{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_23422/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_23422","id":"gutenberg_23422","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/23422","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Cycles","Force and energy","Knowledge, Theory of","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier, Michael Zeug,\nLisa Reigel, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team\nat http://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Note: Words in Greek in the original are transliterated\nand placed between +plus signs+. Words italicized in the original are\nsurrounded by _underscores_. Characters superscripted in the original\nare inclosed in {} brackets.\n\n\n\n\nESSAYS TOWARDS\nA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE\n\n\n     _Rosalind:_ I pray you, what is't o'clock?\n\n     _Orlando:_  You should ask me, what time o' day;\n                   there's no clock in the forest.\n\n                    _As You Like It, Act III. Sc. 2._\n\n\n\n\nESSAYS TOWARDS A\nTHEORY OF KNOWLEDGE\n\n\nBY\n\nALEXANDER PHILIP\nF.R.S.E\n\n\n[Illustration]\n\n\nLONDON\nGEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS LIMITED\nNEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO.\n1915\n\n\n\n\n+he gar achromatos te kai aschematistos kai anaphes ousia ontos ousa\npsyches kybernete monoi theatei no, peri hen to tes alethous epistemes\ngenos, touton echei ton topon.+--PHAEDRUS.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nTwo years ago, in the preface to another essay, the present writer\nventured to affirm that \"Civilisation moves rather towards a chaos than\ntowards a cosmos.\" But he could not foretell that the _descensus Averni_\nwould be so alarmingly rapid.\n\nWhen we find Science, which has done so much and promised so much for\nthe happiness of mankind, devoting so large a proportion of its\nresources to the destruction of human life, we are prone to ask\ndespairingly--Is this the end? If not; how are we to discover and assure\nfor stricken Humanity the vision and the possession of a Better Land?\n\nNot certainly by the ostentatious building of peace-palaces nor even by\nthe actual accomplishment of successful war. Only by the discovery of\ntrue first principles of Thought and Action can Humanity be redeemed.\nUndeterred by the confused tumult of to-day we must still seek a true\nunderstanding of what knowledge is--what are its powers and what also\nare its limitations. Nor may we forget that other principle of\nlife--with which it is so quaintly contrasted in Lord Bacon's\ntranslation of the Pauline aphorism--_Knowledge bloweth up, Charity\nbuildeth up._\n\n_January 1915._\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                         PAGE\nI\n\nTIME AND PERIODICITY                       11\n\n\nII\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF PHYSICAL CONCEPTS            17\n\n\nIII\n\nTHE TWO TYPICAL THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE      36\n\n\nIV\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF ENERGY                     81\n\n\n\n\nESSAYS TOWARDS A\nTHEORY OF KNOWLEDGE\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nTIME AND PERIODICITY\n\n\nWe can measure Time in one way only--by counting repeated motions. Apart\nfrom the operation of the physical Law of Periodicity we should have no\nnatural measures of Time. If that statement be true it follows that\napart from the operation of this law we could not attain to any\nknowledge of Time.[11:1] Perhaps this latter proposition may not at\nfirst be readily granted. Few, probably, would hesitate to admit that in\na condition in which our experience was a complete blank we should be\nunable to acquire any knowledge of Time; but it may not be quite so\nevident that in a condition in which experience consisted of a\nmultifarious _but never repeated_ succession of impressions the\nKnowledge of Time would be equally awanting.[12:1] Yet so it is. The\noperation of the Law of Periodicity is necessary to the measurement of\nTime. It is by means, and only by means, of periodic pulsative movements\nthat we ever do or can measure Time. Now, apart from some sort of\nmeasurement Time would be unknowable. A time which was neither long nor\nshort would be meaningless. The idea of unquantified Time cannot be\nconceived or apprehended. Time to be known must be measured.\n\nPeriodicity, therefore, is essential to our Knowledge of Time. But\nNature amply supplies us with this necessary instrument. The Law of\nPeriodicity prevails widely throughout Nature. It absolutely dominates\nLife.\n\nThe centre of animal vitality is to be found in the beating heart and\nbreathing lungs. Pulsation qualifies not merely the nutrient life but\nthe musculo-motor activity as well. Eating, Walking,--all our most\nelementary movements are pulsatory. We wake and sleep, we grow weary and\nrest. We are born and we die, we are young and grow old. All animal life\nis determined by this Law.\n\nPeriodicity--generally at a longer interval of pulsation--equally\naffects the vegetal forms of life. The plant is sown, grows, flowers,\nand fades.\n\nPeriodicity is to us less obvious in the inanimate world of molecular\nchanges; yet it is in operation even there. But it is more especially in\nthe natural motions of those so-called material masses which constitute\nour physical environment that Periodicity most eminently prevails.\nIndeed it was by astronomers that the operation of this Law was first\ndefinitely recognised and recorded. Periodicity is the scientific name\nfor the Harmony of the Spheres.\n\nThe two periodic motions which most essentially affect and concern us\nhuman beings are necessarily the two periodic motions of the globe which\nwe inhabit--its rotation upon its axis which gives us the alternation of\nDay and Night, and its revolution round the Sun which gives us the year\nwith its Seasons. To the former of these, animal life seems most\ndirectly related; to the latter, the life of the vegetal orders. It is\nevident that the forms of animal life on the globe are necessarily\ndetermined by the periodic law of the Earth's diurnal rotation. This\naccounts for the alternations of waking and sleeping, working and\nresting, and so forth. In like manner the more inert vitality of the\nvegetable kingdom is determined by the periodic law of the Earth's\nannual revolution. When fanciful speculators seek to imagine what kind\nof living beings might be encountered on the other planets of our\nsystem, they usually make calculations as to the force of gravity on the\nsurface of these planets and conjure up from such data the possible size\nof the inhabitants, their relative strength and agility of movement,\netc. So far so good. But the first question we should ask, before\nproceeding to our speculative synthesis, should rather be the length of\nthe planet's diurnal rotation and annual revolution periods. Certain\nplanets, such as Mars and Venus, have rotation periods not very\ndifferent from those of our own Earth.[14:1] Other things being equal,\ntherefore, a certain similarity of animal life must be supposed possible\non these planets. On the other hand, the marked difference in their\nrevolution period would lead us to expect a very wide divergence between\ntheir lower forms of life, if any such there be, and our own terrestrial\nvegetation. The shorter the annual period the more would the vegetal\napproximate to the animal, and _vice versa_. It would, however, be\nfoolish to waste more time over a speculation so remote.\n\nBut these two facts remain unshaken:--(1) That our measurements and\nwhole science of Time depend absolutely on the operation throughout\nNature of the Law of Periodicity, and (2) that the periodicities which\naffect and determine animal and vegetal life upon our Earth are the\nperiodic movements of rotation and revolution of that Earth itself.\n\nNow it is to the curvilinear motions of the heavenly bodies that we must\nascribe our subjection to the periodic law. If these heavenly bodies\nmoved for ever in straight lines, as they would do if unacted on by\nnatural forces, the periodic rhythm of Nature would disappear.\n\nIt is to the fact that all Nature is under the constraint due to the\nconstant silent operation of physical Force that we owe, therefore, the\nlaw which determines the most essential features of vitality. The\npulsations in which life consists and by which it is sustained are\nattributable to the constraint and limitation which we recognise as the\neffect of the operation of Natural Force. It is to this same cause that\nwe ascribe the resistance of cohering masses in virtue of which\nsensation arises and by which our experience is punctuated. It is by\nmeans of these obstructions to free activity that our experience is\ndenoted, and by reference to these that it is cognised. Indeed, Activity\nitself as we know it depends upon and presupposes the existence of\nthese cohering masses.\n\nThus the operation of Natural Force and the constraint and limitation\nwhich are thereby imposed upon our activity appear at once to determine\nthe conditions of life and to furnish the fundamental implements of\nKnowledge.\n\nWe cannot overleap the barriers by which Life is constrained. These,\nwhilst, on the one hand they seem to _create the environment_ which\nsustains Life, on the other hand seem to impose upon it the limitations\nunder which it inevitably fails and dies. We cannot even in imagination\nconceive, either as reality or as fancy, the illimitable puissance of a\nLife perfectly free and unrestrained. Yet the assurance that Perfect\nLove could overcome the bonds of Materiality and Death encourages in\nmankind the Hope of an existence beyond the impenetrable veil of\nphysical limitation. And this at any rate may be admitted, namely, that\nthat dynamic condition in which materiality arises is also the\ncondition-precedent of Tridimensionality, of Force, of Time, and of\nMutation. But we cannot thus account for the _elan vital_ itself.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[11:1] Plato in the dialogue _Timaeus_ tells us that Time was born with\nthe Heavens, and that Sun, Moon, and Planets were created in order that\nTime might be.\n\n[12:1] This might be contrasted with the statement of M. Bergson who\ntells us (_Evolution creatrice_, p. 11): \"Plus nous approfondirons la\nnature du temps plus nous comprendrons que duree signifie invention,\ncreation de formes, elaboration continue de l'absolument nouveau.\"\n\n[14:1] Recently, we believe, astronomers have favoured the view that the\nday of Venus is equal in length to her year.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF PHYSICAL CONCEPTS\n\n\n\"_Penser c'est sentir_,\" said Condillac. \"It is evident,\" said Bishop\nBerkeley, \"to one who takes a survey of the _objects_ of Human Knowledge\nthat they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses or else such\nas are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the\nMind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination either\ncombining, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived\nin the foresaid ways.\" J. S. Mill tells us, \"The points, lines, circles,\nand squares which one has in his mind are, I apprehend, simply copies of\npoints, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his\nexperience,\" and again, \"The character of necessity ascribed to the\ntruths of Mathematics and even, with some reservations to be hereafter\nmade, the peculiar certainty attributed to them is an illusion.\" \"In the\ncase of the definitions of Geometry there exist no real things exactly\nconformable to the definitions.\" Again Taine, \"_Les images sont les\nexactes reproductions de la sensation._\" Again Diderot, \"_Pour imaginer\nil faut colorer un fond et detacher de ce fait des points en leur\nsupposant une couleur differente de celle du fond. Restituez a ces\npoints la meme couleur qu'au fond,--a l'instant ils se confondent avec\nlui et la figure disparait_,\" etc. Again, Dr. Ernest Mach, Vienna,\nremarks, \"We are aware of but one species of elements of Consciousness:\nsensations.\" \"In our perceptions of Space we are dependent on\nsensations.\" Dr. Mach repeatedly refers to \"space-sensations,\" and\nindeed affirms that all sensation is spatial in character.[18:1]\n\nAccording to the view of Knowledge of which we have extracted examples\nabove, the ideas of the mind are originally furnished to it by\nsensation, from which therefore are derived, not necessarily all our\nThoughts, but all the materials of Discourse, all that constitutes the\nessence of Knowledge.\n\nOur purpose at the moment is to show that this view is altogether false,\nand our counter proposition is, that it is from our Activity that we\nderive our fundamental conceptions of the external world; that\nsensations only mark the interruptions in the dynamic Activity in which\nwe as potent beings partake, and that they serve therefore to denote and\ndistinguish our Experience, but do not constitute its essence.\n\nWe do not propose now to devote any time to the work of showing that\nsensations from their very nature could never become the instruments of\nKnowledge. We propose rather to turn to the principal ideas of the\nexternal world which are the common equipment of the Mind in order to\nascertain whether in point of fact they are derived from Sensation.\n\nOf course to some extent the answer depends on what we mean by\nSensation. If by that term we intend our whole Experience of the\nexternal, then of course it necessarily follows--or, at least, we\nadmit--that our Knowledge of the external must be thence derived. But\nsuch a use of the term is loose, misleading, and infrequent. The only\nsafe course is to confine the term Sensation to the immediate data of\nthe five senses--touch, sight, hearing, smell, and taste, with probably\nthe addition of muscular and other internal feelings. It is in this\nsense that the word is usually employed, and has been employed by the\nSensationalist School themselves.\n\nNow we might perhaps begin by taking the idea of Time as a concept\nconstantly employed in Discourse, but of which it would be absurd to\nsuggest that it is supplied to us by Sensation. It might, however, be\nurged in reply that the idea of Time is not derived from the external\nworld at all, but is furnished to us directly by the operations of the\nMind, and that therefore its intellectual origin need not involve any\nexception to the general rule that the materials of our Knowledge of the\nworld are furnished by Sensation alone. Without, therefore, entering\nupon any discussion of the interesting question as to what is the real\nnature of Time, we shall pass to the idea of Space.\n\nMach, the writer whom we have already quoted, in his essay on _Space and\nGeometry_ speaks constantly and freely of sensations of Space, and as\nthere can be no denial of the fact that Space is a constituent of the\nexternal world, it would seem to follow that those who hold Sensation to\nbe the only source of our Knowledge must be obliged to affirm the\npossibility of sensations of Space. Mach indeed claims to distinguish\nphysiological Space, geometrical Space, visual Space, tactual Space as\nall different and yet apparently harmoniously blended in our Experience.\nHe is, however, sadly wanting in clearness of statement. He never tells\nus when and where exactly we do have a sensation of Space. In truth he\nnever gets behind the postulate of an all-enveloping tridimensional\nworld; so that he throughout assumes Space as a datum, and his inquiry\nis an effort to rediscover Space where he has already placed it.\n\nLet us, however, consider for a moment what can be meant by a sensation\nof Space. Does it not look very like a contradiction in terms? Pure\nSpace, if it means anything, means absolute material emptiness and\nvacuity. How, then, by any possibility can it give rise to a sensation?\nWhat sensory organ can it be conceived as affecting? How and in what way\ncan it be felt?\n\nThe truth is the idea of Space is essentially negative. It represents\nabsence of physical obstruction of every kind. No doubt, we may describe\nit positively as a possibility of free movement, and such a description\nis at once true and important. Yet even _it_ involves a negative. The\nterm \"free\" is in reality, though not in form, a negative term and means\n\"unconstrained.\" And the reason why such a term is necessarily negative\nis to be found in the fact that a state of dynamic constraint is the\nessential condition under which we enter upon our organic existence.\nFreedom is a negation of the Actual. Absolute freedom is a condition\nonly theoretically possible, and is essentially the negation of the\nstate of restraint in which our life is maintained.\n\nBut the definition last quoted is nevertheless valuable because it\nclearly shows what really is the origin of the idea of Space. It proves\nthat the idea of Space is a representation of one condition of our\nActivity. It is because the primary work of Thought is to represent the\nforms of our dynamic Activity that we find the idea of Space so\nnecessary and fundamental.\n\nBut it will perhaps be argued that our ordinary sensations carry with\nthem a spatial meaning and implication, and that indirectly, therefore,\nour sensations _do_ supply us with the idea of Space. It will readily be\nagreed that if this is so of any sensations it is pre-eminently true of\nthe sensations of vision and touch. Indeed, it will perhaps not be\ndisputed that the ordinary vident man derives from the sensations of\nvision his most common spatial conceptions. We propose, therefore, to\ninquire very briefly how the character of spatial extension becomes\nassociated with the data of Vision.\n\nThe objects of Vision appear to be displayed before us in immense\nmultitude, each distinct from its adjacent neighbour, yet all\ninter-related as parts of one single whole--the presentation thus\nconstituting what is called Extensity.\n\nThis is the most commonly employed meaning of the term spatial. Yet it\nis evidently in its origin rather temporal than spatial. In ordinary\nmovement we encounter by touch various obstacles, but only a very few of\nthese impress us at any one moment of time. On the contrary, they\nsucceed one after the other. To the blind, therefore, as Platner long\nago remarked: Time serves instead of Space. In Vision, on the other\nhand, a large number, which it would take a very long time to encounter\nin touch, are presented _simultaneously_. In this there is an immense\npractical advantage, the result being that we come habitually to direct\nour every action by reference to the data of Sight. Now it is because\nthese data--so simultaneously presented--are employed by us as the\nguides of action that their presentation acquires the character which we\ndenominate Extensity. The simultaneous occurrence of a large number of\nSounds does not seem to us to present such a character. But let us\nsuppose that all the objects which constitute obstacles to our Activity\nemitted Sounds by which they were recognised; it is not doubtful that\nthese would then come to be employed by us as the guides of our Activity\nand would acquire in our minds the character of Extensity. They would\narrange themselves in a cotemporaneous, extensive, or spatial relation\nto one another just as the objects of Vision do at present.\n\nIt is only, therefore, when we come to employ the simultaneous\npresentation of Vision as the instrument of our Activity and the guide\nof Action that it acquires the character commonly called extensive.\n_Successive_ visual sensations convey no extensive suggestion.\n\nIt is important to realise the nature of this peculiar feature in the\ndata of Vision. The sounds which we hear, the odours which we smell, are\nthe immediate result of certain undulations affecting the appropriate\norgan of sensation. We refer these to the object in which the\nundulations originate. In like manner a light which we see is referred\nto its objective luminous source. But light also and in addition is\nreflected from, and thus reveals the presence of the whole body of our\nresistant environment. Hence is derived the coloured presentation of\nVision to which the character of extensity attaches. Nothing similar\ntakes place in the case of the other distantial sensations. If sonorous\nundulations excited vibration in every resistant object of the\nenvironment they would undoubtedly come to arrange themselves in an\norder resembling the extensity suggested by Vision, though the slower\nrate of transmission of sound would detract from the practical\nsimultaneity in the effect which, as we have seen, largely accounts for\nthe perception of visual extensity. The universal diffusion of sunlight\nis also a determining factor.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe matter becomes still clearer when we contrast the experience of\nvident men with what we have been able to learn of the experiences of\nthe blind. Nowhere have we found this aspect of the question discussed\nwith the same clearness and ability as by M. Pierre Villey in his\nrecently published essay, _Le Monde des Aveugles_--Part III.\n\nThe blind man, as he remarks, requires representations in order to\ncommand his movements. We must then penetrate the mind of the blind and\nascertain what are his representations. Are they, he asks, muscular\nimages combined by temporal relations, or are they images of a spatial\norder? He replies without hesitation: Both, but, above all, spatial\nimages. It is clear, he says, that the modalities of the action of the\nblind are explained by spatial representations. These must be derived\nfrom touch. What, then, can be the spatial representations which arise\nfrom touch? The blind, he says, are often asked, How do you figure to\nyourself such and such an object, a chair, a table, a triangle? M.\nVilley quotes Diderot as affirming that the blind cannot imagine.\nAccording to Diderot, images require colour, and colour being totally\nwanting to the blind the nature of their imagination was to him\ninconceivable. The common opinion, says M. Villey, is entirely with\nDiderot. It does not believe that the blind can have images of the\nobjects around him. The photographic apparatus is awanting and the\nphotograph cannot therefore be there.\n\nDiderot was a sensationalist. For this school, as Villey remarks,\n_l'image est le decalque de la sensation_, and he refers not merely to\nCondillac the friend of Diderot but to his continuator Taine whose\ndictum we have already quoted.\n\nDiderot attempts to solve the problem by maintaining that tactual\nsensations occupy an extended space which the blind in thought can add\nto or contract, and in this way equip himself with spatial conceptions.\n\nThere would, on this view, as M. Villey remarks, be a complete\nheterogeneity between the imagination of the blind and that of the\nvident. M. Villey denies this altogether. He affirms that the image of\nan object which the blind acquires by touch readily divests itself of\nthe characters of tactual sensation and differs profoundly from these.\nHe takes the example of a chair. The vident apprehends its various\nfeatures simultaneously and at once; the blind, by successive tactual\npalpations. But he maintains that the evidence of the blind is unanimous\non this point, that once formed in the mind the idea of the chair\npresents itself to him immediately as a whole,--the order in which its\nfeatures were ascertained is not preserved, and does not require to be\nrepeated. Indeed, the idea divests itself of the great bulk of the\ntactual details by which it was apprehended, whilst the muscular\nsensations which accompanied the act of palpation never seek to be\njoined with the idea. This divestiture of sensation proceeds to such an\nextent that there is nothing left beyond what M. Villey calls the pure\nform. The belief in the reality of the object he refers to its\nresistance. The origin of each of these is exertional. The features upon\nwhich the mind dwells, if it dwells upon them at all, are _les qualites\nqui sont constamment utiles pour la pratique_--in a word, the dynamic\nsignificance of the thing.\n\nWe may remark that much the same is true of the ideas of the vident. In\nordinary Discourse we freely employ our ideas of external objects\nwithout ever attempting a detailed reproduction of the visual image.\nSuch a reproduction would be both impracticable and unnecessary, and\nwould involve such a sacrifice of time as to render Discourse altogether\nimpossible. All that the Mind of the vident ordinarily grasps and\nutilises in his discursive employment of the idea of any physical thing\nis what we have ventured to call its dynamic significance. And the very\ncareful analysis which M. Villey has made of the mental conceptions of\nthe blind clearly shows that in their case he has reached exactly the\nsame conclusion.\n\nOur fundamental conceptions of the external world are therefore derived\nfrom and are built up out of the data of our exertional Activity\ncombined with the interruptions which that Activity perpetually\nencounters, and in which sensations arise. It would indeed be a useful\nwork of psychological analysis if the conditions of exertional action\nwere carefully and systematically investigated--much more useful than\nmost of the trifling experiments to which psychological laboratories are\nusually devoted.\n\nThe principal elements of such a scheme would be--\n\n(1) The force of gravity. This force constantly operating constrains\nthe organism to be in constant contact with the earth on which we live.\nBut, further, it gives us the definite idea of _Direction_. It is from\nthe action of gravity that we derive our distinction between Up and Down\nfrom which as a starting-point we build up our conception of\ntridimensional Space. And in this respect it must be remembered that as\nthe areas of spheres are proportional to the squares of their radii it\nnecessarily follows that gravity if it acts uniformly in tridimensional\nSpace _must_ vary in intensity in proportion to the square of the\ndistance of the point of application from the centre of origin. Gravity\nand tridimensionality are in short necessarily connected.\n\n(2) The same law which determines the force of gravity seems to\ndetermine also the force of cohesion, and therefore the form of material\nbodies. These, therefore, are necessarily subject also to\ntridimensionality, and in the force which generates solid form we find a\nsecond source of our elementary spatial ideas.\n\nSuch form is the expression of an obstacle to action which determines\nall our movements, and in which we discover those forms of the\nlimitations of activity which we call spatial characters.\n\n(3) Organic Dualism is a third determinant of activity, and thus also a\nsource of spatial ideas.\n\nThe structural dualism of the human body, its right and left, its front\nand back, etc., furnish our activity with a set of constant forms to\nwhich its action must conform, and which necessarily also partake of,\nand help us to conceive of tridimensional form. It is interesting to\nnote that this dualism characterises the organs specially adapted to\nserve exertional action rather than those which serve our vegetal or\nnutrient life.\n\nThe way in which our spatial conceptions are ever extended and built up\nout of the data of action is also well illustrated in the case of the\nblind, and to this also M. Villey devotes an interesting chapter under\nthe title _La conquete des representations spatiales_.\n\nThis is effected in their case by the high development of what we must\ncall active touch. Just as we distinguish between hearing and listening,\nbetween seeing and looking, so must we distinguish between touching and\n_palpation_.\n\nMere passive touch gives a certain amount of information, but\ncomparatively little. It is necessary to _explore_; that is what is done\nin active touch--palpation--of different degrees.\n\nThe sensitiveness of the skin varies at different places from the tongue\ndownwards. Palpation by the fingers marks a further stage. The blind\nalso, we are told, largely employ the feet in walking as a source of\nlocative data.\n\nTo the concepts reached by such palpation with the hand, M. Villey gives\nthe name of Manual Space. In this connection he thinks it necessary to\ndistinguish between synthetic touch and analytic touch--the former\nresulting from the simultaneous application of different parts of the\nhand on the surface of a body, the latter that which we owe to the\nmovements of our fingers when having only one point of contact with the\nobject the fingers follow its contour. Various examples of the delicacy\nof the information thus obtainable are given. Following two straight\nlines with the thumb and index respectively, a blind man can acquire by\npractice a sensibility so complete as to enable him to detect the\nslightest divergence from parallelism.\n\nThe analysis passes on from the data of Space manual to those of Space\nbrachial; then to the information derived from walking and other\nmovements of the lower limbs, and then to the co-ordination of the\ninformation derived from the sensations of hearing, which is necessarily\nvery important to the blind.\n\nThe conclusion of the whole matter is that our principal spatial ideas\nare common alike to the blind and the vident. Both can be taught and are\ntaught the same geometry. Both understand one another in the\ndescription of spatial conditions. The common element cannot possibly be\nsupplied either by the data of visual sensation which the blind do not\npossess, or by the data of passive tactual sensation which the vident\nhardly ever employ. _Une etendue commune se retrouverait a la fois dans\nles donnees de la vue et dans celles du toucher._ The common element is\nfurnished by the common laws and forms of our exertional Activity by\nmeans of which and in terms of which we all construct our conceptions of\nthe dynamic world of our environment.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is from our dynamic Activity also that we derive our conception of\nForce. Force, though it is studied scientifically in the measurement of\nthe great natural forces which operate constantly, is originally known\nto us in the stress or pressure to which muscular exertion in contact\nwith a material body gives rise. Such a force if it could be correctly\nmeasured, would record the rate at which Energy was undergoing\ntransmutation, and it is from such experience of pressure that our idea\nof Force is originally derived.\n\nThe mass of bodies is usually measured by their weight, _i.e._ by\ngravity. Its absolute measurement must be in terms of momentum. The true\nestimate of the Energy of a body moving under the impulse of a constant\nForce is stated in the formula 1/2MV{2}. To ascertain M, therefore, we\nmust have given F and V, and these are both conceptions the original\nidea of which is derived from our exertional activity.\n\nQuantity of Matter originally means the same as amount of resistance to\ninitiation of motion, at first estimated by the varying amount of\npersonal muscular energy required to effect the motion in question,\nthereafter objectively and scientifically by comparison with some\nindependent standard whereby a more exact estimation can be attained\nthan was possible by a mere reference to the varying inferences of the\nindividual who might exert the force.\n\nSpace, Mass, Force are all therefore ideas which are furnished to us out\nof our experience as potent actors, and the recognition of this great\ntruth provides us with the means of clearly apprehending and co-relating\nour conceptions of the external world, the framework of our Knowledge.\n\nThe true distinction between a _percept_ and a _concept_ is just that a\npercept is a concept associated with the dynamic system discovered in\nand by our exertional activity.\n\nIn like manner we find here the true solution of the many questions\nwhich have been raised as to the distinction between general and\nabstract, singular and concrete terms.\n\nLanguage expresses action: the roots of language are expressions of the\nelementary acts which make up experience. They are therefore general.\nEach applies to every act of the class in question. They are also\nconcrete. That is so because they refer to exertional activities.\nAbstract terms are terms abstracted from this dynamic reference. Thus\n_white_ is concrete because colour is a property of the dynamic world.\nBut when this property is considered apart from its dynamic support it\nis called _whiteness_, and becomes abstract. In the case of purely\nmental qualities the term is regarded as abstract simply because the\nquality is in every reference extra dynamic. Thus _candour_, _justice_\nare called abstract terms; they are properties of the Mind. But a\nproperty of the dynamic system, _e.g._ Gravitation, does not strike us\nas abstract--the sole distinction being the dynamic reference which the\nlatter term implies.\n\nIt will even be seen that there is sometimes a shading off of abstract\nquality. Thus _Justice_ as an attribute of the Mind strikes us as a\npurely abstract term. But as the word takes up a dynamic reference so\ndoes its abstraction diminish. Thus in the expression \"Administration of\nJustice\" the abstractive suggestion is less pronounced; till in the\nperson of Justice Shallow it vanishes in the very concrete.\n\nBehind and beneath all these considerations we should never lose sight\nof the great main facts--that thought is an activity; that its function\ntherefore is to represent or reproduce our pure exertional activity;\nthat such representation is _at the basis_ of all our concepts of\nexternality; that sensation, _per se_ is mere interruption of activity;\nthat _per se_ it possesses no spatial or extensive or external\nsuggestiveness; that sensations nevertheless serve to denote or give\nfeature and particularity to our experience of activity; that all\nperception of the external is at bottom therefore a mental\nrepresentation of exertional activity and its forms, denoted,\npunctuated, identified by sensation, which latter by itself, we repeat,\ncarries no suggestion of externality. This view revolutionises the whole\npsychology of Perception, and therefore, though it at once gives to that\nscience a much-needed unity, clarity, and simplicity, it will naturally\nbe accepted with reluctance by the laborious authors of the cumbrous\ntheories still generally current.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[18:1] His reason is that we _ab origine_ localise sensations with\nreference to our organism. This, of course, means by reference to the\nsystem of potent energy in which our organism essentially consists.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nTHE TWO TYPICAL THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE\n\n\nThe evolution of living organisms is in general a gradual and continuous\nprocess. But it is nevertheless true that it presents well-marked stages\nand can best be described by reference to these. Frequently, moreover,\nthe meaning and true nature of the movement at one stage is only\nrevealed after a subsequent stage has been reached.\n\nThe development of a brain or cerebrum marks one important advance. The\npresence of this organ renders possible to the animal in varying degree\nwhat are called representations of objects, and the faculty of making\nsuch representations appears to be a condition precedent to the\ndevelopment of deliberation, volition, and purposive action as opposed\nto reflex or instinctive activity. The latter is specially\ncharacteristic of other orders of organic existence such as the\nArticulata--being remarkably exemplified in the activities of the social\ninsects such as the bee.\n\nThe advent of man with his faculty of Discourse may be regarded as\nmarking another distinct stage in the evolutionary movement--a stage,\nmoreover, the operations of which throw light upon the whole nature of\ncerebral representations. The faculty of rational Discourse, as Max\nMueller pointed out, is denominated in Greek by the word +logos+,\napplicable at once to the mental activity and to its appropriate\nexpression in speech. Discourse is an instrument by means of which man\nhas been enabled to construct his whole system of representations of the\nworld in which he lives, the system of what is commonly called his\nKnowledge. Human Knowledge just is the body of man's representations of\nhis Experience in the world of which he forms a part. It is not\nnecessary to insist here on the gradual but remarkable growth and\nextension which Human Knowledge has undergone during the last two\nthousand years. Concurrently with its extension man's ability to control\nthe forces of Nature has been enlarged and increased. At the same time,\nhowever, that extension has rendered possible false developments and\naberrations to which the more limited representations of the brute are\nless liable.\n\nWith the faculty of rational Discourse constantly striving to extend the\nbounds of Knowledge, man came in time to attempt to give an account not\nonly of the immediate objects which surround him, but of the whole choir\nof Heaven and furniture of Earth. In this advance the Greeks took a\nleading part.\n\nWhen we first make acquaintance through historical records with the\nintellectual activity of the Greek mind, we find it engaged in the\nconstruction of various such schemes for an explanation of the\nworld--usually called cosmogonies.\n\nIt was at this stage of intellectual progress that what we might call an\ninterruption occurred in the normal process of evolution. Great\nintellectual activity had for some time prevailed in the Greek\ncommunities; several men of conspicuous genius--notably Heracleitus and\nParmenides--had carried speculation as to the origin and nature of the\nworld to a height hitherto undreamt of. These achievements and the\nconsciousness of continual progress had engendered in Athens\nparticularly what might be called an epidemic of intellectual pride.\n\nOn this scene Socrates appeared, plain, blunt, critical. His teaching\nwas in effect an appeal to men to reflect: to turn their attention away\nfrom the world which they were supposed to be explaining to the\ncontemplation of their own Minds by which the explanation was\nfurnished. +gnothi seauton+ was his motto. All explanations of the\nUniverse or of Experience were, as he showed, vain unless the Cognitive\nFaculty by which they were constructed were operating truly. In\nparticular, the process of Rational Discourse implied the use of\nconcrete general terms, which were recognised to be the essential\ninstruments of Cognition. Socrates therefore devoted his attention\nspecially to a critical examination of these general terms and also of\nthe abstract terms which were the familiar instruments of Discourse.\n\nThe Greeks of that day were endowed with a singular clearness of\nintellectual vision. They readily recognised that Knowledge was an\nintellectual process; they appreciated the activity of Thought or\nRational Discourse as essential to its formation. They quite understood\nthat Knowledge is not of the nature of a photograph--a resemblant\npictorial reproduction of the data furnished by sensation. Only very\ncasually and occasionally do we ever attempt to supply ourselves with a\nresemblant reproduction of our sensations. Obviously such a reproduction\nwould only be of value memorially and could tell us nothing new.\n\nThese early Greeks realised this, and they appear to have realised also\npretty clearly that it would be impossible by means of such pictorial\nimpressions to establish any community of Knowledge. It is of the\nessence of Knowledge that it is something which can be communicated to,\nand which is the common possession of, several individuals. That can\nnever be true of sensation. We can never tell whether our sensations are\nthe same as those of other people--never at any rate by means of\nsensations themselves; never unless and until such sensations have been\ninter-related by some other instrument. A mere photographic reproduction\nof sensation is thus quite useless as a means of Knowledge.\n\nIn some way or other general terms supply the common bond. The\nrecognition of this fact was one of the great results of the Socratic\ndiscussion. This explains the immense importance which Socrates\nnaturally attached to the criticism of general and abstract terms.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe work of Socrates in this direction was immediately taken up and\ncarried much further by Plato. Plato maintained that these general and\nabstract terms were in truth the names of ideas (+eide+) with which the\nmind is naturally furnished, and further that these ideas corresponded\nto and typified the eternal forms of things--the essential constituents\nof the real world. Knowledge was possible because there were such\neternal forms or ideal elements--the archetypes--of which the +eide+\nwere the counterparts and representations.\n\nKnowledge, Plato held, was concerned solely with these eternal forms,\nnot with sensation at all. The sensible world was in a state of constant\nflux and could not be the object of true science. Its apprehension was\neffected by a faculty or capacity (_Republic_, v. 478-79) midway between\nKnowledge and nescience to which he applied the term +doxa+, frequently\ntranslated _opinion_, but which in this connection would be much more\naccurately rendered, _sensible impression_, or even perception. At any\nrate, the term _opinion_ is a very unhappy one, and does not convey the\ntrue meaning at all, for no voluntary intellective act on the part of\nthe subject was implied by the term. Now intelligence in constructing a\nscheme of Knowledge is active. The ideas are the instruments of this\nactivity.\n\nPlato's doctrine of ideas was probably designed or conceived by him as\naffording an explanation also of the community of Knowledge. He\nemphasised the fluent instability of the sensible impression, and as we\nhave already pointed out, sensation in itself labours also under this\ndrawback that it contains and affords no common nexus whereby the\nconceptions or perceptions of one man can be compared or related with\nthose of another.\n\nIndeed, if Experience were composed solely of sensations, each\nindividual would be an isolated solipsistic unit--incapable of rational\nDiscourse or communication with his fellow-men. To cure this defect,\nPlato offered the ideas--universal forms common to the intelligence of\nevery rational being. Not only would they render possible a common\nKnowledge of Reality--the existence of such ideas would necessarily also\ngive permanence, fixity, law, and order to our intellectual activity.\nOur Knowledge would not be a mere random succession of impressions, but\na definitely determined organic unity.\n\nIn all this argument it must be remembered Plato never said or suggested\nthat the intellect of man--thus equipped with ideal forms--was thereby\nenabled to become, or did become, the creator of the world by and in\nwhich each one believes himself to be surrounded and included. He always\ndistinguished between Idea and Reality, between Thought and Thing. The\nideas were types of the forms immanent in things themselves. It has been\nsaid by some scholars that he generally distinguished between the two by\nthe employment of distinct terms, applying +eidos+ to the mental\nconception and +idea+ to the substantial form. This verbal distinction\nwas accepted by many scholars of the epoch of Liddell and Scott and\nDavies and Vaughan. A reference to this distinction in the present\nwriter's essay on _The Dynamic Foundation of Knowledge_ provoked at the\ninstance of one critic the allegation that it is not borne out by a\ncritical study of the Platonic texts. That is a matter of little moment\nand one upon which the writer cannot claim to pronounce. The important\npoint is that in one way or another Plato undoubtedly distinguished\nbetween and indeed contrasted the idea and the substantial form. No\ntrace of the solipsism which results from their being confounded and\nwhich has ultimately brought to destruction the imposing edifice of\nHegelian Thought is to be found in his writings.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe Platonic doctrine of ideas speedily found an energetic critic in\nAristotle. In Aristotle's view, it was quite unnecessary and\nunwarrantable to postulate the existence in the Mind of ideal forms or\ncounterparts of the substantial forms of Reality. This, according to\nhim, was a wholly unnecessary reduplication. He was content to believe\nthat the mind found and recognised the essential forms of things when\nthey were presented to it in perceptive Experience. _Universalia in re_\nwere conceived by him as sufficiently explaining the genesis of\ncognition without the postulation of any such _universalia extra rem_.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo the Platonic doctrine he offered the further objection that the\neternal forms of things which that doctrine affirmed and which it\ndeclared to be represented in their ideal types were necessarily\nimpotential. There was no generative power in the pure activity of\nThought. If, therefore, the essentials of Reality were ideal, it\nfollowed that they also were impotent, and incapable of causative\nefficacy. The sensible world, however, was a fluent and perpetually\ngenerated stream, which required some potent cause to uphold it.\n\nThe eternal Reality which sustained the world was for him an Energy\nconstantly generating the actual, and no conception which failed to\nprovide for this process of causative generation of the things of Sense\ncould in his view adequately account for the phenomena of Nature nor\nconsequently could constitute the system of science.\n\nIn this argument Aristotle undoubtedly expressed a profound truth, but\nit may perhaps be admitted that he rather failed to appreciate fully\nthe difficulty which the Platonic doctrine was designed to meet--that,\nnamely, of providing some sort of common nexus or unifying principle by\nwhich the validity of Knowledge could be maintained. For he had no\ncertain means of showing that the potent energy of Nature was unitary\nand homogeneous.\n\nHe is frequently described as a sensationalist, but such a view is\ncertainly incorrect. This, however, may be admitted--that he sought the\nessentials of Reality not in the Mind but in the Object. It may be\nfairly claimed that to this extent he occupied common ground with the\nsensationalists, in that he was an adherent of the _tabula rasa_ view of\nthe Mind, expressed in the maxim:--\n\n_Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit in sensu._\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPlato and Aristotle may be taken as typical of the two principal\nintellectual tendencies which have characterised all subsequent\nspeculation--the Platonist, he who finds in the constitution of the Mind\nthe eternal principles or at least the types of the eternal principles\nof Reality; the Aristotelian, he for whom these seem to reside in the\nobject and, in the act of Cognition, are merely impressed upon,\ntransferred to, presented to, or otherwise introduced into or\napprehended by the Mind.\n\nThe Aristotelian view of Nature as an energetic process failed to\nimpress itself upon his successors. Greek Philosophy soon after\nAristotle's death decayed or was deprived of its early vigour, and the\ndoctrine which survived the wreck was essentially derived, however\nimperfectly, from the Platonic theory.\n\nThroughout the first fifteen hundred years of the Christian era this\ndoctrine undoubtedly dominated the course of speculation--a speculation\nof which much is now forgotten and almost as much was certainly barren\nand unfruitful, but of which we would entertain a very mistaken notion\nif we were to imagine that it was not often pursued with great subtlety\nand acumen.\n\nOne natural result of the fact that such a principle dominated human\nthought was the prevalence of a belief that the explanation of Nature\nand natural processes could be derived from the cognitive faculty\nitself. Our cognition of our immediate surroundings was doubtless\ncontinuously corrected by immediate practical tests. But the science of\na more extended view of Nature was vitiated by this false principle and\nin consequence for many centuries our whole Knowledge of Nature remained\nunprogressive and unfruitful.\n\n_Causa aequat effectum_, Nature abhors a vacuum, are examples of the\nmaxims derived or supposed to be derived from the necessities of our\nReason, and by the aid of which it was vainly hoped to attain a\nknowledge of Nature and natural laws.\n\nThe principle was in itself unsound.\n\nThe necessary laws of our rational faculty could discover to us only the\nessentials of that faculty itself.\n\nThe maxims by which it was sought to constitute _a priori_ a scheme of\nnatural laws could not justly claim descent from the necessities of\nThought. Had the Schoolmen formed a true conception of the nature of\nKnowledge they would never have imagined that any necessity of Thought\nobliged them to believe that a 10 lb. weight would fall to the ground\nmore rapidly than a 1 lb. weight. Equally true is it that their\nscientific principles had not been derived from any study of the action\nof natural law. They were unacknowledged intellectual orphans.\n\nThe movement associated with the names of Galileo, Bruno, Bacon, Kepler,\nand Newton owed its origin and its success to the abandonment of this\nvicious principle. So far as Nature was concerned, the Mind was regarded\nas a _tabula rasa_, and the physician set himself to ascertain the laws\nof nature not by reflection upon his own mental processes or\nrequirements, but by experiment with and observation of natural\nprocesses themselves. The result has been the establishment of modern\nscience--the greatest triumph which the human mind has yet achieved.\n\n     In a criticism of the writer's essay on _The Dynamic\n     Foundation of Knowledge_ in the _Revue neo-scolastique_ of\n     Louvain, the critic wrote as follows: \"Remarquons qu'il n'a\n     pas compris la synthese scolastique du moyen age, elle qui\n     cependant a concilie d'une facon admirable l'_actuel_ et le\n     _potentiel_ dans l'explication de la nature des choses. Il\n     s'est mepris aussi sur les caracteres de la methode\n     scolastique de connaitre la constitution intime du monde\n     experimental; il croit cette methode exclusivement deductive.\"\n\n     We have felt that candour demanded that we should quote the\n     foregoing passage--coming as it does from a source\n     exceptionally well qualified to express an opinion. If we have\n     nevertheless allowed ourselves in the precedent paragraphs of\n     this essay to express again the view which this critic seeks\n     to qualify, but which we still think in the main sound, we are\n     at the same time very glad to be able in this way to invite\n     attention to the undoubted fact that the distinction between\n     the actual and the potential was recognised by the schoolmen\n     as of a very deep significance. We believe further that the\n     real secret of the failure of mediaevalism to extend its\n     Knowledge of Nature was not so much a preference for\n     deductive over inductive methods as the failure to realise\n     that Nature was a dynamic operation.\n\nIt is important, then, to understand accurately what is the method of\nScience.\n\nThe external world of our Experience seems to be composed of sensible\nimpressions. The ever present visual panorama combined with the constant\noccurrence of other sensations suggests that Nature is, as has so often\nbeen asserted, simply another name for the sensible presentation. A\ntruer view of Nature was adumbrated by Aristotle when he formulated the\ntheory of an Energy ever generative of the sensible. If the founders of\nScience did not fully grasp the Aristotelian conception, it is at least\ncertain that they looked upon Nature not merely as a sensible\npresentation but as a process--a dynamic operation. It was to the study\nof these operations, to the measurement of the natural forces or normal\ncategories of physical action that Galileo and Newton devoted\nthemselves. The true estimate of a moving force may indeed be said to\nhave been their first great problem, just as the law of universal\ngravitation was their grandest generalisation.\n\nIt was to this sure instinct that the founders of Science owed their\nsuccess. Had they devoted themselves to the mere study of sensations--of\nblue things and green things, of hard things and soft things, of loud\nthings and silent things--Science as an efficient and co-ordinated\nsystem would never have come into being.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHaving struck the right path, they moved rapidly along it, leaving the\nSchoolmen and Philosophers behind them, suspicious, hostile, and amazed.\n\nBut Philosophy did not remain altogether negative. The new movement\nextended itself to Metaphysics, and under the leadership of Descartes a\nresolute effort was made to reform Philosophy on sympathetic lines.\n\nIt was in the true spirit of Socrates that Descartes advanced his famous\nmethod of Doubt. The whole fabric of beliefs and rational principles was\nto be subjected to a re-examination, and Descartes found himself on\nbedrock when he touched his famous _Cogito, ergo sum._ The simple fact\nor act of Doubt implied the Activity--the Reality therefore--of the\nDoubter. But the cogitant subject was reduced very much to the condition\nof a _tabula rasa_, and when Descartes proceeded to fill up the blank\nwith a rediscovery on more scientific lines of the essentials of\nCognition he found his basal feature in Extension. Tridimensional Space\nseemed the simple elementary framework of our Knowledge of Nature.\n\nThe method of Descartes was further extended by the English philosopher\nLocke. Those qualities which formed the elements of Knowledge were\ndescribed by him as the primary qualities of body; the sensible\npresentation comprised also the secondary qualities which seemed to be\nin some way superposed upon and contained within the former.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOur fundamental ideas of Nature were called by Locke sensible ideas.\nThese ideas were derived from our sensible Experience, and it is only\njust to Locke to point out that, when examined in detail, his sensible\nideas are seen to be not mere qualifications of sensation, but rather\nthe elementary characters of Nature viewed as a dynamic process and\ndiscovered by our Activity. Yet the ambiguous term _sensible ideas_\nunfortunately led to their being regarded as ideas derived, not from our\naction in any form, but from pure sensation alone.\n\nThis extraordinary error was intensified in the speculation of Berkeley\nand Hume. Experience with them appeared to consist solely of a\nsuccession of sensations appearing to, impressing, or affecting a\n_tabula rasa_ of consciousness.\n\nOf course in such a state of affairs all Knowledge would be impossible.\nThe scepticism which logically followed from such a doctrine was too\nuniversal to be capable even of the fiction that it was credible.\nBerkeley, it is true, endeavoured to save the situation by postulating\nthe incessant and immediate intervention of the Deity as the sustainer\nof the sensible panorama. This purely arbitrary and fictitious expedient\nwas entirely rejected by Hume, who with fearless honesty carried to its\nultimate results the direct consequences of the doctrine and then\ncomplacently left human Knowledge to take care of itself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nA masterly protest against the position of Hume was made by his\ncountryman Reid, who in his _Inquiry into the Human Mind_ very clearly\npointed out the fundamental difference between the sensible\naccompaniments or constituents of our Experience and the real and\nindependently existent substratum by which that Experience is sustained\nand organised. His argument, though it attracted considerable attention,\ndid not, however, affect as deeply as might have been expected the\nfuture of philosophic speculation, probably because he offered no new\nclue or key whereby to detect the origin and account for the presence in\nour Experience of those enduring and substantial elements or forms by\nwhich it is sustained, but on the contrary left their recognition to\nwhat he rather vaguely described as common sense.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMuch more influential was the elaborate answer of Kant, which has\nprofoundly affected the course of Metaphysics since its publication.\nReverting in principle to the platonic method, Kant again sought the\nenduring elements, the fundamentals of Science, in the constitution of\nthe cognitive faculty itself. But very differently from Plato he\ndiscovered these in the categories or essential forms of intellective\naction,--the category of causality and dependence and the so-called\nforms of the transcendental aesthetic--Time and Space. Under these\ncategories the indefinite data of sensation were thought to be organised\ninto a cognisable system.\n\nA rapid advance of speculation along the lines signalised by Kant took\nplace after his work was published, and for many years this movement was\nregarded by a large part of the speculative world as the most hopeful\nand progressive of philosophic efforts, and by its own votaries as\nplacing them in a position of superiority to all other schools of\nthought. The thoroughness of their studies and introspective methods to\nsome extent justified, or at least excused the arrogance of their\npretensions.\n\nBut it is to-day almost unnecessary even to criticise this Philosophy.\n\nFrom the first it was foredoomed to failure, and had no prospect of\nsucceeding where Plato--equipped with armour from the same forge--had\nalready failed.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nKantianism like Platonism failed because it still left the sensible\nunaccounted for. Not only did it fail to tell us whence came these\nsensations which, however transitory and unreal, constantly saluted our\nconsciousness and largely constituted our Experience; it failed also to\nshow us how they could be brought into relation with the faculty of\nKnowledge.\n\nFinding its elemental forms in the structure of the organ of Knowledge,\nit failed to tell us how we ever managed by means of these to get beyond\nour own subjective states, or how we ever came to think that there was a\nWorld outside of the individual consciousness, by the categories of\nwhich, according to them, our cognitions of such a World were called\ninto being. For if Reality were unknowable except by and through the\ncategories, then our Knowledge of Reality was the creature of our own\nmental activity, and we must still remain unable to understand why we\nshould suppose that we had got beyond ourselves.\n\nThese defects of Kantianism were early recognised by Schopenhauer, who\nalso appears to have realised that what was wanted was another and a new\nkey to unlock the gateway of Knowledge.\n\nKnowledge was in essence an affirmation or series of affirmations about\na real World distinct from the Knower. It was surely now obvious that\nthe warrant for such affirmations and the source of their validity must\ncome from somewhere beyond the cognitive faculty itself. The source upon\nwhich men again and again have seemed to fall back is Sensation; but\nSensation being transitory and dependent for its existence upon its\nbeing felt can really give us no help. Some other, some self-existent\nthing is wanted, and with considerable insight Schopenhauer suggested\nthat the key was to be found in the Will.\n\nBut this theory, though it has lately attracted considerable attention,\ncan hardly be claimed as offering any definite prospect of a solution.\nIts cardinal defect is that it still fails to show how the sensible\narises. It is supposed to be generated out of pure Volition, but no\ncausal nexus, no direct connection of any kind is immediately apparent\nbetween the two, and Schopenhauer in developing his theory did nothing\nto supply the want. The doctrine cannot therefore be regarded as more\nthan a helpful stepping-stone to the true answer.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn recent years various forms of opportunist philosophies under the\nnames of Pragmatism, Pluralism, etc., have endeavoured to elude the\npressure of the dilemma and to solace mankind for the failure of\nKantianism by advising them to accept Experience as it is. But though\nsuch a counsel of resignation may in a popular sense of the term be\nregarded as philosophical it can hardly be accepted as a solution.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWe find, then, that since man first began to inquire reflectively upon\nthe nature of his cognitive faculty his speculation has followed one or\nother of two great lines or divisions of theory, neither of which has\nbeen found to afford intellectual satisfaction.\n\nWe have (1) the theory that seeks in some way or other to derive the\nreal constituents of Science from the constitution of the cognitive\nfaculty itself. To this theory, which has inspired one whole stream of\nspeculation from Plato to Hegel, there are at least two absolutely fatal\nobjections.\n\n(_a_) It fails altogether to account for the sensible presentation which\nhowever fluent and unstable appears to stand in a direct and even\nunique relation to the real. It fails to let us understand how that\nrelation arises, how the sensible is generated, or how it enters into\nour consciousness.\n\n(_b_) We are unable under this theory to discover how we ever reach a\nKnowledge of the real World, how we can get beyond ourselves, how if the\nMind in its search for truth is perpetually intercepted by its own forms\nit can ever furnish us with any genuine cognitions of the external.\n\n(2) We have the theory that the essential forms of Reality are to be\nfound in the Object and are thence supplied to the Understanding, which\nplays the part merely of a receptive surface or _tabula rasa_.\n\nIn the hands of Aristotle this doctrine took the form of an affirmation\nthat Nature must be regarded as an energetic process containing within\nitself the potency by which it perpetually generated the actual.\n\nPromising as it was in Aristotle's hands, this speculation was not\ncarried forward or assimilated by his immediate successors. Indeed, it\nwas practically forgotten until the intellectual revival of the\nsixteenth century, which inaugurated the foundations of modern Science.\nHowever little the fact may have been consciously recognised even by\nthe leaders of scientific discovery, this was the conception of Nature\nwhich inspired and sustained the scientific advance. In the department\nof philosophic speculation, however, it appeared only under the debased\nand misleading form of a belief that the sensible presentation was the\ntrue source of the contents of Cognition, that it was from Sensation\nthat the Mind of Man derived the whole fabric of Science. \"_Penser c'est\nsentir_\" was the form in which it was expressed by Condillac, but was\nequally the view which commended itself to Berkeley, at least in his\nearly writings, to Hume, and to a whole army of successors down to J. S.\nMill.\n\nWe hope we have already sufficiently emphasised the falsity of such a\nview. Obviously, if the Mind were merely the passive recipient of a\nstream of impressions, no sort of rational Discourse, no scientific or\ncognitive effort could ever have been stimulated into activity, and the\nvery ideas of causality and relation, indeed all that we associate with\nthe exercise of the understanding, could never have been called into\nbeing.\n\nUpon neither of these views of the nature of Knowledge can we arrive at\nany consistent or intelligible conception of its genesis, nature, or\nmethod of operation.\n\nWhat, then, must we do? It is hardly doubtful that if we are to make\nany progress we must find another and a new key whereby to unlock the\ndouble door that bars the entrance to the inner shrine of truth.\n\nNow _the_ fundamental, or at least _a_ fundamental error characteristic\nof all these various efforts after a solution is to be found in the fact\nthat they view the World as a static thing rather than as a kinetic\nprocess.\n\nThe World to vision seems a great still thing in or on which no doubt\ninnumerable bodies are moving to and fro, but which itself--the\nfundamental thing--is solid and unchanging. But this is an illusion. The\nseemingly unchanging features are changeless only in the monotony of\ntheir constant mutation.\n\nCohering masses are rigid in respect only of the constancy of the\ndynamic process of transmutation in which cohesion consists. The sun\nshines eternally steady only in consequence of the ceaseless kinetic\nenergies which give it being.\n\nWhat we are ever doing in rational Discourse, what Knowledge constantly\naccomplishes, is to furnish an account, a reproduction of a series of\noperations. The World is a process--an activity. That was recognised as\nlong ago as the days of Heracleitus, but his disciples did\nnot--although we think there is good ground for believing that he\ndid[60:1]--his disciples did not realise that a process, whilst it\nimplies constant flux and change, implies also something permanent even\nin its mutations, something which undergoes the change and sustains the\nflow.\n\nTo understand a thing is to discover how it _operates_. The eternal\nforms of things are laws of natural action. Such are the law of\ngravitation, the laws of optics or of chemical combination. A static\npicture unless so interpreted must be at once valueless and meaningless.\n\nIt follows that Thought and Discourse, in furnishing us with Knowledge,\nmust themselves be active, and must in some way or other reproduce the\nactivity of Nature. Thought, in short, _is_ an Activity which reproduces\nthe activity of things, the activity in which the phenomena of Nature\narise.\n\nBut how do we arrive at any apprehension of Natural Action? What informs\nus that Nature is a potency ever operative? What suggests to us the\nconception of potency at all? We reply that we arrive at the idea of\npotent action because we are ourselves active beings. Our organism\nmaintains itself by constant physiological activities. These are the\npermanent constancies of transmutation which _constitute_ the organism.\n\nBut superimposed upon these there are our voluntary exertional\nactivities. By these latter we necessarily mingle with and indeed\nparticipate in the action of the natural forces which (as we usually\nsay) surround us, but which in point of fact do more than surround us.\nThe disparate grouping of natural bodies in vision blinds us to the fact\nthat we are really not merely surrounded by but are mingled with and\nparticipate in the dynamic system.[61:1] We are continually pressing\nwith our weight upon the bodies on which we rest, we are continually\nexerting or resisting the pressure of so-called adhering\nmasses--resistance-points in one dynamic system of which we are\nourselves a part. Thus it is that in our exertional action we reveal to\nour consciousness not only the forms of our own activity but the forms\nof the dynamic system which contains and yet transcends the Sensible and\nthe Ideal.\n\nThe theory we have suggested enables us to proceed at once to a\nrational explanation of Sensation.\n\nSensation is _obstructed action_. A detailed consideration of as many as\nyou like to take of the myriad constituents of our sensible Experience\nwill continually and without exception confirm this simple fact.\n\nIn Nature it is the potent action which is real. It alone can be\ndirectly represented by the activity of Thought. The mere obstruction of\nactivity is not a real thing, hence the unreal character of Sensation.\nYet the obstruction being an obstruction of the real action of Nature\nis, if not real, at least actual and immediate. Nay, its presence in our\nExperience, however mutable and unstable it may be, is the only sure\ntest and guarantee of Reality.\n\nEach of the two leading theories which have dominated speculation\npresents one partial aspect of the truth.\n\nThe eternal cognisable element of Reality _is_ apprehended, as the\nPlatonist holds, by the intellect and by the intellect alone. To that\nextent the Platonist is right. That cognisable element is Action. But\nAction is denoted for us only in the obstructions which it encounters.\nThese obstructions constitute our World of Sensible Experience, which\nis therefore for each of us the sure indicator of the Real. In\nrecognising this fact the sensationalist is right in his turn.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNot only does the dynamic conception of Nature enable us to account for\nSensation, but it lets us see how the Sensible World becomes a\nconstituent of Experience. It is by and through its obstructions and\nthese only that we featurise or denote our Experience. It is by the\nbreaks, the turnings in the road that we cognise its course. It is by\nthe line of rocks and breakers that we define the shore. But we must not\nmistake the turnings for the roadway nor the shore for the ocean.\n\nIt is in and by our activity that we discover this World of sensible\nobstructions. The features of the Sensible World correspond therefore to\nthe laws of our exertional activity, but the correspondence is\nrelational, not resemblant. Just so, it is by the reflection of Light\nthat we discover the forms of the obstacle which solid bodies oppose to\nthe radiant undulation. The resultant colours correspond to the form of\nthese obstructions; but the correspondence is relational not resemblant.\nThe same is true of sounds, of tactual sensations, of every other\nsensible obstacle to pure activity.\n\nBy the clouds of smoke we follow or used to follow the progress of the\nbattle, but the battle is something other than a cloud of smoke.\n\nWe are, as Plato told us in his famous allegory, like prisoners in a\ncave--our attitude averted from the aperture, and it is only by the\nshadows cast upon the cavern wall that we can interpret the events which\nare transacting themselves outside.\n\nIn one sense, therefore, the whole sensible and spatial World is real.\nAt least it is actual; and it affords us the materials from which we\nconstruct our scheme of phenomena, and by which the kinetic process of\nReality is denoted and conceived.\n\nThe question ever and anon occurs to us--How upon this view can we solve\nthe problem of transcendence? How even on this view of the case do we\nmanage to get beyond ourselves? How are we in any way helped thereto by\nthe fact that Reality consists in potent action rather than in\nSensation?\n\nAgain, the answer is significant. In action, that is, in exertional\naction, we are really _part_ of a larger _whole_. Our exertional action\nis _ab initio_ mingled in and forms really an integral part of the\ndynamic system in which our life is involved. The ever operative forces\nof Gravity, Cohesion, Chemical Affinity, and so forth are the phenomenal\nexpression of the laws of energetic transmutation in which we partake\nand of which we are organically a part, however apparently separate and\ndisparate our bodies may seem to be. It is life and feeling, not action,\nwhich really distinguish the individual from his environment, at least\nfrom his material dynamic environment. Be it noted that what is required\nis not an explanation of how we transcend Experience. That by no effort\ncan we ever do in Knowledge. All we are required to explain is how we\ntranscend our Thought and our Sensibility. The answer is: Our Experience\nbegins in action, and it begins therefore in a sphere which is beyond\nthe mere subjective Consciousness, and yet is _organically one_ with the\norgans of Cognition and Feeling.\n\nIt is only by a visual fiction that we come to regard our active selves\nas distinct from the dynamic system. We cannot, in fact, shake off the\nbonds of corporeality, of gravity, of all the various restraints of our\norganic activity.\n\nRelatively, however, the cerebral activity of Thought is liberated from\nthe stresses of the dynamic environment; hence the apparent freedom and\nindependence, under certain conditions, of Thought, Imagination, and\nVolition.\n\nA great difficulty in realising this view of Experience is to be found\nin the apparent Solidity and Inertia of material bodies. Sensible\nexperiences group themselves round these _constancies_. But a material\nbody, when its sensible concomitants are abstracted, is nothing more\nthan a permanent process of energy transmutation the interruption of\nwhich in one form or another may originate Sensation. It follows that\nthe world of spatially extended bodies is a homogeneous and consistent\nwhole, reflecting in its laws and forms the real operations by which it\nis constituted and sustained. But all this actual World is nevertheless\nphenomenal only, albeit the phenomena are derived from and related to\nthe Real as change is to the thing which changes.\n\nTo a large extent we are misled by the impressive prominence of the\nvisual data. In vision we are presented with a system of inter-related\nand simultaneously occurring sensations which we find by experience to\nbe the sure and certain indicators of the potent obstructions which our\nactivity encounters. For this reason we habitually make use of the\nvisual sign as the guide and instrument of our exertional activity, and\nthis habitual use leads us to regard the visual presentation as the\nessential form of Reality. However sure we are that that is a false\nview, it yet is very difficult to retrace our steps and re-enter the\nelemental darkness which involves the blind.\n\nThe philosophic value of the interpretation of Experience by the blind\nought therefore to be very great. Observations made on the experiences\nof the blind and of those to whom vision has been restored are not very\nnumerous, but many of these recorded by Plainer, the friend of Leibniz,\nand others are of the highest value, and remarkably confirm the view for\nwhich we have been contending.\n\nUndoubtedly, so far as we are aware, the most valuable contribution to\nthis aspect of the discussion is to be found in a little volume recently\npublished in Paris under the title _Le Monde des Aveugles_. The author,\nM. Pierre Villey, is himself blind. In the interests of Science he has\ncast aside the delicacy and reserve which have generally prevented the\nblind from analysing or at least from discussing the import of their\nexperiences. He is also fortunately possessed of a philosophic and\nhighly cultivated intellect, and has not failed to make himself\nacquainted with the general course of metaphysical speculation.\n\nThe present writer has been in correspondence with M. Villey, whose\nconclusions remarkably confirm the view for which this essay contends,\nand he finds that M. Villey recognises the truth of that view.\nIndividual quotations would only detract from the cumulative effect of\nhis argument, but we may refer in particular to the interesting\ndiscussion as to the relations between the space concepts of the blind\nand those of the vident. The blind can be taught, and are taught,\ngeometry, and can discuss and understand spatial and geometrical\nproblems. The sensible furniture by which the spatial conceptions of the\nblind are denoted obviously cannot be visual, and are no doubt largely\ntactual, whilst on the other hand the vident utilise the visual data to\nthe almost total exclusion of any other. There must therefore be some\ncommon measure by means of which a community is established between the\nspatial conceptions of the blind and those of the vident. M. Villey\nconcludes and clearly shows that the common medium is to be found in the\nfact that our spatial conceptions are fundamentally based upon and are\nexpressive of the discoveries of our exertional activity. Touch, in\nshort, is an ambiguous term and includes both passive sensations and\nthose forms of Activity which we describe when we use the term \"feel\" as\na transitive verb. Just as we distinguish between seeing and looking or\nbetween hearing and listening, so should we distinguish between touch\npassive and touch active or palpation.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe view of Science which we have endeavoured to explain has received a\nnotable confirmation from the establishment during the latter part of\nthe nineteenth century of the scientific doctrine of Energy.[69:1]\n\nThe culmination of the scientific fabric of which Galileo and Newton\nlaid the foundations was reached when it was demonstrated that the whole\nphysical universe must be regarded as composed of Energy, either kinetic\nand actually undergoing transmutation from one form to another, or\npotential and quiescent yet containing within itself the quantifiable\ncapacity of transformation. The objective correlatives of the different\nclasses of sensible experiences are found to be different forms which\nthis Energy assumes--the kinetic energy of a mass in motion, the radiant\nenergy of Light, the energy of Heat, the potential energy of chemical\nseparation, etc.--all these have now at length been shown to be forms of\none real thing capable under appropriate conditions of being transmuted\ninto each other and of which not only the inter-transmutability but the\nequivalent values can be calculated and have been found by experiment to\nbe fixed and definite. Thus the mechanical equivalent of heat is a fixed\nand definite quantity. The Energy of a body in motion can be measured\nand stated in terms of mass and velocity.\n\nThe profound conception of Aristotle, under which Nature was regarded as\na potent Energy containing within itself the capacity of generating the\nphenomenal World, has again been revived and realised--but with great\nadditions. The theory in the hands of Science is now not only confirmed\nby incessant experiment, but the relation which it affirms between\nreality and phenomenon has been _quantified_.\n\nMoreover, the actual operations under which the potential generates the\nactual have, so to say, been laid bare to view; and lastly, the\ninter-transmutability of all forms of Energy and its real unity have\nbeen established.\n\nThe doctrine has therefore received a confirmation of which Aristotle\ndid not dream, and its explanation has at the same time received an\nillumination which his vague if profound adumbration could never afford.\nWith this added support the true conception of human knowledge has\nreceived new strength. The theory is still, nevertheless, not to be\ngrasped without a resolute effort of reflection. It involves an\ninversion of our everyday conceptions more radical than that which was\ndemanded by the Copernican theory of astronomy, and we know that that\ntheory--offered to and rejected by mankind before the beginning of the\nChristian era--had to wait through sixteen or seventeen hundred years\nbefore it secured an acceptance, at first grudging and even now not\nalways adequate.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe ordinary metaphysical student has hitherto rather resented the idea\nthat in order to a true solution of the problem of Knowledge he must\nacquaint himself with the fundamental conceptions of physics. Yet so it\nis. It may perhaps be hoped that when the first strangeness of the new\nposition has disappeared the conditions may be accepted with greater\nreadiness. At any rate, a correct apprehension of our fundamental\nconceptions of the world of our external experience is indispensable. No\ntheory can wholly dispense with such conceptions. It is therefore\nessential that, however elementary, they should be clear and not\ncontradictory. Philosophy has always vaguely realised and exacted as\nmuch. The need is now imperative.\n\nSome years ago, in an essay on Schopenhauer, the author, Mr. Saunders,\nremarked, \"How the matter of which my arm is composed and that state of\nconsciousness which I call my Will [imagine anyone calling Will a state\nof consciousness!] are conjoined is a mystery beyond the reach of\nScience, and the man who can solve it is the man for whom the world is\nwaiting.\"\n\nWell, if that be so, then the world need not wait any longer. The\nrequired explanation is offered to metaphysics by the scientific work of\nthe physicians who built up and consolidated the modern doctrine of\nEnergy. It is true that most of them have continued to postulate the\nreality of material bodies. For their purpose there was no real\ndifficulty in doing so. What they required was a datum of configuration,\na phenomenal basis upon which their calculations could proceed and in\nterms of which, as a point of origin, their statement of transmutations\nwas made. The persistence of material bodies is a condition precedent to\nthe phenomenal manifestations in which our Experience arises. Organic\nexistence in every form and the world in which it arises presuppose the\nactuality of these. But dynamically they are merely the phenomenal\nresult of certain permanent forces constantly in operation. To beings,\nif there be such, inhabiting the Ether there is little doubt but that a\ngravitation system like that of the sun and its planets must present a\ncorporate rigidity and identity somewhat similar to that which cohering\nmasses present to our intelligence. But, in terms of reality, Energy,\npotential and kinetic, containing within itself the potency which\ngenerates the actual and sustains the constant transmutation in which\nphenomena arise is the sole and only postulate.\n\nThe rise of meta-geometrical methods and other branches of scientific\nspeculation have led in recent years to a considerable amount of very\ninteresting inquiry into the nature of our fundamental geometrical\nconceptions. Strange to say, a large body of respectable mathematicians\nhave been found to favour the extraordinary view that our mathematical\nconceptions are derived from Sensation. We do not propose here to\ndiscuss at length this idea. It is merely another form of the old\nsensationalist view of Knowledge, but we suggest that the conditions of\nthe problem will readily appear in their true light and real nature\nwhenever such inquirers realise the fact that our exertional activity is\nthe source of our cognitions of the external, and that therefore our\npure exertional activity is the source of the basal concepts of\ngeometry.\n\nHere lies the root of the distinction between pure and empirical\nscience. The propositions of geometry, being derived from our own pure\nactivity, are of the former class; the inductive conclusions of physical\nexperimental science, being gathered by observation and measurement\nfrom sensible data, are empirical and approximate. A geometrical\nproposition--such, for example, as the assertion that the three angles\nof a triangle are equal to two right angles--is not merely approximate.\nIt has no dependence on measurement. It is absolutely true. It is\nascertained deductively, and therefore measurement is not involved, and\nis never employed. Its truth is not ascertained by measurement. It is\nnot verified by measurement. It in no degree depends upon the sensible\nfigure. It is equally true for every human being whatever be the degree\nof accuracy of the figure by the aid of which he studies it, or indeed\nwhether he studies it by figure or otherwise, as must necessarily be the\ncase with the born blind.\n\nThere may be many different forms of energetic transmutation which may\ndetermine many other forms of space besides that form of tridimensional\nspace in which our Activity is involved. For such, a different geometry\nmay and will be applicable; but for the tridimensional conditions of\n_our activity_ the proposition is necessary and absolute. No measurement\nof any stellar parallax, however minute and whatever the result might\nbe, could have any bearing on its truth. Geometry is the science of the\npure forms of our motor activity amidst corporeal bodies.\n\nA useful illustration of our argument is to be drawn from a\nconsideration of the question of phonetic spelling. Occasionally we find\npersons urging that all spelling should be an exact reproduction of\nsound. Indeed, an improved alphabet has been designed to enable the idea\nto be carried out with greater accuracy.\n\nNow it is quite true that it is by their sound that we recognise or\ndenote our words. Hence our alphabet was originally phonetic in\nprinciple, and indeed still is so, although the correspondence is\nimperfect. As the use of visible signs develops spelling seems to fall\ninto certain fixed frames and to deviate more and more from pure\nphonetic simplicity. But why is this so? It is because the sounds are\nmerely the symbols or indicators of the different forms of vocal\narticulation (vocal acts), and it is really as the symbols and\nindicators of these actions that they possess any meaning and acquire\nsuch permanence and identity as they have. The phonetic system,\ntherefore, becomes in use subordinated to the expression of the acts by\nwhich are produced these radical vocables which constitute the\nessentials of rational Discourse.\n\nIn all this the process of the expression of words in spelling is a\nmicrocosmic counterpart of the process of cognition as we have tried to\nexplain it.\n\nIt is noteworthy that the same thing necessarily happens in the case of\nany new system of spelling.\n\nThe most prominent advocates of phonetic spelling have been also the\nauthors of a system of phonetic shorthand.\n\nLike the written and printed alphabet of Europe, the alphabet of\nPhonography was made phonetic. Indeed it started off as a more nearly\nperfect phonetic system than the ordinary European alphabet. But as its\nuse advances its employment undergoes the same change. The phonetic\nsymbols are abbreviated by grammalogues and contractions, and this\nproceeds in accordance with a principle unconsciously recognised but\nwhich really depends on the same inherent necessity to preserve in a\nconsistent form the expression of the radical vocables of Speech.\nFinally, in the hands of the expert stenographer the system of phonetic\nshorthand (though he still uses the sound as the guide and indicator of\nhis actions) is as far removed from a pure phonetic representation as\nthe ordinary method of spelling. Indeed, unless some such suprasensible\nand unifying principle were available, phonetic spelling would speedily\nperish in an infinity of degenerate variations.\n\nWe adduce this illustration as one which very well confirms our main\nargument. We have no desire to discuss on its merits the general\nquestion of Spelling Reform, which of course is quite apart from the\nattempt to establish a scheme of spelling on a purely phonetic basis. A\nmore rational system of spelling is nevertheless an object worthy of all\nconsideration.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIntellectualism and sensationalism have both broken down. The world of\nspeculation is anxiously looking for a new clue. Witness the pathetic\neagerness with which it clutches at every floating straw. The\ninnumerable \"isms\" by which it seeks ever and anon to keep itself afloat\nare most of them but the sometimes unrecognisable wreckage of the old\nsystems drifting about under very inappropriate names. Such terms as\nRealism and Idealism are freely used (generally prefixing the adjective\n\"new\") by writers in philosophic periodicals in a sense which might make\nPlato, Aquinas, or Kant turn in their graves.\n\nWe see their votaries encumbered with the trappings of a futile\nerudition of the insignificant or clinging pathetically to the insecure\nrelics of teleological doctrine, or, still less virile, seeking support\nin a return to the unscientific tales of supernatural spiritualism. Such\nefforts are vain.\n\nOnly by facing the facts with all their consequences, whatever these\nmay be and whatever they may involve for the proudest aspirations of\nmankind--only thus can truth be attained. And lest any should say that\nwe preach an unrelieved pessimism, let us remind such that Knowledge is\nnot after all the source of Life, that another category and a different\nprinciple--that, namely, which we indicate under the term\nLove-divine--must have generated the potent current of Life, and that no\none should close the door against the hopes of the human Intelligence\nuntil he has discovered what are the limits imposed upon what Perfect\nLove can do.\n\nThe question still remains whether mankind will be equal to the effort\nrequired to assimilate the essential truth. They very nearly failed to\nassimilate the Copernican cosmogony. For sixteen hundred years after it\nwas first offered to mankind the race preferred to grope in the darkness\nand confinement of a false conception.\n\nIf they succeed in accomplishing the reception of the new truth,\nunheard-of progress may be looked for. If they fail, civilisation must\ndisappear and humanity decline. There is no middle course. As Bacon\nremarked, in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only to God and\nangels to be lookers-on.\n\nWe know how stubbornly the Ptolemaic cosmogony still clings to our\nconceptions, how largely it still dominates--or till recently did\ndominate--the religious cosmography of the most civilised peoples.\n\nIn Philosophy our leading teachers seem as yet to have a very feeble\nappreciation of the new conditions. They turn greedily to the eloquent\npages of _L'Evolution creatrice_, but however earnestly they search they\ncannot find there any definite solution of the difficulties of the\nage-old problem. They wander wearily through the mazes of psychological\ndetail or wage almost childish logomachies over the interpretation of\neach other's essays. Philosophical magazines are filled with articles\nwhich reflect this state of the philosophic mind. Philosophical\ncongresses meet and argue and go home; Gifford lecturers prelect; yet so\nfar as can be seen there is little sign that the key has been grasped.\nThe great fact remains obscured amidst a mass of words.\n\nThe elucidation of the problem of Knowledge demands certain improvements\nin our philosophic terminology. Language as a rule is a very unerring\nphilosopher, and words shaped and polished by long usage generally\nexpress, more truly than those who use them realise, the essential\nreality of things. Yet these long-enduring errors of the ages which we\nhave been discussing here have left their impress too on the terminology\nof Metaphysics.\n\nThought and Action are in common speech contrasted, and the distinction\nexpresses an essential truth. But when we seek to say further that both\nof these are Activities, we are stating another truth in terms which are\nhardly consistent with the previously contrasted distinction. It might\nbe better if Action and Active could be applied generally to both and if\nthe term _exertion_ could be substituted for Action in describing the\nforms of activity which we denominate _motor_. To that suggestion,\nhowever, there are also serious objections. The words derived from _ago_\nhave historically a special application to the exertional and dynamic.\nWe leave the question to our readers as one of which it is of\nconsiderable importance to find a satisfactory solution.\n\nIn the foregoing pages our object has been to illustrate the erroneous\nconceptions by which the theory of human cognition has been obscured and\nto explain briefly what we conceive to be the true solution. The\nargument in support of the doctrine here explained has been more fully\npresented by the present writer in an essay entitled _The Dynamic\nFoundation of Knowledge_, to which the reader who desires to study the\nquestion further must now be referred.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[60:1] +Kosmon tonde ton auton akanton oute tis theon oute anthropon\nepoiese, all' en aiei kai esti kai estai pyr aeizoon haptomenon metra\nkai aposbennymenon metra.+ Quoted by Clement of Alexandria, etc. (_The\nFirst Philosophers of Greece_, by A. Fairbanks, p. 28.)\n\n[61:1] \"La subdivision do la matiere en corps isoles est relative a\nnotre perception\" (_Evolution creatrice_, p. 13).\n\n[69:1] For a clear brief summary of the theory the reader may be\nreferred to a little work by Sir William Ramsay, F.R.S., entitled\n_Elements and Electrons_, pp. 8-15.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF ENERGY[81:1]\n\n\nThe problem of Metaphysics--the nature of Reality--still presses for a\nsolution. Agnosticism is but a cautious idealism--a timid phenomenalism.\nThat philosophy, however named, which proclaims that the experience of\nlife is nothing more than a vain show, a pantomime of sensations\ndistinguished only from ideas by their greater intensity and\ndistinctness, is not only a confession of failure. It is a denial of\nfact.\n\nTo know the nature of the Absolute as such, to present the Absolute to\nfinite minds as it must be presented, if that be possible, to the\nAbsolute itself, must ever remain impossible to man. But it is equally\ntrue that to attempt such a task has never been the urgent mission of\nPhilosophy. The distinction between the Ideal and the Real, between the\nconceptual and the perceptual, is quite certainly and incessantly\nrecognised. Agnosticism can neither deny the fact successfully, nor\nsolve the speculative difficulties which its recognition raises up. The\nReal and the Ideal, essentially distinct yet mockingly similar, for ever\nblend and intermingle in the composite experience of life. Truly to\ndiscriminate and unravel these,--validly to separate the Ideal element\nwhich impregnates that Reality which we are for ever compelled to\npostulate and recognise, still remains the great problem of\nPhilosophy--humbler perhaps and more practical, but not less profound\nthan any vain attempt to discover to finite conception the Absolute as\nit is in itself. Therefore it is that the efforts of negative and\nagnostic criticism to dispense with the recognition of Reality as a\nnecessary postulate of our activity are foredoomed to failure. They\nleave us not a solitude which we might pretend to be peace, but a\nseething sea of troubles urgently demanding a new attempt to reveal the\nunity which must underlie the infinite diversity of experience.\n\nSuch, indeed, seems to us the present position of Metaphysics; and, what\nis more important, it appears to react with increasing force upon the\ntheories and investigations of Science.\n\nThe problem of Reality is thus at present not without a special and\nincreasing interest for the students of Physical Science. Until lately\nthey have been taught and have always maintained that Matter is the\ndirect object of sense-perception. No doubt it is long since Philosophy\nhas urged that our conceptions of the external world are a mentally\nconstructed system. But this doctrine has made but little impression\nupon the students of Natural Science. The objective origin of our\nsensations and the apparently objective reality also of the intelligible\nqualities and operative laws of the external world are too strongly\nimpressed upon their minds. Idealism and Transcendentalism have carried\nno conviction to them. Still, the difficulties of common sense have\ncontinued to grow. Recent developments of scientific theory have\nincreased the urgency of the problem, but they seem to us also to\nsuggest a solution the beneficial results of which affect the whole of\nMetaphysics.\n\nWe refer to the doctrine of Energy, which occupies now as great a place\nin the physical sciences as the doctrine of Evolution does in the\nzoological sciences.\n\nNatural philosophers have for some time taught that there are two Real\nThings in the physical universe--Matter and Energy. It seems a very\nstriking theory. Has it received the attention it deserves from the\nstudent of Metaphysics? We are convinced that it has not: and the reason\nhe most frequently gives for this neglect is that, being a purely\nscientific doctrine, it does not come within his sphere. Science, we are\ntold, deals with the phenomenal world internally considered; Philosophy\nwith the relations of the phenomenal world to Reality, and with the\nnature of the transcendental elements in our Knowledge.\n\nThis may be generally true. Nevertheless, Philosophy and Science have\nsurely concepts in common. They both refer to the same thing when they\nspeak of Space; we presume also when they speak of Matter. Indeed,\nPhilosophy analyses the conceptions involved not only in scientific\nreasoning, but in the most common and ordinary mental processes. It\nanalyses them with special reference to the relations between the\nPhenomenal and the Real--a question which, though it always lies latent,\ndoes not in ordinary circumstances arise in urgent form. It is therefore\nevident that the fundamental conceptions of Science _do_ fall within the\npurview of Philosophy.\n\nThe study of Physics _can_ be carried on practically as a study of\nphenomena--of Heat, Colours, Sounds, Forces, etc., all of which are\nkinds of phenomena--without the expression of any dogmatic and\nformulated opinion as to their relation with Reality. Physics can speak\nof mass and weight and avoid all reference to Matter; but there always\nis, in scientific reasoning, an implicit reference to Reality, and it\nfacilitates, therefore, the expression of scientific reasoning, when the\naccount of a physical process is stated with reference to a supposed\nreality, such as Matter. And in making such reference Science _is_\nthinking of the thing-in-itself. It _is_ a reference beyond phenomena.\n\nHeat, Light, Sound, Force, are names of classes of phenomena, and the\ngreat discovery of Physics during the nineteenth century has been that\nthese are all transformable into each other, and bear definite numerical\nrelations to each other in proportion to which such transformations take\nplace. Science availing itself of this discovery, unifies its conception\nof Nature and gives expression to the doctrine of the\ninter-transmutability of the various classes of physical phenomena by\npostulating an entity called Energy, and regarding the various classes\nof phenomena as transmutations which this entity undergoes. But Science\nhas been reluctant to recognise that it is now entitled to dispense with\nthe postulation of Matter. The theory, as announced by the leading men\nof science, has therefore been to the effect that there exist in the\nphysical universe _two_ real things--Matter and Energy--in place of one\nonly, as commonly supposed for so long.\n\nNow we maintain, on the contrary, that such a statement of physical\ntheory is erroneous and redundant; that Science is not obliged to\npostulate _two_ such entities; that the concept of Energy supplies all\nher requirements; and that the employment of that conception obviates\nthe very serious contradictions which are involved in any assumption of\na real entity of the nature of Matter as ordinarily understood--a\nconception of which the very description involves difficulties which\nhave perplexed thinking men for more than two centuries.\n\nOur argument on this point involves consideration of the place occupied\nby Energy in a potential form.\n\nWhilst the transformability of Heat, Light, Sound, and other physical\nphenomena in definite numerical ratios has led to their being all\nregarded as actual manifestations of transmutations proceeding in one\nreal thing, occasionally there is a seeming break in the catena; no\nphenomenon can be detected into which the heat or light or other\nimmediately preceding manifestation has been transformed; but, later on,\nthe co-relative reappears, and by an argument as strong as that which\nasserts the continuous identity of an intelligence before, during, and\nafter a temporary suspension of consciousness, the student of Physics\nmaintains the continued existence _in posse_, if not _in esse_, of the\nEnergy which by appropriate action he can again reveal in an active or\nkinetic manifestation. Hence arises the conception of potential Energy.\nThe Energy to which we attribute the force of cohesion which any\nparticular body can on occasion manifest, we believe to exist\npotentially whilst that body continues unacted upon. Our belief is\nconfirmed by our experience of the certainty with which, on the\nrecurrence of the given conditions, the force always again manifests\nitself. In like manner the potential Energy to which we attribute the\nForce of Gravitation we believe to exist at all times, even when not\nkinetically active. Indeed, it only manifests itself when a\ntransmutation is taking place into some other form of Energy. Now it is\nthe universal association of these two forms of potential Energy with\nthe common and fundamental data of our sense-experience that has\nsuggested the construction in our minds of the conception of Matter, and\nfurnished us with the ideas of solidity, impenetrability, and weight\nwhich constitute its groundwork.\n\nOur view, therefore, is that the concept of materiality can, in the way\njust indicated, be in all cases analysed into, and derived from, the\nconception of Energy; and that Science, if consistent, cannot postulate\nthe reality of Matter as well. Potential Energy adequately supplies the\ndemand for a real substratum of which phenomena are the manifestation.\n\nThe whole question is very well worth the attention, not only of\nscientific students but of metaphysicians. The inquiry will distinctly\ngain if it receive the auxiliary attention of those who have studied the\nprocess by which we form our mental conceptions, and whilst the students\nof Physics deserve the honours of discovery, they cannot safely dispense\nwith such assistance, for which the present confused and inconsistent\nstate of the fundamental definitions of Physical Science most urgently\ncalls. There is here a neglected but very interesting field for the\nmetaphysician's efforts.\n\nRecent scientific writings contain enough to show us that men of science\nare already beginning to recognise not only the inconsistency of the\ntheory of two real things, but the dominating significance of the\nconception of Energy, and are gradually coming to claim for the\nconception of Matter little more than recognition as the vehicle of\nenergetic transmutation. Let us then for the moment accept the position\nthat Science--ridding itself of redundant theory--postulates Energy as\nthe real thing-in-itself, in terms of which it frames its statement of\nphysical phenomena, and let us examine briefly the effects which the\nacceptance of this new postulate is likely to have on philosophic\nspeculation.\n\nAll my Presentment, all the content of my sense-experience, according to\nthis theory, I attribute to a multifarious continuous series of\ntransmutations constantly proceeding in some portion of the system of\nEnergy which constitutes the real substratum of phenomena. I study,\nmeasure, and classify the different species of these transmutations; I\nassociate particular sensations and classes of sensations with\nparticular transmutations, and I thence infer the existence _in posse_\nor _in esse_ of more or less Energy in some particular form transmuting\nitself according to some one or other definite physical law. I infer\nalso the existence of various supplies of potential Energy constantly\navailable, and of other intelligent agents like myself.\n\nI associate every such intelligent agent with a particular series or\ngroup of sense-experiences, and further I assume that the world at his\nPresentment, consists for him in a similar series of transmutations\ncontinuously going on in that portion of the energetic system which I\nbelieve in a similar way to constitute such person's bodily organism.\nThus by the same process of reasoning by which I am led to believe that\nmy own Presentment consists in the energetic transmutations proceeding\nin my organism, I explain the universality of the experience of all\nintelligent agents. In my own case, by that union of consciousness with\nphysical energy which accompanies the manifestation of life, I am\nimmediately related with that portion of the energetic system which is\nthe real substratum of my organism, and am made conscious of the series\nof transmutations occurring at that particular point in it which is\nrepresented by my sensory system. In the case of others, from certain of\nthe transmutations occurring in my Presentment, I am led to infer the\nexistence of other similar microcosmic systems in the energetic\nmacrocosm of the physical universe.\n\nThis is all very well as a theory, but if all I know is the series of\ntransmutations occurring in the portion of the system of Energy related\ndirectly to my intelligence, how did I ever learn to infer from these\ntransmutations the existence of that Energy underlying them, and still\nmore of the whole energetic system extending far beyond my organism? How\ndo I deduce from transmutations proceeding in the portion of the\nenergetic system which constitutes the real substratum of my organism\nthe existence, not only of that substratum itself, but of other portions\nof the system similarly related to other intelligences, and of the\nenergetic system as a whole? How do I get beyond my Presentment? How\npass from Ideality to Existence?\n\nI answer that I never could by any chance or possibility have got beyond\nit or got any suggestion of the Reality had I been merely related to my\nPresentment as a passive and percipient subject. In point of fact,\nhowever, I am in relation with the energetic system not merely or\nprimarily as an Intelligence percipient of the transmutations proceeding\nin it at a particular point, but also as a Will initiative to some\nextent of such transmutations and capable of influencing and directing\nthe physical process. Life necessarily involves a process of energetic\ntransmutation constantly proceeding at that portion of the system of\nEnergy which constitutes my organism, and I am there related as Will\nwith a larger system which embraces the part in which intelligence is\ndeveloped.\n\nFundamentally, life manifests itself in all grades of the zoologic\nhierarchy as a union of Volition (or what appears in action as Volition)\nwith some particular point in the universe of physical Energy, the union\nconstituting what we call a living organism.\n\nDespite its profound importance to us personally and to our race, we\nshould not forget that, objectively considered, the brain in man and the\nhigher animals is merely a special organ highly developed by use, as\nthe trunk is in the elephant, the middle phalanx in the horse, or wings\nin the bird. Intelligence is hardly to any extent a necessity of the\nvital union of the Will with the energetic system. It is not at all\ndeveloped in the vegetal kingdom, hardly at all in some branches of the\nanimal, and there may conceivably be an infinite number of other\n\"kingdoms\" in which it may be either undeveloped, or very differently\ndeveloped, or superseded by some other manifestation by us unimaginable.\nIts development indeed seems to be concurrent with the development of a\nlocomotive faculty--a striking confirmation of the theory that it is in\nour activity that we derive the suggestions which call forth the\nexercise of the Understanding and transform sensation into perception.\n\nIt is only with a comparative fraction of the organism that I am related\nas a passively percipient intelligence. I am directly or indirectly\nrelated as Will, as an originative cause of activity, with a larger\nportion of my organism, many parts of which are quite distinct from the\ncognitive portion. Now it is from my relation as Will with Energy other\nthan and beyond the energetic transmutations which constitute my\nPresentment that I discover the energetic system of Nature, as a real\nthing--beyond, underlying, and by its transmutations constitutive of my\nPresentment. Many of the transmutations which occur in my Presentment I\nrecognise as attributable to my own volitional activity operating upon\nmy energetic organism, and _in my own activity there is thus suggested\nto me a source of phenomena lying beyond these phenomena themselves_. A\ntransmutation initiated in my brain is a pure idea. The key which\nsuggests to me the real world is the occurrence of transmutations\nascribable to my activity operating beyond the sphere which constitutes\nmy Presentment.\n\nIt is in this way that I originally discover the real energetic\nsubstratum to the phenomenal world of my Presentment. I learn from the\ntransmutations to infer the agency and operation of the underlying\nenergy, and thus gradually construct my whole systematic conception of\nthe real world in which I live and move and have my being.\n\nThis view of my activity and of the consequences of my relation as Will\nto the energetic system represented by my organism, including the\nportion thereof related to my intelligence, supplies us therefore with a\nkey to the inevitable reference of thoughts to things.\n\nI distinguish in my active experience a clear difference between wishing\nand willing, and further between willing and effective action. My\nPower--the Energy related to my Will--the exertion of which is\nnecessary to translate Volition into an overt result--is a limited and\nquantifiable thing, but that such a hidden energetic medium or\nsubstratum underlies all phenomena is evident from the fact that I do\nnot will directly the appearance of any given phenomenon. I may wish\nthat. But when the Volition is reached and the wish transformed into\novert exertion I find myself involved in the multifarious processes of\nan energetic system which I may so far influence, but which is\nnevertheless in many ways constantly going on irrespective of my\nVolition. I may wish to avoid pain and may will certain exertions with\nthat view, but the consequences may be the reverse of what I wished.\nThis shows that the Volition operates immediately not on the sensation\nbut on the energetic system.\n\nIn all cases between Volition and overt result there seems to be erected\nand constantly maintained around me a vast energetic system, a part but\nonly a small part of which, namely the Energy of my organism, can be\ninfluenced directly by my Will, whilst, even in immediate relation with\nthat part, transmutations beyond the reach of my Will are constantly\ngoing on. Indeed, what fundamentally distinguishes Volition from Desire\nis its relation to the energetic system.\n\nThe doctrine of Energy therefore puts in a new and clearer light the\nwhole theory of Causation.\n\nIt is common for philosophers to talk of invariable sequence as the\ncriterion of Causality. But, in fact, that is quite fallacious. No one\never regards a phenomenon as the cause of another phenomenon. We ascribe\nCausality to the energetic transmutation which in some form or other we\ninevitably believe to accompany the appearance of every phenomenon. We\nnever postulate a causal relation between day and night--the most\nnotable case of invariable sequence. When we say the fire warms the\nroom, or the horse draws the cart, or the sun ripens the corn, it is the\nEnergy which we rightly or wrongly associate with the visual sensation\nreferred to in the words \"fire\" and \"horse\" and \"sun\" of which we are\nthinking, and by no means of these visual sensations themselves. As has\nbeen well said, we never suppose that the leading carriage of the train\ndraws those behind it, although their relation of sequence is quite as\nclose to it as to the engine.\n\nTrue, it is and must be from and by phenomena only that I infer and\nmeasure the transmutations of Energy, but the transmutations measured\nare operations of the real thing-in-itself postulated by Science. The\nexistence of such Energy is suggested to me primarily in my experience\nof my own activity in which I recognise my power of doing work--a\nquantifiable and measurable thing, homogeneous with the Energy in\nrespect of which Science states the relations and conditions of all\nphysical phenomena. My most incessant mental act is that by which, on\nthe analogy of my own active experience, I refer all phenomena to the\nunderlying energetic system. This reference it is which transforms\nsensation into perception; and the constant affirmation of this\nreference is the great function of the synthetic mental activity of the\nunderstanding, and is at once the origin and explanation of that\nimperative mental tendency which metaphysicians call the law of\nCausality.\n\nHow, then, does this doctrine affect the theory of the nature of Space?\n\nIf it be true that the world as my Presentment consists in the\ntransmutations occurring in that particular part of the energetic system\nwhich constitutes the real substratum of the brain, then phenomena as a\nwhole must arise in transmutation, in a process of Becoming rather than\nin a state of Being, and Space must be the content, the condition, in\nwhich that process proceeds. The laws of Space, therefore, are laws, so\nto speak, of motion, not of position. The most absolutely still and\nmotionless visual presentation is really a series of constant\ntransmutations of Energy and the form of Space is constituted by the\nlaws of transmutation, which are thus at once the necessary conditions\nof my perception and the universal conditions of all sense-perception.\nSpace, therefore, does not contain the real thing which sustains the\nphenomenal world any more than it does the reality which underlies my\nconscious self. It is the universal condition of the transmutations\nwhich constitute phenomena; and it therefore \"contains\" all these\nphenomena, including my body as phenomenon and only as phenomenon. Its\nform is discovered by my organic motor activity, and in representing\nthis activity the mind constructs its concepts of Space and Extension.\n\nThis view of the nature of Space, by relating its forms and laws with\nthe objective, and a-logical thing-in-itself in virtue of the\ntransmutations of which our sense-experience occurs, relieves an obvious\ndifficulty which must always have been felt in accepting without\nqualification the purely Kantian view which regarded it as a category\nimposed by the Intelligence upon the otherwise unknowable world of\nsense.\n\nThe most ardent assertors of the ideality of Space have hitherto\napparently had difficulty in avoiding the tendency to conceive it as the\npersistent all-embracing objective content of the thing-in-itself, not\nmerely of the phenomenon, although the latter only might enter into\nKnowledge. The doctrine, however, which presents our conception of Space\nas discovered in our activity amid resistant transmutation-processes not\nonly establishes its ideality but at the same time explains the relation\nwhich its form nevertheless bears to the objective material laws of the\nsensible presentation. It liberates the mind from the oppressive\nnecessity of regarding Space as still somehow objectively extending and\ncontaining the real world. It also relieves an obvious difficulty which\nconfronts the Philosophy of Schopenhauer in locating those\ntranscendental forms of the phenomenon which are imposed _a priori_ upon\nthe presentation, and yet are not to be found in the pure Volition.\n\nOf course, it must never be forgotten that my whole sentient experience\nconsists primarily of the series of energetic transmutations occurring\nat that part of the energetic system which is in immediate vital\nrelation with my consciousness. It is my experience of active exertion,\nof moving, speaking, etc., which gives a suggestion of the real\nenergetic world. The transmutations of the real Energy of the world\nbeyond my organism never enter my Consciousness. Transmutations arising\nbeyond my body only enter the presentation by influencing the cerebral\nprocess. The luminous undulation and the sound-wave must both produce\ntransmutation of the cerebral Energy in order to affect Consciousness.\nYet the various characters of the transmitted impulses are\ndistinguishable in the resultant cerebral transmutations. Thus I feel\nsensations of hardness, roughness, pain, colour, sound, etc. It is by a\nprocess of mental construction that I associate these with the forms of\nmy exertional activity, and thus frame my conceptions of real bodies in\nthe world around me--those which I more directly associate with the\nEnergy subject to my Volition being conceived as representing my body.\nFor reasons of convenience, I refer those conceptions chiefly to the\nco-ordinated visual presentation, and thus build up my conception of the\nextended world of material things. Science is possible because all\ntransmutations of Energy take place according to definite numerical laws\nand ratios. The whole work of Science is to explain every phenomenon in\nterms of its definite transmutation of Energy. These definite numerical\nlaws and processes are characteristic of all Energy transmutation, and\nthus regulate the experience of every intelligent being. It is in virtue\nof these that our separate systems of knowledge correspond, and that we\nare thus presented each with corresponding aspects of one outer world.\nThe laws which regulate the cerebral changes that accompany\nsense-presentation are for me the necessary _a priori_ laws of\nperception. It is because these laws operate in common in all brains\nthat community of intercourse is possible amongst mankind. It is because\nof the further fact that the whole of the transmutations of Energy which\nconstitute physical phenomena compose a numerically inter-related and\nregulated system that Science and rational knowledge are possible to the\nintellect of man. Our knowledge is what we are obliged to think and\nassert regarding experience; but the universality of experience is not\nexplained merely by the common nature and general laws of Intelligence,\nbut depends also on the generality of the laws under which the\ntransmutations of Energy proceed.\n\nWe are now, therefore, by the aid of the doctrine of Energy, better able\nthan before to distinguish accurately between the Ideal and the Real as\ncontrasted elements in our experience.\n\nMy Presentment as a whole consists in the transmutation-processes--in\nthe sensations, feelings, perceptions, images, ideas--in short, in all\nthat is going on at the point where (I necessarily express myself in\nterms of spatial relations, though in this connection these are\nfigurative) my sentience and intelligence are developed.\n\nMy whole Presentment is, therefore, in one sense subjective, or, as some\nwould say, ideal. For me, my Presentment is the impression produced on,\nthe condition established in, my Consciousness in virtue of what is\ngoing on at this so-called point of contact.\n\nWhat we mean, therefore, by the subjectivity or ideality of the\nPresentment is the aspect of energetic transmutations when viewed as\naffecting my Consciousness in contrast with their obverse aspect when\nviewed as transmutations in the objective system. As my Presentment,\nthey are all subjective or ideal, and it is in this reference that\nBerkeley and Hume, for instance, speak of ideas of sense, such as the\ncolour blue, the heat of the fire, the pain of a blow. These,\nconstituting the bulk of the Presentment, they distinguish from what\nBerkeley called ideas of the imagination--those stimulated or\noriginated, or, as he said, \"excited,\" by the intelligence itself.\nWhilst he contended that both classes are ideal or subjective, in\nrespect that they are constituents of the Presentment, the latter have\nan additional title to subjectivity in respect of their origin, and\nconstitute what are called \"ideas\" when the word is used in\ncontra-distinction to \"sensations\"--such pure ideas occurring in\nresponse to a subjective impulse.\n\nOn the other hand, there is a sense in which the Presentment is, if not\nreal, at least actual and objective.\n\nSo far as we know, Intelligence never develops except in conjunction\nwith an organism--that is, in vital relation with physical Energy. My\nPresentment is constituted by the occurrence and depends upon the\ncontinuance of the transmutations or operations proceeding at the\nrelated point in the energetic system. Even pure ideas, though\nsubjective not only in regard to aspect but in regard to their origin,\nare objective in respect that they also consist in an energetic\ntransmutation.\n\nHerein lies the germ of truth to be discovered even in the unintelligent\ndogmatism of those philosophers who assert the absolute Reality of my\nPresentment, as such--not merely its actuality. It is comparatively\nseldom, however, either in Science or Philosophy, that we meet a thinker\nprepared to go as far as that. Most take refuge in a distinction between\nprimary and secondary qualities of bodies, classing my sensations as\nnon-resembling secondary qualities, which they admit cannot be conceived\nto exist without the mind in the form in which they make up my\nPresentment, but reserving five or six primary qualities--solidity,\nextension, figure, motion, rest--which they conceive to exist\nindependently, just as they enter into my Presentment. In point of fact,\nhowever, these so-called primary qualities are not the names of\nintuitions, but are abstractions or generalisations of the most general\nand necessary elements of my active Experience by reference to which I\nmentally construct my world. The transmutations of Energy are not a\nnever-repeated accidental kaleidoscope. They proceed according to\nconstant, definite, measurable laws, and though subordinate variations\nare infinite and make up the details of my Presentment, the general laws\nand conditions according to which all Energy transmutes are definite,\nand constitute the general features or qualities of my Experience, and\nthese are the so-called primary qualities of bodies regarded in the\nlight of the doctrine of Energy.\n\nThe primary quality of extension, in particular, is a conception\nresulting from the association of my visual Presentment with my power of\nactive exertion, and the delusive tendency to regard this quality as in\nsome sense primarily and fundamentally real is due to the unconscious\nrecognition of the fact that it is in virtue of my power, or association\nas an agent with the energetic system, that I derive a suggestion of the\nreal world beyond the phenomena which constitute my experience.\n\nI cannot exist without some development of activity. Hence are derived\nmy conceptions of free space and of resistance between bodies. My\nprimary sensations are the sensations of touch, and the primary impulse\nof thought is to relate these with my active exertions. When sight is\nfirst restored to the blind the first impulse is to regard the new\nsensation as a form of touch. Its intellectual suggestiveness is a\ndevelopment. The system or stream of transmutations in which my\nvolitional activity principally takes part is that represented by the\noperation of the forces of Gravitation and Cohesion; the system which\ninfluences my visual sensations is a quite different series. The changes\nin this latter series, by their greater rapidity, enable me to\nanticipate the other series, and for this and other reasons I employ\nthese sensations to signalise and symbolise the transmutations\nproceeding in the series with which I am more immediately related as an\nactive and \"willing\" agent. All transmutations, if they result in\nsensations, must do so by producing changes in the Energy of my\norganism, and must therefore be conditioned by the general laws which\nregulate the changes which occur there, or, in other words, must be\ncontained within a self-consistent spatial condition; but the\ndifferences in the characters of visual Space, as it is called, and the\nspatial content of my activity, reflect the differences in the series of\nenergetic transmutations with which they are respectively connected.\n\nWe see more clearly, therefore, with the aid of the doctrine of Energy,\nthe import of the theory of transcendental aesthetic enunciated by Kant,\nwho first pointed out that there are elements, and those the most\nnecessary and universal, in the sense-presentation which bear the\ncharacter of ideality as fully as the most subjective efforts of our\nideative activity. More particularly do we illustrate the ideality of\nSpace as a cognition precedent to experience. It is because general laws\nconstantly operative regulate the transmutations which constitute the\nindividual's Presentment that it is possible for him to abstract from\nand generalise the data of sense; and it is because the subjective\nprocess of Ideation, by which we mean our representative mental activity\nin its widest sense, consists also in transmutations under the same\ngeneral laws of the same portion of the energetic organism, that it is\npossible to frame general ideas. These general laws of organic\ntransmutation are the _a priori_ conditions of the necessary\ndetermination in time of all existences in the world of phenomena.\n\nThe form, therefore, of the phenomenon, in the language of Kant, is\nconstituted by the transmutations of the Energy immediately related to\nconsciousness; the matter of the phenomenon is constituted by the\nvarieties produced in these by the transmitted transmutations from the\nEnergy beyond--just as the musician may produce a constant variety of\nharmonies upon his instrument, but all must be conditioned by the\nrelations fixed and established between the notes of which the\ninstrument is composed. Transmutations of the cerebral Energy may be\nstimulated not only from without, but by subjective impulse from within;\nbut in either case the laws of these transmutations are the necessary\nform of experience, and it is the possibility of transmutation upon an\ninternal and subjective impulse which makes possible the formation of\nsynthetical judgments _a priori_. It is as if the organ were not only\nresponsive to impressions upon its keyboard from without, but were also\nautomotive and could originate harmonies in its own notes; and as if,\nmoreover, it were endowed with consciousness so as to receive an\nintuition of both classes of music. The former would correspond to\nsensations, the latter to ideas; and we might imagine such an instrument\nby presenting to itself its own system of notes, contriving thus to\nframe _a priori_ a synthetical system of these general musical laws\nwhich would constitute the necessary and universal form of its whole\nmusical experience. To complete the perhaps fantastic analogy we must\nimagine the world to be one co-ordinated musical system, and our\ninstrument to be endowed with the power of playing upon the other\nkeyboards; of thence deriving the suggestion of the distinction between\nthe internal and external impulses which respectively awakened harmonies\nwithin itself; and lastly, of thus at length conceiving in the spirit of\nscience that the necessary and universal laws which it recognised as the\nmost subjective and fundamental conditions of its own operation, at the\nsame time regulated the activity of the entire musical universe.\n\nHow natural it would be for such an intelligent musical instrument, if\nunhappily endowed with common sense, to believe and assert that the real\nsubstance of the universe consisted solely of sounds. Yet how evident\nwould it be to us from our standpoint of more absolute knowledge that\nthe whole orchestra of sounds, although actual and quite distinct from\nconsciousness, was still merely phenomenal, and yet withal, in its every\nexpression, revealed the laws and structure of reality--of the system of\nthings in themselves--a system the reality of which was dissimilar to\nthose appearances, though all its laws and structure could be studied\nand derived from them.\n\nBerkeley, therefore, erred seriously when he described the idea as a\nfainter sensation. Faint subjective reproductions of our sensations, as\nof blue, green, or the like, constitute a very insignificant element in\nour mental furniture. We seldom pursue so far into detail the ideative\neffort. Severely and effectively as Berkeley criticised Locke's account\nof abstract ideas, the fact remains that abstraction is a primary\nfeature of our whole conceptual system; and the abstractable elements of\nthe sensible presentation being the necessary constituents of all\nideative representation are properly denominated ideal. The one element\nof particularity which every idea lacks is the reference to the\ntransmitted transmutation to which the sensible phenomenon owes its\norigin. We derive such reference to the external solely from the\nobstructions which our free activity encounters and without which we\ncould receive no suggestion of the non-ego, and in particular no\nsuggestion of the dynamic element which fundamentally distinguishes\nthings from thoughts. The empirical content of experience--the so-called\nsecondary qualities of bodies--are often called in their subjective\naspect \"ideal\" because the mental impression is obviously very\ndifferent from the transmutation objectively regarded. But this is to\nconfound the ideal with the subjective, which latter term is that\nproperly applicable both to the sensible impression and to purely mental\nactivity. The primary qualities, being the general laws or forms of\norganic Energy-transmutation, are in a higher sense ideal, for they are\nthe necessary conditions under which both sense-presentation and\nideative representation proceed. Whilst, therefore, as Kant maintained,\nthey are the _a priori_ element in perception, they at the same time\nconstitute the laws which regulate all Energy-transmutation within our\nexperience both organic and extra-organic.\n\nWe hold, therefore, to the Platonic doctrine that whilst, on the one\nhand, the sensible is only an object of thought in so far as it partakes\nof the intelligible, on the other hand the idea is not only a type for\nthe individual mind, but is partaker also of the laws which penetrate\nthe system of things. Idealism as a Philosophy, in denying the validity\nof any reference of the content of the Presentment to a further\nexistence outside of the subjective experience, has induced that wider\nuse of the term idea which applies it to the whole actuality of\nexperience in its subjective aspect. With the advance of Philosophy we\nmust revert to that more ancient use of the term idea which confines\nits extension into the realm of the perceptual to those elements of the\nsensible presentation which can be reproduced by the conceptual activity\nof the subject, and which in asserting, for instance, the ideality of\nSpace, reminds us at the same time that Ideality implies not merely\nsubjectivity, but the expression or representation also of some aspect\nof those laws which regulate the system of Reality.\n\nBut is not common sense right, after all? Do I really mean to say that\ntables, chairs, houses, mountains--the whole world of my Presentment,\nare to be regarded as shrivelled up and located in my brain, or in the\nenergetic correlative of my brain? Is the whole Universe, as known to me\nor conceived by me, contained within a minute portion of itself--the\nbrain? Now Science does say something very like this, and the logical\ndifficulties of the position are very pressing. But they cannot be got\nover by attempting to revert to common sense, because to assert that all\nmy conceived Universe is immediately perceived by me as it exists, would\nseem to involve a diffusion of my intelligence throughout Space which is\nstill more inconceivable and self-contradictory. Even apart from this\nimplication, the assumption of the Reality of the phenomenal world\ndestroys itself. To assume the reality of so-called material particles\nis to lay the foundation of an argument which surely leads to the\nconclusion that the whole world of my consciousness is produced by and\nconsists in motions in that certain small group of these same molecules\nwhich is assumed to make up my brain. The solution is only reached when\nwe discover that the error lies in forgetting that the Reality which is\nthe seat of my Presentment is itself unperceived, and that what I\ncommonly call a body and a brain are the phenomena occurring in my\nPresentment, and which I associate with such real substratum. The real\nsubstratum of my Presentment is a part of the energetic Universe, which\nis constantly undergoing transmutations. Wherever such Energy is united,\nin an organism, with consciousness these transmutations, as affecting\nand perceived by such consciousness, constitute its Presentment or\nsense-experience; and aided by the constructive activity of thought\nexpand, as it were, subjectively into a whole world of experience, as\nthe electric current vibrating darkly along the narrow confines of the\nwire suddenly expands at the carbon point into the luminous undulations\nwhich light a city.\n\nWe admit, therefore, to the full the actuality and objectivity of the\nsensible presentation. We only deny that it is the real thing-in-itself.\nThe latter is not discovered by sense. My energetic organism is like a\nwell-fitting garment; I do not feel it at all. I feel only changes or\ntransmutations taking place in it. Be not alarmed, therefore, for your\ncommon-sense world. We leave it to you intact and actual--not deducting\neven a single primary quality. Allowing fully for the extent to which,\nlittle suspected by you, it is a mentally constructed system, its\nelements are still actual and objective; they are modes of Reality;\nextension and the other primary qualities are qualities of these modes.\nMoreover, the Ego, I, myself, as Will, as a continuously identic\nintelligent agent, am not given to myself immediately in my Presentment,\nany more than is the real object. The existence of my Ego, of my\ncogitant self, is an inference which I am compelled to draw from the\nfacts of my mental activity. _Cogito, ergo sum._ Similarly, my energetic\norganism is the real a-logical thing-in-itself which I am compelled to\npostulate in order to explain my perception of physical phenomena in the\nlight of my physical activity; _ago, ergo possum_.\n\nWe must not overlook the unique position in our Presentment occupied by\nthe visual presentation. Its universality, simultaneousness, minute\naccuracy, quantifiability, etc., are such that it is really to the\nvisual Presentment that I refer all other elements in my\nsense-experience. I think of them with reference to it. In connection\nwith it I mentally construct my world. I associate with some\nmodification of the visual presentation the phenomena resultant upon the\nenergetic activity of my own organism, and the other forces and\npotential Energies which that activity reveals and suggests. It is thus\nthat I derive the compound idea of Body as consisting of Figure,\nExtension, and Solidity. The continued appearance in my visual\npresentation of the grey colour which I am now seeing is to me the sign\nof the continued persistence of that potential Energy in virtue of which\nI regard it as the appearance of a solid extended stone wall. Everything\nis referred to the visual presentation, and it is in reference to it\nthat the mind works in constructing its world.\n\nThe whole theory of molecular action is a theory constructed in\nreference to the visual presentation--the reality of which, strangely,\nit seems to result in overthrowing. A born-blind man could never have\ninvented the conception of atoms or molecules. This is well worth\nthinking over. The visual presentation is not really fundamental; and we\nmust undo the inversion induced by its great convenience whereby we\nrefer to it all the other elements of our sense-experience and conceive\nof our activity and our whole actual world by reference to the visible\nsign. It is in consequence of this reference to the visual that bodies\nare thought of as discrete units, so that it is difficult to conceive\nthat the real thing in virtue of which we experience the perception of,\nsay, a heap of stones, is truly more or less potential Energy--just as\nthe continuous process of thought is very different from the disparate\nsymbols of speech.\n\nI habitually refer to the visual extended image as the primary basis of\nmy idea of the world, or of any particular part of the world, such as my\ndining-room. Why? Simply because, for the reasons already noted, the\nsense of sight is the sense of universal reference. In principle it is\nthe same habitual tendency which makes me associate every element of my\nworld with its appropriate name. It is different in the case of other\nsensations. When I am absent from Niagara I do not, in thinking of it,\nprimarily conceive of it as a roar of sound. I think of certain motions\nof mass which, if I were present, would occasion the subjective\nsensations of sound. But for the habitual tendency arising from the\nuniversal reference to the visible I would do the same in the case of\nthe visual image. All I am necessitated to think is a real event--a\nreal, physical, dynamical transmutation--proceeding quite independently\nof my perception or presence; and if I can only manage to realise that I\nmust, for philosophical purposes, eliminate my reference to visual as\nwell as to audible or other sensations, I will understand that all I am\nentitled to, and all I can, without hopeless contradiction, postulate as\nreal thing existing independently of my perception, is a transmutation\nof Energy. This energy is imperceptible, unextended, unfigured, yet it\nis by no means a mere logical or mental necessity or associative\ntendency. On the contrary, it is very real. It sustains my every act. By\nan imperative mental necessity I am obliged, by inference from my\nexperiences as an active and percipient agent, to postulate the\nenergetic system in which I am involved, and with one particular centre\nin which I am organically related.\n\nBut we recall at this point that Science says she must still postulate\nMatter as the vehicle of Energy. But what does that mean except that the\nsubject of her studies is the sensible presentation which itself\nconsists of energy transmutation in part constantly changing but with\nrelatively permanent and recurrent elements? These more permanent\nelements constitute what we call bodies. If the sensible presentation\nconsisted exclusively of one continuous, unchanging phenomenon, Reason\nwould never be stimulated, and Personality, Cause, Power would never\nhave been postulated or conceived. But the transmutation is constantly\n\"accelerated\"--incessantly fluctuates and varies. Certain of these\nvariations I recognise as related to my own volitional activity, and I\nam thus furnished with a key which enables me, by a sympathetic analogy,\nto attribute all the changes in my experience to various agents, each\nrelated to the other by the intervention of this system of physical\nEnergy. Some of these I can further trace to the initiative of Volition\nof myself or other persons; others I can only recognise as integral\nparts of the vast energetic system of Nature, the stimulus of which I\ncannot follow further.\n\nThe reality of Matter is said to be proved by its indestructibility; but\nthis characteristic can easily be resolved into (1) the\nindestructibility of Space and Extension which we have seen to be merely\nanother name for the necessity or inevitable universality of the general\nlaws and conditions of Energy transmutation, and (2) the\nindestructibility of the Energy to the transmutations of which we\nattribute the forces of Cohesion and Gravitation.\n\nAll vital activity is but a producing of changes in the stream of\ntransmutation. We never do, nor in the nature of things do we ever try\nto, increase or diminish the quantity of the real Energy itself. We\ninstinctively recognise the objective source of our physical power, and\nthis has led some thinkers to suppose that the indestructibility of\nMatter is an _a priori_ datum of thought. But such a belief is quite\nunfounded. All it amounts to is a recognition that the destruction of\nMatter is _beyond our power_--a necessary consequence of the fact that\nwe merely act upon the transmutation-process. Many a long contest\nbetween the supporters of _a priori_ and experiential knowledge can be\nset at rest by this view of the mediating functions of the energetic\norganism.\n\nThe reflections which we have thus briefly noted and illustrated open a\nwide field for inquiry. The scientific doctrine of Energy would seem to\nbe pregnant with momentous consequences for Philosophy, and it is worth\nwhile for metaphysicians to devote to this subject the deepest and most\ndeliberate thought. The results cannot easily be grasped by a mere\ncursory perusal of memoranda, in which we have only sketched a few\nsalient aspects of the doctrine. We deprecate unwarrantable assurance,\nand are fully conscious of the difficulty of adequately expressing\nthought on such a theme; but we have not written rashly nor without\ngood grounds for asking attention.\n\nScience, it seems to us, postulates in Energy an a-logical, unextended,\nreal thing-in-itself in terms of which the phenomena of Physics can be\nadequately and quantifiably stated. At the same time it furnishes\nPhilosophy with a theory of the objectively real thing-in-itself which\nsatisfied those necessities of thought by which we are constrained to\ninterpret our sense-experience by a constant reference to a Reality\nbeyond it--a necessity due to our association as Actors with an Energy\nbeyond that which is the seat of our Presentment. Such a view avoids the\nincurable difficulties and contradictions involved in the theory of the\nreality of extended material substance, or in any theory, indeed, which\nasserts the reality--as presented--of the sensible presentation.\nPhysical Reality thus conceived is consistently thinkable as co-existent\nwith the thing-in-itself--be it ultimately Intelligence or Volition--of\nwhich our cognitive and conative existence is a manifestation. And such\na doctrine, by explaining all phenomena as transmutations proceeding\n(according to the definite mathematical laws prevailing throughout the\nwhole Universe of Energy) at that point in the system which is\norganically related to Consciousness, accounts at once for the apparent\napriority and necessity of the qualities of Space, and at the same time\nfor their evident universality and objectivity.\n\nIn a word, it would rather seem as if Science, unconscious of its\npregnant possibilities, has not only formulated a theory which\nco-ordinates and unifies the entire fabric of physical knowledge, but\nhas also at length furnished Philosophy with the key to that problem the\nsolution of which has, in the words of Schopenhauer, been the main\nendeavour of philosophers for more than two centuries, namely, to\nseparate by a correctly drawn line of cleavage the Ideal--that which\nbelongs to our knowledge as such--from the Real, that which exists\nindependently of us; and thus to determine the relation of each to the\nother.\n\nTo us it seems not strange that Philosophy should in the end be indebted\nto Science for this solution--nor should Science, in the hour of her\ngreatest speculative victory, object too hastily to the assistance which\nthe thinker, trained to the study of the process of thought, can render\nin clarifying and restating in its metaphysical aspects a theory which,\nif profoundly conceived, and formulated by men of science from Rumford\nand Davy to Stewart, Tait, and Kelvin, was partially anticipated by the\nmetaphysician who conceived the world as will and idea.\n\nWe maintain, therefore, that the presentation of sense, the continuum\nor manifold, or what you will, consists in the transmutations of a real\nsubstance itself unextended and unperceived; that the laws of these\ntransmutations are what constitute the geometric all-containing Space;\nthat at a point in this real energetic system organically related to the\nintelligent self, the transmutations occurring there constitute the\nindividual's sensible experience; that his mind, by also actively\ninfluencing the system at that point, can stimulate the train of\ntransmutations which constitute his world of ideas; that the mind can\ndiscover itself as Will influencing transmutations in the organism which\nare transmitted through a wider, larger portion of the system; and can\nrecognise the transmutations at the related point as influenced\nsometimes by its own Volition and sometimes by other agents. We seek to\nbring the added light of scientific theory to reconcile the conflict\nbetween the law and the fact, between the objects of reflection and the\nobjects of sense, between the world of thought and the world of\nphenomena,--the problem which Plato raised and which has since been the\ncentral problem of Metaphysics. In doing so we present a doctrine which\nnot only maintains the truth of the Ideal, and the actuality of the\nphenomenal, and the relative reality of both, but which proves, with\nall the cogency of Science, how it is that the Sensible is permeated by\nand made knowable only by the Ideal, by the laws of the transmutations\nwhich constitute actuality, and that, on the other hand, the Ideal only\nenters experience as the regulative principle of the ever-transmuting\nReality.\n\nThe world consists not merely of phenomena, nor of phenomena and laws\nwhich regulate them. These are but transitional and imperfect aspects of\nReality. \"Our standard of Truth and Reality,\" says a recent writer,\n\"moves us on towards an individual with laws of its own, and to laws\nwhich form the vital substance of a single existence.\" We approach such\na goal in the conception of Energy--the laws of whose constant\ntransmutations are what we call Nature.\n\nWe must distinguish Energy as Absolute Reality from such conceptions as\nActivity, which is its subjective aspect, or as Force, which is really\nthe rate at which Energy is, in certain cases, transformed. Dynamics,\nwhich investigates Force, is a study of the fundamental transmutations\nof Energy. It postulates Energy as the Real Entity in terms of which it\ncan frame a satisfactory theory of dynamical phenomena.\n\nThe metaphysical labours of the century which has elapsed since Kant\nhave not been altogether in vain. The deeper thinkers are pretty nearly\nagreed that the Absolute is not to be identified with its appearances.\nHow far they can bring home this view in practical form to the\nintelligence of man is another matter. Plato doubtless saw the truth in\na sort of beatific vision, but the tide of speculation ebbed after his\ndeath, and its healing waters never inundated the deserts of mediaeval\nthought. The discursive weakness in which the speculation of the\ntranscendental Philosophy seems to dissipate itself makes us fear a\nsimilar decline. Metaphysics must receive the assistance of the great\nspeculative achievement of Physics. It must realise that Science can\npostulate a Reality unperceived and unqualified by the conditions of\nsense, but in terms of which Science can explain the whole phenomena of\nthe sensible presentation in their objective aspect,--explain these as\ntransmutations of Reality, proceeding in accordance with the general\nmathematical laws under which Reality transmutes itself.\n\nIt may be said that reason requires us to think that the Universe is a\nunity. Where do you embrace within Reality, in such a view of it,\nIntelligence, Volition, Feeling? We answer: Of course, obviously\nReality, as postulated by Physics, does not contain these. But the Real\nThing postulated by Physics is but one aspect of the whole, and may be,\nmust be, merged in a higher Reality--of which phenomena, on the one\nhand, and Thought, Conation, Feeling on the other, are the appearances.\nThat involves a further advance, the attainment of a higher degree of\nTruth which would bridge the Dualism of Thought and Existence, of Self\nand Not-self, of Spirit and Nature, and whilst, on the one hand, such\nReality must fundamentally be a-logical, on the other hand Energy may\nowe its energy to Spirit.\n\nIn the dualism which we must, in experience, recognise, we notice one\nfundamental distinction: quantification, measurability, appear the\nattributes of the physical; quality, ideality, of the spiritual. The\napprehension, therefore, of the doctrine of Energy should accomplish in\nclarity and security the abolition of the intolerable contradictions\nwhich have hitherto involved the search for Reality amid its\nappearances. We think it suggests the most satisfying explanation of the\ndistinction which separates, and the principle which relates Ideality\nand Externality, and should obviate the almost childish efforts of\ntranscendentalists to expound the relation of the Mind to a body which\nis involved in, and which is yet--for the individual--distinguished,\nthey cannot tell us how, from the whole system of Nature.\n\nOf course, neither Thought nor Volition, as such, can be the absolute\nReality. They, like Physical Force, are but transmutations, affections,\nphases of Reality. Nor, again, is Energy, as a quality, a correct\ndescription of the Absolute, as such. The Absolute, as such, we cannot\ndescribe; but in studying, as Physics does, the relations of physical\nphenomena and stating these in terms of Reality, it conveniently gives\nReality a name appropriate to its own standpoint.\n\nMetaphysics rightly declines to be required to study special branches of\nScience. Nothing but grotesque absurdity ensues when this precaution is\noverlooked. Yet Metaphysics has hitherto thought itself the better of a\nlittle logic, and in the future it will have to grasp the scientific\nconception of Reality. There is nothing else for it; and, after all, it\nis remarkable how far the most fundamental conceptions of Metaphysics\nare dependent on a physical origin.\n\nSurely it is of primary importance to realise the effect upon our\nconceptions of Space and Extension of the doctrine of the transmutations\nof Energy. Even the profoundest metaphysicians have seemingly failed to\nexplain how Space, Matter, and Extension are related with Reality. You\ncannot ignore this difficulty by saying that these are the working\nconceptions of particular branches of Physical Science. But when you\nrealise that physical phenomena, even the most permanent and rigid, are\nby scientific demonstration but transmutations of the real thing, you\nmay then understand that Space, Body, and Extension are but the laws and\nconditions of the process. As appearances, and within the realm of\nphenomena, they seem still what they have always seemed. So much we\nstill concede without diminution or obscurity; and at the same time we\ncan harmonise them as they could never be harmonised before with\npostulated Reality.\n\nIt is the same with Time. The facts of memory would seem to imply that\nthere is no succession in the Absolute. We are always present at all\ntimes of our life. In recollecting a past event we are contemplating no\nmere image, but the actual past event itself. Our chronometry depends on\nthe annual motion of the Earth round the Sun. It has thus a purely\nphysical basis.\n\nWe might illustrate the application of the doctrine of Energy to every\ndepartment of Metaphysics. But such is not the object of the present\nessay. We merely desire to indicate briefly some of the many aspects of\nthe theory, and if only we have been able to suggest a line of inquiry,\nthe primary object of this essay has been attained.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[81:1] Originally printed in 1898, now revised and rewritten.\n\n\n_Printed by_ MORRISON & GIBB LIMITED, _Edinburgh_\n\n\n\n\n_BY THE SAME AUTHOR_\n\n\nTHE\nDYNAMIC FOUNDATION\nOF KNOWLEDGE\n\n_Crown 8vo. 330 pp. 6s. net_\n\n\n\"Mr. Philip, a thinker of considerable acuteness, expounds further the\ndynamic theory of knowledge which he propounded in 'Matter and Energy'\nand the 'Doctrine of Energy.' What we are really sensible of in the\nexternal world is mutation; but the consciousness of our own activity\nsuggests the existence of something behind phenomena. The reality which\nsustains experience is found to be, in essence, power--power conceived\nas an energy containing within itself the principle of its own\nevolution; an energy constantly transmuting itself, and in its\ntransmutations furnishing the entire presentation of sense. The\nuniversal application of this concept unifies science or the knowledge\nof nature; and the dynamic theory is applied by Mr. Philip to life,\neconomics, and education.\"\n                                                           _Times._\n\n\n\"Well written, and contains much sound analysis of perception and the\nlike, with much that is debatable but suggestive and\nstimulating.\"--_Nature._\n\n\n\"The argument is conducted with great ability and thoroughness, and the\nwriter reveals a most accurate acquaintance with the results of both\nscience and philosophy.\"--_Glasgow Herald._\n\n\nKEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUeBNER, & CO., LTD.\nBROADWAY HOUSE, 68-74 CARTER LANE, LONDON, E.C.","title":"Essays Towards a Theory of Knowledge","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":24429}