{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_21995/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_21995","id":"gutenberg_21995","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/21995","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Christianity","Philosophy","Philosophy and religion"],"text":"E-text prepared by Al Haines\n\n\n\nTranscriber's note:\n\n   Page numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed\n   in curly braces, e.g. {99}.  They have been located where page\n   breaks occurred in the original book.\n\n\n\n\n\nPHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION\n\nSix Lectures Delivered at Cambridge\n\nby\n\nHASTINGS RASHDALL\n\nD. Litt. (Oxon.), D.C.L. (Dunelm.)\nFellow of the British Academy\nFellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nLondon: Duckworth & Co.\n3 Henrietta St. Covent Garden\n1909\nAll rights reserved\n\n\n\n\n{v}\n\nGENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES\n\nMan has no deeper or wider interest than theology; none deeper, for\nhowever much he may change, he never loses his love of the many\nquestions it covers; and none wider, for under whatever law he may live\nhe never escapes from its spacious shade; nor does he ever find that it\nspeaks to him in vain or uses a voice that fails to reach him.  Once\nthe present writer was talking with a friend who has equal fame as a\nstatesman and a man of letters, and he said, 'Every day I live,\nPolitics, which are affairs of Man and Time, interest me less, while\nTheology, which is an affair of God and Eternity, interests me more.'\nAs with him, so with many, though the many feel that their interest is\nin theology and not in dogma.  Dogma, they know, is but a series of\nresolutions framed by a council or parliament, which they do not\nrespect any the more because the parliament was composed of\necclesiastically-minded persons; while the theology which so interests\nthem is a discourse touching God, though the Being so named is the God\nman conceived as not only related to himself and his world but also as\nrising ever higher with the notions of the self and the world.  Wise\nbooks, not in dogma but in theology, may therefore be described as the\nsupreme {vi} need of our day, for only such can save us from much\nfanaticism and secure us in the full possession of a sober and sane\nreason.\n\nTheology is less a single science than an encyclopaedia of sciences;\nindeed all the sciences which have to do with man have a better right\nto be called theological than anthropological, though the man it\nstudies is not simply an individual but a race.  Its way of viewing man\nis indeed characteristic; from this have come some of its brighter\nideals and some of its darkest dreams.  The ideals are all either\nethical or social, and would make of earth a heaven, creating\nfraternity amongst men and forming all states into a goodly sisterhood;\nthe dreams may be represented by doctrines which concern sin on the one\nside and the will of God on the other.  But even this will cannot make\nsin luminous, for were it made radiant with grace, it would cease to be\nsin.\n\nThese books then,--which have all to be written by men who have lived\nin the full blaze of modern light,--though without having either their\neyes burned out or their souls scorched into insensibility,--are\nintended to present God in relation to Man and Man in relation to God.\nIt is intended that they begin, not in date of publication, but in\norder of thought, with a Theological Encyclopaedia which shall show the\ncircle of sciences co-ordinated under the term Theology, though all\nwill be viewed as related to its central or main idea.  This relation\nof God to human knowledge will then be looked at through mind as a\ncommunion of Deity with humanity, or God in fellowship {vii} with\nconcrete man.  On this basis the idea of Revelation will be dealt with.\nThen, so far as history and philology are concerned, the two Sacred\nBooks, which are here most significant, will be viewed as the scholar,\nwho is also a divine, views them; in other words, the Old and New\nTestaments, regarded as human documents, will be criticised as a\nliterature which expresses relations to both the present and the\nfuture; that is, to the men and races who made the books, as well as to\nthe races and men the books made.  The Bible will thus be studied in\nthe Semitic family which gave it being, and also in the Indo-European\nfamilies which gave to it the quality of the life to which they have\nattained.  But Theology has to do with more than sacred literature; it\nhas also to do with the thoughts and life its history occasioned.\nTherefore the Church has to be studied and presented as an institution\nwhich God founded and man administers.  But it is possible to know this\nChurch only through the thoughts it thinks, the doctrines it holds, the\ncharacters and the persons it forms, the people who are its saints and\nembody its ideals of sanctity, the acts it does, which are its\nsacraments, and the laws it follows and enforces, which are its polity,\nand the young it educates and the nations it directs and controls.\nThese are the points to be presented in the volumes which follow, which\nare all to be occupied with theology or the knowledge of God and His\nways.\n\nA. M. F.\n  'O.'\n\n\n\n\n{ix}\n\nPREFACE\n\nThese Lectures were delivered in Cambridge during the Lent Term of last\nyear, on the invitation of a Committee presided over by the Master of\nMagdalene, before an audience of from three hundred to four hundred\nUniversity men, chiefly Under-graduates.  They were not then, and they\nare not now, intended for philosophers or even for beginners in the\nsystematic study of philosophy, but as aids to educated men desirous of\nthinking out for themselves a reasonable basis for personal Religion.\n\nThe Lectures--especially the first three--deal with questions on which\nI have already written.  I am indebted to the Publisher of _Contentio\nVeritatis_ and the other contributors to that volume for raising no\nobjection to my publishing Lectures which might possibly be regarded as\nin part a condensation, in part an expansion of my Essay on 'The\nultimate basis of Theism.'  I have dealt more systematically with many\nof the problems here discussed in an Essay upon 'Personality in God and\nMan' contributed to _Personal Idealism_ (edited by Henry {x} Sturt) and\nin my 'Theory of Good and Evil.'  Some of the doctrinal questions\ntouched on in Lecture VI. have been more fully dealt with in my volume\nof University Sermons, _Doctrine and Development_.\n\nQuestions which were asked at the time and communications which have\nsince reached me have made me feel, more even than I did when I was\nwriting the Lectures, how inadequate is the treatment here given to\nmany great problems.  On some matters much fuller explanation and\ndiscussion will naturally be required to convince persons previously\nunfamiliar with Metaphysic: on others it is the more advanced student\nof Philosophy who will complain that I have only touched upon the\nfringe of a vast subject.  But I have felt that I could not seriously\nexpand any part of the Lectures without changing the whole character of\nthe book, and I have been compelled in general to meet the demand for\nfurther explanation only by the above general reference to my other\nbooks, by the addition of a few notes, and by appending to each chapter\nsome suggestions for more extended reading.  These might of course have\nbeen indefinitely enlarged, but a long list of books is apt to defeat\nits own purpose: people with a limited time at their disposal want to\nknow which book to make a beginning upon.\n\nThe Lectures are therefore published for the most {xi} part just as\nthey were delivered, in the hope that they may suggest lines of thought\nwhich may be intellectually and practically useful.  I trust that any\nphilosopher who may wish to take serious notice of my views--especially\nthe metaphysical views expressed in the first few chapters--will be\ngood enough to remember that the expression of them is avowedly\nincomplete and elementary, and cannot fairly be criticized in much\ndetail without reference to my other writings.\n\nI am much indebted for several useful suggestions and for valuable\nassistance in revising the proofs to one of the hearers of the\nLectures, Mr. A. G. Widgery, Scholar of St. Catherine's College,\nCambridge, now Lecturer in University College, Bristol.\n\nH. RASHDALL.\n\nNEW COLLEGE, OXFORD,\n  Jan. 6, 1909.\n\n\n\n\n{xii}\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nLECTURE I\n\nMIND AND MATTER, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1\n\n1.  Is Materialism possible?  There is no immediate\n    knowledge of Matter; what we know is always\n    Self + Matter.  The idea of a Matter which can exist\n    by itself is an inference: is it a reasonable one?\n\n2.  No.  For all that we know about Matter implies Mind.\n    This is obvious as to secondary qualities (colour,\n    sound, etc.); but it is no less true of primary\n    qualities (solidity, magnitude, etc.).  Relations,\n    no less than sensations, imply Mind, . . . . . . . . . . .   8\n\n3.  This is the great discovery of Berkeley, though he did\n    not adequately distinguish between sensations and\n    intellectual relations,  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12\n\n4.  But Matter certainly does not exist merely for _our_\n    transitory and incomplete knowledge: if it cannot exist\n    apart from Mind, there must be a universal Mind in which\n    and for which all things exist, _i.e._ God,  . . . . . . .  16\n\n5.  But Theism is possible without Idealism.  The\n    impossibility of Materialism has generally been\n    recognized (_e.g._ by Spinoza, Spencer, Haeckel).\n    If the ultimate Reality is not Matter, it must be\n    utterly unlike anything we know, or be Mind.  The\n    latter view more probable, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19\n\n6.  It is more reasonable to explain the lower by the\n    higher than _vice versa_,  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26\n\n\nLECTURE II\n\nTHE UNIVERSAL CAUSE, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29\n\n1.  We have been led by the idealistic argument to\n    recognize the necessity of a Mind which _thinks_ the\n    world.  Insufficiency of this view.\n\n{xiii}\n\n2.  In our experiences of external Nature we meet with\n    nothing but succession, never with Causality.  The\n    Uniformity of Nature is a postulate of Physical\n    Science, not a necessity of thought.  The idea of\n    Causality derived from our consciousness of Volition.\n    Causality=Activity,  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31\n\n3.  If events must have a cause, and we know of no cause\n    but Will, it is reasonable to infer that the events\n    which _we_ do not cause must be caused by some other\n    Will; and the systematic unity of Nature implies that\n    this cause must be _One_ Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41\n\n4.  Moreover, the analogy of the human mind suggests the\n    probability that, if God is Mind, there must be in\n    Him, as in us, the three activities of Thought,\n    Feeling, and Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44\n\n5.  The above line of argument can be used by the Realist\n    who believes matter to be a thing-in-itself; but it\n    fits in much better with the Idealistic view of the\n    relations between mind and matter, and with the\n    tendency of modern physics to resolve matter into Force, .  48\n\n6.  Testimony of Spencer and Kant to the theory that the\n    Ultimate Reality is Will,  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51\n\n7.  Is God a Person? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54\n\n\nLECTURE III\n\nGOD AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58\n\n1.  The empirical study of Nature ('red in tooth and\n    claw') can tell us of purpose, not what the purpose is.\n    The only source of knowledge of the character of God is\n    to be found in the moral Consciousness.\n\n2.  Our moral judgements are as valid as other judgements\n    (_e.g._ mathematical axioms), and equally reveal the\n    thought of God,  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62\n\n3.  This does not imply that the moral consciousness is not\n    gradually evolved, or that each individual's conscience\n    is infallible, or that our moral judgements in detail\n    are as certain as mathematical judgements, or that the\n    detailed rules of human conduct are applicable to God, . .  63\n\n{xiv}\n\n4.  Corollaries:\n\n    (_a_) Belief in the objectivity of our moral judgements\n        logically implies belief in God, . . . . . . . . . . .  69\n    (_b_) If God aims at an end not fully realized here, we\n        have a ground for postulating Immortality, . . . . . .  77\n    (_c_) Evil must be a necessary means to greater good,  . .  79\n\n5.  In what sense this 'limits God.'  Omnipotence=ability\n    to do all things which are in their own nature\n    possible,  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81\n\n\nLECTURE IV\n\nDIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87\n\n1.  _Is the world created?_  There may or may not be a\n    beginning of the particular series of physical events\n    constituting our world.  But, even if this series has a\n    beginning, this implies some previous existence which\n    has no beginning.\n\n2.  _Is the whole-time series infinite?_  Time must be\n    regarded as objective, but the 'antinomies' involved\n    in the nature of Time cannot be resolved,  . . . . . . . .  90\n\n3.  _Are Spirits created or pre-existent?_  The close\n    connexion and correspondence between mind and body\n    makes for the former view.  Difficulties of\n    pre-existence--heredity, etc., . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93\n\n4.  _An Idealism based on Pre-existence without God_ is\n    open to the same objections and others.  Such a system\n    provides no mind (_a_) in which and for which the whole\n    system exists, or (_b_) to effect the correspondence\n    between mind and body, or (_c_) to allow of a purpose\n    in the Universe; without this the world is not rational, .  96\n\n5.  _The human mind (i.e. consciousness) not apart of the\n    divine Consciousness_, though in the closest possible\n    dependence upon God.  The Universe a Unity, but the\n    Unity is not that of Self-Consciousness, . . . . . . . . . 101\n\n6.  _There is no 'immediate' or 'intuitive' knowledge of\n    God_.  Our knowledge is got by inference, like knowledge\n    of our friend's existence, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106\n\n{xv}\n\n7.  _Religion and Psychology_.  It is impossible to base\n    Religion upon Psychology or 'religious experience'\n    without Metaphysics, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111\n\n8.  _Summary_: the ultimate nature of Reality, . . . . . . . . 118\n\n    Note on Non-theistic Idealism, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128\n\n\nLECTURE V\n\nREVELATION,  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127\n\n1.  There is no special organ of religious knowledge, but\n    religious knowledge has many characteristics which may\n    be conveniently suggested by the use of the term 'faith,'\n    especially its connexion with character and Will.\n\n2.  The psychological causes of religious belief must be\n    carefully distinguished from the reasons which make it\n    true.  No logic of discovery.  Many religious ideas\n    have occurred in a spontaneous or apparently intuitive\n    way to particular persons, the truth of which the\n    philosopher may subsequently be able to test by\n    philosophical reflection, though he could not have\n    discovered them, but they are not necessarily true\n    because they arise in a spontaneous or unaccountable\n    manner,  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134\n\n3.  False conceptions of Revelation and true.  All knowledge\n    is in a sense revealed, especially religious and moral\n    knowledge: but spiritual insight varies.  Need of the\n    prophet or religious genius, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139\n\n4.  Reasoned and intuitive beliefs may both be 'revealed,' . . 143\n\n5.  Degrees of truth in the historical religions.  Dependence\n    of the individual upon such religions.  Christianity\n    occupies a unique position, because it alone combines an\n    ethical ideal which appeals to the universal Conscience\n    with a Theism which commends itself to Reason.  The truth\n    of Christianity is dependent upon its appeal to the moral\n    and religious consciousness of the present,  . . . . . . . 148\n\n\n{xvi}\n\nLECTURE VI\n\nCHRISTIANITY,  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157\n\n1.  The claim of Christianity to be the special or absolute\n    Religion not dependent upon miracles.\n\n2.  Ritschlian Theologians right in resting the truth of\n    Christianity mainly upon the appeal made by Christ to\n    the individual Conscience: but wrong in disparaging\n    (_a_) philosophical arguments for Theism, (_b_) the\n    relative truth of non-Christian systems, (_c_) the\n    value of Doctrine and necessity for Development, . . . . . 161\n\n3.  Christian doctrine (esp. of the Logos) is an attempt to\n    express the Church's sense of the unique value of Christ\n    and His Revelation.  The necessity for recognizing\n    development both in Christian Ethics and in Theology,  . . 164\n\n4.  Some reflections on our practical attitude towards\n    Christian doctrine.  Some means of expressing the unique\n    position of Christ wanted.  The old expressions were\n    influenced by philosophy of the time, but not valueless.\n    Illustrations.  Need of re-interpretation and further\n    development, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168\n\n5.  The doctrine of continuous Revelation through the\n    Spirit is a part of Christianity, and the condition\n    of its acceptance as the final or absolute Religion, . . . 185\n\n\n\n\n{1}\n\nPHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION\n\n\nLECTURE I\n\nMIND AND MATTER\n\nI have been invited to speak to you about the relations between\nReligion and Philosophy.  To do that in a logical and thoroughgoing way\nit would be necessary to discuss elaborately the meaning first of\nReligion and then of Philosophy.  Such a discussion would occupy at\nleast a lecture, and I am unwilling to spend one out of six scanty\nhours in formal preliminaries.  I shall assume, therefore, that we all\nknow in some general way the meaning of Religion.  It is not necessary\nfor our present purpose to discuss such questions as the definition of\nReligion for purposes of sociological investigation, or the possibility\nof a Religion without a belief in God, or the like.  I shall assume\nthat, whatever else may be included in the term Religion, Christianity\nmay at least be included in it; and that what you are practically most\ninterested in is the bearing of Philosophy upon the Christian ideas\nconcerning the {2} being and nature of God, the hope of Immortality,\nthe meaning and possibility of Revelation.  When we turn to Philosophy,\nI cannot perhaps assume with equal confidence that all of you know what\nit is.  But then learning what Philosophy is--especially that most\nfundamental part of Philosophy which is called Metaphysics--is like\nlearning to swim: you never discover how to do it until you find\nyourself considerably out of your depth.  You must strike out boldly,\nand at last you discover what you are after.  I shall presuppose that\nin a general way you do all know that Philosophy is an enquiry into the\nultimate nature of the Universe at large, as opposed to the discussion\nof those particular aspects or departments of it which are dealt with\nby the special Sciences.  What you want to know, I take it, is--what\nrational enquiry, pushed as far as it will go, has to say about those\nultimate problems of which the great historical Religions likewise\nprofess to offer solutions.  The nature and scope of Philosophy is best\nunderstood by examples: and therefore I hope you will excuse me if\nwithout further preface I plunge _in medias res_.  I shall endeavour to\npresuppose no previous acquaintance with technical Philosophy, and I\nwill ask those who have already made some serious study of Philosophy\nkindly to remember that I am trying to make myself intelligible to\nthose who have not.  I shall {3} not advance anything which I should\nnot be prepared to defend even before an audience of metaphysical\nexperts.  But I cannot undertake in so short a course of lectures to\nmeet all the objections which will, I know, be arising in the minds of\nany metaphysically trained hearers who may honour me with their\npresence, many of which may probably occur to persons not so trained.\nAnd I further trust the Metaphysicians among you will forgive me if, in\norder to be intelligible to all, I sometimes speak with a little less\nthan the _akribeia_ at which I might feel bound to aim if I were\nreading a paper before an avowedly philosophical Society.\nReservations, qualifications, and elaborate distinctions must be\nomitted, if I am to succeed in saying anything clearly in the course of\nsix lectures.\n\nMoreover, I would remark that, though I do not believe that an\nintention to edify is any excuse for slipshod thought or intellectual\ndishonesty, I am speaking now mainly from the point of view of those\nwho are enquiring into metaphysical truth for the guidance of their own\nreligious and practical life, rather than from the point of view of\npure speculation.  I do not, for my own part, believe in any solution\nof the religious problem which evades the ultimate problems of all\nthought.  The Philosophy of Religion is for me not so much a special\nand sharply distinguished branch or department of {4} Philosophy as a\nparticular aspect of Philosophy in general.  But many questions which\nmay be of much importance from the point of view of a complete theory\nof the Universe can be entirely, or almost entirely, put on one side\nwhen the question is, 'What may I reasonably believe about those\nultimate questions which have a direct and immediate bearing upon my\nreligious and moral life; what may I believe about God and Duty, about\nthe world and its ultimate meaning, about the soul and its destiny?'\nFor such purposes solutions stopping short of what will fully satisfy\nthe legitimate demands of the professed Metaphysician may be all that\nis necessary, or at least all that is possible for those who are not\nintending to make a serious and elaborate study of Metaphysic.  I have\nno sympathy with the attempt to base Religion upon anything but honest\nenquiry into truth: and yet the professed Philosophers are just those\nwho will most readily recognize that there are--if not what are\ntechnically called degrees of truth--still different levels of thought,\ndifferent degrees of adequacy and systematic completeness, even within\nthe limits of thoroughly philosophical thinking.  I shall assume that\nyou are not content to remain at the level of ordinary unreflecting\nCommon-sense or of merely traditional Religion--that you do want (so\nfar as time and opportunity serve) to get to the bottom of things, {5}\nbut that you will be content in such a course as the present if I can\nsuggest to you, or help you to form for yourselves, an outline--what\nPlato would call the _hypotyposis_ of a theory of the Universe which\nmay still fall very far short of a finished and fully articulated\nmetaphysical system.\n\nI suppose that to nearly everybody who sets himself down to think\nseriously about the riddle of the Universe there very soon occurs the\nquestion whether Materialism may not contain the solution of all\ndifficulties.  I think, therefore, our present investigation had better\nbegin with an enquiry whether Materialism can possibly be true.  I say\n'can be true' rather than 'is true,' because, though dogmatic\nMaterialists are rare, the typical Agnostic is one who is at least\ninclined to admit the possibility of Materialism, even when he does\nnot, at the bottom of his mind, practically assume its truth.  The man\nwho is prepared to exclude even this one theory of the Universe from\nthe category of possible but unprovable theories is not, properly\nspeaking, an Agnostic.  To know that Materialism at least is not true\nis to know something, and something very important, about the ultimate\nnature of things.  I shall not attempt here any very precise definition\nof what is meant by Materialism.  Strictly speaking, it ought to mean\nthe view that nothing really exists but matter.  But the existence, in\nsome sense or {6} other, of our sensations and thoughts and emotions is\nso obvious to Common-sense that such a creed can hardly be explicitly\nmaintained: it is a creed which is refuted in the very act of\nenunciating it.  For practical purposes, therefore, Materialism may be\nsaid to be the view that the ultimate basis of all existence is matter;\nand that thought, feeling, emotion--consciousness of every kind--is\nmerely an effect, a by-product or concomitant, of certain material\nprocesses.\n\nNow if we are to hold that matter is the only thing which exists, or is\nthe ultimate source of all that exists, we ought to be able to say what\nmatter is.  To the unreflecting mind matter seems to be the thing that\nwe are most certain of, the one thing that we know all about.  Thought,\nfeeling, will, it may be suggested, are in some sense appearances which\n(though we can't help having them) might, from the point of view of\nsuperior insight, turn out to be mere delusions, or at best entirely\nunimportant and inconsiderable entities.  This attitude of mind has\nbeen amusingly satirised by the title of one of Mr. Bradley's\nphilosophical essays--'on the supposed uselessness of the Soul.'[1]  In\nthis state of mind matter presents itself as the one solid reality--as\nsomething undeniable, something perfectly intelligible, something, too,\nwhich is pre-eminently {7} important and respectable; while thinking\nand feeling and willing, joy and sorrow, hope and aspiration, goodness\nand badness, if they cannot exactly be got rid of altogether, are, as\nit were, negligible quantities, which must not be allowed to disturb or\ninterfere with the serious business of the Universe.\n\nFrom this point of view matter is supposed to be the one reality with\nwhich we are in immediate contact, which we see and touch and taste and\nhandle every hour of our lives.  It may, therefore, sound a rather\nstartling paradox to say that matter--matter in the sense of the\nMaterialist--is something which nobody has ever seen, touched, or\nhandled.  Yet that is the literal and undeniable fact.  Nobody has ever\nseen or touched or otherwise come in contact with a piece of matter.\nFor in the experience which the plain man calls seeing or touching\nthere is always present another thing.  Even if we suppose that he is\nJustified in saying 'I touch matter,' there is always present the 'I'\nas well as the matter.[2]  It is always and inevitably matter + mind\nthat he knows.  Nobody ever can get away from this 'I,' nobody can ever\nsee or feel what matter is like apart from the 'I' which knows {8} it.\nHe may, indeed, infer that this matter exists apart from the 'I' which\nknows it.  He may infer that it exists, and may even go as far as to\nassume that, apart from his seeing or touching, or anybody else's\nseeing or touching, matter possesses all those qualities which it\npossesses for his own consciousness.  But this is inference, and not\nimmediate knowledge.  And the validity or reasonableness of the\ninference may be disputed.  How far it is reasonable or legitimate to\nattribute to matter as it is in itself the qualities which it has for\nus must depend upon the nature of those qualities.  Let us then go on\nto ask whether the qualities which constitute matter as we know it are\nqualities which we can reasonably or even intelligibly attribute to a\nsupposed matter-in-itself, to matter considered as something capable of\nexisting by itself altogether apart from any kind of conscious\nexperience.\n\nIn matter, as we know it, there are two elements.  There are certain\nsensations, or certain qualities which we come to know by sensation,\nand there are certain relations.  Now, with regard to the sensations, a\nvery little reflection will, I think, show us that it is absolutely\nmeaningless to say that matter has the qualities implied by these\nsensations, even when they are not felt, and would still possess them,\neven supposing it never had been and never would be felt by any one\nwhatever.  In a world in which {9} there were no eyes and no minds,\nwhat would be the meaning of saying that things were red or blue?  In a\nworld in which there were no ears and no minds, there would clearly be\nno such thing as sound.  This is exactly the point at which Locke's\nanalysis stopped.  He admitted that the 'secondary qualities'--colours,\nsounds, tastes--of objects were really not in the things themselves but\nin the mind which perceives them.  What existed in the things was\nmerely a power of producing these sensations in us, the quality in the\nthing being not in the least like the sensations which it produces in\nus: he admitted that this power of producing a sensation was something\ndifferent from, and totally unlike, the sensation itself.  But when he\ncame to the primary qualities--solidity, shape, magnitude and the\nlike--he supposed that the qualities in the thing were exactly the same\nas they are for our minds.  If all mind were to disappear from the\nUniverse, there would henceforth be no red and blue, no hot and cold;\nbut things would still be big or small, round or square, solid or\nfluid.  Yet, even with these 'primary qualities' the reference to mind\nis really there just as much as in the case of the secondary qualities;\nonly the fact is not quite so obvious.  And one reason for this is that\nthese primary qualities involve, much more glaringly and unmistakably\nthan the secondary, something which is not _mere_ sensation--something\nwhich {10} implies thought and not mere sense.  What do we mean by\nsolidity, for instance?  We mean partly that we get certain sensations\nfrom touching the object--sensations of touch and sensations of what is\ncalled the muscular sense, sensations of muscular exertion and of\npressure resisted.  Now, so far as that is what solidity means, it is\nclear that the quality in question involves as direct a reference to\nour subjective feelings as the secondary qualities of colour and sound.\nBut something more than this is implied in our idea of solidity.  We\nthink of external objects as occupying space.  And spaciality cannot be\nanalysed away into mere feelings of ours.  The feelings of touch which\nwe derive from an object come to us one after the other.  No mental\nreflection upon sensations which come one after the other in time could\never give us the idea of space, if they were not spacially related from\nthe first.  It is of the essence of spaciality that the parts of the\nobject shall be thought of as existing side by side, outside one\nanother.  But this side-by-sideness, this outsideness, is after all a\nway in which the things present themselves to a mind.  Space is made up\nof relations; and what is the meaning of relations apart from a mind\nwhich relates, or _for_ which the things are related?  If spaciality\nwere a quality of the thing in itself, it would exist no matter what\nbecame of other things.  It would be quite possible, therefore, {11}\nthat the top of this table should exist without the bottom: yet\neverybody surely would admit the meaninglessness of talking about a\npiece of matter (no matter how small, be it an atom or the smallest\nelectron conceived by the most recent physical speculation) which had a\ntop without a bottom, or a right-hand side without a left.  This\nspace-occupying quality which is the most fundamental element in our\nordinary conception of matter is wholly made up of the relation of one\npart of it to another.  Now can a relation exist except for a mind?  As\nit seems to me, the suggestion is meaningless.  Relatedness only has a\nmeaning when thought of in connection with a mind which is capable of\ngrasping or holding together both terms of the relation.  The relation\nbetween point A and point B is not _in_ point A or _in_ point B taken\nby themselves.  It is all in the 'between': 'betweenness' from its very\nnature cannot exist in any one point of space or in several isolated\npoints of space or things in space; it must exist only in some one\nexistent which holds together and connects those points.  And nothing,\nas far as we can understand, can do that except a mind.  Apart from\nmind there can be no relatedness: apart from relatedness no space:\napart from space no matter.  It follows that apart from mind there can\nbe no matter.\n\nIt will probably be known to all of you that the {12} first person to\nmake this momentous inference was Bishop Berkeley.  There was, indeed,\nan obscure medieval schoolman, hardly recognized by the historians of\nPhilosophy, one Nicholas of Autrecourt, Dean of Metz,[3] who\nanticipated him in the fourteenth century, and other better-known\nschoolmen who approximated to the position; and there are, of course,\nelements in the teaching of Plato and even of Aristotle, or possible\ninterpretations of Plato and Aristotle, which point in the same\ndirection.  But full-blown Idealism, in the sense which involves a\ndenial of the independent existence of matter, is always associated\nwith the name of Bishop Berkeley.\n\nI can best make my meaning plain to you by quoting a passage or two\nfrom his _Principles of Human Knowledge_, in which he extends to the\nprimary qualities of matter the analysis which Locke had already\napplied to the secondary.\n\n\n'But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances\nmay exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of\nbodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this?  Either we must\nknow it by Sense or by Reason.--As for our senses, by them we have the\nknowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are\nimmediately perceived by sense, call them what you will; but they do\nnot inform us that things exist {13} without the mind, or unperceived,\nlike to those which are perceived.  This the Materialists themselves\nacknowledge.--It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all\nof external things, it must be by Reason inferring their existence from\nwhat is immediately perceived by sense.  But what reason can induce us\nto believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we\nperceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend\nthere is any _necessary_ connexion betwixt them and our ideas?  I say\nit is granted on all hands--and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and\nthe like, puts it beyond dispute--that it is possible we might be\naffected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies\nexisting without resembling them.  Hence, it is evident the supposition\nof external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since\nit is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be\nproduced always in the same order we see them in at present, without\ntheir concurrence.\n\n      *      *      *      *      *      *\n\n'In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should\never come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very\nsame reasons to think there were that we have now.  Suppose--what no\none can deny possible--an intelligence _without the help of external\nbodies_, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that\nyou are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his\nmind.  I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to\nbelieve the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his\nideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for\nbelieving the same thing?  Of this there can be no {14} question--which\none consideration were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the\nstrength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have, for the\nexistence of bodies without the mind.'[4]\n\n\nDo you say that in that case the tables and chairs must be supposed to\ndisappear the moment we all leave the room?  It is true that we do\ncommonly think of the tables and chairs as remaining, even when there\nis no one there to see or touch them.  But that only means, Berkeley\nexplains, that if we or any one else were to come back into the room,\nwe should perceive them.  Moreover, even in thinking of them as things\nwhich might be perceived under certain conditions, they have entered\nour minds and so proclaimed their ideal or mind-implying character.  To\nprove that things exist without the mind we should have to conceive of\nthings as unconceived or unthought of.  And that is a feat which no one\nhas ever yet succeeded in accomplishing.\n\nHere is Berkeley's own answer to the objection:\n\n\n'But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine\ntrees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and\nnobody by to perceive them.  I answer, you may so, there is no\ndifficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than\nframing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and\n{15} at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may\nperceive them?  But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all\nthe while?  This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shews you\nhave the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it does\nnot shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought\nmay exist without the mind.  To make out this, it is necessary that\n_you_ conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a\nmanifest repugnancy.  When we do our utmost to conceive the existence\nof external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own\nideas.  But the mind, _taking no notice of itself_, is deluded to think\nit can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the\nmind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or exist in,\nitself.  A little attention will discover to any one the truth and\nevidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any\nother proofs against the existence of _material substance_.'[5]\n\n\nBerkeley no doubt did not adequately appreciate the importance of the\ndistinction between mere sensations and mental relations.  In the\nparagraph which I have read to you he tends to explain space away into\nmere subjective feelings: in this respect and in many others he has\nbeen corrected by Kant and the post-Kantian Idealists.  Doubtless we\ncannot analyse away our conception of space or of substance into mere\nfeelings.  But relations imply mind no less than sensations.  Things\nare no mere {16} bundles of sensations; we do think of them as objects\nor substances possessing attributes.  Indeed to call them (with\nBerkeley), 'bundles of sensations' implies that the bundle is as\nimportant an element in thinghood as the sensations themselves.  The\nbundle implies what Kant would call the intellectual 'categories' of\nSubstance, Quantity, Quality, and the like.  We do think objects: but\nan object is still an object of thought.  We can attach no intelligible\nmeaning to the term 'object' which does not imply a subject.\n\nIf there is nothing in matter, as we know it, which does not obviously\nimply mind, if the very idea of matter is unintelligible apart from\nmind, it is clear that matter can never have existed without mind.\n\nWhat then, it may be asked, of the things which no human eye has ever\nseen or even thought of?  Are we to suppose that a new planet comes\ninto existence for the first time when first it sails into the\ntelescope of the astronomer, and that Science is wrong in inferring\nthat it existed not only before that particular astronomer saw it, but\nbefore there were any astronomers or other human or even animal\nintelligences upon this planet to observe it?  Did the world of Geology\ncome into existence for the first time when some eighteenth-century\ngeologist first suspected that the world was more than six thousand\nyears old?  Are all those ages of past {17} history, when the earth and\nthe sun were but nebulae, a mere imagination, or did that nebulous mass\ncome into existence thousands or millions of years afterwards when Kant\nor Laplace first conceived that it had existed?  The supposition is\nclearly self-contradictory and impossible.  If Science be not a mass of\nillusion, this planet existed millions of years before any human--or,\nso far as we know, any animal minds--existed to think its existence.\nAnd yet I have endeavoured to show the absurdity of supposing that\nmatter can exist except for a mind.  It is clear, then, that it cannot\nbe merely for such minds as ours that the world has always existed.\nOur minds come and go.  They have a beginning; they go to sleep; they\nmay, for aught that we can immediately know, come to an end.  At no\ntime does any one of them, at no time do all of them together,\napprehend all that there is to be known.  We do not create a Universe;\nwe discover it piece by piece, and after all very imperfectly.  Matter\ncannot intelligibly be supposed to exist apart from Mind: and yet it\nclearly does not exist merely for _our_ minds.  Each of us knows only\none little bit of the Universe: all of us together do not know the\nwhole.  If the whole is to exist at all, there must be some one mind\nwhich knows the whole.  The mind which is necessary to the very\nexistence of the Universe is the mind that we call God.\n\n{18}\n\nIn this way we are, as it seems to me, led up by a train of reasoning\nwhich is positively irresistible to the idea that, so far from matter\nbeing the only existence, it has no existence of its own apart from\nsome mind which knows it--in which and for which it exists.  The\nexistence of a Mind possessing universal knowledge is necessary as the\npresupposition both of there being any world to know, and also of there\nbeing any lesser minds to know it.  It is, indeed, possible to believe\nin the eternal existence of limited minds, while denying the existence\nof the one Omniscient Mind.  That is a hypothesis on which I will say a\nword hereafter.[6]  It is enough here to say that it is one which is\nnot required to explain the world as we know it.  The obvious _prima\nfacie_ view of the matter is that the minds which apparently have a\nbeginning, which develope slowly and gradually and in close connexion\nwith certain physical processes, owe their origin to whatever is the\nultimate source or ground of the physical processes themselves.  The\norder or systematic interconnexion of all the observable phenomena in\nthe Universe suggests that the ultimate Reality must be one Being of\nsome kind; the argument which I have suggested leads us to regard that\none Reality as a spiritual Reality.  We are not yet entitled to speak\nof this physical Universe as _caused_ {19} by God: that is a question\nwhich I hope to discuss in our next lecture.  All that I want to\nestablish now is that we cannot explain the world without the\nsupposition of one universal Mind in which and for which all so-called\nmaterial things exist, and always have existed.\n\nSo far I have endeavoured to establish the existence of God by a line\nof thought which also leads to the position that matter has no\nindependent existence apart from conscious mind, that at bottom nothing\nexists except minds and their experiences.  Now I know that this is a\nline of thought which, to those who are unfamiliar with it, seems so\nparadoxical and extravagant that, even when a man does not see his way\nto reply to it, it will seldom produce immediate or permanent\nconviction the first time he becomes acquainted with it.  It is for the\nmost part only by a considerable course of habituation, extending over\nsome years, that a man succeeds in thinking himself into the idealistic\nview of the Universe.  And after all, there are many minds--some of\nthem, I must admit, not wanting in philosophical power--who never\nsucceed in accomplishing that feat at all.  Therefore, while I feel\nbound to assert that the clearest and most irrefragable argument for\nthe existence of God is that which is supplied by the idealistic line\nof thought, I should be sorry to have to admit that a man {20} cannot\nbe a Theist, or that he cannot be a Theist on reasonable grounds,\nwithout first being an Idealist.  From my own point of view most of the\nother reasons for believing in the existence of God resolve themselves\ninto idealistic arguments imperfectly thought out.  But they may be\nvery good arguments, as far as they go, even when they are not thought\nout to what seem to me their logical consequences.  One of these lines\nof thought I shall hope to develope in my next lecture; but meanwhile\nlet me attempt to reduce the argument against Materialism to a form in\nwhich it will perhaps appeal to Common-sense without much profound\nmetaphysical reflection.\n\nAt the level of ordinary common-sense thought there appear to be two\nkinds of Reality--mind and matter.  And yet our experience of the unity\nof Nature, of the intimate connexion between human and animal minds and\ntheir organisms (organisms governed by a single intelligible and\ninterconnected system of laws) is such that we can hardly help\nregarding them as manifestations or products or effects or aspects of\nsome one Reality.  There is, almost obviously, some kind of Unity\nunderlying all the diversity of things.  Our world does not arise by\nthe coming together of two quite independent Realities--mind and\nmatter--governed by no law or by unconnected and independent systems of\nlaw.  {21} All things, all phenomena, all events form parts of a single\ninter-related, intelligible whole: that is the presupposition not only\nof Philosophy but of Science.  Or if any one chooses to say that it\n_is_ a presupposition and so an unwarrantable piece of dogmatism, I\nwill say that it is the hypothesis to which all our knowledge points.\nIt is at all events the one common meeting-point of nearly all serious\nthinkers.  The question remains, 'What is the nature of this one\nReality?'  Now, if this ultimate Reality be not mind, it must be one of\ntwo things.  It must be matter, or it must be a third thing which is\nneither mind nor matter, but something quite different from either.\nNow many who will not follow the idealistic line of thought the whole\nway--so far as to recognize that the ultimate Reality is Mind--will at\nleast admit that Idealists have successfully shown the impossibility of\nsupposing that the ultimate Reality can be matter.  For all the\nproperties of matter are properties which imply some relation to our\nsensibility or our thought.  Moreover, there is such a complete\nheterogeneity between consciousness and unconscious matter, considered\nas something capable of existing without mind, that it seems utterly\nimpossible and unthinkable that mind should be simply the product or\nattribute of matter.  That the ultimate Reality cannot be what we mean\nby matter has been admitted by the most naturalistic, {22} and, in the\nordinary sense, anti-religious thinkers--Spinoza, for instance, and\nHaeckel, and Herbert Spencer.  The question remains, 'Which is the\neasier, the more probable, the more reasonable theory--that the\nultimate Reality should be Mind, or that it should be something so\nutterly unintelligible and inconceivable to us as a _tertium quid_--a\nmysterious Unknown and Unknowable--which is neither mind nor matter?'\nFor my own part, I see no reason to suppose that our inability to think\nof anything which is neither matter nor mind but quite unlike either is\na mere imperfection of human thought.  It seems more reasonable to\nassume that our inability to think of such a mysterious X is due to\nthere being no such thing.[7]\n\nOur only way of judging of the Unknown is by the analogy of the known.\nIt is more probable, surely, that the world known to us should exhibit\nsomething of the characteristics of the Reality from which it is\nderived, or of which it forms a manifestation, than that it should\nexhibit none of these characteristics.  No doubt, if we were to argue\nfrom some small part of our experience, or from the detailed\ncharacteristics of one part of our experience to what is beyond our\nexperience; if, for instance {23} (I am here replying to an objection\nof Hoeffding's), a blind man were to argue that the world must be\ncolourless because he sees no colour, or if any of us were to affirm\nthat in other planets there can be no colours but what we see, no\nsensations but what we feel, no mental powers but what we possess, the\ninference would be precarious enough.  The Anthropomorphist in the\nstrict sense--the man who thinks that God or the gods must have human\nbodies--no doubt renders himself liable to the gibe that, if oxen could\nthink, they would imagine the gods to be like oxen, and so on.  But the\ncases are not parallel.  We have no difficulty in thinking that in\nother worlds there may be colours which we have never seen, or whole\ngroups of sensation different from our own: we cannot think that any\nexistence should be neither mind nor matter, but utterly unlike either.\nWe are not arguing from the mere absence of some special experience,\nbut from the whole character of _all_ the thought and experience that\nwe actually possess, of all that we are and the whole Universe with\nwhich we are in contact.  The characteristic of the whole world which\nwe know is that it consists of mind and matter in close connexion--we\nmay waive for a moment the nature of that connexion.  Is it more\nprobable that the ultimate Reality which lies beyond our reach should\nbe something which possesses the characteristics of mind, or that it\nshould {24} be totally unlike either mind or matter?  Do you insist\nthat we logically ought to say it might contain the characteristics of\nboth mind and matter?  There is only one way in which such a\ncombination seems clearly thinkable by us, _i.e._ when we represent\nmatter as either in the idealistic sense the thought or experience of\nmind, or (after the fashion of ordinary realistic Theism) as created or\nproduced by mind.  But if you insist on something more than this, if\nyou want to think of the qualities of matter as in some other way\nincluded in the nature of the ultimate Reality as well as those of\nmind, at all events we could still urge that we shall get nearer to the\ntruth by thinking of this ultimate Reality in its mind-aspect than by\nthinking of it in its matter-aspect.\n\nI do not believe that the human mind is really equal to the task of\nthinking of a Reality which is one and yet is neither mind nor matter\nbut something which combines the nature of both.  Practically, where\nsuch a creed is professed, the man either thinks of an unconscious\nReality in some way generating or evolving mind, and so falls back into\nthe Materialism which he has verbally disclaimed; or he thinks of a\nmind producing or causing or generating a matter which when produced is\nsomething different from itself.  This last is of course ordinary\nTheism in the form in which it is commonly {25} held by those who are\nnot Idealists.  From a practical and religious point of view there is\nnothing to be said against such a view.  Still it involves a Dualism,\nthe philosophical difficulties of which I have attempted to suggest to\nyou.  I confess that for my own part the only way in which I can\nconceive of a single ultimate Reality which combines the attributes of\nwhat we call mind with those of what we know as matter is by thinking\nof a Mind conscious of a world or nature which has no existence except\nin and for that Mind and whatever less complete consciousnesses that\nmay be.  I trust that those who have failed to follow my sketch of the\narguments which lead to this idealistic conclusion may at least be led\nby it to see the difficulties either of Materialism or of that kind of\nagnostic Pantheism which, while admitting in words that the ultimate\nReality is not matter, refuses to invest it with the attributes of\nmind.  The argument may be reduced to its simplest form by saying we\nbelieve that the ultimate Reality is Mind because mind will explain\nmatter, while matter will not explain mind: while the idea of a\nSomething which is neither in mind nor matter is both unintelligible\nand gratuitous.\n\nAnd this line of thought may be supplemented by another.  Whatever may\nbe thought of the existence of matter apart from mind, every one will\n{26} admit that matter possesses no value or worth apart from mind.\nWhen we bring into account our moral judgements or judgements of value,\nwe have no difficulty in recognizing mind as the highest or best kind\nof existence known to us.  There is, surely, a certain intrinsic\nprobability in supposing that the Reality from which all being is\nderived must possess at least as much worth or value as the derived\nbeing; and that in thinking of that Reality by the analogy of the\nhighest kind of existence known to us we shall come nearer to a true\nthought of it than by any other way of thinking possible to us.  This\nis a line of argument which I hope to develope further when I come to\nexamine the bearing upon the religious problem of what is as real a\npart of our experience as any other--our moral experience.\n\nI will remind you in conclusion, that our argument for the existence of\nGod is at present incomplete.  I have tried to lead you to the idea\nthat the ultimate Reality is spiritual, that it is a Mind which knows,\nor is conscious of, matter.  I have tried to lead you with the Idealist\nto think of the physical Universe as having no existence except in the\nmind of God, or at all events (for those who fail to follow the\nidealistic line of thought) to believe that the Universe does not exist\nwithout such a Mind.  What further relation exists between physical\nnature and this Universal Spirit, I shall hope in the next lecture {27}\nto consider; and in so doing to suggest a line of argument which will\nindependently lead to the same result, and which does not necessarily\npresuppose the acceptance of the idealistic creed.\n\n\nLITERATURE\n\nThe reader who wishes to have the idealistic argument sketched in the\nforegoing chapter developed more fully should read Berkeley's\n_Principles of Human Knowledge_.  For the correction of Berkeley's\nsensationalistic mistakes the best course is to read Kant's _Critique\nof Pure Reason_ or the shorter _Prolegomena to any future Metaphysic_\nor any of the numerous expositions or commentaries upon Kant.  (One of\nthe best is the 'Reproduction' prefixed to Dr. Hutchison Stirling's\n_Text-book to Kant_.)  The non-metaphysical reader should, however, be\ninformed that Kant is very hard reading, and is scarcely intelligible\nwithout some slight knowledge of the previous history of Philosophy,\nespecially of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, while some acquaintance with\nelementary Logic is also desirable.  He will find the argument for\nnon-sensationalistic Idealism re-stated in a post-Kantian but much\neasier form in Ferrier's _Institutes of Metaphysic_.  The argument for\na theistic Idealism is powerfully stated (though it is not easy\nreading) in the late Prof. T. H. Green's _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Book\nI.  In view of recent realistic revivals I may add that the earlier\nchapters of Mr. Bradley's _Appearance and Reality_ still seem to me to\ncontain an unanswerable defence of Idealism as against Materialism or\nany form of Realism, though his Idealism is not of the theistic type\ndefended in the above lecture.  The idealistic argument is stated in a\nway which makes strongly for Theism by Professor Ward in _Naturalism\nand Agnosticism_--a work which would perhaps be the best sequel to\nthese lectures for any reader {28} who does not want to undertake a\nwhole course of philosophical reading: readers entirely unacquainted\nwith Physical Science might do well to begin with Part II.  A more\nelementary and very clear defence of Theism from the idealistic point\nof view is to be found in Dr. Illingworth's _Personality Human and\nDivine_.  Representatives of non-idealistic Theism will be mentioned at\nthe end of the next lecture.\n\n\n\n[1] _Mind_, vol. iv. (U.S.), 1885.\n\n[2] I do not mean of course that in the earliest stages of\nconsciousness this distinction is actually made; but, if there are\nstages of consciousness in which the  'I' is not realized, the idea of\nmatter or even of an 'object' or 'not-self' existing apart from\nconsciousness must be supposed to be equally absent.\n\n[3] I have dealt at length with this forgotten thinker in a\nPresidential Address to the Aristotelian Society, printed in their\n_Proceedings_ for 1907.\n\n[4] _Principles of Human Knowledge_, pt. i., Sections 18, 20.\n\n[5] _Principles of Human Knowledge_, pt. 1., Section 23.\n\n[6] See Lecture IV., pp. 96-101, 123-6.\n\n[7] I have attempted to meet this line of argument somewhat more\nadequately, in the form in which it has recently been taken up by\nProfessor Hoeffding in his _Philosophy of Religion_, in a review in the\nReview of Theology and Philosophy for November, 1907 (vol. iii.).\n\n\n\n\n{29}\n\nLECTURE II\n\nTHE UNIVERSAL CAUSE\n\nIn my last lecture I endeavoured to show that matter, so far from\nconstituting the ultimate Reality, cannot reasonably be thought of as\nexisting at all without mind; and that we cannot explain the world\nwithout assuming the existence of a Mind in which and for which\neverything that is not mind has its being.  But we are still very far\nfrom having fully cleared up the relation between the divine Mind and\nthat Nature which exists in it and for it: while we have hardly dealt at\nall with the relation between the universal Mind and those lesser minds\nwhich we have treated--so far without much argument--as in some way\nderived from, or dependent upon, that Mind.  So far as our previous line\nof argument goes, we might have to look upon the world as the thought of\nGod, but not as caused by Him or due to His will.  We might speak of God\nas 'making Nature,' but only in the sense in which you or I make Nature\nwhen we think it or experience it.  {30} 'The world is as necessary to\nGod as God is to the world,' we are often told--for instance by my own\nrevered teacher, the late Professor Green.  How unsatisfactory this\nposition is from a religious point of view I need hardly insist.  For all\nthat such a theory has to say to the contrary, we might have to suppose\nthat, though God is perfectly good, the world which He is compelled to\nthink is very bad, and going from bad to worse.  To think of God merely\nas the Mind which eternally contemplates Nature, without having any power\nwhatever of determining what sort of Nature it is to be, supplies no\nground for hope or aspiration--still less for worship, adoration,\nimitation.  I suggested the possibility that from such a point of view\nGod might be thought of as good, and the world as bad.  But that is\nreally to concede too much.  A being without a will could as little be\nbad as he could be good: he would be simply a being without a character.\nFrom an intellectual point such a way of looking at the Universe might be\nmore intelligent or intelligible than that of pure Materialism or pure\nAgnosticism; but morally and religiously I don't know that, when its\nconsequences are fully realized, it is any great improvement upon either\nof them.[1] {31} Moreover, even intellectually it fails to satisfy the\ndemand which most reflecting people feel, that the world shall be\nregarded as a Unity of some kind.  If God is thought of as linked by some\ninexplicable fate to a Nature over which He has no sort of control--not\nso much control as a mere human being who can produce limited changes in\nthe world,--we can hardly be said to have reduced the world to a Unity.\nThe old Dualism has broken out again: after all we still have God and the\nworld confronting one another; neither of them is in any way explained by\nthe other.  Still less could such a world be supposed to have a purpose\nor rational end.  For our own mere intellectual satisfaction as well as\nfor the satisfaction of our religious needs we must go on to ask whether\nwe are not justified in thinking of God as the Cause or Creator of the\nworld, as well as the Thinker of it.\n\nThis enquiry introduces us to the whole problem of Causality.  The sketch\nwhich I gave you last time of Bishop Berkeley's argument was a very\nimperfect one.  Bishop Berkeley was from one point of view a great\nphilosophic iconoclast, though he destroyed only that he might build up.\nHe destroyed the superstition of a self-existing matter: {32} he also\nwaged war against what I will venture to call the kindred superstition of\na mysterious causal nexus between the physical antecedent and the\nphysical consequent.  On this side his work was carried on by Hume.\nBerkeley resolved our knowledge into a succession of 'ideas.'  He did, no\ndoubt, fall into the mistake of treating our knowledge as if it were a\nmere succession of feelings: he ignored far too much--though he did not\ndo so completely--that other element in our knowledge, the element of\nintellectual relation, of which I said something last time.  Here, no\ndoubt, Berkeley has been corrected by Kant; and, so far, practically all\nmodern Idealists will own their indebtedness to Kant.  Even in the\napprehension of a succession of ideas, in the mere recognition that this\nfeeling comes after that, there is an element which cannot be explained\nby mere feeling.  The apprehension that this feeling came after that\nfeeling is not itself a feeling.  But can I detect any relation between\nthese experiences of mine except that of succession?  We commonly speak\nof fire as the cause of the melting of the wax, but what do we really\nknow about the matter?  Surely on reflection we must admit that we know\nnothing but this--that, so far as our experience goes, the application of\nfire is always followed by the melting of the wax.  Where this is the\ncase we do, from the point of view of {33} ordinary life, speak of the\none phenomenon as the cause of the other.  Where we don't discover such\nan invariable succession, we don't think of the one event as the cause of\nthe other.\n\nI shall be told, perhaps, that on this view of the nature of Causality we\nought to speak of night as the cause of day.  So perhaps we should, if\nthe result to which we are led by a more limited experience were not\ncorrected by the results of a larger experience.  To say nothing of the\nvaluable correction afforded by the polar winter and the polar summer, we\nhave learned by a more comprehensive experience to replace the law that\nday follows night by the wider generalisation that the visibility of\nobjects is invariably coincident upon the presence of some luminous body\nand not upon a previous state of darkness.  But between cases of what we\ncall mere succession and what is commonly called causal sequence the\ndifference lies merely in the observed fact that in some cases the\nsequence varies, while in others no exception has ever been discovered.\nNo matter how frequently we observe that a sensation of red follows the\nimpact upon the aural nerve of a shock derived from a wave of ether of\nsuch and such a length, we see no reason why it should do so.  We may, no\ndoubt, make a still wider generalization, and say that every event in\nNature is invariably preceded by some definite complex of conditions,\n{34} and so arrive at a general law of the Uniformity of Nature.  And\nsuch a law is undoubtedly the express or implied basis of all inference\nin the Physical Sciences.  When we have once accepted that law (as the\nwhole mass of our experience in the purely physical region inclines us to\ndo), then a single instance of A B C being followed by D (when we are\nquite sure that we have included all the antecedents which we do not know\nfrom other experience to be irrelevant) will warrant our concluding that\nwe have discovered a law of nature.  On the next occasion of A B C's\noccurrence we confidently predict that D will follow.  But, however often\nwe have observed such a sequence, and however many similar sequences we\nmay have observed, we are no nearer to knowing _why_ D should follow ABC:\nwe can only know that it always does: and on the strength of that\nknowledge we infer, with a probability which we do no doubt for practical\npurposes treat as a certainty, that it always will.  But on reflection we\ncan see no reason why a wave of ether of a certain length should produce\nred rather than blue, a colour rather than a sound.  There, as always, we\ndiscover nothing but succession, not necessary connexion.\n\nThese cases of unvaried succession among phenomena, it should be\nobserved, are quite different from cases of real necessary connexion.  We\ndon't want to examine thousands of instances of two {35} added to two to\nbe quite sure that they always make four, nor in making the inference do\nwe appeal to any more general law of Uniformity.  We simply see that it\nis and always must be so.  Mill no doubt tells us he has no difficulty in\nsupposing that in the region of the fixed stars two and two might make\nfive, but nobody believes him.  At all events few of us can pretend to\nsuch feats of intellectual elasticity.  No amount of contradictory\ntestimony from travellers to the fixed stars, no matter whether they were\nBishops of the highest character or trained as Professors of physical\nScience, would induce us to give a moment's credence to such a story.  We\nsimply see that two and two must make four, and that it is inconceivable\nthey should ever, however exceptionally, make five.  It is quite\notherwise with any case of succession among external phenomena, no matter\nhow unvaried.  So long as we confine ourselves to merely physical\nphenomena (I put aside for the moment the case of conscious or other\nliving beings) nowhere can we discover anything but succession; nowhere\ndo we discover Causality in the sense of a necessary connexion the\nreversal of which is inconceivable.\n\nAre we then to conclude that there is no such thing as Causality, that in\nsearching for a cause of everything that happens, we are pursuing a mere\nwill o' the wisp, using a mere _vox nihili_ which has {36} as little\nmeaning for the reflecting mind as fate or fortune?  Surely, in the very\nact of making the distinction between succession and causality, in the\nvery act of denying that we can discover any causal connexion between one\nphysical phenomenon and another, we imply that we have got the idea of\nCausality in our minds; and that, however little we may have discovered a\ngenuine cause, we could not believe that anything could happen without a\ncause.\n\nFor my own part, I find it quite possible to believe that a phenomenon\nwhich has been followed by another phenomenon 9999 times should on the\n10,000th time be followed by some other phenomenon.  Give me the\nrequisite experience, and belief would follow; give me even any adequate\nevidence that another person has had such an experience (though I should\nbe very particular about the evidence), and I should find no difficulty\nin believing it.  But to tell me that the exception to an observed law\nmight take place without any cause at all for the variation would seem to\nbe pure nonsense.  Put the matter in another way.  Let us suppose an\nempty world, if one can speak of such a thing without contradiction--let\nus suppose that at one time nothing whatever had existed, neither mind\nnor matter nor any of that mysterious entity which some people find it\npossible to believe in which is {37} neither mind nor matter.  Let us\nsuppose literally nobody and nothing to have existed.  Now could you\nunder these conditions rationally suppose that anything could have come\ninto existence?  Could you for one moment admit the possibility that\nafter countless aeons of nothingness a flash of lightning should occur or\nan animal be born?  Surely, on reflection those who are most suspicious\nof _a priori_ knowledge, who are most unwilling to carry their\nspeculations beyond the limits of actual experience, will be prepared to\nsay, 'No, the thing is utterly for ever impossible.'  _Ex nihilo nihil\nfit_: for every event there must be a cause.  Those who profess to reject\nall other _a priori_ or self-evident knowledge, show by their every\nthought and every act that they never really doubt that much.\n\nNow, it would be just possible to contend that we have got the bare\nabstract concept or category of Causality in our minds, and yet that\nthere is nothing within our experience to give it any positive\ncontent--so that we should have to say, 'Every event must have a cause,\nbut we never know or can know what that cause is.  If we are to talk\nabout causes at all, we can only say \"The Unknowable is the cause of all\nthings.\"'  Such a position can be barely stated without a contradiction.\nBut surely it is a very difficult one.  Nature does not generally supply\nus with categories of thought, while it gives us no power {38} or\nopportunity of using them.  It would be like holding, for instance, that\nwe have indeed been endowed with the idea of number in general, but that\nwe cannot discover within our experience any numerable things; that we\nhave got the idea of 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., but have no capacity whatever for\nactually counting--for saying that here are three apples, and there four\nmarbles.  And, psychologically, it would be difficult to find any\nparallel to anything of the kind.  Nature does not first supply us with\nclearly defined categories of thought, and then give us a material to\nexercise them upon.  In general we discover these abstract categories by\nusing them in our actual thinking.  We count beads or men or horses\nbefore we evolve an abstract idea of number, or an abstract\nmultiplication table.  It is very difficult to see how this idea of Cause\ncould possibly have got into our heads if we had never in the whole\ncourse of our experience come into any sort of contact with any actual\nconcrete cause.  Where then, within our experience, if not in the\nsuccession of external events, shall we look for a cause--for something\nto which we can apply this category or abstract notion of causality?  I\nanswer 'We must look within: it is in our experience of volition that we\nactually find something answering to our idea of causal connexion.'  And\nhere, I would invite you not to think so much of our consciousness of\nactually {39} moving our limbs.  Here it is possible to argue plausibly\nthat the experience of exercising causality is a delusion.  I imagine\nthat, if I will to do so, I can move my arm; but I will to stretch out my\narm, and lo! it remains glued to my side, for I have suddenly been\nparalysed.  Or I may be told that the consciousness of exerting power is\na mere experience of muscular contraction, and the like.  I would ask you\nto think rather of your power of directing the succession of your own\nthoughts.  I am directly conscious, for instance, that the reason why I\nam now thinking of Causality, and not (say) of Tariff Reform, is the fact\nthat I have conceived the design of delivering a course of lectures on\nthis subject; the succession of ideas which flow through my mind as I\nwrite or speak is only explicable by reference to an end--an end which I\nam striving to bring into actual being.  In such voluntarily concentrated\npurposeful successions of thought I am immediately exercising causality:\nand this causality does further influence the order of events in physical\nnature.  My pen or my tongue moves in consequence of this striving of\nmine, though no doubt for such efforts to take place other physical\nconditions must be presupposed, which are not wholly within my own\ncontrol.  I am the cause, but not the whole or sole cause of these\nphysical disturbances in external nature: I am a cause but not an\nuncaused cause.  {40} My volition, though it is not the sole cause of the\nevent which I will, is enough to give me a conception of a cause which is\nthe sole cause of the events.\n\nThe attempt is of course sometimes made, as it was made by Hume, to\nexplain away this immediate consciousness of volition, and to say that\nall that I immediately know is the succession of my subjective\nexperiences.  It may be contended that I don't know, any more than in the\ncase of external phenomena, that because the thought of my lecture comes\nfirst and the thought of putting my pen into the ink to write it comes\nafterwards, therefore the one thought causes the other.  Hence it is\nimportant to point out that I have a negative experience with which to\ncontrast the positive experience.  I do not _always_, even as regards my\nown inward experiences, assume that succession implies Causality.\nSupposing, as I speak or write, a twinge of the gout suddenly introduces\nitself into the succession of my experiences: then I am conscious of no\nsuch inner connexion between the new experience and that which went\nbefore it.  Then I am as distinctly conscious of passivity--of not\ncausing the succession of events which take place in my mind--as I am in\nthe other case of actively causing it.  If the consciousness of\nexercising activity is a delusion, why does not that delusion occur in\nthe one case as much as in the other?  I hold then that in the\nconsciousness of {41} our own activity we get a real direct experience of\nCausality.  When Causality is interpreted to mean mere necessary\nconnexion--like the mathematical connexion between four and twice two or\nthe logical connexion between the premisses of a Syllogism and its\nconclusion,--its nature is fundamentally misrepresented.  The essence of\nCausality is not necessary connexion but Activity.  Such activity we\nencounter in our own experience of volition and nowhere else.[2]\n\nNow, if the only cause of which I am immediately conscious is the will of\na conscious rational being, is it not reasonable to infer that some such\nagency is at work in the case of those phenomena which we see no reason\nto attribute to the voluntary actions of men and animals?  It is well\nknown that primitive man took this step.  Primitive man had no notion of\nthe 'Uniformity of Nature': it is only very gradually that civilized man\nhas discovered it.  But primitive man never doubted for one instant the\nlaw of Causality: he never doubted that for any change, or at least for\nany change of the kind which most frequently attracted his attention,\nthere must {42} be a cause.  Everything that moved he supposed to be\nalive, or to be under the influence of some living being more or less\nlike himself.  If the sea raged, he supposed that the Sea-god was angry.\nIf it did not rain to-day, when it rained yesterday, that was due to the\nfavour of the Sky-god, and so on.  The world for him was full of spirits.\nThe argument of primitive man's unconscious but thoroughly sound\nMetaphysic is well expressed by the fine lines of Wordsworth in the\n_Excursion_:\n\n  Once more to distant ages of the world\n  Let us revert, and place before our thoughts\n  The face which rural solitude might wear\n  To the unenlightened swains of pagan Greece.\n  --In that fair clime, the lonely herdsman, stretched\n  On the soft grass through half a summer's day,\n  With music lulled his indolent repose:\n  And, in some fit of weariness, if he,\n  When his own breath was silent, chanced to hear\n  A distant strain, far sweeter than the sounds\n  Which his poor skill could make, his fancy fetched,\n  Even from the blazing chariot of the sun,\n  A beardless Youth, who touched a golden lute,\n  And filled the illumined groves with ravishment.\n  The nightly hunter, lifting a bright eye\n  Up towards the crescent moon, with grateful heart\n  Called on the lovely wanderer who bestowed\n  That timely light, to share his joyous sport:\n  And hence, a beaming Goddess with her Nymphs,\n  Across the lawn and through the darksome grove,\n  (Not unaccompanied with tuneful notes\n  By echo multiplied from rock or cave),\n{43}\n  Swept in the storm of chace; as moon and stars\n  Glance rapidly along the clouded heaven,\n  When winds are blowing strong.  The traveller slaked\n  His thirst from rill or gushing fount, and thanked\n  The Naiad.  Sunbeams, upon distant hills\n  Gliding apace, with shadows in their train,\n  Might, with small help from fancy, be transformed\n  Into fleet Oreads sporting visibly.\n  The Zephyrs fanning, as they passed, their wings,\n  Lacked not, for love, fair objects whom they wooed\n  With gentle whisper.  Withered boughs grotesque,\n  Stripped of their leaves and twigs by hoary age,\n  From depth of shaggy covert peeping forth\n  In the low vale, or on steep mountain side;\n  And, sometimes, intermixed with stirring horns\n  Of the live deer, or goat's depending beard,--\n  These were the lurking Satyrs, a wild brood\n  Of gamesome Deities; or Pan himself,\n  The simple shepherd's awe-inspiring God![3]\n\n\nGrowing experience of the unity of Nature, of the interdependence of all\nthe various forces and departments of Nature, have made such a view of it\nimpossible to civilized and educated man.  Primitive man was quite right\nin arguing that, where he saw motion, there must be consciousness like\nhis own.  But we have been led by Science to believe that whatever is the\ncause of any one phenomenon (at least in inanimate nature), must be the\ncause of all.  The interconnexion, the regularity, the order observable\nin phenomena are too great to be the result of chance or of the\nundesigned concurrence of a number of {44} independent agencies: and\nperhaps we may go on further to argue that this one cause must be the\nultimate cause even of those events which are directly and immediately\ncaused by our own wills.  But that is a question which I will put aside\nfor the present.  At least for the events of physical nature there must\nbe one Cause.  And if the only sort of cause we know is a conscious and\nrational being, then we have another most powerful reason for believing\nthat the ultimate reality, from which all other reality is derived, is\nMind--a single conscious Mind which we may now further describe as not\nonly Thought or Intelligence but also Will.[4]\n\nLet me add this additional consideration in support of the conclusion\nthat the world is not merely thought by God but is also willed by God.\nWhen we talk about thought without will, we are talking about something\nthat we know absolutely nothing about.  In all the consciousness that we\nknow of, in every moment of our own immediate waking experience, we find\nthought, feeling, willing.  Even in the consciousness of animals there\nappears to be something analogous to these three sides or aspects of\nconsciousness: but at all events in developed human consciousness we know\nof no such thing as thinking without willing.  All thought involves\nattention, and to attend is to will.  If, therefore, on the grounds {45}\nsuggested by the Hegelian or other post-Kantian Idealists, we have been\nled to think that the ultimate Reality is Mind or Spirit, we should\nnaturally conclude by analogy that it must be Will as well as Thought\nand--I may add, though it hardly belongs to the present argument to\ninsist upon that--Feeling.  On the other hand if, with men like\nSchopenhauer and Edouard von Hartmann,[5] we are conducted by the\nappearances of design in Nature to the idea that Nature is striving after\nsomething, that the ultimate Reality is Will, we must supplement that\nline of argument by inferring from the analogy of our own Consciousness\nthat Will without Reason is an unintelligible and meaningless\nabstraction, and that (as indeed even Hartmann saw) Schopenhauer's Will\nwithout Reason was as impossible an abstraction as the apparently\nwill-less universal Thinker of the Hegelian:[6] while against\nSchopenhauer and his more reasonable successor, Hartmann, I should insist\nthat an unconscious Will is as unintelligible a contradiction as an\nunconscious Reason.  Schopenhauer and Hegel seem to have seen, each of\nthem, exactly {46} half of the truth: God is not Will without Reason or\nReason without Will, but both Reason and Will.\n\nAnd here I must try to meet an inevitable objection.  I do not say that\nthese three activities of the human intellect stand in God side by side\nwith the same distinctness and (if I may say so) irreducibility that they\ndo in us.  What feeling is for a Being who has no material organism, we\ncan form no distinct conception.  Our thought with its clumsy processes\nof inference from the known to the unknown must be very unlike what\nthought is in a Being to whom nothing is unknown.  All our thought too\ninvolves generalization, and in universal concepts (as Mr. Bradley has\nshown us) much that was present in the living experience of actual\nperception is necessarily left out.  Thought is but a sort of\nreproduction--and a very imperfect reproduction--of actual, living,\nsensible experience.  We cannot suppose, then, that in God there is the\nsame distinction between actual present experience and the universal\nconcepts employed in thinking which there is in us.  And so, again,\nwilling must be a very different thing in a being who wills or creates\nthe objects of his own thought from what it is in beings who can only\nachieve their ends by distinguishing in the sharpest possible manner\nbetween the indefinite multiplicity of things which they know but do not\ncause and the tiny fragment {47} of the Universe which by means of this\nknowledge they can control.  Nevertheless, though all our thoughts of God\nmust be inadequate, it is by thinking of Him as Thought, Will and\nFeeling--emancipated from those limitations which are obviously due to\nhuman conditions and are inapplicable to a Universal Mind--that we shall\nattain to the truest knowledge of God which lies within our capacity.  Do\nyou find a difficulty in the idea of partial and inadequate knowledge?\nJust think, then, of our knowledge of other people's characters--of what\ngoes on in other people's minds.  It is only by the analogy of our own\nimmediate experience that we can come to know anything at all of what\ngoes on in other people's minds.  And, after all, such insight into other\npeople's thoughts, emotions, motives, intentions, characters, remains\nvery imperfect.  The difficulty is greatest when the mind which we seek\nto penetrate is far above our own.  How little most of us know what it\nwould feel like to be a Shakespeare, a Mozart, or a Plato!  And yet it\nwould be absurd to talk as if our knowledge of our fellows was no\nknowledge at all.  It is sufficient not merely to guide our own thoughts\nand actions, but to make possible sympathy, friendship, love.  Is it not\nso with our knowledge of God?  The Gnosticism which forgets the immensity\nof the difference between the Divine Mind and the human is not less\nunreasonable--not {48} less opposed to the principles on which we conduct\nour thinking in every other department of life--than the Agnosticism\nwhich rejects probabilities because we cannot have immediate certainties,\nand insists on knowing nothing because we cannot know everything.\n\nThe argument which infers that God is Will from the analogy of our own\nconsciousness is one which is in itself independent of Idealism.  It has\nbeen used by many philosophers who are Realists, such as Reid or Dr.\nMartineau, as well as by Idealists like Berkeley, or Pfleiderer, or\nLotze.  It does not necessarily presuppose Idealism; but it does, to my\nmind, fit in infinitely better with the idealistic mode of thought than\nwith the realistic.  If you hold that there is no difficulty in supposing\ndead, inert matter to exist without any mind to think it or know it, but\nthat only a Mind can be supposed to cause change or motion, you are\nassuming a hard and fast distinction between matter and force which the\nwhole trend of modern Science is tending to break down.  It seems to\nimply the old Greek conception of an inert, passive, characterless _hule_\nwhich can only be acted upon from without.  The modern Physicist, I\nimagine, knows nothing of an inert matter which can neither attract nor\nrepel, even if he does not definitely embark on the more speculative\ntheory which actually defines the atom or the electron {49} as a centre\nof force.  Activity belongs to the very essence of matter as understood\nby modern Science.  If matter can exist without mind, there is (from the\nscientific point of view) some difficulty in contending that it cannot\nlikewise move or act without being influenced by an extraneous Mind.  If,\non the other hand, with the Idealist we treat the notion of matter\nwithout mind as an unintelligible abstraction, that line of thought would\nprepare us to see in force nothing but a mode of mental action.  The\nIdealist who has already identified matter with the object of thought\nwill find no difficulty in going on to see in force simply the activity\nor expression or object of Will.  And if he learns from the Physicist\nthat we cannot in the last resort--from the physical point of\nview--distinguish matter from force, that will fit in very well with the\nmetaphysical position which regards thought and will as simply two\ninseparable aspects of the life of mind.\n\nAnd now I will return once more for a moment to the idealistic argument.\nI have no doubt that many of you will have felt a difficulty in accepting\nthe position that the world with which we come in contact is merely a\nstate of our own or anybody else's consciousness.  It is so obvious that\nin our experience we are in contact with a world which we do not create;\nwhich is what it is whether we like it or not; which opposes itself at\nevery turn to our desires and {50} inclinations.  You may have been\nconvinced that we know nothing of any external world except the effects\nwhich it produces upon consciousness.  But, you will say to yourselves,\nthere must have been something to cause these effects.  You are perfectly\nright in so thinking.  Certainly in our experience of the world we are in\ncontact with a Reality which is not any state of our own mind, a Reality\nwhich we do not create but simply discover, a Reality from which are\nderived the sensations which we cannot help feeling, and the objects\nwhich we cannot help thinking.  So far you are quite right.  But very\noften, when the Realist insists that there must be something to cause in\nmy mind this appearance, which I call my consciousness of a table, he\nassumes all the while that this something--the real table, the table in\nitself--is _there_, inside or behind the phenomenal table that I actually\nsee and feel; out there, in space.  But if we were right in our analysis\nof space, if we were right in arguing that space is made up of\nintellectual relations[7] and that {51} intellectual relations can have\nno being and no meaning except in and for a mind which apprehends them,\nthen it is obvious that you must not think of this Reality which is the\ncause of our experience of external objects, as being _there_, as\noccupying space, as being 'external.'  If space be a form of our thought,\nor (in Kantian language) a form of our sensibility, then the Reality\nwhich is to have an existence in itself, cannot be in space.  A reality\nwhich is not in space can no longer be thought of as matter: whatever\nelse matter (as commonly conceived) means, it is certainly something\nwhich occupies space.  Now we know of no kind of existence which is not\nin space except Mind.  On the idealistic view to which I have been\nendeavouring to lead you, we are, indeed, justified in saying that there\nis a Reality which is the underlying cause or ground of our experiences,\nbut that that Reality is one which we may describe as Thought no less\nthan as Will.\n\nIt may interest some of you to know how near one who is often considered\nthe typical representative of naturalistic, if not materialistic, modes\nof thought, ultimately came to accepting this identification.  Let me\nread to you a passage from one of Mr. Spencer's later works--the third\nvolume of his _Sociology_:--\n\n'This transfiguration, which the inquiries of physicists continually\nincrease, is aided by that other {52} transfiguration resulting from\nmetaphysical inquiries.  Subjective analysis compels us to admit that our\nscientific interpretations of the phenomena which objects present, are\nexpressed in terms of our own variously-combined sensations and\nideas--are expressed, that is, in elements belonging to consciousness,\nwhich are but symbols of the something beyond consciousness.  Though\nanalysis afterwards reinstates our primitive beliefs, to the extent of\nshowing that behind every group of phenomenal manifestations there is\nalways a _nexus_, which is the reality that remains fixed amid\nappearances which are variable;[1] yet we are shown that this _nexus_ of\nreality is for ever inaccessible to consciousness.  And when, once more,\nwe remember that the activities constituting consciousness, being\nrigorously bounded, cannot bring in among themselves the activities\nbeyond the bounds, which therefore seem unconscious, though production of\neither by the other seems to imply that they are of the same essential\nnature; this necessity we are under to think of the external energy in\nterms of the internal energy, gives rather a spiritualistic than a\nmaterialistic aspect to the Universe: further thought, however, obliging\nus to recognize the truth that a conception given in phenomenal\nmanifestations of this ultimate energy can in no wise show us what it\nis.'[8]\n\n\nNow, I think this is one of the passages which would justify Mr.\nBradley's well-known epigram, that Mr. Herbert Spencer has told us more\nabout the Unknowable than the rashest of theologians has ever ventured to\ntell us about God.\n\n{53}\n\nEven Kant, who is largely responsible for the mistakes about Causality\nagainst which this lecture has been a protest--I mean the tendency to\nresolve it into necessary connexion--did in the end come to admit that in\nthe large resort we come into contact with Causality only in our own\nWills.  I owe the reference to Professor Ward, and will quote the\nparagraph in which he introduces it:--\n\n\n'Presentation, Feeling, Conation, are ever one inseparable whole, and\nadvance continuously to higher and higher forms.  But for the fact that\npsychology was in the first instance studied, not for its own sake, but\nin subservience to speculation, this cardinal importance of activity\nwould not have been so long overlooked.  We should not have heard so much\nof passive sensations and so little of active movements.  It is\nespecially interesting to find that even Kant at length--in his latest\nwork, the posthumous treatise on the _Connexion of Physics and\nMetaphysics_, only recently discovered and published--came to see the\nfundamental character of voluntary movement.  I will venture to quote one\nsentence: \"We should not recognise the moving forces of matter, not even\nthrough experience, if we were not conscious of our own activity in\nourselves exerting acts of repulsion, approximation, etc.\"  But to Maine\nde Biran, often called the French Kant, to Schopenhauer, and, finally, to\nour own British psychologists, Brown, Hamilton, Bain, Spencer, is\nespecially due the merit of seeing the paramount importance of the active\nside of experience.  To this then primarily, and not to any merely {54}\nintellectual function, we may safely refer the category of causality.'[9]\n\n\nI may add that Professor Ward's _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, from which\nI have quoted, constitutes the most brilliant and important modern\ndefence of the doctrine which I have endeavoured very inadequately to set\nbefore you in this lecture.\n\nIt is a remarkable fact that the typical exponent of popular so-called\n'scientific' Agnosticism, and the founder of that higher metaphysical\nAgnosticism which has played so large a part in the history of modern\nPhilosophy, should before their deaths have both made confessions which\nreally amount to an abjuration of all Agnosticism.  If the ultimate\nReality is to be thought of as a rational Will, analogous to the will\nwhich each of us is conscious of himself having or being, he is no longer\nthe Unknown or the Unknowable, but the God of Religion, who has revealed\nHimself in the consciousness of man, 'made in the image of God.'  What\nmore about Himself we may also hold to be revealed in the human spirit, I\nhope to consider in our next lecture.  But, meanwhile, a word may be\nuttered in answer to the question which may very probably be asked--Is\nGod a Person?  A complete answer to the question would involve elaborate\ndiscussions, but for our present purpose the question may be answered\nvery {55} briefly.  If we are justified in thinking of God after the\nanalogy of a human soul--if we are justified in thinking of Him as a\nself-conscious Being who thinks, feels, and wills, and who is, moreover\n(if I may a little anticipate the subject of our next lecture) in\nrelation with, capable of loving and being loved by other such\nbeings--then it seems most natural to speak of God's existence as\npersonal.  For to be a self-conscious being--conscious of itself and\nother beings, thinking, willing, feeling, loving--is what we mean by\nbeing a person.  If any one prefers to speak of God as 'super-personal,'\nthere is no great objection to so doing, provided that phrase is not made\n(as it often is) an excuse for really thinking of God after the analogy\nof some kind of existence lower than that of persons--as a force, an\nunconscious substance, or merely a name for the totality of things.  But\nfor myself, I prefer to say that our own self-consciousness gives us only\nan ideal of the highest type of existence which it nevertheless very\nimperfectly satisfies, and therefore I would rather think God is a Person\nin a far truer, higher, more complete sense than that in which any human\nbeing can be a person.  God alone fully realizes the ideal of\nPersonality.  The essence of Personality is something positive: it\nsignifies to us the highest kind of being within our knowledge--not (as\nis too often supposed) the mere limitations {56} and restraints which\ncharacterize human conscious life as we know it in ourselves.  If we are\njustified in thinking of God after the analogy of the highest existence\nwithin our knowledge, we had better call Him a Person.  The word is no\ndoubt inadequate to the reality, as is all the language that we can\nemploy about God; but it is at least more adequate than the terms\nemployed by those who scruple to speak of God as a Person.  It is at\nleast more adequate and more intelligent than to speak of Him as a force,\na substance, a 'something not ourselves which makes for righteousness.'\n_Things_ do not 'make for righteousness'; and in using the term Person we\nshall at least make it clear that we do not think of Him as a 'thing,' or\na collection of things, or a vague substratum of things, or even a mere\ntotality of minds like our own.[10]\n\n\nLITERATURE\n\nAs has been explained in this Lecture, many idealistic writers who insist\nupon the necessity of God as a universal, knowing Mind to explain both\nthe existence of the world and our knowledge of it, are more or less\nambiguous about the question whether the divine Mind is to be thought of\nas willing or causing the world, though passages occur in the writings of\nmost of them which tend in this direction.  'God {57} must be thought of\nas creating the objects of his own thought' is a perfectly orthodox\nHegelian formula.  Among the idealistic writers (besides Berkeley) who\ncorrect this--as it seems to me--one-sided tendency, and who accept on\nthe whole the view of the divine Causality taken in this Lecture, may be\nmentioned Lotze, the 9th Book of whose _Microcosmus_ (translated by Miss\nElizabeth Hamilton and Miss Constance Jones) or the third Book of his\n_Logic_ (translation ed. by Prof.  Bosanquet), may very well be read by\nthemselves (his views may also be studied in his short _Philosophy of\nReligion_--two translations, by the late Mrs. Conybeare and by Professor\nLadd); Pfleiderer, _Philosophy and Development of Religion_, especially\nchapter v.; and Professor Ward's _Naturalism and Agnosticism_.\n\nAmong the non-idealistic writers who have based their argument for the\nexistence of God mainly or largely upon the consideration that Causality\nis unintelligible apart from a rational Will, may be mentioned--among\nolder writers Reid, _Essays on the Active Powers of Man_, Essay I.\n(especially chapter v.), and among more recent ones Martineau, _A Study\nof Religion_.  Flint's _Theism_ may be recommended as one of the best\nattempts to state the theistic case with a minimum of technical\nMetaphysic.\n\nTwo little books by Professor Andrew Seth (now Seth Pringle-Pattison),\nthough not primarily occupied with the religious problem, may be\nmentioned as very useful introductions to Philosophy--_The Scottish\nPhilosophers_ and _Hegelianism and Personality_.\n\n\n\n[1] Of course deeply religious men like Green who have held this view did\nnot admit, or did not realize, such consequences.  The tendency here\ncriticized is undoubtedly derived from Hegel, but passages suggestive of\nthe opposite view can be extracted from his writings, e.g.: 'God,\nhowever, as subjective Power, is not simply will, intention, etc., but\nrather immediate Cause' (_Philosophy of Religion_, Eng. trans., ii. p.\n129).\n\n[2] The idea of Causality was by Kant identified with the idea of logical\nconnexion, _i.e._ the relation of the premisses of a syllogism to its\nconclusion; but this does not involve _time_ at all, and _time_ is\nessential to the idea of Causality.  For an admirable vindication of our\nimmediate consciousness of Causality see Professor Stout's chapter on\n'The Concept of Mental Activity' in _Analytic Psychology_ (Book II.\nchap. i.).\n\n[3] _Excursion_, Book IV.\n\n[4] For the further development of this argument see Lecture IV.\n\n[5] See especially the earlier chapters of _The Philosophy of the\nUnconscious_ (translated by W. C. Coupland).\n\n[6] Of course passages can be quoted from Hegel himself which suggest the\nidea that God is Will as well as Thought; I am speaking of the general\ntendency of Hegel and many of his disciples.  Some recent Hegelians, such\nas Professor Boyce, seem to be less open to this criticism, but there are\ndifficulties in thinking of God as Will and yet continuing to speak of\nultimate Reality as out of Time.\n\n[7] It may be objected that this is true only of 'conceptual space' (that\nis, the space of Geometry), but not of 'perceptual space,' _i.e._ space\nas it presents itself in a child's perception of an object.  The\ndistinction is no doubt from many points of view important, but we must\nnot speak of 'conceptual space' and 'perceptual space' as if they had\nnothing to do with one another.  If the relations of conceptual space\nwere not in some sense contained or implied in our perceptions, no amount\nof abstraction or reflection could get the relations out of them.\n\n[8] _Sociology_, vol. iii. p. 172.\n\n[9] _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, vol. ii. pp. 191-2.\n\n[10] For a further discussion of the subject the reader may be referred\nto my essay on 'Personality in God and Man' in _Personal Idealism_.\n\n\n\n\n{58}\n\nLECTURE III\n\nGOD AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS\n\nA course of purely metaphysical reasoning has led us up to the idea of\nGod--that is to say, of a conscious and rational Mind and Will for\nwhich the world exists and by which that world and all other spirits\nare caused to exist.  I have passed over a host of difficulties--the\nrelation of God to time, the question whether or in what sense the\nworld may be supposed to have a beginning and an end, the question of\nthe relation in which God, the universal Mind, stands to other minds,\nthe question of Free-will.  These are difficulties which would involve\nelaborate metaphysical discussions: I shall return to some of them in a\nlater lecture.  It must suffice for the present to say that more than\none answer to many of these questions might conceivably be given\nconsistently with the view of the divine nature which I have contended\nfor.  All that I need insist on for my present purpose is--\n\n(1) That God is personal in the sense that He is a {59} self-conscious,\nthinking, willing, feeling Being, distinguishable from each and all\nless perfect minds.\n\n(2) That all other minds are in some sense brought into being by the\ndivine Mind, while at the same time they have such a resemblance to, or\ncommunity of nature with, their source that they may be regarded as not\nmere creations but as in some sense reproductions, more or less\nimperfect, of that source, approximating in various degrees to that\nideal of Personality which is realised perfectly in God alone.  In\nproportion as they approximate to that ideal, they are causes of their\nown actions, and can claim for themselves the kind of causality which\nwe attribute in its perfection to God.  I content myself now with\nclaiming for the developed, rational human self a measure of freedom to\nthe extent which I have just defined--that it is the real cause of its\nown actions.  It is capable of self-determination.  The man's actions\nare determined by his character.  That is quite consistent with the\nadmission that God is the ultimate cause of a self of such and such a\ncharacter coming into existence at such and such a time.\n\n(3) I will not say that the conception of those who regard the human\nmind as literally a part of the divine, so that the human consciousness\nis in no sense outside of the divine, is necessarily, for those who\nhold it, inconsistent with the conception of {60} personality both in\nGod and man: I will only say that I do not myself understand such an\nassertion.  I regard the human mind as derived from God, but not as\nbeing part of God.  Further discussion of this question I reserve for\nmy next lecture.\n\nWe have led up to the idea of God's existence.  But so far we have\ndiscovered nothing at all about His character or purposes.  And it is\nclear that without some such knowledge the belief in God could be of\nlittle or no value from any religious or moral point of view.  How are\nwe to learn anything about the character of God?  I imagine that at the\npresent day few people will attempt to prove the goodness or\nbenevolence of God from an empirical examination of the facts of Nature\nor of History.  There is, no doubt, much in History and in Nature to\nsuggest the idea of Benevolence, but there is much to suggest a\ndirectly opposite conclusion.  Few of us at the present day are likely\nto be much impressed by the argument which Paley bases upon the\nexistence of the little apparatus in the throat by which it is\nbenevolently arranged that, though constantly on the point of being\nchoked by our food, we hardly ever are choked.  I cannot help reminding\nyou of the characteristic passage: 'Consider a city-feast,' he\nexclaims, 'what manducation, what deglutition, and yet not one Alderman\nchoked in a century!'  Such arguments look at the matter from the point\n{61} of view of the Alderman: the point of view of the turtle and the\nturkey is entirely forgotten.  I would not for a moment speak\ndisrespectfully of the argument from design.  Darwinism has changed its\nform, but anybody who reads Edouard von Hartmann's _Philosophy of the\nUnconscious_ is not likely to rise from its perusal with the idea that\nthe evidences of design have been destroyed by Darwinism, whatever he\nmay think of Hartmann's strange conclusion that the design can be\nexplained by the operation of an unconscious Mind or Will.  The\nphilosophical argument of Mr. R. B. Haldane in _The Pathway to\nReality_,[1] and the purely biological argument of Dr. John Haldane in\nhis two lectures on _Life and Mechanism_, and still more recently the\nbrilliant and very important work of M. Bergson, _L'Evolution\nCreatrice_ have, as it seems to me, abundantly shown that it is as\nimpossible as ever it was to explain even the growth of a plant without\nsupposing that in it and all organic Nature there is a striving towards\nan end.  But the argument from design, though it testifies to purpose\nin the Universe, tells us nothing about the nature of that purpose.\nPurpose is one thing; benevolent purpose is another.  Nobody's estimate\nof the comparative amount of happiness and misery in the world is worth\nmuch; but for my own part, if I trusted simply to empirical evidence,\n{62} I should not be disposed to do more than slightly attenuate the\npessimism of the Pessimists.  At all events, Nature is far too 'red in\ntooth and claw' to permit of our basing an argument for a benevolent\ndeity upon a contemplation of the facts of animal and human life.\nThere is but one source from which such an idea can possibly be\nderived--from the evidence of our own moral consciousness.\n\nOur moral ideals are the work of Reason.  That the happiness of many\nought to be preferred to the happiness of one, that pleasure is better\nthan pain, that goodness is of more value than pleasure, that some\npleasures are better than others--such judgements are as much the work\nof our own Reason, they are as much self-evident truths, as the truth\nthat two and two make four, or that A cannot be both B and not B at the\nsame time, or that two straight lines cannot enclose a space.  We have\nevery right to assume that such truths hold good for God as well as for\nman.  If such Idealism as I have endeavoured to lead you to is well\nfounded, the mind which knows comes from God, and therefore the\nknowledge which that mind possesses must also be taken as an imperfect\nor fragmentary reproduction of God's knowledge.  And the Theist who\nrejects Idealism but admits the existence of self-evident truths will\nbe equally justified in assuming that, for God as well as for man, two\nand two must make {63} four.  We have just as much right to assume that\nour moral ideas--our ideas of value--must come from God too.  For God\ntoo, as for us, there must exist the idea, the ultimate category of the\ngood; and our judgements of value--judgements that such and such an end\nis good or worth striving for--in so far as they are true judgements,\nmust be supposed to represent His judgements.  We are conscious, in\nproportion as we are rational, of pursuing ends which we judge to be\ngood.  If such judgements reveal God's judgements, God must be supposed\nto aim likewise at an ideal of good--the same ideal which is revealed\nto us by our moral judgements.  In these judgements then we have a\nrevelation, the only possible revelation, of the character of God.  The\nargument which I have suggested is simply a somewhat exacter statement\nof the popular idea that Conscience is the voice of God.\n\nFurther to vindicate the idea of the existence, authority, objective\nvalidity of Conscience would lead us too far away into the region of\nMoral Philosophy for our present subject.  I will only attempt very\nbriefly to guard against some possible misunderstandings, and to meet\nsome obvious objections:\n\n(1) It need hardly be pointed out that the assertion of the existence\nof the Moral Consciousness is not in the slightest degree inconsistent\nwith recognising its gradual growth and development.  The {64} moral\nfaculty, like every other faculty or aspect or activity of the human\nsoul, has grown gradually.  No rational man doubts the validity--no\nIdealist doubts the _a priori_ character--of our mathematical\njudgements because probably monkeys and possibly primitive men cannot\ncount, and certainly cannot perform more than the very simplest\narithmetical operations.  Still less do we doubt the validity of\nmathematical reasoning because not only children and savages, but\nsometimes even distinguished classical scholars--a Macaulay, a Matthew\nArnold, a T. S. Evans,--were wholly incapable of understanding very\nsimple mathematical arguments.  Equally little do we deny a real\ndifference between harmony and discord because people may be found who\nsee no difference between 'God save the King' and 'Pop goes the\nWeasel.'  Self-evident truth does not mean truth which is evident to\neverybody.\n\n(2) It is not doubted that the gradual evolution of our actual moral\nideas--our actual ideas about what is right or wrong in particular\ncases--has been largely influenced by education, environment,\nassociation, social pressure, superstition, perhaps natural\nselection--in short, all the agencies by which naturalistic Moralists\ntry to account for the existence of Morality.  Even Euclid, or whatever\nhis modern substitute may be, has to be taught; but that does not show\nthat Geometry is an arbitrary system {65} invented by the ingenious and\ninterested devices of those who want to get money by teaching it.\nArithmetic was invented largely as an instrument of commerce; but it\ncould not have been invented if there were really no such things as\nnumber and quantity, or if the human mind had no original capacity for\nrecognizing them.  Our scientific ideas, our political ideas, our ideas\nupon a thousand subjects have been partly developed, partly thwarted\nand distorted in their growth, by similar influences.  But, however\ngreat the difficulty of getting rid of these distorting influences and\nfacing such questions in a perfectly dry light, nobody suggests that\nobjective truth on such matters is non-existent or for ever\nunattainable.  A claim for objective validity for the moral judgement\ndoes not mean a claim for infallibility on behalf of any individual\nConscience.  We may make mistakes in Morals just as we may make\nmistakes in Science, or even in pure Mathematics.  If a class of forty\nsmall boys are asked to do a sum, they will probably not all bring out\nthe same answer: but nobody doubts that one answer alone is right,\nthough arithmetical capacity is a variable quantity.  What is meant is\nmerely that, if I am right in affirming that this is good, you cannot\nbe likewise right in saying that it is bad: and that we have some\ncapacity--though doubtless a variable capacity--of judging which is the\ntrue {66} view.  Hence our moral judgements, in so far as they are true\njudgements, must be taken to be reproductions in us of the thought of\nGod.  To show that an idea has been gradually developed, tells us\nnothing as to its truth or falsehood--one way or the other.\n\n(3) In comparing the self-evidence of moral to that of mathematical\njudgements, it is not suggested that our moral judgements in detail are\nas certain, as clear and sharply defined, as mathematical judgements,\nor that they can claim so universal a consensus among the competent.\nWhat is meant is merely (_a_) that the notion of good in general is an\nultimate category of thought; that it contains a meaning intelligible\nnot perhaps to every individual human soul, but to the normal,\ndeveloped, human consciousness; and (_b_) that the ultimate truth of\nmorals, if it is seen at all, must be seen immediately.  An ultimate\nmoral truth cannot be deduced from, or proved by, any other truth.  You\ncannot prove that pleasure is better than pain, or that virtue is\nbetter than pleasure, to any one who judges differently.  It does not\nfollow that all men have an equally clear and delicate moral\nconsciousness.  The power of discriminating moral values differs as\nwidely as the power of distinguishing musical sounds, or of\nappreciating what is excellent in music.  Some men may be almost or\naltogether without such a power of moral discrimination, just as some\nmen are wholly {67} destitute of an ear for music; while the higher\ndegrees of moral appreciation are the possession of the few rather than\nof the many.  Moral insight is not possessed by all men in equal\nmeasure.  Moral genius is as rare as any other kind of genius.\n\n(4) When we attribute Morality to God, it is not meant that the conduct\nwhich is right for men in detail ought to be or could possibly in all\ncases be practised by God.  It is a childish objection (though it is\nsometimes made by modern philosophers who should know better) to allege\nwith Aristotle that God cannot be supposed to make or keep contracts.\nAnd in the same way, when we claim universal validity for our moral\njudgements, we do not mean that the rules suitable for human conduct\nwould be the same for beings differently organized and constituted.\nOur rules of sexual Morality are clearly applicable only to sexually\nconstituted beings.  What is meant in asserting that these rules are\nuniversally and objectively valid is that these are the rules which\nevery rational intelligence, in proportion as it is rational, will\nrecognize as being suitable, or conducive to the ideal life, in beings\nconstituted as we are.  The truth that permanent monogamous marriage\nrepresents the true type of sexual relations for human beings will be\nnone the less an objectively valid ethical truth, because the lower\nanimals are below it, while superior beings, {68} it may be, are above\nit.  Universal love is none the less the absolute moral ideal because\nit would be absurd to say that beasts of prey do wrong in devouring\nother creatures, or because war is sometimes necessary as a means to\nthe end of love at our present imperfect stage of social and\nintellectual development.  The means to the highest good vary with\ncircumstances; the amount of good that is attainable in such and such\ncircumstances varies also; consequently the right course of conduct\nwill be different for beings differently constituted or placed under\ndifferent circumstances: but the principles which, in the view of a\nperfect intelligence, would determine what is the right course for\ndifferent beings in different circumstances will be always the same.\nThe ultimate principles of our moral judgement, _e.g._ that love is\nbetter than hate, are just as applicable to God as they are to us.  Our\nconception of the highest good may be inadequate; but we certainly\nshall not attain to greater adequacy, or a nearer approach to ultimate\ntruth, by flatly contradicting our own moral judgements.  It would be\njust as reasonable to argue that because the law of gravitation might\nbe proved, from the point of view of the highest knowledge, to be an\ninadequate statement of the truth, and all inadequacy involves some\nerror, therefore we had better assume that from the point of view of\nGod there is no difference whatever {69} between attraction and\nrepulsion.  All arguments for what is called a 'super-moral' Deity or a\n'super-moral' Absolute are open to this fatal objection: moral\njudgements cannot possibly rest upon anything but the moral\nconsciousness, and yet these doctrines contradict the moral\nconsciousness.  The idea of good is derived from the moral\nconsciousness.  When a man declares that from the point of view of the\nUniverse all things are very good, he gets the idea of good from his\nown moral consciousness, and is assuming the objective validity of its\ndictates.  His judgement is an ethical judgement as much as mine when I\nsay that to me some things in this world appear very bad.  If he is not\nentitled to assume the validity of his ethical judgements, his\nproposition is false or meaningless.  If he is entitled to assume their\nvalidity, why should he distrust that same moral consciousness when it\naffirms (as it undoubtedly does) that pain and sin are for ever bad,\nand not (as our 'super-moral' Religionists suggest) additional artistic\ntouches which only add to the aesthetic effect of the whole?\n\nI shall now proceed to develop some of the consequences which (as it\nappears to me) flow from the doctrine that our belief in the goodness\nof God is an inference from our own moral consciousness:\n\n(1) It throws light on the relations between Religion and Morality.\nThe champions of ethical {70} education as a substitute for Religion\nand of ethical societies as a substitute for Churches are fond of\nassuming that Religion is not only unnecessary to, but actually\ndestructive of, the intrinsic authority of the moral law.  If we\nsupposed with a few theologians in the most degenerate periods of\nTheology (with William of Occam, some extreme Calvinists, and a few\neighteenth-century divines like Archdeacon Paley) that actions are\nright or wrong merely because willed by God--meaning by God simply a\npowerful being without goodness or moral character, then undoubtedly\nthe Secularists would be right.  If a religious Morality implies that\nVirtue means merely (in Paley's words) 'the doing good to mankind in\nobedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness'\n(so that if God were to will murder and adultery, those practices would\nforthwith become meritorious), then undoubtedly it would be better to\nteach Morality without Religion than with it.  But that is a caricature\nof the true teaching of Christ or of any considerable Christian\ntheologian.  Undoubtedly we must assert what is called the\n'independence' of the moral judgement.  The judgement 'to love is\nbetter than to hate' has a meaning complete in itself, which contains\nno reference whatever to any theological presupposition.  It is a\njudgement which is, and which can intelligibly be, made by people of\nall religions or of none.  But {71} we may still raise the question\nwhether the validity of that judgement can be defended without\ntheological implications.  And I am prepared most distinctly to\nmaintain that it cannot.  These moral judgements claim objective\nvalidity.  When we say 'this is right,' we do not mean merely 'I\napprove this course of conduct,' 'this conduct gives me a thrill of\nsatisfaction, a \"feeling of approbation,\" a pleasure of the moral\nsense.'  If that were all that was meant, it would be perfectly\npossible that another person might feel an equally satisfactory glow of\napprobation at conduct of a precisely opposite character _without\neither of them being wrong_.  A bull-fight fills most Spaniards with\nfeelings of lively approbation, and most Englishmen with feelings of\nacute disapprobation.  If such moral judgements were mere feelings,\nneither of them would be wrong.  There could be no question of\nobjective rightness or wrongness.  Mustard is not objectively nice or\nobjectively nasty: it is simply nice to some people and nasty to\nothers.  The mustard-lover has no right to condemn the mustard-hater,\nor the mustard-hater the mustard-lover.  If Morality were merely a\nmatter of feeling or emotion, actions would not be objectively right or\nobjectively wrong; but simply right to some people, wrong to others.\nHume would be right in holding the morality of an action to consist\nsimply in the pleasure it gives to the person who {72} contemplates it.\nRightness thus becomes simply a name for the fact of social\napprobation.[2]  And yet surely the very heart of the affirmation which\nthe moral consciousness makes in each of us is that right and wrong are\nnot matters of mere subjective feeling.  When I assert 'this is right,'\nI do not claim personal infallibility.  I may, indeed, be wrong, as I\nmay be wrong in my political or scientific theories.  But I do mean\nthat I think I am right; and that, if I am right, you cannot also be\nright when you affirm that this same action is wrong.  This objective\nvalidity is the very core and centre of the idea of Duty or moral\nobligation.  That is why it is so important to assert that moral\njudgements are the work of Reason, not of a supposed moral sense or any\nother kind of feeling.  Feelings may vary in different men without any\nof them being in the wrong; red really is the same as green to a\ncolour-blind person.  What we mean when we talk about the existence of\nDuty is that things are right or wrong, no matter what you or I think\nabout them--that the laws of Morality {73} are quite as much\nindependent of my personal likings and dislikings as the physical laws\nof Nature.  That is what is meant by the 'objectivity' of the moral law.\n\nNow, the question arises--'Can such an objectivity be asserted by those\nwho take a purely materialistic or naturalistic view of the Universe?'\nWhatever our metaphysical theories about the nature of Reality may be,\nwe can in practice have no difficulty in the region of Physical Science\nabout recognizing an objective reality of some kind which is other than\nmy mere thinking about it.  That fire will burn whether I think so or\nnot is practically recognized by persons of all metaphysical\npersuasions.  If I say 'I can cloy the hungry edge of appetite by bare\nimagination of a feast,' I try the experiment, and I fail.  I imagine\nthe feast, but I am hungry still: and if I persist in the experiment, I\ndie.  But what do we mean when we say that things are right or wrong\nwhether I think them so or not, that the Moral Law exists outside me\nand independently of my thinking about it?  Where and how does this\nmoral law exist?  The physical laws of Nature may be supposed by the\nMaterialist or the Realist somehow to exist in matter: to the\nMetaphysician there may be difficulties in such a view, but the\ndifficulties are not obvious to common-sense.  But surely (whatever may\nbe thought about physical laws) the moral law, {74} which expresses not\nany matter of physical fact but what _ought_ to be thought of acts,\ncannot be supposed to exist in a purely material Universe.  An 'ought'\ncan exist only in and for a mind.  In what mind, then, does the moral\nlaw exist?  As a matter of fact, different people's moral judgements\ncontradict one another.  And the consciousness of no living man can\nwell be supposed to be a flawless reflection of the absolute moral\nideal.  On a non-theistic view of the Universe, then, the moral law\ncannot well be thought of as having any actual existence.  The\nobjective validity of the moral law can indeed be and no doubt is\n_asserted_, believed in, acted upon without reference to any\ntheological creed; but it cannot be defended or fully justified without\nthe pre-supposition of Theism.  What we mean by an objective law is\nthat the moral law is a part of the ultimate nature of things, on a\nlevel with the laws of physical nature, and it cannot be _that_, unless\nwe assume that law to be an expression of the same mind in which\nphysical laws originate.  The idea of duty, when analysed, implies the\nidea of God.  Whatever else Plato meant by the 'idea of the good,' this\nat least was one of his meanings--that the moral law has its source in\nthe source of all Reality.\n\nAnd therefore at bottom popular feeling is right in holding that\nreligious belief is necessary to Morality.  Of course I do not mean to\nsay that, were {75} religious belief to disappear from the world,\nMorality would disappear too.  But I do think Morality would become\nquite a different thing from what it has been for the higher levels of\nreligious thought and feeling.  The best men would no doubt go on\nacting up to their own highest ideal just as if it did possess\nobjective validity, no matter how unable they might be to reconcile\ntheir practical with their speculative beliefs.  But it would not be so\nfor the many--or perhaps even for the few in their moments of weakness\nand temptation, when once the consequences of purely naturalistic\nEthics were thoroughly admitted and realized.  The only kind of\nobjective validity which can be recognized on a purely naturalistic\nview of Ethics is conformity to public opinion.  The tendency of all\nnaturalistic Ethics is to make a God of public opinion.  And if no\nother deity were recognized, such a God would assuredly not be without\nworshippers.  And yet the strongest temptation to most of us is the\ntemptation to follow a debased public opinion--the opinion of our age,\nour class, our party.  Apart from faith in a perfectly righteous God\nwhose commands are, however imperfectly, revealed in the individual\nConscience, we can find no really valid reason why the individual\nshould act on his own sense of what is intrinsically right, even when\nhe finds himself an 'Athanasius contra mundum,' and when his own\npersonal likings and inclinations {76} and interests are on the side of\nthe world.  Kant was at bottom right, though perhaps he did not give\nthe strongest reasons for his position, in making the idea of God a\npostulate of Morality.\n\nFrom a more directly practical point of view I need hardly point out\nhow much easier it is to feel towards the moral law the reverence that\nwe ought to feel when we believe that that law is embodied in a\npersonal Will.  Not only is religious Morality not opposed to the idea\nof duty for duty's sake: it is speculatively the only reasonable basis\nof it; practically and emotionally the great safeguard of it.  And\nwhatever may be thought of the possibility of a speculative defence of\nsuch an idea without Theism, the practical difficulty of teaching\nit--especially to children, uneducated and unreflective persons--seems\nto be quite insuperable.[3]  In more than one country in which\nreligious education has been banished from the primary schools, grave\nobservers complain that the idea of Duty seems to be suffering an\neclipse in the minds of the rising {77} generation; some of them add\nthat in those lands crime is steadily on the increase.  Catechisms of\ncivil duty and the like have not hitherto proved very satisfactory\nsubstitutes for the old teaching about the fear of God.  Would that it\nwere more frequently remembered on both sides of our educational\nsquabbles that the supreme object of all religious education should be\nto instil into children's minds in the closest possible connexion the\ntwin ideas of God and of Duty!\n\n(2) I have tried to show that the ethical importance of the idea of God\nis prior to and independent of any belief in the idea of future rewards\nand punishments or of a future life, however conceived of.  But when\nthe idea of a righteous God has once been accepted, the idea of\nImmortality seems to me to follow from it as a sort of corollary.  If\nany one on a calm review of the actual facts of the world's history can\nsuppose that such a world as ours could be the expression of the will\nof a rational and moral Being without the assumption of a future life\nfor which this is a discipline or education or preparatory stage,\nargument would be useless with him.  Inveterate Optimism, like\ninveterate Scepticism, admits of no refutation, but in most minds\nproduces no conviction.  For those who are convinced that the world has\na rational end, and yet that life as we see it (taken by itself) cannot\nbe that end, the hypothesis {78} of Immortality becomes a necessary\ndeduction from their belief in God.\n\nI would not disparage the educative effect of the belief in a future\nlife even when expressed in the crude and inadequate metaphor of reward\nand punishment.  Few of us, I venture to think, have reached the moral\nlevel at which the belief--not in a vindictive, retributive, unending\ntorment, but in a disciplinary or purgatorial education of souls\nprolonged after death--is without its value.  At the same time it is a\nmere caricature of all higher religious beliefs when the religious\nmotive is supposed to mean simply a fear of punishment and hope of\npersonal reward, even of the least sensuous or material kind.  Love of\ngoodness for its own sake is for the Theist identical with the love of\nGod.  Love of a Person is a stronger force than devotion to an idea;\nand an ethical conception of God carries with it the idea of\nImmortality.\n\n  The wages of sin is death: if the wages of Virtue be dust,\n    Would she have heart to endure for the life of the worm\n      and the fly?\n\n  She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just,\n    To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky;\n  Give her the wages of going on, and not to die.[4]\n\n\nBelief in human Immortality is, as I have suggested, the postulate\nwithout which most of us cannot {79} believe in God.  Even for its own\nsake it is of the highest ethical value.  The belief in Immortality\ngives a meaning to life even when it has lost all other meaning.  'It\nis rather,' in the noble words of the late Professor Sidgwick, 'from a\ndisinterested aversion to an universe so irrationally constituted that\nthe wages of virtue should be dust than from any private reckoning\nabout his own wages,' that the good man clings to the idea of\nImmortality.  And that is not all.  The value of all higher goods even\nin this life, though it does not depend wholly upon their duration,\ndoes partly depend upon it.  It would be better to be pure and\nunselfish for a day than to be base and selfish for a century.  And yet\nwe do not hesitate to commend the value of intellectual and of all\nkinds of higher enjoyments on account of their greater durability.\nWhy, then, should we shrink from admitting that the value of character\nreally is increased when it is regarded as surviving bodily death?\nDisbelief in Immortality would, I believe, in the long run and for the\nvast majority of men, carry with it an enormous enhancement of the\nvalue of the carnal and sensual over the spiritual and intellectual\nelement in life.\n\n(3) A third consequence which follows from our determining to accept\nthe moral consciousness as containing the supreme revelation of God is\nthis.  From the point of view of the moral consciousness {80} we cannot\nsay that the Universe is wholly good.  We have only one means of\njudging whether things are good or bad: the idea of value is wholly\nderived from our own ethical judgements or judgements of value.  If we\ndistrust these judgements, there is no higher court to which we can\nappeal.  And if we distrust our most ultimate judgements of value, I do\nnot know why we should trust any judgements whatever.  Even if we grant\nthat from some very transcendental metaphysical height--the height, for\ninstance, of Mr. Bradley's Philosophy--it may be contended that none of\nour judgements are wholly true or fully adequate to express the true\nnature of Reality, we at all events cannot get nearer to Reality than\nwe are conducted by the judgements which present themselves to us as\nimmediate and self-evident.  Now, if we do apply these judgements of\nvalue to the Universe as we know it, can we say that everything in it\nseems to be very good?  For my own part, I unhesitatingly say, 'Pain is\nan evil, and sin is a worse evil, and nothing on earth can ever make\nthem good.'  How then are we to account for such evils in a Universe\nwhich we believe to express the thought and will of a perfectly\nrighteous Being?  In only one way that I know of--by supposing they are\nmeans to a greater good.  That is really the substance and substratum\nof all the Theodicies of all the Philosophers and all the {81}\nTheologians except those who frankly trample on or throw over the Moral\nConsciousness, and declare that, for those who see truly, pain and sin\nare only additional sources of aesthetic interest in a great\nworld-drama produced for his own entertainment by a Deity not\nanthropomorphic enough to love but still anthropomorphic enough to be\namused.\n\nI shall be told no doubt that this is limiting God.  A human being may,\nit will be urged, without loss of goodness, do things in themselves\nevil, as a means to a greater good: as a surgeon, he may cause\nexcruciating pain; as a statesman or a soldier, he may doom thousands\nto a cruel death; as a wise administrator of the poor law, he may\nrefuse to relieve much suffering, in order that he may not cause more\nsuffering.  But this is because his power is limited; he has to work\nupon a world which has a nature of its own independent of his volition.\nTo apply the same explanation to the evil which God causes, is to make\nHim finite instead of Infinite, limited in power instead of Omnipotent.\nNow in a sense I admit that this is so.  I am not wedded to the words\n'Infinite' or 'Omnipotent.'  But I would protest against a persistent\nmisrepresentation of the point of view which I defend.  It is suggested\nthat the limit to the power of God must necessarily spring from the\nexistence of some other thing or being outside of Him, not created by\nHim or under His {82} control.  I must protest that that is not so.\nEverybody admits that God cannot change the past; few Philosophers\nconsider it necessary to maintain that God could construct triangles\nwith their angles not together equal to two right angles, or think it\nany derogation from his Omnipotence to say that He could not make the\nsum of two and two to be other than four.  Few Theologians push their\nidea of Freewill so far as to insist that God could will Himself to be\nunjust or unloving, or that, being just and loving, he could do unjust\nor unloving acts.  There are necessities to which even God must submit.\nBut they are not imposed upon Him from without: they are parts of His\nown essential nature.  The limitation by which God cannot attain His\nends without causing some evil is a limitation of exactly the same\nnature.  If you say that it is no limitation of God not to be able to\nchange the past, for the thing is really unmeaning, then I submit that\nin the same way it may be no limitation that He should not be able to\nevolve highly organized beings without a struggle for existence, or to\ntrain human beings in unselfishness without allowing the existence both\nof sin and of pain.  From the point of view of perfect knowledge, these\nthings might turn out to be just as unmeaning as for God to change the\npast.  The popular idea of Omnipotence is one which really does not\nbear looking into.  If we supposed the world {83} to contain no evil at\nall, still there would be in it a definite amount of good.  Twice such\na world would be twice as good.  Why is there not twice that amount of\ngood?  A being who deliberately created only a good world of limited\nquantity--a definite number of spirits (for instance) enjoying so much\npleasure and so much virtue--when he could have created twice that\nnumber of spirits, and consequently twice that amount of good, would\nnot be perfectly good or loving.  And so on _ad infinitum_, no matter\nhow much good you suppose him to have created.  The only sense which we\ncan intelligibly give to the idea of a divine Omnipotence is this--that\nGod possesses all the power there is, that He can do all things that\nare in their own nature possible.[5]\n\nBut there is a more formidable objection which I have yet to meet.  It\nhas been urged by certain Philosophers of great eminence that, if we\nsuppose God not to be unlimited in power, we have no guarantee that the\nworld is even good on the whole; we should not be authorized to infer\nanything as to a future life or the ultimate destiny of Humanity from\nthe fact of God's goodness.  A limited God might be a defeated God.  I\nadmit the difficulty.  This is the 'greatest wave' of all in the\ntheistic {84} argument.  In reply, I would simply appeal to the reasons\nwhich I have given for supposing that the world is really willed by\nGod.  A rational being does not will evil except as a means to a\ngreater good.  If God be rational, we have a right to suppose that the\nworld must contain more good than evil, or it would not be willed at\nall.  A being who was obliged to create a world which did not seem to\nhim good would be a blind force, as force is understood by the pure\nMaterialist, not a rational Will.  That much we have a right to claim\nas a matter of strict Logic; and that would to my own mind be a\nsufficient reason for assuming that, at least for the higher order of\nspirits, such a life as ours must be intended as the preface to a\nbetter life than this.  But I should go further.  To me it appears that\nsuch evils as sin and pain are so enormously worse than the mere\nabsence of good, that I could not regard as rational a Universe in\nwhich the good did not very greatly predominate over the evil.  More\nthan that I do not think we are entitled to say.  And yet Justice is so\ngreat a good that it is rational to hope that for every individual\nconscious being--at least each individual capable of any high degree of\ngood--there must be a predominance of good on the whole.  Beings of\nvery small capacity might conceivably be created chiefly or entirely as\na means to a vastly greater good than any that they {85} themselves\nenjoy: the higher a spirit is in the scale of being, the more difficult\nit becomes to suppose that it has been brought into existence merely as\na means to another's good, or that it will not ultimately enjoy a good\nwhich will make it on the whole good that it should have been born.\n\nI could wish myself that, in popular religious teaching, there was a\nfranker conception of this position--a position which, as I have said,\nis really implied in the Theodicies of all the Divines.  Popular\nunbelief--and sometimes the unbelief of more cultivated persons--rests\nmainly upon the existence of evil.  We should cut at the roots of it by\nteaching frankly that this is the best of all possible Universes,\nthough not the best of all imaginable Universes--such Universes as we\ncan construct in our own imagination by picturing to ourselves all the\ngood that there is in the world without any of the evil.  We may still\nsay, if we please, that God is infinite because He is limited by\nnothing outside His own nature, except what He has Himself caused.  We\ncan still call Him Omnipotent in the sense that He possesses all the\npower there is.  And in many ways such a belief is far more practically\nconsolatory and stimulating than a belief in a God who can do all\nthings by any means and who consequently does not need our help.  In\nour view, we are engaged not in a sham warfare with an evil that is\nreally {86} good, but in a real warfare with a real evil, a struggle in\nwhich we have the ultimate power in the Universe on our side, but one\nin which the victory cannot be won without our help, a real struggle in\nwhich we are called upon to be literally fellow-workers with God.\n\n\nLITERATURE\n\nThe subject is more or less explicitly dealt with in most of the works\nmentioned at the end of the last two lectures, and also in books on\nMoral Philosophy too numerous to mention.  Classical vindications of\nthe authority of the Moral Consciousness are Bishop Butler's _Sermons_,\nand Kant's _Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals_ and\nother ethical writings (translated by T. K. Abbott).  I have expressed\nmy own views on the subject with some fullness in the third book of my\n_Theory of Good and Evil_.\n\n\n\n[1] See especially Book II. Lect. iii.\n\n[2] 'We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases:\nbut in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in\neffect feel that it is virtuous.'  (_Treatise_, Part I, Section ii.,\ned. Green and Grose, vol. ii. p. 247.)  'The distinction of moral good\nand evil is founded in the pleasure or pain, which results from the\nview of any sentiment, or character; and as that pleasure or pain\ncannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows that there is\njust so much virtue in any character as every one places in it, and\nthat 'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken.'\n(_Ibid._ vol. ii. p. 311.)\n\n[3] There are no doubt ways of making Morality the law of the Universe\nwithout what most of us understand by Theism, though not without\nReligion, and a Religion of a highly metaphysical character; but\nbecause such non-theistic modes of religious thought exist in Buddhism,\nfor instance, it does not follow that they are reasonable, and, at all\nevents, they are hardly intelligible to most Western minds.  Such\nnon-theistic Religions imply a Metaphysic quite as much as Christianity\nor Buddhism.  There have been Religions without the idea of a personal\nGod, but never without Metaphysic, _i.e._ a theory about the ultimate\nnature of things.\n\n[4] Tennyson's _Wages_.\n\n[5] The doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas is 'Cum possit Deus omnia\nefficere quae esae possunt, non autem quae contradictionem implicant,\nomnipotens merito dicitur.'  (_Summa Theol_., Pars I. Q. xxv. art. 8.)\n\n\n\n\n{87}\n\nLECTURE IV\n\nDIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS\n\nIn the present lecture I shall try to deal with some of the difficulties\nwhich will probably have been arising in your minds in the course of the\nlast three; and in meeting them, to clear up to some extent various\npoints which have been left obscure.\n\n(1) _Creation_.  I have endeavoured to show that the world must be\nthought of as ultimately an experience in the mind of God, parts of which\nare progressively communicated to lesser minds such as ours.  This\nexperience--both the complete experience which is in His own mind and\nalso the measure of it which is communicated to the lesser minds--must be\nthought of as willed by God.  At the same time I suggested as an\nalternative view that, even if we think of things as having an existence\nwhich is not simply in and for minds, the things must be caused to exist\nby a rational Will.  Now the world, as we know it, consists of a number\nof changes taking place in time, changes which are undoubtedly\nrepresented in thought as changes happening to, or {88} accidents of, a\npermanent substance, whether (with the Idealist) we suppose that this\nsubstance is merely the object of Mind's contemplation, or whether (with\nthe Realist) we think of it as having some sort of being independent of\nMind.  But what of the first of these events--the beginning of the whole\nseries?  Are we to think of the series of events in time as having a\nbeginning and possibly an end, or as being without beginning or end?\nWhat in fact are we to make of the theological idea of Creation, often\nfurther defined as Creation out of nothing?  It is often suggested both\nby Idealists and by Realists that the idea of a creation or absolute\nbeginning of the world is unthinkable.  Such a view seems to me to be a\npiece of unwarrantable _a priori_ dogmatism--quite as much so as the\nclosely connected idea that the Uniformity of Nature is an _a priori_\nnecessity of thought.  No doubt the notion of an absolute beginning of\nall things is unthinkable enough: if we think of God as creating the\nworld at a definite point of time, then we must suppose God Himself to\nhave existed before that creation.  We cannot think of an event in time\nwithout thinking of a time before it; and time cannot be thought of as\nmerely empty time.  Events of some kind there must necessarily have been,\neven though those events are thought of as merely subjective experiences\ninvolving no relation to space.  A beginning of existence is, {89}\nindeed, unthinkable.  But there is no difficulty in supposing that this\nparticular series of phenomena which constitutes our physical Universe\nmay have had a beginning in time.  On the other hand there is no positive\nevidence, for those who cannot regard the early chapters of Genesis as\nrepresenting on such a matter anything but a primitive legend edited by a\nlater Jewish thinker, that it had such a beginning.  It is no doubt more\ndifficult to represent to ourselves a beginning of space; and the notion\nof an empty space, eternally thought but not eternally filled up by any\nseries of phenomena of the space-occupying kind, represents a rather\ndifficult, though not (as it seems to me) an absolutely impossible\nconception.  The question, therefore, whether there was a beginning of\nthe series of events which constitute the history of our physical world\nmust (so far as I can see) be left an open one.\n\nOf course if the argument of Lord Kelvin be accepted, if he is justified\nin arguing on purely physical grounds that the present distribution of\nenergy in the Universe is such that it cannot have resulted from an\ninfinite series of previous physical changes, if Science can prove that\nthe series is a finite one, the conclusions of Science must be\naccepted.[1]  Metaphysic has nothing to say for or against such a view.\nThat is a question of Physics on which {90} of course I do not venture to\nexpress any opinion whatever.\n\n(2) _The time-series_.  I am incompetent to pronounce an opinion on the\nvalidity of such arguments as Lord Kelvin's.  But, however we decide this\nquestion, there will still remain the further and harder question, 'Is\nthe series of all events or experiences, physical or psychical (not\nmerely the particular series which constitutes our physical Universe), to\nbe thought of as finite or infinite?  On the one hand it involves a\ncontradiction to talk of a time-series which has a beginning: a time\nwhich has no time before it is not time at all; any more than space with\nan end to it would be space.  On the other hand, we find equally, or\nalmost equally, unthinkable the hypothesis of an endless series of events\nin time: a series of events, which no possible enumeration of its members\nwill make any smaller, presents itself to us as unthinkable, directly we\nregard it as expressing the true nature of a positive reality, and not as\na mere result of mathematical abstraction.  Here then we are presented\nwith an antinomy--an apparent contradiction in our thought--which we can\nneither avoid nor overcome.  It is one of the classical antinomies\nrecognized by the Kantian Philosophy--the only one, I may add, which\nneither Kant himself nor any of his successors has done anything to\nattenuate or to remove.  {91} Kant's own attempted solution of it\ninvolved the impossible supposition that the past has no existence at all\nexcept in so far as it is thought by some finite mind in the present.\nThe way out of this difficulty which is popular with post-Kantian\nIdealists is to say that God is Himself out of time, and eternally sees\nthe whole series at once.  But, in the first place, that does not get\nover the difficulty: even if God does see the whole series at once, He\nmust see it either as limited or as endless, and the old antinomy breaks\nout again when we attempt to think either alternative.  And secondly,\nwhen you treat a temporal series as one which is all really present\ntogether--of course it may all be _known_ together as even we know the\npast and the future--but when you try to think of God as contemplating\nthe whole series as really present altogether, the series is no longer a\ntime-series.  You have turned it into some other kind of\nseries--practically (we may say) into a spacial series.  You have cut the\nknot, instead of unravelling it.  I have no doubt that the existence of\nthis antinomy does point to the fact that there is some way of thinking\nabout time from which the difficulty disappears: but we are, so far as I\ncan see, incompetent so to resolve it.  Philosophers resent the idea of\nan insoluble problem.  By all means let them go on trying to solve it.  I\ncan only say that I find no difficulty in showing the futility {92} of\nany solution of the time-difficulty which I have so far seen.  For the\npresent at least--I strongly suspect for ever--we must acquiesce on this\nmatter in a reverent Agnosticism.  We can show the absurdity of regarding\ntime as merely subjective; we can show that it belongs to the very\nessence of the Universe we know; we can show that it is as 'objective' as\nanything else within our knowledge.  But how to reconcile this\nobjectivity with the difficulty of thinking of an endless succession no\nPhilosopher has done much to explain.  For religious purposes it seems\nenough to believe that each member of the time-series--no matter how many\nsuch events there may be, no matter whether the series be endless or\nnot--is caused by God.  The more reflecting Theologians have generally\nadmitted that the act of divine Conservation is essentially the same as\nthat of Creation.  A God who can be represented as 'upholding all things\nby the power of his word' is a creative Deity whether the act of creation\nbe in time, or eternally continuous, or (if there were any meaning in\nthat phrase) out of time altogether.[2]\n\n{93}\n\n(3) _The creation of spirits_.  It may seem to some of you that I may\nhave so far left out, or too easily disposed of, an important link in our\nargument.  I have given reasons for thinking that the material world\ncannot be explained without the assumption of a universal Consciousness\nwhich both thinks and wills it.  I have assumed rather than proved that\nthe lesser minds, in which the divine experience is partially reproduced,\nare also caused to exist and kept in existence by the same divine Will.\nBut how, it may be said, do we know that those minds did not exist before\nthe birth of the organisms with which upon this planet they are\nconnected?  The considerations which forbid our thinking of matter as\nsomething capable of existing by itself do not apply to minds.  A\nconsciousness, unlike a thing, exists 'for itself,' not merely 'for\nanother': a mind is not made what it is by being known or otherwise\nexperienced by another mind: its very being consists in being itself\nconscious: it is what it is for itself.  It is undoubtedly impossible\npositively to disprove the hypothesis of eternally pre-existent souls.\nSometimes that hypothesis is combined with Theism.  It {94} is supposed\nthat God is the supreme and incomparably the most powerful, but not the\nonly, self-existent and eternal Spirit.  This hypothesis--sometimes\nspoken of as Pluralism[3]--has many attractions: from the time of Origen\nonwards the idea of Pre-existence has seemed to many to facilitate the\nexplanation of evil by making it possible to regard the sufferings of our\npresent state as a disciplinary process for getting rid of an original or\na pre-natal sinfulness.  It is a theory not incapable of satisfying the\ndemands of the religious Consciousness, and may even form an element in\nan essentially Christian theory of the Universe: but to my mind it is\nopposed to all the obvious indications of experience.  The connexion\nbetween soul and body is such that the laws of the soul's development\nobviously form part of the same system with the laws of physical nature.\nIf one part of that system is referred to the divine Will, so must the\nwhole of it be.  The souls, when they have entered animal bodies, must be\nsupposed to be subject to a system of laws which is of one piece with the\nsystem of physical laws.  If the physical part of the world-order is\nreferred to the divine Will, the psychical part of it must be equally\nreferred to {95} that Will.  The souls might, indeed, conceivably have an\nindependent and original nature of their own capable of offering\nresistance to the divine intentions.  But we see, to say the least, no\nindications of a struggle going on between an outside divine Will and\nindependent beings not forming a part of the divine scheme.  At all\nevents, the result of this struggle, if struggle there be, is (so far as\nwe can observe) a system, complete and orderly, within the psychical\nsphere as much as within the purely physical sphere.  And in particular\nthe body is exactly fitted to the soul that is to inhabit it.  We never\nfind the intellect of a Shakespeare in connexion with the facial angle of\na negro; bodies which resemble the bodies of their parents are connected\nwith souls between which a similar resemblance can be traced.  If the\nsouls existed before birth, we must suppose those souls to be kept\nwaiting in a limbo of some kind till a body is prepared suitable for\ntheir reception.  We must suppose that among the waiting souls, one is\nfrom time to time selected to be the offspring of such and such a\nmatrimonial union, so as to present (as it were) a colourable appearance\nof being really the fruit of that union.  Further, before birth the souls\nmust be steeped in the waters of Lethe, or something of the kind, so as\nto rid them of all memory of their previous experiences.  Such a\nconception seems to {96} me to belong to the region of Mythology rather\nthan of sober philosophical thought.  I do not deny that Mythology may\nsometimes be a means of pictorially or symbolically envisaging truths to\nwhich Philosophy vaguely points but which it cannot express in clearly\napprehensible detail.  But such a Mythology as this seems to be\nintellectually unmotived and unhelpful.  It is not wanted to explain the\nfacts: there is nothing in our experience to suggest it, and much which\nis _prima facie_ opposed to it.  It really removes no single difficulty:\nfor one difficulty which it presents some appearance of removing, it\ncreates a dozen greater ones.  It is a hypothesis which we shall do well\nto dismiss as otiose.\n\n(4) _Non-theistic Idealism_.  Somewhat less unmotived, if we look upon it\nfrom a merely intellectual point of view, is the theory of pre-existent\nsouls without a personal God.  Many, if not most, of you probably possess\nmore or less acquaintance with the views of my friend, Dr. McTaggart.  I\ncannot here undertake a full exposition or criticism of one of the ablest\nthinkers of our day--one of the very few English thinkers who is the\nauthor of a truly original metaphysical system.  I can only touch--and\nthat most inadequately--upon the particular side of it which directly\nbears upon our present enquiry.  Dr. McTaggart is an Idealist; he\nrecognizes the {97} impossibility of matter without mind.  For him\nnothing exists but spirits, but he does not recognize the necessity for\nany one all-embracing or controlling Spirit: the only spirits in his\nUniverse are limited minds like those of men and animals.  He differs,\nthen, from the Pluralist of the type just mentioned in getting rid of the\nhypothesis of a personal God side by side with and yet controlling the\nuncreated spirits.  And he differs further from all Pluralists in not\ntreating the separate spirits as so many centres of consciousness quite\nindependent of, and possibly at war with, all the rest: the spirits form\npart of an ordered system: the world is a unity, though that unity is not\nthe unity which belongs to self-consciousness.  He recognizes, in the\ntraditional language of Philosophy, an Absolute, but this Absolute is not\na single spiritual Being but a Society: or, if it is to be called a\nsingle spiritual Being, it is a Being which exists or manifests itself\nonly in a plurality of limited consciousnesses.\n\nThis scheme is, I admit, more reasonable than Pluralism.  It does,\nnominally at least, recognize the world as an ordered system.  It gets\nrid of the difficulty of accounting for the apparent order of the Cosmos\nas the result of a struggle between independent wills.  It is not, upon\nits author's pre-suppositions, a gratuitous theory: for a mind which\naccepts Idealism and rejects Theism it is the only {98} intelligible\nalternative.  But I must confess that it seems to me open to most of the\ndifficulties which I have endeavoured to point out in Pluralism, and to\nsome others.  In the first place, there is one, to my mind, great and\ninsuperable difficulty about it.  As an Idealist, Dr. McTaggart has to\nadmit that the whole physical world, in so far as it exists at all, must\nexist in and for some consciousness.  Now, not only is there, according\nto him, no single mind in which the system can exist as a whole, but even\nall the minds together do not apparently know the whole of it, or (so far\nas our knowledge goes) ever will.  The undiscovered and unknown part of\nthe Universe is then non-existent.  And yet, be it noticed, the known\npart of the world does not make a perfectly articulated or (if you like\nthe phrase) organic system without the unknown part.  It is only on the\nassumption of relations between what we know and what we don't know that\nwe can regard it as an orderly, intelligible system at all.  Therefore,\nif part of the system is non-existent, the whole system--the system as a\nwhole--must be treated as non-existent.  The world is, we are told, a\nsystem; and yet as a system it has (upon the hypothesis) no real\nexistence.  The systematic whole does not exist in matter, for to Dr.\nMcTaggart matter is merely the experience of Mind.  What sort of\nexistence, then, can an undiscovered planet possess till it is {99}\ndiscovered?  For Dr. McTaggart has not provided any mind or minds in and\nfor which it is to exist.  At one time, indeed, Dr. McTaggart seemed\ndisposed to accept a suggestion of mine that, on his view, each soul must\nbe omniscient; and to admit that, while in its temporal aspect, each soul\nis limited and fallible in its knowledge, it is at the same time\nsupertemporally omniscient.  That is a conception difficult beyond all\nthe difficulties of the most arbitrary and self-contradicting of orthodox\npatristic or scholastic speculations.  But, as Dr. McTaggart does not now\nseem disposed to insist upon that point, I will say no more about it\nexcept that to my mind it is a theory which defies all intellectual\ngrasp.  It can be stated; it cannot be thought.\n\nFurther, I would remind you, the theory is open to all the objections\nwhich I urged against the Pre-existence theory in its pluralistic form.\nI have suggested the difficulties involved in the facts of heredity--the\ndifficulty of understanding how souls whose real intellectual and moral\ncharacteristics are uncaused and eternal should be assigned to parents so\nfar resembling them as to lead almost inevitably to the inference that\nthe characteristics of the children are to some extent causally connected\nwith those of the parents.[4] Now the Pluralist can {100} at least urge\nthat for this purpose ingenious arrangements are contrived by God--by the\nOne Spirit whom he regards as incomparably the wisest and most powerful\nin the Universe.  Dr. McTaggart recognizes no intelligence capable of\ngrappling with such a problem or succession of problems.  But this\nparticular matter of the assignment of souls to bodies is only a\nparticular application of a wider difficulty.  Dr. McTaggart contends\nthat the Universe constitutes not merely a physical but a moral order.\nHe would not deny that the Universe means something; that the series of\nevents tends towards an end, an end which is also a good; that it has a\npurpose and a final cause.  And yet this purpose exists in no mind\nwhatever, and is due to no will whatever--except to the very small extent\nto which the processes of physical nature can be consciously directed to\nan end by the volitions of men and similarly limited intelligences.  As a\nwhole, the Universe is purposed and willed by no single will or\ncombination of wills.  I confess I do not understand the idea of a\npurpose which operates, but is not the purpose of a Mind which is also a\nWill.  All the considerations upon which I dwelt to show the necessity of\nsuch a Will to account for the Universe which we know, are so many\narguments against Dr. McTaggart's scheme.  The events of Dr. McTaggart's\nUniverse are, upon the view of Causality which I {101} attempted to\ndefend in my second lecture, uncaused events.\n\nNevertheless, as a Philosopher, I am deeply grateful to Dr. McTaggart.\nNot only does his scheme on its practical side seem to me preferable to\nmany systems which sound more orthodox--systems of vague pantheistic\nTheism in which Morality is treated as mere 'appearance' and personal\nImmortality deliberately rejected--but it has done much intellectually to\nclear the air.  Dr. McTaggart seems to me right in holding that, if God\nor the Absolute is to include in itself all other spirits, and yet the\npersonality or self-consciousness of those spirits is not to be denied,\nthen this Absolute in which they are to be included cannot reasonably be\nthought of as a conscious being, or invested with the other attributes\nusually implied by the term God.\n\nAnd this leads me to say a few words more in explanation of my own view\nof the relation between God and human or other souls.  To me, as I have\nalready intimated, it seems simply meaningless to speak of one\nconsciousness as included in another consciousness.  The essence of a\nconsciousness is to be for itself: whether it be a thought, a feeling, or\nan emotion, the essence of that consciousness is what it is for me.\nEvery moment of consciousness is unique.  Another being may have a {102}\nsimilar feeling: in that case there are two feelings, and not one.\nAnother mind may know what I feel, but the knowledge of another's agony\nis (fortunately) a very different thing from the agony itself.  It is\nfashionable in some quarters to ridicule the idea of 'impenetrable'\nsouls.  If 'impenetrable' means that another soul cannot know what goes\non in my soul, I do not assert that the soul is impenetrable.  I believe\nthat God knows what occurs in my soul in an infinitely completer way than\nthat in which any human being can know it.  Further, I believe that every\nsoul is kept in existence from moment to moment by a continuous act of\nthe divine Will, and so is altogether dependent upon that Will, and forms\npart of one system with Him.  On the other hand I believe that (through\nthe analogy of my own mind and the guidance of the moral consciousness) I\ndo know, imperfectly and inadequately, 'as in a mirror darkly,' what goes\non in God's Mind.  But, if penetrability is to mean identity, the theory\nthat souls are penetrable seems to me mainly unintelligible.  The\nacceptance which it meets with in some quarters is due, I believe, wholly\nto the influence of that most fertile source of philosophical\nconfusion--misapplied spacial metaphor.[5]  It seems easy to talk about a\nmind being {103} something in itself, and yet part of another mind,\nbecause we are familiar with the idea of things in space forming part of\nlarger things in space--Chinese boxes, for instance, shut up in bigger\nones.  Such a mode of thought is wholly inapplicable to minds which are\nnot in space at all.  Space is in the mind: the mind is not in space.  A\nmind is not a thing which can be round or square: you can't say that the\nintellect of Kant or of Lord Kelvin measures so many inches by so many:\nequally impossible is it to talk about such an intellect being a part of\na more extensive intellect.\n\nThe theory of an all-inclusive Deity has recently been adopted and\npopularized by Mr. Campbell,[6] who has done all that rhetorical skill\ncombined with genuine religious earnestness can do to present it in an\nattractive and edifying dress.  And yet the same Logic which leads to the\nassertion that the Saint is part of God, leads also to the assertion that\nCaesar Borgia and Napoleon Buonaparte and all the wicked Popes who have\never been white-washed by episcopal or other historians are also parts of\nGod.  How can I worship, how can I strive to be like, how can I be the\nbetter for believing in or revering {104} a Being of whom Caesar Borgia\nis a part as completely and entirely as St. Paul or our Lord himself?\nHindoo Theology is consistent in this matter.  It worships the\ndestructive and the vicious aspects of Brahma as much as the kindly and\nthe moral ones: it does not pretend that God is revealed in the Moral\nConsciousness, or is in any exclusive or one-sided way a God of Love.  If\nit be an 'ethical obsession' (as has been suggested) to object to treat\nImmorality as no less a revelation of God than Morality, I must plead\nguilty to such an obsession.  And yet without such an 'obsession' I\nconfess I do not see what is left of Christianity.  There is only one way\nout of the difficulty.  If we are all parts of God, we can only call God\ngood or perfect by maintaining that the deliverances of our moral\nconsciousness have no validity for God, and therefore can tell us nothing\nabout him.  That has been done deliberately and explicitly by some\nPhilosophers:[7] the distinguished Theologians who echo the language of\nthis Philosophy have fortunately for their own religious life and\nexperience, but unfortunately for their philosophical consistency,\ndeclined to follow in their steps.  A God who is 'beyond good and evil,'\ncan be no fitting object of {105} worship to men who wish to become good,\njust, merciful.  If the cosmic process be indifferent to these ethical\nconsiderations, we had better (with honest Agnostics like Professor\nHuxley) make up our minds to defy it, whether it call itself God or not.\n\nBut it is not so much on account of its consequences as on account of its\nessential unmeaningness and intellectual unintelligibility that I would\ninvite you to reject this formula 'God is all.'  Certainly, the Universe\nis an ordered system: there is nothing in it that is not done by the Will\nof God.  And some parts of this Universe--the spiritual parts of it and\nparticularly the higher spirits--are not mere creations of God's will.\nThey have a resemblance of nature to Him.  I do not object to your saying\nthat at bottom there is but one Substance in the Universe, if you will\nonly keep clear of the materialistic and spacial association of the word\nSubstance: but it is a Substance which reveals itself in many different\nconsciousnesses.  The theory of an all-inclusive Consciousness is not\nnecessary to make possible the idea of close and intimate communion\nbetween God and men, or of the revelation in and to Humanity of the\nthought of God.  On the contrary, it is the idea of Identity which\ndestroys the possibility of communion.  Communion implies two minds: a\nmind cannot have communion with itself or with part of itself.  The two\nmay also in a {106} sense be one; of course all beings are ultimately\npart of one Universe or Reality: but that Reality is not one\nConsciousness.  The Universe is a unity, but the unity is not of the kind\nwhich constitutes a person or a self-consciousness.  It is (as Dr.\nMcTaggart holds) the unity of a Society, but of a Society (as I have\nattempted to argue) which emanates from, and is controlled by and guided\nto a preconceived end by, a single rational Will.[8]\n\n(5) _The intuitive theory of religious knowledge_.  In other quarters\nobjection will probably be taken to my not having recognized the\npossibility of an immediate knowledge of God, and left the idea of God to\nbe inferred by intellectual processes which, when fully thought out,\namount to a Metaphysic.  It will be suggested that to make religious\nbelief dependent upon Reason is to make it impossible to any but trained\nPhilosophers or Theologians.  Now there is no doubt a great\nattractiveness in the theory which makes belief in God depend simply upon\nthe immediate affirmation of the individual's own consciousness.  It\nwould be more difficult to argue against such a theory of immediate\nknowledge or intuition if we found that the consciousness of all or most\nindividuals does actually reveal to them {107} the existence of God:\nthough after all the fact that a number of men draw the same inference\nfrom given facts does not show that it is not an inference.  You will\nsometimes find Metaphysicians contending that nobody is really an\nAtheist, since everybody necessarily supposes himself to be in contact\nwith an Other of which he is nevertheless a part.  I do not deny that, if\nyou water down the idea of God to the notion of a vague 'something not\nourselves,' you may possibly make out that everybody is explicitly or\nimplicitly a believer in such a Deity.\n\nI should prefer myself to say that, if that is all you mean by God, it\ndoes not much matter whether we believe in Him or not.  In the sense in\nwhich God is understood by Christianity or Judaism or any other theistic\nReligion it is unfortunately impossible to contend that everybody is a\nTheist.  And, if there is an immediate knowledge of God in every human\nsoul, this would be difficult to account for.  Neither the cultivated nor\nthe uncultivated Chinaman has apparently any such belief.  The ignorant\nChinaman believes in a sort of luck or destiny--possibly in a plurality\nof limited but more or less mischievous spirits; the educated Chinaman,\nwe are told, is for the most part a pure Agnostic.  And Chinamen are\nbelieved to be one-fifth of the human race.  The task of the Missionary\nwould be an easier one if he could {108} appeal to any such widely\ndiffused intuitions of God.  The Missionary, from the days of St. Paul at\nAthens down to the present, has to begin by arguing with his opponents in\nfavour of Theism, and then to go on to argue from Theism to Christianity.\nI do not deny--on the contrary I strongly contend--that the rational\nconsiderations which lead up to Monotheism are so manifold, and lie so\nnear at hand, that at a certain stage of mental development we find that\nbelief independently asserting itself with more or less fullness in\nwidely distant regions of time and space; while traces of it are found\nalmost everywhere--even among savages--side by side with other and\ninconsistent beliefs.  But even among theistic nations an immediate\nknowledge of God is claimed by very few.  If there is a tendency on the\npart of the more strongly religious minds to claim it, it is explicitly\ndisclaimed by others--by most of the great Schoolmen, and in modern times\nby profoundly religious minds such as Newman or Martineau.  Its existence\nis in fact denied by most of the great theological systems--Catholic,\nProtestant, Anglican.  Theologians always begin by arguing in favour of\nthe existence of God.  And even among the religious minds without\nphilosophical training which do claim such immediate knowledge, their\ncreed is most often due (as is obvious to the outside observer) to the\ninfluence of environment, of education, of social {109} tradition.  For\nthe religious person who claims such knowledge of God does not generally\nstop at the bare affirmation of God's existence: he goes on to claim an\nimmediate knowledge of all sorts of other things--ideas clearly derived\nfrom the traditional teaching of his religious community.  The Protestant\nof a certain type will claim immediate consciousness of ideas about the\nforgiveness of sins which are palpably due to the teaching of Luther or\nSt. Augustine, and to the influence of this or that preacher who has\ntransmitted those ideas to him or to his mother: while the Catholic,\nthough his training discourages such claims, will sometimes see visions\nwhich convey to him an immediate assurance of the truth of the Immaculate\nConception.  Even among Anglicans we find educated men who claim to know\nby immediate intuition the truth of historical facts alleged to have\noccurred in the first century, or dogmatic truths such as the complicated\nniceties of the Athanasian Creed.  These claims to immediate insight thus\nrefute themselves by the inconsistent character of the knowledge claimed.\nAn attempt may be made to extract from all these immediate certainties a\nresidual element which is said to be common to all of them.  The attempt\nhas been made by Professor James in that rather painful work, the\n_Varieties of Religious Experience_.  And the residuum turns out to be\nsomething so vague that, if not {110} absolutely worthless, it is almost\nincapable of being expressed in articulate language, and constitutes a\nvery precarious foundation for a working religious creed.\n\nThe truth is that the uneducated--or rather the unanalytical, perhaps I\nought to say the metaphysically untrained--human mind has a tendency to\nregard as an immediate certainty any truth which it strongly believes and\nregards as very important.  Such minds do not know the psychological\ncauses which have led to their own belief, when they are due to\npsychological causes: they have not analysed the processes of thought by\nwhich they have been led to those beliefs which are really due to the\nworking of their own minds.  Most uncultivated persons would probably be\nvery much surprised to hear that the existence of the friend with whose\nbody they are in physical contact is after all only an inference.[9]  But\nsurely, in the man who has discovered that such is the case, the warmth\nof friendship was never dimmed by the reflection that his knowledge of\nhis friend is not immediate but mediate.  It is a mere prejudice to\nsuppose that mediate knowledge is in any {111} way less certain, less\nintimate, less trustworthy or less satisfying than immediate knowledge.\nIf we claim for man the possibility of just such a knowledge of God as a\nman may possess of his brother man, surely that is all that is wanted to\nmake possible the closest religious communion.  It is from the existence\nof my own self that I infer the existence of other selves, whom I observe\nto behave in a manner resembling my own behaviour.  It is by an only\nslightly more difficult and complicated inference from my own\nconsciousness that I rise to that conception of a universal Consciousness\nwhich supplies me with at once the simplest and the most natural\nexplanation both of my own existence and of the existence of the Nature\nwhich I see around me.\n\n(6) _Religion and Psychology_.  I do not deny that the study of religious\nhistory, by exhibiting the naturalness and universality of religious\nideas and religious emotions, may rationally create a pre-disposition to\nfind some measure of truth in every form of religious belief.  But I\nwould venture to add a word of caution against the tendency fashionable\nin many quarters to talk of basing religious belief upon Psychology.  The\nbusiness of Psychology is to tell us what actually goes on in the human\nmind.  It cannot possibly tell us whether the beliefs which are found\nthere are true or false.  An erroneous {112} belief is as much a\npsychological fact as a true one.  A theory which goes on, by inference\nfrom what we observe in our own minds, to construct a theory of the\nUniverse necessarily involves a Metaphysic, conscious or unconscious.  It\nmay be urged that the reality of religious experience is unaffected by\nthe question whether the beliefs associated with it are true or false.\nThat is the case, so long as the beliefs are supposed to be true by the\nperson in question.  But, when once the spirit of enquiry is aroused, a\nman cannot be--and I venture to think ought not to be--satisfied as to\nthe truth of his belief simply by being told that the beliefs are\nactually there.\n\nIt may be contended, no doubt, that religious experience does not mean\nmerely a state of intellectual belief, but certain emotions, aspirations,\nperhaps (to take one particular type of religious experience) a\nconsciousness of love met by answering love.  To many who undergo such\nexperiences, they seem to carry with them an immediate assurance of the\nexistence of the Being with whom they feel themselves to be in communion.\nThat, on the intellectual presuppositions of the particular person, seems\nto be the natural--it may be the only possible--way of explaining the\nfeeling.  But even there the belief is not really immediate: it is an\ninference from what is actually matter of experience.  And it is,\nunhappily, no less a matter of well-ascertained {113} psychological fact\nthat, when intellectual doubt is once aroused, such experiences no longer\ncarry with them this conviction of their own objective basis.  The person\nwas really under the influence of an intellectual theory all along,\nwhether the theory was acquired by hereditary tradition, by the influence\nof another's mind, or by personal thought and reflection.  When the\nintellectual theory alters, the same kind of experience is no longer\npossible.  I will not attempt to say how far it is desirable that persons\nwho are perfectly satisfied with a creed which they have never examined\nshould (as it were) pull up the roots of their own faith to see how deep\nthey go.  I merely want to point out that the occurrence of certain\nemotional experiences, though undoubtedly they may constitute part of the\ndata of a religious argument, cannot be held to constitute in and by\nthemselves sufficient evidence for the truth of the intellectual theory\nconnected with them in the mind of the person to whom they occur.  They\ndo not always present themselves as sufficient evidence for their truth\neven to the person experiencing them--still less can they do so to\nothers.  Equally unreasonable is it to maintain, with a certain class of\nreligious philosophers, that the religious experience by itself is all we\nwant; and to assume that we may throw to the winds all the theological or\nother beliefs which have actually been associated {114} with the various\ntypes of religious experience, and yet continue to have those experiences\nand find them no less valuable and no less satisfying.  If there is one\nthing which the study of religious Psychology testifies to, it is the\nfact that the character of the religious experience (though there may be\ncertain common elements in it) varies very widely with the character of\nthe theoretical belief with which it is associated--a belief of which it\nis sometimes the cause, sometimes the effect, but from which it is always\ninseparable.  The Buddhist's religious experiences are not possible to\nthose who hold the Christian's view of the Universe: the Christian's\nreligious experiences are not possible to one who holds the Buddhist\ntheory of the Universe.  You cannot have an experience of communion with\na living Being when you disbelieve in the existence of such a Being.  And\na man's theories of the Universe always at bottom imply a Metaphysic of\nsome kind--conscious or unconscious.\n\nSometimes the theory of a Religion which shall be purely psychological\nsprings from pure ignorance as to the meaning of the terms actually\nemployed by the general usage of philosophers.  Those who talk in this\nway mean by Psychology what, according to the ordinary philosophic usage,\nis really Metaphysic.  For Metaphysic is simply the science which deals\nwith the ultimate nature of the Universe.  {115} At other times attempts\nare made by people of more or less philosophical culture to justify their\ntheory.  The most widely influential of such attempts is the one made by\nM. Auguste Sabatier.[10]  This attempt has at least this much in its\nfavour--that it is not so much to the ordinary experience of average men\nand women that M. Sabatier appeals as to the exceptional experiences of\nthe great religious minds.  He lays the chief stress upon those\nexceptional moments of religious history when a new religious idea\nentered into the mind of some prophet or teacher, _e.g._ the unity of\nGod, the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of Man.  Here, just because\nthe idea was new, it cannot (he contends) be accounted for by education\nor environment or any other of the psychological causes which obviously\ndetermine the traditional beliefs of the great majority.  These new\nideas, therefore, he assumes to be due to immediate revelation or\ninspiration from God.  Now it is obvious that, even if this inference\nwere well grounded, it assumes that we have somehow arrived independently\nat a conception of God to which such inspirations can be referred.  The\nPsychology of the human mind cannot assume the existence of such a Being:\nif we infer such a Being from our own mental experience, that is not\nimmediate but {116} mediate knowledge.  It is a belief based on\ninference, and a belief which is, properly speaking, metaphysical.  The\nidea of a Religion which is merely based upon Psychology and involves\nnothing else is a delusion: all the great Religions of the world have\nbeen, among other things, metaphysical systems.  We have no means of\nascertaining their truth but Reason, whether it assume the form of a\nrough common-sense or of elaborate reasoning which not only is Metaphysic\nbut knows itself to be so.  Reason is then the organ of religious truth.\nBut then, let me remind you, Reason includes our moral Reason.  That\nreally is a faculty of immediate knowledge; and it is a faculty which, in\na higher or lower state of development, is actually found in practically\nall human beings.  The one element of truth which I recognize in the\ntheory of an immediate knowledge of God is the truth that the most\nimportant data upon which we base the inference which leads to the\nknowledge of God are those supplied by the immediate judgements or\nintuitions of the Moral Consciousness.\n\nAnd here let me caution you against a very prevalent misunderstanding\nabout the word Reason.  It is assumed very often that Reason means\nnothing but inference.  That is not what we mean when we refer moral\njudgements to the Reason.  We do not mean that we can prove that things\nare right or {117} wrong: we mean precisely the opposite--that ultimate\nmoral truth is immediate, like the truth that two and two make four.  It\nmight, of course, be contended that the same Reason which assures me that\ngoodness is worth having and that the whole is greater than the part,\nassures us no less immediately of the existence of God.  I can only say\nthat I am sure I have no such immediate knowledge, and that for the most\npart that knowledge is never claimed by people who understand clearly the\ndifference between immediate knowledge and inference.  The idea of God is\na complex conception, based, not upon this or that isolated judgement or\nmomentary experience, but upon the whole of our experience taken\ntogether.  It is a hypothesis suggested by, and necessary to, the\nexplanation of our experience as a whole.  Some minds may lay most stress\nupon the religious emotions themselves; others upon the experience of the\nouter world, upon the appearances of design, or upon the metaphysical\nargument which shows them the inconceivability of matter without mind;\nothers, again, may be most impressed by the impossibility of accounting\nin any way for the immediate consciousness of duty and the conviction of\nobjective validity or authority which that consciousness carries with it.\nBut in any case the knowledge, when it is a reasonable belief and not\nbased merely upon authority, involves {118} inference--just like our\nknowledge of our friend's existence.  The fact that my friend is known to\nme by experience does not prevent his communicating his mind to me.  I\nshall try to show you in my next lecture that to admit that our knowledge\nof God is based upon inference is not incompatible with the belief that\nGod has spoken to man face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend.\n\n\nAt this point it may perhaps be well, for the sake of clearness, to\nsummarize the position to which I have tried to lead you.  I have tried\nto show that the material Universe cannot reasonably be thought of as\nhaving any existence outside, or independently of, Mind.  It certainly\ndoes not exist merely in any or all of the human and similar minds whose\nknowledge is fleeting, and which have, there is every reason to believe,\na beginning in time.  We are bound then to infer the existence of a\nsingle Mind or Consciousness, which must be thought of as containing all\nthe elements of our own Consciousness--Reason or Thought, Feeling, and\nWill--though no doubt in Him those elements or aspects of Consciousness\nare combined in a manner of which our own minds can give us but a very\nfaint and analogical idea.  The world must be thought of as ultimately\nthe thought or experience of this Mind, which we call God.  And this Mind\nmust be thought {119} of as not only a Thinker, but also as a Cause or a\nWill.  Our own and all other minds, no less than the events of the\nmaterial Universe, owe their beginning and continuance to this divine\nWill: in them the thought or experience of the divine Mind is reproduced\nin various degrees; and to all of them is communicated some portion of\nthat causality or activity of which God is the ultimate source, so that\ntheir acts must be regarded as due mediately to them, ultimately to God.\nBut, though these minds are wholly dependent upon and in intimate\nconnexion with the divine Mind, they cannot be regarded as _parts_ of the\ndivine Consciousness.  Reality consists of God and all the minds that He\nwills to exist, together with the world of Nature which exists in and for\nthose minds.  Reality is the system or society of spirits and their\nexperience.  The character and ultimate purpose of the divine Mind is\nrevealed to us, however inadequately or imperfectly, in the moral\nconsciousness; and the moral ideal which is thus communicated to us makes\nit reasonable for us to expect, for at least the higher of the dependent\nor created minds, a continuance, of their individual existence, after\nphysical death.  Pain, sin, and other evils must be regarded as necessary\nincidents in the process by which the divine Will is bringing about the\ngreatest attainable good of all conscious beings.  The question whether\nour material Universe, {120} considered as the object of Mind, has a\nbeginning and will have an end, is one which we have no data for\ndeciding.  Time-distinctions, I think, must be regarded as\nobjective--that is to say, as forming part of the nature and constitution\nof the real world; but the antinomy involved either in supposing an\nendless succession or a beginning and end of the time-series is one which\nour intellectual faculties are, or at least have so far proved, incapable\nof solving.  The element of inadequacy and uncertainty which the\nadmission of this antinomy introduces into our theory of the Universe is\nan emphatic reminder to us of the inadequate and imperfect character of\nall our knowledge.  The knowledge, however, that we possess, though\ninadequate knowledge, is real knowledge--not a sham knowledge of merely\nrelative or human validity; and is sufficient not only for the guidance\nof life but even for the partial, though not the complete, satisfaction\nof one of the noblest impulses of the human mind--the disinterested\npassion for truth.  'Now we see in a mirror darkly'; but still we see.\n\nThe view of the Universe which I have endeavoured very inadequately to\nset before you is a form of Idealism.  Inasmuch as it recognizes the\nexistence--though not the separate and independent existence--of many\npersons; inasmuch as it regards both God and man as persons, without\nattempting {121} to merge the existence of either in one all-including,\ncomprehensive consciousness, it may further be described as a form of\n'personal Idealism.'  But, if any one finds it easier to think of\nmaterial Nature as having an existence which, though dependent upon and\nwilled by the divine Mind, is not simply an existence in and for mind,\nsuch a view of the Universe will serve equally well as a basis of\nReligion.  For religious purposes it makes no difference whether we think\nof Nature as existing in the Mind of God, or as simply created or brought\ninto and kept in existence by that Mind.  When you have subtracted from\nthe theistic case every argument that depends for its force upon the\ntheory that the idea of matter without Mind is an unthinkable absurdity,\nenough will remain to show the unreasonableness of supposing that in\npoint of fact matter ever has existed without being caused and controlled\nby Mind.  The argument for Idealism may, I hope, have at all events\nexhibited incidentally the groundlessness and improbability of\nmaterialistic and naturalistic assumptions, and left the way clear for\nthe establishment of Theism by the arguments which rest upon the\ndiscovery that Causality implies volition; upon the appearances of\nintelligence in organic life; upon the existence of the moral\nconsciousness; and more generally upon the enormous probability that the\nultimate Source of Reality should resemble rather {122} the highest than\nthe lowest kind of existence of which we have experience.  That Reality\nas a whole may be most reasonably interpreted by Reality at its highest\nis after all the sum and substance of all theistic arguments.  If anybody\nfinds it easier to think of matter as uncreated but as always guided and\ncontrolled by Mind, I do not think there will be any religious objection\nto such a position; though it is, as it seems to me, intellectually a\nless unassailable position than is afforded by an Idealism of the type\nwhich I have most inadequately sketched.\n\nMr. Bradley in a cynical moment has defined Metaphysics as the 'finding\nof bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct.'  I do not for myself\naccept that definition, which Mr. Bradley himself would not of course\nregard as expressing the whole truth of the matter.  But, though I am\nfirmly convinced that it is possible to find good reasons for the\nreligious beliefs and hopes which have in fact inspired the noblest\nlives, I still feel that the greatest service which even a little\nacquaintance with Philosophy may render to many who have not the time for\nany profounder study of it, will be to give them greater boldness and\nconfidence in accepting a view of the Universe which satisfies the\ninstinctive or unanalysed demands of their moral, intellectual, and\nspiritual nature.\n\n{123}\n\nNOTE ON NON-THEISTIC IDEALISM\n\nIt may perhaps be well for the sake of greater clearness to summarize my\nobjections--those already mentioned and some others--to the system of Dr.\nMcTaggart, which I admit to be, for one who has accepted the idealistic\nposition that matter does not exist apart from Mind, the only\nintelligible alternative to Theism.  His theory is, it will be\nremembered, that ultimate Reality consists of a system of selves or\nspirits, uncreated and eternal, forming together a Unity, but not a\nconscious Unity, so that consciousness exists only in the separate\nselves, not in the whole:\n\n(1) It is admitted that the material world exists only in and for Mind.\nThere is no reason to think that any human mind, or any of the other\nminds of which Dr. McTaggart's Universe is composed, knows the whole of\nthis world.  What kind of existence then have the parts of the Universe\nwhich are not known to any mind?  It seems to me that Dr. McTaggart would\nbe compelled to admit that they do not exist at all.  The world\npostulated by Science would thus be admitted to be a delusion.  This\nrepresents a subjective Idealism of an extreme and staggering kind which\ncannot meet the objections commonly urged against all Idealism.\n\n(2) Moreover, the world is not such an intellectually complete system as\nDr. McTaggart insists that it must be, apart from the relations of its\nknown parts to its unknown parts.  If there are parts which are unknown\nto any mind, and which therefore do not exist at all, it is not a system\nat all.\n\n(3) If it be said that all the spirits between them know the world--one\nknowing one part, another another--this is a mere hypothesis, opposed to\nall the probabilities suggested by experience, and after all would be a\nvery inadequate answer to our difficulties.  Dr. McTaggart insists {124}\nthat the world of existing things exists as a system.  Such existence to\nan Idealist must mean existence for a mind; a system not known as a\nsystem to any mind whatever could hardly be said to exist at all.\n\n(4) If it be suggested (as Dr. McTaggart was at one time inclined to\nsuggest) that every mind considered as a timeless Noumenon is omniscient,\nthough in its phenomenal and temporal aspect its knowledge is\nintermittent and always limited, I reply (_a_) the theory seems to me not\nonly gratuitous but unintelligible, and (_b_) it is open to all the\ndifficulties and objections of the theory that time and change are merely\nsubjective delusions.  This is too large a question to discuss here: I\ncan only refer to the treatment of the subject by such writers as Lotze\n(see above) and M. Bergson.  I may also refer to Mr. Bradley's argument\n(_Appearance and Reality_, p. 50 sq.) against the theory that the\nindividual Ego is out of time.\n\n(5) The theory of pre-existent souls is opposed to all the probabilities\nsuggested by experience.  Soul and organism are connected in such a way\nthat the pre-existence of one element in what presents itself and works\nin our world as a unity is an extremely difficult supposition, and\ninvolves assumptions which reduce to a minimum the amount of identity or\ncontinuity that could be claimed for the Ego throughout its successive\nlives.  A soul which has forgotten all its previous experiences may have\nsome identity with its previous state, but not much.  Moreover, we should\nhave to suppose that the correspondence of a certain type of body with a\ncertain kind of soul, as well as the resemblance between the individual\nand his parents, implies no kind of causal connexion, but is due to mere\naccident; or, if it is not to accident, to a very arbitrary kind of\npre-established harmony which there is nothing in experience to suggest,\nand which (upon Dr. McTaggart's theory) there is no creative intelligence\nto pre-establish.  The theory cannot be absolutely refuted, but all Dr.\nMcTaggart's ingenuity has not--to my own mind, {125} and (I feel sure) to\nmost minds--made it seem otherwise than extremely difficult and\nimprobable.  Its sole recommendation is that it makes possible an\nIdealism without Theism: but, if Theism be an easier and more defensible\ntheory, that is no recommendation at all.\n\n(6) Dr. McTaggart's whole theory seems to me to waver between two\ninconsistent views of Reality.  When he insists that the world consists\nof a system or Unity, he tends towards a view of things which makes the\nsystem of intellectual relations constituting knowledge or Science to be\nthe very reality of things: on such a view there is no impossibility of\nan ultimate Reality not known to any one mind.  But Dr. McTaggart has too\nstrong a hold on the conviction of the supremely real character of\nconscious mind and the unreality of mere abstractions to be satisfied\nwith this view.  If there is no mind which both knows and wills the\nexistence and the mutual relations of the spirits, the supreme reality\nmust be found in the individual spirits themselves; yet the system, if\nknown to none of them, seems to fall outside the reality.  The natural\ntendency of a system which finds the sole reality in eternally\nself-existent souls is towards Pluralism--a theory of wholly independent\n'Reals' or 'Monads.'  Dr. McTaggnrt is too much of a Hegelian to\nacquiesce in such a view.  The gulf between the two tendencies seems to\nme--with all respect--to be awkwardly bridged over by the assumption that\nthe separate selves form an intelligible system, which nevertheless no\none really existent spirit actually understands.  If a system of\nrelations can be Reality, there is no ground for assuming the\npre-existence or eternity of individual souls: if on the other hand\nReality is 'experience,' an unexperienced 'system' cannot be real, and\nthe 'unity' disappears.  This is a line of objection which it would\nrequire a much more thorough discussion to develope.\n\n(7) On the view which I myself hold as to the nature of Causality, the\nonly intelligible cause of events is a Will.  The events of Dr.\nMcTaggart's world (putting aside the very {126} small proportion which\nare due, in part at least, to the voluntary action of men or spirits) are\nnot caused at all.  His theory is therefore open to all--and more than\nall--the objections which I have urged in Lecture II. against the theory\nwhich explains the Universe as the thought of a Mind but not as caused by\nthat Mind.\n\n(8) It is just possible that some one might suggest that the first of my\nobjections might be met by the allegation that there is nothing in the\nscheme which forbids us to suppose that the whole of Nature is known to\nmore than one of the spirits which make up Reality, though not to all, or\nindeed any, of the human and non-human spirits known to us.  I should\nreply (_a_) that the considerations which lead to the hypothesis of one\nomniscient Being do not require more than one such spirit, and _entia non\nsunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem_; (_b_) such a scheme would still\nbe open to Objection 7.  If it is a speculative possibility that all\nNature may exist in the knowledge of more than one spirit, it cannot well\nbe thought of as willed by more than one spirit.  If the Universe,\nadmitted to form an ordered system, is caused by rational will at all, it\nmust surely be caused by one Will.  But perhaps a serious discussion of a\npolytheistic scheme such as this may be postponed till it is seriously\nmaintained.  It has not been suggested, so far as I am aware, by Dr.\nMcTaggart himself.\n\n(9) The real strength of Dr. McTaggart's system must be measured by the\nvalidity of his objections to a Theism such as I have defended.  I have\nattempted to reply to those objections in the course of these Lectures,\nand more at length in a review of his _Some Dogmas of Religion_ in _Mind_\n(N.S.), vol. xv., 1906.\n\n\n\n[1] Cf. Flint's _Theism_, Ed. v., p. 117 and App. xi.\n\n[2] The most illuminating discussion of time and the most convincing\nargument for its 'objectivity' which I know, is to be found in Lotze's\n_Metaphysic_, Book II. chap. iii., but it cannot be recommended to the\nbeginner in Metaphysic.  A brilliant exposition of the view of the\nUniverse which regards time and change as belonging to the very reality\nof the Universe, has recently appeared in M. Bergson's L'Evolution\nCreatrice, but he has hardly attempted to deal with the metaphysical\ndifficulties indicated above.  The book, however, seems to me the most\nimportant philosophical work that has appeared since Mr. Bradley's\n_Appearance and Reality_, and though the writer has hardly formulated his\nNatural Theology, it constitutes a very important contribution to the\ntheistic argument.  Being based upon a profound study of biological\nEvolution, it may be specially commended to scientific readers.\n\n[3] Such a view is expounded in Dr. Schiller's early work _The Riddles of\nthe Sphinx_ and in Professor Howison's _The Limits of Evolution_.  The\nvery distinguished French thinker Charles Renouvier (_La Nouvelle\nMonadologie_, etc.), like Origen, believed that souls were pre-existent\nbut created.\n\n[4] I use the word 'causally connected' in the popular or scientific\nsense of the word, to indicate merely an actually observed\npsycho-physical law.\n\n[5] In part, perhaps, also to a mistaken theory of predication, which\nassumes that, because every fact in the world can be represented as\nlogically a predicate of Reality at large, therefore there is but one\nSubstance or (metaphysically) Real Being in the world, of which all other\nexistences are really mere 'attributes.'  But this theory cannot be\ndiscussed here.\n\n[6] In _The New Theology_.\n\n[7] _E.g._ by Mr. Bradley in _Appearance and Reality_ and still more\nuncompromisingly by Professor A. E. Taylor in _The Problem of Conduct_,\nbut I rejoice to find that the latter very able writer has recently given\nup this theory of a 'super-moral' Absolute.\n\n[8] I think it desirable to mention here that Professor Watson's account\nof my views in his _Philosophical Basis of Religion_ completely\nmisrepresents my real position.  I have replied to his criticisms in\n_Mind_, N.S. No. 69 (Jan. 1909).\n\n[9] This is sometimes denied by Philosophers, but I have never been able\nto understand on what grounds.  If I know _a priori_ the existence of\nother men, I ought to be able to say _a priori_ how many they are and to\nsay something about them.  And this is more than any one claims.\n\n[10] In _Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion d'apres La Psychologie\net l'histoire_.\n\n\n\n\n{127}\n\nLECTURE V\n\nREVELATION\n\nI have tried in previous lectures to show that the apprehension of\nreligious truth does not depend upon some special kind of intuition;\nthat it is not due to some special faculty superior to and different in\nkind from our ordinary intellectual activities, but to an exercise of\nthe same intellectual faculties by which we attain to truth in other\nmatters--including, however, especially the wholly unique faculty of\nimmediately discerning values or pronouncing moral judgements.  The\nword 'faith' should, as it seems to me, be used to express not a\nmysterious capacity for attaining to knowledge without thought or\nwithout evidence, but to indicate some of the manifold characteristics\nby which our religious knowledge is distinguished from the knowledge\neither of common life or of the physical Sciences.  If I had time there\nwould be much to be said about these characteristics, and I think I\ncould show that the popular distinction between knowledge and religious\n{128} faith finds whatever real justification it possesses in these\ncharacteristics of religious knowledge.  I might insist on the\nfrequently implicit and unanalysed character of religious thinking;\nupon the incompleteness and inadequacy of even the fullest account that\nthe maturest and acutest Philosopher can give of ultimate Reality; upon\nthe merely probable and analogical character of much of the reasoning\nwhich is necessarily employed both in the most popular and in the most\nphilosophical kinds of reasoning about such matters; and above all upon\nthe prominent place which moral judgements occupy in religious thought,\nmoral judgements which, on account of their immediate character and\ntheir emotional setting, are often not recognized in their true\ncharacter as judgements of the Reason.  Most of the mistakes into which\npopular thinking has fallen in this matter--the mistakes which\nculminate in the famous examination-paper definition of faith as 'a\nmeans of believing that which we know not to be true'--would be avoided\nif we would only remember, with St. Paul and most of the greater\nreligious thinkers, that the true antithesis is not between faith and\nreason but between faith and sight.  All religious belief implies a\nbelief in something which cannot be touched or tasted or handled, and\nwhich cannot be established by any mere logical deduction from what can\nbe touched or tasted or handled.  So far from implying {129} scepticism\nas to the power of Reason, this opposition between faith and sight\nactually asserts the possibility of attaining by thought to a knowledge\nof realities which cannot be touched or tasted or handled--a knowledge\nof equal validity and trustworthiness with that which is popularly said\nto be due to the senses, though Plato has taught us once for all[1]\nthat the senses by themselves never give us real knowledge, and that in\nthe apprehension of the most ordinary matter of fact there is implied\nthe action of the self-same intellect by which alone we can reach the\nknowledge of God.\n\nIt may further be pointed out that, though neither religious knowledge\nnor moral knowledge are mere emotion, they are both of them very\nclosely connected with certain emotions.  Great moral discoveries are\nmade, not so much by superior intellectual power, as by superior\ninterest in the subject-matter of Morality.  Very ordinary intelligence\ncan see, when it is really brought to bear upon the matter, the\nirrationality or immorality of bad customs, oppressions, social\ninjustices; but the people who have led the revolt against these things\nhave generally been the people who have felt intensely about them.  So\nit is with the more distinctly religious knowledge.  Religious thought\nand insight are largely dependent upon the emotions to which religious\n{130} ideas and beliefs appeal.  The absence of religious thought and\ndefinite religious belief is very often (I am far from saying always)\ndue to a want of interest in Religion; but that does not prove that\nreligious thought is not the work of the intellect, any more than the\nfact that a man is ignorant of Politics because he takes no interest in\nPolitics proves that political truth is a mere matter of emotion, and\nhas nothing to do with the understanding.  Thought is always guided by\ninterest--a truth which must not be distorted with a certain modern\nschool of thought, if indeed it can properly be called thought, into\nthe assertion that thinking is nothing but willing, and that therefore\nwe are at liberty to think just what we please.\n\nAnd that leads on to a further point.  Emotion and desire are very\nclosely connected with the will.  A man's moral insight and the\ndevelopment of his thought about moral questions depend very largely\nupon the extent to which he acts up to whatever light he has.  Vice, as\nAristotle put it, is _phthartike arches_--destructive of moral first\nprinciples.  Moral insight is largely dependent upon character.  And so\nis religious insight.  Thus it is quite true to say that religious\nbelief depends in part upon the state of the will.  This doctrine has\nbeen so scandalously abused by many Theologians and Apologists that I\nuse it with great hesitation.  I have no sympathy {131} with the idea\nthat we are justified in believing a religious doctrine merely because\nwe wish it to be true, or with the insinuation that non-belief in a\nreligious truth is always or necessarily due to moral obliquity.  But\nstill it is undeniable that a man's ethical and religious beliefs are\nto some extent affected by the state of his will.  That is so with all\nknowledge to some extent; for progress in knowledge requires attention,\nand is largely dependent upon interest.  If I take no interest in the\nproperties of curves or the square root of -1, I am not very likely to\nmake a good mathematician.  This connexion of knowledge with interest\napplies in an exceptional degree to religious knowledge: and that is\none of the points which I think many religious thinkers have intended\nto emphasize by their too hard and fast distinctions between faith and\nknowledge.\n\nBelief itself is thus to some extent affected by the state of the will;\nand still more emphatically does the extent to which belief affects\naction depend upon the will.  Many beliefs which we quite sincerely\nhold are what have been called 'otiose beliefs'; we do not by an effort\nof the will realize them sufficiently strongly for them to affect\naction.  Many a man knows perfectly that his course of life will injure\nor destroy his physical health; it is not through intellectual\nscepticism that he disobeys his {132} physician's prescriptions, but\nbecause other desires and inclinations prevent his attending to them\nand acting upon them.  It is obvious that to men like St. Paul and\nLuther faith meant much more than a mere state of the intellect; it\nincluded a certain emotional and a certain volitional attitude; it\nincluded love and it included obedience.  Whether our intellectual\nbeliefs about Religion are energetic enough to influence action, does\nto an enormous extent depend upon our wills.  Faith is, then, used, and\nalmost inevitably used, in such a great variety of senses that I do not\nlike to lay down one definite and exclusive definition of it; but it\nwould be safe to say that, for many purposes and in many connexions,\nreligious faith means the deliberate adoption by an effort of the will,\nas practically certain for purposes of action and of feeling, of a\nreligious belief which to the intellect is, or may be, merely probable.\nFor purposes of life it is entirely reasonable to treat probabilities\nas certainties.  If a man has reason to think his friend is\ntrustworthy, he will do well to trust him wholly and implicitly.  If a\nman has reason to think that a certain view of the Universe is the most\nprobable one, he will do well habitually to allow that conviction to\ndominate not merely his actions, but the habitual tenour of his\nemotional and spiritual life.  We should not love a human being much if\nwe allowed ourselves habitually to {133} contemplate the logical\npossibility that the loved one was unworthy of, or irresponsive to, our\naffection.  We could not love God if we habitually contemplated the\nfact that His existence rests for us upon judgements in which there is\nmore or less possibility of error, though there is no reason why we\nshould, in our speculative moments, claim a greater certainty for them\nthan seems to be reasonable.  The doctrine that 'probability is the\nguide of life' is one on which every sensible man habitually acts in\nall other relations of life: Bishop Butler was right in contending that\nit should be applied no less unhesitatingly to the matter of religious\nbelief and religious aspiration.\n\nThe view which I have taken of the nature of faith may be illustrated\nby the position of Clement of Alexandria.  It is clear from his\nwritings that by faith he meant a kind of conviction falling short of\ndemonstration or immediate intellectual insight, and dependent in part\nupon the state of the will and the heart.  Clement did not disparage\nknowledge in the interests of faith: faith was to him a more elementary\nkind of knowledge resting largely upon moral conviction, and the\nfoundation of that higher state of intellectual apprehension which he\ncalled Gnosis.  I do not mean, of course, to adopt Clement's Philosophy\nas a whole; I merely refer to it as illustrating the point that,\nproperly considered, faith is, or rather includes, a particular kind or\nstage {134} of knowledge, and is not a totally different and even\nopposite state of mind.  It would be easy to show that this has been\nfully recognized by many, if not most, of the great Christian thinkers.\n\nOne last point.  It is of the utmost importance to distinguish between\nthe process by which psychologically a man arrives at a religious or\nother truth and the reasons which make it true.  Because I deny that\nthe truth of God's existence can reasonably be accepted on the basis of\nan immediate judgement or intuition, I do not deny for one moment that\nan apparently intuitive conviction of the truth of Christianity, as of\nother religions, actually exists.  The religious belief of the vast\nmajority of persons has always rested, and must always rest, very\nlargely upon tradition, education, environment, authority of one kind\nor another--authority supported or confirmed by a varying measure of\nindependent reflection or experience.  And, just where the influence of\nauthority is most complete and overwhelming, it is least felt to be\nauthority.  The person whose beliefs are most entirely produced by\neducation or environment is very often most convinced that his opinions\nare due solely to his own immediate insight.  But even where this is\nnot the case--even where the religious man is taking a new departure,\nrevolting against his environment and adopting a religious belief\nabsolutely at variance with the established {135} belief of his\nsociety--I do not contend that such new religious ideas are always due\nto unobserved and unanalysed processes of reasoning.  That in most\ncases, when a person adopts a new creed, he would himself give some\nreason for his change of faith is obvious, though the reason which he\nwould allege would not in all cases be the one which really caused the\nchange of religion.  There may be other psychological influences which\ncause belief besides the influence of environment: in some cases the\npsychological causes of such beliefs are altogether beyond analysis.\nBut, though I do not think M. Auguste Sabatier justified in assuming\nthat a belief is true, and must come directly from God, simply because\nwe cannot easily explain its genesis by the individual's environment\nand psychological antecedents, it is of extreme importance to insist\nthat it is not proved to be false because it was not adopted primarily,\nor at all, on adequate theoretical grounds.  A belief which arose at\nfirst entirely without logical justification, or it may be on\nintellectual grounds subsequently discovered to be inadequate or false,\nmay nevertheless be one which can and does justify itself to the\nreflective intellect of the person himself or of other persons.  And\nmany new, true, and valuable beliefs have undoubtedly arisen in this\nway.  Even in physical Science we all know that there is no Logic of\ndiscovery.  It {136} is a familiar criticism upon the Logic of Bacon\nthat he ignored or under-estimated the part that is played in\nscientific thinking by hypothesis, and the consequent need of\nscientific imagination.  Very often the new scientific idea comes into\nthe discoverer's mind, he knows not how or why.  Some great man of\nScience--I think, Helmholtz--said of a brilliant discovery of his, 'It\nwas given to me.'  But it was not true because it came to Helmholtz in\nthis way, but because it was subsequently verified and proved.  Now,\nundoubtedly, religious beliefs, new and old, often do present\nthemselves to the minds of individuals in an intuitive and\nunaccountable way.  They may subsequently be justified at the bar of\nReason: and yet Reason might never have discovered them for itself.\nThey would never have come into the world unless they had presented\nthemselves at first to some mind or other as intuitions, inspirations,\nimmediate Revelations: and yet (once again) the fact that they so\npresent themselves does not by itself prove them to be true.\n\nI may perhaps illustrate what I mean by the analogy of Poetry.  I\nsuppose few people will push the sound-without-sense view of Poetry to\nthe length of denying that poets do sometimes see and teach us truths.\nNo one--least of all one who is not even a verse-maker himself--can, I\nsuppose, analyse the intellectual process by which a poet {137} gets at\nhis truths.  The insight by which he arrives at them is closely\nconnected with emotions of various kinds: and yet the truths are not\nthemselves emotions, nor do they in all cases merely state the fact\nthat the poet has felt such and such emotions.  They are propositions\nabout the nature of things, not merely about the poet's mental states.\nAnd yet the truths are not true because the poet _feels_ them, as he\nwould say--no matter how passionately he feels them.  There is no\nseparate organ of poetic truth: and not all the things that poets have\npassionately felt are true.  Some highly poetical thoughts have been\nvery false thoughts.  But, if they are true, they must be true for good\nlogical reasons, which a philosophical critic may even in some cases by\nsubsequent reflection be able to disentangle and set forth.  Yet the\npoet did not get at those truths by way of philosophical reflection:\nor, if he was led to them by any logical process, he could not have\nanalysed his own reasoning.  The poet could not have produced the\narguments of the philosopher: the philosopher without the poet's lead\nmight never have seen the truth.  I am afraid I must not stay to defend\nor illustrate this position: I will only say that the poets I should\nmost naturally go to for illustration would be such poets as\nWordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning, though perhaps all three are a\nlittle {138} too consciously philosophic to supply the ideal\nillustration.\n\nI do not think it will be difficult to apply these reflections to the\ncase of religious and ethical truth.  All religious truth, as I hold,\ndepends logically upon inference; inference from the whole body of our\nexperiences, among which the most important place is held by our\nimmediate moral judgements.  The truth of Theism is in that sense a\ntruth discernible by Reason.  But it does not follow that, when it was\nfirst discovered, it was arrived at by the inferences which I have\nendeavoured to some extent to analyse, or by one of the many lines of\nthought which may lead to the same conclusions.  It was not the Greek\nphilosophers so much as the Jewish prophets who taught the world true\nMonotheism.  Hosea, Amos, the two Isaiahs probably arrived at their\nMonotheism largely by intuition; or (in so far as it was by inferential\nprocesses) the premisses of their argument were very probably inherited\nbeliefs of earlier Judaism which would not commend themselves without\nqualification to a modern thinker.  In its essentials the Monotheism of\nIsaiah is a reasonable belief; we accept it because it is reasonable,\nnot because Isaiah had an intuition that it was true; for we have\nrejected many things which to Isaiah probably seemed no less\nself-evidently true.  And yet it would be a profound mistake to assume\nthat {139} the philosophers who now defend Isaiah's creed would ever\nhave arrived at it without Isaiah's aid.\n\nI hope that by this time you will have seen to some extent the spirit\nin which I am approaching the special subject of to-day's lecture--the\nquestion of Revelation.  In some of the senses that have been given to\nit, the idea of Revelation is one which hardly any one trained in the\nschool--that is to say, any school--of modern Philosophy is likely to\naccept.  The idea that pieces of information have been supernaturally\nand without any employment of their own intellectual faculties\ncommunicated at various times to particular persons, their truth being\nguaranteed by miracles--in the sense of interruptions of the ordinary\ncourse of nature by an extraordinary fiat of creative power--is one\nwhich is already rejected by most modern theologians, even among those\nwho would generally be called rather conservative theologians.  I will\nnot now argue the question whether any miraculous event, however well\nattested, could possibly be sufficient evidence for the truth of\nspiritual teaching given in attestation of it.  I will merely remark\nthat to any one who has really appreciated the meaning of biblical\ncriticism, it is scarcely conceivable that the evidence for miracles\ncould seem sufficiently cogent to constitute such an attestation.  In\nproof of that I will merely appeal to the modest, apologetic, tentative\ntone in which {140} scholarly and sober-minded theologians who would\nusually be classed among the defenders of miracles--men like the Bishop\nof Ely or Professor Sanday of Oxford--are content to speak of such\nevidences.  They admit the difficulty of proving that such miraculous\nevents really happened thousands of years ago on the strength of\nnarratives written at the very earliest fifty years after the alleged\nevent, and they invite us rather to believe in the miracles on the\nevidence of a Revelation already accepted than to accept the revelation\non the evidence of the miracles.  I shall have a word to say on this\nquestion of miracles next time; but for the present I want to\nestablish, or rather without much argument to put before you for your\nconsideration, this position; that the idea of revelation cannot be\nadmitted in the sense of a communication of truth by God, claiming to\nbe accepted not on account of its own intrinsic reasonableness or of\nthe intellectual or spiritual insight of the person to whom it is made,\nbut on account of the historical evidence for miraculous occurrences\nsaid to have taken place in connexion with such communication.  The\nmost that can reasonably be contended for is that super-normal\noccurrences of this kind may possess a certain corroborative value in\nsupport of a Revelation claiming to be accepted on other grounds.\n\nWhat place then is left for the idea of Revelation?  {141} I will ask\nyou to go back for a moment to the conclusions of our first lecture.\nWe saw that from the idealistic point of view all knowledge may be\nlooked upon as a partial communication to the human soul of the\nthoughts or experiences of the divine Mind.  There is a sense then in\nwhich all truth is revealed truth.  In a more important sense, and a\nsense more nearly allied to that of ordinary usage, all moral and\nspiritual truth may be regarded as revealed truth.  And in particular\nthose immediate judgements about good and evil in which we have found\nthe sole means of knowing the divine character and purposes must be\nlooked on as divinely implanted knowledge--none the less divinely\nimplanted because it is, in the ordinary sense of the words, quite\nnatural, normal, and consistent with law.  Nobody but an Atheist ought\nto talk about the unassisted human intellect: no one who acquiesces in\nthe old doctrine that Conscience is the voice of God ought either on\nthe one hand to deny the existence of Revelation, or on the other to\nspeak of Revelation as if it were confined to the Bible.\n\nBut because we ascribe some intrinsic power of judging about spiritual\nand moral matters to the ordinary human intellect, it would be a\ngrievous mistake to assume that all men have an equal measure of this\npower.  Because we assert that all moral and spiritual truth comes to\nmen by {142} Revelation, it does not follow that there are not degrees\nof Revelation.  And it is one of the special characteristics of\nreligious and moral truth that it is in a peculiar degree dependent\nupon the superior insight of those exceptional men to whom have been\naccorded extraordinary degrees of moral and spiritual insight.  Even in\nScience, as we have seen, we cannot dispense with genius: very ordinary\nmen can satisfy themselves of the truth of a hypothesis when it is once\nsuggested, though they would have been quite incompetent to discover\nthat hypothesis for themselves.  Still more unquestionably are there\nmoral and spiritual truths which, when once discovered, can be seen to\nbe true by men of very commonplace intellect and commonplace character.\nThe truths are seen and passed on to others, who accept them partly on\nauthority, by way of social inheritance and tradition; partly because\nthey are confirmed in various degrees by their own independent\njudgement and experience.  Here then--in the discovery of new spiritual\ntruth--we encounter that higher and exceptional degree of spiritual and\nethical insight which in a special and pre-eminent sense we ought to\nregard as Revelation or Inspiration.  Here there is room, in the\nevolution of Religion and Morality, for the influence of the men of\nmoral or religious genius--the Prophets, the Apostles, the Founders and\nReformers of Religions: and, since {143} moral and spiritual insight\nare very closely connected with character, for the moral hero, the\nleader of men, the Saint.  Especially to the new departures, the\nturning-points, the epoch-making discoveries in ethical and religious\nprogress connected with the appearance of such men, we may apply the\nterm Revelation in a supreme or culminating sense.\n\nIt is, as it seems to me, extremely important that we should not\naltogether divorce the idea of Revelation from those kinds of moral and\nreligious truth which are arrived at by the ordinary working of the\nhuman intellect.  The ultimate moral judgements no doubt must be\nintuitive or immediate, but in our deductions from them--in their\napplication both to practical life and to theories about God and the\nUniverse--there is room for much intellectual work of the kind which we\ncommonly associate rather with the philosopher than with the prophet.\nBut the philosopher may be also a prophet.  The philosophically trained\nGreek Fathers were surely right in recognizing that men like Socrates\nand Plato were to be numbered among those to whom the Spirit of God had\nspoken in an exceptional degree.  They too spoke in the power of the\nindwelling Logos.  But still it is quite natural that we should\nassociate the idea of Revelation or Inspiration more particularly with\nthat kind of moral and intellectual discovery which comes to\nexceptional men by way {144} of apparent intuition or immediate\ninsight.  We associate the idea of inspiration rather with the poet\nthan with the man of Science, and with the prophet rather than with the\nsystematic philosopher.  It is quite natural, therefore, that we should\nassociate the idea of Revelation more especially with religious\nteachers of the intuitive order like the Jewish prophets than with even\nthose philosophers who have also been great practical teachers of\nEthics and Religion.  But it is most important to recognize that there\nis no hard and fast line to be drawn between the two classes.  The\nJewish prophets did not arrive at their ideas about God without a great\ndeal of hard thinking, though the thinking is for the most part\nunexplicit and the mode of expression poetic.  'Their idols are silver\nand gold; even the work of men's hands. . . .  They have hands and\nhandle not; feet have they and walk not: neither speak they through\ntheir throat.'  There is real hard reasoning underlying such noble\nrhetoric, though the Psalmist could not perhaps have reduced his\nargument against Polytheism and Idolatry to the form of a dialectical\nargument like Plato or St. Thomas Aquinas.  In the highest instance of\nall--the case of our Lord Jesus Christ himself--a natural instinct of\nreverence is apt to deter us from analysing how he came by the truth\nthat he communicated to men; but, though I would not deny that the\ndeepest {145} truth came to him chiefly by a supreme gift of intuition,\nthere are obvious indications of profound intellectual thought in his\nteaching.  Recall for a moment his arguments against the misuse of the\nSabbath, against the superstition of unclean meats, against the\nSadducean objection to the Resurrection.  I want to avoid at present\ndogmatic phraseology; so I will only submit in passing that this is\nonly what we should expect if the early Church was right in thinking of\nChrist as the supreme expression in the moral and religious sphere of\nthe Logos or Reason of God.\n\nThe thought of great religious thinkers is none the less Revelation\nbecause it involves the use of their reasoning faculties.  But I\nguarded myself against being supposed, in contending for the\npossibility of a philosophical or metaphysical knowledge of God, to\nassume that religious truth had always come to men in this way, or even\nthat the greatest steps in religious progress have usually taken the\nform of explicit reasoning.  Once again, it is all-important to\ndistinguish between the way in which a belief comes to be entertained\nand the reasons for its being true.  All sorts of psychological causes\nhave contributed to generate religious beliefs.  And when once we have\ndiscovered grounds in our own reflection or experience for believing\nthem to be true, there is no reason why we should not regard all of\nthem as {146} pieces of divine revelation.  Visions and dreams, for\ninstance, had a share in the development of religious ideas.  We might\neven admit the possibility that the human race would never have been\nled to think of the immortality of the soul but for primitive ideas\nabout ghosts suggested by the phenomena of dreams.  The truth of the\ndoctrine is neither proved nor disproved by such an account of its\norigin; but, if that belief is true and dreams have played a part in\nthe process by which man has been led to it, no Theist surely can\nrefuse to recognize the divine guidance therein.  And so, at a higher\nlevel, we are told by the author of the Acts that St. Peter was led to\naccept the great principle of Gentile Christianity by the vision of a\nsheet let down from heaven.  There is no reason why that account should\nnot be historically true.  The psychologist may very easily account for\nSt. Peter's vision by the working in his mind of the liberal teaching\nof Stephen, the effect of his fast, and so on.  But that does not\nprevent us recognizing that vision as an instrument of divine\nRevelation.  We at the present day do not believe in this fundamental\nprinciple of Christianity because of that dream of St. Peter's; for we\nknow that dreams are not always truth or always edifying.  We believe\nin that principle on other grounds--the convincing grounds (among\nothers) which St. Luke puts into St. Peter's mouth {147} on the\nfollowing morning.  But that need not prevent our recognizing that God\nmay have communicated that truth to the men of that generation--and\nthrough them to us--partly by means of that dream.\n\nThe two principles then for which I wish to contend are these: (1) that\nRevelation is a matter of degree; (2) that no Revelation can be\naccepted in the long run merely because it came to a particular person\nin a peculiarly intuitive or immediate way.  It may be that M. Auguste\nSabatier is right in seeing the most immediate contact of God with the\nhuman soul in those intuitive convictions which can least easily be\naccounted for by ordinary psychological causes; in those new departures\nof religious insight, those unaccountable comings of new thoughts into\nthe mind, which constitute the great crises or turning-points of\nreligious history.  But, though the coming of such thoughts may often\nbe accepted by the individual as direct evidences of a divine origin,\nthe Metaphysician, on looking back upon them, cannot treat the fact\nthat the psychologist cannot account for them, as a convincing proof of\nsuch an origin, apart from our judgement upon the contents of what\nclaims to be a revelation.  Untrue thoughts and wicked thoughts\nsometimes arise equally unaccountably: the fact that they do so is even\nnow accounted for by some as a sufficient proof of direct diabolic\nsuggestion.  When we have judged the {148} thought to be true or the\nsuggestion to be good, then we, who on other grounds believe in God,\nmay see in it a piece of divine revelation, but not till then.\n\nFrom this point of view it is clear that we are able to recognize\nvarious degrees and various kinds of divine revelation in many\ndifferent Religions, philosophies, systems of ethical teaching.  We are\nable to recognize the importance to the world of the great historical\nReligions, in all of which we can acknowledge a measure of Revelation.\nThe fact that the truths which they teach (in so far as they are true)\ncan now be recognized as true by philosophic thought, does not show\nthat the world would ever have evolved those thoughts, apart from the\ninfluence of the great revealing personalities.  Philosophy itself--the\nPhilosophy of the professed philosophers--has no doubt contributed a\nvery important element to the content of the historical Religions; but\nit is only in proportion as they become part of a system of religious\nteaching, and the possession of an organized religious community, that\nthe ideas of the philosophers really come home to multitudes of men,\nand shape the history of the world.  Nor in many cases would the\nphilosophers themselves have seen what they have seen but for the great\nepoch-making thoughts of the great religion-making periods.  And the\nsame considerations which show the importance of religious movements in\nthe {149} past tend also to emphasize the importance of the historical\nReligion and of the religious community in which it is enshrined in\nmodern times.  Because religious truth can now be defended by the use\nof our ordinary intellectual faculties, and because all possess these\nfaculties in some degree, it is absurd to suppose that the ordinary\nindividual, if left to himself, would be likely to evolve a true\nreligious system for himself--any more than he would be likely to\ndiscern for himself the truths that were first seen by Euclid or Newton\nif he were not taught them.  To under-estimate the importance of the\ngreat historical Religions and their creators has been the besetting\nsin of technical religious Philosophy.  Metaphysicians have in truth\noften written about Religion in great ignorance as to the real facts of\nreligious history.\n\nBut because we recognize a measure of truth in all the historical\nReligions, it does not follow that we can recognize an equal amount of\ntruth in all of them.  The idea that all the Religions teach much the\nsame thing--or that, while they vary about that unimportant part of\nReligion which is called doctrine or dogma, they are all agreed about\nMorality--is an idea which could only occur to the self-complaisant\nignorance which of late years has done most of the theological writing\nin the correspondence columns of our newspapers.  The real student of\ncomparative {150} Religion knows that it is only at a rather advanced\nstage in the development of Religion that Religion becomes in any\nimportant degree an ethical teacher at all.  Even the highest and most\nethical Religions are not agreed either in their Ethics or in their\nTheology.  Not only can we recognize higher and lower Religions; but\nthe highest Religions, among many things which they have in common, are\nat certain points diametrically antagonistic to each other.  It is\nimpossible therefore reasonably to maintain that fashionable attitude\nof mind towards these Religions which my friend Professor Inge once\ndescribed as a sort of honorary membership of all Religions except\none's own.  If we are to regard the historical Religions as being of\nany importance to our own personal religious life, we must choose\nbetween them.  If we put aside the case of Judaism in its most\ncultivated modern form, a form in which it has been largely influenced\nby Christianity, I suppose there is practically only one Religion which\nwould be in the least likely to appeal to a modern philosophical\nstudent of Religion as a possible alternative to Christianity--and that\nis Buddhism.  But Buddhist Ethics are not the same as Christian Ethics.\nBuddhist Ethics are ascetic: the Christianity which Christ taught was\nanti-ascetic.  In its view of the future, Buddhism is pessimistic;\nChristianity is optimistic.  Much as {151} Buddhism has done to\ninculcate Humanity and Charity, the principle of Buddhist Humanity is\nnot the same as that of Christianity.  Humanity is encouraged by the\nBuddhist (in so far as he is really influenced by his own formal creed)\nnot from a motive of disinterested affection, but as a means of\nescaping from the evils of personal and individual existence, and so\nwinning Nirvana.  We cannot at one and the same time adhere to the\nEthics of Buddhism and to those of Christianity, though I am far from\nsaying that Christians have nothing to learn either from Buddhist\nteaching or from Buddhist practice.  Still less can we at one and the\nsame time be Atheists with the Buddhist and Theists with the Christian;\nlook forward with the Buddhist to the extinction of personal\nconsciousness and with the Christian to a fuller and more satisfying\nlife.  To take an interest in comparative Religion is not to be\nreligious; to be religious implies a certain exclusive attachment to\nsome definite form of religious belief, though it may of course often\nbe a belief to which many historical influences have contributed.\n\nI have been trying to lead you to a view of Revelation which recognizes\nthe existence and the importance of those exceptional religious minds\nto whom is due the foundation and development of the great historical\nReligions, while at the same time we refuse, in the last resort, to\nrecognize any {152} revelation as true except on the ground that its\ntruth can be independently verified.  I do not mean to deny that the\nindividual must at first, and may quite reasonably in some cases\nthroughout life, accept much of his religious belief on authority; but\nthat is only because he may be justified in thinking that such and such\na person, or more probably such and such a religious community, is more\nlikely to be right than himself.  Rational submission to authority in\nthis or that individual postulates independent judgement on the part of\nothers.  I am far from saying that every individual is bound to satisfy\nhimself by personal enquiry as to the truth of every element in his own\nReligion; but, if and so far as he determines to do so, he cannot\nreasonably accept an alleged revelation on any other ground than that\nit comes home to him, that the content of that Religion appeals to him\nas true, as satisfying the demands of his intellect and of his\nconscience.  The question in which most of us, I imagine, are most\nvitally interested is whether the Christian Religion is a Religion\nwhich we can accept on these grounds.  That it possesses some truth,\nthat whatever in it is true comes from God--that much is likely to be\nadmitted by all who believe in any kind of Religion in the sense in\nwhich we have been discussing Religion.  The great question for us is,\n'Can we find any reason for the modern man {153} identifying himself in\nany exclusive way with the historical Christian Religion?  Granted that\nthere is some truth in all Religions, does Christianity contain the\nmost truth?  Is it in any sense the one absolute, final, universal\nReligion?'\n\nThat will be the subject for our consideration in the next lecture.\nBut meanwhile I want to suggest to you one very broad provisional\nanswer to our problem.  Christianity alone of the historical Religions\nteaches those great truths to which we have been conducted by a mere\nappeal to Reason and to Conscience.  It teaches ethical Monotheism;\nthat is to say, it thinks of God as a thinking, feeling, willing\nConsciousness, and understands His nature in the light of the highest\nmoral ideal.  It teaches the belief in personal Immortality, and it\nteaches a Morality which in its broad general principles still appeals\nto the Conscience of Humanity.  Universal Love it sets forth as at once\nthe central point in its moral ideal and the most important element in\nits conception of God.  In one of those metaphors which express so much\nmore than any more exact philosophical formula, it is the Religion\nwhich teaches the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man.  And\nthese truths were taught by the historical Jesus.  No one up to his\ntime had ever taught them with equal clearness and in equal purity, and\nwith the same freedom from other and inconsistent teachings: {154} and\nthis teaching was developed by his first followers.  Amid all\naberrations and amid all contamination by heterogeneous elements, the\nsociety or societies which look back to Christ as their Founder have\nnever in the worst times ceased altogether to teach these truths; and\nnow they more and more tend to constitute the essence of Christianity\nas it is to-day--all the more so on account of the Church's gradual\nshuffling off of so many adventitious ideas and practices which were at\none time associated with them.  Christianity is and remains the only\none of the great historical Religions which has taught and does teach\nthese great truths in all their fullness.[2]  These considerations\nwould by themselves be sufficient to put Christianity in an absolutely\nunique position among the Religions of Mankind.\n\nI have so far been regarding our Lord Jesus Christ simply as a teacher\nof religious and ethical truth.  I think it is of fundamental\nimportance that we should _begin_ by regarding him in this light.\n{155} It was in this light that he first presented himself to his\nfellow-countrymen--even before (in all probability) he claimed to be\nthe fulfiller of the Messianic ideal which had been set before them by\nthe prophets of their race.  And I could not, without a vast array of\nquotation, give you a sufficient impression of the prominence of this\naspect of his work and personality among the earlier Greek Fathers.\nEven after the elaborate doctrines of Catholic Christianity had begun\nto be developed, it was still primarily as the supremely inspired\nTeacher that Jesus was most often thought of.  When the early\nChristians thought of him as the incarnate Logos or Reason of God, to\nteach men divine truth was still looked upon as the supreme function of\nthe Logos and the purpose of his indwelling in the historical Jesus.\nBut from the first Jesus appealed to men as much more than a teacher.\nIt is one of the distinctive peculiarities of religious and ethical\nknowledge that it is intimately connected with character: religious and\nmoral teaching of the highest kind is in a peculiar degree inseparable\nfrom the personality of the teacher.  Jesus impressed his\ncontemporaries, and he has impressed successive ages as having not only\nset before man the highest religious and moral ideal, but as having in\na unique manner realized that ideal in his own life.  Even the word\n'example' {156} does not fully express the impression which he made on\nhis followers, or do justice to the inseparability of his personality\nfrom his teaching.  In the religious consciousness of Christ men saw\nrealized the ideal relation of man not merely to his fellow-man but\nalso to his heavenly Father.  From the first an enthusiastic reverence\nfor its Founder has been an essential part of the Christian Religion\namid all the variety of the phases which it has assumed.  The doctrine\nof the Christian Church was in its origin an attempt to express in the\nphilosophical language of the time its sense of this supreme value of\nChrist for the religious and moral life of man.  As to the historical\nsuccess and the present usefulness of these attempts, I shall have a\nword to say next time.  Meanwhile, I would leave with you this one\nthought.  The claim of Christianity to be the supreme, the universal,\nin a sense the final Religion, must rest mainly, in the last resort,\nupon the appeal which Christ and his Religion make to the moral and\nreligious consciousness of the present.\n\n\nLITERATURE\n\nSee the works mentioned at the end of the next Lecture, to which, as\ndealing more specially with the subject of Lecture v., may be added\nProfessor Sanday's _Inspiration_, and Professor Wendt's _Revelation and\nChristianity_.\n\n\n\n[1] Throughout his writings, but pre-eminently in the _Theoetetus_.\n\n[2] If it be said that Judaism or any other Religion does now teach\nthese truths as fully as Christianity, this may possibly apply to the\ncreed of individual members of these Religions, but it can hardly be\nclaimed for the historical Religions themselves.  I should certainly be\nprepared to contend that even such individuals lose something by not\nplacing in the centre of their Religion the personality of him by whom\nthey were first taught, and the communities which have been the great\ntransmitters of them.  But in this course of lectures I am chiefly\nconcerned with giving reasons why Christians should remain Christians,\nrather than with giving reasons why others who are not so should become\nChristians.\n\n\n\n\n{157}\n\nLECTURE VI\n\nCHRISTIANITY\n\nIn my last lecture I tried to effect a transition from the idea of\nreligious truth as something believed by the individual, and accepted\nby him on the evidence of his own Reason and Conscience to the idea of\na Religion considered as a body of religious truth handed down by\ntradition in an organized society.  The higher Religions--those which\nhave passed beyond the stage of merely tribal or national Religion--are\nbased upon the idea that religious truth of enduring value has been\nfrom time to time revealed to particular persons, the Founders or\nApostles or Reformers of such religions.  We recognized the validity of\nthis idea of Revelation, and the supreme importance to the moral and\nreligious life of such historical revelations, on one condition--that\nthe claim of any historical Religion to the allegiance of its followers\nmust be held to rest in the last resort upon the appeal which it makes\nto their Reason and Conscience: though the individual may often be\n{158} quite justified in accepting and relying upon the Reason and\nConscience of the religious Society rather than upon his own.\n\nThe view which I have taken of Revelation makes it quite independent of\nwhat are commonly called miracles.  All that I have said is quite\nconsistent with the unqualified acceptance or with the unqualified\nrejection of miracles.  But some of you may perhaps expect me to\nexplain a little more fully my own attitude towards that question.  And\ntherefore I will say this much--that, if we regard a miracle as\nimplying a suspension of a law of nature, I do not think we can call\nsuch a suspension _a priori_ incredible; but the enormous experience\nwhich we have of the actual regularity of the laws of nature, and of\nthe causes which in certain states of the human mind lead to the belief\nin miracles, makes such an event in the highest degree improbable.  To\nme at least it would seem practically impossible to get sufficient\nevidence for the occurrence of such an event in the distant past: all\nour historical reasoning presupposes the reign of law.  But it is being\nmore and more admitted by theologians who are regarded as quite\northodox and rather conservative, that the idea of a miracle need not\nnecessarily imply such a suspension of natural law.  And on the other\nhand, decidedly critical and liberal theologians are more and more\ndisposed to admit {159} that many of the abnormal events commonly\ncalled miraculous may very well have occurred without involving any\nreal suspension of natural law.  Recent advances in psychological\nknowledge have widened our conception of the possible influence of mind\nover matter and of mind over mind.  Whether an alleged miraculous event\nis to be accepted or not must, as it seems to me, depend partly upon\nthe amount of critically sifted historical evidence which can be\nproduced for it, partly upon the nature of the event itself--upon the\nquestion whether it is or is not of such a kind that we can with any\nprobability suppose that it might be accounted for either by known laws\nor by laws at present imperfectly understood.\n\nTo apply these principles in detail to the New Testament narratives\nwould involve critical discussions which are outside the purpose of\nthese lectures.  I will only say that few critical scholars would deny\nthat some recorded miracles even in the New Testament are unhistorical.\nWhen they find an incident like the healing of Malchus's ear omitted in\nthe earlier, and inserted in the later redaction of a common original,\nthey cannot but recognize the probability of traditional amplification.\nAt the same time few liberal theologians will be disposed to doubt the\ngeneral fact that our Lord did cure some diseases by spiritual\ninfluence, or that an appearance of our Lord to the disciples--of\nwhatever nature--actually {160} did occur, and was the means of\nassuring them of his continued life and power.  At all events I do not\nmyself doubt these two facts.  But at least when miracles are not\nregarded as constituting real exceptions to natural law, it is obvious\nthat they will not prove the truth of any teaching which may have been\nconnected with them; while, even if we treat the Gospel miracles as\nreal exceptions to law, the difficulty of proving them in the face of\nmodern critical enquiry is so great that the evidence will hardly come\nhome to any one not previously convinced, on purely spiritual grounds,\nof the exceptional character of our Lord's personality and mission.\nThis being so, I do not think that our answer to the problem of\nmiracles, whatever it be, can play any very important part in Christian\nApologetic.  When we have become Christians on other grounds, the acts\nof healing may still retain a certain value as illustrating the\ncharacter of the Master, and the Resurrection vision as proclaiming the\ntruth of Immortality in a way which will come home to minds not easily\naccessible to abstract argument.  The true foundation not merely for\nbelief in the teaching of Christ, but also for the Christian's\nreverence for his Person, must, as it seems to me, be found in the\nappeal which his words and his character still make to the Conscience\nand Reason of mankind.  This proposition would be {161} perhaps more\ngenerally accepted if I were to say that the claim of Christ to\nallegiance rests upon the way in which he satisfies the heart, the\naspirations, the religious needs of mankind.  And I should be quite\nwilling to adopt such language, if you will only include respect for\nhistoric fact and intellectual truth among these religious needs, and\nadmit that a reasonable faith must rest on something better than mere\nemotion.  Fully to exhibit the grounds of this claim of Christ upon us\nwould involve an examination of the Gospel narratives in detail: it\nwould involve an attempt to present to you what was this teaching, this\ncharacter, this religious consciousness which has commanded the homage\nof mankind.  To attempt such a task would be out of place in a brief\ncourse of lectures devoted to a particular aspect of Religion--its\nrelation to Philosophy.  Here I must assume that you feel the spiritual\nsupremacy of Christ--his unique position in the religious history of\nthe world and his unique importance for the spiritual life of each one\nof us--; and go on to ask what assertions such a conviction warrants us\nin making about his person and nature, what in short should be our\nattitude towards the traditional doctrines of the Christian Church.\n\nYou may know something of the position taken up in this matter by the\ndominant school of what I may call believing liberal Theology in {162}\nGermany--the school which takes its name from the great theologian\nRitschl, but which will be best known to most Englishmen in connexion\nwith the name of Prof. Harnack, though it may be well to remember that\nHarnack is nearer to the left than to the right wing of that school.\nThe fundamental principle of that school is to base the claims of\nChristianity mainly upon the appeal which the picture of the life,\nteaching, character, and personality of Christ makes to the moral and\nreligious consciousness of mankind.  Their teaching is Christo-centric\nin the highest possible degree: but they are almost or entirely\nindifferent to the dogmatic formulae which may be employed to express\nthis supreme religious importance of Christ.  In putting the personal\nand historical Christ, and not any doctrine about him, in the centre of\nthe religious life I believe they are right.  But this principle is\nsometimes asserted in an exaggerated and one-sided manner.  In the\nfirst place they are somewhat contemptuous of Philosophy, and of\nphilosophic argument even for such fundamental truths as the existence\nof God.  I do not see that the subjective impression made by Christ can\nby itself prove the fact of God's existence.  We must first believe\nthat there is a God to be revealed before we can be led to believe in\nChrist as the supreme Revealer.  I do not believe that the modern world\nwill permanently accept a view of the Universe {163} which does not\ncommend itself to its Reason.  The Ritschlians talk about the truth of\nReligion resting upon value-judgements.  I can quite understand that a\nvalue-judgement may tell us the supreme value of Christ's character and\nhis fitness to be treated as the representative of God to us, when once\nwe believe in God: but I cannot see how any value-judgement taken by\nitself can assure us of that existence.  Value is one thing: existence\nis another.  To my mind a Christian Apologetic should begin, like the\nold Apologies of Justin or Aristides, with showing the essential\nreasonableness of Christ's teaching about God and its essential harmony\nwith the highest philosophic teaching about duty, about the divine\nnature, about the soul and its eternal destiny.  The Ritschlian is too\nmuch disposed to underrate the value of all previous religious and\nethical teaching, even of Judaism at its highest: he is not content\nwith making Christ the supreme Revealer: he wants to make him the only\nRevealer.  And when we turn to post-Christian religious history, he is\napt to treat all the great developments of religious and ethical\nthought from the time of the Apostles to our own day as simply\nworthless and even mischievous corruptions of the original, and only\ngenuine, Christianity.  He tends to reduce Christianity to the\n_ipsissima verba_ of its Founder.  The Ritschlian dislikes Dogma, not\nbecause it may be at times a {164} misdevelopment, but because it is a\ndevelopment; not because some of it may be antiquated Philosophy, but\nsimply because it is Philosophy.[1]\n\nIn order to treat fairly this question of doctrinal development, it\nmust be remembered that what is commonly called dogma is only a\npart--perhaps not the most important part--of that development.\nSupreme as I believe to be the value of Christ's great principle of\nBrotherhood, it is impossible to deny that, if we look in detail at the\nmoral ideal of any educated Christian at the present day, we shall find\nin it many elements which cannot explicitly be discovered in the\n_ipsissima verba_ of Christ and still less of his Apostles.  And\ndevelopment in the ethical ideal always carries with it some\ndevelopment in a man's conception of God and the Universe.  Some of\nthese elements are due to a gradual bringing out into clear\nconsciousness, and an application to new details, of principles latent\nin the actual words of Christ; others to an infusion of Greek\nPhilosophy; others to the practical experience and the scientific\ndiscoveries of the modern world.  Christianity in the course of\nnineteen centuries has gradually absorbed into itself many ideas from\nvarious sources, {165} christianizing them in the process.  Many ideas,\nmuch Hellenic Philosophy, many Hellenic ideals of life, many Roman\nideas of government and organization have thus, in the excellent phrase\nof Professor Gardner, been 'baptized into Christ.'  This capacity of\nabsorbing into itself elements of spiritual life which were originally\nindependent of it is not a defect of historical Christianity, but one\nof its qualifications for being accepted by the modern world as a\nuniversal, an absolute, a final Religion.\n\nIt does not seem to me possible to recognize the claim of any\nhistorical Religion to be final and ultimate, unless it include within\nitself a principle of development.  Let me, as briefly as I can,\nillustrate what I mean.  It is most clearly and easily seen in the case\nof Morality.  If the idea of a universal Religion is to mean that any\ndetailed code of Morals laid down at a definite moment of history can\nserve by itself for the guidance of all human life in all after ages,\nwe may at once dismiss the notion as a dream.  In nothing did our Lord\nshow his greatness and the fitness of his Religion for universality\nmore than in abstaining from drawing up such a code.  He confined\nhimself to laying down a few great principles, with illustrations\napplicable to the circumstances of his immediate hearers.  Those\nprinciples require development and application to the needs and {166}\ncircumstances of successive ages before they can suffice to guide us in\nthe details of conduct.  To effect this development and application has\nbeen historically the work of the Church which owes its origin to the\ndisciples whom he gathered around him.  If we may accept the teaching\nof the fourth Gospel as at least having germs in the actual utterances\nof our Lord, he himself foresaw the necessity of such a development.\nAt all events the belief in the continued work of God's Spirit in human\nSociety is an essential principle of the Christian Religion as it was\ntaught by the first followers of its Founder.  Take for instance the\ncase of slavery.  Our Lord never condemned slavery: it is not certain\nthat he would have done so, had the case been presented to him.  Very\nlikely his answer would have been 'Who made me a judge or a divider,'\nor 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's.'  No one on\nreflection can now fail to see the essential incompatibility between\nslavery and the Christian spirit; yet it was perhaps fourteen hundred\nyears before a single Christian thinker definitely enunciated that\nincompatibility, and more than eighteen hundred years before slavery\nwas actually banished from all nominally Christian lands.  Who can\ndoubt that many features of our existing social system are equally\nincompatible with the principles of Christ's teaching, and that the\n{167} accepted Christian morality of a hundred years hence will\ndefinitely condemn many things which the average Christian Conscience\nnow allows?\n\nAnd then there is another kind of development in Ethics which is\nequally necessary.  The Christian law of Love bids us promote the true\ngood of our fellow-men, bids us regard another man's good as equally\nvaluable with our own or with the like good of any other.  But what is\nthis good life which we are to promote?  As to that our Lord has only\nlaid down a few very general principles--the supreme value of Love\nitself, the superiority of the spiritual to the carnal, the importance\nof sexual purity.  These principles our consciences still acknowledge,\nand there are no others of equal importance.  But what of the\nintellectual life?  Has that no value?  Our Lord never depreciated it,\nas so many religious founders and reformers have done.  But he has\ngiven us no explicit guidance about it.  When the Christian ideal\nembraced within itself a recognition of the value and duty of Culture,\nit was borrowing from Greece.  And when we turn from Ethics to\nTheology, the actual fact of development is no less indisputable.\nEvery alteration of the ethical ideal has brought with it some\nalteration in our idea of God.  We can no longer endure theories of the\nAtonement which are opposed to modern ideas of Justice, though they\nwere quite compatible with {168} patristic or medieval ideas of\nJustice.  The advances of Science have altered our whole conception of\nGod's mode of acting upon or governing the world.  None of these things\nare religiously so important as the great principle of the Fatherhood\nof God, nor have they in any way tended to modify its truth or its\nsupreme importance.  But they do imply that our Theology is not and\ncannot be in all points the same as that of the first Christians.\n\nNow with these presuppositions let us approach the question of that\ngreat structure of formal dogma which the Church has built upon the\nfoundation of Christ's teaching.  A development undoubtedly it is; but,\nwhile we must not assume that every development which has historically\ntaken place is necessarily true or valuable, it is equally\nunphilosophical to assume that, because it is a development, it is\nnecessarily false or worthless.  Our Lord himself did, indeed, claim to\nbe the Messiah; the fact of Messiahship was what was primarily meant by\nthe title 'Son of God.'  Even in the Synoptists he exhibits a\nconsciousness of a direct divine mission supremely important for his\nown race; and, before the close, we can perhaps discover a growing\nconviction that the truth which he was teaching was meant for a larger\nworld.  Starting from and developing these ideas, his followers set\nthemselves to devise terms which should express their own sense of\ntheir Master's unique {169} religious value and importance, to express\nwhat they felt he had been to their own souls, what they felt he might\nbe to all who accepted his message.  Even to St. Paul the term 'Son of\nGod' still meant primarily 'the Messiah': but in the light of his\nconception of Jesus, the Messianic idea expanded till the Christ was\nexalted to a position far above anything which Jewish prophecy or\nApocalypse had ever claimed for him.  And the means of expressing these\nnew ideas were found naturally and inevitably in the current\nphilosophical terminology of the day.  With the fourth Gospel, if not\nalready with St. Paul, there was infused into the teaching of the\nChurch a new element.  From the Jewish-Alexandrian speculative Theology\nthe author borrowed the term Logos to express what he conceived to be\nthe cosmic importance of Christ's position.  He accepted from that\nspeculation--probably from Philo--the theory which personified or\nhalf-personified that Logos or Wisdom of God through which God was\nrepresented in the Old Testament as creating the world and inspiring\nthe prophets.  This Logos through whom God had throughout the ages been\nmore and more fully revealing Himself had at last become actually\nincarnate in Jesus Christ.  This Word of God is also described as truly\nGod, though in the fourth Gospel the relation of the Father to the\nWord--at {170} least to the Word before the Incarnation--is left wholly\nvague and undefined.\n\nFrom these comparatively simple beginnings sprang centuries of\ncontroversy culminating in that elaborate system of dogma which is\noften little understood even by its most vigorous champions.  You know\nin a very general way the result.  The Logos was made more and more\ndistinct from God, endowed with a more and more decidedly personal\nexistence.  Then, when the interests of Monotheism seemed to be\nendangered, the attempt was made to save it by asserting the\nsubordination of the Son to the Father.  The result was that by\nArianism the Son was reduced to the position of an inferior God.\nPolytheism had once more to be averted by asserting in even stronger\nterms not merely the equality of the Son with the Father but also the\nUnity of the God who is both Father and Son.  The doctrine of the\nDivinity of the Holy Ghost went through a somewhat similar series of\nstages.  At first regarded as identical with the Word, a distinction\nwas gradually effected.  The Word was said to have been incarnate in\nJesus; while it was through the Holy Ghost that the subsequent work of\nGod was carried on in human hearts.  And by similar stages the equality\nof the Holy Ghost to Father and to Son was gradually evolved; while it\nwas more and more strongly asserted that, in spite of the eternal\ndistinction of {171} Persons, it was one and the same God who revealed\nHimself in all the activities attributed to each of them.\n\nSide by side with these controversies about the relation between the\nFather and the Word, there was a gradual development of doctrine as to\nthe relation between the Logos and the human Jesus in whom he took up\nhis abode.  Frequently the idea of any real humanity in Jesus was all\nbut lost.  That was at last saved by the Catholic formula 'perfect God\nand perfect man'; though it cannot be denied that popular thought in\nall ages has never quite discarded the tendency to think of Jesus as\nsimply God in human form, and not really man at all.  Even now there\nare probably hundreds of people who regard themselves as particularly\northodox Churchmen who yet do not know that the Church teaches that our\nLord had a human soul and a human will.\n\nWhat are we to make of all that vast structure, of the elaboration and\ncomplication of which the Constantinopolitan Creed which we miscall\nNicene and even the so-called Athanasian Creed give very little idea to\nthose who do not also know something of the Councils, the Fathers, and\nthe Schoolmen?  Has it all a modern meaning?  Can it be translated into\nterms of our modern thought and speech?  For I suppose it hardly needs\ndemonstration--that such {172} translation is necessary, if it be\npossible.  I doubt whether any man in this audience who has not made a\nspecial study of the subject, will get up and say that the meaning of\nsuch terms as 'substance,' 'essence,' 'nature,' 'hypostasis,' 'person,'\n'eternal generation,' 'procession,' 'hypostatic union,' and the like is\nat once evident to him by the light of nature and an ordinary modern\neducation.  And those who know most about the matter will most fully\nrealize the difficulty of saying exactly what was meant by such phrases\nat this or that particular moment or by this or that particular\nthinker.  A thorough discussion of this subject from the point of view\nof one who acknowledges the supreme claims of Christ upon the modern\nmind, and is yet willing fairly to examine the traditional Creed in the\nlight of modern philosophical culture, is a task which very much needs\nto be undertaken.  I doubt if it has been satisfactorily performed yet.\nEven if I possessed a tithe of the learning necessary for that task, I\ncould obviously not undertake it now.  But a few remarks on the subject\nmay be of use for the guidance of our personal religious life in this\nmatter:\n\n(1) I should like once more to emphasize the fact that the really\nimportant thing, from the point of view of the spiritual life of the\nindividual soul, is our personal attitude towards our Lord himself and\nhis teaching, and not the phrases in which we express {173} it.  A man\nwho believes what Christ taught about God's Fatherhood, about human\nbrotherhood and human duty, about sin, the need for repentance, the\nFather's readiness to forgive, the value of Prayer, the certainty of\nImmortality--the man who finds the ideal of his life in the character\nof Jesus, and strives by the help which he has supplied to think of God\nand feel towards God as he did, to imitate him in his life, to live\n(like him) in communion with the Father and in the hope of\nImmortality--he is a Christian, and a Christian in the fullest sense of\nthe word.  He will find in that faith all that is necessary (to use the\nold phrase) for salvation--for personal goodness and personal Religion.\nAnd such a man will be saved, and saved through Christ; even though he\nhas never heard of the Creeds, or deliberately rejects many of the\nformulae which the Church or the Churches have 'built upon' that one\nfoundation.\n\n(2) At the same time, if we believe in the supreme importance of Christ\nfor the world, for the religious life of the Church and of the\nindividual, it is surely convenient to have some language in which to\nexpress our sense of that importance.  The actual personal attitude\ntowards Christ is the essential thing: but as a means towards that\nattitude it is of importance to express what Christ has actually been\nto others, and what he ought to be to ourselves.  Children {174} and\nadults alike require to have the claims of Christ presented to them\nbefore they can verify them by their own experience: and this requires\narticulate language of some kind.  Religion can only be handed down,\ndiffused, propagated by an organized society: and a religious society\nmust have some means of handing on its religious ideas.  It is possible\nto hold that under other conditions a different set of terms might have\nexpressed the truth as well as those which have actually been enshrined\nin the New Testament, the Liturgies, and the Creeds.  But the phrases\nwhich have been actually adopted surely have a strong presumption in\ntheir favour, even if it were merely through the difficulty of changing\nthem, and the importance of unity, continuity, corporate life.  It is\neasier to explain, or even if need be, alter in some measure the\nmeaning of an accepted formula than to introduce a new one.  Religious\ndevelopment has at all times taken place largely in this way.  Our Lord\nhimself entirely transformed the meaning of God's Fatherhood,\nMessiahship, the Kingdom of God, the people of God, the true Israel.\nAt all events we should endeavour to discover the maximum of truth that\nany traditional formula can be made to yield before we discard it in\nfavour of a new one.  If we want to worship and to work with Christ's\nChurch, we must do our best to give the maximum of meaning {175} to the\nlanguage in which it expresses its faith and its devotion.\n\n(3) We must insist strongly upon the thoroughly human character of\nChrist's own consciousness.  Jesus did not--so I believe the critical\nstudy of the Gospels leads us to think--himself claim to be God, or to\nbe Son of God in any sense but that of Messiahship.  He claimed to\nspeak with authority: he claimed a divine mission: he claimed to be a\nRevealer of divine truth.  The fourth Gospel has been of infinite\nservice to spiritual Christianity.  It has given the world a due sense\nof the spiritual importance of Christ as the Way, the Truth, and the\nLife.  Perhaps Christianity could hardly have expanded into a universal\nReligion without that Gospel.  But we cannot regard all that the\nJohannine Christ says about himself as the _ipsissima verba_ of Jesus.\nThe picture is idealized in accordance with the writer's own\nconceptions, though after all its Theology is very much simpler than\nthe later Theology which has grown out of it permits most people to\nsee.  We must not let these discourses blind us to the human character\nof Christ's consciousness.  And this real humanity must carry with it\nthe recognition of the thoroughly human limitations of his knowledge.\nThe Bishop of Birmingham has prepared the way for the union of a really\nhistorical view of Christ's life with a reasonable interpretation of\nthe Catholic {176} doctrine about him, by reviving the ancient view as\nto the limitation of his intellectual knowledge;[2] but the principle\nmust be carried in some ways further than the Bishop himself would be\nprepared to go.  The accepted Christology must be distinctly recognized\nas the Church's reflection and comment upon Christ's work and its\nvalue, not as the actual teaching of the Master about himself.\n\n(4) It must likewise be recognized that the language in which the\nChurch expressed this attitude towards Christ was borrowed from Greek\nMetaphysics, particularly from Plato and Neo-Platonism in the patristic\nperiod, and from Aristotle in the Middle Ages.  And we cannot\ncompletely separate language from thought.  It was not merely Greek\ntechnical phrases but Greek ways of thinking which were imported into\nCatholic Christianity.  And the language, the categories, the ideas of\nGreek Philosophy were to some extent different from those of modern\ntimes.  The most Platonically-minded thinker of modern times does not\nreally think exactly as Plato thought: the most Catholic-minded thinker\nof modern times, if he has also breathed the atmosphere of modern\nScience and modern Culture, cannot really think exactly as Athanasius\nor Basil thought.  I {177} do not suppose that any modern mind can\nthink itself back into exactly the state of mind which an ancient\nFather was in, when he used the term Logos.  This central idea of the\nLogos is not a category of modern thought.  We cannot really think of a\nBeing who is as distinct from the Father as he is represented as being\nin some of the patristic utterances--I say advisedly some, for widely\ndifferent modes of thought are found in Fathers of equal authority--and\nyet so far one with him that we can say 'One God, one spiritual Being,\nand not two.'  Nor are we under any obligation to accept these formulae\nas representing profound mysteries which we cannot understand: they\nwere simply pieces of metaphysical thinking, some of them valuable and\nsuccessful pieces of thinking, others less so.  We must use them as\nhelps, not as fetters to our thought.  But, though we cannot think\nourselves back into exactly the same intellectual condition as a\nfourth- or fifth-century Father, there is no reason why we should not\nrecognize the fundamental truth of the religious idea which he was\ntrying to express.  A modern Philosopher would probably express that\nthought somewhat in this manner.  'The whole world is a revelation of\nGod in a sense, and still more so is the human mind: all through the\nages God has gone on revealing Himself more and more in human\nconsciousness, especially through the prophets and other {178}\nexceptionally inspired men.  The fullest and completest revelation of\nHimself was made once for all in the person and teaching of Jesus, in\nwhom we recognize a revelation of God adequate to all our spiritual\nneeds, when developed and interpreted by the continued presence of\nGod's Spirit in the world and particularly in the Church which grew out\nof the little company of Jesus' friends.'\n\n(5) I do not think at the present day even quite orthodox people are\nmuch concerned about the technicalities of the conciliar Theology, or\neven about the niceties of the Athanasian Creed.  They are even a\nlittle suspicious sometimes that much talk about the doctrine of the\nLogos is only intended to evade a plain answer to the supreme question\nof the Divinity of Christ.  You will expect me perhaps to say something\nabout that question.  I would first observe that the popular term\n'divinity of Christ' is apt to give a somewhat misleading impression of\nwhat the orthodox teaching on the subject really is.  For one thing, it\nis apt to suggest the idea of a pre-existent human consciousness of\nJesus, which would be contrary to Catholic teaching.  The Logos--the\neternal Son or Reason of God--pre-existed; but not the man Jesus Christ\nwho was born at a particular moment of history, and who is still,\naccording to Catholic Theology, a distinct human soul perfectly and for\never united with the Word.  {179} And then again, it is apt to suggest\nthe heretical idea that the whole Trinity was incarnate in Christ, and\nnot merely the Word.  Orthodox Theology does not teach that God the\nFather became incarnate in Christ, and suffered upon the Cross.  And\nlastly, the constant iteration of the phrase 'Divinity of Christ' tends\nto the concealment of the other half of the Catholic doctrine--the real\nhumanity of Christ.  To speak of the God-manhood of Christ or the\nindwelling of God in Christ would be a truer representation even of the\nstrictest orthodox doctrine, apart from all modern re-interpretations.\nBut even so, when all this is borne in mind, it may be asked, What is\nthe real meaning of saying that a man was also God?  I would answer,\n'Whether it is possible to give a modern, intelligible, philosophically\ndefensible meaning to the idea of Christ's Divinity depends entirely\nupon the question what we conceive to be the true relation between\nHumanity in general and God.'  If (as I have attempted to show) we are\njustified in thinking of all human consciousness as constituting a\npartial reproduction of the divine Mind; if we are justified in\nthinking of human Reason, and particularly of the human Conscience, as\nconstituting in some measure and in some sense a revelation by means of\nwhich we can rise to a contemplation of the divine nature; if\nPersonality (as we know it in man) is the highest category within our\nknowledge; then {180} there is a real meaning in talking of one\nparticular man being also divine; of the divine Reason or Logos as\ndwelling after a unique, exceptional, pre-eminent manner in him.\n\nAs Dr. Edward Caird has remarked, all the metaphysical questions which\nwere formerly discussed as to the relation between the divine and the\nhuman nature in Christ, are now being discussed again in reference to\nthe relation of Humanity in general to God.  We cannot say intelligibly\nthat God dwells in Christ, unless we have already recognized that in a\nsense God dwells and reveals Himself in Humanity at large, and in each\nparticular human soul.  But I fully recognize that, if this is all that\nis meant by the expression 'divinity of Christ,' that doctrine would be\nevacuated of nearly all that makes it precious to the hearts of\nChristian people.  And therefore it is all-important that we should go\non to insist that men do not reveal God equally.  The more developed\nintellect reveals God more completely than that of the child or the\nsavage: and (far more important from a religious point of view), the\nhigher and more developed moral consciousness reveals Him more than the\nlower, and above all the actually better man reveals God more than the\nworse man.  Now, if in the life, teaching, and character of Christ--in\nhis moral and religious consciousness, and in the life and character\nwhich {181} so completely expressed and illustrated that\nconsciousness--we can discover the highest revelation of the divine\nnature, we can surely attach a real meaning to the language of the\nCreeds which singles him out from all the men that ever lived as the\none in whom the ideal relation of man to God is most completely\nrealized.  If God can only be known as revealed in Humanity, and Christ\nis the highest representative of Humanity, we can very significantly\nsay 'Christ is _the_ Son of God, very God of very God, of one substance\nwith the Father,' though the phrase undoubtedly belongs to a\nphilosophical dialect which we do not habitually use.\n\n(6) Behind the doctrine of the Incarnation looms the still more\ntechnical doctrine of the Trinity.  Yet after all, it is chiefly, I\nbelieve, as a sort of necessary background or presupposition to the\nidea of Christ's divine nature that modern religious people, not\nprofessionally interested in Theology, attach importance to that\ndoctrine.  They accept the doctrine in so far as it is implied by the\nteaching of Scripture and by the doctrine of our Lord's Divinity, but\nthey are not much attached to the technicalities of the Athanasian\nCreed.  The great objection to that Creed, apart from the damnatory\nclauses, is the certainty that it will be misunderstood by most of\nthose who think they understand it at all.  The {182} best thing we\ncould do with the Athanasian Creed is to drop it altogether: the next\nbest thing to it is to explain it, or at least so much of it as really\ninterests the ordinary layman--the doctrine of three Persons in one\nGod.  And therefore it is important to insist in the strongest possible\nway that the word 'Person' which has most unfortunately come to be the\ntechnical term for what the Greeks more obscurely called the three\n_huostaseis_ in the Godhead does not, and never did, mean what we\ncommonly understand by Personality--whether in the language of ordinary\nlife or of modern Philosophy.  I do not deny that at certain periods\nTheology did tend to think of the Logos as a distinct being from the\nFather, a distinct consciousness with thoughts, will, desires, emotions\nnot identical with those of God the Father.  The distinction was at\ntimes pushed to a point which meant either sheer Tritheism, or\nsomething which is incapable of being distinctly realized in thought at\nall.  But that is scarcely true of the Theology which was finally\naccepted either by East or West.  This is most distinctly seen in the\nSumma Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas: and I would remind you that you\ncannot be more orthodox than St. Thomas--the source not only of the\nTheology professed by the Pope and taught in every Roman Seminary but\nof the Theology embodied in our own Articles.  St. Thomas' explanation\nof the Trinity {183} is that God is at one and the same time Power or\nCause[3] (Father), Wisdom (Son), Will (Holy Ghost); or, since the Will\nof God is always a loving Will, Love (Amor) is sometimes substituted\nfor Will (Voluntas) in explanation of the Holy Spirit.[4]  How little\n{184} St. Thomas thought of the 'Persons' as separate consciousnesses,\nis best seen from his doctrine (taken from Augustine) that the love of\nthe Father for the Son is the Holy Spirit.  The love of one Being for\nhimself or for another is not a Person in the natural, normal, modern\nsense of the word: and it would be quite unorthodox to attribute\nPersonality to the Son in any other sense than that in which it is\nattributed to the Holy Ghost.  I do not myself attach any great\nimportance to these technical phrases.  I do not {185} deny that the\nsupremely important truth that God has received His fullest revelation\nin the historical Christ, and that He goes on revealing Himself in the\nhearts of men, might have been otherwise, more simply, to modern minds\nmore intelligibly, expressed.  There are detailed features of the\npatristic or the scholastic version of the doctrine which involve\nconceptions to which the most accomplished Professors of Theology would\nfind it difficult or impossible to give a modern meaning.  I do not\nknow for instance that much would have been lost had Theology (with the\nall but canonical writers Clement of Rome and Hermas, with Ignatius,\nwith Justin, with the philosophic Clement of Alexandria) continued to\nspeak indifferently of the Word and the Spirit.  Yet taken by itself\nthis Thomist doctrine of the Trinity is one to which it is quite\npossible to give a perfectly rational meaning, and a meaning probably\nvery much nearer to that which was really intended by its author than\nthe meaning which is usually put upon the Trinitarian formula by\npopular religious thought.  That God is Power, and Wisdom, and Love is\nsimply the essence of Christian Theism--not the less true because few\nUnitarians would repudiate it.\n\n(7) Once more let me briefly remind you that any claim for finality in\nthe Christian Religion must be based on its power of perpetual\ndevelopment.  {186} Belief in the continued work of the Holy Spirit in\nthe Church is an essential element of the Catholic Faith.  We need not,\nwith the Ritschlian, contemptuously condemn the whole structure of\nChristian doctrine because undoubtedly it is a development of what was\ntaught by Christ himself.  Only, if we are to justify the development\nof the past, we must go on to assert the same right and duty of\ndevelopment in Ethics and in Theology for the Church of the future.  In\nthe pregnant phrase of Loisy, the development which the Church is most\nin need of at the present moment is precisely a development in the idea\nof development itself.\n\nBut how can we tell (it may be asked), if we once admit that the\ndevelopment of Religion does not end with the teaching of Christ, where\nthe development will stop?  If we are to admit an indefinite\npossibility of growth and change, how do we know that Christianity\nitself will not one day be outgrown?  If we once admit that the final\nappeal is to the religious consciousness of the present, we must\nacknowledge that it is not possible to demonstrate _a priori_ that the\nChristian Religion is the final, universal, or absolute Religion.  All\nwe can say is that we have no difficulty in recognizing that the\ndevelopment which has so far taken place, in so far as it is a\ndevelopment which we can approve and accept, seems to us a development\nwhich leaves the {187} Religion still essentially the Religion of\nChrist.  In the whole structure of the modern Christian's religious\nbelief, that which was contributed by Christ himself is incomparably\nthe most important part--the basis of the whole structure.  The\nessentials of Religion and Morality still seem to us to be contained in\nhis teaching as they are contained nowhere else.  All the rest that is\nincluded in an enlightened modern Christian's religious creed is either\na direct working out of the principles already contained there, or (if\nit has come from other sources) it has been transformed in the process\nof adaptation.  Nothing has been discovered in Religion and Morality\nwhich tends in any way to diminish the unique reverence which we feel\nfor the person of Christ, the perfect sufficiency of his character to\nrepresent and incarnate for us the character of God.  It is a\ncompletely gratuitous assumption to suppose that it will ever lose that\nsufficiency.  Even in the development of Science, there comes a time\nwhen its fundamentals are virtually beyond the reach of\nreconsideration.  Still more in practical life, mere unmotived,\ngratuitous possibilities may be disregarded.  It weakens the hold of\nfundamental convictions upon the mind to be perpetually contemplating\nthe possibility or probability of fundamental revision.  We ought no\ndoubt to keep the spiritual ear ever open that we may always be hearing\nwhat the Spirit saith unto {188} the Churches.  But to look forward to\na time when any better way will be discovered of thinking of God than\nJesus' way of thinking of Him as a loving Father is as gratuitous as to\ncontemplate the probability of something in human life at present\nunknown being discovered of greater value than Love.  Until that\ndiscovery is made, our Religion will still remain the Religion of him\nwho, by what he said and by what he was, taught the world to think of\nGod as the supreme Love and the supreme Holiness, the source of all\nother love and all other holiness.\n\n\nLITERATURE\n\nThe literature is here too vast to mention even the works of the very\nfirst importance: I can only select a very few books which have been\nuseful to myself.  The late Sir John Seeley's _Ecce Homo_ may be\nregarded as in the light of modern research a somewhat uncritical book,\nbut it remains to my mind the most striking expression of the appeal\nwhich Christ makes to the Conscience of the modern world.  It has\nproved a veritable fifth Gospel to many seekers after light.  Bishop\nMoorhouse's little book, _The Teaching of Christ_, will serve as an\nintroduction to the study of Christ's life and work.  A more elaborate\ntreatment of the subject, with which I am very much in sympathy, is\nWendt's _Teaching of Jesus_.  The ideal life of Christ perhaps remains\nto be written.  Professor Sanday's Article on 'Jesus Christ' in\nHastings' _Dictionary of the Bible_ may be mentioned as a good\nrepresentative of moderate and scholarly Conservatism or Liberal\nConservatism.  Professor Oscar Holtzmann's _Life of Jesus_ is based on\nmore radical, perhaps over-radical, criticism.  Professor Harnack's\n{189} _What is Christianity?_ has become the typical expression of the\nRitschlian attitude.  The ideas of extreme Roman Catholic 'Modernism'\nmay be gathered from Loisy's _l'Evangile et l'Eglise_ and _Autour d'un\nPetit Livre_.  Professor Gardner's three books--_Exploratio\nEvangelica_, the shorter _An Historic View of the New Testament_, and\n_The Growth of Christianity_--may be especially commended to those who\nwish to satisfy themselves that a thorough-going recognition of the\nresults of historical Criticism is compatible with a whole-hearted\npersonal acceptance of Christianity.  Dr. Fairbairn's _Philosophy of\nthe Christian Religion_ and Bousset's _What is Religion?_ are\nespecially valuable as vindications of the supreme position of\nChristianity combined with the fullest recognition of the measure of\nRevelation contained in all the great historical Religions.  Allen's\n_Continuity of Christian Thought_ suggests what seems to me the right\nattitude of the modern thinker towards traditional dogma, though the\nauthor's position is more decidedly 'Hegelian' than mine.  I may also\nmention Professor Inge's contribution to _Contentio Veritatis_ on 'The\nPersonal Christ,' and some of the Essays in _Lux Hominum_.  Though I\ncannot always agree with him, I recognize the high value of the Bishop\nof Birmingham's Bampton Lectures on _The Divinity of Jesus Christ the\nSon of God_ and the accompanying volume of _Dissertations_.\n\n\n\n[1] In their assertion of the necessity of Development, and of the\nreligious community as the origin of Development, the teaching of the\nAbbe Loisy and the Roman Catholic Modernists seems to me to be\ncomplementary to that of the Kitschlians, though I do not always accept\ntheir rather destructive critical conclusions.\n\n[2] In his Essay in _Lux Mundi_ (1889).  He has since developed his\nview in his Bampton Lectures on _The Incarnation of the Son of God_ and\na volume of _Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation_.\n\n[3] I venture thus to translate 'Principium' (_arche_); in Abelard and\nhis disciple Peter the Lombard, the famous Master of the Sentences, the\nword is 'Potentia' (L. I. Dist. xxxiv.): and St. Thomas himself (P. I.\nQ. xli. Art. 4) explains 'Principium' by 'Potentia generandi Filium.'\n\n[4] Thus in _Summa Theologica_, Pars I. Q. xxxvii. Art. 1, the\n'conclusio' is 'Amor, personaliter acceptus, proprium nomen est\nSpiritus sancti,' which is explained to mean that there are in the\nGodhead 'duse processiones: Una per modum intellectus, quae est\nprocessio Verbi; alia per modum voluntatis, quae est processio amoris.'\nSo again (_ibid._ Q. xlv. Art. 7): 'In creaturis igitur rationalibus,\nin quibus est intellectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio\nTrinitatis per modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis Verbum\nconceptum, et amor procedens.'  In a friendly review of my Essay in\n_Contentio Veritatis_, in which I endeavoured to expound in a modern\nform this doctrine, Dr. Sanday (_Journal of Theological Studies_, vol.\niv., 1903) wrote: 'One of the passages that seem to me most open to\ncriticism is that on the doctrine of the Trinity (p. 48).  \"Power,\nWisdom, and Will\" surely cannot be a sound trichotomy as applied either\nto human nature or Divine.  Surely Power is an expression of Will and\nnot co-ordinate with it.  The common division, Power (or Will), Wisdom,\nand Love is more to the point.  Yet Dr. Rashdall identifies the two\ntriads by what I must needs think a looseness of reasoning.'  The\nMargaret Professor of Divinity hardly seems to recognize that he is\ncriticizing the Angelical Doctor and not myself.  If Dr. Sanday had had\nthe formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity, the result, if less\nmetaphysically subtle, might no doubt have proved more easily\nintelligible to the modern mind; but the 'identification' of which he\ncomplains happens to be part of the traditional doctrine, and I was\nendeavouring merely to make the best of it for modern Christians.  I\nadd St. Thomas' justification of it, which is substantially what I gave\nin _Contentio Veritatis_ and have repeated above: 'Cum processiones\ndivinas secundum aliquas actiones necesse est accipere, secundum\nbonitatem, et hujusmodi alia attributa, non accipiuntur aliae\nprocessiones, nisi Verbi et amoris, secundum quod Deus suam essentiam,\nveritatem et bonitatem intelligit et amat' (Q. xxvii. Art. 5).  The\nsource of the doctrine is to be found in St. Augustine, who habitually\nspeaks of the Holy Spirit as Amor; but, when he refers to the 'Imago\nTrinitatia' in man the Spirit is represented sometimes by 'Amor,'\nsometimes by 'Voluntas' (_de Trin._, L. xiv. cap 7).  The other two\nmembers of the human triad are with him 'Memoria' (or 'Mens') and\n'Intelligentia.'\n\nWith regard to the difficulty of distinguishing Power from Will, I was\nperhaps to blame for not giving St. Thomas' own word 'Principium.'  The\nword 'Principium' means the _pege theoteos_, the ultimate Cause or\nSource of Being: by 'Voluntas' St. Thomas means that actual putting\nforth of Power (in knowing and in loving the Word or Thought eternally\nbegotten by God the Father) which is the Holy Ghost.  I am far from\nsaying that the details of St. Thomas' doctrine are not open to much\ncriticism: a rough correspondence between his teaching and any view of\nGod's Nature which can commend itself to a modern Philosopher is all\nthat I endeavoured to point out.  The modern thinker would no doubt\nwith Dr. Sanday prefer the triad 'Power, Wisdom, Love,' or (I would\nsuggest) 'Feeling, including Love as the highest form of Feeling.'  The\nreason why St. Thomas will not accept such an interpretation is that\nhis Aristotelianism (here not very consonant with the Jewish and\nChristian view of God) excludes all feeling or emotion from the divine\nnature; 'Love' has therefore to be identified with 'Will' and not with\n'Feeling.'  I cannot but think that the Professor might have taken a\nlittle more trouble to understand both St. Thomas and myself before\naccusing either of us of 'looseness of reasoning.'","title":"Philosophy and Religion: Six Lectures Delivered at Cambridge","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":49669}