a part of the material world, of that\nworld which till now has been called psychological, because it does\nnot come under the senses, and because it is subjective and\ninaccessible to others than ourselves; it studies the laws of those\nobjects, which laws have been termed mental.[37]\n\nThese laws are not recognised, popularly speaking, either in physics\nor in biology; they constitute for us a cognition apart from that of\nthe natural world. Association by resemblance, for example, is a law\nof consciousness; it is a psychological law which has no application\nnor counterpart in the world of physics or biology. We may therefore\nsum up what has been said by the statement that psychology is the\nstudy of a certain number of laws, relations, and connections.\n\nAs to the particular feature which distinguishes mental from physical\nlaws, we can formulate it, as does William James, by saying that the\nessence of a mental law is to be teleological, or, if the phrase be\npreferred, we can say that mental activity is a finalistic activity,\nwhich expends itself as will in the pursuit of future ends, and as\nintelligence in the choice of the means deemed capable of serving\nthose ends. An act of intelligence is recognised by the fact of its\naiming at an end, and employing for this end one means chosen out of\nmany. Finality and intelligence are thus synonymous. In opposition to\nmental law, physical law is mechanical, by which expression is simply\nimplied the absence of finality. Finality opposed to mechanism; such\nis the most concise and truest expression in which must be sought the\ndistinctive attribute of psychology and of the moral sciences, the\nessential characteristic by which psychological are separated from\nphysical facts.\n\nI think it may be useful to dwell a little on the mental laws which I\nhave just opposed to the physical, and whose object is to assure\npreadaptation and form a finality.[38] Their importance cannot be\nexaggerated. Thanks to his power of preadaptation, the being endowed\nwith intelligence acquires an enormous advantage over everything which\ndoes not reason. No doubt, as has been shrewdly remarked, natural\nselection resembles a finality, for it ends in an adaptation of beings\nto their surroundings. There is therefore, strictly speaking, such a\nthing as finality without intelligence. But the adaptation resulting\ntherefrom is a crude one, and proceeds by the elimination of all that\ndoes not succeed in adapting itself; it is a butchery. Real finalism\nsaves many deaths, many sufferings, and many abortions.[39]\n\nLet us examine, then, the process of preadaptation; it will enable us\nto thoroughly comprehend, not only the difference between the physical\nand the psychical laws, but the reason why the psychical manages in\nsome fashion to mould itself upon the physical law.\n\nNow, the means employed by preadaptation is, if we take the matter in\nits simplest form, to be aware of sensations before they are\nexperienced. If we reflect that all prevision implies a previous\nknowledge of the probable trend of events, it will be understood that\nthe part played by intelligence consists in becoming imbued with the\nlaws of nature, for the purpose of imitating its workings. By the\nlaws of nature, we understand here only that order of real sensations,\nthe knowledge of which is sufficient to fulfil the wants of practical\nlife. To us there are always gaps in this order, because the sensation\nit is important for us to know is separated from us either by the\nbarriers of time or of space, or by the complication of useless\nsensations. Thence the necessity of interpolations. That which we do\nnot perceive directly by our senses, we are obliged to represent to\nourselves by our intelligence; the image does the work of sensation,\nand supplements the halting sensation in everything which concerns\nadaptation.\n\nTo replace the inaccessible sensation by the corresponding image, is\ntherefore to create in ourselves a representation of the outer world\nwhich is, on all the points most useful to us, more complete than the\ndirect and sensorial presentation of the moment. There is in us a\npower of creation, and this power exercises itself in the imitation of\nthe work of nature; it imitates its order, it reconstitutes on the\nsmall scale adapted to our minds, the great external order of events.\nNow, this work of imitation is only really possible if the imitator\nhas some means at his disposal analogous to those of the model.\n\nOur minds could not divine the designs of nature, if the laws of\nimages had nothing in common with the laws of nature. We are thus led\nto confront these two orders of laws with each other; but, before\ndoing so, one more preliminary word is necessary. We have up till now\nsomewhat limited the problem, in order to understand it. We have\nreduced the psychological being to one single function, the\nintellectual, and to one single object of research, the truth. This\nis, however, an error which has often been committed, which is now\nknown and catalogued, called intellectualism, or the abuse of\nintellectualism. It is committed for this very simple reason, that it\nis the intellectual part of our being which best allows itself to be\nunderstood, and, so to speak, intellectualised. But this leaves out of\nthe question a part of our entire mental being so important and so\neminent, that if this part be suppressed, the intelligence would cease\nto work and would have no more utility than a machine without motive\npower. Our own motive power is the will, the feeling, or the tendency.\nWill is perhaps the most characteristic psychical function, since, as\nI have already had occasion to say, nothing analogous to it is met\nwith in the world of nature. Let us therefore not separate the will\nfrom the intelligence, let us incarnate them one in the other; and,\ninstead of representing the function of the mind as having for its aim\nknowledge, foresight, the combination of means, and self-adaptation,\nwe shall be much nearer the truth in representing to ourselves a\nbeing who _wills_ to know, _wills_ to foresee, and _wills_ to adapt\nhimself, for, after all, he _wills_ to live.\n\nHaving said this, let us compare the psychological law and that of\nnature. Are they identical? We shall be told that they are not, since,\nas a fact, errors are committed at every moment by the sudden failures\nof human reason. This is the first idea which arises. Human error, it\nwould seem, is the best proof that the two laws in question are not\nalike, and we will readily add that a falling stone does not mistake\nits way, that the crystal, in the course of formation does not miss\ntaking the crystalline shape, because they form part of physical\nnature, and are subject in consequence to its determinism. But this is\nfaulty reasoning, and a moment of reflection demonstrates it in the\nclearest possible manner; for adaptation may miss its aim without the\nbeing who adapts himself and his surroundings necessarily obeying\ndifferent laws. When the heat of a too early spring causes buds to\nburst forth prematurely which are afterwards destroyed by frost, there\nis produced a fault of adjustment which resembles an error of\nadaptation, and the bringing forward of this error does not\nnecessarily imply that the tree and the whole of physical nature are\nobeying different laws. Moreover, the difference between the laws of\nnature and those of the understanding does not need deduction by\nreasoning from an abstract principle; it is better to say that it is\ndirectly observable, and this is how I find that it presents itself to\nus.\n\nThe essential law of nature is relatively easy to formulate, as it is\ncomprised in the very definition of law. It simply consists in the\nsentence: uniformity under similar conditions. We might also say: a\nconstant relation between two or several phenomena, which can also be\nexpressed in a more abstract way by declaring that the law of nature\nrests on the combination of two notions, identity and constancy.\n\nOn the other hand, the laws of our psychical activity partly\ncorrespond to the same tendencies, and it would be easy to demonstrate\nthat the microcosm of our thoughts is governed by laws which are also\nan expression of these two combined notions of constancy and identity.\nIt is, above all, in the working of the intellectual machine, the best\nknown and the most clearly analysed up till now, that we see the\napplication of this mental law which resembles, as we say, on certain\nsides, the physical law: and the best we can do for our demonstration\nwill doubtless be to dissect our reasoning powers. Reason, a process\nessential to thought in action, is developed in accordance with a law\nwhich resembles in the most curious manner a physical law. It\nresembles it enough to imitate it, to conform to it, and, so to speak,\nto mould itself on it.\n\nNow, the reason does not follow the caprices of thought, it is subject\nto rules; it results from the properties of the images, those\nproperties which we have above referred to, the material character of\nwhich we have recognised, and which are two in number--similarity and\ncontiguity, as they are termed in the jargon of the schools. They are\nproperties which have for their aim to bring things together, to\nunite, and to synthetise. They are unceasingly at work, and so\napparent in their labour that they have long been known. We know,\nsince the time of Aristotle, that two facts perceived at the same time\nreproduce themselves together in the memory--this is the law of\ncontiguity; and that two facts perceived separately, but which are\nsimilar, are brought together in our mind--this is the law of\nsimilarity.\n\nNow, similarity and contiguity form by combination the essential part\nof all kinds of reasoning, and this reasoning, thus understood, works\nin a fashion which much resembles (we shall see exactly in what\ndegree) a physical law. I wish to show this in a few words. What\nrenders my demonstration difficult and perhaps obscure is, that we\nshall be obliged to bring together rather unexpectedly categories of\nphenomena which are generally considered separate.\n\nThe distinctive attribute of the reason consists, as I have said, in\nthe setting to work of these two elementary properties, similarity and\ncontiguity. It consists, in fact, in extending continuity by\nsimilarity; in endowing with identical properties and similar\naccompaniments things which resemble each other; in other words, it\nconsists in impliedly asserting that the moment two things are\nidentical in one point they are so for all the rest. This will be\nfairly well understood by imagining what takes place when mental\nimages having the above-mentioned properties meet. Suppose that B is\nassociated with C, and that A resembles B. In consequence of their\nresemblance the passing from A to B is easy; and then B suggesting C\nby contiguity, it happens that this C is connected with A connected,\nthough, in reality, they have never been tried together. I say they\nare associated on the basis of their relation to B, which is the\nrallying point. It is thus that, on seeing a piece of red-hot iron\n(A), I conclude it is hot (C), because I recollect distinctly or\nunconsciously another piece of red-hot iron (B), of which I once\nexperienced the heat. It is this recollection B which logicians, in\ntheir analysis of logical, verbal, and formal argument, call the\nmiddle term. Our representation of the process of reasoning is not\nspecial to argument. It also expresses the process of invention, and\nevery kind of progress from the known to the unknown. It is an\nactivity which creates relations, which assembles and binds together,\nand the connections made between different representations are due to\ntheir partial identities, which act as solder to two pieces of metal.\n\nIt will now be understood that these relations between the images\ncuriously resemble the external order of things, the order of our\nsensations, the order of nature, the physical law. This is because\nthis physical law also has the same character and expresses itself\nsimilarly. We might say \"all things which resemble each other have the\nsame properties,\" or \"all things alike on one point resemble each\nother on all other points.\" But immediately we do so, the difference\nbetween the physical and the mental law becomes apparent. The formula\nwe have given is only true on condition that many restrictions and\ndistinctions are made.\n\nThe process of nature is so to do that the _same_ phenomenon always\nunfolds itself in the same order. But this process is not always\ncomprehended in real life, for it is hidden from our eyes by the\nmanifold combinations of chance; in the reality that we perceive there\nis a crowd of phenomena which resemble each other but are not really\nthe same. There are a number of phenomena which co-exist or follow\neach other without this order of co-existence or succession being\nnecessary or constant. In other words, there are resemblances which\nare the marks of something, as a logician would say, and others which\nare not the marks of anything; there are relations of time and space\nwhich are the expression of a law; there are some which are\naccidental, and may possibly never be reproduced.\n\nIt would be a wonderful advantage if every scientific specialist would\nmake out a list of the non-significant properties that he recognises\nin matter. The chemist, for example, would show us that specific\nweight has hardly any value in diagnosis, that the crystalline form of\na salt is often not its own, that its colour especially is almost\nnegligible because an immense number of crystals are white or\ncolourless, that precipitation by a given substance does not\nordinarily suffice to characterise a body, and so on. The botanist, on\nhis part, would show us that, in determining plants, absolute\ndimension is less important than proportion, colour less important\nthan form, certain structures of organs less important than others.\nThe pathologist would teach us that most pathological symptoms have\nbut a trivial value; the cries, the enervation, the agitation of a\npatient, even the delirium which so affects the bystanders, are less\ncharacteristic of fever than the rate of his pulse, and the latter\nless than the temperature of the armpit or the dryness of the tongue,\n&c. At every moment the study of science reveals resemblances of facts\nand contiguities of facts which must be neglected for the sake of\nothers. And if we pass from this profound knowledge of the objects to\nthe empirical knowledge, to the external perception of bodies, it is\nin immense number that one espies around one traps laid by nature. The\nsound we hear resembles several others, all produced by different\ncauses; many of our visual sensations likewise lend themselves to the\nmost varied interpretations; by the side of the efficient cause of an\nevent we find a thousand entangled contingencies which appear so\nimportant that to disentangle them we are as much perplexed as the\nsavage, who, unable to discriminate between causes and coincidences,\nreturns to drink at the well which has cured him, carefully keeping to\nthe same hour, the same gestures, and the same finery.\n\nThe reason of this is that the faculty of similarity and the faculty\nof contiguity do not give the distinction, necessary as it is, between\nresemblances and co-existences which are significant and those which\nare not. The causal nexus between two phenomena is not perceived as\nsomething apart and _sui generis_; it is not even perceived at all. We\nperceive only their relation in time and space, and it is our mind\nwhich raises a succession to the height of a causal connection, by\nintercalating between cause and effect something of what we ourselves\nfeel when we voluntarily order the execution of a movement. This is\nnot the place to inquire what are the experimental conditions in which\nwe subject phenomena to this anthropomorphic transformation; it will\nsuffice for us to repeat here that, in perception, a chance relation\nbetween phenomena impresses us in the same way as when it is the\nexpression of a law.\n\nOur intellectual machine sometimes works in accord with the external\nlaw and at others makes mistakes and goes the wrong way. Then we are\nobliged to correct it, and to try a better adjustment, either by\nprofounder experimenting with nature (methods of concordance,\ndiscordance, variations, &c.), or by a comparison of different\njudgments and arguments made into a synthesis; and this collaboration\nof several concordant activities ends in a conclusion which can never\nrepresent the truth, but only the probable truth. The study of the\nlaws of the mind shows us too clearly, in fact, their fluidity with\nregard to the laws of nature for us not to accept probabilism. There\nexists no certitude--only very varied degrees of probability. Daily\npractice contents itself with a very low degree of probability;\njudicial logic demands a rather higher one, especially when it is a\nquestion of depriving one of our fellow-creatures of liberty or life.\nScience claims one higher still. But there is never anything but\ndifferences of degrees in probability and conjecture.\n\nThis, then, is the definition of psychology that we propose. It\nstudies a certain number of laws which we term mental, in opposition\nto those of external nature, from which they differ, but which,\nproperly speaking, do not deserve the qualification of mental, since\nthey are--or at least the best known of them are--laws of the images,\nand the images are material elements. Although it may seem absolutely\nparadoxical, psychology is a science of matter--the science of a part\nof matter which has the property of preadaptation.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 33: LANGE, _Histoire du Materialisme_, II., 2me. partie,\nchap. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Let us remark, in passing, how badly nature has\norganised the system of communication between thinking beings. In what\nwe experience we have nothing in common with our fellows; each one\nexperiences his own sensations and not those of others. The only\nmeeting point of different minds is found in the inaccessible domain\nof the _noumena._]\n\n[Footnote 35: E. RABIER, _Lecons de Philosophie_, \"Psychologie,\" p.\n33.]\n\n[Footnote 36: This seems to have been the opinion of Democritus. The\nmodern doctrine of radiation from the human body, if established,\nwould go nearly as far as the supposition in the text. Up till now,\nhowever, it lacks confirmation.--ED.]\n\n[Footnote 37: I am compelled, much against my will, to use throughout\nthis passage an equivocal expression, that of \"mental law,\" or law of\nconsciousness, or psychological law. I indicate by this the laws of\ncontiguity and of similarity; as they result from the properties of\nthe images, and as these are of a material nature, they are really\nphysical and material laws like those of external nature. But how can\nall these laws be called physical laws without running the risk of\nconfusing them one with the other?]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Finality_ seems to be here used in the sense of the\ndoctrine which regards perfection as the final cause of\nexistence.--ED.]\n\n[Footnote 39: See a very interesting article by E. GOBLOT, \"La\nFinalite sans Intelligence,\" _Revue de Metaphysique_, July 1900.]\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\nTHE UNION OF THE SOUL[40] AND THE BODY\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE MIND HAS AN INCOMPLETE LIFE\n\n\nThe problem of the union of the mind and the body is not one of those\nwhich present themselves in pure speculation; it has its roots in\nexperimental facts, and is forced upon us by the necessity of\nexplaining observations such as those we are about to quote.\n\nThe force of our consciousness, the correctness of our judgments, our\ntempers and our characters, the state of health of our minds, and also\ntheir troubles, their weaknesses, and even their existence, are all in\na state of strict dependence on the condition of our bodies, more\nprecisely with that of our nervous systems, or, more precisely still,\nwith the state of those three pounds of proteid substance which each\nof us has at the back of his forehead, and which are called our\nbrains. This is daily demonstrated by thousands upon thousands of\nobservations.\n\nThe question is to know how this union of the body with the\nconsciousness is to be explained, it being assumed that the two terms\nof this union present a great difference in their nature. The easier\nit seems to demonstrate that this union exists, the more difficult it\nappears to explain how it is realised; and the proof of this\ndifficulty is the number of divergent interpretations given to it.\nWere it a simple question of fact, the perpetual discussions and\ncontroversies upon it would not arise.\n\nMany problems here present themselves. The first is that of the\ngenesis or origin of the consciousness. It has to be explained how a\npsychical phenomenon can appear in the midst of material ones. In\ngeneral, one begins by supposing that the material phenomena are\nproduced first; they consist, for instance, in the working of the\nnervous centres. All this is physical or chemical, and therefore\nmaterial. Then at a given moment, after this mechanical process, a\nquite different phenomenon emerges. This is thought, consciousness,\nemotion. Then comes the question whether this production of thought in\nthe midst of physical phenomena is capable of explanation, and how\nthought is connected with its physical antecedents. What is the nature\nof the link between them? Is it a relation of cause to effect, of\ngenesis? or a coincidence? or the interaction of two distinct forces?\nIs this relation constant or necessary? Can the mind enjoy an\nexistence independent of the brain? Can it survive the death of the\nbrain?\n\nThe second question is that of knowing what is the role, the utility,\nand the efficacity of the psychical phenomenon. Once formed, this\nphenomenon evolves in a certain direction and assumes to us who have\nconsciousness of it a very great importance. What is its action on the\nmaterial phenomena of the brain which surround it? Does it develop\naccording to laws of its own, which have no relation to the laws of\nbrain action? Does it exercise any action on these intra-cerebral\nfunctions? Does it exercise any action on the centrifugal currents\nwhich go to the motor nerves? Is it capable of exciting a movement? or\nis it deprived of all power of creating effect?\n\nWe will briefly examine the principal solutions which the imagination\nof mankind has found for these very difficult problems. Some of the\nbest known of these solutions bear the names of spiritualism,\nmaterialism, parallelism, and monism. We will speak of these and of\nsome others also.\n\nBefore beginning our critical statement, let us recall some of the\nresults of our previous analyses which here intrude themselves, to use\nthe ambitious language of Kant, as the prolegomena to every future\nsolution which claims the title of science. In fact, we are now no\nlonger at the outset of our investigation. We have had to acknowledge\nthe exactness of certain facts, and we are bound to admit their\nconsequences. Notably, the definition of psychical phenomena at which\nwe arrived, not without some trouble, will henceforth play a rather\nlarge part in our discussion. It will force us to question a great\nmetaphysical principle which, up till now, has been almost universally\nconsidered as governing the problem of the union of the mind with the\nbody.\n\nThis principle bears the name of the _axiom of heterogeneity_, or the\nprinciple of _psycho-physical dualism_. No philosopher has more\nclearly formulated it, and more logically deduced its consequences,\nthan Flournoy. This author has written a little pamphlet called\n_Metaphysique et Psychologie_, wherein he briefly sets forth all the\nknown systems of metaphysics by reducing them to the so-called\nprinciple of heterogeneity; after this, the same principle enables him\nto \"execute\" them. He formulates it in the following terms: \"body and\nmind, consciousness and the molecular cerebral movement of the brain,\nthe psychical fact and the physical fact, although simultaneous, are\nheterogeneous, unconnected, irreducible, and obstinately two.\"[41] The\nsame author adds: \"this is evident of itself, and axiomatic. Every\nphysical, chemical, or physiological event, in the last resort, simply\nconsists, according to science, in a more or less rapid displacement\nof a certain number of material elements, in a change of their mutual\ndistances or of their modes of grouping. Now, what can there be in\ncommon, I ask you, what analogy can you see, between this drawing\ntogether or moving apart of material masses in space, and the fact of\nhaving a feeling of joy, the recollection of an absent friend, the\nperception of a gas jet, a desire, or of an act of volition of any\nkind?\" And further on: \"All that we can say to connect two events so\nabsolutely dissimilar is, that they take place _at the same time_....\nThis does not mean that we wish to reduce them to unity, or to join\nthem together by the link of causality ... it is impossible to\nconceive any real connection, any internal relation between these two\nunconnected things.\"\n\nLet us not hesitate to denounce as false this proposition which is\npresented to us as an axiom. On looking closely into it, we shall\nperceive that the principle of heterogeneity does not contain the\nconsequences it is sought to ascribe to it. It seems to me it should\nbe split up into two propositions of very unequal value: 1, the mind\nand body are heterogeneous; 2, by virtue of this heterogeneity it is\nnot possible to understand any direct relation between the two.\n\nNow, if the first proposition is absolutely correct, in the sense that\nconsciousness and matter are heterogeneous, the second proposition\nseems to us directly contrary to the facts, which show us that the\nphenomena of consciousness are incomplete phenomena. The consciousness\nis not sufficient for itself; as we have said, it cannot exist by\nitself. This again, if you like, is an axiom, or rather it is a fact\nshown by observation and confirmed by reflection. Mind and matter\nbrought down to the essential, to the consciousness and its object,\nform a natural whole, and the difficulty does not consist in uniting\nbut in separating them. Consider the following fact: \"I experience a\nsensation, and I have consciousness of it.\" This is the coupling of\ntwo things--a sensation and a cognition.\n\nThe two elements, if we insist upon it, are heterogeneous, and they\ndiffer qualitatively; but notwithstanding the existing prejudice by\nreason of which no direct relation, no commerce, can be admitted\nbetween heterogeneous facts, the alliance of the consciousness and the\nsensation is the natural and primitive fact. They can only be\nseparated by analysis, and a scrupulous mind might even ask whether\none has the right to separate them. I have a sensation, and I have\nconsciousness of it. If not two facts, they are one and the same. Now,\nsensation is matter and my consciousness is mind. If I am judging an\nassortment of stuffs, this assortment, or the sensation I have of\nthem, is a particle of matter, a material state, and my judgment on\nthis sensation is the psychical phenomenon. We can neither believe,\nnor desire, nor do any act of our intelligence without realising this\nwelding together of mind and matter. They are as inseparable as motion\nand the object that moves; and this comparison, though far-fetched, is\nreally very convenient. Motion cannot exist without a mobile object;\nand an object, on the other hand, can exist without movement. In the\nsame way, sensation may exist without the consciousness; but the\nconverse proposition, consciousness without sensation, without an\nobject, an empty consciousness or a \"pure thought,\" cannot be\nunderstood.\n\nLet us mark clearly how this union is put forward by us. We describe\nit after nature. It is observation which reveals to us the union and\nthe fusion of the two terms into one. Or, rather, we do not even\nperceive their union until the moment when, by a process of analysis,\nwe succeed in convincing ourselves that that which we at first\nconsidered single is really double, or, if you like, can be made into\ntwo by the reason, without being so in reality. Thus it happens that\nwe bring this big problem in metaphysics on to the field of\nobservation.\n\nOur solution vaguely resembles that which has sometimes been presented\nunder the ancient name of _physical influx_, or under the more modern\nname of _inter-actionism_. There are many authors who maintain that\nthe soul can act directly on the body and modify it, and this is what\nis called inter-actionism. Thereby is understood, if I mistake not, an\naction from cause to effect, produced between two terms which enjoy a\ncertain independence with regard to each other. This interpretation is\nindubitably close to ours, though not to be confused with it. My\npersonal interpretation sets aside the idea of all independence of the\nmind, since it attributes to the mind an incomplete and, as it were, a\nvirtual existence.\n\nIf we had to seek paternity for ideas I would much rather turn to\nAristotle. It was not without some surprise that I was able to\nconvince myself that the above theory of the relations between the\nsoul and the body is to be found almost in its entirety in the great\nphilosopher. It is true that it is mixed up with many accessory ideas\nwhich are out of date and which we now reject; but the essential of\nthe theory is there very clearly formulated, and that is the important\npoint. A few details on this subject will not be out of place. I give\nthem, not from the original source, which I am not erudite enough to\nconsult direct, but from the learned treatise which Bain has published\non the psychology of Aristotle, as an appendix to his work on the\nSenses and the Intelligence.\n\nThe whole metaphysics of Aristotle is dominated by the distinction\nbetween form and matter. This distinction is borrowed from the most\nfamiliar fact in the sensible world--the form of solid objects. We may\nname a substance without troubling ourselves as to the form it\npossesses, and we may name the form without regard to the substance\nthat it clothes. But this distinction is a purely abstract one, for\nthere can be no real separation of form from matter, no form without\nmatter, and no matter without form. The two terms are correlative;\neach one implies the other, and neither can be realised or actualised\nwithout the other. Every individual substance can be considered from a\ntriple point of view: 1st, form; 2nd, matter; and 3rd, the compound or\naggregate of form and matter, the inseparable _Ens_, which transports\nus out of the domain of logic and abstraction into that of reality.\n\nAristotle recognises between these two logical correlatives a\ndifference in rank. Form is superior, nobler, the higher in dignity,\nnearer to the perfect entity; matter is inferior, more modest, more\ndistant from perfection. On account of its hierarchical inferiority,\nmatter is often presented as the second, or _correlatum_, and form as\nthe first, or _relatum_. This difference in rank is so strongly\nmarked, that these two correlations are likewise conceived in a\ndifferent form--that of the potential and the actual. Matter is the\npotential, imperfect, roughly outlined element which is not yet\nactual, and may perhaps never become so. Form is the actual, the\nenergy, the entelechy which actualises the potential and determines\nthe final compound.\n\nThese few definitions will make clear the singularly ingenious idea of\nAristotle on the nature of the body, the soul, and of their union. The\nbody is matter which is only intelligible as the _correlatum_ of form;\nit can neither exist by itself nor be known by itself--that is to say,\nwhen considered outside this relation. The soul is form, the actual.\nBy uniting with the body it constitutes the living subject. The soul\nis the _relatum_, and is unintelligible and void of sense without its\n_correlatum_. \"The soul,\" says Aristotle, \"is not a variety of body,\nbut it could not exist without a body: the soul is not a body, but\nsomething which belongs or is relative to a body.\" The animated\nsubject is a form plunged and engaged in matter, and all its actions\nand passions are so likewise. Each has its formal side which concerns\nthe soul, and its material side which concerns the body. The emotion\nwhich belongs to the animated subject or aggregate of soul and body is\na complex fact having two aspects logically distinguishable from each\nother, each of which is correlative to the other and implies it. It is\nthus not only with our passions, but also with our perceptions, our\nimaginations, reminiscences, reasonings, and efforts of attention to\nlearn. Intelligence, like emotion, is a phenomenon not simply of the\ncorporeal organism nor of the [Greek: Nous] only, but of the\ncommonalty or association of which they are members, and when the\nintelligence weakens it is not because the [Greek: Nous] is altered,\nbut because the association is destroyed by the ruin of the corporeal\norganism.\n\nThese few notes, which I have taken in their integrity from Bain's\ntext, allow us thoroughly to comprehend the thought of Aristotle, and\nit seems to me that the Greek philosopher, by making of the soul and\nbody two correlative terms, has formed a comparison of great\nexactness. I also much admire his idea according to which it is\nthrough the union of the body and soul that the whole, which till then\nwas only possible, goes forth from the domain of logic and becomes\nactual. The soul actualises the body, and becomes, as he said, its\nentelechy.\n\nThese views are too close to those I have myself just set forth for it\nto be necessary to dwell on their resemblance. The latter would become\nstill stronger if we separated from the thought of Aristotle a few\ndevelopments which are not essential, though he allowed them great\nimportance: I refer to the continual comparison he makes with the form\nand matter of corporeal objects. Happy though it may be, this\ncomparison is but a metaphor which perhaps facilitates the\nunderstanding of Aristotle's idea, but is not essential to his theory.\nFor my part, I attach far greater importance to the character of\n_relatum_, and _correlatum_ ascribed to the two terms mind and matter,\nand to the actualisation[42] produced by their union.\n\nLet me add another point of comparison. Aristotle's theory recalls in\na striking manner that of Kant on the _a priori_ forms of thought. The\nform of thought, or the category, is nothing without the matter of\ncognition, and the latter is nothing without the application of form.\n\"Thoughts without content given by sensation are empty; intuitions\nwithout concept furnished by the understanding are blind.\" There is\nnothing astonishing in finding here the same illustration, since there\nis throughout a question of describing the same phenomenon,--the\nrelation of mind to matter.\n\nThere remains to us to review the principal types of metaphysical\nsystems. We shall discuss these by taking as our guide the principle\nwe have just evolved, and which may be thus formulated: _The phenomena\nof consciousness constitute an incomplete mode of existence._\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 40: See [Note 1] on p. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 41: For reference, see [Note 18] on p. 73.--ED.]\n\n[Footnote 42: _i.e._ rendering actual.--ED.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nSPIRITUALISM[43] AND IDEALISM\n\n\nFlournoy has somewhere written that the chief interest of the systems\nof metaphysics lies less in the intellectual constructions they raise\nthan in the aspirations of the mind and of the heart to which they\ncorrespond. Without taking literally this terribly sceptical opinion,\nit would be highly useful to begin the study of any metaphysical\nsystem by the psychology of its author. The value of each system would\nbe better understood, and their reasons would be comprehended.\n\nThis book is too short to permit us to enter into such biographical\ndetails. I am obliged to take the metaphysical systems _en bloc_, as\nif they were anonymous works, and to efface all the shades,\noccasionally so curious, that the thought of each author has\nintroduced into them. Yet, however brief our statement, it seems\nindispensable to indicate clearly the physical or moral idea\nconcealed within each system.\n\n\nSPIRITUALISM\n\nIt is known that spiritualism is a doctrine which has for its chief\naim the raising of the dignity of man, by recognising in him faculties\nsuperior to the properties of matter. We constantly meet, in\nspiritualism, with the notion of superior and inferior, understood not\nonly in an intellectual sense but also in the sense of moral worth.\n\nIt will also be remarked, as a consequence of the above principle,\nthat a spiritualist does not confine himself to discussing the ideas\nof his habitual adversary, the materialist; he finds them not only\nfalse, but dangerous, and is indignant with them; some persons even\ningenuously acknowledge that they hold firmly to certain principles\nbecause they fear to be converted to materialism. I can also discern\nin this system a very natural horror of death, which inspires in so\nmany people, of whom I am one, both hatred and disgust. The\nspiritualist revolts against the prospect of a definitive annihilation\nof thought, and the system he adopts is largely explained as an effort\ntowards immortality.\n\nThis effort has led to the theory of two substances, the soul and the\nbody, which are represented as being as thoroughly separated as\npossible. The soul has not its origin in the body, and it derives none\nof its properties from its fellow; it is a substance created in\ncomplete independence relatively to the body; the soul, in its\nessence, has nothing in common with matter. The essence of the soul,\nsaid Descartes, is thought; the essence of the body is extent. It\nfollows from this that the soul, in its determinations and actions, is\nliberated from the laws and necessities of the corporeal nature; it is\na free power, a power of indetermination, capable of choice, capable\nof introducing new, unforeseen, and unforeseeable actions, and on this\npoint opposes itself to corporeal phenomena, which are all subject to\na determinism so rigorous that any event could be foreseen if its\nantecedents were known. Another consequence of spiritualism is the\nadmission of the immortality of the soul, which, being widely distinct\nfrom the body, is not affected by its dissolution; it is, on the\ncontrary, liberated, since death cuts the link which binds them\ntogether.\n\nBut there is a link, and the explanation of this link brings with it\nthe ruin of the whole system. One is forced to admit that this\nprinciple of the separation of body and soul is liable, in fact, to\nmany exceptions. Even if they are two isolated powers, the necessities\nof life oblige them to enter continually into communication with each\nother. In the case of perceptions, it is the body which acts on the\nsoul and imparts sensations to it; in movements, it is the soul, on\nthe contrary, which acts on the body, to make it execute its desires\nand its will.\n\nSpiritualists must acknowledge that they are at some trouble to\nexplain this traffic between the two substances; for, with their\nrespect for the principle of heterogeneity mentioned above, they do\nnot manage to conceive how that contact of the physical and the mental\ncan be made which is constantly necessary in the life of relation. By\nwhat means, have they long asked themselves, can that which is only\nextent act on that which is only thought? How can we represent to\nourselves this _local_ union of matter with an immaterial principle,\nwhich, by its essence, does not exist in space? The two substances\nhave been so completely separated, to insure the liberty of the soul\nand its superiority over the body, that it has become impossible to\nbring them together. The scission has been too complete. They cannot\nbe sewn together again.\n\nSuch are the principal objections raised against spiritualism. These\nobjections are derived from points of view which are not ours, and we\nhave therefore no need to estimate their value.\n\nFrom our point of view, the spiritualist conception has chosen an\nexcellent starting point. By establishing the consciousness and the\nobject of cognition as two autonomous powers, neither of which is the\nslave of the other, spiritualism has arrived at an opinion of\nirreproachable exactness; it is indeed thus that the relations of\nthese two terms must be stated; each has the same importance and the\nright to the same autonomy.[44]\n\nYet, spiritualism has not rested there, and, by a lamentable\nexaggeration, it has thought that the consciousness, which it calls\nthe soul, could exercise its functions in complete independence of the\nobject of cognition, which it calls matter. There is the error. It\nconsists in misunderstanding the incomplete and, as it were, virtual\nexistence of the consciousness. This refutation is enough as regards\nspiritualism. Nothing more need be added.\n\n\nIDEALISM\n\nIdealism is an exceedingly complex system, varying much with varying\nauthors, very polymorphous, and consequently very difficult to\ndiscuss.\n\nThe ancient hylozoism, the monadism of Leibnitz, and the recent\npanpsychism of M. Strong are only different forms of the same\ndoctrine.\n\nLike spiritualism, with which it is connected by many ties, idealism\nis a philosophy which expresses some disdain for matter, but the\nthoughts which have sought to shelter themselves under this philosophy\nare so varied that it would be perilous to try to define them briefly.\n\nThere can be discussed in idealism a certain number of affirmations\nwhich form the basis of the system. None of these affirmations is,\nstrictly speaking, demonstrated or demonstrable; but they offer very\ndifferent degrees of probability, and it is for this reason that we\nshall notice them.\n\nAmongst these affirmations there are some that we have already met\nwith in our study of the definition of sensation; others will be newer\nto us.\n\n1. Here is one which seems to arise directly from the facts, and\nappears for a long time to have constituted an impregnable position\nfor idealists. It may be expressed in three words: _esse est percipi_.\n\nStarting with the observation that every time we bear witness to the\nexistence of the external world, it is because we perceive it,\nidealists admit that the existence of this external world shares\nexactly the lot of our perception, and that like it it is\ndiscontinuous and intermittent. When we close our eyes, it ceases to\nexist, like a torch which is extinguished, and lights up again when we\nopen them. We have already discussed this proposition, and have shown\nthat it contains nothing imperative; and we may very well decline to\nsubscribe to it.\n\n2. There follows a second proposition, barely distinct from the\nprevious one. There should be nothing else in objects but that which\nwe perceive, and that of which we have consciousness should be, in the\nfullest possible acceptation of the words, the measure of what is.\nConsequently there should be no need to seek, under the object\nperceived, another and larger reality, a source from which might flow\nwider knowledge than that we at present possess. This is as disputable\nas the preceding affirmation, and for the same reasons.\n\n3. The third proposition is the heart of the idealist thesis. It is\nsometimes presented as a deduction from the foregoing, but it is\nnevertheless thoroughly distinct from it, and the preceding\naffirmations might legitimately be accepted and this new one rejected.\nThis proposition may be expressed thus: _Everything that is perceived\nis psychical._\n\nIt is not only idealists who subscribe to this opinion, however, and\nwe have seen, when dealing with the definition of matter, that it is\nwidely spread. We understand by it that the objects we perceive exist\nin the consciousness, are of the consciousness, and are constituted\nby ideas; the whole world is nothing but idea and representation; and,\nsince our mind is taken to be of a psychical nature, the result is\nthat everything, absolutely everything, the person who knows and the\nthing known, are all psychical. This is panpsychism. Flournoy, on this\npoint, says, with a charm coloured by irony: \"We henceforth experience\na sweet family feeling, we find ourselves, so to speak, _at home_ in\nthe midst of this universe ...\"[45] We have demonstrated above that\nthe unity here attained is purely verbal, since we cannot succeed in\nsuppressing the essential differences of things.\n\n4. Now comes an affirmation on the genesis of things. After having\nadmitted that the object is an idea of the mind, one of its\nmanifestations, or one of its moods, the idealists go so far as to say\nthat the consciousness is the generating power of ideas, and,\nconsequently, the generating cause of the universe. It is thought\nwhich creates the world. That is the final conclusion.\n\nI indicated, beforehand, in the chapters on the definition of\nsensation and on the distinction between the consciousness and the\nobject, the reasons which lead me to reject the premises of idealism.\nIt will be sufficient to offer here a criticism on its last\nconclusion: \"It is the mind that creates the world.\"\n\nThis thesis strikes at the duality--consciousness and object; it gives\nthe supremacy to the consciousness by making of the object an effect\nor property of the former. We can object that this genesis cannot be\nclearly represented, and that for the very simple reason that it is\nimpossible to clearly accept \"mind\" as a separate entity and distinct\nfrom matter. It is easy to affirm this separation, thanks to the\npsittacism of the words, which are here used like counterfeit coin,\nbut we cannot represent it to ourselves, for it corresponds to\nnothing. The consciousness constitutes all that is mental in the\nworld; nothing else can be described as mental. Now this consciousness\nonly exists as an act; it is, in other terms, an incomplete form of\nexistence, which does not exist apart from its object, of which the\ntrue name is matter. It is therefore very difficult to understand this\naffirmation, \"It is the mind that creates the world,\" since to be able\nto do so, we should have to imagine a consciousness without an object.\n\nMoreover, should we even succeed in doing so, we should be none the\nmore disposed, on that account, to give assent to this proposition.\nConsciousness and matter represent to us the most different and\nantithetical terms of the whole of the knowable. Were the hypothesis\nto be advanced that one of these elements is capable of engendering\nthe other, we should immediately have to ask ourselves why this\ngenerating power and this pre-eminence should be attributed to one\nrather than to the other element. Who can claim that one solution is\nmore clear, more reasonable, or more probable than the other?\n\nOne of the great advantages of the history of philosophy here asserts\nitself. This history shows us that different minds when reflecting on\nthe same problems have come to conceive solutions which have appeared\nto them clear, and consequently were possible; now, as these solutions\nare often contradictory, nothing shows better than their collation the\ndistance between possibility and fact. Thus the materialists, who,\nlike the idealists, have put forward a genetic theory of the mind,\nhave conceived mind as produced by matter;--a conception diametrically\nopposed to that of the idealists. It may be said that these two\nconceptions, opposed in sense, annul each other, and that each of\nthese two philosophical systems has rendered us service by\ndemonstrating the error of the opposing system.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 43: It is, perhaps, needless to point out that by\n\"spiritualism\" M. Binet does not mean the doctrine of the\nspirit-rappers, whom he, like other scientific writers, designates as\n\"spiritists,\" but the creed of all those who believe in disembodied\nspirits or existences.--ED.]\n\n[Footnote 44: I do not insist on the difference between my conception\nand the spiritualistic conception; my distinction between\nconsciousness and matter does not correspond, it is evident, to that\nof \"facts of consciousness\" and \"physical facts\" which spiritualism\nsets up.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Archives de Psychologie_, vol. iv. No. 14, Nov. 1904,\np. 132 (article on Panpsychism).]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nMATERIALISM AND PARALLELISM\n\n\nMaterialism is a very ancient doctrine. It is even the most ancient of\nall, which simply proves that amongst the different explanations given\nof our double physico-mental nature, this doctrine is the easiest to\nunderstand. The origin of materialism is to be found in the beliefs of\nsavage tribes, and is again found, very clearly defined, in the\nphilosophy of those ancient Greeks who philosophized before Plato and\nAristotle. A still stranger fact is that the thoughts of a great\nnumber of the Fathers of the Church inclined towards the philosophy of\nmatter. Then, in the course of its evolution, there occurred a moment\nof eclipse, and materialism ceased to attract attention till the\ncontemporary period in which we assist at its re-birth, Nowadays, it\nconstitutes a powerful doctrine, the more so that it has\nsurreptitiously crept into the thoughts of many learned men without\ntheir being clearly conscious of it. There are many physicists and\nphysiologists who think and speak as materialists, though they have\nmade up their minds to remain on the battle-ground of observed facts\nand have a holy horror of metaphysics. In a certain sense, it may be\nsaid that materialism is the metaphysics of those who refuse to be\nmetaphysicians.\n\nIt is very evident that in the course of its long history, materialism\nhas often changed its skin. Like all knowledge, it has been subject to\nthe law of progress; and, certainly, it would not have been of a\nnature to satisfy the intellectual wants of contemporary scholars, had\nit not stripped itself of the rude form under which it first\nmanifested itself in the mind of primitive man. Yet what has enabled\nthe doctrine to keep its unity through all its changes is that it\nmanifests a deeply human tendency to cling by preference to everything\nvisible and tangible.\n\nWhatever strikes the eyes, or can be felt by the hand, seems to us in\nthe highest degree endowed with reality or existence. It is only much\nlater, after an effort of refined thought, that we come to recognise\nan existence in everything that can be perceived in any way whatever,\neven in an idea. It is still later that we understand that existence\nis not only that which is perceived but also that which is linked\nlogically with the rest of our knowledge. A good deal of progress has\nbeen necessary to reach this point.\n\nAs I have not the slightest intention of giving even an abridged\nhistory of materialism, let us come at once to the present day, and\nendeavour to say in what consists the scientific form this doctrine\nhas assumed. Its fundamental basis has not changed. It still rests on\nour tendency to give chief importance to what can be seen and touched;\nand it is an effect of the hegemony of three of our senses, the\nvisual, the tactile, and the muscular.\n\nThe extraordinary development of the physical sciences has no doubt\ngiven an enormous encouragement to materialism, and it may be said\nthat in the philosophy of nature it occupies a principal place, and\nthat it is there in its own domain and unassailable.\n\nIt has become the expression of the idea that everything that can be\nexplained scientifically, everything susceptible of being measured, is\na material phenomenon. It is the representation of the material\nexplanation pushed to its last limits, and all experiments, all\ncalculations, all inductions resting on the grand principle of the\nconservation of matter and energy plead in its favour.\n\nWe will examine with some precision how far such a doctrine solves the\nproblem of the existence of the intellectual functions.\n\nThe doctrine has understood this connection as being purely material,\nand has sought its image in other phenomena which are entirely so.\nThus, it has borrowed from physiology the principle of its\nexplanation, it has transported into the domain of thought the idea of\nfunction, and it has supposed that the soul is to the body in the\nrelation of function to organ. Intelligence would thus be a cerebral\nfunction. To explain intelligence, materialists link it with matter,\nturn it into a property of matter, and compare it to a movement of\nmatter, and sometimes even to a secretion. So Karl Vogt, the\nillustrious Genevan naturalist, one day declared, to the great scandal\nof every one, that the brain secretes the thought as the kidney does\nurine. This bold comparison seemed shocking, puerile, and false, for a\nsecretion is a material thing while thought is not. Karl Vogt also\nemployed another comparison: the brain produces the thought as the\nmuscle produces movement, and it at once seems less offensive to\ncompare the thought to a movement than to compare it to a liquid\nsecretion. At the present day, an illustration still more vague would\nbe used, such as that of a transformation of energy: chemical energy\ndisengaged by the nerve centres would be thus looked upon as\ntransformed into psychical energy.\n\nHowever, it matters little what metaphors are applied to for help in\nexplaining the passage from the physical to the mental. What\ncharacterises materialist philosophy is its belief in the possibility\nof such a passage, and its considering it as the genesis of thought.\n\"One calls materialist,\" says Renouvier, with great exactness, \"every\nphilosophy which defines thought as the product of a compound whose\nelements do not imply thought.\" A sweeping formula which allows us to\nforesee all the future avatars of the materialist doctrine, and to\nclass them beforehand in the same category.\n\nThe criticisms which have been directed against materialism are all,\nor nearly all, variations of the principle of heterogeneity. We will\nnot dwell long on this, but simply recollect that, according to this\nprinciple, it is impossible to attribute to the brain the capacity of\ngenerating consciousness. Physical force can indeed generate physical\nforce under the same or a different form, and it thus produces all the\neffects which are determined by the laws of nature. But it is\nimpossible to comprehend how physical force can enrich itself at a\ngiven moment by a conscious force. Physical force is reduced to\nmovements of bodies and to displacements of atoms; how could a change\nof position in any inert objects give rise to a judgment, a reasoning,\nor any phenomenon of the consciousness? It is further said: this idea\nof function, which materialists here introduce to render more\ncomprehensible the passage from a material body to a spiritual action,\ncontains only an empty explanation, for the function is not\nessentially distinct by its nature from the organ; it is simply \"the\norgan in activity,\" it adds to the organ taken in a state of repose\nbut one change, viz. activity, that is to say movement, and,\nconsequently, the function of an organ is material by the same right\nas the organ. When a muscle contracts, this contraction, which is the\nproper function of the muscular fibre, consists in a condensation of\nthe muscular protoplasm, and this condensation is a material fact.\nWhen a gland enters into activity, a certain quantity of liquid flows\ninto the channels of the gland, and this liquid is caused by a\nphysical and chemical modification of the cellular protoplasm; it is a\nmelting, or a liquefaction, which likewise is material. The function\nof the nerve cell is to produce movement, or to preserve it, or to\ndirect it; ii is material like the cells. There is therefore nothing\nin all those functional phenomena which might lead us to understand\nhow a material cause should be capable of engendering a conscious\neffect.\n\nIt seems that all materialists have acknowledged that here is the\nvulnerable point in their theory, for it is the principle of\nheterogeneity which they have especially combated. But their defence\nis wanting in frankness, and principally consists in subterfuges.\n\nIn brief, it affirms that we are surrounded with mystery, that we are\nnot sufficiently learned to have the right to impose limits to the\npower of matter, and to say to it: \"Thou shalt not produce this\nphenomenon.\" A materialist theologian declares that he sees no\nimpossibility in stones thinking and arguing, if God, in His infinite\npower, has decided to unite thought with brute matter. This argument\nis not really serious; it demands the intervention of so powerful a\n_Deus ex machina_, that it can be applied equally to all problems; to\nsolve all is to solve none.\n\nModern materialists rightly do not bring God into the question. Their\nmode of argument takes another form; but it remains to be seen if, at\nbottom, it is not the same as the other. It simply consists in\naffirming that up till now we know certain properties of matter only,\nbut that science every day discovers new ones; that matter is a\nreservoir of unknown forces, and that it is not impossible that the\norigin of psychical forces may yet be discovered in matter. This idea\nis clearly hinted at by Littre. The physicist Tyndall gave it a\ndefinite formula when he uttered at the Belfast Congress this phrase\nso often quoted: \"If I look back on the limits of experimental\nscience, I can discern in the bosom of that matter (which, in our\nignorance, while at the same time professing our respect for its\nCreator, we have, till now, treated with opprobrium) the promise and\nthe power of all forms and qualities of life.\"\n\nThe opponents of the doctrine have not ceased to answer that the\nmatter of to-morrow, like the matter of to-day, can generate none but\nmaterial effects, and that a difficulty is not solved by putting off\nits solution to some indefinite date in our scientific evolution: and\nit certainly seems that the counter-stroke is decisive, if we admit\nthe principle of heterogeneity with its natural consequence.\n\nWe will now criticise the above doctrine by making use of the ideas I\nhave above enunciated. The criticism we have to apply to materialism\nis not the same as that just summarised. The axis of the discussion\nchanges its position.\n\nIn the first place, I reproach materialism with presenting itself as a\ntheory of the generation of the consciousness by the object. We have\nalready reproached idealism with putting itself forward as a theory of\nthe generation of the object by the consciousness. The error of the\ntwo systems is produced in a converse direction, but is of the same\ngravity. The consciousness and its object, we say yet again,\nconstitute the widest division it is possible to effect in the domain\nof cognition; it is quite as illegitimate to reduce the first term to\nthe second as to reduce the second to the first. To reduce one to the\nother, by way of affiliation or otherwise, there must first be\ndiscovered, then, an identity of nature which does not exist.\n\nIn the second place, when one examines closely the explanation\nmaterialism has imagined in order to derive thought from an action of\nmatter, it is seen that this representation is rendered completely\nimpossible by all we know of the nature of thought. For the\nmaterialist to suppose for one moment that thought is a cerebral\nfunction, he must evidently make an illusion for himself as to what\nthought is, and must juggle with concepts. Perhaps, could we penetrate\ninto his own inmost thought, we should discover that at the moment he\nsupposes a mere cell can manufacture the phenomena of consciousness,\nsome vague image suggests itself to him whereby he identifies these\nphenomena with a light and subtle principle escaping from the nerve\ncell, something which resembles an electric _effluve_, or a\nwill-of-the-wisp, or the flame from a punch-bowl.[46]\n\nI cannot, of course, tell whether my supposition is correct. But what\nI assert, with the calmness of perfect certitude, is that the\nmaterialist has not taken the pains to analyse attentively what he\ncalls the phenomenon of consciousness. Had he made this analysis and\nkept the elements in his mind, he would have seen that it is almost\nimpossible to hook in any way a phenomenon of consciousness on to a\nmaterial molecule.\n\nIn fact, also, to take this into account, we will not remain within\nthe vagueness of the concept, but will take a particular example to\nargue upon, viz. that of an external perception. I open my window on a\nfine day, and I see before me a sunny plain, with, as far as the eye\ncan reach, houses amongst the trees, and again more houses, the most\ndistant of which are outlined against my far-off horizon. This is my\nmental phenomenon. And while I am at my window, my eyes fixed on the\nview, the anatomist declares that, starting from my retina, molecular\nvibrations travel along the optic nerve, cross each other at the\nchiasma, enter into the fascia, pass through the internal capsule and\nreach the hemispheres, or rather the occipital regions, of the brain,\nwhere, for the moment, we agree to localise the centre of projection\nof the visual sensations. This is my physical phenomenon. It now\nbecomes the question of passing from this physical phenomena to the\nmental one. And here we are stopped by a really formidable\ndifficulty.\n\nMy mental phenomenon is not entirely mental, as is usually supposed\nfrom the deceitful brevity of the phrase. It is in great part\nphysical, for it can be decomposed into two elements, a consciousness\nand its object; and this object of the consciousness, this group of\nlittle houses I see in the plain, belongs to sensation--that is to\nsay, to something physical--or, in other words, to matter.\n\nLet us examine in its turn the physical process which is supposed to\nbe discovered in my nervous centres while I am in course of\ncontemplating the landscape. This pretended physical process itself,\nquite as much as my conscious perception of the landscape, is a\nphysico-psychical phenomenon; for my cerebral movements are perceived,\nhypothetically at least, by an observer. This is a perception,\nconsequently it can be decomposed into two things, a consciousness and\nits object. As a further consequence, when we wish, by a metaphysical\neffort, to attach the consciousness to a material state of the brain\nand to establish a link between the two events, it will be found that\nwe wrongly hook one physico-mental phenomenon on to another.\n\nBut, evidently, this objection is not a refutation. We may if we\nchoose suppose that the so-called cerebral process is capable of\nsubsisting at moments when no one perceives it, and that it exists of\nitself, is sufficient for itself, and is entirely physical. But can\nwe subject the mental process of perception to the same purification?\nCan we separate these two elements, the consciousness and its object,\nretain the element consciousness and reject the element object, which\nis physical, thus constituting a phenomenon entirely mental, which\nmight then be possibly placed beside the entirely physical phenomenon,\nso as to study their relation to each other? This is quite impossible,\nand the impossibility is double, for it exists _de facto_ and _de\njure_.\n\n_De jure_, because we have already established that a consciousness\nempty and without object cannot be conceived. _De facto_, because the\nexistence of the object that consciousness carries with it is very\nembarrassing for the materialist; for this object is material, and as\nreal and material as the fibres and cells of the brain. It might,\nindeed, be supposed that by transformation or otherwise there goes\nforth from the cerebral convolution a purely psychical phenomenon\nresembling a wave. But how can we conceive the transformation of this\nconvolution into a semi-material phenomenon? How can we comprehend\nthat there should issue from this convolution the material object of a\nperception--for example, a plain dotted with houses?\n\nAn English histologist remarked one day, with some eloquence, how\nlittle the most minute study of the brain aided us to understand\nthought. He was thus answering Auguste Comte, who, in a moment of\naberration, claimed that psychology, in order to become a science,\nought to reject the testimony of the consciousness, and to use\nexclusively as its means of study the histology of the nerve centres\nand the measurement of the cranium. Our histologist, who had passed\npart of his life examining, under the microscope, fragments of\ncerebral matter, in following the forms of the cells, the course of\nthe fibres, and the grouping and distribution of the fascia, made the\nfollowing remark: \"It is the fact that the study, however patient,\nminute, and thorough it might be, of this nerve-skein can never enable\nus to know what a state of consciousness is, if we do not know it\notherwise; for never across the field of the microscope is there seen\nto pass a memory, an emotion, or an act of volition.\" And, he added,\n\"he who confines himself to peering into these material structures\nremains as ignorant of the phenomena of the mind as the London cabman\nwho, for ever travelling through the streets of the great city, is\nignorant of what is said and what is going on in the interior of the\nhouses.\" This picturesque comparison, the truth of which has never\nbeen questioned, is based on this supposition, that the psychical act\nis entirely immaterial and invisible, and therefore escapes the\npiercing eye of the microscope. But a deeper analysis of the mind\nshows how little exact is this assertion. From the moment each\npsychical act implies a material object, we can ask ourselves two\nthings: (1) Why is it that the anatomist does not discover these\nmaterial objects in the interior of the brain? We ought to see them,\nfor they are material, and therefore visible. We ought to see them\nwith their aspect and colour, or be able to explain why they are not\nseen. In general, all that is described to us in the brain is the\nmolecular vibrations. But we are not conscious of them. Where, then,\nis that of which we are conscious? (2) It should next be explained to\nus by what elaboration, transmutation, or metamorphosis a molecular\ndisturbance, which is material, can transform itself into the objects\nwhich are equally material.\n\nThis is the criticism we have to address to materialism. Until proof\nto the contrary, I hold it to be irrefutable.\n\n\nPARALLELISM\n\nFor this exposition to follow the logical order of ideas, the\ndiscussion on materialism should be immediately succeeded by that on\nparallelism. These two doctrines are near akin; they resemble each\nother as the second edition of a book, revised and corrected,\nresembles the first. Parallelism is the materialist doctrine of those\nforewarned folk, who have perceived the errors committed and endeavour\nto avoid them, while cherishing all that can be saved of the condemned\ndoctrine. That which philosophers criticised in materialism was the\nmisunderstanding of the principle of heterogeneity. The parallelists\nhave seen this mistake, and have taken steps to respect this\nprinciple: we shall see in what way. They are especially prudent, and\nthey excel in avoiding being compromised. They put forth their\nhypothesis as a provisional one, and they vaunt its convenience. It\nis, say they, a practical method of avoiding many difficulties; it\nbecomes for philosophers an equivalent of that phrase which so many\ntimorous ministers repeat: \"Above all, no scrapes!\"\n\nLet us study the exact point on which parallelism has amended\nmaterialism. We have seen that every materialist doctrine is the\nexpression of this idea, that physical phenomena are the only ones\nthat are determined, measurable, explicable, and scientific. This idea\ndoes wonders in the natural sciences, but is at fault when, from the\nphysical, we pass into the moral world, and we have seen how the\nmaterialistic doctrine fails when it endeavours to attach the physical\nto the mental. There are then two great difficulties which the\nmaterialistic explanation finds before it; one is a difficulty of\nmechanism and the other of genesis. By connecting the mind with the\nbrain, like a function to its organ, this doctrine seeks to solve\nthese two problems, and with what little success we have seen.\n\nParallelism, has tried to avoid these two problems; not only does it\nnot solve them, but it arranges so as not to propound them. The\nexpedient adopted consists in avoiding the meeting of the physical and\nthe mental; instead of placing them end to end and welding one to the\nother, they are placed in parallel fashion side by side. To explain\ntheir correlation, which so many observations vaguely demonstrate, the\nfollowing hypothesis is advanced. Physical and psychical life form two\nparallel currents, which never mingle their waters; to every state of\ndefinite consciousness there corresponds the counterpart of an equally\ndefinite state of the nerve centres; the fact of consciousness has its\nantecedents and its consequences in the consciousness; and the\nphysical fact equally takes its place in a chain of physical facts.\nThe two series are thus evolved, and correspond strictly to each other\naccording to a necessary law; so that the scholar who was perfectly\ninstructed, and to whom one of these states was presented, could\ndescribe its fellow. But never does any of the terms of one series\ninfluence the terms of the other.\n\nObservation and the testimony of the consciousness seem to attest this\ndual progress; but they are, according to the parallelist hypothesis,\nillusions. When I move my arm by a voluntary act, it is not my will,\n_qua_ act of consciousness, which determines the movement of the\narm--for this is a material fact. The movement is produced by the\ncoming into play of groups of muscles. Each muscle, composed of a\nsemi-fluid substance, being excited, contracts in the direction of its\ngreatest length. The excitant of the muscles is also a material fact,\na material influx which starts from the motor cells of the encephalon,\nand of which we know the course down through the pyramidal fascium,\nthe anterior roots of the spinal cord, and the nerves of the periphery\nto its termination in the motor plates of the muscles. It is this\nexcitement which is the physical, direct, and veritable cause of\nvoluntary movements. And it is the same with all acts and signs, all\nexpressions of our conscious states; the trembling of fear, the\nredness of anger, the movements of walking, down to the words we\nutter--all these are physical effects produced by physical processes,\nwhich act physically, and of which the mental counterpart has in\nitself no effective action.\n\nLet it be understood that I am here pointing out one of the forms, and\nthat the most usual, of the parallelist theory. Each author varies it\naccording to his fancy; some widen the correspondence between the\nphysical and the moral, others prefer to narrow it. At one time a\nvague relation is supposed which is only true on a large scale, and is\na union rather than an equivalence. At another, it is an exact\ncounterpart, a complete duplicate in which the smallest physical event\ncorresponds to a mental one.\n\nIn one of the forms of this theory that has been recently invented,\nparallelists have gone so far as to assert that there exists no real\ncohesion in the mental chain, and that no mental phenomenon can have\nthe property of provoking another mental phenomenon by an act of true\ncausality. It is within the nervous tissue, they say, that the nexus\nof psychic states should be enclosed. These should succeed in time\nwithout being directly connected with one another; they should succeed\nbecause the physical basis of them is excited in succession. Some of\nthem would be like an air on the piano: the notes follow each other\nand arrange themselves into melodies, not by any affinity proper to\nthemselves, but because the keys of the instrument are struck in the\nrequired order.\n\nI said a little while ago that parallelism was a perfected\nmaterialism. The reason of this will be understood. It is a doctrine\nwhich preserves the determinism of physical facts while avoiding the\ncompromising of itself in the difficult explanation of the connection\nbetween the soul and the body. It remains scientific without raising a\nmetaphysical heresy.\n\nBain is one of those who have most clearly expressed, not only the\nadvantages, but also the aspirations of this theory (_Mind and Body_,\np. 130):--\n\n\"We have every reason for believing,\" he says, \"that there is in company\nwith all our mental processes, _an unbroken material succession_. From\nthe ingress of a sensation, to the outgoing responses in action, the\nmental succession is not for an instant dissevered from a physical\nsuccession. A new prospect bursts upon the view; there is mental result\nof sensation, emotion, thought--terminating in outward displays of\nspeech or gesture. Parallel to this mental series is the physical series\nof facts, the successive agitation of the physical organs, called the\neye, the retina, the optic nerve, optic centres, cerebral hemispheres,\noutgoing nerves, muscles, &c. While we go the round of the mental circle\nof sensation, emotion, and thought, there is an unbroken physical circle\nof effects. It would be incompatible with everything we know of the\ncerebral action, to suppose that the physical chain ends abruptly in a\nphysical void, occupied by an immaterial substance; which immaterial\nsubstance, after working alone, imparts its results to the other edge\nof the physical break, and determines the active response--two shores of\nthe material with an intervening ocean of the immaterial. There is, in\nfact, no rupture of nervous continuity. The only tenable supposition is,\nthat mental and physical proceed together, as undivided twins.\"\n\nOn reading this passage it is easy to see the idea which forms the\nbasis of the doctrine. It is, as I have already said, the fetichism of\nmechanics: parallelism takes its inspiration from this quite as\ndirectly as does materialism, but with more skill, inasmuch as it\navoids the most dangerous question, that of the interaction of physics\nand morals, and replaces it by an hypothesis much resembling\nLeibnitz's hypothesis of the pre-established harmony, On the other\nhand, a second merit of this prudent doctrine is the avoiding the\nquestion of genesis. It does not seek for the origin of thought, but\nplaces this last in a relation of parallelism with the manifestations\nof matter; and in the same way that parallel lines prolonged _ad\ninfinitum_ never meet, so the partisans of this doctrine announce\ntheir resolution not to inquire how the actual state of things has\nbeen formed, nor how it will end if, for example, one of the terms\nshould disappear by the death of the bodily organism.\n\nNotwithstanding so many precautions, criticisms have not been wanting;\nonly they would seem not to have touched the weak part of the\ndoctrine and not to be decisive. We will only run through them\nbriefly.\n\nIt has been said: there is no logical necessity which forces us to\nrefuse to the consciousness the privilege of acting in complete\nindependence of the nervous mechanism.\n\nIt has also been said: it is by no means certain that any nervous\nmechanism can be invented which imitates and, if need were, could\nreplace an intellectual act. For instance, what association of nerve\ncells, what molecular action, can imitate an act of comparison which\nenables us to see a resemblance between two objects? Let it be\nsupposed, for example, that the resemblance of two impressions come\nfrom a partial identity, and that the latter has for material support\nan identity in the seat or the form of the corresponding nervous\ninflux. But what is identity? How can it be conceived without\nsupposing resemblance, of which it is but a form? How, then, can the\none be explained by the other? Thus, for instance, at the bottom of\nall our intellectual acts, there is a certain degree of belief. Can\nany material combination be found which corresponds thereto?\n\nThere is one last objection, the most serious of all. Parallelism, by\nestablishing a fixed and invariable relation between the physical and\nthe moral, ends by denying the role of this last, since the physical\nmechanism is sufficient to draw to itself all the effects which\ngeneral belief attributes to the moral. The parallelists on this point\ngo very much further than the materialists; the latter at least\nconcede that the consciousness is of some use, since they compared it\nto a function or a secretion, and, after all, a secretion is a useful\nliquid. The parallelists are so strongly convinced that mechanism is\nalone efficacious that they come to deny any role to thought. The\nconsciousness for them has no purpose: yet it keeps company with its\nobject. The metaphors which serve to define it, part of which have\nbeen imagined by Huxley, are all of a passive nature. Such is the\nlight, or the whistling noise which accompanies the working of an\nengine, but does not act on its machinery. Or, the shadow which dogs\nthe steps of the traveller. Or a phosphorescence lighting up the\ntraces of the movements of the brain.\n\nIt has also been said that the consciousness is a useless luxury. Some\nhave even gone further, and the fine and significant name of\n_epiphenomenon_, that has been given to thought, well translates that\nconception, according to which semi-realities may exist in nature.\n\nAll these objections certainly carry great weight, but they are not\ncapable of killing the doctrine--they only scotch it.\n\nI think there is a radical vice in parallelism, which till now has not\nbeen sufficiently indicated, and I ask what can really remain of the\nwhole edifice when this vice has been once exposed?\n\nParallelism implies a false idea, which we have already come across\nwhen discussing materialism. It is the idea that a phenomenon of\nconsciousness constitutes one complete whole.\n\nThe error proceeds from the use of concepts which cause the reality to\nbe lost sight of. The reality shows that every phenomenon of\nconsciousness consists in a mode of activity, an aggregate of\nfaculties which require an object to fasten on to and so realise\nthemselves, and that this object is furnished by matter. What we\nalways note in intuition is the union, the incarnation of\nconsciousness-matter. Our thoughts, our memories, our reasonings have\nas object sensations, images--that is to say, things which, strictly\nspeaking, are as material as our own brains. It is therefore rather\nchildish to put all these workings of the spirit on another plane and\nin another world than the workings of the brain since they are in\ngreat part of the same nature as the last named and they contain so\nmany material elements. Now if we re-establish facts as they are, if\nwe admit a parallelism between physical phenomena, on the one hand,\nand phenomena at once physical and psychical, on the other, the\nparallelist hypothesis loses every sort of meaning. It ceases to\npresent to us the image of two phenomena of an absolutely different\norder, which are found coupled together like the two faces of a unity,\nthe front and back of a page, the right and wrong side of a stuff. If\nthere is anything material in the psychical part, the opposition of\nnature no longer exists between the two terms; they become identical.\n\nVery often, certain parallelists, after thinking they have discovered\nthe duality of nature, endeavour to bring it back to unity by\nsupposing that the two faces of the reality are as two effects of one\nunique reality, inaccessible to our senses and underlying appearances.\nWhy go so far afield to seek unity? It is trouble in vain: for it is\nto be found in the phenomenon itself.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 46: I can quote two observations in support of this. M.\nBRIEUX, to whom I was relating this part of my argument, stopped me,\nsaying, \"You have guessed right; I represent to myself thought issuing\nfrom brain in the form of an electric gleam.\" Dr. SIMON also informed\nme, during the reading of my manuscript, that he saw \"thought floating\nover the brain like an _ignis fatuus_.\"]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nMODERN THEORIES\n\n\nIt may be thought that the objection taken above to parallelism and\nmaterialism is personal to myself, because I have put it forward as\nthe consequence of my analysis of the respective shares of thought and\nmatter in every act of cognition. This is not so. I am here in harmony\nwith other philosophers who arrived at the same conclusions long\nbefore me, and it may be useful to quote them.\n\nWe will begin with the prince of idealists, Berkeley. \"'Everything you\nknow or conceive other than spirits,' says Philonous to Hylas, 'is but\nyour ideas; so then when you say that all ideas are occasioned by\nimpressions made in the brain, either you conceive this brain or you\ndo not. If you conceive it, you are in that case talking of ideas\nimprinted in an idea which is the cause of this very idea, which is\nabsurd. If you do not conceive it, you are talking unintelligibly, you\nare not forming a reasonable hypothesis.' 'How can it be reasonable,'\nhe goes on to say, 'to think that the brain, which is a sensible\nthing, _i.e._ which can be apprehended by the senses--an idea\nconsequently which only exists in the mind--is the cause of our other\nideas?'\"[47]\n\nThus, in the reasoning of Berkeley, the function of the brain cannot\nexplain the production of ideas, because the brain itself is an idea,\nand an idea cannot be the cause of all our other ideas.\n\nM. Bergson's argument is quite similar, although he takes a very\ndifferent standpoint from that of idealism. He takes the word image in\nthe vaguest conceivable sense. To explain the meaning of this word he\nsimply says: \"images which are perceived when I open my senses, and\nunperceived when I close them.\" He also remarks that the external\nobjects are images, and that the brain and its molecular disturbances\nare likewise images. And he adds, \"For this image which I call\ncerebral disturbance to generate the external images, it would have to\ncontain them in one way or another, and the representation of the\nwhole material universe would have to be implicated in that of this\nmolecular movement. Now, it is enough to enunciate such a proposition\nto reveal its absurdity.\"[48]\n\nIt will be seen that this reasoning is the same as Berkeley's, though\nthe two authors are reasoning on objects that are different; according\nto Berkeley, the brain and the states of conscience are psychical\nstates; according to Bergson, the definition of the nature of these\ntwo objects designated by the term image is more comprehensive, but\nthe essential of his argument is independent of this definition. It is\nenough that the two terms should be of similar nature for one to be\nunable to generate the other.\n\nMy own argument in its turn comes rather near the preceding ones. For\nthe idea of Berkeley, and the image of Bergson, I substitute the term\nmatter. I say that the brain is matter, and that the perception of any\nobject is perception of matter, and I think it is not easy to explain\nhow from this brain can issue this perception, since that would be to\nadmit that from one matter may come forth another matter. There is\ncertainly here a great difficulty.\n\nM. Bergson has thought to overcome it by attacking it in the following\nway. He has the very ingenious idea of changing the position of the\nrepresentation in relation to the cerebral movement. The materialist\nplaces the representation after this movement and derives it from the\nmovement; the parallelist places it by the side of the movement and in\nequivalence to it. M. Bergson places it before the movement, and\nsupposes it to play with regard to it the part of exciting cause, or\nsimply that of initiator. This cerebral movement becomes an effect of\nthe representation and a motor effect. Consequently the nervous system\npasses into the state of motor organ: the sensory nerves are not, as\nsupposed, true sensory nerves, but they are the commencements of motor\nnerves, the aim of which is to lead the motor excitements to the\ncentres which play the part of commutators and direct the current,\nsometimes by one set of nerves, sometimes by others. The nervous\nsystem is like a tool held in the hand: it is a vehicle for action, we\nare told, and not a substratum for cognition. I cannot here say with\nwhat ingenuity, with what powerful logic, and with what close\ncontinuity of ideas M. Bergson develops his system, nor with what\naddress he braves its difficulties.\n\nHis mind is remarkable alike for its power of systematisation and its\nsuppleness of adaptation. Before commencing to criticise him, I am\nanxious to say how much I admire him, how much I agree with him\nthroughout the critical part of his work, and how much I owe to the\nperusal of his book, _Matiere et Memoire_. Though I was led into\nmetaphysics by private needs, though some of the ideas I have set\nforth above were conceptions of my own (for example, the criticism of\nthe mechanical theory of matter, and the definition of sensation),\nbefore I had read M. Bergson's book, it cannot be denied that its\nperusal has so strongly modified my ideas that a great part of these\nare due to him without my feeling capable of exactly discerning which;\nfor ideas have a much more impersonal character than observations and\nexperiments. It would therefore have been ungrateful to criticise him\nbefore having rendered him this tribute.\n\nThere are, in M. Bergson's theory, a few assertions which surprise us\na little, like everything which runs counter to old habits. It has\nalways been supposed that our body is the receptacle of our\npsychological phenomena. We store our reminiscences in our nerve\ncentres; we put the state of our emotions in the perturbations of\ncertain apparatus; we find the physical basis of our efforts of will\nand of attention in the sensations of muscular tension born in our\nlimbs or trunk. Directly we believe that the nervous system is no\nlonger the depository of these states, we must change their domicile;\nand where are they to be placed? Here the theory becomes obscure and\nvague, and custom renders it difficult to understand the situation of\nthe mind outside the body. M. Bergson places memory in planes of\nconsciousness far removed from action, and perception he places in the\nvery object we perceive.\n\nIf I look at my bookcase, my thought is in my books; if I look at the\nsky, my thought is in a star.[49] It is very difficult to criticise\nideas such as these, because one is never certain that one understands\nthem. I will therefore not linger over them, notwithstanding the\nmistrust which they inspire in me.\n\nBut what seems to me to require proof is the function M. Bergson is\nled to attribute to the sensory nerves. To his mind, it is not exact\nto say that the excitement of a sensory nerve excites sensation. This\nwould be a wrong description, for, according to him, every nerve, even\na sensory one, serves as a motor; it conducts the disturbance which,\npassing through the central commutator, flows finally into the\nmuscles. But then, whence comes it that I think I feel a sensation\nwhen my sensory nerve is touched? Whence comes it that a pressure on\nthe epitrochlear nerve gives me a tingling in the hand? Whence comes\nit that a blow on the eyeball gives me a fleeting impression of light?\nOne must read the page where M. Bergson struggles against what seems\nto me the evidence of the facts. \"If, for one reason or another,\" he\nsays, \"the excitement no longer passes, it would be strange if the\ncorresponding perception took place, since this perception would then\nput our body in relation with points of space which would no longer\ninvite it to make a choice. Divide the optic nerve of any animal; the\ndisturbance starting from the luminous point is no longer transmitted\nto the brain, and thence to the motor nerves. The thread which\nconnected the external object to the motor mechanism of the animal by\nenveloping the optic nerve, is severed; the visual perception has\ntherefore become powerless, and in this powerlessness consists\nunconsciousness.\" This argument is more clever than convincing. It is\nnot convincing, because it consists in exaggerating beyond all reason\na very real fact, that of the relation which can be discovered between\nour sensations and our movements. We believe, with M. Bergson, that it\nis absolutely correct to see in action the end and the _raison d'etre_\nof our intelligence and our sensibility. But does it follow that every\ndegree, every shade, every detail of sensation, even the most\ninsignificant, has any importance for the action? The variations of\nsensibility are much more numerous than those of movements and of\nadaptation; very probably, as is seen in an attentive study of\ninfancy, sensibility precedes the power of motion in its\ndifferentiations. A child shows an extraordinary acuteness of\nperception at an age when its hand is still very clumsy. The\ncorrelation, then, is not absolute. And then even if it were so, it\nwould not follow that the suppression of any movement would produce by\nrebound the suppression of the sensation to which this movement\nhabitually corresponds. On this hypothesis, a sensation which loses\nits motor effect becomes useless. Be it so; but this does not prove\nthat the uselessness of a sensation is synonymous with insensibility.\nI can very well imagine the movement being suppressed and the useless\nsensation continuing to evoke images and to be perceived. Does not\nthis occur daily? There are patients who, after an attack of paralysis\nremain paralysed in one limb, which loses the voluntary movement, but\ndoes not necessarily lose its sensibility. Many clear cases are\nobserved in which this dissociation takes place.\n\nI therefore own that I cannot follow M. Bergson in his deduction. As a\nphysiologist, I am obliged to believe firmly in the existence of the\nsensory nerves, and therefore I continue to suppose that our conscious\nsensations are consequent to the excitement of these nerves and\nsubordinate to their integrity. Now, as therein lies, unless I\nmistake, the essential postulate, the heart of M. Bergson's theory, by\nnot admitting it I must regretfully reject the whole.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 47: I borrow this quotation from RENOUVIER, _Le\nPersonnellisme_, p. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Matiere et Memoire_, p. 3. The author has returned to\nthis point more at length in a communication to the Congres de\nPhilosophie de Geneve, in 1904. See _Revue de Metaphysique et de\nMorale_, Nov. 1904, communication from H. BERGSON entitled \"Le\nParalogisme psycho-physiologique.\" Here is a passage from this article\nwhich expresses the same idea: \"To say that the image of the\nsurrounding world issues from this image (from the cerebral movement),\nor that it expresses itself by this image, or that it arises as soon\nas this image is suggested, or that one gives it to one's self by\ngiving one's self this image, would be to contradict one's self; since\nthese two images, the outer world and the intra-cerebral movement,\nhave been supposed to be of the same nature, and the second image is,\nby the hypothesis, an infinitesimal part of the field of\nrepresentation, while the first fills the whole of it.\"]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Matiere et Memoire_, p. 31]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\nA few convinced materialists and parallelists, to whom I have read the\nabove criticisms on their systems, have found no answer to them; my\ncriticisms have appeared to them just, but nevertheless they have\ncontinued to abide by their own systems, probably because they were\nbound to have one. We do not destroy an erroneous idea when we do not\nreplace it by another.\n\nThis has decided me to set forth some personal views which,\nprovisionally, and for want of better, might be substituted for the\nold doctrines. Before doing this, I hasten to explain their character,\nand to state openly that they are only hypotheses.\n\nI know that metaphysicians rarely make avowals of this kind. They\npresent their systems as a well-connected whole, and they set forth\nits different parts, even the boldest of them, in the same dogmatic\ntone, and without warning that we ought to attach very unequal degrees\nof confidence to these various parts. This is a deplorable method, and\nto it is perhaps due the kind of disdain that observers and\nexperimentalists feel for metaphysics--a disdain often without\njustification, for all is not false, and everything is not\nhypothetical, in metaphysics. There are in it demonstrations,\nanalyses, and criticisms, especially the last, which appear to me as\nexact and as certain as an observation or experiment. The mistake lies\nin mixing up together in a statement, without distinction, the certain\nwith the probable, and the probable with the possible.\n\nMetaphysicians are not wholly responsible for this fault of method;\nand I am much inclined to think that it is the natural consequence of\nthe abuse of speculation. It is especially by the cultivation of the\nsciences of observation that we foster in ourselves the precious sense\nof proof, because we can check it any minute by experimental\nverification. When we are working at a distance from the facts, this\nsense of proof gets thinner, and there is lost that feeling of\nresponsibility and fear of seeing one's assertions contradicted by a\ndecisive countervailing observation, which is felt by every observer.\nOne acquires the unbearable pride which I note in Kant, and one\nabandons one's self to the spirit of construction. I am speaking from\npersonal experience. I have several times detected within me this bad\nspirit of construction, I have been seeking to group several facts of\nobservation under the same idea, and then I have discovered that I was\nbelittling and depreciating those facts which did not fit in with the\nidea.\n\nThe hypothesis I now present on the relations of the mind and the\nbrain has, for me, the advantage of bringing to light the precise\nconditions which a solution of this great problem must satisfy for\nthis solution to be worthy of discussion.\n\nThese conditions are very numerous. I shall not indicate them all\nsuccessively; but here are two which are particularly important.\n\n1. The manifestations of the consciousness are conditioned by the\nbrain. Let us suspend, by any means, the activity of the encephalic\nmass, by arresting the circulation of the blood for example, and the\npsychic function is at once inhibited. Compress the carotid, and you\nobtain the clouding-over of the intellect. Or, instead of a total\nabolition, you can have one in detail; sever a sensory nerve with the\nbistoury, and all the sensations which that nerve transmits to the\nbrain are suppressed. Consciousness appears only when the molecular\ndisturbance reaches the nerve centres; everything takes place in the\nsame way as if this disturbance released the consciousness.\nConsciousness also accompanies or follows certain material states of\nthe nerve centres, such as the waves which traverse the sensory\nnerves, which exercise reflex action in the cells, and which propagate\nthemselves in the motor nerves. It is to the production, the\ndistribution, and the integrity of this nervous influx that the\nconsciousness is closely linked. It there finds one of the conditions\nof its apparition.\n\n2. On the other hand, the consciousness remains in complete ignorance\nof these intra-cerebral phenomena. It does not perceive the nerve-wave\nwhich sets it in motion, it knows nothing of its peculiarities, of its\ntrajectory, or the length of its course. In this sense it may be said\nthat it is in no degree an anatomist; it has no idea of all the\npeculiarities of the nerve-wave which form part of its cerebral\nhistory from the moment when these peculiarities are out of relation\nwith the properties of external objects.\n\nOne sometimes wonders that our consciousness is not aware that the\nobjects we perceive with our two eyes correspond to a double\nundulation, namely, that of the right and that of the left, and that\nthe image is reversed on the retina, so that it is the rods of the\nright which are impressed by objects on our left, and the rods of the\nupper part by objects below our eyes. These are, it has been very\njustly said, factitious problems, imaginary difficulties which do not\nexist. There is no need to explain, for instance, direct vision by a\nreversed image, because our consciousness is not aware that the image\non the retina is reversed. In order to take account of this, we should\nrequire another eye to see this image. This answer appears\nparticularly to the point. It will be found that it is absolutely\ncorrect if we reflect that this case of the unfelt inversion of the\nimage on the retina is but one example of the anatomical ignorance of\nthe consciousness.\n\nIt might also be declared, in the same order of ideas, that our\nconsciousness is ignorant, that excitements of the eye cross each\nother at the level of the chiasma, and pass through the internal\ncapsule, and that the majority of the visual excitements of an eye are\nreceived by the opposite hemisphere.\n\nA rather confused notion of these facts has formed itself in the minds\nof several critics, and I can discern the proof of this in the\nlanguage they use. It will be said, for example, that the idea exists\nin the consciousness or in the mind, and phrases like the following\nwill be avoided: \"I think with my brain\"--the suggestion consists in\nintroducing an idea in the brain--\"The nerve cell perceives and\nreasons, &c.\" Ordinarily these forms of speech are criticised because\nthey appear to have the defect of establishing a confusion between two\nirreducible elements, the physical and the mental. I think the error\nof language proceeds from another cause, since I do not admit this\ndistinction between the physical and the mental. I think that the\nerror consists in supposing vaguely that the consciousness\ncomprehends intra-cerebral phenomena, whereas it ignores them.\n\nLet me repeat that there is no such thing as intra-cerebral\nsensibility. The consciousness is absolutely insensitive with regard\nto the dispositions of the cerebral substance and its mode of work. It\nis not the nervous undulation which our consciousness perceives, but\nthe exciting cause of this wave--that is, the external object. The\nconsciousness does not feel that which is quite close to it, but is\ninformed of that which passes much further off. Nothing that is\nproduced inside the cranium interests it; it is solely occupied with\nobjects of which the situation is extra-cranial. It does not penetrate\ninto the brain, we might say, but spreads itself like a sheet over the\nperiphery of the body, and thence springs into the midst of the\nexternal objects.\n\nThere is, therefore, I do not say a contradiction, but a very striking\ncontrast between these two facts. The consciousness is conditioned,\nkept up, and nourished by the working of the cerebral substance, but\nknows nothing of what passes in the interior of that substance. This\nconsciousness might itself be compared to a parasitical organism which\nplunges its tap roots into the nerve centres, and of which the organs\nof perception, borne on long stalks, emerge from the cranium and\nperceive everything outside that cranium. But this is, of course,\nonly a rough image.\n\nStrictly, it is possible to explain this distribution of the\nconscience, singular as it is at first sight, by those reasons of\npractical utility which are so powerful in the history of evolution.\n\nA living being has to know the world external to himself in order to\nadapt and preadapt himself to it, for it is in this outer world that\nhe finds food, shelter, beings of his own species, and the means of\nwork, and it is on this world of objects that he acts in every\npossible way by the contractions of his muscles. But with regard to\nintracephalic actions, they are outside the ordinary sphere of our\nactions. There is no daily need to know them, and we can understand\nthat the consciousness has not found very pressing utilitarian motives\nfor development in that direction. One must be an histologist or a\nsurgeon to find an appreciable interest in studying the structure of\nthe nerve cell or the topography of the cerebral centres.\n\nWe can therefore explain well enough, by the general laws of\nadaptation, the reason of the absence of what might be called\n\"cerebral sensibility,\" but, here as elsewhere, the question of the\n\"Why\" is much easier to solve than that of the \"How.\"\n\nThe question of the \"How\" consists in explaining that the\nconsciousness, directly aroused by a nerve-wave, does not perceive\nthis undulation, but in its stead the external object. Let us first\nnote that between the external object and the nervous influx there is\nthe relation of cause to effect. It is only the effect which reaches\nus, our nerve cells, and our consciousness. What must be explained is\nhow a cognition (if such a word may be employed here) of the effect\ncan excite the consciousness of the cause. It is clear that the effect\ndoes not resemble the cause, as quality: the orange I am looking at\nhas no resemblance with the brain wave which at this moment is\ntraversing my optic nerve; but this effect contains everything which\nwas in the cause, or, more exactly, all that part of the cause of\nwhich we have perception. Since it is only by the intermediary of our\nnervous system that we perceive the object, all the properties capable\nof being perceived are communicated to our nervous system and\ninscribed in the nerve wave. The effect produced therefore is the\nmeasure of our perception of the cause. This is absolutely certain.\nAll bodies possess an infinity of properties which escape our\ncognitions; because, as excitants of our organism, these properties\nare wanting in the intensity or the quality necessary to make it\nvibrate; they have not been tuned in unison with our nervous chords.\nAnd, inversely, all we perceive of the mechanical, physical, and\nchemical properties of a body is contained in the vibration this body\nsucceeds in propagating through our cerebral atmosphere. There is in\nthis a phenomenon of transmission analogous to that which is produced\nwhen an air of music is sent along a wire; the whole concert heard at\nthe other extremity of the wire has travelled in the form of delicate\nvibrations.\n\nThere must therefore exist, though unperceived by our senses, a sort\nof kinship between the qualities of the external objects and the\nvibrations of our nerves. This is sometimes forgotten. The theory of\nthe specific energy of the nerves causes it to be overlooked. As we\nsee that the quality of the sensation depends on the nerve that is\nexcited, one is inclined to minimise the importance of the excitant.\nIt is relegated to the position of a proximate cause with regard to\nthe vibration of the nerve, as the striking of a key on the piano is\nthe proximate cause of the vibration of a string, which always gives\nthe same degree of sound whether struck by the forefinger or third\nfinger, or by a pencil or any other body. It will be seen at once that\nthis comparison is inexact. The specific property of our nerves does\nnot prevent our knowing the form of the excitant, and our nerves are\nonly comparable to piano strings if we grant to these the property of\nvibrating differently according to the nature of the bodies which\nstrike them.\n\nHow is it that the nerve wave, if it be the depository of the whole of\nthe physical properties perceived in the object, resembles it so\nlittle? It is because--this is my hypothesis--these properties, if\nthey are in the undulation, are not there alone. The undulation is the\nwork of two collaborators: it expresses both the nature of the object\nwhich provokes it and that of the nervous apparatus which is its\nvehicle. It is like the furrow traced in the wax of the phonograph\nwhich expresses the collaboration of an aerial vibration with a\nstylus, a cylinder, and a clock-work movement. This engraved line\nresembles, in short, neither the phonographic apparatus nor the aerial\nvibration, although it results from the combination of the two.\n\nSimilarly, I suppose that if the nervous vibration resembles so little\nthe excitant which gives it birth, it is because the factor nervous\nsystem adds its effect to the factor external object. Each of these\nfactors represents a different property: the external object\nrepresents a cognition and the nervous system an excitement.\n\nLet us imagine that we succeed in separating these two effects. It\nwill be conceived, theoretically, that a separation of this kind will\nlay bare the hidden resemblances, giving to each collaborator the\npart which belongs to it. The excitement, for instance, will be\nsuppressed, and the cognition will be retained. Is it possible to\nmake, or at least to imagine, such an analysis? Perhaps: for, of these\ntwo competing activities, one is variable, since it depends on the\nconstantly changing nature of the objects which come into relation\nwith us; the other, on the contrary, is a constant, since it expresses\nthe contribution of our nerve substance, and, though this last is of\nvery unstable composition, it necessarily varies much less than the\nseries of excitants. We consequently see faintly that these two\nelements differ sufficiently in character for us to be able to suppose\nthat they are separable by analysis.\n\nBut how could this analysis be made? Evidently not by chemical or\nphysical means: we have no need here of reagents, prisms, centrifugal\napparatus, permeable membranes, or anything of that kind. It will\nsuffice to suppose that it is the consciousness itself that is the\ndialyser. It acts by virtue of its own laws--that is to say, by\nchanges in intensity. Supposing that sensibility increases for the\nvariable elements of the undulation, and becomes insensible for the\nconstant elements. The effect will be the same as a material\ndissociation by chemical analysis: there will be an elimination of\ncertain elements and the retention of others.\n\nNow, all we know of the consciousness authorises us to entrust this\nrole to it, for it is within the range of its habits. We know that\nchange is the law of consciousness, that it is effaced when the\nexcitements are uniform, and is renewed by their differences or their\nnovelty. A continued or too often repeated excitement ceases in time\nto be perceived. It is to condense these facts into a formula that\nBain speaks of the law of relativity of cognition, and, in spite of a\nfew ambiguities on the part of Spencer and of Bain himself in the\ndefinition of this law,[50] the formula with the sense I have just\nindicated is worth preserving.\n\nLet us see what becomes of it, when my hypothesis is adopted. It\nexplains how certain excitements proceeding from the objects--that is\nto say, forming part of the variable element--cease to be perceived\nwhen they are repeated and tend to become constant. _A fortiori_, it\nseems to me, should the same law explain how the constant element _par\nexcellence_, the one which never varies from the first hour, is never\nperceived. There is, in the concert of the sounds of nature, an\naccompaniment so monotonous that it is no longer perceived; and the\nmelody alone continues to be heard.\n\nIt is in this precisely that my hypothesis consists. We will suppose a\nnerve current starting from one of the organs of the senses, when it\nis excited by some object or other, and arriving at the centre of the\nbrain. This current contains all the properties of the object, its\ncolour, its form, its size, its thousand details of structure, its\nweight, its sonorous qualities, &c., &c., properties combined with and\nconnected by the properties of the nerve-organ in which the current is\npropagated. The consciousness remains insensible to those nervous\nproperties of the current which are so often repeated that they are\nannulled; it perceives, on the contrary, its variable and accidental\nproperties which express the nature of the excitant. By this partial\nsensibility, the consciousness lays bare that which, in the nerve\ncurrent, represents the object--that is to say, a cognition; and this\noperation is equivalent to a transformation of the current into a\nperception, image, or idea. There is not, strictly speaking, a\ntransformation, but an analysis; only, the practical result is the\nsame as that of a transformation, and is obtained without its being\nnecessary to suppose the transmutation of a physical into a mental\nphenomenon.\n\nLet us place ourselves now at the moment when the analysis I am\nsupposing to be possible has just been effected. Our consciousness\nthen assists at the unrolling of representations which correspond to\nthe outer world. These representations are not, or do not appear to\nbe, lodged in the brain; and it is not necessary to suppose a special\noperation which, taking them in the brain, should project them to the\nperiphery of our nerves. This transport would be useless, since for\nthe consciousness the brain does not exist: the brain, with its fibres\nand cells, is not felt; it therefore supplies no _datum_ to enable us\nto judge whether the representation is external or internal with\nregard to it. In other words, the representation is only localised in\nrelation to itself; there is no determinate position other than that\nof one representation in relation to another. We may therefore reject\nas inexact the pretended law of eccentricity of the physiologists, who\nsuppose that sensation is first perceived as it were centrally, and\nthen, by an added act, is localised at the peripheric extremity of the\nnerve. This argument would only be correct if we admitted that the\nbrain is perceived by the consciousness of the brain. I have already\nsaid that the consciousness is not an anatomist, and that therefore\nthis problem does not present itself.\n\nSuch as it is, this hypothesis appears to me to present the advantage\nof explaining the reason why our consciousness coincides, in certain\ncircumstances, with the actions of the brain, and, in others, does not\ncome near them. In other words, it contains an explanation of the\nunconscious. I can show this by quoting certain exact facts, of which\nthe explanation has been hitherto thought to present difficulties, but\nwhich become very easy to understand on the present hypothesis. The\nfirst of these facts relates to the psychology of the motor current.\nThis current has been a great feature in the studies which have been\nmade on the feeling of effort and on the physical basis of the will.\nThe motor current is that which, starting from the cerebral cells of\nthe motor region, travels by way of the fibres of the pyramidal tract\ninto the muscles of the body; and it is centrifugal in direction.\nResearches have been made as to whether we are or may be conscious of\nthis current; or rather, the question has been put in somewhat\ndifferent terms. It has been asked whether a psychological state can\nbe the counterpart of this motor current,--if, for example, the\nfeeling of mental effort produced in us at the moment of executing a\ndifficult act or of taking a grave resolution, might not have this\nmotor current for a basis.\n\nThe opinion which has prevailed is in the negative. We have\nrecognised--a good deal on the faith of experiment, and a little also\nfor theoretical reasons--that no sensation is awakened by the\ncentrifugal current. As to the sensation of effort, it has been agreed\nto place it elsewhere. We put it among the centripetal sensations\nwhich, are produced as the movement outlines itself, and which proceed\nfrom the contracted muscles, the stretched ligaments, and the\nfrictional movements of the articulations. Effort would therefore form\npart of all the psychical phenomenology, which is the duplicate of\nthose sensory currents which are centripetal in direction.\n\nIn the long run, I can see no sort of theoretical reason for\nsubordinating the consciousness to the direction of the nerve current,\nand for supposing that the consciousness is aroused when this current\nis centripetal, and that it cannot follow the centrifugal current. But\nthis point matters little. My hypothesis would fairly well explain why\nthe motor current remains unconscious; it explains the affair by\ntaking into consideration the nature of this current and not its\ndirection. This current is a motor one because it is born in the\ncentral cells, because it is a discharge from these cells, and is of\nentirely nervous origin. Since it does not correspond with the\nperception of an object--the ever varying object--it is always the\nsame by nature. It does not carry with it in its monotonous course the\n_debris_ of an object, as does the sensory current. Thus it can flow\nwithout consciousness.\n\nThis same kind of hypothesis supplies us with the reasons why a given\nsensory current may be, according to circumstances, either conscious\nor unconscious. The consciousness resulting from the analysis of the\nmolecular wave is, as it were, a supplementary work which may be\nsubsequently added to the realised wave. The propagation of the wave\nis the essential fact--there is always time to become conscious of it\nafterwards. It is thus that we happen, in moments of abstraction, to\nremain insensible to certain even very powerful excitements. Our\nnervous system registers them, nevertheless, and we can find them\nagain, later on, within the memory. This is the effect of a belated\nanalysis.\n\nThe converse phenomenon occurs much more frequently. We remark many\nactions and perceptions which occur the first time with consciousness,\nemotion, and effort. Then, when they are repeated, as coordination\nbecomes stronger and easier, the reflex consciousness of the operation\nbecomes feebler. This is the law of habit, which slowly carries us\ntowards automatism. These observations have even been extended, and\nthe endeavour made to apply them to the explanation of the origin of\nreflex actions and of instincts which have all started with\nconsciousness. This is a rather bold attempt, for it meets with many\nserious difficulties in execution; but the idea seems fairly correct,\nand is acceptable if we may limit it. It is certain that the\nconsciousness accompanies the effort towards the untried, and perishes\nas soon as it is realised. Whence comes this singular dilemma\npropounded to it by nature: to create something new or perish? It\nreally seems that my hypothesis explains this. Every new act is\nproduced by nerve currents, which contain many of those variable\nelements which the consciousness perceives; but, in proportion as the\naction of the brain repeats itself and becomes more precise and more\nexact, this variable element becomes attenuated, falls to its lowest\npitch, and may even disappear in the fixation of habit and instinct.\n\nMy hypothesis much resembles the system of parallelism. It perfects\nit, as it seems to me, as much as the latter has perfected\nmaterialism. We indeed admit a kind of parallelism between the\nconsciousness and the object of cognition; but these two series are\nnot independent, not simply placed in juxtaposition as is possible in\nordinary parallelism; they are united and fused together so as to\ncomplete each other. This new theory appears to me to represent a\nbetter form of the series of attempts which have been inspired by the\ncommon necessity of making the phenomena of consciousness accord with\nthe determinism of physical facts.\n\nI hold fast to this physical determinism, and accept a strictly\nmechanical conception of the functions of the nervous system. In my\nidea, the currents which pass through the cerebral mass follow each\nother without interruption, from the sensorial periphery to the motor\nperiphery; it is they, and they alone, which excite the movements of\nthe body by acting on the muscles. Parallelism recognises all these\nthings, and I do likewise.\n\nLet us now see the advantages of this new system. First, it contains\nno paralogism, no logical or psychological error, since it does not\nadvance the supposition that the mental differs by its nature from the\nphysical phenomenon. We have discussed above the consequences of this\nerror, They are here avoided. In the second place, it is explanatory,\nat least in a certain measure, since the formula we employ allows us\nto understand, better than by the principle of a simple juxtaposition,\nwhy certain nerve currents flow in the light of consciousness, while\nothers are plunged into the darkness of unconsciousness. This law of\nconsciousness, which Bain called the law of relativity, becomes, when\nembodied with my theory of the relations of the physical to the moral,\nan explanation of the distribution of consciousness through the\nactions of the brain.\n\nI ask myself whether the explanation I have devised ought to be\nliterally preserved. Perhaps not. I have endeavoured less to present a\nready-made solution than to indicate the direction in which we ought\nto look for one. The law of consciousness which I have used to explain\nthe transformation of a nerve current into perception and images is\nonly an empirical law produced by the generalisation of particular\nobservations. Until now there has been, so far as I know, no attempt\nto ascertain whether this law of consciousness, notwithstanding the\ngeneral nature which some authors incline to ascribe to it, might not\nexplain itself by some more general facts, and might not fit, as a\nparticular case, into a more comprehensive frame. To be brief, this is\nvery possible. I have not troubled myself about it, and I have made a\ntranscendental use of this empirical law; for I have impliedly\nsupposed it to be a first principle, capable of accounting for the\ndevelopment of the consciousness, but itself incapable of explanation.\n\nIf other observers discover that that which to me has appeared\ninexplicable, may be explained by quite peculiar causes, it is clear\nthat my theory must be abandoned or modified. New theories must then\nbe sought for, which will probably consist in recognising different\nproperties in the consciousness. A little thought will discover\nseveral, I have no doubt. By way of suggestion, I will indicate one\nof these hypothetical possibilities: \"The consciousness has the\nfaculty of reading in the effect that which existed in the cause.\" It\nis not rash to believe that by working out this idea, a certain\nsolution would be discovered. Moreover, the essential is, I repeat,\nless to find a solution than to take account of the point which\nrequires one; and metaphysics seem to me especially useful when it\nshows us where the gap in our knowledge exists and what are the\nconditions required to fill this gap.\n\nAbove all, I adhere to this idea, which has been one of the guiding\nforces of this book: there exists at the bottom of all the phenomena\nof the intelligence, a duality. To form a true phenomenon, there must\nbe at once a consciousness and an object. According to passing\ntendencies, either of temperament or of fashion, preponderance has\nbeen given sometimes to one of the terms of this couple, sometimes to\nthe other. The idealist declares: \"Thought creates the world.\" The\nmaterialist answers: \"The matter of the brain creates thought.\"\nBetween these two extreme opinions, the one as unjustifiable as the\nother in the excesses they commit, we take up an intermediate\nposition. Looking at the balance, we see no argument capable of being\nplaced in the scale of the consciousness which may not be neutralised\nby an argument placed in the scale of the object; and if we had to\ngive our final verdict we should say: \"The consciousness and matter\nhave equal rights,\" thus leaving to every one the power to place, in\nthis conception of an equality of rights, the hopes of survival of\nwhich his heart has need.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 50: The _equivoque_ perpetrated by BAIN and SPENCER consists\nin supposing that the consciousness bears solely on differences. This\nis going too far. I confine myself to admitting that, if sensation is\nnot changed from time to time, the consciousness becomes weaker and\ndisappears.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nRECAPITULATION\n\n\nI ask permission to reproduce here a communication made by me in\nDecember 1904 to the Societe Francaise de Philosophie. I there set\nforth briefly the ideas which I have just developed in this book. This\nsuccinct _expose_ may be useful as a recapitulation of the argument.\n\n\n_Description of Matter._--The physicists who are seeking for a\nconception of the Inmost structure of matter in order to explain the\nvery numerous phenomena they perceive, fancy they can connect them\nwith other phenomena, less numerous, but of the same order. They thus\nconsider matter in itself.\n\nWe psychologists add to matter something more, viz. the observer. We\nconsider matter and define it by its relations to our modes of\nknowledge--that is to say, by bearing in mind that it is conditioned\nby our external perception. These are two different points of view.\n\nIn developing our own standpoint, we note that of the outer world we\nare acquainted with nothing but our sensations: if we propound this\nlimit, it is because many observations and experiments show that,\nbetween the external object and ourselves, there is but one\nintermediary, the nervous system, and that we only perceive the\nmodifications which the external object, acting as an excitant,\nprovokes in this system.\n\nLet us provisionally apply to these modifications the term sensations,\nwithout settling the question of their physical or mental nature.\n\nOther experiments, again, prove to us that our sensations are not\nnecessarily similar to the objects which excite them; for the quality\nof each sensation depends on what is called the specific energy of the\nnerve excited. Thus, whether the optic nerve be appealed to by a ray\nof light, an electric current, or a mechanical shock, it always gives\nthe same answer, and this answer is the sensation of light.\n\nIt follows that our nervous system itself is only known to us as\nregards its structure by the intermediary of sensations, and we are\nnot otherwise more informed upon its nature than upon that of any\nother object whatever.\n\nIn the second place, a much more serious consequence is that all our\nsensations being equally false, so far as they are copies of the\nexcitants which provoke them, one has no right to use any of these\nsensations to represent to ourselves the inmost structure of matter.\nThe theories to which many physicists still cling, which consist in\nexplaining all the modalities of matter by different combinations of\nmovement, start from false premises. Their error consists in\nexplaining the whole body of our sensations by certain particular\nsensations of the eye, of the touch, and of the muscular sense, in\nwhich analysis discovers the elements and the source of the\nrepresentation of motion. Now these particular sensations have no more\nobjective value than those of the tongue, of the nose, and of the ear;\nin so far as they are related to the external excitant of which it is\nsought to penetrate the inmost nature, one of them is as radically\nfalse as the other.\n\nIt is true that a certain number of persons will think to escape from\nour conclusion, because they do not accept our starting point. There\nexist, in fact, several systems which propound that the outer world is\nknown to us directly without the intermediary of a _tertium quid_,\nthat is, of sensation. In the first place, the spiritists are\nconvinced that disembodied souls can remain spectators of terrestrial\nlife, and, consequently, can perceive it without the interposition of\norgans. On the other hand, some German authors have recently\nmaintained, by rather curious reasoning, that the specific energy of\nour nervous system does not transform the excitants, and that our\nsensations are the faithful copies of that which causes them.\nFinally, various philosophers, Reid, Hamilton, and, in our own days,\nthe deep and subtle mind of M. Bergson, have proposed to admit that by\ndirect comprehension we have cognisance of the objects without mystery\nand as they are. Let this be admitted. It will change nothing in our\nconclusions, and for the following reasons.\n\nWe have said that no kind of our sensations--neither the visual, the\ntactile, nor the muscular--permits us to represent to ourselves the\ninmost structure of matter, because all sensations, without exception,\nare false, as copies of material objects. We are now assured that we\nare mistaken, and that our sensations are all true--that is to say,\nare faithful copies of the objects. If all are true, it comes to the\nsame thing as if all are false. If all are true, it is impossible to\nmake any choice among them, to retain only the sensations of sight and\ntouch, and to use them in the construction of a mechanical theory, to\nthe exclusion of the others. For it is impossible for us to explain\nsome by the others. If all are equally true, they all have the same\nright to represent the structure of matter, and, as they are\nirreconcilable, no theory can be formed from their synthesis.\n\nLet us, consequently, conclude this: whatever hypothesis may be built\nup on the relations possibly existing between matter and our\nsensations, we are forbidden to make a theory of matter in the terms\nof our sensations.\n\nThat is what I think of matter, understood as the inmost structure of\nbodies--of unknowable and metaphysical matter. I shall not speak of it\nagain; and henceforth when I use the word matter, it will be in quite\na different acceptation--it will be empirical and physical matter,\nsuch as it appears to us in our sensations. It must therefore be\nunderstood that from this moment we change our ground. We leave the\nworld of _noumena_ and enter that of phenomena.\n\n\n_Definition of Mind._--Generally, to define the mind, we oppose the\nconcept of mind to the concept of matter, with the result that we get\nextremely vague images in our thoughts. It is preferable to replace\nthe concepts by facts, and to proceed to an inventory of all mental\nphenomena.\n\nNow, in the course of this inventory, we perceive that we have\ncontinually to do with two orders of elements, which are united in\nreality, but which our thought may consider as isolated. One of these\nelements is represented by those states which we designate by the name\nof sensations, images, emotions, &c.; the other element is the\nconsciousness of these sensations, the cognition of these images, the\nfact of experiencing these emotions. It is, in other words, a special\nactivity of which these states are the object and, as it were, the\npoint of application--an activity which consists in perceiving,\njudging, comparing, understanding, and willing. To make our inventory\norderly, let us deal with these two elements separately and begin with\nthe first.\n\nWe will first examine sensation: let us put aside that which is the\nfact of feeling, and retain that which is felt. Thus defined and\nslightly condensed, what is sensation? Until now we have employed the\nword in the very vague sense of a _tertium quid_ interposed between\nthe object and ourselves. Now we have to be more precise, and to\ninquire whether sensation is a physical or a mental thing. I need not\ntell you that on this point every possible opinion has been held. My\nown opinion is that sensation should be considered as a physical\nphenomenon; sensation, be it understood, in the sense of impression\nfelt, and not in that of capacity to feel.\n\nHere are the arguments I invoke for the support of my thesis: in the\nfirst place, popular opinion, which identifies matter with what we\nsee, and with what we touch--that is to say, with sensation. This\npopular opinion represents a primitive attitude, a family possession\nwhich we have the right to retain, so long as it is not proved to us\nto be false: next, this remark, that by its mode of apparition at once\nunexpected, the revealer of new cognitions, and independent of our\nwill, as well as by its content, sensation sums up for us all we\nunderstand by matter, physical state, outer world. Colour, form,\nextent, position in space, are known to us as sensations only.\nSensation is not a means of knowing these properties of matter, it is\nthese properties themselves.\n\nWhat objections can be raised against my conclusion? One has evidently\nthe right to apply the term psychological to the whole sensation,\ntaken _en bloc_, and comprising in itself both impression and\nconsciousness. The result of this terminology will be that, as we know\nnothing except sensations, the physical will remain unknowable, and\nthe distinction between the physical and the mental will vanish. But\nit will eventually be re-established under other names by utilising\nthe distinction I have made between objects of cognition and acts of\ncognition;--a distinction which is not verbal, and results from\nobservation.\n\nWhat is not permissible is to declare that sensation is a\npsychological phenomenon, and to oppose this phenomenon to physical\nreality, as if this latter could be known to us by any other method\nthan sensation.\n\nIf the opinion I uphold be accepted, if we agree to see in sensation,\nunderstood in a certain way, a physical state, it will be easy to\nextend this interpretation to a whole series of different phenomena.\nTo the images, first, which proceed from sensations, since they are\nrecurring sensations; to the emotions also, which, according to recent\ntheories, result from the perception of the movements which are\nproduced in the heart, the vessels, and the muscles; and finally, to\neffort, whether of will or of attention, which is constituted by the\nmuscular sensations perceived, and consequently also results from\ncorporeal states. The consequences must be clearly remarked. To admit\nthat sensation is a physical state, is to admit, by that very fact,\nthat the image, idea, emotion, and effort--all those manifestations\ngenerally ascribed to the mind alone--are also physical states.\n\nWhat, then, is the mind? And what share remains to it in all these\nphenomena, from which it seems we are endeavouring to oust it? The\nmind is in that special activity which is engaged in sensation, image,\nidea, emotion, and effort. For a sensation to be produced; there must\nbe, as I said a little time ago, two elements: the something felt--a\ntree, a house, an animal, a titillation, an odour,--and also the fact\nof feeling this something, the consciousness of it, the judgment\npassed on it, the reasoning applied to it--in other terms, the\ncategories which comprehend it. From this point of view, the dualism\ncontained in sensation is clearly expressed. Sensation as a thing\nfelt, that is, the physical part, or matter; sensation as the fact of\nfeeling or of judging, that is, the mind.\n\nMark the language I use. We say that matter is the something felt; but\nwe do not say for the sake of symmetry, that the mind is the something\nwhich feels. I have used a more cautious, and, I think, a more just\nformula, which places the mind in the fact of feeling. Let me repeat\nagain, at the risk of appearing too subtle: the mind is the act of\nconsciousness; it is not a subject which has consciousness. For a\nsubject, let it be noted, a subject which feels, is an object of\ncognition--it forms part of the other group of elements, the group of\nsensations. In practice we represent by mind a fragment of our own\nbiography, and by dint of pains we attribute to this fragment the\nfaculty of having a consciousness; we make it the subject of the\nrelation subject-object. But this fragment, being constituted of\nmemories and sensations, does not exactly represent the mind, and does\nnot correspond to our definition; it would rather represent the mind\nsensationalised or materialised.\n\nFrom this follows the curious consequence that the mind is endowed\nwith an incomplete existence; it is like form, which can only be\nrealised by its application to matter of some kind. One may fancy a\nsensation continuing to exist, to live and to provoke movements, even\nafter ceasing to be perceived. Those who are not uncompromising\nidealists readily admit this independence of the objects with regard\nto our consciousness, but the converse is not true. It is impossible\nto understand a consciousness existing without an object, a perception\nwithout a sensation to be perceived, an attention without a point of\napplication, an empty wish which should have nothing to wish for; in a\nword, a spiritual activity acting without matter on which to act, or\nmore briefly still--mind without matter. Mind and matter are\ncorrelative terms; and, on this point, I firmly believe that Aristotle\nwas much closer to the truth than many modern thinkers.\n\nI have convinced myself that the definition of mind at which we have\njust arrived is, in its exactness and soberness, the only one which\npermits psychology to be distinguished from the sciences nearest to\nit. You know that it has been discovered in our days that there exists\na great difficulty in effecting this delimitation. The definitions of\npsychology hitherto proposed nearly all have the defect of not\nagreeing with the one thing defined. Time fails us to review them all,\nbut I shall point out one at least, because our discussion on this\nparticular formula will serve as a preparation for taking in hand the\nlast question that remains to be examined--the relation of the mind\nto the body.\n\nAccording to the definition I am aiming at, psychology would be the\nscience of internal facts, while the other sciences deal with the\nexternal. Psychology, it has also been said, has as its instrument\nintrospection, while the natural sciences work with the eye, the\ntouch, the ear--that is to say, with the senses of extrospection.\n\nTo this distinction, I reply that in all sciences there exist but two\nthings: sensations and the consciousness which accompanies them. A\nsensation may belong to the inner or the outer world through\naccidental reasons, without any change in its nature; the sensation of\nthe outer world is the social sensation which we share with our\nfellows. If the excitant which provokes it is included in our nervous\nsystem, it is the sensation which becomes individual, hidden to all\nexcept ourselves, and constituting a microcosm by the side of a\nmacrocosm. What importance can this have, since all the difference\ndepends on the position occupied by the excitant?\n\nBut we are persistently told: there are in reality two ways of\narriving at the cognition of objects--from within and from without.\nThese two ways are as opposite as the right and wrong side of a stuff.\nIt is in this sense that psychology is the science of the within and\nlooks at the wrong side, while the natural sciences reckon, weigh,\nand measure the right side. And this is so true, they add, that the\nsame phenomenon absolutely appears under two forms radically different\nfrom each other according as they are looked at from one or the other\nof the two points of view. Every one of our thoughts, they point out\nto us, is in correlation with a particular state of our cerebral\nmatter; our thought is the subjective and mental face, the\ncorresponding cerebral process is the objective and material face.\n\nThough this dualism is frequently presented as an observed truth, I\nthink it is possible to show its error. Take an example: I look at the\nplain before me, and see a flock of sheep pass through it. At the same\ntime an observer, armed with a microscope _a la_ Jules Verne, looks\ninto my brain and observes there a certain molecular dance which\naccompanies my visual perception. Thus, on the one hand, is my\nrepresentation; on the other, a dynamic state of the nerve cells. This\nis what constitutes the right and the wrong sides of the stuff. We are\ntold, \"See how little resemblance there is in this; a representation\nis a psychical, and a movement of molecules a material, thing.\"\n\nBut I, on the contrary, think there is a great resemblance. When I see\nthe flock passing, I have a visual perception. The observer who, by\nthe hypothesis, is at that moment looking into my brain, also\nexperiences a visual perception. Granted, they are not the same\nperception. How could they be the same? I am looking at the sheep, he\nis looking at the interior of my brain; it is not astonishing that,\nlooking at objects so different, we should receive images also very\ndifferent. But, notwithstanding their difference of object--that is,\nof content--there are here two visual perceptions composed in the same\nway; and I do not see by what right it can be said that one represents\na material, the other a physical, phenomenon. In reality, each of\nthese perceptions has a two-fold and psycho-physical value--physical\nin regard to the object to which it applies, and psychical inasmuch as\nit is an act of perception, that is to say, of consciousness. For one\nis just as much psychical as the other, and as much material, for a\nflock of sheep is as material a thing as is my brain. If we keep this\nconclusion in our minds, when we come to make a critical examination\nof certain philosophical systems, we shall easily see the mistake they\nmake.\n\nSpiritualism[51] rests on the conception that the mind can subsist and\nwork in total independence of any tie to matter. It is true that, in\ndetails, spiritualists make some modification in this absolute\nprinciple in order to explain the perceptions of the senses and the\nexecution of the orders of the will; but the duality, the\nindependence, and the autonomy of the soul and the body remain, in any\ncase, the peculiar dogma of the system. This dogma appears to me\nutterly false; the mind cannot exist without matter to which it is\napplied; and to the principle of heterogeneity, so often invoked to\nforbid all commerce between the two substances, I reply by appealing\nto intuition, which shows us the consciousness and its different\nforms, comparison, judgment, and reasoning, so closely connected with\nsensation that they cannot be imagined as existing with an isolated\nlife.\n\nMaterialism, we know, argues quite differently; it imagines that a\nparticular state of the nerve centres has the virtue of generating a\npsychical phenomenon, which represents, according to various\nmetaphors, property, function, effect, and even secretion. Critics\nhave often asked how, with matter in motion, a phenomenon of thought\ncould be explained or fabricated. It is very probable that those who\nadmit this material genesis of thought, represent it to themselves\nunder the form of something subtle, like an electric spark, a puff of\nwind, a will-of-the-wisp, or an alcoholic flame. Materialists are not\nalone responsible for these inadequate metaphors, which proceed from a\nmetaphysics constructed of concepts. Let us recollect exactly what a\npsychical phenomenon is. Let us banish the will-o'-the-wisps, replace\nthem by a precise instance, and return to the visual perception we\ntook as an example a little while back: without intending a pun,\n\"revenons a nos moutons.\" These sheep which I see in the plain are as\nmaterial, as real, as the cerebral movement which accompanies my\nperception. How, then, is it possible that this cerebral movement, a\nprimary material fact, should engender this secondary material fact,\nthis collection of complicated beings which form a flock?\n\nBefore going any further, let us invite another philosophical system\nto take a place within the circle of our discussion; for the same\nanswer will suffice for it as well as for the preceding one, and it\nwill be as well to deal with both at once. This new system,\nparallelism, in great favour at the present day, appears to me to be a\nmaterialism perfected especially in the direction of caution. To\nescape the mystery of the genesis of the mind from matter, this new\nsystem places them parallel to each other and side by side, we might\nalmost say experimentally, so much do parallelists try to avoid\ntalking metaphysics. But their position is untenable, and they\nlikewise are the victims of the mirage of concepts; for they consider\nthe mental as capable of being parallel to the physical without\nmingling with it, and of subsisting by itself and with a life of its\nown. Such a hypothesis is only possible by reason of the insufficient\ndefinition given to the mind. If it be recognised that the mind has an\nincomplete existence and is only realised by its incarnation in\nmatter, the figure which is the basis of parallelism becomes\nindefensible. There is no longer on the one hand the physical, and on\nthe other the mental, but on one side the physical and the mental\ncombined, and on the other the same combination; which amounts to\nsaying that the two faces to a reality, which it was thought had been\nmade out to be so distinct, are identical. There are not two faces,\nbut one face; and the monism, which certain metaphysicians struggle to\narrive at by a mysterious reconciliation of the phenomenal duality\nwithin the unity of the noumenon, need not be sought so far afield,\nsince we already discover it in the phenomenon itself.\n\nThe criticisms I have just pointed out to you, only too briefly, are\nto be found in several philosophers, confusedly in Berkeley, and with\nmore precision in M. Bergson's book on _Matiere et Memoire_. The\nlatter author, remarking that our brain and the outer world are to us\nimages of the same order, refuses to admit that the brain, which is\nonly a very small part of these images, can explain and contain the\nother and much larger part, which comprises the vast universe. This\nwould amount to saying that the whole is comprised in the part. I\nbelieve that this objection is analogous to the one just stated with\nless ingenuity.\n\nIt is interesting to see how M. Bergson gets out of the difficulty\nwhich he himself raised. Being unwilling to bring forth from the\nmolecular movement of the brain the representation of the world, or to\nsuperpose the representation on this movement as in the parallelist\nhypothesis, he has arrived at a theory, very ingenious but rather\nobscure, which consists in placing the image of the world outside the\nbrain, this latter being reduced to a motor organ which executes the\norders of the mind.\n\nWe thus have four philosophical theories, which, while trying to\nreconcile mind with matter, give to the representation a different\nposition in regard to cerebral action. The spiritualist asserts the\ncomplete independence of the representation in relation to cerebral\nmovement; the materialist places it after, the parallelist by the side\nof, the cerebral movement; M. Bergson puts it in front.\n\nI must confess that the last of these systems, that of M. Bergson,\npresents many difficulties. As he does not localise the mind in the\nbody, he is obliged to place our perception--that is to say, a part of\nourselves--in the objects perceived; for example, in the stars when we\nare looking at them. The memory is lodged in distant planes of\nconsciousness which are not otherwise defined. We understand with\ndifficulty these emigrations, these crumblings into morsels of our\nmind. This would not matter if our author did not go so far as to\nmaintain that the sensory nerves of the brain are not sensory nerves,\nand that the severance of them does not suppress sensations, but\nsimply the motor efforts of these sensations. All the physiologist in\nme protests against the rashness of these interpretations.\n\nThe principal difficulties of the problem of the union between the\nmind and the body proceed from the two following facts, which seem\nincompatible. On the one hand, our thought is conditioned by a certain\nintra-cerebral movement of molecules and atoms; and, on the other\nhand, this same thought has no consciousness of this molecular\nmovement. It does not know the path of the wave in our nerves; it does\nnot suspect, for example, that the image of the objects is reversed in\nthe retina, or that the excitements of the right eye for the most part\ngo into the left hemisphere. In a word, it is no anatomist. It is a\nvery curious thing that our consciousness enters into relation only\nwith the extra-cerebral, the external objects, and the superficies of\nour bodies.\n\nFrom this, this exact question suggests itself: a molecular wave must\ncome as far as our visual cerebral centre for us to have the\nperception of the object before our eyes; how is it that our\nconsciousness is unaware of this physiological event from which it\ndepends, and is borne towards the distant object as if it sprang forth\noutside our nervous system?\n\nLet us first remark, that if we do not perceive this wave, yet it must\ncontain all we know of the external object, for it is evident that we\nonly know of it that part of its properties which it transmits to our\nnerves and our nerve centres. All the known substance of the external\nobject is, then, implied in this vibration; it is there, but it is not\nthere by itself. The vibration is the work of two collaborators; it\nexpresses at once the nature of the object which provokes it, and the\nnature of the nerve apparatus which transports it, as the furrow\ntraced in the wax of the phonograph implies the joint action of an\naerial vibration with a stylus, a cylinder, and, a clock-work\napparatus.\n\nI therefore suppose--and this is, I say it plainly, but an\nhypothesis--that if the nervous vibration so little resembles the\nexternal excitant which generates it, it is because the factor nervous\nsystem superadds its effect to the factor excitant. Let us imagine,\nnow, that we have managed to separate these two effects, and we shall\nunderstand that then the nervous event so analysed might resemble only\nthe object, or only the nervous system. Now, of these two effects, one\nis constant, that one which represents the action of the nervous\nsystem; there is another which varies with each new perception, and\neven with every moment of the same perception--that is to say, the\nobject. It is not impossible to understand that the consciousness\nremains deaf to the constant and sensitive to the variable element.\nThere is a law of consciousness which has often been described, and\nfresh applications of which are met with daily: this is, that the\nconsciousness only maintains itself by change, whether this change\nresults from the exterior by impressions received, or is produced from\nthe interior by movements of the attention. Let us here apply this\nempirical law, and admit that it contains a first principle. It will\nthen be possible for us to understand that the consciousness formed\ninto a dialyser of the undulation may reject that constant element\nwhich expresses the contribution of the nervous system, and may lay\nbare the variable element which corresponds to the object: so that an\nintestinal movement of the cerebral substance, brought to light by\nthis analytical consciousness, may become the perception of an object.\nBy accepting this hypothesis, we restore to the sensory nerves and to\nthe encephalic centres their property of being the substrata of\nrepresentation, and avoid the objection made above against materialism\nand parallelism, that they did not explain how a cerebral movement,\nwhich is material, can engender the perception of an object which\ndiffers greatly from it and is yet as material as the movement\nitself. There is not here, properly speaking, either generation,\ntransformation, or metamorphosis. The object to be perceived is\ncontained in the nerve current. It is, as it were, rolled up in it;\nand it must be made to go forth from the wave to be seen. This last is\nthe work of the consciousness.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 51: See [Note 43] on p. 191.]\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\nABSTRACTIONS, character of, 8\n\n\"Archives de Psychologie,\" 198\n\nAristotle, 106, 129, 169, 186-190, 201, 265\n\nAssociation, \"inseparable,\" 116\n\nAutomatism, 250\n\n\nBAIN, 3, 121, 186, 189, 219, 245, 252\n\nBelfast, congress at, 207\n\nBergson, 47, 86;\n  theory of images and brain, 226-230;\n  refutation of, 230-233; 259, 271, 272\n\nBerkeley, 47, 109, 225, 226, 227, 271\n\nBerthelot, 147\n\nBinet, 3, 191;\n  theory of mind and brain, 236, 255\n\nBody, union with mind, 179;\n  Aristotle on body and soul, 188\n\nBrain, 225, 226, 227;\n  and consciousness, 236, 237, 247\n\nBrieux, 209\n\nBrillouin, 10\n\n\nCATEGORIES, 106, 107, 114, 190, 263\n\nChange, law of consciousness, 245\n\nCognition, 15, 33, 58, 98, 105, 107, 117, 123, 140, 141, 145, 153,\n    155, 157, 162, 184, 190, 195, 208, 225, 228, 241, 243, 246, 251, 260,\n    262, 264, 266\n\nComte, Auguste, 213\n\nConcepts, method of, 6, 7;\n  metaphysics of, 8, 223\n\nConclusion, 234-255\n\nCondillac, 98\n\nCondition, normal, 80\n\nConsciousness, 58, 195;\n  anatomical ignorance of, 237, 238;\n  definition of: relation subject-object, categories of the\n    understanding, separability of the consciousness from its\n    object, idealism, 96-134;\n  as dialyser, 244;\n  law of, 275, 276;\n  and nerve current, 247-255;\n  manifestations of, 236;\n  of a state, 63;\n  origin of, 180;\n  phenomena of, 17, 88, 190, 210, 223;\n  useless luxury, 222\n\nContiguity, law of, 169, 170, 173\n\nCurrent, motor, psychology of, 248, 249;\n  nerve, 246, 249, 250, 251, 252, 276;\n  sensory, 250\n\n\nDANTEC, \"Les Lois Naturelles,\" 10\n\nDastre, \"La Vie et la Mort,\" 10, 145\n\nDemocritus, 158\n\nDescartes, 64, 77, 78, 97, 152, 193\n  \"Discours de la Methode,\" 77\n\nDreams, 82, 87\n\nDualism, of mind and matter, 69, 71, 182, 140, 155, 182, 254, 263\n\nDuality, of sensation, 78;\n  of ideation, 78;\n  of consciousness and object, 199;\n  of nature,  224;\n  of soul and body, 269\n\nDuhem, evolution of mechanics, 10\n\n\nEbbinghaus, 160, 161\n\nEccentricity, law of, 247\n\nEffort, psychological nature of, 94;\n  sensation of, 249, 263\n\nEgo, 75, 86, 88, 89, 99, 152;\n  and non-ego, 96, 100, 101\n\nEmotions, definitions of the, 88-95, 263\n\nEnergy, 30, 31\n\nEnumeration, method of, 6\n\nEpiphenomenon, 222\n\n\"Etude Experimentale de l'Intelligence\" (Binet), 8\n\nExcitant, the, 18, 21, 22, 83, 244, 257, 258, 266\n\nExistence or reality, 84, 85\n\nExternospection, 140-146\n\n\nFathers of the Church, 201\n\nFechner, 149\n\nFerrier, 73\n\nFinality, definition of, 163\n\nFlournoy, 70, 73, 182, 191, 198\n\n\nGeneva, congress of, philosophy at, 226\n\nGoblot, E., \"La Finalite sans Intelligence,\" 164\n\n\nHabit, law of, 250\n\nHallucinations, 81, 82, 87\n\nHamilton, William, 47, 65, 256;\n  \"Philosophy\" of, 47\n\nHerbart, 90, 91\n\nHerrick, C. L., 86\n\nHeterogeneity, axiom of, 182, 183;\n  principle of, 8, 73, 74, 182, 183, 194, 205, 206, 208, 215, 269\n\n\"Histoire du Materialisme\" (Lange), 137\n\nHume, 64, 109\n\nHuxley, 118, 222\n\n\nIdealism, principle of, 64, 73, 119-125;\n  refutation of, 95-200\n\nIdeation, duality of, 78, 80\n\nIdentity, 221\n\nImage, definition of the, 76-87, 263\n\nIntellectualism, definition of, 166\n\nIntelligence, only inactive consciousness, 117;\n  materialist explanation of, 204\n\nInter-actionism, 185\n\nIntrospection, 140-146\n\nIntuition, 269\n\n\nJames, William, theory of emotion, 91-94; 100, 163\n\n\"Journal of Philosophy,\" 100\n\n\nKant, 34, 106, 107, 108, 181, 190, 235\n\nKelvin, Lord, 11\n\nKnowable, the, 4, 5, 7\n\nKnowledge and its object, 55-59;\n  two groups of, 98\n\nKuelpe, 160\n\n\n\"L'Ame et le Corps,\" 3\n\n\"La Finalite sans Intelligence\" (Goblot), 164\n\n\"La Nouvelle Monadologie\" (Renouvier et Prat), 64\n\n\"La Philosophie de Hamilton,\" 47\n\n\"La Vie et la Mort\" (Dastre), 10\n\nLadd, 58 _note_[14]\n\nLange, theory of emotion, 91;\n  \"Histoire du Materialisme,\" 137\n\nLaw of contiguity, 162 _note_[37], 169, 170, 173\n\nLaw of eccentricity, 247\n\nLaw of mental expression rejected, 162 _note_[37];\n  mental distinguished from physical, 163\n\nLaw, psychological compared with natural, 167, 168\n\nLaw of relativity of cognition, 245\n\nLaw of similarity, 162 _note_[37], 169, 170\n\nLe Bon, Gustave (\"l'Evolution de la Matiere\"), 27\n\n\"Le Paralogisme psycho-physiologique\" (Bergson), 226\n\n\"Le Personnellisme\" (Renouvier), 226\n\n\"Lecons de Philosophie\" (Rabier), 148\n\nLeibnitz, 129, 195, 220\n\nLittre, 207\n\nLocke, 139\n\n\"Logical and Psychological Distinction between the True and the\n    Real\" (Herrick), 86\n\nLotze, 73, 148\n\nLyons, 66\n\n\nMach, 160\n\nMaterialism, origin and definition of, 201-203;\n  refutation of, 203-214; 269, 275\n\n\"Matiere et Memoire\" (Bergson), 86, 226, 229, 230, 271\n\nMatter, definition of, 3-51;\n  description of, 256-260;\n  distinct from mind, 3;\n  domain of physics, 6;\n  mechanical theories of, 27-43;\n  non-significant properties of, 172, 173;\n  _X_ of; 18, 21, 25, 49\n\nMechanics, fetichism of, 220\n\nMechanism, nervous, to imitate intellectual act, 221\n\nMetaphysics, 128 _note_[31], 234, 235\n\n\"Metaphysique et Psychologie\" (Flournoy), 182\n\nMethod, rule of, 5;\n  of concepts and enumeration, 6\n\nMeudon, 152\n\nMill, John Stuart, 13, 19, 47, 64, 116, 121\n\nMind, definition of, 55-175; 260-266;\n  distinction between, and matter, 3;\n  domain of psychology, 6;\n  incomplete life of, 179-190;\n  inseparability of, and matter, 185;\n  inventory of 56;\n  \"Mind and Body\" (Bain), 3, 219\n\nMonadism, 195\n\nMonism, 69, 271\n\nMotion, 35\n\nMovement, molecular, 73;\n  vibratory, 31\n\nMueller, 21\n\nMuensterberg, 160\n\n\nNerves, motor, 228, 230;\n  power of distinction, 22;\n  specific energy of, 21, 46, 242;\n  sensory, 228, 230, 232, 273, 275;\n  vibrations of, 242, 243;\n  nervous system, 16, 17, 24, 25, 44, 45, 48, 115, 228, 241, 257,\n    258, 274, 275\n\nNoumena, 34, 35, 43, 109, 142 _note_[34], 260, 271\n\n\nObject. See _Subject_\n\nObservation, 235\n\nOrgan, function of, material, 206\n\nOstwald, 10\n\n\nPanmaterialism, 70\n\nPanpsychism, 70, 195, 198\n\nParallelism, definition of, 214-220;\n  refutation of, 221-224; 251; 252, 270-272; 275\n\nParallelist theory, 132\n\nPerceptible, the, 84, 85\n\nPerception, intermediate character of, 15;\n  of a child, 232\n\nPersonality, formation of, 100\n\nPhenomena, auditory, 37;\n  physical, 30, 31;\n  visual, 37\n\nPhenomenism of Berkeley, 109 _note_[26]\n\n\"Philosophical Review,\" 70\n\nPhilosophy, history of, 200\n\n\"Philosophy of Hamilton\" (J. S. Mill), 47\n\nPilon, 113\n\nPlato, 201\n\nPreadaptation, process of, 164-175\n\nPrince, Morton, 70\n\nProbabilism forced upon us, 174\n\n\"Psychical Review,\" 86\n\n\"Psychologie,\" 112\n\n\"Psychologie du Raisonnement\" (Binet), 113\n\nPsychology, definitions of, 135-175, 265, 266\n\n\nRabier, E., 98, 112, 148\n\nRadio-activity, 27\n\nReason developed according to law, 169\n\nRecapitulation, 256-276\n\nReid, Thomas, 47, 65, 259\n\nRelativity, principle of, 104, 109, 252\n\nRenouvier, 64, 97, 106, 205, 226\n\n\"Revue Generale des Sciences,\" 10\n\n\"Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale,\" 164, 226\n\n\"Revue de Philosophie,\" 10\n\nRaymond, Du Bois, 73\n\nRibot, 137\n\n\nSearch, direction of, 5, 6\n\nSensation, 10, 14, 35, 44, 50, 51, 55;\n  definition of, 60-75;\n  mistrusted by physicists, 28-30;\n  only means of acquaintance with outer world, 10-26, 50, 256-259;\n  physical or mental, 261-266;\n  visual, 73\n\nSensibility, cerebral, 239, 240;\n  employment in physiology, 61\n\nSeparation of consciousness from its object, 126-134\n\nSimilarity. See _Law_\n\nSimon, Dr., 209\n\nSociete Francaise de Philosophie, 256\n\nSoul, distinct from body, 77;\n  union of body and, 179-276\n\nSouls, disembodied, 45\n\nSpecificity of Nerves. See _Nerves_\n\nSpencer, Herbert, 245\n\nSpiritualism, refutation of, 192, 195, 268, 269\n\nStrong, M., 195\n\nSubject, defined and distinguished from object, 96\n\nSubstance, definition of, 102\n\nSubstantialism, 134\n\nSymbols, mechanical theories of matter, 27-43\n\nSystem, nervous, 16, 17, 24, 25, 44, 45, 48, 115, 228, 241, 257, 258,\n    274, 275\n\n\nTaine, 79\n\nTheories, modern, 225-233\n\nThought, not a movement, 7, 8;\n  characteristics of, 76\n\nTruth, 84, 85\n\nTyndall, 89, 207\n\n\nUnconsciousness, 127-133\n\nUnderstanding, categories of the, 103-118\n\nUnknowable, the, 25, 26\n\nUnion of mind and body, problem of, 273;\n  of soul and body, 179-276\n\n\nVerne, Jules, 267\n\nVogt, Karl, 204\n\n\nWave, molecular, 273, 274, 276;\n  nerve, 243\n\nWill, the most characteristic psychical function, 166, 167\n\nWorld, assembly of sensations, 26;\n  our ideas, 65;\n  external known only by our sensations, 10-26; 50, 256-259\n\n\n_X_ of matter, 18, 21, 25, 49\n\n\nZoologist, visual sensations of, 13\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTHE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC SERIES.\n\nEach Book Complete in One Volume. Crown 8vo. cloth, 5_s._ unless\notherwise described.\n\n\n     I. FORMS of WATER: in Clouds and Rivers, Ice and Glaciers.\n     By J. TYNDALL, LL.D., F.R.S. With 25 Illustrations. Twelfth\n     Edition.\n\n     II. PHYSICS and POLITICS; or, Thoughts on the Application of\n     the Principles of 'Natural Selection' and 'Inheritance' to\n     Political Society. By WALTER BAGEHOT. Tenth Edition.\n\n     III. FOODS. By EDWARD SMITH, M.D., LL.B., F.R.S. With 156\n     Illustrations. Tenth Edition.\n\n     IV. MIND and BODY: the Theories of their Relation. By\n     ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D. With Four Illustrations. Ninth\n     Edition.\n\n     V. The STUDY of SOCIOLOGY. By HERBERT SPENCER. Eighteenth\n     Edition.\n\n     VI. The CONSERVATION of ENERGY. By BALFOUR STEWART, M.A.,\n     LL.D., F.R.S. With 14 Illustrations. Eighth Edition.\n\n     VII. ANIMAL LOCOMOTION; or, Walking, Swimming, and Flying.\n     By J. B. PETTIGREW, M.D., F.R.S., &c. With 130\n     Illustrations. Fourth Edition.\n\n     VIII. RESPONSIBILITY in MENTAL DISEASE. By HENRY MAUDSLEY,\n     M.D. Fifth Edition.\n\n     IX. The NEW CHEMISTRY. By Professor J. P. COOKE, of the\n     Harvard University. With 31 Illustrations. Eleventh Edition.\n\n     X. The SCIENCE of LAW. By Professor SHELDON AMOS. Eighth\n     Edition.\n\n     XI. ANIMAL MECHANISM: a Treatise on Terrestrial and Aerial\n     Locomotion. By Professor E. J. MAHEY. With 117\n     Illustrations. Fourth Edition.\n\n     XII. The DOCTRINE of DESCENT and DARWINISM. By Professor\n     OSCAR SCHMIDT (Strasburg University). With 26 Illustrations.\n     Eighth Edition.\n\n     XIII. The HISTORY of the CONFLICT between RELIGION and\n     SCIENCE. By J. W. DRAPER, M.D., LL.D. Twenty-second Edition.\n\n     XIV. FUNGI: their Nature, Influences, Uses, &c. By M. C.\n     COOKE, M.A., LL.D. Edited by the Rev. M. J. BERKELEY, M.A.,\n     F.L.S. With Illustrations, Fifth Edition.\n\n     XV. The CHEMISTRY of LIGHT and PHOTOGRAPHY. By Dr. HERMAN\n     VOGEL. With 100 Illustrations. Sixth Edition.\n\n     XVI. The LIFE and GROWTH of LANGUAGE. By WILLIAM DWIGHT\n     WHITNEY. Sixth Edition.\n\n     XVII. MONEY and the MECHANISM, of EXCHANGE. By W. STANLEY\n     JEVONS, M.A., F.R.S. Eleventh Edition.\n\n     XVIII. The NATURE of LIGHT, with a General Account of\n     PHYSICAL OPTICS. By Dr. EUGENE LOMMEL. With 188\n     Illustrations and a Table of Spectra in Chromo-lithography.\n     Sixth Edition.\n\n     XIX. ANIMAL PARASITES and MESSMATES. By Monsieur VAN\n     BENEDEN. With 83 Illustrations. Fourth Edition.\n\n     XX. FERMENTATION. By Professor SCHUeTZENBERGER. With 28\n     Illustrations. Fourth Edition.\n\n     XXI. The FIVE SENSES of MAN. By Professor BERNSTEIN. With 91\n     Illustrations. Seventh Edition.\n\n     XXII. The THEORY of SOUND in its RELATION to MUSIC. By\n     Professor PIETRO BLASERNA. With numerous Illustrations.\n     Sixth Edition.\n\n     XXIII. STUDIES in SPECTRUM ANALYSIS. By J. NORMAN LOCKYER,\n     F.R.S. With Six Photographic Illustrations of Spectra, and\n     numerous Engravings on Wood. Fifth Edition. 6_s._ 6_d._\n\n     XXIV. A HISTORY of the GROWTH of the STEAM ENGINE. By\n     Professor R. H. THURSTON. With numerous illustrations. Fifth\n     Edition.\n\n     XXV. EDUCATION as a SCIENCE. By ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D. Ninth\n     Edition.\n\n     XXVI. The HUMAN SPECIES. By Professor A. DE QUATREFAGES,\n     Membre de l'Institut. Fifth Edition.\n\n     XXVII. MODERN CHROMATICS. With Application to Art and\n     Industry. By OGDEN N. ROOD. Third Edition. With 130 original\n     Illustrations.\n\n     XXVIII. The CRAYFISH: an Introduction to the Study of\n     Zoology. By T. H. HUXLEY, F.R.S. Sixth Edition. With 82\n     Illustrations.\n\n     XXIX. The Brain As an Organ of Mind. By H. CHARLTON BASTIAN,\n     M.D. Fourth Edition. With 184 Illustrations.\n\n     XXX. The ATOMIC THEORY. By Professor A. WURTZ. Translated by\n     E. CLEMINSHAW, F.C.S. Seventh Edition.\n\n     XXXI. The NATURAL CONDITIONS of EXISTENCE as they affect\n     Animal Life. By KARL SEMPER, Fifth Edition. With 2 Maps and\n     106 Woodcuts.\n\n     XXXII. GENERAL PHYSIOLOGY of MUSCLES and NERVES. By Prof. J.\n     ROSENTHAL. Fourth Edition. With 75 Illustrations.\n\n     XXXIII. SIGHT: an Exposition of the Principles of Monocular\n     and Binocular Vision. By JOSEPH LE CONTE, LL.D. Third\n     Edition. With 132 Illustrations.\n\n     XXXIV. ILLUSIONS: a Psychological Study. By JAMES SULLY.\n     Fourth Edition.\n\n     XXXV. VOLCANOES: what they are and what they teach. By JOHN\n     W. JUDD, F.R.S. Fifth Edition. With 96 Illustrations.\n\n     XXXVI. SUICIDE: an Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics. By\n     Professor H. MORSELLI. Third Edition.\n\n     XXXVII. The BRAIN and its FUNCTIONS. By J. LUYS, Physician\n     to the Hospice de la Salpetriere. With numerous\n     Illustrations. Third Edition.\n\n     XXXVIII. MYTH and SCIENCE: an Essay. By TITO VIGNOLI. Fourth\n     Edition.\n\n     XXXIX. The SUN. By C. A. YOUNG, Ph.D., LL.D. Fifth Edition.\n     With numerous Illustrations.\n\n     XL. ANTS, BEES, and WASPS. A Record of Observations on the\n     Habits of the Social Hymenoptera. By Lord AVEBURY.\n     Fourteenth Edition. With 5 Chromo-lithographic Plates.\n\n     XLI. ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE. By GEORGE J. ROMANES, LL.D.,\n     F.R.S. Sixth Edition.\n\n     XLII. The CONCEPTS and THEORIES of MODERN PHYSICS. By J. B.\n     STALLO. Third Edition.\n\n     XLIII. DISEASES of MEMORY. An Essay in the Positive\n     Psychology. By TH. RIBOT. Fourth Edition.\n\n     XLIV. MAN BEFORE METALS. By N. JOLY, Correspondent\n     del'Institut de France. Fifth Edition. With 148\n     Illustrations.\n\n     XLV. The SCIENCE of POLITICS. By Prof. SHELDON AMOS. Third\n     Edition.\n\n     XLVI. ELEMENTARY METEOROLOGY. By ROBERT H. SCOTT. With 11\n     Plates and 40 Figures in Text. Seventh Edition.\n\n     XLVII. The ORGANS of SPEECH. By GEORG HERMANN VON MEYER.\n     With 47 Illustrations.\n\n     XLVIII. FALLACIES: a View of Logic from the Practical Side.\n     By ALFRED SIDGWICK. Second Edition.\n\n     XLIX. The ORIGIN of CULTIVATED PLANTS. By ALPHONSE DE\n     CANDOLLE. Second Edition.\n\n     L. JELLY FISH, STAR FISH, and SEA URCHINS. Being a Research\n     on Primitive Nervous Systems. By G. J. ROMANES, LL.D.,\n     F.R.S. Second Edition.\n\n     LI. The COMMON SENSE of the EXACT SCIENCES. By the late\n     WILLIAM KINGDON CLIFFORD. Third Edition. With 100 Figures.\n\n     LII. PHYSICAL EXPRESSION: its Modes and Principles. By\n     FRANCIS WARNER, M.D., F.R.C.P. Second Edition. With 50\n     Illustrations.\n\n     LIII. ANTHROPOID APES. By ROBERT HARTMANN. With 63\n     Illustrations. Second Edition.\n\n     LIV. The MAMMALIA in their RELATION to PRIMEVAL TIMES. By\n     OSCAR SCHMIDT. Second Edition. With 51 Woodcuts.\n\n     LV. COMPARATIVE LITERATURE. By H. MACAULAY POSNETT, LL.D.\n\n     LVI. EARTHQUAKES AND OTHER EARTH MOVEMENTS. By Prof. JOHN\n     MILNE. With 38 Figures. Fourth Edition, revised.\n\n     LVII. MICROBES, FERMENTS, and MOULDS. By E. L. TROUESSART.\n     With 107 Illustrations. Third Edition.\n\n     LVIII. GEOGRAPHICAL, and GEOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION of ANIMALS.\n     By Prof. A. HEILPRIN. Second Edition.\n\n     LIX. WEATHER: a Popular Exposition of the Nature of Weather\n     Changes from Day to Day. By the Hon. RALPH ABERCROMBY. With\n     96 Figures. Fourth Edition.\n\n     LX. ANIMAL MAGNETISM. By ALFRED BINET and CHARLES FERE.\n     Fourth Edition.\n\n     LXI. MANUAL of BRITISH DISCOMYCETES, with descriptions of\n     all the Species of Fungi hitherto found in Britain included\n     in the Family, and Illustrations of the Genera. By WILLIAM\n     PHILLIPS, F.L.S. Second Edition.\n\n     LXII. INTERNATIONAL LAW. With Materials for a Code of\n     International Law. By Professor LEONE LEVI.\n\n     LXIII. The GEOLOGICAL HISTORY of PLANTS. By Sir J. WILLIAM\n     DAWSON. With 80 Illustrations.\n\n     LXIV. The ORIGIN of FLORAL STRUCTURES THROUGH INSECT and\n     other AGENCIES. By Prof. G. HENSLOW. Second Edition.\n\n     LXV. On the SENSES, INSTINCTS, and INTELLIGENCE of ANIMALS,\n     With special reference to INSECTS. By Lord AVEBURY. With 118\n     Illustrations. Third Edition.\n\n     LXVI. The PRIMITIVE FAMILY in its ORIGIN and DEVELOPMENT. By\n     C. N. STARCKE. Second Edition.\n\n     LXVII. PHYSIOLOGY of BODILY EXERCISE. By FERNAND LAGRANGE,\n     M.D. Second Edition.\n\n     LXVIII. The COLOURS of ANIMALS: their Meaning and Use,\n     especially considered in the case of Insects. By E. B.\n     POULTON, F.R.S. With Chromo-lithographic Frontispiece and\n     upwards of 60 figures in Text, Second Edition.\n\n     LXIX. INTRODUCTION to FRESH-WATER ALGAE. With an Enumeration\n     of all the British Species. By M. C. COOKE, LL.D. With 13\n     Plates Illustrating all the Genera.\n\n     LXX. SOCIALISM: NEW and OLD. By WILLIAM GRAHAM, M.A..\n     Professor of Political Economy and Jurisprudence, Queen's\n     College, Belfast. Second Edition.\n\n     LXXI. COLOUR-BLINDNESS and COLOUR-PERCEPTION. By F. W.\n     EDRIDGE-GREEN, M.D. With 3 Coloured Plates.\n\n     LXXII. MAN and the GLACIAL PERIOD. By G. F. WRIGHT, D.D.\n     With 111 Illustrations and Maps. Second Edition.\n\n     LXXIII. HANDBOOK of GREEK and LATIN PALAEOGRAPHY. By Sir E.\n     MAUNDE THOMPSON, K.C.B. With Tables of Alphabets and\n     Facsimiles. Second Edition.\n\n     LXXIV. A HISTORY of CRUSTACEA: Recent Malacoatraca. By\n     THOMAS R. R. STEBBING, M.A. With 19 Plates and 32 Figures in\n     Text.\n\n     LXXV. The DISPERSAL of SHELLS: an Inquiry into the means of\n     Dispersal possessed by Fresh Water and Land Mollusca. By H.\n     WALLIS KEW, F.Z.S. With Preface by A. R. WALLACE, F.R.S.,\n     and Illustrations.\n\n     LXXVI. RACE and LANGUAGE. By ANDRE LEFEVRE, Professor in the\n     Anthropological School, Paris.\n\n     LXXVII. The ORIGIN of PLANT STRUCTURES by SELF-ADAPTATION TO\n     THE ENVIRONMENT. By Rev. G. HENSLOW, M.A., F.L.S., F.C.S.,\n     &c., author of 'The Origin of Floral Structures,' &c.\n\n     LXXVIII. ICE-WORK PRESENT and PAST. By Rev. T. G. BONNEY,\n     D.Sc. LL.D., F.R.S., &c., Professor of Geology at University\n     College, London; Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.\n\n     LXXIX. A CONTRIBUTION to our KNOWLEDGE of SEEDLINGS. By Lord\n     AVEBURY.\n\n     LXXX. The ART of MUSIC. By Sir C. HUBERT H. PARRY, Mus. Doc.\n\n     LXXXI. The POLAR AURORA. By ALFRED ANGOT. Illustrated.\n\n     LXXXII. WHAT is ELECTRICITY? By J. TROWBRIDGE. Illustrated.\n\n     LXXXIII. MEMORY. By F. W. EDRIDGE-GREEN, M.D. With\n     Frontispiece.\n\n     LXXXIV. The ELEMENTS of HYPNOTISM. By R. HARRY VINCENT. With\n     Diagrams. Second Edition.\n\n     LXXXV. SEISMOLOGY. By JOHN MILNE, F.R.S., F.G.S., &c, Author\n     of 'Earthquakes.' With 53 Figures.\n\n     LXXXVI. On BUDS and STIPULES. By Lord AVEBURY, F.R.S.,\n     D.C.L., LL.D. With 4 Coloured Plates and 340 Figures in the\n     Text.\n\n     LXXXVII. EVOLUTION by ATROPHY, in Biology and Sociology. By\n     JEAN DEMOOR, JEAN MASSART, and EMILE VANDERVELDE. Translated\n     by Mrs. CHALMERS MITCHELL. With 84 Figures.\n\n     LXXXVIII. VARIATION in ANIMALS and PLANTS. By H. M. VERNON,\n     M.A., M.D.\n\n\nLondon: KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUeBNER, & CO., LTD.","title":"The Mind and the Brain: Being the Authorised Translation of L'\u00c2me et le Corps","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":63321}