{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_22150/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_22150","id":"gutenberg_22150","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/22150","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Category: Science - Biology","Evolution","Religion and science"],"text":"Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Keith Edkins and\nthe Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nhttps://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of\npublic domain works from the University of Michigan Digital\nLibraries.)\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's note: A few typographical errors have been corrected: they\nare listed at the end of the text.\n\nTHE THEORIES OF DARWIN.\n\nHALL, STUTTGART, April 5, 1880.\n\nWe hereby authorize the Rev. Dr. G. A. Zimmermann to translate into English\nthe book entitled\n\n_Die Darwin'schen Theorien und ihre Stellung zur Philosophie, Religion und\nMoral von Rudolf Schmid_.\n\nWe declare that we know of no other translation of the said book and that\nDr. Zimmermann's translation will be the only one authorized by us for the\nUnited States as well as for the British Empire and its Dominions.\n\n  (_The Author_) RUDOLF SCHMID.\n\n  (_The Publisher_) PAUL MOSER.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nTHE\n\nTHEORIES OF DARWIN\n\nAND THEIR RELATION TO\n\nPHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND MORALITY.\n\nBy RUDOLF SCHMID, President of the Theological Seminary at Schoenthal,\nWuertemberg.\n\nTRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY G. A. ZIMMERMANN, PH.D.\n\nWITH AN INTRODUCTION BY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL\n\nCHICAGO:\nJANSEN McCLURG. & COMPANY\n1883.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nCOPYRIGHT\nBY JANSEN, MCCLURG & CO.\nA.D. 1882.\n\nR. R. DONNELLEY & SONS, PRINTERS.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {1}\n\n\nAUTHOR'S PREFACE\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe movement which received its impulse as well as its name from Darwin,\nseems to have recently passed its distinctest phase; but the more prominent\npoints of opposition, religious, ethical, and scientific, which have been\nrevealed through it, remain as sharply contrasted as before. The author of\nthis book desires, in the first place, to be of service to such readers as\nfeel the need of setting themselves right upon these questions, which touch\nthe highest interests of mankind, but who lack time and opportunity to\ninvestigate independently a realm in which so many and so heterogeneous\nsciences come into mutual contact. The illogical and confused manner in\nwhich some noisy leaders confound these sciences and their problems and\nconsequences, renders it still more difficult to arrive at a satisfactory\nresult; and thus perhaps many readers will look with interest upon an\ninvestigation designed to simplify the different problems and the different\nattempts at their solution, and to treat them not only in their relations\nto each other, but also separately. But with this primary object, the\nauthor combines another: to render a service to some among the many who\nperceive the harmony between their scientific conviction and their\nreligious need threatened or shaken by the results of science, and who are\nunwilling to lose this harmony, or, having lost it, desire to regain it.\nThose voices are indeed becoming louder, and more generally and willingly\nheard, which proclaim an irreconcilability between faith and {2} knowledge,\nbetween the religious and the scientific views of the world; which declare\nthat peace between the two can only be had at the price either of\npermitting the religious impulses of the heart to be stifled in favor of\nscience, of satisfying the religious need of the mind with a nourishment\nwhich in the light of science proves to be an illusion, or, as sceptics in\ntheory and eclectics in practice, of renouncing with resignation a logical\nconnection and foundation to their former view of the world. The most\nstriking proof of the extent to which these voices are heard, is the fact\nthat it has been possible for a one-sided pessimism to become the\nfashionable system of philosophy in a Christian nation. The most effective\nmeans for opposing such discordant voices, and for making amends for the\ndisagreements which they have occasioned, undoubtedly consists in the\nactual proof of the contrary of their theories, in the clear presentation\nof a standpoint from which not only the most unrestricted freedom of\ninvestigation and the most unreserved acknowledgment of its results shall\nbe in perfect harmony with the undiminished care of our entire religious\npossession, but in which this peace is preserved and forever established by\nthe very fact that one function of the mind directly requires the other,\none possession directly guarantees the other. This is the standpoint of the\nauthor, and from it he has endeavored to treat all the questions which are\nto be taken into consideration. Should he, by his exposition of this\nstandpoint, succeed in helping even a few readers in reaching the\nconviction of the actual harmony between the scientific, religious, and\nethical acquisitions of mankind, or in confirming them anew in such\nconviction, he would find himself amply rewarded for this first extended\nventure before the public.\n\nR. S.\n\n{3}\n\nAUTHOR'S PREFACE TO AMERICAN EDITION.\n\nSix years have elapsed since I wrote the book which is now going forth in\nEnglish dress. The great leader of the theories in question has passed\naway; the waves of thought he set in motion are assuming smoother shape;\nand I can only add to what I have already written, that not only have I had\nno occasion to retract any of the statements or views laid down in the\nbook, but I perceive the religious as well as the scientific world growing\nmore and more into accord with the views I have maintained, and which were\nat first so vehemently opposed.\n\nI owe so much to the literary men of the English tongue on both sides of\nthe Atlantic, that I shall be glad if, through the devoted labors of the\ntranslator, I am enabled to pay them a tribute of gratitude by aiding them\nin clearing the way for thought in these much disputed fields, or in\nreconciling in their minds the conflict between faith and science.\n\nR. S.\n\nSCHOeNTHAL, WUeRTEMBERG, _September_, 1882.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{5}\n\nINTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN EDITION,\n\nBY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is well known that Mr. Darwin's theory on the Origin of Species has been\naccepted in Germany more widely, with more absolute faith, and with more\nvehement enthusiasm, than in the country of its birth. In Germany, more\nconspicuously than elsewhere, it has itself become the subject of\ndevelopments as strange and as aberrant as any which it assumes in the\nhistory of Organic Life. The most extravagant conclusions have been drawn\nfrom it--invading every branch of human thought, in Science, in Philosophy,\nand in Religion. These conclusions have been preached, too, with a\ndogmatism as angry and as intolerant as any of the old theologies. It is\nthe fate of every idea which is new and fruitful, that it is ridden to the\ndeath by excited novices. We can not be surprised if this fate has\novertaken the idea that all existing animal forms have had their ancestry\nin other forms which exist no longer, and have been derived from these by\nordinary generation through countless stages of descent. Although this is\nan idea which, whether true or not, is entirely subordinate to the larger\nidea of creation, it usurps in many minds the character of a substitute.\nThis is natural enough. The theory, or at least the language, of\nEvolutionists, puts forward a visible order of phenomena as a complete and\nall-sufficient account of its own origin and cause. However unsatisfactory\nthis may be to the higher faculties of the mind, it is eminently {6}\nsatisfactory to those other faculties which are lower in the scale. It\ndismisses as needless, or it postpones indefinitely, all thought of the\nagencies which are ultimate and unseen. Just as in the physical world, some\ntrivial object which is very near us may shut out the whole of a wide\nhorizon, so in the intellectual world, some coarse mechanical conception\nmay shut out all the kingdom of Nature and the glory of it.\n\nTwo great subjects of investigation lie before us. The first is to\nascertain how far the Theory of Evolution represents an universal fact, or\nonly one very partial and fragmentary aspect of a great variety of facts\nconnected with the origin and development of Organic Life. The second and\nby far the most important inquiry, is to estimate aright, or as nearly as\nwe can, the relative place and importance of these facts in the Philosophy\nof Nature.\n\nSubjects of investigation so rich and manifold as these may well attract\nall the most varied gifts of the human mind. This they have already done,\nand there is every indication that they will continue to do so for\ngenerations yet to be. Already an immense literature is devoted to them;\nand every fresh effort of observation and of reasoning seems to open out\nnew and fruitful avenues of thought. The work which is here introduced to\nthe English reader contains an excellent review of this literature, so far\nas it is represented in the English and German languages. Knowing the\nauthor personally, as I have done for many years, I recognize with pleasure\nin his work all the carefulness of inquiry, and all the conscientiousness\nof reasoning, which belong to a singularly candid and patient mind.\n\nARGYLL.\n\n  INVERARY CASTLE, SCOTLAND,\n      _September, 1882._\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{7}\n\nNOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR.\n\nThe consideration which this work has received from the leaders of\nreligious and philosophic thought in Germany, and, indeed, wherever it has\nbeen read in its original form, has led the translator to believe that an\nEnglish version of it would be acceptable. Especially in America, where\nreligious problems and religious thought are so intimately connected with\nthe processes of scientific and philosophic investigation, and where the\nagitation of these problems is so peculiarly active and violent, it has\nseemed that a work marked by so much scholarship, profundity, and\ncomprehensiveness and originality of treatment, must serve an important\npurpose to the cause of religious no less than of scientific truth. It may\nbe explained here, that the author resided for some years in the family of\nthe Duke of Argyll, and there breathed, to a certain extent, the scientific\nair of Darwinism in its very origin; and thus his familiarity with all the\nresults of modern scientific research, added to his theological and\nphilosophical acquirements, enable him, with a most admirable blending of\nthe spirit of fairness and toleration with logical severity of treatment,\nto bring these different domains into their proper relation with each other\nand to establish between them that essential harmony in which consists the\nsolution of these most profound and vital problems of man's welfare.\n\nOf the translation it may properly be said that, while the aim has been to\ngive the work the clearest possible form consistent with that strict\nfidelity to the original which is {8} especially demanded by the character\nof its material, the translator has not hoped to make the work altogether\n\"easy\" reading. Peculiarities of the author's style have been, it is\nbelieved, largely preserved; and occasional difficulties of apprehension\nare no doubt to be expected, both from the method of treatment and from the\nprofound and abstruse character of the topics treated. The translator will\nbe well satisfied if it shall be found that he has succeeded in performing\nhis task without adding unduly to the seeming obscurities of certain\npassages--obscurities which, however, will no doubt vanish before that\ndegree of mental application without which such works may not be read at\nall intelligibly.\n\nAcknowledgments are properly due and are gladly rendered to George C.\nDawson, Esq., of Chicago, and to Mr. Francis F. Browne, editor of _The\nDial_, for valuable assistance in revising and perfecting this version.\n\nG. A. Z.\n\nCHICAGO, _October_, 1882.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{9}\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n  INTRODUCTION ... 17\n\n_PART FIRST:_\n_THE DARWINIAN THEORIES_.\n\nBOOK I.\nTHE PURELY SCIENTIFIC THEORIES.\n\n  The Scientific Problem, ... 23\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nRISE OF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\n  Sec.1. Direct Predecessors, ... 30\n  Sec.2. Indirect Preparations, ... 33\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nHISTORY OF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\n  Sec.1. Darwin, ... 38\n  Sec.2. The Followers of Darwin.--Ernst Haeckel, ... 45\n  Sec.3. Modifications of the Theory.--Moriz Wagner. Wigand, ... 52\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nPRESENT STATE OF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\n  Sec.1. The Theory of Descent, ... 61\n  Sec.2. The Theory of Evolution.--Archaeology, Ethnography, Philology, ... 77\n  Sec.3. The Theory of Selection, ... 100\n\n{10}\n\nBOOK II.\nTHE PHILOSOPHIC COMPLETIONS AND CONSEQUENCES\nOF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\n  The Philosophic Problems, ... 108\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE NATURO-PHILOSOPHIC SUPPLEMENTS OF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\n  Sec.1. The Origin of Self-Consciousness and of Free Moral\n      Self-Determination, ... 115\n  Sec.2. The Origin of Sensation and of Consciousness, ... 127\n  Sec.3. The Origin of Life, ... 132\n  Sec.4. The Elements of the World; the Theory of Atoms, and the Mechanical\n      View of the World, ... 140\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nMETAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\n  Sec.1. Elimination of the Idea of Design in the World.--Monism, ... 158\n\n{11}\n\n_PART SECOND:_\n_THE POSITION OF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES\nIN REFERENCE TO RELIGION AND MORALITY._\n\nBOOK I.\nHISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.\n\n  Plan of Treatment, ... 185\n\n_A. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND RELIGION._\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nMORE OR LESS NEGATIVE POSITION IN REFERENCE TO RELIGION.\n\n  Sec.1. Extreme Negation: L. Buechner and Consistent Materialism, ... 188\n  Sec.2. Replacement of Religion Through a Religious Worship of the\n      Universe.--Strauss. Oskar Schmidt. Haeckel, ... 190\n  Sec.3. Pious Renunciation of the Knowability of God. Wilhelm Bleek. Albert\n      Lange. Herbert Spencer, ... 193\n  Sec.4. Spinoza and Hegel in the Garb of Darwin.--Carneri, Ed. von Hartmann,\n      ... 203\n  Sec.5. Reecho of Negation on the Side of the Christian View of the World,\n      ... 206\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nREFORM OF RELIGION, OR AT LEAST OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION, THROUGH\nDARWINISM.\n\n  Sec.1. Heinrich Lang. Friedrich Vischer. Gustav Jaeger, ... 210\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nPEACE BETWEEN RELIGION AND DARWINISM.\n\n  Sec.1. Darwin. Wallace. Owen. Asa Gray. Mivart. McCosh. Anderson. K. E. von\n      Baer. Alexander Braun. Braubach, and others, ... 217\n\n{12}\n\n_B. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND MORALITY_.\n\n  Preliminary View, ... 228\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nANTAGONISM BETWEEN DARWINISM AND MORALITY.\n\n  Sec.1. Objections to Darwinism from an Ethical Standpoint, ... 230\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nREFORM OF MORALITY THROUGH DARWINISM.\n\n  Sec.1. The Materialists and Monists. Darwin and the English Utilitarians.\n      Gustav Jaeger, ... 233\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nNEUTRALITY AND PEACE BETWEEN DARWINISM AND MORALITY.\n\n  Sec.1. Mivart. Alexander Braun, and others, ... 245\n\nBOOK II.\nANALYTICAL.\n\n  Preliminary View, ... 249\n\n_A. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND RELIGION_.\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND THE THEISTIC VIEW OF THE WORLD.\n\n_a. The Position of Purely Scientific Darwinism in Reference to Theism_.\n\n  Sec.1. Scientific Investigation and Theism.--The Idea of Creation, ... 252\n  {13}\n  Sec.2. The Descent Theory and Theism, ... 259\n  Sec.3. The Evolution Theory and Theism, ... 263\n  Sec.4. The Selection Theory and Theism, ... 270\n\n_b. The Darwinistic Philosophies in their Position Regarding Theism_.\n\n  Sec.5. The Naturo-Philosophic Supplements of Darwinism and Theism, ... 273\n  Sec.6. Elimination of the Idea of Design, or its Acknowledgment and Theism,\n      ... 284\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY.\n\n  Sec.1. The Creation of the World, ... 290\n  Sec.2. The Creation of Man, ... 314\n  Sec.3. The Primitive Condition of Man.--Paradise, the Fall of Man, and\n      Primitive History, ... 321\n  Sec.4. Providence, Hearing of Prayer, and Miracles, ... 345\n  Sec.5. The Redeemer and the Redemption, the Kingdom of God, and the\n      Receiving of Salvation, ... 373\n  Sec.6. Eschatology, ... 375\n\n_B. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND MORALITY_.\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nDARWINISM AND MORAL PRINCIPLES.\n\n  Sec.1. Darwinistic Naturalism and Moral Principles, ... 379\n  Sec.2. Scientific Darwinism and Moral Principles, ... 386\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nDARWINISM AND MORAL LIFE.\n\n  Sec.1. Darwinistic Naturalism and Moral Life, ... 391\n  Sec.2. Scientific Naturalism and Moral Life, ... 396\n\n  CONCLUSION, ... 399\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{14}\n\nAUTHORS CITED.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n  Agassiz, Louis, 35, 37, 50, 320.\n  Anderson, 225.\n  Anonymus, \"the Unconscious,\" etc., 128, 129, 131, 134, 159.\n  Anonymus, \"Vestiges,\" etc., 33.\n  Argyll, Duke of, 50, 91, 92, 135, 172, 202, 288.\n  Ausland, 159, 240, 281.\n\n  Baer, Karl Ernst von, 36, 54, 56, 71, 74, 81, 83, 106, 132, 149, 160,\n      177, 226, 259, 281, 288, 320.\n  Barrande, 54.\n  Baumgaertner, Heinrich, 57, 176.\n  Blanchard, Emil, 54, 106.\n  Bleek, Wilhelm, 17, 96, 97, 194, 197, 234, 236.\n  Boerhave, 36.\n  Braubach, 226.\n  Braun, Alexander, 55, 176, 226, 246, 397.\n  Braun, Julius, 17.\n  Buch, Leopold von, 52.\n  Buckle, 17.\n  Buechner, Ludwig, 42, 118, 141, 158, 188, 205, 219, 233, 396.\n  Buffon, 31.\n\n  Carneri, 203, 238.\n  Carns, 36.\n  Christy, 90.\n  Condillac, 96.\n  Cotta, Bernhard von, 51.\n  Curtius, 96.\n  Cuvier, 31, 32, 34, 37, 320.\n\n  Darwin, 17, 18, 25, 27, 38, 118, 171, 177, 217, 240, 320, 389.\n  Descartes, 127.\n  Dillman, 295, 301.\n  Dohrn, 84.\n  DuBois-Reymond, Emil, 124, 125, 127, 130, 134, 149.\n\n  Ebrard, 159, 209.\n  Ecker, 56.\n  Escher, von der Linth, 54.\n\n  Farrar, 96.\n  Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 135, 146.\n  Fichte, Immanuel Hermann, 142, 175.\n  Fraas, Oskar, 55, 90.\n  Frohschammer, 175.\n\n  Gegenbaur, 56.\n  Geiger, Lazar, 17, 96.\n  Geoffrey St. Hilaire, Etienne, 32, 34.\n  Gerhard, 197.\n  Giebel, 54.\n  Goeppert, 54.\n  Goethe, 33, 34, 35, 320.\n  Gray, Asa, 222.\n  Grusebach, 55.\n  Grimm, Jacob, 17, 95.\n\n  Haeckel, 35, 42, 43, 45, 75, 78, 106, 123, 130, 133, 149, 159, 160, 166,\n      170, 204, 219, 234, 237, 281, 395.\n  Hartmann, Eduard von, 56, 60, 106, 131, 142, 168, 176, 191, 205, 334,\n      376.\n  Heer, Oswald, 56, 176.\n  Hegel, 126, 136, 204.\n  Helmholtz, 136, 159.\n  Heyse, 96.\n  Hilgendorf, 82.\n  His, Wilhelm, 56, 81, 106.\n  Huber, 175.\n  Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 17, 95.\n  Huxley, Thomas, 42, 50, 177, 198, 222, 279.\n\n  Jaeger, Gustav, 51, 124, 214, 243.\n  Jellinghaus, 94.\n\n  {15}\n  Kant, 195, 282.\n  Keim, 18, 337.\n  Koelliker, 56, 81, 176.\n  Koestlin, Julius, 175, 187.\n  Koestlin, Otto. 149.\n  Kowalewsky, A., 42.\n  Kowalewsky, W., 83.\n  Kurz, Johann Heinrich, 306.\n\n  Lamarck, 27, 30, 31, 33, 320.\n  Lang, Heinrich, 197, 210.\n  Lange, Friedrich Albert, 112, 168, 173, 176, 194, 196.\n  Lartet, 96.\n  Leibnitz, 127, 217.\n  Leidy, 83.\n  Lessing, 405, 407.\n  Linnaeus, 30.\n  Livingstone, 93.\n  Lotze, 142, 145, 149.\n  Lubbock, Sir John, 18, 91, 93, 242.\n  Lyell, Sir Charles, 18, 36, 55, 89, 90, 222.\n\n  Maedler, 177, 252.\n  Malthus, 39.\n  Marsh, 83.\n  Martensen, 187.\n  Mayer, Robert von, 37, 129, 149, 155.\n  McCosh, 224.\n  Mill, John Stuart, 242.\n  Mivart, 55, 106, 223, 245.\n  Moleschott, 42.\n  Mueller, Fritz, 79.\n  Mueller, Max, 18, 96, 98.\n  Murchison, Sir Roderick, 54.\n\n  Naegeli, 56.\n  Nitzsch, Karl Immanuel, 361.\n  Noire, Ludwig, 281.\n\n  Oken, 34, 320.\n  Owen, Richard, 35, 56, 164, 176, 221, 223, 320.\n\n  Peschel, Oskar, 279.\n  Pfaff, 54.\n  Pfleiderer, Otto, 187.\n  Planck, Carl Ch., 105, 110.\n  Preyer, 136, 146, 153.\n\n  Rathke, Heinrich, 81.\n  Reichenbach, 42.\n  Renan, 18.\n  Reville, Albert, 334.\n  Ritschl, 364.\n  Ruetimeyer, 56, 83.\n\n  Sandberger, 55, 82.\n  Schaaffhausen, 56, 85, 177.\n  Schelling, 109.\n  Schiller, 180.\n  Schleicher, 17, 96.\n  Schleiden, 42, 51.\n  Schleiermacher, 190.\n  Schmidt, Oskar, 33, 35, 51, 75, 124, 159, 164, 191, 234.\n  Schopenhauer, 128, 190.\n  Schrader, Eberhard, 345.\n  Seidlitz, 51, 159, 238.\n  Semper, Karl, 84, 131.\n  Snell, Karl, 42, 262.\n  Spencer, Herbert, 128, 139, 194, 242, 279.\n  Spinoza, 204.\n  Stael, Madame de, 234.\n  Steffens, 109.\n  Steinthal, 17, 96.\n  Strauss, David Friedrich, 18, 112, 125, 128, 159, 163, 174, 175, 190,\n      213, 234, 337, 376, 394.\n  Swammerdam, 36.\n\n  Tait, 138.\n  Thomson, Sir William, 138.\n  Truempelmann, 209.\n  Tuebingen School, 18.\n  Tylor, 91.\n\n  Ulrici, 142, 144, 149, 175, 235.\n\n  Virchow, 56, 85.\n  Vischer, Friedrich, 175, 176, 213, 264.\n  Vogt, Karl, 42, 56.\n  Volkmann, A. W., 56, 105, 177.\n\n  Wagner, Moriz, 52, 56.\n  Wallace, Alfred Russell, 37, 101, 177, 221, 262.\n  Wedgewood, 96.\n  Weismann, 56.\n  Wigand, Albert, 26, 52, 56, 57, 106, 135, 149, 170, 226.\n  Wundt, 142.\n  Wuertemberger, 82.\n\n  Zittel, 56.\n  Zoellner, 128, 129, 131, 138, 139.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{17}\n\nTHE THEORIES OF DARWIN,\n\nAND THEIR RELATION TO\n\nPHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, AND MORALITY.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nWith the appearance of Darwin's \"Origin of Species,\" on the 24th of\nNovember, 1859, a new impulse began in the intellectual movement of our\ngeneration. It is true, the whole theory advocated and inaugurated by\nDarwin is, in the first place, only one of the many links in the long chain\nof phenomena in the realm of the intellectual development of our century,\nall of which have the same character, and give their stamp to the entire\nmental work of the last decades. This stamp consists in the tendency of\nscience, which has nearly become universal, not only to consider all\nphenomena, both of the physical and the mental life, in connection with\ntheir preceding conditions in space and time, but to trace them back more\nor less exclusively to these conditions, and to explain them exclusively by\nmeans of the same. What a Wilhelm von Humboldt, and, still more, a Jacob\nGrimm, prepared the way for in the realm of philology, a Lazar Geiger and a\nSteinthal, and (under direct influence of Darwin) a Schleicher and a\nWilhelm Bleek further developed; what Julius Braun did in the realm of the\nhistory of art; what a Buckle and a Sir {18} John Lubbock tried to do in\nthe realm of the history of civilization; what a Max Mueller did in the\nrealm of the history of religion; what the Tuebingen School began and its\ndisciples carried out in the realm of the exegesis of the Bible; what a\nStrauss and a Renan, and in a certain sense also a Keim, did in the realm\nof christology; what, finally--without being so closely connected with\nindividual names--was also done in the realm of the world's history: this,\nDarwin did in the realm of the history of the organic kingdoms, seconded by\nthe geological principles of Sir Charles Lyell and by the investigations in\nbiology and comparative anatomy of a number of scientists. From this point\nof view, the movement which was inaugurated by Darwin seems to us but the\nreflex of the universal spirit of the present time upon a particular realm;\nnamely, that of natural science. But since, soon after the appearance of\nthe before-mentioned work and long before the publication of Darwin's\n\"Descent of Man,\" man also was included in the consequences of the\nevolution theory, and his existence was explained as a wholly natural\ndevelopment out of lower animal forms; since Darwin himself unreservedly\nadopted this theory of the descent of man from the animal world as an\nentirely natural consequence of his doctrine of the origin of species, the\nevolution question has gone far beyond the proportionately narrow and\nlimited bounds of natural philosophy and of merely theoretical scientific\ninterest--has surpassed in interest all the before-mentioned\ninvestigations, however lively this interest was and is to-day, and has\nstirred up the minds of all most thoroughly, not only in their scientific\nbut also in their religious and ethical depths, some in {19} acknowledgment\nand admiration, others in aversion and repugnance, and only a few in sober\nand unprejudiced judgment. While some see in Darwinism the flambeau which\nnow lights mankind to entirely new paths of truth, and also to spiritual\nand moral perfection, others see in it only an unproved hypothesis,\nthreatening to become the torch which might change the noblest and greatest\nacquirements of the culture of past centuries into a heap of ashes; while\nsome date from it a new period of culture, others see in it a deep descent\nof the present from the scientific, religious, and moral height which\nmankind has ascended.\n\nUnder these circumstances, it has become an impossibility for religion and\nthe moral interest as guardians of the highest and most sacred acquisitions\nof mankind, and still more for theology and ethics as the scientific\nrepresentations of religion and morality, to remain idle spectators. It\nwould certainly be more agreeable to them, and more profitable, if they\ncould delay their judgment until the question became better cleared up. For\nthe whole question presented by Darwin has not yet passed beyond the stage\nof problems and attempts at solution; and there is always something\nunsatisfactory in being compelled to deal with theories which in their\nfundamentals are still hypotheses. But since all tendencies of the present\nwhich are hostile to Christianity and to the theistic view of the world,\nfrom the most extreme materialism up to the most sublime monism (as\npantheism and materialism of to-day have begun to call themselves),\nseemingly with the confidence of complete victory, take possession of\nDarwinism as the solid ground from which they hope to destroy all and every\nbelief {20} connected with faith in a living creator and master of the\nworld, it has also become impossible for those to whom the religious and\nethical acquisitions of mankind are a sacred sanctuary to take any longer a\nreserved and expectant position. Silence now would be looked upon only as\nan inglorious retreat; and thus nothing remains but openly to face the\nquestion: What position must religion and morality take in reference to the\nDarwinian theories?\n\nIn order to treat of the question with that objectivity which it requires,\nwe have to begin with a synopsis of the theories themselves. In this\nrepresentation we have to discriminate strictly between the merely\nscientific theories and the naturo-philosophical and metaphysical\nsupplements and conclusions which have been brought into connection with\nthem. For precisely in the mixing of the most different problems which are\nto be considered here, lies the main cause of the confused and superficial\njudgment which is so often heard upon these questions.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {21}\n\n\nPART I.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTHE THEORIES OF DARWIN.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{23}\n\nBOOK I.\n\nTHE PURELY SCIENTIFIC THEORIES.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTHE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM.\n\nThe interesting problem which underlies Mr. Darwin's theories is the answer\nto the question: _How did the different species of organic beings on the\nearth originate?_ We find ourselves in the midst of an endless variety of\norganic beings, animals and plants; we see ourselves, so far as regards the\nentire physical part of our being, in relationship with this organic\nworld--especially with the organization and physical functions of the\nanimal body. The organic individuals come and go. They originate by being\nbegotten by and born of individuals of the same kind, or they spring up\nthrough the formation of germs and buds; and they produce in the same way\nnew individuals, that resemble them in all essential characteristics. Like\nalways begets like, so far as our observations go. But not only the\nindividuals, but even the species to which they belong, must have\noriginated at some definite period of time--and, indeed, as geology tells\nus, not all at once, but in a long series, which stretched through\nimmeasurable epochs of the earth's history. Thus we come face to face with\nthe question, already put, which we can now formulate more {24} precisely:\n_How did the first individuals of each organic species come into\nexistence?_\n\nNo human being ever has observed, nor ever could observe, the origination\nof a new species, because man, as it seems, did not appear on the earth\nuntil all the other organisms were in existence. For this reason, the\nscientists for a long time thought it unprofitable to occupy themselves\nwith this question; and even in our time a great many of them declare the\nquestion to be absolutely insolvable, and every attempt at answering it to\nbe an unjustifiable use of hypotheses. But the impulse toward investigation\nadmits of no limitation so long as there is any probability of extending\nits field of action. Especially in the province of nature, so many things\nwhich could not be discovered by mere observation have been traced\nindirectly, and so many important and established facts have been added to\nour stores of knowledge, by first starting from hypothetical premises, that\nman has again and again endeavored to approximate an answer to the question\nof the origin of species by taking the indirect course of hypothesis and\ninduction, whenever the direct way of observation did not lead to any\nresult. Religion of course gives a solution to the problem by stating that\nthe species have been originated by the creative act of God. It is wrong to\nsay that this solution is opposed to the above-mentioned impulse toward\ninvestigation; for this solution suffices for religion, whether a natural\nprogress in the origination of species be established or not. For, to the\nbeliever in religion, the whole universe, with all its objective phenomena\nand growth, is the work of God as well as the individuals of the already\nexisting species; and a {25} closer acquaintance with the manner of their\norigin is not only no disturbance to his ground of belief, but, on the\ncontrary, an addition to his knowledge of the method of God's action. In\nevery man of sound mind, the religious faith is not antagonistic or even\nindifferent to the scientific impulse toward investigation, but stands upon\na most intimate footing with it. Hence the human intellect again and again\nmakes the attempt to find an answer to the problem of the origin of species\nin a scientific way, and each endeavor of this kind necessarily ends with\nthe dilemma that either the first individuals of a species, no matter\nwhether it be the highest or the lowest, have been evolved out of inorganic\nmatter, or they originated by descent from the most closely related species\nof their predecessors. The denial of the first part of our dilemma, and the\naffirmation of the second, is the \"Theory of Descent.\"\n\nBut this theory of descent leads us at once into another dilemma. If the\nspecies originated by descent from the most closely related lower species,\nand under certain circumstances also from species of the same rank, and\neven by degeneration from the next higher, it must have occurred in one of\ntwo ways: either by leaps--called by naturalists \"metamorphosis of germs\"\nor \"heterogenetic conception\"--or by a succession of imperceptibly small\nalterations of the individuals from generation to generation. Each of these\nchanges would have been no greater than the differences we observe to-day\nbetween the individuals of the very same species, but became in the course\nof time so massed and strengthened in one direction that new species have\nbeen evolved. This hypothesis is called the \"Theory of Development,\" {26}\nor \"Evolution.\" We retain this name, although well aware of the fact that\nthe authors do not agree in their use of the term \"evolution.\" Professor\nWigand, who adopts only the theory of a descent from one primordial cell to\nanother, and who positively rejects the idea of a progress from one fully\ndeveloped species to another, claims among other things that one value of\nhis own theory is that he secures for the idea of evolution its full\nmeaning. The expression still has a meaning for those who reject the real\ndescent of the species or their primordial germs one from another, and\nacknowledge only the ideal bond of a common plan in their successive\nmanifestations. But as soon as we examine more closely the literal and\nlogical meaning of the word, we shall find it of most weight when we\nunderstand by it the before-mentioned gradual evolution in opposition to\nthe theory of progress by leaps or new creations. Moreover, it is well\nknown that long before this no other term than evolution was used to\ndesignate the growth of a single organic individual from the primordial\ncell and egg to its fully developed form and vital function. Besides, we\nfind ourselves also in harmony with most of the authors, so far as they\nhave distinct conceptions of the different scientific problems, if we use\nthe term \"theory of evolution\" for the gradual development of one species\nfrom another, in opposition to the hypothesis of a metamorphosis of germs,\nor even of a genealogy of primordial cells.\n\nBut each evolution theory leads again to new theories, as soon as it has to\nbe proved in a scientific way. For it can claim a scientific worth only\nwhen sustained by earnest attempts to find and prove the {27} productive\npower, agencies and laws of such an evolution of species. Those attempts\ncan be made in various ways. As a philosophical question, many attempts at\nsolution have been made, both in ancient and modern times; but being mainly\nin the realm of metaphysics, they do not come within the limits of our\nscientific essay. As a question for investigators of natural phenomena,\nonly two attempts of sufficient importance to be mentioned have been made.\nThe first one was made by Lamarck, who, taking the really different ideas\nof descent and evolution as one, made use of the hypothesis of\ntransmutation; thus becoming the pioneer of Darwinism. The other attempt\nwas made by Darwin in his theory of natural selection, or struggle, for\nexistence, and is called the \"Theory of Selection.\"\n\nIn defining our problem, therefore, we find ourselves under the influence\nof a scientific law of development. The simple problem which we started\nfrom has developed into a trinity of problems and attempts at solution. The\nsimple question of the origin of species led us into the dilemma of a\n_generatio aequivoca_, or a descent; the hypothesis of a descent led to the\ndilemma of a heterogenetic conception, or an evolution; and the hypothesis\nof an evolution rendered necessary the attempt at explaining this\nevolution, and showed Darwin's method of explaining it by his selection\ntheory. It will be well for the reader to keep distinctly in mind the\ndifference between these problems and theories, in following our\ninvestigations, even if we cannot arrange our historical sketch according\nto the natural principle of division arising from these differences.\n\nFor it lies in the nature of the question itself, that {28} these theories,\nin their historical progress, did not appear singly, but together. Those\nwho inclined to the theory of a descent of species could claim for it the\nattention of scientific investigators only after having also made the\nattempt at conceiving this descent in a concrete way, and according to\ncertain analogies of observation. The only analogy of the kind appeared in\nthe sphere of individual development and individual differences on the one\nhand, and in that of closely related characters of allied species on the\nother; and thus led of itself to the evolution theory. As soon as the\nnaturalists thought they had found the causes of such an evolution of the\nspecies, they naturally placed these causes in the foreground of their\ndemonstrations, and erected upon them the structure of their entire theory;\nthus treating descent, evolution and selection as one single and\nindissolubly connected theory. But this manner of treating the question had\nalso its dangers, which have already caused a great deal of confusion and\nmisunderstanding, as well as much unprofitable controversy. Often friends\nand enemies of the theories placed that which was in favor of the theory of\ndescent to the credit of the evolution or selection theory; and, on the\nother hand, that which seemed opposed to the selection theory was often\nheld to be a weakening of the evolution and descent theory; and this was\ndone, not only by amateurs, but often enough by the highest authorities\nalso. In reality, however, it is quite conceivable that the idea of a\ndescent may prove correct, and possibly the idea of an evolution of the\nspecies will have to be replaced by that of a heterogenetic generation, or\nby the theory that certain groups in the organic system are originated {29}\nby heterogenetic generation, and others by evolution; and so the evolution\ntheory must share with the theory of heterogenetic generation, or of a\nmetamorphosis of germs. On the other hand, it is conceivable that even\nwhere the evolution theory is confirmed, the evolution can be accounted for\nwholly or partly by other reasons than those derived from the selection\ntheory. And even this result of present investigations is not\ninconceivable: that the reasons for and against the different theories will\nbe found to balance one another to such a degree that they will sooner or\nlater lead science, in answering the question of the origin of species, to\nthe old confession of Socrates--\"_Ignoramus_.\"\n\nWe shall, therefore, have to arrange our historical sketch according to the\nhistorical order of the appearance of the theories, and treat the problems\nmore or less as an undivided whole. But we shall keep in mind, during our\nhistorical sketch, not only the logical separation of the problems in\nquestion, in order not to lose clearness of judgment, but we shall also at\nthe end of our review, if we consider the present condition of the\nproblems, have to examine the same once more in detail, so far as regards\nthe above mentioned separation.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{30}\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nRISE OF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\nSec. 1. _Direct Predecessors.--Lamarck._\n\nThe first man who gave direct expression to the idea of a successive\ngeneration of the species through transmutation, and who attempted to\nfollow it up in a scientific way, was the French naturalist and\nphilosopher, Jean Lamarck, born 1744. In the year 1801, and subsequently,\nhe published his views, first in smaller essays and afterward more in\ndetail in his \"_Philosophie Zoologique_,\" which appeared in 1809, and in\nthe first volume of his \"_Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertebres_,\"\npublished in 1815. In these works Lamarck upholds fully the descent and\nevolution theory, and maintains that the simplest organisms are generated\nthrough a _generatio spontanea_, which is still taking place; but that all\nthe more developed organisms, including man, are descended through a\ngradual change from other species. With this theory, he put himself in\ndirect and conscious opposition to the old doctrine of the immutability of\nspecies and their characteristics, which had been ably maintained by\nLinnaeus, and also made some attempts at explanation which approach very\nnearly the selection theory. A change in the physical conditions of life,\nespecially the force of habit in the use or disuse of the organs, the\ninheritance of physical and psychical {31} qualities thus attained, and the\nextension of the process of transmutation into extraordinarily long periods\nof time with very slight changes, are also, in his view, the probable\ncauses of the variation and development of the species. He only lacks the\nidea of a natural selection in the struggle for existence, and the\ncomparison of the processes in nature with the methodical selection of man\nin the breeding of domestic animals and plants, to identify his views with\nthose of Darwin.\n\nAt first, Lamarck met only with violent opposition; but after a little\nwhile his views ceased to attract attention. The time had not yet come to\nmake such an attempt at observing nature from the standpoint of evolution.\nThe sciences which favor such a mode of observation, and even demand\nit--such as comparative anatomy and physiology and the history of the\ndevelopment of the different plants and animals--were only in their\ninfancy, or were--like palaeontology and the comparative geography of plants\nand animals--not yet in existence. The influence of Linnaeus, whose views\ndiametrically opposed those of Lamarck, predominated over all the\ninvestigations of natural science; Buffon, who favored the ideas of\nLamarck, and loved to trace a unity in natural phenomena, was too instable\nin his investigations and views to arrive at a comprehensive principle; and\neven the eminent naturalist, Cuvier, of Montpellier, showed in his\nobservation of nature a predilection for analysis rather than synthesis,\nand although his comprehensive mind inclined to generalize and explain, he\nplaced himself in decided opposition to a theory which was founded only on\na few decisive facts.\n\nThis last mentioned deficiency seems to have been {32} the main cause of\nLamarck's views soon being lost sight of. They nowhere found a support in\nfacts; the force of habit played in them an exaggerated and unnatural\n_role_; the different illustrations of them--such as the long neck of the\ngiraffe explained by the permanent and inherited habit of browsing on the\nbranches of high trees, or the web on the toes of frogs, swimming-birds,\netc., explained by the habit of swimming--were talked about and laughed at\nmore as curiosities than as worthy of serious consideration.\n\nOnly twice after this did the question put by Lamarck attract wider\nattention from the learned world. The first time was when, in 1830, the\nbitter contest arose at the Academy of Paris, between Cuvier and Etienne\nGeoffrey St. Hilaire, the father of Isidor G. St. Hilaire. Geoffrey St.\nHilaire had views similar to Lamarck's, but reached them from quite a\ndifferent standpoint--from the observation of the analogy and homology of\nthe organs; and accounted for the variation of species, not by the use or\ndisuse of the organs, but on the one hand by the common original type of\nthe organs, and on the other by the varied influence of the\nsurroundings--the _monde ambiant_. Lamarck himself seems not to have been\nmentioned in this contest. The controversy turned much more on the question\nwhether in observing nature we can proceed by synthesis and find in the\nanalogies of the organisms the principles for explaining the real\nconnection between the different organic forms, or whether the analytical\nprocess is the only correct one, and the synthetical should be discarded.\nThe solution of it will probably be, that the one process must be\nsupplemented by the {33} other, as Goethe has already shown in his account\nof this controversy; but at that time it was decided in favor of the\nanalytical principle, and the question was for the time dropped. It came up\nfor a second time, but created little excitement, in 1844, when an\nanonymous work, \"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,\" directed the\nattention and the interest of scientists again to Lamarck and his doctrine.\nBut this interest also soon came to an end, until through Darwin's first\npublication the half-forgotten man again suddenly attained great honor.\n\nThose who wish to form a closer acquaintance with the different advocates\nof the evolution theory before Darwin's appearance, will find them\ncarefully arranged in the historical sketch which Darwin gives in the\nintroduction to his work on \"The Origin of Species\"; and the most important\nextracts of Lamarck's \"_Philosophie Zoologique_\" are to be found in Oscar\nSchmidt's \"Descent and Darwinism.\"[1]\n\nSec. 2. _Indirect Preparations._\n\nWhile thus the ideas of Lamarck gradually fell into partial oblivion, yet\ncontemporaneous with and following them arose several other series of\nthoughts, views, and investigations, which, although they only indirectly\nprepared for the revival of the evolution theory, yet exercised a deeper\nand more lasting influence on the minds of scientists. We refer to the\nideas in regard to natural phenomena held during the first decades of our\ncentury; further, to the principles of comparative anatomy which, up to the\npresent time, partly dependent {34} and partly independent of natural\nphilosophy, have been expressed, valued, and admired as leading thoughts;\nand, lastly, to the empiric results of comparative anatomical and\nbiological investigations in palaeontology and geology, as attained by the\nhelp of those very principles. And even physics and astronomy had to\ncooeperate in preparing the way for the idea of evolution.\n\nThe philosophical ideas referred to, together with the points of view and\nresults of comparative anatomy, led more and more decisively to the idea of\nan _original form_, or _type_, which retains its identity in all the\nmodifications of form in plants and animals; and of a _ground-plan_, which\nis realized in the systems of the plant and animal world in higher and\nhigher differentiations and in more and more developed modifications,\ndiverging farther and farther from the prototype until it reaches its\nhighest form, still reducible to the prototypes, in the most highly\norganized dicotyledons in plants, and in the animal world in the mammalia,\nand lastly in man.\n\nMen like Cuvier and Geoffrey St. Hilaire, who otherwise stand diametrically\nopposed to each other, unite in these and kindred ideas. The naturalist\nOken attains the same result, tinged with the views of Schelling; the poet\nGoethe, from an intuitive knowledge of nature, arrived at the same\nconclusion. The former, during a journey in the Hartz Mountains, at the\nsight of a bleached deer's skull, and the latter, upon picking up a sheep's\nskull in the Jewish cemetery at Venice, were struck by the same thought:\nthe skull is only a modified vertebra. Oken founded upon this idea and\nkindred analogies his profound philosophy of the system of animals and\nplants which comes very near to the evolution {35} theory, and in his\ncosmogony traces all organisms to a protoplasm in such a way as to bring\nhim in this respect also very near to Darwinism. Goethe, in his\nmetamorphosis of plants, develops ideas in which, in all seriousness, he\nmakes a concrete application of his thought of a prototype to the leaf of a\nplant; and proved for zooelogy the fruitfulness of his idea of a type by his\nwell known discovery of the mid-jaw bone in man. Although Oscar Schmidt\nseems to be decidedly right in supposing, in opposition to Ernst Haeckel,\nthat Goethe did not intend to have his idea of unity and development taken\nin a real but in an ideal sense, and hence could not be called a direct\nrepresentative of the evolution theory, still he is all the more decidedly\na predecessor of that theory in directing attention to the unity in plan\nand metamorphosis of plants and animals. Louis Agassiz, who, on the other\nhand, continued up to his death in opposition to the entire doctrine of\ndescent, made the idea of _types_ the principle of his whole\nclassification, and said: \"Man is the purpose toward which the whole animal\ncreation tends from the first appearance of the first paleozoic fish.\"\nRichard Owen, who rejected the selection theory and favored that of\ndescent, published, long before Darwin's appearance, some most interesting\nresults of his anatomical and palaeontological investigations from the point\nof view of the prototype and its modifications. \"Man, from the beginning of\norganisms, was ideally present upon the earth,\" is a sentence which we\nquote from Owen's works.\n\nIn short, this ideal momentum in the observation of the organic kingdoms is\nnot only the most beautiful blossom and the ripest fruit of the union\nbetween {36} laborious and comprehensive detailed investigations and a\ngeneralizing philosophic penetration, but it was also a very efficient\npreparation of the mind for the evolution problem, so far as the summing up\nof the organisms under a type and plan is only the ideal reverse of its\nrealistic reduction to a common pedigree.\n\nWe have yet to add the investigations in regard to the history of evolution\nof the single organisms, as well as those in comparative anatomy, which in\nformer centuries were begun by scientists like Swammerdam and Boerhave and\ncarried more nearly to completion by K. E. von Baer, Carus, and others. In\nreducing all the tissues of plants and animals to one cell, and tracing\nback also their individual developments to the first differentiation of the\nsimplest cell, they followed out the unity of the plan of the organic\nkingdoms--which hitherto had been maintained only ideally and proclaimed as\na philosophic postulate--farther and deeper into the sphere of empiric\nreality. We must mention, moreover, the great palaeontological discoveries\nwhich, from the first foraminifera of the Cambrian formations up to the\nhistorical period of man, showed a great progressive scale in the\nappearance of the organisms and a very wide relationship between this scale\nand the natural systems of botany and zooelogy; and, finally, the principles\nof geology, which, under the leadership of Sir Charles Lyell, starting from\nthe idea of an identity of the powers which were active in former times\nwith those of the present, attempted to explain the most violent of the\nchanges in the earth's crust in former times by causes active to-day. This\noften explains prodigious effects--such as the elevation and settling of\nentire mountains {37} and continents--by the constant and related action of\nthe slightest causes and most gradual steps; it opens the perspective into\nvast epochs of long and numerous geological periods; and sometimes, where\nscientists like Cuvier and Agassiz have supposed the most complete\ncataclysms and the most universal revolutions of the globe, there prove to\nhave been only gradual changes with revolutions very partially and locally\nlimited.\n\nFinally, if we take into consideration the grand discoveries which\nstrikingly illustrate the connection in extent and quality between the\nuniverse and all its agencies and powers--such as Robert von Mayer's\ndiscovery of the conservation of force and of the mechanical equivalent of\nheat, or the spectrum analysis and the information which it gives us by\never-increasing evidences of the identity of the cosmic and telluric\nsubstances--we may venture to say that the scientific and intellectual\nground was well prepared for a theory which takes the origin of organisms\ninto this common relationship of the essential unity and development of the\nuniverse.\n\nOnly one thing more remained to complete the hypothesis offered by Lamarck,\nof the _fact_ of a development of species by a new and more satisfactory\nanswer to the question as to the _manner_ of their development. The task of\nanswering in a more comprehensive and scientific way the question as to the\nmanner of development has been undertaken by Darwin in his selection\ntheory. Alfred Russell Wallace, who arrived at the same results\ncontemporaneously with and independently of Darwin, has, with praiseworthy\nmodesty, renounced his claim to priority of the discovery, as Darwin had\nbeen longer engaged in working out his theories and had begun to collect\nmaterials for proof.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {38}\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nHISTORY OF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\nSec. 1. _Darwin._\n\nIn order to explain the development of higher species from lower ones in a\nnatural way, Darwin starts from two facts. The first fact is, that all\nindividuals of the same species show, besides their specific similarity,\nindividual differences: a fact which we call the _law of individual\nvariability_. The other fact is, that each individual inclines to transmit\nto his offspring all his qualities--not only the characteristics of the\nspecies, but also those of the individual: a fact which we call the _law of\nheredity_.\n\nTo show how the whole basis of explanation of the evolution of one species\nfrom another is given in these two facts, Darwin calls attention to the\nrules according to which the often extraordinarily great varieties of\ndomestic animals and cultivated plants are obtained and preserved; namely,\nthe rules of _artificial breeding_. The breeder simply selects from a\nspecies those individuals having such individual qualities as he wishes to\npreserve and to increase, and refrains from breeding those individuals\nwhich do not possess the characteristics he wants or which possess them\nonly in a small degree. He continues the same process with the next\ngeneration; and by the constant and effectual agency of the two {39}\nbefore-mentioned laws, he will, after the lapse of a few generations, have\nbreeded a variety in which the characteristics originally belonging only to\na single individual have become common and permanent.\n\nIt is now important to consider whether nature, in _natural selection_\n(whence the name \"Selection Theory\") does not act unconsciously according\nto the same rules, and attain the same results, as man with his artificial\nand intentional selection; and, furthermore, whether she does not reach\nresults which, according to that principle of natural selection, finally\nexplain the origin of all, even of the highest and most complicated\norganisms, from one single original form or a few original and simplest\nforms. Darwin finds these questions answered in the affirmative; and\narrives at this answer through the following conclusions.\n\nThe English political economist Malthus (1766-1834), in his \"Essay on the\nPrinciples of Population,\" established a law in regard to the growth of the\nhuman race, which may be applied just as well to all the species of the\nentire organic world: that population tends to increase in a geometrical\nratio, although the conditions of life for the individual remain the same\nor at most increase in an arithmetical ratio. The consequence is that if\nthe species is to be preserved and the individuals of future generations\nare to continue to find sufficient food and other means for sustaining\nlife, a great many individuals of each generation must perish very early,\nand even as germ and seed, and only a minority will be preserved and\nreproduced. This exuberant prodigality of life-germs, of which\nproportionately only a few are preserved and reproduced, takes place in the\nplant and {40} animal world in a very marked degree. There a continual\n_struggle for existence_ prevails; each individual has to get access to his\nconditions of life by wresting them from a whole series of other\nindividuals of his own or other species; and now the question arises: which\nindividuals will survive in this struggle? which will more probably be\npreserved and procreate offspring? Evidently, the answer is, those\nindividuals which possess individual characteristics more favorable to the\npreservation of the individual than those possessed by other individuals.\nThese individual characteristics are transmitted to the next generation. In\nthis there will be again individuals that have in a still higher degree the\ncharacteristics thus transmitted and favorable for the preservation of the\nindividual, or that add to these favorable characteristics new\ncharacteristics favorable in another direction to the survival of the\nindividual in the struggle for existence. While these individuals, with\nmore probability than the others, are thus preserved and reproduced, they\ntransmit to their offspring not only the old favorable characteristics\nincreased, but also those newly added. Among the favorable individual\nqualities, Darwin reckons the divergence of character, the perfection of\norganization, and the law of correlation; the latter, however, can not be\nexplained by natural selection, since according to this law a variation in\nan organ brings about a corresponding variation in entirely different\norgans (_e.g._, cats with white fur and blue eyes are also deaf).\n\nThis is _natural selection by means of the survival of the fittest in the\nstruggle for existence_. Changes in the conditions and surroundings of\nlife, and more or less {41} perfect adaptation of the organisms to the new\nconditions of form, color, food and habit, are the main causes of those\nindividual variations, the accumulation of which through many generations\nproduces so great effects. If we only have behind us periods long enough to\npermit us to imagine each step in the development as an extremely small and\nhardly appreciable one, natural selection offers us not the exclusive but\nthe main means of explaining the evolution of the whole animal and plant\nworld out of one or a few simple organized original forms.\n\nThis is the outline of the selection theory, as given by Darwin in 1859,\nand still retained in all its essentials. It is true, in his work on the\norigin of man he added as supplemental the _sexual_ to the common natural\nselection, and made it of special importance for the presentation of the\n_beautiful_ in nature--for the production of beautiful forms, colors, and\ntones, and for the development of power and intelligence. And in the same\nwork he said that there are many circumstances of structure which seem to\nbe neither beneficial nor detrimental to the individual, and that to have\noverlooked this fact was one of his greatest mistakes in his former\npublications. But for the rest, he maintains the selection theory\nunchanged, with the single modification that it explains, if not the whole\ndevelopment of the species through descent, at least that which is of most\nimportance in it.\n\nThat it was only one step in the course of reasoning to extend the\nselection theory to the descent of man, was seen by many as soon as\nDarwin's work on the origin of species was published and began to attract\n{42} attention; although not a syllable upon this question was presented in\nthis work. Various persons manifested their presentiment or perception\naccording to their point of view--partly by the most violent opposition to\nthe new doctrine, partly by scientific development or modification of their\nanthropogonic views, partly also by revelling in imagination in the\nconsequences hostile to religious faith which they thought could be drawn\nfrom this doctrine. We remind the reader of the itinerant lectures of Karl\nVogt about the ape-pedigree of man, and of the echo they found by assent or\ndissent in press and public; also of Huxley in England, Karl Snell,\nSchleiden, Reichenbach, and others; of the materialists, L. Buechuer and\nMoleschott, and of the publications of Ernst Haeckel. Finally, Darwin\nhimself made us fully certain of the importance which from the beginning he\nhad attributed to his theory, by publishing his work on the \"Descent of\nMan,\" in the year 1870.\n\nIn this work he explained the descent of man fully from the before-named\nprinciples of the descent, evolution, and selection theories, of which we\nhave given all the essentials in the foregoing presentation. He carefully\nenumerates everything in the structure of the human body that reminds us of\nour relationship with the animals--especially those embryonic phenomena and\nrudimentary organs in man which are still to be found in use and in a more\ndeveloped state in different animal species, and which led him to imagine\nour ancestors now with a tail, then with sharp ears, now living in the\nwater, then being hermaphrodites. He reviews the spiritual qualities of\nman, and finds for them all analogous qualities in the animal world. He\nfinds in his work on {43} \"Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals,\"\npublished in 1872, new confirmation of the genealogical relationship of\nboth. He looks over the whole course of the zooelogical system and of\npalaeontological discoveries, and searches for the points where the branches\nand twigs of the animal pedigree of man must have diverged. To begin with\nthe lowest branches, he thinks the most important divergence took place\nwhere the series of vertebrates may have been developed out of the\ninvertebrates. Here he adopts the investigations of A. Kowalewsky, and the\ndeductions of Haeckel founded upon them, concerning the larva of the\nascidiae, a genus of marine mollusca of the order tunicata, and sees in a\ncord, to be found in this larva, most decided relationship to the spine of\nthe lancelet fish or amphioxus, the lowest of all the vertebrates, it being\nyet doubtful whether it belongs at all to the vertebrates. In the\ntransition that once took place from one species of ascidian larva to a\nform similar to the lancelet fish, he sees the new branch diverging in the\nseries of vertebrates. Out of the fish he concludes that the amphibia were\ndeveloped, and out of those the reptilia, out of one of them the\nmarsupialia, and from them the lemurs or half-apes, the representatives of\nwhich yet live in Madagascar and the southern part of Asia. From these\nthere branched off on the one side the platyrrhini, or apes with a flat\nnose, on the new continent; on the other, the catarrhini, or apes with a\nnarrow nose, on the old. Among the ancestor of the last, he searches for\nthe common progenitors, from which again two branches started--on the one\nhand the ignoble branches of the catarrhine species of apes, always\nremaining lower in {44} development, to which also belong the\nanthropomorphous apes, like the orang outang and gibbon in Asia, the\ngorilla and chimpanzee in Africa; on the other hand, that branch which\nrepresents the ascent of animals to man.\n\nThe refining agencies which finally raise the animal up to the man are\nessentially the same that on the lowest scales of the pedigree have caused\nthe development of the lower organisms into the higher, namely: favorable\nindividual variations, inheritance, acclimatization, survival of the\nfittest in the struggle for existence, natural, and especially, sexual\nselection. These are, if not the exclusive, still the main agencies which\nfinally led the primate of the earthly creation upon the stage and\nfurnished him with his superior faculties. But it is particularly by means\nof his social life, and of the forces which determine, transmit, increase\nand ennoble the various impulses and instincts promoting it, that man has\nbecome what he is. Through the need and faculty of reciprocal help, through\nsexual selection--which of course is a very essential factor of social\nlife--there originated language, and reflection, and all the intellectual\nqualities; and through these again originated the moral qualities, which\nare most important in constituting the specific worth of man, and which\nwere finally developed into self-consciousness and free moral\nresponsibility.\n\nBut with the description of this attempt to explain more in detail these\nspecific characteristics of man, we leave the ground of pure natural\nscience and enter the region of philosophy, in which we have to take up the\n{45} question again (in Book II, Ch. I) at the same point where we here\nleave it.\n\nSec. 2. _The Followers of Darwin.--Ernst Haeckel._\n\nDarwin's theory soon found an enthusiastic corps of followers--on the\ncontinent, and especially in Germany, almost more than in his own country.\nThe outlook into an entirely new explanation of the origin of man, and the\nprobable use of this theory for attacks upon faith in a Creator and Master\nof the world, called wide-spread attention to it; and the theory opened to\nnatural science itself entirely new impulses and paths, and promised the\nsolution of many problems before which it had hitherto been compelled to\nstand in silence. To be sure, it threatened likewise to allure the mind\nfrom the slow but sure ways of solid study to the entertaining but insecure\nand aimless paths of imagination and hypothesis.\n\nAmong all the German followers of Darwin who adopted not only the idea of\nan origin of species through descent and evolution, but also the\nexplanation of evolution by natural selection, and extended it so as to\nmake the principle of selection of exclusive value, Ernst Haeckel occupies\nthe most prominent rank.\n\nIn his \"General Morphology,\" published in 1866, and in his \"Natural History\nof the Creation,\" the first edition of which appeared in 1868, and finally\nin his \"Anthropogeny\"[2] (why he does not say Anthropogony, we are nowhere\ninformed), 1874, this scientist brought the new theory, which had been\npresented by Darwin in an almost bewildering flood of details, into\nconnection and order, and, analyzing the powers active in natural\nselection, combined them into an entire system of laws. He {46} at once\ndrew the origin of man also into the course of reasoning on the new theory,\nand sustained the theory by the discovery of the _monera_ and other low\norganisms of one cell, as well as by special investigations of the\ncalcareous sponges. For these labors, he was rewarded by the warm and\nunreserved acknowledgment which Darwin made to him in his work upon the\norigin of man, which was published subsequently to the \"Natural History of\nthe Creation.\" There Darwin says: \"If this work had appeared before my\nessay had been written, I should probably never have completed it. Almost\nall the conclusions at which I have arrived, I find confirmed by this\nnaturalist, whose knowledge on many points is much fuller than mine.\"\nHaeckel's labors rendered still greater service to the Darwinian theory by\ndividing the organic world into three kingdoms: the protista kingdom, the\nvegetable kingdom, and the animal kingdom,--a division which solves in a\nmost simple way the difficulty that was felt more and more of securing for\nthe lowest organisms a place among the animals or plants. He further aided\nthe theory by leaving the choice open to adopt either a uniform or\nmultiform pedigree of the organisms and their kingdoms and classes, and by\ntreating each class under both points of view; and finally, by fascinating\nexperiments to bring before us in detail the hypothetical pedigrees of all\nclasses of organisms from the protista kingdom up to man.\n\nWe will try to reproduce briefly the pedigree which is of most\ninterest--the hypothetical _pedigree of man_. Haeckel divides it into\ntwenty-two stages, eight of them belonging to the series of the\ninvertebrates, and fourteen to that of the vertebrates. On this ladder of\n{47} twenty-two rounds, he leads us from the lowest form of the living\nbeing, in slight and mostly plausible transitions, continually higher and\nhigher, up to man; and makes our steps easy by mentioning at each stage, on\nthe one hand the corresponding state in the embryonic development, on the\nother the still living creature through which, in his opinion, the former\norganisms of the corresponding round of the ladder are still represented,\nand which accordingly has been a creature that remained on its round, while\nother members of its family have been developed up to man and to many other\ngenera and species.\n\nHe begins with the monera, the organisms of the lowest form, discovered by\nhimself, which have not so much as the organic rank of a cell, but are only\ncorpuscules of mucus, without kernel or external covering, called by him\ncytod, and arising from an organic carbon formation. The lowest and most\nformless moneron is the bathybius, discovered by Thomas Huxley, a network\nof recticular mucus, which in the greatest depths of the sea, as far down\nas 7,000 metres, covers stone fragments and other objects, but are also\nfound in less depths, in the Mediterranean Sea, for instance. From the\nmoneron he proceeds to the amoeba--a simple cell, with a kernel, which\nstill corresponds to the egg of man in its first state. The third stage is\nformed by the communities of amoebae (synamoebae), corresponding to the\nmulberry-yolk in the first development of the fecundated egg, and to some\nstill living heaps of amoebae. To the fourth stage he assigns the planaea,\ncorresponding to the embryonic development of an albumen and the planula or\nciliated {48} larva. When these ciliated larvae are developed, they contract\nthemselves so as to form a cavity; and this fifth stage--especially\nimportant for his theory--he calls gastraea. In this form, he says, the\nprogaster is already developed, and its wall is differentiated for the\nfirst time into an animal or dermal layer (ectoblast), and into a\nvegetative or intestinal layer (hypoblast). At the sixth stage, there\nbranched off the prothelmis, or worms, with the first formations of a\nnervous system, the simplest organs of sense, the simplest organs for\nsecretion (kidneys) and generation (sexual organs), represented to-day by\nthe gliding worms or turbellaria; as the seventh stage, the soft worms, as\nhe called them at first--the blood worms, or coelomati, as he describes\nthem in his \"Anthropogeny\"--a purely hypothetical stage, on which a true\nbody-cavity and blood were formed; the eighth stage are the chorda-animals\nwith the beginning of a spinal rod, corresponding to the larva of the\nascidiae. At the ninth stage, called the skull-less animals (acrania), and\ncorresponding to the still living lancelet, we enter the series of the\nvertebrates. The importance of the eighth and ninth stages for the theory,\nwe have already pointed out in our remarks upon Darwin, p. 43. The tenth\nstage is formed by those low fishes in which the spinal rod is\ndifferentiated into the skull--and the vertebral-column, called the\nsingle-nostriled animals (monorrhini), and represented by the cyclostoma of\ntoday (hag and lampreys). The eleventh stage is formed by the primaeval fish\nor selachii (sharks); the twelfth by the mud fish, of which there still\nlive the protopterus in Africa, the lepidosiren in the tributaries of the\nAmazon, and the ceratodus in the swamps of Southern {49} Australia. On the\nthirteenth stage, there are the gilled amphibians (sozobranchia), proteus\nand axolotl; on the fourteenth, the tailed amphibians (sozura), newt and\nsalamander; on the fifteenth, the purely hypothetical primaeval amniota or\nprotamnia (amnion is the name given to the chorion which surrounds the\ngerm-water and embryo of the three higher classes of vertebrates) on the\nsixteenth, the primary mammals (promammalia), to which the present\nmonotremes (ornithorhynchus and echidna) stand nearest; on the seventeenth,\nthe pouched animals or marsupialia; on the eighteenth, the semi-apes or\nprosimiae (loris and maki); on the nineteenth, the tailed apes, or menocerca\n(nose-apes and slender-apes, or semnopithecus); on the twentieth, the\nman-like apes (anthropoides) or tail-less catarrhini (gorilla, chimpanzee,\norang outang and gibbon). And now we come to twenty-one--ape-like men or\nspeechless primaeval men (alali)--of whom we are reminded to-day by the\ndeaf, and dumb, the cretins and the microcephali; and number twenty-two is\n_homo sapiens_, the man. The Australians and the Papuans are supposed to be\nthe only remaining representatives of his first stage-development. In like\nmanner, Haeckel also gives us the stem-branches of all the types, classes\nand orders of the organisms, and forms from them a very acceptable\nhypothetical pedigree; or--if we prefer to suppose a polyphyletic rather\nthan a monophyletic origin of species--hypothetical pedigrees of the whole\norganic world.\n\nThe perspicuity and clearness of Haeckel's deductions, the extent of his\nknowledge, and the singleness of his aim, to which he makes them all\nsubservient, lend {50} to his works a great charm. But on the other hand we\ndare not conceal that, even on the ground of explanations belonging purely\nto natural history, the character of hypothesis is often lost in that of\narbitrariness and of the undemonstrable. Even the unlearned in natural\nscience often enough get this impression when reading his works, and will\nfind it confirmed by scientists who not only contradict his assertions in\nmany cases, but disclose plain errors in his drawings--errors, indeed,\nexclusively in favor of the unity-hypothesis; and in other cases they show\nthat drawings which are given as pictures of the real, represent merely\nhypothetical opinions. There is especially evident in his works an\nextremely strong tendency to impress on his hypotheses the character of an\nestablished and proved fact, by giving them the alluring name of laws.\nEntire systems of laws of the selection theory are produced, and all\nimaginable assertions are also immediately called laws. For example,\nHuxley, in his anatomical investigations of apes and men, arrives at the\nconclusion that the differences between the highest and the lowest apes are\ngreater than the differences between the highest apes and man. This purely\nanatomical comparison, Haeckel calls repeatedly \"Huxley's Law.\" We are well\naware that the idea of law is capable of great extension in meaning, and in\nthat respect we can refer to nothing more instructive than the\nwell-meditated inquiry upon this idea in the \"Reign of Law\" of the Duke of\nArgyll (London, Strahan & Co.). But if we may venture to call purely\nanatomical comparisons of this nature _laws_, such a use of language\ndestroys all logical reasoning; and this mistake appears again in Haeckel's\nphilosophic {51} discussions, of which we shall have to speak hereafter. We\nshall have to refer also hereafter to an additional embellishment, which\nHaeckel thinks himself obliged to give to his works--namely, that he makes\non every occasion the strongest attacks upon faith in a personal God, a\nCreator and Lord of the world; that he traces all the motives of human\naction to self-interest; that he denies the liberty of man and the moral\nsystem of the world; that he makes consent to his view of things the\ncriterion of the intellectual development of a man; and that he thinks to\nrender a service to civilization by such a view of the world and of ethics.\n\nIn the consequent carrying out of the selection principle as the\nsatisfactory key in explaining the origin of all species and also of man,\nHaeckel is indeed, in spite of the approval of his works by the British\nmaster, more Darwinian than Darwin himself, who expressly refuses to give\nexclusive value to this theory of explanation. Hence there are among\nscientists only a few who go with him to this extent. In Germany, aside\nfrom the materialists, we only know of Seidlitz and Oskar Schmidt--who in\nthe thirteenth volume of the \"International Scientific Series\" treats of\n\"The Theory of Descent and Darwinism,\" and advocates not only the autocracy\nof the selection theory, but also all the monistic and atheistic\nconsequences which are deduced from it. Perhaps Gustav Jaeger, Schleiden,\nBernhard Cotta--at least judging from their earlier publications--should be\nmentioned as followers of the pure selection theory; although they do not\nall draw from it the before-mentioned philosophic consequences. On the\nother hand, the number of those is very great who, although inspired {52}\nby Darwin to adopt the idea of an origin of species through descent and\nevolution, yet have more or less modified, laid aside, or entirely refused\nthe very doctrine which is especially new in Darwin's theory--the selection\ntheory. In the following section we shall briefly give an account of them.\n\nSec. 3. _Modifications of the Theory--Moriz Wagner. Wigand._\n\nOne of the most prominent objections to the selection theory, which strikes\nus at once from the standpoint of natural history, is the following: The\nvarieties of a domesticated species, obtained by artificial breeding, are\nlost, and return to the original wild form of the species as soon as they\nare crossed long enough with other varieties or are left to themselves and\nto the crossing with individuals of the original form of their species; and\nhence we can not see how individual characteristics, even if favorable to\nthe individual, will not be lost again by the crossing which is inevitable\nin a state of nature, with such individuals as do not possess those\ncharacteristics. Besides, it is an established fact, confirmed by all our\nobservations stretching over thousands of years, that the characteristics\nof species are preserved in spite of all individual modifications, and that\nthis preservation of the characteristics of species has its cause\nessentially in the free crossing of individuals.\n\nThis objection induced Moriz Wagner to take up again an idea already\nexpressed by Leopold von Buch, and to complete the principle of a selection\nthrough natural breeding by another, and partly, indeed, to supplant it by\nthe principle of _isolation by migration_. Isolated individuals, who, from\nany reason naturally to {53} be accounted for, leave the mass of their\nfellows, can from the very consequence of this isolation transmit to their\noffspring common individual characteristics which are not destroyed again\nby the crossing with other individuals. They will especially fix and\ntransmit these individual characteristics, when they are favorable to them\nfor the conditions of existence in their new place of living, and these\nindividual characteristics will so much the more be increased and developed\nin a direction favorable to the subsistence of the individuals in their new\nplace of living, as there are more closely connected with this isolation\nvariations in the conditions of existence, in climate, geographical\nsurroundings, food, and so on. He very attractively applies this theory\nalso to the explanation of the origin of man. According to his opinion,\neven the nearest animal progenitors of man were isolated, and the isolating\npower was the rise of the great mountains of the Old World, which took\nplace previous to the glacial period. One pair, or perhaps a few pairs, of\nthose progenitors were driven away from the luxurious climate of the torrid\nzone to the northern half of the globe, and found their return cut off by\nglaciers and high mountains; in place of a comfortable life on the trees,\nnecessity urged them to gain support from conditions less favorable to\nexistence, and necessity, this mother of so many virtues and achievements,\nfinally made man what he is. In following out these ideas, Moriz Wagner has\ngradually and more and more decidedly given up the selection theory, and\nopposed it by sharp criticisms.\n\nThis _migration_ or _isolation theory_ also found a degree of favor, but\nsubordinate in its nature. For it {54} can not and will not pretend to\nsolve the main problems. It only tries to explain how the individual\nvariations, already in existence, might have been preserved and perhaps\nincreased, and how new conditions of existence could have roused latent\npowers; but not how these variations and these powers originated. Just as\nlittle is the selection theory able to explain this; but it pretends to do\nit, and hence we can easily comprehend how during the last few years a\nconstantly increasing number of voices, and more important ones, have been\nraised against the selection theory. This opposition came not only from\nthose who--like Agassiz, Barrande, Emil Blanchard, Escher von der Linth,\nGoeppert, Giebel, Sir Roderick Murchison, Pfaff, and others--directly reject\neach and every idea of descent on account of the difficulty in defending\nthe selection theory; or who--like Karl Ernst von Baer,[3] (the {55}\npioneer in the region of the history of individual development), like Oskar\nFraas, Griesebach, Sandberger, and others--generally take a more reserved\nand neutral position, because of the uncertainty of the facts and the\ninaccessibility of the problems; but it comes especially from those\nscientists who are inclined to adopt an origin of species through descent\nand even through development, yet refuse to explain it by the selection\nprinciple, and look for the essential cause of the development in the\norganisms themselves, without claiming to have themselves found these\ncauses. Among the most prominent advocates of this view, we may name the\nlate Sir Charles Lyell, Mivart, and {56} Richard Owen, in England; and in\nGermany, Alexander Braun, Ecker, Gegenbaur, Oswald Heer, W. His, Naegeli,\nRuetimeyer, Schaaffhausen, Virchow, Karl Vogt, A. W. Volkmann, Weismann,\nZittel, and here also Moriz Wagner, and among the philosophers, Eduard von\nHartmann. Many of these men are but little aware of the difference between\nthe two questions: whether, on the one hand, the adoption of the origin of\nspecies through descent does not of itself involve the idea of a gradual\ndevelopment of one species from another, almost unobservable in its single\nsteps; or, on the other hand, whether a descent of species through\nheterogenetic generation in leaps and through a metamorphosis of the germs,\ncould be imagined. They consider descent and evolution as identical; and\nthis identification is explainable so long as we are not in a condition to\ncome nearer to the eventual causes of the supposed variation of species.\nBut men are not wanting who put these questions clearly and plainly, and\nseparate them distinctly from one another. Among them we may mention K. E.\nvon Baer, Ed. von Hartmann and Wigand; of the latter we will have occasion\nto speak more in detail hereafter. Among them we find also scientists who\nanswer the question in the sense of a new-modeling of the species, of a\nheterogenetic generation, and of a metamorphosis of germs. To this class\nbelong especially Oswald Heer--\"Urwelt der Schweitz\" (\"Antediluvian World\nin Switzerland\"), Zuerich, 1865, p. 590-604; Koelliker--\"Ueber die\nDarwin'sche Schoepfungstheorie,\" (\"Darwin's Theory of Creation\"), Leipzig,\n1864; \"Morphologie und Entwicklungeschichte des Pennatulidenstammes nebst\nallgemeinen Betrachtungen zur Descendenzlehre,\" {57} (\"Morphology and\nHistory of the Development of the Stem of the Pennatulidae, together with\nGeneral Remarks on the Descent Theory\"), Frankfurt, 1872; and Heinrich\nBaumgaertner--\"Natur und Gott\" (\"Nature and God\"), Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1870.\nHeer has introduced into scientific language the term \"new-modeling of the\nspecies,\" Koelliker that of a \"heterogenetic generation,\" and Baumgaertner\nthat of a \"transmutation of the types through a metamorphosis of germs.\"\nBaer also is not averse to adopting the latter.\n\nThe botanist, Albert Wigand, of Marburg, takes a peculiar position. On one\nhand, the observation of the relationship of organic beings with one\nanother leads him to adopt a common genealogy, a descent; on the other, the\nobjections to adopting a descent of the species one from another appear to\nhim insurmountable. In the first place, he sees all the species everywhere\nstrictly limited--although in the second volume of his work, which appeared\nafter the preceding lines were written, he again warns against a one-sided\nemphasizing of the invariability of species. In the second place, he sees\nso clearly, through the whole organic world, the differences, nay, the\ncontrasts, of the species, in their building plan, in the numbers and\nconditions and positions of their parts, and in their mode of development,\nthat it appears to him impossible to assume in the perfected organism a\nproduction of germs which in a course of generations, by a process even as\ngradual as possible, would grow into such an entirely new phenomenon as a\nnew, even closely related, species would be. But if we adopt the theory of\na heterogenetic generation, we explain by it the variety but not the\nsimilarity of species; {58} for a heterogenetic generation would in the new\nspecies make everything different from the old one--a conclusion, the\nnecessity of which it would be difficult to show. For these reasons, he\nrefers the descent of the organic beings, not to the series of the species,\nwith their individuals already specified and defined, but to the series of\n_primordial cells_ living free in the water. The earliest primordial cells\nrepresented only the common character of the _whole organic world_, and out\nof them the primordial cells of the _animal_ and those of the _vegetable\nkingdom_ were produced by dividing the cells; so that the first ones\nembraced only the general and primitive characteristics of the whole\nanimal, the last ones those of the whole vegetable kingdom. Out of these\nprimordial cells of the two kingdoms, those of the _main types_\nproceeded--(for instance, the primordial cells of the radiated animals, the\nvertebrates, etc., the gymnosperms, the angiosperms, etc.); out of them\nthose of the _classes_--(for instance, the mammalia, the dicotyledons); out\nof them those of the _orders_--(for instance, the beasts of prey,\nrosiflorae); out of them those of the _families_ (canina, rosaceae); out of\nthem those of the _genus_ (canis, rosa); and out of them those of the\n_species_ (canis lupus, rosa canina). Only when the primordial cells of the\nspecies had been produced, were they developed into finished\nrepresentatives of the species; and when once these primordial cells of the\nspecies had been developed into finished and full-grown individuals of the\nspecies, their transmission took place in the manner well known to us.\nWigand published his criticism of the Darwinian Theories in his larger\nwork, \"Der Darwinismus und die Naturforschung Newtons und Cuviers,\"\n(\"Darwinism {59} and the Natural Science of Newton and Cuvier\"),\nBraunschweig, Vieweg, Vol. I, 1874, Vol. II, 1876, and his own attempt at\nexplanation in a smaller book, published at the same place in 1872: \"Die\nGenealogie der Urzellen als Loesung des Descendenzproblems oder die\nEntstehung der Arten ohne natuerliche Zuchtwahl\" (\"Genealogy of the\nPrimordial Cells as a Solution of the Problem of Descent; or the Origin of\nSpecies without Natural Selection\").\n\nWhether this _genealogy of the primordial cells_ found any followers, we do\nnot know. None of the hypotheses thus far mentioned are so very far from\nhaving analogies in experience. The idea of a first development of the\nhigher organisms out of their specific primordial cell, through all kinds\nof conditions of larvae up to the finished form, demands of us the\nacceptance of monstrous improbabilities--(think, for example, of the first\nmen, who, originating from a human primordial cell, grow in different\nmetamorphoses of larvae, first in the water and then on the land, until they\nappear as finished men). Moreover, the hypothesis, in claiming that a\nheterogenetic generation of one species from another must necessarily\nnullify all similarity between the organism of the child and that of the\nmother, is so little convincing, and shows--in the necessity of conceiving\nthe universal type of organisms, the type of kingdoms, of main types, of\nclasses, of orders, of families, of genera, and of species, as but\nindividual existences which, in the form of cells and before the existence\nof the developed species, partly through many thousands of years, lead a\nreal empiric and concrete life--such an abstract synthetical construction\nof nature, that {60} we are not astonished that the theory of the genealogy\nof primordial cells stands almost alone. On the other hand, Wigand's larger\ncritical work rendered great service in clearing up the problems. It is\ntrue, his judgment appears in many single cases not at all convincing,\nsince he often enough fights his adversaries with sophisms and deduces from\nthe views of Darwin and Haeckel conclusions to which they certainly do not\nlead. But in the majority of cases, his work is full of real convincing\npower, and with the breadth of its philosophical view and with the\nsharpness of its definitions, as well as with its abundance of philosophic\nand especially botanical teachings and their ingenious application, it is\ndirectly destructive to the use of the selection theory as the principal\nkey to the solution of the problems. Eduard von Hartmann describes the work\nin his publication, \"Wahrheit und Irrthum im Darwinismus,\" (\"Truth and\nError in Darwinism\"), as a mile-stone which marks the limits where\nDarwinism as such passed the summit of its influence in Germany.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {61}\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nPRESENT STATE OF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\nSec. 1. _The Theory of Descent._\n\nThe historical retrospect of the Darwinian theories, from their purely\nscientific side, leads us of itself to a critical review of their present\nstate. We can briefly indicate in advance the result to which it will lead\nus, viz.: that the descent theory has gained, the selection theory has lost\nground, the theory of development oscillates between both; but that all\nthree theories have not yet passed beyond the rank of hypotheses, although\nthey have very unequal hypothetical value. We can best arrange our review\nby beginning with that theory which is the most common, and which perhaps\nmay still have value when both the others find their value diminished or\nlost: _the theory of descent_. From that we proceed to the _theory of\nevolution_, and from this to that of _selection_.\n\nThe theory of descent is indeed at first sight exceedingly plausible, and\nwill probably always be the _directive_ for all future investigations as to\nthe origin of species. The organic species show, besides the great variety\nof their characteristics and the unchangeable nature of these\ncharacteristics, many other qualities which are common to them; and these\ncommon characteristics are precisely those which are most essential. {62}\nMoreover the higher the structure of the organisms which are\ndifferentiated, the more numerous and more valuable will become the\nevidences of similarity, and the greater also will be their distance from\nthe inorganic and from the lowest organisms of their class, their type, or\ntheir kingdom. For instance, rose and apple-tree, elder and ash, wolf and\ndog, goat and sheep, ape and man, are not only a great deal farther removed\nfrom the mode of existence of inorganic bodies than the algae, the monera,\nand other low organisms, but they have also, in spite of the great interval\nwhich separates them from one another and especially which separates man\nfrom every animal, much more numerous and important points of contact than,\nfor instance, two families or genera of algae or of mosses, of polyps or of\ninfusoria, have among one another. Now our imagination refuses to accept\nthe theory that the Creator, or nature, or whatever we wish to call the\nprinciple generating the species, in producing the new species, laid aside\nall those points of contact which are continually becoming more numerous\nand more important, and produced instead, by ever widening leaps, the new\nand higher species from the inorganic, which lies farther and farther from\nthem. On the other hand, the theory appears to us all the more plausible,\nthat every new species came into existence on that stage which is the most\nnearly related to it, and which was already in existence. If we add\nfurther, that the two old maxims of the natural scientists, _omne vivum ex\novo_ and _omne ovum ex ovario_, have not been invalidated, in spite of all\nthe searching for a _generatio aequivoca_, and that, even if the origination\nof the lowest organisms out of the inorganic could in future be {63}\nproved, yet the truth of these maxims for all the higher organized\nindividuals is established as a fact without exception. Moreover, if we\ntake into consideration the fact that we can not at all imagine either the\norigin or the first development of a higher animal or a human organism\nwithout the protecting integument and the nourishing help of a mother's\nwomb, we may venture to say that each and every attempt to render the\norigin of the first individuals of the higher species conceivable, leads of\nnecessity to the descent theory. We have either to reject, once for all,\nsuch an attempt, as an unscientific playing with impossibilities, or to\naccept the idea of descent. It is certainly the lasting merit of Darwin,\neven if his whole structure of proofs should in the course of time show\nitself weak, that he not only had the courage (as others had before him),\nbut also inspired scientists with the courage to trace the idea of a\ndescent of species in a scientific way.\n\nTo be sure, so long as we have no other proof of the descent theory than\nthe circumstance that we can imagine it, it will continue to be nothing\nmore than an ingenious hypothesis. We have, therefore, to look to the realm\nof nature for more direct proofs; and we are there furnished with them.\nThey are presented to us by geology in connection with the botanical and\nzooelogical systems, by geology in connection with vegetable and animal\ngeography, by comparative anatomy, and by the history of the embryonic\ndevelopment of animals.\n\n_Geology_ finds in the strata of the crust of the globe a large number of\nextinct plants and animals of extraordinary variety; but all of them,\nhowever much they {64} may differ from the organisms of to-day, are\ncompletely in harmony with the _botanical_ and _zooelogical systems_ in\nwhich we divide the still living organisms. Not only have by far the most\nof the now extinct genera and species their family and stem-companions, and\nmany even their genera and species companions, in the living world, but\nalso those genera whose nearer relations are now extinct--as, for instance,\nthe club-moss-trees, the trilobites, the ammonites, the belemnites, the\nsauria, the nummulites,--show still a very perceptible relationship with\nliving genera, and can be quite accurately included in the botanical and\nzooelogical systems; nay, they even fill up gaps in it. The anatomical,\nmorphological, and, so far as we can judge, the physiological and\nbiological relationship of the fossil with living organisms, is so great\nand comprehensive that in the present state of science a systematic botany\nor zooelogy, that should only treat of the fossils or of living organisms\nalone, would be imperfect. But the relationship of the fossil organisms\nwith the natural systems of botany and zooelogy is apparent not only in this\nrespect, but also in the fact that the single species during the long\nperiods of time which are shown by geology to have elapsed, came into\nexistence in a series, which again pretty closely corresponds to the\nnatural system of the organic kingdoms; and that the fossil representatives\nof all classes and families, the nearer they come to the present world,\nappear the more nearly related to the living organisms, so that the fauna\nand flora of the ante-human time are lost in those of the human period by\ntransitions gliding from the one to the other. For instance, in the Miocene\nformation of the tertiary epoch {65} we find thirty per cent. of species\nstill living to-day; in the Pliocene, even sixty to eighty per cent., and\ntoward its end even about ninety-six per cent. of species which are\nidentical with those now living.\n\nA brief glance may still more closely illustrate this analogy between the\ngeological series and the organic systems. Plants and animals seem to have\nappeared nearly at the same time, and at first in the form of the very\nlowest organisms. The earliest plants found by geology belong also to the\nlowest stage of the vegetable kingdom; they are the algae. They are followed\nagain by higher cryptogamous plants, especially ferns and club-mosses. Only\nat a later period flowering plants appear, among them being first the\nplants with naked seeds standing lower in the systems, as the cycad-trees\nand pine-forests; later, those with enclosed seeds, among them being again\nfirst the monocotyledons, last the dicotyledons,--all of them precisely\ncorresponding to the botanical system. The same thing is true in the animal\nkingdom. If the eozoon Canadense, found in the laurentian slate of the\nCambrian formation in North America, is really an organism and not an\ninorganic form, the earliest vestiges of animal life we can find are the\nrhizopodes or foraminifera; and these organisms belong to the lowest stage\nof life--to that stage which forms a kind of undeveloped intermediate\nmember between the vegetable and animal kingdom, Haeckel's kingdom of the\nprotista. The next oldest animal organisms found in the Cambrian formation\nare the zooephytes, and immediately above them the mollusca and the\ncrustacea. In the following Silurian period we find corals, radiata, worms,\nmollusca, and crustacea, in {66} great number, also all the main-types of\nthe invertebrates; and in the highest Silurian strata there are also to be\nfound representatives of the lowest class of vertebrates, of fish, but\nstill of very low organization and little differentiated. That the five\nmain-types of the invertebrates seem to have appeared quite\ncontemporaneously, yet that the zooephytes really appeared first, does not\ncontradict the before-mentioned law of a progress in the appearance of the\norganisms from the lower to the higher. For in the zooelogical system also\nthese main-types of the invertebrates do not stand one above the other, but\nby the side of each other: at most, the radiata, the worms, the mollusca,\nand the articulata, take their places above the zooephytes. Only within the\nmain-types, in the classes, orders, etc., do differences in rank take\neffect; and even here, not without exception. What difference in rank, for\ninstance, is there between an oyster and a cuttle-fish? between a cochineal\nand a bee or ant? and yet the first two belong to one and the same\ntype--the type of mollusca; and the last three to one and the same\nclass--the class of insects. The vertebrates rank decidedly above the\ninvertebrates; and in a manner wholly corresponding to this, the\nvertebrates also appear after the invertebrates. Just as decidedly as to\ntheir rank, the main classes of the vertebrates do not stand beside, but\nabove one another: above the fish stand the amphibia, above them the\nreptiles, next the birds, and above them the mammalia. To this series of\nsuccession also the geological facts seem to correspond pretty closely;\nonly long after the fish do the first amphibia and reptilia\nappear--although it can not yet be decided which of these {67} two classes\nhas left its earliest traces. If the interpretation of the gigantic\nfoot-steps in the colored sandstone of North America, as belonging to the\ncursorial birds, is correct, the first appearance of birds falls in the\ntime between the reptilia and mammalia; otherwise the first mammalia would\nhave appeared before the first birds. For if we find the first real bones\nof birds only in the Jura and in the Chalk-formation, they are birds with\ntail-spines and with teeth in the beak--hence still related to the reptilia\nor the sauria. The first traces of mammalia to be found in the Upper Keuper\nformation, and in the Jura, belong to the order of opossums or marsupialia;\n_i.e._, to that order which (excepting the echidna and the ornithorhynchus\nthat, as so-called monotremeta, stand the very lowest in the class of the\nmammalia, but are very scarce) occupies the lowest stage among the\nmultitude of mammalia. Only after them do the higher orders of mammalia\nappear; and last of all organisms, man.\n\nIf we follow more in detail the appearance of the single organisms, some\nremarkable modifications show themselves in the course of their appearance\nand growth. We have heretofore mentioned the possibility of the appearance\nof the mammalia before the bird. Another fact which deserves attention is,\nthat frequently the lowest representatives of a class or an order do not at\nfirst appear where the highest representatives of the next lower class or\norder are in existence, but with lower representatives of a preceding class\nor order, viz.: such representatives of the same as are still less\ndifferentiated and unite in themselves comparatively still more generic and\nless specific characteristics--as for instance, the lowest and {68}\nearliest amphibia, which do not appear at the same time and place with the\nmost highly organized fishes, but with fishes of still lower organization.\nMoreover many groups of organisms show in earlier geological periods a\nrichness of development from which they have now fallen far away. For\ninstance, among the mammalia the pachydermata, among the reptilia the\nsalamander and newt, among the articulata the cephalopoda, are at present\nremarkably reduced;--compare with the legions of ammonites and belemnites\nof the secondary period the small number of nautilus and cuttle-fish of the\nseas at the present day. A similar fortune was experienced by the ferns and\nclub-mosses which formed whole forests in the carboniferous period. Other\ngroups which once played a great _role_, are now wholly extinct; for\ninstance, the trilobites of the primary, the sauria of the secondary, the\nnummulites of the tertiary periods. Now, all these modifications of\ngeological progress would entirely correspond to the idea of a pedigree to\nwhich the descent theory traces back the whole abundance of forms of\norganisms. As soon as we seriously accept the idea of a pedigree, each of\nthe two organic kingdoms would throughout form for its classes and species\nnot only one single straight line of descent, but a tree, the branches of\nwhich are again ramified in a manifold way; a tree on which single\nbranches--as perhaps that of the class of birds--may leave the main-stem or\na main-branch, possibly being a branch destined to a higher development,\nand on that account held back in the process of development; a tree,\nfinally, on which also branches and twigs can wholly or partly die off, as\nthose of the extinct or reduced groups of organisms. {69}\n\nFrom the point where the geological formations approach the present time,\n_plant_ and _animal geography_ also assists _geology_ in increasing the\nweight of the reasons for an origin of organisms through descent. With the\ntertiary period, the fauna and flora of the globe, which in former periods\nhad a nearly uniform character all over the earth and showed no climatic\ndifferences, begin to separate according to climate, zones, and greater\ncontinents. This separation becomes distinctly evident in the middle\ntertiary formations, the Miocene, and much more distinctly in the higher\ntertiary formations, the Pliocene. The animals, especially the higher\nvertebrates, of the Pliocene formation on each continent or each larger\ngroup of islands, correspond very closely to the now living animals of the\nsame geographical limit, with the exception of being generally of a much\nlarger size. The Pliocene animal world of mammalia of the three old\ncontinents, for instance, corresponds exactly, through all its orders, to\nthe present fauna of Europe, Asia and Africa; and that on an average it was\nbuilt up more stupendously than that of to-day, we can see from the\ncave-bear and the mammoth. South America is the home of a peculiar order of\nmammalia--of the edentata, to which belong the sloth, the armadillo, and\nthe like. All its predecessors are to be found also in the Pliocene strata\nof South America, and only there; and mostly in gigantic, but otherwise\ncompletely related, forms. New Zealand has no indigenous mammalia, but in\ntheir place great cursorial birds with but rudimentary wings. Exactly the\nsame thing is found by geology in its tertiary and post-tertiary strata:\nnowhere a mammal, but gigantic birds with rudimentary {70} wings, down to\nthe dinornis, which probably died out in man's time. New Holland has merely\nmarsupial and some monotrematous, but no placental, mammalia; even its\ntertiary strata give no placental mammalia, but marsupialia, in analogy\nwith all living genera, herbivorous, and carnivorous. Indeed, the analogy\ngoes so far that the same line which through the Indian Archipelago\nseparates the present Australian animal and plant world from the Asiatic,\nforms also the separating line for the geological zones of the Pliocene\nepoch. All these are facts which render quite inevitable the idea of an\norigin of the higher organic species of to-day through descent.\n\nBut still, from another side, animal geography, though it does not yet\nspeak for a common pedigree of the whole animal world, as the facts just\nmentioned also do not, still at least speaks for a descent of related,\nthough at present separated, genera and species from common forefathers.\nThe continents of the Old and New World are so constructed that toward the\nNorth Pole they approach one another very closely, and toward the South\nPole they withdraw from one another. Without doubt there existed in the\nNorth, through long periods of time, a land-connection of America with Asia\nand with Europe. Now, both continents have their more or less\ncharacteristic animal world, and these characteristics are distributed over\nthe two halves of the globe in the following extremely remarkable way: The\nfauna of the Old and the New World, in those groups of animal genera which\nlive only in the warmer or tropic zones or only south of the equator, and\nhave no associates of genera or families in the higher North, is in each\nhemisphere entirely characteristic, and differs in a {71} marked way from\nthe fauna of the other half of the globe. For instance, the rhinoceros, the\nhippopotamus, the giraffe, the antelope with undivided horns, the hedgehog,\nthe mole proper, are only inhabitants of the Old World, whence also the\nhorse originally came, the striped ones in Africa and the non-striped in\nAsia; on the other hand, the lemur, the ant-eater, the armadillo, and\nothers, are limited to South America. The apes of the Old World have five\nmolar teeth on each side of the jaw, narrow noses, tails usually short and\nnever prehensile, and fleshy protuberances for sitting; the apes of the New\nWorld have six molar teeth, flat noses, and long prehensile tails. And on\nthe contrary, where closely related species are found on both parts of the\nglobe, they belong only to genera of which single species live or have\nlived in the far North; as, for instance, the rein-deer, still common to\nthe Old and the New World in this very North which once formed a bridge\nbetween the two halves of the earth. The same is true in regard to cattle,\nthe deer, the cat, the dog, the hare. Similar facts can also be shown of\nother animal classes. The farther the different species of these genera\nwithdraw from the North Pole, the greater become the differences between\nthe species on the one half of the globe and the analogous species of the\nother. Compare on this point K. E. von Baer's \"Studien aus dem Gebiete der\nNaturwissenchaften, ueber Darwin's Lehre,\" (\"Studies from the Realm of\nNatural Science upon Darwin's Teachings\"), p. 356 f. If we add, further,\nthe before mentioned fact, that those genera which are exclusively peculiar\nto one or the other continent, have their related predecessors in the\ntertiary strata of these continents, {72} the hypothesis of a separate\norigin for each single species, without genealogical connection with the\nanatomically and physiologically related species, becomes neither more nor\nless than a scientific impossibility.\n\nMoreover, there are several facts of _comparative anatomy_ which have long\nbeen the joy of all zooelogists and have rewarded the toilsome labors of\ndetailed investigations by a delightful view over the whole realm of the\norganic world, but which find a scientific explanation only in the descent\ntheory. They are the _homology of the organs_, and to a certain degree also\nthe so-called _rudimentary organs_. By homology of organs we mean the fact\nthat within one and the same class-group of organisms all the organs, and\nespecially the organs in their most solid constituents, in the skeleton,\nare built after one and the same fundamental plan, and therefore are even\nin their most widely separated modifications varied after this one and the\nsame plan. This is especially true of the vertebrae and the limbs. This\nhomology goes so far within one class, particularly within the class of\nmammalia, that, for instance, the hands and feet of man, the hands of the\nape, the paws of the beast of prey, the hoof of the horse and of the ox,\nthe paws of the mole, the fins of the seal and of the whale, the\nwing-membranes of the flying-squirrel, correspond to one another in their\nsmallest parts and ossicles, and can all be registered with the same\nnumbers and letters; _i.e._, they are homologous to one another even to the\nminutest detail. The _ideal_ plan and connection in the organisms,\ndisclosed by these facts, and long ago acknowledged and admired, receives\nat the same time its simple _material_ basis through the acceptance of a\ncommon descent. {73}\n\nA similar relation is observed in _rudimentary organs_.\n\nMany of them, as the nipples of males, point, if not to a common descent\nfrom a lower form, at least to a common plan of the sexes. But when the\nembryo of the whale still has its teeth in the jaw, the grown up whale its\nhip-bones, when the eye of man still has its winking membrane, the ear and\nmany portions of the skin their rudimentary muscles of motion, the end of\nthe vertebral column its rudimentary tail, the intestinal canal its blind\nintestine; when sightless animals, living in the dark, still have their\nrudimentary eyes, blind worms their shoulder-blades; when in like manner\nthe plants, especially in their parts of fecundation, show in great number\nsuch rudimentary organs as are entirely useless for the functions of life,\nbut which are never misleading in determining their relationship with other\nplants:--how simply are all these facts explained by the descent theory,\nhow not at all without it!\n\nFinally, if we now mention the _history of the development of animals_, we\nshall have to postpone to the next section the consideration of the most\nessential facts furnished by this science; for the individual development\nof animals is a process which could speak not only for a descent of the\nspecies, but also for a descent of them through gradual development. But\nwhere, as in the present section, we treat the descent theory apart from\nthe evolution theory, we have also to think of the possibility that the\nspecies or groups of species are not originated through gradual\ndevelopment, but nevertheless do originate through descent--namely, in\nleaps through metamorphosis of germs or a heterogenetic generation; and for\nsuch an idea we find confirmation in the {74} observation of the history of\ndevelopment of animals, which we call _change of generation_ or\n_metagenesis_.[4] By this is meant the following phenomenon: Certain\nanimals, as the salpa and doliolum of the order of the tunicata, as well as\ncertain mites and many tape-worms, produce offspring which are wholly\ndissimilar to the mother stock. These offspring have the capacity of\nreproducing themselves--if not by sexual means, as at the first generation,\nstill by the formation of sprouts; and it is only the animals originated by\nthe second generation (with many species, even those by the third) which\nreturn again to the form of the first generation. The plant-lice transmit\nthemselves through six, seven, even ten generations by means of sprouts,\nuntil a generation appears which lays eggs. Now it is indeed true that the\nchange of generation forms a circle in which the form of the last\ngeneration always returns to that of the first, and therefore leaves the\nspecies, as species, wholly unchanged. But it is nevertheless a process\nwhich shows that the natural law of an identity between generator and\nproduct, observed in other relations, is not without exception; and if we\nonce have reason to suppose that the generation of new species took place\nin past periods of the globe, but has ceased in the present, such processes\nin the single period open to our direct observation--namely, the present\n(in which, however, according to our knowledge, the species remain\nconstant)--are {75} nevertheless hints worthy of notice. For they refer us\nto ways in which in those former times, when certainly new species did\noriginate, this formation of species might possibly have taken place.\n\nThis consideration leads us to treat of the main objection raised to every\ndescent theory: namely, that never yet has the origin of one species from\nanother been observed, but that, on the contrary, _all species_--so far as\nour experience goes, stretching over thousands of years--_remain constant_.\nWe will give no weight to the fact that the constancy of species seems by\nno means to be absolutely without exception; for on the whole, they\ncertainly remain constant. The only example which goes to prove such an\nevolution of species as taking place to-day--viz: the natural history of\nsponges--seems not to have this bearing. The transitions of form, proven by\nO. Schmidt in the siliceous sponges and by Haeckel in the chalk-sponges,\nseem to show, not the genetic coming forth of a new species out of another,\nand especially not the evolution of a higher species out of a lower, but\nrather the uncertainty of the idea of species in general and the\nworthlessness of the skeleton-forms, for this idea, in such low\norganizations as the sponges. But that objection already loses its chief\nforce from the consideration that we have not only never observed the\norigin of one species from another, but never even the origin of a species\nitself; and that nevertheless all species have successively originated in\ntime. If we, therefore, are not able to observe directly their origination,\nwe have a right to make all possible attempts at approaching the knowledge\nof it in an indirect way. But we see this objection invalidated by still\nanother {76} fact. From all observations, it seems to be evident that those\nagencies which originated the species in general have ceased since man\nappeared. Now this fact is inconvenient for all those who, on metaphysical\ngrounds, reject aim and purpose in the world and accept an aimless motion\nin the universe, a circle in which only identical powers are ever active to\nall eternity. From this standpoint, the scientists cannot, except by very\nartificial hypotheses, escape the conclusion that, if new species once\noriginated through descent, new species ought still to originate through\ndescent. In like manner, it is true, they are also obliged to accept the\nother conclusion: that if new species once originated through primitive\ngeneration, new species ought still to originate through primitive\ngeneration. On the other hand, those scientists who recognize aims in the\nworld for which the world and each part of it is destined, and which are\nattained in the world through the processes of coming into existence, have\nto expect in advance that the organic kingdoms are also planned with\nreference to those aims. They naturally see the aim of the origin of\nspecies attained, where in the organic world beings appear who combine with\nthe highest physical organization a self-conscious and responsible\nspiritual life, and who are capable of conceiving the ideal, even the idea\nof God. For, with the appearance of these beings, there enter upon the\ntheatre of the world beings who go beyond the value of a purely physical\norganism and of a purely somato-psychical life, and in like manner\nrepresent again a higher order of beings; just as the first appearance of\norganic life on earth once introduced a new and higher stage of {77}\nexistence in contrast to the inorganic world. Scientists who take this\nstandpoint can readily adopt the fact that we do not now observe the\norigination of new species; for it is in full harmony with their\nmetaphysical doctrines, without the same being on that account essentially\ndependent upon the confirmation or rejection of the hypothesis of the\npresent constancy of species. With this very fact, the maxim that if new\nspecies once originated through descent, new species must still originate\nthrough descent, has lost for them its truth, and therefore its power of\ndemonstration. So we see even here, while in the midst of the discussion of\na purely scientific problem, in what close correlation metaphysics and\nnatural science stand, and moreover--since the metaphysical view is most\nclosely connected with the religious--in what close relationship religion\nand natural science stand. At the same time we also see how little the\nmetaphysical interest, and much more how little the religious interest, has\nreason to avoid the investigation of facts in nature.\n\nSec. 4. _The Theory of Evolution--Archaeology, Ethnography, Philology._\n\nThe evolution theory teaches that the species have developed themselves one\nfrom another in gradual transitions, each of which was as small as the\nindividual differences still observed to-day among the individuals of the\nsame species. It is not without support, especially in the _history of the\ndevelopment of plants and animals_.\n\nEach organic being becomes what it is by means of organic development. Each\nplant, even the highest organized, begins in its seed-germ with a simple\ncell, {78} and is differentiated in constant development up to the fully\nperfected individual. Each animal, even the most highly organized (man\nincluded), begins the course of its existence as an egg; and each egg has\nno greater value of form than that of a single cell. This egg-cell is\ndifferentiated, after fecundation, in gradual and imperceptible\ntransitions, farther and farther, higher and higher, until the individual\nhas reached its perfect organization. No organ, no function of the body, no\npower or function of the soul or of the mind, appears suddenly, but all in\ngradual development. Since we see all individuals thus originating by means\nof gradual development, the possibility lies very near that the different\norganic formations of all the organic kingdoms could also have been\noriginated by the same means.\n\nIn still another direction does the history of the development of single\nplants and animals make this possibility plausible to us. In the animal\nworld, and partly also in the plant world, the single individuals of higher\nspecies in their embryonic development pass through states of development,\nin the former stages of which not only the individuals of the most\ndifferent species look confusingly similar to one another, but also the\nembryos in their organization remind us of the perfected state of much\nlower classes of beings. In order to give a clear idea of the first\nmentioned facts, Haeckel, for instance, in his \"Natural History of Creation\"\nand in his \"Anthropogeny,\" represents by engravings the embryos of\ndifferent vertebrates and also of man; representations which--although,\naccording to the judgment of competent scientists, unfortunately not exact,\nbut modified, after the manner of stencil plates, in favor of {79} greater\nsimilarity--yet make it quite clear that the similarity of the different\nembryos must be very great. We see, for instance, on one table the embryos\nof a fish, a salamander, a turtle, a fowl; on a second, those of a pig, an\nox, a rabbit, a man; on a third, those of a turtle, a fowl, a man; and we\nfind the similarity really great. Examples of the second fact--that\nindividuals of higher classes or orders in former states of their embryonic\ndevelopment represent an organization which corresponds to the full-grown\nindividuals of the lower classes--are: the tail of the human embryo, the\ngill-arches of the embryos of reptilia, of birds, of mammalia, and of man.\nNow Haeckel here takes up again an idea first suggested by Fritz Mueller, and\nderives from these observations the \"biogenetic maxim,\" as he calls it:\n\"The history of the germ is an epitome of the history of the descent; or,\nin other words, ontogeny (the history of the germs or the individuals) is a\nrecapitulation of phylogeny (the history of the tribe); or, somewhat more\nexplicitly: that the series of forms through which the individual organism\npasses during its progress from the egg-cell to its fully developed state,\nis a brief, compressed reproduction of the long series of forms through\nwhich the animal ancestors of that organism (or the ancestral forms of its\nspecies) have passed from the earliest periods of so-called organic\ncreation down to the present time.\" In his latest publication, \"Ziele und\nWege der heutigen Entwicklungsgeschichte,\" (\"Aims and Methods of the\nPresent History of Evolution\"), he admits into the formulation of his\nbiogenetic maxim also the consideration of those phenomena in the\nontogenetic development which are no recapitulation of the history {80} of\nthe stem, but originated by adapting the embryo to its surroundings. In the\ndescription and explanation of this theory, he uses a term which throws\nupon nature a peculiar reproach, never before made, namely: cenogeny, or\nhistory of falsifications, in contrast to palingeny, or history of\nabridgments. This amended formula now reads: The development of germs is an\nabridgment of the development of stems, and is the more complete according\nas the development of the abridgment is continued by inheritance, the less\ncomplete according as the development of the false is introduced by\nadaptation.\n\nNow, we ask: Is this biogenetic maxim correct? and moreover, from the fact\nof the organic individuals originating through development, are we entitled\nto draw the conclusion that even the species must have originated through\ndevelopment? To this question we can no longer get an answer from the\nlife-processes of living organisms; for we have already mentioned the fact\nthat, according to the present state of our knowledge, we can no longer\nobserve the origination of a new species. Moreover, the embryonic states of\ndevelopment show also, in all their similarity, even in the very first\nstages, and with especial distinctness in these first stages, many\ndifferences between the single species; and this is true especially of\nthose species which, according to the followers of this so-called\nbiogenetic maxim, should lie in the same stem-line,--so that the direct\nscientific value of the embryological results to the palaeontological\ninvestigation, or of the latter to the former, is so far very slight. Such\na problem, however, as the one contained in that biogenetic maxim, which\nonly gives to investigators the _direction_ in which possibly an {81}\ninteresting and profitable path can be opened, does not at all deserve the\nname of a \"_law_.\" K. E. von Baer, the founder of the whole present science\nof the history of development, has certainly a most competent judgment of\nthe correctness of this so-called biogenetic maxim; and he convincingly\nshows, in his essay on \"Darwin's Doctrine,\" that the embryos never\nrepresent a former animalic form, but that their development follows the\nprinciple of representing first the common characteristics of the class,\nthen those of the order, etc., until finally the individual characteristics\nappear in the formation. Those who wish more information about embryology\ncan find it in Heinrich Rathke's \"Entwicklungsgeschichte der Wirbelthiere\"\n(\"History of the Development of Vertebrates\"), edited by A. Koelliker,\nLeipzig, Engelmann, 1861; and those who wish to inform themselves as to the\ninfluence of the ontogenetic results of the solution of the phylogenetic\nproblems, will find, besides the before-mentioned work of Wigand, rich and\nclearly elaborated material in the publication of Wilhelm His--\"Unsere\nKoerperform und das physiologische Problem ihrer Entstehung, Briefe an einen\nbefreundeten Naturforscher\" (\"The Form of our Body and the Physiological\nProblem of its Origin; Letters to an Associate Scientist\"), Leipzig, Vogel,\n1875. The latter writer, although he advocates the descent theory, rejects\nthe hasty assertions of Haeckel with direct and convincing arguments.\n\nThus embryology, having from the simple fact of an origin of single plants\nand animals through descent at least confirmed the idea of the\n_possibility_ of an origin also of species through development, forsakes us\nin the {82} inquiry as to the _reality_ of such a genealogy of development,\nand refers us to other sciences.\n\nSuch a science, from which we certainly are entitled to expect a decided\nanswer, is _geology_. For if the evolution theory is right, those periods\nof the history of our globe in which new species originated--namely, the\nperiods of geology--_must_ show us also the _forms of transition_ between\nthe different species. And, indeed, geology gives us an answer; but it\nreads contradictorily: It says yes, and it says no.\n\nGeology does show us forms of transition, and, indeed, most frequently in\nthe lower classes of animals. Who that has once studied petrifactions, does\nnot know the mass of forms of the terebratulae, the belemnites, and the\nammonites, in the Jura formation? Wuertemberger has brought light into the\nperplexing division of species of the ammonites by simply showing their\ntemporary and systematic transitions into one another. In the fresh water\nchalk formation of Steinheim, near Heidenheim, in Wuertemberg, scientists\nhave found, on the same place, in an uninterrupted series of strata, the\nsnail valvata or paludina multiformis in all imaginable transitions--from\nthe flat winding, showing the form of a chess-board, up to the sharp form\nof a tower. And it was not, as Hilgendorf thought, in a series which can be\ntraced in the strata according to time, but, as Sandberger says, in quite a\nvaried mixture, yet in all imaginable modifications. But even among the\nhigher and the highest classes of animals, we can trace the transitions.\nThe flying sauria, if not in their organs of flying, which remind us more\nof the bat, at least in head, neck, and toes, are closely connected with\nthe {83} birds--the oldest birds of the Jura and chalk formations, with\ntheir tail-spines similar to the reptilia and their teeth in the beak to\nthe sauria. The tertiary formations especially show the primitive history\nof many vertebrates in very instructive forms of transitions--which, for\ninstance, Ruetimeyer, a scientist who is very cautious in his conclusions,\nvery distinctly traced to the horse, to the ruminating animals, and lately\nalso to the turtles. Still more in detail, W. Kowalewsky has lately shown\nus the primitive history of the horse, and Leidy and Marsh have further\ncompleted it by the addition of American forms, the former having at the\nsame time described the forms which have led to the tapir.\n\nBut to such facts there are, on the other hand, experiences directly\ncontradictory. Many lower and higher forms of animals and plants appear in\nthe geological strata, so far as they have been explored, in a wholly\nindependent way. We have mentioned, in the foregoing section, that the main\ntypes of the invertebrates appear somewhat contemporaneously and without\nany traceable intermediate form. The trilobites, a quite highly organized\norder of crustacea, appear in the strata of the silurian epoch almost\nsuddenly, in very many and very distinctly marked species. The uncertainty\nof our knowledge shows itself most clearly when we ask for the geneologic\nrelationship of the vertebrates. In Chap. II, Sec. 1 and Sec. 2 we have already\nreferred to the value which Darwin, and more especially Haeckel, lays on the\nrelationship of the larva of the ascidia to the lancelet fish. Now the\nimportant testimony of K. E. von Baer, in his \"Memoires de l'Academie de\nSt. Petersbourg,\" Ser. vii, Vol. 19, No. 2, tells us that the\nnerve-ganglion {84} of the ascidia lies on the side of the stomach, and on\nthat account can not be homologous with the spine of the vertebrates, but\nthat the cord in the larva of the ascidia is nothing more than a support\nfor the tail in swimming, which afterwards disappears, as with many other\nlarvae. As to the course of reasoning in reaching these genealogical\nconclusions, he says: \"The hypothesis is indeed flexible. According to\ncommon reasoning, that which shows itself early in the development is an\ninheritance of the first progenitors. Therefore the ascidae ought to descend\nfrom the vertebrates, and not the reverse. But it was necessary to show the\ndescent of the vertebrates from the lower forms. In order to respond to\nsuch a necessity, men sometimes reverse their conclusions. Although\nfavorably disposed to the doctrine of the transmutation of the animalic\nforms, I want a complete proof before I can believe in a transformation of\nthe vertebrate type into that of the mollusca.\" Moreover, the zooelogists\nSemper and Dohrn find in the embryonic development of the sharks, the\nscates, and other cartilaginous fishes, organs which would bring them\nrather into a nearer relationship with the ringed worms than with the\ncrustacea. When, on the other hand, we look around in palaeontology, the\noldest fossil fishes remind us neither of the crustacea nor of the ringed\nworms, but of the crabs: a class of animals which lies entirely outside of\nHaeckel's stem-line of vertebrates. Also the first appearance of mammalia\ndoes not show transitions. Thus far we have not found in the geological\nstrata any vestiges of the half-apes, which, according to the hypothesis of\nthe evolutionists, as a common stem-line for the lines of ape and man\ndevelopment, once played such an {85} important _role_, and which have\nquite numerous representatives.\n\nBut the answer which geology gives to our questions as to the probable\nconfirmation of the evolution theory, naturally becomes most interesting\nwhere the _origin of man_ is treated of. Our attention is, therefore,\nespecially directed to the most recent formations of the globe which show\nus the oldest remains of man. The most instructive are those parts of the\nskeleton which allow us to draw the most convincing conclusions as to the\ndegree of mental development of an individual, namely: the parts of the\nskull. Although human bones seem to have been less easily preserved than\nthose of animals, and are, comparatively speaking, very scarce, especially\nmore so than prehistoric implements, still there are not wanting such\nremains, which go back far beyond historical time. The oldest known skull\nis the celebrated one of the Neander cave near Duesseldorf, with its large\nvault of the forehead, and its low height. Although Virchow finds on it\nevidences of rachitis in youth and of gout in old age, as well as of\ninjuries, it nevertheless can not have been changed in its _fundamental\nform_ by any sickness, even according to Virchow. This very skull now\nindisputably shows a still lower formation, which, although quite\nessentially different from the type of the ape, stands nearer to it than is\nthe case with the skulls of men in later times. Of a later date, and of a\ncorrespondingly higher form, are the skull of Engis, of Cannstatt, the\nskulls of the Belgian caves (especially Chauvaux), of France, and of\nGibraltar. According to the weighty authority of Schaaffhausen (note his\nopening address at the Wiesbaden Congress of the {86} Anthropological\nSociety, 1873), the skulls and the remaining parts of the skeleton show\nmore indications of a lower formation the older they are. He especially\ncalls attention to a certain bone of the roof of the skull--the _Os\ninterparietale_ or the so-called _Os Incae_--which has only recently been\nrecognized as a characteristic of a lower formation of skulls, standing\nnearer to that of animals. As late as the summer of 1873, two human\nskeletons were found at Coblenz in a volcanic sand, of which Schaaffhausen\nsays: \"No less than eight anatomic marks of a lower formation, which\nprobably have not heretofore been found together, indicate the great age of\nthese remains.\" With all these traces of a difference between the former\nand the present state of the physical condition of man, the differences\nbetween the type of man and that of the animal are still great enough to\nleave wide open the possibility of the origin of man through some other\nmeans than that of gradual development. On the other hand, it is more or\nless in favor of the evolution idea, that so far such old remains of man\nhave been found in places which certainly can not have been the cradle of\nmankind, and that those parts of the earth which we would naturally suppose\nto be the first dwelling place of the earliest human genera have been\nlittle or not at all investigated. And also the hypothesis of Haeckel, that\nthe cradle of mankind was a land between Africa and Asia, now sunk in the\nsea, and called Lemuria, can be neither proved nor denied. Such vague\npossibilities have indeed not the least scientific value.\n\nIn considering these contradictory results of geological investigation, we\ndare not overlook three points: First, our knowledge of the crust of the\nglobe is still {87} very fragmentary, and does not yet extend over the\nwhole globe. Further, it lies in the nature of the case that the strata in\nmountain formations can only give a very incomplete picture of the whole\nvariety of the real organic life which may have populated the earth and the\nsea. What a poor picture of the present plant and animal life would be\noffered, for instance, by the soil of our continents, the slime, sand, and\npebbles of our coasts and of the bottoms of our lakes and seas, if we had\nto construct from them alone the fauna and flora of the present! A third,\nbut purely hypothetical, consideration is rendered of importance\nparticularly by Darwin and Haeckel; namely, that the forms of transition\nwithout doubt existed for a shorter period than those forms whose\norganization has established itself in fully developed species.\n\nThus far we have directed our attention to inquiring how the organic\nindividuals were originated--and have throughout observed a successive\ndevelopment; next, we have questioned geology--and here also have observed\na progress in the appearance of the species, but have received at the same\ntime contradictory answers to the question whether this progress presents\nitself as a gradual development of one species from another or as a sudden\nappearance. So the reasons for and against the evolution theory almost\nbalance one another; and it is not improbable that the hypothesis of an\norigin of species through development will have to share its authority with\nthe hypothesis of a descent of species through heterogenetic generation, as\nwell as with the hypothesis of a primitive generation of lower organisms,\nstill repeating itself at a later time. Thus for the origination of {88}\ngroups lying nearer together, we have the evolution theory; for the other\ngroups, and especially for the origination of types where no transitions to\nother types can be traced, the theory of the heterogenetic or primitive\ngeneration recommends itself; and both theories thus far are of a purely\nhypothetical nature.\n\nBut there is still a third realm, which is just as open to our observation\nas the history of the development of organisms and as geology, and of which\nwe can also ask, whether it does not open for us an indirect way to the\nknowledge of the origin of species, and especially of man--a knowledge\nwhich we can no longer approach in the direct way of observation. This\nrealm is _natural history_ and the _history of the development of the human\nrace_. For mankind also is engaged in a process of development, and its\npresent members do not stand on the same height. Now the question is, to\nwhat beginning can we trace backward the development of mankind, and to\nwhat succeeding stages of development from this present condition? And do\nwe find in these earliest periods, and on these lowest stages, points that\nare connected with still earlier conditions and organizations, and\nespecially points which could genealogically join together mankind and the\nanimal kingdom? Three sciences, still young, favorite children of the\npresent generation, participate in investigating this realm, namely,\n_archaeology_, _comparative ethnology_, and _comparative philology_.\n\n_Archaeology_ leads us back to far-off times. It is a fact that,\nchronologically speaking, man lived in the glacial period--according to\nFrench scientists, even before it; and that, palaeontologically speaking,\nman and {89} mammoth lived at the same time, and, according to a discovery\nmade some thirty years ago at Denise in Middle France, probably even man\nand another older and defunct form of pachydermata, the elephas\nmeridionalis, in North America man and the mastodon. The reader may compare\nthe discoveries regarding the age of mankind, as they are described most\nrecently by Sir Charles Lyell in his work upon this subject, in the\npublications of the Anthropological Congress at Brussels in the year 1873,\nand in those of the fourth General Assembly of the German Society for\nAnthropology, Ethnology and Primitive History, at Wiesbaden, in the year\n1873.\n\nNow, to be sure, from the oldest human _tools_ and _utensils_ that are\nfound, we can expect still less than from the oldest human bones that they\nwill throw direct light upon the answer to the question of the _origin_ of\nman. For where man not only uses tools, but _manufactures_ the same for\nuse, a wide breach already exists between man and animal. Manufactured\narticles, therefore, can only throw some light on the history of the\ndevelopment of the already existing human race. And even this light is less\nclear than we perhaps expected in view of the first interesting\nprehistorical discoveries. It is true, all these discoveries show us an\nascent from the simplest and roughest forms to the more perfect; from the\nsplit but unpolished stone to the polished, and from stone to bronze and\niron. But a progress of the human races in manufacturing and using\narticles, from the simple and rough form to the more artificial, lies so\nmuch in the nature of the case, and is so taken for granted with every\nconception of the origin of man, even with that contradictory to Darwinism,\nthat from this simplicity of {90} the earliest tools we can not at all\nconclude that there was a condition of mankind lying near that of animals;\nand especially we can draw only general and uncertain conclusions as to\nthat which makes man _man_, as to the spiritual and moral qualities of\nthose prehistoric men. Moreover, in discoveries belonging to the very\noldest, we come upon drawings and engravings from which we recognize the\nman of those primitive times as a creature whose life was not entirely\ntaken up in the animalic struggle for existence, but was already adorned\nwith those ideal pursuits and enjoyments which we are accustomed to ascribe\nto the height of civilization. Examine, for instance, the drawing of a\nmammoth on a mammoth tooth of Dordogne, which the French scientists Lartet\nand Christy have reprinted in their Reliquiae Aquitanicae (1868), and which\nSir Charles Lyell has copied in his \"Age of the Human Race.\" How much\nspirit and life in this primitive work of art! Or read what Fraas, in the\n\"Journal of the German Society for Anthropology,\" March, 1874, reports\nabout the picture of a grazing reindeer, engraved on a knife handle made of\nthe horns of a reindeer, which was lately found in the cave of Thayngen\nnear Schaffhausen, and which surpasses in beauty all rough drawings thus\nfar found. The whole bearing of the animal--the muscles of the legs and the\nhead, the form of the many-branched antlers, with the wide-spread eyes, the\nrepresentation of the hair upon the body and under-jaw--all disclose a real\nartist among those savages.\n\nThis is also to be taken into consideration: that those men, whose traces\nwe find, could possibly have been the descendants of more noble\npredecessors, driven {91} off and degenerated, just as well as they could\nhave been representatives of the whole former condition of culture of\nmankind. In England, where the questions of the first condition of culture\nof mankind are very warmly discussed, the Duke of Argyll particularly, in\nhis \"Primeval Man,\" advocates these views, and very forcibly calls\nattention to the fact that thus far the places of the discovery of the\nearliest traces of man undoubtedly lie very far from the original home of\nthe human race; while Sir John Lubbock, in his \"Origin of Civilization\" and\nin his \"Prehistoric Times,\" and also Tylor in his \"Beginning of Culture\"\nand in his \"Early History of Mankind,\" take the opposite view of a progress\nof mankind from the most uncultivated beginnings.\n\nArchaeology, as a whole, seems to do no more than admit that its results can\nbe incorporated into the theory of an origin of the human race through\ngradual development, _if_ this theory can be shown to be correct in some\nother way, and that its results can just as well be brought into harmony\nwith a contradictory theory.\n\n_Comparative ethnology_ gives us quite a similar result. It is true, there\nare races of mankind in the lowest grades of human existence. It is well\nknown how Darwin, in his voyage on board the \"Beagle,\" got one of his first\nvivid impressions of the possibility of an evolution of man from the animal\nworld, by seeing the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego; and it is remarkable\nthat the arms, tools, and furniture, used by the lowest savages, are very\nsimilar to the earliest remains of civilized races found on earth. The\nconclusion lies extremely near, that the savages simply remained in earlier\nstages of human culture; and an ethnographic picture of mankind {92} at\npresent would in a similar way give an approximately correct view of its\nformer development, as the natural zooelogical and botanical system of the\npresent fauna and flora must give us at the same time the key to their\npedigree; supposing the Darwinian theory to be correct.\n\nIf it were so, ethnology would be an altogether inestimable help for the\nexploration of the descent and development of the human race. For the\nextremely few and rare fossil remains of man--which, moreover, do not give\nus any answer to the most important questions in regard to the mental and\nmoral quality of the primitive man--would be rendered complete by living\nexamples of the kind, which remained at the old stages of development.\n\nBut much is still wanting, before the followers of an evolution theory dare\nto use ethnology directly as a primitive history of the development of\nmankind, prepared and preserved for them. Especially the before-mentioned\nobjection of the Duke of Argyll--that the lowest savages of our time can\njust as well be depraved as be men who remained stationary in the process\nof development--has here increased weight. Moreover, even with the savages\nof to-day, a rude state of their tools and a low condition of their mental\nand moral life are not so nearly parallel as to allow unrestricted\nconclusions to be drawn. Finally, we still know too little about the state\nof culture of the savages; and the deeper and higher the intellectual and\nethical possessions of mankind are, the presence of which among the savages\nis in question, the more uncertain is our knowledge.\n\nThis is especially true of the most important question in this\nconnection--the question as to the existence {93} or absence of an idea of\nGod, and the different stages of development of religious ideas. While some\nassume as an established fact, that there are savage tribes without any\nidea of God or any religion, and even give the names of these tribes,\nespecially of some from the interior of South America; while Sir John\nLubbock systematically enumerates seven stages of religious development,\nfrom atheism to the connection of religious with moral conceptions, and\nlets each single race run through these stages in an identical series until\nit either remains on one of the seven stages or arrives at the highest:\nyet, on the contrary, other equally trustworthy scientists assert that\nthere is not a single human race without some idea of religion and of a\nGod--indeed, not a single race without a monotheistic presentiment--and\nthat all heathenism, down to its most degenerate stages, consists not so\nmuch in a non-recognition of a God as in ignoring him. They call especial\nattention to the difficulty of getting acquainted with the ideas of a\nsavage tribe without living with it through many years and being intimate\nwith its language and customs, and especially without enjoying the\nunrestricted confidence of the tribe. Mutual misunderstandings, a\nsuspicious reserve, evasive and untrue answers to questions, are entirely\nunavoidable without those conditions. At any rate, the fact deserves\nattention, that those who have been longest and most active among savages,\nand who enjoyed their confidence to the fullest extent, all reached this\nresult: they found them not only not without religion, but also not without\na presentiment of the monotheistic idea of God. Livingstone, for instance,\nexpressed this idea decidedly of all the African tribes {94} with which he\nbecame acquainted; and Jellinghaus gives the same evidence in regard to the\nKols in South Asia.\n\nThe _anatomic_ results of ethnology are more favorable to the descent\ntheory, although they too lead no farther than to the conclusion that the\nskull-forms of the lowest tribes represent a lower stage of formation than\nthose of the higher, and that these lower skull-forms are relatively nearer\nto the ape-form than the higher, but that they are still separated from it\nby a wide interval.\n\nIt appears, then, that even ethnology does not lead us essentially nearer\nthe solution of the question than archaeology and geological anthropology.\n\nThe relatively strongest support to the evolution theory is given by\n_comparative philology_; and since language is the most important and most\ndecisive of all the distinctive characteristics which separate man and\nanimal[5], this science deserves especial consideration.\n\nIn the realm of the natural sciences, the enormous progress of palaeontology\non the one hand and of systematic zooelogy and botany on the other took\nplace step by step together, and thus prepared the way for Darwin's\nidea--which, from the rich material of analytical investigations, only\ntries to draw the simple synthesis, and to show at the same time in the\nzooelogical and botanical _system_ a representation of the zooelogical and\nbotanical _history of development_. In quite an analogous way, a process\ntook place in the linguistic realm which in independent investigations\nprepared the way for Darwinism, and now, since Darwin's theory has sought\n{95} acknowledgment in the realm of natural history, brings again Darwin's\nideas to the support of philology.\n\nLinguistic and ethnographic investigations, especially the linguistic works\nof the missionaries, long ago resulted in gathering rich material from the\nstorehouse of the language of races now living, and the latest works in the\nrealm of historical, etymological, and comparative philology had traced the\nbranches and twigs of the better known languages to stems and roots lying\nfar back. The result of the comparison soon became the same as in the realm\nof the organic world: what presented itself in the system of the living\nlanguages as a lower form, seemed to represent itself as the older and more\noriginal form also in the history of languages. Therefore, all the\nprominent linguistic investigators found themselves more and more urged to\naccept a theory which declares language, this entirely specific\ncharacteristic of man, to be subject to the same laws of development from\nthe simpler and most simple forms as the world of the organic. Long ago so\ncelebrated a man as Jacob Grimm,--\"Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache\" (\"The\nOrigin of Language\"), Berlin, Duemmler--following the footsteps of Wilhelm\nvon Humboldt, had established a theory, according to which language is \"not\ncreated, but produced by the liberty of the human will;\" and judging from\nmany of his Darwinistic utterances concerning the origin and development of\nlanguage, he had traced its development in such a way as to arrive at the\nconclusion that artless simplicity in the unfolding of the senses is the\nfirst period of its appearance.\n\nThe scientists divide all the languages of the earth into three great\ngroups: first, the monosyllabic, {96} isolating, radical, or asynthetic\nlanguages; second, the agglutinant, terminational, or polysynthetic\nlanguages; third, the inflectional languages. They are of the opinion that\neven the languages of highest rank--the inflectional--very probably took a\nstarting-point from the asynthetic languages, and a course of development\nthrough the agglutinants, and that in like manner the agglutinants have\nbehind them an asynthetic period. Thus they trace all the languages back to\ncertain _roots_, which are more or less common to the different groups of\nlanguages.\n\nTo the question that now arises--_How did these roots originate?_--the\nlinguists give us three different answers. The onomatopoetic theory, called\nby Max Mueller the Wow-Wow Theory, traces them to imitations of the sound\n(W. Bleek, G. Curtius, Schleicher, Wedgewood, Farrar); the interjectional\ntheory, called by Max Mueller the Pooh-Pooh, or Pah-Pah Theory, traces them\nto expressions of the senses (Condillac); a third theory declares the roots\nto be phonetic types (Max Mueller, Lazar Geiger, Heyse, Steinthal); while it\nis still an open question, whether the attempts at explanation of these\ntypes must here come to a stand-still for the present, as Max Mueller\nthinks, or whether, according to Lazar Geiger, we can trace the first\nroot-expressions especially to impressions of light and color.\n\nThe reasons from which Max Mueller, in his \"Lectures on the Science of\nLanguages\" (Vol. I, Lect. IX), rejects the first two theories and proves\nthe third, are quite convincing. Even if, in a purely hypothetical way, a\nlanguage could be thought of _in abstracto_, the roots of which only\nconsist in imitations of sounds or interjections, still in the _really\nexisting_ languages, {97} so far as we can trace back and uncover their\nroots, the roots imitating sounds and the interjectional roots form only a\nsmall and entirely isolated minority, which neither shares in, nor is\ncapable of development; they stand like \"dead sticks in a live hedge.\" By\nfar the greater number of roots, and all which are capable of development,\nexpress abstractions from visible objects, conditions and activities, and\ntherefore presume a human intelligence, reflecting with self-consciousness,\nwhich formed and used the roots.\n\nNow Max Mueller sees, back of this period, still open to science, in which\nthe root-elements of the human languages were fixed, a long period of\nexuberant and unhindered growth of the elements of language, in which the\nroots were separated from the multitude of nascent tones by elimination or\nnatural selection in the struggle for existence. In this realm, which is no\nlonger open to investigation, the naturalistic and the linguistic friends\nof the evolution theory are now in entire accord. Wilhelm Bleek, in his\nsmall, but very noteworthy essay, \"Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache\" (\"Origin\nof Language\"), Weimar, Boehlau, 1868, p. 11, uses this ingenious figure:\nwhat the animal world possesses analogous to language, takes about the same\nposition as, in the art of printing, the block-print does in relation to\nprinting with movable types. On page 12, he sees in the communication of\nthe emotions among animals the sources from which under favorable\nconditions (in consequence of which the separation of language into\narticulated parts became possible) human language might have originated.\nThis idea, which is closely joined to the interjectional theory, Darwin\nmeets {98} with a related idea, depending upon the onomatopoetical theory,\nwhen he says, in his \"Descent of Man\": \"Since monkeys certainly understand\nmuch that is said to them by man, and when wild, utter signal-cries of\ndanger to their fellows, may not some unusually wise ape-like animal have\nimitated the growl of a beast of prey, and thus told his fellow-monkeys the\nnature of the expected danger? This would have been a first step in the\nformation of language.\"\n\nBut philology, from the point where it goes farther back in search of the\nroots of language, leaves the safe ground of knowledge and commits itself\nto the fluctuating ocean of conjectures; and since also the scientific\nevolution theory has only a hypothetical value, the support of a hypothesis\nin the one science by a hypothesis in the other naturally adds no weight to\nits probability, either for the one or the other. Besides, we must not\noverlook the fact that the very point in the history of the development of\nlanguages on which the investigation, as it looks backwards, must at\npresent pause--namely, the existence of linguistic roots--presumes a\nfaculty of abstraction which can not be thought of without\nself-consciousness.\n\nTherefore archaeology, comparative ethnography, and comparative philology,\nshow us quite clearly a _development_, but not an _origin_ of mankind\nthrough development. Yet they do show an already existing development of\nmankind; for all three sciences lead back to starting-points, where mankind\nalready existed with all the essential attributes of mankind, and leave us\nwithout answer to our questions as to the conditions lying still farther\nback. Their results we can {99} without difficulty harmonize with a theory\nwhich supposes mankind to have originated by evolution, provided such a\ntheory could be confirmed from another side; but they agree just as well\nwith a contrary theory, which excludes the origin of mankind by gradual\ndevelopment.\n\nTaking, thus, everything into consideration, we come to the conclusion that\nthe evolution theory, like the descent theory, is so far only a\nhypothesis--and, indeed, a hypothesis which as such has a much more\nproblematical character than the descent theory. For while in regard to the\nlatter we had to say that we have either this explanation or none of the\norigin of the higher species, with the evolution theory there is not even\nroom for this alternative. For even in case of its failure, a descent of\none species from another through heterogenetic generation is certainly very\npossible. Besides, it is not only possible, but even probable, that both\ntheories--that of heterogenetic generation and that of gradual\ndevelopment--may have to share with one another in the explanation of the\norigin of species; and even that, especially for the lowest species and for\nthe beginnings of the main types, primitive generation also has its share\nin the establishment of the paternity.\n\nThe evolution theory could only pass beyond the rank of a hypothesis, if we\nshould succeed in showing the impelling forces of such an origin of species\nthrough development. Such an attempt can be made in two ways--the\nmetaphysical and the scientific-empirical. The first, the metaphysical,\nalthough it may be justified in its general principles, will always, from\nthe point at which it attempts to approach the concrete questions as {100}\nto the origin of single species, expose itself to the fate of being _a\npriori_ rejected by science as unjustified, and of being _a posteriori_\nconfuted by facts--a fate which it has richly and clearly experienced in\nthe first half of our century. But the discussion of the metaphysical way\ndoes not belong to the present purely scientific part of our investigation;\nit will, however, be shortly taken up again in Book II. The other way, the\nscientific-empirical, will have to be looked upon as correct when it can\nshow the impelling forces of development in such powers and laws as are\neither still active to-day or at least have their points of connection in\npowers and laws active to-day. Such an attempt is the selection theory. We\nhave already in Chap. II, Sec. 1 and 2, given an outline of this theory, and\nhave only yet to discuss its present state of tenability.\n\nSec. 3. _The Theory of Selection._\n\nThe selection theory also is not entirely without support in the realm of\nobserved facts. How simply it explains the fixedness of the differences of\nclosely related species arising from their geographical and climatical\nhome! how simply the similarity of the color of many animals from the color\nof their abode, through which they have protection against persecution! how\nsimply the so-called _mimicry_--_i.e._, the similarity of certain species\nin form and color with form and color of entirely different species in the\nmidst of which they live, a similarity which often gives them protection\nagainst persecution! The best known examples of this, in our regions, are\nthe spinning caterpillars, which in a state of rest look strikingly like a\ntwig of a tree or a shrub on which {101} they live. In other regions there\nis a multitude of the most striking freaks of nature of this kind--for\ninstance, butterflies and other insects, which at rest look like the leaves\nof plants under which they live; butterflies living among other butterflies\nwhich, by an offensive odor, are protected against persecution, and\nalthough they are themselves a favorite food for birds, carrying the form\nand color of that badly-smelling family of butterflies. We can also add the\norchideae, and their resemblance to bees, flies, butterflies, spiders, etc.\nA. R. Wallace and Darwin themselves recur often to these striking\nappearances.\n\nBut herewith we have mentioned nearly every support which the selection\ntheory has on the ground of observed facts. More numerous and more weighty\nare the objections to it. First of all, we have to state that the selection\ntheory no longer enjoys that protection which the descent and evolution\ntheories can justly claim, against the main objection, mentioned in Chap.\nIII, Sec. 1, to all the ideas of descent, development and selection. That main\nobjection is the permanence of species, observed through thousands of\nyears; and the defense with which the descent and evolution theories\nsuccessfully weaken it, is the statement of the fact that, since man\nappeared, no new species has originated, and that therefore the principle\nof the generation of species seems to have come to a stand-still. Now this\nfact is no longer in favor of the selection theory, but directly repugnant\nto it. For the selection theory expressly declares the origin of species\nthrough agencies that are all active still, and, therefore, if they really\nsuffice to explain the origin of species, would not only have to generate\nnew species, {102} but also to develop _all_ the existing species. All\nthose circumstances which, according to the selection theory, have led to\nchange of species, are just as active to-day as they are supposed to have\nbeen from the beginning of organic life; and the effect which we observe is\nnot change but permanence of species. The individuals still have individual\nqualities; they still have the tendency to inherit, in addition to the\nqualities of the species, those of the individual; the individuals still\nchange their abode, and therewith also their conditions of life; a natural\nselection still takes place in the struggle for existence; and what is the\nresult? From an observation stretching over thousands of years, we find\nnowhere an effect of natural selection going farther than alterations in\ngrowth and color and purely external changes in form. All the dispositions\nof organisms and their reciprocal action aim not at increasing the\nindividual differences, but at reducing them to the average character of\nthe species. When the species change their abode or their conditions of\nlife, they either perish or remain constant; at least, with the exception\nof the slight modifications before mentioned. Even those alterations which\nartificial breeding produces, have a tendency to return to the original\nspecies: as soon as cultivated plants and domestic animals are left to\nthemselves, they run wild, _i.e._, they reassume their original qualities.\nEven the bastard-formations either cease to be fertile, or, remaining\nfertile, finally return to one or the other stem-form of the originally\ncrossed species. Nor can we oppose to these facts the consideration that\nthe period of time during which mankind has observed the organisms is too\nshort. For the permanence of very many {103} species can be traced through\nthousands of years, and the shortness of the period of our observations is\namply counterbalanced on the one hand by the multitude of species from all\nparts of the organic systems which come under our notice, on the other by\nthe immense alterations in the conditions of existence to which man submits\nplants and animals. How great, for instance, are the alterations in the\nconditions of existence which tropical plants undergo in our hot-houses and\ngardens! And the only alteration they show is that they are stunted and\nonly bear blossoms with difficulty and fruits with still greater\ndifficulty.[6] Now, if the ever-active selection principle does not produce\nin thousands of years even minimum alterations which can be observed,\nscience certainly is justified in doubting for the present the asserted\neffect of that principle.\n\nThus not only are the _facts_ directly opposed to the autocracy of the\nselection principle; but _logic_ is also none the less so. For, under the\nmost favorable circumstances, selection would only explain the\n_preservation_ and perhaps also the _increase_ of useful qualities and\norgans, _if_ the same are already in existence and have shown themselves\nuseful to the individual; but would not explain their _origination_. This\nwould rather most emphatically be left to _chance_. According to the strict\nselection theory, it would be _pure chance_ that among the thousands and\nthousands of individual qualities of the individuals of a species, such\nqualities are always existing as offer advantages to the individual in his\nstruggle for existence. And it would be a second series of chances, which\nfrom generation to generation would {104} have to coincide with the first,\nthat among the individual qualities advantageous to the individual and\nmaking it victorious in the struggle for existence, there should be found\nalways just those qualities which develop the species and raise it to a\nhigher rank and order in the zooelogical and botanical systems. But the\ntotal of improbabilities which would have to be overcome continually in\nthis theatre of chance, would in the course of generations necessarily\namount to infinity. Thus, in the very beginning, insuperable doubts arise\nas to how we can explain from two causes the world of organisms which is so\nrichly, beautifully, and systematically arranged. The first of these causes\nis the inclination to individual alteration, inherited indeed in the\norganisms, but in itself absolutely indifferent, for the systematical idea\nin the framework of the organic systems and for the progressive element in\nthe development. The other is the struggle for existence and natural\nselection, which approaches the organisms purely from without like\nindividual variability, must as a whole appear a necessity, but in each\nsingle case in the concrete mixture of coinciding circumstances, would seem\na work of chance for the individual which is to be changed.\n\nMoreover, it is a demonstrable impossibility to explain the origin of just\nthose organs and members in the structure of organisms which are\nsystematically the most significant and functionally the most important, by\nmeans of natural selection. It is true that many of these organs and\nmembers, in their perfected state, offer to the organism an immense\nadvantage over lower organisms; but if they had been originated through\ngradual development, they would have been in their first {105} beginnings\nand earlier stages of development at least quite indifferent, often\ndirectly obstructive to the individual in its struggle for existence, and\ntherefore would have been called into existence and developed by agencies\nwhich had an effect directly counteracting natural selection. How high, for\ninstance, stand the vertebrates above the invertebrates! Yet how could the\nfirst deviation from the ganglionic system of the nerves of the\ninvertebrates to the cerebro-spinal system of the vertebrates have\noccurred?--and, especially, how could the first deposit of the vertebral\ncolumn have procured any benefit to the individual in the struggle for\nexistence? We quote this objection from Karl Planck's \"Wahrheit und\nFlachheit des Darwinismus,\" (\"Truth and Platitude of Darwinism\"),\nNoerdlingen, Beck, 1872.\n\nStill more striking is the insufficiency of the selection theory for the\nexplanation of the origin of the organs of motion in the higher classes of\nvertebrates. A. W. Volkman says of it, in his instructive lecture, \"Zur\nEntwickelung der Organismen,\" (\"Development of the Organisms\") Halle,\nSchmidt, 1875, p. 3 ff.: \"Without doubt, animals with extremities will come\nfrom animals which lacked extremities. Now if the metamorphosis originated\nin the course of one generation, the animals with extremities would have an\nadvantage over the rest, which ought to show itself in the natural\nselection; but if the development of an extremity needs 10,000 generations,\nthe individual in which the process of the development begins produces\n1/10000 of the extremity and the advantage, resulting therefrom is reduced\nto zero. For an organ can only be of advantage when it performs its\nfunctions; and on {106} the first of the 10,000 stages of development the\nextremity can not perform its functions. Just think of the cetacea! Of the\nhind extremity, only its carrier, the pelvis, has been developed; and even\nthis is only represented by the two hip-bones, hanging in the flesh. As to\nthe python, the hind extremities are more complete, but they lie hidden\nunder the skin, and therefore are of no use for local movement. Such\nexamples show that in the history of the development of an organ thousands\nof years may pass, and numerous generations may arise and disappear, until\nit reaches that grade of perfection where it is of use to its owner. How\ntherefore, can we look upon such an organ, when finally it is perfect, as a\nproduct of selection in the sense of Darwin?\"\n\nWe find the scientific objections to the selection theory collected in\ndetail in the before-mentioned works of Wigand, Blanchard, His, von Baer,\nand especially in Mivart's \"Genesis of Species,\" (London, MacMillan, 1871);\nand it is a praiseworthy testimony of Darwin's love of truth, that lately\nhe himself, the originator of the selection theory, willingly admits these\nweak points in his theory,[7] while Haeckel and many of his followers {107}\nin Germany still stoutly reject every doubt of the autocracy of the\nselection principle.\n\nIn summing up all we have said thus far about the theories of descent, of\nevolution, and of selection, we still find all three solutions of the\nscientific problems to be hypotheses, but hypotheses of very different\nvalue. The idea of descent has the most scientific ground; it will, as a\npermanent presupposition, govern all scientific investigations as to the\norigin of species, even if it does not exclude the idea of an\noften-repeated primitive generation of organisms--especially of those that\nstand still lower in development. More uncertain and less comprehensive is\nthe position of the evolution theory; in all likelihood, the idea of an\norigin through development will have to share the sovereignty with the idea\nof origin by leaps through metamorphosis of germs. Still more unfavorable\nis the state of the selection theory. It possesses the merit of having\nstarted the whole question as to the origin of species; it may explain\nsubordinary developments; natural selection may have cooeperated as a\nregulator in the whole progress and the whole preservation of organic life.\nEd. von Hartmann, in his essay, \"Truth and Error of Darwinism,\" (Berlin,\nDuncker, 1875), on page 111, compares its functions with those of the bolt\nand coupling in a machine; but that the driving principle which called new\nspecies into existence lay or originated _in_ the organisms, and did not\napproach them from without, seems to be confirmed more and more decidedly\nwith every new step of exact investigation as well as of reflection.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {108}\n\n\nBOOK II.\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHIC SUPPLEMENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHIC PROBLEMS.\n\nAlthough, in accordance with the requirements of the task before us, we\nhave to restrict ourselves to giving the results of natural science only in\ntheir general outlines, still we believe that we have not overlooked any\nessential result which is of importance to the question of the origin of\nspecies and of man. We have now finished our scientific review; and the\nconclusion to which we see ourselves brought is that natural science, in\nits investigation of the origin of species, has arrived at nothing but\nproblems which it is not able to solve. There is a very great probability\nof an origin of species, at least of the higher organized species, through\ndescent; but whether through descent by means of gradual development or of\nmetamorphosis of germs, or whether with one group of organisms it is in\nthis way, with another in that, is not yet decided. The attempt to explain\ntheir entire origin exclusively by the selection theory, must be regarded\nas a failure; all indications rather show that, supposing the descent\nprinciple correct, the deciding agencies which formed new species did not\napproach the old species out of which the new ones originated from {109}\nwithout, but that they originated or were already in existence within them.\nBut what these agencies were, natural science is at present unable to\nstate; and not only those scientists who reject every idea of a descent,\nbut also those who are favorable to the ideas of descent and of evolution,\nrejecting only the selection theory, are at one in silent or open\nacknowledgment of this limit of our knowledge, be it permanent or\ntemporary.\n\nBut now the question arises: does the search after these agencies\nhenceforth remain the exclusive task of natural science, and have we\ntherefore simply to wait and see whether it will succeed in finding them?\nor have we to look for the answer to these questions, which natural science\ncan no longer give, in another science--namely, philosophy? The first\nquestion we will have to answer in the affirmative, the second in the\nnegative. It is certainly understood that _metaphysical_ principles must\nunderlie all _physical_ appearances; and the right to define these\nprinciples, so far as they can be known, is willingly conceded to\nphilosophy by the scientists, with the exception of those of materialistic\nand naturalistic tendencies. This mutual re-approaching of philosophy and\nnatural science is one of the most gratifying, and, to both, most fruitful\nevidences of the intellectual work of the present generation. But these\nmetaphysical principles themselves become cognizable only when the physical\neffects, whose cause they are, become accessible to our knowledge; and\nevery attempt to find them _a priori_, or only to extend them _a priori_,\nwill always fail through the opposition of empirical facts; or even if this\nattempt accommodates itself to the existing state of knowledge at a given\ntime, it will always be overcome by the {110} progress of the empirical\nsciences. In the most favorable case, it can claim the value of a\nhypothesis which has to be put to the proof, whether it can be empirically\nconfirmed and whether we can successfully operate with it in knowing the\nworld of realities. But herewith it leaves the realm of pure philosophy,\nand makes the question of its right to exist dependent upon the decision of\nnatural science.\n\nSince the decline of the doctrines of nature held by Schelling, Steffens,\nand Hegel, there has come to our knowledge, from the domain of philosophy,\nbut one earnest attempt to explain the origin and development of organisms\ndown to the concrete differences between single types, classes, and even\norders and families, from one single metaphysical principle; and this\nattempt has been made by an antagonist of the descent doctrine. K. Ch.\nPlanck, in \"Seele und Geist, oder Ursprung, Wesen und Thaetigkeitsform der\nphysischen und geistigen Organisation von den naturwissenschaftlichen\nGrundlagen aus allgemein fasslich entwickelt\" (\"Soul and Spirit, or Origin,\nNature, and Form of Activity of Physical and Intellectual Organization,\nClearly Developed from a Scientific Basis\"), Leipzig, Fues, 1871, and in\n\"Wahrheit und Flachheit des Darwinismus\" (\"Truth and Platitude of\nDarwinism\"), Noerdlingen, Beck, 1872, makes the \"inner concentration\" the\nmoving principle of the whole development of the world. He thinks that what\nbelongs to the organism and to the soul has originated and developed up to\nman and his spiritual nature thus: that the creating centrum of the earth\nproduces individual centra on its periphery, which tend more and more to\nbring into view the principle of {111} centralization, in its contrast to\nthe purely peripheral form of existence, until it reaches its goal in man,\nwith his centralizing spirit. We have no reason to reject the idea of a\nprinciple of concentration in the world and its parts; it is confirmed by\nobservation, and shows itself fruitful in many respects. But in spite of\nthe many ingenious and often suggestive ideas in the works of Planck, we\nhave some doubt about a system which tries to explain the whole concrete\nabundance of the richness of formations and life-forms in the world, rising\nhigher and higher up to spiritual existence and moral action, from the\nsingle idea of concentration, and makes this principle the mystical and\nmysteriously acting cause of a whole world and its contents. We doubt at\nthe outset the success of this argument. We have especially the strongest\nobjections to a philosophical system which submits all the contending\nphysical theories of the present to the measure of that concentration\nprinciple, and from these purely metaphysical reasons takes side\nexclusively with the one or the other of the theories, or establishes new\ntheories--from the theories of atoms and ether, of light and heat, down to\ngeological questions as to whether universal revolutions of the world or a\ncontinual development took place. The solution of all these questions, in\ntheir full extent, we do not attribute to philosophy, but to natural\nscience; although to a natural science which permits philosophy to define\nthe ideas with which it operates and the general principles to which it\ncomes. For this renunciation--which philosophy, however, can not at all\nescape--it will be the more richly rewarded in this, that it obtains the\nmore certainly for its own work sure and sifted material. But all attempts\nwhich can not {112} submit to this renunciation, give only an apparent\nright to that view which Albert Lange, in his \"History of Materialism,\"\ndefends, when he banishes speculative philosophy to the realm of\nimagination.\n\nBut in rejecting philosophy in the question of the causes of the\ndevelopment and organization of the organic kingdoms, we did not reach the\nend of the philosophic problems with which we are confronted. This whole\nquestion is itself only a segment of the problems before which we stand,\nand leads of necessity to other questions.\n\nAlready within the series of development of the organic world, so far as it\nis investigated by natural science, we have found and named a point (at the\nend of Sec. 1, Chap. II, Book I), where the competency of pure natural science\ncomes to an end, and the question arises whether another source of\nknowledge--_i.e._, even philosophy--can not take up the investigation where\nnatural science completes its task. This point was the _origin of\nself-consciousness_ and of _free moral self-determination_; consequently,\nthe origin of that which makes man _man_. Going still farther back on the\ntemporal and ideal scale of organic beings, we arrive at another point,\nwhich natural science no longer can explain, and that is the _origin of\nsensation_ and of _consciousness_. With the appearance of sensation and\nconsciousness, the _animal world_ came into existence. Moreover, the whole\nscientific question as to the origin and development of species, so far as\nwe have hitherto treated it, started from initial points where the organic\nand life already existed; it, therefore, leads of necessity to the further\nquestion as to _the origin of the organic and of life itself_. D. F.\nStrauss, {113} in his \"Postscript as Preface,\" thus clearly and simply\ncharacterizes these still unfilled blanks in the evolution theory: \"There\nare, as is well known, three points in the rising development of nature, to\nwhich the appearance of incomprehensibility especially adheres (to speak\nmore categorically: which have not been explained thus far by anybody). The\nthree questions are: How has the living sprung from that which is without\nlife? the sentient (and conscious) being from that which is without\nsensation? that which possesses reason (self-consciousness and free will)\nfrom that which is without reason?--questions equally embarrassing to\nthought.\" But even the question as to the origin of the organic and of life\ncan not be discussed without an investigation, leading us farther back to\nthe question as to _the elements of the world_ in general. The _doctrine of\natoms_, and the _mechanical view of the world_, are the scientific\nevidences of the efforts in this direction.\n\nSo far as the attempts to solve these four questions start from the results\nof natural science and, from this starting-point of the known, try to solve\nthe unknown, we will have to assign them in the encyclopaedic classification\nof the sciences, to that department of philosophy which treats the\ndoctrines of nature; and since our whole investigation starts from the\nDarwinian theories, and only tries to treat of what is properly connected\nwith them, the attempts to solve these four questions offer themselves as\nthe _naturo-philosophic supplements of the Darwinian-theories_.\n\nAfter concluding our treatment of them, we shall have to speak of still\nanother view, which presupposes all these attempts at solution to be wholly\nor nearly {114} successful, and draws an inference from them which no\nlonger belongs to the realm of natural science, but is a purely\n_metaphysical_ hypothesis; it is the _abolition of the idea of design in\nnature_. In connection with this, finally, we shall have to discuss the\nname which this view has lately assumed, viz: \"_Monism_.\"\n\nWhatever further questions may arise, belong either to the special\nsubdivisions of natural science and philosophy, or to theological and\nethical problems.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {115}\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE NATURO-PHILOSOPHIC SUPPLEMENTS OF THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\nSec. 1. _The Origin of Self-Consciousness and of Free Moral\nSelf-Determination._\n\nIf sensation, and its most developed form, consciousness, is a reflex of\nthe material in something immaterial, which feels itself a unit in contrast\nto the material, and, where sensation rises into consciousness, is opposed\nas a unit to the material--self-consciousness again is the reflex of this\nsentient and conscious subject in a new and still higher immaterial unity;\nand this again makes this sentient and conscious subject, together with the\nsum of its feelings and ideas, its object, changing it from a sentient and\nconscious subject into a felt and presented object. Therefore it is clear,\nand will be the result of all thought upon these concepts, that as with\nsensation and consciousness, so also with self-consciousness, something new\nalways comes into existence--a higher category of being, different from the\nmerely material. The first is the form of being of the animal world; the\nlatter that of mankind.\n\nIt is exactly the same with the first appearance of voluntary movement, and\nagain with that of free moral self-determination. The reaction of the\nsentient subject upon his sensations is something qualitatively different\nfrom the purely mechanical and physical action and {116} reaction of pure\nmatter; although, in order to understand the possibility of a sensation as\nwell as of a voluntary movement, we must admit that the physical qualities\nof matter must be such as to afford a basis and condition for sentient and\nreacting beings. That reaction is the reaction of something immaterial upon\nthe material, even if it is entirely caused by the material and bound to\nthe material. Now, with free moral self-determination a new subject comes\ninto existence and activity in the individual, which makes that subject,\nreacting upon mere sensations and ideas, its object, and, as a new\nimmaterial subjective unity, acts determiningly upon that subject which has\njust become object. This new subject, considered from the side of its\nreceptivity, we call _self-consciousness_; from the side of its\nspontaneity, _free moral self-determination_. Whether we consider this\nfreedom predetermined or not, does not at all alter the described fact and\nthe qualitative difference between the form of human moral agency and that\nof purely animal spontaneity. For even those advocating determination must\nadmit that the morally acting subject distinguishes itself from its object,\nand does not take its motives to action from the material and from the\ninstinctive life which is bound to the sensual and dependent on it.\n\nNow it is true that all these circumstances in organized individuals which\nserve self-consciousness and free moral self-determination as their\ncondition, presupposition, and basis, all the dispositions of the soul and\nthe manifestations of life found in the animal world, will be worthy of the\nclosest attention even on this account: because they form the basis, the\ncondition, and (if self-consciousness and freedom are once present) an\nessential {117} part of the contents and object of self-consciousness and\nmoral self-determination. But where the origin of man is discussed, the\ncentral point of the investigation is no longer the enumeration of those\nactivities of the soul of man whose analogies we also find in the animal\nworld, but rather in the answer to the question as to how that entirely new\nmanifestation, self-consciousness and moral self-determination, came into\nexistence or could have originated. This question is the more decidedly the\ncentral point of the investigation, since this new form, when once in\nexistence, has for its object not only what already appears in the life of\nthe soul of animals, but also receives a new object, which can only be an\nobject of self-consciousness and of moral self-determination, and not of\nmere consciousness and instinctive life. These new objects are the ideas\nleading up to the conception of God and moral ideals.\n\nNow this very question as to the origin of self-consciousness and of free\nmoral self-determination is wholly misjudged as to its importance, and\ngiven remarkably little attention by those evolutionists who are well\nversed in the realm of natural science. The question as to the origin of\nself-consciousness is either entirely ignored--as if self-consciousness\nmust originate wholly by itself, if only those first steps of an\nintellectual and social life which the animal world also shows, are once\npresent and properly developed--or the solution is put aside with the most\nsuperficial analogies. The question regarding free moral\nself-determination, on the other hand, is either likewise ignored, and for\nthe same reasons, or it is supposed that it must fail of itself, if {118}\nonly this self-determination is explained in a deterministic way.\n\nIt is true, Darwin devotes several chapters of his work, \"Descent of Man,\"\nto a comparison of the intellectual powers of man with those of animals,\nand these chapters are full of the most interesting facts and comparisons;\nbut although his work comprises two volumes, he devotes to the origin of\nself-consciousness, individuality, abstraction, general ideas, etc., only a\nsingle page, and justifies his brief treatment with the assertion that the\nattempt at discussing these higher faculties is useless, because hardly two\nauthors agree in their definitions of these terms. What he says about\nself-consciousness is really contained in two sentences, namely: \"But how\ncan we feel sure that an old dog with an excellent memory and some power of\nimagination, as shown by his dreams, never reflects on his past pleasures\nor pains in the chase? This would be a form of self-consciousness.\" On the\nother hand, as Buechner has remarked in his \"Lectures about Darwin's\nTheory\": \"How little can the hard-working wife of a degraded Australian\nsavage, who hardly ever uses abstract words, and can not count above four,\nhow little can such a woman exert her self-consciousness, or reflect on the\nnature of her own existence!\" And in Darwin's _resume_ of his chapters on\nthe intellectual powers of man and animals, he says, on page 126: \"If it\ncould be proved that certain high mental powers, such as the formation of\ngeneral concepts, self-consciousness, etc., were absolutely peculiar to\nman, which seems extremely doubtful, it is not improbable that these\nqualities are merely the incidental results of other highly-advanced\nintellectual faculties: {119} and these again mainly the result of the\ncontinued use of a perfect language.\"\n\nIf Darwin is thus not able to show us in the animal world a single real\nanalogy which at all approaches self-consciousness, and, in order to supply\nthis want, must have recourse to the purely hypothetical _possibility_ that\nit is not certain whether an old hunting-dog does not reflect upon the past\njoys of the chase; if by the uncertainty of the expression that\nself-consciousness might be an \"_accompanying_\" result of other faculties,\nhe nevertheless gives us to understand that he can not find the\n_sufficient_ cause of the origin of self-consciousness in those other\nfaculties; and, finally, if he closes the last mentioned quotation with a\nsentence which has for its premise the wholly illogical thought that\nlanguage might have been able to reach \"a high state of development\" before\nthe origin of self-consciousness and without its assistance: then, indeed,\nthe result of all this certainly is that he has given no adequate\nconsideration to the specific nature of self-consciousness. It is only\nunder this supposition that it is possible for him to say: \"Nevertheless,\nthe difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it\ncertainly is, is one of degree and not of quality.\" The authors may\npossibly not agree in the definitions of the idea of self-consciousness--we\nourselves perhaps are only an additional example in confirmation of this\nfact--; but whatever the definition may be, the fact itself remains, that\nself-consciousness does not stand as one of the intellectual faculties\nbeside the others and cooerdinate with them, but, as an entirely new form of\nbeing, introduces a qualitatively new and valuable factor into the subject.\nThat which precedes the {120} origin of self-consciousness--the purely\nconscious and not yet self-conscious life of the soul, as it shows itself\nwith higher animals, especially with mammals--_may_ have been the necessary\ncondition and requirement for the origin of self-consciousness. It\ncertainly _has_ been so; and from this point of view, all these\npsychological studies of animals and psycho-physical investigations which\nare a favorite object of modern science, have a high value; but what has\nbeen called into existence by _means_ of conditions is not on that account\nthe _product_ of those conditions. This very fact is one of the greatest\nmistakes of most of the modern evolution theories: that very often--and\nespecially where they wish to draw metaphysical conclusions from their\nscientific results or hypotheses--they confound condition and basis with\ncause.\n\nNow it appears to us that, in quite an analogous way, Darwin overlooks or\ncontests the fact that with _free moral self-determination_ something\nspecifically new comes into existence. He certainly discusses the origin of\nthe moral qualities of man more in detail than he does the origin of his\nintellectual qualities. He derives them, in their first beginnings, from\nthe fixity, transmission and increase of the _social_ impulses and\ninstincts. These, being the basis of the whole moral development, and\nleading in their more mature form to love and to sympathy, originated by\nnatural selection; and the other moral qualities, such as moral sense and\nconscience, progressed more by the effect of custom, by the power of\nreflection, instruction, and religion, than by natural selection. Higher\nand lower, common and special, permanent and transitory instincts come into\ncollision {121} with one another. The dissatisfaction of man when any of\nthe lower, special, and transitory instincts have overcome the higher,\ncommon and permanent, and the resolution to act differently for the future,\nis _conscience_. Darwin considers that one a _moral being_ who is capable\nof comparing with one another his past and future actions and motives, of\napproving some of them and of disapproving others; and the fact that man is\nthe only creature who can with certainty be ranked as a moral being is,\naccording to Darwin, the greatest of all differences between man and\nanimals.\n\nHere, again, the whole central point of the investigation as to the origin\nof man does not lie in the question of the origin of the instincts between\nwhich the moral subject, acting in moral self-determination, has to choose.\nFor it is clear that the beginnings of these instincts are also present in\nthe animal world. But the main question is, how did this faculty and\nnecessity of choosing, this conscience and responsibility, this \"moral\nsense,\" as Darwin calls it, originate? Now to this question we have a plain\nanswer in the before-mentioned utterances of Darwin: It originated not as a\n_product_ of the social instincts--it only has these instincts for its\npreceding condition, object and instrument; but it originated as a product\nof other agencies, which act upon these impulses and instincts, operate\nwith them, choose between them; and as these other agencies Darwin mentions\nthe high development of the intellectual powers. That this is his opinion,\nwe can clearly see from an expression with which he introduces his essay on\nthe origin of \"moral sense\": \"The following proposition seems to me in a\nhigh degree probable--namely, that {122} any animal whatever, endowed with\nwell-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or\nconscience, _as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or\nnearly as well developed, as in man_.\" These intellectual powers which\nmoral feeling and conscience require at their birth, are certainly,\naccording to Darwin the power to distinguish oneself as subject from one's\nimpulses and instincts, and to choose between them; _i.e._,\nself-consciousness. We shall have to admit fully this intimate connection\nbetween moral self-determination and self-consciousness; but we must admit,\nat the same time, that moral self-determination--this new form of activity\nin which moral activity distinguishes itself from all _merely_ instinctive\nactivity--finds its sufficient explanation in the previous stage of the\nanimal world as little as self-consciousness; and that moral\nself-determination has the condition and presupposition, but not the cause,\nof its existence in that which is also found in the previous stage of the\nanimal world. The proof that the origin of moral self-determination finds\nits sufficient explanation in that which the previous stage of the animal\nworld also has, would appear to have been given by Darwin only when he had\nsucceeded in explaining the origin of self-consciousness from animal\nintelligence; but that he did not succeed in it, we think we have clearly\nshown. On the other hand, we willingly admit that the study of the social\nand all other instincts and impulses which are common to man and animals,\nand which in man form the object and instrument of his moral activity, has\nfor us the highest interest, inasmuch as the only problem is to explain the\nconditions and prerequisites of moral self-determination--or, historically\nspeaking, the conditions {123} and prerequisites of the origin of morally\nacting beings. Furthermore we have to say here also that condition and\nprerequisite are not identical with cause, and it is precisely the _cause_\nof moral responsibility and of the origin of such morally responsible\nbeings, which has not yet been discovered by the Darwinian theory.\n\nThe followers of Darwin enter still less into the discussion of the\nquestion as to the origin of self-consciousness and of moral\nself-determination. Haeckel--who, in his \"Natural History of Creation\" and\nin his \"Anthropogeny,\" expounds his whole evolution theory in all its\nantecedent conditions and consequences--has, indeed, much to say of the\ndifferent faculties of the soul of man and animals. He traces these\nfaculties in the case of man down to the lowest state of the most degraded\nraces, and in the case of animals from the kermes up to the bee, from the\nlancelet-fish to the dog, ape, elephant and horse; and he also treats of\nthe so-called _a priori_ knowledge which \"arose only by long-enduring\ntransmission, by inheritance of acquired adaptations of the brain, out of\noriginally empiric or experiential knowledge _a posteriori_,\" (Vol. II,\n345). But we look in vain in his works for a treatment of the question as\nto the origin of the Ego--of self-consciousness. Nowhere does he enter into\nthe analysis of the psychological ideas; he only compares the psychical\nutterances of different creatures, and thinks the whole problem solved when\nhe says: \"The mental differences between the most stupid placental animals\n(for instance, sloths and armadillos) and the most intelligent animals of\nthe same group (for instance dogs and apes) are, at any rate, much more\nconsiderable than the differences in the {124} intellectual life of dogs,\napes, and men.\" Or: \"If these brutish parasites are compared with the\nmentally active and sensitive ants, it will certainly be admitted that the\npsychical differences between the two are much greater than those between\nthe highest and lowest mammals--between beaked animals, pouched animals and\narmadillos, on the one hand, and dogs, apes, men, on the other.\" The fact\nthat in the human individual consciousness and self-consciousness are\ngradually developed, is to him a proof that in the organic kingdom also\nconsciousness and self-consciousness came into existence gradually, and,\nindeed, hand-in-hand with the development of the nervous system; and with\nthis result he thinks that he has relieved himself from the task of showing\nthe \"how\" of the origin of self-consciousness. This becomes clearly evident\nfrom a remark about the origin of consciousness, in his \"Anthropogeny,\"\nwhere he says that, if DuBois-Reymond had thought that consciousness is\ndeveloped, he would no longer have held its origin to be a thing beyond the\nlimits of human capacity. Haeckel likewise seems to regard the question of\nthe origin of moral self-determination as solved or rejected, if only\nfreedom is denied--which, indeed, is repeatedly done by him.\n\nA similar defect in the treatment of this question by evolutionists we find\nin the works of Oscar Schmidt, Gustav Jaeger, and others. Even Emil\nDuBois-Reymond, who, in his celebrated and eloquent lecture on \"The Limits\nof the Knowledge of Nature,\" given before the assembly of scientists at\nLeipzig, 1872, asserts so energetically that the origin of sensation and\nconsciousness is inexplicable (see next section), seems to {125} take the\norigin of self-consciousness for granted, and as needing no further\nexplanation, if only consciousness is once present.\n\nSince, then, the scientists leave us without a sufficient answer to the\nquestion respecting the origin of self-consciousness and of moral\nself-determination, we shall have to turn to the philosophers. Here,\nindeed, we find rich definitions and genetic analyses, but none that lead\nus any farther than to the information that consciousness is the necessary\ncondition of self-consciousness; that animal instinct is the necessary\nantecedent condition of moral self-determination. Yet in the works of these\nvery philosophers who are inclined to a mechanical and \"monistic\" view of\nthe world, we find that they directly avoid the question as to the origin\nof self-consciousness and of moral self-determination. As soon as they are\nled near it, in the course of reasoning in their works, they suddenly turn\naside again to the quite different questions of the connection between\nbrain and soul, between physical and psychical, external and internal\nprocesses, etc. Evidently they feel that with this question they have\narrived at the weak point of their system. That here is a weak point, we\nclearly see in the case of D. F. Strauss, a leading advocate of modern\nnaturalism, and the greatest philosophic scholar of that school. It is\ntrue, in his \"Postscript as Preface,\" as we saw before, he mentions the\norigin of self-consciousness as one of the points which need special\nexplanation; but he seems to have made this acknowledgment more with the\npurpose of showing that DuBois-Reymond, in admitting the origin of\nself-consciousness to be explainable, has no longer any reason to contest\nthe explicability of the {126} origin of sensation and consciousness; for\nin his work on \"The Old Faith and the New,\" he did not enter into that\nquestion at all. On the other hand, he makes in his last-mentioned work a\nremarkable confession. In answering the question--how do we determine our\nrule of life?--he comes to speak of the position of man in nature, traces a\nlaw of progress in nature, and says: \"In this cumulative progression of\nlife, man is also comprised, and, moreover, in such wise that the organic\nplasticity of our planet (provisionally, say some naturalists, but that we\nmay fairly leave an open question) culminates in him. _As nature can not go\nhigher, she would go inwards._ 'To be reflected within itself,' was a very\ngood expression of Hegel's. Nature felt herself already in the animal, but\nshe wished to know herself also.\" But still stronger is the following\nexpression: \"_In man, nature endeavored not merely to exalt, but to\ntranscend herself._\" In Sec. 1, Chap. II, we shall have to speak of this\nimportant acknowledgment of teleology in nature, which such an antagonist\nof teleology as Strauss makes in the above-quoted remarks about a progress\nin nature and a will of nature; but here we are more interested in the\nequally remarkable acknowledgment of the fact that man can not be explained\nfrom nature alone--that he is something which transcends nature. For that\n(according to Strauss) nature, in originating man, not only _intended_ to\ntranscend herself, but really did transcend herself and, that she succeeded\nin her intention, we can infer from the moral precept which Strauss gives:\n\"Do not forget for a moment, that thou art human; not merely a natural\nproduction.\"\n\nThe result of our investigation, therefore, is that {127} with\nself-consciousness and free moral self-determination something specifically\nnew came into existence which had its antecedent condition in a previous\nstate of existence, but has not yet found its sufficient explanation in\nthis antecedent state.\n\nSec. 2. _The Origin of Sensation and of Consciousness._\n\nThe limits of our knowledge show themselves still more clearly in the\nattempts to explain the origin of consciousness and its lowest\nform--sensation. Self-consciousness is without doubt ideally nearer to\nconsciousness in this, that both are an immaterial activity; and yet we\nfound no demonstrable bridge which leads from consciousness to\nself-consciousness. Still broader is the gulf between the material and the\nimmaterial, between the unconscious and the conscious,--or, to describe the\ntwo realms with names which bring them nearest together, between that which\nis without sensation and that which has sensation: a gulf to bridge which\nphilosophy also has vainly exerted its utmost efforts, as has been well\nknown since the \"supernatural assistance\" of Descartes and the\n\"preestablished harmony\" of Leibnitz. Wherein lies the real necessity that\nthere should be sensation? How does the material become something that is\nfelt? What is the demonstrable cause (not the condition, but the cause) of\na sentient subject? To these questions, every science up to the present day\nlacks an answer. As is well known, DuBois-Reymond, in his\npreviously-mentioned lecture upon \"The Limits of our Knowledge of Nature,\"\ndeclares the origin of sensation and of consciousness to be one of two\nlimits, beyond {128} which we have not only to say \"_ignoramus_,\" but\n\"_ignorabimus_.\"\n\n_In abstracto_, we might think of two attempts at bridging over this gulf:\nthe first one is that we try to transform sensation itself into something\nmaterial, and the other is that we attribute sensation also to that which,\naccording to our observation, seems to be without sensation; namely, to\nmatter and its elements, the atoms. Both of these attempts have been\nmade--the former by D. F. Strauss in his \"The Old Faith and the New,\" and\nby the English philosopher, Herbert Spencer, in his \"First Principles of\nPhilosophy;\" the latter, first pointed out by Schopenhauer, was taken up\nand farther developed by Zoellner in his work, \"Ueber die Natur der Kometen\"\n(\"Nature of the Comets\"), Leipzig, Engelmann, 1872, and with special\nacuteness by an \"Anonymus\" in the work: \"Das Unbewusste von Standpunkt der\nPhysiologie und Descendenztheorie\" (\"The Unconscious from the Standpoint of\nPhysiology and Descent Theory\"), Berlin, Duncker, 1872.\n\nStrauss says, in the previously-mentioned work: \"If, under certain\nconditions, motion is transformed into heat, why may it not, under other\nconditions, be transformed into sensation?\" And Herbert Spencer says, in\nhis \"First Principles of Philosophy,\" (page 217): \"Various classes of facts\nthus unite to prove that the law of metamorphosis, which holds among the\nphysical forces, holds equally between them and the mental forces. Those\nmodes of the unknowable which we call motion, heat, light, chemical\naffinity, etc., are alike transformable into each other, and into those\nmodes of the unknowable which we distinguish as sensation, {129} emotion,\nthought: these, in their turns, being directly or indirectly\nretransformable into the original shapes.\"\n\nBut motion--even the finest material motion, that of ether, (which, in\nconsequence of the very important discovery of the conservation of force\nand of the mechanical equivalent of heat, made by Robert von Mayer, at\npresent is taken to be heat)--is so decidedly a material process, the\nsensation of motion is so decidedly a reflex of the material in something\nimmaterial, that the assertion of a transformation of motion into sensation\nseems to us only to change the point of view, and not to explain the\ndifference, but to efface it. And we think that the appeal of Strauss from\nhis contemporaries, who do not understand him, to posterity, who would\nunderstand him better and esteem him, has but little prospect of being\noperative.\n\nIf that which has sensation and that which has it not, are to be brought\ngenetically near one another, and hence the difference between the two at\nthe point where the lowest sentient being has found its first existence, is\nto be made void or at least bridged over, then it is much more reasonable,\nand also in the line of Strauss's solution, to deny the difference between\nthat which has sensation and that which has it not, and to do this in the\nsense in which we also declare that to be sentient which we have hitherto\nbeen accustomed to regard as without sensation; and we should likewise\nattribute sensation to the original elements of the world, be they called\natoms or whatever one may wish. This is done by Zoellner and by the before\nmentioned \"Anonymus.\" This conclusion is logical; it is even the only\npossible conclusion, if we once start from the axiom that the new, which\ncomes {130} into existence, must necessarily be explainable from agencies\npreviously active, and known to or imagined by us through abstractions and\nhypotheses. Zoellner is certainly right when, in his work which appeared\nbefore the lecture of DuBois-Reymond, he puts the alternative, \"either to\nrenounce forever the conceivableness of the phenomena of sensation, or\nhypothetically to add to the common qualities of matter one more, which\nplaces the simplest and most elementary transactions of nature under a\nprocess of sensation, legitimately connected with it;\" as also when he says\n(page 327): \"We may regard the intensity of these sensations (of matter) as\nlittle and unimportant as we wish; but the hypothesis of their existence\nis, according to my conviction, a necessary condition, in order to\ncomprehend the really existing phenomena of sensation in nature.\" Only we\nshall do well to choose the first alternative for the present, and, with\nDuBois-Reymond, answer the question as to the explanation of the origin of\nsensation with an \"_ignoramus_\"; indeed, we shall take a surer road with\nhis \"_ignorabimus_\" than by a plunge into that bottomless ocean of\nhypotheses--in spite of the protest of Haeckel, who (Anthrop., page XXI)\nsees that scientist who has the courage to admit the limits of our\nknowledge, on account of this \"_ignorabimus_\", walking in the army of the\n\"black International\", and \"marshalled under the black flag of the\nhierarchy,\" together with \"spiritual servitude and falsehood, want of\nreason and barbarism, superstition and retrogression\", and fighting,\n\"spiritual freedom and truth, reason and culture, evolution and progress.\"\nFor a solution of the question which simply denies all sharply-marked\ndifferences in the world, and explains {131} the new, which comes into\nexistence with sensation, by the assertion that this new element is not\nnew, but was already present, and that it exists everywhere, only we do not\nsee it everywhere,--such a solution seems to us not to be the true way to\ninterpret the problem of the sphinx. Even Ed. von Hartmann seems to\ninfringe the impartiality of the true observer, when, in his \"Philosophy of\nthe Unconscious,\" he attributes sensation to plants. But when Zoellner says\n(p. 326): \"_All the labors of natural beings_ [and, as the connection\nindicates, of all, even of inorganic natural beings] are determined by like\nand dislike;\" and when \"Anonymus\" attributes sensation to all atoms and to\nall complexities composed of them, even to stone, then all reasonable\nconception of natural things and processes certainly vanishes into thin\nair.\n\nIt will be remembered, however, that in treating the question of the origin\nof self-consciousness, although we were not able to solve the problem,\nnevertheless we had to ascribe high value to the investigation of all\npsychical processes on the low stage of sensation and consciousness, since\nthey show us not the cause, but the condition and basis, of\nself-consciousness. Likewise, in the question as to the origin of sensation\nand of consciousness, although we are not able to solve it, we will\nwillingly admit that we observe, even in that which has no sensation,\nqualities and processes which furnish the absolutely necessary condition\nand basis for sensation. For the same reason, we will also admit the\nmanifold analogies of sensation which we observe in that which is without\nsensation. The whole system of symbols in nature which fills our treasury\nof words and penetrates, in a {132} thousandfold way, our scientific and\npopular, our poetical and prosaic speech, our thoughts and feelings, bears\nwitness to the fact that that which is without sensation is also a\npreparatory step to sensation, and feeling both active and passive springs\nfrom it. However, a preparatory step, as such, is not necessarily the\ncause; and the fact and the acknowledgment of a correlation is not on that\naccount an explanation.\n\nSec. 3. _The Origin of Life._\n\nThe third problem to be solved is the origin of life. As is well known,\nDarwin himself makes no attempt at explaining this problem, but is\nsatisfied with the idea that life was infused into one or a few forms by\nthe Creator (\"Origin of Species,\" 6 ed., p. 429). His investigations and\ntheories only begin where organic life, in its first and lowest forms, is\nalready in existence.\n\nBut lately there have been made, in the realm of the organic, discoveries\nof beings which take the lowest conceivable round on the ladder of\norganisms, and which in their form and structure are so simple that from\nthem to the inorganic there seems to be but a short step. We can no longer\nmention as belonging to the bridges which are said to lead from the organic\nworld to the inorganic, the often-named _bathybius_, discovered by Huxley,\nand so strongly relied upon for the mechanical explanation of life--a slimy\nnet-like growth, which covers the rocks in the great depths of the ocean.\nFor after scientists like K. E. von Baer and others had already declared it\nprobable that this bathybius is only a precipitate of organic relics, no\nless a person than the discoverer of the bathybius, in the \"Annals of\nNatural History,\" 1875, {133} and in the \"Quarterly Journal of\nMicroscopical Science,\" 1875, has suggested that the whole discovery is but\ngypsum, which was precipitated in a gelatinous condition. Likewise the\nutterances concerning the simplicity and lack of structure of the lowest\norganisms, are to be accepted only with great reservation; for most of\nthese organisms show very differently and very distinctly stamped\nstructures; of this fact, anyone may easily convince himself, who has had\nthe opportunity of observing with the microscope low and lowest organisms,\nand to admire their striking and manifold forms. Nevertheless, there are\nmonera whose structure seems to be nothing but a living clod without kernel\nand cover, and which in that respect represent the lowest conceivable form\nof organic being and life.\n\nNow, relying on these discoveries, as well as upon the successful\ndemonstration, by inorganic means, of organic acids in chemistry, and\nstarting from the supposition that the first appearance of life must\nnecessarily be explained by those agencies which are already active in the\ninorganic nature, many scientists have attempted the so-called _mechanical\nexplanation of life_. This attempt has been made most logically and\nsystematically by Haeckel. He says that organic _matter_, organic _form_,\nand organic _motion_, in the lowest stages of the organic, which are almost\nthe only ones to be taken into consideration when the problem of the origin\nof life is discussed, contain nothing at all which does not also pertain to\nthe inorganic. In his opinion, organic _matter_ is an albuminous carbon\ncombination, of which we have to presuppose that, like all chemical\ncombinations, under certain physical and chemical conditions it can also\narise in the realm {134} of the inorganic in a purely chemical and\nmechanical way. Organic _form_ which, in its lowest stages, is so simple,\nlike the moneron and the bathybius, and which stands still lower than a\ncell, is, moreover, something which there is no difficulty in explaining\nfrom inorganic matter. Finally, organic _motion_ which alone is the last\nand lowest characteristic of the organic in its lowest stage--in which the\nprocess of life properly consists, and in which, therefore, we have to\nrecognize the _punctum saliens_ of the whole question--is only an increase\nand complication of the merely mechanical motion of the inorganic, likewise\nexplainable by mechanical causes. This view Haeckel expounds in the\nthirteenth and partly also in the first chapter of his \"Natural History of\nCreation,\" and explains the origin of the first and most simple organic\nindividuals either through what he calls _autogony_ in an inorganic fluid,\nor through _plasmogony_ in an organic fluid--a plasma or protoplasma. In\nfact, according to him, the only correct idea is that all matter is\nprovided with a soul, that inorganic and organic nature is one, that all\nnatural bodies known to us are equally animated, and that the contrast\ncommonly drawn between the living and the dead world does not exist. This\nis but a repetition, in a more rhetorical way, of the same idea which\n\"Anonymus\" expressed in discussing the question as to the origin of\nsensation.\n\nDuBois-Reymond--who, in his lecture at Leipzig, pronounced the origin of\n_sensation_ and of _consciousness_ a problem of natural science, never to\nbe solved--is also of the opinion that the explanation of _life_ from mere\nmechanism of atoms is very probable, and only a question of time. It is\nwell known that the experimental {135} attempts at originating the organic\nthrough chemistry are at present pursued with an eagerness that can have\nits stimulus only in the hope of success.\n\nIt is clear that the main point of the question does not lie in organic\nmatter or in organic form, but in organic _motion_, for even the specific\nof the organic _form_ originates only first through _organic motion of\nlife_. If, therefore, life is to be explained from mechanical causes, it\nmust also be shown that the merely mechanical motion of inorganic matter\nproduces that motion which we know as organic motion, and _how_ it produces\nit. The idea of \"increase and complication of the inorganic, merely\nmechanical motion,\" with which Haeckel throws a bridge from the living to\nthe lifeless or from the organic to the inorganic, does not yet give us\nthat proof; it seems rather to be one of those pompous phrases with which\npeople hide their ignorance and make the uncritical multitude believe that\nthe explanation is found: a manipulation against which, among others,\nWigand, in his great work, repeatedly protests, as also does the Duke of\nArgyll in his lecture on \"Anthropomorphism in Theology,\" having especially\nin his mind the deductions of Spencer. For we may review the whole known\nseries of mechanical motions and their mechanical causes, and imagine their\nmechanical increase and their mechanical complication the largest possible;\nand still the life-motion of the organic will never result therefrom. If\nsuch a keen psychical and physiological investigator and thinker, and such\nan authority in the realm of the motions of atoms and molecules, as Gustav\nTheodor Fechner--\"Einige Ideen zur Schoepfungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte\nder Organismen\" (\"Some Ideas about the History of the {136} Creation and\nDevelopment of Organisms\"), Leipzig, 1873, p. 1, f.--can find the whole\nlasting and effectual difference between the organic and inorganic in\nnothing else than in the way and manner of _motion_--namely, that the\nmotion of the _organic_ molecules is different from that of the _inorganic_\nmolecules--and when he traces this difference with mathematical exactness,\nthen an assertion which simply denies that difference, without attempting\nto show the identity of the two motions, to say nothing of proving this\nidentity, is nothing more than a clear evidence that the mechanical theory\nhas not yet succeeded in explaining the origin of life, and that those\nscientists who so haughtily look down upon the abuse of \"_vital power_,\" to\nthe efficacy of which their antagonists began to resort when their\nknowledge came to an end, make exactly the same abuse with their\n\"_mechanism_.\" That organic motion, even the organic motion of molecules,\n_once present_, comes into dependence on the well known laws of mechanism,\nwe naturally will not deny; any more than that the human body, when serving\nthe will of the mind, follows in its motions the laws of physiology and\nmechanism.\n\nPreyer seems to make a mistake similar to that of those who efface\nsensation and motion, when, in an essay on the hypothesis of the origin of\nlife, in the \"Deutsche Rundschau,\" Vol. I, 7, he even effaces the\ndifference between life and sensation, and simply identifies life and\nmotion. \"Self-motion, called life, and inorganic movement of bodies by\nagencies outside of themselves, are but quantitatively, intensively, or\ngradually different forms of motion; not in their innermost being\ndifferent.... Our will changes many kinds of motion into heat, makes {137}\ncold metal to be red-hot simply by hammering.... Likewise inversely, as the\nlaw of the conservation of force must require, a part of the eternal heat\nof the metal can be now and forever transposed into the living motion of\nour soul.\" This whole manner of investigation and proof is one of those\nnumerous unconscious logical fallacies which, introduced by Hegel, have\ngradually attained a certain title by possession. From the observation of a\nprocess, they abstract a characteristic, as general as possible,--as, for\ninstance, from the observation of life the characteristic of motion; then\nthey find that the process has the characteristic in common with still\nother processes--as, for instance, the self-motion of the living has the\ngeneral characteristic of motion in common with the objective motion of the\nlifeless; and then they persuade themselves that the process which they try\nto explain is really explained by having found a quality of this process as\ncomprehensive as possible. And in order to hide the falsity of the\nconclusion, they also give to the general idea, which they have found to be\na characteristic of that process, the same name which the special process\nhas,--as, for instance, they call motion life, no matter whether it is a\nmotion of itself or a being moved, no matter whether it is performed from\nwithin or in consequence of an impulse from without; and then they say:\n\"Behold, life is explained; life is nothing but motion.\" But it can be\nreadily seen that life is also motion, and has therefore this\ncharacteristic in common with everything which is moved; but that the\nspecific of that motion called life--namely, self-motion in consequence of\nan impulse renewing itself from within, and, as Fechner shows, {138}\nself-motion in a rotatory direction of the molecules, precisely the same\nthing which in distinction from other motions we call life,--is not\nexplained, but simply ignored.\n\nThere is still another bold hypothesis which we have to mention--namely,\n_that the organic germs were once thrown from other spheres upon the earth\nby aerolites_. Years ago this idea was declared by Helmholtz to be\nscientifically conceivable; then it was formally asserted and brought into\ngeneral notice by Sir William Thompson, in his opening address before the\nannual assembly of the British Association at Edinburgh, in 1871, but\nrejected as formally and materially unscientific by Zoellner, in the preface\nto his work, \"Nature of Comets,\" and again defended by Helmholtz in his\npreface to the second volume of a translation of Thompson and Tait's\nTheoretical Physics. However, this hypothesis also only defers the solution\nof the question, and, supposing its scientific possibility, leads either to\nthe remoter question, how life did originate in those other spheres, or to\nthe metaphysical assertion of the eternity of life and of the eternal\ncontinuity of the living in the world, and shows therewith very clearly the\nimpossibility of its explanation.\n\nThis inexplicability would still exist, if what is quite improbable should\nhappen, namely, that the experimental attempts at _artificially producing\norganic life_ should be successful, and if thus the question as to the\n_generatio aequivoca_, which during the past decades so much alarmed the\nminds of scientists and theologians, should be experimentally solved and\nanswered in the affirmative. For in view of the hopes of a possible\nexplanation of life, which is expected to be the reward for the success of\n{139} these attempts, Zoellner is fully right in saying: \"That the\nscientists to-day set such an extremely high value on the inductive proof\nof the _generatio aequivoca_, is the most significant symptom of how little\nthey have made themselves acquainted with the first principles of the\ntheory of knowledge. For, suppose they should really succeed in observing\nthe origin of organic germs under conditions entirely free from objection\nto any imaginable communication with the atmosphere, what could they answer\nto the assertion that the organic germs, in reference to their extension,\nare of the order of ether-atoms, and, with these, press through the\nintervals of the material molecules which form the sides of our apparatus?\"\n\nHow little life is explained, at least according to the present state of\nour knowledge, also follows from the _insufficiency of all attempts_ at\n_defining it_. The latest and most thorough attempt at such a definition of\nlife, with which we are familiar, is that made by Herbert Spencer in his\n\"First Principles\", Sec. 25, and in his \"Principles of Biology,\" Vol. I, Part\nI, Chap. 4 and 5. Having made thorough investigations, he arrives at the\ngeneral formula: \"Life is the continuous adjustment of internal relations\nto external relations.\" To this definition we will not make the objection\nthat it is nothing but a logical abstraction from the common quality of all\nprocesses and phenomena of life; for it certainly lies in the nature of a\ndefinition that it can be nothing else but that. Nevertheless, we will\nstate that such a definition of life not only does not lead us any nearer\nto the comprehension of its processes, and especially of the richness and\nthe organization of its forms and functions, but that it {140} clearly\nshows us how little the origin of life is explained. For this very\ndefinition necessarily and obviously leads us to the questions: Whence do\nthose internal relations originate, whence their adjustment to external\nrelations, and whence the continuity of this adjustment? The answer to\nthese questions this definition still owes us.\n\nTherefore, not only self-consciousness and freedom, not only sensation and\nconsciousness, but also life and the organic, remain a phenomenon which--at\nleast, according to the present state of our knowledge and\nreasoning--enters into the realm of the world of phenomena as _something\nnew_ that can not be explained from the foregoing, although it presupposes\nthe foregoing as the _condition_, not the cause, of its appearance; and no\nmatter whether we have to think of the modality of its origin as a sudden\nor as a gradual one.\n\nSec. 4. _The Elements of the World, the Theory of Atoms, and the Mechanical\nView of the World._\n\nThe investigating and thinking mind, when it attempts to explain the\nappearances and forms of that which exists, finds itself led further and\nfurther back, until it finally arrives at the last elements of the world\nand of matter. Whether we take the problem of life as solved or unsolved,\nthe living has matter and its subordination to the efficiency of all its\nchemical and mechanical powers in common with the lifeless; and the\norganic, in its first beginnings, stands extraordinarily near to, and is\ngrown on the ground of, the inorganic,--if not according to the category of\ncause and effect, still according to that of condition and consequence, of\nbasis and structure. Therefore we stand at last before the {141} question\nof the final elements of matter, which, indeed, constitutes organic as well\nas inorganic bodies.\n\nThe answer to this question is attempted by the theory of atoms: the\ndoctrine which teaches that the whole material world is composed of simple\nparticles which are no farther divisible, and from whose juxtaposition the\nchemical elements--and, in respect to their other forms of existence and\ncombination, the whole world of bodies, with all their forms, states, and\nchanges,--are composed.\n\nThis theory has not only the practical value that the physical (and\nespecially the chemical) sciences can make and use their formulas most\neasily under the supposition of such simple primitive elements; but it also\nhas the great theoretical merit that it has broken down the old barriers\nbetween _matter_ and _force_, and has thus promoted considerably our method\nof regarding the world of material substances. Toward this result,\nscientists and philosophers--and, among the latter, the thinkers and\ninvestigators of both views of the world, the theistic and the pantheistic,\nthe ideal and the materialistic,--have worked with equal merit, and have\nequally enjoyed its fruits, with perhaps the single exception of so pure a\nmaterialist as Ludwig Buechner, who, it seems, does not like to give up his\nold doctrine of force _and_ matter as the two inseparable, equivalent, and\nequally eternal elements of the universe. That matter itself, even when\nlooked upon from a purely physical standpoint, has an incorporeal\nprinciple; that the whole world of bodies, as such, has but a phenomenal\ncharacter; that not force _and_ matter are the two empirico-physical\nprinciples of the world, but that matter itself must be a product of\nelementary {142} force active in the atoms; these doctrines have now be\npretty nearly common property of natural science and philosophy.\nInvestigators who like Wilhelm Wundt, rise from natural science to\nphilosophy, or such as take their starting-point from philosophy--whether\nthey be theists, like Lotze, I. H. Fichte, Ulrici, or occupy the ground of\na pessimistic pantheism, as does Eduard von Hartmann,--all share this view\nand its fruits.\n\nBut in spite of all these preferences for the theory of atoms, we should\nnot forget that it still has but hypothetical value--that it is but an idea\nof limits, which indicates, where the scientifically perceptible ceases,\nand that every attempt at moving this limit still farther on must either\nfail and lead into unsolvable contradictions, or, if successful, only leads\nto new difficulties and unsolved problems.\n\nAlready within that realm in which the theory of atoms is a supplemental\nhypothesis directly indispensable at present--_i.e._, within their\napplication in physical sciences--we meet suppositions which raise great\ndoubts and difficulties. Such a scientific difficulty occurs when the\natomism of the natural philosophers supposes a double complexity of atoms,\nmaterial atoms and atoms of ether: complexities which both penetrate one\nanother, and are supposed to follow partly totally different, partly the\nsame, elementary laws of force. Material atoms are subordinate to the law\nof gravitation, while atoms of ether are not; and yet both act legitimately\nupon one another,--as, for instance, when heat passes into motion and\nmotion into heat, which certainly presupposes a law of power acting in\ncommon for both. Another difficulty lies in the atomism of the chemists;\nand still another {143} in the divergency of the aims at which the physical\ntheory of atoms on the one hand and the chemical theory of atoms on the\nother seem to point. Chemistry is inclined to explain the difference of its\nnumerous elements from the original difference of the atoms; and yet it is\nnot at all certain that the elements of chemistry themselves are not\ncomposed of still more simple and less numerous primary elements. Many\nindications seem to point to such primary elements which are more simple in\nnumber and quality, and investigators even mention an element--hydrogen--in\nthe direction of which we have to look for the way that will lead us to\nthose primitive elements of matter. The divergency of aims, finally,\nconsists in the fact that physical atomism prevailingly points to a\nconformity of the atoms of bodies; chemical atomism, on the contrary,--at\nleast, according to its present state,--points to a dissimilarity among\nthese.\n\nThe hypothetical and problematical nature of the theory of atoms strikes us\nstill more clearly when we try to analyze it philosophically. First, we\nmeet that antinomy which we always find where we try to pass beyond the\nlimits of our empirical knowledge by means of conception. For, if the atoms\nstill occupy space, we can not understand why they should not be further\ndivisible, and if they do not occupy space, we can not understand how any\nsum of that which does not occupy space, can finally succeed in filling\nspace. It is true, this very antinomy has led to the overcoming of that\ndualism of force and matter which so long enchained science, and the\novercoming of which we greet as a progress of our theoretical knowledge of\nnature. We no {144} longer look upon the atoms as material elements, but as\ncentres of force. The antinomy has the further merit that, in the realm of\nthe knowledge of nature, it brings to our consciousness the great advantage\nof a concrete perception and reasoning over purely logical abstractions.\nFor Ulrici, in his \"God and Nature,\" is right in calling our attention to\nthe fact that we must think about the atoms, not in an _abstractly_ logical\nand an _abstractly_ mathematical way, but concretely; that we have to\nconsider them, not as mere quantities, but as qualities; and that we can\nthen easily arrive at the perception of something which occupies space, and\nwhich therefore, according to abstract conclusions of logic and\nmathematics, could still be thought of as divisible _in abstracto_, but\nwhich, even as a consequence of its _quality_, of its concrete natural\nform, is no longer divisible in reality. Nevertheless, in spite of all\nthese remarkable attempts at overcoming the difficulties of the theory of\natoms, that antinomy returns as often as we undertake to make that clearly\nperceptible which we have at last gained a partial conception of; and thus\nshows us, from this side also, that even with the theory of atoms we have\narrived at the limit where not only our observation, but also the\npreciseness and certainty of our conceptions, ceases.\n\nBy the atomic theory, we do not gain anything for the ultimate explanation\nof the world and its contents, not even if its present hypothetical value\nshould be changed into a complete demonstration. For the whole theory but\nremoves the question as to the origin of things from their sensible\nappearance to the elements of that appearance, and leaves us standing just\nas helpless before the elements as before the appearances. For {145} whence\ndoes the whole richness of the appearances in the world come? If the atoms\nare all alike, and their laws of force the simplest we can imagine, then\ntheir grouping into all the developments and formations of which we observe\nsuch an infinite and regularly arranged abundance, is not less unexplained\nthan if we had not gone back to the theory of atoms at all. But if the\natoms and their laws of force are different, the difficulty is not\nsimplified, but doubled. For, first, the theory then owes us an answer to\nthe questions wherein the difference of the atoms consists and whence it\ncomes; and, second, the question we have to consider in supposing a\nuniformity of the atoms, is not disposed of or answered--the question,\nnamely, as to the causes which bring these different atoms together to form\nprecisely those complexities of atoms which we observe as the world of\nphenomena.\n\nThis insufficiency of the theory of atoms in explaining the world and its\ncontents, is another proof to us that, however great the practical value of\nthis theory may be for the operations of physics and chemistry, its\ntheoretical value consists essentially in the fact that it formulates more\naccurately the perception of the limits of our exact knowledge. Even the\nidea of Lotze, that the atoms (in themselves different) are not really the\nfinal elements of matter, but consist of still more simple but likewise\ndifferent elements, seems to us more a decoration than an extension of the\nlimits at which our perception has arrived; we stand before a double door,\nbut find both doors locked. We agree with DuBois-Reymond, when he declares,\nin his before-mentioned lecture, the impossibility of perceiving the last\nelements of the {146} world, matter and force, to be the other limit of our\nknowledge of nature which, together with the impossibility of the\nexplanation of the origin of sensation and consciousness, remains forever\nfixed.\n\nLikewise, the peculiar modification which G. Th. Fechner gives to the\ntheory of the last elements of the world, cannot escape the charge of\nleaving the problem of the world scientifically just as unsolved as before.\nFechner not only finds, as we have already mentioned, the difference\nbetween the organic and the inorganic in the difference of the mutual\nmotions, but he also finds that the character of organic motions is exactly\nthe same as that which the bodies of the universe have among themselves in\ntheir motions. Thus he distinguishes the _cosmorganic_ motion, which is\nperformed in the whole of the universe, and the _molecular-organic_ motion,\nwhich we observe in the single organisms of the earth; he makes God the\npersonal, self-conscious soul of this cosmical organism; and, in using the\nlaw of the tendency to stability, with which he completes the Darwinian\nselection theory, asserts that the organic in the whole of the universe, as\nwell as in the narrow sphere of single bodies on the earth, is the first\nthing from which the inorganic was separated and became gradually fixed.\nThus, in his opinion, the problem which up to the present has occupied\ninvestigators,--namely, how did the organic originate from the\ninorganic?--would have to be reversed to, how did the inorganic originate\nfrom the organic?\n\nPreyer would also reach a similar result with his above-mentioned theory of\nthe identity of life and motion. For according to this theory, the living\nwould {147} be as old and common as motion, and the organic but the dregs\nof life.\n\nWe may, therefore, say that, without regard to the fact that neither\npantheism nor theism will ever harmonize with Fechner's solution of this\ncontrast which gives to God exactly the same position in the world as the\nsoul has in the body, natural science will certainly treat with great\nreserve a cosmo-metaphysical system which so fully upsets all results of\nexact investigations into the history of origin and development, and has no\nother proof for itself than the identity, or at least the similarity, of\nthe abstract formula according to which the molecular motions of organisms\nand the cosmical motions are performed. Although we thus have to deny to\nthe proof of this identity or similarity the weight which Fechner gives to\nit, nevertheless it has still no small merit, since it throws new and\nclearer light upon the old thought, always attractive and yet so difficult\nto present,--of a macrocosmus and a microcosmus, which has been often\nenough treated with so much natural mysticism.\n\nThus, in our inquiry into the development of things, we have successively\narrived at four points, each of which urged us to make the confession that\nhere something new came into existence, which can not be explained from the\npreceding conditions of its being; these four points were: the origin of\nself-consciousness, the origin of sensation and consciousness, the origin\nof life, and finally the elements of the universe. Arrived at the last\nproblem, we see the confession of our ignorance increased to the still more\ncomprehensive confession that we are really not able _fully_ to explain\nanything in the world. We are able to perceive a uniformity of law in the\nstates and {148} changes of things, and to abstract therefrom common laws\nof nature; we can observe single objects, and perceive their states and\nchanges in their connection with one another and in their dependence on\nthose laws. But we are not able to explain scientifically either the origin\nof these laws or the last physical causes of the qualities of things, which\nfollow these laws.\n\nWe should reach the same result if we had not started from the objective\nworld of the existing, as we were induced to do by our subject, but from\ntheoretical investigations. Here also we should immediately find ourselves\nin a world of relations between subject and object, of a regularly arranged\nabundance of subjective and objective qualities, states and processes, of\nwhich the objective only come to our knowledge through the medium of the\nsubjective, and of regularly arranged laws to which both the subjective and\nthe objective are commonly subordinate. But why just these and no other\nqualities of the subject and of objects exist, why just these and no other\nlaws reign, why just this and no other relation takes place between the\nperceiving subject and the perceived object, would remain unanswered as\nbefore.\n\nAmidst a generation which is so fond of reveling in the thought of an\nextension of all the limits of our knowledge, and is inclined to proclaim\nas true that which it wishes and hopes, investigators are not wholly\nwanting who very decidedly express their consciousness of these limits of\nour knowledge, and at the same time combine it with the most logical\nscientific reasoning and investigation. Even when in detail they reach\nthese limits from the most varying points of view, and draw {149} them in\ndifferent directions, they all agree in confirming the principle that it is\none of the first and most indispensable conditions of successful\ninvestigation always to be conscious of the limits of its perception.\nVoices which remind mankind of these limits, are perhaps less popular, for\nman prefers to be reminded of the advances rather than of the limitations\nof his knowledge; but they are on that account the more worthy of our\ngratitude, for they keep us on the solid ground of the attainable from\nwhich alone sure progress in knowledge is possible. Among such philosophers\nwe name Ulrici, and especially Lotze; among scientists, in the first place,\ntwo pioneers in their departments--namely, in the department of the\nmechanism of heat, Robert von Mayer--compare his \"Bemerkungen ueber das\nmechanische Aequivalent der Waerme\" (\"Remarks on the Mechanical Equivalent\nof Heat\"), and \"Ueber nothwendige Consequenzen und Inconsequenzen der\nWaermemechanik\" (\"Necessary Consequences and Inconsequences of the Mechanism\nof Heat\"), Stuttgart, Cotta;--and in the realm of the development of\norganisms, K. E. von Baer--compare his \"Reden und kleinere Aufsaetze\"\n(\"Addresses and Essays\"), 2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1864 and 1876. In this\nconnection we have already mentioned the name of DuBois-Reymond. Otto\nKoestlin published two remarkable dissertations in this direction--\"Ueber\ndie Grenzen der Naturwissenschaft\" (\"Limits of Natural Science\"), Tuebingen,\nFues, 2d ed., 1874, and \"Ueber natuerliche Entwicklung\" (\"Natural\nDevelopment\"), ib., 1875. In the latter he especially cautions against\nhastily confounding the laws of development of planets, development of the\norganic kingdom, and development {150} of the individual organisms.\nRecently, Wigand, in the second volume of his work already frequently\nmentioned, attempts, with an extreme energy which does too little justice\nto the representation and investigation of the still unsolved problems, to\nformulate the limits of the knowable.\n\nA contrary extreme, and of its kind a still more one-sided corrective of\nthis too great stability, we have in those investigators who, by reason of\nthe great progress which has been made in the realm of the theoretical\nknowledge of nature, allow themselves to be drawn on to the hope of still\nexplaining all states and processes in the world--the spiritual and the\nethic processes as well as the physical--from the pure mechanism of atoms;\nand who see in that which thus far has been mechanically explained, the\nonly and the infallible way of explaining all that is still obscure. They\ncall this view the _mechanical view of the world_; and, as \"monism,\" put it\nin opposition to the \"vitalistic, teleological, and dualistic view of the\nworld.\" In order to obtain a correct view of this standpoint, we quote from\nHaeckel's \"Natural History of Creation\", Vol. I, page 23, the following\npassage: \"By the theory of descent we are for the first time enabled to\nconceive of the unity of nature in such a manner that a mechanico-causal\nexplanation of even the most intricate organic phenomena, for example, the\norigin and structure of the organs of sense, is no more difficult (in a\ngeneral way) than is the mechanical explanation of any physical process;\nas, for example, earthquakes, the courses of the wind, or the currents of\nthe ocean. We thus arrive at the extremely important conviction that _all\nnatural bodies_ which are known to us are _equally {151} animated_, that\nthe distinction which has been made between animate and inanimate bodies\ndoes _not_ exist. When a stone is thrown into the air, and falls to earth\naccording to definite laws, or when in a solution of salt a crystal is\nformed, the phenomenon is neither more nor less a mechanical manifestation\nof life than the growth and flowering of plants, than the propagation of\nanimals or the activity of their senses, than the perception or the\nformation of thought in man.\" Here crystallization, organic life,\nsensation, and formation of thought, are expressly put in one line of\nmechanism with the falling of a stone.\n\nIn the following section we will have occasion to discuss this view as a\n_view of the world_; but we believe that the presentation of this idea, and\nthe exclusive vindication of it as a complete view of the world, needs just\nhere, where we still stand on the ground of the philosophy of natural\nperception, some critical sifting.\n\nIn the realm of material nature, _mechanical_ explanation and general\nexplanation is directly identical; _i.e._, a process of nature remains\nobscure so long and so far as its mechanism is not yet perceived, and in\nthe same degree as its mechanism is perceived, the process also is\nexplained. The uniformity of law in the occurrence of events according to\nthe causal principle in the realm of material nature, can be approached by\nus in no other form than in that of mechanism, provided we understand by\nmechanism an activity according to law and which can be mathematically\nestimated as to size and number. So far, therefore, every scientific\ninvestigator in the knowledge of material nature takes his place on the\nstandpoint of a mechanical view of the world. {152}\n\nBut here we have gone to the full extent to which we are justified in\ntaking a mechanical view of the world, and have fixed its limits in its own\nproper realm--the realm of the scientific perception of the material world;\neven if we do not join with Wigand in resigning scientific inquiry in that\ndirection, and express the expectation that these limits are not fixed and\nnot to be designated in advance, but will be moved farther and farther, and\nthat not only in regard to the knowledge of the quantity of phenomena\n(which even Wigand, as a scientific investigator, naturally admits), but\nalso in regard to their quality. In our researches hitherto we have often\nmet such limits. We have found that in the realm of the material world such\nimportant phenomena and processes as life are at present not yet fully\nexplained. By the mechanical view of the world, we have been led back to\nthe last elements and to the most elementary forces of matter, but have\nbeen convinced that we are no longer able to find them with scientific\ncertainty, and that consequently not a single quality of material existence\nis really explained and traced back to its last material causes, to say\nnothing of the transcendental causes which are entirely inaccessible to our\nexact scientific knowledge.\n\nNow there is another realm of existence, just as large as and, according to\nits value, still larger than, that of the material world, which, not on\naccount of its scientific inaccessibility, but in conformity with its own\npeculiar nature, entirely withdraws itself from the mechanical view. It is\nthe realm of _psychical life_; and, still more decidedly and more\nevidently, the _realm of mind_. As far as our observations go, the law of\n{153} causality reigns here also, and here also nothing takes place without\na cause. But as here the _realm_ in which the causal law reigns is no\nlonger material nature, so even the _form_ in which it is active is no\nlonger that of mechanism. For we certainly cannot understand mechanical\neffect to be anything else than an effect of something material upon\nsomething material, whose uniformity of law can be exactly estimated\nmathematically as to size and number. Now if the application of mechanism\nto the psychical and spiritual realm does not express anything except the\ncertainly quite insidious idea that here also causality reigns, it is\nnothing else but the substitution of another idea for the word\nmechanism--an idea which it never had in the entire use of language up to\nthis time, and by the substitution of which the proof for a mechanism of\nthe mind is not given, but surreptitiously obtained in a manner similar to\nthe before-mentioned attempt of Preyer, surreptitiously to obtain the proof\nfor the origin of life.\n\nBut if the mechanical explanation of the functions of the mind really means\nthat they also consist in an effect of the material upon something\nmaterial, and that this effect can be mathematically estimated as to size\nand number, it is an assertion which has first to be proven, but which\ncannot be proven and cannot be allowed even as an hypothesis, as a problem\nfor investigation, because it contradicts our whole experience. And it\ncontradicts not only the conclusions drawn from most natural appearances,\nwhich, as is well known, are deceitful and even tell us that the sun goes\naround the earth, but it contradicts the philosophical analysis just as\nmuch and even still more directly and decidedly than {154} the direct\nimpression--as became clear to us at the lowest point of contact between\nthe material and the psychical, viz., at sensation, when we showed the\nimpossibility of scientifically explaining the origin of sensation.\n\nIt is easy to see what facts made it altogether possible to produce such a\nmaterialistic psychology and to give it at the first superficial view a\ncertain appearance of truth; but it will not be difficult to detect its\nwant of truth. According to our whole experience, the human mind is bound\nto the body; its proper activity, its whole communication with the material\nand immaterial world outside of it, even its whole mutual intercourse with\nthe minds of fellow-beings, is performed by means of bodily functions\nwhich, as such, are subordinate to mechanism. Therefore \"physiological\npsychology\" certainly belongs to the most interesting of the branches of\nscience which at present enjoy special care, and works in this realm, like\nthose of Wundt, are worthy of the greatest attention. Now if these points\nof contact once exist between the material and the psychical and spiritual\nprocesses, so that material functions causally influence psychical and\nspiritual ones, and psychical and spiritual functions similarly influence\nmaterial ones, there must also exist between the laws of material processes\nand those of psychical and spiritual functions a relation which makes\npossible such a mutual effect, and we must be able to abstract from it the\nexistence of a common higher law of which on the one side the material\nlaws, and on the other the psychical and spiritual, are but partial laws.\nPrecisely here lie the indications which appear to favor materialism in\npsychology. But it is only an appearance. For, from the acknowledgment\n{155} and scientific investigation of a reciprocal action, to an\nidentification of the two factors which act upon one another, is still an\ninfinite step. If science is not even able to identify material motion and\nsensation, still less can it identify material motion and the spiritual and\nethic activities. When this is done, it is done only in consequence of the\nsame confounding of condition and cause which we had to expose on the\noccasion of the assertion of the possibility of explaining the origin of\nlife or of sensation, and of consciousness or of self-consciousness. But we\nhere also willingly admit that the realm in which causality reigns in the\nform of mechanism, aims at being the support, foundation, and instrument of\nanother realm where causality still reigns, but mechanism ceases. How far\ninvestigation may still proceed in the direction of those interesting\npoints and lines where both realms touch one another in causal reciprocal\naction, we do not know. We are hardly able to indicate the direction in\nwhich the investigation must proceed, and this direction seems to be\nassigned to it by the idea of _Ausloesung_.[8] The idea of _Ausloesung_,\nwhich plays such an {156} important _role_ in physics, seems to be still\nfruitful for the knowledge of psycho-physical life: bodily functions _loesen\naus_ spiritual ones, spiritual functions bodily ones. But so much the more\nclearly does this theory show the limits of mechanism: mechanism reigns in\nthe world of bodies from the _Ausloesungen_ and to the _Ausloesungen_, with\nwhich the mind induces the body to activity, and the body the mind; beyond\nthese limits causality still reigns, but no longer mechanism.\n\nNow if thus the mechanical view of the world has within its own most proper\nrealm--the realm of material phenomena--its limits, even if they are\ncapable of being moved farther; and if it is without any scientific\nacceptance in the realm of soul and mind: its usurpations reach the highest\npossible degree when it pretends to {157} explain the last causes of\nthings. For from its very nature it follows that it is only able to explain\nthe reciprocal action of material things among themselves, when these\nthings in their finalities, or the causes of their qualities and\nconditions, are already present, and the laws which they follow are already\nactive. As to the origin of those qualities or their causes, and of these\nlaws, this view leaves us entirely in the dark.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {158}\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nMETAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE DARWINIAN THEORIES.\n\nSec. 1. _Elimination of the Idea of Design in the World.--Monism._\n\nFrom this mechanical view of the world, quite a peculiar conclusion has\nbeen recently drawn--not by Darwin, who does not give any opinion at all\nabout the mechanical view of the world, as such, or about its extension and\ninfluence, nor, indeed, by Darwinians, not even by all followers of a\nmechanical view of the world, but only by a part of them; namely, by those\nwho have in a high degree attracted to themselves the attention of reading\npeople. This conclusion is nothing less than the _elimination of the idea\nof design in nature_. This phenomenon demands our attention. Heretofore,\nthe proof of plan, design, and end in nature, at large and in detail, was\nlooked upon as the most beautiful blossom and fruit of a thoughtful\ncontemplation of nature; it was the great and beautiful common property, in\nthe enjoyment of which the direct, the scientific, and the religious\ncontemplation of nature peacefully participated. Now this view is to be\ngiven up forever, in consequence of nothing else than Darwin's selection\ntheory. With an energy--we may say with a passionateness and confidence of\nvictory--such as we were accustomed to see only in the most advanced\nadvocates of materialism, Ludwig {159} Buechner, D. F. Strauss, Haeckel,\nOskar Schmidt, Helmholtz, the editor of the \"Ausland\" and some of his\nassociates, and our often-mentioned \"Anonymus,\"--in a common attack, assail\nevery idea of a _conformity to an end_ in nature, every idea of a goal\ntoward which the development at large and individually strives; in a word,\nthe whole category of _teleology_.[9]\n\nIn order to be just in our judgment, we shall have to let the advocates of\nthis view speak for themselves;--the advocates of _Dysteleology_, as\nHaeckel, who is so extremely productive in forming new exotic words, calls\nit; or of _Aposkopiology_, as Ebrard, in his \"Apologetik\" (\"Apologetics\"),\ncorrecting the etymology, {160} somewhat pedantically calls it; or of\n_Teleophoby_, as it is called by K. E. von Baer, in humorous irony.\n\nThe anonymous author of the book called \"The Unconscious from the\nStandpoint of Physiology and Descent Theory\", asserts that, while the\ndescent theory but puts the teleological principle in question by\nwithdrawing the ground for a positive proof--an assertion which we\ncertainly have to reject most decidedly (compare Part II, Book II, Chap. I,\nSec. 2-Sec. 6)--the selection theory directly rejects it. Natural selection, he\nsays, solves the seemingly unsolvable problem of explaining the conformity\nto the end in view, as result, without taking it as an aiding principle.\nAnd Helmholtz says: \"Darwin's theory shows how conformity to the end in the\nformation of organisms can also originate without any intermingling of an\nintelligence by the blind administration of a law of nature.\"\n\nHaeckel really revels in these ideas. He says (Nat. Hist. of Creat., Vol. I,\np. 19): \"These optimistic views [of the much-talked-of purposiveness of\nnature or of the much-talked-of beneficence of the Creator] have,\nunfortunately, as little real foundation as the favorite phrase, 'the moral\norder of the universe,' which is illustrated in an ironical way by the\nhistory of all nations.... If we contemplate the common life and the mutual\nrelations between plants and animals (man included), we shall find\neverywhere, and at all times, the very opposite of that kindly and peaceful\nsocial life which the goodness of the Creator ought to have prepared for\nhis creatures--we shall rather find everywhere a pitiless, most embittered\n_Struggle of All against All_. Nowhere in nature, no matter where we turn\nour eyes, does that {161} idyllic peace, celebrated by the poets, exist; we\nfind everywhere a struggle and a striving to annihilate neighbors and\ncompetitors. Passion and selfishness--conscious or unconscious--is\neverywhere the motive force of life.... Man in this respect certainly forms\nno exception to the rest of the animal world.\" And on page 33: \"In the\nusual dualistic or teleological (vital) conception of the universe, organic\nnature is regarded as the purposely executed production of a Creator\nworking according to a definite plan. Its adherents see in every individual\nspecies of animal and plant an 'embodied creative thought,' the material\nexpression of a _definite first cause_ (causa finalis), acting for a set\npurpose. They must necessarily assume supernatural (not mechanical)\nprocesses of the origin of organisms.... On the other hand, the theory of\ndevelopment carried out by Darwin, must, if carried out logically, lead to\nthe monistic or mechanical (causal) conception of the universe. In\nopposition to the dualistic or teleological conception of nature, our\ntheory considers organic as well as inorganic bodies to be the necessary\nproducts of natural forces. It does not see in every individual species of\nanimal and plant the embodied thought of a personal Creator, but the\nexpression for the time being of a mechanical process of development of\nmatter, the expression of a necessarily active cause, that is, of a\nmechanical cause (causa efficiens). Where teleological Dualism seeks the\narbitrary thoughts of a capricious Creator in miracles of creation, causal\nMonism finds in the process of development the necessary effects of eternal\nimmutable laws of nature.\" Haeckel's \"Anthropogeny\" also is replete with\nattacks upon a teleological {162} view of nature, which leave nothing\nwanting in distinctness and coarseness. On page 111, Vol. I, we read: \"The\nrudimentary organs clearly prove that the mechanical, or monistic\nconception of the nature of organisms is alone correct, and that the\nprevailing teleological, or dualistic method of accounting for them is\nentirely false. The very ancient fable of the all-wise plan according to\nwhich 'the Creator's hand has ordained all things with wisdom and\nunderstanding,' the empty phrase about the purposive 'plan of structure' of\norganisms is in this way completely disproved. Stronger arguments can\nhardly be furnished against the customary teleology, or Doctrine of Design,\nthan the fact that all more highly developed organisms possess such\nrudimentary organs.\" (Compare also Vol. II, p. 439: \"The rudimentary organs\nare among the most overwhelming proofs against the prevailing teleological\nideas of creation.\") According to his opinion (Vol. I. p. 245), comparative\nanatomy may no longer look for a \"pre-arranged plan of construction by the\nCreator.\" Besides, he calls it an anthropocentric error to look upon man as\na preconceived aim of creation and a true final purpose of terrestrial\nlife; and on page 17, of Vol. II, he supports this judgment by comparing\nthe relative shortness of the existence of mankind with the length of the\npreceding geological periods: \"Since the awakening of the human\nconsciousness, human vanity and human arrogance have delighted in regarding\nMan as the real main-purpose and end of all earthly life, and as the centre\nof terrestrial Nature, for whose use and service all the activities of the\nrest of creation were from the first defined or predestined by a 'wise\nprovidence.' How utterly baseless these {163} presumptuous anthropocentric\nconceptions are, nothing could evince more strikingly than a comparison of\nthe duration of the Anthropozoic or Quaternary Epoch with that of the\npreceding Epochs.\" And on page 234, Vol. II: \"Hence it is that, in\naccordance with the received teleological view, it has been customary to\nadmire the so-called 'wisdom of the Creator' and the 'purposive\ncontrivances of His Creation' especially in this matter. But on more mature\nconsideration it will be observed that the Creator, according to this\nconception, does after all but play the part of an ingenious mechanic or of\na skillful watchmaker; just, indeed, as all these cherished teleological\nconceptions of the Creator and His Creation are based on childish\nanthropomorphism.... But it is exactly on this point that the history of\nevolution proves most clearly that this received conception is radically\nfalse. The history of evolution convinces us that the highly purposive and\nadmirably constituted sense organs, like all other organs, have developed\n_without premeditated aim_.\"\n\nStrauss, in his \"The Old Faith and the New,\" gives to this idea its\nphilosophic and universalistic finish. In Sec. 67-Sec. 70, he eliminates not only\nthe idea of design in individual cases, but also the idea of a design in\nthe world as a whole; allows us to speak of design in the world only in a\nsubjective sense, so far as we understand it to be what we think we\nperceive as the common final aim of the concert of the powers, active in\nthe world; and finds, when in such a sense it is spoken of as design in the\nworld, that the universe reaches its end in every instance. Only the parts\ndevelop themselves, driven by the mechanical laws of causality, and after\nhaving lived {164} their period of life, sink back again into the universe,\nin order to make place for new developments and to prepare them in their\nturn.\n\nFor the view of the world which the antagonists of teleology construct out\nof this \"mechanical\" and \"causal\" view, they, as we have repeatedly seen,\nhave invented the name \"_monism_.\" In contrast to all dualism in reasoning\nabout the relation of body and soul, God and universe, time and eternity,\nand especially in contrast to the dualism with which the theistic view of\nthe world is said to be loaded, monism claims that what was formerly\ndivided into God and universe, force and matter, matter and spirit, body\nand soul, is but one; and it thus exhibits a reconciliation, a higher\nunity, of materialism and idealism, of pantheism and atheism, which unity\nin the scientific and the practical ethic realm has no antagonist to fight\nmore energetically, and none which it is better able to fight successfully,\nthan _dualism_, which the monistic view of the world, by a queer mistake as\nto the theistic position of God in nature, especially considers the whole\ntheistic view of the world.\n\nThe scientific antagonists of teleology show such a scientific intolerance\nagainst their own associates, that one of the latest exhibitors of\nDarwinism, Oskar Schmidt, in his \"Theory of Descent and Darwinism,\" bluntly\nclasses one of the greatest and most deserving investigators in the realm\nof comparative anatomy and palaeontology, Richard Owen, of London, with the\n\"'Halves' who, fearing the conclusions, with one word come to terms with\nthe scientific conscience.\" And why?--because Owen still sees ends in\nnature, and by his inclination to the acceptance of a descent, does not\nallow himself to {165} be prevented from giving adhesion to a teleological\nview of the world. And this invention of monism is proclaimed to the world\nin such a full consciousness of its great importance in the history of\nculture, that Haeckel closes his \"Nat. Hist. of Creat.\" with the following\nwords: \"Future centuries will celebrate our age, which was occupied with\nlaying the foundations of the Doctrine of Descent, as the new era in which\nbegan a period of human development, rich in blessings,--a period which was\ncharacterized by the victory of free inquiry over the despotism of\nauthority, and by the powerful ennobling influence of the Monistic\nPhilosophy.\" At the end of the lecture, next to the last, in the same Vol.\nII, page 332, he pays the following compliment to the antagonists of\nmonism: \"The recognition of the theory of development and the Monistic\nPhilosophy based upon it, forms the best criterion for the degree of man's\nmental development.\" In his \"Generic Morphology,\" and in the first edition\nof his \"Nat. Hist. of Creat.,\" he, in a geological scala, which closes with\nthe human period, even divides the whole past, present, and future history\nof mankind into two halves: first part, dualistic period of culture; second\npart, monistic period of culture. Still, we will not omit to mention, with\ncredit, that this anticipatory historiography has discreetly disappeared\nfrom the geological scala of the following editions of his \"Natural History\nof Creation.\"\n\nAs to the further scientific consequences to which this anti-teleological\nmonism leads, the advocates of it are in tolerable accord; although they\nare subject to the most incomprehensible illusions regarding the practical\nconsequences of it, as we have seen in the above-quoted {166} concluding\nwords of Haeckel's \"Natural History of Creation.\" As to the scientific\nconsequences, they express themselves plainly enough: the belief in a\nliving Creator and Lord of the world no longer find any place; everything,\neven all the rich treasures of human life and history, become a result of\nblindly acting forces; the history of the world, ethics, and all spiritual\nsciences, are in the progress of perception dissolved into physiology, and\nphysiology into chemistry, physics and mechanism. In his \"Natural History\nof Creation,\" Vol. I, page 170, Haeckel frankly calls the whole history of\nthe world a physico-chemical process.\n\nWhoever refers to a view of another person, is in duty bound to enter into\nthat view, if possible objectively, even if he does not agree with it. The\nauthor of this book tries to comply with this obligation in all his\nrepresentations, but must confess that in regard to the just described view\nof the world, he does not succeed in making it conceivable to himself in a\nmanner to be justified even from a relatively scientific standpoint; a want\nfor which, it is true, we have beforehand the explanatory cause in the\nquotation from Haeckel's \"Natural History of Creation,\" Vol. II, p. 332,\ngiven above.\n\nPerhaps it appears relatively conceivable, when it is asserted that the\nobservation of an order, a connection, a development, a plan, in the world,\nleads to the perception of such a quality of the laws, primitive elements,\nand forces of the world, that something like it _had to_ result from them;\nbut that it does not lead to the acknowledgment of a personal author of the\nworld. We call such a view relatively conceivable, not because we agree\nwith it--for we find a logic which, in {167} contemplating the universe,\nstarts from an intelligent author of the world, infinitely less surrounded\nby difficulties than one contrary to it--but because the acknowledgment or\ndenial of a living God is in the last instance not the result of any\nscientific investigation or logical chain of reasoning, but the moral act\nof the morally and religiously inclined individual, and because, if the\nindividual has once refused the strongest factor of faith in God,--namely,\nhis self-testimony in the conscience,--it is no longer impossible for the\nindividual to ignore his other testimonies as such, or to declare them\ndeficient. Now we certainly can say that we see order and many results in\nthe world, which are conformable to the object in view, and in consequence\nof this observation must admit that no imaginable quality of primitive\nbeginnings, elements, and forces of the world had caused this result, but\nthat this result must have already been in the plan. But there certainly\nare imaginable, _in abstracto_, infinitely many possibilities of other\nelements and primitive beginnings of the world,--perhaps of some whose\nresult would have been but an eternal chaos, or of others whose result\nwould have been but an eternal rigidness, or of still others whose result\nwould also have been a certain order and variety of phenomena and\nprocesses, but less beautiful than that of the really existing world. Thus,\nthen, this world now exists as a _special chance_ of infinitely many\nchances; and who knows whether, in the course of thousands of millions of\nterrestrial years in the struggle for existence, it did not obtain its\nexistence among infinitely many possibilities of worlds through a natural\nworld-selection, and thus, by the result of its existence, fully legitimate\nits conformity to {168} the end in view? With this deduction, we do not\nmake, as it may seem, an awkward attempt at rendering the whole standpoint\nridiculous by a wild phantasy; but we quote it from a celebrated and\notherwise very meritorious book, namely the \"Geschichte des Materialismus\"\n(\"History of Materialism\"), by the too early deceased Friedrich Albert\nLange. The reader will find it, in the second part, page 275, simply a\nlittle shorter and, as it seems to us, less clear, but as the only \"correct\nteleology\" which Lange professes. This whole view, like all world-theories\nand cosmogonies of pantheism, naturalism, or atheism, and even like the\nlatest of Eduard von Hartmann, is to us but a proof that the rejection of\nthe reality of a living Creator and Lord of the world requires of its\nadvocates mysteries and mysticisms of atheism compared to which the\ngreatest difficulties of the Christian view of the world are but the merest\ntrifles.\n\nTherefore, if that first and second step in the rejection of the highest\nintelligence and omnipotence as the final cause of the world, are once\nmade, it is easy for us to comprehend still other supports which this view\nof the world draws to itself. However large the number of things in the\nworld for whose existence we can give a reason, or of which we can show\nthat that, which preceded, aimed at their appearance, still the number of\nthose to which we can not ascribe aim and design is just as large. There\nare even phenomena enough which in their main effects appear to us directly\nirrational; as, for instance, those which operate destructively,--all the\ntortures which animals inflict on one another, etc. Besides, we can also\nfind imperfections in the degree of the {169} conformity to the end in view\nin all those phenomena which appear to us as properly planned; for\ninstance, the organic appears to us higher than the inorganic, and yet it\nis in its existence not only dependent on the inorganic, but is often\ndestroyed prematurely by it. Of course, all these limits and barriers of\nour teleological perception are abundantly used by all antagonists of a\nteleological view of the world for the basis of their position.\nFurthermore, the way and manner in which man fixes his ends and reaches\nthem, is essentially different from the way and manner in which nature\nacts. Man seeks to attain his ends with less expenditure of power and\nmeans, the more he acts conformably to the end in view; while nature, it\noften enough appears to us, when we have reason to imagine an effect of its\nprocesses also as the probable end of them, reaches this end only by an\nimmense squandering of means--for instance, the preservation of organic\nspecies simply by the production of thousands of germs and eggs, most of\nwhich perish, and but very few of which are developed, and still less are\ntransmitted. This is a difference to which Lange points, in order to reject\na theory which recognizes a striving toward an end (Zielstrebigkeit) in\nnature, or at most to allow it a little place as the lowest form of\nteleology, and to reject every attempt to regard it as analogous to human\nstriving toward an end, as _anthropomorphism_. Nature, he says, acts, as if\na man, in order to shoot a hare, should in a large field discharge millions\nof guns in all possible directions; as if he, in order to get into a locked\nroom, should buy ten thousand different keys and try them all; as if, in\norder to have a house, he should build up a town and {170} leave the\nsuperfluous houses to wind and weather. Nobody should call such actions\nconformable to an end in view, and still less should we suppose behind this\naction any higher wisdom, hidden reasons, or superior sagacity. It is true,\nWigand is right in replying to this, that when we observe such things in\nnature, we have to draw the conclusion that the very end supposed by the\nobserving man--in this case, the preservation of the species--is not the\nonly end, but that it has other ends besides; as, for instance, richness of\nlife, inexhaustible abundance, preservation of other organisms, etc.\nBesides, this is but a single side of the comparison between the action of\nman and that of nature; and from this side action of man, conformable to an\nend in view, appears as a higher form of teleology, that of nature as a\nlower. But there are other sides of comparison, which just as clearly\nstrike the eye; nature builds from within in full sovereignty of its\nprocess over matter and form. Man approaches his materials from without;\nnature works with never-erring certainty (Haeckel's latest theory, that\nnature _falsifies_ its laws and processes, can surely not be meant in\nearnest!); man often enough with error, false calculation, awkwardness,\nfailure and capricious arbitrariness. In these directions, teleology of\nnature is infinitely superior to that of man.\n\nWe must be very careful in using anthropomorphism as a term of reproach. It\nmay be used as a reproach in warning against careless reasoning and hasty\ncomparison, but the idea of anthropomorphism is so extensible that it can\nbe extended over all human reasoning and conception. Are not the reasons on\naccount of which the so-called anthropomorphism is to be rejected, often\n{171} enough just as anthropomorphistic as the ideas which are attacked?\nFor instance, when the idea of the personality of God is attacked as an\nanthropomorphistic one, are not the reasons with which it is assailed\nexactly as anthropomorphistic as the conceptions which are to be assailed?\nDo we not derive all our reasoning, logic, our views, and in fact\neverything, at first from our human nature, and do we not in our most\nabstract reasoning always operate simply with the laws, as they inhere in\nour human nature? Is there even a single scientific description conceivable\nwithout its being full of anthropomorphisms? Even the works of Darwin\nwhich, according to the opinion of these opponents of anthropomorphism,\ndestroy anthropomorphism and teleology, are the most striking proof in\nfavor of it. The discovery of the general reign of the law of causality\ninvalidates, as they say, the reign of the category of teleology; for the\none category contradicts the other. Suppose it were so (we will, however,\nimmediately see that the contrary is true) whence do we know that the\ncategory of causality has the preference over that of finality or\nteleology? The one, as well as the other, is anthropomorphistic, and is an\nundoubtedly necessary form of our human reasoning. We _believe_ in their\nobjective validity, because we cannot believe that the sum of existences\nand the relations between the perceiving subject and the perceived object\naim at deceiving man; we do not want to be robbed of either the one or the\nother category; but if the question is as to the preference of the one\ncategory over the other (which we contest), who knows whether the category\nof finality has not more reasons for its superiority than causality?\nCompare, in reference {172} to this whole question, also the clear analyses\nin the second volume of the work of Wigand, and the instructive lecture of\nthe Duke of Argyll upon anthropomorphism in theology.\n\nNevertheless, all the points against teleology thus far quoted can be\nunderstood by us as attempts at rejecting the _necessity_ of acknowledging\na teleologically acting principle of the world--or, to express ourselves\nmore clearly, of a living God--after having once rejected the deepest\nmotive for this acknowledgment, namely: the self-testimony of God in the\nhuman conscience and mind. But it is one thing to declare that we are not\nobliged to accept a certain conclusion, and quite another to declare that\nwe are obliged to accept directly the opposite of such a conclusion. It is\none thing to declare that the phenomena in the world do not yet oblige us\nto suppose an author with a preconceived plan, and still another to declare\nthat because I have found or still hope to find the causal connexion of\nphenomena conformable to the end in view, no author with a preconceived\nplan exists. This last assertion is one which the author of this work\nconfesses not to understand, and in whose conclusion he cannot agree.\nKnowledge of the _origin_ of something certainly does not exclude the\nquestion _wherefore_ it exists, and does not even take its place, and when\nI have answered both questions satisfactorily, then I may and must justly\nask whether both that for which something exists and that by which\nsomething exists, is intended or not, whether that which in the language of\ncausality I call cause and effect, also belongs to the category of\nfinality, according to which that very cause is at the same time called\nmeans, and that very effect also design. {173} The one way of viewing\npostulates the other as its necessary completion; and the teleological\npoint of view is so little an impediment for the causal, that we are much\nmore fully convinced scientifically of the correctness of the teleological\nway of viewing, when first the causal chain of causes and effects lies\nplain before our perception without any wanting links.\n\nWe still have to mention two monstrosities which, as it seems to us,\nnecessarily result from the rejection of teleology, although the opponents\nof teleology contest the fact.\n\nThe one is the reduction to _chance_ of all single formations in the world.\nIt is true, necessity reigns in laws and their effect; but if the degree\nand the sum of all qualities in the world are not based the one upon the\nother, if especially the single organizations originate by the way of\nnatural selection, every coincidence of each single causal chain in the\nworld with any other causal chain is something accidental for the one as\nwell as for the other. Now, an explanation of that in the world which is\nconformable to the end in view, by chance, is a scientifically illogical\nidea. An accidental coincidence of many circumstances can in a single case\nproduce something which is conformable to an end in view; but the\nprobability that the formation conformable to the end in view is again\nnullified by the next throw of the dice of chance, is so great, and with\nevery following throw grows so decidedly in geometrical progression, that\nthis probability after a few terms becomes a certainty, and we can directly\ndemonstrate mathematically that the world without a teleological plan would\nbe and remain a chaos. As we have seen, even Lange finds himself obliged to\n{174} admit this plan, with the exception that he makes this plan itself\nchance--special chance among infinitely many possibilities.\n\nThe other consequence of that elimination of the idea of design is that it\nforbids every difference between _higher_ and _lower_, and changes\neverything into an indifferent and equivalent continual stream of coming\nand going. For the whole idea of higher and lower belongs to the category\nof teleology. If the new which originates is _but_ a product of that which\nwas already in existence, and if the latter does not aim at the production\nof the new, then the new is equivalent to the preceding; and it is but an\nillusion of man, preconceiving an end, when in the products of nature he\ndiscriminates between higher and lower. A beginning of the acknowledgment\nof this consequence is made, when Haeckel, in his Anthropogeny, so violently\nattacks the idea that man is end and design of the terrestrial creation.\nBut generally the antagonists of teleology are guilty of the inconsequence\nwhich, although from the principles of their system to be rejected, is\nindelibly impressed on our thinking mind and especially on our moral\nconsciousness, that they still discriminate between higher and lower, and\nparticularly that they willingly assign to the moral disposition and\ndemand, and to the morally planned individual, the priority among\nexistences. This fact is pronounced in a very striking way in the\nconcessions of Strauss, which we have quoted on page 126, according to\nwhich nature, where it can no longer go beyond itself, wishes to go into\nitself, and in man has wished to go not only upwards but even beyond\nitself.\n\nTherefore, not only theology, but also philosophy, {175} and even natural\nscience, in their most prominent advocates, have in a uniform chorus\nprotested against this destruction of the idea of design. That it was\nunanimously done on the part of _theology_, is quite natural, and needs no\nfurther proofs. When we, nevertheless, mention expressly a single essay on\nthese questions, it is done on account of the fact that in its energetic\ndefense of the teleological point of view it is especially effective by\nfrankly and impartially admitting the strongest positions of the opponent's\nstandpoint--a thing which rarely happens on the part of theologians. It is\nthe essay of Julius Koestlin \"Ueber die Beweise fuer das Dasein Gottes\"\n(\"Proofs of the Existence of God\"), in the \"Theologische Studien und\nKritiken,\" 1875, IV and 1876, I; especially 1876, I, p. 42 ff. On the part\nof philosophy, we have to mention Ulrici, Fichte, Huber and Frohschammer,\nwho have rejected the attack against teleology with inflexible criticism.\nEven Friedrich Vischer in the sixth part of his \"Kritische Gaenge\"\n(\"Critical Walks\"), has forcibly maintained the right of teleology,\nespecially of its highest revelation, the moral order of the world--in\ncontrast to his friend D. F. Strauss, whose \"The Old Faith and the New\" he\ncriticises; but it is true, in consequence of his pantheism, he reaches the\nwholly imaginary conclusion of supposing a moral order of the world without\na regulator. And, to be able to make the systematized order and beauty of\nnature conceivable to himself without a Creator, to be able to make\nconceivable to himself a design in nature, an ideal, according to which\nnature works as an unconscious artist, he gives to philosophy the certainly\nunsolvable problem of finding the idea of {176} timeless time, to which the\n\"afterward\" can just as well be a \"beforehand\"; he prefers to do this\nrather than to find the equally clear and deep solution of that\nteleological difficulty in the simple idea of a Creator, who, as such, also\nstands above time. One of the most remarkable philosophic testimonies for\nthe right of teleology is the philosophic system of Eduard von Hartmann\nwho, although he calls his absolute the unconscious, ascribes to it an\nunconscious intelligence and an unconscious will, and makes the observation\nand acknowledgment of designs and ends, which he sees in the whole realm of\nthe world of phenomena, an essential part of his entire system. All\nattempts of this kind, as those of Vischer and Hartmann, fully and\ncorrectly to understand the language of facts on the one side and to reject\non the other the necessary conclusion to which it leads--namely, the\nacknowledgment of a creative intelligence _above_ the facts, and having an\nend in view--only increase in like manner as the above-quoted cosmogonic\nidea of Lange by the monstrosities of reasoning to which they lead, the\npower of demonstration for that which they undertake to contest. Natural\nscientists, finally, even Darwinians, have not only in _casual_ utterances\noften spoken a weighty word in favor of teleology--as, for instance, those\nwho, like Oswald Heer, Koelliker, Baumgaertner, believe in a metamorphosis of\ngerms, but also men who are quite favorable to the idea of an origin of the\nspecies through descent--as, for instance, Richard Owen, at the end of his\n\"Comparative Anatomy of the Vertebrates,\" separately published as\n\"Derivative Hypothesis of Life and Species\"; Alexander Braun, in his\nlecture \"Ueber die Bedeutung der Entwicklung in der Naturgeschichte\" {177}\n(\"On the Importance of Development in Nature\"), Berlin, 1872; A. W.\nVolkmann \"Ueber die Entwicklung der Organismen\" (\"On the Development of\nOrganisms\"), Halle, 1875; Schaaffhausen, in his opening address to the\nWiesbaden Anthr. Versammlung, Braunschweig, 1874, and others; but they have\nalso given to teleology entire treatises. Besides a more popular treatise\nof the astronomer Maedler in \"Westermann's Monatshefte,\" October, 1872,\nthere belong to them the frequently mentioned work of Wigand, and\nespecially three essays of great importance from the pen of a man who in\nquestions of development and its extent has among all contemporaries the\nfirst right to speak, namely, Karl Ernst von Baer. They are the essays on\nthe conformity to the end in view in general, on the conformity to the end\nin view in organic bodies, and on Darwin's doctrine, published together\nwith two other essays in the already mentioned \"Studien aus dem Gebiete der\nNaturwissenschaften,\" (Reden und Kleinere Aufsaetze, 2ter Theil),\nPetersburg, 1876. Nay, even the two founders of Darwinism, Darwin himself\nand A. R. Wallace, as we shall see in defining their position in reference\nto religion, express themselves decidedly teleologically; this is\nespecially true of Wallace, and likewise of their active and able second,\nHuxley. Only a single utterance of Darwin in a later publication seems to\ntake a sceptical position in regard to teleology; compare below Part\nSecond, Book I, Chapt. III, Sec. 1.\n\nFinally, we have to say a word concerning the _name_ which the\nanti-teleological view of the world gives to itself: the name \"_monism_.\"\nThe view of the world which monism gives us, seems hardly comprehensible;\nand {178} just as little does the name which it gives itself, seem\njustifiable.\n\nIf this name is to indicate only a maxim of _investigation_--the directive\nwhich scientific investigation has to take, in order to reach more general\npoints of view--we could declare ourselves in full accord with it. All\ninvestigation strives after a unity of principle; this impulse is a\nscientific leading motive of our nature. Besides the absolute limits of our\nknowledge, there are still enough relative and provisory limits to it; and\nthere also are enough low points of view, mistakes, and imperfections in\nscience, to justify us when we expressly form and establish monism as a\nmaxim of scientific investigation. All those theories and points of view\nneed such a spur and corrective, which are hastily satisfied with a\ndualistic or a still farther expanded limit of our knowledge. Among them we\nrank in theology the antique heathenish dualism which separates God and the\nworld in such a way that God is but the architect of the eternal matter,\nexisting independently of God; and also the modern deistic dualism which\nconsiders only the elements, principles, and beginning of the world, as\ndependent on God, but not the entire course of their developments as a\nwhole and in detail. In philosophy, taken in a narrower sense, we reckon\nwith them the one-sided atomism which can no longer find the connecting\nlink between the single elements of the world, or the one-sided assertion\nof realism or idealism, since at this time all views of the world which win\nacceptance from the present generation claim the praise of showing the\nreconciliation and higher unity of realism and idealism. In anthropology,\nthere belongs to them {179} such a treatment of psychology and physiology,\nthat the one science does not trouble itself about the other, and the\ninvestigation does not seek or keep in mind that which is common to both,\nor that which is higher and superior to them; and in all natural sciences,\nevery mode of investigation belongs to them, where the single science\nretains no sympathy with all other sciences and with the principles of all\nscientific investigation. In regard to these low points of view, mistakes,\nor imperfections, monism certainly is a correct and necessary maxim of\ninvestigation; but this maxim ought not to lead us so far that we--as very\noften happens from the _unity_ or the possibility of grouping several forms\nof existence under general conceptions--make an _identity_, that we efface\nthe differences instead of explaining them, and then think the effacement\nis an explanation; that we set forth the _assumed_ form of unity as if one\nwe had found, and in this manner falsify the method of knowing. For as\ncertainly and as much as man is subject to the dangers of error and\nfalsification, just so certainly and so little is nature subject to\nfalsification.\n\nBut if the name \"monism\" is to designate a certain _view of the world_, it\nis for such a designation either too comprehensive and quite applicable to\n_all_ views which have a right to the name of view of the world; or it is\nmisleading, and not applicable to any. For the name, as if it were properly\ncalled henism, either expresses only the _unity_ of the principle of the\nworld, and designates a quality which is the characteristic of every view\nof the world, and which especially belongs to theism in a clearer and more\nperfect way than to any other standpoint; or the name is used to attest\nthat the world _alone_ {180} exists, and that monism knows of but _one_\nexistence,--namely, that of the world; while the contrary view of the\nworld--that of theism, which in a manner wholly incompetent, and\nhistorically wholly unjustified, is called dualism--supposes _two_\nexistences, God and the world. But then this name does not correctly\nrepresent either itself or theism. It does not correctly represent itself:\nfor the so-called monism does not, indeed, suppose that that which\n_appears_ in the world is the really existing, or that the processes which\ncome into appearance have again their _final_ cause only in the appearance,\nbut it seeks the final causes of the phenomena in laws and principles which\ncan no longer be observed by our senses, and of those it again seeks the\ncommon, highest, and very last principle, the perception of which it\neither, with Haeckel, renounces or finds it, with other theories, now in\natomism, and in attraction and repulsion, then in the law of causality.\nThus it has not only a single existence and mode of existence, but it does\nexactly the same thing that theism does: it seeks the final principles of\nthe world. And it does not correctly represent theism: for theism also does\nnot know of two existences to which the idea of existing is applicable in\nfully the same way--namely, the world _and_ God---but in seeking a cause\nfor the existence of the world, it finds it in God; the world, according to\nits view, only exists by the fact that it exists in and through God. So\ntheism in this sense also contests with monism for the right of the name.\n\nTherefore, when teleology allows the opponent's view of the world to\nappropriate the name monism exclusively to itself, it can do this only in\nthe same {181} sense as that in which, in order to avoid disputes, we are\nsatisfied with many irrational names which have forced themselves upon us;\nas, for instance, we can perhaps call the clerical party in Bavaria the\npatriotic, because it calls itself so, or as we accept the title of the\nultramontane paper \"Germania,\" at Berlin, without conceding to the bearers\nof those names the care of patriotism and of the interests of the German\nempire in a higher degree than to parties and papers of a different\nstandpoint. In fact, this linguistic arbitrariness does not particularly\ntend to clearness of conception and to the avoidance of obscure phrases.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{183}\n\nPART II\n\nTHE POSITION OF THE DARWINIAN\nTHEORIES IN REFERENCE TO\nRELIGION AND MORALITY.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{185}\n\nBOOK I.\n\nHISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPLAN OF TREATMENT.\n\nIn discussing the conclusions which have been drawn by Darwinism in\nreference to religion and morality, it would seem appropriate to treat of\nthe two realms together. For the grouping which we have to give to the\ndifferent conclusions of Darwinian tendencies, in their position in\nreference to religion, is nearly the same which they also receive in their\nposition in reference to ethical questions.\n\nBut, nevertheless, we prefer to separate the two questions; not only\nbecause in fact one author has laid more stress upon the religious realm,\nanother more upon the ethical, but because in reality, and also in the\nsolution which we shall try to give to the problems presented by them, both\nrealms, although closely interwoven, and limited by one another, still are\ntheoretically to be treated apart.\n\nIn order not to exceed too much the limits of our task, we must avoid going\nmore into the details of the relations between religion and morality in\ngeneral, than is absolutely necessary for the solution of our main problem.\nThis restriction we can easily put on ourselves. For, first, every one who\nreflects at all on human life and action, and on his own religious and\n{186} moral conduct, generally has a very correct, instinctive, and direct\nconception and perception as to the realm of the religious as well as of\nthe moral--as to their mutual differences, as well as to their reciprocal\nrelations--even if he has not yet tried to bring this conception into ideas\nand formulas; and, secondly, it will not be difficult to present a short\nformula as to the ideal relation between the religious and the moral,\nsufficient for the wants of science as well as for the practical needs of a\nmore detailed investigation. The _religious_ is the relation of our\npersonality to God; the _moral_, the relation of it to the world,\ncomprehensively taken, ourselves included. We purposely call it a relation\nof our personality, and not merely a relation of man, because in the\nreligious the ethical moment of self-determination which is included in the\nidea of personality, is an essential factor; and because we gladly make it\nconspicuous, partly in opposition to the one-sidedness of Schleiermacher's\nfeeling of absolute dependence, partly to prevent a contrary\nmisunderstanding of our own view, as if we found the seat of religion in\nthe activity of knowledge. For when, in our representation of the Darwinian\nconclusions and in our own investigation, we proceed as objectively as\npossible, and try to avoid all systematization which is unfruitful for our\ntask, in discussing the Darwinian theories in reference to religion, we\nshall have to take chiefly into consideration their relation to religion in\nan objective sense, and chiefly also their relation to the contents of\nreligion; but this would make it appear that we supposed religion in a\nsubjective sense, religiousness, to be in the first place an activity and a\npossession of knowledge. Nothing lies farther from us {187} than this\nthought; although religiousness certainly has and asks for solid,\nobjectively true, and really possessed salvation, and however little we\nwould overlook the word of the Lord: \"And this is life eternal, that they\nmight _know_ thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast\nsent.\" (John xvii, 3.)\n\nThose who wish to inform themselves in regard to the relation of religion\nand morality, will find the necessary information in Martensen's \"Ethik\"\n(\"Ethics\"), in Otto Pfleiderer's monograph, which partly assumes a contrary\npoint of view, and in a thorough essay of Julius Koestlin (Theol. Studien\nund Kritiken, 1870, I), which appeared before the \"Ethics\" of Martensen.\n\nIn undertaking now to represent the conclusions which have been drawn from\nDarwinism, we treat of the religious realm as the higher, a realm demanding\na sound morality prior to the moral realm; and we begin with those\nconclusions which take a hostile position in reference to religion, in\norder to proceed from them to the moderate and friendly relations.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{188}\n\n_A. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND RELIGION._\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nMORE OR LESS NEGATIVE POSITION IN REFERENCE TO RELIGION.\n\nSec. 1. _Extreme Negation. L. Buechner and Consistent Materialism._\n\nThe common point of beginning and attack of all those who take a negative\nposition against religion, is the rejection of teleology. The most advanced\nof all materialists, Ludwig Buechner, in his self-criticism, which he gives\nin his \"Natur und Wissenschaft\" (\"Nature and Science\"), on page 465, openly\ndeclares, and quite correctly, that with the success or failure of the\nattacks upon teleology materialism itself stands or falls.\n\nNow while many, as we shall immediately see, although opposed to a\nteleological view of the world, still are inclined to give a more or less\nlasting value to certain psychical processes which may be called by the\nname religion, Buechner, on the contrary, makes a direct attack upon\neverything which is thus called. He does not render it difficult for us to\nreview his position. For, after having given it openly, but still with\ncertain relative modifications, in different publications (especially in\nhis book \"Force and Matter,\" which appeared in 1855 in the first edition,\nand in 1872 in the twelfth) he gives it in cynical nakedness in the\nlectures with which he travelled through America and {189} Germany in\n1872-1874, and the contents of which he has made public in his pamphlet:\n\"Der Gottesbegriff und dessen Bedeutung in der Gegenwart\" (\"The Idea of\nGod, and its Importance at the Present Time\"), Leipzig, 1874, Theo. Thomas.\nAs is said in the preface, the design of the lecture is \"to give a renewed\nimpulse to the final and definitive elimination of an idea which, according\nto the opinion of the author, obstructs our whole spiritual, social, and\npolitical development, as no other idea does.\" He means the idea of God;\nnot merely the theistic idea of a personal God, but the idea of God in\ngeneral. For even the pantheistic idea of God, which he had formerly\ntreated with a certain polite reserve, finds in his eyes even less favor\nthan the theistic. He says: \"If the absurdity is already great enough in\ntheism, it is possibly still greater in pantheism, which moreover has\nalways played a great _role_ in philosophy;\" and, \"Christianity has but\ninjured the spiritual and material progress of mankind.\" In agreement with\nStrauss, he sees the earliest origin of the idea of God only in ignorance\nand fear. \"Every creating, preserving, or reigning principle in the world\nis done away with, and there remains as highest spiritual power present in\nthe world only human reason. Atheism or philosophic monism alone leads to\nfreedom, to reason, progress, acknowledgment of true humanity,--in short to\nhumanism.\"\n\nThis materialistic opposition to everything which is called religion, is\ncertainly independent of Darwinism, and originated before its time; but\nsince Buechner himself sees in Darwinism but a grand confirmation of his\nview of the world, and believes that he has found in it {190} that\nprinciple which, with urgent necessity, banishes teleology from the\ncontemplation of nature--teleology, with the defeat or victory of which\nmaterialism stands or falls,--we are entitled and obliged to rank even this\nview of the world among the conclusions which in reference to religion have\nbeen drawn from the theories of Darwin. And, indeed, it is a most extreme\nconclusion, and simply puts itself in the category of negation to the\ncontents of religion, as well as to religion in a subjective sense, to\nreligious and pious conduct. It can be clearly seen how firmly a view of\nthe world which makes war against religion and the idea of God its special\nlife-task, is connected with all those destructive elements which lie in\nhuman nature, and especially in the social circumstances of the present,\nand which have their only and final ethical limit in the consciousness of\nGod which, as a power never wholly to be effaced, lies in the depth of the\nsoul of even those who wander farthest from a moral and spiritual life.\n\nSec. 2. _Replacement of Religion through a Religious Worship of the Universe.\nStrauss, Oskar Schmidt, Haeckel._\n\nStrauss, in that testament of his scientific life and activity, \"The Old\nFaith and the New,\" takes a somewhat different position in reference to\nreligion. Even for him, the whole idea of God is abolished and replaced by\nthe idea of the cosmos; but he makes this cosmos the object of religious\nworship, and has exactly the same feeling of absolute dependence in regard\nto it, which, according to Schleiermacher, constitutes the nature of\nreligion. When Arthur Schopenhauer or {191} Eduard von Hartmann bring forth\ntheir pessimistic accusations against the universe, his religious sensation\nreacts against it in the same manner as the organism against the prick of a\nneedle. This pessimism, he says, acts upon reason as an absurdity, but upon\nsensation as blasphemy. \"We demand the same piety for our cosmos that the\ndevout of old demanded for his God. If wounded, our feeling for the cosmos\nsimply reacts in a religious manner.\" While, therefore, Strauss, to the\nquestion, \"Are we still Christians?\" gives an emphatic \"No,\" he answers the\nquestion, \"Have we still a religion?\" with \"Yes or No, according to the\nspirit of the inquiry.\"\n\nAmong men of science who wrote about Darwinism, Oskar Schmidt, in his\nbefore-quoted publication, \"The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism,\" seems\nto take exactly the same position in reference to religion. At least, he\nunreservedly professes monism, rejects all teleological conceptions as\nimperfections, speaks of the caprice of a personal God, and sees the\nconception that the idea of God is immanent in human nature invalidated by\nthe fact \"that many millions in the most cultivated nations, and among them\nthe most eminent and lucid thinkers, have not the consciousness of a\npersonal God; those millions of whom the heroic Strauss became the\nspokesman.\"\n\nHaeckel, it is true, mentions Strauss only in the preface of the fourth\nedition of his \"Natural History of Creation,\" but here he greets \"The Old\nFaith and the New\" as the confession which he also makes, and thus gives us\nan express right to place him in this class, although he calls his worship\nof the universe religion; {192} it is, however, a classification which his\nwhole position compelled us to give him. It is true, he speaks very warmly\nof his own religion, which is founded on the clear knowledge of nature and\nits inexhaustible abundance of manifestations, and which, as \"simple\nreligion of nature,\" will in the future act upon the course of development\nof mankind, ennobling and perfecting it in a far higher degree than the\nvarious ecclesiastic religions of the different nations, \"resting on a\nblind belief in the vague secrets and mythical revelations of a sacerdotal\ncaste.\" (Nat. Hist. of Cr., Vol. II, p. 369.) He also repeatedly speaks of\n\"manifestations of nature,\" and even of a \"divine Spirit which is\neverywhere active in nature.\" In that respect he seems to take in reference\nto religion, without regard to the historical form in which it appeared as\nChristian religion, a still more friendly and less problematic position\nthan Strauss. Moreover, he demands for every individual the full right of\nforming his own religion; among the more highly developed species of men,\nhe says, every independent and highly developed individual, every original\nperson, has his own religion, his own God; and it would certainly,\ntherefore, not be arrogant if he should also claim the right of forming his\nown conception of God, his own religion. But when we try to form a more\ncomplete idea of his position in reference to religion, we really do not\nfind any essential difference between it and that of Strauss. According to\nrepeated utterances, he can not imagine the personal Creator without\ncaprice and arbitrariness; again and again he advocates monism with great\nwarmth, and also identifies, in express words, God and the universe, God\nand nature. {193} \"Corresponding to our progressive perception of nature\nand our immovable conviction of the truth of the evolution theory, our\nreligion can be only a _religion of nature_.\" \"In rejecting the dualistic\nconception of nature and the herewith connected amphitheistic conception of\nGod, ... we certainly lose the hypothesis of a personal Creator; but we\ngain in its place the undoubtedly more worthy and more perfect conception\nof a divine Spirit which penetrates and fills the universe.\" Furthermore,\nthe faith in a personal Creator is called a low dualistic conception of\nGod, which corresponds to a low animal stage of development of the human\norganism. The more highly developed man of the present, he says, is capable\nof and intended for an infinitely nobler and sublimer monistic idea of God,\nto which belongs the future, and through which we attain a more sublime\nconception of the unity of God and nature. According to his Anthropogeny,\nthe belief that the hand of a Creator has arranged all things with wisdom\nand intelligence is an ancient story and an empty phrase.\n\nSec. 3. _Pious Renunciation of the Knowability of God. Wilhelm Bleek, Albert\nLange, Herbert Spencer._\n\nA more friendly position in reference to religion is taken by those who\nhold, not directly negative, but only decidedly sceptical views of the\nexistence of God; who reduce the relative unsearchableness of God, which\nevery religious standpoint admits, to an absolute unknowability; and who\nfind the nature of religion either in a pious acknowledgment of this\nunknowability, or in a poetical substitute for the knowledge of God,\n_i.e._, comprehending the unknowable in a figure. The most prominent {194}\nadvocates of this position are, on the side of exact investigation, Wilhelm\nBleek; and on that of philosophy, Albert Lange in Germany and Herbert\nSpencer in England. Since all three use the Darwinian theories for their\nsystems, they also belong to the ranks of our historico-critical essay.\n\nWilhelm Bleek, in the preface to his \"Ursprung der Sprache\" (\"Origin of\nLanguage\"), rejects all claims of a positively revealed religion to an\nobjective truth--not in such a way as to substitute the universe in place\nof God, but so that he remains sceptical in reference to every attempt at\nforming an idea of God, demands a pious and modest confession of this\nnon-understanding by man, and sees in this reverential modesty the\ncertainly not very significant nature of his religion. In the preface he\nsays that all worship originates in reverence for ancestors, and that even\nthe doctrine of the atonement of modern theology has its origin there. The\nnext step after reverence for ancestors was the worship of nature. But the\ngrand turning-point at which the mythological mode of view gives way--in\nwhich mode of view he also reckons Christianity--is the giving up of the\nidea of the necessity of an atonement; for this whole idea is but\nanthropomorphism. It is when man has recognized the impossibility of a\nbeing, similar to man, as the final cause of all existences, and in\nreverential modesty has admitted his ignorance in reference to the nature\nof the origin of things, that he learns to understand how narrow a view he\nhas of God when he thinks that he understands him.\n\nOn the side of philosophy, Albert Lange and Herbert Spencer reach similar\nresults. Albert Lange, in his {195} \"History of Materialism,\" starting\nespecially from premises of Kant, reaches the conclusion that the \"thing\n_per se_,\" the \"intelligible world,\" is absolutely hidden to us. What we\nperceive is but the world of appearances; and the fact that we perceive it,\nand perceive it as we do, is originally founded in the human organization.\nBy virtue of this organization we are bound, in all our knowledge of the\nworld of appearances, to the law of causality. Science does not get beyond\nthis causal chain of finite and relative causes and effects; to the \"thing\n_per se_\" there is nowhere to be found a bridge, not even as Kant supposes,\nin the categoric imperative, nor in ideas. Inasmuch as science does not get\nbeyond this chain, it is materialistic; inasmuch as it must nevertheless\nperceive the existence, or at least the possibility of the existence, of a\n\"thing _per se_,\" even if it does not see any way to its perception, it is\nidealistic. But man also has ideal impulses, and he has to follow them just\nas much as the impulse of perception. By virtue of these ideal impulses, he\nmakes in imagination a picture of the \"thing _per se_\" in the activity of\nphilosophic speculation, art, and religion. Philosophic speculation is but\nimaginative conceptions. It has always a value in the history of culture,\nas a summing-up of the elements of culture and of the spiritual impulses\nand treasures of a certain time; but it errs as soon as it claims to be\nmore than imaginative conceptions--namely, an adequate representation of\nthe final cause of all things--for it lacks the necessary basis of\nexperience. Art does not claim this, and therefore is not exposed to that\ndanger of deception. Religion satisfies a need of the heart, to have a home\nof the spirit in the \"thing _per se_\"; but {196} since the \"thing _per se_\"\nis not accessible for us, religion creates in mind that home, in order to\nrise above the common reality to it. Lange finds the highest realization of\na perfect satisfaction of that impulse in the philosophic poems of\nSchiller. He sees the quintessence of religion expressly \"in the elevation\nof minds above the real, and in the creation of a home of the spirit.\"\nReligion remains untouched in its full vital power, as long as it retains\nthat as its quintessence; but it is exposed to all the dangers of a\ndestructive criticism as soon as it seeks its quintessence in something\nelse--for instance, in certain doctrines of God, the human soul, creation\nof the world, etc.\n\nHerbert Spencer is in full accord with Lange in regard to the theory of an\nabsolute indiscernibleness of the final cause of all things; but he reaches\nthis result in a somewhat different way, and from his premises infers a\ndifferent modification of the nature of religion. In his \"First Principles\"\nhe appears to be a true scholar of the English and Scotch schools of\nphilosophy, from which he takes his start in conscious and express\nopposition to the German modes of speculation, and begins with an empiric\ncomparison of all actual contrasts existing in the world and in human life.\nHe follows the axiom that a particle of truth lies at the basis of every\nerror, and that each contrast becomes a contrast only by the fact that the\ntwo poles of the contrast have something in common. Now, in comparing with\none another all contrasts between religion and science, and all forms of\nreligiousness and irreligiousness, from fetishism up to monotheism,\npantheism, and atheism, all imaginable cosmogonies, he finds, as the last\ntruth common to all, and therefore {197} alone absolutely certain, the\n_absolute indiscernibleness of the final cause of all things_. On page 44\nhe says, that religions diametrically opposed in their overt dogmas, are\nyet perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that there is a problem to be\nsolved, that the existence of the world with all it contains is a mystery\never pressing for interpretation; and on page 45, that the omnipresence of\nsomething which passes comprehension, is that which remains unquestionable.\nAnd on page 46 he concludes: \"If Religion and Science are to be reconciled,\nthe basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain\nof all facts--that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly\ninscrutable.\" The acknowledgment of this fact is religiousness; the\ncontrary of it is irreligiousness and anthropomorphistic arrogance, even if\nit appears in the name of religiousness. \"Volumes might be written upon the\nimpiety of the pious\" (p. 110).\n\nA comparison of the two philosophers is interesting.\n\nIn one direction, Lange does more justice to the religious need than\nSpencer does. While he sees in religion the metaphorical realization of the\nneeds of the heart, of a \"creation of a home of the spirit,\" he gives to\nthe heart full play to satisfy its need, and to create and arrange for\nitself a spiritual home entirely according to its need. He especially\nacknowledges repeatedly the need of the heart for _atonement_, and\nvigorously defends this need and its satisfaction against Liberal\nTheologians (Reformtheologen), like Heinrich Lang; he also stands, as we\nsee, in satisfactory contrast to Wilhelm Bleek. Without reserve, he admits\ninto the hymn-book of his religion of the future hymns like that of\nGerhard: \"O Haupt voll Blut und Wunden\" (\"O Sacred Head, {198} now\nwounded\"). To be sure, all the concessions he makes to religion sink again\nto the value of a beautiful illusion, from the fact that for him they are\nbut metaphorical approaches to the cause of all things, which after all\nstill remains inaccessible. But nevertheless, in consequence of that idea\nof religion, religious life, and especially also religious service, has\ninfinitely more room for rich development in Lange than in Spencer. For,\naccording to the view of the latter, religiousness consists in nothing else\nbut the perception and acknowledgment of this indiscernibleness of the\nfinal cause. All other things which may be still connected with religious\nlife and reasoning, are but a misty veil. The acknowledgment of the\nindiscernibleness of the final cause of all things alone is the\nquintessence of religion. But such a religiousness, which expressly forbids\nimagining any quality or any state of the highest being, certainly would\nbe, as Prof. Huxley correctly says in his \"Lay Sermons,\" for the most part\nof the silent sort.\n\nWhile thus Lange's conception of religion is superior to that of Spencer in\nadmitting a richer development of religious life, a more various\nsatisfaction of the religious need, in another direction Spencer is\nsuperior. He comes considerably nearer to a correct and full _conception of\nGod_ than Lange. His idea of the final cause of all things does not lie\nentirely in the conception that it is the absolute indiscernible; but\nSpencer is fully in earnest with the idea that this indiscernible is the\nreal cause of the world and of all single existences in it. He accordingly\nforbids giving certain attributes to the absolute--not because it would be\ndoubtful whether it has attributes or not, but because it stands _above_\nall these {199} imaginable attributes as their real cause. Therefore he\nforbids, for instance, attributing personality, intelligence, will, to the\nhighest being--not because it could also be impersonal, and in want of\nintelligence and will, but because it stands _above_ all these attributes\nas their highest real cause, and because we can think of all these\nattributes only in human analogy, and therefore, when attributed to the\nhighest being, can think of them only in rejectable anthropomorphism. He\nsays, on page 109: \"Those who espouse this position [personality of God],\nmake the erroneous assumption that the choice is between personality and\nsomething lower than personality; whereas the choice is rather between\npersonality and something higher. Is it not just possible that there is a\nmode of being as much transcending Intelligence and Will, as these\ntranscend mechanical motion? It is true that we are totally unable to\nconceive any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for\nquestioning its existence; it is rather the reverse.... The Ultimate Cause\ncannot in any respect be conceived by us because it is in every respect\ngreater than can be conceived.\"\n\nThus we find in Lange a fuller and richer conception of the subject of\nreligion; but this conception is in want of one thing--without which it is\nin want of everything--namely, of nothing less than of the objective\nreality. Spencer's religiousness has a much more meagre and less varied\ncharacter: the acknowledgment and veneration of the indiscernible; but he\nnevertheless gives us with this content and object a _real_ object, even an\nobject of veneration, in which the abundance of all reality is hidden, with\nthe only conception that the indiscernible {200} does not let us look into\nits cornucopia, but only lets us judge of the abundance of its contents by\nthe richness of that which it pours over us in the world of the relatively\nperceptible.\n\nIt will not be difficult to show the points at which each of these writers\nwould have been able, had he so wished, to lead his conception of religion,\nthe one to a real, the other to a full content.\n\nLange finds the last principle of perception which is accessible to us, in\nour _organization_. Now from our organization originate not only all modes\nof the perception of the empirical world, but just as well all our ideal\nimpulses, especially the ethical. Which one of all those dispositions,\nimpulses, and activities has the precedence, mainly depends upon the value\nwhich man places upon them. Now, when man attributes to the ideal and\nethical a higher value than to the empirical, when in reflecting about\nhimself he finds that even in the normal individual the empirical, sensual,\nand material is subordinate and subject to the ideal and especially to the\nethical, then from the standpoint of Lange he is right, and obliged to\nestimate the truth of that ideal and ethical as higher than the truth of\nthe empirical world, and to look at the whole empirical world only as being\nin the service of that ideal world. When, at the same time, we observe an\ninner harmony in our organization, this observation gives us the right and\nthe duty of controlling the truth of our empirical perception by the truth\nof the results of our ideal and our ethical activity, and the latter again\nby the former. For if we do not wish to suppose that the human organization\naims at a grand deception of mankind, we have, in spite of {201} the\nsuperiority of the ideal and ethical activities, to establish the axiom\nthat the empirical and the ideal and ethical cannot remain in lasting\ncontradiction. Besides, if we should add to this that a religion like\nChristianity offers to man that which it gives to him on the ground of\nhistorical facts, then the reports of these facts will certainly be subject\nto historical criticism just as surely as all historical reports; but if\nthey are confirmed, the ideal and ethical convincing power which lies in\nthis religion, unites for us with the whole weight of the convincing power\nof the historical and empirical facts, although the reproduction and\nsystematization of its contents is still deficient and capable of further\ndevelopment.\n\nIn Spencer's system, there are two points by which his own course of\nreasoning is able to bridge over the poverty of his conception of religion.\nThe first point, given on pages 107-108 of his \"First Principles,\" and also\nelsewhere in his works, is the acknowledgment that the final cause of all\nthings is _higher_ than all that we know, and is of such a nature that it\nreally can be the real cause of everything, even the real cause of the\nspiritual and ethical. Thus he forbids us to think of qualities of the\nhighest being, but he himself thinks of them; for this conception of the\nhighest being as an _impersonal_ is certainly something else and something\nmuch more valuable than the mere negation of personality. The other point\nwhich might be able to lead him out of the vacuum of his idea of God, lies\nin the method of his own investigation. When he seeks the truth by\ncollecting what is common in all the contrasts, he also must seek and find\nsomething common between the highest cause {202} of all things on one side\nand of the world as a whole and in detail on the other; and this something\nwill consist of the necessity of the highest cause of all things being so\nqualified that _it is able_ to bring into existence the world as a whole\nand in detail. If such ideas are also rejected as anthropomorphisms, then\nall reasoning and investigating is anthropomorphistic; and in that respect\nwe refer to what we had to say above, when treating of teleology (p. 170\nff.). The same Duke of Argyll whom we there had occasion to quote, in an\narticle in the \"Contemporary Review\" (May, 1871), upon \"Variety as an Aim\nin Nature,\" has admirably shown that it is the mind of man from which we\nmay draw conclusions as to the nature of the Creator, and that the picture\nwhich we thus get of him, can at the same time be seen true and yet dim, at\nthe same time real and yet from a distance; for the human mind does not\nfeel anything so much as its own limitations, and therefore can easily\nimagine each of his powers and talents as being present in the highest\nbeing in infinite perfection. If Spencer had made this comparison, and\ndrawn the conclusions which follow from it for the nature of the final\ncause of all things, the indiscernibleness of God would for him be reduced\nto an unsearchableness, the unknowable be changed into an unsearchable, and\nwe could willingly acknowledge the humble modesty in regard to the infinity\nof the deity, which his philosophy requires, as a factor of all true\nreligiousness. But we have to present to him as an expression, not only of\ntrue religiousness, but also of true science, that passage of the Psalms:\n\"He that planted the ear, shall he {203} not hear? He that formed the eye,\nshall he not see?\" (Psalm XCIV, 9.)\n\nSec. 4. _Spinoza and Hegel in the Garb of Darwin: Carneri. Eduard von\nHartmann._\n\nTo the Austrian philosopher Carneri in his \"Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus\"\n(\"Morality and Darwinism\"), three books of Ethics, Vienna, Braumueller,\n1871, we shall have to give a place of his own.\n\nInasmuch as religion and the beautiful are to him but a preliminary stage\nof truth which has to dissolve itself into philosophy--a philosophy which,\ninclined to monism, prefers to call itself pantheism--he takes a position\nin reference to religion similar to that toward materialism, namely: a\nnegative position. But inasmuch as he still grants to religion in a\nsubjective sense, to \"religion in the form of piety,\" a lasting position\nand truth (religion, he says, has truth, but the positive God of religion\nhas no reality, page 114), and inasmuch as he ascribes to it not only a\ntransitory pedagogical value for the masses, which are not yet elevated to\nthe height of philosophic reasoning, but a value also for the\nphilosopher--namely, the value of religiousness and of piety--he rather\nbelongs to the second and third of the before-mentioned groups.\n\nCarneri, in his \"Three Books of Ethics,\" gives us a whole philosophic\nencyclopedia. In thoughts sometimes rich, but without regularly arranged\nand quiet reasoning, and in full command and employment of modern terms\nwhich he uses sometimes like a genius, but often superficially and\nunjustly, he develops a view of the world which, although it appears in an\nindependent way {204} in all its fundamentals, as regards its contents\ntakes its origin from Spinoza, and as regards form and dialectics from\nHegel, but sometimes, it is true, sinks into weaknesses of which these\nphilosophers would hardly have been guilty. So, for instance, when he\nsimply identifies religious faith with conjecture, he takes a superficial\nview which he has in common with Haeckel who, among other things, repeatedly\nsays that faith begins where knowledge ceases. Dialectical motion is\neverything to him. In pursuing this dialectical motion, he gives us a\nmultitude of outlooks into all imaginable realms of knowledge and life, but\nhe always follows at the same time the formula of dialectical motion, and,\nwhere the difficulties of the real world are most invincibly opposed to\nthis dialectics, knows, like his master, with almost chivalric ease, to\nmingle and confound abstract formalistic reasoning and thoughts naturally\nfollowing from the given thought. Want of clearness in general makes the\nreading of this otherwise not unimportant book very difficult. On a\nDarwinian foundation in his conception of nature and its development, he\nputs a Hegelian structure into his conception of human spiritual life, but\nfinally lets mankind, although it is the highest form of appearance in this\ndevelopment, sink back into death and destruction.\n\nThe God of this view of the world is the causal law; the conception of this\ncausal law is the worship of the philosopher--a God, of course, so\nincapable of filling and quieting a mind longing for God--a worship so\nleathern that Carneri himself cannot get rid of the opinion that, with such\nreligious ideas of reform, he will finally lose the last reader of his\nbook. The aim of the {205} development, also, does not promise to the mind\nany substitute for the rigidness of God, for the aim of the development is\ndeath--the death of the individual as well as of the universe. \"He who has\nlearned to get comfort in the deepest affliction from the absolute\nimpartiality of the causal law, is on so good terms with death, whose\ninflexibility he comprehends, that without reluctance he gives to it the\nuniverse into the bargain.\" (p. 353.)\n\nWe give these glimpses into the dreary waste of the very latest advocate of\npessimism which, as it seems, has fully and formally become the fashion, in\norder to show what monstrosities are demanded from thought, what revolting\nhardness from feeling, what nonentities of ethical striving, are offered as\nvaluable wares, if man has once begun to break the bond between himself and\nhis living Creator and Master. For this reason, not only the\nanti-teleological monists meet the fate of Nihilism, whether they appear in\nthe plebeian roughness of Buechner or in the aristocratic gentility of\nStrauss, but also such a brilliant advocate of teleology as Eduard von\nHartmann does not know of any other final end to offer to the world and\nmankind than nothingness, because he did not wish to be driven from his\nperception of ends in the world to the only conclusion to which it\nleads--namely: to the perception of an absolute intelligent and ethical\npersonality that directs these ends. He prefers, rather, to suppose an\nunconsciously seeing substance of the world, which, after having once in\nthe dark impulse of its unconscious will, made the mistake of creating a\nworld, leads the same by the instinct of unconscious teleology in sad,\nmelancholy, and yet relatively {206} best development, until it is ripe to\nsink back into nothingness, and thereby to bring the absolute to rest.\n\nAlthough we pity the individuals who came under the ban of such a\npessimism, we nevertheless can be glad of the fact that the consequences of\nsuch a separation from God are at least exposed so clearly, and return from\nwandering through such barren steppes with renewed thankfulness to our\nChristian view of the world, with its divine plan and aim.\n\nWe have, next, however to review the representatives of theism and of the\nChristian view of the world--which review will show us that the song of\ntriumph which monism began to raise before its expected victory, came very\nnear disturbing the composure of persons here and there.\n\nSec. 5. _Re-echo of Negation on the Side of the Christian View of the World._\n\nIn this condition of affairs, it certainly could not happen otherwise than\nthat, even on the part of the theistic and positive Christian view of the\nworld, some advocates were drawn into the contest who thought themselves\nobliged to see two irreconcilable antagonists in Darwinism and\nChristianity.\n\nScience and religion had both been so much accustomed to see the origin of\nspecies, and especially the appearance of man on the stage of earth, hidden\nin impenetrable and unapproachable secrecy, that every attempt at clearing\nup this darkness very naturally appeared to both as an attack upon the\ncreative activity of God. The mode of reasoning to which mankind, in its\nscientific as well as in its religious meditations, had {207} accustomed\nitself for hundreds of years, was used to exclude from the idea of creation\nthe conception of intervening agencies; and this was true not only in\nregard to the idea of the first creation of the universe, where the idea of\nintervening agencies naturally is left out, but also in regard to the idea\nof the creation of single beings. Moreover, mankind was so accustomed to\nsee a contrast between origination and creation, that in the same degree in\nwhich man tried or was able to perceive the modalities of the origin of\nspecies, the divine causality, or at least the idea of creation, seemed to\ndisappear; and for the word of the Bible, that God created creatures _each\nafter its kind_, a place could no longer be found.\n\nTo this was added the fact that not only all materialism took possession of\nDarwinism as the irresistible battering-ram which, as they said, forever\ndemolishes the whole fortress of theism and buries under its ruins all\nthose who take refuge in this decaying castle, but that even _naturalists_\nlet themselves be carried away without opposition by this anti-theistic\ncurrent, and even submitted to be heralds and prophets of this new\nanti-theistic wisdom of monism. Let the reader think of Haeckel's \"Natural\nHistory of Creation\" and \"Anthropogeny,\" where he will find the most\ninteresting reports from all realms of exact natural science, together with\na wholly unsolved entanglement of descent, selection, and mechanical view\nof the world, and this mode of contemplation of the world, with eloquent\nand enthusiastic proclamation of monism and with unconcealed derision of\nthe capricious arbitrariness of a personal Creator, all thrown together as\none great entire system, formed at one stroke. {208}\n\nIs it, then, to be wondered at, that not only the uncritical among\nbelievers, but also those who thoughtfully examined the movements of the\nmind, believed in the loudly-proclaimed connection of Darwinism with the\nwhole anti-Christian view of the world, and therefore protested immediately\nagainst everything which is called Darwinism? Can we reproach theologians\nfor not immediately becoming scientists themselves, in order to form an\nindependent judgment in the question, when even the most eminent scientists\ndeclared that amalgamation of the most heterogenetic as an inevitable\nconsequence of Darwinism, and as much as possible diminished or concealed\ntheir want of harmony with a few other investigators who, although small in\nnumber, yet by their weight counterbalanced dozens of names of the second\nand third rank?\n\nThus we could read, in the journals of specialists, in pamphlets, in\nreligious and political journals, even in local newspapers, a great many\narticles which were guilty of exactly the same confounding of the\nscientific and the religious, and again of the scientific and the\nphilosophic, as those who had caused this confounding, and who, under the\nsupposition of this solidarity of wholly distinct things, attacked and\ncontested in the interest of religion, not only the anti-religious\nconclusions of Darwinian philosophers, but also Darwinism as a merely\nscientific theory, and rendered the contrast as strong as possible by\nadhering to that above censured, unmotived, indefensible, and one-sided\nconception of creation.\n\nAnd although on the part of positive Christian theology there was a\ngradually increasing number of voices {209} of those who in the idea of an\norigin of species through _descent_ do not yet see an injury to the\ntheistic and Christian conception of God and creation, still as a rule this\nconcession was made only to the idea of descent, and not to that of\nselection and to that which is properly called Darwinism. As a rule, in\nmost of the theological works which treat in general of the _Darwinian_\nquestions, Darwinism and opposition to the Christian conception of God and\ncreation were and are still taken as identical. For instance, Ebrard, in\nthe first part of his \"Apologetik\" (\"Apologetics\"), Guetersloh, Bertelsmann,\n1874, enumerates among the systems which are opposed to Christianity, in\nthe same line with the doubtless anti-theistic and anti-Christian\n_aposkopiology_ or negation of the idea of design, also the mechanistic\nsystem, or the negation of the organic vital force, and the Darwinian\ntheory of descent. Besides, in reading his \"Apologetics,\" we had earnestly\nwished, in the interest of science as well as of religion, that a\ntheologian who writes a work which claims to be scientific and to advocate\nthe Christian standpoint, had abstained from that coarse and disgusting\ncontempt and derision of adversaries which we meet so often in his book,\nand which only causes friend and foe to take a position contrary to that\nwhich the author intended. Truempelmann who, in an essay upon Darwinism,\nmonistic philosophy, and Christianity (Jahrbuecher fuer protestantische\nTheologie, 1876, I) gives a similar conception of the relation between\nDarwinism and religion, but defends his whole position with much more\nscientific acuteness and depth, has also not taken the tone which worthily\ntreats an opposite opinion and its advocates.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {210}\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nREFORM OF RELIGION, OR AT LEAST OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION, THROUGH\nDARWINISM.\n\nSec. 1. _Heinrich Lang, Friedrich Vischer, Gustav Jaeger._\n\nIn passing on to those who in Darwinism do not see a negation but a\nreformation of religion, or at least of theology, we first meet Heinrich\nLang, the late spiritual leader of the \"Reformtheologie\" in Switzerland. He\ntreats of \"Die Religion im Zeitalter Darwins\" (\"Religion in the Age of\nDarwin\") in Holtzendorff's and Oncken's \"Deutsche Zeit- und Streitfragen,\"\nJahrg. II, Heft 31, Berlin, Luederitz, 1873.\n\nWith a very correct estimate of the lasting value of religion as well as of\nnatural science, and with a warm apology for the religious realm, he\nregulates the boundaries of each by asking religion not to hinder modern\nknowledge of the world and nature, and by asking knowledge of nature to\nleave the realm of religion untouched in its self-certainty.\n\nBut when he, evidently still dependent on the old rationalistic\nsupernaturalistic conception of miracle and providence, claims to find that\nas the result of modern knowledge of the world and nature a special\nprovidence is no longer conceivable, and no other hearing of prayer is\npossible than a subjective psychological one; that the processes in the\nworld, in their entire final causal connection of causes and effects,\nnowhere leave a place for {211} the freely acting hand of a divine Lord of\nthe world, and that even a moral order of the world can only prove itself\nso far as guilt and punishment stand in a natural causal connection with\none another: then his religiousness makes concessions to the modern view of\nthe world which it is not at all obliged to make or justified in making,\nand forces upon religion a reform against the necessity and usefulness of\nwhich not only religious feeling and need, but also deeper and more\nconsequent reflection on God and the world, just as strongly strives.\n\nWhat remains to him as an independent realm for religion is nevertheless\nworthy of recognition. As faith of the human mind in a transcendental unity\nwhich manifests itself in the manifold and sensible, and carries through a\nmoral order of the world--although one which, by the before-mentioned\nlimitation of the natural connection of guilt and punishment, is very much\nreduced--religion gives to the mind warmth and worship; as confidence of\nthe heart in an infinite possession in the anguish of the finite, it\ncreates confidence in God, gratitude, devotion, energy, courage of life; as\nreverence for a holiness which stands unimpeachable above the fluctuating\ninclinations of our will, awakens the consciousness of guilt, and abolishes\nthe guilt, it remains the basis of all moral action. Lang also sharply and\ncorrectly points out the insufficiency of Strauss's \"The Old Faith and the\nNew,\" as well as the conflict between his metaphysical naturalism which\nonly leads to the struggle for existence, and his demand of self-submission\nto the universe, and of the moral and spiritual self-determination of man\nas of a being which goes beyond nature. Nevertheless we can not follow Lang\nin his {212} ways of reform. First--his conception of God is amazingly\nmeagre, and of more than a Spencerian unapproachableness. God is to him,\naccording to his \"Dogmatics,\" nothing but the eternal, in itself perfect\ncause of all being, exempted from all changes of the world's process. When\nhe gives the name of father to this primeval cause, as he does in his\nsermons and elsewhere, without being able to admit relation of mutual love\nof person to person, he only makes it glaringly evident how little his\nabstract metaphysics can satisfy religious need. Second--that which is\nclaimed to be gained by this modern view of the world (namely, extension of\nthe supremacy of religion to everything, even to the affairs of daily\nlife), is not at all new, but is the effect of long-existing sound\nreligiousness, and is the essence of all sound religious doctrine; and we\ntherefore can not see how a view of the world, which, for instance, denies\ndivine providence, and limits the hearing of prayer to its psychological\neffects, shall have greater force to leaven the whole daily life\nreligiously, than our Christian faith in the Father without whose will no\nsparrow falls to the ground, and who says to his children: \"Call upon me in\nthe day of trouble: I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me.\"\nThird--exactly that which Lang declares a purification of religion (namely,\nthe before-mentioned elimination of divine providence and of all that which\nis connected therewith), appears to us not at all as a reform, but as an\nimmense impoverishment and desolation of religion, which is so far from\nbeing required by natural science, that it turns out to be but a concession\nto the most superficial metaphysicians who, of course, have become very\npopular. {213}\n\nFriedrich Vischer is also to be ranked in this group. In the sixth part of\nhis \"Kritische Gaenge\" (\"Critical Walks\"), he speaks of Strauss' \"The Old\nFaith and the New,\" and takes his determined position in reference to the\nreligious question, quite essentially differing from Strauss. In regard to\nthe aversion to miracles, he stands on the same ground with Strauss and\nLang; in protesting against Strauss' elimination of the idea of design, and\nespecially in demanding a moral order of the world, he is still more\nenergetic than Lang. He particularly does not, like Lang, limit the moral\norder of the world to the simple empiric causal connection between human\naction and its consequences. But on the other hand, by his opposition to\nthe idea of a personality of God, he again deviates more than Lang from the\ntrue meaning of Christian religiousness. On page 219 he says: \"How, in\nspite of the infinite crossings of human action, is inner conformity to the\nend in view in general so established through that which we call chance, or\nrather by means of these crossings, that we can speak of a moral order of\nthe world? Men, individuals as well as communities, follow their aims.\nHereby there always results something quite different from that which they\nintended and wished. Sublime laws govern above us, between us, full of\nmystery in the midst of life; one of them in reference to guilt, punishment\nof guilt, is called nemesis. Faith in that meaning of the word, which we\nregard as a low one [he means the faith which has its dogmas beyond which\nthe man of the most recent culture has passed, not knowing that he also\ncarries around with him his dogmas, his \"new faith\"] is in need of a person\nwho founds, carries out, and executes {214} these laws. But the faith of\nthe monists has no such need. Why not? That needs more sufficient\ndemonstration.\"\n\nCertainly it needs more sufficient demonstration. But this demonstration\nwill never be possible, so long as we acknowledge the government of a moral\norder of the world. For this leads of necessity to faith in a living God,\nand this faith demands from our conception less pretensions than the faith\nin a kind of system of spiritual machinery by which chance and the\nwished-for are woven together, without this system proceeding from a highly\nspiritual and ethical intelligence. It nevertheless must be acknowledged\nthat Vischer, from the standpoint of _ethical_ need, vindicates the\nposition and truth of religion, as he also beautifully and correctly\ndefines its position in reference to morality, in saying that morality\nmakes the demand, religion gives the strength to meet it.\n\nFrom another side, Gustav Jaeger makes a compromise between Darwinism and\nreligion in his five lectures on \"Die Darwinsche Theorie und ihre Stellung\nzu Moral und Religion\" (\"The Darwinian Theory and its Position in Reference\nto Morality and Religion\"), Stuttgart, J. Hoffmann, 1869.\n\nHe makes still more valid concessions to religion and Christianity than\nLang and Vischer; directly opposes materialistic monism; leaves to faith in\na personal God, in the divinity of Christ, in individual immortality, in\nthe answer to prayer beyond the psychological effect, in miracles, in\nshort, to the full contents of Christian religiousness, their weight and\ntruth; and in that respect we would have to rank him in the following\ngroup, if he {215} did not by his manner of proving these concessions\nexclude himself from it, and rank himself in that group of which we treat\nin the present section.\n\nAccording to his opinion, Darwinism gives to religion, if not new contents\n(although these contents are entirely subject to revision according to\nDarwinism), still a wholly new foundation, and, indeed, a foundation of\nsubjective religiousness, as well as of the objective contents of religion,\nonly from the standpoint of its practical usefulness in the struggle for\nexistence. The faith in a personal God, in immortality, in redemption by\nthe God-Man Jesus Christ, in the hearing of prayer, in help in danger even\nto the extent of miracles, strengthens man, gives to him a superiority to\nthose who do not have that faith and who do not have the habit of prayer,\nand therefore is so far the best weapon in the struggle for existence; and\nherein lies the truth of religion, especially of the Christian religion, as\nthe most successful weapon in the struggle for existence which takes place\nthrough the whole creation, from the lowest organisms up to the highest\nspiritual life of mankind.\n\nWe willingly admit that Christianity has certainly proved itself by far the\nstrongest and most successful means of education to mankind, and that, if\nwe must once express this experience in the Darwinian mode of speaking, we\ncan express it as above. But with the attempt to make the _truth_ of\nreligion and the truth of its contents, even if only subjective, dependent\nonly and solely upon the proof of its _usefulness_, nobody, either friend\nor foe, will be satisfied. The adversaries of religion and Christianity,\nperhaps with the exception of Buechner, will admit that Christianity has for\nsome {216} time been a quite useful weapon to mankind in the struggle for\nexistence; but they will say that they are just about to replace it by a\nstill more useful weapon; and the advocates of religion and Christianity\nlikewise can not agree upon a mere grounding of their religion upon need\nwhich puts upon them every day the possibility of changing it for something\nstill more useful. Both friend and foe will join in the conviction that\nobjective truth is always the best guarantee for subjective success; and\nthus both will pass beyond the purely utilitarian apologetics or polemics\nto the questions as to the objective reality of the contents of Christian\nreligiousness.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {217}\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nPEACE BETWEEN RELIGION AND DARWINISM.\n\nSec. 1. _Darwin, Wallace, R. Owen, Asa Gray, Mivart, McCosh, Anderson, K. E.\nv. Baer, Alex. Braun, Braubach, etc._\n\nIt still remains for us to take a glance at those who think religion and\nDarwinism, and Christianity and Darwinism, hold toward one another\nreciprocally amicable relations.\n\nIn the first place, we have to mention Darwin himself. In his earliest\nwork, \"Origin of Species,\" he repeatedly gives this opinion, as on page\n421: \"I see no good reason why the views given in this volume should shock\nthe religious feelings of any one. It is satisfactory, as showing how\ntransient such impressions are, to remember that the greatest discovery\never made by man, namely, the law of the attraction of gravity, was also\nattacked by Leibnitz 'as subversive of natural, and inferentially of\nrevealed, religion.' A celebrated author and divine has written to me that\nhe 'has gradually learned to see that it is just as noble a conception of\nthe Deity to believe that He created a few original forms capable of\nself-development into other and needful forms, as to believe that He\nrequired a fresh act of creation to supply the voids caused by the action\nof His laws.'\" On page 428, he speaks of the laws which God has impressed\non matter; and at the end of his work, on page 429, he says: \"There is\ngrandeur in this {218} view of life, with its several powers, having been\noriginally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one.\" In his\n\"Descent of Man,\" he also protests against the reproach that his views are\nirreligious, and says: \"The birth both of the species and of the individual\nare equally parts of that grand sequence of events which our minds refuse\nto accept as the result of blind chance.\" In treating of the question as to\nthe development of the moral instincts, he says: \"If he [man] breaks\nthrough the fixed habits of his life, he will assuredly feel\ndissatisfaction. He must likewise avoid the reprobation of _the one_ God or\ngods in whom, _according to his knowledge_ or superstition, he may\nbelieve.\" And furthermore he remarks: \"The question whether there exists a\nCreator and Ruler of the Universe, has been answered in the affirmative by\nsome of the highest intellects that have ever existed.\"\n\nIt is true, all these expressions about religion are very general; but\nsince in his works we do not find any utterance contrary to them and\nhostile to religion, we have a right to rank the celebrated originator of\nthe whole agitation among those naturalists who are conscious of the limits\nof the realms of the natural and the religious, and are convinced of the\npossibility of a harmony between the two. For his casual utterances against\na \"creation\" of single species always combine with the word creation the\nidea of that direct creation out of nothing, without intervening agencies,\nwhich is entirely correct for the idea of the first, origin of the\nuniverse, but which for the origin of the single formations within the\nuniverse is neither asked for by the religious view of the world, nor\nestablished by the Holy {219} Scriptures, nor by a cautiously reasoning\ntheology, although it very often controls the conceptions of naturalists as\nwell as of theologians. Now, while Darwin rejects the idea of a sudden\nappearance of a new species out of nothing--or, as he once expressed\nhimself in his \"Origin of Species,\" the idea \"that at innumerable periods\nin the earth's history certain elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly\nto flash into living tissues,\"--and he is no doubt right in rejecting\nit,--still at the same time he does not deny the dependence of the\nsuccessive origin of a new species on a divine author. But in calling that\nprocess creation and this one not, he gives the appearance of an opposition\nto the religious idea of creation--an appearance of which the greater part\nof the guilt is borne by those theologians who define the idea of the\ncreation, even of a single form, in a manner which is only proper for the\nidea of the first origin of the universe.\n\nIt is true, we could rank Darwin still more readily among the scientists\nwho are at peace with all the claims of religion, did he not in his\n\"Descent of Man,\" when enumerating the \"excellent naturalists and\nphilosophers\" who with him reduce the pedigree of man to lower forms,\nmention names of men who in their works firmly unite Darwinism and monistic\nnaturalism or even materialism, and expressly protest against a separation\nof their naturo-historical results and their philosophic points of view. We\nmean Buechner and Haeckel. The latter's \"Natural History of Creation,\" he\nespecially praises: \"If this work had appeared before my essay had been\nwritten, I should probably never have completed it. Almost all the\nconclusions at which I have {220} arrived I find confirmed by this\nnaturalist,\" etc. The entire silence in regard to the anti-Christian\nresults which these two authors derive from their naturo-historical\npremises, makes Darwin's own position in reference to religion again very\nuncertain. It seems that Darwin in his theology is not only inclined to\ntheism, but, following the traditions of his countrymen of the last\ncentury, to a quite cool and superficial deism, and that he permits himself\nto be too much impressed by the anti-teleological deductions of many of his\nfollowers, and to be induced to separate in his later publications the\nCreator and his work more widely than he has done in the beginning. For\nwhile in his \"Origin of the Species,\" and in his \"Descent of Man\" he\nnowhere contests a teleological view of nature, and rejects the idea of\nsingle creations only under the erroneous supposition that the idea of the\ncreation of the single also excludes the action of intervening agencies, we\nfind, on the other hand, in \"The Expression of the Emotions in Man and\nAnimals\" a passage which, though in a reserved way, seems to give just as\nmuch support to the adversaries of teleology as to its advocates, if,\nindeed, not more. He says (page 338): \"The belief that blushing was\n_specially_ designed by the Creator is opposed to the general theory of\nevolution, which is now so largely accepted; but it forms no part of my\nduty here to argue on the general question. Those who believe in design\nwill find it difficult to account for shyness being the most frequent and\nefficient of all the causes of blushing,\" etc. This inconsistency in his\nutterances has its origin in the fact that the strength of this naturalist\ndoes not seem to lie in logical philosophic thought. {221}\n\nA. R. Wallace, the independent and contemporaneous co-originator of the\nDarwinian theory, still more evidently and more decidedly expresses himself\nfavorably as to the position of this theory in reference to religion. In\nhis \"Natural Selection,\" he says on page 368: \"It does not seem an\nimprobable conclusion that all force may be will-force; and thus, that the\nwhole universe is not merely dependent on, but actually is, the WILL of\nhigher intelligences or of one Supreme Intelligence.\"\n\nHe pronounces the belief that God created the new species in \"continual\ninterference\" with the regular process of things, a lower conception, \"a\nlimitation of the Creator's power\" (page 280), hence something which he\nmakes objection to directly in the interest of religion. Moreover, he sees,\nespecially in those stages which caused the physical development of man,\nand which became the material basis of his spiritual productions, moments\nof development which cannot be explained by natural selection or by a\ncoincidence of material circumstances, but only by the preformation of the\nbody after a certain design and for a certain purpose.\n\nRichard Owen, the celebrated anatomist, and palaeontologist of England, who,\nafter having for a long time resisted the Darwinian theories, lately\naccepted the idea of development and rejected that of selection, takes a\nsimilar position. In the last part of his \"Comparative Anatomy of\nVertebrates,\" which was issued separately in 1863 under the title\n\"Derivative Hypothesis of Life and Species,\" he sees in the causes which\nproduced the new species only the servants of a predestinating {222}\nintelligent will--for instance, the horse predestinated and prepared for\nman; and on page 90 of vol. V. of \"Transactions of the Zooelogical Society,\"\nhe says, \"that natural evolution, through secondary causes, by means of\nslow physical and organic operations through long ages, is not the less\nclearly recognizable as the act of all-adaptive Mind, because we have\nabandoned the old error of supposing it the result of a primary, direct and\nsudden act of creational construction.... The succession of species by\ncontinuously operating law is not necessarily a 'blind operation.' Such\nlaw, however designed in the properties and successions of natural objects,\nintimates, nevertheless, a preconceived progress. Organisms may be evolved\nin orderly succession, stage after stage, towards a foreseen goal, and the\nbroad features of the course may still show the unmistakable impress of\nDivine volition.\"\n\nProfessor Huxley, of London, the zealous and oft-mentioned advocate of the\ndescent of man from the ape, says--what is so energetically contested by\nhis warmest friends in Germany, by Buechner, Haeckel, O. Schmidt, and\nothers--that the teleological and the mechanical mode of viewing nature by\nno means exclude one another. He does this, of course, without going into\nany details of the religious question.\n\nAsa Gray, an eminent and highly esteemed American botanist, who is\nparticularly respected by Darwin, and is supported also by Sir Charles\nLyell in \"The Antiquity of Man,\" says in his essay on \"Natural Selection\nnot Incompatible with Natural Theology, a Free Examination of Darwin's\nTreatise\" (London, Truebner, 1861), on page 29: \"Agreeing that plants and\nanimals {223} were produced by Omnipotent _fiat_ does not exclude the idea\nof natural order and what we call secondary causes. The record of the\n_fiat_--'Let the earth bring forth grass,' etc., 'the living creature,'\netc.,--seems even to imply them, and leads to the conclusion that the\ndifferent species were produced through natural agencies.\" And on page 38:\n\"Darwin's hypothesis concerns the _order_ and not the _cause_, the _how_\nand not the _why_ of the phenomena, and so leaves the question of design\njust where it was before.\" And finally, in a passage which is adopted by\nSir Charles Lyell (ib. page 505): \"We may imagine that events and\noperations in general go on in virtue simply of forces communicated at the\nfirst, and without any subsequent interference, or we may hold that now and\nthen, and only now and then, there is a direct interposition of the Deity;\nor, lastly, we may suppose that all the changes are carried on by the\nimmediate orderly and constant, however infinitely diversified, action of\nthe intelligent efficient Cause.\"\n\nMivart, an English Catholic, most decidedly advocates a reconcilability of\nDarwinian views, and especially of the evolution theory, as he establishes\nit with the full contents of Christian orthodoxy, in his remarkable book\n\"On the Genesis of Species\" (London and New York, Macmillan & Co., 2d. ed.\n1871), in which we find a great many independent naturo-historical\ninvestigations. He assigns to the selection theory only a subordinate\nposition, but on the other hand accepts an _evolution_, and, in close\nconnection with R. Owen, explains it from inner and innate impulses of\ndevelopment of the organisms, which act now more slowly and gradually, now\nmore by impulses; he places man as to {224} his _physical_ part entirely\namong the effects of the evolution principle, although, taking into\nconsideration some utterances of Wallace, he thinks it possible, but not\nprobable, that the creation and the preceding stage of his physical nature\nis also different from that of animals. But, on the other hand, in fully\nadopting the old scholastic creationism, he supposes a special creation of\nthe _soul_, a separation of body and soul, which in this form is very\ncontestable, and might better have been replaced by a separation of natural\nand rational or of physico-psychical and pneumatical parts of his being.\nWith such a view of nature, he finds the fullest harmony between the\nevolution theory and religion, reconciles the plausible antagonism of\ncreation and development by dividing the idea of creation into a primary\ncreation (creation of the beginning out of nothing) and into a secondary\ncreation (creation through intervening agencies, although that which is\nproduced through them is still a creation and a work of the Creator), and\ndeclares his conviction that what is acting according to law in nature also\nstands under the causation and government of God like the first beginning\nof the universe--a postulate of our primary views without which the whole\nuniverse and our existence in it would harden into a cold mechanism without\nconsolation or ideality.\n\nFinally, at the assembly of the Evangelical Alliance in New York (October,\n1873), there were heard many voices of eminent advocates of a theistic and\nChristian view of the world, which maintained the full consistency of an\nevolution theory with religion and Christianity. McCosh, for instance, as\nreferee in the philosophic section as to the relation of the evolution\ntheory and {225} religion, said[10]: \"I am not sure that religion is\nentitled to insist that every species of insects has been created by a\nspecial _fiat_ of God, with no secondary agent employed.\" And still more\nplainly and more courageously, President Anderson, of the University of\nRochester, in his very remarkable address, speaks about the unnecessary and\nunworthy fear of many Christian men, when they see the appearance of\nhypotheses with which science operates. At the end of his address, he says:\n\"The evidence for the existence of a personal Creator cannot be affected by\nany considerations drawn from the mode, relative rapidity, or the nature of\nthe proximate antecedents and consequences in the creative process.\"\n\nFrom German sources, we can note fewer utterances of a friendly or at least\nneutral position between Darwinism and religion. For this fact there are\nmany reasons. One may be, that on the continent in general there is a\nsmaller number of those who, without being specialists in both realms,\nunite active religious interest and reasoning with a thorough study of\nthose naturo-historical questions, while in Great Britain\nphysico-theological studies have been for generations traditional and the\nobject of interest for the majority of educated men. A second reason,\nindeed, is that some of the warmest scientific advocates of Darwinism at\nonce attacked also theism and Christianity; hence with all those who did\nnot have time and incitement enough to study the questions for themselves,\nthey necessarily created the opinion that Darwinism really attacks even the\nfundamentals of {226} religion, and their whole tendency had but a\nrepelling influence even on scientists of deeper spiritual and ethical\ndisposition and need. Finally, in Germany as well as on the whole\ncontinent, the number of those who do not care for religious questions in\ngeneral, and who therefore interest themselves in the scientific questions\nbrought up by Darwin, but do not trouble themselves farther for their\nposition in reference to religion and Christianity, is unfortunately larger\nthan in Great Britain.\n\nNevertheless, such friendly voices are not entirely wanting in our country.\nThe botanist Alex Braun says, in his beautiful and significant lecture on\nthe importance of development in natural history, p. 48: \"Some said that\nthe descent theory denies creation, and it is true, the Darwinians\nthemselves caused this opinion by contrasting creation and development as\nirreconcilable ideas. But this contrast does not actually exist, for as\nsoon as we look upon creation as a divine effect, not merely belonging to\nthe past, or appearing in single abrupt movements, but connected and\nuniversally present in time, we can seek and find it nowhere else but in\nthe natural history of development itself.... Theologians themselves,\naccording to the Mosaic documents, acknowledge a _history_ of creation;\nnatural history, looked upon from its inner side, is nothing else but the\nfarther carrying out of the history of creation.\"\n\nEven K. E. von Baer, who expressly contests the idea of selection, thinks\nit only scientifically indefensible, but not anti-religious; an opinion\nalso held by Wigand.\n\nA similar friendly relation between Darwinism and religion is advocated by\nBraubach, in his publication, {227} \"Religion, Moral und Philosophie der\nDarwin'schen Artlehre nach ihrer Natur and ihrem Character als kleine\nParallele menschlich-geistiger Entwicklung\" (\"Religion, Morality, and\nPhilosophy of the Darwinian Doctrine of Species, as to its Nature and\nCharacter; a Small Parallel of Human Intellectual Development\"), Neuwied,\nHansen, 1869, a publication to which we pay special attention, since\nDarwin, in his \"Descent of Man,\" twice paid it the honor of a quotation. It\nis true, the essay, through its peculiar dependence on an original and\nquite arbitrarily grouped scheme, gives the impression of something very\nsingular, and is not very agreeably and easily read; but it shows such an\nenergetic union of respect for science and its work and results, with\nadhesion to all the fundamentals of Christian truth, that it has to be\nmentioned as one of the rare voices which, even in regard to the realm of\nnature, pronounce the fullest harmony between religion and science.\nBraubach finds in the animal kingdom the _elements_ of all the spiritual\nlife of mankind, even of _religion_ and _morality_; but everything is still\nwrapped in the lowest stage of sensuality. Nevertheless, he assigns to\nmankind, by its possession of the idea of _infinity_, something absolutely\nnew, absolutely superior to the animal world, and sees the Darwinian ideas,\neven in the religious and moral possession of mankind, confirmed by the\nfact that they develop themselves on the way from the sensual stage to the\nrational exactly according to the principles of Darwin--namely, through\ntransmission with individual variability in the struggle for existence,\nthrough selection of the fittest. With special earnestness, he pronounces\nthe indissoluble unity of religion and morality, {228} and says that\nreligion, as it presents itself upon Darwinian grounds, is a moral\nreligion.\n\nWe find here and there in periodicals many more voices which pronounce the\nconviction that, out of the present contest of minds, peace between\nreligion and science will result.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n_B. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND MORALITY._\n\nPRELIMINARY VIEW.\n\nWe can treat much more briefly of this portion of our task than of the\nposition of the Darwinians in reference to the religious question, for the\nreason that the contrasts in the ethical realm are far less sharply drawn\nthan in the religious realm, although in principle they are not less widely\napart. For while there are a great many men who think that it belongs to\ngood society and to the indispensable characteristics of high modern\neducation to show either cold indifference or direct hostility in reference\nto religion and to the whole religious question; while a great many of the\nmuch-read works of _belle lettres_ never tire of teaching the reading\npublic that the religious question really no longer exists for the educated\nman, on the other hand, nobody, not even the extremest atheist and enemy of\nreligion, wishes to renounce the reputation of having moral principles.\nThus it happens that the positions taken by the Darwinians in reference to\nthe ethical question are less varied than those taken by them in reference\nto the religious question. And we may also be brief for another reason,\n{229} namely, that by reviewing the position of the Darwinians in reference\nto the religious question, we have essentially prepared the way for the\nprincipal questions which will have to be treated.\n\nWe shall group the utterances upon the relation of the Darwinian theories\nto morality as we did those in regard to the relation of Darwinism to\nreligion; and shall first let the advocates of an irreconcilableness\nbetween the two speak, then those advocating a reformative influence of\nDarwinism upon morality, and finally those striving for neutrality and\npeace between the two. We shall have no occasion, except incidentally, to\ndiscriminate between the different fundamental principles and parts of\nethics, but shall in the last part of our work treat of the question\nindependently. In making subdivisions for them here, we should but cause\ninfinite repetitions, unnecessarily complicate our review, and render it\nmore difficult.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {230}\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nANTAGONISM BETWEEN DARWINISM AND MORALITY.\n\nSec. 1. _Objections to Darwinism from an Ethical Standpoint._\n\nFrom what we said at the beginning of the preceding preliminary view, it is\nevident that we have to look for the advocates of an irreconcilableness\nbetween morality and Darwinism, not in the camp of the followers of the\nlatter, but only in that of its adversaries. It is true, such advocates\nwere never wanting. In pamphlets and journals, it has been often enough\nsaid that Darwinism cuts through the nerve of life, not only of religion,\nbut also of morality.\n\nIt was demonstrated that in making man a mere product of nature, and\ndegrading him to a being that is nothing else but a more highly developed\nanimal, Darwinism takes from human personality its value, from the realms\nof morality its dignity, and from its demands their autonomy. In making the\nstruggle for existence the principle of all development and, by extending\nit to the development and social relations of man, at the same time the\nhuman social principle, it puts in place of self-denial and love the\nprinciple of egoism and boorishness and the right of the stronger, gives\nfull course to the unchaining of all animal passions, and coquettes with\nall the emotions which, flattering the animal part of man, {231} aims at\nthe subversion of all that exists and at the destruction of the ideal\nacquisitions of mankind. In tracing everything which constitutes the higher\nposition and dignity of man back to his own work, and permitting it to be\nworked out of physical, spiritual, and ethical brutishness, in slow\ndevelopment and effort, closely related to the animal kingdom, it fosters\nand nourishes haughtiness in an intolerable way. And finally, in breaking\noff and denying the dependence of man upon God, and leading to mechanical\ndeterminism, it destroys the deepest and most effective motive to moral\naction--the tracing of the moral law to the authority of the divine\nLaw-giver, and the consciousness of an individual moral responsibility.\n\nIt cannot be denied that many of the most zealous Darwinians gave too much\ncause for such a conception and representation of the ethical consequences\nof their system. In view of the fact that they applied the selection\nprinciple, with its most radical consequences, to the origin and\ndevelopment of mankind, and that they elevated the same to the ethical and\nsocial principle of mankind and did not permit the acceptance of any new\nand higher agencies in mankind except those already active in the animal\nand the organic world, and that they gladly treated this selection\nprinciple also in the social and ethical realm as a struggle for existence,\nit was simply an entirely logical conclusion that the advocates of the\nmoral nobility of mankind reproached such a reproduced Darwinism with\ndegrading the moral dignity of man and with replacing love by egoism.\nBesides, in view of the fact that they declared materialistic monism, even\nthe most naked atheism, the only conclusion of {232} Darwinism, and\nextended their mechanistic explanation of the world to a determinism in the\nhighest degree mechanistic, and, carried to its utmost limit, to a denial\nof human freedom, it was not to be wondered at that those who recognize in\ntheism the basis of all life worthy of man, and in the freedom of man one\nof the most precious pearls in the crown of his human dignity and of his\ncreation in the image of God, complained of Darwinism's taking from\nmorality its strongest motive and from moral action its responsibility.\nAnd, finally, in view of the fact that those who thus express themselves in\ntheir works showed but rarely, or not at all, some of the noblest fruits of\nmoral education, such as respectful treatment of adversaries, humbleness\nand tact, they could not themselves reasonably complain that there was\nascribed to their doctrine an influence detrimental to moral education. All\nthis we find abundantly confirmed in the publications of Buechner and\nHaeckel, and in many articles of the \"Ausland.\"\n\nBut the question is, whether those Darwinians who drew these conclusions\nwere by their scientific investigations obliged to draw them, or whether\nthey did not rather reach their religious and ethical view of the world by\nquite other ways, and whether they did not in a wholly arbitrary and\nirresponsible manner make extensive use of Darwinism in this anti-religious\nand ethically objectional direction--a fact which we shall try to prove in\nthe last part of our investigation.\n\nOf course the Darwinians who spoke thus, did not intend to injure the moral\nprinciple, but only to purify and reform it; and therefore we shall have to\nspeak of them in the following section.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {233}\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nREFORM OF MORALITY THROUGH DARWINISM.\n\nSec. 1. _The Materialists and Monists. Darwin and the English Utilitarians.\nGustav Jaeger._\n\nAmong those who ascribe to Darwinism a morally reforming influence, we have\nto mention in the first place the _materialists_. It is true that even\nbefore the appearance of Darwinism they established their own moral\nprinciple of naturalistic determinism and of the education of man only by\nscience and enlightenment, in opposition to a morality which rests on the\nprinciple of the eternal value of the individual, of full moral\nresponsibility, of the holiness of the moral law, and of a divine author of\nit; they stigmatized the ethical requirement of aiming at the eternal\nwelfare of the soul as a lower stage of morality in comparison with their\nown, which carries in itself the reward of virtue; and they declared\nChristianity and humanity, Christian morality and the morality of humanity,\ntwo things irreconcilably opposed to one another. But in having taken\npossession of Darwinism as their monopoly, they have made it the basis of\nnew attacks upon the present moral principle of Christendom; and therefore\nwe have here to mention them with their moral system.\n\nBuechner, in his lecture on \"Gottesbegriff und dessen {234} Bedeutung\" (\"The\nIdea of God and its Importance\"), replaces the moral principle (which in\nhis opinion is nothing innate but something acquired) by education,\nlearning, freedom and well-being; says that only atheism or philosophic\nmonism leads to freedom, reason, progress, acknowledgment of true\nhumanity--to humanism; that this humanism seeks the motives of its morality\nnot in the external relations to an extramundane God, but in itself and in\nthe welfare of mankind; and that infidels often, even as a rule, have\nexcelled by moral conduct, while Christianity has originated many more\ncrimes than it has hindered, and it would no longer be possible to\nestablish with real Christians a vital community as at present understood.\nHe declares the utterance of Madame de Stael, that \"to comprehend\neverything means to forgive everything,\" the truest word ever spoken; and\nconcludes his lecture with the remarks that the more man renounces his\nfaith and confides in his own power, his own reason, his own reflexion, the\nhappier he will be and the more successful in his struggle for existence.\n\nStrauss in \"The Old Faith and the New,\" a publication which certainly has\nto be ranked here, for the reason that in it he founds on Darwinism his\nwhole knowledge of the world, on the ground of which he wishes to arrange\nlife, appears to be much more decent, and in the practical consequences\nmuch more conservative, than Buechner; but essentially stands upon quite the\nsame ground. Haeckel, Oskar Schmidt, and (as to his linguistic Darwinism) W.\nBleek, group themselves around Strauss, partly with, partly without express\nreference to his deductions. {235}\n\nStrauss arrives at a peculiar inconsequence, but one well worthy of notice,\nwhen, in place of the struggle for existence which, according to the\nconclusions of those who also reduce morality to Darwinism, is still the\n_spiritus rector_ of moral development in mankind, and yet cannot of itself\npossibly lead to the morally indispensable requirements and virtues of\nself-sacrifice and of mere subordination under the moral idea, he suddenly\nsubstitutes a going of man beyond mere nature, and herewith a moral\nprinciple, which can never be deduced from Darwinism alone, and which is\ndirectly opposed to monism and pankosmism, which is to be the basis of his\nethics. The reader may compare the manner in which he metaphysically\nsupports his moral principle when he says: \"As nature cannot go higher, she\nwould go inwards. Nature felt herself already in the animal, but she\n_wished to know herself also_.... In man, nature endeavored not merely to\nexalt, but _to transcend herself_.\" Ulrici, the philosopher, in his reply\nto Strauss, has pointed out in sharp terms this inconsequence, as well as\nthe other, that from the ground of a blind necessity which does not know\nanything of a higher and a lower, the difference of higher and lower, good\nand bad, rational and irrational, cannot at all be maintained; and that the\nrequirement of a progress cannot at all be made, and its idea not at all be\ngiven. In this very perceptible inconsistency, Strauss calls that morality\nwhich he requires, \"_the relation of man to the idea of his kind_.\" To\nrealize the latter in himself, is the summary of his duties toward himself;\nactually to recognize and promote the equality of the kind in all the\nothers, is the {236} summary of his duties towards others. He opposes the\ninternal satisfaction which originates therein, to the \"rough\" idea of a\nreward of virtue and piety, coming from _without_, which, in order to\nconnect both, is in need of a God. And he again reaches that inconsequence\nwhich from his metaphysical standpoint is entirely without motive, but as\nto itself only worthy to be recognized, when in another formula of his\nmoral imperative he says: \"Ever remember that thou art human, not _merely a\nnatural production_.\"\n\nIt is also this representation and realization of the _idea of the kind_,\nwhich those who combine with their Darwinism a negation of theism have\nmostly established before the appearance of the work of Strauss as the\nhighest moral principle, and to which they are also led most naturally by\nDarwin's deduction of morality from the social instincts. Thus, Wilhelm\nBleek, in the preface to his \"Ursprung der Sprache\" (\"Origin of Language\"),\nsays (page XIII): \"To aim at the inner and outer harmony of his genus in\none or the other way, and to promote the correct relations of the different\nparts to one another in their reciprocal connections and in the greater\nparts of the whole organism (family, community, nation), are the highest\nvisible designs of human existence, which must by themselves incite man to\nnoble actions and to virtuous deeds. In the performance of this task lies\nthe highest happiness which seems to be given to our species, a happiness\naccessible by everyone in his own way. Neither the fruit of eternal\npunishment nor the hope of an individual happiness, is really capable as a\ntruly saving idea to elevate man to a higher existence; even if we take no\naccount of the fact that {237} each of these two fundamental dogmas of the\nvulgar dogmatism makes but refined egoism the lever of its ethics.\"\n\nHaeckel alone, in his \"Natural History of Creation,\" with his utterances as\nto Christianity, morality, and the history of the world, again sinks down\nto the level of the coarseness of Buechner, and even below it. On page 19,\nvol. I, he entirely contests the reality of the moral order of the world,\nand continues: \"If we contemplate the common life, and the mutual relations\nbetween plants and animals (man included), we shall find _everywhere_ and\n_at all times_, the very opposite of that kindly and peaceful social life,\nwhich the goodness of the Creator ought to have prepared for his\ncreatures--we shall rather find _everywhere_ a pitiless, most embittered\n_struggle of all against all_. Nowhere in nature, no matter where we turn\nour eyes, does that idyllic peace, celebrated by the poets, exist; we find\neverywhere a _struggle_ and a _striving to annihilate_ neighbors and\ncompetitors. _Passion and selfishness, conscious or unconscious, is\neverywhere the motive force of life._ Man in this respect certainly forms\nno exception to the rest of the animal world.\" On page 237, vol. I, he\nprofesses the most extreme naturalistic determinism: \"The will of the\nanimal, _as well as that of man_, is never free. The widely spread dogma of\nthe freedom of the will is, from a scientific point of view, altogether\nuntenable.\" And on page 170, vol. I, he even says: \"If, as we maintain,\nnatural selection is the great active cause which has produced the whole\nwonderful variety of organic life on the earth, all the interesting\nphenomena of _human life_ must also be explicable from the same cause. For\nman is after all {238} only a most highly-developed vertebrate animal, and\nall aspects of human life have their parallels, or, more correctly, their\nlower stages of development, in the animal kingdom. The _whole history of\nnations_, or what is called _universal history, must therefore be\nexplicable by means of natural selection,--must be a physico-chemical\nprocess_, depending upon the interaction of adaptation and inheritance in\nthe struggle for life. And this is actually the case.\" That in his ethical\nnaturalism he sees a real reform of morality, he expressly declares on the\npage next to the last of his \"Natural History of Creation\": \"Just as this\nnew monistic philosophy first opens up to us a true understanding of the\nreal universe, so its application to practical human life must open up _a\nnew road towards moral perfection_.\" (Vol. II, p. 367.)\n\nIn the low conception of morality and its principle, Haeckel is perhaps\nseconded only by Seidlitz who says in his \"Die Darwin'she Theorie\"\n(\"Darwin's Theory\"), p. 198: \"Rational and moral life consist in the\nsatisfaction of all physical functions, in correct proportion and relation\nto one another. Man is immoral through excessive satisfaction of one\nfunction and through neglect of the others.\"\n\nAs in the religious question, so in the ethical, Carneri also takes a\npeculiar position. In reducing all the phenomena of existence, together\nwith the whole spiritual life of mankind, to a close development of nature\naccording to the causal law, in expressly grouping also the utterances of\nthe will of man under this law of an absolute necessity, in fully adopting\nDarwin's doctrine as the wholly satisfactory key for the comprehension of\nthe entire development of nature up to the history of {239} mankind, in\nadvocating an absolutely monistic determinism and a nearly exclusive\ndependence of the efficacy of moral principles on the theoretic cultivation\nof the mind, on reasoning and education, he, as before mentioned, stands on\nexactly the same ground with materialists and monists among whom he\nexpressly ranks himself; in the inconsequence with which he makes\nconcessions to the power of the idea and the ideal over man--concessions\nwhich could never be concluded from a mere immanent process of nature--he\nis closely related to Strauss. But it is peculiar that, although entirely\ndependent in his reasoning on that monistic view of the world, and that\nDarwinian view of nature, he defines his ethical developments and his\nreflections on the organizations of human life in a relative independence,\nwhich again separates him as moralist from these before-mentioned monists\nand materialists, and rather ranks him, as we have seen in Chap. I, Sec. 4, in\nthe line of the disciples of Spinoza and Hegel. From this it can also be\nexplained, how it could happen that in criticisms and reviews of Darwinism\nand its literature the standpoint which he takes could find such different\nand diametrically opposed expositions. While, for instance, the \"Beweis des\nGlaubens,\" in the March number of 1873, thinks that Carneri wishes to seek\non Darwinian ground a new and better basis for morality than we had\nheretofore; while Haeckel in the preface to the third edition of his\n\"Natural History of Creation,\" page XXIX, mentions the publication of\nCarneri with the greatest praise, earnestly recommends all theologians and\nphilosophers to read it, and greets it as the first successful attempt at\napplying fruitfully the monistic view {240} of the world, as established by\nDarwinism, to the realm of practical philosophy and at showing that the\nimmense progress of our knowledge of the world caused by the descent theory\nhas only the most beneficial effect upon the further progressing\ndevelopment of mankind in practical life;--a criticism in the \"Ausland\" (8\nApril, 1872, No. 15), calls the same publication \"an attempt at harmonizing\nDarwin's hypothesis with the current views of ethics, and at showing that\nthose doctrines cannot be sustained which result as strictly logical\nconclusions from Darwin's theory, and which are opposed to the present\nviews of morality.\"\n\nIn returning from this digression to Darwinism in its purest form, to\nDarwin himself, we have in the first place to resume the discussion entered\nupon as to the way and manner in which, according to Darwin,\nself-determination is originated. Love and sympathy, moral feeling (with\nthis definition he seems to point at the consciousness of moral freedom of\nwill and of responsibility), and conscience, are to him very important\nelements of morality; and in the moral disposition of man he sees the\ngreatest of all differences between man and animal. He also willingly\nacknowledges the powerful impulse which morality has from religion, when he\nsays (\"Descent of Man,\" Vol. II, page 347): \"With the more civilized races,\nthe conviction of the existence of an all-seeing Deity has had a potent\ninfluence on the advance of morality.\" From these and all his other\ndeductions, we see that Darwin in no way intends to modify the maxims of\nmoral action; and if under the expression \"reform of morality,\" with which\nwe have headed the present chapter, we should understand but {241} a reform\nof moral action itself, we should without hesitation have to rank Darwin\nwith the next group, and not with that of which we now treat; just as in\nour review of the position of Darwinism in reference to the religious\nquestion, we had to rank him with those who take a neutral and peaceful\nposition in reference to religion.\n\nBut if he does not touch upon morality in the maxims, he nevertheless comes\nforth in the _theory_ of moral action, in the science of morality with\nreformatory claims,--namely, with the fact that reduces the whole moral\nlife to those agencies which are already active in the preceding animalic\nstage. It is true, he makes, as we have seen, a distinction in the genetic\nderivation of morality. He wholly reduces love and sympathy to social\ninstincts which man has in common with the animal; and he lets the formal\nmotives of moral action, sense of duty and conscience, originate through\nthe high development of intelligence and other spiritual forces, and to be\nincreased and transmitted by custom and inheritance, if those are present.\nBut, on the other hand, development of intelligence is to him an exclusive\nproduct of the preceding stage on which it was developed, and thus, in his\nopinion, entire morality, notwithstanding that double derivation, certainly\nhas purely and exclusively the natural basis as its origin. If that is once\nthe standpoint to which man sees himself led, he has, in order to reason\nlogically, but a double choice. He must either say that a development out\nof a natural basis can possibly be consistent with the appearance of a new\nand higher principle, or must give up the autonomy of the moral law, and\nleave the moral action of {242} man, even in his maxims, to the unsteady\nflowing of development, or even of arbitrariness, and to the degree of\neducation and intelligence of subjectivity. Neither the one nor the other\nis done by Darwin. It is true, on the one hand he shows that modesty, so\noften exhibited by him, of the investigator who does not wish to express\nany opinion on questions regarding which he has not yet attained a mature\njudgment; but on the other hand he also manifests the same aversion to\ngoing beyond purely naturo-historical speculations which, as we have seen\nin Part I, Book II, Chapter I, Sec. 1, hindered him from obtaining a clear\nconception of the importance of the question as to the origin of\nself-consciousness and of moral self-determination, and the same want of\nsequence in reasoning, which, as we have found in Chap. III, prevented him\nfrom giving an affirmative or negative decision in such an important\nquestion, as whether a divine end is to be observed in the processes of the\nworld.\n\nIn this naturalization of ethical principles, he is closely related to that\npeculiar moral-philosophic tendency in England, which long before Darwin's\nappearance, took its origin in John Stuart Mill, but which now, in the\nclosest connection with Darwin's principles, has its main advocate in\nHerbert Spencer, and is commonly called the _utilitarian_ tendency. We\nunderstand by this that conception of the moral motive which allows the\nmoral good, however it may be ideally separated from the useful in the\ndeveloped condition of mankind at the present time, in its origin to be\ndeveloped at the outset from the same origin as the useful,--namely, from\nthe sensation of like and dislike; a theory of utility which Sir John\nLubbock still tried to complete and deepen by {243} the theory of an\ninheritance of the sensation of authority. Activities which originally\nproved to be only useful, were inherited as traditional instinct by the\noffspring, and were thus freed from the sensation of the useful, and acted\nas _authority_; this is the origin of _duty_, according to the history of\ndevelopment. Inasmuch as this philosophic system aims at taking from ethics\nthe absoluteness of its demands, and at drawing down these demands into the\nactivities of originating and developing, it is also to be treated of in\nthis place.\n\nAs in the religious question, so in the ethical, Gustav Jaeger also stands\nnearer to a neutral relation between Darwinism and the hitherto valid\nprinciples. He puts the moral principles the same as the religious, into\nthe balance of utility to man in his struggle for existence, and finds it\nthus easy and to be taken for granted, that the principles of morality, as\nthey became the common property of mankind as influenced by Christianity,\nreally prove themselves also the most serviceable to mankind. Social life\nis of more benefit to man than hermit life; this reflection leads him to\nthe moral principle of charity. And as, according to Darwinism, rising\ndevelopment shows itself in an increasing differentiation and more richly\norganized physical development, so the organization of society according to\nthe principle of the division of work is that form of social life which\nproves itself the most practical to man; and this reflection leads him to\nthe full acknowledgment of the entire ethical organization of human life\nand its tasks.\n\nBut, as we saw, in treating of the religious question, that nobody, neither\nfriend nor foe, could possibly be {244} satisfied with the substitution of\nthe category of utility for that of truth, we are compelled to say in\nreference to the ethical question, that a moral principle which, on such a\nfoundation, has its basis and authority only in its utility, is really no\nauthority, and loses its value with every individual who is unwilling to\nacknowledge its utility and thinks another ground of action may be more\nuseful than the moral.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {245}\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nNEUTRALITY AND PEACE BETWEEN DARWINISM AND MORALITY.\n\nSec. 1. _Mivart, Alex. Braun, and Others._\n\nEvidently a real neutrality between the Darwinian theories of development\nand the hitherto valid and absolute authority of the moral principle is\npossible only, when we deny that the ethical demand is simply a natural\nprocess--although we may perceive its origin within the limits of a natural\nprocess--and when we fail to identify that demand with this process, and do\nnot deduce it from the latter as its sufficient ground of explanation; but\nharmony between the two theories, in spite of all traces of Darwinism in\nthe scientific parts of anthropology, is possible when we acknowledge the\nmoral demand, if once present and valid, in its entire and, so to speak,\nits metaphysical independence in its full value, far exceeding all natural\nnecessity.\n\nIt is shown by Mivart that such an absolute authority of the ethical\ndemands, and such an independence of the whole science of morality, may be\nbrought into accord with the scientific theories of development. In his\nbook on \"The Genesis of Species,\" he devotes a whole chapter to ethical\nquestions. He discriminates, in the moral good, between the formal good\n(good with consciousness and will of the good) and the {246} material good\n(good without consciousness and design), ascribes only the latter to the\nanimal world in its moral features, and the former exclusively to mankind,\nand thus takes ground quite analogous to that held by him on the religious\nquestion, where he includes in the theory of development the physical part\nof man, but excludes the intellectual part, with the single qualification\nthat in the religious question he unnecessarily renders his position more\ndifficult by designating this intellectual or spiritual part by the term\n\"soul.\"\n\nGerman authorities, who see in Darwinism only a scientific question which\ncan be solved by means of natural investigation, and who therefore, think\nthe religious and ethical questions but little affected by it, have\nexpressed themselves in regard to this neutral position toward morality\nstill more rarely than as to its neutrality toward religion. The reason for\nthis is probably that the independence of moral principles and the\nabsoluteness of their authority entirely result from themselves, as soon as\nwe have once admitted theism and left room in general for a freedom\nstanding above natural causality--and perhaps it is due to the further fact\nthat the realm of the moral is more palpably urged as a reality and\nnecessity upon even the most indifferent mind than the realm of religion.\n\nOn the other hand, we find frequent utterances which _indirectly_ refer to\nthe ethical realm--for instance, expressions in reference to the ethical\nimportance of an animal descent of man. Alex. Braun says: \"Man _assents_ to\nthe idea of being appointed _lord_ of the creatures, but then he may also\nacknowledge that he is not placed over his subjects as a stranger, but\noriginated from the {247} beings whose lord he wishes to be. It is not an\nunworthy idea, but rather an elevating one, that man constitutes the last\nand highest member in the ancient and infinitely rich development of\norganic nature on our planet, being connected by the most intimate bonds of\nrelationship with the other members, as the latter are connected among\nthemselves with one another: not a pernicious parasite on the tree of\nnatural life, but the true son of the blissful mother Nature.\" In reducing\ndescent, which he accepts, to a development from an _inner_ force, and in\nascribing to the Darwinian selection, with its struggle for existence, the\nvalue only of a regulator (he adopts this term of Wallace as a very\nstriking one), Braun, in his concluding appeal to young students, calls\nespecial attention to the ethical importance of a development proceeding\nfrom within, saying: \"Life has its outer and its inner side; all its works\nand ways must follow mechanical laws, but its tasks and aims belong to a\nhigher realm. We are permitted to take a glance into this realm through the\nall-embracing history of the development of nature, which leads up into our\nown inmost being, up to our highest end. Truly progressive development is\nthe best wish for every youth,\" etc.\n\nInasmuch as that in which Alex. Braun finds a satisfaction for the\nfulfillment of the ethical tasks--namely, a deeper knowledge of man's\nconnection with lower nature, and the pointing to the proper tasks of the\ndevelopment of mankind,--has thus far been the substance of all sound\nsystems of morality, we did not mention these and similar utterances, of\nwhich we could gather many more from other writers, in the preceding part\nof our {248} work--_i.e._, in describing those who ascribe to Darwinism a\nreformatory influence upon morality; but we rank these utterances with\nthose which predict from the descent theory neither injury to morality nor\nany especial enlightenment regarding it.\n\nWe have now reached the end of that part of our work which considers and\ntreats of the views of others. To our regret, we have been compelled to\nrestrict ourselves, in this review, to the countries of the English and\nGerman tongues; the former being the home of Darwin, the latter our own. We\nshould have preferred to take into our review also the literature of France\nand Belgium, Holland and Italy; but we feared being able to give only an\nincomplete report. Besides, it is in Germany and Great Britain--and partly\nalso in North America, related to both in language and origin--where the\nDarwinian agitation has taken deepest hold of the mind; and, in restricting\nour report to these countries, we are not likely to have omitted any view\nessential to the consideration of the present question. It is true that in\nthe other countries named the Darwinian literature is also rich, and we are\nwell aware of the incompleteness of our report in that respect. But we\nbelieve that we have not omitted any essential views and evidences, even if\nthe names of many of their advocates have not been mentioned.\n\nIt still remains to us to investigate independently the position of the\nDarwinian theories, with their philosophic supplements, in reference to\nreligion and morality: a task for which we hope to have essentially\nprepared the way through the preceding representations and investigations.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {249}\n\n\nBOOK II.\n\nANALYTICAL.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPRELIMINARY VIEW.\n\nIn treating the _religious_ question, we proceed from the supposition that\nreligion is concerned not only in this subjective truth of religious\nimpulse and sensation, but also in the objective truth and reality of its\nfaith, although it attains these in a different way from natural science. A\nreligion which should have the authorization of its existence only in\npsychology, and which was not allowed to ask whether the object of its\nfaith also has objective reality, would stand on a weak basis, and its end\nwould only be a question of time; for an impulse which can only be\npsychologically established, and to which no real objective necessity could\ncorrespond, must sooner or later either be proven a psychological error or\nbe eliminated by progressing culture. On the other hand, if we find a\nreconcilableness or an irreconcilableness of Darwin's views with the\nobjective substance of religion, the possible question as to its\nreconcilableness or irreconcilableness with subjective religiousness on the\nground of those results wholly answers itself. In no way, not even in the\nmost indirect, can we approve that method of book-keeping by which\nsomething can be true in regard to religion and false in regard to science,\nor vice-versa; on the contrary, we see {250} in all attempts at healing in\nsuch a way the rupture which at present exists in the minds of so many,\nonly a more emphatic avowal of that rupture.\n\nIn treating of the religious question as it affects the position of\nDarwinism in reference to the substance and the objective truth of the\nreligious faith, without going into a detailed treatment of the question of\nthe reconcilableness of a purely subjective religiousness with the\nDarwinian views, it will be of advantage to speak first of the position of\nthe Darwinian theories in reference to the basis of all true and sound\nreligion and religiousness--the _theistic view of the world_. In doing\nthis, we shall discriminate the purely scientific theories of Darwin from\nthe philosophic supplements and conclusions which have been given to and\ndrawn from them, and shall have to consider each of them separately in\nconnection with the theistic view of the world. If thereby we shall\ndiscover Darwinian views which can be brought into accord with a theistic\nview of the world, we shall also, in order to close our investigation, have\nto consider them with those parts of the theology of _positive\nChristianity_ which can be affected by the Darwinian questions.\n\nIn treating the question of the relation of Darwinism to morality, our\ninvestigation can be somewhat abridged, because many of the principal\nquestions which have to be considered have found their solution in what has\nbeen previously said, and partly also because they will present themselves\nin it different form.\n\nThe principal division in our discussion we shall most appropriately assign\nto ethics, and thus treat first of the position of Darwinism in reference\nto the moral principles, and then treat of this in reference to the\nconcrete {251} moral life. Where the question as to the position of\nDarwinism in reference to morality occurs, we shall no longer have to treat\nof it separately as to the different aspects of its problems--we should\notherwise get lost in too many repetitions; but we shall only have to\nseparate an ethical naturalism which supports itself upon Darwinian\ngrounds, from pure Darwinism, and to treat of each in turn as to its\nposition in reference to morality.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {252}\n\n\n_A. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND RELIGION._\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND THE THEISTIC VIEW OF THE WORLD.\n\nA. THE POSITION OF PURELY SCIENTIFIC DARWINISM IN REFERENCE TO THEISM.\n\nSec. 1. _Scientific Investigation and Theism. The Idea of Creation._\n\nAt the very beginning of our investigation, we have to state that the\nabsolute freedom of scientific investigation lies not only in the interest\nof natural science, but just as clearly in the direct interest of religion;\nand that every attempt at limiting the freedom of scientific investigation\nin a pretended religious interest, can only have its cause in the fullest\nmisapprehension of that which the religious interest requires. For the\nreligious view of the world consists in this: that it sees in the universe,\nwith all its inhabitants and processes, the work of an almighty Creator and\nRuler of the world; and therefore it cannot be unimportant to it, whether\nwe also have a knowledge of this work, to a certain extent, whether we make\nuse of the means which lead to the knowledge of the world, {253} and\nwhether we make progress in the knowledge, or not. The religious view of\nthe world sees in every correction and enrichment of our scientific\nknowledge only a correction and enrichment of our knowledge of the way and\nmanner of the divine creation and action; and every such correction and\nenrichment acts directly as an incitement to religiousness--although,\nfortunately for the universal destination of religion, the degree of our\nreligiousness is not dependent upon the degree of our knowledge of nature.\nTherefore, the religious view of the world does not throw any barriers in\nthe way of scientific investigation; it does not prescribe the route by\nwhich the latter is to reach its aim, and it does not forbid it any\nscientific auxiliary means, nor, indeed, any scientific auxiliary\nhypothesis, nor does it, so far as the communication of scientific\nknowledge is concerned, inquire after the religious or the irreligious\nstandpoint of those who offer it such knowledge. In all these directions,\nit knows of but one requirement: that of exact and correct presentation; in\na word, of but one requirement of _truth_. Real, well-founded, and certain\nresults of natural science can never come into antagonism with religion;\nfor precisely the same thing which in the language of natural science is\ncalled natural causal connection, is in that of religion called the way and\nmanner of divine action and government. Where man has adopted any view, the\nproving of which, according to its nature, belongs to natural science, and\nnatural science should show an error in such a view, he must simply give it\nup and surrender the erroneous opinion, that such a view is to form a\nconstituent part of our religious perception. Just as decidedly, on the\nother hand, religion can ask of {254} natural science that it should not\nuse speculative views of religious character, the proving of which belongs\nto the science of religion, for the purpose of scientific generalizations,\nin case the science of religion should prove that such views are\nantagonistic to the nature and the principles of religion.\n\nThose who, on religious grounds, look with suspicion upon scientific\ninvestigation, are frequently influenced by two erroneous notions, closely\nrelated to one another, without regard to the well-grounded aversion to the\natheistic beauty with which so many scientific works are adorned. One of\nthese errors is the notion that any object is remote from divine causality\nin the degree in which it has the cause of its origin in the natural\nconnection, and that it would be easier for us to trace the origin of an\nobject to the authorship of God, if we could not find any natural cause of\nits origin, than if we had knowledge of such a natural cause. The other\nerror is the notion that the idea of \"creation\" excludes the idea of the\naction of secondary causes.\n\nIf the first mentioned opinion were correct, those certainly would be right\nwho identify the progress of sciences with the progress of atheism; and\nignorance would then be the most effective protection of piety. But this\nopinion is in direct conflict with all sound religious and scientific\nreasoning. It is in conflict with sound religious reasoning: for the\nreligious view of the world sees in nature itself, with its whole\nassociation of causes and effects, a work of God; and as certainly as,\naccording to the religious view of nature, a thousand years in the sight of\nGod are but as yesterday when it is past, just so certainly is an object a\nwork of {255} God, whether its origin is due to milliards of _well-known_\nsecondary causes, which all together are works of God--as well with\nreference to the laws which they obey as to the materials and forces in\nwhich these laws are active--or whether, when treating the question as to\nthe immediate cause of its existence, we see ourselves led to an agency\n_unknown_ to us. And that opinion is also in conflict with all sound\nscientific reasoning: for the fact that we do not have any knowledge of the\nimmediate cause of a phenomenon, is by no means a proof that this immediate\ncause is the direct action of God who does not use any secondary causes;\nthe phenomena may just as well have still more material or immaterial\nsecondary causes, unknown to us. We will illustrate the error, referred to,\nby an example which will also reveal its relationship to the other error of\nwhich we shall have to speak immediately. It is certainly no evidence of an\nespecially intensive piety, if we build the conviction that God is the\nCreator of man, among other things, on the obscurity in which for us the\norigin of mankind is wrapped. For from this obscurity no other conclusion\ncan be drawn than increased proofs of the limitation of our knowledge; that\npiety which traces those phenomena whose natural causes we know, just as\ndecidedly to the causality of God, is much more--we shall not say,\nintensive, but correctly guided--than that piety which traces back those\nwhose natural causes are hidden to us. And, on the other hand, it is also\nno evidence of especial religious coolness or indifference, when we pursue\nwith interest and the desire of success the attempts at bringing light into\nthe history of the origin of mankind. He who does the latter can, according\nto his religious or {256} irreligious standpoint, just as easily connect\nhis interest with the hope of an enrichment of his knowledge of the ways\nand works of God, as with the hope of a confirmation in his atheistic view\nof the world. The reverence with which we stand before the action of God in\nthose works whose existence is in a higher degree a mystery to us than the\nexistence of others (for in reality everything is a mystery to us), is\nperhaps a little differently modified from the reverence with which we\nstand before the action of God in those of his works in the mode of whose\norigin we are permitted to get a deeper glance; but each is reverence, and\nwe can get from both nutriment for our religious nature.\n\nThose who favor the second error--namely, that the idea of creation\nexcludes the idea of secondary causes--overlook the facts that the idea of\nthe creation of the universe is essentially different from the idea of the\ncreation of the single elements of the universe, as, for instance, of the\nearth, of the organisms, of man; that the idea of a creation without\nsecondary causes can only be applied to the origin of the universe in its\nelements, forces, and laws, and that the first origin of the single\nelements in the world--as of the single planets, organisms, man--not only\nadmits the action of secondary causes, but even requires and presupposes\nthe action of conditions. For all single species of beings which have\noriginated within the already existing world, have also certain elements,\neven the whole basis and condition of their existence, in common with that\nwhich was already before in existence; the planet has its elements in\ncommon with the elements of other planets, the organic has the same\nmaterial substances as the inorganic, man has {257} the elements and the\norganization of his body as well as a great part of his psychical activity\nin common with animals. Nothing urges us to suppose--and the analogy of all\nthat we know even forbids us to suppose--that with the appearance of a new\nspecies of beings, the same matter and the same quality of matter which the\nlast appearance has in common with the already existing, has each time been\ncalled anew into existence out of nothing. Only that which in the new\nspecies is really new, comes into existence anew with its first appearance.\nBut we do not even know whether the proximate cause of this new does really\ncome into existence for the first time, or whether it was not before in\nexistence in a real, perhaps latent, condition, and is now set free for the\nfirst time. In the one case as in the other, we shall call the new, which\ncomes into existence, a new creation. And if man thinks that the new only\ndeserves the name of creation, when it occurs suddenly and at once, where\nbefore only other things were present, like a _deus ex machina_, certainly\nsuch an opinion is only a childlike conception, which becomes childish as\nsoon as we scientifically reason about the process. It cannot be doubtful\nthat religious minds which are not accustomed to scientific reasoning, have\nsuch a conception; whether theologians also favor it, we do not know,\nalthough it is possible. Certainly those scientists who intend to attack\nthe faith in a living Creator and Lord of the world, take it as the wholly\nnatural, even as the only possible, conception of a Creator and his\ncreation; and of course it is to them a great and cheap pleasure to become\nvictorious knights in such a puppet-show view of the conception of\ncreation. But the source whence Christians derive their {258} religious\nknowledge tells them precisely the contrary. The Holy Scripture, it is\ntrue, sees in the entire universe a work of God. But where it describes the\ncreation of the single elements of the world, it describes at the same time\ntheir creation as the product of natural causes, brought about by natural\nconditions. The reader may see, for instance, the words: \"And God said, Let\nthe earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, etc. And _the earth\nbrought forth_ grass and herb,\" etc. \"And God said, Let _the earth bring\nforth the living creature_.\" Even the creation of man is thus related: \"And\nthe Lord God _formed_ man of the dust of the ground.\" Certainly the forming\npresupposes a matter out of which man is formed. And, on the other hand,\nwhere the Bible speaks of single beings in the kingdoms long before created\nand perfected, of the individual man who is originated by generation and\nbirth, of single plants and animals--in general, of single processes and\nphenomena in the world long before perfected, of wind and waves, of rain\nand flames, which altogether have their natural causes of origin--it speaks\nof them all precisely in the same way as when describing their first\ncreation as works of God. The expressions \"create, make, form, cause to\nappear,\" are applied to the single individuals of the kingdoms long before\ncreated, precisely in the same way as they are to the first origin of the\nfirst individuals of those kingdoms.\n\nThus, by the full freedom which religious interest gives to scientific\ninvestigation, we are well prepared to treat with entire impartiality the\nquestion as to the position of each of the Darwinian theories in reference\nto theism. {259}\n\nSec. 2. _The Descent Theory and Theism._\n\nIn the first part of our investigation, we found that the idea of the\norigin of the species, especially of the higher organized species, through\ndescent from the next related lower ones, has a high degree of probability,\nalthough it is still not proven in a strictly scientific sense, and\nalthough especially the supposition of an often-separated primitive\ngeneration of single types is not excluded by that idea, and we can hardly\nsuppose that the main types of the animal kingdom are developed out of one\nanother. Now we are far from asking of _religion_ to decide for itself in\nfavor of the one or the other mode of conception, or to place its influence\nin the one or the other balance-scale of scientific investigations. It\nleaves the answering of these questions exclusively to natural science,\nknowing beforehand that it will be able to come to an understanding with\nthe one as well as with the other result of its investigations. But we\nconfess frankly that it is incomparably _easier_ for us to bring the origin\nof the higher groups of organisms in accord with a theistic and\nteleological view of the world through descent than the origin of each\nsingle species of organisms through a primitive generation; and we reach\nthis result especially by the attempt at teleologically perceiving the\npalaeontological remains of organic life on earth. Theism and teleology see\nin the origin of things a striving towards a goal, a rising from the lower\nto the higher, a development--it is true a development really taken only in\nthe ideal sense of an ideal connection, of a plan; or, as K. E. v. Baer, in\n1834, in his lecture on the most common law of nature in all development,\nexpresses {260} himself, of a progressive victory of mind over matter. Such\na plan and its realization we can much more easily conceive when, in the\npast genera which geological formations show us, a genealogical connection\ntakes place between the preceding species and the now living species, than\nwhen each species perished and beside or after it the newly appearing\nspecies always originated out of the inorganic through primitive\ngeneration. In the first case, we see in the preceding a _real_ preparation\nfor the following, and also easily perceive, the apparent waste of enormous\nperiods of time for the successive processes of creation. In the second\ncase, the coming and going of genera in innumerable thousands of years,\nwithout any exterior connection, becomes an incomprehensible problem, and\nthe striving towards an end according to a regular plan, which we observe\nin the development, of the organic kingdoms on earth, disappears completely\nin metaphysical darkness.\n\nPrecisely because so many advocates of a theistic view of the world have\nthought that for the sake of the theistic idea of creation they were\nobliged to suppose a primitive origin of all the organic species, and\nbecause, nevertheless, the fact is patent that in the course of the\npre-historic thousands of years myriads of species came and perished, not\nto return again, they became liable to the reproach on the part of the\nadversaries of theism, that the Creator, as they supposed him, makes\nunsuccessful attempts, which he has to throw away, as the potter a\ndefective vessel, until he finally succeeds in making something durable and\nuseful; and this objection was and is still made, not only to these\nsuperficial theists and their unhappily-selected and indefensible position,\nbut to {261} the whole view of the world of theism itself and to the faith\nin God and the Creator in general.\n\nFor all these reasons, we can from the religious point of view but welcome\nthe idea of a descent of species. Philologists have, if we are correctly\ninformed, the canon that as a rule the more difficult text is the more\ncorrect one; but we doubt whether those should adopt this canon who try to\nread in the book of nature, whether with the eye of science or with that of\nreligion--unless the faculty of reasoning is given to us in order to\nconceal the truth.\n\nBut, we have also to look for a manner of reconciling theism with all the\ndifferent possibilities under which a descent is at all reasonable and\nconceivable. One of these possibilities is that of an entirely successive\ndevelopment of species out of one another by imperceptibly small\ntransitions; and of this we shall soon speak. Another is the possibility of\na descent by leaps, through a metamorphosis of germs or a heterogenetic\ngeneration. The real causes of such a heterogenetic generation, if it took\nplace at all, have not yet been found; therefore we have to treat only of\nthe abstract possibilities of its conceivableness. There are two such\npossibilities.\n\nThe birth of a new species took place in one of two ways: Either to those\nmaterials and forces which formed the germ of the new species, were added\nentirely new metaphysical agencies which did not exist before, and only the\nbasis and the frame within which the new appeared, or that which the new\nspecies has in common with the old mother-species had the cause of its\nexistence in the preceding. Likewise even the original productions {262} of\nman are always composed of two factors--of the given pre-suppositions and\nconditions, and of the new which on their basis and within their frame\ncomes into existence. Otherwise the causes of the new which was to\noriginate already lay in all former stages, but were still latent and still\nhindered in their activity, and only at the time of the birth the new\nimpulse came which set them free for their activity. This new impulse may\nvery well belong to the causal connection of the universe, and be caused by\nsomething analogous to natural selection.\n\nIn the first case, which in its application to the origin of man is adopted\nby A. R. Wallace and Karl Snell, the reconciliation between descent and\ntheism has not the least difficulty; for if the agency which in the\nnew-appearing species produces that which is specifically new in it, came\nonly into existence with the first formation of the germs of the new\nspecies in the mother-species, this new certainly cannot have its origin\nanywhere else than in the supermundane _prima causa_ in the Creator and\nLord of the world.\n\nIn the second case also, theism is in no way threatened. For if we have to\nrefer the cause of a new phenomenon in the world so far back as even to the\nbeginning and the first elements of all things, we nevertheless have to\narrive at last at the cause of all causes; and this is the living God, the\nCreator and Lord of the world. Thus the new form of existence would anyhow\nhave the cause of its existence in God; and the value, the importance, and\nthe substance of its existence, would only commence from where it really\nmade its appearance, and not from where its still latent causes existed. As\nlittle as we attribute to the just fecundated {263} egg of man the value of\nman, although we know that under the right conditions the full man is to be\ndeveloped out of it, just so little in accordance with that view would the\ndifferences of value within the created world be dissolved in a mass of\natoms or potencies of a similar value. Neither should we have to fear that\nfrom such a theory cold deism would be substituted for our theism, full of\nlife. For as certainly as theism does not exclude, but includes, all that\nis relative truth in deism, so certainly the supposition that the Creator\nhad laid the latent causes of all following creatures in the first germs of\nthe created, would also not exclude the idea of a constant and omnipotent\npresence of the Creator in the world. Undoubtedly it belongs to our most\nelementary conceptions of God, that we have to conceive his lofty position\nabove time, not as an abstract distance from finite development, but, as an\nabsolute domination over it; so that for God himself, who creates time and\ndevelopments in time, there is no dependence on the temporal succession of\ncreated things, and it is quite the same to him whether he instantly calls\na creature into existence, or whether he prepares it in a short space of\ntime, or years, or in millions of years. In this idea we also find the only\npossible and simple solution of the before-mentioned problem of a timeless\ntime which Fr. Vischer wishes to propose to philosophy.\n\nSec. 3. _The Evolution Theory and Theism._\n\nIn speaking of an evolution theory, in distinction from the descent theory,\nwe mean, as is evident from the first part of our work, that way and mode\nof {264} constructing the doctrine of the descent of species which permit\nthis descent to take place, not by the leaps of a metamorphosis of germs,\nbut by transitions so imperceptably small that the difference of two\ngenerations which lie in the same line of descent, is never greater than\nthose differences which always take place between parents and children of\nthe same species--transitions so gradual that only the continuation of\nthese individual changes in a single direction produces an increase and,\nfinally and gradually, the new species. The treatment of the question as to\nwhat position this _evolution theory_ takes regarding theism, is even more\nsimple than answering the question as to the position of the descent idea\nin reference to theism.\n\nFor now we have no longer to discuss the different possibilities of a\ndevelopment, as heretofore we have discussed those of a descent, but only\nthe idea of a gradual development or of an evolution in general. Of such\npossibilities, it is true, we find several. In the first place, we can look\nfor the inciting principle of the development of species either in the\ninterior of organisms, or we can see it approaching the latter from\nwithout. The only scientific system which has made any attempt at\nmentioning and elaborating the inciting principle of development is that of\nDarwin; a system that chooses the second of the alternatives just stated\nand sees the essential principle that makes the transmission of individuals\na progress beyond one species, approaching the individuals from without.\nBut while we shall have to treat of this specific Darwinian theory--the\nselection theory--still more in detail in the following section, we shall\nalso there have to point, out {265} everything that theism has to say in\nreference to a principle of development which approaches the organisms from\nwithout. Another possible explanation of the origin of species through\ndevelopment is to be found in the fact that we look for the inciting\nprinciple of development in the interior of organisms. This is done, so far\nas we know, by all those scientists who, although inclined to an evolution\ntheory, are adversaries of the selection theory; but none of them claim to\nhave found the inciting agencies of development. Thus, as in the preceding\nsection, we are again referred only to the wholly abstract possibility of\nconceiving these inciting agencies either as coming into existence anew in\nthe organism with each smallest individual modification which leads to a\ndevelopment of the species, or as being before present in the organisms,\nbut still latent, and only coming into activity when they are set free. But\nthe question whether theism could accept the one or the other possibility\nhad to be treated of in the preceding section, and was there answered in\nthe affirmative.\n\nThus it only remains to treat in general of the question as to the\nreconcilableness of the idea of the origin of species through evolution,\nthrough gradual development, _in general_ with a theistic view of the\nworld.\n\nIn the first place, we wish to render evident the fact which is so often\noverlooked by the friends of monism and still more by theistic adversaries\nof the idea of evolution, that the idea of a development of species, and\nalso of man, does not offer to theistic reasoning any new or any other\ndifficulties than those which have been long present, and which had found\ntheir solution in the religious consciousness long before any idea of\nevolution disturbed the {266} mind. It is true, the question as to the\norigin of _mankind_ is, to speak in the language of natural history, a\nstill unsolved _problem_; and the supposition of its gradual development\nout of the animal kingdom is still an _hypothesis_--one of all those\nattempts at solving this problem which still wait for confirmation or\nrefutation. But there is another quite analogous question whose position\nhas long ceased to be a mere problem, and whose solution is no longer a\nmere hypothesis; namely, the question as to the origin of the perfect human\nor any other organic _individual_. To speak again in the language of\nnatural history, this origin is no longer a problem--that is, without\nregard to the obscurity in which the existence and origin of every\ncreature, as to its last causes, is always and will always be veiled for\nus. We know that the human, and, in general, every organic individual,\nbecomes that which it is through _development_. It begins the course of its\nbeing with the existence of a single cell, the egg, and goes through all\nstages of this development by wholly gradual and imperceptible transitions,\nso that the precise moment cannot exactly be fixed when any organ, any\nphysical or psychical function, comes into existence, until perfect man is\n_developed_. Man has this mode of coming into existence in common with all\norganized beings, down to the lowest organisms which stand above the value\nand rank of a single cell. At this place, and with the design of our\npresent discussion in view, we ought not to render the importance of this\nfact obscure by a teleological comparison of the different eggs and germs\nwith one another. If we look upon that which is to _come out_ of the germs,\nand which certainly if prepared and present in the first vital functions of\nthe {267} germ, although we are not able to observe, prove, and estimate it\nby means of the microscope and the retort, then of course the difference in\nthe value of the germs must be immense; and from this point of view we\ncertainly look upon the germ of man differently than upon the germ of an\noyster. But here the question is not as to the differences of value of\norganisms: no scientist who remains within the limits of his realm, will\never deny them; but we treat of the question whether such valuable objects\ncome into existence suddenly or gradually--whether it is possible, or even\na fact which repeats itself before our eyes, that a form of being of higher\nvalue comes forth from a form of being of a lower value in gradual\ndevelopment. And here it is an undisputed fact that all qualities of man,\nthe physical as well as the spiritual, come into existence in such a\ngradual development that not in a single one of them can be fixed any\nmoment of which it may be said: on the other side of this moment it did not\nexist, but on this side it did exist. All differentiations of his body,\nfrom the first differentiation of the egg-cell into a complexity of cells\nup to the last formation of his organs, take place in the same gliding\ndevelopment. All his psychical and spiritual functions and forces come into\nexistence in this form of gradual development. Where, in the development of\nthe human individual, is the moment in which consciousness, language,\nself-consciousness, memory, will, the perception of God, moral\nresponsibility, the perception of the idea and the ideal, or whatever else\nwe may mention, came into existence? Nowhere; all this, and all the rest,\nis developed in a gradual process. The only marked time in this development\nis the time of birth: {268} it brings a great change into physical life,\nand is perhaps the beginning epoch of the spiritual development of man. But\neven the birth is not absolutely bound to a certain time; the child may be\nborn too early, by weeks or even months, and its development nevertheless\ntakes place; and even after birth, how slowly and gradually spiritual\ndevelopment begins and continues!\n\nWith this gradual process of individual development which we have long\nknown, we have never found any difficulty in bringing two things into\nharmony. First, we always judged the value of the single qualities of man\nonly in the proportion in which they were really present and came into\nexistence, and in such a way that we entirely followed the flowing\ndevelopment of the individual. Therefore we looked upon the suckling, for\ninstance, not at all as a morally responsible individual; upon the child of\ntwo years as more responsible, but to a far less degree than the child of\nschool-age, and the latter again to a less degree than the man; and thus we\nhave been long accustomed to reason, when looking upon all single qualities\nof man. Second, we did not find any difficulty in bringing into perfect\nharmony the idea of a gradual process of individual development and of the\ndependence of the latter on a complex totality of natural causes: with the\nidea of the absolute dependence on God, the Creator, of that which arose\nthrough development. Every religiously reasoning man has always looked upon\nhimself as the child of his parents, gradually developed under the activity\nof complex natural causes, as well as the creature of God, that owes the\nexistence of all its forces and parts of body and soul to God. Should it\nthen, be so difficult, or is it only {269} something new, to bring into\nharmony, when looking upon the entire species and genus, that which we were\nlong ago able to bring into harmony when looking upon the individual--it\nbeing presupposed that the investigation leads us to a development of the\nentire species and genus similar to that of the individual development? Or\nhave we here again to ask, as in Sec. 1: is it more religious to make no\nattempt at removing the veil which covers the natural process of the origin\nof mankind, than to make it? It is true, the not knowing anything can,\nunder certain circumstances, create and increase the sensation of reverence\nfor the depth of divine power and wisdom; but a perception of the ways of\nGod is also certainly able to create the same. On that account, we need not\nat all fear that by such an attempt and its eventual success we might get\ninto the shallows of superficiality, to which nothing seems any longer to\nbe hidden, only because it has no presentiment of the depths which are to\nbe sounded. There will always remain enough of the mysterious and the\nuninvestigated, and each new step forward will only lead to new views, to\nnew secrets, to new wonders.\n\nBut does not a development, like that which we here for the moment assume\nhypothetically, efface and destroy the specific value of man and mankind\nfrom still another side? Would not a _beginning_ of mankind be really lost,\nin case that theory of evolution should gain authority? and would not there\nstill lie between that which is decidedly called animal world and that\nwhich is decidedly called mankind an innumerable series of generations of\nbeings which were neither animal nor man? We do not believe it. What makes\nman _man_, {270} we can exactly point out: it is self-consciousness and\nmoral self-determination. Now, in case development took place in the above\nsense, it may have passed ever so gradually; the epochs of preparation\nbetween that which we know as highest animal development and that which\nconstitutes the substance of man, may have stretched over ever so many\ngenerations, and, if the friends of evolution desire it, we say over ever\nso many thousands of generations; yet that which makes man\n_man_--self-consciousness and moral self-determination--must have always\ncome into actual reality in _individuals_. Those individuals in which\nself-consciousness came into existence and activity, for the first time,\nand with it the entire possibility of the world of ideas--the consciousness\nof moral responsibility, and with it also the entire dignity of moral\nself-determination--were the first men. The individuals which preceded the\nlatter may have been ever so interesting and promising as objects of\nobservation, if we imagine ourselves spectators of these once supposed\nprocesses; yet, they were not men.\n\nSec. 4. _The Selection Theory and Theism._\n\nThe last scientific theory whose position in reference to theism we have to\ndiscuss, is the selection theory.\n\nWe have found but little reason for sympathizing with this theory. But\nsince we believed that we were obliged to suspect it, not for religious but\nfor scientific reasons, so the completeness of our investigation requires\nus to assume hypothetically that the selection principle really manifests\nitself as the only and exclusive principle of the origin of species, and to\nask now what position it would in such a case take in reference to theism.\n{271}\n\nThe only answer we are able to give is decidedly favorable to theism.\n\nIt is true, development would in such a case approach the organisms merely\nfrom without. For the principle lying within the organisms, which would\nthen be the indispensable condition of all development, would be first the\nprinciple in itself, wholly without plan or end, of individual variability;\nsecond, the principle of inheritance which for itself and without that\nfirst principle is indeed no principle of development, but the contrary.\nThe causes from which the single individuals vary in such or such a way,\nwould then be the outer conditions of life and adaptation to them: _i.e._,\nsomething coming from without. And the causes from which one individual,\nvarying in such or such a way, is preserved in the struggle for existence,\nand another, varying differently, perishes, would be approaching the\nindividuals also from without; hence they are a larger or smaller useful\nvariation for the existence of the individual.\n\nNow if, through these influencing causes of development, approaching the\nmost simple organisms from without, a rising line of higher and higher\norganized beings comes finally into existence (a line in which sensation\nand consciousness, finally self-consciousness and free-will, appear) we\nagain reach the teleological dilemma: all this has either happened by\nchance, or it has not. No man who claims to treat this question earnestly\nand in a manner worthy of respect, will assert that it happened by chance,\nbut by necessity. But with this word the materialist only hides or avoids\nthe necessity of supposing a plan and end in place of chance, as we have\nconvinced ourselves in Part I, Book II, Chap. II, Sec. 1. {272} The only\nexception in this case is, that the bearer and agent of this plan would not\nbe the single organism (as is easily possible when we accept a descent\ntheory which is more independent from the selection theory), but the\ncollection of all forces and conditions, acting upon the organism from\nwithout. And for the question, whence this plan and its realization comes,\nwe had again but the one answer: from a highest intelligence and\nomnipotence, from the personal God of theism. The _locus_ of creation and\nthe _locus_ of providence would now, as ever, retain their value in the\ntheological system, with the sole exception that most of that which so far\nbelonged to the _locus_ of creation would now belong, in a higher degree\nthan in the hitherto naturo-historical view, to the _locus_ of providence\nand of the government of the world. When looked upon from the theocentric\npoint of view, the new forms which we had to suppose as called into\nexistence only by selection, would remain products of divine creation: the\n\"God said, and it was so,\" would retain its undiminished importance; but\nlooked upon from the cosmic point of view, they would present themselves as\nproducts of the divine providence and government of the world, still more\nexclusively than in every principal of explanation which finds the causes\nof development in the organisms themselves or in an immaterial cause acting\nupon the organisms from within. The first as well as the second point of\nview is in full harmony with the religious view of things.\n\nWe do not conceal that on the ground of all other analogies we sympathize\nmore with those who look for the determining influences of the origin of\nnew species rather within than without nature, and who, while {273} looking\nat that which the higher species have in common with the lower, do not\nforget or neglect the new, the original, which they possess. But we are\nindeed neither obliged nor entitled, in the name of religion, to take\nbeforehand in the realm of scientific investigation the side of the one or\nthe other direction of investigation, or even of the one or the other\nresult of investigation, before it is arrived at. Let us unreservedly allow\nscientists free investigation in their realm, so long as they do not meddle\nwith ethical or religious principles, and quietly await their results.\nThese results, when once reached, may correspond ever so closely with our\npresent view and our speculative expectations, or in both relations be ever\nso surprising and new; the one case as well as the other has already\nhappened: at any rate they will not affect our religious principles, but\nonly enrich our perception of the way and manner of divine activity in the\nworld, and thereby give new food and refreshment, to our religious life.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nA. THE DARWINISTIC PHILOSOPHEMES IN THEIR POSITION REGARDING THEISM.\n\nSec. 5. _The Naturo-Philosophic Supplements of Darwinism and Theism._\n\nWe still have to discuss the position of theism in reference to the\n_philosophic_ problems to which a Darwinistic view of nature sees itself\nled, and in the first place its position in reference to the\nnaturo-philosophic theories with which the descent idea tries to complete\nitself.\n\nIn the first part of our book, we have found that not {274} a single one of\nthe naturo-philosophic problems before which the descent idea places us, is\nreally solved: neither the origin of self-consciousness and of moral\nself-determination, nor the origin of consciousness and of sensation, nor\nthe origin of life; and even the theory of atoms, although it is quite\nimportant and indispensable for the natural philosopher and chemist\naccording to the present state of his knowledge and investigation, has not\nyet been able to divest itself of its hypothetical character. Religion\nmight, therefore, refuse to define its position in reference to theories\nwhich are still of a quite problematic and hypothetical nature. But by\ngiving such a refusal, religion would not act in its own interest. The\nreproach is often made that it has an open or hidden aversion to the\nfreedom of scientific investigation--a reproach which, it is true, is often\nenough provoked by its own advocates; often the assertion is made by\nadvocates of free investigation, that free science has led, or can lead at\nany moment, to results which shake or even destroy theism and with it the\nobjective and scientifically established truth of a religious view of the\nworld. The consequence of this assertion is exactly, as before-mentioned,\nthat minds whose religious possession is to them an inviolable sanctuary,\nand who lack time and occasion, inclination and ability, to examine\nscientifically these asserted results of science, really suspect free\nscience and contest the right of its existence. Another consequence of this\nstate of war between religion and science is the fact that so many minds in\nboth camps fall into a servile dependence upon battle-cries: they confound\nfreedom of investigation with license; science with apathy or {275}\nhostility to faith; faith with lack of scientific perception, blind\nunreasoning belief, etc. Such a state of affairs does not, indeed, serve\nthe interests of peace and truth; only a correct treatment of philosophy as\nwell as of religion can lead to them.\n\nSuch a way of peace and truth from the side of religion and its scientific\ntreatment is entered upon, when religion sets itself right, not only with\nall real, but also with all _conceivable_, _possible_ results of the other\nsciences, not only of the exact, but also of the philosophic sciences. If\nit finds, in such an investigation, that such conceivable results are\nreconcilable with the theistic view of the world which is the basis of\nreligion, it has already shown its relationship to the freedom of\ninvestigation. But if it finds anywhere a possible result which is in\nconflict with its theistic view of the world, it is obliged to examine the\nmutual grounds of dissent, as to the degree of their truth and their power\nof demonstration; and in case its own position is the stronger, better\nfounded, and more convincing, to prove this fact. If it does this, it again\nacts according to the principle of free investigation--with the single\ndifference that in such a case it not only makes this allowance to the\nopponent, but also uses this principle for itself in its own realm and\nespecially in the border land between itself and its opponent; but at the\nsame time it shows in this case (what, indeed, so many are inclined to\ndeny), that religion also has its science, and that theology itself is this\nscience, and has the same rights as the sciences which are built up in the\nrealm of material things or of abstract reasoning.\n\nWe therefore assume hypothetically, that the origin {276} of\nself-consciousness and of moral self-determination is fully explained by\nconsciousness; the origin of consciousness and sensation by that which has\nno sensation; the origin of the living and organic by the lifeless and\ninorganic; and that atomism also is scientifically established and proven:\nhow, then, would such a theory of the world and theism stand in respect to\neach other? By this assumption, we think we should simply stand again at\nthe point, the basis of which we had to discuss in Part I, Book II, Chap.\nII, Sec. 1, when treating of teleology. We should always see something new,\nsomething harmoniously arranged: a process of objects of value, continually\nrising higher and higher, coming forth out of one another in direct causal\nconnection; and should have a choice of one of two ways of explaining this\nprocess. We should either have to be satisfied with this final causal\nconnection, and perceive in this process itself its highest and last cause,\nin doing which we should be obliged again to deny order and plan in this\nprocess, to reject the category of lower and higher and the acknowledgment\nof a striving towards an end in these developments, and after having\nclimbed to that Faust-height of investigation and knowledge, to throw\nourselves in spiritual suicide back into the night and barbarism of chaos,\nor of a rigid mechanism to which all development, all life, all spiritual\nand ethical tasks, are but appearance; or we should have to treat the idea\nof development seriously and recognize a plan and a striving towards an end\nin this world-process, and should then find ourselves referred to a higher\nintelligence and a creative will as the highest and last cause which\nappoints the end and conditions of this process. This would be the case\nstill more, as we actually {277} see that at present the single beings\nwhich stand on a lower stage of existence no longer produce beings of a\nhigher stage, although, according to that theory whose correctness we now\nassume hypothetically, the elements and factors for the production of those\nhigher forms of existence are fully present in the lower ones. Inorganic\nmatter no longer produces organisms; the lower species of plants or animals\nno longer develop higher ones; the animal no longer becomes man; and yet\nthere were periods, lying widely apart, in which, according to that theory,\nsuch things took place. What else set free those active causes, at the\nright time and in the right place? What else closed again at the precise\nplace and moment the valves of the proceeding development, and brought to\nrest again the inciting force of the rising development?--what else but the\nhighest end-appointing intelligence and omnipotence?\n\nEven the inherent qualities of the elements, and the products of all the\nhigher forms of existence which in the future shall arise out of them, the\nwhole striving toward an end of the processes in the world, would present\nitself to us much more vividly than now, where we are still in the dark as\nto all these questions. We should see in _atoms_ the _real_ inherent\nqualities of all things and processes which are to be developed out of\nthem; in the inorganic the _real_ inherent qualities for the organic and\nliving; in that which has no consciousness and sensation the _real_\ninherent qualities for self-consciousness. Instead of being now obliged to\nrecur to the ideal and metaphysical, we should see the threads of the\nworld's plan uncovered before us in empirical reality; and far from bearing\nwith it an impoverishment of our {278} consciousness of God, all this would\nbring us only an immense enrichment of its contents; for with such an\nenlargement of our knowledge, we should only be permitted to take glances\ninto the way and manner of divine creation and action--glances of a depth\nwhich at present we are far from being permitted to take.\n\nEven very concrete parts of a theistic view of the world, as they present\nthemselves to us--_e.g._, in the Holy Scripture, from its most developed\npoints of view--would now find only richer illustrations than heretofore.\nSt. Paul, for instance, in Rom. viii, speaks of the earnest expectation of\nthe creature that waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. As to\nthe present state of our knowledge of nature, those who adopt this view are\nonly entitled to see in the sensation of pain of the _animal world_ a\nsensation of this longing, unconscious of the end; but as to all soulless\nand lifeless beings and elements in the world, they can see in these words\nof a sighing and longing creation only a strong figurative expression used\nbecause of its suitableness to denote suffering of the animal world, as\nwell as of men,--for the destination of the world to another and higher\nexistence in which the law of perishableness and suffering no longer\ngoverns. On the other hand, if, as we assume hypothetically, all higher\nforms of existence in the world could be explained out of the preceding\nlower ones, and if the before-mentioned theorem of a sensation of atoms\nshould form a needed and correct link in that chain of explanation, those\nwords of sighing and longing would have to be literally taken in a still\nmore comprehensive sense than now and in their directly literal meaning\n{279} would refer not only to the animal world but indeed to everything in\nthe world.\n\nTherefore, so long as attempts at explaining the different forms of\nexistence in the world wholly from one another keep within their own\nlimits, and do not of themselves undermine theism; and so long as there are\nmen who on the one hand favor such a mode of explanation and on the other\nhand still adhere firmly to a faith in God, whether it be the deeper theism\nor the more shallow and superficial deism--so long religion has no reason\nfor opposing those attempts at explanation. And there are such men; we need\nonly to mention Huxley, whose position in reference to religion we have\nalready discussed; or Oskar Peschel, who, in his \"Voelkerkunde\"\n(\"Ethnology\"), says: \"It is not quite clear how pious minds can be\ndisturbed by this theory; for creation obtains more dignity and importance\nif it has in itself the power of renewal and development of the perfect.\"\nEven Herbert Spencer, with his idea of the imperceptibility of the\nsuper-personal, of the final cause of all things, is still a living proof\nof the fact that man can trace the mechanism of causality back to its last\nconsequences and, as Spencer does, even derive consciousness and sensation\nfrom that which is without sensation, and yet not necessarily proceed so\nfar as _negation_ of a living God, even if he persists in his refusal to\nperceive in general the ultimate cause of things.\n\nTo meet those attempts, religion would have to take only two precautionary\nmeasures on two closely related points; and in doing this it would indeed\nmake use of that before-mentioned right to defend freedom of {280}\ninvestigation both in its own realm and in the border-territory.\n\nOne precaution would consist in the requirement of the acknowledgment that\neven in that purely immanent mode of explanation the _idea of value is\nfixed_, but that the value of the new appears only when the new itself\nreally comes into existence; that we therefore do not call, _e.g._, the\ninorganic _living_, because according to that mode of explanation life\ndevelops itself out of it; and that we do not ascribe to the animal the\nvalue of man, because according to that mode of explanation it also\nincludes the causes of the development of man. Such a discrimination of\nideas is indeed a _scientific postulate_, as we have had occasion to show\nat many points of our investigation; and we also complied with this\nrequirement long ago in that realm of knowledge which is related to these\nquestions as to the origin of things, but is more accessible and open to\nus, namely, in the realm of the development of the individual. We have\nspoken of this at length in Sec. 3. But in the interest of _religion_ also we\nhave to request that the _differences of value_ of things be retained, even\nwhen man thinks he is able to explain their origin merely out of one\nanother. For without this, all things would finally merge simply into\nexistences of like value; man would stand in no other relation to God than\nwould any other creature, irrational or lifeless; and the quintessence of\nreligious life--the relation of mutual personal love between God and man,\nthe certainty of being a child of God--would be illusory when there should\nno longer be a difference of value between man and animal, animal and\nplant, plant and stone. {281}\n\nMany a reader thinks, perhaps, that with this precaution we make a\nrestriction which is wholly a matter of course, and that nobody would think\nof denying these differences of value. Haeckel, in his \"Anthropogeny,\"\nrepeatedly reproaches man with the \"arrogant anthropocentric imagination\"\nwhich leads him to look upon himself as the aim of earthly life and the\ncentre of earthly nature; this, he says, is nothing but vanity and\nhaughtiness. Several writers in the \"Ausland\" faithfully second him in this\ndebasement of the value of man. Its editor (\"Ausland,\" 1874, No. 48, p.\n957), for instance, reproaches Ludwig Noire, although he otherwise\nsympathizes with him, that in his book \"Die Welt als Entwicklung des\nGeistes\" (\"The World as Development of Mind\"), Leipzig, Veit & Co., 1874,\nhe still takes this anthropocentric standpoint and can say: \"The\nanthropocentric view recognizes in man's mind the highest bloom of matter,\nwhich has attained to the possession of a soul.\" This, Haeckel says, is\nnothing else but the former conception, not yet overcome, that man is the\ncrown of creation. This pleasure in debasing the value of man is also a\ncharacteristic sign of the times. K. E. von Baer is right, when, in his\n\"Studies\" (page 463), he says: \"In our days, men like to ridicule as\narrogant the looking upon man as the end of the history of earth. But it is\ncertainly not man's merit that he has the most highly developed organic\nform. He also must not overlook the fact that with this his task of\ndeveloping more and more his spiritual gifts has only begun.... Is it not\nmore worthy of man to think highly of himself and his destination, than,\nfixing his attention only upon the low, to {282} acknowledge only the\nanimalic basis in himself? I am sorry to say that the new doctrine is very\nmuch tainted in this direction of striving after the low. I should rather\nprefer to be haughty than base, and I well recollect the expression of\nKant, 'Man cannot think highly enough of man.' By this expression the\nprofound thinker especially meant that mankind has to set itself great\ntasks. But the modern views are more a palliation of all animal emotions in\nman.\"\n\nThe other precautionary measure referred to would be, that the _realm of\nmind_, and especially the _ethical realm_, is not dissolved into a _natural\nmechanism_. This precaution is also connected with the first one, the\nlatter being its condition; for only where it is acknowledged that causes,\nso long as they are still latent, do not fall under the same category of\nvalue as their effects, when these are once realized, it can also be\nacknowledged that the realm of mind and morality, although it has grown out\nof the ground of the mechanism of nature, can still have brought something\nnew and higher into the world. Besides, this precaution is also a postulate\nof anthropologic science. For spiritual and ethical facts have at least the\nsame truth and reality as the material, and a still higher value, and can\ntherefore not permit any injury to their full recognition. But religion\nalso must require this acknowledgment. For if the specific _activity_ of\nmind in man is endangered, we also lose his specific _value_, and thus get\ninto the before-mentioned dilemma; and if the moral responsibility of man\nis endangered, the relation of man to God loses its ethical character. Of\nthe consequences in reference to morality, we shall have to speak\nhereafter. {283}\n\nMoreover, religion does not require this acknowledgment without a rich\ncompensation. For if that naturo-philosophic mode of explanation, whose\ncorrectness we hypothetically assume in this present section, prove to be\nright, and if the higher which comes anew into existence in the world, is\nto have the full cause of its origin in the preceding lower, such an\nadmission, in accordance with the laws of logic, by which _causa aequat\neffectum_, is only possible when we either similarly, as above, invalidate\nall difference between higher and lower, all difference of value of\ncreatures, and contest the possibility that that which appears anew can\nalso follow new laws of existence and activity; or when, in the highest\ncause of all final causes in the world, we see the full abundance of all\nthose possibilities present as real cause, which afterwards appear in\nsuccession in the world. This highest cause, then, lodges in material\nthings the final causes of all which is to come, as still latent causes,\nwaiting to be set free; and such a highest cause as the fullness of all\nthat which is successively to be developed in the world, is offered to\nscience by religion itself in the idea of a living God. We say expressly,\nthat religion offers this idea to science, and not that science creates\nthis idea; for the acknowledgment of God, as we have before had occasion to\npoint out, is in the last instance not a result of science, but an ethical\naction of mind,--although from this acknowledgment the brightest light\nfalls upon science and the whole series of its conclusions, and although\nscience owes to precisely this idea of God the highest points of view to\nwhich it sees itself led and from which alone it is able to survey its\nentire realm. {284}\n\nSec. 6. _Elimination of the Idea of Design or its Acknowledgment and Theism._\n\nIn the whole preceding course of our investigation as to the position of\nreligion and theism regarding the different scientific and\nnaturo-philosophic theories, theism could quietly keep the position of a\nfriendly and peaceful spectator. The degrees of our sympathy with the\ntheories which have successively passed before our eyes, were on scientific\ngrounds very unequal; but on religious grounds, and in the interest of a\ntheistic view of the world, we found ourselves nowhere induced to take\nsides for or against a theory. But the position of religion and theism\nbecomes quite different in reference to the assertion that the existence of\nends and designs in nature is refuted by the evolution theory or by any\nother hypothetical or real results of science. With this assertion, the\nexistence of a living and personal God, of a Creator and Lord of the world,\nis denied; and every religion which claims objective truth for its basis is\neliminated. It is true, man can under this supposition still speak of a\nreligion in the sense of subjective religiousness; but the life-nerve is\nalso cut off from this subjective religiousness. We have repeatedly had\noccasion to prove this in our historical review, and also in the section in\nwhich we pointed out the plan of our own analysis.\n\nBut still, where we have had to represent this anti-teleological view of\nthe world, we have happily convinced ourselves of the fact that an\nexistence of ends and designs in nature is not only _reconcilable_ with the\nconformity to law and the causal mechanism of its processes, but is {285}\nalso _postulated_ by scientific contemplation of nature, as soon as the\nlatter observes that in these processes, acting with lawful necessity,\nsomething in general is attained, and, moreover, when out of them comes\nforth something so infinitely rich and beautifully arranged, such a rising\nseries of higher and higher developments, as the world. On the other hand,\ncombatting the striving towards an end in nature leads to such scientific\nmonstrosities, destroys so thoroughly the idea of God and also all ideas of\nvalue in the world, even all spiritual and ethical acquisitions of mankind,\nthat we can explain the origin of such a doctrine only by the determined\npurpose of getting rid, at any cost, of the dependence on a living God:\nagain a proof of the fact that faith, or want of faith, in its final\ncauses, is not the product of reflecting intelligence, but an ethical\naction of that centre of human personality from which the spiritual process\nof life in the individual comes forth--an ethical action of mind.\n\nHerewith the position of theism in reference to the elimination of the idea\nof design is also soon characterized: it is _the position of irreconcilable\nantagonism_. In rejecting the position of its opponent, theism perceives\nthat it is in harmony not only with every correctly understood religious\nneed, but equally so with every scientific interest--with the interest of a\ncorrect knowledge of nature, as well as with the interest of those sciences\nwhich have to take care of and try to understand the spiritual and ethical\nendowments of mankind.\n\nIf we now turn our attention to the _position of theism in reference to the\nidea of design in general_, theism on its part also gives an equally firm\nsupport to that intimate connection, proven by natural science, between\ncausality {286} and striving toward an end--between actiology and\nteleology, as they are called in the language of the philosophical school.\nWhile a contemplation of nature perceives in nature a mechanism governed by\nlaws and necessities, it finds results reached through this chain of\ncausality in which it must acknowledge ends toward which the preceding has\nstriven. Now, theism, on its part, proceeds from the highest end-appointing\ncause of things and processes, and finds that the reaching of these ends\npostulates a mechanism of natural conformity to law. In order to prove\nthis, we certainly must take a course which is prohibited by many as\nanthropomorphism, _i.e._, we must try to study the connection of ends and\ndesigns, and the possibility of such a connection where we are able to\nobserve in general not only the _accomplishment_ of purposes, but also the\n_forming_ of purposes; and the only realm of this kind which we know of, is\nthe realm of human action. He who, merely through fear of anthropomorphism,\nshrinks from this only possible comparison, may consider that for those who\nassume a highest end-appointing cause (and we, too, proceed from this\nstandpoint) man also, who forms his designs and strives toward his ends, is\na product of that highest end-appointing cause; and that, therefore, in the\nhuman striving toward an end, a certain analogue of the divine striving\ntoward an end must occur. We are, indeed, not obliged on this account to\nidentify the two, and to close our eyes against the immense differences\nwhich exist between them, and which, wholly of themselves, intrude upon our\nobservation. What we mean by that analogy may thus be stated.\n\nMan forms for himself designs and ends, and pursues {287} and reaches them\nby using the objects and forces of nature as means. He can do this only\nbecause the forces in nature act from necessity, strictly conformable to\nlaw. Because, and so far as man knows the action of forces, conformable to\nlaw, and the inviolable necessity of the connection between certain causes\nand their effects, he can select and make use of such causes as means, by\nvirtue of which he reaches those effects as designs intended by him. If he\ncould not depend on this conformity to law, on this causal connection\ntaking place according to simple necessities, he could not select, make,\nand use, with certainty, any tool, from the club with which he defends\nhimself against his enemies or cracks the shells of fruit, up to the finest\ninstruments of optics and chemistry, and even to the telegraph and steam\nengine. The conformity to law, with which the forces of nature act, far\nfrom being an impediment to his appointing and reaching his ends is much\nmore the indispensable means by which he is enabled in general to reach\nthem. Now, if we thus find, in the only action striving towards an end\nwhich we are able to observe to the extent of the appointing of ends and\nthe selection of means--namely, man's end appointing action--such a strong\ndependence of finality on causality that the reaching of ends is not\npossible at all unless the means act of necessity conformably to law, then\nwe are certainly obliged to draw the conclusion that the highest author of\nthings has prepared the world so, that the reaching of ends requires the\naction of means, and that the category of finality and the category of\ncausality are mutually prepared for each other. For, according to the\ntheistic and teleological view of the world, the {288} laws of nature,\nacting with causality and necessity, are certainly not laws which the\nCreator found in some way, and with which he had to calculate as with\nfactors given to him from somewhere else, in order to make use of them, so\nfar as he was permitted, for the accomplishment of his designs--this would\nbe the way and manner of _human_ teleological action, and transferring it\nto _divine_ action would be an anthropomorphism which we should have to\nreject. On the contrary, these laws themselves are the work of the\nteleologically acting Creator--he, indeed, will have given to them such a\nquality that with them he is able to reach his ends as a whole and in\ndetail. The inviolability of the laws of nature also results from this\nidea. For means which would have to be supplemented, sometimes set aside,\noccasionally replaced by others, would be less perfect than such means as\nby virtue of their quality are able with certainty to serve the designs\nwhich are to be reached by them. How theism can reconcile with this view\nthe indispensable idea of divine freedom, we shall have occasion to show in\nChap. II, Sec. 4.\n\nAmong the writers who defend teleology, we can mention two who, starting\nfrom the analogy of human teleological action, have pointed out the idea\nthat teleology itself requires a necessity, conformable to law, in the\nactivity of the forces of nature. One of the two is K. E. von Baer, in his\noft-quoted essays on striving towards end; and the other is the Duke of\nArgyll. At a time when the assault against teleology had just begun, this\nnoble author perceived the whole importance and weight of these attacks,\nand most energetically defended teleology. The expression of the\njust-mentioned ideas, {289} among others, forms one of the fundamentals of\nhis work, \"The Reign of Law\" (London, Strahan & Co., first edition\npublished in 1866, and since then in frequently repeated editions); a work\nwhich is well fitted to instruct us, in the most interesting manner,\nregarding the present state of the related questions as they are treated of\nin Great Britain.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {290}\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY.\n\nSec. 1. _The Creation of the World._\n\nNow that we have come to a clear understanding of the position of the\nDarwinian theories in reference to the basis of all religion and of all\nliving religiousness, to theism in general, it remains to be seen what\nposition those of the theories which are reconcilable with theism take in\nreference to the positive Christian view of the world.\n\nWe naturally omit all those objects and parts of Christian dogmatics which\nhave no points of contact, or are very indirectly connected with the\nDarwinian ideas, or which--as, _e.g._, their position in reference to the\nidea of God in general--have found their principal illustration in our\ninvestigation just finished. We shall nevertheless have now to take into\nconsideration once more, although from another side, some objects which we\nhave discussed in treating of the relation of the Darwinian ideas to\ntheism, on account of the specific part which theism has in Christianity.\nThis is especially the case with those Christian facts which belong to the\nfirst article of the Apostolic Creed, and immediately also with the\ndoctrine of the creation of the world. {291}\n\nAt first sight it seems that the evolution theory and Christianity are in\nno other place more sharply opposed to each other than in that of the\nhistory of creation. Darwinism claims for its theory immense periods of\ntime; and geology seems to furnish them according to its demand. The Holy\nScripture, on the other hand, teaches a creation of the world in six days.\n\nWith the attempt to find the right way to end this conflict, we enter upon\nthat part of the border-land between theology and natural science, which,\namong all others, is most contested, and which has offered to the most\nluxuriant fancy the widest field of action and the one most profitably\ntaken advantage of.\n\nWe confess at the outset that we sympathize with those who try to keep the\npeculiar realms of religion and natural science apart in such a way that a\ncollision between the two is impossible. We quietly leave the investigation\nof the temporal succession in creation--especially the investigation of all\nthat belongs in the finite causal connection of natural processes--to\nnatural science; we also do not look to the source of our Christian\nreligion, to the Holy Scripture, for a scientific manual, least of all for\nthe communication of a knowledge of nature, supernaturally manifested and\nclaiming divine authority, the acquisition of which is especially the task\nof scientific labor. But we bestow just as decidedly upon religion the\nspecific task of showing man the way to communion with God, especially the\nway of salvation; a task in which it can as little permit itself to be\nhindered by natural science, as the latter in the pursuit of its peculiar\ntasks can allow an objection from any source. On the side of religion, the\nbond of unity which brings {292} into harmony the two activities of the\nhuman mind--the religious and the investigating--in the realm of nature,\nand, in general, in the whole realm of exact science, consists in the fact\nthat in all which exact science offers to religion as the result of its\ninvestigation, the latter perceives and shows the works and ways of God;\nand on the side of the exact sciences, the bond consists in the fact that\nthey bring within the reach of their scientific, historical, literary,\nculturo-historical, and exegetical investigations all that which in the\nreligious realm appears, or in the written word is fixed, as historical\nfact. Religion, therefore, concedes to exact sciences the full right of\nexamining the biblical records as to all the relations of their historical\nand literary connections; it even makes these investigations a quite\nessential and, at present, very much favored branch of its own science of\ntheology. On the other hand, religion reserves just as decidedly to itself\nthe full right of drawing from them, of maintaining, and of realizing, the\nwhole full _religious_ basis and significance of those records.\n\nWe know very well that such a proposition is very simple in principle, but\nmuch more difficult in practice. For the quintessence of that which\nconstitutes the basis of the Christian religion--namely, the leading back\nof mankind to communion with God by means of salvation--is not only a\nphilosopheme, a theoretical or mystic doctrine, but a _fact_: it comes into\nthe world as a series of divine _facts_; it is interwoven by innumerable\nthreads into creation and the course of nature and history; and, as to this\nwhole aspect of its appearance in the world of phenomena, it falls under\nthe cognition of the exact sciences. But as soon as any given fact excites\nthe {293} interest of religion as well as that of exact science, collisions\nare possible from both sides. Some advocates of religion, through mistaken\nzeal for religious interests, may think it necessary to assert and to\nrepresent as indispensable to religion facts whose cognition as to reality\nbelongs only to exact science and which are contested by exact science; as,\n_e.g._, the creation of the world in six literal days, or the creation of\nthe single elements of the world without the action of secondary causes.\nAnd some advocates of exact science, from reasons of a superficial analogy,\nmay erroneously think it necessary to dispute the reality of facts,\notherwise well attested, but wanting analogy, in which religion has a\ncentral interest; as, _e.g._, the reality of the resurrection of Jesus\nChrist, or the reality of his miracles. Or they may unjustifiably try, from\nour experiences in this world, to forbid glances which religion permits us\nto throw beyond the present course of the world; _e.g._, the eschatological\nhope of Christians is often enough contested, or as the laws of nature are\ncalled eternal in the absolute sense of the word, although natural science\nis only led to a recognition of the duration of the same, which is\ncongruent with the circumstances and duration of this present course of the\nworld.\n\nWe are perfectly aware of all these possibilities of a collision, and of\nall the difficulties of their prevention and reconciliation; but we\nnevertheless know of no other way for their avoidance than that simple\nprinciple of agreement which, on account of its simplicity and clearness,\nseems to us to be perfectly able to maintain the peace between the two\nparties interested, or where it is disturbed, to restore it. {294}\n\nThus, we wholly agree that in the question of creation the investigation of\nthe succession and of all modalities in the appearance of the single\nelements of the world, is entirely left to natural science, and that the\nbiblical records should on the one hand be investigated wholly, and even to\ntheir remotest consequences, from a literary, historical, and exegetical\npoint of view, and on the other hand be tested with equal fullness and\ncompleteness as to their religious contents. The literary and exegetical\nexamination of the Mosaic account of creation will reveal that its\nconceptions of that which in the creation of the world belongs entirely to\nthe natural process, do not go beyond that which otherwise belongs to the\nsphere of knowledge and views of antiquity, as well as of immediate\nperception of nature in general; and that we cannot expect any scientific\nexplanation from it, because man really came last on the stage of earth,\nand is therefore not able to say anything, founded upon autopsy, about the\norigin of all the other creatures which preceded his appearance. Just as\nlittle could the first men possess and deliver to their offspring a\nremembrance of the first beginnings of their own existence. Moreover, the\nliterary and exegetical interpretation of the Bible will also refer to\nother passages of the Holy Scripture which entirely differ from the\nsuccession of creations, as they are related in Genesis I; so, _e.g._,\nbesides Job XXXVIII, 4-11, the second account of creation in Genesis II,\n4-25: again a proof that what we read in the Biblical record of creation\nabout the succession in the appearance of creatures is not binding upon us.\nReligion can have nothing to say against these results; it will not reject\nthe information of man as to the {295} succession and the modalities in the\nappearance of the single elements of the world, which it receives from\nnatural science, and will not expect it by means of a special supernatural\nmanifestation; it will willingly accept it from natural science, and simply\nmake use of it in such a way that in nature and its processes it also\nperceives a manifestation of God. Now, when it examines the different\nBiblical accounts of creation as _to their religious substance_, it will\nfind in them such a pure and correct idea of divine nature and divine\naction--such a pure conception, equally satisfying to mind and to science,\nof the nature of man, of his position in nature, of the nature and\ndestination of the two sexes, of the ethical nature and the ethical\nprimitive history of man,--it will especially have to acknowledge in the\nBiblical account of creation, in spite of all points of collision with the\ncosmogonies of paganism, such an elevation above them, such an exemption\nfrom all _theogony_, with which heathen cosmogonies are always mixed up,\nthat we are perfectly right in perceiving in these records the full and\nunmistakable elements of a pure and genuine stream of manifestation, which\npours into mankind.\n\nSo far we find ourselves in full harmony with a theology which, in the\nmanner indicated, reconciles the religious interest with the historical and\ncritical interest. We find the points of view to which this perception\nleads, represented with special clearness and attractiveness in Dillmann's\nRevision of Knobel's \"Commentar zur Genesis\" (\"Commentary on Genesis\"),\nLeipzig, Hirzel, 1875.\n\nBut it seems to us that a readiness to be just to historical criticism and\nimpartial exegesis has hindered {296} theologians occupying this standpoint\nfrom being just also to _the religious element_, in its full meaning, in\nreference to a very important part of the Mosaic account of creation, in\nwhich the author of it shows quite a decided religious interest. We mean\nthe _six days of creation_, together with the _seventh day_, the divine\nSabbath. Theologians became too quickly satisfied with the exegetical\nperception of these seven days, as creative, earthly days, of twenty-four\nhours; and this hindered them from assigning to the religious meaning the\nfull importance which these days have in that record. That the idea and the\nnumber of the days in that account have a high religious meaning to the\nauthor, is clear from the following: The account in Genesis I, 1-24,\nbelongs to that series of parts of the Pentateuch which we call the\noriginal, and which has the Sinaitical Law as the centre of its belief. The\ndivision of the days into weeks, each having six working days and one day\nof rest, which possibly existed before, but which received obligatory\nimportance to Israel first by the Sinaitical legislation, so far controls\nthat account of the creation of the world that, next to the sublime\nperception of the dignity and position of man, it forms its very\nquintessence. The account makes that divine week of creation, with its six\nworking days and its divine day of rest, the divine prototype and model for\nthe human division of time; and the Decalogue also, in the conception which\nit has in Exodus XX, directly bases the commandment of the Sabbath on the\ndivine week of creation. Now, if we suppose that the author took these days\nas earthly days of twenty-four hours, we are first of all obliged to reject\nas a child-like error the idea on which from _religious_ {297} reasons--not\nfrom reasons of a mystical idea of God, but from direct practical religious\nreasons--he puts great importance; an idea with which he establishes an\ninstitution of human life which has been preserved through many thousands\nof years and is still preserved as the exceedingly blissful basis of all\nsocial life. For that the creation of the world, from the beginning of\nthings up to the appearance of man, demanded more than six times\ntwenty-four hours, is beyond any doubt. Moreover, we should be obliged to\nreject the arguments of such a central religious custom as Sabbath-rest in\na record in which we have to assign an absolute and lasting religious value\nto all other religious elements of it, as to the ideas of the unity,\nomnipotence, and wisdom of God, of his creation through the creative word,\nof the perfection of his works, of man bearing the image of God. We should\neven see that idea of God which presents itself to us out of all other\ncharacteristics of that record in such spotless purity and sublime\nmagnitude, sink down to a decided insignificance through the identification\nof the divine days of creation with our earthly days of twenty-four hours.\nAll this certainly brings near to us the question: do we make a correct\nexegesis, do we correctly _read_ that record, when we think that the\nauthor, because he speaks of days, must necessarily have understood earthly\ndays, such as we know now?\n\nWe readily perceive how interpreters have arrived at this view. The divine\nsections of creation in the Mosaic account show themselves too decidedly as\ndays to make possible any other interpretation than to take them as days.\nNow from experience we do not know of any other days than of earthly days\nof twenty-four hours; {298} and therefore the conclusion naturally follows,\nthat the author also took the divine days of creation as such earthly days\nof twenty-four hours. A simple reference of the same to periods, so that we\nshould again think of fixed periods of the earth or of the world, would\nespecially pervert the literal sense--would entirely remove from the\naccount the idea of \"day\" which is so essential to the author of the\nrecord, and thereby render obscure the archetype of the divine week of\ncreation for the human divisions of time; and the looked-for harmony\nbetween the Biblical days and the geological periods of the earth would by\nno means be established by such an identification of the days of creation\nwith the periods of the world: for the geological or even the cosmic and\nastronomical periods are nowhere in congruity with the Biblical days of\ncreation.\n\nBut the question, however, is: are there not evidences in the Biblical\naccount itself which show that the author did _not_ take these days as\ncreative earthly days of twenty-four hours? We have to answer this question\ndecidedly in the affirmative.\n\nIn the first place, it is an established fact that these days of the week\nof creation were also, according to the meaning of the author, _days of\nGod_. Now that such days of God, even with the most childish and simple\nworldly knowledge of that early period of mankind, so soon as such a pure\n_idea of God_, as appears from the whole account, is at the bottom of the\nconception, can no longer be _identical_ with the days of the creature, is\nto be inferred beforehand with the greatest probability from the purity of\nthat idea of God, and is even expressly {299} confirmed by special\nevidences in the record itself. We have to mention no less than four of\nthem.\n\nThe days of creation present themselves _as days of God_, which as such\n_differ from the creative days of earth_ by the fact that with them the\n_day_ and the _work of the day_ are absolutely identical. In the creative\ndays, the day and the work of the day are always different from one\nanother; the days come and go as temporal frames which include everything\nthat happens during these days, whether we know it or not. Now we may turn\nour attention to and mention ever so many works of an earthly day: there\nalways happen innumerable other things which also belong within the frame\nof that day and which are only not observed by us. It is quite another\nthing with those Biblical days of creation: here the day _begins_ with the\nbeginning of the day's work; it _exists_ and _passes on_ single and alone\nin the course of the work of the day, and it comes to an end when the day's\nwork is completed, and the work of the following day begins: it comes to an\nend with \"evening and morning.\"\n\nWe also lay some stress, though not very much, upon the fact that, in the\naccount, that which makes and regulates the _earthly_ day is created not\nbefore the fourth day of creation, Genesis I, 14: \"And God said, Let there\nbe lights in the firmament of the heaven _to divide the day from the\nnight_; and let them be for signs and for seasons, and _for days_ and\nyears.\" We admit that if we were obliged for other reasons to suppose that\nthe author of the account took the days of creation as common earthly days\nof twenty-four hours, we must and should find it possible that the author\nhad been able to {300} suppose the existence and the course of such earthly\ndays even _before_ the creation of sun, moon, and stars; for he certainly\ncould not yet have the scientific perception that the sun with its light\nand the rotation of the earth were the only cause of an earthly day. But it\nis easier and more natural for us to bring that passage, Genesis I, 14,\ninto accord with the conception that the days of creation are divine days\nwhich, as such, are different from creative days, and on one of which God\nalso created that which originates creative days.\n\nAnother evidence in the account is of still greater importance for our\nconception of days. These days of creation in the Biblical record _have no\nnight_. The account closes the work of each day with the words: \"_And the\nevening and the morning were the first day_,\" \"_the second day_,\" etc. Now,\nif we have to suppose that the author took these days as common earthly\ndays, it would be quite impossible to understand why, after having\nmentioned at the close of the day's work that it now became evening, he\nomits the long night of twelve hours, and, although not having said\nanything of the night, makes the morning which follows the latter, the end\nof the preceding day; and why he does not say, \"and it became evening\" and\n\"it became _night_, the first day,\" etc. We then could not avoid the\nquestion: what, according to the conception of the author, did God do in\nthese six nights of his week of creation? But if we suppose that the author\ntook the days as days of God, and therefore, in his conception of the days\nof creation, elevated the same above the common earthly days of the\ncreature, and so represented them to himself as he alone, through his idea\nof God, thought he might {301} venture to do, then that mode of expression,\nso exceedingly strange under all other suppositions, appears very simple\nand natural to us. For the author did not mention a night, because these\ndays simply had no night; and they had none, because as days of God they\n_could_ have none--because with God there is no night; because the rest of\nGod, as the seventh day shows, is only a day of rest and not a night of\nrest. And the author saw the morning immediately following the evening of\nhis divine day of creation, and recognized in this morning together with\nthe evening immediately preceding it, the close of the day, because the\naccomplishment of the day's work (evening) already contained in itself the\npreparation of the following day's work, or at least pointed to the coming\nof the latter.\n\nFinally, the fact that, according to the Biblical account, _the seventh day\nstill has no end_, is just as decisive for us. The end of each of the six\ndays is mentioned by the solemn repetition of the words: \"And the evening\nand the morning were the first day,\" etc.; but it is not mentioned in\nregard to the seventh day. Now if, according to the meaning of the author,\nthe seventh day had also had its end like any of the six preceding days, he\nwould at the seventh and _last_ day have had _double reason_ for mentioning\nits end; and the omission of that concluding word would indeed be\ninconceivable. When Dillman says: \"The formula 'and (it became) the\nevening' is wanting, because the account is here at an end, and is no\nlonger to be carried over to another day, and because for that reason its\ndesignation as seventh day is presupposed in v. 2,\" we have to reply that,\nunder the supposition of the days of creation having {302} been common\nearthly days, a carrying over of the account to further days was certainly\nto be expected, even if from nothing else than the formula: \"And the\nevening and the morning were the first day,\" etc. For then the human weeks\ncould have followed the week of God, in which man, following the divine\nexample, would have had to work six days and to rest one. The same\ncommentator says (p. 24): \"The author could not even have dared make a\nstatement about the life-duration of the first men, if to him the day in\nwhich he was created had been an indefinitely long period of time.\" But,\naccording to the conception of the Biblical author supposed by us, only the\n\"day of God,\" in which he was created, would have been an indefinitely long\nperiod of time (although we are not willing to identify the days of God\nwith certain earthly periods of time); the earthly days and the earthly\nyears, on the other hand, would have their existence after the fourth day\nof creation, and thus, according to that view, we could estimate and name\nthe earthly years and days of all that which happened before the fourth day\nof creation, under the condition that we have, or believe we have, the\nmeans of estimating them. When Dillmann continues: \"On the contrary, the\nauthor took these days as nothing else than days,\" we wholly agree with\nhim; but add to it: \"not days of the creature, but days of God.\"\n\nBy this long duration of the seventh day, we are obliged to draw still\nanother conclusion; namely, that according to the conception of the author\nthe six preceding days also must have far exceeded the duration of earthly\ndays. This leads us to another Biblical analogy, whose direct power of\ndemonstration for a long {303} duration of the Biblical days of creation\nis, it is true, justly contested, but which, as soon as we have to assume\nfor other reasons that according to the author the days of creation far\nexceed the earthly days as to duration, becomes a strong support of this\nview. For it is certainly not unimportant that in the 90th Psalm, the psalm\nof Moses, the mediator of the Sinaitical legislation, to the circle of\nideas of which that account of the creation so entirely belongs, the\nthought is expressed which is also taken up in the second letter of St.\nPeter, with its developed cosmological conceptions: namely, the thought\n\"that one day _is_ with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years\nas one day.\"\n\nWith that exegesis of the seventh day as one still remaining up to the\npresent, we are in clear accord with the more developed theology of the New\nTestament, and with the interpretation which it itself gives of that divine\nday of rest. Jesus himself, in St. John, V. 17, puts aside a reproach of\nthe Pharisees in reference to a healing on the Sabbath, with the words: \"My\nfather worketh hitherto, and I work.\" This answer only has a meaning in the\nsense: my father worketh hitherto, although, since the accomplishment of\nthe days of creation, he enjoys the Sabbath-rest; and thus I also work on\nthe Sabbath as on a work-day. And the Letter to the Hebrews, in its fourth\nchapter, looks through the medium of the ninety-fifth Psalm back to this\nSabbath of creation which, as a day of rest of God, exists to-day, and the\nentering into which is given and promised to the people of God.\n\nBy this whole conception of the Biblical week of creation, which appears to\nus _exegetically_ much more {304} natural and unconstrained than any other,\nwe alone reach that conception which the author of that record _intends to_\nreach; namely, a conception really worthy of God, of his temporal relation\nto the world, and of the relation of human days to the divine days of\ncreation; we get a foundation for the commandment to keep the Sabbath, the\nidea of which can be completed without disturbing the idea of God. The\nrelation of God to the whole temporal course of this present world, from\nits beginning to its end, for the religious mode of contemplation of man\nwho, as the image of God, looks to the creative activity of God for a\nprototype and an example for his own activity, can be comprised in one\nsingle, great, divine week, whose first six days last to the completion of\nthe creation of man, and whose seventh day still lasts and will last to the\ncompletion of the course of the world--till the latter itself, and mankind\nwith it, can enter into the divine rest.\n\nFrom this religious interpretation, which we have to ascribe to that\nBiblical idea of the divine week of creation, it by no means follows that\nreligion has to demand of natural science that it shall reach in its\ncosmogonic investigations the same succession in the appearance of things\nas we find in the Biblical account. This would be nothing else but an\nactual carrying of a pretended religious interest over beyond the limits of\na realm in which the deciding vote belongs to natural science. However\nincomplete the cosmogonic knowledge of the latter may be, it nevertheless\nis at present established clearly enough to reject forever such a demand.\nAstronomy convinces us that it is entirely inconceivable that all which\nbelongs to the work of the fourth Biblical day of creation, even {305} the\nwhole formation of stars and of our system of planets, _succeeded_ the work\nof the third day, the formation of earthly continents and plants. And\ngeology in its strata, which exhibit petrifactions, shows us that the\nrelative Biblical days' works in reality did not succeed one another\nalternately in such a way that the one began where the other ceased, but\nthat from the beginning of organic life the works of the third and the\nfifth days from the carboniferous period, also the works of the third,\nfifth, and sixth days, developed themselves perfectly by the side of each\nother. It would be an excess of refinement to identify any Biblical day of\ncreation with any period or any complex of periods in the development of\nthe earth or of the world.\n\nOn the other hand, for a Christianity founded upon the Holy Scripture, it\nis still not entirely without interest to compare _the results of natural\nscience and the extent and succession of the Biblical days' works with one\nanother_. For a declaration which undertakes to trace something which has\nso deep a hold on human life as the Sabbath-rest, back to the prototype of\ndirectly divine action, is certainly worthy of attention. Now if we wish to\nmake such a comparison, we can only do it in exact analogy with the way and\nmanner in which we compare the predictions of the prophetical word with\ntheir fulfilment. For in so far as the declarations of that Biblical record\nabout the circumstances of creation have religious value of which we are to\ntake notice, they as declarations concerning events of which man certainly\ncannot have historical knowledge of his own, come entirely under the point\nof view of the _prophetical word_; with the exception that they do not\ncontain a forward-looking but a {306} _backward-looking prophecy_. This is\none of the most correct and fruitful thoughts which Johann Heinrich Kurz,\nin his \"Bibel und Astronomie\" (\"Bible and Astronomy\"), Berlin, Wohlgemuth,\n1st edition, 1842, has expressed, but has fantastically misused, in that\nwork, in general so prolific of indefensible positions; a fate which, as is\nwell known, the forward-looking prophecy has had also often enough to\nundergo.\n\nIn the same manner as we have to explain the forward-looking prophecy from\ntwo factors--on the one hand, from the circumstances of time, the\nknowledge, the dispositions, and the characters of prophets; on the other,\nfrom the receptivity of their mind for the mind of God and the last\npurposes of his actions--we also have explained that record of creation\nfrom two factors: on the one hand, from the view and the knowledge of its\ntime, and on the other from the receptivity of its author for a pure and\nliving idea of God and of the religious relations of human life. And we\nshall also have to do likewise when interpreting it. For the interpretation\nof the forward-looking prophecy, we have behind us the experience of\nthousands of years, from which the following principles, of treatment and\ninterpretation have resulted. As long as such a prophetic word is not yet\nfulfilled, so long, indeed, its meaning is and remains the object of\nChristian faith and Christian hope; but it is difficult and almost\nimpossible to distinguish in it, what is lasting substance, and what is\ntransient form. Perhaps many a thing is looked upon as substance, which in\nthe fulfilment appears to be only an image and form; and perhaps many a\nthing as form, which in the fulfilment shows itself as a more concrete\nreality than we had supposed. {307} And it would even be psychologically a\nviolent assumption, if we should presuppose in the mind of the prophet a\nstill greater knowledge of the future course of things, than that which he\nexpresses; or if we should separate him in his worldly knowledge, and even\nin the form of his prophetic utterances, from the views and limits of his\ntime. But by far the most fruitless effort of all would be to construct\nbeforehand out of his words the particulars of the historical course of the\nfuture. Attempts of this kind have been defeated whenever they have been\nmade. But if the fulfilment of such a prophetic word has once taken place,\nit is a joy and a strengthening of faith to all following generations, and\neven after the final fulfilment of all prophecy, it will still be a joy to\nthe children of God in their perfection, to compare prophecy and fulfilment\nand to allow the prophecy to be illumined by the light of fulfilment, the\nfulfilment by that of prophecy.\n\nAll this finds its full application to the Biblical narrative of creation.\nThat which in the forward-looking prophecy is the historical fulfilment, is\nin the backward-looking the scientific investigation. So long as the latter\nwas not directed at all to the prehistoric history of the earth, it was an\naudacious undertaking to separate in the Biblical six days' work substance\nand form from one another; it was and is still an unpsychological violence\nto suppose in the human author of the narrative all possible knowledge of\npsychical and scientific secrets, and to lift him above the child-like\nviews of his time concerning the things of this world. But it was by far\nthe most fruitless undertaking to construct in detail from his words a\npicture of the real {308} circumstances of the creation and development of\nthe world. Attempts of this kind have been often made; but they have\nproduced nothing but dreams. And certainly the attempt to control and\ncorrect natural investigation by means of such dreams would be like trying\nto correct well-established facts of history by the prophecies of a still\nearlier period, or even to prove them false. But from the time when natural\nscience, as it is at present, began to pay attention to the prehistoric\nhistory of the earth and even of the universe, such a comparison has been\npossible.\n\nIt tells us, it is true, that the Biblical days' works did not follow each\nother in the course of earthly and cosmic developments in such a way, that\nthe one began where the other ceased, but that they passed on in the long\nlines of their course, beside one another, and above one another. But\nlooking upon their _meridian altitudes_, they nevertheless, where we are\nable to undertake certain geological comparisons, follow one another\nexactly in the same order in which the days follow one another in that\nBiblical record. The meridian altitude of the _third day_ (for here the\ncertainty of geological knowledge first begins for us) has to be looked for\nwhere the continents are formed and the vegetable life preponderates on\nearth: and that is the _carboniferous period_. The meridian altitude of the\n_fourth day_ must have been reached where for the first time the covering\nof vapor and clouds of the earthly atmosphere permanently parted, and sun,\nmoon, and stars became visible: and geology finds this time in the period\nwhich lies between the carboniferous period and the trias--in the _Permian\nperiod_, as it is called in England, in the _dyas_ of the {309}\nfossiliferous and of cupriferous slate and _Zechstein_, as we call it in\nGermany. The meridian altitude of the _fifth day_ has to be looked for\nwhere ocean-life, with its sauria and innumerable animals, gave its impress\nto organic life on earth, and the air was filled with inhabitants: geology\ncalls such a time the _secondary period_ of trias, Iura, and chalk. That\nocean-life preponderated in this period, is beyond any doubt; while in\ngeneral geology gives us more meagre information about the inhabitants of\nthe air than of the animals of the ocean and land. The flying sauria of\nIura are still characteristic enough to leave at least the possibility that\nthe winged world, which in value still stands below the mammalia, assisted\nin giving to that secondary period its proper type. Finally, the meridian\naltitude of the _sixth day_ cannot be anywhere else than where the animals\nof the land became the most characteristic inhabitants of the globe, and\nwhere man appeared: and that is the tertiary period of geology, in which\nmammalia appeared in great numbers and variety, and at the end of which we\nfind the first traces of the appearance of man.\n\nWe nevertheless do not assign special weight to the establishment of such a\ncorrespondence. The religious value of the idea of a divine week of\ncreation is rendered perfectly certain to us, if we only find that it is\nreconcilable with a pure idea of God. That would not be the case, if we had\nto look upon the week of creation as an earthly week; but it is perfectly\nso, if the divine week stretches over the whole temporality of the course\nof the world. Therewith we can be satisfied. For we have neither\ntheological nor philosophical nor {310} scientific evidences enough to draw\nfrom these Biblical utterances any _metaphysical conclusions_ in reference\nto the relations of God to the temporal development of the world. We should\nnot dare to contest directly such metaphysical relations: for the human\nweek, with its day of rest, is such an eminently fortunate and blissful\ninvitation, the observance of this command is accompanied by such a\nstriking prosperity in all life-relations of a people, its non-observance\nby such an evident curse, and, moreover, the idea of man bearing the image\nof God is such a fruitful idea, satisfying equally spirit and mind, that we\nhave to remember the possibility that the institution of the human week,\nwith its day of rest, is certainly founded on the real relations of the\nlife-process of that creature which bears the image of God to the activity\nof its divine prototype upon the earth. But nevertheless, we just as little\ndare to attempt or to challenge the establishment of such metaphysical\nrelations: for a theosophistic treatment of numbers seems to us no fruitful\nfield for the promotion of religion--neither for the promotion of religious\nknowledge nor for that of religious life.\n\nStill, however, the result of our comparison between Biblical and\nscientific interpretation seems to us worth mentioning for a special\nreason. It is true, we have found a succession of the _meridian altitudes_\nof the Biblical days in the same order in which, according to the Biblical\nrelation, the days' works followed one another; but we have found in the\n_total course_ of the Biblical days that their works in reality passed on\nin long lines contemporaneously with one another. Now, since that first\npart of our result--the succession of _meridian {311} altitudes_--is the\nleast we have to expect, if the counting of the days shall at all have an\nobjectively real ground in the world's process, on the other hand, the\nsecond part of our result--the far-reaching contemporary existence of the\ndifferent Biblical days--has an exact analogy with those prophecies whose\npartial or entire fulfilment permits us a more certain judgment of the\ncharacter of prophecy and a more certain comparison between prophecy and\nfulfilment. Even the prophetic world knows of a divine day, which in the\nprophecies occupies an eminent and central position: it is the day of the\nLord as the day of judgment and salvation. This day of the Lord also stands\nbefore the eye of the prophet, certainly not as a common earthly day of\ntwenty-four hours, but as a day of God rising above earthly days and\nembracing an infinite number of them, although it also has its very\ndistinct meaning which comes into the earthly temporality. But in the\nhistoric fulfilment, there happen along with it a thousand things which do\nnot belong to it; for two-thirds of mankind that day did not dawn at all;\nand as to its temporal course, it had its dawn in the beginnings of\nmankind,--its sunrise took place eighteen hundred years ago, and its\nmeridian altitude is still impending.\n\nFinally, that even the piety of those who composed the Biblical records,\nand of all those who see in them the manifested evidences of their faith,\nassigns no religious weight to the succession of the days' works, becomes\nclear from the before-mentioned fact, that the second account of creation,\nwhich makes man and his ethical primitive history its centre, relates the\ncreation of the inhabitants of the earth in quite a different order from\n{312} the first one. We shall treat of this point again, and more in\ndetail, for another reason, in the following section.\n\nWe still have to treat of the question as to what position the Holy\nScripture and Biblical Christianity take regarding a _development in\ngeneral_: and here also we have only to say that they are very favorable to\nsuch an idea. The works of the six days themselves are in their succession\nnothing else but a development, a permanent differentiation of that which\nwas not separated before, a continuous unfolding of the more simple into\nthe more complex, an always progressing preparation of the globe for newer\nand higher forms of existence, until finally man appeared. In the Biblical\naccount of creation, the idea which forms the basis of every evolution\ntheory, (namely, that the new which appears has its conditions and\nsuppositions, its creative secondary reasons, in the preceding), is\npronounced with special clearness. When it says: \"Let the Earth bring forth\ngrass and herb,... and the earth brought forth,\" etc.; \"And God said: Let\nthe waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life,\"\netc.; \"Let the earth bring forth the living creature; and it was so;\" and\n\"God made the beast of the earth,\"--the creative causality also is\nmentioned in the clearest words by the side of and under the causality of\nthe Creator, by means of which the latter had made creatures. The friendly\nrelation between the Biblical account and the evolution theory even goes so\nfar that the Holy Scripture, like that theory, does not permit animals to\ncome forth from plants, although the latter represent the lower, the former\nthe higher, and that, plants are a {313} necessary condition for animals,\nbut that even according to the Bible both kingdoms come forth from the\ninorganic of the earth. When treating of the creation of plants, it says,\n\"Let the earth bring forth grass,\" etc.; and when treating of that of\nanimals, it says, \"Let the earth bring forth the living creature.\" At last,\nif science should once succeed in perceiving more clearly than now the\norigin of the organic from the inorganic, it would have in those words the\nmeans for a harmony with the Biblical conception.\n\nNow, just as evidently as the Holy Scripture is favorable, in general and\nas a whole, to the idea of evolution, so certainly it seems to reject it\nprecisely at that point where the whole interest of our question lies;\nnamely, in reference to the origin of the single species. For here, when\ntreating of the creation of plants as well us of animals, it is said in\nmost distinct words: \"_after his kind_.\" But the contradiction is only\napparent. As to the way and manner in which God created every species,\nwhether he used secondary causes or not, nothing else is said than that God\ncreated every species, that the creatures exist in distinctly marked\nspecies, and that these species are not chance, but lie in the plan of\nGod--that they are his work. This fact, that it was God who wished to\ncreate each species as species, and in reality created it, is just as\nfirmly established, if the species came forth from one another and were\ndeveloped in gradual transitions, as if they received their existence in\nsome other way. As, in the fifth day's work, we find simply the words: \"And\nGod said, _Let the earth bring forth_ the living creature: and it was so;\"\nand \"_God made_ the beast of the earth,\"--in precisely the same way {314}\nGod could indeed _create_ single plants and animals _after their kind_, in\nsuch a way that one should come forth from another, that they should be\ndeveloped from one another.\n\nSec. 2. _The Creation of Man._\n\nThe most important facts which we have to mention, as bearing upon the\nposition of the Christian doctrine of the creation of man in reference to\nthe evolution theory, have been treated of in Chapter I, _A_. We have\nespecially convinced ourselves of the fact, that the new, even if it has\nits secondary causes, and comes into existence in gradual development, is\nno less a creation of God, and has no less the full value of the new, than\nif it were created instantaneously. Likewise man also stands before us\nuntouched in the full newness and dignity of his being, in the full\nqualitative and not simply quantitative superiority of the highest gifts of\nhis mind, and especially of his personality, his ego, his liberty,--in one\nword, in his full image of God,--whether we have to look upon him as\ncreated in gradual development or as created suddenly.\n\nThere are two circumstances in the Biblical account from which we see that,\nalthough it is naturally silent as to the descent problem, it not only\nknows and acknowledges the connection of man with the lower creatures of\nthe earth, but also expressly directs attention to it.\n\nOne of these circumstances is connecting man's creation with that of\nland-animals, in a single day's work. We do not lay more stress on this\nunion than that of the Holy Scripture, although it emphasizes so strongly\nthe dignity of man in his likeness to God and in his having entire {315}\nsupremacy over the whole earth, and although it could have found therein\nreasons enough for assigning a proper day to the creation of man, to which\nthe whole preceding creation pointed, and whom the whole creation on earth\nshould serve, yet in its account of the creation it evidently desires man\nto be looked upon in his connection as a creature with the animal world.\nMoreover, we should not overlook, in the Biblical account, that the\nbenediction which God gives to the animals of the water and the air, at the\nend of the fifth day, is in the sixth day not pronounced over the\nland-animals--although they certainly are as much entitled to it as fish\nand birds--but over man. Of course, it is presupposed that the land-animals\nnaturally partake of the benediction of man, so far as it can be due to\nthem; the benediction, namely, of fertility and of increase. According to\nthese indications and to the Biblical conception, man stands in still\nanother and closer connection with the animal world than in that of mere\nsupremacy over it.\n\nThe second circumstance to which we have to call attention, is the\ndeclaration (Genesis II, 7), that God created man out of earth; or rather,\nas the literal translation says: \"_And the Lord God formed man (of) dust of\nthe ground._\" It is of no importance whether the accusative \"dust of the\nground\" is, as some say, a mere appositive, or, as others explain it, the\naccusative of matter. When the account calls man dust of the ground, or a\nbeing formed of dust, the difference is infinitely insignificant, whether\nthe earthly matter out of which God formed man who is dust of the earth,\nwas an animal organism or not; whether man was formed {316} directly or\nindirectly out of the earth, and whether the forming demanded a longer or a\nshorter time. For that it did demand time, and that it was not an\ninstantaneous creation, is implied in the expression \"to form.\"\n\nWe call attention to this passage for still another reason. The second\naccount of creation, as it begins Genesis II, 4, and goes on to the end of\nthe third chapter, is strikingly different from the first account, Genesis\nI-Genesis II, 4. It has its origin in that author whose book is called that\nof the Jehovist, or, more lately, the judaico-prophetic book; and who,\namong all those that have contributed stones to the building of the\nPentateuch, gives the deepest insight into the nature of sin and grace, and\ninto the divine plan of salvation. Now in this book, from the religious\npoint of view so extremely worthy of attention, the account of the creation\nis given quite differently. Man is the centre of the account; that which\ndoes not directly refer to him is entirely omitted. The order in which the\ninhabitants of the earth were created, is not only not divided into the six\nday's works of the first account, and in verse 4 is not only directly taken\nas the work of a single day, in the expression [Hebrew: BAYWOM] (in the\nday, in which = when), without especial stress being put upon the\nexpression \"one day,\" for [Hebrew: BAYWOM] has become a particle; but this\norder is entirely different from the other. In the second account, the\nsuccession is the following: \"first, man; then, the paradise into which man\nis placed; next, the trees (the question at what time the rest of the\nvegetable world was created is left entirely without answer); then, the\ndetermination to create also an assistant to man; next, the creation of\nanimals; finally, the creation of the woman out {317} of a rib of man.\"\nNow, although it is wholly beyond doubt that the two accounts had different\nauthors, the question will nevertheless arise, how it was possible that\nthose who inserted these two accounts in the Holy Scripture, one after the\nother, could so harmlessly put side by side and read one after the other\nthese two accounts, so entirely contradictory, without being obliged to\nthink that the truth of the one would refute the other. They certainly must\nhave had in some way the conviction that the one account was consistent\nwith the other. But such an agreement between the two accounts is only\npossible when we either see in them only ideal truths, or when one of the\ntwo shall represent the actual reality of the circumstances of creation,\nand the other rather their ideal character. In case we should have to make\nsuch a distinction, it cannot be doubtful which of the two accounts has\nmore of the real, and which more of the ideal character. In the first\naccount nothing is related which does not give direct points of connection\nin the real process, as we can imagine it. In the second account, we find\nmany points which hardly permit a direct literal conception, even on the\npart of the first readers of the account and of the editors of the canon of\nthe Old Testament: for instance, besides the different order in which the\nfirst account is given, the creation of the woman out of the rib of man:\nthis account, when ideally taken, is so inexpressibly comprehensive,\npregnant, and deep--when taken really, so perfectly improbable. It will be\nlikewise difficult to believe that even the old readers of the account--at\nleast those of them who looked deeper and were more enlightened--took with\nextreme {318} literalness the expression, that God breathed into the\nnostrils of man who is dust of the ground, the breath of life. The third\nchapter has still other features from which we have at least to assume that\nthe author did not at all intend to give importance to an extremely literal\nconception of it. Now, if the second account is the more ideal one, the\nmeaning of it is: that man, his being, his aim, his primitive history, is\nmade the centre of the entire description, and around him all the rest is\ngrouped; while in the first account he appears to be more the end of the\nwhole creation--as he presents himself to natural investigation in the real\nprocess of creation, as the last member in the chain, not as the centre in\na circle or a star. Now if that is the case, if the second account of\ncreation, having man as its centre, is the more ideal, then we certainly\nmust not overlook the fact that in the ideal account man is called dust of\nthe ground. Then the nature of dust also belongs, from the ideal point of\nview, so necessarily to the nature of man that the question, whether the\nconnection of this man who is dust of the ground, with this ground, is\nbrought about through the form of a preceding animal organism, or not, is\nno longer of importance. Therefore, if we oppose the animal ancestry of man\nfor the general reasons that we do not wish to descend from something\nlower, that lower nevertheless is present as dust of the ground. And if we\noppose such a pedigree on account of the ugliness and wickedness which\nexist in the animal world, we have to point to the fact that, on the one\nhand, mankind also has stains which are uglier than those which disfigure\nthe wildest beast of prey, and that, on the other hand, the animal world\nshows features which {319} are so noble that no man need be ashamed of\nthem. It is certainly a right feeling to which Darwin, in his \"Descent of\nMan,\" gives expression, when he says: \"For my own part, I would as soon be\ndescended from that heroic little monkey who braved his dreaded enemy in\norder to save the life of his keeper, or from that old baboon who,\ndescending from the mountains, carried away in triumph his young comrade\nfrom a crowd of astonished dogs, as from a savage who delights to torture\nhis enemies, offers up bloody sacrifices, practices infanticide without\nremorse, treats his wives like slaves, knows no decency, and is haunted by\nthe grossest superstitions.\" We have but to add:--if only the coming forth\nfrom the creative hand of God, the creation in his own image, the communion\nwith Him and being a child of His, are preserved. And that all this can be\npreserved, even when adopting descent and evolution, we have seen from\nrepeated considerations.\n\nBut we have to draw still another conclusion from the difference between\nthe two accounts of creation. If the succession, in which the inhabitants\nof the earth appear in the first account, is so entirely different from\nthat in the second, as it evidently is, we have necessarily either to give\nup the historical reality of the one or of the other account, or of both,\nor to suppose that the creation of the inhabitants of the earth took place\nin a way and manner which makes it possible to perceive a _real_ connection\nof the succession in the first account, _as well as_ in that of the second,\nwith the real processes of creation. Now we do not at all intend to argue\nwith those who choose the first part of the dilemma; we ourselves join with\nthem, and believe that salvation does {320} not depend upon the objective\nreality of that succession, nor the possession of salvation on the faith of\nsuch reality. But we leave to the consideration of those who, in their\nreligious convictions, think themselves bound to the objective reality of\nboth accounts, the following thoughts: If not only ideal depth, but also a\nconnection with the empirical and historical reality of the process of\ncreation, is to be assigned to the succession of the first account as well\nas to that of the second, it is only possible by assuming a\ndescent--namely, that man, _e.g._, may be called in one sense the first of\ncreatures, inasmuch as with the first organism that was already given which\nwas afterwards developed into man, and inasmuch as all which was otherwise\ncreated and developed as aspecial species, was only present on account of\nthat aim; and that man in another, in the merely empirico-historical sense,\nis still also the last of creatures. Thus, then, the advocates of descent\nwould find themselves in the unaccustomed position, equally surprising to\nfriend and foe, of being in a much more friendly relation to the Biblical\nbelief in revealed religion than their opponents. We should see the\napparent discords not only between Scripture and nature, but also between\naccount and account, dissolved into harmony, and above the double relation\nof the two accounts we should see the morphological ideas of Oken and\nGoethe, the ideas of types of Cuvier, Agassiz, and Owen, the laws of\ndevelopment of K. E. von Baer, and finally the ideas of descent of Lamarck\nand Darwin, reach a friendly hand to one another. And even the old joys of\na teleological view of nature, adorned indeed with queue and wig, but at\npresent rejected with too much disdain, even if they {321} are called\nichthyo-teleological and insecto-teleological, would attain in this\nreconciliation their modest, subordinate place. Moreover, we should then\nhave the satisfaction of seeing again that a religiousness which in its own\nrealm gives absolutely free play to natural investigation, and does not\nfind it beneath its dignity to learn from natural science, can on that\naccount retain its own autonomy in its own realm much more uncontestedly;\nand that, as it seems to us in the present case, it can go much farther in\nthe use which it makes of its autonomy and in the extension of the revealed\ncharacter of its religious records to physical processes and circumstances,\nthan is either necessary or safe, and that it nevertheless is rewarded for\nkeeping peace with natural science by more rich, more living, and more\ncorrect glimpses into the harmony between the word of God and the work of\nGod, than would be the case with a religiousness which, without regard to\nnatural science, weaves its cosmogonies from the Holy Scripture alone.\n\nSec. 3. _The Primitive Condition of Man: Paradise, the Fall of Man, and\nPrimitive History._\n\nAfter the Holy Scripture has narrated the creation of man in two accounts,\nthe second of them gives us a continuation in the well-known account of\nParadise and of the fall of man, with its consequences; and the further\ndevelopment, of the Biblical doctrine, as well as of Christian theology,\nhas also taken the substance and quintessence of these narratives into its\nrepresentation of the Christian truths of salvation.\n\nWe shall not throw any obstacles in the way of bringing about an\nunderstanding between the Darwinian views {322} and the Biblical primitive\nhistory, by acknowledging the justice of the view that Christian piety\nmight in some way contain in itself the demand that also the form in which\nthe facts of truth in Genesis III are given to us, has historical reality.\nHe who makes this demand has only his own short-sightedness and imprudence\nto blame, if he also loses the substance with the form, the figurative\nnature of which can be shown to him only too certainly. We acknowledge it\nas a real providence of God, which intends faithfully to guard believing\nman against a senseless and slavish adherence to the letter, and against\ngrounding his means of salvation upon insecure foundations, that at the\ngrand and venerable portal of Holy Scripture two accounts stand peacefully\nbeside one another, which, if we penetrate through the form into their\nsubstance, complete one another in magnificent and profound harmony, but\nwhich, if we look upon the form as their substance, so diametrically\ncontradict each other that we cannot do anything else but reject the one or\nthe other, or, still more logically, both. We think that this hint is\nstrong enough to be understood, and bears, like all bowing before truth and\nits power of conviction, rich fruit not only for our knowledge, but also\nfor the purity, certainty, and richness of our religiousness. We shall not\nlose by this acknowledgment the character of revelation and the impression\nof the truth of these Biblical records, but shall be able through them, and\nthrough them alone, to gain and perceive it. It is true, the first account,\nand still more the second--the account of the creation and of the primitive\nhistory of man--has in its external form an exceedingly close relationship\nto the poetical myths of the ancient nations of the Orient; but {323} its\ndifference does not consist essentially in the form--although this too,\nbeing the form of a true and correct substance, shows differences enough\nfrom these heathen myths--but consists in the substance itself. These\nheathen myths certainly contain many beautiful, deep, and true factors, but\nalways, besides, fundamental ideas which we have to reject as half-true or\nwholly erroneous: sometimes a dualistic conception of God and the world,\nsometimes a materialization of the divine, the spiritual, and the ethical,\nsometimes fatalistic and sometimes magic elements in great number. These\nBiblical representations, on the other hand, certainly appear to us still\nin a picturesque form which is analogous to that formation of myth; for it\nreally seems to be the only form in which the mind of man, in his first\nepoch of life, was able to perceive and represent supernatural and ethical\ntruth, as we are to-day able to represent the highest relations of our mind\nto the supernatural and the ethical only in pictures and parables; but the\nBiblical representations offer us, under this plastic covering, a substance\nwhich, in view of the most extensive criticism, of the deepest speculation,\nand of the most enlightened and practically most successful piety, is still\nestablished as the purest, the most correct, and the most fruitful\nrepresentation of the nature of God, and of the ethical nature and the\nethical history of man.\n\nMoreover, we shall not make it difficult to bring about an understanding\nbetween the Darwinian theories and the Biblical doctrine, by supporting the\nother view taught by the Holy Scripture--that death came into the animal\nworld first through the fall of man, and that the fall of man first brought\nthe character of perishableness {324} into the condition of the earth or\neven of the universe. There are essentially three Biblical passages to\nwhich those refer who think that they find such a view in the Holy\nScripture; namely, Romans V, 12; Romans VIII, 19-23, and Genesis III; but\nthey are wrong. That the Apostle Paul, in Romans V, 12, by the world, into\nwhich death came through sin, did not mean the universe or the globe, but\nmankind, is plain enough from the connection, and is only demanded by the\ndifference of meaning which in the Greek, as well as in the German\nlanguage, the word \"world\" has according to its connection. And in Romans\nVIII, 19-23, where he speaks of the subjection of the creature to vanity,\nhe does not mention a certain time in which it happened, nor an historical\noccasion, as the fall of man, which should have given the impulse to this\nsubjection; but he only says, in general, that it was God who \"hath\nsubjected the creature to vanity,\" and that he hath \"subjected the same _in\nhope_.\" He who reads this passage without prepossession, can be led to no\nother idea than to this: that God has subjected the creature to the law of\nvanity from the very beginning of creation--not forever, but from the very\nbeginning--with the intention that he shall also celebrate his\ntransfiguration and deliverance from the yoke of perishableness, together\nwith the perfection of mankind, and with the manifestation and\ntransfiguration of the children of God. And even the curse of the ground\n(Genesis III, 17) is no cursing of the universe, or of the globe and its\ncreatures, but only a cursing of _the ground_; and of this not on its own\naccount, but only in its relation, as a means of subsistence, to man, and\nin opposition to the {325} exemption from labor which his life hitherto\nhad, and to the agreeableness of his means of support in paradise.\n\nAfter having thus rejected these two perversions of the Biblical doctrine,\nthere remains to us as an established substance of the latter, and as an\nessential part of Christian dogmatics, so far as it may come into contact\nwith the _Darwinian_ views, at least the following: Man was originally\ncreated by God, good and happy. To his goodness there also belonged the\npossibility of having a sinless development, as he ought to have had; and\nto his happiness there also belonged a life amid surroundings wholly\ncorresponding to him, and the possibility of obtaining exemption from death\nand all evils by way of a self-controlling submission to God, which resists\ntemptation. We purposely express ourselves thus. For the Biblical primitive\nhistory does not say that man was _created_ with exemption from the law of\ndeath, but that the latter must have been _granted_ to him as a reward for\nhis submission: the tree of life stood _by the side of_ the tree of the\nknowledge of good and evil, and only the eating of the fruit of the tree of\nlife, by avoiding the eating of the forbidden fruit, should have given to\nman that immortality which he forfeited by disobedience. Man became\ndisobedient, and, in consequence of it, subject to death; the harmony\nbetween man and his surroundings disappeared; the earth became to him a\nplace of labor and of death; and now began for man his historical\ndevelopment as a web of guilt, of punishment, and of education and\nredeeming mercy.\n\nNow, in the presence of this Biblical view, the question comes up first of\nall: is a view according to which man should have been able and obliged to\ntake a sinless {326} development, and, in case he had taken it, should have\nbeen exempt from the fate of death and of the ills preceding it, and\nendowed with immortality as to body and soul--is such a view in any way\nreconcilable with the Darwinian ideas of development, according to which\nman came forth from the series of lower organisms, subject to death?\n\nWe could avoid answering this question by a deduction similar to that which\nwe drew in Chap. I, Sec. 3, when treating of the question of the\nreconcilableness of the idea of evolution with theism, but of which we\nlikewise made no use. We could show that in this question no other\ndifficulties present themselves to the religious consciousness, than such\nas existed long before the appearance of the Darwinian theories and were\novercome by pious consciousness and religious reasoning. For a difficulty\nentirely similar to that which here appears to us, when looking upon the\nwhole human _species_ and its origin, stood before us heretofore, when\nlooking upon the human _individual_ and his origin. From the standpoint of\nBiblical Christianity, we ascribe to the human individual an immortality of\nthe soul and a coming resurrection of the body; but we do not to the human\nembryo at the beginning of its development in the womb. Now we know that\nthe development of man from that embryo to perfect man is wholly gradual;\nthat we cannot observe and predicate of any organ, of any quality, of any\nactivity of body, soul, or mind, exactly the moment when it comes into\nexistence; and that therefore we cannot give the moment when we could\nassume that something so decidedly great and new as the immortality of the\nsoul and the prospect of a {327} resurrection of the body, begins for the\nhuman individual. Although we know all this, nevertheless in all\ndiscussions of the question whether we have to hope for an immortality of\nthe soul and a resurrection of the body, the gradual development has hardly\never been, so far as we know, a weight--in any case, never the decisive\nweight--in the balance _against_ the supposition of an immortality. If we\ncan look upon the idea of an immortality of the soul and of a resurrection\nof the body as reconcilable with the fact, that the human individual was\nonly developed gradually out of something which was still soulless and\nperishable, we also have to look upon the other fact as reconcilable with\nthe gradual development of the whole _species_; namely, that man, if he\nshould have developed himself without sin, would have reached an\nimmortality of body and soul. But we shall not enter this path which would\nlead us around the whole question. For the objection might be made, that\nthe scientific and philosophic impossibility of assuming an eternal\nduration of an individual that originated in time, has, indeed, always been\npointed out, and only the _assertion_, not the _proof_, of the contrary has\nbeen opposed to it; but that Darwinism puts this impossibility into new and\nfull light. Therefore, if we wish to reach a certain basis for our\nconviction, nothing else remains to us but to enter upon that question\nwholly and exclusively from Darwinian premises.\n\nNow these premises, indeed, indicate to us a _development_ of things, but a\ndevelopment of such a kind that there appears to us something new, and\nalways new in a rising line. The rising of this line of development\nconsists in the fact that the spiritual comes forth from the {328} natural\nin permanent progress and in always higher development: that mind\nvanquishes matter. The first new thing which meets us in the development of\nthe globe, is the organic and life; the second, sensation and\nconsciousness; the third, self-consciousness and free-will. Now let us once\nsuppose imaginary human spectators of every first appearance of these\nphenomena. Would he who thus far had only known inorganic phenomena and\nprocesses, have dared, before the appearance of life, to utter the\nproposition: matter can also become living and live? And who would have\ndared to suggest the further doctrine: matter can also feel and get a\nconsciousness of things? Finally, who would have dared even to say: matter\ncan also become a self-conscious and free personality? To every person who\nwould have pronounced such dreams of the future, there would have been\nopposed, apparently with full right, the inviolable mechanism of the\ninorganic world. But all this nevertheless took place. If something\nmaterial can be led so far that a personality lives in it, that, with the\nassistance of this material basis, is able to perceive the ideas and the\neternal, that can act in accordance with aims and designs and can set\nitself the highest aims, and that may even enter upon a loving and\nchild-like relation to the highest primitive cause of all things, then we\nare no longer permitted to say that the material, of which the body of such\na personality consists, could not have been subjected to the service of\nsuch a personality so far, that the latter could have vanquished the\nelements of the destruction of life in an eternal process of spontaneous\nrenewal.\n\nIt is true, with such a concession alone we have not {329} gained anything\ndirectly. For _in abstracto_ everything is finally conceivable which does\nnot contradict the logical laws of reasoning--even the basilisk and the\nmountain of diamonds in stories and fairy tales. But such an _abstract_\nconceivableness has not the least value for the knowledge of the _real_,\nnor even for the knowledge of the _really possible_. For in the world of\nbeing and becoming, everything in its last elements, forces, qualities, and\nlaws, as well as in the last causes of its development, is something so\nabsolutely _given_, that only afterward are we able to analyze that which\nis present, from our observations, or to follow from the given factors that\nwhich can be, or which under other conditions would have become different,\nand that we are not able to synthetically construct the one or the other in\nadvance, independently from the factors of reality. If, therefore, that\nconcession shall attain a scientific value, and if the conditional\nsentence: Man would not have been subject to death if he had not sinned, is\nto become an admitted and unassailable part of Christian theology, we have\nto look in the realm of phenomena, and in the course of that which took\nplace, for _facts_ which _prove_ that man, if he had not committed sin,\nwould not have died, and which thus change that merely abstract,\npossibility into a real one.\n\nNow we have such a fact in the _resurrection of the Lord_. If it really\ntook place, then it is the last earthly stage in the course of the Lord's\nwork of Redemption, and then it permits us to draw conclusions backwards as\nto what would have become of man, if he had not been in need of this\nredemption, if he had had a sinless development instead of one with sin.\n{330}\n\nWe know very well that in mentioning this fact we meet not only the\nopposition of those who contest a teleological, theistic, and especially a\nChristian view of the world, but also the natural doubts of those who\ndefend with warm interest teleology and the ethical fundamentals and\nproductive forces of Christianity, but who think it more advisable to pass\nover the whole question of the resurrection in cautious silence. The main\nconsideration which hinders them from believing in the reality of the\nresurrection of Jesus Christ, is not the want of historical attestation,\nbut rather the absolute want of any attested analogy in the other events\nwhich have taken place on the earth. What we commonly see and witness in\nthe dead, is without exception precisely the opposite of that which is\nrelated about the further fate of Jesus crucified. Now we have repeatedly\nhad occasion to point out that the want of analogy cannot at all be a proof\nof a fact's not having taken place, supposing it otherwise well\nestablished. Especially if a _development_ of events follows aims, it lies\nin the nature of this development that in its course in all the places\nwhere we really and actually can speak of a development, of a process,\nthings appear and must appear which were not present before, and which,\neven if they once appeared, nevertheless need not necessarily be repeated,\nexcept at certain times which correspond to the plan of development;\nnamely, when \"their time has come.\" All these are events which are wanting\nin analogy, but which cannot be doubted at all on that account. That was\nthe case with the first appearance of organic life, also with the first\nappearance of beings having sensation and consciousness; moreover, it was\nthe case with the first appearance of each of the thousands {331} of\nspecies of organic beings: all these things, at the time when they first\nappeared, lacked every analogy in the past, and were perhaps repeated for\nsome time, in primitive generations, perhaps not; at any rate, they have\nall ceased to have analogies within the memory of man. In an eminent degree\ndoes the first appearance of man want every analogy with what we observe\nelsewhere. We never see men appear on the stage of the earth, who were not\noriginated by men; yet this event, so contrary to all analogy, did once\ntake place, and stands without parallel and analogy in the midst of the\nseries of events, so far as our knowledge can reach.\n\nThus the resurrection of the Lord must also necessarily want analogy, in\ncase it is an event which really marks a station of progress in the\ndevelopment of earthly creatures and their history, and in case also its\nnature and its importance tend not to bring mankind, or at least those who\nbelieve in him who has been raised, at once under the influence of its\nphysical consequences, but only so far to prepare the way for these\nconsequences in intellectual and moral life-forces. And precisely such an\nevent is the resurrection of Jesus, according to the announcement of the\nLord as to himself and his work, and according to the development of this\npersonal testimony in the minds of his first disciples, and also according\nto what Jesus actually became for mankind, and especially for Christianity.\nAccording to this testimony of Jesus and his apostles, and to this actual\nexperience, Jesus is the Redeemer, whose work is to make amends for the\ndestruction caused by sin, and thus to originate and establish a new\ncreation in mankind which, from inner, mental, and spiritual beginnings,\n{332} renews mankind, and becomes the leaven which, in long periods of\nlabor, leads it to the goal of perfection; a perfection in which the whole\ncreation shall participate--with which, indeed, mankind is inseparably\nconnected on the whole natural side of its existence. But then it also lies\nin the nature of the resurrection of Jesus to be single in its kind, and\nwithout analogy, until that time shall have come in the development of\nmankind when the last enemy, death, shall be forever removed and overcome.\n\nWe quite fail to conceive how those who acknowledge design in the world,\ncan avoid the acknowledgment of the resurrection of Jesus--supposing the\nfact to be historically established: whereof we shall have to speak\nhereafter. It is, indeed, quite impossible to speak of a goal of mankind,\nif annihilation--annihilation of single personalities as well as of mankind\nas a whole--is its certain destiny. Where and what is this end of mankind,\nif the last generation of the globe is to perish with the destruction of\nthis globe, or languish and die even before that destruction, and if\nnothing will be left of mankind beyond the soulless material for new\nformations in their putrifying corpses and desolate homes and works of art?\nWhere and what is this goal, if all which once set human minds and hearts\nin motion, and which stimulated the intellectual and moral work of the\nhuman races, simply ceases to exist, no longer finds anywhere even a place\nof remembrance, and nowhere has a fruit to exhibit, except perhaps in the\nmind of a God who once set the cruel play in motion, and now permits it to\ncease, in order to procure for himself a change in the entertainment? A\nmere immortality of human {333} souls, without resurrection and without the\nperfection and transfiguration of the universe, is not afforded us by this\ngoal, which we certainly need, if we are to think at all of a goal for\nmankind. For if all departing souls should be carried into another world\nwhose only relation to the further course of the earthly history of mankind\nwas in the fact, that the dead are always gathered in it; into another\nworld whose only relation to the past of the earthly history of mankind\nshould be in the fact, that it is divided into a heaven and a hell for\nthose who reach it; if in this world everything should move on, without\nend, in eternal coming and going; and if nothing could be said of that\nother world than that everything there is different from ours--even that we\nshould there have no possible points of contact with this world: then we\nshould have nothing else but a gloomy dualism of the world for which\nneither our intellectual, nor our psychical, and least of all our physical,\norganization is in any way prepared, we should have in it no satisfaction\nof our noblest instincts, no goal to which we would be led by any of the\nguides who show us the paths which we have to follow on earth. Only a\nresurrection and transfiguration of the earth and the universe, as well as\nof a glorified mankind, show us such a goal. For this aim, for such a\n_real_ continuation of life of the single personality, and of all mankind,\nafter the long work of moral and intellectual development, all noble and\nworthy instincts of mankind are prepared--from the instinct of\nself-preservation up to the instinct of self-sacrifice for ideal purposes\nand the instinct of moral perfection and community with God. We find that\nin all the rest of creation, instincts and inherent powers {334} are\npresent to be satisfied. The naturalistic tendencies which at present\ncontrol so many minds, are very much inclined to found their whole view of\nthe world upon this correlation of instinct, function, and satisfaction.\nShould, then, the highest instincts of the highest creature on earth alone\nmake an exception? Have they originated from illusions, and do they lead to\nillusions? We cannot refrain from quoting a word which Alb. Reville, of\nRotterdam, has written in the first part of the October issue of the \"Revue\ndes Deux Mondes,\" 1874, on the occasion of a criticism of E. v. Hartmann's\n\"Philosophy of the Unconscious\"; though it was written only in defence of\ntheism in general. We quote from a report of E. P., in the _Augsburger\nAllgem. Zeitung_, Oct. 27, 1874, which is all at present at our command:\n\"When the young bird, fluttering its wings on the edge of its mother's\nnest, launches forth for the first time, it finds the air which carries it,\nwhile a passage is opened for it. Instinct deceived the bird just as little\nas it deceives the multitude of large and small beings which only live in\nfollowing its incitations. And should man alone, whom spiritual perfection\nattracts--man whose characteristic instinct it is to raise himself mentally\ntoward the real-ideal, the superiority of which he cannot sufficiently\ndescribe, should man, who obeys his nature, dash his head against the wall\nbuilt of unhewn stones of unconscious, blind, and deaf force? Nature,\nindeed, has too much spirit--according to Hartmann himself--to indulge in\nsuch an absurdity; and the philosophy of the 'unconscious Unconscious' will\nnever permit it.\" It is true, there is actually present in mankind, and in\nit alone, such a discord between {335} instinct and satisfaction: man has\nin himself instincts which are opposed to sin and death, and nevertheless\nsin and death exist. But the redemption through Christ, and especially the\nknowledge of his resurrection, announces to us that this discord is\nremoved.\n\nTherefore, he who in general acknowledges that mankind in its development\nhas had given to it goals which correspond to its gifts and instincts, has\nevery reason to look about and see whether, in the course of human history,\ncertain things have happened which point at such aims--indications which\nprophetically assure mankind, that it advances toward a spiritual and moral\nperfection, and toward an undiminished participation of all members of\nmankind in this perfection. Such an assurance is offered us in the\nresurrection of Jesus; and therefore, all who have not abandoned a\nteleological view of the world, have reason for _examining it with\nreference to the degree of its historical truth_. This degree is the\nhighest which we can in general claim of any historical event.\n\nIn order to show this with such brevity as is necessary in the present\nbook, and at the same time to guard ourselves against every danger of\nprejudice in the investigation, we shall for this occasion assume\nhypothetically that all, even the most extreme, assertions of Biblical\ncriticism as to the authenticity and inauthenticity of the books of the New\nTestament, and as to the difference of their component parts and the time\nof their composition, are correct and proven; and see what then remains\nestablished. In the first place, it is an acknowledged fact, that Peter\nfirst, then the eleven apostles at different times, and between these more\nthan five hundred \"brethren\" (_i.e._, nearly or fully all who had preserved\ntheir {336} attachment to the Lord till his death), saw the appearances of\nthe risen one, a few days after his death; and, indeed, under the most\ndifferent circumstances, and under mental conditions in which they did not\nat all expect any such second appearance. We have, in regard to this, the\nmost authentic written evidence of the apostle Paul, in the fifteenth\nchapter of his first letter to the Corinthians: a letter whose authenticity\nno criticism has dared to doubt. This letter was written in the spring of\n58: and Paul himself had already been changed from a persecutor into a\nbeliever in Christ in the year 36--_i.e._, one year after the death of\nJesus, which took place in 35; he went to Jerusalem in 39, and here\neverything was related to him by Peter, as we know from his letter\n(likewise not contested) to the Galatians. Thus the authentic information\nof the man, who in 58 collected the historical proofs of the reality of the\nresurrection of Jesus for his Corinthian Christians, goes back to four\nyears after the death of Jesus, and to the personal witnesses of the\nappearances; as in that letter he also refers to the fact that \"many of\nthese five hundred brethren are still living.\" Moreover, it is an\nestablished fact, that the first written evidences of the evangelical\nhistory from which our canonical gospels subsequently originated, likewise\ncontained accounts of the appearance of the risen one. Finally, it is an\nestablished fact that, from the very beginning, the whole meaning of\nevangelical preaching turned on the two facts of the death and of the\nresurrection of Jesus, as on the two cardinal points of all preaching of\nsalvation; also that all the faith of those who embraced the Gospel was\nfounded upon these two facts, as upon the historical fundamentals of the\n{337} salvation which comes from Jesus; and that thus Christianity, with\nall its effects, which have unhinged the old world and diffused streams of\nblessing over mankind, has its historical basis in faith in the death of\nJesus and his resurrection. This is our historical chain of proof. And that\nevidence which gives certainty to its most important link, on which\neverything depends--the _appearance_ of the risen one--is the entire\nfailure of all the attempts at explaining that appearance from a seeming\ndeath, from an intended deception, from a self-delusion, from a vision and\nan ecstasy, from a poetic myth; in short, from any other cause than, that\nthe Lord really appeared to his disciples as the man who was dead, but who\nis risen and lives. We cannot follow Keim in all his methods of\nreconstructing the life of Jesus, and we believe that he is much too timid\nregarding the consequences which follow from an objective, real appearance\nof Jesus after his death; but we acknowledge it as a high merit of his\nchristological works, that although he is willing to use criticism to the\nutmost, he has so thoroughly and strikingly shown the impossibility of\nexplaining the appearance of Jesus after his death differently from the\nreal manifestations of his still living person. It is well that Strauss, in\nhis \"The Old Faith and the New,\" declares the history of the resurrection\nof Jesus a _historical humbug_; for it may open the eyes of many, if the\ntendency, of which Strauss is leader, is no longer able to explain\nChristianity--the noblest, purest, and most successful religion which has\ncome into existence in the whole history of mankind--otherwise than by\ncalling it a humbug. With him who is pleased with this manner of explaining\nthe most perfect blossom and fruit of {338} the tree of mankind, we\ncertainly can find no common ground of mutual understanding.\n\nWe have been led to all these discussions, by looking for something actual\nwhich should be able to throw its light back upon the earliest primitive\nhistory of mankind--a history which can no longer be historically\ninvestigated. We have found this reality in the resurrection of Jesus; and\nthe light which it throws upon the primitive history of man, we have\nperceived in the conclusion to which it leads us: that man, if he had taken\na sinless development, would also have been exempt from death.\n\nThe resurrection of Jesus throws its light upon still another side of the\nBiblical doctrine of the primitive condition of man: namely, upon that\nwhich is the religious quintessence of the Biblical doctrine of _Paradise_.\nAs now the resurrection of the Lord is the beginning and the prophecy of a\nnew creation on the basis of the old, and as we now hope, with St. Paul,\nthat this beginning shall manifest its comprehensive cosmic effects, when\nthe Lord shall manifest them in the resurrection of the \"children of God:\"\nso, in case of a sinless development of man, the beginning of this new and\nglorified stage of creation would certainly have been perceptible at the\nbeginning of the history of mankind and in the relation of man to his\nearthly surroundings. But we are of course not permitted to make or to\npursue such a suggestion at present, since a sinful development of mankind,\nwith its consequences, actually took place.\n\nWe have no reason to enter into the discussion of another often and much\ndebated question, which is connected with the primitive history of man;\nnamely, {339} _whether mankind is descended from one or more pairs of men_.\nWe pass it by; because it has no connection whatever with the acceptance or\nrejection of the Darwinian ideas, and since it is not yet archaeologically\nand scientifically solvable. There are Darwinians who think\nmonogenetically, and others who think polygenetically; and there is still a\nthird class--and they speak most correctly--who acknowledge that they know\nnothing about it. Besides, we can also pass by this question, for the\nreason that in spite of the important place which it occupies in the\ntheological system of St. Paul, we have no right to assign to it, in the\nform in which we put it, the decisive dogmatic importance which it still\noccupies in many conceptions of Christian theology. For we cannot question\nthe right of the natural sciences to enter into the discussion of this\nquestion, and to look for a solution of it. As soon as we make this\nconcession, it necessarily and naturally follows from it, that we must no\nlonger make the substance and truth of our religious possession, even in a\nsubordinate manner, dependent on the results of exact investigations: for\nour religious possessions have too deep a basis of truth, to permit us to\nground them on the results of investigations in a realm so dark for science\nand so far removed from religious interest. As to this question, we may\nhope for a future solution in the monogenetic sense: we may rejoice over\nthe fact that, according to the present state of knowledge, the needle of\nthe scale rather inclines in favor of a oneness of origin of mankind; but\nwe must also be prepared to accept the possibility of a contrary result,\nwithout being afraid that in such a case we should have to abandon at once\nthat religious factor {340} for whose sake the advocates of a monogenetic\ndescent might defend their view. This religious (and, we may add, quite as\nstrong ethic) factor consists in the idea of the intimate unity and\nbrotherhood of mankind. We must absolutely adhere to this idea; for it is\nin opposition to the particularism which, quite without exception, governed\nthe entire old world, even its most highly developed nations, and which was\nonly penetrated by some beams of hope and prediction in the prophecy of\nIsrael--one of the most beautiful and blissful gifts of Christianity to\nmankind. This idea still contains, as ethical motive, one of the strongest,\nmost indispensable, and most promising forces in the world. If this idea\nshall be a real and lastingly effective one, it certainly must also have\nits real basis in the history of the origin of mankind. But, we must ask,\nis the only conceivable reality of this basis a monogenetic pedigree, and\ndo we lose this reality if science should once find that mankind came into\nexistence not only in one single pair, but in several pairs, even in\ndifferent places, and at different times? Even in such a case, the idea of\nthe unity of mankind would only lose its real basis, if at the same time we\nwere permitted to think also anti-teleologically--if we were permitted to\nsuppose that that which came into existence, repeatedly, and in different\nplaces, had each time entirely different causes without a common aim and a\ncommon plan. If we think teleologically, we see the unity of mankind, also\nin case of a polygenetic origin, in the unity of the metaphysical and\nteleological cause which called mankind into existence; and to rational\nbeings, endowed with mind, as men are, the metaphysical bond is certainly\nstronger than the physical. {341} Precisely the Darwinian ideas of the\norigin of species through descent would show us in such a case the real\nbond which unites mankind. For then we should only have to go back from the\ndifferent points on the stem-lines of the prehistoric generators of these\nprimitive men, at which men originated otherwise than by generation, in\norder to arrive finally at a common root of all these stem-lines: the\nmembers of mankind would even then remain consanguineous among one another,\nnot only in an ideal, but in a real sense.\n\nNow that the idea of the unity of mankind was holy and important to St.\nPaul, is to be inferred in advance from such a universal mind. And when in\nActs XVII, 26, he expresses this idea before the Athenians, so proud of\ntheir autochthony, with the words that \"of one blood all nations of men\ndwell on all the face of the earth\"; or when, in Romans V, and 1\nCorinthians XV, he makes use of the idea in order to explain and to glorify\nthe universal power of redemption of Christ by putting Adam and Christ in\nopposition to one another, as the first and the second Adam, so that he\nsees sin and death coming forth from Adam, grace and justice and life from\nChrist and extending over mankind; then we find this idea quite convincing\nand natural, and adhere firmly to the quintessence of these truths, even if\nwe acknowledge neither in these passages, nor in Genesis I and II, the\nintention of God to give us a supernatural manifestation of the exterior\nprocess of the creation of man. Paul himself gives us a hint not to follow\nslavishly a literal interpretation, when he says, in Romans V, \"as by one\nman sin entered into the world and death by sin,\" and calls this man Adam,\nalthough he knows that according to the {342} Biblical relation, Eve was\nthe one who was first seduced, and although he expressly points out and\nmakes use of this priority of the sin of Eve in another connection, and for\nanother reason.\n\nFinally, we may here also take into consideration the contradictions which\nhave come up by reason of more recent investigations, in reference to the\n_prehistoric conditions of man_, and which, especially in England, have\nbeen designated as the contradiction between the _elevation theory_ and the\n_depravation theory_.\n\nIn general, this contradiction is looked upon as if a conception of the\nprimitive history of man, remaining conformable to the Bible, could only be\nbrought into harmony with a depravation theory, and not with an elevation\ntheory; but certainly without reason.\n\nThe Biblical and Christian conception of the primitive history of man does\nnot at all demand the conception of a gradual sinking down of mankind from\na supernatural height--of a gradual depravation of our species--which many\nrepresentations seem to assume. For, according to it, the fall of man had\nalready taken place with the first pair of mankind; they were driven from\nParadise, to long hard labor and development; and Paradise was taken from\nearth. Even the paradisaical condition, with its short duration, was\ndeficient in all the various gifts of life which are a product of human\ninventive faculty and skill, and which can leave behind vestiges and\nremains. But what the Holy Scripture relates or indicates of the\nafter-paradisaical primitive history of man, wholly corresponds to the idea\nof a gradual development out of the more simple and rough, which is\ndemanded by the evolution theory in its {343} application to history. That,\neven according to the Biblical conception, goodness and progress in outer\nculture, sin and intellectual stagnation, are not identical, we see from\nthe fact, that by the Holy Scripture the most successful inventions of man\nare not assigned to the more pious Sethites, but to the Titan-like,\nrebellious Kainites. Likewise, the evolution theory does not at all require\na constant, general, and exclusive progress of mankind in all its members.\nAs in the realm of irrational organisms, so in the history of mankind; it\nhas to assume the most various ramifications with progress, stand-still,\nand retrogradation. It is true, it sees in the nations of culture progress\nin an upward rising line; but besides, stand-still and retrogradations in\ngreat variety. It also sees in mankind in general a labor of upward rising\ndevelopment; but it also sees many hindrances of development, and many\nshavings which the work throws to one side. But exactly the same thing was\nalso seen in every religious or profane contemplation of history, long\nbefore the evolution theory was born.\n\nTherefore, the different views of the earliest primitive history of man,\nthe theory of depravation and that of elevation, do not stand so opposed to\none another--the former representing the Biblical and religious, the latter\nthe anti-religious, view of the history--but the question as to the\nprimitive history is not yet solved in that respect; the depravation\ntheory, as well as the elevation theory, indicates rather the _directions_\nin which investigation has to put its questions to the archaeological\nsources. Investigation, on the other hand, has free scope in both\ndirections; and the primitive history of man shows itself to be a realm in\nwhich religious and scientific interest, {344} opponents and advocates of\nthe descent theory, can peacefully join hands for common labor. Up to the\npresent, the investigations reach results which seem to fall now more into\none, now more into the other, scale of the balance. On the one hand, the\nolder the products of human skill are, the more simple they are; on the\nother hand, even the oldest remains show man in full possession of that\nwhich distinguishes him from the animal, and attests a spiritual life. The\nreader may think of the before mentioned sketches of the reindeer and\nmammoth (page 90). If we finally come down to historic times, and to the\npresent, in order to try to draw conclusions from the comparisons of the\nremotest times of which we have historic knowledge, with the present, as to\nprehistoric times, we likewise find on the one side vestiges of the lowest\nbarbarism in the past and present; but on the other side we find that the\noldest written monuments afford a glance into a perfection of intellectual\nreflection and into a nobility of moral and religious views which permits\nus to draw the highest conclusions as to the intellectual worth of earliest\nmankind. The very oldest records of the Holy Scripture give evidence of\nthis intellectual height; and even the royal programmes of Assyrian\nmonarchs, which the wonderful diligence and ingenuity of recent\ninvestigators have deciphered from the cuneiform inscriptions, not only\nrelatively correspond to the height of culture which we find in the ruins\nof Assyrian palaces, but even, when looked upon absolutely and aside from\nthe morality of conquest which they indulge, are inspired by a nobility of\nmind, and permeated by a religiousness, which no potentate of recent times\nwould need to be ashamed of. They have {345} been made accessible to the\npublic by the work of Eberhard Schrader: \"Die Keilinschriften und das Alte\nTestament\" (\"Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament\"), Giessen, 1872.\n\nSec. 4. _Providence, Hearing of Prayer, and Miracles._\n\nBefore we enter into the special christological realm, we have yet to\nglance at the realm of the more common relations between God and the\ncreature, as they have found, in faith in a divine providence, in hearing\nof prayer, and in divine miracles, their reflection in Christian\nconsciousness.\n\nIt is true, we had to discuss the chief basis of an understanding in this\nmatter when treating of the position of the Darwinian theories in reference\nto theism in general; but we have a double reason for entering again into\nthe consideration of the concrete form which this faith has obtained in\nChristianity.\n\nOne reason is the fact, that faith in a special providence of God, in a\nhearing of prayer, and in a connection of the human history of salvation\nwith miracles, forms a very essential part of the Christian view of the\nworld and of Christian religiousness. All Holy Scripture is interwoven with\nassurances of a providence of God, going even into details; with the most\ndistinct and solemn promises of the hearing of our prayers; and with the\nmost emphatic reference to the miracles which it relates. The Lord himself\nnot only found all these doctrines, and left them untouched, but he\ndeveloped them in the most pregnant way, and brought them into the most\nintimate connection with the quintessence and centre of his doctrine.\nAccording to his teaching, {346} \"a sparrow shall not fall to the ground\nwithout the will of your heavenly Father; but the very hairs of your head\nare all numbered.\" He encourages us to pray, with the words: \"Verily,\nverily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he\nwill give it you;\" and he proves himself to be the Redeemer, through signs\nand wonders, and refers to the greatest sign which was to be manifested in\nhim--the sign of the resurrection.\n\nThe other reason for entering upon the discussion of these questions, lies\nin the incredible thoughtlessness with which a great part of modern\neducated people, even of such men as do not at all wish to abandon faith in\na living God, permit themselves to be governed by the leaders of religious\ninfidelity, and to be defiled and robbed of everything, which belongs to\nthe nature of a living God. By many, it is considered as good taste, and as\nan indispensable sign of deep scientific learning and high education, and\nit forms a seldom contested part of correspondence in newspapers, which\nhave for their public a wide circle of educated people, that in referring\nto the inviolableness of the laws of nature they declare faith in a special\nprovidence of God to be a view long ago rejected, and which is only\nconsistent with half-civilized individuals; that they look down with a\ncompassionate and self-conscious smile upon the egoistic implicit faith of\ncongregations who still pray for good harvest-weather, and see in the\ndamage done by a hailstorm a divine affliction; that they criticise it as a\nsad token of ecclesiastical darkness, when even church-authorities order\nsuch prayers in case of wide-spread calamities; that they fall into a\npassion over the {347} narrowness and the dulling influence of pedagogues\nwho see in the histories which they relate to their pupils or put into\ntheir hands for reading, the government of an ethical order of the world\nwhich goes a little farther than the rule that he who deceives injures his\ngood name, and he who gets intoxicated injures his health; that they give a\nman who still believes in the resurrection of Jesus, to understand that he\nhas not yet learned the first elements of the theory of putrefaction and\nperishableness. That the adversaries of faith in a God thus express\nthemselves, and try to conquer as much ground as possible for their frosty\ndoctrine, is certainly quite natural; but that even advocates of theism\nshould permit such stuff to be presented to them, and can keep silent in\nregard to it--nay, that even preachers offer it to their congregations as\nordinary Sabbath edification, and that their hearers can gratefully accept\nit--is certainly a suggestive and alarming evidence of the rapidity with\nwhich, in many men who still do not wish consciously and certainly to be\nthought godless (_i.e._, to be separated from God), their connection with\nthe source of light and life is decreasing, and of how strongly the fear\nthat they may be looked upon as unscientific and imperfectly educated,\noverbalances the fear of losing the living God and Father, and therewith\nthe support of both mind and life.\n\nNow, that this faith in a _special providence_, in a _hearing of prayer_,\nand in _divine miracles_, forms an essential part of Christian\nreligiousness, we do not need to show more in detail; it is an established\nhistorical fact, and an object of direct Christian knowledge. On the other\nhand, we have still to say a word concerning {348} that which, on the part\nof those just described, is so strongly contested; namely, about the\nscientific worth of such a faith, and also about its reconcilableness with\nthe Darwinism theories.\n\nIn the first place, as to the faith in a _special providence of God_, and,\nin connection with it, as to the possibility of _a hearing of human\nprayer_, such a faith is by itself the inevitable consequence of all\ntheism; nay, it is precisely identical with theism; it is that which makes\ntheism _theism_, and distinguishes it from mere deism--_i.e._, from an idea\nof God, which merely makes God the author of the world, and lets the world,\nafter it was once created, go its own way. Now, the theistic idea of God,\nwhich sees the Creator in an uninterrupted connection with his creation, is\nin itself the more scientific one: for a God who, although the author of\nthe world, would not know how to find, nor intend to find, a way of\ncommunication with his creation, would certainly be an idea theologically\ninconceivable. We should, therefore, still have to adhere to the idea of a\nspecial providence of God, even if in our discursive reasoning and exact\ninvestigation of the processes in the world we should not find a single\nguide referring us to the scientific possibility of such a direct and\nuninterrupted dependence of the world on its author. We should then have\nsimply to declare a conviction of the providence of God to be a postulate\nof our reasoning, which is given with the idea of God itself; and would\njust as little call this conviction unscientific on account of the fact,\nthat we are not able to show the modalities of divine providence, as in\nreference to the exact sciences we should contest the character of their\n{349} scientific value on account of the fact that they are no longer able\nto give us an answer exactly where our questions become most important and\ninteresting.\n\nBut the ways in which we are able to realize scientifically the idea of a\ndivine providence are, indeed, not entirely closed for us. We have several\nof them; one starts from the idea of God, others from the empiric created\nworld.\n\nIt belongs to the _idea of God_, that we have to think of the sublimity of\nGod over time and space, of his eternity and omnipresence, in such a way\nthat God, in his being, life, and activity, does not stand _in_ time nor\nwithin any limits or differences of space, but absolutely above time and\nabove all limits and differences of space; that he is _present_ in his\nworld everywhere and at any time. He who objects to this, can only do it\nwith weapons to which we have to oppose the objection which the adversaries\nof the Christian idea of God so often raise against it--namely, the\nobjection of a rejectable _anthropomorphism_. In contesting the possibility\nof the idea of an uninterrupted presence of a personal and living God in\nthe entire realm of the universe, the adversaries seem to permit themselves\nto be daunted by the difficulty which is offered to man in controlling the\nrealms of his own activity. The greater such a realm, the more difficult\nbecomes a comprehensive survey, the more the human influence has to\nrestrict itself to the greater and more common and to neglect the little\nand single. The more removed is the past which helps to constitute the\ncircumstances of the present, the greater is the human ignorance and\noblivion; the more removed is the future, the greater is the human\nincapability of {350} influencing it decisively. Such measures ought to\ndisappear, even in their last traces, when we reflect on God and divine\nactivity. If once the idea is established for us of a living God, who is\nalways present in the world created by him, and in whose \"sight a thousand\nyears are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night,\"\nthe final causal chain of causes and effects may be ever so long, and\nstretching over this course of the world from its beginning to its end; the\nsingle phenomena may be woven together of ever so many thousands and\nthousands of millions of different causal chains: we nevertheless see above\nthem all the regulating hand of God from whom they all come, and who not\nonly surveys and controls their texture in all its threads, but who himself\narranged, wove, and made it. Such a view is not only more satisfactory to\nthe religious need of man, but it also seems to us more scientific, than a\nview which traces everything back to a blind and dead cause, or even to no\nultimate cause at all, and thinks it has entirely removed the last veil, if\nit pronounces the great word \"causal law.\"\n\nNow, while our _idea of God_ thus tells us that God has in his hand all\ncausal chains in the world, and its million-threaded web in constant\nomni-surveying presence and in all-controlling omnipotence, our reflection\non the _world_ and its substance and course also leads us from the _a\nposteriori_ starting-point of analytical investigation precisely to the\nsame result; it even leads us to a still more concrete conception of this\nidea--namely, to the result, that not only the _causal chains, in their\ntotality and in their web_, but also _all single links_ of these chains,\n{351} have their force and existence only by virtue of a transcendental, or\nwhat is the same, of a _metaphysical_, cause.\n\nFor if we analyze the single phenomena in the world, we certainly observe\nin the activity of their qualities and forces such a conformity to law,\nthat, in our reflection on these phenomena, we can go from one phenomenon\nto the necessity of another as its cause or its effect, and thus form those\nparticular causal chains and causal nets in whose arranged representation\nnatural science consists. But that those qualities and forces exist and act\nprecisely thus, and not otherwise, and why, we are no longer able to\nexplain. We can only say: the material and the apparent is no longer their\ncause, but their effect; therefore, the cause of that which comes into\nexistence lies beyond the phenomenon--_i.e._, in the transcendental, in the\nmetaphysical.\n\nThis becomes evident in the _inorganic world_ and in those qualities which\nare common to all matter. Such common qualities of the latter are, for\ninstance, cohesion and gravitation. That all matter has the quality of\ncohesion, we can only say because we observe it; but that it must be so,\nand why, we are not able to say. This becomes still more evident in\ngravitation. Gravitation is so decidedly an action in space, that it\nappears to us, together with cohesion, as precisely the bond which binds\nthe entire material world together. Each single material atom is subject to\nits force; but how and why, and especially how and why matter acts upon the\nmatter _in space_, physics can no longer tell us, but refers us to a\nmetaphysical cause.\n\nThis dependence of each single being, and of all its qualities and forces,\non a transcendental and {352} metaphysical cause of its existence, becomes\nmost clear to us in the world of the _organic_, and especially in the\ntransmission and development of organisms. _That_ individuals originate new\nindividuals of their species; _that_ the fecundated germs, if the necessary\nconditions are present, develop themselves out of the first germ and\negg-cell in continually progressive and distinct differentiations, each\nafter its kind, into the full-grown condition, so that individuals endowed\nwith a soul and intellectual life are also developed out of such\nbeginnings;--these are facts which are continually repeated before our\neyes, and men of science have not yet reached the end in pursuing the\nactual in these processes into its finest ramifications. But how it is that\nindividuals _must_ transmit themselves--that the seeds and eggs _must_ have\nthis force of germination and development--they have not yet been able to\nexplain, and will never be able to do so. The word \"inheritance,\" which is\nto solve the problem, is only a _name_ for the _fact_ which we observe, and\nfor the regularity of its repetition; but for this fact of inheritance\nitself, we seek in vain a _physical_ explanation: we are referred to a\n_metaphysical_ cause. Thus, not only the _first_ origin of life on earth is\nan enigma to us (as we have seen in Part I, Book II, Chapter I, Sec. 3), but\norganic life itself, in its whole existence and course, is a process which,\nat every step, and in every place of its course, remains to us in its last\ncauses physically unexplained, and refers us to metaphysical causes.\n\nIf we finally see in all these inorganic and organic processes a striving\ntowards ends--and we must see it, as soon as we in general observe order,\nthe category of higher and lower, and the appearance of the higher on {353}\nthe basis of the lower--we are, with all our teleological observations,\nagain referred to the metaphysical, and still more decidedly to the\ngoal-setting metaphysical; and a metaphysical which sets and reaches goals\nis nothing else than that in philosophic language which in the language of\nreligion we call a living _Creator_ and _Ruler of the world_ and the\nactivity of his _providence_.\n\nFrom still another side, the knowledge of the world, even in a scientific\nway, leads us to the acknowledgment of a divine providence which controls\nwith absolute freedom every process in every place and in every moment of\nthe world's course. We see continually, in the midst of nature, and in its\ncausal course conformable to law, something supernatural, transcendental,\nand metaphysical, acting decisively upon the course of nature; and that is\nthe _free activity of man_. Every man carries in the freedom of the\ndeterminations of his will something transcendental and metaphysical in\nhimself, which we can call natural only when we mean by nature the summary\nof all that which exists, but which we have to call supernatural when we\nmean by nature the summary of that which belongs to the world of phenomena\nin its traceable causes as well as in its traceable effects. The scale of\nlife-activities, from the lowest arbitrary motions, from the impulses and\ninstincts of the animal up to the highest moral action of the will of man,\nshows us in indistinct transitions all stages which lead from the natural\nto the supernatural, until, in the ethical and religious motives of man, we\narrive at superphysical (_i.e._, supernatural) motives which daily and\nhourly invade the natural, and in this invasion consciously and\nunconsciously use the forces of nature {354} and their activity,\nconformable to law, and in spite of their metaphysical and transcendental\norigin, from the moment of their activity, join the natural causal\nconnection of the world's course. This observation of an invasion of the\nphysical by the supernatural, as it continually takes place in the free\naction of man, leads us in a triple way to the acknowledgment of an action\nof divine providence upon the course of the world.\n\nIn the first place, this observation shows us, in a very direct way, points\nwhere the free disposition of God acts determinatingly upon the course of\nthings, and where this action becomes accessible to our observation. These\npoints are the human personalities, in so far and inasmuch as they permit\nthemselves to be influenced and determined by the will of God in the\nethical and religious motives of their action, and, when these motives\nbecome actions, determinately act upon the course of things.\n\nIn the second place, this observation further leads, by way of two\nconclusions, to the acknowledgment of a divine providence.\n\nOne conclusion is the following: If there exist in the world free and\nintelligent beings which, through their free determinations, guided by\nreflection, decisively act upon the course of nature, and if these beings,\non account of these very qualities of freedom and intelligence, occupy the\nhighest stage among the creatures which we know, the last metaphysical\ncause of their existence must also have qualities which are able to produce\nsuch free and intelligent beings--at least the qualities of freedom and\nintelligence in the highest degree. And this highest metaphysical cause\nwhich produces free and intelligent personalities in the world, can at\nleast be no {355} more dependent upon the entire world, whose author it is,\nthan those personalities are dependent upon that realm in the world in\nwhich they have their existence. We call such a metaphysical cause, to\nwhich we have to ascribe freedom and intelligence in the highest degree,\nGod; and we call its free position in reference to the world, the\ngovernment of the world, or providence.\n\nThe other conclusion leads us to the acknowledgment of a connection of\nprovidence with conformability to law in the actions of all forces and\nqualities in the world. It is the same conclusion to which we had to refer\nin Chap. I, Sec. 6, but which now, as we draw from theism the conclusion of\nthe acknowledgment of a special divine providence, falls with increased\nweight into the scale. It is the following: On the one hand, we observe in\nthe processes of the world a striving towards ends; on the other, we know\nin the world itself only one single creature which acts according to aims,\nwhich sets itself its ends and reaches them with freely chosen means. This\none creature is man. Now man can, as we pointed out in Chap. I, Sec. 6, choose\nand use the means with which he wishes to reach his ends, only because he\ncan rely on the conformity to the end in view and the regularity in the\neffect of all the qualities and forces of things. If he could not rely on\nthem, he certainly could set himself ends; but the reaching of them he\nwould have to leave to the play of chance. Now if we see, on the one side,\nthat the only creature known to us which sets itself ends is able to reach\nthese ends by virtue of inviolable conformity to law in the forces and\neffects of its means, and if we see, on the other, that in the course of\nthe world ends are also reached, and that at the same time {356} all\nsecondary causes which lead to these ends act with a necessity conformable\nto law, we certainly are right in drawing the conclusion that the highest\nmetaphysical cause of all things--we now say, the living God--has so\nprepared the whole universe that his free but regular and systematic\ngoal-setting and end-reaching action upon the course of all things rests,\nas a whole as well as in detail, directly upon the conformity to law of all\nforces and their effects.\n\nThe observation of a free action of the human personality upon the course\nof things, once more leads us back to a reflection on the _idea of God_.\nFor if we have reason to acknowledge a _freedom_ of the determinations of\nhuman will--and the consciousness of ethical responsibility will be a proof\nof this freedom which cannot be invalidated by any contrary reflection--the\nquestion comes up: _how is this freedom of a creature reconcilable with the\nidea of God?_ Far be it from us to claim to have found a solution of these\nlast and most important problems of the human mind. For all meditations on\nthem but lead to antinomies in the presence of which we dare not churn to\nremove all difficulties of reflection still less to solve the difficulties\nby pursuing only one chain of reasoning and ignoring the other. The way of\nscience leads rather to mere _compromises_, and these compromises consist\nin the fact, that on every side of our observations or arguments we look\nfor and adhere to that which results for us in incontestable fact or\nindispensable postulate, and that we adhere to all results or postulates\nthus found even when we are no longer able to trace their unity and harmony\nback to their last sources. Now if, on the one hand, our idea of {357} God\nis established as a self-testimony of God to our ethical consciousness and\nas a result of our teleological reasoning, and if, on the other, is\nestablished the fact of the world and of its processes going on conformably\nto law, and likewise the fact of human freedom and its actions upon the\ncourse of things, and finally the fact of the admission of the human will\nand action into a higher teleology which is superior to human will, and\nwhich, in the history of mankind, of individuals, and nations, reaches its\nhigher ends, now by affirming, now by denying, human will; then we have\nsimply to account for all these facts as mere _facts_, and the scientific\nattempt at pursuing them into their inner connection is nothing else but a\nmore or less successful compromise. We have to be satisfied with these\nindications, for the further discussion of them would lead us far beyond\nthe task of the present publication. We shall only point out the fact, that\nprecisely the knowledge of the image of God in man shows us the way to the\nknowledge of how it is conceivable that God can create personalities\nthrough whose freedom of will he relatively limits the absoluteness of his\nown will.\n\nIn all our discussions hitherto, the scientific basis of a faith in the\npossibility of an _answer to prayer_ has been evident. All reasons for a\ndivine providence, also speak with the same force of persuasion for the\nhearing of our prayers, as soon as the _idea of being a child of God_ has\nbecome an integral part of our idea of God. And this idea--the idea of God\nas the father, and of a relationship of love between the divine and the\nhuman personalities--is so much a part of the Christian idea of God, that\nit belongs to its very essence. Only one {358} consideration might offer\nscientific difficulties to our faith in the hearing of prayer: namely, if\nGod hears the prayers of his children, in the course of time new motives\nfor his action present themselves to him; now, is it reconcilable with the\nidea of God, that God makes himself in any such way dependent on that which\nfirst appeared in time, and on the changing moods of the creature? But this\ndifficulty is precisely the same which we met, when acknowledging human\nfreedom and its reconcilableness with a divine providence; and we have\ntried to indicate above the path which leads to its solution.\n\nIt is the principal idea which penetrates all our reasoning about the\nrelation of God and the world--namely, the idea of a _teleology in the\nworld_--which is to lead us to a correct conception of the _miracles_ and\ntheir reconcilableness with a mechanism of nature and with the Darwinistic\nideas of development. In the much discussed contest about the problem of\nmiracles, clearer results would certainly have been attained, if one had\nquestioned more closely what the record of the Christian religion means by\nmiracles, and what position, according to it, these miracles have to take\nin the order of the world and in the divine plan of salvation; and after\nhaving satisfied himself as to this position, had further asked what\nposition they take in reference to our exact science and our theistic view\nof the world. Instead of doing this, we have often enough seen friend and\nfoe of the idea of miracles, as soon as the question was even touched upon,\nat once set to work with the insufficient conceptions of old rationalism\nand supernaturalism, and thus raising objections and attempting solutions\nwhich could satisfy nobody. Especially every inadequate idea {359} which\nwas put forth by the advocates of faith in miracles, was gladly accepted by\nits adversaries; for thereby they were furnished with a caricature of the\nidea of miracles, the tearing to pieces of which was an easy and agreeable\nsport to them.\n\nThe very ideas of the _natural_ and the _supernatural_ are a category which\nis to be treated with caution. When discussing the question of divine\nprovidence, we have seen that, with every free act of the will of man\nspringing from an ethical motive, something supernatural invades the\nnatural, so that in every normal human life we always see supernatural and\nnatural by the side of and in one another.\n\nThe distinction between the _direct_ and the _indirect action or invasion\nof God_ is also to be used with great caution and restriction. For where we\nare no longer able to find secondary causes, who can assert that God no\nlonger uses any? Where the realm of visible causes ceases and that of the\ninvisible begins, who can exclude secondary causes? And on the other hand,\nwhere God acts directly, who can deny the concurrence of his direct\npresence and his direct action, or reduce the value of that which was\nindirectly produced?\n\nMoreover, the often-returning conceptions of a _breaking of the laws of\nnature_, or the compromises which were made between a breaking and a\nnon-breaking of the laws of nature by assuming a \"supernatural acceleration\nof the process of nature,\" were still more misleading. In the whole world,\ninfinitely many higher and lower forces act according to laws and order. In\nevery process, a part of the forces which in the single case surround it,\nbecome active, and thereby hinder {360} another part from its activity. But\nthe laws of this other part of forces are not thereby invalidated or\nbroken. When a man acts with moral freedom, from mere moral motives, the\nhighest of the conceivable forces over which we have control comes into\ndirect action upon the natural. But therewith those forces, with their\nlaws, which would have been active if another motive had determined him,\nare not yet overcome, but only hindered from their activity in exactly the\nsame way as one part of forces can be active and another not, where mere\nmechanical actions take place. Thus, in miracles, no law of nature is\novercome, but only a force which otherwise would have been active according\nto the law of its activity, is for the time hindered from action by another\nforce becoming active. Moreover, through the conscious and unconscious\nconnection of the idea of irregularity and lack of plan with the idea of\nmiracles, not only the idea of a God who works miracles, but also that of a\npersonal Creator and Ruler of the world, in general, has come into\ndiscredit. For that reason, Haeckel, for instance, when he attacks the\nChristian idea of creation, never fails to speak of the \"capricious\narbitrariness\" of the Creator; and Oskar Schmidt also speaks of the\n\"caprice\" of the God of Christians.\n\nWith these criticisms, which we have made in reference to the treatment of\nthe question of miracles, we certainly have undertaken only to characterize\nthe superficial skirmishing which took place between the two opposing views\nof the world, but not the labors of more recent theological science. But\nthat skirmish has made, like all superficiality, the most noise in the\nworld; and since the adversaries of the faith in {361} miracles endeavored\nalmost exclusively to reflect in this manner, and almost ignored the deeper\ndeductions of theological science, they succeeded in making the idea of\nmiracles almost the most dreaded object of antipathy to modern education,\nand many of those who feel that the conceptions of traditional dogmatics\nare in need of revision, and religion and science of a reconciliation,\nendeavor to find that revision and reconciliation especially in the fact,\nthat religion gives up miracles. On the other hand, _theology as science_,\nin its main advocates, long ago gave up these insufficient and misleading\ncategories and conceptions, and established a conception of miracles which\ncan easily be received into the science of the processes of nature, as well\nas into our reasoning about God and the divine. The first who adopted this\nmode of treatment, is one of the pioneers of more recent positive theology,\nand of a theology still uninfluenced by science--Karl Immanuel Nitzsch. It\nis certainly interesting to read what this man, as early as 1829, said, in\nthe first edition of his \"System der Christlichen Lehre\" (\"System of\nChristian Doctrine\"), and also in the succeeding edition printed without\nalteration. He says, on page 64: \"The miracles of revelation are, in spite\nof all objective supernaturalness, derived from their central origin,\n_something really conformable to law_: partly in relation to the higher\norder of things to which they belong and which is also a world, a nature in\nits kind, and acts upon the lower in its way; partly in reference to the\nsimilarity to common nature which they retain in any way; partly on account\nof their teleological perfection; and they must not only be expected as the\nhomogeneous phenomenon from the inner miracle of {362} redemption, from the\nstandpoint of perfect Christian faith, but also by virtue of the union\nbetween spirit and nature, be looked upon _as the natural in its kind_.\" In\nthese words we find the fruitful germs of a sound dogmatic development\nwhich the idea of miracles has found on the part of more recent theology.\n\nLet us, in the first place, try to keep free from all preconceived, correct\nor incorrect, opinions, and ask how the miracles appear to us, when they\npresent themselves with a claim to acknowledgment as integral parts of a\ndivine revelation of salvation, namely, in the religion of redemption and\nits record. In regard to their name, they appear to us in the Holy\nScriptures as amazing bright processes, as great deeds and signs; and in\nregard to their nature, as signs which are destined to call the attention\nof man to the government in grace and in judgment of a living God, to the\nsalvation of redemption which God gives to man, and to the human\ninstruments which he uses for that purpose. Now, in a view of the world\nwhich, like the Biblical, so decidedly sees a revelation of God in all that\nwhich takes place, in a view of the world to which everything natural has\nalso, as a work of God, its supernatural cause, and everything\nsupernatural, at present, or in the future, is transposed again into nature\nand history, not only all those above rejected conceptions of miracles lose\ntheir significance, but all remaining conceptions with which one otherwise\ntries to distinguish the miracles from all that is not miraculous, or to\nclassify the different species of miracles, also diminish in importance, as\ndo also all those distinctions of direct and indirect actions of God--the\ndistinctions of relative and absolute, of subjective and objective\nmiracles: and there {363} remains hut a single inviolable kernel and\ncentral point of the Biblical conception of miracles, and that is the above\nmentioned _teleological character_ of miracles. Indeed, we are not willing\nto reject all these logical distinctions and investigations as worthless:\nthey have helped to render clear our conceptions and ideas, and they still\nhelp. But a deeper investigation of the idea of miracles and its relation\nto a scientific knowledge of the world may perhaps finally lead our more\ndeveloped reflection back to the fact that we find the quintessence and the\nnature of miracles only where the pious people of the Bible found it. And\nthis quintessence of miracles consists precisely in their _teleological\nnature_, and not at all in the fact that they cannot be explained\nphysically: it consists in the fact that miracles are _signs_ through which\nGod manifests himself and his government over man, and actually shows the\nlatter that _he_ wishes to bring him to the pursuit of perfection by the\nway of redemption. Ritschl, in an essay which appeared in the \"Jahrbuecher\nfuer Deutsche Theologie,\" as early as 1861, pointed out this decidedly\nteleological character of Biblical miracles and the indifference shown by\npious men in the Bible as to the question whether these deeds and signs can\nbe explained naturally or not.\n\nThe profit which we derive from this reverting to the Biblical conception\nof the idea of miracles is by no means small.\n\nIn the first place, we help to establish the full recognition of that\ndirect religious consciousness and sensation which is not only\ncharacteristic of the pious men of Scripture, but which yet characterizes\nall genuine religiousness; and this consists in the fact that the religious\nman sees {364} _miracles of God in all that turns his attention to God's\ngovernment_,--in the sea of stars, in rock and bush, in sunshine and storm,\nin flower and worm, just as certainly as in the guidance of his own life\nand in the facts and processes of the history of salvation and of the\nkingdom of the Lord. In this idea of miracles, the essential thing is not\nthat the phenomena and processes are inconceivable to him--although\ncertainly in all that comes into appearance there is still an\nincomprehensible and uncomprehended remainder. For a form of nature,\n_e.g._, which turns his attention to a creator, is of course a miracle,\neven if he is able to look upon it with none other eye than that of the\nunlearned: but it even then remains a miracle,--nay, it is increased to a\nstill greater miracle, if he has learned to contemplate and investigate it\nwith all the auxiliary means of science. A hearing of his prayers remains a\nmiracle, whether or not he is able to perceive the natural connection of\nthe process in which he sees his prayers answered, or even to trace it back\nto the remotest times which preceded his prayers. The events and facts of\nthe history of salvation remain miracles to him, whether the history of\nnature and the world offers to him auxiliary means of explaining them or\nnot. The pious man, therefore, does not find the essential characteristic\nof miracles in their relative inconceivableness, but in the fact that they\nrefer him to a living God who stands above this process, whether perceived\nor unperceived in its relative causal connection, and unites it with the\ncourse of things in order to reach his ends and to manifest himself to man.\nNow, in our attempt at a scientific reproduction of the idea of miracles,\nif we return to that Biblical conception, we see no longer in this just\n{365} mentioned religious conception of miracles a pious sophistry which\navoids the difficulty of the idea, or a child-like _naivete_ worthy of\nbeing partly envied and partly pitied, which does not at all see the\ndifficulties and remains on the child-stage of Biblical conceptions; but we\nonly perceive in it a confirmation and fulfilment of that profound and\nbeneficent word of our Lord: \"Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shall not\nreceive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein.\"\nOf course, piety as well as science makes _distinctions_ among miracles.\nThe former separates the _mere products and processes of nature_ which,\nthrough what is explicable as well as what is inexplicable in their\nqualities and processes, point to an almighty and all-wise Creator, and\nthereby become miracles to the religious view of the world, from the\n_historical events_ which, by their newness and uniqueness, and by their\npointing toward divine ends, manifest God and his teleological government\nto man, and calls them miracles in a still more specific sense than science\ndoes. And among historical events, piety as well as science assigns the\nname miracle, in the most pregnant sense, to those events which belong to\nthe _history of salvation_, and, by their newness and uniqueness, introduce\nnew stages into it, render legitimate its new instruments, or bring new\nfeatures of redemption to our knowledge. Our religiousness has the greatest\nand deepest interest in this history: for it is the history of the leading\nback of man into communion with God by the way of redemption; and therefore\nthe events of this history are precisely those miracles upon which our\ndeepest religious interest is concentrated. But in spite of all these\ndistinctions in degree, that natural relationship and that {366} common\ncharacter of the miraculous between the miracles of nature, the miracles of\nthe history of man, and the miracles of the history of salvation, remain\nestablished; and we render a service to religious consciousness, as well as\nto the scientific conception of the idea of miracles, if by returning to\nthe Biblical idea of miracles, as we propose, we make a more comprehensive\ndefinition of miracles possible.\n\nAnother advantage which we derive from returning to the Biblical idea of\nmiracles consists in the fact that it preserves us from the _magical_ and\nnecromantic in our conceptions of miracles; that it allows us a _grouping\nof miracles according to value_, which corresponds with the idea of God and\nof the divine government as well as with the idea of miracles itself; and\nthat in the presence of all single relations of miracles it summons us to\n_criticise_ and _investigate the real state of the case_. For the nature of\nmiracles does not consist in the inconceivable--at least not in the\nplanless and arbitrary,--but in the fact that they call the attention of\nman to God and his government; and this leads to the reverse of all that is\nmagical and necromantic, because the magical is unworthy of the idea of God\nand contradicts all the other self-testimony of God. Now if the nature of\nmiracles consists in the fact that they call my attention to God and his\ngovernment, an event will become a miracle to me, and increase its value,\nin the degree in which it refers me to God and his government, and\nespecially in the degree in which it refers me to that government of God\nwhich is the most important to me--namely, to the action of God in me and\nmankind, with which he is bringing about his ends in salvation; {367} but\nin the degree in which an event loses this character, it becomes to me an\nevent without miraculous or religious significance. This gives a quite\ndefinite grouping of miracles according to value, from those which belong\nto the central manifestations of the divine plan of salvation and way of\nredemption, to those which lie in the extreme periphery of religious\ninterest. It is a grouping which corresponds with the idea of God just as\nmuch as with the idea of miracles; while all other divisions or groupings\nof miracles according to value, which might take their principle of\ndivision and their weight from the greater or smaller conceivableness of\nthe causal connection, from the greater or smaller difference of a\nmiraculous event from all other events, are indifferent in reference to the\nidea of God, and change the centre of gravity in the idea of miracles.\nBesides, if these miracles are to be real signs to me which refer me to\nGod, his government, and his ways of salvation, they must, in the first\nplace, in order to secure my conviction, be real events and facts and not\nmere falsifications and fictions; and this point leads us to the duty and\nright of criticising and investigating actual circumstances. In presence of\nall Biblical and non-Biblical miracles, we have the full right and the full\nduty of using criticism in reference to the confirmation of actual\ncircumstances, and where the latter cannot be established with certainty,\nthe question is in order whether the related event is really of such a\ncharacter as to legitimate itself as a sign of God and his government. In\nthe preceding section, we have had occasion to use this principle in\nreference to the investigation of that event which, next to the coming of\nthe Redeemer, offers itself to us as the {368} central miracle of the\nhistory of salvation and redemption: namely, in reference to the history of\nthe resurrection of the Lord.\n\nWe have by no means the wish to avoid _difficulties_ which meet us, when\ntrying to bring miracles, and especially the specific and pregnant miracles\nof the history of salvation, into harmony with our scientific knowledge of\nthe world: only we can no longer admit that these difficulties consist in\nthe inconceivableness or in the supernaturalism of miracles. For to the\nreligious view of the world--which traces equally the explicable as well as\nthe inexplicable back to God, which even derives the natural from the\nsupernatural causality of God--neither the occasional inexplicability nor\nthe supposed supernaturalness of an event can be that which makes the event\na miracle. But an event in the history of salvation becomes a miracle from\nthe fact that something _extraordinary_, something _new_, happens in it,\nwhich by its newness and its extraordinary character presents itself to man\nas the manifestation of certain divine _ends in salvation_, and can be\nexplained _at first sight_, but only at first sight, from nothing else than\nfrom the service which it renders to the plan of redemption. Whether\nafterwards these extraordinary and new features can or cannot be perceived\nin their natural connection, or explained out of it, does not at all change\nanything in the miraculous character of the event, as soon as it has _once_\nhad the before-mentioned effect. The only task and the only difficulty\nwhich meets us in the question of miracles, is to show that such\nextraordinary and new things really happen, and to bring the reality and\npossibility of such new things into our perception of the {369} causal\nconnection of the course of the world, conformable to law. But it ceases to\nbe a difficulty, so soon as we acknowledge a teleology in the course of the\nworld and a teleology in the history of mankind, and especially as soon as\nwe acknowledge that teleology in the history of mankind which, by the way\nof the divine means of redemption, leads man back to God. Where there are\nno ends, nothing can happen which calls the attention of men to these ends;\nnor, indeed, can anything new happen; for nothing prevails in more absolute\nsovereignty to all eternity than the maxims _causa aequat effectum_ and\n_effectus aequat causam_. But where ends are appointed and reached,\nsomething new also happens; and every new thing refers to its end. For each\nstep leading nearer such an end is something new, and refers, as soon as we\ncompare it with preceding steps, to the end towards which it strives. All\nends to which the course of things refers us, are to the religious view of\nthe world ends which are appointed by God; all means which serve to reach\nthe ends, are means which God created and chose; and every phenomenon and\nevery event which manifests this teleological government of God to our\nmind, is a miracle to us. Now this whole course of the world is interwoven\nwith such new things, in events which manifest to us, now more clearly, now\nmore dimly, the striving of the course of the world towards an end, because\nthe latter is really striving towards an end. Even prehistoric times show\nus new things which, from a scientific and historical point of view, we\nhave to place in the line of the course of the world; and from a religious\npoint of view, in the line of miracles. The first appearance of organic\nlife on earth was new, and indicated new ends; the first {370} appearance\nof each single species of animals and plants was new; new, also, and\nindicating the highest end of creative life, was the first appearance of\nman. All these things we call _miracles_ of creation; and we especially\nplace the creative miracle of the appearance of man on a level with the\ngreatest miracles of which we have knowledge, and use the name miracle for\nall before mentioned newly appearing formations, whether or not we are able\nto explain those originations from the preceding connection of the course\nof nature and its forces. Now, in the history of mankind, where the\nintellectual and ethical motives of that which happens become active, where\nalso the greatest ends which come up for consideration are spiritual and\nethical ends, where man himself acts freely according to ends, and where,\ntherefore, human and divine teleology come alternately into play, the\nmanifestation of a striving toward an end, in which religious consciousness\nimmediately sees also ends and means of God, is repeated in an eminent\ndegree. Every event which brings about a progress in the history of mankind\nas well as of individuals, is as to this side something new, extraordinary,\nteleological: _i.e._, a miracle to the religious mode of contemplation; and\nthis miracle is the greater as is more important the end under\nconsideration, and the greater and the more decisive the step towards this\nend which the event accomplishes. Now, if we recognize the return of\nmankind into a communion with God as the highest goal of the general and\nindividual history of mankind, and if we find in the latter facts which\nlead to this goal, then these facts are the great central miracles of\nhistory. As such, the facts of redemption present {371} themselves with all\nthat for which it once prepared the way; and, now that it has come, leads\nto full and complete perfection--and among them all, the coming, the\nperson, and the history of Jesus Christ, stands as central fact and central\nmiracle in the midst of all events in the history of salvation, and forms\nthe central point of all religious interest. We see how unjust it is when\none urges, as an objection to a belief in miracles, that it assigns to God\narbitrary and capricious actions. We call the manifestations of divine\nteleology miracles. But striving towards an end and conformity to a regular\nplan is not arbitrariness or caprice, but the contrary; and the greater our\nestimate of the highest cause of all things, the greater will appear to us\nthe conformity to a plan and to law of all which presents itself as\nmiracles in the course of events. There is perhaps one objection which is\nabout as equally unjust as the objection of caprice; and that is the\nobjection that faith in miracles, in teaching a belief in supernatural\nthings, lends to introduce into the course of events something which is\nagainst nature. But since miracles, as a sign of divine teleology, manifest\nends for which nature also is prepared, and through which the fallen nature\nof man, fallen by sin, is again restored; and since to the religious view\nof the world all natural phenomena and processes expressly rank among\nmiracles, the faith in miracles teaches the contrary of an opposition to\nnature. It is incontestible--and will become still clearer and more certain\nto us through all farther investigation of the subject--that the\nacknowledgment of the idea of miracles as a necessary and a justified part\nof religiousness {372} stands and falls with the acknowledgment of a\nteleological view of the world.\n\nWe certainly do not indulge in the foolish hope that with the deductions of\nthis section we should be able suddenly to win over any of the decided\nadversaries of faith in providence and miracles. For, as we have had\noccasion to remind the reader, the acknowledgment or the non-acknowledgment\nof God and his living government in the world is not the result of this or\nthat reflection and chain of conclusions, but rather an ethical action of\nthe centre of human personality in which God discovers himself in his\nself-manifestation. Now, if this centre, in the freedom of its decision,\nhas once denied the acknowledgment of God and his government, then the\nintellectual actions of the soul offer themselves to this atheistic and\nanti-theistic standpoint, and build up atheistic systems in which the ideas\nof providence and miracles naturally find no place. Thus system is opposed\nto system, although the one is not able to overcome the other. For the last\nand deepest power of conviction lies, neither for one nor the other system,\nin its chains of conclusions, in its superstructure, but in its foundation,\nits standpoint, and its principles; and the choosing of one or the other\nstandpoint, the theistic or atheistic, is an ethical action which precedes\nmethodical reasoning--or if it takes place at the same time or precedes it,\nhas still deeper motives than those of more or less clear forms of mere\nreasoning. But we believe, and we wish and hope in our modest way to have\nshown by our present investigation, that the standpoint of faith also has\nits logical and justified science, and that it is able to appreciate the\n{373} world of the real more universally and candidly, and offers to\nlogical reasoning fewer and less important difficulties, than the systems\nof atheism.\n\nWe have now discussed all the essential and direct points of contacts\nbetween Christianity and the theory of evolution. But a remaining part,\nstill more closely related to the centre of the Christian view of the\nworld, yet offers some indirect points of contact which demand treatment.\n\nSec. 5. _The Redeemer and the Redemption. The Kingdom of God and the\nAcceptance of Salvation._\n\nAs soon as it is once an established fact that an evolution theory of the\norigin of man as a merely scientific theory permits all the valuable\nqualities of man, when they have once come into existence, to show\nthemselves undiminished in their entire greatness and importance, and must\nso permit them, then the whole Christian view of the world, of the\nRedeemer, his person, his course of redemption, and his work, remains\nentirely untouched by all these scientific theories of evolution. Yet the\nBiblical representation, the orthodox perception, and the actual history of\nthe Redeemer and his work, present us with some evidences which are rather\nin sympathy than in antipathy with these scientific theories. First, the\nlong preparation for his birth, which began immediately after the fall of\nman and stretched over at least four thousand years, perhaps over a much\nlonger period, the special preparation of his human genealogy, the\nselection, separation, and guidance of the ancestor and of the people of\nIsrael, of the tribe, the family, and finally of the mother of Jesus--all\nthese are manifestly {374} just as favorable to the idea of evolution as\nthey would have been to the idea of a sudden creation of man out of\nnothing, if Christ, the second Adam, had come into existence by a sudden\ncreation. Moreover, the Redeemer himself was wholly subject to the ordinary\nlaws of development of the human individual, and was, from his annunciation\nand conception, developed entirely like man in the long process of\nevolution from the egg and its still absolutely indifferent spiritual worth\nthrough all the imperceptible stages of development before and after the\nbirth up to the full age of man. Likewise the result of his course of\nsalvation, redemption, and entrance into the kingdom of God, underwent the\nsame process of gradual development. It began with a few disciples, and was\nslowly propagated; it has to-day reached but a small part of mankind, and\neven where it took root, it sees infinitely many things by its side which\nit has not yet been able to penetrate with its leaven:--facts which have\nmuch more elective affinity with the scientific ideas of development than\nwith those of sudden creations.\n\nFinally, precisely the same analogy forces itself upon us in the Christian\ndoctrine of the way of salvation. The work of the Holy Spirit in the human\nindividual is nothing less than a new birth; its aim is the revival of the\nentire man, in mind, soul, and body. In most men, this work takes place by\na slow process, advancing step by step. This gradual course is even the\nrule in Christianized nations; although a decisive change of mind often\nenough, though by no means always, takes place in marked epochs of the\ninner history of life. And in all Christians--even in those whose\nconversion takes place by a sudden awakening, like that of Paul--the {375}\ntransformation of the entire man into the similarity of Christ, and the\nfull restoration of the image of God, is certainly a process of\ndevelopment, and must await its completion in the resurrection. This view\nis also confirmed by the Lord's parable of the seed, growing up\nimperceptibly.\n\nEvery believing Christian knows these facts, and judges and acts according\nto them: therefore, when in the realm of nature, which God certainly\nsubmitted to the free investigation of the human mind, he meets similar\nviews, what right has he to protest against them as being hostile to\nreligion?\n\nSec. 6. _Eschatology._\n\nIn our discussion of the preceding questions, we have seen that an entirely\nneutral, not to say friendly, relationship is taking place between religion\nand the theories of development, which will continue so long as the latter\nkeep within the limits of their proper realm, the perception of nature; and\nthat a hostile relation takes place, and anti-religious attacks are to be\nguarded against, only when a disbelieving system of metaphysics, which has\ngrown on other ground, in an uncalled-for way, tries to connect itself\nclosely with the theory of descent. This is in an eminent degree the case\nwith the great eschatological hopes of Christianity. The evolution theory\nso exclusively contents itself with the attempts at perceiving the causal\ncircumstances of organisms in the _present_ world, that it does not at all\nwish to, and cannot, express itself concerning the _end_ and _goal_ of the\nworld and the laws and circumstances which may reign in a _future aeon_, and\nthat it gives free scope to every perception of the ultimate which might\ncome from another source. {376}\n\nOn the other hand, Christian eschatology is alone able to do most essential\nservice to the evolution theory, in case it should be verified, by giving\nan answer to questions to which the evolution theory tends more decidedly\nthan any other scientific theory--namely, to the questions as to _the end\nof the world and mankind_, with such distinctions as no philosophy which\ntreats of the doctrines of nature, is able to give, although natural\nscience itself demands the answer to these questions the more peremptorily,\nthe higher the points of view are to which it leads us.\n\nThe world shows to every investigating eye a development, whether we have\nto take this development as descent or as successive new creation; and\ntherefore we shall take, in the following discussion, the idea of\ndevelopment in this broad sense which comprises all conceivable attempts at\nexplanation. All nature--its most comprehensive cosmic realms as well as\nthe realms of its smallest organisms--together with the corporeal,\npsychical, and spiritual nature of man, shows a _harmony_, a _conformity to\nthe end in view_, and a _striving toward an end_ of its development, the\ndenial of which will certainly not add to the laurels which transmit the\nscientific fame of our present generation to posterity. Now, what is this\nend? The answer which we receive from those who reject Christian\neschatology, may be given by two scientific antipodes: by Strauss and\nEduard von Hartmann. Strauss takes sides with those who reject all striving\ntoward an end in nature; and his answer to the question (which still\nasserts itself in his system of the world), is: eternal circular motion of\nthe universe, death of all individuals and of all complexes of individuals,\neven of {377} mankind. Eduard von Hartmann, on the other hand, is filled by\nthe knowledge of the teleological, but he rejects the hope of Christians\nand the end which offers itself to him in the place of the rejected end of\nChristian hope, is destruction--destruction of all individuals and\ndestruction of the world. In view of such ends, is not the Christian's hope\n_the_ answer which not only satisfies the deepest ethical and religious\nneed, but also all heights and depths of the most faithful, most devoted,\nand most enlightened investigation of nature?\n\nFinally, we have still another eschatological conclusion to mention and\nreject; a conclusion which is drawn from this theory by the advocates of\nthe evolution theory. It opens the perspective into a future development of\nstill higher beings out of man. _In abstracto_, we can naturally make no\nobjection to the possibility of such a development, as soon as we once\naccept the evolution theory; but we have to object to the supposition of\nsuch a process _in infinitum_. For such a process would certainly be\ninterrupted by the final destruction of the globe; and in case the\nmechanico-naturalistic view of the world should be right, this destruction\nwould be only the more cruel as would be more highly organized the beings\nwhich should find their destruction in this inevitable catastrophe.\nMoreover, as we have repeatedly seen, a development _in infinitum_ suffers\nfrom a self-contradiction: for development involves an end, and this end\nmust certainly have been once reached. Now, if we have reason to assume\nthat this end has been reached in the development of the inhabitants of the\nglobe, by the creature being in the image of God and his child, and that it\nis also reached in fallen man through redemption {378} and its perfection,\nthen the idea of development, it is true, allows and postulates a relative\ndevelopment of mankind, so long as this takes place within the limits of\nthe now valid laws of the universe,--a development towards the perfection\nof this likeness to God and filial relationship; but that idea of\ndevelopment has no longer an influence that would lead to the production of\nnew beings which should be more than man.\n\nWith the foregoing, we believe that we have discussed all essential points\nof the relation between religion and Darwinism; and we now proceed to the\nlast part of our investigation.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n{379}\n\n_B. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND MORALITY._\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nDARWINISM AND MORAL PRINCIPLES.\n\nSec. 1. _Darwinistic Naturalism and Moral Principles._\n\nIf we consider the ethical consequences of a view of the world which,\nproceeding from Darwinism, permits the universe, man included, to be taken\nup into a mechanism of atoms--a mechanism in which everything, even the\nethical action of man, finds its sufficient explanation--we certainly\ncannot perceive how such a view of the world is able to arrive at firm\nmoral principles. If man, even in his spiritual life and moral action, is a\nmere product of nature, originated through descent, and if his whole\nspiritual life is fully consumed by these merely mechanical factors, then\nall moral principles are also nothing else than inherited customs founded\nupon those instincts which in the struggle for existence have proven to be\nthe most beneficial to man. Then their influence is subject to continual\nchange, always corresponding to the existing state of human development. As\nthese moral instincts have displaced the former instincts of the animal\npredecessors of man--say, _e.g._, of sharks, of marsupialia, of\nlemurides--so they must {380} also expect it any time to be displaced in\nturn by new and still more useful instincts. And even in the same period of\nthe development of mankind, the moral or immoral principles which have\nactual authority in each nation or tribe, have their full right of\nexistence as long as they are not displaced by still more advantageous\ninstincts. Moral principles in which infanticide, prostitution, and\ncannibalism have a place, are inferior to the highest form of Christian\nmorality only so far as they do not hold their own in the struggle for\nexistence, when nations having those low views come into collision with\nnations of higher moral culture; but in themselves they have full value and\nfull right, so long as they attain the end of all instincts, and so far as\nwe can speak of ends at all; in such naturalism, apart from human activity,\nthe end consists only in the preservation of the individual and the species\nin the struggle for existence.\n\nUnder these suppositions, moral principles not only lose their objective\nand solid consistency in the mass of mankind, but they also become\nirrevocably subject to the arbitrariness of the single individual. An\nindividual who either has not, or asserts that he has not, a determined\nmoral instinct, or who allows it to be smothered by some other instinct\nwhich in a normal individual is subordinate, but in him stronger, is fully\njustified in his immoral action so long as he is successful with it. Every\nindividual is entirely his own master and his own judge. If man is morally\ngood, it may be the consequence of an especially happy individual\ndisposition, or of an especially clear perception, or of happy\ncircumstances and influences; but it is not the consequence of a free\nsubordination under the authority {381} of a moral law; for there is\nneither freedom nor an objective moral authority. The single man is but the\nproduct of a certain sum and mixture of powers of nature, acting of\nnecessity, which may with him turn out fortunately or unfortunately. If, on\nthe other hand, man is morally perverted, society may defend itself against\nhis perversity; wisdom may try to convince him of the bad consequences of\nhis perversity for himself and society; the effect of his perversity may\nmake him sensible of the bad consequences of his actions: but there is no\nother objectively valid corrective of his perversity. If he is successful\nin his immoral action, and if he silences his conscience, this voice of the\nunobserved higher instinct in favor of the preferred lower--which\nunfortunately, as is well known, succeeds oftenest and most easily in the\ncase of those whose perversity has become the most habitual, and in whom\nanother grouping of instincts would be most desirable--then the whole\naffair is settled, and he is absolved. Let us be understood correctly. We\ndo not say that all advocates of mechanical or monistic ethics draw these\nconclusions in reality; we know very well that many a man is better than\nhis system; but it seems to us inevitable that the logical pursuit of that\nnaturalistic principle leads to this dissolution of all solid fundamentals\nof moral principles, and that it is but an inconsequence, certainly worthy\nof honor and of notice, if all the advocates of naturalism do not profess\nthis dissolution of all moral principles with the same cynic frankness that\nis shown by many of their partisans.\n\nWe do not say too much, when we charge ethical naturalism with dissolution\nof _all_ moral principles. Let {382} us examine them, for a moment,\naccording to the old but still fundamental division into duty, virtue, and\nhighest good.\n\nAccording to the principles of that ethical naturalism, there can be no\n_duty_ at all, no objective moral law, binding absolutely and in general.\nThe motives of action are either the strongest and most durable instincts,\nor, in case of high culture, conventional agreement of that which benefits\nsociety. In the one as well as in the other case, when the duty is\nneglected, the appeal is not made to something absolutely objective and\nbinding, but either to the highest instinct (and to this every individual\nhas the right to answer with a _Quod nego_), or to agreement and custom;\nand as to this, every individual has the right to make his reformatory or\nrevolutionary attempt at change--of course only upon the condition that his\nattempt is successful, and that it stands proof.\n\nRelatively it is easiest for ethical naturalism to establish a principle of\n_virtue_, inasmuch as we have to look upon virtue as the principle of\nindividual perfection, and inasmuch as even naturalism, by means of the\nindestructible impulse of man to attain moral ideas, can postulate an ideal\nof human action. But on closer examination even the naturalistic idea of\nvirtue vanishes under our hands. Virtue, as individual morality, is\nconstituted of the factors of duty and of the highest good, which form the\nmotives of virtuous action. Now a system of morality which, as we have\nseen, is entirely wanting in an objective solid principle of duty as the\nmotive of action, and which likewise, as we shall see immediately, is\nwanting in an objectively established highest good as the end of action,\ncannot possibly {383} produce any other idea of virtue than an abstract\nformal one. In ethical naturalism, even this form is subject to change.\nFor, according to this system, not only the motive and end but also the\nform of moral action depend on that which in every circle of society and at\nevery time proves to be the most successful form. It is the proof of\nsuccess or failure which gives this form a certain traditional authority\nand a relative solidity--but only a relative one, and only until it is\ndisplaced by a still more successful form.\n\nThat, finally, ethical naturalism is also wanting in an objective end of\nmoral action, in the idea and meaning of the _highest good_, is indeed not\ndenied by naturalism itself. It is true it speaks with predilection of the\nidea of species, which man is to represent and to realize, and in that\nrespect we can say that the highest good of naturalistic ethologists is the\nspecies or the idea of species.[11] But the idea of species is only the\nempty vessel which first becomes valuable by reason of its contents. Now,\nif we ask ethical naturalism the properties with which that idea of species\nis to be endowed, it certainly mentions properties, but those which are too\nrich; namely, it mentions the idea of all that is good in human life and\nthe forms of human life, _in concreto_, the whole sum of all the conditions\nand acquisitions of the culture of mankind, art, nature, and science: the\ncomprehensive idea of these acquisitions, the enjoyment of them, the work\nat them, is the highest good. Now, since no human individual can enjoy them\nall and work at them all at the same time, every individual, as {384} to\ndisposition, inclination, and circumstances, has to enjoy a part of them,\nto work at a part of them, and to renounce a part of them. And since each\nsingle one of these good things, however valuable to the individual, may be\nrefused to or taken away from him, he has again to learn to be satisfied\nwith that idea of species, however little it is able to offer him, when\nseparated from the empiric possessions of this earthly life. Thus with\nnaturalism the highest good is either mentioned in an abstraction which\ndoes not offer us anything, or which, if we ask the meaning of that\nabstraction, is instantly drawn down into the low sphere and the varied\nmultiformity of empirical and individual life, left to the chance of\nindividual taste, and confounded with that which is connected with the\nhighest good only in the second line and in a derived manner--namely, with\nthe formations and actions of life which strive at and serve the\nrealization of the highest good. Ethical naturalism is not able to produce\nout of itself an objective highest good which is for each individual alike\nattractive, rich, and comprehensive.\n\nMoreover, since ethical naturalism proves itself insufficient for the\nprinciples of any and all morality, it is but a natural conclusion that it\nis still less able to produce those principles which are characteristic of\nthe highest representation of human morality known to mankind, namely:\n_Christian morality_. Ethical monism has no room for three ethical\nfundamental views, whose full possession morality owes to Christianity, and\nwhich gives to Christian morality its highest motive power. One of these is\na deeper conception of evil as a sin, as a positive rebellion against the\ngood; another is faith in a future {385} absolute realization of the\nhighest good in an end sometime to be reached by mankind and the individual\nand by means of a moral order of the world; and the third is the\nacknowledgment of the full worth of personality. Evil--to which of course\nno objective valid moral law, but only one conventionally established,\nstands opposed--is to ethical naturalism nothing but the action of an\ninstinct which in this given case is not beneficial to man in his struggle\nfor existence; the category of good and evil is entirely replaced by the\ncategory of the useful and detrimental. With the disappearance of the idea\nof sin as a transgression of the divine law, the correlated idea of\nholiness also disappears from the system of ethical naturalism. Besides,\nblessedness, complete harmony of the outer and inner man with the ideal in\nthe state of mankind as well as of every individual, complete realization\nof the highest good for the whole as well as for the single through the\nmeans of moral work and perfection on the part of man and of holy and\nloving guidance and endowment on the part of God, is an aim which\nnaturalism is not able to acknowledge, since, according to it, mankind and\nindividuals continue in the ever-flowing stream of earthly incompletion\nuntil both reach their destiny in annihilation. A moral order of the world\nis an impossibility to it, since no holy and loving Ruler and Governor of\nthe world, but only a blind mechanism, causes the course of things.\nFinally, the personality of man can be only perceived in its worth and in\nits full importance, when, in the first place, it is in the possession of\nfreedom, of full moral responsibility; and when, in the second place, it\nlives beyond the span of its short earthly existence and may hope for a\nfull realization of {386} all its ideals of virtue and the highest good for\nitself as well as for mankind. Both these points must be contested by\nmonism and naturalism. The place of freedom is taken by absolute\ndeterminism; even man is only a natural product, the highest which\nnaturalism knows, but still no more than a product of nature; his\npersonality and his life, bound to the material body, cease with the death\nof this body, and therefore never reach the ideal of either morality or\nblessedness. All ideals are and must forever remain objective illusions\nwhich came forth out of the power of the corresponding noble impulse,\nimaginative objective conceptions of the moral impulses.\n\nSec. 2. _Scientific Darwinism and Moral Principles._\n\nWhilst Darwinistic naturalism surely injures the moral principles, the\nDarwinistic theories are friendly to them, if they, as mere scientific\ntheories, restrain themselves within the limits of natural science. But in\nno other point of the entire realm of contact between the natural and\nintellectual sciences is it more difficult to observe the boundary-line\nthan in reflecting upon the moral self-determination of man; here natural\nscience is always in danger of going beyond its limits.\n\nIn the question as to the relation of the evolution theories to religion,\nthe boundary-line can everywhere be easily drawn in theory and easily\nobserved in practice. For it is entirely natural for man to look upon the\nphenomena of the visible world on the one hand, with a religious mind, as\nworks and actions of an almighty Creator and Ruler of the world, on the\nother, with his observing and reflecting mind, as products of natural\ncauses. With this double view, man by no means feels {387} himself dragged\nhither and thither between two conflicting views; he is able in his logical\ncontemplation of the world scientifically to establish and arrange each for\nitself and both in their harmony, and has the full consciousness that the\none, like the other, has subjective as well as objective truth. Or, if a\nsingle individual does not have this consciousness, he must at least admit\nthat it is not Darwinism primarily which created the difficulty of this\ncombined view of the world, but that the latter existed for man in the past\nas well as in the present.\n\nBut the relation of the _Darwinian_ theories to ethical problems is quite a\ndifferent thing. Here, in the first place, it is not the same process which\nis to be explained as well in regard to its natural conditions as to its\nmoral cause. It is true that this double view deserves attention in so far\nas we can look upon every action which results from a moral determination\nalso in reference to its natural side. If I have to raise my arm in\nconsequence of a moral determination, then physiology and mechanism can\ndemonstrate with it the whole theory of the motion of members. But this is\nnot the question, when we treat of the relation between the natural and the\nethical. In this example, the moralist examines the motives of my action,\nthe scientist describes and explains the activity of the nerves and muscles\nof my arm, and as long as the scientist is not guilty of going beyond the\nboundary to which he is tempted, and which even now we are endeavoring to\nmake clear, as long as he does not include the ethical motives in his\nphysiological attempts at explanation, the one keeps himself neutral with\nreference to the other; each of them knows that he is {388} operating in a\nfield which at first has nothing in common with that of the other. In a\nmoral action, _as such_, the question is no longer as to a process which is\nto be explained as well in regard to its natural conditions as to its\nethical cause, but of a process which _either_ has its ethical cause, and\nthen in its ethical value _no_ natural cause, _or_ which even in its\nethical motives belongs to the causal connection of empirical nature with\nits indestructible chain of natural causes and natural effects. Now at this\npoint the scientist, as such, is always exposed to the danger of denying\nthe first part of our dilemma and affirming the second. For, in moral\naction, something which is elevated above nature and its causal connection\nalways makes its way into this causal connection of nature, and with its\naction and the effects of this action wholly enters into this connection:\nand natural science which has to deal particularly with this causal\nconnection of nature and with it alone, is on that account nevertheless\nalways tempted to explain everything that it sees coming into this\nconnection, in _all_ its causes (even in those which no longer belong to\nthis natural causal connection), out of it. It is therefore always tempted\nto trace even ethical action which, with its deeds, makes its way and\nenters into this causal connection, but which with its motives stands above\nit, as to its motives, back to a natural causal connection; and thus to\ncontest the independence of ethical motives and their principles--which\nindependence is not dependent on nature, but, on the contrary, frequently\ncontradicts it. Ethics must adhere to the fact that the ethical\ndetermination of the will has its origin not in a natural condition, but in\nthe ethical centre of personality; although all the conditions under which\nthe ethical motive {389} originates and acts, belong completely to the\ncausal connection of natural life, in which man himself stands as to the\nwhole natural part of his being. The ethical realm stands above the natural\nrealm, and shows its superiority partly by the category of moral demands\nwhose imperativeness cannot have grown out of the mechanical necessity of\nthe natural law, because it often enough contradicts the latter and carries\nout its demands in opposition to it, partly by the consciousness of\nindividual responsibility which cannot be got rid of even by him who\nmentally establishes a system of determinism that denies responsibility,\npartly by the voice of the injured conscience which cannot merely be the\ndislike of a dissatisfied higher natural impulse, when it can speak of the\nsame action for years, even for an entire human life, and even, where man\nhas counterbalanced that once felt dissatisfaction of the higher impulse,\nby an oft-repeated satisfaction of it. In Book I, Chapter V, Sec. 1, we tried\nto show that even Darwin seems not to have entirely avoided this danger of\nexplaining the moral from physical causes; while at the same time we\nacknowledge that he otherwise esteems the realm of the moral, and that he\neven finds the lofty position of man above the animal world still more\ndecidedly expressed in his moral than in his intellectual qualities.\n\nBut such an intrusion of the physical into the ethical is by no means a\nnecessary consequence of scientific Darwinism--only an ever-present\ntemptation of it. He who once admits that even by means of development\nsomething new can originate, that even under the full influence of the\nevolution theory there appeared in the series of creation entirely new\nphenomena with the {390} appearance of life and the organic, and of\nsensation and consciousness, and still more with the appearance of\nself-consciousness and freedom, which phenomena no evolution theory is able\nto explain; and he who takes into consideration the weight of that other\nobvious fact that, in the origin and the growth of each single man, a time\nin which he acts with moral responsibility follows in gradual development a\ntime in which he had but the value and the life of a cell,--such an one can\nexplain the whole origin of mankind according to the evolution theory, and\nyet see something absolutely new coming forth with the appearance of moral\ndetermination. All conditions of the moral determinations of the will may\nbe and are naturally conditioned, as, indeed, in this world the entire\nspiritual life of man is certainly bound to the conditions of his corporeal\nlife; all preliminary stages of moral types which preceded the temporal\nappearance of moral beings, and which surround us still, those stages which\nappear in the animal world, may have preceded and prepared the way for the\nintroduction of morally responsible beings into the world: the moral\ndetermination of the will itself nevertheless remains something new and\nindependent--something which transcends nature.\n\nIf this fact is once admitted, then ethics also has free play to establish\nindependently and render valid its principles. And then we have no longer\nany reason to treat of the relation of the different ethical principles to\nnaturo-historical Darwinism; for this relation is that of absolute mutual\npeace.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {391}\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nDARWINISM AND MORAL LIFE.\n\nSec. 1. _Darwinistic Naturalism and Moral Life._\n\nPrecisely the same relationship between Darwinism and morality, which we\nfound in treating of moral principles, presents itself when we ask about\nthe relationship of Darwinistic ideas and moral life in its concrete\nreality. He who builds a system of monistic naturalism upon his Darwinism,\nif he is logical, and not better than his system, comes into inevitable\ncollision with concrete moral life; while he who limits his Darwinism to\nthe realm of natural science, remains in concrete life in peace with\nmorality.\n\nThat Darwinistic ethical naturalism also comes into conflict with concrete\nmoral life, becomes evident from the joy with which the advocates of\nsubversion and negation greet the new principle of the \"struggle for\nexistence,\" and make it the principle of their own actions and social\ntheories. This is not chance sympathy, but is founded upon the nature of\nethical naturalism. Of him who learns to look upon himself only as a\nproduct of nature, though highly ennobled, we cannot expect any other\nprinciple than that of following his nature: not, indeed, the ideal nature\nof man--for this is an abstraction which man reaches only by means of a\nlong {392} process of reflection--but his own empirical nature, as he finds\nit present in himself; for this is indeed that natural product as which man\nhas to consider himself according to that theory. Where this leads to,\neverybody knows who knows human nature. If these consequences are not to be\nfound in all ethical naturalists, and if they are perhaps the least evident\nin the system and life of the very ones who otherwise teach naturalism the\nmost logically (Strauss, for example), we again most cheerfully admit that\nmany men are better than their systems, and that in making objection to a\nsystem, even an ethical system, we in the first place do not say anything\nat all about the advocates of this system and their moral value. Often\nenough some noble and fruitful truth has been advocated by men who are\npersonally contemptible, and often enough some dangerous error is\npropagated by men who are personally very amiable and moral, although the\ndamage which such an error carries with it, must become evident in their\nlives, on closer observation. Besides, we must not overlook the fact, that\nwhat in a perverse system is still relatively true, and the thing which\ngives it a relative vitality, is borrowed from truth and from the correct\nsystem; and that all those who oppose the present fundamentals of morality,\nand especially of Christian morality, in a thousand ways live upon and\nconsume the possessions which they owe to the same influences against which\nthey contend.\n\nBut to whatever relative height the moral nobility of single advocates of\nethical naturalism may rise, it is not able, at least not from its own\nprinciples, to produce thoroughly moral and truly cultivated characters;\nsuch are only produced where that which forms the character, {393} flows\nout of a spring of life whose origin is _above_ nature and its series of\ncauses.\n\nFrom this we see that for the most part a very low idea of personality, a\nvery low derivation of the motives of human action, is found in the works\nof Darwinistic moralists--as, _e.g._, we have seen in the works of Haeckel\nthat to him the idea of a personality of God is inseparably connected with\nthe idea of capricious arbitrariness, and that he derives all actions of\nall men from the motives of egoism.\n\nBut we also see, from still more common evidences, the fact that some of\nthe very highest blossoms and noblest fruits of human virtue, as they ripen\non the ground of Christian morality, are not even acknowledged, much less\nrequired, by ethical naturalism. We think particularly of the virtues of\n_love_, of _self-denial_, and of _humility_. Certainly, we do not deny that\nmen who are inclined toward naturalism can and do possess love to a certain\ndegree, but the highest exemplification of love, the love of enemies in the\nfullest sense of the word--not only compassion on the battle-field, but the\nfull, forgiving, blessing love which renders good for evil, and even\nintercedes for a personal enemy, although he may be the intentional and\nsuccessful destroyer of our whole earthly happiness--such a love may\nperhaps be demanded and admired by a naturalistic moralist under the\nimposing influence of the presence of such a love and in unconscious\ndependence on the motives of Christianity which surround him; but he will\nnever be able to show from what point of his system it is to be deduced. On\nthe other hand, it is easy to show him more than one point of his system\nwhich, far from requiring such love, {394} stigmatizes it as simple\nfoolishness. Such a fruit only ripens under the care of him who gave his\nlife for us while we still were enemies, and under the influence of the\nremission of our sin by our Heavenly Father.\n\nMoreover, an ethical naturalist can also accomplish much in _self-denial_:\nhe can make many great sacrifices, if he can thereby reach a desirable end\nthat cannot be reached without acts of self-denial; he can show great\nstrength and patience in a resigned endurance of the inevitable; and if we\ntake into consideration the possibility of its being logically at variance\nwith his system, he may perform all that which the highest morality\nrequires. But a renunciation which is more than silent resignation, and\nwhich under certain circumstances can also become a joyful renunciation of\nall that was beloved and dear to man on earth, does not grow out of the\nsoil of naturalism, and is possible only there where man carries in himself\na possession which would render him still more fortunate and happy than the\nidea of species, and where he knows the cross of Jesus, and understands the\nword of the Lord: \"He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that\nloseth his life for my sake, shall find it.\" Strauss is a striking proof\nthat naturalism is not able to estimate the tasks of self-denial at their\nfull importance. In his \"The Old Faith and the New,\" although he speaks\nwith great earnestness of moral demands, yet he deeply degrades that which\nis connected with a Christian renunciation of self and the world, when he\nreproaches Christianity with \"a thorough cult of poverty and _mendicity_\"\n(!) and, regarding its demand for self-denial, he denies that it has any\ncomprehension of the tasks of {395} industry, of the virtues of home and\nfamily life, of patriotism and civil virtue.\n\nFinally, we may make a similar statement in regard to _humility_. There\ncertainly are ethical naturalists also who are modest. But when the\nprophets of ethical naturalism again and again announce that the great aim\nof all the discoveries of the evolution theory is to show us how far\nmankind has fortunately progressed; when their spirit of devotion is\nnourished by Goethe's Promethean word: \"Hast thou not thyself accomplished\nall, thou holy glowing heart?\"--and even when Haeckel prints as the leading\nmotto of his \"Anthropogeny\" Goethe's poem \"Prometheus\"; when the struggle of\nselection is also elevated to a moral principle, and the life-task of an\nindividual is limited to creating elbow-room for himself: then humility,\nindeed, is a virtue which a naturalist may acquire, not through his\nnaturalism, but in spite of it; and the great _naivete_ with which, in\nbooks of that tendency, haughtiness and passion for glory are treated as\nsomething necessarily understood, and their own ego is glorified, is a much\nmore logical result. \"We are proud of having so immensely out-stripped our\nlower animal ancestors, and derive from it the consoling assurance that in\nfuture also, mankind, as a whole, will follow the _glorious_ career of\nprogressive development, and attain a still higher degree of mental\nperfection.\" (Haeckel, \"Hist. of Creat.\") This is the theme which is\nrepeated in many variations in all books of similar tendency. In the same\nbook already referred to, we read: \"Each free and highly developed\nindividual, each _original_ person, has his own religion, his own God; _so\nit is certainly not arrogance_ when we also claim the {396} right of\nforming our own idea of God.\" Or, \"The recognition of the theory of\ndevelopment and the monistic philosophy based upon it forms the best\ncriterion for the degree of man's mental development.\" L. Buechner, in his\ncollection of essays, \"Aus Natur und Welt\" (\"From Nature and the World\"),\ndedicates a long chapter to self-glorification, and finds confirmed in\nhimself the word of the poet, \"Great destinies are always preceded by\nspirit messengers\"; and he, still living, prefaces his own biography in the\nlatest edition of \"Kraft und Stoff\" (\"Force and Matter\"), and on the first\npage of the same publishes the testimonial which he received, when leaving\nthe gymnasium: \"The bearer of this testimonial excelled in the thorough\nstudy of literature, philosophy, and poetry, and as regards style in his\nproductions showed an excellent talent.\" In view of these things, we\ncertainly do no injustice to this tendency when we deny to it the\nconception of the idea and the practice of humility.\n\nSec. 2. _Scientific Darwinism and Moral Life._\n\nIt is evident from the peace-relation between mere scientific Darwinism and\nmoral principles, that naturo-historical Darwinism also remains in peace\nwith moral life. We therefore have no longer to treat of any question of\ncompetency in the realm of concrete moral life, but only to mention the\npoints of contact in which both realms, fully acknowledging their mutual\nindependence, yet in an inferior way exercise some beneficial influence\nupon each other. {397}\n\nMoral life influences Darwinism in so far as, by its mere existence, it\ncautions the advocate of the scientific evolution theory against effacing\nthe differences between the moral and the natural, and against degrading\nman to the level of animals on account of his connection with the animal\nworld. The naturo-historical idea of evolution, in case it should turn out\nto be correct, would exercise an influence upon moral life in a three-fold\ndirection: First, it would add to all the motives of the humane treatment\nof the animal world--which certainly without it already has moral\ndemands--a new one, and establish them all more firmly. Man would then\nrecognize in the animal world which surrounds him branches of his own\nnatural pedigree, and exercise his right of mastery only in the sense which\nAlex. Braun expresses, when he says: \"Man consents to the idea of being\nappointed master of animals; but then he must also acknowledge that he is\nnot placed over his subjects as a stranger, but proceeded from the people\nitself, whose master he wishes to be.\" A second service which the idea of\nevolution would have to render to the forming of moral life, would consist\nin the fact that it would favor all those ethical modes of contemplation\nand those maxims which regard the gradual process of development and the\ngrowth of character as the relative power of influences and conditions, and\nthat it would give them hints for the perception of moral growth, in like\nmanner as, in the before-mentioned parable, the Lord illustrates the\nimperceptible and continual growth of the kingdom of God with the growth of\na plant. A third service which the evolution theory might be able {398} to\nrender to moral life, would consist in the fact that it would give to the\nmotive of perfection and progress, which is always and everywhere a moral\nlever, a new illustration and a new weight by pointing at the progress\nwhich development has to show in the life of nature.\n\n       *       *       *       *       * {399}\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nIf now, having reached our goal, we look back upon the way which we have\ntraversed, we find a justification of the regret expressed at the\nbeginning, that a scientific treatment of religion and morality is\ncompelled to take a position in regard to theories which are not yet\nestablished. We found the most different problems--scientific,\nnaturo-philosophical, metaphysical, religious and ethical--inextricably\nmixed, and were obliged, as one of our first tasks, to make an attempt at\nfinding the clew and at examining and testing each single problem, together\nwith attempts at its solution, separately, although keeping constantly in\nmind its connection with all other problems and their attempts at solution.\nWe found ourselves led into the presence of a series of the most\ninteresting problems, but not a single solution finished. That very attempt\nat solution which brought up this whole question, and which was repeatedly\nannounced as the infallible key to the solution of all scientific\nproblems--the selection theory--we found a decided failure, at least in the\ndirection of the extension and importance which was given to this theory.\nAnd yet in spite of the hypothetical nature of all attempts at solution, we\nsee investigators in all the realms of natural science strongly attracted\nby the very promising character of these problems and busily engaged in\nmaking attempts at solution; {400} and we see even philosophy strongly\nattracted by its interest in these works. Such a diligent work can\ncertainly not be without gain; but wherein will this gain consist? Will it,\nas its antagonists prophecy, be like that which in former times alchemy\nbrought to science, which, indeed, enriched chemistry by an entire series\nof new discoveries, but did not find what it sought, the one fundamental\nelement from which all the rest are derived, which only confirmed, with a\npower acknowledged even to-day, the old doctrine of the elementary\ndifference of the elements? Will the Darwinian investigations thus also\nmake all possible discoveries _by the way_, but in place of that which they\nlook for, in place of a common pedigree or of a few pedigrees for all\norganisms, finally only give additional strength to the permanence of\nspecies and the unapproachableness of the secret of their origin? Or can we\nderive from the reasons which the investigators urge in favor of the idea\nof an origin of species through descent and evolution, the hope that that\nmysterious darkness of prehistoric times upon which the works of our\ncentury have shed so much light, will still be illuminated even to the\nsources from which organic species came, and from which mankind also\noriginated? We must leave the decision of these questions to the future and\nto scientists.\n\nBut we have to note _one_ gain, which is so great that on its account, we\nwillingly cease our regret in regard to the unfinished condition of these\ntheories; for we owe the full enjoyment of this gain to that very\nunfinished condition. It is the gain which _religion and morality_ get from\nthese investigations, and which consists in the new and comprehensive\nconfirmation of the conviction, {401} which, indeed, was established\nbefore, that religion and morality--Christian religion and Christian\nmorality--rest on foundations which can no longer be shaken by any result\nof exact investigation.\n\nThe triumph with which the Darwinian theories were greeted by many as the\nnew sun before whose rising all that mankind had thus far called light and\nsun turns pale, and the antipathy with which, on that very account, many to\nwhom their religious and ethical acquisitions are a sacred sanctuary, turn\naway from these theories, urged us to investigate their position in\nreference to religion and morality. Now, if these theories had produced a\ncertain undoubted result, we should unquestionably have been satisfied with\nthe examination of the position of religion and morality in reference to\nthis certain result. But since not a single result of those investigations\nis really established, we have found ourselves obliged to give our\ninvestigation a much greater extension and to discuss even all imaginable\n_possibilities_. The beneficial result of this comparison was, that\nreligion and morality not only remain at peace with all imaginable\npossibilities of _scientific_ theories, but can also, in the realm of the\n_philosophy of the doctrines of nature_, be passive spectators of all\ninvestigations and attempts, even of all possible excursions into the realm\nof fancy, without being obliged to interfere. It is in the realm of _mere\nmetaphysics_ that we first perceive an antagonist whose victory would\nindeed be fatal to the religious and ethical acquisitions of mankind: this\nantagonist is called elimination from nature of the idea of design.\nFortunately, this metaphysical idea is in such striking opposition not only\nto the whole world of facts but also to all logical {402} reasoning, it has\neverywhere, where man perceives organization and a difference between lower\nand higher, especially in the contemplation of the world, of this _cosmos_\nof wonderful order and beauty, so decidedly all philosophical as well as\nall exact sciences as its adversaries, it lays its hands so rudely and so\ndestructively not only upon the religious and ethical acquisitions but also\nupon all ideal remaining acquisitions of mankind, that religion and\nmorality know, when fighting this adversary, they are in firm accord with\nall the spiritual interests of mankind.\n\nThis, in its most essential features, is the pleasing result of our\ncritical examination; and such a demonstration of the immovably solid\nfoundation, secure from all the change of opinions and all the progress of\ndiscoveries on which morality and religion rest, has still an entire series\nof further pleasing consequences in its train.\n\nIn the first place, it is a living and actual proof of the fact that\nreligion and morality give to all sciences _the full freedom of\ninvestigation_. The religious and ethical interest itself not only gives,\nbut even _requires_, this freedom of investigation. It requires it in\nconsequence of that _impulse of truth_ which religion has in common with\nevery impulse of knowledge, and which in itself is an ethical impulse. In\nconsequence of this impulse, religion must found its possession on nothing\nelse than subjective and objective truth, and can look upon all the paths\nwhich lead through even the remotest realm of knowledge to the\nestablishment of truth, only with sympathetic interest. Precisely those who\nsee in religion more than a mere expression of emotion, and all those who\nrequire that their religious life and the object of {403} their religious\nfaith shall possess truth, subjective and objective, cannot commit any\ngreater folly than treating search for truth in any other realm with\nsuspicion, or even ignoring it. They only injure that which they meant to\ndefend, by rendering the purity of their own religious interest suspected,\nand by establishing more firmly the breach between religious life and faith\nand the other acquisitions of culture and interests of their time, of which\nneither religion nor science, but only a misguided tendency of their minds\nand hearts, is guilty. How much unfriendly and unjust judgment has already\nfound utterance by means of the pen and voice, in reference to honest and\nmeritorious workers, on the part of religious zealots who fail to recognize\nthat close relationship of the religious with the scientific impulse of\ntruth! How often and how much does such a judgment gain great consideration\nfrom a public of which but a few are able to form an independent opinion of\nthe men and works which are thus abused before their eyes and ears, and how\nmuch of the aversion to the form in which the religious life of the present\noffers itself, on the part of those men who are thus suspected, is in the\nlast instance to be attributed neither to be irreligiousness of these men\nnor to the deficiency of the present form of our religious life, but to the\nrepelling effect of that unjust treatment!\n\nAnother gain of our discussion, correlated to that just mentioned, consists\nin the proof _that religion and morality have their autonomous principle\nand realm_ which is not at all obliged to borrow the proof of its truth\nfrom the present condition and degree of our knowledge, but carries it in\nitself, although it stands in {404} fruitful reciprocal action with all the\nother realms of knowledge and life. Just as decidedly as we had to caution\nthe advocates of religion against keeping themselves indifferent,\nsuspicious, or even hostile, regarding the advances into the realm of\nsecular knowledge, so decidedly do we like to see the workers in the realm\nof the knowledge of nature cautioned against confusing points of view, in\nthinking that they can through their scientific knowledge purify and reform\nthe religious and ethical realms. They may purify and reform as much as\nthey please, but only in their own realm. The only thing they are able to\nreform is our knowledge of nature, and in our religious and ethical life\nand perception only that which belongs to this natural part; but this is\nonly the outer part of religious and ethical life: the source of our\nreligion and morality springs from quite another ground than that which\nthey cultivate.\n\nA third gain from our discussion is the actual proof of _the harmony\nbetween faith and knowledge, between the religious and the scientific views\nof the world_. In our investigation we had no occasion for psychological or\ntheoretical investigations as to faith and knowledge and their mutual\nrelation; but if our discussion is not an entire failure, perhaps the\nactual exposition of a standpoint on which faith and knowledge may live at\npeace with one another, which is not bought by a sacrifice on either side,\nand which does not consist in a compromise of the two, but which has its\nreason in the deepest and most active interest of the one, in the full and\nunconstrained freedom of the other, a stronger proof for the intimate\nrelationship of these brothers, between whom the present generation wishes\ntoo often to sow discord, than if we {405} had undertaken long\nreligio-philosophical and theoretical investigations.\n\nFinally, the results of our analysis have given us still another gain: they\nhave led us beyond Lessing's \"Nathan\" and his parable of the \"Three Rings.\"\nWe call this a gain, without the least intention of discrediting by it the\nmotives of tolerance and the points of view for the judgment of the\ncharacter and religiousness of human individuals, which lay in that\nparable, or suspecting the motives of so many of our contemporaries whose\nreligio-philosophical judgment is entirely expressed in that parable. We\nsaw ourselves compelled to make a choice either of accepting or of\nrejecting ends in the world, and found that the world resolves itself into\na senseless game at dice, and that the phenomena become more unintelligible\nthe more important they are, if we ignore or even reject teleology. The\nacknowledgment of the latter prevented us from seeing in the world and its\nevents merely the eternal stream of planless coming and going; it prevented\nus from accepting such an endless stream of appearance and disappearance,\nand therefore also an endless stream of the appearance and disappearance of\nnew forms of religion in that creature for whose appearance we see all\nother creatures are only a preparation, and are even obliged to look upon\nthem as a preparation in accordance with no other theory more than that of\nevolution. It also urged us to inquire as to the ends and designs of\nmankind, and we found this end in the disposition of man for a communion\nwith God, for the state of bearing his image and of being his child. Now we\nhave fully to acknowledge that Christianity, like all religions which claim\ntruth and universal acceptance, {406} is to be analyzed with the very same\nmeans of science as all phenomena in the world of facts, and that therefore\nit is especially subject to all investigations of religio-philosophical,\nreligio-historical, and historical criticism, to its fullest extent. But\nprecisely such an analysis of Christianity leads us to a result which\nelevates Christian religion high above all other forms. It also confirms by\nmeans of science what, indeed, is established to a Christian mind as\ncertainty from his own direct experience, that the quintessence of that\nwhich Christianity offers us, is truth and gives full satisfaction to soul\nand mind. For that analysis establishes, in the first place, that\nChristianity shows us the idea of God and the nature and destiny of man in\na purity such as no other religion does, and in such a life-creating power\nthat it is able to satisfy most completely all the nobler desires and\nimpulses of soul and mind, and to overcome most successfully all ignoble\nones. Furthermore, it shows us that these gifts of Christianity offered\nthemselves, and still offer themselves, not only in philosophemes and\ndoctrines, in parables and myths, in postulates and prophecies, but what,\nindeed, is not the case in any other religion, in an arranged course of\ndeeds and facts which, in everything that is necessary and essential for\nthe acquisition of that idea of God and for the realization of that ideal\nof mankind, legitimate themselves to criticism as historical facts, and\nwhich legitimate themselves as actions of divine manifestation by the fact,\nthat they and their consequences also are really able to fulfill what they\npromise, and to bring mankind nearer to the accomplishment of that goal\nwhich they set up for it. Finally, it shows us, when it reviews and\ncompares the development of {407} culture among all mankind, that the\nChristian nations have really borne the richest blossom and fruit which has\nappeared hitherto on the tree of mankind, and that Christianity, for the\nlife of nations, has not only, like other religions, powers of\npreservation, but also powers of renovation and renewal which other\nreligions are wanting. Even all the errors of superstition and immorality,\nof intolerance and lust of power, of so many of its advocates and\nconfessors, at which the adversaries of the Christian view of the world so\nwillingly point, are but a confirmation of its value. For they show us how\ndivine and heavenly the gift must be, if even such errors were not able to\nsmother its fruits. If we do not wish to suppose that mankind has\nfoundations and ends which up to the present it is not yet allowed to know,\nwe certainly must look for these foundations and ends where we find the\nbest which has so far been given to mankind and which has been accomplished\nby it.\n\nThis acknowledgment of Christianity as the only true and only really\nuniversal religion leads us beyond another sentiment of Lessing, which has\nfound an equally strong or perhaps still stronger echo in the mind. We mean\nthe expression that, if he had to choose, he would prefer the continual\nsearch for truth to the possession of truth itself. We emphatically\nacknowledge the holy right and the high nobility of this impulse of\ninvestigation and activity, but we need not buy its acknowledgment and\nsatisfaction at the price of being obliged to renounce a consciousness or\nthe hope of a consciousness which is equally indispensable to our inner\nhappiness as that impulse of investigation, and which first gives to this\nimpulse its overwhelming power--namely, the {408} consciousness and the\nhope of really possessing the truth. For, in fact, we are not required to\nmake this choice. There is a possession of truth which does not exclude,\nbut requires, the search for truth: that is the possession of truth in the\nanswer to the questions as to the starting point and the goal of our life,\nthe possession of truth in the fundamentals of our religious view of the\nworld. It is the certainty about the starting-point and goal of our life,\nwhich lastingly and effectively invites us also to look for and perceive\nall the ways which, in theory as well as in practice, lead from a firm\nstarting-point to a certain end, and only the possession of truth in the\nfundamentals of our religious view of the world gives value and\nsatisfaction to investigation in a world which, without this possession,\ncontains for us only transitory and fleeting, and therefore only\nunsatisfactory, things, but which stands before us as the work and the\ntheatre of revelation of a God and Father, and therefore gives to\ninvestigation inexhaustible joy and satisfaction when we look upon it from\nthose stand-points.\n\nIn like manner as, at the outset of our investigation, we perceived in\norganic species creations of God, and in spite of this, or rather on\naccount of it, looked upon the attempts at exploring their origin with so\nmuch deeper interest, we also see ourselves, in the still more direct\nreligious realm, not at all condemned to stagnation when we acknowledge\nChristianity as absolute religion. This very acknowledgment alone makes a\nreal progress possible for us. For every progress, in order to be a real\nprogress, needs a firm starting-point and a certain goal; hence that which\nis shown and offered to mankind in Christianity. From this {409}\nstarting-point and toward this end there are tasks enough for religious\nprogress. The ever more definite investigation of the facts and doctrines\nof Christianity, the improvement and ever more complete reproduction of the\nscientific image in which these facts and doctrines are reflected in the\nmind of man the progressing adaptation of ecclesiastical life in divine\nservice, and organization to the substance and the need of Christian\nreligiousness, the harmonizing of our possession of faith with all other\nelements of culture of each period, the working up of that which is given\nto us in Christianity into the spiritual and ethical acquisition of a\nsingle personality and its ever more complete representation and\nrealization in the individual and the common life, the progressing\npenetration of generations by the transfiguring light of religion and\nmorality, and the progressive overcoming of the likewise progressingly\ndeveloping kingdom of evil--in short, all that which the language of\nreligion calls the growth of the kingdom of God, is work and progress\nenough, but certainly work and progress on the ground of a certain basis as\nthe starting-point given to us by God, and work and progress toward a\ncertain goal set for us by God.\n\nIt is only from this basis of a possession of truth as it is offered to us\nby Christian theism, and by the facts of redemption and of a reconciliation\nof man with God, that the breach between faith and knowledge, between\nreligion and the life of culture, which at present takes place in so many a\nheart and mind, can be healed; and, far from seeking to cripple or hinder\nthose who stand on this basis, it alone gives to their theoretical and\npractical activity its joyous strength and certain end, to {410} their\nsphere of knowledge its universal breadth. The Apostle Paul, at the end of\n1 Corinthians, XV, when he takes a comprehensive view from the highest\npoints of Christian hope to which he found himself led from those\nfundamentals, knows of no fitter words to conclude with and to give it a\npractical application than these: \"Wherefore, my beloved brethren, be ye\nsteadfast, unmoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch\nas ye know that your labour is not vain in the Lord.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nNotes\n\n[1] \"The International Scientific Series.\" No. XIII.\n\n[2] \"Evolution of Man.\"\n\n[3] It was only when the manuscript of this work was nearly finished and\nthe first part of it had gone to the press, that the author received the\nsecond part of K. E. von Baer's \"_Studien aus dem Gebiete der\nNaturwissenschaften_\" (Studies in the Realm of Natural Sciences). It\ncontains another essay on teleology, \"_Ueber Zielstrebigkeit in den\norganischen Koerpern insbesondere_,\" and a treatise on Darwin's doctrine,\n\"_Ueber Darwin's Lehre_,\" which Baer had promised long ago and which the\npublic had anxiously awaited. It is no little satisfaction to find that I,\nfrom my modest premises, reached results regarding the naturo-philosophical\nproblems and their weight in the religious realm which so fully harmonize\nwith the views of this first authority in the realm of the history of\ndevelopment. I shall still have occasion here and there to avail myself of\na study of this latest and most important publication upon the question of\nDarwinism, and shall confine myself here to the remark that von Baer,\nalthough he rejects the selection theory and the superficial treatment of\nthe principle of evolution on the part of materialists, is by no means\ndisinclined to the idea of the origin of species through descent, whether\nin gradual development or in leaps; and that in this respect he could no\nlonger be counted among the advocates of the group above referred to, but\namong those which we mention farther on, had he not repeatedly and forcibly\nconfessed, with a modesty worthy of acknowledgment, his total ignorance\nconcerning the manner in which certain forms of life, especially the higher\nones, originated. The origin of higher species without the supposition of a\ndescent is to him unexplainable, because the individuals of these species\nare, in their first development of life, so dependent on the mother.\nFurthermore, he points out the fact that in early periods of the earth the\norganic forming power which ruled, must have been a higher one than it is\nat the present time; in like manner as the first period in the embryonic\ndevelopment of individuals is to-day the most productive. This higher power\nof organization, he says, could consist in a higher power of changing\norganisms into new species, as well as in a higher power of producing new\nspecies through primitive generation; or it could consist in both. In\ngeneral, there is no reason to suppose that primitive generations which\ntook place at the first origination of life on earth, could not have been\nrepeated later and oftener. The nearer a generation was to these\nindividuals originated through primitive generation, the greater was\nundoubtedly its flexibility and changeableness; the farther, the greater\nthe fixity of type.\n\n[4] After the completion this manuscript, the author found that K. E. von\nBaer, in his treatise upon Darwin's doctrine, pays especial attention to\nthe change of generation and also to the metamorphosis of plants and\nanimals in exactly the same sense and reaches the same conclusion.\n\n[5] Compare Max Mueller, \"Lectures on the Science of Language,\" 6th ed.,\nLondon, 1871, vol. I, p. 403.\n\n[6] Compare v. Baer, \"Studies, etc.,\" p. 294 ff.\n\n[7] Darwin says, on page 146, Eng. Ed., of his \"Descent of Man\": \"In the\nearlier editions of my 'Origin of Species', I perhaps attributed too much\nto the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest.... I did\nnot formerly sufficiently consider the existence of structures which, as\nfar as we can at present judge, are neither beneficial nor injurious; and\nthis I believe to be one of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my\nwork.... An unexplained residuum of change, perhaps a large one, must be\nleft to the assumed uniform action of those unknown agencies, which\noccasionally induce strongly-marked and abrupt deviations of structure in\nour domestic productions.\"\n\n[8] This word, which is of recent coinage in Germany, has been found so\nincapable of being rendered by an exact English equivalent, that it has\nbeen thought best to retain it and to give the author's own explanation of\nthe meaning which he desired it to express. He says, in a note to the\ntranslator: \"I was led to this idea [of _Auslosung_] in a small essay of\nRobert von Mayer (\"Ueber Ausloesung,\" 1876). Afterwards Mayer personally\nstated to me that he heartily approved the emphasis I had given to this\nidea, and said that he had only thought of the fact that psychical\nprocesses, like the action of the will, _losen aus_ (release) physiological\nprocesses, like the action of the muscles, and that I had carried the idea\nfarther, in saying that psychical processes are _ausgelost_ (released) by\nphysiological processes, and that this is a very important step farther on\nthe way of investigation. Mayer himself thought it would be necessary to\ncall the attention to this, when he further developed the ideas he had\ngiven in the before-mentioned essay; his intention to do so was prevented\nby his death.\n\n\"_Auslosung_ is a word originated by modern mechanical science, and means:\n(1.) Slight mechanical operations of detaching and the like, by which\nanother and more important action, whose forces were heretofore restrained,\ncan be set into activity: _e.g._, the pressure which sets in motion a\nmachine, previously at rest, is _Auslosung_; the pressure on the trigger of\na gun is _Auslosung_; the friction of a match which is the beginning of a\ngreat fire is _Auslosung_. (2.) This idea may now be applied to chemical\nprocesses: _e.g._, a glass of sugar-water will remain sweet unless some\nforeign element is introduced into it, but the moment it receives a\nfermenting substance either by chance, from the air, or with intention,\nthen the sugar water is brought into a process of chemical decomposition,\nand from this there results _Auslosung;_ but the introduction of the\nfermenting agent into the sugar-water is _Auslosung_. (3.) Von Mayer\napplies this idea to psycho-physical relations of life, and says: when the\nwill acting through the agency of the motor nerves sets in motion the\nmuscles, this is _Auslosung_.\"--[TRANS.]\n\n[9] For the use of readers who do not understand Greek, we may state that\nthe word _teleology_ is derived from the Greek word _telos_, Gen. _teleos_:\nend, purpose, aim; and means the \"doctrine of design or a conformity to the\nend in view,\" or, as K. E. von Baer prefers and wishes to have introduced\ninto scientific language, \"the doctrine of the striving toward an end\"\n(_Zielstrebigkeit_). It seems to be quite a superficial treatment of an\nidea on whose reception or rejection no less a thing than an entire view of\nthe world with all its most important and deepest questions depends, when\nDr. G. Seidlitz, in an essay on the success of Darwinism (\"Ausland,\" 1874,\nNo. 37), states incidentally that teleology is derived from the Greek\n[Greek: teleos] _perfect_. It is true that the Greek adjective for perfect\nis also derived from that noun, [Greek: telos], which has the same root as\nthe German word _Ziel_, and there is even an Ionic form for that adjective\nwhich is [Greek: teleos], but the Attic form is [Greek: teleios]; and since\nmodern languages, when a choice is allowed, do not derive their Greek\nforeign words from the Ionic, but from the Attic dialect, that word--were\nit really derived from that adjective and did it express \"doctrine of\nperfection\"--would have to be teleiology, or, in Latinized form, teliology.\nAs far as we know, the word, since it was introduced into scientific\nlanguage, has never been derived from any other root than from [Greek:\ntelos], Gen. [Greek: teleos], _end_, and has never been used in any other\nsense than to express the doctrine of a purpose and end in the world.\n\n[10] Compare \"History, Essays, and Orations of the 6th General Conference\nof the Evangelical Alliance,\" New York, Harper Bros., 1874, p. 264-271.\n\n[11] Compare D. F. Strauss, the most celebrated moral philosopher of\nMonism, in Sec. 74 of his \"The Old Faith and the New.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nCorrections made to printed original.\n\np. 43. \"the whole course of the zooelogical system\" - \"zoloogical\" in\noriginal.\n\np. 65. \"corals, radiata, worms, mollusca, and crustacea\" - \"radita\" in\noriginal.\n\np. 73. \"many portions of the skin\" - \"the the\" (across line break) in\noriginal.\n\np. 86. \"forsakes us in the inquiry\" - \"inqury\" in original.\n\np. 112. \"even philosophy can not take up the investigation\" - \"phi-osophy\"\n(across line break) in original.\n\np. 147. \"the origin of self-consciousness\" - \"conciousness\" in original.\n\np. 265. \"the origin of species through development\" - \"developement\" in\noriginal.\n\np. 297. \"any other interpretation than to take them\" - \"then\" in original.\n\np. 343. \"the Titan-like, rebellious Kainites\" - \"Titian\" in original.\n\nNote 3. \"The nearer a generation was\" - \"a a\" (across line break) in\noriginal.","title":"The Theories of Darwin and Their Relation to Philosophy, Religion, and Morality","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":112136}