{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_22283/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_22283","id":"gutenberg_22283","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/22283","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Monism","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Janet Blenkinship\nand the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nhttp://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n  MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM\n\n  BY THE LATE\n\n  GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.\n\n  HONORARY FELLOW OF GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE\n\n\n  LONDON LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. AND NEW YORK 1895\n  Oxford\n  HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY\n\n\n\n    WORKS BY _GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S._\n\n    =DARWIN, AND AFTER DARWIN=: an Exposition of the Darwinian Theory,\n    and a Discussion on Post-Darwinian Questions.\n\n    PART I. THE DARWINIAN THEORY. With Portrait of Darwin and 125\n    Illustrations. _Crown 8vo_, 10s. 6d.\n\n    PART II. POST-DARWINIAN QUESTIONS: HEREDITY AND UTILITY. _Crown\n    8vo_.\n\n    =AN EXAMINATION OF WEISMANNISM.= _Crown 8vo_, 6s.\n\n    =MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM.= _Crown 8vo_.\n\n    =THOUGHTS ON RELIGION=. Edited, with a Preface, by CHARLES GORE,\n    M.A., Canon of Westminster. _Crown 8vo_, 4s. 6d.\n\n    London\n    LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nOf the contents of this little volume the section on _Mind and Motion_\nwhich forms, in accordance with a suggestion of the author's, a general\nintroduction, was delivered at Cambridge as the Rede Lecture in 1885,\nand was printed in the _Contemporary Review_ for June in that year. The\nchapter on The _World as an Eject_ was published, almost as it now\nstands, in the _Contemporary Review_ for July, 1886. A paper on _The\nFallacy of Materialism_, of which Mr. Romanes incorporated the more\nimportant parts in the Essay on Monism, was contributed to the\n_Nineteenth Century_ for December, 1882. The rest was left in MS. and\nwas probably written in 1889 or 1890.\n\nThe subjects here discussed frequently occupied Mr. Romanes' keen and\nversatile mind. Had not the hand of death fallen upon him while so much\nof the ripening grain of his thought still remained to be finally\ngarnered, some modifications and extensions of the views set forth in\nthe Essay on Monism would probably have been introduced. Attention may\nbe drawn, for example, to the sentence on p. 139, italicized by the\nauthor himself, in which it is contended that the will as agent _must be\nidentified with the principle of Causality_. I have reason to believe\nthat the chapter on _The World as an Eject_ would, in a final revision\nof the Essay as a whole, have been modified so as to lay stress on this\nidentification of the human will with the principle of Causality in the\nworld at large--a doctrine the relation of which to the teachings of\nSchopenhauer will be evident to students of philosophy.\n\nBut the hand of death closed on the thinker ere his thought had received\nits full and ultimate expression. When in July, 1893, I received from\nMr. Romanes instructions with regard to the publication of that which\nnow goes forth to the world in his name, his end seemed very near; and\nhe said with faltering voice, in tones the pathos of which lingers with\nme still, that this and much besides must, he feared, be left\nunfinished. He suggested that perhaps I might revise the parts in the\nlight of the whole. But I have thought it best to leave what he had\nwritten as he wrote it, save for quite unimportant emendations, lest in\nrevising I should cast over it the shadow of my own opinions.\n\nIt only remains to add that the conclusions reached in this Essay should\nbe studied in connection with the later _Thoughts on Religion_ which\nCanon Gore has recently edited.\n                                                C. LL. M.\n  BRISTOL,\n  _May, 1895._\n\n\n\n\n  CONTENTS\n                                                                      PAGE\n\n  MIND AND MOTION                                                        1\n\n  MONISM                                                                39\n\n  INTRODUCTION                                                          41\n\n  CHAPTER     I. SPIRITUALISM                                           47\n\n     \"       II. MATERIALISM                                            55\n\n     \"      III. MONISM                                                 79\n\n     \"       IV. THE WORLD AS AN EJECT                                  88\n\n     \"        V. THE WILL IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM  119\n\n     \"       VI. THE WILL IN RELATION TO MONISM                        129\n\n\n\n\nMIND AND MOTION\n\n[REDE LECTURE, 1885.]\n\n\nThe earliest writer who deserves to be called a psychologist is Hobbes;\nand if we consider the time when he wrote, we cannot fail to be\nsurprised at what I may term his prevision of the most important results\nwhich have now been established by science. He was the first clearly to\nsound the note which has ever since constituted the bass, or fundamental\ntone, of scientific thought. Let us listen to it through the clear\ninstrumentality of his own language:--\n\n     'All the qualities called sensible are, in the object which causeth\n     them, but so many motions of the matter by which it presseth on our\n     organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything\n     else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but\n     motion.... The cause of sense is the external body or object, which\n     presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in\n     taste and touch, or mediately, as in hearing, seeing, and smelling;\n     which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings\n     and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and\n     heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or\n     endeavour.... And because _going_, _speaking_, and the like\n     voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of\n     _whither_, _which way_, and _what_; it is evident that the\n     imagination [or idea] is the first internal beginning of all\n     voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any\n     motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or\n     the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible;\n     yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions are. These small\n     beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in\n     walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are\n     commonly called ENDEAVOUR[1].'\n\nThese quotations are sufficient to show that the system of Hobbes was\nprophetic of a revelation afterwards declared by two centuries of\nscientific research. For they show how plainly he taught that all our\nknowledge of the external world is a knowledge of motion; and, again,\nthat all our acquisitions of knowledge and other acts of mind themselves\nimply, as he elsewhere says, some kind of 'motion, agitation, or\nalteration, which worketh in the brain.' That he conceived such motion,\nagitation, or alteration to be, from its extreme minuteness, 'invisible'\nand 'insensible,' or, as we should now say, molecular, is likewise\nevident. I can therefore imagine the delight with which he would hear me\nspeak when I say, that it is no longer a matter of keen-sighted\nspeculation, but a matter of carefully demonstrated fact, that all our\nknowledge of the external world is nothing more than a knowledge of\nmotion. For all the forms of energy have now been proved to be but modes\nof motion; and even matter, if not in its ultimate constitution vortical\nmotion, at all events is known to us only as changes of motion: all that\nwe perceive in what we call matter is change in modes of motion. We do\nnot even know what it is that moves; we only know that when some modes\nof motion pass into other modes, we perceive what we understand by\nmatter. It would take me too long to justify this general statement so\nthat it should be intelligible to every one; but I am confident that all\npersons who understand such subjects will, when they think about it,\naccept this general statement as one which is universally true. And, if\nso, they will agree with Hobbes that all our knowledge of the external\nworld is a knowledge of motion.\n\nNow, if it would have been thus a joy to Hobbes to have heard to-day how\nthoroughly he has been justified in his views touching the external\nworld, with no less joy would he have heard that he has been equally\njustified in his views touching the internal world. For it has now been\nproved, beyond the possibility of dispute, that it is only in virtue of\nthose invisible movements which he inferred that the nervous system is\nenabled to perform its varied functions.\n\nTo many among the different kinds of movement going on in the external\nworld, the animal body is adapted to respond by its own movements as\nbest suits its own welfare; and the mechanism whereby this is effected\nis the neuro-muscular system. Those kinds of movement going on in the\nexternal world which are competent to evoke responsive movements in the\nanimal body are called by physiologists stimuli. When a stimulus falls\nupon the appropriate sensory surface, a wave of molecular movement is\nsent up the attached sensory nerve to a nerve-centre, which thereupon\nissues another wave of molecular movement down a motor nerve to the\ngroup of muscles over whose action it presides; and when the muscles\nreceive this wave of nervous influence they contract. This kind of\nresponse to stimuli is purely mechanical, or non-mental, and is\nordinarily termed reflex action. The whole of the spinal cord and lower\npart of the brain are made up of nerve-centres of reflex action; and, in\nthe result, we have a wonderfully perfect machine in the animal body\nconsidered as a whole. For while the various sensory surfaces are\nseverally adapted to respond to different kinds of external\nmovement--the eye to light, the ear to sound, and so on--any of these\nsurfaces may be brought into suitable relation with any of the muscles\nof the body by means of the cerebro-spinal nerve-centres and their\nintercommunications.\n\nSo much, then, for the machinery of the body. We must now turn to\nconsider the corporeal seat of the mind, or the only part of the nervous\nsystem wherein the agitation of nervous matter is accompanied with\nconsciousness. This is composed of a double nerve-centre, which occurs\nin all vertebrated animals, and the two parts of which are called the\ncerebral hemispheres. In man this double nerve-centre is so large that\nit completely fills the arch of the skull, as far down as the level of\nthe eyebrows. The two hemispheres of which it consists meet face to face\nin the middle line of the skull, from the top of the nose backwards.\nEach hemisphere is composed of two conspicuously distinct parts, called\nrespectively the grey matter and the white matter. The grey matter is\nexternal, enveloping the white matter like a skull-cap, and is composed\nof an inconceivable number of nerve-cells connected together by\nnerve-fibres. It is computed that in a human brain there cannot be less\nthan a thousand millions of cells, and five thousand millions of fibres.\nThe white matter is composed only of nerve-fibres, which pass downwards\nin great strands of conducting tissue to the lower centres of the brain\nand spinal cord. So that the whole constitutes one system, with the grey\nmatter of the cerebral hemispheres at the apex or crown.\n\nThat the grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres is the exclusive seat\nof mind is proved in two ways. In the first place, if we look to the\nanimal kingdom as a whole, we find that, speaking generally, the\nintelligence of species varies with the mass of this grey matter. Or, in\nother words, we find that the process of mental evolution, on its\nphysical side, has consisted in the progressive development of this\ngrey matter superimposed upon the pre-existing nervous machinery, until\nit has attained its latest and maximum growth in man.\n\nIn the second place, we find that when the grey matter is experimentally\nremoved from the brain of animals, the animals continue to live; but are\ncompletely deprived of intelligence. All the lower nerve-centres\ncontinue to perform their mechanical adjustments in response to suitable\nstimulation; but they are no longer under the government of the mind.\nThus, for instance, when a bird is mutilated in this way, it will\ncontinue to perform all its reflex adjustments--such as sitting on a\nperch, using its wings when thrown into the air, and so forth; but it no\nlonger remembers its nest or its young, and will starve to death in the\nmidst of its food, unless it be fed artificially.\n\nAgain, if the grey matter of only one hemisphere be removed, the mind is\ntaken away from the corresponding (i. e. the opposite) side of the body,\nwhile it remains intact on the other side. For example, if a dog be\ndeprived of one hemisphere, the eye which was supplied from it with\nnerve-fibres continues able to see, or to transmit impressions to the\nlower nerve-centre called the optic ganglion; for this eye will then\nmechanically follow the hand waved in front of it. But if the hand\nshould hold a piece of meat, the dog will show no mental recognition of\nthe meat, which of course it will immediately seize if exposed to the\nview of its other eye. The same thing is found to happen in the case of\nbirds: on the injured side _sensation_, or the power of responding to a\nstimulus, remains intact; while _perception_, or the power of mental\nrecognition, is destroyed.\n\nThis description applies to the grey matter of the cerebral hemispheres\nas a whole. But of course the question next arises whether it only acts\nas a whole, or whether there is any localization of different\nintellectual faculties in different parts of it. Now, in answer to this\nquestion, it has long been known that the faculty of speech is\ndefinitely localized in a part of the grey matter lying just behind the\nforehead; for, when this part is injured, a man loses all power of\nexpressing even the most simple ideas in words, while the ideas\nthemselves remain as clear as ever. It is remarkable that in each\nindividual only this part of one hemisphere appears to be used; and\nthere is some evidence to show that left-handed persons use the opposite\nside from right-handed. Moreover, when the side which is habitually in\nuse is destroyed, the corresponding part of the other hemisphere begins\nto learn its work, so that the patient may in time recover his use of\nlanguage.\n\nWithin the last few years the important discovery has been made, that by\nstimulating with electricity the surface of the grey matter of the\nhemispheres, muscular movements are evoked; and that certain patches of\nthe grey matter, when thus stimulated, always throw into action the same\ngroups of muscles. In other words, there are definite local areas of\ngrey matter, which, when stimulated, throw into action definite groups\nof muscles. The surface of the cerebral hemispheres has now been in\nlarge measure explored and mapped out with reference to these so-called\nmotor-centres; and thus our knowledge of the neuro-muscular machinery of\nthe higher animals (including man) has been very greatly furthered. Here\nI may observe parenthetically that, as the brain is insentient to\ninjuries inflicted upon its own substance, none of the experiments to\nwhich I have alluded entail any suffering to the animals experimented\nupon; and it is evident that the important information which has thus\nbeen gained could not have been gained by any other method. I may also\nobserve that as these motor-centres occur in the grey matter of the\nhemispheres, a strong probability arises that they are not only the\nmotor-centres, but also the volitional centres which originate the\nintellectual commands for the contraction of this and that group of\nmuscles. Unfortunately we cannot interrogate an animal whether, when we\nstimulate a motor-centre, we arouse in the animal's mind an act of will\nto throw the corresponding group of muscles into action; but that these\nmotor-centres are really centres of volition is pointed to by the fact,\nthat electrical stimuli have no longer any effect upon them when the\nmental faculties of the animal are suspended by anaesthetics, nor in the\ncase of young animals where the mental faculties have not yet been\nsufficiently developed to admit of voluntary co-ordination among the\nmuscles which are concerned. On the whole, then, it is not improbable\nthat on stimulating artificially these motor-centres of the brain, a\nphysiologist is actually playing from without, and at his own pleasure,\nupon the volitions of the animal.\n\nTurning, now, from this brief description of the structure and leading\nfunctions of the principal parts of the nervous system, I propose to\nconsider what we know about the molecular movements which go on in\ndifferent parts of this system, and which are concerned in all the\nprocesses of reflex adjustment, sensation, perception, emotion,\ninstinct, thought, and volition.\n\nFirst of all, the rate at which these molecular movements travel through\na nerve has been measured, and found to be about 100 feet per second, or\nsomewhat more than a mile a minute, in the nerves of a frog. In the\nnerves of a mammal it is just about twice as fast; so that if London\nwere connected with New York by means of a mammalian nerve instead of an\nelectric cable, it would require nearly a whole day for a message to\npass.\n\nNext, the time has also been measured which is required by a\nnerve-centre to perform its part in a reflex action, where no thought or\nconsciousness is involved. This time, in the case of the winking reflex,\nand apart from the time required for the passage of the molecular waves\nup and down the sensory and motor nerves, is about 1/20 of a second.\nSuch is the rate at which a nerve-centre conducts its operations when no\nconsciousness or volition is involved. But when consciousness and\nvolition are involved, or when the cerebral hemispheres are called into\nplay, the time required is considerably greater. For the operations on\nthe part of the hemispheres which are comprised in perceiving a simple\nsensation (such as an electrical shock) and the volitional act of\nsignalling the perception, cannot be performed in less than 1/12 of a\nsecond, which is nearly twice as long as the time required by the lower\nnerve-centres for the performance of a reflex action. Other experiments\nprove that the more complex an act of perception, the more time is\nrequired for its performance. Thus, when the experiment is made to\nconsist, not merely in signalling a perception, but in signalling one of\ntwo or more perceptions (such as an electrical shock on one or other of\nthe two hands, which of five letters is suddenly exposed to view, &c.),\na longer time is required for the more complex process of distinguishing\nwhich of the two or more expected stimuli is perceived, and in\ndetermining which of the appropriate signals to make in response. The\ntime consumed by the cerebral hemispheres in meeting a 'dilemma' of this\nkind is from 1/5 to 1/20 of a second longer than that which they consume\nin the case of a simpler perception. Therefore, whenever mental\noperations are concerned, a relatively much greater time is required for\na nerve-centre to perform its adjustments than when a merely mechanical\nor non-mental response is needed; and the more complex the mental\noperation the more time is necessary. Such may be termed the physiology\nof deliberation.\n\nSo much, then, for the rate at which molecular movements travel through\nnerves, and the times which nerve-centres consume in performing their\nmolecular adjustments. We may next consider the researches which have\nbeen made within the last few months upon the rates of these movements\nthemselves, or the number of vibrations per second with which the\nparticles of nervous matter oscillate.\n\nIf, by means of a suitable apparatus, a muscle is made to record its own\ncontraction, we find that during all the time it is in contraction, it\nis under-going a vibratory movement at the rate of about nine pulsations\nper second. What is the meaning of this movement? The meaning is that\nthe act of will in the brain, which serves as a stimulus to the\ncontraction of the muscle, is accompanied by a vibratory movement in the\ngrey matter of the brain; that this movement is going on at the rate of\nnine pulsations per second; and that the muscle is giving a separate or\ndistinct contraction in response to every one of these nervous\npulsations. That such is the true explanation of the rhythm in the\nmuscle is proved by the fact that if, instead of contracting a muscle by\nan act of the will, it be contracted by means of a rapid series of\nelectrical shocks playing upon its attached nerve, the record then\nfurnished shows a similar trembling going on in the muscle as in the\nprevious case; but the tremors of contraction are now no longer at the\nrate of nine per second: they correspond beat for beat with the\ninterruptions of the electrical current. That is to say, the muscle is\nresponding separately to every separate stimulus which it receives\nthrough the nerve; and further experiment shows that it is able thus to\nkeep time with the separate shocks, even though these be made to follow\none another so rapidly as 1,000 per second. Therefore we can have no\ndoubt that the slow rhythm of nine per second under the influence of\nvolitional stimulation, represents the rate at which the muscle is\nreceiving so many separate impulses from the brain: the muscle is\nkeeping time with the molecular vibrations going on in the cerebral\nhemispheres at the rate of nine beats per second. Careful tracings show\nthat this rate cannot be increased by increasing the strength of the\nvolitional stimulus; but some individuals--and those usually who are of\nquickest intelligence--display a somewhat quicker rate of rhythm, which\nmay be as high as eleven per second. Moreover, it is found that by\nstimulating with strychnine any of the centres of reflex action, pretty\nnearly the same rate of rhythm is exhibited by the muscles thus thrown\ninto contraction; so that all the nerve-cells in the body are thus shown\nto have in their vibrations pretty nearly the same period, and not to be\nable to vibrate with any other. For no matter how rapidly the electrical\nshocks are allowed to play upon the grey matter of the cerebral\nhemispheres, as distinguished from the nerve-trunks proceeding from them\nto the muscles, the muscles always show the same rhythm of about nine\nbeats per second: the nerve-cells, unlike the nerve-fibres, refuse to\nkeep time with the electric shocks, and will only respond to them by\nvibrating at their own intrinsic rate of nine beats per second.\n\nThus much, then, for the rate of molecular vibration which goes on in\nnerve-centres. But the rate of such vibration which goes on in sensory\nand motor nerves may be very much more rapid. For while a nerve-centre\nis only able to _originate_ a vibration at the rate of about nine beats\nper second, a motor-nerve, as we have already seen, is able to\n_transmit_ a vibration of at least 1,000 beats per second; and a sensory\nnerve which at the surface of its expansion is able to respond\ndifferently to differences of musical pitch, of temperature, and even of\ncolour, is probably able to vibrate very much more rapidly even than\nthis. We are not, indeed, entitled to conclude that the nerves of\nspecial sense vibrate in actual unison, or synchronize, with these\nexternal sources of stimulation; but we are, I think, bound to conclude\nthat they must vibrate in some numerical proportion to them (else we\nshould not perceive objective differences in sound, temperature, or\ncolour); and even this implies that they are probably able to vibrate at\nsome enormous rate.\n\nWith further reference to these molecular movements in sensory nerves,\nthe following important observation has been made--viz. that there is a\nconstant ratio between the amount of agitation produced in a sensory\nnerve, and the intensity of the corresponding sensation. This ratio is\nnot a direct one. As Fechner states it, 'Sensation varies, not as the\nstimulus, but as the logarithm of the stimulus.' Thus, for instance, if\n1,000 candles are all throwing their light upon the same screen, we\nshould require ten more candles to be added before our eyes could\nperceive any difference in the amount of illumination. But if we begin\nwith only 100 candles shining upon the screen, we should perceive an\nincrease in the illumination by adding a single candle. And what is true\nof sight is equally true of all the other senses: if any stimulus is\nincreased, the smallest increase of sensation first occurs when the\nstimulus rises one per cent, above its original intensity. Such being\nthe law on the side of sensation, suppose that we place upon the optic\nnerve of an animal the wires proceeding from a delicate galvanometer, we\nfind that every time we stimulate the eye with light, the needle of the\ngalvanometer moves, showing electrical changes going on in the nerve,\ncaused by the molecular agitations. Now these electrical changes are\nfound to vary in intensity with the intensity of the light used as a\nstimulus, and they do so very nearly in accordance with the law of\nsensation just mentioned. So we say that in sensation the cerebral\nhemispheres are, as it were, acting the part of galvanometers in\nappreciating the amount of molecular change which is going on in sensory\nnerves; and that they record their readings in the mind as faithfully as\na galvanometer records its readings on the dial.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHitherto we have been considering certain features in the physiology of\nnervous action, so far as this can be appreciated by means of\nphysiological instruments. But we have just seen that the cerebral\nhemispheres may themselves be regarded as such instruments, which record\nin our minds their readings of changes going on in our nerves. Hence,\nwhen other physiological instruments fail us, we may gain much\nadditional insight touching the movements of nervous matter by attending\nto the thoughts and feelings of our own minds; for these are so many\nindices of what is going on in the cerebral hemispheres. I therefore\npropose next to contemplate the mind, considered thus as a physiological\ninstrument.\n\nThe same scientific instinct which led Hobbes so truly to anticipate the\nprogress of physiology, led him not less truly to anticipate the\nprogress of psychology. For just as he was the first to enunciate the\nfundamental principle of nerve-action in the vibration of molecules, so\nwas he likewise the first to enunciate the fundamental principle of\npsychology in the association of ideas. And the great advance of\nknowledge which has been made since his day with respect to both these\nprinciples, entitles us to be much more confident than even he was that\nthey are in some way intimately united. Moreover, the manner in which\nthey are so united we have begun clearly to understand. For we know from\nour study of nerve-action in general, that when once a wave of invisible\nor molecular movement passes through any line of nerve-structure, it\nleaves behind it a change in the structure such that it is afterwards\nmore easy for a similar wave, when started from the same point, to\npursue the same course. Or, to adopt a simile from Hobbes, just as water\nupon a table flows most readily in the lines which have been wetted by a\nprevious flow, so the invisible waves of nerve-action pass most readily\nin the lines of a previous passage. This is the reason why in any\nexercise requiring muscular co-ordination, or dexterity, 'practice makes\nperfect:' the nerve-centres concerned learn to perform their work by\nfrequently repeating it, because in this way the needful lines of\nwave-movement in the structure of the nerve-centre are rendered more and\nmore permeable by use. Now we have seen that in the nerve-centres called\nthe cerebral hemispheres, wave-movement of this kind is accompanied with\nfeeling. Changes of consciousness follow step by step these waves of\nmovement in the brain, and therefore when on two successive occasions\nthe waves of movement pursue the same pathway in the brain, they are\nattended with a succession of the same ideas in the mind. Thus we see\nthat the tendency of ideas to _re_cur in the same order as that in\nwhich they have previously _oc_curred, is merely an obverse expression\nof the fact that lines of wave-movement in the brain become more and\nmore permeable by use. So it comes that a child can learn its lessons by\nfrequently repeating them; so it is that all our knowledge is\naccumulated; and so it is that all our thinking is conducted.\n\nA wholly new field of inquiry is thus opened up. By using our own\nconsciousness as a physiological instrument of the greatest delicacy, we\nare able to learn a great deal about the dynamics of brain-action\nconcerning which we should otherwise remain in total ignorance. But the\nfield of inquiry thus opened up is too large for me to enter upon\nto-day. I will therefore merely observe, in general terms, that although\nwe are still very far from understanding the operations of the brain in\nthought, there can be no longer any question that in these operations of\nthe brain we have what I may term the objective machinery of thought.\n'Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently,' said\nHobbes. Starting from this fact, modern physiology has clearly shown why\nit is a fact; and looking to the astonishing rate at which the science\nof physiology is now advancing, I think we may fairly expect that within\na time less remote than the two centuries which now separate us from\nHobbes, the course of ideas in a given train of thought will admit of\nhaving its footsteps tracked in the corresponding pathways of the brain.\nBe this, however, as it may, even now we know enough to say that,\nwhether or not these footsteps will ever admit of being thus tracked in\ndetail, they are all certainly present in the cerebral structures of\neach one of us. What we know on the side of mind as logical sequence, is\non the side of the nervous system nothing more than a passage of nervous\nenergy through one series of cells and fibres rather than through\nanother: what we recognize as truth is merely the fact of the brain\nvibrating in tune with Nature.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSuch being the intimate relation between nerve-action and mind-action,\nit has become the scientifically orthodox teaching that the two stand to\none another in the relation of cause to effect. One of the most\ndistinguished of my predecessors in this place, the President of the\nRoyal Society, has said in one of the most celebrated of his\nlectures:--'We have as much reason for regarding the mode of motion of\nthe nervous system as the cause of the state of consciousness, as we\nhave for regarding any event as the cause of another.' And, by way of\nperfectly logical deduction from this statement, Professor Huxley argues\nthat thought and feeling have nothing whatever to do with determining\naction: they are merely the bye-products of cerebration, or, as he\nexpresses it, the indices of changes which are going on in the brain.\nUnder this view we are all what he terms conscious automata, or machines\nwhich happen, as it were by chance, to be conscious of some of their own\nmovements. But the consciousness is altogether adventitious, and bears\nthe same ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as a\nsteam-whistle bears to the activity of a locomotive, or the striking of\na clock to the time-keeping adjustments of the clock-work. Here, again,\nwe meet with an echo of Hobbes, who opens his work on the Commonwealth\nwith these words:--\n\n     'Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by\n     the _art_ of man, as in many other things, in this also imitated,\n     that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a\n     motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in the principal part\n     within; why may we not say, that all _automata_ (engines that move\n     themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch), have an\n     artificial life? For what is the _heart_, but a _spring_; and the\n     _nerves_, but so many _strings_; and the _joints_, but so many\n     _wheels_, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by\n     the artificer[2]?'\n\nNow, this theory of conscious automatism is not merely a legitimate\noutcome of the theory that nervous changes are the causes of mental\nchanges, but it is logically the only possible outcome. Nor do I see any\nway in which this theory can be fought on grounds of physiology. If we\npersist in regarding the association between brain and thought\nexclusively from a physiological point of view, we must of necessity be\nmaterialists. Further, so far as we are physiologists our materialism\ncan do us no harm. On the contrary, it is to us of the utmost service,\nas at once the simplest physiological explanation of facts already\nknown, and the best working hypothesis to guide us in our further\nresearches. But it does not follow from this that the theory of\nmaterialism is true. The bells of St. Mary's over the way always ring\nfor a quarter of an hour before the University sermon; yet the ringing\nof the bells is not the cause of the sermon, although, as long as the\nassociation remains constant, there would be no harm in assuming, for\nany practical purposes, that it is so. But just as we should be wrong in\nconcluding, if we did not happen to know so much about the matter as we\ndo, that the University sermon is produced by the vibration of bells in\nthe tower of St. Mary's Church, so we may be similarly wrong if we were\ndefinitely to conclude that the sermon is produced by the vibration of a\nnumber of little nerve-cells in the brain of the preacher.\n\nNow, if time permitted, and if I supposed that you would all care to go\nwith me into matters of some abstruseness, I could certainly prove that\nwhatever the connexion between body and mind may be, we have the best\npossible reasons for concluding that it is not a causal connexion. These\nreasons are, of course, extra-physiological; but they are not on this\naccount less conclusive. Within the limits of a lecture, however, I can\nonly undertake to give an outline sketch of what I take to be the\noverwhelming argument against materialism.\n\nWe have first the general fact that all our knowledge of motion, and so\nof matter, is merely a knowledge of the modifications of mind. That is\nto say, all our knowledge of the external world--including the knowledge\nof our own brains--is merely a knowledge of our own mental states. Let\nit be observed that we do not even require to go so far as the\nirrefutable position of Berkeley, that the existence of an external\nworld without the medium of mind, or of being without knowing, is\ninconceivable. It is enough to take our stand on a lower level of\nabstraction, and to say that whether or not an external world can exist\napart from mind in any absolute or inconceivable sense, at any rate it\ncannot do so _for us_. We cannot think any of the facts of external\nnature without presupposing the existence of a mind which thinks them;\nand therefore, so far at least as we are concerned, mind is necessarily\nprior to everything else. It is for us the only mode of existence which\nis real in its own right; and to it, as to a standard, all other modes\nof existence which may be _in_ferred must be _re_ferred. Therefore, if\nwe say that mind is a function of motion, we are only saying, in\nsomewhat confused terminology, that mind is a function of itself.\n\nSuch, then, I take to be a general refutation of materialism. To use but\na mild epithet, we must conclude that the theory is unphilosophical,\nseeing that it assumes one thing to be produced by another thing, in\nspite of an obvious demonstration that the alleged effect is necessarily\nprior to its cause. Such, I say, is a general refutation of\nmaterialism. But this is far from being all. 'Motion,' says Hobbes,\n'produceth nothing but motion;' and yet he immediately proceeds to\nassume that in the case of the brain it produces, not only motion, but\nmind. He was perfectly right in saying that with respect to its\nmovements the animal body resembles an engine or a watch; and if he had\nbeen acquainted with the products of higher evolution in watch-making,\nhe might with full propriety have argued, for instance, that in the\ncompensating balance, whereby a watch adjusts its own movements in\nadaptation to external changes of temperature, a watch is exhibiting the\nmechanical aspect of volition. And, similarly, it is perhaps possible to\nconceive that the principles of mechanism might be more and more\nextended in their effects, until, in so marvellously perfected a\nstructure as the human brain, all the voluntary movements of the body\nmight be originated in the same mechanical manner as are the\ncompensating movements of a watch; for this, indeed, as we have seen, is\nno more than happens in the case of all the nerve-centres other than the\ncerebral hemispheres. If this were so, motion would be producing nothing\nbut motion, and upon the subject of brain-action there would be nothing\nfurther to say. Without consciousness I should be delivering this\nlecture; without consciousness you would be hearing it; and all the busy\nbrains in this University would be conducting their researches, or\npreparing for their examinations, mindlessly. Strange as such a state\nof things might be, still motion would be producing nothing but motion;\nand, therefore, if there were any mind to contemplate the facts, it\nwould encounter no philosophical paradox: it would merely have to\nconclude that such were the astonishing possibilities of mechanism. But,\nas the facts actually stand, we find that this is not the case. We find,\nindeed, that up to a certain level of complexity mechanism alone is able\nto perform all the compensations or adjustments which are performed by\nthe animal body; but we also find that beyond this level such\ncompensations or adjustments are never performed without the\nintervention of consciousness. Therefore, the theory of automatism has\nto meet the unanswerable question--How is it that in the machinery of\nthe brain motion produces this something which is not motion? Science\nhas now definitely proved the correlation of all the forces; and this\nmeans that if any kind of motion could produce anything else that is not\nmotion, it would be producing that which science would be bound to\nregard as in the strictest sense of the word a miracle. Therefore, if we\nare to take our stand upon science--and this is what materialism\nprofesses to do--we are logically bound to conclude, not merely that the\nevidence of causation from body to mind is not so cogent as that of\ncausation in any other case, but that in this particular case causation\nmay be proved, again in the strictest sense of the term, a physical\nimpossibility.\n\nTo adduce only one other consideration. Apart from all that I have said,\nis it not in itself a strikingly suggestive fact that consciousness\nonly, yet always, appears upon the scene when the adjustive actions of\nany animal body rise above the certain level of intricacy to which I\nhave alluded? Surely this large and general fact points with\nirresistible force to the conclusion, that in the performance of these\nmore complex adjustments, consciousness--or the power of feeling and the\npower of willing--is of some _use_. Assuredly on the principles of\nevolution, which materialists at all events cannot afford to disregard,\nit would be a wholly anomalous fact that so wide and important a class\nof faculties as those of mind should have become developed in constantly\nascending degrees throughout the animal kingdom, if they were entirely\nwithout use to animals. And, be it observed, this consideration holds\ngood whatever views we may happen to entertain upon the special theory\nof natural selection. For the consideration stands upon the general fact\nthat all the organs and functions of animals are of use to animals: we\nnever meet, on any large or general scale, with organs and functions\nwhich are wholly adventitious. Is it to be supposed that this general\nprinciple fails just where its presence is most required, and that the\nhighest functions of the highest organs of the highest animals stand out\nof analogy with all other functions in being themselves functionless? To\nthis question I, for one, can only answer, and answer unequivocally,\nNo. As a rational being who waits to take a wider view of the facts than\nthat which is open to the one line of research pursued by the\nphysiologist, I am forced to conclude that not without a reason does\nmind exist in the frame of things; and that apart from the activity of\nmind, whereby motion is related to that which is not motion, this planet\ncould never have held the wonderful being, who in multiplying has\nreplenished the earth and subdued it--holding dominion over the fish of\nthe sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that\nmoveth.\n\nWhat, then, shall we say touching this mysterious union of mind and\nmotion? Having found it physically impossible that there should be a\ncausal connexion proceeding from motion to mind, shall we try to reverse\nthe terms, and suppose a causal connexion proceeding from mind to\nmotion? This is the oldest and still the most popular theory--the theory\nof spiritualism. And, no doubt, in one important respect it is less\nunphilosophical than the opposite theory of materialism. For\nspiritualism supposes the causation to proceed from that which is the\nsource of our idea of causality--the mind: not from that into which this\nidea has been read--the brain. Therefore, if causation were to be\naccepted as a possibility either way, it would be less unreasonable to\nsuppose mental changes the causes of material changes than _vice versa_;\nfor we should then at least be starting from the basis of immediate\nknowledge, instead of from the reflection of that knowledge in what we\ncall the external world. Seeing that the external world is known to us\nonly as motion, it is logically impossible for the mind to infer its own\ncausation from the external world; for this would be to infer that it is\nan effect of motion, which would be the same as saying that it is an\neffect of its own knowledge; and this would be absurd. But, on the other\nhand, it is not thus logically impossible for the mind to infer that it\nmay be the cause of some of its own knowledge, or, in other words, that\nit may have in some measure the power of producing what it knows as\nmotion. And when the mind does infer this, no logic on earth is able to\ntouch the inference; the position of pure idealism is beyond the reach\nof argument. Nevertheless, it is opposed to the whole momentum of\nscience. For if mind is supposed, on no matter how small a scale, to be\na cause of motion, the fundamental axiom of science is impugned. This\nfundamental axiom is that energy can neither be created nor\ndestroyed--that just as motion can produce nothing but motion, so,\nconversely, motion can be produced by nothing but motion. Regarded,\ntherefore, from the stand-point of physical science, the theory of\nspiritualism is in precisely the same case as the theory of materialism:\nthat is to say, if the supposed causation takes place, it can only be\nsupposed to do so by way of miracle.\n\nAnd this is a conclusion which the more clear-sighted of the idealists\nhave expressly recognized. That subtle and most entertaining thinker,\nfor example, the late Professor Green of Oxford, has said that the\nself-conscious volition of man 'does not consist in a series of natural\nevents, ... is not natural in the ordinary sense of that term; not\nnatural at any rate in any sense in which naturalness would imply its\ndetermination by antecedent events, or by conditions of which it is not\nitself the source.'\n\nThus the theory of spiritualism, although not directly refutable by any\nprocess of logic, is certainly enfeebled by its collision with the\ninstincts of physical science. In necessarily holding the facts of\nconsciousness and volition super-natural, extra-natural, or non-natural,\nthe theory is opposed to the principle of continuity.\n\nSpiritualism being thus unsatisfactory, and materialism impossible, is\nthere yet any third hypothesis in which we may hope to find intellectual\nrest? In my opinion there is. If we unite in a higher synthesis the\nelements both of spiritualism and of materialism, we obtain a product\nwhich satisfies every fact of feeling on the one hand, and of\nobservation on the other. The manner in which this synthesis may be\neffected is perfectly simple. We have only to suppose that the\nantithesis between mind and motion--subject and object--is itself\nphenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have only to suppose\nthat the seeming duality is relative to our modes of apprehension; and,\ntherefore, that any change taking place in the mind, and any\ncorresponding change taking place in the brain, are really not two\nchanges, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear a musical\nsound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings.\nRelatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of\nchanges, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we know that in\nan absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the diversity\nin consciousness is created only by the difference in our modes of\nperceiving the same event--whether we see or whether we hear the\nvibration of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of\nnerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the same\nevent, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of\nperceiving it.\n\nThe great advantage of this theory is that it supposes only one stream\nof causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously\nconcerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and\ncontradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset.\nThus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion;\nmind-changes nothing but mind-changes: both producing both\nsimultaneously, neither could be what it is without the other, because\nwithout the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is.\nImpossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that\nconsciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence of mind changes\nof brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very causation of\nthese changes that they should have a mental side. The use of mind to\nanimals is thus rendered apparent; for intelligent volition is thus\nshown to be a true cause of adjustive movement, in that the cerebration\nwhich it involves could not otherwise be possible: the causation would\nnot otherwise be complete.\n\nA simple illustration may serve at once to render this doctrine more\neasily intelligible, and to show that, if accepted, the doctrine, as it\nappears to me, terminates the otherwise interminable controversy on the\nfreedom of the will.\n\nIn an Edison lamp the light which is emitted from the burner may be said\nindifferently to be caused by the number of vibrations per second going\non in the carbon, or by the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of\nvibration could not take place in the carbon without constituting that\ndegree of temperature which affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a\ntrain of thought may be said indifferently to be caused by brain-action\nor by mind-action; for, _ex hypothesi_, the one could not take place\nwithout the other. Now, when we contemplate the phenomena of volition by\nthemselves, it is as though we were contemplating the phenomena of light\nby themselves: volition is produced by mind in brain, just as light is\nproduced by temperature in carbon. And just as we may correctly speak of\nlight as the cause, say, of a photograph, so we may correctly speak of\nvolition as the cause of bodily movement. That particular kind of\nphysical activity which takes place in the carbon could not take place\nwithout the light which causes a photograph; and, similarly, that\nparticular kind of physical activity which takes place in the brain\ncould not take place without the volition which causes a bodily\nmovement. So that volition is as truly a cause of bodily movement as is\nthe physical activity of the brain; seeing that, in an absolute sense,\nthe cause is one and the same. But if we once clearly perceive that what\nin a relative sense we know as volition is, in a similar sense, the\ncause of bodily movement, we terminate the question touching the freedom\nof the will. For this question in its last resort--and apart from the\nambiguity which has been thrown around it by some of our\nmetaphysicians--is merely the question whether the will is to be\nregarded as a cause of Nature. And the theory which we have now before\nus sanctions the doctrine that it may be so regarded, if only we\nremember that its causal activity depends upon its identity with the\nobverse aspect known as cerebration, without which identity in apparent\nduality neither volition nor cerebration could be the cause which in\nfact they are. It thus becomes a mere matter of phraseology whether we\nspeak of the will determining, or being determined by, changes going on\nin the external world; just as it is but a matter of phraseology whether\nwe speak of temperature determining, or being determined by, molecular\nvibration. All the requirements alike of the free-will and of the\nbond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a synthesis which comprises\nthem both. On the one hand, it would be as impossible for an\n_un_conscious automaton to do the work or to perform the adjustments of\na conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp to give out light\nand cause a photograph when not heated by an electric current. On the\nother hand, it would be as impossible for the will to originate bodily\nmovement without the occurrence of a strictly physical process of\ncerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison lamp which\nhad been deprived of its carbon-burner.\n\nIt may be said of this theory that it is highly speculative, not\nverifiable by any possible experiment, and therefore at best is but a\nmere guess. All which is, no doubt, perfectly true; but, on the other\nhand, we must remember that this theory comes to us as the only one\nwhich is logically possible, and at the same time competent to satisfy\nthe facts alike of the outer and of the inner world. It is a speculation\nin the sense of not being verifiable by experiment; but it has much more\nvalue than ordinarily attaches to an unverifiable speculation, in that\nthere is really no alternative hypothesis to be considered: if we choose\nto call it a guess, we must at the same time remember it is a guess\nwhere it does not appear that any other is open. Once more to quote\nHobbes, who, as we have seen, was himself a remarkable instance of what\nhe here says: 'The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the\nbest guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he\nguesses at.' In this case, therefore, the best prophet is not the\nphysiologist, whose guess ends in materialism; nor the purely mental\nphilosopher, whose guess ends in spiritualism; but rather the man who,\nbeing 'versed and studied' in all the facts appertaining to both sides\nof the matter, ends in the only alternative guess which remains open.\nAnd if that most troublesome individual, the 'plain man' of Locke,\nshould say it seems at least opposed to common sense to suppose that\nthere is anything in a burning candle or a rolling billiard-ball\nsubstantially the same as mind, the answer is that if he could look into\nmy brain at this moment he would see nothing there but motion of\nmolecules, or motion of masses; and apart from the accident of my being\nable to tell him so, his 'common sense' could never have divined that\nthese motions in my brain are concerned in the genesis of my spoken\nthoughts.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is obvious that from this hypothesis as to the substantial identity\nof mind and motion, two important questions arise; and I feel that some\nreference to these questions is in present circumstances forced upon me,\nbecause they have both been considered in precisely the same connexion\nby one of the most powerful intellects that was ever sent out into the\nworld by this University. I mean the late Professor Clifford. As my\nintimate and valued friend, I desire to mention his name in this place\nwith all the affection, as well as with all the admiration, to which I\nwell know it is so fully entitled; and if I appear to mention him only\nin order to disagree with him, this is only because I know equally well\nthat in his large and magnanimous thought differences of philosophical\nopinion were never felt to weaken the bonds of friendship.\n\nIn his well-known lecture on Body and Mind, Professor Clifford adopted\nthe hypothesis of identity which we are now considering, and from it was\nled to the conclusion that if in the case of cerebral processes motion\nis one with mind, the same must be true of motion wherever it occurs;\nor, as he expressed it subsequently, the whole universe must be made of\nmind-stuff. But in his view, although matter in motion presents what may\nbe termed the raw material of mind, it is only in the highly elaborated\nconstitution of the human brain that this raw material is sufficiently\nwrought up to yield a self-conscious personality. Hence the dissolution\nof a human brain implies the dissolution of a human mind; and hence also\nthe universe, although entirely composed of mind-stuff, is itself\nmindless. Now, all I have to say about these two deductions is\nthis--they do not necessarily follow from the theory which is before us.\nIn holding that the mind of man perishes with his body, and that above\nthe mind of man there is no other, Clifford may have been right, or may\nhave been wrong. I am not here to discuss at length any questions of\nsuch supreme importance. But I feel that I am here to insist upon the\none point which is immediately connected with my subject; and this is,\nthat whether or not Clifford was right in his conclusions, these\nconclusions certainly did not follow by way of any logical sequence from\nhis premises. Because within the limits of human experience mind is only\nknown as associated with brain, it clearly does not follow that mind\ncannot exist in any other mode. It does not even follow that any\nprobability upon this matter can be thus established. The basis of\nanalogy on which Clifford sought to rear an inference of cosmical\nextent, was restricted to the one instance of mind as known upon one\nplanet; and, therefore, it is hard to imagine a more precarious use of\nthat precarious method which is called by logicians simple enumeration.\nIndeed, even for what it is worth, the inference may be pointed with\nquite as much effect in precisely the opposite direction. For we have\nseen how little it is that we understand of the one mode in which we\ncertainly know that mind does exist; and if from this little we feel\nimpelled to conclude that there is a mode of mind which is not\nrestricted to brain, but co-extensive with motion, is consubstantial and\nco-eternal with all that was, and is, and is to come; have we not at\nleast a suggestion, that high as the heavens are above the earth, so\nhigh above our thoughts may be the thoughts of such a mind as this? I\noffer no opinion upon the question whether the general order of Nature\ndoes not require some one explanatory cause; nor upon the question\nwhether the mind of man itself does not point to something kindred in\nthe self-existing origin of things. I am not concerned to argue any\npoint upon which I feel that opinions may legitimately differ. I am only\nconcerned to show that, in so far as any deductions can be drawn from\nthe theory which is before us, they make at least as much against as in\nfavour of the cosmical conclusions arrived at by Clifford.\n\nOn February 17, in the year 1600, when the streets of Rome were thronged\nwith pilgrims from all the quarters of Christendom, while no less than\nfifty cardinals were congregated for the Jubilee; into the densely\ncrowded Campo di Fiori a man was led to the stake, where, 'silent and\nself-sustained,' before the eyes of all nations, he perished in the\nflames. That death was the death of a martyr: it was met voluntarily in\nattestation of truth. But most noble of all the noble army to which he\nbelonged, the name of that man is written large in history, as the name\nof one who had fortitude to die, not in the cause of religious belief,\nbut in that of scientific conviction. For why did Bruno suffer? He\nsuffered, as we all know, because he refused to recant his persuasion of\nthe truth of the Copernican theory. Why, then, do I adduce the name of\nBruno at the close of this lecture? I do so because, as far as I have\nbeen able to ascertain, he was the first clearly to enunciate the\nmonistic theory of things to which the consideration of my subject has\nconducted us. This theory--or that as to the substantial identity of\nmind and motion--was afterwards espoused, in different guises, by sundry\nother writers; but to Bruno belongs the merit of its original\npublication, and it was partly for his adherence to this publication\nthat he died. To this day Bruno is ordinarily termed a pantheist, and\nhis theory, which in the light of much fuller knowledge I am advocating,\nPantheism. I do not care to consider a difference of terms, where the\nonly distinction resides in so unintelligible an idea as that of the\ncreation of substance. It is more to the purpose to observe that in the\nmind of its first originator--and this a mind which was sufficiently\nclear in its thought to die for its perception of astronomical\ntruth--the theory of Pantheism was but a sublime extension of the then\ncontracted views of Theism. And I think that we of to-day, when we look\nto the teaching of this martyr of science, will find that in his theory\nalone do we meet with what I may term a philosophically adequate\nconception of Deity. If the advance of natural science is now steadily\nleading us to the conclusion that there is no motion without mind, must\nwe not see how the independent conclusion of mental science is thus\nindependently confirmed--the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being\nwithout knowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come\nwhen we may begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study\nof Nature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of\npossible truths. And if this is the case--if there is no motion without\nmind, no being without knowing--shall we infer, with Clifford, that\nuniversal being is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that\nmost stupendous of questions--Is there knowledge with the Most High? If\nthere is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not\nrather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in the\nmedium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being?\n\nThis, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if we are\ncareful to set the logical conditions with complete impartiality. But\nthe ulterior question remains, whether, so far as science is concerned,\nit is here possible to point any inference at all: the whole orbit of\nhuman knowledge may be too narrow to afford a parallax for measurements\nso vast. Yet even here, if it be true that the voice of science must\nthus of necessity speak the language of agnosticism, at least let us see\nto it that the language is pure; let us not tolerate any barbarisms\nintroduced from the side of aggressive dogma. So shall we find that this\nnew grammar of thought does not admit of any constructions radically\nopposed to more venerable ways of thinking; even if we do not find that\nthe often-quoted words of its earliest formulator apply with special\nforce to its latest dialects--that if a little knowledge of physiology\nand a little knowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper\nknowledge of both, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their\nrelations to one another, will lead men back to some form of religion,\nwhich, if it be more vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier\ndays.\n\n    'It is a beauteous evening, calm and free;\n    The holy time is quiet as a nun,\n    Breathless with adoration; the broad sun\n    Is sinking down in its tranquillity;\n    The gentleness of heaven is on the sea:\n    Listen! the mighty being is awake,\n    And doth with his eternal motion make\n    A sound like thunder, everlastingly.'\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 1: _Leviathan_, pt. i. chaps, i. and vi.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Leviathan_, Introduction.]\n\n\n\n\nMONISM\n\n\n     'Das Ich ist nicht aus Leib und Seele zusammengesetzt, sondern es\n     ist eine bestimmte Entwicklungsstufe des Wesens, das von\n     verschiedenem Standpunkt betrachtet in koerperliches und geistiges\n     Dasein auseinanderfaellt.'--Wundt, _Vorlesungen ueber die\n     Menschen-und Thierseele_, i. 293.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nIn no respect has the progress of physical science exercised a more\nprofound influence upon philosophical thought than it has by proving an\napparently quantitative relation between material changes and mental\nchanges. It has always been known that there is qualitative relation.\nEven long before mankind suspected that the brain was in any way\nconnected with thought, it was well understood that alcohol and other\npoisons exercised their sundry influences on the mind in virtue of\ninfluences which they exercised upon the body; and even the lowest\nsavages must always have been aware that a blow on the head is followed\nby insensibility. But it was not until the rise of Physiology that this\nqualitative relation between corporeal changes and mental changes was\ngradually found to be a quantitative one--or that every particular\nchange of mind had an exact and invariable counterpart in some\nparticular change of body. It is needless for me to detail the\nsuccessive steps in the long course of physiological discovery whereby\nthis great fact has been established; it is enough to say that the fact\n_is_ established to the satisfaction of every physiologist.\n\nNow, when once the relation between material changes and mental changes\nhas been thus recognized as quantitative--or, which is the same thing,\nwhen once the association has been recognized as both invariable and\nexact--there arises the question as to how this relation is to be\nexplained. Formally considered--or considered as a matter of logical\nstatement irrespective of the relative probabilities which they may\npresent, either to the minds of different individuals or to the general\nintelligence of the race--it appears to me that the possible hypotheses\nare here seven in number.\n\n     I. The mental changes may cause the material changes.\n\n     II. The material changes may cause the mental changes.\n\n     III. There may be no causation either way, because the association\n     may be only a phenomenal association--the two apparently diverse\n     classes of phenomena being really one and the same.\n\n     IV. There may be no causation either way, because the association\n     may be due to a harmony pre-established by a superior mind.\n\n     V. There may be no causation either way, because the association\n     may always be due to chance.\n\n     VI. There may be no causation either way, because the material\n     order may not have any real existence at all, being merely an ideal\n     creation of the mental order.\n\n     VII. Whether or not there be any causation either way, the\n     association may be one which it is necessarily beyond the power of\n     the human mind to explain.\n\nSo far as I can see, this list of possible answers to the question\nbefore us is exhaustive. I will next show why, in my opinion, the last\nfour of them may be excluded _in limine_.\n\nThe suggestion of pre-established harmony (IV) merely postpones the\nquestion: it _assumes_ a higher _mind_ as adjusting correspondencies\nbetween known minds and animal bodies with respect to the activities of\neach; and, therefore, it either leaves untouched the ultimate question\nconcerning the relation of mind (as such) to matter, or else it answers\nthis question in terms of spiritualism (I).\n\nThe suggestion of chance (V) is effectually excluded by the doctrine of\nchances: even in any one individual mind, the association between mental\nchanges and material changes is much too intimate, constant, and\ndetailed to admit of any one reasonably supposing that it can be due\nonly to chance.\n\nThe suggestion of pure idealism (VI) ultimately implies that the\nthinking Ego is itself the sole existence--a position which cannot,\nindeed, be turned by any assault of logic; but one which is\nnevertheless too obviously opposed to common sense to admit of any\nserious defence; its immunity from direct attack arises only from the\ngratuitous nature of its challenge to prove a negative (namely, that the\nthinking Ego is _not_ the sole existence), and this a negative which is\nnecessarily beyond the region of proof.\n\nLastly, the suggestion that the problem is necessarily insoluble (VII)\ndoes not deserve to be regarded as an hypothesis at all; for to suppose\nthat the problem is necessarily insoluble is merely to exclude the\nsupposition of there being any hypothesis available.\n\nIn view of these several considerations, it appears to me that, although\nin a formal sense we may say there are altogether seven possible answers\nto the question before us, in reality, or for the purposes of practical\ndiscussion, there are nowadays but three--namely those which head the\nabove list, and which I will now proceed to consider.\n\nI have named these three hypotheses in the order of their appearance\nduring the history of philosophical thought. The earliest is the\nspiritualistic. As far back as we can trace the conceptions of primitive\nman, we meet with an unquestioning belief that it is his spirit which\n_animates_ his body; and, starting from this belief as explanatory of\nthe movements of his own body, he readily attributes movements elsewhere\nto analogous agencies--the theory of _animism_ in Nature thus becoming\nthe universal theory in all early stages of culture. It also appears to\nbe the theory most natural to our own children during the early years of\ntheir dawning intelligence, and would doubtless continue through life in\nthe case of every individual human being, were he not subsequently\ninstructed in the reasons which have led to its rejection by many other\nmembers of his race. These reasons, as already observed, have been\nfurnished in their entirety only within comparatively recent times; not\nuntil Physiology was able to prove how intimate is the association\nbetween cerebral processes and mental processes did it become possible\nfor materialism to turn the tables upon spiritualism, by simply\ninverting the hypothesis. Lastly, although the theory of Monism (III)\nmay be traced back at least as far as the pantheistic thought of\nBuddhism, it there had reference to theology as distinguished from\npsychology. And even as presented in the writings of Bruno, Spinoza, and\nother so-called monists prior to the present century, the hypothesis\nnecessarily lacked completeness on account of the absence of knowledge\nafterwards supplied by physiology. For Monism, in the sense of this term\nas I shall use it, may be metaphorically regarded as the child of the\ntwo pre-existing theories, Spiritualism and Materialism. The birth of\nthis child was necessarily impossible before both its parents had\nreached mature age. On the one hand it was necessary that the theory of\nSpiritualism should have outgrown its infancy as Animism, its childhood\nas Polytheism, before it entered upon its youth as Monotheism--or before\nit was able to supply material for the conception of Monism as a theory\nof cosmical extent. On the other hand, Materialism required to grow into\nthe fullness of manhood, under the nursing influence of Science, before\nit was possible to engender this new-born offspring; for this offspring\nis new-born. The theory of Monism, as we are about to consider it, is a\ncreature of our own generation; and it is only as such that I desire to\ncall attention to the child. In order, however, to do this, I must\nfollow the example of biographers in general, and begin by giving a\nbrief sketch of both the parents.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nSPIRITUALISM.\n\n\nIn proceeding to consider the opposite theories of Spiritualism and\nMaterialism, it is before all else desirable to be perfectly clear upon\nthe point of theory whereby they are essentially distinguished. This\npoint is that which is raised by the question whether mind is the cause\nor the effect of motion. Both theories are dualistic, and therefore\nagree in holding that there is causation as between mind and motion:\nthey differ only in their teaching as to the direction in which the\ncausation proceeds. Of course, out of this fundamental difference there\narise many secondary differences. The most important of these secondary\ndifferences has reference to the nature of the eternal or self-existing\nsubstance. Both theories agree that there is such a substance; but on\nthe question whether this substance be mental or material, the two\ntheories give contradictory answers, and logically so. For, if mind as\nwe directly know it (namely, in ourselves) is taken to be a cause of\nmotion, within our experience mind is accredited with priority; and\nhence the inference that elsewhere, or universally, mind is prior to\nmotion. Furthermore, as motion cannot take place without something which\nmoves, this something is likewise supposed to have been the result of\nmind: hence the doctrine of the creation by mind both of matter and of\nenergy. On the other hand, the theory of materialism, by refusing to\nassign priority to mind as known directly in ourselves, naturally\nconcludes that mind is elsewhere, or universally, the result of matter\nin motion--in other words, that matter in motion is the eternal or\nself-existing substance, and, as such, the cause of mind wherever mind\noccurs.\n\nI may observe, in passing, that although this cosmical deduction from\nthe theory of materialism is, as I have said, natural, it is not (as is\nthe case with the corresponding deduction from the theory of\nspiritualism) inevitable. For it is logically possible that even though\nall known minds be the results of matter in motion, matter in motion may\nnevertheless itself be the result of an unknown mind. This, indeed, is\nthe position virtually adopted by Locke in his celebrated controversy\nwith the Bishop of Worcester. Having been taken to task by this divine\nfor the materialistic tendency of his writings, Locke defends himself by\ndenying the necessary character of the deduction which we are now\nconsidering. For example, he insists, 'I see no contradiction in it that\nthe first eternal thinking being should, if he pleased, give to certain\nsystems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some\ndegrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as I think, I have\nproved (lib. IV, ch. 10 and 14 &c.), it is no less than a contradiction\nto suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense\nand thought) should be that eternal first thinking being.' Under this\nview, it will be observed, mind is supposed to have the ultimate\npriority, and thus to have been the original or creating cause of matter\nin motion, which, in turn, becomes the cause (or, at least, the\nconditional condition) of mind of a lower order. This view, however,\nneed not detain us, inasmuch as it can only be held by those who, on\ngrounds independent of philosophical thinking, already believe in mind\nas the First Cause or Eternal Being: this belief granted, there is, of\ncourse, an end of any question as between Spiritualism and Materialism.\nI have, therefore, only mentioned this possible phase of spiritualistic\ntheory, in order to show that the theory of Materialism as applied to a\nhuman being does not _necessarily_ involve an extension of that theory\nto the cosmos. But I hold this distinction as of no practical value: it\nmerely indicates a logical possibility which no one would be likely to\nentertain except on grounds independent of those upon which the\nphilosophical dispute between Spiritualism and Materialism must be\nconfined.\n\nOf more practical importance is the remark already made, namely, that\nthe fundamental or diagnostic distinction between these two species of\ntheory consists _only_ in the views which they severally take on the\nquestion of causality. This remark is of practical importance, because\nin the debate between spiritualists and materialists it is often lost\nsight of: nay, in some cases, it is even expressly ignored. Obviously,\nwhen it is either intentionally or unintentionally disregarded, the\ndebate ceases to be directed to the question under discussion, and may\nthen wander aimlessly over the whole field of collateral speculation.\nThroughout the present essay, therefore, the discussion will be\nrestricted to the only topic which we have to discuss--namely, whether\nmind is the cause of motion, motion the cause of mind, or neither the\ncause of the other.\n\nThe view to be first considered--namely, that mind is the cause of\nmotion--obviously has one great advantage over the opposite view: it\nsupposes the causality to proceed from that which is the source of our\nidea of causality (the mind); not from that into which this idea has\nbeen read by the mind. Hence, it is so far less difficult to imagine\nthat mental changes are the cause of bodily changes than _vice versa_;\nfor upon this hypothesis we are starting at least from the substance of\nimmediate knowledge, and not from the reflection of that knowledge in\nwhat we call the external world.\n\nOn the other hand, the theory of Spiritualism labours under certain\nspeculative difficulties which appear to me overwhelming. The most\nformidable of these difficulties arises from the inevitable collision of\nthe theory with the scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy.\nWhether or not we adopt the view that all causation of a physical kind\nis ultimately an expression of the fact that matter and energy are\nindestructible[3], it is equally certain that this indestructibility is\na necessary condition to the occurrence of causation as natural.\nTherefore, if the mind of man is capable of breaking in as an\nindependent cause upon the otherwise uniform system of natural\ncausation, the only way in which it could do so would be by either\ndestroying or creating certain _quanta_ of either matter or energy or\nboth. But to suppose the mind capable of doing any of these things would\nbe to suppose that the mind is a cause in some other sense than a\nphysical or a natural cause; it would be to suppose that the mind is a\nsuper-natural cause, or, more plainly, that all mental activity, so far\nas it is an efficient cause of bodily movement, is of the nature of a\nmiracle.\n\nThis conclusion, which appears to me unavoidably implicated in the\nspiritualistic hypothesis, is not merely improbable _per se_, but admits\nof being shown virtually impossible if we proceed to consider the\nconsequences to which it necessarily leads. A sportsman, for example,\npulls the trigger of a gun, thereby initiating a long train of physical\ncauses, which we may take up at the point where the powder is\ndischarged, the shot propelled, and the bird dropped. Here the man's\nvolition is supposed to have broken in upon the otherwise continuous\nstream of physical causes--first by modifying the molecular movements of\nhis brain, so as to produce the particular co-ordination of\nneuro-muscular movement required to take accurate aim and to fire at the\nright moment; next by converting a quantity of gunpowder into gas,\npropelling a quantity of lead through the air; and finally, by killing a\nbird. Now, without tracing the matter further than this, let us consider\nhow enormous a change the will of the man has introduced, even by so\ntrivial an exercise of its activity. No doubt the first change in the\nmaterial world was exceedingly slight: the molecular movement in the\ncortex of his brain was probably not more than might be dynamically\nrepresented by some small fraction of a foot-pound. But so intricate is\nthe _nexus_ of physical causality throughout the whole domain of Nature,\nthat the intervention of even so minute a disturbance _ab extra_ is\nobviously bound to continue to assert an influence of ever-widening\nextent as well as of everlasting duration. The heat generated by the\nexplosion of the powder, the changed disposition of the shot, the death\nof the bird--leading to innumerable physical changes as to stoppage of\nmany mechanical processes previously going on in the bird's body, loss\nof animal heat, &c., and also to innumerable vital changes, leading to\na stoppage of all the mechanical changes which the bird would have\nhelped to condition had it lived to die some other death, to propagate\nits kind, and thus indirectly condition an incalculable number of future\nchanges that would have been brought about by the ever increasing number\nof its descendants--these and an indefinite number of other physical\nchanges must all be held to have followed as a direct consequence of the\nman's volition thus suddenly breaking in as an independent cause upon\nthe otherwise uniform course of Nature. Now, I say that, apart from some\nsystem of pre-established harmony, it appears simply inconceivable that\nthe order of Nature could be maintained at all, if it were thus liable\nto be interfered with at any moment in any number of points. And if the\nspiritualist takes refuge in the further hypothesis of a pre-established\nharmony between acts of human (not to add brute) volition and causes of\na natural kind, we have only to observe that he thus lands himself in a\nspeculative position which is practically identical with that occupied\nby the materialist. For the only difference between the two positions\nthen is that the necessity which the materialist takes to be imposed on\nhuman volition by the system of natural causation, is now taken by the\nspiritualist to be equally imposed by a super-natural volition. The\nnecessity which binds the human volition must be equally rigid in\neither case; and therefore it can make no practical difference whether\nthe source of it be regarded as natural or super-natural, material or\nmental: so that a man be fated to will only in certain ways--and this\nwith all the rigour which belongs to causation as physical--it is\nscarcely worth while to dispute whether the predestination is of God or\nof Nature. There can be no question, however, that in this matter the\npossibility which I have supposed to be suggested by the spiritualist is\nmore far-fetched than that which obviously lies to the hand of the\nmaterialist; and, moreover, that it too plainly wears the appearance of\na desperate device to save a hollow theory.\n\nIt remains to add that this great difficulty against the spiritualistic\ntheory has been revealed in all its force only during the present\ngeneration. Since the days of fetishism, indeed, the difficulty has\nalways been an increasing one--growing with the growth of the perception\nof uniformity on the one hand, and of mechanical as distinguished from\nvolitional agency on the other. But it was not until the correlation of\nall the physical forces had been proved by actual experiment, and the\nscientific doctrine of the conservation of energy became as a\nconsequence firmly established, that the difficulty in question assumed\nthe importance of a logical barrier to the theory of mental changes\nacting as efficient causes of material changes.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 3: In the opinion of some modern writers the indestructibility\nof matter and the conservation of energy are alone sufficient to explain\nall the facts of natural causation. 'For,' it is urged, 'if in any case\nsimilar antecedents did not determine similar consequents, on one or\nother of these occasions some _quantum_ of force, or of matter, or of\nboth, must have disappeared--or, which is the same thing, the law of\ncausation cannot have been constant.' In a future chapter I shall have\nto recur to this view. Meanwhile I have only to observe that whether or\nnot the law of causation is nothing more than a re-statement of the fact\nthat matter and energy are indestructible, it is equally true that this\nfact is at least a necessary _condition_ to the operation of that law.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nMATERIALISM.\n\n\nThis is the theory which presents great fascination to the student of\nphysical science. By laborious investigation physiology has established\nthe fact beyond the reach of rational dispute, that there is a constant\nrelation of concomitancy between cerebral action and thought. Within\nexperience mind is found in constant and definite association with that\nhighly complex and peculiar disposition of matter called a living brain.\nThe size and elaboration of this peculiar structure throughout the\nanimal kingdom stand in conspicuous proportion to the degree of\nintelligence displayed; while the impairment of this structure, whether\nby congenital defect, mutilation, anaemia, decay, or appropriate poison,\nentails corresponding impairment of mental processes. Thus much being\nestablished, no reasonable man can hesitate in believing the relation\nbetween neurosis and psychosis to be a constant and concomitant\nrelation, so that the step between this, and regarding it as a causal\nrelation, seems indeed a small one. For, in all matters of physical\ninquiry, whenever we have proved a constant relation of concomitancy in\na sequence _A B_, we call _A_ the cause of _B_; and, therefore, it has\nbeen frequently said that the evidence of causation between neurosis and\npsychosis is recognized causation. Lastly, to fortify this hypothesis,\nmaterialists point to the doctrine of the conservation of energy, which\nis supplied by the science of physics as a sort of buttress in this\nmatter to the teachings of physiology. For, as this doctrine compels us\nto believe that the chain of physical causation involved in cerebral\nprocesses can nowhere be broken or deflected _ab extra_, we are\ncompelled to believe that the mental processes, which are correlatively\nassociated with these cerebral processes, can nowhere escape from 'the\ncharmed circle of the forces,' so that whether we look to the detailed\nteachings of physiology, or to the more general teachings of physics, we\nalike perceive that natural science appears to leave no locus for mind\nother than as a something which is in some way a result of motion.\n\nThe position of Materialism being thus at first sight so naturally\nstrong, and having been in recent years so fortified by the labours of\nphysiology, it is not surprising that in the present generation\nMaterialism should be in the ascendant. It is the simple truth, as a\nlearned and temperate author, speaking from the side of theology, has\nrecently said, that\n\n     'Materialism is a danger to which individuals and societies will\n     always be more or less exposed. The present generation, however,\n     and especially the generation which is growing up, will obviously\n     be very especially exposed to it; as much so, perhaps, as any\n     generation in the history of the world. Within the last thirty\n     years the great wave of spiritualistic or idealistic thought ...\n     has been receding and decreasing; and another, which is in the main\n     driven by materialistic forces, has been gradually rising behind,\n     vast and threatening. It is but its crest that we at present see;\n     it is but a certain vague shaking produced by it that we at present\n     feel; but we shall probably soon enough fail not both to see and\n     feel it fully and distinctly[4].'\n\nSuch being the present importance of Materialism, I shall devote the\npresent chapter to a consideration of this theory. Each of the points in\nthe argument for Materialism which I have mentioned above admits, of\ncourse, of elaboration; but I think that their enumeration contains all\nthat is essential to the theory in question. It now devolves upon us to\ninquire whether this theory is adequate to meet the facts.\n\nAnd here I may as well at once give it as my own opinion that, of\nhowever much service the theory of Materialism may be, up to a certain\npoint, it can never be accepted by any competent mind as a final\nexplanation of the facts with which it has to deal. Unquestionable as\nits use may be as a fundamental hypothesis in physiology and medicine,\nit is wholly inadequate as a hypothesis in philosophy. That is to say,\nso long as there is a constant relation of concomitancy found by\nexperience to obtain between neural processes and mental processes, so\nlong no harm can accrue to physical science by assuming, for its own\npurposes, that this relation is a causal one. But as soon as the\nquestion concerning the validity of this assumption is raised into the\nregion of philosophy, it receives the answer that the assumption cannot\nbe allowed to pass. For where the question becomes one not as to the\n_fact_ of the association but as to its _nature_, philosophy, which must\nhave regard to the facts of mind no less than to those of matter, must\npronounce that the hypothesis is untenable; for the hypothesis of this\nassociation being one of causality acting from neurosis to psychosis,\ncannot be accepted without doing violence, not merely to our faculty of\nreason, but to our very idea of causation itself.\n\nA very small amount of thinking is enough to show that what I call my\nknowledge of the external world, is merely a knowledge of my own mental\nmodifications. A step further and I find that my idea of causation as a\nprinciple in the external world is derived from my knowledge of this\nprinciple in the internal world. For I find that my idea of force and\nenergy in the external world is a mere projection of the idea which I\nhave of effort within the region of my own consciousness; and therefore\nmy only idea of causation is that which is originally derived from the\nexperience which I have of this principle as obtaining among my own\nmental modifications.\n\nIf once we see plainly that the idea of causation is derived from\nwithin, and that what we call the evidence of physical causation is\nreally the evidence of mental modifications following one another in a\ndefinite sequence, we shall then clearly see, not merely that we have no\nevidence, but that we _can have_ no evidence of causation as proceeding\nfrom object to subject. However cogent the evidence may appear at first\nsight to be, it is found to vanish like a cloud as soon as it is exposed\nto the light of adequate contemplation. In the very act of thinking the\nevidence, we are virtually denying its possibility as evidence; for as\nevidence it appeals only to the mind, and since the mind can only know\nits own sequences, the evidence must be presenting to the mind an\naccount of its own modifications; from the mere fact, therefore, of its\nbeing accepted as thinkable, the evidence is proved to be illusory.\n\nTo uneducated men it appears an indisputable fact of 'common sense' that\nthe colour of a flower exists as perceived in the flower, apart from any\nrelation to the percipient mind. A physiologist has gone further into\nthe thicket of things, and finds that the way is not so simple as this.\nHe regards the quality of colour as necessarily related to the faculty\nof visual perception; does not suppose that the colour exists _as such_\nin the flower, but thinks of the something there as a certain order of\nvibrations which, when brought into relation with consciousness through\nthe medium of certain nerves, gives rise to the perception experienced;\nand in order to account for the translation into visual feeling of an\nevent so unlike that feeling as is the process taking place in the\nflower, physiologists have recourse to an elaborate theory, such as that\nof Helmholtz or Hering. In other words, physiologists here fully\nrecognize that colour, or any other thing perceived, only exists _as\nperceived_ in virtue of a subjective element blending with an objective;\nthe thing _as perceived_ is recognized as having no existence apart from\nits relation to a percipient mind. Now, although physiologists are at\none with the philosophers thus far, it is to be feared that very\nfrequently they are in the same position as the above-mentioned\n'uneducated men,' when it becomes needful to press still further into\nthe thicket. For after having distinguished the necessity of recognizing\na mind-element in any possible theory of perception, they forthwith\nproceed to disregard this element when passing from the ground of\nperception to that of thought. Although the ideas of matter, motion,\ncausation, and so on, are themselves as much the offspring of a thinking\nmind, with its environment, as the perception of colour is a conceiving\nof the percipient mind, with _its_ environment, these ideas are\ninconsistently supposed to stand for equivalent realities of the\nexternal world--to truly represent things that are virtually independent\nof any necessary relation to mind. Or, as the case has recently been\nwell put by Principal Caird:\n\n     'You cannot get mind as an ultimate product of matter, for in the\n     very attempt to do so you have already begun with mind. The\n     easiest step of any such inquiry involves categories of thought,\n     and it is in terms of thought that the very problem you are\n     investigating can be so much as stated. You cannot start in your\n     investigations with a bare, self-identical, objective fact,\n     stripped of every ideal element or contribution from thought. The\n     least and lowest part of outward observation is not an independent\n     entity--fact _minus_ mind, and out of which mind may, somewhere or\n     other, be seen to emerge; but it is fact or object as it appears to\n     an observing mind, in the medium of thought, having mind or thought\n     as an inseparable factor of it. Whether there be such a thing as an\n     absolute world outside of thought, whether there be such things as\n     matter and material atoms existing in themselves before any mind\n     begins to perceive or think about them, is not the question before\n     us. If it were possible to conceive of such atoms, at any rate you,\n     before you begin to make anything of them, must think them; and you\n     can never, by thinking about atoms, prove that there is no such\n     thing as thought other than as an ultimate product of atoms. Before\n     you could reach thought or mind as a last result you must needs\n     eliminate from it the data of the problem with which you start, and\n     that you can never do, any more than you can stand on your own\n     shoulders or outstrip your own shadow.... In one word, to\n     constitute the reality of the outward world--to make possible the\n     minimum of knowledge, nay, the very existence for us of molecules\n     and atoms--you must needs presuppose that thought or thinking self,\n     which some would persuade us is to be educed or evolved from\n     them.... To make thought a function of matter is thus, simply, to\n     make thought a function of itself[5].'\n\nFrom this reasoning there can be no escape; and it is more rational for\na man to believe that colour exists as such in a flower than, after\nhaving plainly seen that such cannot be the case, forthwith to\ndisregard the teaching of this analogy, and to imagine that any apparent\nevidence of mind as a result of matter or motion can possibly be\nentertained as real evidence.\n\nRemembering, then, that from the nature of this particular case it is as\nimpossible for mind to prove its own causation as it is for water to\nrise above its source, it may still be well, for the sake of further\nargument, to sink this general consideration, and to regard such\nspurious evidence of causation as is presented by Materialism, without\nprejudice arising from its being _prima facie_ inadmissible.\n\nMaterialists, as already observed, are fond of saying that the evidence\nof causation from neurosis to psychosis is as good as such evidence can\nbe proved to be in any other case. Now, quite apart from the general\nconsiderations just adduced to show that from the peculiar nature of\nthis case there can here be no such evidence at all--quite apart from\nthis, and treating the problem on the lower ground of the supposed\nanalogy, it may be clearly shown that the statement is untrue. For a\nlittle thought will show that in point of fact the only resemblance\nbetween this supposed case of causation and all other cases of\nrecognized causation, consists in the invariability of the correlation\nbetween cerebral processes and mental processes; in all other points the\nanalogy fails. For in all cases of recognized causation there is a\nperceived _connexion_ between the cause and the effect; the antecedents\nare physical, and the consequents are physical. But in the case before\nus there is no perceived, or even conceivable, connexion between the\ncause and the effect; for the causes are supposed to be physical and the\neffects mental. And the antithesis thus posited is alone sufficient to\nseparate _toto coelo_ the case of causation supposed from that of all\ncases of causation recognized. From the singularly clear and\nwell-balanced statement of this subject given by Professor Allman in his\nPresidential Address before the British Association, I may here fitly\nquote the following:--\n\n     'If we could see any analogy between thought and any one of the\n     admitted phenomena of matter, we should be justified in the first\n     of these conclusions (i. e. that of Materialism) as the simplest,\n     and as affording a hypothesis most in accordance with the\n     comprehensiveness of natural laws; but between thought and the\n     physical phenomena of matter there is not only no analogy, but no\n     conceivable analogy; and the obvious and continuous path which we\n     have hitherto followed up in our reasonings from the phenomena of\n     lifeless matter through those of living matter here comes suddenly\n     to an end. The chasm between unconscious life and thought is deep\n     and impassable, and no transitional phenomena can be found by\n     which, as by a bridge, we may span it over[6].'\n\nAnd, not unduly to multiply quotations, I shall only adduce one more\nfrom another of the few eminent men of science who have seen their way\nclearly in this matter, and have expressed what they have seen in\nlanguage as clear as their vision. Professor Tyndall writes:--\n\n     'The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding\n     facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite\n     thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur\n     simultaneously, we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor\n     apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to\n     pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one phenomenon to the\n     other. They appear together but we do not know why. Were our minds\n     and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable\n     us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable\n     of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their\n     electrical discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately\n     acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we\n     should be as far as ever from the solution of the problem. How are\n     these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness?\n     The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain\n     intellectually impassable[7].'\n\nNext, in all cases of recognized causation there is a perceived\n_equivalency_ between cause and effect, such equivalency belonging to\nthe very essence of that in which we conceive causation to consist. But\nas between matter and motion on the one side, and feeling and thought on\nthe other, there can be no such equivalency conceivable. That no such\nequivalency is conceivable may be rendered apparent on grounds of\nMaterialism itself. For Materialism is bound to accept the fundamental\ndoctrine of modern physics--that, viz. as to the conservation of\nenergy--and therefore it becomes evident that unless we assimilate\nthought with energy, there is no possibility of a causal relation, or a\nrelation of equivalency, as obtaining between the one and the other.\nFor however little we may know about brain-dynamics, materialists, at\nleast, must take it for granted that in every process of cerebration the\nmatter and force concerned are indestructible quantities, and therefore\nthat all their possible equations are fully satisfied, could we but\nfollow them out. Howsoever complex we may suppose the flux and reflux of\nforces to be within the structure of a living brain, it is no more\npossible for any one of the forces concerned to escape from brain to\nmind, than it would be for such an escape to occur in a steam-engine or\na watch; the doctrine of the conservation of energy forms an insuperable\nbar to the supposition that any equation in the region of physics can be\nleft unsatisfied, in order to pass over and satisfy some other equation\nin the region of psychics.\n\nOf course in saying this I am aware that some of the more clear-sighted\nof the materialists have plainly perceived this difficulty in all its\nmagnitude, and so have felt that unless it can be met, any theory of\nMaterialism must necessarily contain a radical contradiction of\nprinciples. Some few materialists have therefore sought to meet the\ndifficulty in the only way it can be met, viz. by boldly asserting the\npossibility of thought and energy being transmutable. On this view\nthought becomes a mode of motion, and takes its rank among the forces as\nidentical in nature with heat, light, electricity, and the rest. But\nthis view is also inherently impossible. For suppose, as a matter of\nargument, that physiologists should discover a mechanical equivalent of\nthought, so that we might estimate the value of a calculation in thermal\nunits, or the 'labour of love' in foot-pounds: still we should not be\nout of our difficulties; we should only have to cut a twist of flax to\nfind a lock of iron. For by thus assimilating thought with energy, we\nshould in no wise have explained the fundamental antithesis between\nsubject and object. The fact would remain, if possible, more\nunaccountable than ever, that mind should present absolutely no point of\nreal analogy with motion. Involved with the essential idea of motion is\nthe idea of extension; suppress the latter and the former must\nnecessarily vanish, for motion only means transition in space of\nsomething itself extended. But thought, as far as we can possibly know\nit, is known and distinguished by the very peculiarity of not having\nextension. Therefore, even if we were to find a mechanical equivalent of\nthought, thought would still not be proved a mode of motion. On the\ncontrary, what would be proved would be that, in becoming transformed\ninto thought, energy had ceased to be energy; in passing out of its\nrelation to space it would cease to exist as energy, and if it again\npassed into that relation it would only be by starting _de novo_ on a\nnew course of history. Therefore the proof that thought has a mechanical\nequivalent would simply amount to the proof, not that thought _is_\nenergy, but that thought _destroys_ energy. And if Materialism were to\nprove this, Materialism would commit suicide. For if once it were\nproved that the relation of energy to thought is such that thought is\nable to absorb or temporarily to annihilate energy, the whole argument\nof Materialism would be inverted, and whatever evidence there is of\ncausation as between mind and matter would become available in all its\nforce on the side of Spiritualism. This seems plain, for if it even were\nconceivable--which most distinctly it is not--that a motor could ever\nbecome a motive, and so pass from the sphere of dynamics into the sphere\nof consciousness, the fact would go to prove, not that the motor was the\ncause of the motive, but rather that the motive was the cause of\ndestroying the motor; so that at that point the otherwise unbroken chain\nof physical sequences was interrupted by the motive striking in upon it,\nand in virtue of the mysterious power supposed to have been proved by\nphysiology, cancelling the motor, so allowing the nerve-centre to act as\ndetermined by the motive.\n\nOf course I wish it to be understood that I believe we are here dealing\nwith what I may call, in perhaps suitably contradictory terms,\ninconceivable conceptions. But let it be remembered that I am not\nresponsible for this ambiguity; I am only showing what must be the\nnecessary outcome of analysis if we begin by endeavouring phenomenally\nto unite the most antithetical of elements--mind and motion.\nMaterialism, at least, will not be the gainer should it ever be proved\nthat in the complex operations of the brain a unique exception occurs\nto the otherwise universal law of the conservation of energy in space.\n\nWe may, therefore, quit the suggestion that the difficulty experienced\nby Materialism of showing an equivalency between neurosis and psychosis\ncan ever be met by assuming that some day mental processes may admit of\nbeing expressed in terms of physical. But before leaving this difficulty\nwith regard to equivalency, I may mention one other point that seems to\nme of importance in connexion with it. I have already said that if we\nsuppose causation to proceed from brain to mind, we must suppose this\nessential requirement of equivalency between the cerebral causes and the\nmental effects to be satisfied somewhere.\n\nBut where are we to say that it is satisfied? Even if we suppose that\nthought has a mechanical equivalent, and that causation proceeds in the\ndirection from energy to thought, still, when we have regard to the\nsupposed effects, we find that even yet they bear no kind of equivalency\nto their supposed causes. The brain of a Shakespeare probably did not,\nas a system, exhibit so much energy as does the brain of an elephant;\nand the cerebral operations of a Darwin may not have had a very\nperceptibly larger mechanical equivalent than those of a banker's clerk.\nYet in the world of thought the difference between our estimate of the\nresults, or 'work done,' in these cases is such as to drive all ideas of\nequivalency to the winds. Doubtless, a materialist will answer that it\nis not fair to take our estimate of 'work done' in the world of mind as\nthe real equivalent of the energy supposed to have passed over from the\nworld of motion, seeing that our estimate is based, not on the\nquantitative amount of thought produced, but rather on its qualitative\ncharacter with reference to the social requirements of the race. But to\nthis it is enough to answer that we have no means of gauging the\nquantity of thought produced other than by having regard to _its_\neffects in the world of mind, and this we cannot do except by having\nregard to its qualitative character. Many a man, for instance, must have\nconsumed more than a thousand times the brain-substance and brain-energy\nthat Shelley expended over his 'Ode to a Skylark,' and yet as a result\nhave produced an utterly worthless poem. Now, in what way are we to\nestimate the 'work done' in two such cases, except by looking to the\nrelative effects produced in the only region where they are produced,\nviz. in the region of mind? Yet, when we do so estimate them, what\nbecomes of the evidence of equivalency between the physical causes and\nthe psychical effects?\n\nNow if thus, whether or not we try to form an estimate, it is impossible\nto show any semblance of equivalency between the supposed causes and the\nalleged effects, how can any one be found to say that the evidence of\ncausation is here as valid as it is in any other case? The truth rather\nis that the alleged effects stand out of every relation to the supposed\ncauses, with the exception only of being associated in time.\n\nThere still remains one other enormous difficulty in the way of the\ntheory of Materialism; it necessarily embodies the theory of _conscious\nautomatism_, and is therefore called upon to explain why consciousness\nand thought have ever appeared upon the scene of things at all. That\nthis is the necessary position of Materialism is easily proved as\nfollows. We have already seen that Materialism would commit suicide by\nsupposing that energy could be transmuted into thought, for this would\namount to nothing short of supposing the destruction of energy as such;\nand to suppose energy thus destructible would be to open wide the door\nof spiritualism. Materialism, therefore, is logically bound to argue in\nthis way: We cannot conceive of a conscious idea, or mental change, as\nin any way affecting the course of a cerebral reflex, or material\nchange; while, on the other hand, our knowledge of the conservation of\nenergy teaches us as an axiom that the cerebral changes must determine\neach other in their sequence as in a continuous series. Nowhere can we\nsuppose the physical process to be interrupted or diverted by the\npsychical process; and therefore we must conclude that thought and\nvolition really play no part whatever in determining action. Thoughts\nand feelings are but indices which show in the mirror of the mind\ncertain changes that are proceeding in the matter of the brain, and are\nas inefficient in influencing those changes as the shadow of a cloud is\npowerless to direct the movements of that of which it is the shadow.\n\nBut when Materialism reaches, in a clear and articulate manner, this\ninference as a conclusion necessary from its premises, it becomes\nopposed at once to common sense and to the requirements of methodical\nreason. It becomes opposed to common sense because we all feel it is\npractically impossible to believe that the world would now have been\nexactly what it is even if consciousness, thought, and volition had\nnever appeared upon the scene--that railway trains would have been\nrunning filled with mindless passengers, or that telephones would have\nbeen invented by brains that could not think to speak to ears that could\nnot hear. And the conclusion is opposed to the requirements of\nmethodical reason, because reason to be methodical is bound to have an\nanswer to the question that immediately arises from the conclusion. This\nquestion simply is, Why have consciousness, thought, and volition ever\nbeen called into existence; and why are they related, as they are\nrelated, to cerebral action? Materialism, by here undertaking to prove\nthat these things stand uselessly isolated from all other things, is\nbound to show some reason why they ever came to be, and to be what they\nare. For observe, it is not merely that these things exist in a supposed\nunnecessary relation to all other things; the fact to be explained is\nthat they exist in a most intimately woven and invariable connexion with\ncertain highly complex forms of organic structure and certain highly\npeculiar distributions of physical force. Yet these unique and\nextraordinary things are supposed by automatism to be always results and\nnever causes; in the theatre of things they are supposed to be always\nspectators and never actors; in the laboratory of life they are supposed\nto be always by-products; and therefore in the order of nature they are\nsupposed to have no _raison d'etre_. Such a state of matters would be\naccountable enough if the stream of mental changes were but partly,\noccasionally, and imperfectly associated with the stream of material\nchanges; but as the association is so minute, invariable, and precise,\nthe hypothesis of the association being merely accidental, or _not\nrequiring explanation_, becomes, at the bar of methodical reasoning,\nself-convicted of absurdity.\n\nThe state of the case, then, simply is that two distinct facts stand to\nbe explained by the theory of conscious automatism--first, why psychosis\nshould ever have been developed as a mysterious appendage to neurosis;\nand, secondly, why the association between these things should be so\nintimate and precise. Assuredly, on the principles of evolution, which\nmaterialists at least cannot afford to disregard, it would be a wholly\nanomalous fact that so wide and general a class of phenomena as those of\nmind should have become developed in constantly ascending degrees\nthroughout the animal kingdom, if they are entirely without use to\nanimals. If psychosis is, as supposed, a function of neurosis, the\ndoctrine of natural selection alone would forbid us to imagine that this\nfunction differs from all other functions in being itself functionless.\nIf it would be detrimental to the theory of natural selection that any\none isolated structure--such as the tail of a rattlesnake--should be\nadapted to perform a function useless to the animal possessing it, how\nutterly destructive of that theory would be the fact that all the\nphenomena of mind have been elaborated as functions of nerve-tissue\nwithout any one of them ever having been of any use either to the\nindividual or to the species. And the difficulty that thus arises is\nmagnified without limit when we remember that the phenomena of mind are\ninvariable in their association with cerebral structure, grade for\ngrade, and process for process.\n\nIt is of no argumentative use to point to the fact that many adaptive\nmovements in animals are performed by nerve-centres apart from any\nassociation with consciousness or volition, because all the facts on\nthis head go to prove that consciousness and volition come in most\nsuggestively just where adaptive movements begin to grow varied and\ncomplex, and then continue to develop with a proportional reference to\nthe growing variety and complexity of these movements. The facts,\ntherefore, irresistibly lead to the conclusion (if we argue here as we\nshould in the case of any other function) that consciousness and\nvolition are functions of nerve-tissue super-added to its previous\nfunctions, in order to meet new and more complex demands on its powers\nof adaptation.\n\nNeither is it of any argumentative use to point to the fact that\nadaptive actions which originally are performed with conscious volition\nmay by practice come to be performed without conscious volition. For it\nis certain that no adaptive action of quite a novel kind is ever\nperformed from the first without consciousness of its performance, and\ntherefore, although it is true that by repetition its performance may\nbecome mechanical or unconscious, this does not prove that consciousness\nwas without use in producing the adaptive action. It only proves that\nafter a nervous mechanism has been elaborated by the help of\nconsciousness, consciousness may be withdrawn and leave the finished\nmechanism to work alone; the structure having been completed, the\nscaffolding necessary to its completion may be removed.\n\nBut passing over this difficulty which the theory of conscious\nautomatism seems bound to encounter in its collision with the theory of\nnatural selection, the most insuperable of all its difficulties arises\nfrom the bare fact, which it cannot explain, that conscious intelligence\nexists, and exists in the most intimate relation with one peculiar kind\nof material structure. For automatists must concede that the evidence\nof causation in the region of mind is at least as cogent as it is in the\nregion of matter, seeing that the whole science of psychology is only\nrendered possible as a science by the fundamental fact of observation\nthat mental antecedents determine mental consequents. Therefore, if we\ncall a physical sequence _A, B, C_, and a mental sequence _a, b, c_\nautomatists have to explain, not merely why there should be such a thing\nas a mental sequence at all, but also why the sequence _a, b, c_ should\nalways proceed, link for link, with the sequence _A, B, C_. It clearly\nis no answer to say that the sequence _A, B, C_ implies the successive\nactivity of certain definite nerve-centres _A', B', C'_ which have for\ntheir subjective effects the sequence _a, b, c_ so that whenever the\nsequence _A, B, C_ occurs the sequence _a, b, c_ must likewise occur.\nThis is no answer, because it merely restates the hypothesis of\nautomatism, and begs the whole question to be discussed. What methodical\nreason demands as an answer is simply why the sequence _A, B, C_ even\nthough we freely grant it due to the successive activity of certain\ndefinite nerve-centres, should be attended by the sequence _a, b, c_.\nReason perceives clearly enough that the sequence _a, b, c_ belongs to a\nwholly different category from the sequence _A, B, C_ the one being\nimmediately known as a process taking place in a something which is\nwithout extension or physical properties of any kind, and the other\ntaking place in a something which when, translated by the previous\nsomething, we recognize as having extension and the other antithetical\nproperties which we class together as physical. There would of course be\nno difficulty if the sequence _A, B, C_ continued through any amount of\ncomplexity in the same conceivable category of being; so that there\nwould be nothing actually inconceivable in cerebral sequence--changes\nrunning through _D, E, F_, &c., to an extent sufficient to cause\nunconscious automatism of any degree of complexity. But that which does\nrequire explanation from automatists is why automatism should have\nbecome associated with consciousness, and this so intimately that every\nchange in the sequence _A, B, C_, &c., is accompanied by a particular\nand corresponding change in the sequence _a, b, c_, &c. Thus, to take a\ndefinite illustration, if on seeing the sun I think of a paper on solar\nphysics, and from this pass to thinking of Mr. Norman Lockyer, and from\nthis to speculating on the probability of certain supposed elements\nbeing really compounds, there is here a definite causal connexion in the\nsequence of my _thoughts_. But it is the last extravagance of absurdity\nto tell me that the accompanying causal sequences going on in my brain\nhappen to have exactly corresponded to the sequences which were taking\nplace in the mind, the two trains of sequences being each definite and\ncoherent in themselves, and yet each proceeding link for link in lines\nparallel with the other. Without some theory of pre-established\nharmony--which, of course, it is no part of automatism to entertain--it\nwould, on the doctrine of chances alone, be impossible to suppose that\nthe causal sequences in the brain always happen to be just those which,\nby running link for link with another set of causal sequences taking\nplace in the mind, enable both the series to be definite and coherent in\nthemselves. Therefore, before reason can allow the theory of automatism\nto pass, it must be told how this wonderful fact of parallelism is to be\nexplained. There must be _some_ connexion between the intrinsically\ncoherent series _A, B, C_ and the no less intrinsically coherent\nsequence _a, b, c_, which may be taken as an explanation why they\ncoincide each to each. What is this connexion? We do not know; but we\nhave now seen that, whatever it is, it cannot be an ordinary causal\nconnexion--first, because the doctrine of the conservation of energy\nmakes it incumbent on us to believe that the procession of physical\ncause and effect is complete within the region of brain--a closed\ncircle, as it were, from which no energy can, without argumentative\nsuicide, be supposed to escape into the region of mind; and next,\nbecause, even were this difficulty disregarded, it is unaccountable that\nthe causative influence (whatever it is supposed to be), which passes\nover from the region of physics into that of psychics, should be such as\nto render the psychical series coherent in itself, when on the physical\nside the series must be determined by purely physical conditions,\nhaving no reference whatsoever to psychical requirements.\n\nThus it is argumentatively impossible for Materialism to elude the\nnecessity of explaining the kind of connexion which it supposes to\nsubsist between neurosis and psychosis; and forasmuch as the above\nconsiderations clearly show this connexion cannot be accepted as one of\nordinary causality without some answer being given to the questions\nwhich reason has to ask, Materialism must be ruled out of court if she\nfails to respond to the demand. But it is no less clearly impossible\nthat she can respond to the demand, and therefore at the bar of\nPhilosophy Materialism must be pronounced, for this as well as for the\nreasons previously cited, conspicuously inadequate to account for the\nfacts.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 4: Professor Flint, _Antitheistic Theories_, p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Philosophy of Religion_, pp. 95, 99, and 101.]\n\n[Footnote 6: British Association Report, 1879, p. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 7: British Association Report, 1868. Trans. of Sections, p.\n5.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nMONISM.\n\n\nWe have seen, then, that both the alternative theories of Spiritualism\nand Materialism are found, when carefully examined, to be so beset with\ndifficulties of a necessary and fundamental kind, that it is impossible\nto entertain either without closing our eyes to certain contradictions\nwhich they severally and inherently present. We may, indeed, go even\nfurther than this, and affirm that to suppose mind the cause of motion\nor motion the cause of mind is equally to suppose that which in its very\nnature as a supposition is neither true nor untrue, but nonsensical.\nFor, as Prof. Clifford has said in his essay on _Body and Mind_,--\n\n     'It may be conceived that, at the same time with every exercise of\n     volition, there is a disturbance of the physical laws; but this\n     disturbance, being perceptible to me, would be a physical fact\n     accompanying the volition, and could not be volition itself, which\n     is not perceptible to me. Whether there is such a disturbance of\n     the physical laws or no is a question of fact to which we have the\n     best of reasons for giving a negative answer; but the assertion\n     that another man's volition, a feeling in his consciousness which\n     I cannot perceive, is part of the train of physical facts which I\n     may perceive,--this is neither true nor untrue, but nonsense; it is\n     a combination of words whose corresponding ideas will not go\n     together[8].'\n\nAnd seeing that the correlatives are in each case the same, it is\nsimilarly 'nonsense' to assert the converse proposition: or, in other\nwords, it is equally nonsense to speak of mental action causing cerebral\naction, or of cerebral action causing mental action--nonsense of the\nsame kind as it would be to speak of the _Pickwick Papers_ causing a\nstorm at sea, or the eruption of a volcano causing the forty-seventh\nproposition in the first book of Euclid.\n\nWe see, then, that two of the three possible theories of things contain\nthe elements of their own destruction: when carefully analyzed, both\nthese theories are found to present inherent contradictions. On this\naccount the third, or only alternative theory, comes to us with a large\nantecedent presumption in its favour. For it comes to us, as it were, on\na clear field, or with the negative advantage of having no logical\nrivals to contend with. The other two suggestions having been weighed in\nthe balance and found wanting, we are free to look to the new-comer as\nquite unopposed. This new-comer must, indeed, be interrogated as\ncarefully as his predecessors, and, like them, must be judged upon his\nown merits. But as he constitutes our last possible hope of solving the\nquestion which he professes himself able to solve, the absolute failure\nof his predecessors entitles him to a patient hearing. By the method of\nexclusion his voice is now the only voice that remains to be heard, and\nunless it can speak to better purpose than the others, we shall have no\nalternative but to abandon the facts as inexplicable, or to confess that\nit is necessarily impossible for the human mind ever to arrive at any\ntheory of things.\n\nBefore proceeding to state or to examine this third and last of the\nsuggested theories, it is desirable--in order still further to define\nits _status a priori_--that I should exhibit the reason why the two\nother suggestions have necessarily failed. For to my mind it is\nperfectly obvious that this reason is to be found, and found only, in\nthe fact that they are both dualistic. The inherent, the fatal, and the\nclosely similar difficulties which attach to both the dualistic\ntheories, attach to them merely because they _are_ dualistic. The\n'nonsense' of each of them is really identical, and arises only because\nthey both make the same irrational attempt to find more in the effect\nthan they have put into the cause. In other words, both the dualistic\ntheories suppose that the physical chains of causation is complete\nwithin itself, and that the mental chain is also complete within itself:\nyet they both proceed to the contradiction that one of these chains is\nable to allow some of its causal influence to escape, as it were, in\norder to constitute the other chain. It makes no difference, in point\nof logic, whether such an escape is supposed to take place from the\nphysical chain (materialism) or from the mental chain (spiritualism): in\neither case the fundamental principle of causality is alike\nimpugned--the principle, that is, of there being an equivalency between\ncause and effect, such that you cannot get more out of your effect than\nyou have put into your cause. Both these dualistic theories, although\nthey take opposite views as to which of the two chains of causation is\nthe cause of the other, nevertheless agree in supposing that there _are_\ntwo chains of causation, and that one of them _does_ act causally upon\nthe other: and it is in this matter of their common consent that they\nboth commit suicide. Every process in the physical sphere must be\nsupposed to have its equations satisfied within that sphere: else the\ndoctrine of the conservation of energy would be contravened, and thus\nthe causation contemplated could no longer be contemplated as physical.\nSimilarly, every process in the mental sphere must be supposed to have\nits equations satisfied within that sphere: else the causation\ncontemplated could no longer be contemplated as mental: some of the\nequations must be supposed not to have been satisfied within the mental\nsphere, but to have been carried over into the physical sphere--thus to\nhave either created or destroyed certain quantities of energy within\nthat sphere, and thus, also, to have introduced elements of endless\nconfusion into the otherwise orderly system of Nature.\n\nFrom this vice of radical contradiction, to which both the dualistic\ntheories are committed, the monistic theory is free. Moreover, as we\nshall immediately find, it is free to combine the elements of truth\nwhich severally belong to both the other theories. These other theories\nare each concerned with what they see upon different sides of the same\nshield. The facts which they severally receive they severally report,\nand their reports appear to contradict each other. But truth can never\nbe really in contradiction with other truth; and it is reserved for\nMonism, by taking a simultaneous view of both sides, to reconcile the\npreviously apparent contradictions. For these and other reasons, which\nwill unfold themselves as we proceed, I fully agree with the late\nProfessor Clifford where he says of this theory--'It is not merely a\nspeculation, but is a result to which all the greatest minds that have\nstudied this question (the relation between body and mind) in the right\nway have gradually been approximating for a long time.' This theory is,\nas we have already seen, that mental phenomena and physical phenomena,\nalthough apparently diverse, are really identical.\n\nIf we thus unite in a higher synthesis the elements both of spiritualism\nand of materialism, we obtain a product which satisfies every fact of\nfeeling on the one hand, and of observation on the other. We have only\nto suppose that the antithesis between mind and motion--subject and\nobject--is itself phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have\nonly to suppose that the seeming duality is relative to our modes of\napprehension: and, therefore, that any change taking place in the mind,\nand any corresponding change taking place in the brain, are really not\ntwo changes, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear a\nmusical sound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings.\nRelatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of\nchanges, which appear to be very different in kind; yet we know that in\nan absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the diversity\nin consciousness is created only by the difference in our mode of\nperceiving the same events--whether we see or whether we hear the\nvibration of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of\nnerve-strings and a process of thought are really one and the same\nevent, which is dual or diverse only in relation to our modes of\nperceiving it.\n\nOr, to take another and a better illustration, in an Edison lamp the\nlight which is emitted from the burner may be said indifferently to be\ncaused by the number of vibrations per second going on in the carbon, or\nby the temperature of the carbon; for this rate of vibration could not\ntake place in the carbon without constituting that degree of temperature\nwhich affects our eyes as luminous. Similarly, a train of thought may be\nsaid indifferently to be caused by brain-action or by mind-action; for,\n_ex hypothesi_, the one could not take place without the other. Now when\nwe contemplate the phenomena of volition by themselves, it is as though\nwe were contemplating the phenomena of light by themselves: volition is\nproduced by mind in brain, just as light is produced by temperature in\ncarbon. And just as we may correctly speak of light as the cause, say,\nof a photograph, so we may correctly speak of volition as the cause of\nbodily movement. That particular kind of physical activity which takes\nplace in the carbon could not take place without the light which causes\na photograph; and, similarly, that particular kind of physical activity\nwhich takes place in the brain could not take place without the volition\nwhich causes a bodily movement. So that volition is as truly a cause of\nbodily movement as is the physical activity of the brain; seeing that,\nin an absolute sense, the cause is one and the same. But if we once\nclearly perceive that what in a relative sense we know as volition is,\nin a similar sense, the cause of bodily movement, we terminate the\nquestion touching the freedom of the will. It thus becomes a mere matter\nof phraseology whether we speak of the will determining, or being\ndetermined by, changes going on in the external world; just as it is but\na matter of phraseology whether we speak of temperature determining, or\nbeing determined by, molecular vibration. All the requirements alike of\nthe free-will and of the bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a\nsynthesis which comprises them both. On the one hand, it would be as\nimpossible for an _un_conscious automaton to do the work or to perform\nthe adjustments of a conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp\nto give out light and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric\ncurrent. On the other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to\noriginate bodily motion without the occurrence of a strictly physical\nprocess of cerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison\nlamp which had been deprived of its carbon-burner.\n\nThe great advantage of this theory is, that it supposes only one stream\nof causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously\nconcerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and\ncontradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset.\nThus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion;\nmind-changes nothing but mind-changes--both producing both\nsimultaneously: neither could be what it is without the other, because\nwithout the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is.\nImpossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that\nconsciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence of mind the\nchanges of the brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very\ncausation of these movements that they should have a mental side. And\nequally impossible is the supposition of the spiritualist that the\ncerebral processes are adventitious, or that in the absence of brain the\nchanges of the mind could be what they are; for it belongs to the very\ncausation of these changes that they should have a material side.\nFurthermore, the use of mind to animals and to men is thus rendered\napparent; for intelligent volition is thus shown to be a true cause of\nadjustive movement, in that the cerebration which it involves could not\notherwise be possible: the causation would not otherwise be complete.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 8: _Lectures and Essays_, vol. ii. pp. 56-7.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nTHE WORLD AS AN EJECT.\n\n\nIn the Introduction to this essay I have sought to show that there are,\nfor the purposes of practical discussion, but three theories of the\nWorld of Being. There is, first, the theory of Materialism, which\nsupposes matter in motion to be the ultimate or self-existing Reality,\nand, therefore, the cause of mind. Next, there is the theory of\nSpiritualism, which supposes mind to be the ultimate Reality, and,\ntherefore, the cause of matter in motion. Lastly, there is the theory of\nMonism which supposes matter in motion to be substantially identical\nwith mind, and, therefore, that as between mind and matter in motion\nthere is no causal relation either way. In the foregoing chapters I have\nconsidered these three theories, and argued that of them the\nlast-mentioned is the only one which satisfies all the facts of feeling\non the one hand, and of observation on the other. The theory of Monism\nalone is able to explain, without inherent contradiction, the phenomena\nboth of the subjective and objective spheres.\n\nIt is my present purpose to extend the considerations already presented.\nAssuming the theory of Monism, I desire to ascertain the result to which\nit will lead when applied to the question whether we ought to regard the\nexternal world as of a character mental or non-mental. As observed in my\nRede Lecture (_supra_, p. 33), this question has already been considered\nby the late Professor Clifford, who decided that on the monistic theory\nthe probability pointed towards the external world being of a character\nnon-mental; that, although the whole universe is composed of\n'mind-stuff,' the universe as a whole is mindless. This decision I then\nbriefly criticized; it is now my object to contemplate the matter\nsomewhat more in detail.\n\nI will assume, on account of reasons previously given, that when we\nspeak of matter in motion we do not at all know what it is that moves,\nnor do we know at all what it is that we mean by motion. Therefore if,\nas unknown quantities, we call matter _a_ and motion _b_, all we are\nentitled to affirm is that _a + b = z_, where _z_ is a known quantity,\nor mind. Obversely stated, we may say that the known quantity _z_ is\ncapable of being resolved into the unknown _a + b_. But, inasmuch as\nboth _a_ and _b_ are unknown, we may simplify matters by regarding their\nsum as a single unknown quantity _x_, which we take to be substantially\nidentical with its obverse aspect known as _z_.\n\nHere, then, are our data. The theory of Monism teaches that what we\nperceive as matter in motion, _x_, is the obverse of what we know as\nmind, _z_. What, then, do we know of _z_? In the first place, we well\nknow that this is the only entity with which we are acquainted, so to\nspeak, at first hand; all our knowledge of _x_ (which is the only other\nknowledge we possess) is possible only in so far as we are able to\ntranslate it into terms of _z_. In the next place, we know that _z_ is\nitself an entity of the most enormous complexity. Standing as a symbol\nof the whole range of individual subjectivity, it may be said to\nconstitute for each individual the symbol of his own personality--or the\nsum total of his conscious life. Now each individual knows by direct\nknowledge that his conscious life is, as I have said, of enormous\ncomplexity, and that numberless ingredients of feeling, thought, and\nvolition are therein combined in numberless ways. Therefore the symbol\n_z_ may be considered as the sum of innumerable constituent parts,\ngrouped _inter se_ in numberless systems of more or less complexity.\n\nFrom these considerations we arrive at the following conclusions. The\ntheory of Monism teaches that all _z_ is _x_; but it does not,\ntherefore, necessarily teach that all _x_ is _z_. Nevertheless, it does\nteach that if all _x_ is not _z_, this must be because _x_ is _z_,\n_plus_ something more than _z_, as a little thought will be sufficient\nto show. Thus, the four annexed diagrams exhaust the logical\npossibilities of any case, where the question is as to the inclusion or\nexclusion of one quantity by another. In Fig. 1 the two quantities are\ncoincident; in Fig 2 the one is wholly included by the other; in Fig. 3\nit is partially included; and in Fig. 4 wholly excluded. Now in the\npresent case, and upon the data supplied, the logical possibilities are\nexhausted by Figs. 1 and 2. For, upon these data, Figs. 3 and 4\nobviously represent logical impossibilities; no part of Mind can,\naccording to these data, stand outside the limits of Matter and Motion.\nTherefore, if the Ego is not coincident with the Non-ego (or if all _x_\nis not _z_, as in Fig. 1), this can only be because the Ego is less\nextensive than the Non-ego (or because _x_ is _z plus_ something more\nthan _z_, as in Fig. 2).\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 1]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 2]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 3]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 4]\n\nOf these two logical possibilities Idealism, in its most extreme form,\nmay adopt the first. For Idealism in this form may hold that apart from\nthe Ego there is no external world; that outside of _z_ there is no _x_;\nthat the only _esse_ is the _percipi_. But, as very few persons\nnowadays are prepared to go the length of seriously maintaining that in\nactual fact there is no external world save in so far as this is\nperceived by the individual mind, I need not wait to consider this\npossibility. We are thus practically shut up to a consideration of the\npossibility marked 2.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 5]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 6]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 7]\n\nThe theory of Monism, then, teaches that _x_ is _z_ _plus_ something\nmore than _z_; and therefore it becomes a matter of great moment to\nconsider the probable nature of the overplus. For it obviously does not\nfollow that because _x_ is greater than _z_ in a logical sense,\ntherefore _x_ must be greater than _z_ in a psychological sense. Save\nupon the theory of Idealism (with which Monism is not specially\nconcerned) the amount (whatever it may be) wherein _x_ is greater than\n_z_, may not present any psychological signification at all. We may find\nthat the surface of our globe is considerably larger than that of the\ndry land, and yet it may not follow that the mental-life to be met with\nin the sea is psychologically superior to that which occurs on dry land.\nIf, therefore, we represent by comparative shading degrees of\npsychological excellence, it is evident that the theory of Monism must\nentertain the three possibilities indicated diagrammatically in Figs. 5,\n6, and 7. It makes no difference what the comparative areas of _x_ and\n_z_ may be, or whether _x_ be uniformly shaded throughout its extent.\nAll we have so far to notice is that the fact of logical inclusion does\nnot necessarily carry with it the implication of psychological\nsuperiority.\n\nNext we must notice that besides our own subjectivities, we have\ncognizance of being surrounded by many other inferred subjectivities\nmore or less like in kind (i. e. other human minds); and also yet many\nother inferred subjectivities more or less unlike, but all inferior (i.\ne. the minds of lower animals, young children, and idiots). Following\nClifford, I will call these inferred subjectivities by the name of\nejects, and assign to them the symbol _y_. Thus, in the following\ndiscussion, _x_ = the objective world, _y_ = the ejective world, and _z_\n= subjective world. Now, the theory of Monism supposes that _x_, _y_,\nand _z_ are all alike in kind, but present no definite teaching as to\nhow far they may differ in degree. We may, however, at once allow that\nbetween the psychological value of _z_ and that of _y_ there is a wide\ndifference of degree; and also that, while the value of _z_ is a fixed\nquantity, that of _y_ varies greatly in the different parts of the area\n_y_. Our scheme, therefore, will now adopt this form--\n\n[Illustration]\n\nBut the important question remains how we ought to shade _x_. According\nto Clifford, this ought scarcely to be shaded at all, while according to\ntheologians (and theists generally) it ought to be shaded so much more\ndeeply than either _y_ or _z_, that the joint representation in one\ndiagram would only be possible by choosing for the shading of _x_ a\ncolour different from that employed for _y_ and _z_, and assigning to\nthat colour a representative value higher than that assigned to the\nother in the ratio of one to infinity. It will be my object to estimate\nthe relative probability of these rival estimates of the psychological\nvalue of _x_.\n\nStarting from _z_ as our centre, we know that this is an isolated system\nof subjectivity, and hence we infer that all _y_ is composed of\nanalogous systems, resembling one another as to their isolation, and\ndiffering only in their degrees of psychological value. Now this,\ntranslated into terms of _x_ (or into terms of objectivity) means that\n_z_ is an isolated system of matter in motion, and that the same has to\nbe said of all the constituent parts of _y_. In other words, both\nsubjectivity and ejectivity are only known under the condition of being\nisolated from objectivity; which, obversely considered, means that the\nmatter in motion here concerned is temporarily separated off from the\nrest of the objective world, in such wise that it forms a distinct\nsystem of its own. If any part of the objective world rudely forces its\nway within the machinery of that system, it is at the risk of\ndisarranging the machinery and stopping its work--as is the case when a\nbullet enters the brain. Such converse as the brain normally holds with\nthe external world, is held through the appointed channels of the\nsenses, whereby appropriate causation is supplied to keep the otherwise\nisolated system at work. We know, from physiological evidence, that when\nsuch external causation is withheld, the isolated system ceases to work;\ntherefore, the isolation, although complete under one point of view,\nunder another point of view is incomplete. It is complete only in the\nsense in which the isolation of a machine is complete--i. e. it is in\nitself a working system, yet its working is ultimately dependent upon\ncausation supplied from without in certain appropriate ways. This truth\nis likewise testified to on the obverse aspect of psychology. For\nanalysis shows that all our mental processes (however complex they may\nbe internally) are ultimately dependent on impressions of the external\nworld gained through the senses. Whether regarded objectively or\nsubjectively, therefore, we find that it is the business of the isolated\nsystem to elaborate, by its internal processes, the raw materials which\nare supplied to it from without. Seeing, then, that the isolation of the\nsystem is thus only partial, we may best apply to it the term\ncircumscribed. Such partial isolation or circumscription of matter in\nmotion--so that it shall in itself constitute a little working\nmicrocosm--appears to be the first condition to the being of a\nsubjective personality. Why, then, does not the working of a machine\npresent a subjective side?\n\nOur answer to this question is to be found in the following\nconsiderations. We are going upon the hypothesis that all mind is matter\nin motion, and that all matter in motion is mind--or, as Clifford\nphrased it, that all the external world is composed of mind-stuff. No\nmatter how lightly we may shade _x_, we are assuming that it must be\nshaded, and not left perfectly white. Now, both mind and matter in\nmotion admit of degrees: first as to quantity, next as to velocity, and\nlastly as to complexity. But the degrees of matter in motion are found,\nin point of observable fact, not to correspond with those of mind, save\nin the last particular of complexity, where there is unquestionably an\nevident correspondence. Therefore it is that a machine, although\nconforming to the prime condition of subjectivity in being a\ncircumscribed system of matter in motion, nevertheless does not attain\nto subjectivity: the _x_ does not rise to _z_ because the internal\nprocesses of _x_ are not sufficiently intricate, or their intricacy is\nnot of the appropriate kind. From which it follows that although, as I\nhave said, all matter in motion is mind, merely as matter in motion (or\nirrespective of the kinds and degrees of both) it may not necessarily be\nmind in the elaborated form of consciousness: it may only be the raw\nmaterial of mind--or, as Clifford called it, mind-stuff. Thus, although\nall conscious volition is matter in motion, it does not follow that all\nmatter in motion is conscious volition. Which serves to restate the\nquestion as to how far it is probable, or improbable, that all matter in\nmotion is conscious volition--i.e. how deeply we ought to shade _x_.\n\nWell, the first thing to be considered in answering this question is\nthat, according to the theory of Monism, we _know_ that it is within the\nrange of possibility for matter in motion to reach a level of intricacy\nwhich shall yield conscious volition, and even self-conscious thought of\nan extremely high order of development. Therefore, the only question is\nas to whether it is possible, or in any way probable, that matter in\nmotion as occurring in _x_ resembles, in point of intricacy, matter in\nmotion as occurring in _z_. Professor Clifford perceived that this is\nthe core of the question, and staked the whole answer to it on an\nextremely simple issue. He said that unless we can show in the\ndisposition of heavenly bodies some morphological resemblance to the\nstructure of a human brain, we are precluded from rationally\nentertaining any probability that self-conscious volition belongs to the\nuniverse. Obviously, this way of presenting the case is so grossly\nillogical that even the exigencies of popular exposition cannot be held\nto justify the presentation. For aught that we can know to the contrary,\nnot merely the highly specialized structure of the human brain, but even\nthat of nervous matter in general, may only be one of a thousand\npossible ways in which the material and dynamical conditions required\nfor the apparition of self-consciousness can be secured. To imagine that\nthe human brain of necessity exhausts these possibilities is in the last\ndegree absurd. Therefore, we may suggest the following presentation of\nClifford's case as one that is less obviously inadequate:--if any\nresemblance to the material and dynamical conditions of the microcosm\ncan be detected in the macrocosm, we should have good reason to ascribe\nto the latter those attributes of subjectivity which we know as\nbelonging to the former; but if no such resemblance can be traced, we\nshall have some reason to suppose that these attributes do not belong to\nthe universe. Even this, however, I should regard as much too wide a\nstatement of the case. To take the particular conditions under which\nalone subjectivity is known to occur upon a single planet as exhausting\nthe possibilities of its occurrence elsewhere, is too flagrant a use of\nthe method of simple enumeration to admit of a moment's countenance.\nEven the knowledge that we have of the two great conditions under which\nterrestrial subjectivities occur--circumscription and complexity--is\nonly empirical. It may well be that elsewhere (or apart from the\nconditions imposed by nervous tissue) subjectivity is possible\nirrespective both of circumscription and of complexity. Therefore,\nproperly or logically regarded, the great use of the one exhibition of\nsubjectivity furnished to human experience, is the proof thus furnished\nthat subjectivity is possible under _some_ conditions; and the utmost\nwhich on the grounds of such proof human experience is entitled to argue\nis, that _probably_, if subjectivity is possible elsewhere, its\npossibility is given by those conditions of circumscription and\ncomplexity in the material and dynamical relations concerned, which we\nfind to be the invariable and quantitative concomitants of subjectivity\nwithin experience. But this is a widely different thing from saying that\nthe only kind of such circumscription and complexity--or the only\ndisposition of these relations--which can present a subjective side is\nthat which is found in the structures and functions of a nervous system.\n\nNow, if we fix our attention merely on this matter of complexity, and\nrefuse to be led astray by obviously false analogies of a more special\nkind, I think there can be no question that the macrocosm does furnish\namply sufficient opportunity, as it were, for the presence of\nsubjectivity, even if it be assumed that subjectivity can only be\nyielded by an order of complexity analogous to that of a nervous system.\nFor, considering the material and dynamical system of the universe as a\nwhole, it is obvious that the complexity presented is greater than that\nof any of its parts. Not only is it true that all these parts are\nincluded in the whole, and that even the visible sidereal system alone\npresents movements of enormous intricacy[9], but we find, for instance,\nthat even within the limits of this small planet there is presented to\nactual observation a peculiar form of circumscribed complex, fully\ncomparable with that of the individual brain, and yet external to each\nindividual brain. For the so-called 'social organism,' although composed\nof innumerable individual personalities, is, with regard to each of its\nconstituent units, a part of the objective world--just as the human\nbrain would be, were each of its constituent cells of a construction\nsufficiently complex to yield a separate personality.\n\nIf to this it be objected that, as a matter of fact, the social organism\ndoes not possess a self-conscious personality, I will give a twofold\nanswer. In the first place, Who told the objector that it has not? For\naught that any one of its constituent personalities can prove to the\ncontrary, this social organism may possess self-conscious personality of\nthe most vivid character: its constituent human minds may be born into\nit and die out of it as do the constituent cells of the human body: it\nmay feel the throes of war and famine, rejoice in the comforts of peace\nand plenty: it may appreciate the growth of civilization as its passage\nfrom childhood to maturity. If this at first sight appears a grotesque\nsupposition, we must remember that it would appear equally so to ascribe\nsuch possibilities to the individual brain, were it not for the\nirrelevant accident of this particular form of complex standing in such\nrelation to our own subjectivity that we are able to verify the fact of\nits ejectivity. Thus, for aught that we can tell to the contrary, Comte\nmay have been even more justified than his followers suppose, in\nteaching the personification of Humanity.\n\nBut, in the next place, if the social organism is not endowed with\npersonality, this may be for either one of two reasons. All the\nconditions required for attaining so high a level of psychical\nperfection may not be here present; or else the level of psychical\nperfection may be higher than that which we know as personality. This\nlatter alternative will be considered in another relation by-and-by, so\nI will not dwell upon it now. But with reference to all these possible\ncontingencies, I may observe that we are not without clear indications\nof the great fact that the high order of complexity which has been\nreached by the social organism _is_ accompanied by evidence of something\nwhich we may least dimly define as resembling subjectivity. In\nnumberless ways, which I need not wait to enumerate, we perceive that\nsociety exhibits the phenomena both of thought and conduct. And these\nphenomena cannot always be explained by regarding them as the sum of the\nthoughts and actions of its constituent individuals--or, at least, they\ncan only be so regarded by conceding that the thoughts and actions of\nthe constituent individuals, when thus _summated_, yield a different\nproduct from that which would be obtained by a merely arithmetical\ncomputation of the constituent parts: the composite product differs from\nits component elements, as H_2O differs from 2H + O. The general truth\nof this remark will, I believe, be appreciated by all historians.\nSeeing that ideas are often, as it is said, 'in the air' before they are\ncondensed in the mind of individual genius, we habitually speak of the\n'Zeit-geist' as the product of a kind of collective psychology, which is\nsomething other than the mere sum of all the individual minds of a\ngeneration. That is to say, we regard society as an eject, and the more\nthat a man studies the thought and conduct of society, the more does he\nbecome convinced that we are right in so regarding it. Of course this\neject is manifestly unlike that which we form of another individual\nmind: it is much more general, vague, and so far unlike the pattern of\nour own subjectivity that even to ascribe to it the important attribute\nof personality is felt, as we have just seen, to approach the grotesque.\nStill, in this vague and general way we do ascribe to society ejective\nexistence: we habitually think of the whole world of human thought and\nfeeling as a psychological complex, which is other than, and more than,\na mere shorthand enumeration of all the thoughts and feelings of all\nindividual human beings.\n\nThe ejective existence thus ascribed to society serves as a\nstepping-stone to the yet more vague and general ascription of such\nexistence to the Cosmos. At first, indeed, or during the earliest stages\nof culture, the ascription of ejective existence to the external world\nis neither vague nor general: on the contrary, it is most distinct and\nspecific. Beginning in the rudest forms of animism, where every natural\nprocess admits of being immediately attributed to the volitional agency\nof an unseen spirit, anthropomorphism sets out upon its long course of\ndevelopment, which proceeds _pari passu_ with the development of\nabstract thought. Man, as it has been truly said, universally makes God\nin his own image; and it is difficult to see how the case could be\notherwise. Universally the eject must assume the pattern of the subject,\nand it is only in the proportion that this pattern presents the features\nof abstract thinking that the image which it throws becomes less and\nless man-like. Hence, as Mr. Fiske has shown in detail, so soon as\nanthropomorphism has assumed its highest state of development, it begins\nto be replaced by a continuous growth of 'deanthropomorphism,' which,\npassing through polytheism into monotheism, eventually ends in a\nprogressive 'purification' of theism--by which is meant a progressive\nmetamorphosis of the theistic conception, tending to remove from Deity\nthe attributes of Humanity. The last of these attributes to disappear is\nthat of personality, and when this final ecdysis has been performed, the\neject which remains is so unlike its original subject, that, as we shall\nimmediately find, it is extremely difficult to trace any points of\nresemblance between them.\n\nNow it is with this perfect, or imago condition of the world-eject, that\nwe have to do. Mr. Herbert Spencer, in what I consider the profoundest\nreaches of his philosophic thought, has well shown, on the one hand,\nhow impossible it is to attribute to Deity any of the specific\nattributes of mind as known to ourselves subjectively; and, on the other\nhand, how it is possible to conceive 'symbolically' that the universe\nmay be instinct with a 'quasi-psychical' principle, as greatly\ntranscending personality as personality transcends mechanical\nmotion[10]. Accepting, then, the world-eject in this its highest\nconceivable stage of evolution, I desire to contemplate it under the\nlight of the monistic theory.\n\nWe have seen that, whether we look upon the subjective or objective face\nof personality, we find that personality arises from limitation--or, as\nI have previously termed it, circumscription. Now, we have no evidence,\nnor are we able to conceive, of the external world as limited;\nconsequently we are not able to conceive, of the world-eject as\npersonal. But, inasmuch as personality arises only from limitation, the\nconclusion that the world-eject is impersonal does not tend to show that\nit is of lower psychical value than conscious personality: on the\ncontrary, it tends to show that it is probably of higher psychical\nvalue. True, we are not able to conceive actually of mind as impersonal;\nbut we can see that this merely arises from our only experience of mind\nbeing given under conditions of personality; and, as just observed, it\nis possible to conceive symbolically that there may be a form of mind as\ngreatly transcending personality as personality transcends mechanical\nmotion.\n\nNow, although we cannot conceive of such a mind actually, we may most\nprobably make the nearest approach to conceiving of it truly, by\n_provisionally_ ascribing to it the highest attributes of mind as known\nto ourselves, or the attributes which belong to human personality. Just\nas a thinking insect would derive a better, or more true, conception of\nhuman personality by considering it ejectively than by considering it\nobjectively (or by considering the mind-processes as distinguished from\nthe brain-processes), so, if there is a form of mind immeasurably\nsuperior to our own, we may probably gain a more faithful--howsoever\nstill inadequate--conception of it by contemplating its operations\nejectively than by doing so objectively. I will, therefore, speak of the\nworld-eject as presenting conscious volition, on the understanding that\nif _x_ does not present either consciousness or volition, this must\nbe--according to the fundamental assumption of psychism on which we are\nnow proceeding--because _x_ presents attributes at least as much higher\nthan consciousness or volition as these are higher than mechanical\nmotion. For when we consider the utmost that our conscious volition is\nable to accomplish in the way of contrivance--how limited its knowledge,\nhow short its duration, how restricted its range, and how imperfect its\nadaptations--we can only conclude that _if_ the ultimate constitution of\nall things is pyschical, the philosophy of the Cosmos becomes a\n'philosophy of the Unconscious' only because it is a philosophy of the\nSuperconscious.\n\nNow, if once we feel ourselves able to transcend the preliminary--and\ndoubtless very considerable--difficulty of symbolically conceiving the\nworld-eject as super-conscious, and (because not limited) also\nsuper-personal, I think there can be no question that the world-object\nfurnishes overwhelming proof of psychism. I candidly confess that I am\nnot myself able to overcome the preliminary difficulty in question. By\ndischarging the elements of personality and conscious volition from the\nworld-eject, I appear to be discharging from my conception of mind all\nthat most distinctively belongs to that conception; and thus I seem to\nbe brought back again to the point from which we started: the\nworld-eject appears to have again resolved itself into the unknown\nquantity _x_. But here we must distinguish between actual conception and\nsymbolical conception. Although it is unquestionably true that I can\nform no actual conception of Mind save as an eject of personality and\nconscious volition, it is a question whether I am not able to form a\nsymbolical conception of Mind as thus extended. For I know that\nconsciousness, implying as it does continual change in serial order of\ncircumscribed mental processes, is not (symbolically considered) the\nhighest conceivable exhibition of Mind; and just as a mathematician is\nable to deal symbolically with space of _n_ dimensions, while only able\nreally to conceive of space as limited to three dimensions, so I feel\nthat I ought not to limit the abstract possibilities of mental being by\nwhat I may term the accidental conditions of my own being.\n\nI need scarcely wait to show why it appears to me that if this position\nis granted, the world-object furnishes, as I have said, overwhelming\nproof of psychism; for this proof has been ably presented by many other\nwriters. There is first the antecedent improbability that the human mind\nshould be the highest manifestation of subjectivity in this universe of\ninfinite objectivity. There is next the fact that throughout this\nuniverse of infinite objectivity--so far, at least, as human observation\ncan extend--there is unquestionable evidence of some one integrating\nprinciple, whereby all its many and complex parts are correlated with\none another in such wise that the result is universal order. And if we\ntake any part of the whole system--such as that of organic nature on\nthis planet--to examine in more detail, we find that it appears to be\ninstinct with contrivance. So to speak, wherever we tap organic nature,\nit seems to flow with purpose; and, as we shall presently see, upon the\nmonistic theory the evidence of purpose is here in no way attenuated by\na full acceptance of any of the 'mechanical' explanations furnished by\nscience. Now, these large and important facts of observation\nunquestionably point, as just observed, to some one integrating\nprinciple as pervading the Cosmos; and, if so, we can scarcely be wrong\nin supposing that among all our conceptions it must hold nearest kinship\nto that which is our highest conception of an integrating cause--viz.,\nthe conception of psychism. Assuredly no human mind could either have\ndevised or maintained the working of even a fragment of Nature; and,\ntherefore, it seems but reasonable to conclude that the integrating\nprinciple of the whole--the Spirit, as it were, of the Universe--must be\nsomething which, while as I have said holding nearest kinship with our\nhighest conception of disposing power, must yet be immeasurably superior\nto the psychism of man. The world-eject thus becomes invested with a\npsychical value as greatly transcending in magnitude that of the human\nmind, as the material frame of the universe transcends in its magnitude\nthe material frame of the human body. Therefore, without in any way\nstraining the theory of Monism, we may provisionally shade _x_ more\ndeeply than _z_, and this in some immeasurable degree.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOne other matter remains to be considered with reference to this\nworld-eject as sanctioned by Monism. It leaves us free to regard all\nnatural causation as a direct exhibition of psychism. The prejudice\nagainst anything approaching a theistic interpretation of the Universe\nnowadays arises chiefly from the advance of physical science having\npractically revealed the ubiquity of natural causes. It is felt that\nwhen a complete explanation of any given phenomenon has been furnished\nin terms of these causes, there is no need to go further; the phenomenon\nhas been rendered intelligible on its mechanical side, and therefore it\nis felt that we have no reason to suppose that it presents a mental\nside--any supplementary causation of a mental kind being regarded as\nsuperfluous. Even writers who expressly repudiate this reasoning prove\nthemselves to be habitually under its influence; for we constantly find\nthat such writers, after conceding the mechanical explanations as far as\nthese have been _proved_, take their stand upon the more intricate\nphenomena of Nature where, as yet, the mechanical explanations are not\nforthcoming. Whether it be at the origin of life, the origin of\nsentiency, of instinct, of rationality, of morality, or of religion,\nthese writers habitually argue that here, at least, the purely\nmechanical interpretations fail; and that here, consequently, there is\nstill room left for a psychical interpretation. Of course the pleading\nfor theism thus supplied is seen by others to be of an extremely feeble\nquality; for while, on the one hand, it rests only upon ignorance of\nnatural causation (as distinguished from any knowledge of super-natural\ncausation), on the other hand, abundant historical analogies are\navailable to show that it is only a question of time when pleading of\nthis kind will become more and more restricted in its subject-matter,\ntill eventually it be altogether silenced. But the pleading which Monism\nis here able to supply can never be silenced.\n\nFor, according to Monism, all matter in motion is mind; and, therefore,\nmatter in motion is merely the objective revelation, _to_ us and _for_\nus, of that which in its subjective aspect--or in its ultimate\nreality--is mind. Just as the operations of my friend's mind can only be\nrevealed to me through the mechanical operations of his body, so it may\nvery well be that the operations of the Supreme Mind (supposing such to\nexist) can only be revealed to me through the mechanical operations of\nNature. The only difference between the two cases is that while I am\nable, in the case of my friend's mind, to elicit responses of mechanical\nmovement having a definite and intended relation to the operations of my\nown mind, similarly expressed to him; such is not the case with Nature.\nWith the friend-eject I am able to _converse_; but not so with the\nworld-eject[11]. This great difference, however, although obviously\ndepriving me of any such direct corroboration of psychism in the\nworld-eject as that which I thus derive of psychism in the friend-eject,\nought not to be regarded by me as amounting, in the smallest degree, to\n_disproof_ of psychism in the world-eject. The fact that I am not able\nto converse with the world-eject is merely a negative fact, and should\nnot be allowed to tell against any probability (otherwise derived) in\nfavour of psychism as belonging to that eject. There may be a thousand\nvery good reasons why I should be precluded from such converse--some of\nwhich, indeed, I can myself very clearly perceive.\n\nThe importance of Monism in thus enabling us rationally to contemplate\nall processes of physical causation as possibly immediate exhibitions\nof psychism, is difficult to overrate. For it entirely discharges all\ndistinction between the mechanical and the mental; so that if physical\nscience were sufficiently advanced to yield a full natural explanation\nof all the phenomena within human experience, mankind would be in a\nposition to gain as complete a knowledge as is theoretically possible of\nthe psychological character of the world-eject. Already we are able to\nperceive the immense significance of being able to regard any sequence\nof natural causation as the merely phenomenal aspect of the ontological\nreality--the merely outward manifestation of an inward meaning. Thus,\nfor example, I am listening to a sonata of Beethoven's played by Madame\nSchumann. Helmholtz tells me all that he knows about the physics and\nphysiology of the process, both beyond and within my brain. But I feel\nthat, even if Helmholtz were able to tell me very much more than he can,\nso long as he is dealing with these objective explanations, he is at\nwork only upon the outer skin of the whole matter. The great reality is\nthe mind of Beethoven communicating to my mind through the complex\nintervention of three different brains with their neuro-muscular\nsystems, and an endless variety of aerial vibrations proceeding from a\npianoforte. The method of communication has nothing more to do with the\nreality communicated than have the paper and ink of this essay to do\nwith the ideas which they serve to convey. In each case a vehicle of\nsymbols is necessary in order that one mind should communicate with\nanother; but in both cases this is a vehicle of _symbols_, and nothing\nmore. Everywhere, therefore, the reality may be psychical, and the\nphysical symbolic; everywhere matter in motion may be the outward and\nvisible sign of an inward and spiritual grace.\n\nTake again the case of morality and religion. Because science, by its\ntheory of evolution, appears to be in a fair way of explaining the\ngenesis of these things by natural causes, theists are taking alarm; it\nis felt by them that if morality can be fully explained by utility, and\nreligion by superstition, the reality of both is destroyed. But Monism\nteaches that such a view is entirely erroneous. For, according to\nMonism, the natural causation of morality and religion has nothing\nwhatever to do with the ultimate truth of either. The natural causation\nis merely a record of physical processes, serving to manifest the\npsychical processes. Nor can it make any difference, as regards the\nultimate veracity of the moral and religious feelings, that they have\nbeen developed slowly by natural causes; that they were at first grossly\nselfish on the one hand, and hideously superstitious on the other; that\nthey afterwards went through a long series of changes, none of which\ntherefore can have fully corresponded with external truth; or that even\nnow they may be both extremely far from any such correspondence. All\nthat such considerations go to prove is, that it belongs to the natural\nmethod of mental evolution in man that with advancing culture his\nejective interpretations of Nature should more and more nearly\n_approximate_ the truth. The world-eject must necessarily vary with the\ncharacter of the human subject; but this does not prove that the\nejective interpretation has throughout been wrong in _method_: it only\nproves that such interpretation has been imperfect--and necessarily\nimperfect--in _application_.\n\nSuch, then, I conceive to be one of the most important consequences of\nthe monistic theory. Namely, that by regarding physical causation as\neverywhere but the objective or phenomenal aspect of an ejective or\nontological reality, it furnishes a logical basis for a theory of things\nwhich is at the same time natural and spiritual. On the objective\naspect, the explanations furnished by reason are of necessity physical,\nwhile, on the ejective aspect, such explanations are of necessity\nmetaphysical--or rather, let us say, hyper-physical. But these two\norders of explanation are different only because their modes of\ninterpreting the same events are different. The objective explanation\nwhich was given (as we supposed) by Helmholtz of the effects produced on\nthe human brain by hearing a sonata, was no doubt perfectly sound within\nits own category; but the ejective explanation of these same effects\nwhich is given by a musician is equally sound within _its_ category. And\nsimilarly, if instead of the man-object we contemplate the world-object\nphysical causation becomes but the phenomenal aspect of psychical\ncausation; the invariability of its sequence becomes but the expression\nof intentional order; the iron rigidity of natural law becomes the\nsensuous manifestation of an unalterable consistency as belonging to the\nSupreme Volition.\n\nMy object in this paper has been to show that the views of the late\nProfessor Clifford concerning the influence of Monism on Theism are\nunsound. I am in full agreement with him in believing that Monism is\ndestined to become the generally accepted theory of things, seeing that\nit is the only theory of things which can receive the sanction of\nscience on the one hand and of feeling on the other. But I disagree with\nhim in holding that this theory is fraught with implications of an\nanti-theistic kind. In my opinion this theory leaves the question of\nTheism very much where it was before. That is to say, while not\nfurnishing any independent proof of Theism, it likewise fails to furnish\nany independent disproof. The reason why in Clifford's hands this theory\nappeared to furnish independent disproof, was because he persisted in\nregarding the world only as an object: he did not entertain the\npossibility that the world might also be regarded as an eject. Yet, that\nthe world, under the theory of Monism, is at least as susceptible of an\nejective as it is of an objective interpretation, I trust that I have\nnow been able to show. And this is all that I have endeavoured to show.\nAs a matter of methodical reasoning it appears to me that Monism alone\ncan only lead to Agnosticism. That is to say, it leaves a clear field of\nchoice as between Theism and Atheism; and, therefore, to a carefully\nreasoning Monist, there are three alternatives open. He may remain a\nMonist, and nothing more; in which case he is an agnostic. He may\nentertain what appears to him independent evidence in favour of Theism,\nand thus he may become a theist. Or he may entertain what appears to him\nindependent evidence in favour of Atheism, and thus he may become an\natheist. But, in any case, so far as his Monism can carry him, he is\nleft perfectly free either to regard the world as an object alone, or to\nregard the world as also an eject[12].\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 9: If we imagine the visible sidereal system compressed within\nthe limits of a human skull, so that all its movements which we now\nrecognize as molar should become molecular, the complexity of such\nmovement would probably be as great as that which takes place in a human\nbrain. Yet to this must be added all the molecular movements which are\nnow going on in the sidereal system, visible and invisible.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Principles of Psychology_, vol. i. pp. 159-61; _Essays_,\nvol. iii. pp. 246-9; and _First Principles_, p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 11: It is, however, the belief of all religious persons that\neven this distinction does not hold. If they are right in their belief,\nthe distinction would then become one as to the mode of converse. In\nthis case what is called communion with the Supreme Mind must be\nsupposed to be a communion _sui generis_: the converse of mind with mind\nis here _direct_, or does not require to be translated into the language\nof mechanical signs: it is subjective, not ejective. Still, even here we\nmust believe that the physical aspect accompanies the psychical,\nalthough not necessarily observed. An act of prayer, for example, is, on\nits physical aspect, an act of cerebration: so is the answer (supposing\nit genuine), in as far as the worshipper is concerned. Thus prayer and\nits answer (according to Monism) resemble all the other processes of\nNature in presenting an objective side of strictly physical causation.\nNor is it possible that the case could be otherwise, if _all_ mental\nprocesses consist in physical process, and vice versa. It is obvious\nthat this consideration has important bearings on the question as to the\nphysical efficacy of prayer. From a monistic point of view both those\nwho affirm and those who deny such efficacy are equally in the right,\nand equally in the wrong; they are merely quarrelling upon different\nsides of the same shield. For, according to Monism, if the theologians\nare right in supposing that the Supreme Mind is the hearer of prayer in\nany case, they are also right in supposing that the Mind must\nnecessarily be able to grant what is called physical answers, seeing\nthat in order to grant _any_ answer (even of the most apparently\nspiritual kind) some physical change must be produced, if it be only in\nthe brain of the petitioner. On the other hand, the scientists are\nequally right in maintaining that no physical answer to prayer can be of\nthe nature of a miracle, or produced independently of strictly physical\ncausation; for, if so, the physical and the psychical would no longer be\ncoincident. But, until the scientists are able to perform the hopeless\ntask of proving where the possibilities of physical causation end, as a\nmere matter of abstract speculation and going upon the theory of Monism,\nit is evident that the theologians may have any latitude they choose to\nclaim, both as regards this matter and that of so-called miracles.]\n\n[Footnote 12: It may be explained that by Agnosticism I understand a\ntheory of things which abstains from either affirming or denying the\nexistence of God. It thus represents, with regard to Theism, a state of\nsuspended judgement; and all it undertakes to affirm is, that, upon\nexisting evidence, the being of God is unknown. But the term Agnosticism\nis frequently used in a widely different sense, as implying belief that\nthe being of God is not merely now unknown, but must always remain\nunknowable. It is therefore often represented that Mr. Herbert Spencer,\nin virtue of his doctrine of the Unknowable, is a kind of apostle of\nAgnosticism. This, however, I conceive to be a great mistake. The\ndistinctive features of Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable are not\nmerely non-agnostic, but anti-agnostic. For the doctrine affirms that we\nhave this much knowledge of God--namely, that if He exists, He must for\never be unknown. Without question, this would be a most important piece\nof definite knowledge with regard to Deity, negative though it be; and,\ntherefore, any man who holds it has no right to be called an agnostic.\n\nTo me it has always seemed that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so\nfar as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is highly\nunphilosophical. By what right can it be affirmed that Deity, if He\nexists, may not reveal the fact of His existence to-morrow--and this to\nthe whole human race without the possibility of doubt? Or, if there be a\nGod, who is to say that there certainly cannot be a future life, in\nwhich each individual man may have unquestionable proof of Theism? It is\na perfectly philosophical statement for any one to make that, as matters\nnow stand, he can see no evidence of Theism; but to say that he knows\nthe human race never can have such evidence, is a most unphilosophical\nstatement, seeing that it could only be justified by absolute knowledge.\nAnd, on this account, I say that the doctrine of the Unknowable, in so\nfar as it differs from the doctrine of the Unknown, is the very reverse\nof agnostic.\n\nNow, the theory of Monism alone, as observed in the text, appears to be\npurely agnostic in the sense just explained. If in some parts of the\nforegoing essay I appear to have been arguing in favour of theistic\nimplications, this has only been in order to show (as against Clifford)\nthat the world does admit of being regarded as an eject. But inasmuch\nas--religious faith apart--we are not able to verify any such ejective\ninterpretation, we are not able to estimate its value. Monism sanctions\nthe shading of _x_ as deeply as we choose; but the shading which it\nsanctions is only provisional.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE WILL IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM.\n\n\nIn the foregoing chapters I have considered the theory of Monism, first\nin contrast with the theories of Materialism and of Spiritualism, and\nnext in relation to the theory of Theism. In this chapter and that which\nsucceeds it I propose to consider Monism in relation to the Will. To do\nthis it is needful to begin by considering the problems which are\npresented by the Will in relation to the older theories of Materialism\non the one hand and of Spiritualism on the other.\n\nAlthough the phenomena of volition have occupied so large a province of\nphilosophical literature, the fundamental problems which arise in\nconnexion with them are only two in number, and both admit of being\nstated in extremely simple terms. The historical order in which these\ntwo problems have arisen is the inverse of their logical order. For\nwhile in logical order the two problems would stand thus--Is the Will an\nagent? If so, is it a free agent?--in actual discussion it was long\ntaken for granted that the Will is an agent, and hence the only\ncontroversy gathered round the question whether the Will is a free\nagent. Descartes, indeed, seems to have entertained the prior question\nwith regard to animals, and there are passages in the _Leviathan_ which\nmay be taken to imply that Hobbes entertained this question with regard\nto man. But it was not until recent years that any such question could\nstand upon a basis of science as distinguished from speculation; the\nquestion did not admit of being so much as stated in terms of science\nuntil physiology was in a position openly to challenge our right to\nassume that the Will is an agent. Such a challenge physiology has now\ngiven, and even declared that any assumption of volitional agency is, in\nthe presence of adequate physiological knowledge, impossible.\n\nThe two problems which I thus state separately are often, and indeed\ngenerally, confused together; but for the purpose of clear analysis it\nis of the first importance that they should be kept apart. In order to\nshow the wide distinction between them, we may best begin with a brief\nconsideration of what it is that the two problems severally involve; and\nto do this we may best take the problems in what I have called their\nlogical order.\n\nFirst, then, as regards the question whether the Will is an agent, the\nrival theories of Materialism and Spiritualism stand to one another in a\nrelation of contradiction. For it is of the essence of Spiritualism to\nregard the Will as an agent, or as an original cause of bodily movement,\nand therefore as a true cause in Nature. On the other hand, it is of the\nessence of Materialism to deny that the Will is an agent. Hitherto,\nindeed, materialists as a body have not expressly recognized this\nimplication as necessarily belonging to their theory; but that this\nimplication does necessarily belong to their theory--or rather, I should\nsay, really constitutes its most distinctive feature--admits of being\neasily shown. For the theory that material changes are the causes of\nmental changes necessarily terminates in the so-called theory of\nconscious automatism--or the theory that so far as the conditions to\nbodily action are concerned, consciousness is adventitious, bearing the\nsame ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as the striking\nof a clock bears to the time-keeping adjustments of the clock-work. From\nthis conclusion there is no possibility of escape, if once we accept the\npremises of Materialism; and therefore I say it belongs to the essence\nof Materialism to deny the agency of Will.\n\nJust as necessarily does it belong to the essence of Monism to affirm\nthe agency of Will. For, according to this theory, while motion is\nproducing nothing but motion, mind-change nothing but mind-change, both\nare producing both simultaneously; neither could be what it is without\nthe other, for each is to the other a necessary counterpart or\nsupplement, in the absence of which the whole causation (whether\nregarded from the physical or mental side) would not be complete.\n\nNow, in my opinion the importance of the view thus presented by the\ntheory of Monism is, for all purposes of psychological analysis,\ninestimable. It is impossible nowadays that such analysis can proceed\nvery far in any direction without confronting the facts presented by\nphysiology: hence it is impossible for such analysis to confine itself\nexclusively to the spiritual or subjective side of psychology. On the\nother hand, in so far as such analysis has regard to the material or\nobjective side, it has hitherto appeared to countenance--in however\ndisguised a form--the dogmatic denial of the Will as an agent. Hence the\nsupreme importance to psychology of reconciling the hitherto rival\ntheories of Spiritualism and Materialism in the higher synthesis which\nis furnished by the theory of Monism. For, obviously, in the absence of\nany philosophical justification of the Will as an agent, we are without\nany guarantee that all psychological inquiry is not a vain beating of\nthe air. If, as Materialism necessarily implies, the Will is not a cause\nin Nature, there would be no reason in Nature for the agency either of\nfeeling or of intelligence. Feeling and intelligence would, therefore,\nstand as ciphers in the general constitution of things; and any inquiry\ntouching their internal system of causation could have no reference to\nany scientific inquiry touching causation in general. I am aware that\nthis truth is habitually overlooked by psychologists; but it is none\nthe less a truth of fundamental importance to the whole superstructure\nof this science. Or, in other words, unless psychologists will expressly\nconsent to rear their science on the basis provided by the philosophical\ntheory of Monism, there is nothing to save it from logical\ndisintegration; apart from this basis, the whole science is, so to\nspeak, built in the air, like an unsubstantial structure of clouds.\nPsychologists, I repeat, habitually ignore this fact, and constantly\nspeak of feeling and intelligence as true causes of adjustive action;\nbut by so doing they merely beg from this contradictory theory of\nSpiritualism a flat denial of the fundamental postulate on which they\nelsewhere proceed--the postulate, namely, that mental changes are\ndetermined by cerebral changes. Consider, for example, the following\npassage from Mr. Spencer's _Principles of Psychology_ (Sec. 125), which\nserves to show in brief compass the logical incoherency which in this\nmatter runs through his whole work:--\n\n     'Those races of beings only can have survived in which, on the\n     average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities\n     conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and\n     habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or\n     indirectly destructive of life; and there must ever have been,\n     other things equal, the most numerous and long-continued survivals\n     among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were\n     the best, tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment.'\n\nThe argument here is that the 'adjustments of feelings to actions,' when\nonce attained, leads in turn to an adjustment of actions to\nfeelings--or, as I have myself stated the argument in my _Mental\nEvolution in Animals_, 'the _raison d'etre_ of Pleasure and Pain has\nbeen that of furnishing organisms with guides to adjustive action:\nmoreover, as in the case of direct sensation dictating any simple\nadjustment for the sake of securing an immediate good, so in the case of\ninstinct dictating a more intricate action for the sake of eventually\nsecuring a more remote good (whether for self, progeny, or community);\nand so, likewise, in the case of reason dictating a still more intricate\nadjustment for the sake of securing a good still more remote--in all\ncases, that is, where volition is concerned, pleasures and pains are the\nguides of action.' But thus to affirm that pleasures and pains are the\nguides of action is merely another way of affirming that the Will is an\nagent--a cause of bodily movement, and, as such, a cause in Nature. Now,\nas we have seen, Mr. Spencer not only affirms this--or rather assumes\nit--but proceeds to render an _a priori_ explanation of the accuracy of\nthe guidance. Yet he nowhere considers the fundamental question--Why\nshould we suppose that the Will is an agent at all? Assuredly the answer\ngiven by physiology to this question is a simple denial that we have any\njustification so to regard the Will: in view of her demonstration of\nconscious automatism, she can see no reason why there should be any\nconnexion at all between a subjective feeling of pleasure or pain\nand an objective fact of 'agreement or disagreement with the\nenvironment'--nay, one of the most eminent of her priesthood has\ndeclared that there _is_ no more connexion between the ambition of a\nNapoleon and a general commotion of Europe, than there is between the\npuff of a steam-whistle and the locomotion of a train. And, as I have\nnow repeatedly insisted, on grounds of physiology alone this is the only\nlogical conclusion at which it is possible to arrive. Yet Mr. Spencer,\nwhile elsewhere proceeding on the lines of physiology, whenever he\nencounters the question of the agency of Will, habitually jumps the\nwhole gulf that separates Materialism from Spiritualism. And this\nwonderful feat of intellectual athletics is likewise performed, so far\nat least as I am aware, by every other psychologist who has proceeded on\nthe lines of physiology. Indeed, the logical incoherency is not so\nserious in Mr. Spencer's case as it is in that of many other writers\nwhom I need not wait to name. For Mr. Spencer does not seek to found his\nsystem on a basis of avowed Materialism, and, therefore, he may be said\nto have left this fundamental question of volitional agency in abeyance.\nBut all those writers who have reared their systems of psychology on a\nbasis of avowed Materialism--or, which is the same thing, on a basis of\nphysiology alone--lay themselves open to the charge of grossest\ninconsistency when they thus assume that the Will is an agent. It is\nimpossible that these writers can both have their cake and eat it.\nEither they must forego their Materialism, or else they must cease to\nspeak of 'motives determining action,' 'conduct being governed by\npleasures and pains,' 'voluntary movements in their last resort being\nall due to bodily feelings,' 'the highest morality and the lowest vice\nbeing alike the result of a pursuit of happiness,' &c. &c. And, so far\nas I can see, it is only in the way above indicated, or on the theory of\nMonism, that it is possible, without ignoring the facts of physiology on\nthe one hand or those of psychology on the other, philosophically to\nsave the agency of Will.\n\nFrom this brief exposition it may be gathered that on the materialistic\ntheory it is impossible that the Will can be, in any sense of the term,\nan agent; that on the spiritualistic theory the Will is regarded as an\nagent, but only in the sense of a non-natural or miraculous cause; and,\nlastly, that on the monistic theory the Will is saved as an agent, or\nmay be properly regarded and as properly denominated a true cause, in\nthe ordinary sense of that term. For this, as well as for other reasons\nwhich need not here be specified, I accept in philosophy the theory of\nMonism; and am thus entitled in psychology to proceed upon the doctrine\nthat the Will is an agent. We have next to consider the ulterior\nquestion whether upon this theory the Will may be properly regarded as a\nfree agent.\n\nBy a free agent is understood an agent that is able to act without\nrestraint, or spontaneously. The word 'free,' therefore, bears a very\ndifferent meaning when applied exclusively to the Will, and when\napplied more generally to the living organism. For we may properly say\nthat a man, or an animal, is free when he, or it, is at liberty to act\nin accordance with desire. Touching the fact of freedom in this sense\nthere is, of course, no question. We have not to consider the possible\nfreedom of man, but the possible freedom of Will; we have not to\ncontemplate whether a man may be free to do what he wills, but whether\nhe can be free to will what he wills. Such being the question, we have\nto consider it in relation to the three philosophical theories already\nstated--Materialism, Spiritualism, and Monism.\n\nFor the theory of Materialism the present question has no existence. If\nthis announcement appears startling, it can only be because no\nmaterialist has ever taken the trouble to formulate his own theory with\ndistinctness. For, as previously shown, Materialism necessarily involves\nthe doctrine of conscious automatism; but, if so, the Will is concluded\nnot to be an agent at all, and therefore it becomes idle to discuss\nwhether, in any impossible exercise of its agency, it is free or subject\nto restraint. The most that in this connexion could logically stand to\nbe considered by the advocates of Materialism would be whether or not\nthe adventitious and inefficacious feelings of subjectivity which are\nassociated with cerebral activity are determinate or free; but this\nwould probably be regarded on all hands as a somewhat useless topic of\ndiscussion, and certainly in any case would have no reference to the\nquestion of free _agency_. The point to be clearly understood is that,\naccording to the materialistic theory, a motor is distinct from a\nmotive, although in some unaccountable manner the motor is able to cause\nthe motive. But the motive, when thus caused, is not supposed to exert\nany causal influence on bodily action; it is supposed to begin and end\nas a motive, or never itself to become a motor. In other words, as\nbefore stated, the Will is not supposed to be an agent; and, therefore,\nto this theory the doctrine of free-will and of determinism are alike\nirrelevant. We need not wait to prove that this important fact is\nhabitually overlooked by materialists themselves, or that whenever a\nmaterialist espouses the cause of determinism, he is thereby and for the\ntime being vacating his position as a materialist; for if, according to\nhis theory, the Will is not an agent, he is merely impugning his own\ndoctrines by consenting to discuss the conditions of its agency.\n\nThe theory of Spiritualism and the theory of Monism agree in holding\nthat the Will is an agent; and, therefore, to both of these theories the\nquestion whether the Will is a free agent is a real question. Here,\nthen, it devolves upon us to consider carefully the logical status of\nthe rival doctrines of so-called Liberty and Necessity. For convenience\nof arrangement in what follows, we may best begin with the doctrine of\nNecessity, or Determinism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE WILL IN RELATION TO MONISM.\n\n\nWe have now seen that, according to Materialism, the Will is not an\nagent, while according both to Spiritualism and to Monism the Will is an\nagent. Touching the further question, whether the Will is a free agent,\nwe have seen that while the question does not exist for Materialism, it\nappears to require a negative answer both from Spiritualism and from\nMonism. For, as regards its relation to Spiritualism, when once the\nground is cleared of certain errors of statement and fallacies of\nreasoning, we appear to find that unless the will is held to be\nmotiveless--which would be to destroy not only the doctrine of moral\nresponsibility, but likewise that of universal causation--it must be\nregarded as subject to law, or as determined in its action by the nature\nof its past history and present circumstances. Lastly, the theory of\nMonism appears likewise to deny the possibility of freedom as an\nattribute of Will; for, according to this theory, mental processes are\none and the same with physical processes, and hence it does not appear\nthat the doctrine of determinism could well be taught in a manner more\nemphatic.\n\nThus far, then, the doctrine of determinism is seen to be victorious\nover the doctrine of freedom all along the line. By Materialism the\nquestion of freedom is excluded _ab initio_; by Spiritualism and by\nMonism, so far as yet seen, it can be logically answered only in the\nnegative. From which it follows that the sense of moral responsibility\nis of the nature of a vast illusion, the historical genesis of which\nadmits of being easily traced, and the authority of which is thus\ndestroyed. Although it may still serve to supply motives to conduct, it\nseems that it can do so only in the way that belongs to\nsuperstition--that Conscience, as I have before said, is the bogey of\nmankind, and that belief in its authority is like belief in witchcraft,\ndestined to dwindle and to fade before the advance of a better or more\ncomplete knowledge of natural causation.\n\nBut the discussion must not end here. Hitherto I have presented the case\nLiberty _versus_ Necessity with all the impartiality of which I am\ncapable; but I have done so without travelling an inch beyond those\nlimits of discussion within which the question has been debated by\nprevious writers. I believe, indeed, that I have pointed out several\nimportant oversights which have been made on both sides of the question;\nbut in doing this I have not gone further than the philosophical basis\nupon which the question has been hitherto argued. My object, however,\nin publishing these papers is not that of destructive criticism; and\nwhat I have done in this direction has been done only in order to\nprepare the way for what is now to follow. Having shown, as it appears\nto me conclusively, that upon both the rival theories of Materialism and\nSpiritualism--the doctrine of Liberty, and therefore of Moral\nResponsibility--must logically fall, I now hope to show that this\ndoctrine admits of being re-established on a basis furnished by the\ntheory of Monism.\n\nIt often happens that an elaborate structure of argument, which is\nperfectly sound and complete upon the basis furnished by a given\nhypothesis, admits of being wholly disintegrated when the fundamental\nhypothesis is shown to be either provisional or untrue. And such, I\nbelieve, is the case with the issue now before us. For the issue Liberty\n_versus_ Necessity has hitherto been argued on the common assumption\nthat natural causation is not merely the most ultimate principle which\nthe human mind can reach; but also a principle which is, in some way or\nanother, external to that mind. It has been taken for granted by both\nsides in the controversy that if our volitions can be proved to depend\nupon natural causation, as rigid in its sequences within the sphere of a\nhuman mind as within that of a calculating machine, there must be an end\nof the controversy; seeing that our volitions would be thus proved to be\nrigidly determined by those same principles of fixed order, or 'natural\nlaw,' which are external to, or independent of, the human mind--quite as\nmuch as they are external to, or independent of, the calculating\nmachine. Now, it is this assumption which I challenge. The theory of\nMonism entitles one to deny that when we have driven the question down\nto the granite bed of natural causation, nothing more remains to be\ndone; according to this theory it still remains to be asked, What is the\nnature of this natural causation? Is it indeed the ultimate datum of\nexperience, below which the human mind cannot go? And is it indeed so\nfar external to, or independent of, the human mind, that the latter\nstands to it in the relation of a slave to a master--coerced as to\naction by the conditions which that master has laid down?\n\nNow these questions are all virtually answered in the affirmative by the\ndualistic theory of Spiritualism. For the Will is here regarded as an\nagent bound to act in accordance with those conditions of external\nnecessity which dualism recognizes as natural causation. Its internal\ncausation thus becomes but the reflex of external; and the reflection\nbecomes known internally as the consciousness of motive. Hence, the Will\ncannot be philosophically liberated from the toils of this external\nnecessity, so long as dualism recognizes that necessity as existing\nindependently of the Will, and thus imposing its conditions on\nvolitional activity. But the theory of Monism, by identifying external\nwith internal causation--or physical processes with psychical\nprocesses--philosophically saves the doctrine of freedom, and with it\nthe doctrine of moral responsibility. Moreover, it does so without\nrelying upon any precarious appeal to the direct testimony of\nconsciousness itself. As this view of the subject is one by no means\neasy of apprehension, I will endeavour to unfold it part by part.\n\nTo begin with, Monism excludes the possibility of volition being\ndetermined by cerebration. Let us suppose, for example, that a sequence\nof ideas, _A, B, C, D_, occurs in the mind, which on its obverse or\ncerebral aspect may be represented by the sequence _a, b, c, d_. Here\nthe parallelism is not due, as supposed by Materialism, to _a_\ndetermining _Ab_, _b_ determining _Bc_, &c.; it is due to _Aa_\ndetermining _Bb_, _Bb_ determining _Cc_, &c.--the two apparently diverse\ncausal sequences being really but one causal sequence. If the\ndeterminist should rejoin that a causal sequence of some kind is all\nthat he demands--that the Will is equally proved to be unfree, whether\nit be bound by the causal sequence _a, b, c, d_, or by the causal\nsequence _Aa, Bb, Cc, Dd_--I answer that this is a point which we have\nto consider by-and-by. Meanwhile I am only endeavouring to make clear\nthe essential distinction between the philosophical theories of Monism\nand Materialism. And the effect of this distinction is to show that, for\nthe purposes of clear analysis, we may wholly neglect either side of the\ndouble reality. If we happen to be engaged on any physiological\ninquiry, we may altogether neglect the processes of ideation with which\nany process of cerebration may be concerned; while, if we happen to be\nengaged upon any psychological inquiry, we may similarly neglect the\nprocesses of cerebration with which any process of ideation may be\nconcerned. Seeing that each is equally an index of a common sequence, it\ncan make no difference which of them we take as our guide, although for\npurposes of practical inquiry it is of course expedient to take the\ncerebral index when we are dealing with the objective side of the\nproblem, and the mental index when dealing with the subjective. In the\nfollowing pages, therefore, I shall altogether neglect the cerebral\nindex. The inquiry on which we are engaged belongs to the region of\nmind, and, therefore, after what has just been said, it will be apparent\nthat I am entitled to adopt the standpoint of a spiritualist, to the\nextent of fastening attention only upon the mental side of the problem.\nFor although the theory of Monism teaches, as against Spiritualism, that\nno one of the mental sequences could take place without a corresponding\nphysical sequence, the theory also teaches the converse proposition; and\ntherefore it makes no difference which of the two phenomenal sequences\nis taken as our index of the ontological.\n\nNow, it clearly makes a great difference whether the mental changes\nconcerned in volition are regarded as effects or as causes. According\nto Materialism, the mental changes are the effects of cerebral changes,\nwhich were themselves the effects of precedent cerebral changes.\nAccording to Spiritualism, these mental changes are the causes, not only\nof the cerebral changes, but also of one another. According to Monism,\nthe mental changes may be regarded as the causes of the cerebral, or\n_vice versa_, seeing that in neither case are we stating a real\ntruth--the real truth being that it is only a cerebro-mental change\nwhich can cause any change either of cerebration or of mentation. Now it\nis evident that if the mental processes were always the effects of\ncerebral processes (Materialism), there could be no further question\nwith regard to Liberty and Necessity; while, if the mental processes are\nthe causes both of the cerebral processes and of one another\n(Spiritualism), the question before us becomes raised to a higher level.\nThe causality in question being now regarded as purely mental, the will\nis no longer regarded as a passive slave of the brain, and the only\nthing to be considered is whether freedom is compatible with causation\nof a purely mental kind. Now, at an earlier stage of our enquiry I have\nargued that it is not; but this argument was based entirely upon\nspiritualistic premises, or upon the assumption that the principle of\ncausality is everywhere external to, or independent of, the human\nmind--under which assumption I cannot see that it makes much difference\nwhether the coercion comes from the brain alone, or from the whole\ngeneral system of things external to the human mind. And here it is that\nI think the theory of Monism comes to the rescue.\n\nFor, if physical and mental processes are everywhere consubstantial, or\nidentical in kind, it can make no difference whether we regard their\nsequences as objective or ejective, physical or spiritual. Hence, we are\nfree to regard all causation as of a character essentially psychical.\nBut, if so, it must be self-contained as psychical; it cannot be in any\nway determined by anything from without, seeing that outside itself\nthere is nothing in the Universe. Now, if this is true of the\nWorld-eject, it must also be true of the Man-eject, as well as of the\nMan-subject, or Ego. If all causation is psychical, that portion of it\nwhich belongs to, or is manifested by, my own personality is not laid\nupon me by anything from without; it is merely the expression of my own\npsychical activity, as this is taking place within the circumscribed\narea of my own personality. And this activity is spontaneous, in the\nsense that it is not coerced from without. All the sequences which that\nactivity displays within this region are self-determined, in the sense\nthat they are determined by the self, and not by any agency external to\nit. The only influence which any external agency can here exert, is that\nof insisting that bodily action--the physical outcome of my psychical\nprocesses--shall be in accordance with the conditions imposed by the\ninternal system of causation; but this does not influence in any degree\nthose mental processes which do not express themselves in bodily action.\nHence, it may be perfectly true that my bodily action in the past might\nhave been different from what it actually was; for as this action was\nthe outcome of my mentation at the time (according to the spiritual\nindex, which is now our guide), and as this mentation was not coerced\nfrom without, it might very well have been different from what it was.\nEach of the mental sequences at that time was a result of those\npreceding and a cause of those succeeding; but behind all this play of\nmental causation there all the while stood that Self, which was at once\nthe condition of its occurrence, and the _First Cause_ of its action. It\nis not true that that Self was nothing more than the result of all this\nplay of mental causation; it can only have been the First Cause of it.\nFor, otherwise, the mental causation must have been the cause of that\ncausation, which is absurd. Who or What it was that originally caused\nthis First Cause is, of course, another question, which I shall\npresently hope to show is not merely unanswerable, but unmeaning. As a\nmatter of fact, however, we know that this Self is here, and that it can\nthus be proved to be a substance, _standing under_ the whole of that\nmore superficial display of mental causation which it is able to look\nupon introspectively--and this almost as _impersonally_ as if it were\nregarding the display as narrated by another mind. I say, then, that\nthe theory of Monism entitles us to regard this Self as the _fons et\norigo_ of our mental causation, and thus restores to us the doctrine of\nLiberty with its attendant consequence of Moral Responsibility.\n\nIt may help to elucidate this matter if we regard it from another point\nof view. According to Hobbes, 'Liberty is the absence of all impediments\nto action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical qualities\nof the agent.' Now, if we accept this definition, it is easy to show\nthat the theory of Monism is really at one with the doctrine of Liberty.\nFor, in the first place, according to the theory of Monism, the neurosis\nof the brain could not be what it is without the psychosis of the mind.\nConsequently, as above shown, it would be equally incorrect to say that\nthe neurosis governs the psychosis, as it would be to say that the\npsychosis governs the neurosis. But, if so, the Will is free in\naccordance with Hobbes' definition of freedom. Suppose, for example,\nthat on seeing a bone I think of Professor Flower, then remember that a\nlong time ago I lent his book on Osteology to a friend, and forthwith\nresolve to ask my friend what has become of it; here my ultimate\nvolition would be unfree if it were the effect of physical processes\ngoing on in my brain. But the volition might be free if each of these\nmental processes were the result of the preceding one, seeing that there\nmay then have been 'an absence of all impediments' to the occurrence of\nthese processes.\n\nOf course it will be objected--as I have myself urged in the preceding\nchapter--that causal action of any kind is incompatible with freedom of\nvolition--that if there be any such causal action, even though it be\nwholly restricted within the sphere of mind, the Will is really\ncompelled to will as it does will, is determined to determine as it does\ndetermine, and hence that its apparent freedom is illusory. Hobbes'\ndefinition, it may be urged, when applied to the case of the Will, is\nequivocal. No doubt a man is free as to his _action_, if there be an\n'absence of all impediments' to his action--or, in other words, if he is\nable to act as he wills to act. But it does not follow that he is free\nas to his _will_, even though there be an absence of all impediments to\nhis willing as he wills to will. For here the very question is as to\nwhether there are any impediments to his willing otherwise than he does\nwill. The fact that he wills to will as he does will proves that there\nare no impediments to his willing in that direction; but is there a\nsimilar absence of impediments to his willing to will in any other\ndirection? If so, we are still within the lines of determinism. Thus\nHobbes' definition of freedom really applies only to freedom of bodily\naction; not to freedom of volition, seeing that if my will is caused I\ncould not have willed to will otherwise than I did will. Now, the answer\nwhich Monism supplies to this objection is that the will itself is here\nthe ultimate agent, and _therefore an agent which must be identified\nwith the principle of causality_. In other words, the very reason why we\nfeel that Hobbes' definition of liberty, while perfectly valid as\nregards bodily action, seems to lack something when applied to volition,\nis because volition belongs to the sphere of mind--belongs, therefore,\nto that sphere which the theory of Monism regards as identical with\ncausality itself. Although it is true that volitions are caused by\nmotives, yet it is the mind which conditions the motives, and therefore\nits own volitions. It is not true that the mind is always the passive\nslave of causes, known to it as motives. The human mind is itself a\ncausal agent, having the same kind of priority within the microcosm as\nthe World-eject has in the macrocosm. Therefore its motives are in large\npart matters of its own creation. In the intricate workings of its own\ninternal machinery innumerable patterns of thought are turned out, some\nof which it selects as good, while others it rejects as bad; but no one\nof which could have come into being at all without this causal agency of\nthe mind itself.\n\nIt will probably be objected that even though all this were granted, we\ncannot thus save the doctrine of moral responsibility. For it may appear\nthat the liberty which is thus accorded to the Will is nothing better\nthan liberty to will at random, as argued in my previous essay. But here\nwe must observe that although we are thus shown free to will at random,\nit does not follow that we are likewise free to act in accordance with\nour volitions. And this is a most important distinction, which\nlibertarians have hitherto failed to notice. If we are free to will in\nany direction, it follows, indeed, that we are free to will at random;\nbut it follows also, and for this very reason, that we are free to will\nthe _impossible_. True, when we will what is known to be impossible of\nexecution, we call the act an act of desire; but it is clearly the same\nin kind as an act of will, and differs only in not admitting of being\ntranslated into an act of body. Therefore I say that the restriction\nwhich is imposed upon us by the conditions of causality, whether\nexternal or internal, is not any restriction as to willing, but merely\nas to doing. It is not in the subjective, but in the objective world\nthat we encounter the 'bondage of necessity.'\n\nNow, the knowledge that we are thus restricted as to bodily action\nimposes that kind of restraint upon volition which is termed rational.\nThere is nothing in the nature of things to prevent our willing anything\nthat we wish; but there is something in the nature of things to prevent\nour doing everything that we will; and as the practical object of our\nvolition is that of determining bodily action, we find it expedient to\nwill only such things as we believe that we can do. To this extent,\ntherefore, the Will is bound--namely, by the executive capacity of the\nbody. But, strictly speaking, this is not a binding of the Will _qua_\nWill. Even in such cases, as St. Paul says, to will may be present with\nus, but how to perform that which is good we find not. I say then that\nalthough the Will is free to will whatever it wills, nevertheless it\nwould fail in its essential use or object did it refuse to will in\naccordance with the conditions which are imposed upon its executive\ncapacity. Again, to quote St. Paul, the Will might say, All things for\nme are lawful; but all things are not expedient. Now, this consideration\nof expediency is one of constant and far-reaching importance. For not\nonly, as already observed, does it lead to volition on the one hand as\nrational; but it also leads to volition on the other hand as moral. Let\nus take the two points separately.\n\nDo we say that a man is not free to conduct a scientific research,\nbecause in conducting it he must employ the needful apparatus? Or do we\nsay that a man is not free to marry, because in order to do so he must\ngo through a marriage ceremony? Obviously, to say such things would\nsound very like talking nonsense. It is true that in neither case is a\nman free to gain his object without adopting the means which are seen to\nbe necessary under the system of external causation in which he finds\nhimself; but this does not mean that he is not free to do as he wills,\nunless it so happens that he wills to do the impossible. Thus, within\nthe limits that are set by the conditions of causation, a man is\nunderstood to be free to act as he wills so long as he is not 'impeded'\nby some of those conditions. To say that he is not free because he\ncannot get beyond those conditions would be absurd, since, apart from\nthese conditions, action of any kind would be _a priori_ impossible,\nand the man would have, as his only alternative, no-action.\n\nHence, in doing we must conform to the law of causation--which, indeed,\nis all that can be meant by doing--and if in willing what we do we must\nalso conform to the law of causation, where is the difference with\nrespect to freedom? Such restraint as there may be is here a restraint\nupon bodily action; not at all upon the mental action which we call\nvolition. The Will may will in any way that it wills to will; but the\nbody cannot act in every way that the Will may will it to act; therefore\nthe Will finds it expedient to will only in such ways as the body can\nact--i. e. to conform in _its_ action to the external system of\ncausation. If this condition of all action is held to be compatible with\nfreedom in the one case, so in consistency must it be held in the other.\nEqually in either case the agent can only be properly said to be unfree,\nif he be subject to causal restraint from without. And in neither case\ndoes the universal condition of acting under the law of causation\nconstitute bondage, in any other sense than that of furnishing the agent\nwith his conditions to acting in any way at all. Therefore, unless it be\nsaid that a man is not free to do as he wills because he wills to do the\nimpossible, it cannot be denied that he is free to will as he wills\nbecause he wills according to law. For no action of any kind is possible\ncontrary to law--a general fact which goes to constitute an argument _a\nposteriori_ for the rationality of the World-eject--and if volition\nconstituted an exception to this general statement, it could only do so\nby becoming no-action. Now, it is by thus willing according to law--or\nwith due reference to those external conditions of causality with which\nthe executive capacity has to do--that volition is rendered rational.\nThe restraint laid upon volition is not laid upon it _as_ volition, but\nonly in respect of execution. A man may will to marry as long and as\nhard as he chooses; but only if he further wills to take the necessary\nmeans can his volition become rational; it is irrational if he wills to\nmarry, and at the same time wills not to go through the marriage\nceremony. But although irrational, it is none the less free. Considered\nmerely as an act of volition it is equally free, whether it be rational\nor irrational.\n\nAnd, similarly, it is equally free whether it be moral or immoral. The\nobjection that an uncaused volition cannot be a responsible volition\ndepends for its validity on the meaning which we attach to the term\n'uncaused.' If it be meant that the volition arises without any regard\nat all to the surrounding conditions of life, and is carried into effect\nwithout the agent being able to control it by means of any other\nvoluntary act; then, indeed, whatever else such an agent may be, he\ncertainly is not moral. But if it be meant that among a number of\nuncompleted volitions drawing in different directions--and all\n'uncaused' in the sense of belonging immediately to the Ego--one of\nthem gains an advantage by a conscious reference of the mind to it as\ngood or evil, then the agent who is capable of giving this advantage to\nthat member of the system may properly be called moral. The man who\nwilled to marry, and yet willed not to go through the marriage ceremony,\nwas, as we have seen, irrational. Similarly, if any agent wills an\naction without being able to consider any of the consequences which it\nmay involve as either moral or immoral, such an agent is what we must\nproperly call unmoral. Even in such an agent, however, the Will may be\nfree; only it would act without reference to any moral environment, just\nas the lunatic above supposed might endeavour to act without reference\nto any social environment.\n\nLet us look at the whole matter in yet another light. We have repeatedly\nseen that the question of free-will, and therefore of moral\nresponsibility, depends upon the question as to whether a man's action\nin the past might have been other than it was, notwithstanding that all\nthe conditions under which he was placed remained the same. Now, to this\nquestion only one answer can be given by a dualistic theory of things,\nwhether materialistic or spiritualistic. For it belongs to the essence\nof a dualistic theory to regard the principle of causation as a\nprinciple external to, and independent of, the human mind; consequently,\nall the conditions of mental causation being given, a certain result in\nthe way of volition is necessarily bound to ensue--or, in other words,\nat any given time in a man's mental history, his action cannot have\nbeen other than it was. But now, according to the monistic theory, all\ncausation has a psychical basis--being but the objective expression to\nus of the psychical activity of the World-eject. Consequently, according\nto this theory, the course of even strictly physical causation is\ninevitable or necessary only in so far as the psychical activity of the\nWorld-eject is held to be uniform, or consistent within itself. And\nforasmuch as all our knowledge of physical causation is necessarily\nempirical, we have but very inadequate means of judging how far this\nempirical index is a true gauge of the reality. We can, indeed, predict\nan eclipse centuries in advance; but we can only do so on the\nsupposition that such and such physical conditions remain constant, and\nwe have no right to affirm that such must be the case. Our knowledge of\nphysical causation, being but empirical, is probably but a very\ninadequate translation of the psychical activity of the World-eject; and\nhence, not only have we no right to predict a future eclipse with\ncertainty, but we have not so much as the right to affirm that even a\npast eclipse must have taken place of necessity. For we have no right to\naffirm that at any one period of cosmic history the action of the\nWorld-eject must have been what it was, or could not have been other\nthan it was. Our knowledge of the obverse aspect of this action (in the\ncourse of physical causation) is, as I have said, purely empirical; and\nthis is merely another way of saying that although we do know what the\naction of the World-eject has been at such and such a period of cosmic\nhistory, we can have no means of knowing what else it might have been.\nFor anything that we can tell to the contrary, the whole history of the\nsolar system, for example, might have been quite different from what it\nhas been; the course which it actually has run may have been but one out\nof an innumerable number of possible alternatives, any other of which\nmight just as well have been adopted by the World-eject.\n\nNow, if this is true of natural causation in the case of the macrocosm,\nit would appear to be equally so of natural causation in the case of the\nmicrocosm. Indeed, prediction in the case of human activity is so much\nless certain than in the case of cosmic activity, that the attribute of\nfree-will is generally ascribed to the former, while rarely suggested as\npossibly belonging to the latter. And similarly as regards past action.\nIf we are unable to say that at any period in the past history of the\nsolar system the World-eject might not have deflected the whole stream\nof events into some other channel, how can we be able to say that at any\ngiven period of his past history the Man-eject could not have performed\nan analogous act? Obviously, the only reason why we are not accustomed\nto entertain this supposition in either case, is because our judgements\nare beset with the assumption that the principle of causality is prior\nto that of mind--something of the nature of Fate superior even to the\ngods. And, no less obviously, if once we see any reason to regard the\nprinciple of causality as merely co-extensive with that of mind, the\nwhole question as between Necessity and Free-will lapses; there is\nnothing to show that a man's action in the past might not have been\nother than it was. The only outward restraint placed upon the exercise\nof his Will is then seen to be imposed by the conditions of its\nexecutive capacity, and this restraint it is that constitutes man a\nrational agent. On the other hand, the structure of conscience--however\nwe may suppose this to have been formed--imposes that further and inward\nrestraint upon his Will, which constitutes man a moral agent. But\nneither of these restraints can properly be said to constitute bondage\nin the sense required by Necessitarianism, because neither of them\nrequires that the man's Will must will as it does will; they require\nmerely that his Will should act in certain ways if it is to accomplish\ncertain results; and to this extent only is it subject to law, or to the\nincidence of those external influences which help to shape our motives.\n\nBut if this is so, is it not obvious that the sense of moral\nresponsibility is rationally justified? This sense goes upon the\nsupposition that a man's conduct in the past might have been different\nfrom what it was. Clearly, therefore, no question of moral\nresponsibility can ever obtain in cases where the general system of\nexternal causation, or natural law, rendered an alternative line of\naction physically impossible. _The question of moral responsibility can\nonly obtain in cases where two or more lines of conduct were alike\npossible, so far as the external system of causation is concerned--or\nwhere the Will was equally free to choose between two or more courses of\nbodily action._ In other words, the question of moral responsibility has\nnothing to do with the only kind of bondage to which, according to our\npresent point of view, the Will is subject--namely the bondage of being\nrationally obliged to will only what is capable of performance. The\nquestion of moral responsibility has only to do with the system of\ncausation which is inherent in the mind itself; not with the system that\nis external to the mind. And as the theory of Monism identifies the mind\nwith this its own inherent system of causation--or regards a man's Will\nas the originator of a particular portion of general causality--it\nfollows from the theory that a man is justly liable to moral praise or\nblame as the case may be: the moral sense no longer appears as a\ngigantic illusion: conscience is justified at the bar of reason.\n\nIt appears to me impossible that any valid exception can be taken to the\nabove reasoning, if once the premiss is granted--namely, that the\nprinciple of Causality admits of being regarded as identical with that\nof Volition. For if Cause is but another name for Will--whether the Will\nbe subjective or ejective--it follows that my will is a first cause,\nwhich is determined by other causes only in so far as the executive\ncapacity of my body is so determined. As the whole stress of any\nobjection to the present argument must thus be brought to bear upon the\nvalidity of this its fundamental premiss, a few words may now be said to\nshow that the premiss is not wholly gratuitous. Of course the reason why\nat first sight it is apt to appear, not only gratuitous, but even\ngrotesque, is because in these days of physical science the minds of\nmost of us are dominated by the unthinking persuasion that the principle\nof causality is the most ultimate principle which our minds can reach.\nMost of us accept this persuasion as almost of the nature of an axiom,\nand hence the mere suggestion that our own volitions are really uncaused\nappears to us of the nature of a self-evident absurdity. A little\nthought, however, is enough to show that the only ground of reason which\nthis strong prepossession can rest upon, is the assumption that the\nprinciple of causality is logically prior to that of mind. Therefore it\nis the validity of this assumption that we have here to investigate.\n\nIn the first place, then, the assumption is _ipso facto_ irrational. For\nit is evident that in order to make the assumption there must already be\na mind to make it. In other words, the very conception of the principle\nof causality implies a thinking substance wherein that conception\narises, and therefore, as a mere matter of formal statement, it is\nimpossible to assign logical priority to this conception over the thing\nwhereby it is conceived.\n\nIn the next place, when we carefully analyze the nature of this\nconception itself, we find that it arises immediately out of our\nconception of Being as Being. This is shown by the idea of _equivalency_\nbetween cause and effect, which is an essential feature of the\nconception of causality as such. In other words, the statement of any\ncausal relation is merely a statement of the fact that both the matter\nand the energy concerned in the event were of a permanent nature and\nunalterable amount. Therefore, _if_ the ultimate Reality is mental,\nCausation _must_ be ontologically identical with Volition. And that the\nultimate Reality is either mental, or something greater, seems to be\nproved by the consideration that if it be supposed anything _less_,\nthere must be an end of the conception of equivalency as between cause\nand effect, and so of the conception of causality itself; for, clearly,\nif my mind has been caused by anything less than itself, there is an end\nof any possible equivalency between the activity of that thing as a\ncause, and the occurrence of my mind as an effect[13].\n\nLastly, the conception of causality essentially involves the idea of\nfinality as existing somewhere. Here I cannot do better than quote some\nextracts from Canon Mozley's essay on 'The Principle of Causation,' as\nhe manages very tersely to convey the gist of previous philosophizing\nupon this subject.\n\n     'He (Clarke) brings out simply at bottom the meaning and\n     significance of an idea in the human mind, that there is implied in\n     the very idea itself of cause, firstly, that it causes something\n     else; and secondly, that it is uncaused itself.... An infinite\n     series of causes does not make a cause; ... an infinite succession\n     of causes rests, by the very hypothesis, upon no cause; each\n     particular one rests on the one which follows it, but the whole\n     rests upon nothing.... If from one cause we have to go back to\n     another, that which we go back from is not the cause, but that\n     which we go back to is. The very idea of cause, as I have said,\n     implies a stop; and wherever we stop is the cause.... A true cause\n     is a First Cause.... The atheistic idea thus does not correspond to\n     the idea of reason. The atheist appears to acknowledge the\n     necessity of a cause, and appears to provide for it; but when we\n     come to his scheme it fails exactly in that part of the idea which\n     clenches it, and which is essential to its integrity; it fails in\n     providing a stop; ... One might say to him, Why do you give\n     yourself the trouble to supply causation at all? You do so because\n     you consider yourself obliged in reason to do it, but if you supply\n     causation at all, why not furnish such a cause as reason has\n     impressed upon you, and which is inherent in your mind--a cause\n     which stands still, an original cause? If you never intended to\n     supply this, it must have been because you thought a real cause was\n     not wanted; but if you thought a cause not wanted, why not have\n     said from the first that causes were not wanted, and said from the\n     first that events could take place without causes?'\n\nOr, to quote a more recent authority, and one speaking from the side of\nphysical science, Prof. Huxley writes:--\n\n     'The student of nature who starts from the axiom of the\n     universality of the law of causation, cannot refuse to admit an\n     eternal existence; if he admits the conservation of energy, he\n     cannot deny the possibility of an eternal energy; if he admits the\n     existence of immaterial phenomena in the form of consciousness, he\n     must admit the possibility, at any rate, of an eternal series of\n     such phenomena; and, if his studies have not been barren of the\n     best fruit of the investigation of nature, he will have enough\n     sense to see that, when Spinoza says, \"Per Deum intelligo ens\n     absolute infinitum, hoc est substantiam constantem infinitis\n     attributis,\" the God so conceived is one that only a very great\n     fool would deny, even in his heart. Physical science is as little\n     Atheistic as it is Materialistic[14].'\n\nNow, if it thus belongs to the essence of our idea of causation that\nfinality must be reached somewhere, I do not know where this is so\nlikely to be reached as at that principle wherein the idea itself takes\nits rise--viz. Mind. But, if so, the statement that any particular acts\nof mind are uncaused ceases to present any character of self-evident\nabsurdity.\n\nAnd the argument need not end here. For Mr. Herbert Spencer has shown\nthat our idea of causation, not merely requires a mind for its\noccurrence, but that in every mind where it does occur it has been\ndirectly formed out of experiences of effort in acts of volition. So\nthat whether we analyze the idea of cause as we actually discover it in\nour own minds, or investigate the history of its genesis, we alike find,\nas we might have antecedently expected, that it is dependent on our more\nultimate idea of mind as mind; the conception of causality is not, as a\nmatter of fact, original or primal, but derivative or secondary.\nTherefore, if this conception necessarily involves the postulation of a\nfirst cause, there can be no doubt that such a cause can only be\nconceived as of the nature of mind. From which it follows that each\nindividual mind requires to be regarded--if it is regarded at all--as of\nthe nature of a first cause.\n\nFrom this, however, it does not follow that each individual mind\nrequires to be regarded as wholly independent of all other causes, or as\nnever subject to any causal influence which may be exercised by other\nminds. Although each mind presents the feature of finality or\nspontaneity, this does not hinder that it also presents the feature of\nrelation to other minds, which, therefore, are able to act upon it in\nnumberless ways. Now, whether these minds are the minds of other men, of\nother intelligent beings, or of the whole World-eject, the causal\nactivity which is exerted upon my mind expresses itself in that mind as\na consciousness of motives. But although these motives may help to\ndetermine my volitions, there is no reason to suppose that they are\nthemselves the volitions, or that without them my mind would cease to be\nitself a causal agent. On the contrary, if this were supposed, the\nsupposition would amount to destroying the causal agency of my own mind,\nwhich, as we have just seen, must either be original or not at all.\n\nThe way, therefore, that the matter stands is this. In so far as the\nmicrocosm is a circumscribed system of being--a thinking substance, a\npersonality--it is of the nature of a first cause, free to act in any\ndirection as to its thinking and willing, even though its thinking\nshould be irrational as to truth, and its willing impossible as to\nexecution. But in so far as the microcosm enters into relation with the\nmacrocosm, the system of external causation which it encounters\ndetermines the character of its volitions. For although these volitions\nare themselves of the nature of first causes, it is no contradiction to\nsay that they are--at all events in large measure--determined by other\nand external causes. This is no contradiction because, although they are\nthus determined, it does not follow that they are thus determined\n_necessarily_, and this makes all the difference between the theory of\nwill as bond or free. In any stream of secondary causation each member\nof the series is understood to determine the next member of necessity;\nand it is because this notion is imported into psychology that the\ntheory of determinism regards it as axiomatic that, if our volitions are\nin any way caused at all, they can only be caused by way of necessity;\nand hence that under the operation of any given set of motives the\naction of the will can only take place in the direction of the\nresultant. But any such axiom is valid only within the region of second\ncauses. On the hypothesis that volitions are first causes, the axiom is\nirrelevant to them; for although it may be true that they are determined\nby causes from without, it may not be true that they are thus determined\nof necessity: their intrinsic character as themselves first causes,\nalthough not isolating them from any possible contact with other causes,\nnevertheless does protect them from being necessarily coerced by these\ncauses, and therefore from becoming but the mere effects of them. Such\ninfluence, or determination, as is exerted upon the Will by these\nexternal causes is exerted only because any individual mind is not\nitself a macrocosm, but a microcosm in relation to a macrocosm. If it\nwere itself a macrocosm, standing out of relation to all other being,\nits prime causation would, of course, be wholly uninfluenced by any\nother causation; its volitions would then be concerned only with the\ndetermination of its own thoughts in a constant stream of purely\nsubjective contemplation, such as that which the Hindoo philosophy\nattributes to God. But as the human mind discovers itself as existing in\nclose and complex relations with an external world of an orderly\ncharacter, the human mind finds that it is, as before said, _expedient_\nto adapt the course of its own causal activity so as to bring it into\nharmony with the external order. For, although its own causal activity\nis primal, it by no means follows that on this account it is almighty;\nhence, even although it be primal, it is nevertheless under the\nnecessity of adopting means in order to secure its ends--or, in other\nwords, of adjusting its volitions (if they are to be practically\nefficient) to the conditions which are imposed upon its activity by the\norderly system of the external world. Which is merely another way of\nstating the conclusion previously reached--viz. that the only necessity\nwhich can be proved to govern our volitions is the necessity which is\nimposed by our own considerations of reason and morality. Although we\nfind that it is expedient to adapt our own causal activity to that\nlarger system of causal activity by which we are surrounded--seeing that\nwe must do so necessarily if we are to act at all--it by no means\nfollows that we are bound to will what is expedient. In other words, the\nnecessity laid upon us by the system of external causation is a\nnecessity to adopt means for the attainment of ends; not a necessity to\nwill the ends. And although in many cases this distinction may appear to\nbe practically unmeaning--seeing that no man wills what he knows to be\nimpossible of execution, and therefore that to say he is necessarily\nprevented from doing a certain thing seems practically equivalent to\nsaying that he is necessarily prevented from willing that thing--in all\ncases where any question of moral responsibility can possibly obtain,\nthe distinction is one of fundamental importance. For, as already shown,\nany question of moral responsibility can only obtain where two or more\nlines of action are alike possible, and therefore where no necessity is\nlaid upon the man in respect of carrying out his volitions, in whichever\ndirection they may eventually proceed. Although in any event he is\nnecessarily bound to adopt means in order to secure his ends, the moral\nquality of his choice has reference only to the ends which he chooses;\nnot at all to the fact that he has to employ means for the purpose of\nattaining them. And even though his choice be influenced by his physical\nand social environment--as it must be if it be either rational on the\none hand or moral on the other--it does not follow that this influence\nis of a kind to neutralize or destroy the causal nature of his own\nvolition. For the influence which is thus exerted cannot be exerted\nnecessarily, unless we suppose that the Will is not a first cause, which\nis the possibility now under consideration. If the Will is a first\ncause, the influences brought to bear upon it by its relation to other\ncauses--and in virtue of which it is constituted, not only a cause\nprimal, but also a cause rational and moral--these influences differ\n_toto coelo_ from those which are exercised by any members in a series\nof secondary causes upon the next succeeding causes. And the difference\nconsists in the absence of necessary or unconditional sequence in the\none case, and its presence in the other. However strong the determining\ninfluence of a motive may be, if the Will is a first cause, the motive\nmust belong to a different order of causal relation from a motor; for,\nno matter how strong the determining influence may be, _ex hypothesi_ it\ncan never attain to the strength of necessity; the Will must ever remain\nfree to overcome such influence by an adequate exercise of its own power\nof spontaneous action, or of supplying _de novo_ an additional access of\nstrength to some other motive. Of course, as a general rule, the Will\nallows itself to be influenced by motives supplied immediately by its\nrelations with the external world; but this is so only because the\nthinking substance well knows that it is expedient so to fall in with\nthe general stream of external causation. Hence, as a general rule, it\nis only in cases where the stream of external causation is drawing the\nwill in different directions that the causal activity of the Will itself\nis called into play. Or rather, I should say, it is only in such cases\nthat we become conscious of the fact. In the case of every voluntary\nmovement the primal activity of Will must be concerned (and this even in\nthe case of the lower animals); but as the vast majority of such\nmovements are performed by way of response to frequently recurring\ncircumstances, the response which experience has shown to be most\nexpedient is given, as it were, automatically, or without the occurrence\nof any adverse motive. But in cases where motives are drawing in\ndifferent directions, we become conscious of an effort of Will in\nchoosing one or other line of conduct, and, according to our present\nhypothesis, this consciousness of effort is an expression of the work\nwhich the Will is doing in the way of spontaneous causation.\n\nThus, upon the whole, if we identify the principle of causation with the\nprinciple of mind--as we are bound to do by the theory of Monism--we\nthereby draw a great and fundamental distinction between causation as\nthis occurs in the external world, and as it occurs within the limits of\nour own subjectivity. And the distinction consists in the unconditional\nnature of a causal sequence in the external world, as against the\nconditional nature of it in the other case; the condition to the\neffective operation of a motive--as distinguished from a motor--is the\nacquiescence of the first cause upon which that motive is operating.\n\nTo the foregoing argument it may be objected that by expressly regarding\nthe human mind as a first cause of its own volitions, I imply that that\nmind can itself have had no cause, which appears to be self-evidently\nabsurd. But here again the absurdity only arises from our inveterate\nhabit of regarding the principle of causation as logically prior to that\nof mind. If we expressly refuse to do this, there is nothing absurd in\nsupposing the principle of mind wherever it occurs, as itself uncaused.\nFor if, as we are now supposing, this principle is identical with that\nof causation, to say that any mind is caused would be to say that a\ncause is the cause of itself, which would be really absurd. Under the\npresent point of view, therefore, it would be a meaningless question to\nask for the cause of a human mind, since, _ex hypothesi_, a human mind\nis a part of the self-existing substance, although not on this account\nself-existing as to its individual personality. As argued in a previous\nchapter, the personality appears to arise on account of circumscription,\nor the isolation of a constituent part of the World-eject. Therefore,\nalthough it may be reasonable to ask for a cause of this\ncircumscription--or of the personality--it is not reasonable to ask for\na cause of the substance which is thus circumscribed, or of the quality\nof spontaneity which that substance exhibits.\n\nI will now state the whole case in another way. When we regard the facts\nof volition from the stand-point of psychology, the only theory of them\nwhich is open to us is, as we have before seen, that of determinism.\nMoreover, within these limits that theory is perfectly true. Psychology,\nas such, cannot recognize any principle more ultimate than natural\ncausation, seeing that, like any other of her sisters in the family of\nsciences, her whole work and duty are confined to the investigation of\nthis principle. But, just as in the case of all the other sciences, when\nher investigations have been pushed to the point where they encounter\nthe problem of explaining this principle itself, her investigations\nmust necessarily cease; this principle is for all the sciences the\nultimate datum, behind which they cannot go without ceasing to be\nsciences. But it does not follow that because the area of science is\nlimited by that of causation, therefore we are precluded from asking any\nquestions as to the nature of this ultimate datum. Of course any\nquestions which we may thus ask cannot possibly be answered by science;\nthey are questions of philosophy, in the consideration of which science,\nfrom her very nature and essential limitation of her office, can have no\nvoice. Now, if on taking up the principle of causation where this is\nleft by science--viz. as the ultimate or unanalyzable _datum_ of\nexperience, upon which all her investigations are founded, and by which\nthey are all limited--philosophy finds any reason to surmise that it is\nresolvable into the principle of mind, philosophy is thus able to\nsuggest that any distinction between mental processes as determinate or\nfree, is really a meaningless distinction. For, according to this\nsuggestion, the issue is no longer as to whether these processes are\ncaused or uncaused; the very idea of cause has been abolished as one\nwhich belongs only to that lower level of inquiry with which science, or\nsensuous experience, is concerned. Here, no doubt, the question is a\nthoroughly real one, and, as shown in previous chapters, can only be\nanswered in the way of determinism. But so soon as we ascend to the\nphilosophical theory of Monism, and so transcend the conditions of\nsensuous experience, the question whether volitions are caused or\nuncaused becomes, as I have said, a meaningless question, or a question\nthe terms of which are not correctly stated. If it be the case that all\ncausality is of a nature psychical, volition and causation are one and\nthe same thing, differing only in relation to our modes of apprehension.\nIt would therefore be equally meaningless to say that either is the\ncause of the other--just as it would be equally meaningless to say that\nneurosis is the cause of psychosis, or that psychosis is the cause of\nneurosis. Or thus, if volition and causation are one and the same thing,\nthe only reason why they ever appear diverse is because the one is known\nontologically, while the other is known phenomenally. Were it possible\nthat the orbit of my own personality could be widened so as to include\nwithin my own subjectivity the whole universe of causality, I should\nfind--according to Monism--that all causation would become transformed\ninto volition. Hence, the only reason why there now appears to be so\ngreat an antithesis between these two principles, is because the\nvolition which is going on outside of my own consciousness can only be\nknown to me objectively,--or at most ejectively,--on which account the\nprinciple of causality appears to me phenomenally as the most ultimate,\nor most unanalyzable, principle in the phenomenal universe.\n\nUpon the whole, then, I conclude that this is the teaching of Monism. If\nwe view the facts of human volition relatively, or within the four\ncorners of psychological science, there is no escape from the conclusion\nthat they are determined with all the rigour which belongs to natural\ncausation in general. For every sequence of mental changes and every\nsequence of cerebral changes, although phenomenally so diverse, are\ntaken by this theory to be ontologically identical; and therefore the\nsequence of mental changes must be determined with the same degree of\n'necessity' as is that of the cerebral changes. In short, mental\ncausation is taken to be but the obverse aspect of physical causation,\nand, as previously remarked, it is impossible that the doctrine of\ndeterminism could be taught in a manner more emphatic. But, on the other\nhand, the theory of Monism is bound to go further than this. From the\nvery fact of its having gone so far as to identify all physical\nprocesses with psychical processes, it cannot refuse to take the further\nand final step of identifying the most ultimate known principle of the\none with the most ultimate known principle of the other; it is bound to\nrecognize in natural causation the phenomenal aspect of that which is\nknown ontologically as volition. But if these two principles are thus\nregarded as identical, it clearly becomes as unmeaning to ask whether\nthe one is the cause of the other, as it would be to ask whether the one\nwills the other. For, _ex hypothesi_, the two things being one thing,\nor but different modes of viewing the same thing, it becomes mere\nnonsense to speak of either determining the other; they are both but\ndifferent expressions of the same ultimate fact, namely the fact of\nBeing as Being.\n\nIf this result should be deemed unsatisfactory on account of its\nvagueness, let it be remembered that nothing is gained on the side of\nclearness by the converse supposition--viz. that priority should be\nassigned to the principle of causality. For, if we say it is\ninconceivable that anything should come into existence without a\ncause--not even excepting the principle of mind itself--then the\nquestion immediately arises--If all volition is caused, what is the\ncause of volition? What caused this cause? And so on till we arrive at\nthe question, What caused the principle of causality? which is absurd.\nSo that whether we regard mind as prior to cause, or cause as prior to\nmind, or neither as prior to the other, we arrive at precisely the same\ndifficulty. And the difficulty is a hopeless one, because it concerns\nthe ultimate question of Being as Being, or the final mystery of things.\n\nOr, to state the matter in another way. An explanation means the\nreference of observed effects to known causes, or the inclusion of\npreviously unknown causes among causes better known. Hence it is\nobvious, from the very meaning of what we call an explanation, that at\nthe base of all possible explanations there must lie a great\nInexplicable, which, just because more ultimate than any of our\npossible explanations, does not itself require to be explained. To\nsuppose that it does require to be explained, would be to suppose, that\nthere is something still more ultimate into which, if known, this\nInexplicable could be merged. Hence, unless we postulate an infinite\nseries of possible explanations, there must be a basal mystery\nsomewhere, which, in virtue of its constituting the ground of all\npossible explanations, cannot be, and does not require to be, itself\nexplained. What is this basal mystery? Materialism supposes it to be\nlodged in Matter to the exclusion of Mind, while Idealism in its extreme\nforms takes the converse view. Theism supposes that it is an intelligent\nPerson, who is held--and logically enough--not to be able to give any\nexplanation of his own existence; he is, as it is said, self-existent,\nand, if asked to give any account of his being, would only be able to\nrestate the fact of his being in the words, 'I am that I am.' Lastly,\nPantheism, or Monism, supposes the ultimate mystery to be lodged in the\nuniverse as a whole. Now, in the present connexion the question before\nus is simply this--Are we to regard the principle of causality or the\nprinciple of mind as the ultimate mystery? And to this question I answer\nthat to me it appears most reasonable to assign priority to mind. For,\non the one hand, our only knowledge of causation is empirical, while\neven as such it is only possible in the same way as our knowledge of\nobjective existence in general is possible--namely, by way of inference\nfrom our own mental modifications, which therefore must necessarily have\npriority so far as we are ourselves concerned. Next, on the other hand,\neven if we were to grant that the principle of causality is the prius,\nor the ultimate and inexplicable mystery, I cannot see that it is really\navailable to explain the fact of personality. To me it appears that,\nwithin the range of human observation, this is the fact that most wears\nthe appearance of finality, or of that unanalyzable and inexplicable\nnature which we are bound to believe must belong to the ultimate mystery\nof Being. But, be this as it may, the speculative difficulty of\nassigning priority to mind is certainly no greater than that of\nassigning it to causality; and this, as above remarked, is a sufficient\nanswer to the question before us. According to Monism, however, there is\nno need to assign priority to either principle, seeing that one is but a\nphenomenal expression of the other.\n\nOnly one further question remains to be considered. From what I have\njust said on the subject of Personality, it will be apparent that the\ntheory of Monism is in conflict with that of Theism only in so far as\npersonality appears to imply limitation. This is a point which I have\npreviously considered in these pages (Chapter iv, p. 109), with the\nresult of appearing to show that the conflict is one which would\nprobably vanish could we rise above the necessary limitations of human\nthought. Therefore, it here seems worth while to ask, What can be said\nby the philosophical theory of Monism to the old theological dilemma\ntouching free-will and predestination? Or, even apart from any question\nof Theism, what position does Monism suppose the psychical activity of\nman to hold in relation to that of the universe? Of course the latter\nstatement of the question is included in the former; and, therefore, we\nmay present it thus;--If the human will is free, and the theory of\nTheism substantially true, how are we to reconcile the fact with the\ntheory?\n\nAccording to the theory of Theism as sanctioned by Monism, what we\napprehend as natural causation is the obverse of a part of a _summum\ngenus_--i.e. the part falling within human observation whose whole is\nthe Absolute Volition. This Volition, being absolute, can nowhere meet\nwith restraint; it is therefore absolutely free, and can never\ncontradict itself. Thus, those circumscribed portions of it which we\nknow as human minds--and which, on account of being so circumscribed,\nare free within themselves--do not in their freedom conflict with the\nAbsolute Volition. The Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition are\nalways in unison. It is not that the Absolute Volition unconditionally\ndetermines the Relative Volition--else the Relative Volition would not\nbe free; but it is that the Absolute Volition invariably assents to the\nRelative Volition as to the activity of an integral part of itself. This\nwill be at once evident if we consider that our only idea of\ndetermination--i.e. causation--is, upon the theistic theory, derived\nfrom our observing the consistency of the Divine Will, whether as\nrevealed subjectively in the causal operations of our own minds, or\nobjectively in the causal operations of Nature. Therefore, the idea of\ncausation as between the Absolute Volition and the Relative Volition is\nan idea destitute of meaning. One Relative Volition may act causally on\nanother. Relative Volition, because each is wholly external to each. But\nall Relative Volitions are constituent parts of the Absolute Volition,\nwhich, therefore, cannot act causally _on_ them, though it always acts\nsubstantially _with_ them. Or, otherwise phrased, if the subject is a\nconstituent part of its own World-eject--the volition of which is always\nself-consistent--it follows that the volition of the subject must always\nbe coincident with that of its World-eject; and this without being\ndetermined in any other sense than the smaller size of a part can be\nsaid to be determined by the larger size of its whole: i.e. the\ndetermination--if we choose so to call it--is not a causal one, but\narises immediately from the inherent nature of the case. The Absolute\nVolition within itself is free; the Relative Volition within itself is\nfree; but there can be no conflict between these two freedoms. For, if\nthere were a conflict, it must be caused; but where is the cause of this\nconflict to come from? Not from the Absolute Volition, which is\neverywhere self-consistent; not from the Relative Volition, which is\nwholly contained within the Absolute. Thus, regarded from within its own\nsystem, the Relative Volition is free; while, regarded from the system\nof its World-eject, the Relative Volition is predestined. But the\nfreedom is not incompatible with the predestination, nor the\npredestination with the freedom. They stand to each other in the\nrelation of complementary truths, the apparent contradiction of which\narises only from the apparently fundamental antithesis between mind and\ncause which it is the privilege of Monism to abolish.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 13: 'Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily\ncontain it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can\never after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it\nhath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree' (Locke). To\nthis argument Mill answers, 'How vastly nobler and more precious, for\ninstance, are the vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of\nwhich, and by the properties of which, they are raised up! But this\nstricture is not worthy of Mill. The soil and manure do not constitute\nthe whole cause of the plants and animals. We must trace these and many\nother con-causes (conditions) back and back till we come to 'whatsoever\nis first of all things': it is merely childish to choose some few of the\nconditions, and arbitrarily to regard them as alone the efficient\ncauses.]\n\n[Footnote 14: _Collected Essays_, vol. ix. 'Evolution and Ethics,' p.\n140.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n+-------------------------------------------------------------------+\n|Transcriber's note: In this text this H_2O represents a subscript 2|\n+-------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOxford HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY","title":"Mind and Motion and Monism","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":42906}