{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_24107/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_24107","id":"gutenberg_24107","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24107","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: History - Religious","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Eastern question","Islam","Orient"],"text":"Produced by Brownfox, Michael Ciesielski and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This\nfile was produced from images generously made available\nby The Internet Archive)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                     THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM\n\n                               BY\n\n                LATHROP STODDARD, A.M., PH.D. (Harv.)\n\n               AUTHOR OF: THE RISING TIDE OF COLOUR,\n                      THE STAKES OF THE WAR,\n         PRESENT DAY EUROPE: ITS NATIONAL STATES OF MIND,\n            THE TRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO, ETC.\n\n                            WITH MAP\n\n                       _SECOND IMPRESSION_\n\n                             LONDON\n\n                      CHAPMAN AND HALL, LTD.\n\n                              1922\n                    PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY\n                    RICHARD CLAY & SONS LIMITED.\n                         BUNGAY, SUFFOLK\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe entire world of Islam is to-day in profound ferment. From Morocco to\nChina and from Turkestan to the Congo, the 250,000,000 followers of the\nProphet Mohammed are stirring to new ideas, new impulses, new\naspirations. A gigantic transformation is taking place whose results\nmust affect all mankind.\n\nThis transformation was greatly stimulated by the late war. But it began\nlong before. More than a hundred years ago the seeds were sown, and ever\nsince then it has been evolving; at first slowly and obscurely; later\nmore rapidly and perceptibly; until to-day, under the stimulus of\nArmageddon, it has burst into sudden and startling bloom.\n\nThe story of that strange and dramatic evolution I have endeavoured to\ntell in the following pages. Considering in turn its various\naspects--religious, cultural, political, economic, social--I have tried\nto portray their genesis and development, to analyse their character,\nand to appraise their potency. While making due allowance for local\ndifferentiations, the intimate correlation and underlying unity of the\nvarious movements have ever been kept in view.\n\nAlthough the book deals primarily with the Moslem world, it necessarily\nincludes the non-Moslem Hindu elements of India. The field covered is\nthus virtually the entire Near and Middle East. The Far East has not\nbeen directly considered, but parallel developments there have been\nnoted and should always be kept in mind.\n\n                                                      LOTHROP STODDARD.\n\n\n\n\n                             CONTENTS\n\n\nCHAP                                                         PAGE\n\nINTRODUCTION: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE OLD ISLAMIC WORLD     1\n\nI.    THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL                                   20\n\nII.   PAN-ISLAMISM                                             37\n\nIII.  THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST                                75\n\nIV.   POLITICAL CHANGE                                        110\n\nV.    NATIONALISM                                             132\n\nVI.   NATIONALISM IN INDIA                                    201\n\nVII.  ECONOMIC CHANGE                                         226\n\nVIII. SOCIAL CHANGE                                           250\n\nIX.   SOCIAL UNREST AND BOLSHEVISM                            273\n\n      CONCLUSION                                              300\n\n      INDEX                                                   301\n\n                               MAP\n\n      THE WORLD OF ISLAM                       _at end of volume_\n\n\n\n\nTHE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM\n\n    \"Das Alte stuerzt, es aendert sich die Zeit,\n    Und neues Leben blueht aus den Ruinen.\"\n\n                    SCHILLER, _Wilhelm Tell_.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nTHE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE OLD ISLAMIC WORLD\n\n\nThe rise of Islam is perhaps the most amazing event in human history.\nSpringing from a land and a people alike previously negligible, Islam\nspread within a century over half the earth, shattering great empires,\noverthrowing long-established religions, remoulding the souls of races,\nand building up a whole new world--the world of Islam.\n\nThe closer we examine this development the more extraordinary does it\nappear. The other great religions won their way slowly, by painful\nstruggle, and finally triumphed with the aid of powerful monarchs\nconverted to the new faith. Christianity had its Constantine, Buddhism\nits Asoka, and Zoroastrianism its Cyrus, each lending to his chosen cult\nthe mighty force of secular authority. Not so Islam. Arising in a desert\nland sparsely inhabited by a nomad race previously undistinguished in\nhuman annals, Islam sallied forth on its great adventure with the\nslenderest human backing and against the heaviest material odds. Yet\nIslam triumphed with seemingly miraculous ease, and a couple of\ngenerations saw the Fiery Crescent borne victorious from the Pyrenees\nto the Himalayas and from the deserts of Central Asia to the deserts of\nCentral Africa.\n\nThis amazing success was due to a number of contributing factors, chief\namong them being the character of the Arab race, the nature of\nMohammed's teaching, and the general state of the contemporary Eastern\nworld. Undistinguished though the Arabs had hitherto been, they were a\npeople of remarkable potentialities, which were at that moment patently\nseeking self-realization. For several generations before Mohammed,\nArabia had been astir with exuberant vitality. The Arabs had outgrown\ntheir ancestral paganism and were instinctively yearning for better\nthings. Athwart this seething ferment of mind and spirit Islam rang like\na trumpet-call. Mohammed, an Arab of the Arabs, was the very incarnation\nof the soul of his race. Preaching a simple, austere monotheism, free\nfrom priestcraft or elaborate doctrinal trappings, he tapped the\nwell-springs of religious zeal always present in the Semitic heart.\nForgetting the chronic rivalries and blood-feuds which had consumed\ntheir energies in internecine strife, and welded into a glowing unity by\nthe fire of their new-found faith, the Arabs poured forth from their\ndeserts to conquer the earth for Allah, the One True God.\n\nThus Islam, like the resistless breath of the sirocco, the desert wind,\nswept out of Arabia and encountered--a spiritual vacuum. Those\nneighbouring Byzantine and Persian Empires, so imposing to the casual\neye, were mere dried husks, devoid of real vitality. Their religions\nwere a mockery and a sham. Persia's ancestral cult of Zoroaster had\ndegenerated into \"Magism\"--a pompous priestcraft, tyrannical and\npersecuting, hated and secretly despised. As for Eastern Christianity,\nbedizened with the gewgaws of paganism and bedevilled by the maddening\ntheological speculations of the decadent Greek mind, it had become a\nrepellent caricature of the teachings of Christ. Both Magism and\nByzantine Christendom were riven by great heresies which engendered\nsavage persecutions and furious hates. Furthermore, both the Byzantine\nand Persian Empires were harsh despotisms which crushed their subjects\nto the dust and killed out all love of country or loyalty to the state.\nLastly, the two empires had just fought a terrible war from which they\nhad emerged mutually bled white and utterly exhausted.\n\nSuch was the world compelled to face the lava-flood of Islam. The result\nwas inevitable. Once the disciplined strength of the East Roman legions\nand the Persian cuirassiers had broken before the fiery onslaught of the\nfanatic sons of the desert, it was all over. There was no patriotic\nresistance. The down-trodden populations passively accepted new masters,\nwhile the numerous heretics actually welcomed the overthrow of\npersecuting co-religionists whom they hated far worse than their alien\nconquerors. In a short time most of the subject peoples accepted the new\nfaith, so refreshingly simple compared with their own degenerate cults.\nThe Arabs, in their turn, knew how to consolidate their rule. They were\nno bloodthirsty savages, bent solely on loot and destruction. On the\ncontrary, they were an innately gifted race, eager to learn and\nappreciative of the cultural gifts which older civilizations had to\nbestow. Intermarrying freely and professing a common belief, conquerors\nand conquered rapidly fused, and from this fusion arose a new\ncivilization--the Saracenic civilization, in which the ancient cultures\nof Greece, Rome, and Persia were revitalized by Arab vigour and\nsynthesized by the Arab genius and the Islamic spirit. For the first\nthree centuries of its existence (circ. A.D. 650-1000) the realm of\nIslam was the most civilized and progressive portion of the world.\nStudded with splendid cities, gracious mosques, and quiet universities\nwhere the wisdom of the ancient world was preserved and appreciated, the\nMoslem East offered a striking contrast to the Christian West, then sunk\nin the night of the Dark Ages.\n\nHowever, by the tenth century the Saracenic civilization began to\ndisplay unmistakable symptoms of decline. This decline was at first\ngradual. Down to the terrible disasters of the thirteenth century it\nstill displayed vigour and remained ahead of the Christian West. Still,\nby the year A.D. 1000 its golden age was over. For this there were\nseveral reasons. In the first place, that inveterate spirit of faction\nwhich has always been the bane of the Arab race soon reappeared once\nmore. Rival clans strove for the headship of Islam, and their quarrels\ndegenerated into bloody civil wars. In this fratricidal strife the\nfervour of the first days cooled, and saintly men like Abu Bekr and\nOmar, Islam's first standard-bearers, gave place to worldly minded\nleaders who regarded their position of \"Khalifa\"[1] as a means to\ndespotic power and self-glorification. The seat of government was moved\nto Damascus in Syria, and afterward to Bagdad in Mesopotamia. The reason\nfor this was obvious. In Mecca despotism was impossible. The fierce,\nfree-born Arabs of the desert would tolerate no master, and their innate\ndemocracy had been sanctioned by the Prophet, who had explicitly\ndeclared that all Believers were brothers. The Meccan caliphate was a\ntheocratic democracy. Abu Bekr and Omar were elected by the people, and\nheld themselves responsible to public opinion, subject to the divine law\nas revealed by Mohammed in the Koran.\n\nBut in Damascus, and still more in Bagdad, things were different. There\nthe pure-blooded Arabs were only a handful among swarms of Syrian and\nPersian converts and \"Neo-Arab\" mixed-bloods. These people were filled\nwith traditions of despotism and were quite ready to yield the caliphs\nobsequious obedience. The caliphs, in their turn, leaned more and more\nupon these complaisant subjects, drawing from their ranks courtiers,\nofficials, and ultimately soldiers. Shocked and angered, the proud Arabs\ngradually returned to the desert, while the government fell into the\nwell-worn ruts of traditional Oriental despotism. When the caliphate was\nmoved to Bagdad after the founding of the Abbaside dynasty (A.D. 750),\nPersian influence became preponderant. The famous Caliph\nHaroun-al-Rashid, the hero of the _Arabian Nights_, was a typical\nPersian monarch, a true successor of Xerxes and Chosroes, and as\ndifferent from Abu Bekr or Omar as it is possible to conceive. And, in\nBagdad, as elsewhere, despotic power was fatal to its possessors. Under\nits blight the \"successors\" of Mohammed became capricious tyrants or\ndegenerate harem puppets, whose nerveless hands were wholly incapable of\nguiding the great Moslem Empire.\n\nThe empire, in fact, gradually went to pieces. Shaken by the civil wars,\nbereft of strong leaders, and deprived of the invigorating amalgam of\nthe unspoiled desert Arabs, political unity could not endure. Everywhere\nthere occurred revivals of suppressed racial or particularist\ntendencies. The very rapidity of Islam's expansion turned against it,\nnow that the well-springs of that expansion were dried up. Islam had\nmade millions of converts, of many sects and races, but it had digested\nthem very imperfectly. Mohammed had really converted the Arabs, because\nhe merely voiced ideas which were obscurely germinating in Arab minds\nand appealed to impulses innate in the Arab blood. When, however, Islam\nwas accepted by non-Arab peoples, they instinctively interpreted the\nProphet's message according to their particular racial tendencies and\ncultural backgrounds, the result being that primitive Islam was\ndistorted or perverted. The most extreme example of this was in Persia,\nwhere the austere monotheism of Mohammed was transmuted into the\nelaborate mystical cult known as Shiism, which presently cut the\nPersians off from full communion with the orthodox Moslem world. The\nsame transmutive tendency appears, in lesser degree, in the\nsaint-worship of the North African Berbers and in the pantheism of the\nHindu Moslems--both developments which Mohammed would have\nunquestionably execrated.\n\nThese doctrinal fissures in Islam were paralleled by the disruption of\npolitical unity. The first formal split occurred after the accession of\nthe Abbasides. A member of the deposed Ommeyyad family fled to Spain,\nwhere he set up a rival caliphate at Cordova, recognized as lawful not\nonly by the Spanish Moslems, but by the Berbers of North Africa. Later\non another caliphate was set up in Egypt--the Fatimite caliphate,\nresting its title on descent from Mohammed's daughter Fatima. As for the\nAbbaside caliphs of Bagdad, they gradually declined in power, until they\nbecame mere puppets in the hands of a new racial element, the Turks.\n\nBefore describing that shift of power from Neo-Arab to Turkish hands\nwhich was so momentous for the history of the Islamic world, let us\nfirst consider the decline in cultural and intellectual vigour that set\nin concurrently with the disruption of political and religious unity\nduring the later stages of the Neo-Arab period.\n\nThe Arabs of Mohammed's day were a fresh, unspoiled people in the full\nflush of pristine vigour, eager for adventure and inspired by a high\nideal. They had their full share of Semitic fanaticism, but, though\nfanatical, they were not bigoted, that is to say, they possessed, not\nclosed, but open minds. They held firmly to the tenets of their\nreligion, but this religion was extremely simple. The core of Mohammed's\nteaching was theism _plus_ certain practices. A strict belief in the\nunity of God, an equally strict belief in the divine mission[2] of\nMohammed as set forth in the Koran, and certain clearly defined\nduties--prayer, ablutions, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage--these,\nand these alone, constituted the Islam of the Arab conquerors of the\nEastern world.\n\nSo simple a theology could not seriously fetter the Arab mind, alert,\ncurious, eager to learn, and ready to adjust itself to conditions ampler\nand more complex than those prevailing in the parched environment of the\ndesert. Now, not only did the Arabs relish the material advantages and\nluxuries of the more developed societies which they had conquered; they\nalso appreciated the art, literature, science, and ideas of the older\ncivilizations. The effect of these novel stimuli was the remarkable\ncultural and intellectual flowering which is the glory of Saracenic\ncivilization. For a time thought was relatively free and produced a\nwealth of original ideas and daring speculations. These were the work\nnot only of Arabs but also of subject Christians, Jews, and Persians,\nmany of them being heretics previously depressed under the iron bands of\npersecuting Byzantine orthodoxy and Magism.\n\nGradually, however, this enlightened era passed away. Reactionary forces\nappeared and gained in strength. The liberals, who are usually known\nunder the general title of \"Motazelites,\" not only clung to the\ndoctrinal simplicity of primitive Islam, but also contended that the\ntest of all things should be reason. On the other hand, the conservative\nschools of thought asserted that the test should be precedent and\nauthority. These men, many of them converted Christians imbued with the\ntraditions of Byzantine orthodoxy, undertook an immense work of Koranic\nexegesis, combined with an equally elaborate codification and\ninterpretation of the reputed sayings or \"traditions\" of Mohammed, as\nhanded down by his immediate disciples and followers. As the result of\nthese labours, there gradually arose a Moslem theology and scholastic\nphilosophy as rigid, elaborate, and dogmatic as that of the mediaeval\nChristian West.\n\nNaturally, the struggle between the fundamentally opposed tendencies of\ntraditionalism and rationalism was long and bitter. Yet the ultimate\noutcome was almost a foregone conclusion. Everything conspired to favour\nthe triumph of dogma over reason. The whole historic tradition of the\nEast (a tradition largely induced by racial and climatic factors[3]) was\ntoward absolutism. This tradition had been interrupted by the inrush of\nthe wild libertarianism of the desert. But the older tendency presently\nreasserted itself, stimulated as it was by the political transformation\nof the caliphate from theocratic, democracy to despotism.\n\nThis triumph of absolutism in the field of government in fact assured\nits eventual triumph in all other fields as well. For, in the long run,\ndespotism can no more tolerate liberty of thought than it can liberty of\naction. Some of the Damascus caliphs, to be sure, toyed with Motazelism,\nthe Ommeyyads being mainly secular-minded men to whom freethinking was\nintellectually attractive. But presently the caliphs became aware of\nliberalism's political implications. The Motazelites did not confine\nthemselves to the realm of pure philosophic speculation. They also\ntrespassed on more dangerous ground. Motazelite voices were heard\nrecalling the democratic days of the Meccan caliphate, when the\nCommander of the Faithful, instead of being an hereditary monarch, was\nelected by the people and responsible to public opinion. Some bold\nspirits even entered into relations with the fierce fanatic sects of\ninner Arabia, like the Kharijites, who, upholding the old desert\nfreedom, refused to recognize the caliphate and proclaimed theories of\nadvanced republicanism.\n\nThe upshot was that the caliphs turned more and more toward the\nconservative theologians as against the liberals, just as they favoured\nthe monarchist Neo-Arabs in preference to the intractable pure-blooded\nArabs of the desert. Under the Abbasides the government came out frankly\nfor religious absolutism. Standards of dogmatic orthodoxy were\nestablished, Motazelites were persecuted and put to death, and by the\ntwelfth century A.D. the last vestiges of Saracenic liberalism were\nextirpated. The canons of Moslem thought were fixed. All creative\nactivity ceased. The very memory of the great Motazelite doctors faded\naway. The Moslem mind was closed, not to be re-opened until our own day.\n\nBy the beginning of the eleventh century the decline of Saracenic\ncivilization had become so pronounced that change was clearly in the\nair. Having lost their early vigour, the Neo-Arabs were to see their\npolitical power pass into other hands. These political heirs of the\nNeo-Arabs were the Turks. The Turks were a western branch of that\ncongeries of nomadic tribes which, from time immemorial, have roamed\nover the limitless steppes of eastern and central Asia, and which are\nknown collectively under the titles of \"Uralo-Altaic\" or \"Turanian\"\npeoples. The Arabs had been in contact with the Turkish nomads ever\nsince the Islamic conquest of Persia, when the Moslem generals found the\nTurks beating restlessly against Persia's north-eastern frontiers. In\nthe caliphate's palmy days the Turks were not feared. In fact, they were\npresently found to be very useful. A dull-witted folk with few ideas,\nthe Turks could do two things superlatively well--obey orders and fight\nlike devils. In other words, they made ideal mercenary soldiers. The\ncaliphs were delighted, and enlisted ever larger numbers of them for\ntheir armies and their body-guards.\n\nThis was all very well while the caliphate was strong, but when it grew\nweak the situation altered. Rising everywhere to positions of authority,\nthe Turkish mercenaries began to act like masters. Opening the eastern\nfrontiers, they let in fresh swarms of their countrymen, who now came,\nnot as individuals, but in tribes or \"hordes\" under their hereditary\nchiefs, wandering about at their own sweet will, settling where they\npleased, and despoiling or evicting the local inhabitants.\n\nThe Turks soon renounced their ancestral paganism for Islam, but Islam\nmade little change in their natures. In judging these Turkish newcomers\nwe must not consider them the same as the present-day Ottoman Turks of\nConstantinople and Asia Minor. The modern Osmanli are so saturated with\nEuropean and Near Eastern blood, and have been so leavened by Western\nand Saracenic ideas, they that are a very different people from their\nremote immigrant ancestors. Yet, even as it is, the modern Osmanli\ndisplay enough of those unlovely Turanian traits which characterize the\nunmodified Turks of central Asia, often called \"Turkomans,\" to\ndistinguish them from their Ottoman kinsfolk to the west.\n\nNow, what was the primitive Turkish nature? First and foremost, it was\nthat of the professional soldier. Discipline was the Turk's watchword.\nNo originality of thought, and but little curiosity. Few ideas ever\npenetrated the Turk's slow mind, and the few that did penetrate were\nreceived as military orders, to be obeyed without question and adhered\nto without reflection. Such was the being who took over the leadership\nof Islam from the Saracen's failing grasp.\n\nNo greater misfortune could have occurred both for Islam and for the\nworld at large. For Islam it meant the rule of dull-witted bigots under\nwhich enlightened progress was impossible. Of course Islam did gain a\ngreat accession of warlike strength, but this new power was so wantonly\nmisused as to bring down disastrous repercussions upon Islam itself.\nThe first notable exploits of the immigrant Turkish hordes were their\nconquest of Asia Minor and their capture of Jerusalem, both events\ntaking place toward the close of the eleventh century[4]. Up to this\ntime Asia Minor had remained part of the Christian world. The original\nArab flood of the seventh century, after overrunning Syria, had been\nstopped by the barrier of the Taurus Mountains; the Byzantine Empire had\npulled itself together; and thenceforth, despite border bickerings, the\nByzantine-Saracen frontier had remained substantially unaltered. Now,\nhowever, the Turks broke the Byzantine barrier, overran Asia Minor, and\nthreatened even Constantinople, the eastern bulwark of Christendom. As\nfor Jerusalem, it had, of course, been in Moslem hands since the Arab\nconquest of A.D. 637, but the caliph Omar had carefully respected the\nChristian \"Holy Places,\" and his successors had neither persecuted the\nlocal Christians nor maltreated the numerous pilgrims who flocked\nperennially to Jerusalem from every part of the Christian world. But the\nTurks changed all this. Avid for loot, and filled with bigoted hatred of\nthe \"Misbelievers,\" they sacked the holy places, persecuted the\nChristians, and rendered pilgrimage impossible.\n\nThe effect of these twin disasters upon Christendom, occurring as they\ndid almost simultaneously, was tremendous. The Christian West, then at\nthe height of its religious fervour, quivered with mingled fear and\nwrath. Myriads of zealots, like Peter the Hermit, roused all Europe to\nfrenzy. Fanaticism begat fanaticism, and the Christian West poured upon\nthe Moslem East vast hosts of warriors in those extraordinary\nexpeditions, the Crusades.\n\nThe Turkish conquest of Islam and its counterblast, the Crusades, were\nan immense misfortune for the world. They permanently worsened the\nrelations between East and West. In the year A.D. 1000 Christian-Moslem\nrelations were fairly good, and showed every prospect of becoming\nbetter. The hatreds engendered by Islam's first irruption were dying\naway. The frontiers of Islam and Christendom had become apparently\nfixed, and neither side showed much desire to encroach upon the other.\nThe only serious debatable ground was Spain, where Moslem and Christian\nwere continually at hand-grips; but, after all, Spain was mutually\nregarded as a frontier episode. Between Islam and Christendom, as a\nwhole, intercourse was becoming steadily more friendly and more\nfrequent. This friendly intercourse, if continued, might ultimately have\nproduced momentous results for human progress. The Moslem world was at\nthat time still well ahead of western Europe in knowledge and culture,\nbut Saracenic civilization was ossifying, whereas the Christian West,\ndespite its ignorance, rudeness, and barbarism, was bursting with lusty\nlife and patently aspiring to better things. Had the nascent amity of\nEast and West in the eleventh century continued to develop, both would\nhave greatly profited. In the West the influence of Saracenic culture,\ncontaining, as it did, the ancient learning of Greece and Rome, might\nhave awakened our Renaissance much earlier, while in the East the\ninfluence of the mediaeval West, with its abounding vigour, might have\nsaved Moslem civilization from the creeping paralysis which was\novertaking it.\n\nBut it was not to be. In Islam the refined, easygoing Saracen gave place\nto the bigoted, brutal Turk. Islam became once more aggressive--not, as\nin its early days, for an ideal, but for sheer blood-lust, plunder, and\ndestruction. Henceforth it was war to the knife between the only\npossible civilization and the most brutal and hopeless barbarism.\nFurthermore, this war was destined to last for centuries. The Crusades\nwere merely Western counter-attacks against a Turkish assault on\nChristendom which continued for six hundred years and was definitely\nbroken only under the walls of Vienna in 1683. Naturally, from these\ncenturies of unrelenting strife furious hatreds and fanaticisms were\nengendered which still envenom the relations of Islam and Christendom.\nThe atrocities of Mustapha Kemal's Turkish \"Nationalists\" and the\natrocities of the Greek troops in Asia Minor, of which we read in our\nmorning papers, are in no small degree a \"carrying on\" of the mutual\natrocities of Turks and Crusaders in Palestine eight hundred years ago.\n\nWith the details of those old wars between Turks and Christians this\nbook has no direct concern. The wars themselves should simply be noted\nas a chronic barrier between East and West. As for the Moslem East, with\nits declining Saracenic civilization bowed beneath the brutal Turkish\nyoke, it was presently exposed to even more terrible misfortunes. These\nmisfortunes were also of Turanian origin. Toward the close of the\ntwelfth century the eastern branches of the Turanian race were welded\ninto a temporary unity by the genius of a mighty chieftain named Jenghiz\nKhan. Taking the sinister title of \"The Inflexible Emperor,\" this\narch-savage started out to loot the world. He first overran northern\nChina, which he hideously ravaged, then turned his devastating course\ntoward the west. Such was the rise of the terrible \"Mongols,\" whose name\nstill stinks in the nostrils of civilized mankind. Carrying with them\nskilled Chinese engineers using gunpowder for the reduction of fortified\ncities, Jenghiz Khan and his mounted hosts proved everywhere\nirresistible. The Mongols were the most appalling barbarians whom the\nworld has ever seen. Their object was not conquest for settlement, not\neven loot, but in great part a sheer satanic lust for blood and\ndestruction. They revelled in butchering whole populations, destroying\ncities, laying waste countrysides--and then passing on to fresh fields.\n\nJenghiz Khan died after a few years of his westward progress, but his\nsuccessors continued his work with unabated zeal. Both Christendom and\nIslam were smitten by the Mongol scourge. All eastern Europe was ravaged\nand re-barbarized, the Russians showing ugly traces of the Mongol\nimprint to this day. But the woes of Christendom were as nothing to the\nwoes of Islam. The Mongols never penetrated beyond Poland, and western\nEurope, the seat of Western civilization, was left unscathed. Not so\nIslam. Pouring down from the north-east, the Mongol hosts whirled like a\ncyclone over the Moslem world from India to Egypt, pillaging, murdering,\nand destroying. The nascent civilization of mediaeval Persia, just\nstruggling into the light beneath the incubus of Turkish harryings, was\nstamped flat under the Mongol hoofs, and the Mongols then proceeded to\ndeal with the Moslem culture-centre--Bagdad. Bagdad had declined\nconsiderably from the gorgeous days of Haroun-al-Rashid, with its\nlegendary million souls. However, it was still a great city, the seat of\nthe caliphate and the unquestioned centre of Saracenic civilization. The\nMongols stormed it (A.D. 1258), butchered its entire population, and\nliterally wiped Bagdad off the face of the earth. And even this was not\nthe worst. Bagdad was the capital of Mesopotamia. This \"Land between the\nRivers\" had, in the very dawn of history, been reclaimed from swamp and\ndesert by the patient labours of half-forgotten peoples who, with\ninfinite toil, built up a marvellous system of irrigation that made\nMesopotamia the perennial garden and granary of the world. Ages had\npassed and Mesopotamia had known many masters, but all these conquerors\nhad respected, even cherished, the irrigation works which were the\nsource of all prosperity. These works the Mongols wantonly, methodically\ndestroyed. The oldest civilization in the world, the cradle of human\nculture, was hopelessly ruined; at least eight thousand years of\ncontinuous human effort went for naught, and Mesopotamia became the\nnoisome land it still remains to-day, parched during the droughts of low\nwater, soaked to fever-stricken marsh in the season of river-floods,\ntenanted only by a few mongrel fellahs inhabiting wretched mud villages,\nand cowed by nomad Bedouin browsing their flocks on the sites of ancient\nfields.\n\nThe destruction of Bagdad was a fatal blow to Saracenic civilization,\nespecially in the East. And even before that dreadful disaster it had\nreceived a terrible blow in the West. Traversing North Africa in its\nearly days, Islam had taken firm root in Spain, and had so flourished\nthere that Spanish Moslem culture was fully abreast of that in the\nMoslem East. The capital of Spanish Islam was Cordova, the seat of the\nWestern caliphate, a mighty city, perhaps more wonderful than Bagdad\nitself. For centuries Spanish Islam lived secure, confining the\nChristians to the mountainous regions of the north. As Saracen vigour\ndeclined, however, the Christians pressed the Moslems southward. In 1213\nSpanish Islam was hopelessly broken at the tremendous battle of Las\nNavas de Tolosa. Thenceforth, for the victorious Christians it was a\ncase of picking up the pieces. Cordova itself soon fell, and with it the\nglory of Spanish Islam, for the fanatical Christian Spaniards extirpated\nSaracenic civilization as effectually as the pagan Mongols were at that\ntime doing. To be sure, a remnant of the Spanish Moslems held their\nground at Granada, in the extreme south, until the year Columbus\ndiscovered America, but this was merely an episode. The Saracen\ncivilization of the West was virtually destroyed.\n\nMeanwhile the Moslem East continued to bleed under the Mongol scourge.\nWave after wave of Mongol raiders passed over the land, the last notable\ninvasion being that headed by the famous (or rather infamous) Tamerlane,\nearly in the fifteenth century. By this time the western Mongols had\naccepted Islam, but that made little difference in their conduct. To\nshow that Tamerlane was a true scion of his ancestor Jenghiz Khan, it\nmay be remarked that his foible was pyramids of human skulls, his prize\neffort being one of 70,000 erected after the storming of the Persian\ncity of Ispahan. After the cessation of the Mongol incursions, the\nravaged and depopulated Moslem East fell under the sway of the Ottoman\nTurks.\n\nThe Ottoman Turks, or \"Osmanli,\" were originally merely one of the many\nTurkish hordes which entered Asia Minor after the downfall of Byzantine\nrule. They owed their greatness mainly to a long line of able sultans,\nwho gradually absorbed the neighbouring Turkish tribes and used this\nconsolidated strength for ambitious conquests both to east and west. In\n1453 the Osmanli extinguished the old Byzantine Empire by taking\nConstantinople, and within a century thereafter they had conquered the\nMoslem East from Persia to Morocco, had subjugated the whole Balkan\nPeninsula, and had advanced through Hungary to the walls of Vienna.\nUnlike their Mongol cousins, the Ottoman Turks built up a durable\nempire. It was a barbarous sort of empire, for the Turks understood very\nlittle about culture. The only things they could appreciate were\nmilitary improvements. These, however, they thoroughly appreciated and\nkept fully abreast of the times. In their palmy days the Turks had the\nbest artillery and the steadiest infantry in the world, and were the\nterror of Europe.\n\nMeantime Europe was awakening to true progress and higher civilization.\nWhile the Moslem East was sinking under Mongol harryings and Turkish\nmilitarism, the Christian West was thrilling to the Renaissance and the\ndiscoveries of America and the water route to India. The effect of these\ndiscoveries simply cannot be over-estimated. When Columbus and Vasco da\nGama made their memorable voyages at the end of the fifteenth century,\nWestern civilization was pent up closely within the restricted bounds of\nwest-central Europe, and was waging a defensive and none-too-hopeful\nstruggle with the forces of Turanian barbarism. Russia lay under the\nheel of the Mongol Tartars, while the Turks, then in the full flush of\ntheir martial vigour, were marching triumphantly up from the south-east\nand threatening Europe's very heart. So strong were these Turanian\nbarbarians, with Asia, North Africa, and eastern Europe in their grasp,\nthat Western civilization was hard put to it to hold its own. Western\ncivilization was, in fact, fighting with its back to the wall--the wall\nof a boundless ocean. We can hardly conceive how our mediaeval\nforefathers viewed the ocean. To them it was a numbing, constricting\npresence; the abode of darkness and horror. No wonder mediaeval Europe\nwas static, since it faced on ruthless, aggressive Asia, and backed on\nnowhere. Then, in the twinkling of an eye, the sea-wall became a\nhighway, and dead-end Europe became mistress of the ocean--and thereby\nmistress of the world.\n\nThe greatest strategic shift of fortune in all human history had taken\nplace. Instead of fronting hopelessly on the fiercest of Asiatics,\nagainst whom victory by direct attack seemed impossible, the Europeans\ncould now flank them at will. Furthermore, the balance of resources\nshifted in Europe's favour. Whole new worlds were unmasked whence Europe\ncould draw limitless wealth to quicken its home life and initiate a\nprogress that would soon place it immeasurably above its once-dreaded\nAsiatic assailants. What were the resources of the stagnant Moslem East\ncompared with those of the Americas and the Indies? So Western\ncivilization, quickened, energized, progressed with giant strides, shook\noff its mediaeval fetters, grasped the talisman of science, and strode\ninto the light of modern times.\n\nYet all this left Islam unmoved. Wrapping itself in the tatters of\nSaracenic civilization, the Moslem East continued to fall behind. Even\nits military power presently vanished, for the Turk sank into lethargy\nand ceased to cultivate the art of war. For a time the West, busied with\ninternal conflicts, hesitated to attack the East, so great was the\nprestige of the Ottoman name. But the crushing defeat of the Turks in\ntheir rash attack upon Vienna in 1683 showed the West that the Ottoman\nEmpire was far gone in decrepitude. Thenceforth, the empire was harried\nmercilessly by Western assaults and was saved from collapse only by the\nmutual jealousies of Western Powers, quarrelling over the Turkish\nspoils.\n\nHowever, not until the nineteenth century did the Moslem world, as a\nwhole, feel the weight of Western attack. Throughout the eighteenth\ncentury the West assailed the ends of the Moslem battle-line in eastern\nEurope and the Indies, but the bulk of Islam, from Morocco to Central\nAsia, remained almost immune. The Moslem world failed to profit by this\nrespite. Plunged in lethargy, contemptuous of the European\n\"Misbelievers,\" and accepting defeats as the inscrutable will of Allah,\nIslam continued to live its old life, neither knowing nor caring to know\nanything about Western ideas or Western progress.\n\nSuch was the decrepit Moslem world which faced nineteenth-century\nEurope, energized by the Industrial Revolution, armed as never before by\nmodern science and invention which had unlocked nature's secrets and\nplaced hitherto-undreamed-of weapons in its aggressive hands. The result\nwas a foregone conclusion. One by one, the decrepit Moslem states fell\nbefore the Western attack, and the whole Islamic world was rapidly\npartitioned among the European Powers. England took India and Egypt,\nRussia crossed the Caucasus and mastered Central Asia, France conquered\nNorth Africa, while other European nations grasped minor portions of the\nMoslem heritage. The Great War witnessed the final stage in this process\nof subjugation. By the terms of the treaties which marked its close,\nTurkey was extinguished and not a single Mohammedan state retained\ngenuine independence. The subjection of the Moslem world was\ncomplete--on paper.\n\nOn paper! For, in its very hour of apparent triumph, Western domination\nwas challenged as never before. During those hundred years of Western\nconquest a mighty internal change had been coming over the Moslem\nworld. The swelling tide of Western aggression had at last moved the\n\"immovable\" East. At last Islam became conscious of its decrepitude, and\nwith that consciousness a vast ferment, obscure yet profound, began to\nleaven the 250,000,000 followers of the Prophet from Morocco to China\nand from Turkestan to the Congo. The first spark was fittingly struck in\nthe Arabian desert, the cradle of Islam. Here at the opening of the\nnineteenth century, arose the Wahabi movement for the reform of Islam,\nwhich presently kindled the far-flung \"Mohammedan Revival,\" which in its\nturn begat the movement known as \"Pan-Islamism.\" Furthermore, athwart\nthese essentially internal movements there came pouring a flood of\nexternal stimuli from the West--ideas such as parliamentary government,\nnationalism, scientific education, industrialism, and even ultra-modern\nconcepts like feminism, socialism, Bolshevism. Stirred by the\ninteraction of all these novel forces and spurred by the ceaseless\npressure of European aggression, the Moslem world roused more and more\nto life and action. The Great War was a shock of terrific potency, and\nto-day Islam is seething with mighty forces fashioning a new Moslem\nworld. What are those forces moulding the Islam of the future? To their\nanalysis and appraisal the body of this book is devoted.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] _I. e._ \"Successor\"; anglicized into the word \"Caliph.\"\n\n[2] To be carefully distinguished from divinity. Mohammed not only did\nnot make any pretensions to divinity, but specifically disclaimed any\nsuch attributes. He regarded himself as the last of a series of divinely\ninspired prophets, beginning with Adam and extending through Moses and\nJesus to himself, the mouthpiece of God's last and most perfect\nrevelation.\n\n[3] The influence of environment and heredity on human evolution in\ngeneral and on the history of the East in particular, though of great\nimportance, cannot be treated in a summary such as this. The influence\nof climatic and other environmental factors has been ably treated by\nProf. Ellsworth Huntington in his various works, such as _The Pulse of\nAsia_ (Boston, 1907); _Civilization and Climate_ (Yale Univ. Press,\n1915), and _World-Power and Evolution_ (Yale Univ. Press, 1919). See\nalso Chap. III. in Arminius Vambery--_Der Islam im neunzehnten\nJahrhundert. Eine culturgeschichtliche Studie_ (Leipzig, 1875). For a\nsummary of racial influences in Eastern history, see Madison Grant--_The\nPassing of the Great Race_ (N. Y., 1916).\n\n[4] The Turkish overrunning of Asia Minor took place after the\ndestruction of the Byzantine army in the great battle of Manzikert, A.D.\n1071. The Turks captured Jerusalem in 1076.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL\n\n\nBy the eighteenth century the Moslem world had sunk to the lowest depth\nof its decrepitude. Nowhere were there any signs of healthy vigour,\neverywhere were stagnation and decay. Manners and morals were alike\nexecrable. The last vestiges of Saracenic culture had vanished in a\nbarbarous luxury of the few and an equally barbarous degradation of the\nmultitude. Learning was virtually dead, the few universities which\nsurvived fallen into dreary decay and languishing in poverty and\nneglect. Government had become despotism tempered by anarchy and\nassassination. Here and there a major despot like the Sultan of Turkey\nor the Indian \"Great Mogul\" maintained some semblance of state\nauthority, albeit provincial pashas were for ever striving to erect\nindependent governments based, like their masters', on tyranny and\nextortion. The pashas, in turn, strove ceaselessly against unruly local\nchiefs and swarms of brigands who infested the countryside. Beneath this\nsinister hierarchy groaned the people, robbed, bullied, and ground into\nthe dust. Peasant and townsman had alike lost all incentive to labour or\ninitiative, and both agriculture and trade had fallen to the lowest\nlevel compatible with bare survival.\n\nAs for religion, it was as decadent as everything else. The austere\nmonotheism of Mohammed had become overlaid with a rank growth of\nsuperstition and puerile mysticism. The mosques stood unfrequented and\nruinous, deserted by the ignorant multitude, which, decked out in\namulets, charms, and rosaries, listened to squalid fakirs or ecstatic\ndervishes, and went on pilgrimages to the tombs of \"holy men,\"\nworshipped as saints and \"intercessors\" with that Allah who had become\ntoo remote a being for the direct devotion of these benighted souls. As\nfor the moral precepts of the Koran, they were ignored or defied.\nWine-drinking and opium-eating were well-nigh universal, prostitution\nwas rampant, and the most degrading vices flaunted naked and unashamed.\nEven the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, were sink-holes of iniquity,\nwhile the \"Hajj,\" or pilgrimage ordained by the Prophet, had become a\nscandal through its abuses. In fine: the life had apparently gone out of\nIslam, leaving naught but a dry husk of soulless ritual and degrading\nsuperstition behind. Could Mohammed have returned to earth, he would\nunquestionably have anathematized his followers as apostates and\nidolaters.\n\nYet, in this darkest hour, a voice came crying out of the vast Arabian\ndesert, the cradle of Islam, calling the faithful back to the true path.\nThis puritan reformer, the famous Abd-el-Wahab, kindled a fire which\npresently spread to the remotest corners of the Moslem world, purging\nIslam of its sloth and reviving the fervour of olden days. The great\nMohammedan Revival had begun.\n\nMahommed ibn Abd-el-Wahab was born about the year A.D. 1700 in the heart\nof the Arabian desert, the region known as the Nejd. The Nejd was the\none clean spot in the decadent Moslem world. We have already seen how,\nwith the transformation of the caliphate from a theocratic democracy to\nan Oriental despotism, the free-spirited Arabs had returned scornfully\nto their deserts. Here they had maintained their wild freedom. Neither\ncaliph nor sultan dared venture far into those vast solitudes of burning\nsand and choking thirst, where the rash invader was lured to sudden\ndeath in a whirl of stabbing spears. The Arabs recognized no master,\nwandering at will with their flocks and camels, or settled here and\nthere in green oases hidden in the desert's heart. And in the desert\nthey retained their primitive political and religious virtues. The\nnomad Bedouin lived under the sway of patriarchal \"sheiks\"; the settled\ndwellers in the oases usually acknowledged the authority of some leading\nfamily. But these rulers possessed the slenderest authority, narrowly\ncircumscribed by well-established custom and a jealous public opinion\nwhich they transgressed at their peril. The Turks, to be sure, had\nmanaged to acquire a precarious authority over the holy cities and the\nRed Sea littoral, but the Nejd, the vast interior, was free. And, in\nreligion, as in politics, the desert Arabs kept the faith of their\nfathers. Scornfully rejecting the corruptions of decadent Islam, they\nheld fast to the simple theology of primitive Islam, so congenial to\ntheir Arab natures.\n\nInto this atmosphere of an older and better age, Abd-el-Wahab was born.\nDisplaying from the first a studious and religious bent, he soon\nacquired a reputation for learning and sanctity. Making the Meccan\npilgrimage while still a young man, he studied at Medina and travelled\nas far as Persia, returning ultimately to the Nejd. He returned burning\nwith holy wrath at what he had seen, and determined to preach a puritan\nreformation. For years he wandered up and down Arabia, and at last he\nconverted Mahommed, head of the great clan of Saud, the most powerful\nchieftain in all the Nejd. This gave Abd-el-Wahab both moral prestige\nand material strength, and he made the most of his opportunities.\nGradually, the desert Arabs were welded into a politico-religious unity\nlike that effected by the Prophet. Abd-el-Wahab was, in truth, a\nfaithful counterpart of the first caliphs, Abu Bekr and Omar. When he\ndied in 1787 his disciple, Saud, proved a worthy successor. The new\nWahabi state was a close counterpart of the Meccan caliphate. Though\npossessing great military power, Saud always considered himself\nresponsible to public opinion and never encroached upon the legitimate\nfreedom of his subjects. Government, though stern, was able and just.\nThe Wahabi judges were competent and honest. Robbery, became almost\nunknown, so well was the public peace maintained. Education was\nsedulously fostered. Every oasis had its school, while teachers were\nsent to the Bedouin tribes.\n\nHaving consolidated the Nejd, Saud was now ready to undertake the\ngreater task of subduing and purifying the Moslem world. His first\nobjective was of course the holy cities. This objective was attained in\nthe opening years of the nineteenth century. Nothing could stand against\nthe rush of the Wahabi hosts burning with fanatic hatred against the\nTurks, who were loathed both as apostate Moslems and as usurpers of that\nsupremacy in Islam which all Arabs believed should rest in Arab hands.\nWhen Saud died in 1814 he was preparing to invade Syria. It looked for a\nmoment as though the Wahabis were to sweep the East and puritanize all\nIslam at a blow.\n\nBut it was not to be. Unable to stem the Wahabi flood, the Sultan of\nTurkey called on his powerful vassal, the famous Mehemet Ali. This able\nAlbanian adventurer had by that time made himself master of Egypt.\nFrankly recognizing the superiority of the West, he had called in\nnumerous European officers who rapidly fashioned a formidable army,\ncomposed largely of hard-fighting Albanian highlanders, and disciplined\nand equipped after European models. Mehemet Ali gladly answered the\nSultan's summons, and it soon became clear that even Wahabi fanaticism\nwas no match for European muskets and artillery handled by seasoned\nveterans. In a short time the holy cities were recaptured and the\nWahabis were driven back into the desert. The nascent Wahabi empire had\nvanished like a mirage. Wahabism's political role was ended.[5]\n\nHowever, Wahabism's spiritual role had only just begun. The Nejd\nremained a focus of puritan zeal whence the new spirit radiated in all\ndirections. Even in the holy cities Wahabism continued to set the\nreligious tone, and the numberless \"Hajjis,\" or pilgrims, who came\nannually from every part of the Moslem world returned to their homes\nzealous reformers. Soon the Wahabi leaven began to produce profound\ndisturbances in the most distant quarters. For example, in northern\nIndia a Wahabi fanatic, Seyid Ahmed,[6] so roused the Punjabi\nMohammedans that he actually built up a theocratic state, and only his\nchance death prevented a possible Wahabi conquest of northern India.\nThis state was shattered by the Sikhs, about 1830, but when the English\nconquered the country they had infinite trouble with the smouldering\nembers of Wahabi feeling, which, in fact, lived on, contributed to the\nIndian mutiny, and permanently fanaticized Afghanistan and the wild\ntribes of the Indian North-West Frontier.[7] It was during these years\nthat the famous Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi came from his Algerian home\nto Mecca and there imbibed those Wahabi principles which led to the\nfounding of the great Pan-Islamic fraternity that bears his name. Even\nthe Babbist movement in Persia, far removed though it was doctrinally\nfrom Wahabi teaching, was indubitably a secondary reflex of the Wahabi\nurge.[8] In fact, within a generation, the strictly Wahabi movement had\nbroadened into the larger development known as the Mohammedan Revival,\nand this in turn was developing numerous phases, chief among them being\nthe movement usually termed Pan-Islamism. That movement, particularly on\nits political side, I shall treat in the next chapter. At present let\nus examine the other aspects of the Mohammedan Revival, with special\nreference to its religious and cultural phases.\n\nThe Wahabi movement was a strictly puritan reformation. Its aim was the\nreform of abuses, the abolition of superstitious practices, and a return\nto primitive Islam. All later accretions--the writings and\ninterpretations of the mediaeval theologians, ceremonial or mystical\ninnovations, saint worship, in fact every sort of change, were\ncondemned. The austere monotheism of Mohammed was preached in all its\nuncompromising simplicity, and the Koran, literally interpreted, was\ntaken as the sole guide for human action. This doctrinal simplification\nwas accompanied by a most rigid code of morals. The prayers, fastings,\nand other practices enjoined by Mohammed were scrupulously observed. The\nmost austere manner of living was enforced. Silken clothing, rich food,\nwine, opium, tobacco, coffee, and all other indulgences were sternly\nproscribed. Even religious architecture was practically tabooed, the\nWahabis pulling down the Prophet's tomb at Medina and demolishing the\nminarets of mosques as godless innovations. The Wahabis were thus,\ndespite their moral earnestness, excessively narrow-minded, and it was\nvery fortunate for Islam that they soon lost their political power and\nwere compelled thenceforth to confine their efforts to moral teaching.\n\nMany critics of Islam point to the Wahabi movement as a proof that Islam\nis essentially retrograde and innately incapable of evolutionary\ndevelopment. These criticisms, however, appear to be unwarranted. The\ninitial stage of every religious reformation is an uncritical return to\nthe primitive cult. To the religious reformer the only way of salvation\nis a denial of all subsequent innovations, regardless of their\ncharacter. Our own Protestant Reformation began in just this way, and\nHumanists like Erasmus, repelled and disgusted by Protestantism's\npuritanical narrowness, could see no good in the movement, declaring\nthat it menaced all true culture and merely replaced an infallible Pope\nby an infallible Bible.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the puritan beginnings of the Mohammedan Revival\npresently broadened along more constructive lines, some of these\nbecoming tinged with undoubted liberalism. The Moslem reformers of the\nearly nineteenth century had not dug very deeply into their religious\npast before they discovered--Motazelism. We have already reviewed the\ngreat struggle which had raged between reason and dogma in Islam's early\ndays, in which dogma had triumphed so completely that the very memory of\nMotazelism had faded away. Now, however, those memories were revived,\nand the liberal-minded reformers were delighted to find such striking\nconfirmation of their ideas, both in the writings of the Motazelite\ndoctors and in the sacred texts themselves. The principle that reason\nand not blind prescription was to be the test opened the door to the\npossibility of all those reforms which they had most at heart. For\nexample, the reformers found that in the traditional writings Mohammed\nwas reported to have said: \"I am no more than a man; when I order you\nanything respecting religion, receive it; when I order you about the\naffairs of the world, then I am nothing more than man.\" And, again, as\nthough foreseeing the day when sweeping changes would be necessary. \"Ye\nare in an age in which, if ye abandon one-tenth of that which is\nordered, ye will be ruined. After this, a time will come when he who\nshall observe one-tenth of what is now ordered will be redeemed.\"[9]\n\nBefore discussing the ideas and efforts of the modern Moslem reformers,\nit might be well to examine the assertions made by numerous Western\ncritics, that Islam is by its very nature incapable of reform and\nprogressive adaptation to the expansion of human knowledge. Such is the\ncontention not only of Christian polemicists,[10] but also of\nrationalists like Renan and European administrators of Moslem\npopulations like Lord Cromer. Lord Cromer, in fact, pithily summarizes\nthis critical attitude in his statement: \"Islam cannot be reformed; that\nis to say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer; it is something else.\"[11]\n\nNow these criticisms, coming as they do from close students of Islam\noften possessing intimate personal acquaintance with Moslems, deserve\nrespectful consideration. And yet an historical survey of religions, and\nespecially a survey of the thoughts and accomplishments of Moslem\nreformers during the past century, seem to refute these pessimistic\ncharges.\n\nIn the first place, it should be remembered that Islam to-day stands\njust about where Christendom stood in the fifteenth century, at the\nbeginning of the Reformation. There is the same supremacy of dogma over\nreason, the same blind adherence to prescription and authority, the same\nsuspicion and hostility to freedom of thought or scientific knowledge.\nThere is no doubt that a study of the Mohammedan sacred texts,\nparticularly of the \"sheriat\" or canon law, together with a glance over\nMoslem history for the last thousand years, reveal an attitude on the\nwhole quite incompatible with modern progress and civilization. But was\nnot precisely the same thing true of Christendom at the beginning of the\nfifteenth century? Compare the sheriat with the Christian canon law. The\nspirit is the same. Take, for example, the sheriat's prohibition on the\nlending of money at interest; a prohibition which, if obeyed, renders\nimpossible anything like business or industry in the modern sense. This\nis the example oftenest cited to prove Islam's innate incompatibility\nwith modern civilization. But the Christian canon law equally forbade\ninterest, and enforced that prohibition so strictly, that for centuries\nthe Jews had a monopoly of business in Europe, while the first\nChristians who dared to lend money (the Lombards) were regarded almost\nas heretics, were universally hated, and were frequently persecuted.\nAgain, take the matter of Moslem hostility to freedom of thought and\nscientific investigation. Can Islam show anything more revolting than\nthat scene in Christian history when, less than three hundred years\nago,[12] the great Galileo was haled before the Papal Inquisition and\nforced, under threat of torture, to recant the damnable heresy that the\nearth went round the sun?\n\nAs a matter of fact, Mohammed reverenced knowledge. His own words are\neloquent testimony to that. Here are some of his sayings:\n\n\"Seek knowledge, even, if need be, on the borders of China.\"\n\n\"Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave.\"\n\n\"One word of knowledge is of more value than the reciting of a hundred\nprayers.\"\n\n\"The ink of sages is more precious than the blood of martyrs.\"\n\n\"One word of wisdom, learned and communicated to a Moslem brother,\noutweighs the prayers of a whole year.\"\n\n\"Wise men are the successors of the Prophet.\"\n\n\"God has created nothing better than reason.\"\n\n\"In truth, a man may have prayed, fasted, given alms, made pilgrimage,\nand all other good works; nevertheless, he shall be rewarded only in the\nmeasure that he has used his common sense.\"\n\nThese citations (and there are others of the same tenor) prove that the\nmodern Moslem reformers have good scriptural backing for their liberal\nattitude. Of course I do not imply that the reform movement in Islam,\njust because it is liberal and progressive, is thereby _ipso facto_\nassured of success. History reveals too many melancholy instances to the\ncontrary. Indeed, we have already seen how, in Islam itself, the\npromising liberal movement of its early days passed utterly away. What\nhistory does show, however, is that when the times favour progress,\nreligions are adapted to that progress by being reformed and\nliberalized. No human society once fairly on the march was ever turned\nback by a creed. Halted it may be, but if the progressive urge persists,\nthe doctrinal barrier is either surmounted, undermined, flanked, or\nswept aside. Now there is no possibility that the Moslem world will\nhenceforth lack progressive influences. It is in close contact with\nWestern civilization, and is being increasingly permeated with Western\nideas. Islam cannot break away and isolate itself if it would.\nEverything therefore portends its profound modification. Of course\ncritics like Lord Cromer contend that this modified Islam will be Islam\nno longer. But why not? If the people continue to call themselves\nMohammedans and continue to draw spiritual sustenance from the message\nof Mohammed, why should they be denied the name? Modern Christianity is\ncertainly vastly different from mediaeval Christianity, while among the\nvarious Christian churches there exist the widest doctrinal variations.\nYet all who consider themselves Christians are considered Christians by\nall except bigots out of step with the times.\n\nLet us now scrutinize the Moslem reformers, judging them, not by texts\nand chronicles, but by their words and deeds; since, as one of their\nnumber, an Algerian, very pertinently remarks, \"men should be judged,\nnot by the letter of their sacred books, but by what they actually\ndo.\"[13]\n\nModern Moslem liberalism, as we have seen, received its first\nencouragement from the discovery of the old Motazelite literature of\nnearly a thousand years before. To be sure, Islam had never been quite\ndestitute of liberal minds. Even in its darkest days a few voices had\nbeen raised against the prevailing obscurantism. For example, in the\nsixteenth century the celebrated El-Gharani had written: \"It is not at\nall impossible that God may hold in reserve for men of the future\nperceptions that have not been vouchsafed to the men of the past. Divine\nmunificence never ceases to pour benefits and enlightenment into the\nhearts of wise men of every age.\"[14] These isolated voices from Islam's\nDark Time helped to encourage the modern reformers, and by the middle of\nthe nineteenth century every Moslem land had its group of\nforward-looking men. At first their numbers were, of course,\ninsignificant, and of course they drew down upon themselves the\nanathemas of the fanatic Mollahs[15] and the hatred of the ignorant\nmultitude. The first country where the reformers made their influence\ndefinitely felt was in India. Here a group headed by the famous Sir Syed\nAhmed Khan started an important liberal movement, founding associations,\npublishing books and newspapers, and establishing the well-known college\nof Aligarh. Sir Syed Ahmed is a good type of the early liberal\nreformers. Conservative in temperament and perfectly orthodox in his\ntheology, he yet denounced the current decadence of Islam with truly\nWahabi fervour. He also was frankly appreciative of Western ideas and\neager to assimilate the many good things which the West had to offer. As\nhe wrote in 1867: \"We must study European scientific works, even though\nthey are not written by Moslems and though we may find in them things\ncontrary to the teachings of the Koran. We should imitate the Arabs of\nolden days, who did not fear to shake their faith by studying\nPythagoras.\"[16]\n\nThis nucleus of Indian Moslem liberals rapidly grew in strength,\nproducing able leaders like Moulvie Cheragh Ali and Syed Amir Ali, whose\nscholarly works in faultless English are known throughout the world.[17]\nThese men called themselves \"Neo-Motazelites\" and boldly advocated\nreforms such as a thorough overhauling of the sheriat and a general\nmodernization of Islam. Their view-point is well set forth by another of\ntheir leading figures, S. Khuda Bukhsh. \"Nothing was more distant from\nthe Prophet's thought,\" he writes, \"than to fetter the mind or to lay\ndown fixed, immutable, unchanging laws for his followers. The Quran is a\nbook of guidance to the faithful, and not an obstacle in the path, of\ntheir social, moral, legal, and intellectual progress.\" He laments\nIslam's present backwardness, for he continues: \"Modern Islam, with its\nhierarchy of priesthood, gross fanaticism, appalling ignorance, and\nsuperstitious practices is, indeed, a discredit to the Islam of the\nProphet Mohammed.\" He concludes with the following liberal confession of\nfaith: \"Is Islam hostile to progress? I will emphatically answer this\nquestion in the negative. Islam, stripped of its theology, is a\nperfectly simple religion. Its cardinal principle is belief in one God\nand belief in Mohammed as his apostle. The rest is mere accretion,\nsuperfluity.\"[18]\n\nMeanwhile, the liberals were making themselves felt in other parts of\nthe Moslem world. In Turkey liberals actually headed the government\nduring much of the generation between the Crimean War and the despotism\nof Abdul Hamid,[19] and Turkish liberal ministers like Reshid Pasha and\nMidhat Pasha made earnest though unavailing efforts to liberalize and\nmodernize the Ottoman Empire. Even the dreadful Hamidian tyranny could\nnot kill Turkish liberalism. It went underground or into exile, and in\n1908 put through the revolution which deposed the tyrant and brought the\n\"Young Turks\" to power. In Egypt liberalism took firm root, represented\nby men like Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, Rector of El Azhar University and\nrespected friend of Lord Cromer. Even outlying fragments of Islam like\nthe Russian Tartars awoke to the new spirit and produced liberal-minded,\nforward-looking men.[20]\n\nThe liberal reformers, whom I have been describing, of course form the\npart of evolutionary progress in Islam. They are in the best sense of\nthe word conservatives, receptive to healthy change, yet maintaining\ntheir hereditary poise. Sincerely religious men, they have faith in\nIslam as a living, moral force, and from it they continue to draw their\nspiritual sustenance.\n\nThere are, however, other groups in the Moslem world who have so far\nsuccumbed to Western influences that they have more or less lost touch\nwith both their spiritual and cultural pasts. In all the more civilized\nportions of the Moslem world, especially in countries long under\nEuropean control like India, Egypt, and Algeria, there are many Moslems,\nWestern educated and Western culture-veneered, who have drifted into an\nattitude varying from easygoing religious indifference to avowed\nagnosticism. From their minds the old Moslem zeal has entirely departed.\nThe Algerian Ismael Hamet well describes the attitude of this class of\nhis fellow-countrymen when he writes: \"European scepticism is not\nwithout influence upon the Algerian Moslems, who, if they have kept\nsome attachment for the external forms of their religion, usually ignore\nthe unhealthy excesses of the religious sentiment. They do not give up\ntheir religion, but they no longer dream of converting all those who do\nnot practise it; they want to hand it on to their children, but they do\nnot worry about other men's salvation. This is not belief; it is not\neven free thought; but it is lukewarmness.\"[21]\n\nBeyond these tepid latitudinarians are still other groups of a very\ndifferent character. Here we find combined the most contradictory\nsentiments: young men whose brains are seething with radical Western\nideas--atheism, socialism, Bolshevism, and what not. Yet, curiously\nenough, these fanatic radicals tend to join hands with the fanatic\nreactionaries of Islam in a common hatred of the West. Considering\nthemselves the born leaders (and exploiters) of the ignorant masses, the\nradicals hunger for political power and rage against that Western\ndomination which vetoes their ambitious pretensions. Hence, they are\nmostly extreme \"Nationalists,\" while they are also deep in Pan-Islamic\nreactionary schemes. Indeed, we often witness the strange spectacle of\natheists posing as Moslem fanatics and affecting a truly dervish zeal.\nMr. Bukhsh well describes this type when he writes: \"I know a gentleman,\na _Mohammedan by profession_, who owes his success in life to his faith.\nThough, outwardly, he conforms to all the precepts of Islam and\noccasionally stands up in public as the champion and spokesman of his\nco-religionists; yet, to my utter horror, I found that he held opinions\nabout his religion and its founder which even Voltaire would have\nrejected with indignation and Gibbon with commiserating contempt.\"[22]\n\nLater on we shall examine more fully the activities of these gentry in\nthe chapters devoted to Pan-Islamism and Nationalism. What I desire to\nemphasize here is their pernicious influence on the prospects of a\ngenuine Mohammedan reformation as visualized by the true reformers whom\nI have described. Their malevolent desire to stir up the fanatic\npassions of the ignorant masses and their equally malevolent hatred of\neverything Western except military improvements are revealed by\noutbursts like the following from the pen of a prominent \"Young Turk.\"\n\"Yes, the Mohammedan religion is in open hostility to all your world of\nprogress. Learn, ye European observers, that a Christian, whatever his\nposition, by the mere fact that he is a Christian, is in our eyes a\nbeing devoid of all human dignity. Our reasoning is simple and\ndefinitive. We say: the man whose judgment is so perverted as to deny\nthe evidence of the One God and to fabricate gods of different kinds,\ncannot be other than the most ignoble expression of human stupidity. To\nspeak to him would be a humiliation to our reason and an offence to the\ngrandeur of the Master of the Universe. The worshipper of false gods is\na monster of ingratitude; he is the execration of the universe; to\ncombat him, convert him, or annihilate him is the holiest task of the\nFaithful. These are the eternal commands of our One God. For us there\nare in this world only Believers and Misbelievers; love, charity,\nfraternity to Believers; disgust, hatred, and war to Misbelievers. Among\nMisbelievers, the most odious and criminal are those who, while\nrecognizing God, create Him of earthly parents, give Him a son, a\nmother; so monstrous an aberration surpasses, in our eyes, all bounds of\niniquity; the presence of such miscreants among us is the bane of our\nexistence; their doctrine is a direct insult to the purity of our faith;\ntheir contact a pollution for our bodies; any relation with them a\ntorture for our souls.\n\n\"While detesting you, we have been studying your political institutions\nand your military organizations. Besides the new arms which Providence\nprocures for us by your own means, you yourselves have rekindled the\ninextinguishable faith of our heroic martyrs. Our Young Turks, our\nBabis, our new fraternities, all are sects in their varied forms, are\ninspired by the same thought, the same purpose. Toward what end?\nChristian civilization? Never!\"[23]\n\nSuch harangues unfortunately find ready hearers among the Moslem masses.\nAlthough the liberal reformers are a growing power in Islam, it must not\nbe forgotten that they are as yet only a minority, an elite, below whom\nlie the ignorant masses, still suffering from the blight of age-long\nobscurantism, wrapped in admiration of their own world, which they\nregard as the highest ideal of human existence, and fanatically hating\neverything outside as wicked, despicable, and deceptive. Even when\ncompelled to admit the superior power of the West, they hate it none the\nless. They rebel blindly against the spirit of change which is forcing\nthem out of their old ruts, and their anger is still further heightened\nby that ubiquitous Western domination which is pressing upon them from\nall sides. Such persons are as clay in the hands of the Pan-Islamic and\nNationalist leaders who mould the multitude to their own sinister ends.\n\nIslam is, in fact, to-day torn between the forces of liberal reform and\nchauvinistic reaction. The liberals are not only the hope of an\nevolutionary reformation, they are also favoured by the trend of the\ntimes, since the Moslem world is being continually permeated by Western\nprogress and must continue to be thus permeated unless Western\ncivilization itself collapses in ruin. Yet, though the ultimate triumph\nof the liberals appears probable, what delays, what setbacks, what fresh\nbarriers of warfare and fanaticism may not the chauvinist reactionaries\nbring about! Neither the reform of Islam nor the relations between East\nand West are free from perils whose ominous possibilities we shall later\ndiscuss.\n\nMeanwhile, there remains the hopeful fact that throughout the Moslem\nworld a numerous and powerful minority, composed not merely of\nWesternized persons but also of orthodox conservatives, are aware of\nIslam's decadence and are convinced that a thoroughgoing reformation\nalong liberal, progressive lines is at once a practical necessity and a\nsacred duty. Exactly how this reformation shall be legally effected has\nnot yet been determined, nor is a detailed discussion of technical\nmachinery necessary for our consideration.[24] History teaches us that\nwhere the will to reform is vitally present, reformation will somehow or\nother be accomplished.\n\nOne thing is certain: the reforming spirit, in its various\nmanifestations, has already produced profound changes throughout Islam.\nThe Moslem world of to-day is vastly different from the Moslem world of\na century ago. The Wahabi leaven has destroyed abuses and has rekindled\na purer religious faith. Even its fanatical zeal has not been without\nmoral compensations. The spread of liberal principles and Western\nprogress goes on apace. If there is much to fear for the future, there\nis also much to hope.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[5] On the Wahabi movement, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au\ndix-neuvieme Siecle_ (Paris, 1888); W. G. Palgrave, _Essays on Eastern\nQuestions_ (London, 1872); D. B. Macdonald, _Muslim Theology_ (London,\n1903); J. L. Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys_ (2 vols.,\nLondon, 1831); A. Chodzko, \"Le Deisme des Wahhabis,\" _Journal\nAsiatique_, IV., Vol. II., pp. 168 _et seq._\n\n[6] Not to be confused with Sir Syed Ahmed of Aligarh, the Indian Moslem\nliberal of the mid-nineteenth century.\n\n[7] For English alarm at the latent fanaticism of the North Indian\nMoslems, down through the middle of the nineteenth century, see Sir W.\nW. Hunter, _The Indian Musalmans_ (London, 1872).\n\n[8] For the Babbist movement, see Clement Huart, _La Religion de Bab_\n(Paris, 1889); Comte Arthur de Gobineau, _Trois Ans en Perse_ (Paris,\n1867). A good summary of all these early movements of the Mohammedan\nrevival is found in Le Chatelier, _op. cit._\n\n[9] _Mishkat-el-Masabih_, I., 46, 51.\n\n[10] The best recent examples of this polemical literature are the\nwritings of the Rev. S. M. Zwemer, the well known missionary to the\nArabs; especially his _Arabia, the Cradle of Islam_ (Edinburgh, 1900),\nand _The Reproach of Islam_ (London, 1915). Also see volume entitled\n_The Mohammedan World of To-day_, being a collection of the papers read\nat the Protestant Missionary Conference held at Cairo, Egypt, in 1906.\n\n[11] Cromer, _Modern Egypt_, Vol. II., p. 229 (London, 1908). For\nRenan's attitude, see his _L'Islamisme et la Science_ (Paris, 1883).\n\n[12] In the year 1633.\n\n[13] Ismael Hamet, _Les Musulmans francais du Nord de l'Afrique_ (Paris,\n1906).\n\n[14] Quoted by Dr. Perron in his work _L'Islamisme_ (Paris, 1877).\n\n[15] The Mollahs are the Moslem clergy, though they do not exactly\ncorrespond to the clergy of Christendom. Mohammed was averse to anything\nlike a priesthood, and Islam makes no legal provision for an ordained\npriestly class or caste, as is the case in Christianity, Judaism,\nBrahmanism, and other religions. Theoretically any Moslem can conduct\nreligious services. As time passed, however, a class of men developed\nwho were learned in Moslem theology and law. These ultimately became\npractically priests, though theoretically they should be regarded as\ntheological lawyers. There also developed religious orders of dervishes,\netc.; but primitive Islam knew nothing of them.\n\n[16] From the article by Leon Cahun in Lavisse et Rambeaud, _Histoire\nGenerale_, Vol. XII., p. 498. This article gives an excellent general\nsurvey of the intellectual development of the Moslem world in the\nnineteenth century.\n\n[17] Especially his best-known book, _The Spirit of Islam_ (London,\n1891).\n\n[18] S. Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 20, 24, 284.\n(London, 1912).\n\n[19] 1856 to 1878.\n\n[20] For the liberal movement among the Russian Tartars, see Arminius\nVambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_ (London, 1906).\n\n[21] Ismael Hamet, _Les Musulmans francais du Nord de l'Afrique_, p. 268\n(Paris, 1906).\n\n[22] S. Khuda Bukhsh, _op. cit._, p. 241.\n\n[23] Sheikh Abd-ul-Haak, in Sherif Pasha's organ, _Mecheroutiette_, of\nAugust, 1921. Quoted from A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_,\nConstantine, Algeria, 1913.\n\n[24] For such discussion of legal methods, see W. S. Blunt, _The Future\nof Islam_ (London, 1882); A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvieme\nSiecle_ (Paris, 1888); Dr. Perron, _L'Islamisme_ (Paris, 1877); H. N.\nBrailsford \"Modernism in Islam,\" _The Fortnightly Review_, September,\n1908; Sir Theodore Morison, \"Can Islam be Reformed?\" _The Nineteenth\nCentury and After_, October, 1908; M. Pickthall, \"La Morale islamique,\"\n_Revue Politique Internationale_, July, 1916; XX, \"L'Islam apres la\nGuerre,\" _Revue de Paris_, 15 January, 1916.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nPAN-ISLAMISM\n\n\nLike all great movements, the Mohammedan Revival is highly complex.\nStarting with the simple, puritan protest of Wahabism, it has developed\nmany phases, widely diverse and sometimes almost antithetical. In the\nprevious chapter we examined the phase looking toward an evolutionary\nreformation of Islam and a genuine assimilation of the progressive\nspirit as well as the external forms of Western civilization. At the\nsame time we saw that these liberal reformers are as yet only a\nminority, an elite; while the Moslem masses, still plunged in ignorance\nand imperfectly awakened from their age-long torpor, are influenced by\nother leaders of a very different character--men inclined to militant\nrather than pacific courses, and hostile rather than receptive to the\nWest. These militant forces are, in their turn, complex. They may be\ngrouped roughly under the general concepts known as \"Pan-Islamism\" and\n\"Nationalism.\" It is to a consideration of the first of these two\nconcepts, to Pan-Islamism, that this chapter is devoted.\n\nPan-Islamism, which in its broadest sense is the feeling of solidarity\nbetween all \"True Believers,\" is as old as the Prophet, when Mohammed\nand his few followers were bound together by the tie of faith against\ntheir pagan compatriots who sought their destruction. To Mohammed the\nprinciple of fraternal solidarity among Moslems was of transcendent\nimportance, and he succeeded in implanting this so deeply in Moslem\nhearts that thirteen centuries have not sensibly weakened it. The bond\nbetween Moslem and Moslem is to-day much stronger than that between\nChristian and Christian. Of course Moslems fight bitterly among\nthemselves, but these conflicts never quite lose the aspect of family\nquarrels and tend to be adjourned in presence of infidel aggression.\nIslam's profound sense of solidarity probably explains in large part its\nextraordinary hold upon its followers. No other religion has such a grip\non its votaries. Islam has won vast territories from Christianity and\nBrahmanism,[25] and has driven Magism from the face of the earth;[26]\nyet there has been no single instance where a people, once become\nMoslem, has ever abandoned the faith. Extirpated they may have been,\nlike the Moors of Spain, but extirpation is not apostasy.\n\nIslam's solidarity is powerfully buttressed by two of its fundamental\ninstitutions: the \"Hajj,\" or pilgrimage to Mecca, and the caliphate.\nContrary to the general opinion in the West, it is the Hajj rather than\nthe caliphate which has exerted the more consistently unifying\ninfluence. Mohammed ordained the Hajj as a supreme act of faith, and\nevery year fully 100,000 pilgrims arrive, drawn from every quarter of\nthe Moslem world. There, before the sacred Kaaba of Mecca, men of all\nraces, tongues, and cultures meet and mingle in an ecstasy of common\ndevotion, returning to their homes bearing the proud title of \"Hajjis,\"\nor Pilgrims--a title which insures them the reverent homage of their\nfellow Moslems for all the rest of their days. The political\nimplications of the Hajj are obvious. It is in reality a perennial\nPan-Islamic congress, where all the interests of the faith are discussed\nby delegates from every part of the Mohammedan world, and where plans\nare elaborated for Islam's defence and propagation. Here nearly all the\nmilitant leaders of the Mohammedan Revival (Abd-el-Wahab, Mahommed ben\nSennussi, Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani, and many more) felt the imperious\nsummons to their task.[27]\n\nAs for the caliphate, it has played a great historic role, especially in\nits early days, and we have already studied its varying fortunes.\nReduced to a mere shadow after the Mongol destruction of Bagdad, it was\nrevived by the Turkish sultans, who assumed the title and were\nrecognized as caliphs by the orthodox Moslem world.[28] However, these\nsultan-caliphs of Stambul[29] never succeeded in winning the religious\nhomage accorded their predecessors of Mecca and Bagdad. In Arab eyes,\nespecially, the spectacle of Turkish caliphs was an anachronism to which\nthey could never be truly reconciled. Sultan Abdul Hamid, to be sure,\nmade an ambitious attempt to revive the caliphate's pristine greatness,\nbut such success as he attained was due more to the general tide of\nPan-Islamic feeling than to the inherent potency of the caliphal name.\nThe real leaders of modern Pan-Islamism either gave Abdul Hamid a merely\nqualified allegiance or were, like El Sennussi, definitely hostile. This\nwas not realized in Europe, which came to fear Abdul Hamid as a sort of\nMohammedan pope. Even to-day most Western observers seem to think that\nPan-Islamism centres in the caliphate, and we see European publicists\nhopefully discussing whether the caliphate's retention by the\ndiscredited Turkish sultans, its transference to the Shereef of Mecca,\nor its total suppression, will best clip Pan-Islam's wings. This,\nhowever, is a distinctly short-sighted view. The caliphal institution is\nstill undoubtedly venerated in Islam. But the shrewd leaders of the\nmodern Pan-Islamic movement have long been working on a much broader\nbasis. They realize that Pan-Islamism's real driving-power to-day lies\nnot in the caliphate but in institutions like the Hajj and the great\nPan-Islamic fraternities such as the Sennussiya, of which I shall\npresently speak.[30]\n\nLet us now trace the fortunes of modern Pan-Islamism. Its first stage\nwas of course the Wahabi movement. The Wahabi state founded by\nAbd-el-Wahab in the Nejd was modelled on the theocratic democracy of the\nMeccan caliphs, and when Abd-el-Wahab's princely disciple, Saud, loosed\nhis fanatic hosts upon the holy cities, he dreamed that this was but the\nfirst step in a puritan conquest and consolidation of the whole Moslem\nworld. Foiled in this grandiose design, Wahabism, nevertheless, soon\nproduced profound political disturbances in distant regions like\nnorthern India and Afghanistan, as I have already narrated. They were,\nhowever, all integral parts of the Wahabi phase, being essentially\nprotests against the political decadence of Moslem states and the moral\ndecadence of Moslem rulers. These outbreaks were not inspired by any\nspecial fear or hatred of the West, since Europe was not yet seriously\nassailing Islam except in outlying regions like European Turkey or the\nIndies, and the impending peril was consequently not appreciated.\n\nBy the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the situation had\nradically altered. The French conquest of Algeria, the Russian\nacquisition of Transcaucasia, and the English mastery of virtually all\nIndia, convinced thoughtful Moslems everywhere that Islam was in deadly\nperil of falling under Western domination. It was at this time that\nPan-Islamism assumed that essentially anti-Western character which it\nhas ever since retained. At first resistance to Western encroachment was\nsporadic and unco-ordinated. Here and there heroic figures like\nAbd-el-Kader in Algeria and Shamyl in the Caucasus fought brilliantly\nagainst the European invaders. But though these paladins of the faith\nwere accorded widespread sympathy from Moslems, they received no\ntangible assistance and, unaided, fell.\n\nFear and hatred of the West, however, steadily grew in intensity, and\nthe seventies saw the Moslem world swept from end to end by a wave of\nmilitant fanaticism. In Algeria there was the Kabyle insurrection of\n1871, while all over North Africa arose fanatical \"Holy Men\" preaching\nholy wars, the greatest of these being the Mahdist insurrection in the\nEgyptian Sudan, which maintained itself against England's best efforts\ndown to Kitchener's capture of Khartum at the very end of the century.\nIn Afghanistan there was an intense exacerbation of fanaticism awakening\nsympathetic echoes among the Indian Moslems, both of which gave the\nBritish much trouble. In Central Asia there was a similar access of\nfanaticism, centring in the powerful Nakechabendiya fraternity,\nspreading eastward into Chinese territory and culminating in the great\nrevolts of the Chinese Mohammedans both in Chinese Turkestan and Yunnan.\nIn the Dutch East Indies there was a whole series of revolts, the most\nserious of these being the Atchin War, which dragged on interminably,\nnot being quite stamped out even to-day.\n\nThe salient characteristic of this period of militant unrest is its lack\nof co-ordination. These risings were all spontaneous outbursts of local\npopulations; animated, to be sure, by the same spirit of fear and\nhatred, and inflamed by the same fanatical hopes, but with no evidence\nof a central authority laying settled plans and moving in accordance\nwith a definite programme. The risings were inspired largely by the\nmystical doctrine known as \"Mahdism.\" Mahdism was unknown to primitive\nIslam, no trace of it occurring in the Koran. But in the \"traditions,\"\nor reputed sayings of Mohammed, there occurs the statement that the\nProphet predicted the coming of one bearing the title of \"El Mahdi\"[31]\nwho would fill the earth with equity and justice. From this arose the\nwidespread mystical hope in the appearance of a divinely inspired\npersonage who would effect the universal triumph of Islam, purge the\nworld of infidels, and assure the lasting happiness of all Moslems. This\ndoctrine has profoundly influenced Moslem history. At various times\nfanatic leaders have arisen claiming to be El Mahdi, \"The Master of the\nHour,\" and have won the frenzied devotion of the Moslem masses; just as\ncertain \"Messiahs\" have similarly excited the Jews. It was thus natural\nthat, in their growing apprehension and impotent rage at Western\naggression, the Moslem masses should turn to the messianic hope of\nMahdism. Yet Mahdism, by its very nature, could effect nothing\nconstructive or permanent. It was a mere straw fire; flaring up fiercely\nhere and there, then dying down, leaving the disillusioned masses more\ndiscouraged and apathetic than before.\n\nNow all this was recognized by the wiser supporters of the Pan-Islamic\nidea. The impotence of the wildest outbursts of local fanaticism against\nthe methodical might of Europe convinced thinking Moslems that long\npreparation and complete co-ordination of effort were necessary if Islam\nwas to have any chance of throwing off the European yoke. Such men also\nrealized that they must study Western methods and adopt much of the\nWestern technique of power. Above all, they felt that the political\nliberation of Islam from Western domination must be preceded by a\nprofound spiritual regeneration, thereby engendering the moral forces\nnecessary both for the war of liberation and for the fruitful\nreconstruction which should follow thereafter. At this point the ideals\nof Pan-Islamists and liberals approach each other. Both recognize\nIslam's present decadence; both desire its spiritual regeneration. It is\non the nature of that regeneration that the two parties are opposed. The\nliberals believe that Islam should really assimilate Western ideas. The\nPan-Islamists, on the other hand, believe that primitive Islam contains\nall that is necessary for regeneration, and contend that only Western\nmethods and material achievements should be adopted by the Moslem world.\n\nThe beginnings of self-conscious, systematic Pan-Islamism date from\nabout the middle of the nineteenth century. The movement crystallizes\nabout two foci: the new-type religious fraternities like the Sennussiya,\nand the propaganda of the group of thinkers headed by Djemal-ed-Din. Let\nus first consider the fraternities.\n\nReligious fraternities have existed in Islam for centuries. They all\npossess the same general type of organization, being divided into lodges\n(\"Zawias\") headed by Masters known as \"Mokaddem,\" who exercise a more or\nless extensive authority over the \"Khouan\" or Brethren. Until the\nfoundation of the new-type organizations like the Sennussi, however, the\nfraternities exerted little practical influence upon mundane affairs.\nTheir interests were almost wholly religious, of a mystical, devotional\nnature, often characterized by great austerities or by fanatical\nexcesses like those practised by the whirling and howling dervishes.\nSuch political influence as they did exert was casual and local.\nAnything like joint action was impossible, owing to their mutual\nrivalries and jealousies. These old-type fraternities still exist in\ngreat numbers, but they are without political importance except as they\nhave been leavened by the new-type fraternities.\n\nThe new-type organizations date from about the middle of the nineteenth\ncentury, the most important in every way being the Sennussiya. Its\nfounder, Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi, was born near Mostaganem, Algeria,\nabout the year 1800. As his title \"Seyid\" indicates, he was a descendant\nof the Prophet, and was thus born to a position of honour and\nimportance.[32] He early displayed a strong bent for learning and piety,\nstudying theology at the Moorish University of Fez and afterwards\ntravelling widely over North Africa preaching a reform of the prevailing\nreligious abuses. He then made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and there his\nreformist zeal was still further quickened by the Wahabi teachers. It\nwas at that time that he appears to have definitely formulated his plan\nof a great puritan order, and in 1843 he returned to North Africa,\nsettling in Tripoli, where he built his first Zawia, known as the \"Zawia\nBaida,\" or White Monastery, in the mountains near Derna. So impressive\nwas his personality and so great his organizing ability that converts\nflocked to him from all over North Africa. Indeed, his power soon\nalarmed the Turkish authorities in Tripoli, and relations became so\nstrained that Seyid Mahommed presently moved his headquarters to the\noasis of Jarabub, far to the south in the Lybian desert. When he died in\n1859, his organization had spread over the greater part of North Africa.\n\nSeyid Mahommed's work was carried on uninterruptedly by his son, usually\nknown as Sennussi-el-Mahdi. The manner in which this son gained his\nsuccession typifies the Sennussi spirit. Seyid Mahommed had two sons, El\nMahdi being the younger. While they were still mere lads, their father\ndetermined to put them to a test, to discover which of them had the\nstronger faith. In presence of the entire Zawia he bade both sons climb\na tall palm-tree, and then adjured them by Allah and his Prophet to leap\nto the ground. The younger lad leaped at once and reached the ground\nunharmed; the elder boy refused to spring. To El Mahdi, \"who feared not\nto commit himself to the will of God,\" passed the right to rule.\nThroughout his long life Sennussi-el-Mahdi justified his father's\nchoice, displaying wisdom and piety of a high order, and further\nextending the power of the fraternity. During the latter part of his\nreign he removed his headquarters to the oasis of Jowf, still farther\ninto the Lybian desert, where he died in 1902, and was succeeded by his\nnephew, Ahmed-el-Sherif, the present head of the Order, who also appears\nto possess marked ability.\n\nWith nearly eighty years of successful activity behind it, the Sennussi\nOrder is to-day one of the vital factors in Islam. It counts its\nadherents in every quarter of the Moslem world. In Arabia its followers\nare very numerous, and it profoundly influences the spiritual life of\nthe holy cities, Mecca and Medina. North Africa, however, still remains\nthe focus of Sennussism. The whole of northern Africa, from Morocco to\nSomaliland, is dotted with its Zawias, or lodges, all absolutely\ndependent upon the Grand Lodge, headed by The Master, El Sennussi. The\nSennussi stronghold of Jowf lies in the very heart of the Lybian Sahara.\nOnly one European eye[33] has ever seen this mysterious spot. Surrounded\nby absolute desert, with wells many leagues apart, and the routes of\napproach known only to experienced Sennussi guides, every one of whom\nwould suffer a thousand deaths rather than betray him, El Sennussi, The\nMaster, sits serenely apart, sending his orders throughout North Africa.\n\nThe influence exerted by the Sennussiya is profound. The local Zawias\nare more than mere \"lodges.\" Besides the Mokaddem, or Master, there is\nalso a \"Wekil,\" or civil governor, and these officers have discretionary\nauthority not merely over the Zawia members but also over the community\nat large--at least, so great is the awe inspired by the Sennussiya\nthroughout North Africa, that a word from Wekil or Mokaddem is always\nlistened to and obeyed. Thus, besides the various European colonial\nauthorities, British, French, or Italian, as the case may be, there\nexists an occult government with which the colonial authorities are\ncareful not to come into conflict.\n\nOn their part, the Sennussi are equally careful to avoid a downright\nbreach with the European Powers. Their long-headed, cautious policy is\ntruly astonishing. For more than half a century the order has been a\ngreat force, yet it has never risked the supreme adventure. In many of\nthe fanatic risings which have occurred in various parts of Africa,\nlocal Sennussi have undoubtedly taken part, and the same was true during\nthe Italian campaign in Tripoli and in the late war, but the order\nitself has never officially entered the lists.\n\nIn fact, this attitude of mingled cautious reserve and haughty aloofness\nis maintained not only towards Christians but also towards the other\npowers that be in Islam. The Sennussiya has always kept its absolute\nfreedom of action. Its relations with the Turks have never been cordial.\nEven the wily Abdul Hamid, at the height of his prestige as the champion\nof Pan-Islamism, could never get from El Sennussi more than coldly\nplatonic expressions of approval, and one of Sennussi-el-Mahdi's\nfavourite remarks was said to have been: \"Turks and Christians: I will\nbreak both of them with one and the same stroke.\" Equally characteristic\nwas his attitude toward Mahommed Ahmed, the leader of the \"Mahdist\"\nuprising in the Egyptian Sudan. Flushed with victory, Mahommed Ahmed\nsent emissaries to El Sennussi, asking his aid. El Sennussi refused,\nremarking haughtily: \"What have I to do with this fakir from Dongola? Am\nI not myself Mahdi if I choose?\"\n\nThese Fabian tactics do not mean that the Sennussi are idle. Far from\nit. On the contrary, they are ceaselessly at work with the spiritual\narms of teaching, discipline, and conversion. The Sennussi programme is\nthe welding, first, of Moslem Africa and, later, of the whole Moslem\nworld into the revived \"Imamat\" of Islam's early days; into a great\ntheocracy, embracing all True Believers--in other words, Pan-Islamism.\nBut they believe that the political liberation of Islam from Christian\ndomination must be preceded by a profound spiritual regeneration. Toward\nthis end they strive ceaselessly to improve the manners and morals of\nthe populations under their influence, while they also strive to improve\nmaterial conditions by encouraging the better cultivation of oases,\ndigging new wells, building rest-houses along the caravan routes, and\npromoting trade. The slaughter and rapine practised by the Sudanese\nMahdists disgusted the Sennussi and drew from their chief words of\nscathing condemnation.\n\nAll this explains the Order's unprecedented self-restraint. This is the\nreason why, year after year and decade after decade, the Sennussi\nadvance slowly, calmly, coldly; gathering great latent power, but\navoiding the temptation to expend it one instant before the proper time.\nMeanwhile they are covering North Africa with their lodges and schools,\ndisciplining the people to the voice of their Mokaddems and Wekils; and,\nto the southward, converting millions of pagan negroes to the faith of\nIslam.[34]\n\nNothing better shows modern Islam's quickened vitality than the revival\nof missionary fervour during the past hundred years. Of course Islam has\nalways displayed strong proselytizing power. Its missionary successes in\nits early days were extraordinary, and even in its period of decline it\nnever wholly lost its propagating vigour. Throughout the Middle Ages\nIslam continued to gain ground in India and China; the Turks planted it\nfirmly in the Balkans; while between the fourteenth and sixteenth\ncenturies Moslem missionaries won notable triumphs in such distant\nregions as West Africa, the Dutch Indies, and the Philippines.\nNevertheless, taking the Moslem world as a whole, religious zeal\nundoubtedly declined, reaching low-water mark during the eighteenth\ncentury.\n\nThe first breath of the Mohammedan Revival, however, blew the\nsmouldering embers of proselytism into a new flame, and everywhere\nexcept in Europe Islam began once more advancing portentously along all\nits far-flung frontiers. Every Moslem is, to some extent, a born\nmissionary and instinctively propagates his faith among his non-Moslem\nneighbours, so the work was carried on not only by priestly specialists\nbut also by multitudes of travellers, traders, and humble migratory\nworkers.[35] Of course numerous zealots consecrated their lives to the\ntask. This was particularly true of the religious fraternities. The\nSennussi have especially distinguished themselves by their apostolic\nfervour, and from those natural monasteries, the oases of the Sahara,\nthousands of \"Marabouts\" have gone forth with flashing eyes and swelling\nbreasts to preach the marvels of Islam, devoured with a zeal like that\nof the Christian mendicant friars of the Middle Ages. Islam's\nmissionary triumphs among the negroes of West and Central Africa during\nthe past century have been extraordinary. Every candid European observer\ntells the same story. As an Englishman very justly remarked some twenty\nyears ago: \"Mohammedanism is making marvellous progress in the interior\nof Africa. It is crushing paganism out. Against it the Christian\npropaganda is a myth.\"[36] And a French Protestant missionary remarks in\nsimilar vein: \"We see Islam on its march, sometimes slowed down but\nnever stopped, towards the heart of Africa. Despite all obstacles\nencountered, it tirelessly pursues its way. It fears nothing. Even\nChristianity, its most serious rival, Islam regards without hate, so\nsure is it of victory. While Christians dream of the conquest of Africa,\nthe Mohammedans do it.\"[37]\n\nThe way in which Islam is marching southward is dramatically shown by a\nrecent incident. A few years ago the British authorities suddenly\ndiscovered that Mohammedanism was pervading Nyassaland. An investigation\nbrought out the fact that it was the work of Zanzibar Arabs. They began\ntheir propaganda about 1900. Ten years later almost every village in\nsouthern Nyassaland had its Moslem teacher and its mosque hut. Although\nthe movement was frankly anti-European, the British authorities did not\ndare to check it for fear of repercussions elsewhere. Many European\nobservers fear that it is only a question of time when Islam will cross\nthe Zambezi and enter South Africa.\n\nAnd these gains are not made solely against paganism. They are being won\nat the expense of African Christianity as well. In West Africa the\nEuropean missions lose many of their converts to Islam, while across\nthe continent the ancient Abyssinian Church, so long an outpost against\nIslam, seems in danger of submersion by the rising Moslem tide. Not by\nwarlike incursions, but by peaceful penetration, the Abyssinians are\nbeing Islamized. \"Tribes which, fifty or sixty years ago, counted hardly\na Mohammedan among them, to-day live partly or wholly according to the\nprecepts of Islam.\"[38]\n\nIslam's triumphs in Africa are perhaps its most noteworthy missionary\nvictories, but they by no means tell the whole story, as a few instances\ndrawn from other quarters of the Moslem world will show. In the previous\nchapter I mentioned the liberal movement among the Russian Tartars.\nThat, however, was only one phase of the Mohammedan Revival in that\nregion, another phase being a marked resurgence of proselyting zeal.\nThese Tartars had long been under Russian rule, and the Orthodox Church\nhad made persistent efforts to convert them, in some instances with\napparent success. But when the Mohammedan Revival reached the Tartars\nearly in the nineteenth century, they immediately began labouring with\ntheir christianized brethren, and in a short time most of these reverted\nto Islam despite the best efforts of the Orthodox Church and the\npunitive measures of the Russian governmental authorities. Tartar\nmissionaries also began converting the heathen Turko-Finnish tribes to\nthe northward, in defiance of every hindrance from their Russian\nmasters.[39]\n\nIn China, likewise, the nineteenth century witnessed an extraordinary\ndevelopment of Moslem energy. Islam had reached China in very early\ntimes, brought in by Arab traders and bands of Arab mercenary soldiers.\nDespite centuries of intermarriage with Chinese women, their descendants\nstill differ perceptibly from the general Chinese population, and\nregard themselves as a separate and superior people. The Chinese\nMohammedans are mainly concentrated in the southern province of Yunnan\nand the inland provinces beyond. Besides these racially Chinese Moslems,\nanother centre of Mohammedan population is found in the Chinese\ndependency of Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, inhabited by Turkish stocks\nand conquered by the Chinese only in the eighteenth century. Until\ncomparatively recent times the Chinese Moslems were well treated, but\ngradually their proud-spirited attitude alarmed the Chinese Government,\nwhich withdrew their privileges and persecuted them. Early in the\nnineteenth century the breath of the Mohammedan Revival reached China,\nas it did every other part of the Moslem world, and the Chinese\nMohammedans, inflamed by resurgent fanaticism, began a series of revolts\nculminating in the great rebellions which took place about the year\n1870, both in Yunnan and in Eastern Turkestan. As usual, these\nfanaticized Moslems displayed fierce fighting power. The Turkestan\nrebels found an able leader, one Yakub Beg, and for some years both\nTurkestan and Yunnan were virtually independent. To many European\nobservers at that time it looked as though the rebels might join hands,\nerect a permanent Mohammedan state in western China, and even overrun\nthe whole empire. The fame of Yakub Beg spread through the Moslem world,\nthe Sultan of Turkey honouring him with the high title of Commander of\nthe Faithful. After years of bitter fighting, accompanied by frightful\nmassacres, the Chinese Government subdued the rebels. The Chinese\nMoslems, greatly reduced in numbers, have not yet recovered their former\nstrength; but their spirit is still unbroken, and to-day they number\nfully 10,000,000. Thus, Chinese Islam, despite its setbacks, is a factor\nto be reckoned with in the future.[40]\n\nThe above instances do not exhaust the list of Islam's activities during\nthe past century. In India, for example, Islam has continued to gain\nground rapidly, while in the Dutch Indies it is the same story.[41]\nEuropean domination actually favours rather than retards the spread of\nIslam, for the Moslem finds in Western improvements, like the railroad,\nthe post-office, and the printing-press, useful adjuncts to Islamic\npropaganda.\n\nLet us now consider the second originating centre of modern\nPan-Islamism--the movement especially associated with the personality of\nDjemal-ed-Din.\n\nSeyid Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani was born early in the nineteenth century\nat Asadabad, near Hamadan, in Persia, albeit, as his name shows, he was\nof Afghan rather than Iranian descent, while his title \"Seyid,\" meaning\ndescendant of the Prophet, implies a strain of Arab blood. Endowed with\na keen intelligence, great personal magnetism, and abounding vigour,\nDjemal-ed-Din had a stormy and chequered career. He was a great\ntraveller, knowing intimately not only most of the Moslem world but\nwestern Europe as well. From these travels, supplemented by wide\nreading, he gained a notable fund of information which he employed\neffectively in his manifold activities. A born propagandist,\nDjemal-ed-Din attracted wide attention, and wherever he went in Islam\nhis strong personality started an intellectual ferment. Unlike El\nSennussi, he concerned himself very little with theology, devoting\nhimself to politics. Djemal-ed-Din was the first Mohammedan who fully\ngrasped the impending peril of Western domination, and he devoted his\nlife to warning the Islamic world of the danger and attempting to\nelaborate measures of defence. By European colonial authorities he was\nsoon singled out as a dangerous agitator. The English, in particular,\nfeared and persecuted him. Imprisoned for a while in India, he went to\nEgypt about 1880, and had a hand in the anti-European movement of Arabi\nPasha. When the English occupied Egypt in 1882 they promptly expelled\nDjemal, who continued his wanderings, finally reaching Constantinople.\nHere he found a generous patron in Abdul-Hamid, then evolving his\nPan-Islamic policy. Naturally, the Sultan was enchanted with Djemal, and\npromptly made him the head of his Pan-Islamic propaganda bureau. In\nfact, it is probable that the success of the Sultan's Pan-Islamic policy\nwas largely due to Djemal's ability and zeal. Djemal died in 1896 at an\nadvanced age, active to the last.\n\nDjemal-ed-Din's teachings may be summarized as follows:\n\n\"The Christian world, despite its internal differences of race and\nnationality, is, as against the East and especially as against Islam,\nunited for the destruction of all Mohammedan states.\n\n\"The Crusades still subsist, as well as the fanatical spirit of Peter\nthe Hermit. At heart, Christendom still regards Islam with fanatical\nhatred and contempt. This is shown in many ways, as in international\nlaw, before which Moslem nations are not treated as the equals of\nChristian nations.\n\n\"Christian governments excuse the attacks and humiliations inflicted\nupon Moslem states by citing the latter's backward and barbarous\ncondition; yet these same governments stifle by a thousand means, even\nby war, every attempted effort of reform and revival in Moslem lands.\n\n\"Hatred of Islam is common to all Christian peoples, not merely to some\nof them, and the result of this spirit is a tacit, persistent effort for\nIslam's destruction.\n\n\"Every Moslem feeling and aspiration is caricatured and calumniated by\nChristendom. 'The Europeans call in the Orient \"fanaticism\" what at home\nthey call \"nationalism\" and \"patriotism.\" And what in the West they call\n\"self-respect,\" \"pride,\" \"national honour,\" in the East they call\n\"chauvinism.\" What in the West they esteem as national sentiment, in the\nEast they consider xenophobia.'[42]\n\n\"From all this, it is plain that the whole Moslem world must unite in a\ngreat defensive alliance, to preserve itself from destruction; and, to\ndo this, it must acquire the technique of Western progress and learn the\nsecrets of European power.\"\n\nSuch, in brief, are the teachings of Djemal-ed-Din, propagated with\neloquence and authority for many years. Given the state of mingled fear\nand hatred of Western encroachment that was steadily spreading\nthroughout the Moslem world, it is easy to see how great Djemal's\ninfluence must have been. And of course Djemal was not alone in his\npreaching. Other influential Moslems were agitating along much the same\nlines as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. One of these\npioneers was the Turkish notable Aali Pasha, who was said to remark:\n\"What we want is rather an increase of fanaticism than a diminution of\nit.\"[43] Arminius Vambery, the eminent Hungarian Oriental scholar,\nstates that shortly after the Crimean War he was present at a militant\nPan-Islamic gathering, attended by emissaries from far parts of the\nMoslem world, held at Aali Pasha's palace.[44]\n\nSuch were the foundations upon which Sultan Abdul Hamid built his\nambitious Pan-Islamic structure. Abdul Hamid is one of the strangest\npersonalities of modern times. A man of unusual intelligence, his mind\nwas yet warped by strange twists which went to the verge of insanity.\nNursing ambitious, grandiose projects, he tried to carry them out by\ndark and tortuous methods which, though often cleverly Macchiavellian,\nwere sometimes absurdly puerile. An autocrat by nature, he strove to\nkeep the smallest decisions dependent on his arbitrary will, albeit he\nwas frequently guided by clever sycophants who knew how to play upon his\nsuperstitions and his prejudices.\n\nAbdul Hamid ascended the throne in 1876 under very difficult\ncircumstances. The country was on the verge of a disastrous Russian war,\nwhile the government was in the hands of statesmen who were endeavouring\nto transform Turkey into a modern state and who had introduced all sorts\nof Western political innovations, including a parliament. Abdul Hamid,\nhowever, soon changed all this. Taking advantage of the confusion which\nmarked the close of the Russian war, he abolished parliament and made\nhimself as absolute a despot as any of his ancestors had ever been.\nSecure in his autocratic power, Abdul Hamid now began to evolve his own\npeculiar policy, which, from the first, had a distinctly Pan-Islamic\ntrend[45]. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Abdul Hamid determined to\nuse his position as caliph for far-reaching political ends. Emphasizing\nhis spiritual headship of the Mohammedan world rather than his political\nheadship of the Turkish state, he endeavoured to win the active support\nof all Moslems and, by that support, to intimidate European Powers who\nmight be formulating aggressive measures against the Ottoman Empire.\nBefore long Abdul Hamid had built up an elaborate Pan-Islamic propaganda\norganization, working mainly by secretive, tortuous methods.\nConstantinople became the Mecca of all the fanatics and anti-Western\nagitators like Djemal-ed-Din. And from Constantinople there went forth\nswarms of picked emissaries, bearing to the most distant parts of Islam\nthe Caliph's message of hope and impending deliverance from the menace\nof infidel rule.\n\nAbdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda went on uninterruptedly for nearly\nthirty years. Precisely what this propaganda accomplished is very\ndifficult to estimate. In the first place, it was cut short, and to some\nextent reversed, by the Young-Turk resolution of 1908 which drove Abdul\nHamid from the throne. It certainly was never put to the test of a war\nbetween Turkey and a first-class European Power. This is what renders\nany theoretical appraisal so inconclusive. Abdul Hamid did succeed in\ngaining the respectful acknowledgment of his spiritual authority by most\nMoslem princes and notables, and he certainly won the pious veneration\nof the Moslem masses. In the most distant regions men came to regard the\nmighty Caliph in Stambul as, in very truth, the Defender of the Faith,\nand to consider his empire as the bulwark of Islam. On the other hand,\nit is a far cry from pious enthusiasm to practical performance.\nFurthermore, Abdul Hamid did not succeed in winning over powerful\nPan-Islamic leaders like El Sennussi, who suspected his motives and\nquestioned his judgment; while Moslem liberals everywhere disliked him\nfor his despotic, reactionary, inefficient rule. It is thus a very\ndebatable question whether, if Abdul Hamid had ever called upon the\nMoslem world for armed assistance in a \"holy war,\" he would have been\ngenerally supported.\n\nYet Abdul Hamid undoubtedly furthered the general spread of Pan-Islamic\nsentiment throughout the Moslem world. In this larger sense he\nsucceeded; albeit not so much from his position as caliph as because he\nincarnated the growing fear and hatred of the West. Thus we may conclude\nthat Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda did produce profound and\nlasting effects which will have to be seriously reckoned with.\n\nThe Young-Turk revolution of 1908 greatly complicated the situation. It\nwas soon followed by the Persian revolution and by kindred symptoms in\nother parts of the East. These events brought into sudden prominence new\nforces, such as constitutionalism, nationalism, and even social unrest,\nwhich had long been obscurely germinating in Islam but which had been\npreviously denied expression. We shall later consider these new forces\nin detail. The point to be here noted is their complicating effect on\nthe Pan-Islamic movement. Pan-Islamism was, in fact, cross-cut and\ndeflected from its previous course, and a period of confusion and mental\nuncertainty supervened.\n\nThis interim period was short. By 1912 Pan-Islamism had recovered its\npoise and was moving forward once more. The reason was renewed pressure\nfrom the West. In 1911 came Italy's barefaced raid on Turkey's African\ndependency of Tripoli, while in 1912 the allied Christian Balkan states\nattacked Turkey in the Balkan War, which sheared away Turkey's European\nprovinces to the very walls of Constantinople and left her crippled and\ndiscredited. Moreover, in those same fateful years Russia and England\nstrangled the Persian revolution, while France, as a result of the\nAgadir crisis, closed her grip on Morocco. Thus, in a scant two years,\nthe Moslem world had suffered at European hands assaults not only\nunprecedented in gravity but, in Moslem eyes, quite without provocation.\n\nThe effect upon Islam was tremendous. A flood of mingled despair and\nrage swept the Moslem world from end to end. And, of course, the\nPan-Islamic implication was obvious. This was precisely what Pan-Islam's\nagitators had been preaching for fifty years--the Crusade of the West\nfor Islam's destruction. What could be better confirmation of the\nwarnings of Djemal-ed-Din?\n\nThe results were soon seen. In Tripoli, where Turks and Arabs had been\non the worst of terms, both races clasped hands in a sudden access of\nPan-Islamic fervour, and the Italian invaders were met with a fanatical\nfury that roused Islam to wild applause and inspired Western observers\nwith grave disquietude. \"Why has Italy found 'defenceless' Tripoli such\na hornets' nest?\" queried Gabriel Hanotaux, a former French minister of\nforeign affairs. \"It is because she has to do, not merely with Turkey,\nbut with Islam as well. Italy has set the ball rolling--so much the\nworse for her--and for us all.\"[46] The Anglo-Russian man-handling of\nPersia likewise roused much wrathful comment throughout Islam,[47] while\nthe impending extinction of Moroccan independence at French hands was\ndiscussed with mournful indignation.\n\nBut with the coming of the Balkan War the wrath of Islam knew no bounds.\nFrom China to the Congo, pious Moslems watched with bated breath the\nswaying battle-lines in the far-off Balkans, and when the news of\nTurkish disaster came, Islam's cry of wrathful anguish rose hoarse and\nhigh. A prominent Indian Mohammedan well expressed the feelings of his\nco-religionists everywhere when he wrote: \"The King of Greece orders a\nnew Crusade. From the London Chancelleries rise calls to Christian\nfanaticism, and Saint Petersburg already speaks of the planting of the\nCross on the dome of Sant' Sophia. To-day they speak thus; to-morrow\nthey will thus speak of Jerusalem and the Mosque of Omar. Brothers! Be\nye of one mind, that it is the duty of every True Believer to hasten\nbeneath the Khalifa's banner and to sacrifice his life for the safety of\nthe faith.\"[48] And another Indian Moslem leader thus adjured the\nBritish authorities: \"I appeal to the present government to change its\nanti-Turkish attitude before the fury of millions of Moslem\nfellow-subjects is kindled to a blaze and brings disaster.\"[49]\n\nMost significant of all were the appeals made at this time by Moslems to\nnon-Mohammedan Asiatics for sympathy and solidarity against the hated\nWest. This was a development as unprecedented as it was startling.\nMohammed, revering as he did the Old and New Testaments, and regarding\nhimself as the successor of the divinely inspired prophets Moses and\nJesus, had enjoined upon his followers relative respect for Christians\nand Jews (\"Peoples of the Book\") in contrast with other non-Moslems,\nwhom he stigmatized as \"Idolaters.\" These injunctions of the Prophet had\nalways been heeded, and down to our own days the hatred of Moslems for\nChristians, however bitter, had been as nothing compared with their\nloathing and contempt for \"Idolaters\" like the Brahmanist Hindus or the\nBuddhists and Confucianists of the Far East.\n\nThe first symptom of a change in attitude appeared during the\nRusso-Japanese War of 1904. So great had Islam's fear and hatred of the\nChristian West then become, that the triumph of an Asiatic people over\nEuropeans was enthusiastically hailed by many Moslems, even though the\nvictors were \"Idolaters.\" It was quite in keeping with Pan-Islamism's\nstrong missionary bent that many pious Moslems should have dreamed of\nbringing these heroes within the Islamic fold. Efforts to get in touch\nwith Japan were made. Propagandist papers were founded, missionaries\nwere selected, and the Sultan sent a warship to Japan with a Pan-Islamic\ndelegation aboard. Throughout Islam the projected conversion of Japan\nwas widely discussed. Said an Egyptian journal in the year 1906:\n\"England, with her sixty million Indian Moslems, dreads this conversion.\nWith a Mohammedan Japan, Mussulman policy would change entirely.\"[50]\nAnd, at the other end of the Moslem world, a Chinese Mohammedan sheikh\nwrote: \"If Japan thinks of becoming some day a very great power and\nmaking Asia the dominator of the other continents, it will be only by\nadopting the blessed religion of Islam.\"[51]\n\nOf course it soon became plain to these enthusiasts that while Japan\nreceived Islam's emissaries with smiling courtesy, she had not the\nfaintest intention of turning Mohammedan. Nevertheless, the first step\nhad been taken towards friendly relations with non-Moslem Asia, and the\nBalkan War drove Moslems much further in this direction. The change in\nMoslem sentiment can be gauged by the numerous appeals made by the\nIndian Mohammedans at this time to Hindus, as may be seen from the\nfollowing sample entitled significantly \"The Message of the East.\"\n\"Spirit of the East,\" reads this noteworthy document, \"arise and repel\nthe swelling flood of Western aggression! Children of Hindustan, aid us\nwith your wisdom, culture, and wealth; lend us your power, the\nbirthright and heritage of the Hindu! Let the Spirit Powers hidden in\nthe Himalayan mountain-peaks arise. Let prayers to the god of battles\nfloat upward; prayers that right may triumph over might; and call to\nyour myriad gods to annihilate the armies of the foe!\"[52]\n\nTo any one who realizes the traditional Moslem attitude towards\n\"Idolaters\" such words are simply amazing. They betoken a veritable\nrevolution in outlook. And such sentiments were not confined to Indian\nMoslems; they were equally evident among Chinese Moslems as well. Said a\nMohammedan newspaper of Chinese Turkestan, advocating a fraternal union\nof all Chinese against Western aggression: \"Europe has grown too\npresumptuous. It will deprive us of our liberty; it will destroy us\naltogether if we do not bestir ourselves promptly and prepare for a\npowerful resistance.\"[53] During the troublous first stages of the\nChinese revolution, the Mohammedans, emerging from their sulky\naloofness, co-operated so loyally with their Buddhist and Confucian\nfellow-patriots that Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, the Republican leader, announced\ngratefully: \"The Chinese will never forget the assistance which their\nMoslem fellow-countrymen have rendered in the interest of order and\nliberty.\"[54]\n\nThe Great War thus found Islam everywhere deeply stirred against\nEuropean aggression, keenly conscious of its own solidarity, and frankly\nreaching out for Asiatic allies in the projected struggle against\nEuropean domination.\n\nUnder these circumstances it may at first sight appear strange that no\ngeneral Islamic explosion occurred when Turkey entered the lists at the\nclose of 1914 and the Sultan Caliph issued a formal summons to the Holy\nWar. Of course this summons was not the flat failure which Allied\nreports led the West to believe at the time. As a matter of fact, there\nwas trouble in practically every Mohammedan land under Allied control.\nTo name only a few of many instances: Egypt broke into a tumult\nsmothered only by overwhelming British reinforcements, Tripoli burst\ninto a flame of insurrection that drove the Italians headlong to the\ncoast, Persia was prevented from joining Turkey only by prompt\nRusso-British intervention, while the Indian North-West Frontier was the\nscene of fighting that required the presence of a quarter of a million\nAnglo-Indian troops. The British Government has officially admitted that\nduring 1915 the Allies' Asiatic and African possessions stood within a\nhand's breadth of a cataclysmic insurrection.\n\nThat insurrection would certainly have taken place if Islam's leaders\nhad everywhere spoken the fateful word. But the word was not spoken.\nInstead, influential Moslems outside of Turkey generally condemned the\nlatter's action and did all in their power to calm the passions of the\nfanatic multitude.\n\nThe attitude of these leaders does credit to their discernment. They\nrecognized that this was neither the time nor the occasion for a\ndecisive struggle with the West. They were not yet materially prepared,\nand they had not perfected their understandings either among themselves\nor with their prospective non-Moslem allies. Above all, the moral urge\nwas lacking. They knew that athwart the Khalifa's writ was stencilled\n\"Made in Germany.\" They knew that the \"Young-Turk\" clique which had\nengineered the coup was made up of Europeanized renegades, many of them\nnot even nominal Moslems, but atheistic Jews. Far-sighted Moslems had no\nintention of pulling Germany's chestnuts out of the fire, nor did they\nwish to further Prussian schemes of world-dominion which for themselves\nwould have meant a mere change of masters. Far better to let the West\nfight out its desperate feud, weaken itself, and reveal fully its future\nintentions. Meanwhile Islam could bide its time, grow in strength, and\nawait the morrow.\n\nThe Versailles peace conference was just such a revelation of European\nintentions as the Pan-Islamic leaders had been waiting for in order to\nperfect their programmes and enlist the moral solidarity of their\nfollowers. At Versailles the European Powers showed unequivocally that\nthey had no intention of relaxing their hold upon the Near and Middle\nEast. By a number of secret treaties negotiated during the war, the\nOttoman Empire had been virtually partitioned between the victorious\nAllies, and these secret treaties formed the basis of the Versailles\nsettlement. Furthermore, Egypt had been declared a British protectorate\nat the very beginning of the war, while the Versailles conference had\nscarcely adjourned before England announced an \"agreement\" with Persia\nwhich made that country another British protectorate in fact if not in\nname. The upshot was, as already stated, that the Near and Middle East\nwere subjected to European political domination as never before.\n\nBut there was another side to the shield. During the war years the\nAllied statesmen had officially proclaimed times without number that the\nwar was being fought to establish a new world-order based on such\nprinciples as the rights of small nations and the liberty of all\npeoples. These pronouncements had been treasured and memorized\nthroughout the East. When, therefore, the East saw a peace settlement\nbased, not upon these high professions, but upon the imperialistic\nsecret treaties, it was fired with a moral indignation and sense of\noutraged justice never known before. A tide of impassioned determination\nbegan rising which has set already the entire East in tumultuous\nferment, and which seems merely the premonitory ground-swell of a\ngreater storm. So ominous were the portents that even before the\nVersailles conference had adjourned many European students of Eastern\naffairs expressed grave alarm. Here, for example, is the judgment of\nLeone Caetani, Duke of Sermoneta, an Italian authority on Mohammedan\nquestions. Speaking in the spring of 1919 on the war's effect on the\nEast, he said: \"The convulsion has shaken Islamic and Oriental\ncivilization to its foundations. The entire Oriental world, from China\nto the Mediterranean, is in ferment. Everywhere the hidden fire of\nanti-European hatred is burning. Riots in Morocco, risings in Algiers,\ndiscontent in Tripoli, so-called Nationalist attempts in Egypt, Arabia,\nand Lybia are all different manifestations of the same deep sentiment,\nand have as their object the rebellion of the Oriental world against\nEuropean civilization.\"[55]\n\nThose words are a prophetic forecast of what has since occurred in the\nMoslem world. Because recent events are perhaps even more involved with\nthe nationalistic aspirations of the Moslem peoples than they are with\nthe strictly Pan-Islamic movement, I propose to defer their detailed\ndiscussion till the chapter on Nationalism. We should, however, remember\nthat Moslem nationalism and Pan-Islamism, whatever their internal\ndifferences, tend to unite against the external pressure of European\ndomination and equally desire Islam's liberation from European\npolitical control. Remembering these facts, let us survey the present\ncondition of the Pan-Islamic movement.\n\nPan-Islamism has been tremendously stimulated by Western pressure,\nespecially by the late war and the recent peace settlements. However,\nPan-Islamism must not be considered as merely a defensive political\nreaction against external aggression. It springs primarily from that\ndeep sentiment of unity which links Moslem to Moslem by bonds much\nstronger than those which unite the members of the Christian world.\nThese bonds are not merely religious, in the technical sense; they are\nsocial and cultural as well. Throughout the Moslem world, despite wide\ndifferences in local customs and regulations, the basic laws of family\nand social conduct are everywhere the same. \"The truth is that Islam is\nmore than a creed, it is a complete social system; it is a civilization\nwith a philosophy, a culture, and an art of its own; in its long\nstruggle against the rival civilization of Christendom it has become an\norganic unit conscious of itself.\"[56]\n\nTo this Islamic civilization all Moslems are deeply attached. In this\nlarger sense, Pan-Islamism is universal. Even the most liberal-minded\nMoslems, however much they may welcome Western ideas, and however\nstrongly they may condemn the fanatical, reactionary aspects of the\npolitical Pan-Islamic movement, believe fervently in Islam's essential\nsolidarity. As a leading Indian Moslem liberal, The Aga Khan, remarks:\n\"There is a right and legitimate Pan-Islamism to which every sincere and\nbelieving Mohammedan belongs--that is, the theory of the spiritual\nbrotherhood and unity of the children of the Prophet. The real spiritual\nand cultural unity of Islam must ever grow, for to the follower of the\nProphet it is the foundation of the life and the soul.\"[57]\n\nIf such is the attitude of Moslem liberals, thoroughly conversant with\nWestern culture and receptive to Western progress, what must be the\nfeelings of the Moslem masses, ignorant, reactionary, and fanatical?\nBesides perfectly understandable fear and hatred due to Western\naggression, there is, among the Moslem masses, a great deal of genuine\nfanaticism caused, not by European political domination, but by\nreligious bigotry and blind hatred of Western civilization.[58] But this\nfanaticism has, of course, been greatly inflamed by the political events\nof the past decade, until to-day religious, cultural, and political\nhatred of the West have coalesced in a state of mind decidedly ominous\nfor the peace of the world. We should not delude ourselves into\nminimizing the dangerous possibilities of the present situation. Just\nbecause the fake \"Holy War\" proclaimed by the Young-Turks at German\ninstigation in 1914 did not come off is no reason for believing that a\nreal holy war is impossible. As a German staff-officer in Turkish\nservice during the late struggle very candidly says: \"The Holy War was\nan absolute fiasco just because it was not a Holy War.\"[59] I have\nalready explained how most Moslems saw through the trick and refused to\nbudge.\n\nHowever, the long series of European aggressions, culminating in the\nrecent peace settlements which subjected virtually the entire Moslem\nworld to European domination, have been steadily rousing in Moslem\nhearts a spirit of despairing rage that may have disastrous\nconsequences. Certainly, the materials for a holy war have long been\nheaping high. More than twenty years ago Arminius Vambery, who knew the\nMoslem world as few Europeans have ever known it, warned the West of the\nperils engendered by recklessly imperialistic policies. \"As time\npasses,\" he wrote in 1898, \"the danger of a general war becomes ever\ngreater. We should not forget that time has considerably augmented the\nadversary's force of resistance. I mean by this the sentiment of\nsolidarity which is becoming livelier of late years among the peoples of\nIslam, and which in our age of rapid communication is no longer a\nnegligible quantity, as it was even ten or twenty years ago.\n\n\"It may not be superfluous to draw the attention of our\nnineteenth-century Crusaders to the importance of the Moslem press,\nwhose ramifications extend all over Asia and Africa, and whose\nexhortations sink more profoundly than they do with us into the souls of\ntheir readers. In Turkey, India, Persia, Central Asia, Java, Egypt, and\nAlgeria, native organs, daily and periodical, begin to exert a profound\ninfluence. Everything that Europe thinks, decides, and executes against\nIslam spreads through those countries with the rapidity of lightning.\nCaravans carry the news to the heart of China and to the equator, where\nthe tidings are commented upon in very singular fashion. Certain sparks\nstruck at our meetings and banquets kindle, little by little, menacing\nflames. Hence, it would be an unpardonable legerity to close our eyes to\nthe dangers lurking beneath an apparent passivity. What the _Terdjuman_\nof Crimea says between the lines is repeated by the Constantinople\n_Ikdam_, and is commented on and exaggerated at Calcutta by _The Moslem\nChronicle_.\n\n\"Of course, at present, the bond of Pan-Islamism is composed of tenuous\nand dispersed strands. But Western aggression might easily unite those\nstrands into a solid whole, bringing about a general war\".[60]\n\nIn the decades which have elapsed since Vambery wrote those lines the\nsituation has become much more tense. Moslem resentment at European\ndominance has increased, has been reinforced by nationalistic\naspirations almost unknown during the last century, and possesses\nmethods of highly efficient propaganda. For example, the Pan-Islamic\npress, to which Vambery refers, has developed in truly extraordinary\nfashion. In 1900 there were in the whole Islamic world not more than 200\npropagandist journals. By 1906 there were 500, while in 1914 there were\nwell over 1000.[61] Moslems fully appreciate the post-office, the\nrailroad, and other modern methods of rapidly interchanging ideas.\n\"Every Moslem country is in communication with every other Moslem\ncountry: directly, by means of special emissaries, pilgrims, travellers,\ntraders, and postal exchanges; indirectly, by means of Mohammedan\nnewspapers, books, pamphlets, leaflets, and periodicals. I have met with\nCairo newspapers in Bagdad, Teheran, and Peshawar; Constantinople\nnewspapers in Basra and Bombay; Calcutta newspapers in Mohammerah,\nKerbela, and Port Said.\"[62] As for the professional Pan-Islamic\npropagandists, more particularly those of the religious fraternities,\nthey swarm everywhere, rousing the fanaticism of the people: \"Travelling\nunder a thousand disguises--as merchants, preachers, students, doctors,\nworkmen, beggars, fakirs, mountebanks, pretended fools or rhapsodists,\nthese emissaries are everywhere well received by the Faithful and are\nefficaciously protected against the suspicious investigations of the\nEuropean colonial authorities.\"[63]\n\nFurthermore, there is to-day in the Moslem world a widespread\nconviction, held by liberals and chauvinists alike (albeit for very\ndifferent reasons), that Islam is entering on a period of Renaissance\nand renewed glory. Says Sir Theodore Morison: \"No Mohammedan believes\nthat Islamic civilization is dead or incapable of further development.\nThey recognize that it has fallen on evil days; that it has suffered\nfrom an excessive veneration of the past, from prejudice and bigotry and\nnarrow scholasticism not unlike that which obscured European thought in\nthe Middle Ages; but they believe that Islam too is about to have its\nRenaissance, that it is receiving from Western learning a stimulus which\nwill quicken it into fresh activity, and that the evidences of this new\nlife are everywhere manifest.\"[64]\n\nSir Theodore Morison describes the attitude of Moslem liberals. How\nPan-Islamists with anti-Western sentiments feel is well set forth by an\nEgyptian, Yahya Siddyk, in his well-known book, _The Awakening of the\nIslamic Peoples in the Fourteenth Century of the Hegira_.[65] The book\nis doubly interesting because the author has a thorough Western\neducation, holding a law degree from the French university of Toulouse,\nand is a judge on the Egyptian bench. Although, writing nearly a decade\nbefore the cataclysm, Yahya Siddyk clearly foresaw the imminence of the\nEuropean War. \"Behold,\" he writes, \"these Great Powers ruining\nthemselves in terrifying armaments; measuring each other's strength with\ndefiant glances; menacing each other; contracting alliances which\ncontinually break and which presage those terrible shocks which overturn\nthe world and cover it with ruins, fire, and blood! The future is God's,\nand nothing is lasting save His Will.\"\n\nYahya Siddyk considers the Western world degenerate. \"Does this mean,\"\nhe asks, \"that Europe, our 'enlightened guide,' has already reached the\nsummit of its evolution? Has it already exhausted its vital force by two\nor three centuries of hyperexertion? In other words: is it already\nstricken with senility, and will it see itself soon obliged to yield its\ncivilizing role to other peoples less degenerate, less neurasthenic,\nthat is to say, younger, more robust, more healthy, than itself? In my\nopinion, the present marks Europe's apogee, and its immoderate colonial\nexpansion means, not strength, but weakness. Despite the aureole of so\nmuch grandeur, power, and glory, Europe is to-day more divided and more\nfragile than ever, and ill conceals its malaise, its sufferings, and its\nanguish. Its destiny is inexorably working out!...\n\n\"The contact of Europe on the East has caused us both much good and much\nevil: good, in the material and intellectual sense; evil, from the moral\nand political point of view. Exhausted by long struggles, enervated by a\nbrilliant civilization, the Moslem peoples inevitably fell into a\nmalaise; but they are not stricken, they are not dead! These peoples,\nconquered by the force of cannon, have not in the least lost their\nunity, even under the oppressive regimes to which the Europeans have\nlong subjected them....\n\n\"I have said that the European contact has been salutary to us from both\nthe material and intellectual point of view. What reforming Moslem\nprinces wished to impose by force on their Moslem subjects is to-day\nrealized a hundredfold. So great has been our progress in the last\ntwenty-five years in science, letters, and art that we may well hope to\nbe in all these things the equals of Europe in less than half a\ncentury....\n\n\"A new era opens for us with the fourteenth century of the Hegira, and\nthis happy century will mark our Renaissance and our great future! A new\nbreath animates the Mohammedan peoples of all races; all Moslems are\npenetrated with the necessity of work and instruction! We all wish to\ntravel, do business, tempt fortune, brave dangers. There is in the East,\namong the Mohammedans, a surprising activity, an animation, unknown\ntwenty-five years ago. There is to-day a real public opinion throughout\nthe East.\"\n\nThe author concludes: \"Let us hold firm, each for all, and let us hope,\nhope, hope! We are fairly launched on the path of progress: let us\nprofit by it! It is Europe's very tyranny which has wrought our\ntransformation! It is our continued contact with Europe that favours our\nevolution and inevitably hastens our revival! It is simply history\nrepeating itself; the Will of God fulfilling itself despite all\nopposition and all resistance.... Europe's tutelage over Asiatics is\nbecoming more and more nominal--the gates of Asia are closing against\nthe European! Surely we glimpse before us a revolution without parallel\nin the world's annals. A new age is at hand!\"\n\nIf this was the way Pan-Islamists were thinking in the opening years of\nthe century, it is clear that their views must have been confirmed and\nintensified by the Great War.[66] The material power of the West was\nthereby greatly reduced, while its prestige was equally sapped by the\ncharacter of the peace settlement and by the attendant disputes which\nbroke out among the victors. The mutual rivalries and jealousies of\nEngland, France, Italy, and their satellites in the East have given\nMoslems much food for hopeful thought, and have caused corresponding\ndisquietude in European minds. A French publicist recently admonished\nhis fellow Europeans that \"Islam does not recognize our colonial\nfrontiers,\" and added warningly, \"the great movement of Islamic union\ninaugurated by Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani is going on.\"[67]\n\nThe menacing temper of Islam is shown by the furious agitation which has\nbeen going on for the last three years among India's 70,000,000 Moslems\nagainst the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. This agitation is not\nconfined to India. It is general throughout Islam, and Sir Theodore\nMorison does not overstate the case when he says: \"It is time the\nBritish public realized the gravity of what is happening in the East.\nThe Mohammedan world is ablaze with anger from end to end at the\npartition of Turkey. The outbreaks of violence in centres so far remote\nas Kabul and Cairo are symptoms only of this widespread resentment. I\nhave been in close touch with Mohammedans of India for close upon thirty\nyears and I think it is my duty to warn the British public of the\npassionate resentment which Moslems feel at the proposed dismemberment\nof the Turkish Empire. The diplomats at Versailles apparently thought\nthat outside the Turkish homelands there is no sympathy for Turkey. This\nis a disastrous blunder. You have but to meet the Mohammedan now in\nLondon to realize the white heat to which their anger is rising. In\nIndia itself the whole of the Mohammedan community from Peshawar to\nArcot is seething with passion upon this subject. Women inside the\nZenanas are weeping over it. Merchants who usually take no interest in\npublic affairs are leaving their shops and counting-houses to organize\nremonstrances and petitions; even the mediaeval theologians of Deoband\nand the Nadwatul-Ulama, whose detachment from the modern world is\nproverbial, are coming from their cloisters to protest against the\ndestruction of Islam.\"[68]\n\nPossibly the most serious aspect of the situation is that the Moslem\nliberals are being driven into the camp of political Pan-Islamism.\nReceptive though the liberals are to Western ideas, and averse though\nthey are to Pan-Islamism's chauvinistic, reactionary tendencies,\nEurope's intransigeance is forcing them to make at least a temporary\nalliance with the Pan-Islamic and Nationalist groups, even though the\nliberals know that anything like a holy war would dig a gulf between\nEast and West, stop the influx of Western stimuli, favour reactionary\nfanaticism, and perhaps postpone for generations a modernist reformation\nof Islam.\n\nPerhaps it is symptomatic of a more bellicose temper in Islam that the\nlast few years have witnessed the rapid spread of two new puritan,\nfanatic movements--the Ikhwan and the Salafiya. The Ikhwan movement\nbegan obscurely about ten years ago in inner Arabia--the Nejd. It is a\ndirect outgrowth of Wahabism, from which it differs in no essential\nrespect. So rapid has been Ikhwanism's progress that it to-day\nabsolutely dominates the entire Nejd, and it is headed by desert\nArabia's most powerful chieftain, Bin Saud, a descendant of the Saud who\nheaded the Wahabi movement a hundred years ago. The fanaticism of the\nIkhwans is said to be extraordinary, while their programme is the old\nWahabi dream of a puritan conversion of the whole Islamic world.[69] As\nfor the Salafi movement, it started in India even more obscurely than\nIkhwanism did in Arabia, but during the past few years it has spread\nwidely through Islam. Like Ikhwanism, it is puritanical and fanatical in\nspirit, its adherents being found especially among dervish\norganizations.[70] Such phenomena, taken with everything else, do not\naugur well for the peace of the East.\n\nSo much for Pan-Islamism's religious and political sides. Now let us\nglance at its commercial and industrial aspects--at what may be called\neconomic Pan-Islamism.\n\nEconomic Pan-Islamism is the direct result of the permeation of Western\nideas. Half a century ago the Moslem world was economically still in the\nMiddle Ages. The provisions of the sheriat, or Moslem canon law, such as\nthe prohibition of interest rendered economic life in the modern sense\nimpossible. What little trade and industry did exist was largely in the\nhands of native Christians or Jews. Furthermore, the whole economic life\nof the East was being disorganized by the aggressive competition of the\nWest. Europe's political conquest of the Moslem world was, in fact,\nparalleled by an economic conquest even more complete. Everywhere\npercolated the flood of cheap, abundant European machine-made goods,\nwhile close behind came European capital, temptingly offering itself in\nreturn for loans and concessions which, once granted, paved the way for\nEuropean political domination.\n\nYet in economics as in politics the very completeness of Europe's\ntriumph provoked resistance. Angered and alarmed by Western\nexploitation, Islam frankly recognized its economic inferiority and\nsought to escape from its subjection. Far-sighted Moslems began casting\nabout for a _modus vivendi_ with modern life that would put Islam\neconomically abreast of the times. Western methods were studied and\ncopied. The prohibitions of the sheriat were evaded or quietly ignored.\n\nThe upshot has been a marked evolution toward Western economic\nstandards. This evolution is of course still in its early stages, and is\nmost noticeable in lands most exposed to Western influences like India,\nEgypt, and Algeria. Yet everywhere in the Moslem world the trend is the\nsame. The details of this economic transformation will be discussed in\nthe chapter devoted to economic change. What we are here concerned with\nis its Pan-Islamic aspect. And that aspect is very strong. Nowhere does\nIslam's innate solidarity come out better than in the economic field.\nThe religious, cultural, and customary ties which bind Moslem to Moslem\nenable Mohammedans to feel more or less at home in every part of the\nIslamic world, while Western methods of transit and communication enable\nMohammedans to travel and keep in touch as they never could before. New\ntypes of Moslems--wholesale merchants, steamship owners, business men,\nbankers, even factory industrialists and brokers--are rapidly evolving;\ntypes which would have been simply unthinkable a century, or even half a\ncentury, ago.\n\nAnd these new men understand each other perfectly. Bound together both\nby the ties of Islamic fraternity and by the pressure of Western\ncompetition, they co-ordinate their efforts much more easily than\npoliticals have succeeded in doing. Here liberals, Pan-Islamists, and\nnationalists can meet on common ground. Here is no question of political\nconspiracies, revolts, or holy wars, challenging the armed might of\nEurope and risking bloody repression or blind reaction. On the contrary,\nhere is merely a working together of fellow Moslems for economic ends\nby business methods which the West cannot declare unlawful and dare not\nrepress.\n\nWhat, then, is the specific programme of economic Pan-Islamism? It is\neasily stated: the wealth of Islam for Moslems. The profits of trade and\nindustry for Moslem instead of Christian hands. The eviction of Western\ncapital by Moslem capital. Above all, the breaking of Europe's grip on\nIslam's natural resources by the termination of concessions in lands,\nmines, forests, railways, custom-houses, by which the wealth of Islamic\nlands is to-day drained away to foreign shores.\n\nSuch are the aspirations of economic Pan-Islamism. They are wholly\nmodern concepts, the outgrowth of those Western ideas whose influence\nupon the Moslem world I shall now discuss.[71]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[25] Islam has not only won much ground in India, Brahmanism's homeland,\nbut has also converted virtually the entire populations of the\ngreat islands of Java and Sumatra, where Brahmanism was formerly\nascendant.\n\n[26] The small Parsi communities of India, centring in Bombay, are the\nsole surviving representatives of Zoroastrianism. They were founded by\nZoroastrian refugees after the Mohammedan conquest of Persia in the\nseventh century A.D.\n\n[27] Though Mecca is forbidden to non-Moslems, a few Europeans have\nmanaged to make the Hajj in disguise, and have written their\nimpressions. Of these, Snouck Hurgronje's _Mekka_ (2 vols., The Hague,\n1888) and _Het Mekkaansche Feest_ (Leiden, 1889) are the most recent\ngood works. Also see Burton and Burckhardt. A recent account of value\nfrom the pen of a Mohammedan liberal is: Gazanfar Ali Khan, _With the\nPilgrims to Mecca; The Great Pilgrimage of A. H. 1319 (A.D. 1902)_, with\nan Introduction by Arminius Vambery (London, 1905).\n\n[28] The Shiite Persians of course refused to recognize any Sunnite or\northodox caliphate; while the Moors pay spiritual allegiance to their\nown Shereefian sultans.\n\n[29] The Turkish name for Constantinople.\n\n[30] On the caliphate, see Sir W. Muir, _The Caliphate: Its Rise,\nDecline, and Fall_ (Edinburgh, 1915); Sir Mark Sykes, _The Caliph's Last\nHeritage_ (London, 1915); XX, \"L'Islam apres la Guerre,\" _Revue de\nParis_, 15 January, 1916; \"The Indian Khilafat Delegation,\" _Foreign\nAffairs_, July, 1920 (Special Supplement).\n\n[31] Literally, \"he who is guided aright.\"\n\n[32] \"Seyid\" means \"Lord.\" This title is borne only by descendants of\nthe Prophet.\n\n[33] The explorer Dr. Nachtigal.\n\n[34] On the Islamic fraternities in general and the Sennussiya in\nparticular see W. S. Blunt, _The Future of Islam_ (London, 1882); O.\nDepont and X. Coppolani, _Les Confreries religieuses musulmanes_ (Paris,\n1897); H. Duveyrier, _La Confrerie musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben Ali es\nSenoussi_ (Paris, 1884); A. Le Chatelier, _Les Confreries musulmanes du\nHedjaz_ (Paris, 1887); L. Petit, _Confreries musulmanes_ (Paris, 1899);\nL. Rinn, _Marabouts et Khouan_ (Algiers, 1884); A. Servier, _Le\nNationalisme musulman_ (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); Simian, _Les\nConfreries islamiques en Algerie_ (Algiers, 1910); Achmed Abdullah\n(himself a Sennussi), \"The Sennussiyehs,\" _The Forum_, May, 1914; A. R.\nColquhoun, \"Pan-Islam,\" _North American Review_, June, 1906; T. R.\nThrelfall, \"Senussi and His Threatened Holy War,\" _Nineteenth Century_,\nMarch, 1900; Captain H. A. Wilson, \"The Moslem Menace,\" _Nineteenth\nCentury and After_, September, 1907; ... \"La Puissance de l'Islam: Ses\nConfreries Religieuses,\" _Le Correspondant_, 25 November and 10\nDecember, 1909. The above judgments, particularly regarding the\nSennussiya, vary greatly, some being highly alarmist, others minimizing\nits importance. A full balancing of the entire subject is that of\nCommandant Binger, \"Le Peril de l'Islam,\" _Bulletin du Comite de\nl'Afrique francaise_, 1902. Personal interviews of educated Moslems with\nEl Sennussi are Si Mohammed el Hechaish, \"Chez les Senoussia et les\nTouareg,\" _L'Expansion Coloniale francaise_, 1900; Muhammad ibn Utman,\n_Voyage au Pays des Senoussia a travers la Tripolitaine_ (translated\nfrom the Arabic), Paris, 1903.\n\n[35] On Moslem missionary activity in general, see Jansen, _Verbreitung\ndes Islams_ (Berlin, 1897); M. Townsend, _Asia and Europe_, pp. 46-49,\n60-61, 81; A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvieme Siecle_ (Paris,\n1888); various papers in _The Mohammedan World To-day_ (London, 1906).\n\n[36] T. R. Threlfall, \"Senussi and His Threatened Holy War,\" _Nineteenth\nCentury_, March, 1900.\n\n[37] D. A. Forget, _L'Islam et le Christianisme dans l'Afrique\ncentrale_, p. 65 (Paris, 1900). For other statements regarding Moslem\nmissionary activity in Africa, see G. Bonet-Maury, _L'Islamisme et le\nChristianisme en Afrique_ (Paris, 1906); E. W. Blyden, _Christianity,\nIslam, and the Negro Race_ (London, 1887); Forget, _op. cit._\n\n[38] A. Guerinot, \"L'Islam et l'Abyssinie,\" _Revue du Monde musulman_,\n1918. Also see similar opinion of the Protestant missionary K.\nCederquist, \"Islam and Christianity in Abyssinia,\" _The Moslem World_,\nApril, 1921.\n\n[39] S. Brobovnikov, \"Moslems in Russia,\" _The Moslem World_, January,\n1911.\n\n[40] Broomhall, _Islam in China_ (London, 1910); Nigarende, \"Notes sur\nles Musulmans Chinois,\" _Revue du Monde musulman_, January, 1907; paper\non Islam in China in _The Mohammedan World To-day_ (London, 1906).\n\n[41] See papers on Islam in Java and Sumatra in _The Mohammedan World\nTo-day_ (London, 1906); A. Cabaton, _Java, Sumatra, and the Dutch East\nIndies_ (translated from the Dutch), New York, 1916.\n\n[42] Quoted from article by \"X,\" \"Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme,\"\n_Revue du Monde musulman_, March, 1913. This authoritative article is,\nso the editor informs us, from the pen of an eminent Mohammedan--\"un\nhomme d'etat musulman.\" For other activities of Djemal-ed-Din, see A.\nServier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, pp. 10-13.\n\n[43] Quoted from W. G. Palgrave, _Essays on Eastern Questions_, p. 111\n(London, 1872).\n\n[44] A. Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, p. 351 (London,\n1906).\n\n[45] Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic schemes were first clearly discerned by\nthe French publicist Gabriel Charmes as early as 1881, and his warnings\nwere published in his prophetic book _L'Avenir de la Turquie--Le\nPanislamisme_ (Paris, 1883).\n\n[46] Gabriel Hanotaux, \"La Crise mediterraneenne et l'Islam,\" _Revue\nHebdomadaire_, April 13, 1912.\n\n[47] See \"X,\" \"La Situation politique de la Perse,\" _Revue du Monde\nmusulman_, June, 1914; B. Temple, \"The Place of Persia in\nWorld-Politics,\" _Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_, May 4,\n1910; W. M. Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York, 1912).\n\n[48] Quoted from A. Vambery, \"Die tuerkische Katastrophe und die\nIslamwelt,\" _Deutsche Revue_, July, 1913.\n\n[49] Shah Mohammed Naimatullah, \"Recent Turkish Events and Moslem\nIndia,\" _Asiatic Review_, October, 1913.\n\n[50] Quoted by F. Farjanel, \"Le Japon et l'Islam,\" _Revue du Monde\nmusulman_, November, 1906.\n\n[51] Farjanel, _supra_.\n\n[52] Quoted by Vambery, _supra_.\n\n[53] Vambery, \"An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists,\" _Nineteenth\nCentury and After_, April, 1912.\n\n[54] Vambery, \"An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists,\" _Nineteenth\nCentury and After_, April, 1912.\n\n[55] Special cable to the New York _Times_, dated Rome, May 28, 1919.\n\n[56] Sir T. Morison, \"England and Islam,\" _Nineteenth Century and\nAfter_, July, 1919.\n\n[57] H. H. The Aga Khan, _India in Transition_, p. 158 (London, 1918).\n\n[58] This hatred of Western civilization, as such, will be discussed in\nthe next chapter.\n\n[59] Ernst Paraquin, formerly Ottoman lieutenant-colonel and chief of\ngeneral staff, in the _Berliner Tageblatt_, January 24, 1920.\n\n[60] A. Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, pp.\n71, 72 (Paris, 1898).\n\n[61] A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, p. 182.\n\n[62] B. Temple, \"The Place of Persia in World-Politics,\" _Proceedings of\nthe Central Asian Society_, May, 1910.\n\n[63] L. Rinn, _Marabouts et Khouan_, p. vi.\n\n[64] Sir T. Morison, \"England and Islam,\" _op. cit._\n\n[65] Yahya Siddyk, _Le Reveil des Peuples islamiques au quatorzieme\nSiecle de l'Hegire_ (Cairo, 1907). Also published in Arabic.\n\n[66] For a full discussion of the effect of the Great War upon Asiatic\nand African peoples, see my book _The Rising Tide of Colour against\nWhite World-Supremacy_ (New York and London, 1920).\n\n[67] L. Massignon, \"L'Islam et la Politique des Allies,\" _Revue des\nSciences politiques_, June, 1920.\n\n[68] Sir T. Morison, \"England and Islam,\" _op. cit._\n\n[69] For the Ikhwan movement, see P. W. Harrison, \"The Situation in\nArabia,\" _Atlantic Monthly_, December, 1920; S. Mylrea, \"The\nPolitico-Religious Situation in Arabia,\" _The Moslem World_, July, 1919.\n\n[70] For the Salafi movement, see \"Wahhabisme--Son Avenir sociale et le\nMouvement salafi,\" _Revue du Monde musulman_, 1919.\n\n[71] On the general subject of economic Pan-Islamism, see A. Le\nChatelier, \"Le Reveil de l'Islam--Sa Situation economique,\" _Revue\nEconomique internationale_, July, 1910; also his article \"Politique\nmusulmane,\" _Revue du Monde musulman_, September, 1910; M. Pickthall,\n\"La Morale islamique,\" _Revue Politique internationale_, July, 1916; S.\nKhuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_ (London, 1912).\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST\n\n\nThe influence of the West is the great dynamic in the modern\ntransformation of the East. The ubiquitous impact of Westernism is\nmodifying not merely the Islamic world but all non-Moslem Asia and\nAfrica,[72] and in subsequent pages we shall examine the effects of\nWestern influence upon the non-Moslem elements of India. Of course\nWestern influence does not entirely account for Islam's recent\nevolution. We have already seen that, for the last hundred years, Islam\nitself has been engendering forces which, however quickened by external\nWestern stimuli, are essentially internal in their nature, arising\nspontaneously and working toward distinctive, original goals. It is not\na mere copying of the West that is to-day going on in the Moslem world,\nbut an attempt at a new synthesis--an assimilation of Western methods to\nEastern ends. We must always remember that the Asiatic stocks which\nconstitute the bulk of Islam's followers are not primitive savages like\nthe African negroes or the Australoids, but are mainly peoples with\ngenuine civilizations built up by their own efforts from the remote\npast. In view of their historic achievements, therefore, it seems safe\nto conclude that in the great ferment now stirring the Moslem world we\nbehold a real _Renaissance_, whose genuineness is best attested by the\nfact that there have been similar movements in former times.\n\nThe modern influence of the West on the East is quite unprecedented in\nboth intensity and scope. The far more local, partial influence of\nGreece and Rome cannot be compared to it. Another point to be noted is\nthat this modern influence of the West upon the East is a very recent\nthing. The full impact of Westernism upon the Orient as a whole dates\nonly from about the middle of the nineteenth century. Since then,\nhowever, the process has been going on by leaps and bounds. Roads and\nrailways, posts and telegraphs, books and papers, methods and ideas,\nhave penetrated, or are in process of penetrating, every nook and cranny\nof the East. Steamships sail the remotest seas. Commerce drives forth\nand scatters the multitudinous products of Western industry among the\nremotest peoples. Nations which only half a century ago lived the life\nof thirty centuries ago, to-day read newspapers and go to business in\nelectric tram-cars. Both the habits and thoughts of Orientals are being\nrevolutionized. To a discussion of the influence of the West upon the\nMoslem world the remainder of this book will be devoted. The chief\nelements will be separately analysed in subsequent chapters, the present\nchapter being a general survey of an introductory character.\n\nThe permeation of Westernism is naturally most advanced in those parts\nof Islam which have been longest under Western political control. The\npenetration of the British \"Raj\" into the remotest Indian jungles, for\nexample, is an extraordinary phenomenon. By the coinage, the\npost-office, the railroads, the administration of justice, the\nencouragement of education, the relief of famine, and a thousand other\nways, the great organization has penetrated all India. But even in\nregions where European control is still nominal, the permeation of\nWesternism has gone on apace. The customs and habits of the people have\nbeen distinctly modified. Western material improvements and comforts\nlike the kerosene-oil lamp and the sewing-machine are to-day part and\nparcel of the daily life of the people. New economic wants have been\ncreated; standards of living have been raised; canons of taste have been\naltered.[73]\n\nIn the intellectual and spiritual fields, likewise, the leaven of\nWesternism is clearly apparent. We have already seen how profoundly\nMoslem liberal reformers have been influenced by Western ideas and the\nspirit of Western progress. Of course in these fields Westernism has\nprogressed more slowly and has awakened much stronger opposition than it\nhas on the material plane. Material innovations, especially mechanical\nimprovements, comforts, and luxuries, make their way much faster than\nnovel customs or ideas, which usually shock established beliefs or\nancestral prejudices. Tobacco was taken up with extraordinary rapidity\nby every race and clime, and the kerosene-lamp has in half a century\npenetrated the recesses of Central Asia and of China; whereas customs\nlike Western dress and ideas like Western education encounter many\nsetbacks and are often adopted with such modifications that their\noriginal spirit is denatured or perverted. The superior strength and\nskill of the West are to-day generally admitted throughout the East, but\nin many quarters the first receptivity to Western progress and zeal for\nWestern ideas have cooled or have actually given place to a reactionary\nhatred of the very spirit of Western civilization.[74]\n\nWestern influences are most apparent in the upper and middle classes,\nespecially in the Western-educated _intelligentsia_ which to-day exists\nin every Eastern land. These elites of course vary greatly in numbers\nand influence, but they all possess a more or less definite grasp of\nWestern ideas. In their reactions to Westernism they are sharply\ndifferentiated. Some, while retaining the fundamentals of their\nancestral philosophy of life, attempt a genuine assimilation of Western\nideals and envisage a higher synthesis of the spirits of East and West.\nOthers break with their traditional pasts, steep themselves in\nWesternism, and become more or less genuinely Westernized. Still others\nconceal behind their Western veneer disillusionment and detestation.[75]\n\nOf course it is in externals that Westernization is most pronounced. The\nIndian or Turkish \"intellectual,\" holding Western university degrees and\nspeaking fluently several European languages, and the wealthy prince or\npasha, with his motor-cars, his racing-stables, and his annual \"cure\" at\nEuropean watering-places, appear very Occidental to the casual eye. Such\nmen wear European clothes, eat European food, and live in houses partly\nor wholly furnished in European style. Behind this facade exists every\npossible variation of inner life, from earnest enthusiasm for Western\nideals to inveterate reaction.\n\nThese varied attitudes toward Westernism are not parked off by groups or\nlocalities, they co-exist among the individuals of every class and every\nland in the East. The entire Orient is, in fact, undergoing a prodigious\ntransformation, far more sudden and intense than anything the West has\never known. Our civilization is mainly self-evolved; a natural growth\ndeveloping by normal, logical, and relatively gradual stages. The East,\non the contrary, is undergoing a concentrated process of adaptation\nwhich, with us, was spread over centuries, and the result is not so much\nevolution as revolution--political, economic, social, idealistic,\nreligious, and much more besides. The upshot is confusion, uncertainty,\ngrotesque anachronism, and glaring contradiction. Single generations\nare sundered by unbridgeable mental and spiritual gulfs. Fathers do not\nunderstand sons; sons despise their fathers. Everywhere the old and the\nnew struggle fiercely, often within the brain or spirit of the same\nindividual. The infinite complexity of this struggle as it appears in\nIndia is well summarized by Sir Valentine Chirol when he speaks of the\nmany \"currents and cross-currents of the confused movement which is\nstirring the stagnant waters of Indian life--the steady impact of alien\nideas on an ancient and obsolescent civilization; the more or less\nimperfect assimilation of those ideas by the few; the dread and\nresentment of them by those whose traditional ascendancy they threaten;\nthe disintegration of old beliefs, and then again their aggressive\nrevival; the careless diffusion of an artificial system of education,\nbased none too firmly on mere intellectualism, and bereft of all moral\nor religious sanction; the application of Western theories of\nadministration and of jurisprudence to a social formation stratified on\nlines of singular rigidity; the play of modern economic forces upon\nprimitive conditions of industry and trade; the constant and unconscious\nbut inevitable friction between subject races and their alien rulers;\nthe reverberation of distant wars and distant racial conflicts; the\nexaltation of an Oriental people in the Far East.\"[76] These lines,\nthough written about India, apply with fair exactitude to every other\nportion of the Near and Middle East to-day. As a French writer remarks\nwith special reference to the Levant: \"The truth is that the Orient is\nin transformation, and the Mohammedan mentality as well--though not\nperhaps exactly as we might wish. It is undergoing a period of crisis,\nwherein the past struggles everywhere against the present; where ancient\ncustoms, impaired by modern innovations, present a hybrid and\ndisconcerting spectacle.\"[77]\n\nTo this is largely due the unlovely traits displayed by most of the\nso-called \"Westernized\" Orientals; the \"stucco civilization\"[78] of the\nIndian Babu, and the boulevardier \"culture\" of the Turkish\n\"Effendi\"--syphilized rather than civilized. Any profound transformation\nmust engender many worthless by-products, and the contemporary\nWesternization of the Orient has its dark as well as its bright side.\nThe very process of reform, however necessary and inevitable, lends\nfresh virulence to old ills and imports new evils previously unknown. As\nLord Cromer says: \"It is doubtful whether the price which is being paid\nfor introducing European civilization into these backward Eastern\nsocieties is always recognized as fully as it should be. The material\nbenefits derived from European civilization are unquestionably great,\nbut as regards the ultimate effect on public and private morality the\nfuture is altogether uncertain.\"[79]\n\nThe good and the evil of Westernization are alike mostly clearly evident\namong the ranks of the educated elites. Some of these men show the\nhappiest effects of the Western spirit, but an even larger number fall\ninto the gulf between old and new, and there miserably perish. Lord\nCromer characterized many of the \"Europeanized\" Egyptians as \"at the\nsame time de-Moslemized Moslems and invertebrate Europeans\";[80] while\nanother British writer thus pessimistically describes the superficial\nEuropeanism prevalent in India: \"Beautiful Mogul palaces furnished with\ncracked furniture from Tottenham Court Road. That is what we have done\nto the Indian mind. We have not only made it despise its own culture and\nthrow it out; we have asked it to fill up the vacant spaces with\nfurniture which will not stand the climate. The mental Eurasianism of\nIndia is appalling. Such minds are nomad. They belong to no\ncivilization, no country, and no history. They create a craving that\ncannot be satisfied, and ideals that are unreal. They falsify life.\nThey deprive men of the nourishment of their cultural past, and the\nsubstitutes they supply are unsubstantial.... We sought to give the\nEastern mind a Western content and environment; we have succeeded too\nwell in establishing intellectual and moral anarchy in both.\"[81]\n\nThese patent evils of Westernization are a prime cause of that\nimplacable hatred of everything Western which animates so many\nOrientals, including some well acquainted with the West. Such persons\nare precious auxiliaries to the ignorant reactionaries and to the rebels\nagainst Western political domination.\n\nThe political predominance of the West over the East is, indeed, the\noutstanding factor in the whole question of Western influence upon the\nOrient. We have already surveyed Europe's conquest of the Near and\nMiddle East during the past century, and we have seen how helpless the\nbackward, decrepit Moslem world was in face of the twofold tide of\npolitical and economic subjugation. In fact, the economic phase was\nperhaps the more important factor in the rapidity and completeness of\nEurope's success. To be sure, some Eastern lands were subjugated at a\nstroke by naked military force, as in the French expedition to Algiers,\nthe Russian conquest of central Asia, and the Italian descent upon\nTripoli. Much oftener, however, subjection began by the essentially\neconomic process known as \"pacific penetration\"--the acquirement of a\nfinancial grip upon a hitherto independent Oriental country by Western\ncapital in the form of loans and concessions, until the assumption of\nWestern political control became little more than a formal registration\nof what already existed in fact. Such is the story of the subjection of\nEgypt, Morocco, and Persia, while England's Indian Empire started in a\npurely trading venture--the East India Company. The tremendous potency\nof \"pacific penetration\" is often not fully appreciated. Take the\nsignificance of one item alone--railway concessions. Says that keen\nstudent of _Weltpolitik_, Doctor Dillon: \"Railways are the iron\ntentacles of latter-day expanding Powers. They are stretched out\ncaressingly at first. But once the iron has, so to say, entered the soul\nof the weaker nation, the tentacles swell to the dimensions of brawny\narms, and the embrace tightens to a crushing grip.\"[82]\n\nOn the question of the abstract rightness or wrongness of this\nsubjection of the East by the West, I do not propose to enter. It has\nbeen exhaustively discussed, pro and con, and every reader of these\npages is undoubtedly familiar with the stock arguments on both sides.\nThe one thing certain is that this process of subjugation was, broadly\nspeaking, inevitable. Given two worlds at such different levels as East\nand West at the beginning of the nineteenth century--the West\noverflowing with vitality and striding at the forefront of human\nprogress, the East sunk in lethargy and decrepitude--and it was a\nforegone conclusion that the former would encroach upon the latter.\n\nWhat does concern us in our present discussion is the effect of European\npolitical control upon the general process of Westernization in Eastern\nlands. And there can be no doubt that such Westernization was thereby\ngreatly furthered. Once in control of an Oriental country, the European\nrulers were bound to favour its Westernization for a variety of reasons.\nMere self-interest impelled them to make the country peaceful and\nprosperous, in order to extract profit for themselves and reconcile the\ninhabitants to their rule. This meant the replacement of inefficient and\nsanguinary native despotisms inhibiting progress and engendering anarchy\nby stable colonial governments, maintaining order, encouraging\nindustry, and introducing improvements like the railway, the post,\nsanitation, and much more besides. In addition to these material\ninnovations, practically all the Western governments endeavoured to\nbetter the social, intellectual, and spiritual condition of the peoples\nthat had come under their control. The European Powers who built up\ncolonial empires during the nineteenth century were actuated by a spirit\nfar more enlightened than that of former times, when the early colonial\nempires of Spain, Portugal, Holland, and the English East India Company\nhad been run on the brutal and short-sighted doctrine of sheer\nexploitation. In the nineteenth century all Western rule in the Orient\nwas more or less impregnated with the ideal of \"The White Man's Burden.\"\nThe great empire-builders of the nineteenth century, actuated as they\nwere not merely by self-interest and patriotic ambition but also by a\nprofound sense of obligation to improve the populations which they had\nbrought under their country's sway, felt themselves bearers of Western\nenlightenment and laboured to diffuse all the benefits of Western\ncivilization. They honestly believed that the extension of Western\npolitical control was the best and quickest, perhaps the only, means of\nmodernizing the backward portions of the world.\n\nThat standpoint is ably presented by a British \"liberal imperialist,\"\nProfessor Ramsay Muir, who writes: \"It is an undeniable fact that the\nimperialism of the European peoples has been the means whereby European\ncivilization has been in some degree extended to the whole world, so\nthat to-day the whole world has become a single economic unit, and all\nits members are parts of a single political system. And this achievement\nbrings us in sight of the creation of a world-order such as the wildest\ndreamers of the past could never have anticipated. Without the\nimperialism of the European peoples North and South America, Australia,\nSouth Africa, must have remained wildernesses, peopled by scattered\nbands of savages. Without it India and other lands of ancient\ncivilization must have remained, for all we can see, externally subject\nto that endless succession of wars and arbitrary despotisms which have\nformed the substance of their history through untold centuries, and\nunder which neither rational and equal law nor political liberty, as we\nconceive them, were practicable conceptions. Without it the backward\npeoples of the earth must have continued to stagnate under the dominance\nof an unchanging primitive customary regime, which has been their state\nthroughout recorded time. If to-day the most fruitful political ideas of\nthe West--the ideas of nationality and self-government--which are purely\nproducts of Western civilization, are beginning to produce a healthy\nfermentation in many parts of the non-European world, that result is due\nto European Imperialism.\"[83]\n\nThe ethics of modern imperialism have nowhere been better formulated\nthan in an essay by Lord Cromer. \"An imperial policy,\" he writes, \"must,\nof course, be carried out with reasonable prudence, and the principles\nof government which guide our relations with whatsoever races are\nbrought under our control must be politically and economically sound and\nmorally defensible. This is, in fact, the keystone of the imperial arch.\nThe main justification of imperialism is to be found in the use which is\nmade of imperial power. If we make good use of our power, we may face\nthe future without fear that we shall be overtaken by the Nemesis which\nattended Roman misrule. If the reverse is the case, the British Empire\nwill deserve to fall, and of a surety it will ultimately fall.\"[84]\n\nSuch are the basic sanctions of Western imperialism as evolved during\nthe nineteenth century. Whether or not it is destined to endure, there\ncan be no question that this prodigious extension of European political\ncontrol greatly favoured the spread of Western influences of every kind.\nIt is, of course, arguable that the East would have voluntarily adopted\nWestern methods and ideas even if no sort of Western pressure had been\napplied. But they would have been adopted much more slowly, and this\nvital element of time renders such arguments mere academic speculation.\nFor the vital, expanding nineteenth-century West to have deliberately\nrestrained itself while the backward East blunderingly experimented with\nWesternism, accepting and rejecting, buying goods and refusing to pay\nfor them, negotiating loans and then squandering and repudiating them,\ninviting in Europeans and then expelling or massacring them, would have\nbeen against all history and human nature.\n\nAs a matter of fact, Western pressure was applied, as it was bound to be\napplied; and this constant, ubiquitous, unrelenting pressure, broke down\nthe barriers of Oriental conservatism and inertia as nothing else could\nhave done, forced the East out of its old ruts, and compelled it to take\nstock of things as they are in a world of hard facts instead of\nreminiscent dreams. In subsequent chapters we shall examine the manifold\nresults of this process which has so profoundly transformed the Orient\nduring the past hundred years. Here we will continue our general survey\nby examining the more recent aspects of Western control over the East\nand the reactions of the East thereto.\n\nIn my opinion, the chief fallacy involved in criticisms of Western\ncontrol over Eastern lands arises from failure to discriminate between\nnineteenth-century and twentieth-century imperialism. Nineteenth-century\nimperialism was certainly inevitable, and was apparently beneficial in\nthe main. Twentieth-century imperialism cannot be so favourably judged.\nBy the year 1900 the Oriental peoples were no longer mere fanatical\nobscurantists neither knowing nor caring to know anything outside the\nclosed circle of their ossified, decadent civilizations. The East had\nbeen going to school, and wanted to begin to apply what it had been\ntaught by the West. It should have been obvious that these peoples,\nwhose past history proved them capable of achievement and who were now\nshowing an apparently genuine desire for new progress, needed to be\ntreated differently from what they had been. In other words, a more\nliberal attitude on the part of the West had become advisable.\n\nBut no such change was made. On the contrary, in the West itself, the\nliberal idealism which had prevailed during most of the nineteenth\ncentury was giving way to that spirit of fierce political and economic\nrivalry which culminated in the Great War.[85] Never had Europe been so\navid for colonies, for \"spheres of influence,\" for concessions and\npreferential markets; in fine, so \"imperialistic,\" in the unfavourable\nsense of the term. The result was that with the beginning of the\ntwentieth century Western pressure on the East, instead of being\nrelaxed, was redoubled; and the awakening Orient, far from being met\nwith sympathetic consideration, was treated more ruthlessly than it had\nbeen for two hundred years. The way in which Eastern countries like\nTurkey and Persia, striving to reform themselves and protect their\nindependence, were treated by Europe's new _Realpolitik_ would have\nscandalized the liberal imperialists of a generation before. It\ncertainly scandalized present-day liberals, as witness these scathing\nlines written in 1912 by the well-known British publicist Sidney Low:\n\n\"The conduct of the Most Christian Powers during the past few years has\nborne a striking resemblance to that of robber-bands descending upon an\nunarmed and helpless population of peasants. So far from respecting the\nrights of other nations, they have exhibited the most complete and\ncynical disregard for them. They have, in fact, asserted the claim of\nthe strong to prey upon the weak, and the utter impotence of all ethical\nconsiderations in the face of armed force, with a crude nakedness which\nfew Eastern military conquerors could well have surpassed.\n\n\"The great cosmic event in the history of the last quarter of a century\nhas been the awakening of Asia after centuries of somnolence. The East\nhas suddenly sprung to life, and endeavoured to throw itself vigorously\ninto the full current of Western progress. Japan started the enterprise;\nand, fortunately for herself, she entered upon it before the new Western\npolicy had fully developed itself, and while certain archaic ideals\nabout the rights of peoples and the sanctity of treaties still\nprevailed. When the new era was inaugurated by the great Japanese\nstatesmen of the nineteenth century, Europe did not feel called upon to\ninterfere. We regarded the Japanese renaissance with interest and\nadmiration, and left the people of Nippon to work out the difficulties\nof their own salvation, unobstructed. If that revolution had taken place\nthirty years later, there would probably have been a different story to\ntell; and New Japan, in the throes of her travail, would have found the\narmed Great Powers at her bedside, each stretching forth a mailed fist\nto grab something worth taking. Other Eastern countries which have\nendeavoured to follow the example of Japan during the present century\nhave had worse luck. During the past ten years a wave of sheer\nmaterialism and absolute contempt for international morality has swept\nacross the Foreign Offices of Europe, and has reacted disastrously upon\nthe various Eastern nations in their desperate struggles to reform a\nconstitutional system. They have been attempting to carry out the\nsuggestions made to them for generations by benevolent advisers in\nChristendom.\n\n\"Now, when they take these counsels to heart, and endeavour, with\nhalting steps, and in the face of immense obstacles, to pursue the path\nof reform, one might suppose that their efforts would be regarded with\nsympathetic attention by the Governments of the West; and that, even if\nthese offered no direct aid, they would at least allow a fair trial.\"\nBut, on the contrary, \"one Great Power after another has used the\nopportunity presented by the internal difficulties of the Eastern\ncountries to set out upon a career of annexation.\"[86]\n\nWe have already seen how rapid was this career of annexation,\nextinguishing the independence of the last remaining Mohammedan states\nat the close of the Great War. We have also seen how it exacerbated\nMoslem fear and hatred of the West. And the West was already feared and\nhated for many reasons. In the preceding chapter we traced the growth of\nthe Pan-Islamic movement, and in subsequent chapters we shall trace the\ndevelopment of Oriental nationalism. These politico-religious movements,\nhowever, by no means exhaust the list of Oriental reactions to\nWesternism. There are others, economic, social, racial in character. In\nview of the complex nature of the Orient's reaction against Westernism,\nlet us briefly analyse the problem in its various constituent elements.\n\nAnti-Western feeling has been waning in some quarters and waxing in\nothers during the past hundred years. By temperamental reactionaries and\nfanatics things Western have, of course, always been abhorred. But,\nleaving aside this intransigeant minority, the attitude of other\ncategories of Orientals has varied greatly according to times and\ncircumstances. By liberal-minded persons Western influences were at\nfirst hailed with cordiality and even with enthusiasm. In the opening\nchapter we saw how the liberal reformers welcomed the Western concept of\nprogress and made it one of the bases of their projected religious\nreformation. And the liberals displayed the same attitude in secular\nmatters. The liberal statesmen who governed Turkey during the third\nquarter of the nineteenth century made earnest efforts to reform the\nOttoman State, and it was the same in other parts of the Moslem world.\nAn interesting example is the attempt made by General Kheir-ed-Din to\nmodernize Tunis. This man, a Circassian by birth, had won the confidence\nof his master, the Bey, who made him vizier. In 1860 he toured Europe\nand returned greatly impressed with its civilization. Convinced of\nEurope's infinite superiority, he desired passionately to transplant\nWestern ideas and methods to Tunis. This he believed quite feasible, and\nthe result would, so he thought, be Tunis's rapid regeneration.\nKheir-ed-Din was not in the least a hater of the West. He merely\nrecognized clearly the Moslem world's peril of speedy subjection to the\nWest if it did not set its house rapidly in order, and he therefore\ndesired, in a perfectly legitimate feeling of patriotism, to press his\ncountry along the road of progress, that it might be able to stand alone\nand preserve its independence.\n\nSo greatly was the Bey impressed by Kheir-ed-Din's report that he gave\nhim a free hand in his reforming endeavours. For a short time\nKheir-ed-Din displayed great activity, though he encountered stubborn\nopposition from reactionary officials. His work was cut short by his\nuntimely death, and Tunis, still unmodernized, fell twenty years later\nunder the power of France. Kheir-ed-Din, however, worked for posterity.\nIn order to rouse his compatriots to the realities of their situation he\npublished a remarkable book, _The Surest Means of Knowing the State of\nNations_. This book has profoundly influenced both liberals and\nnationalists throughout the Near East, especially in North Africa, where\nit has become the bible of Tunisian and Algerian nationalism. In his\nbook Kheir-ed-Din shows his co-religionists the necessity of breaking\nwith their attitude of blind admiration for the past and proud\nindifference to everything else, and of studying what is going on in the\nouter world. Europe's present prosperity is due, he asserts, not to\nnatural advantages or to religion, but \"to progress in the arts and\nsciences, which facilitate the circulation of wealth and exploit the\ntreasures of the earth by an enlightened protection constantly given to\nagriculture, industry, and commerce: all natural consequences of justice\nand liberty--two things which, for Europeans, have become second\nnature.\" In past ages the Moslem world was great and progressive,\nbecause it was then liberal and open to progress. It declined through\nbigotry and obscurantism. But it can revive by reviving the spirit of\nits early days.\n\nI have stressed the example of the Tunisian Kheir-ed-Din rather than the\nbetter-known Turkish instances because it illustrates the general\nreceptivity of mid-nineteenth-century Moslem liberals to Western ideas\nand their freedom from anti-Western feeling.[87] As time passed,\nhowever, many of these erstwhile liberals, disillusioned with the West\nfor various reasons, notably European aggression, became the bitterest\nenemies of the West, hating the very spirit of Western civilization.[88]\n\nThis anti-Western feeling has, of course, been greatly exacerbated since\nthe beginning of the present century. As an influential Mohammedan wrote\njust before the Great War: \"The events of these last ten years and the\ndisasters which have stricken the Mohammedan world have awakened in its\nbosom a sentiment of mutual cordiality and devotion hitherto unknown,\nand a unanimous hatred against all its oppressors has been the ferment\nwhich to-day stirs the hearts of all Moslems.\"[89] The bitter rancour\nseething in many Moslem hearts shows in outbursts like the following,\nfrom the pen of a popular Turkish writer at the close of the Balkan\nWars: \"We have been defeated, we have been shown hostility by the\noutside world, because we have become too deliberative, too cultured,\ntoo refined in our conceptions of right and wrong, of humanity and\ncivilization. The example of the Bulgarian army has taught us that every\nsoldier facing the enemy must return to the days of barbarism, must have\na thirst of blood, must be merciless in slaughtering children and women,\nold and weak, must disregard others' property, life, and honour. Let us\nspread blood, suffering, wrong, and mourning. Thus only may we become\nthe favourites of the civilized world like King Ferdinand's army.\"[90]\n\nThe Great War itself was hailed by multitudes of Moslems as a\nwell-merited Nemesis on Western arrogance and greed. Here is how a\nleading Turkish newspaper characterized the European Powers: \"They would\nnot look at the evils in their own countries or elsewhere, but\ninterfered at the slightest incident in our borders; every day they\nwould gnaw at some part of our rights and our sovereignty; they would\nperform vivisection on our quivering flesh and cut off great pieces of\nit. And we, with a forcibly controlled spirit of rebellion in our hearts\nand with clinched but powerless fists, silent and depressed, would\nmurmur as the fire burned within: 'Oh, that they might fall out with one\nanother! Oh, that they might eat one another up!' And lo! to-day they\nare eating each other up, just as the Turk wished they would.\"[91]\n\nSuch anti-Western sentiments are not confined to journalists or\npoliticians, they are shared by all classes, from princes to peasants.\nEach class has its special reasons for hating European political\ncontrol. The native princes, even when maintained upon their thrones and\nconfirmed in their dignities and emoluments, bitterly resent their state\nof vassalage and their loss of limitless, despotic power. \"Do you know,\nI can hardly buy a pen or a sword for myself without asking the Resident\nfor permission?\" remarked an Indian rajah bitterly. His attitude was\nprecisely that of Khedive Tewfik Pasha, who, in the early days of the\nBritish occupation of Egypt, while watching a review of British troops,\nsaid to one of his ministers: \"Do you suppose I like this? I tell you, I\nnever see an English sentinel in my streets without longing to jump out\nof my carriage and strangle him with my own hands.\"[92] The upper\nclasses feel much the same as their sovereigns. They regret their former\nmonopoly of privilege and office. This is especially true of the\nWestern-educated _intelligentsia_, who believe that they should hold all\ngovernment posts and resent bitterly the reservation of high-salaried\ndirective positions for Europeans. Of course many intelligent liberals\nrealize so fully the educative effect of European control that they\nacquiesce in a temporary loss of independence in order to complete their\nmodernization and ultimately be able to stand alone without fear of\nreaction or anarchy. However, these liberals are only a small minority,\nhated by their upper-class fellows as time-servers and renegades, and\nsundered by an immense gulf from the ignorant masses.\n\nAt first sight we might think that the masses would, on the whole, be\nfavourably disposed toward European political control. Despite certain\neconomic disadvantages that Westernization has imposed, the masses have\nunquestionably gained most by European rule. Formerly exploited\nruthlessly by both princes and upper classes, the peasants and town\nworkers are to-day assured peace, order, justice, and security for\ntheir landholdings and the fruits of their toil. Now it would be a\nmistake to think that the masses are insensible to all this. The fact\nis, they do recognize the benefits of European rule. Nevertheless, the\nnew rulers, while tolerated and even respected, are never beloved.\nFurthermore, as the generation which knew the old regime dies off, its\nevils are forgotten, and the younger generation, taking present benefits\nfor granted, murmurs at the flaws in the existing order, and lends a\nreadier ear to native agitators extolling the glories of independence\nand idealizing the \"good old times.\"\n\nThe truth of the matter is that, despite all its shortcomings, the\naverage Oriental hankers after the old way of life. Even when he\nrecognizes the good points of the new, he nevertheless yearns\nirrationally for the old. \"A Moslem ruler though he oppress me and not a\n_kafir_[93] though he work me weal\" is a Moslem proverb of long\nstanding. Every colonial administration, no matter how enlightened, runs\ncounter to this ineradicable aversion of Moslems for Christian rule. A\nRussian administrator in Central Asia voices the sentiments of European\nofficials generally when he states: \"Pious Moslems cannot accommodate\nthemselves to the government of _Giaours_.\"[94]\n\nFurthermore, it must be remembered that most Orientals either do not\nrecognize much benefit in European rule, or, even though they do\nrecognize considerable benefits, consider these more than offset by many\npoints which, in their eyes, are maddening annoyances or burdens. The\nvery things which we most pride ourselves on having given to the\nOrient--peace, order, justice, security--are not valued by the Oriental\nanywhere near as highly as we might expect. Of course he likes these\nthings, but he would prefer to get less of them if what he did get was\ngiven by native rulers, sharing his prejudices and point of view. Take\nthe single factor of justice. As an English writer remarks: \"The Asiatic\nis not delighted with justice _per se_; indeed, the Asiatic really cares\nbut little about it if he can get _sympathy_ in the sense in which he\nunderstands that misunderstood word.... This is the real reason why\nevery Asiatic in his heart of hearts prefers the rule of his own\nnationality, bad though it be, to the most ideal rule of aliens. For\nwhen he is ruled by his own countrymen, he is dealt with by people who\nunderstand his frailties, and who, though they may savagely punish him,\nare at least in sympathy with the motives which prompt his\ndelinquencies.\"[95]\n\nTake again the matter of order. The average Oriental not only does not\nappreciate, but detests, our well-regulated, systematic manner of life.\nAccustomed as he has been for centuries to a slipshod, easygoing\nexistence, in which, if there was much injustice, there was also much\nfavouritism, he instinctively hates things like sanitary measures and\npolice regulations. Accustomed to a wide \"personal liberty\" in the\nanarchic sense, he is not willing to limit this liberty for the common\nweal. He wants his own way, even though it involves possible dangers to\nhimself--dangers which may always be averted by bribery, favouritism, or\nviolence. Said an American who had listened to a Filipino's glowing\nwords on independence: \"What could you do, if you were independent, that\nyou cannot do now?\" \"I could build my house there in the middle of the\nstreet, if I wanted to.\" \"But suppose your neighbour objected and\ninterfered?\" \"I would 'get' him.\" \"But suppose he 'got' you?\" A shrug of\nthe shoulders was the only answer.[96]\n\nThe fact is that the majority of Orientals, despite the considerable\npenetration of Western ideas and methods that has been going on for the\nlast century, still love their old ruts and hate to be budged out of\nthem. They realize that Western rule furthers more than anything else\nthe Westernization of their social system, their traditional manner of\nlife, and they therefore tend to react fanatically against it. Every\ninnovation imposed by the colonial authorities is apt to rouse the most\npurblind resistance. For example, compulsory vaccination was bitterly\nopposed for years by the natives of Algeria. The French officials\npointed out that smallpox, hitherto rampant, was being rapidly\nextirpated. The natives replied that, in their opinion, it was merely a\ncrafty scheme for sterilizing them sexually and thus make room for\nFrench colonists. The officials thereupon pointed to the census figures,\nwhich showed that the natives were increasing at an unprecedented rate.\nThe natives merely shrugged their shoulders and continued to inveigh\nagainst the innovation.\n\nThis whole matter has been well summarized by a French writer with a\nwide knowledge of Mohammedan lands. Says Louis Bertrand:\n\n\"In reality, all these peoples, indisposed as they are by their\ntraditions, customs, and climates to live according to our social ideal,\nhate to endure the constraint of our police, of our administration--in a\nword, of any sort of _regulated_ government, no matter how just and\nhonest. Delivered from the most anarchic and vexatious of tyrannies,\nthey remain in spirit more or less like our vagabonds, always hoping to\nescape from the gendarmes. In vain do we point out to the Arabs of North\nAfrica that, thanks to the protection of France, they are no longer\npillaged by Turkish despots nor massacred and tortured by rival tribes.\nThey see only one thing: the necessity of paying taxes for matters that\nthey do not understand. We shall never realize the rage, the fury,\naroused in our Algerian towns by the simple health department ordinance\nrequiring the emptying of a garbage-can at a fixed hour. At Cairo and\nelsewhere I have observed the same rebellious feelings among the\ndonkey-boys and cab-drivers subjected to the regulations of the English\npoliceman.\n\n\"But it is not merely our municipal and administrative regulations which\nthey find insupportable; it is all our habits, taken _en bloc_--in a\nword, the _order_ which regulates our civilized life. For instance: on\nthe railway-line from Jaffa to Jerusalem the train stops at a station\nbeside which stands the tomb of a holy man. The schedule calls for a\nstop of a minute at most. But no sooner had we arrived than what was my\nstupefaction to see all the Mohammedans on the train get off, spread\ntheir prayer-rugs, and tranquilly begin their devotions. The\nstation-master blew his whistle, the conductor yelled at them that he\nwas going to leave them behind; nobody budged. A squad of railway\nemployees had to be mobilized, who, with blows and curses, finally\nbundled these pious persons back into the train again. The business\nlasted a good quarter of an hour, and was not easy. The more vigorous of\nthe worshippers put up an energetic resistance.\n\n\"The above is only a casual instance, chosen at random. What is certain\nis that these peoples do not yet understand what we mean by exactitude,\nand that the concept of a well-regulated existence has not yet\npenetrated their heads.\"[97]\n\nWhat has just been written of course applies primarily to the ignorant\nmasses. But this attitude of mind is more or less common to all classes\nof Oriental peoples. The habits of centuries are not easily transformed.\nIn fact, it must not be forgotten that the upper classes were able to\nenjoy most fully the capricious personal liberty of the unmodified East,\nand that, therefore, though they may be better able to understand the\nvalue of Westernization, they have in one sense the most to lose.[98]\n\nIn fact, for all Orientals, high and low alike, the \"good old times\"\nhad charms which they mournfully regret. For the prince, the pasha, the\ncourtier, existence was truly an Oriental paradise. To be sure, the\nprince might at any moment be defeated and slain by a rival monarch; the\npasha strangled at his master's order; the courtier tortured through a\nsuperior's whim. But, meanwhile, it was \"life,\" rich and full. \"Each of\nthese men had his own character and his own renown among his countrymen,\nand each enjoyed a position such as is now unattainable in Europe, in\nwhich he was released from laws, could indulge his own fancies, bad or\ngood, and was fed every day and all day with the special flattery of\nAsia--that willing submissiveness to mere volition which is so like\nadoration, and which is to its recipients the most intoxicating of\ndelights. Each, too, had his court of followers, and every courtier\nshared in the power, the luxury, and the adulation accruing to his lord.\nThe power was that of life and death; the luxury included possession of\nevery woman he desired; the adulation was, as I have said, almost\nreligious worship.\"[99]\n\nBut, it may be asked, what about the poor man, exploited by this\nhierarchy of capricious despots? What had he to gain from all this?\nWell, in most cases, he got nothing at all; but he _might_ gain a great\ndeal. Life in the old Orient was a gigantic lottery. Any one, however\nhumble, who chanced to please a great man, might rise to fame and\nfortune at a bound. And this is just what pleases the Eastern\ntemperament; for in the East, \"luck\" and caprice are more prized than\nthe \"security\" cherished in the West. In the Orient the favourite\nstories are those narrating sudden and amazing shifts of\nfortune--beggars become viziers or viziers become beggars, and all in a\nsingle night. To the majority of Orientals it is still the uncertainties\nof life, and the capricious favour of the powerful, which make it most\nworth living; not the sure reward of honesty and well-regulated labour.\nAll these things made the life of the Orient infinitely _interesting_\nto _all_. And it is precisely this gambler's interest which\nWesternization has more or less destroyed. As an English writer very\njustly remarks _a propos_ of modern Egypt: \"Our rule may be perfect, but\nthe East finds it dull. The old order was a ragged garment, but it was\ngay. Its very vicissitude had a charm. 'Ah! yes,' said an Egyptian to a\nchampion of English rule, 'but in the old days a beggar might sit at the\ngate, and if he were found pleasing in the eyes of a great lady, he\nmight be a great man on the morrow.' There is a natural and inevitable\nregret for the gorgeous and perilous past, when favour took the place of\njustice, and life had great heights and depths--for the Egypt of Joseph,\nHaroun-al-Rashid, and Ismail Pasha. We have spread the coat of\nbroadcloth over the radiant garment.\"[100]\n\nSaddened and irritated by the threatened loss of so much that they hold\ndear, it is not strange that many Eastern conservatives glorify the past\nas a sort of Golden Age, infinitely superior to anything the West can\nproduce, and in this they are joined by many quondam liberals,\ndisillusioned with Westernism and flying into the arms of reaction. The\nresult is a spirit of hatred against everything Western, which sometimes\nassumes the most extravagant forms. Says Louis Bertrand: \"During a\nlecture that I attended at Cairo the speaker contended that France owed\nIslam (1) its civilization and sciences; (2) half of its vocabulary; (3)\nall that was best in the character and mentality of its population,\nseeing that, from the Middle Ages to the Revolution of 1789, all the\nreformers who laboured for its enfranchisement--Albigensians, Vaudois,\nCalvinists, and Camisards--were probably descendants of the Saracens. It\nwas nothing less than the total annexation of France to Morocco.\"\nMeanwhile, \"it has become the fashion for fervent (Egyptian)\nnationalists to go to Spain and meditate in the gardens of the Alcazar\nof Seville or in the patios of the Alhambra of Granada on the defunct\nsplendours of western Islam.\"[101]\n\nEven more grotesque are the rhapsodies of the Hindu wing of this Golden\nAge school. These Hindu enthusiasts far outdo the wildest flights of\ntheir Moslem fellows. They solemnly assert that Hindustan is the nursery\nand home of all true religion, philosophy, culture, civilization,\nscience, invention, and everything else; and they aver that when India's\npresent regrettable eclipse is past (an eclipse of course caused\nentirely by English rule) she is again to shine forth in her glory for\nthe salvation of the whole world. Employing to the full the old adage\nthat there is nothing new under the sun, they have \"discovered\" in the\nVedas and other Hindu sacred texts \"irrefutable\" evidence that the\nancient Hindu sages anticipated all our modern ideas, including such\nup-to-date matters as bomb-dropping aeroplanes and the League of\nNations.[102]\n\nAll this rhapsodical laudation of the past will, in the long run, prove\nfutile. The East, like the West, has its peculiar virtues; but the East\nalso has its special faults, and it is the faults which, for the last\nthousand years, have been gaining on the virtues, resulting in\nbackwardness, stagnation, and inferiority. To-day the East is being\npenetrated--and quickened--by the West. The outcome will never be\ncomplete Westernization in the sense of a mere wholesale copying and\nabsolute transformation; the East will always remain fundamentally\nitself. But it will be a new self, the result of a true assimilation of\nWestern ideas. The reactionaries can only delay this process, and\nthereby prolong the Orient's inferiority and weakness.\n\nNevertheless, the reactionary attitude, though unintelligent, is\nintelligible. Westernization hurts too many cherished prejudices and\nvested interests not to arouse chronic resistance. This resistance would\noccur even if Western influences were all good and Westerners all angels\nof light. But of course Westernization has its dark side, while our\nWestern culture-bearers are animated not merely by altruism, but also by\nfar less worthy motives. This strengthens the hand of the Oriental\nreactionaries and lends them the cover of moral sanctions. In addition\nto the extremely painful nature of any transformative process,\nespecially in economic and social matters, there are many incidental\nfactors of an extremely irritating nature.\n\nTo begin with, the mere presence of the European, with his patent\nsuperiority of power and progress, is a constant annoyance and\nhumiliation. This physical presence of the European is probably as\nnecessary to the Orient's regeneration as it is inevitable in view of\nthe Orient's present inferiority. But, however beneficial, it is none\nthe less a source of profound irritation. These Europeans disturb\neverything, modify customs, raise living standards, erect separate\n\"quarters\" in the cities, where they form \"extraterritorial\" colonies\nexempt from native law and customary regulation. An English town rises\nin the heart of Cairo, a \"Little Paris\" eats into Arabesque Algiers,\nwhile European Pera flaunts itself opposite Turkish Stambul.\n\nAs for India, it is dotted with British \"enclaves\". \"The great\nPresidency towns, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, are European cities planted\non Indian soil. All the prominent buildings are European, though in some\nof the more recent ones an endeavour has been made to adopt what is\nknown as the 'Indo-Saracenic' style of architecture. For the rest, the\nstreets are called by English names, generally the names of bygone\nviceroys and governors, or of the soldiers who conquered the land and\nquelled the mutiny--heroes whose effigies meet you at every turn. The\nshops are English shops, where English or Eurasian assistants traffic in\nEnglish goods. English carriages and motors bowl along the macadamized\nor tarred roads of Old England. On every hand there is evidence of the\ninstinctive effort to reproduce, as nearly as the climate will permit,\nEnglish conditions of life.... Almost the whole life of the people of\nIndia is relegated to the back streets, not to say the slums--frankly\ncalled in Madras the Black Town. There are a few points--clubs and\ngymkhanas specially established to that end--where Englishmen, and even\nwomen, meet Indian men, and even women, of the wealthier classes, on a\nbasis of social equality. But few indeed are the points of contact\nbetween the Asian town and the European city which has been superimposed\nupon it. The missionary, the Salvation Army outpost, perhaps the\ncuriosity-hunting tourist, may go forth into the bazaars; but the\nEuropean community as a whole cares no more for the swarming brown\nmultitudes around it than the dwellers on an island care for the fishes\nin the circumambient sea.\"[103] And what is true of the great towns\nholds good for scores of provincial centres, \"stations,\" and\ncantonments. The scale may be smaller, but the type is the same.\n\nThe European in the Orient is thus everywhere profoundly an alien,\nliving apart from the native life. And the European is not merely an\naloof alien; he is a ruling alien as well. Always his attitude is that\nof the superior, the master. This attitude is not due to brutality or\nsnobbery; it is inherent in the very essence of the situation. Of course\nmany Europeans have bad manners, but that does not change the basic\nreality of the case. And this reality is that, whatever the future may\nbring, the European first established himself in the Orient because the\nWest was then infinitely ahead of the East; and he is still there to-day\nbecause, despite all recent changes, the East is still behind the West.\nTherefore the European in the Orient is still the ruler, and so long as\nhe stays there _must_ continue to rule--justly, temperately, with\npolitic regard for Eastern progress and liberal devolution of power as\nthe East becomes ripe for its liberal exercise--but, nevertheless,\n_rule_. Wherever the Occidental has established his political control,\nthere are but two alternatives: govern or go. Furthermore, in his\ngoverning, the Occidental must rule according to his own lights; despite\nall concessions to local feeling, he must, in the last analysis, act as\na Western, not as an Eastern, ruler. Lord Cromer voices the heart of all\ntrue colonial government when he says: \"In governing Oriental races the\nfirst thought must be what is good for them, but not necessarily what\nthey think is good for them.\"[104]\n\nNow all this is inevitable, and should be self-evident. Nevertheless,\nthe fact remains that even the most enlightened Oriental can hardly\nregard it as other than a bitter though salutary medicine, while most\nOrientals feel it to be humiliating or intolerable. The very virtues of\nthe European are prime causes of his unpopularity. For, as Meredith\nTownsend well says: \"The European is, in Asia, the man who will insist\non his neighbour doing business just after dinner, and being exact when\nhe is half-asleep, and being 'prompt' just when he wants to enjoy,--and\nhe rules in Asia and is loved in Asia accordingly.\"[105]\n\nFurthermore, the European in the Orient is disliked not merely as a\nruler and a disturber, but also as a man of widely different race. This\nmatter of race is very complicated,[106] but it cuts deep and is of\nfundamental importance. Most of the peoples of the Near and Middle East\nwith which our present discussion is concerned belong to what is known\nas the \"brown\" category of the human species. Of course, in strict\nanthropology, the term is inexact. Anthropologically, we cannot set off\na sharply differentiated group of \"brown\" types as a \"brown race,\" as we\ncan set off the \"white\" types of Europe as a \"white race\" or the\n\"yellow\" Mongoloid types of the Far East as a \"yellow race.\" This is\nbecause the Near and Middle East have been racially a vast melting-pot,\nor series of melting-pots, wherein conquest and migration have\ncontinually poured new heterogeneous elements, producing the most\ndiverse ethnic amalgamations. Thus to-day some of the Near and Middle\nEastern peoples are largely white, like the Persians and Ottoman Turks;\nothers, like the southern Indians and Yemenite Arabs, are largely black;\nwhile still others, like the Himalayan and Central Asian peoples, have\nmuch yellow blood. Again, as there is no brown racial type-norm, as\nthere are white and yellow type-norms, so there is no generalized brown\nculture like those possessed by yellows and whites. The great brown\nspiritual bond is Islam, yet in India, the chief seat of brown\npopulation, Islam is professed by only one-fifth of the inhabitants.\nLastly, while the spiritual frontiers of the Moslem world coincide\nmainly with the ethnic frontiers of the brown world, Islam overlaps at\nseveral points, including some pure whites in eastern Europe, many true\nyellows in the Far East, and multitudes of negroes in Africa.\n\nNevertheless, despite these partial modifications, the terms \"brown\nrace\" and \"brown world\" do connote genuine realities which science and\npolitics alike recognize to be essentially true. There certainly is a\nfundamental comity between the brown peoples. This comity is subtle and\nintangible in character; yet it exists, and under certain circumstances\nit is capable of momentous manifestations. Its salient feature is the\ninstinctive recognition by all Near and Middle Eastern peoples that they\nare fellow \"Asiatics,\" however bitter may be their internecine feuds.\nThis instinctive \"Asiatic\" feeling has been noted by historians for\nmore than two thousand years, and it is true to-day as in the past.\n\nThe great racial divisions of mankind are the most fundamental, the most\npermanent, the most ineradicable things in human experience. They are\nnot mere diverse colorations of skin. Matters like complexion, stature,\nand hair-formation are merely the outward, visible symbols of\ncorrelative mental and spiritual differences which reveal themselves in\nsharply contrasted temperaments and view-points, and which translate\nthemselves into the infinite phenomena of divergent group-life.\n\nNow it is one of these basic racial lines of cleavage which runs between\n\"East\" and \"West.\" Broadly speaking, the Near and Middle East is the\n\"brown world,\" and this differentiates it from the \"white world\" of the\nWest in a way which never can be really obliterated. Indeed, to attempt\nto obliterate the difference by racial fusion would be the maddest of\nfollies. East and West can mutually quicken each other by a mutual\nexchange of ideas and ideals. They can only harm each other by\ntransfusions of blood. To unite physically would be the greatest of\ndisasters. East and West have both given much to the world in the past,\nand promise to give more in the future. But whatever of true value they\nare to give can be given only on condition that they remain essentially\nthemselves. Ethnic fusion would destroy both their race-souls and would\nresult in a dreary mongrelization from which would issue nothing but\ndegeneration and decay.\n\nBoth East and West instinctively recognize the truth of this, and show\nit by their common contempt for the \"Eurasian\"--the mongrel offspring of\nunions between the two races. As Meredith Townsend well says: \"The chasm\nbetween the brown man and the white is unfathomable, has existed in all\nages, and exists still everywhere. No white man marries a brown wife, no\nbrown man marries a white wife, without an inner sense of having been\nfalse to some unintelligible but irresistible command.\"[107]\n\nThe above summary of the political, economic, social, and racial\ndifferences between East and West gives us a fair idea of the numerous\ncross-currents which complicate the relations of the two worlds and\nwhich hinder Westernization. The Westernizing process is assuredly going\non, and in subsequent chapters we shall see how far-reaching is its\nscope. But the factors just considered will indicate the possibilities\nof reaction and will roughly assign the limits to which Westernization\nmay ultimately extend.\n\nOne thing is certain: Western political control in the Orient, however\nprolonged and however imposing in appearance, must ever rest on\nessentially fragile foundations. The Western rulers will always remain\nan alien caste; tolerated, even respected, perhaps, but never loved and\nnever regarded as anything but foreigners. Furthermore, Western rule\nmust necessarily become more precarious with the increasing\nenlightenment of the subject peoples, so that the acquiescence of one\ngeneration may be followed by the hostile protest of the next. It is\nindeed an unstable equilibrium, hard to maintain and easily upset.\n\nThe latent instability of European political control over the Near and\nMiddle East was dramatically shown by the moral effect of the\nRusso-Japanese War. Down to that time the Orient had been so helpless in\nface of European aggression that most Orientals had come to regard\nWestern supremacy with fatalistic resignation. But the defeat of a\nfirst-class European Power by an Asiatic people instantly broke the\nspell, and all Asia and Africa thrilled with a wild intoxication which\nwe can scarcely conceive. A Scotch missionary thus describes the effect\nof the Japanese victories on northern India, where he was stationed at\nthe time: \"A stir of excitement passed over the north of India. Even the\nremote villagers talked over the victories of Japan as they sat in\ntheir circles and passed round the huqqa at night. One of the older men\nsaid to me, 'There has been nothing like it since the mutiny'. A Turkish\nconsul of long experience in Western Asia told me that in the interior\nyou could see everywhere the most ignorant peasants 'tingling' with the\nnews. Asia was moved from end to end, and the sleep of the centuries was\nfinally broken. It was a time when it was 'good to be alive,' for a new\nchapter was being written in the book of the world's history.\"[108]\n\nOf course the Russo-Japanese War did not create this new spirit, whose\nroots lay in the previous epoch of subtle changes that had been going\non. The Russo-Japanese War was thus rather the occasion than the cause\nof the wave of exultant self-confidence which swept over Asia and Africa\nin the year 1904. But it did dramatize and clarify ideas that had been\ngerminating half-unconsciously in millions of Oriental minds, and was\nthus the sign manual of the whole nexus of forces making for a\nrevivified Orient.\n\nFurthermore, this new temper profoundly influenced the Orient's\nattitude toward the series of fresh European aggressions which then\nbegan. It is a curious fact that just when the Far East had\nsuccessfully resisted European encroachment, the Near and Middle East\nshould have been subjected to European aggressions of unparalleled\nseverity. We have already noted the furious protests and the unwonted\nmoral solidarity of the Moslem world at these manifestations of Western\n_Realpolitik_. It would be interesting to know exactly how much of this\ndefiant temper was due to the heartening example of Japan. Certainly\nour ultra-imperialists of the West were playing a dangerous game during\nthe decade between 1904 and 1914. As Arminius Vambery remarked after\nthe Italian raid on Tripoli: \"The more the power and authority of the\nWest gains ground in the Old World, the stronger becomes the bond of\nunity and mutual interest between the separate factions of Asiatics,\nand the deeper burns the fanatical hatred of Europe. Is it wise or\nexpedient by useless provocation and unnecessary attacks to increase\nthe feeling of animosity, to hurry on the struggle between the two\nworlds, and to nip in the bud the work of modern culture which is now\ngoing on in Asia?\"[109]\n\nThe Great War of course immensely aggravated an already critical\nsituation. The Orient suddenly saw the European peoples, who, in racial\nmatters, had hitherto maintained something like solidarity, locked in an\ninternecine death-grapple of unparalleled ferocity; it saw those same\npeoples put one another furiously to the ban as irreconcilable foes; it\nsaw white race-unity cleft by moral and political gulfs which white men\nthemselves continuously iterated would never be filled. The one\nredeeming feature of the struggle, in Oriental eyes, was the liberal\nprogramme which the Allied statesmen inscribed upon their banners. But\nwhen the war was over and the Allies had won, it promptly leaked out\nthat at the very time when the Allied leaders were making their liberal\nspeeches they had been negotiating a series of secret treaties\npartitioning the Near East between them in a spirit of the most cynical\nimperialism; and in the peace conferences that closed the war it was\nthese secret treaties, not the liberal speeches, which determined the\nOriental settlement, resulting (on paper at least) in the total\nsubjugation of the Near and Middle East to European political control.\n\nThe wave of wrath which thereupon rolled over the East was not confined\nto furious remonstrance like the protests of pre-war days. There was a\nnote of immediate resistance and rebellion not audible before. This\nrebellious temper has translated itself into warlike action which has\nalready forced the European Powers to abate some of their extreme\npretensions and which will undoubtedly make them abate others in the\nnear future. The details of this post-war unrest will be discussed in\nlater chapters. Suffice it to say here that the Great War has shattered\nEuropean prestige in the East and has opened the eyes of Orientals to\nthe weaknesses of the West. To the Orient the war was a gigantic course\nof education. For one thing, millions of Orientals and negroes were\ntaken from the remotest jungles of Asia and Africa to serve as soldiers\nand labourers in the White Man's War. Though the bulk of these\nauxiliaries were used in colonial operations, more than a million of\nthem were brought to Europe itself. Here they killed white men, raped\nwhite women, tasted white luxuries, learned white weaknesses--and went\nhome to tell their people the whole story.[110] Asia and Africa to-day\nknow Europe as they never knew it before, and we may be sure that they\nwill make use of their knowledge. The most serious factor in the\nsituation is that the Orient realizes that the famous Versailles \"Peace\"\nwhich purports to have pacified Europe is no peace, but rather an\nunconstructive, unstatesmanlike futility that left old sores unhealed\nand even dealt fresh wounds. Europe to-day lies debilitated and uncured,\nwhile Asia and Africa see in this a standing incitement to rash dreams\nand violent action.\n\nSuch is the situation to-day: an East, torn by the conflict between new\nand old, facing a West riven with dissension and sick from its mad\nfollies. Probably never before have the relations between the two\nworlds contained so many incalculable, even cataclysmic, possibilities.\nThe point to be here noted is that this strange new East which now faces\nus is mainly the result of Western influences permeating it in\nunprecedented fashion for the past hundred years. To the chief elements\nin that permeation let us now turn.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[72] For the larger aspects, see my book _The Rising Tide of Colour\nagainst White World-Supremacy_ (New York and London, 1920).\n\n[73] On these points, see Arminius Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern\nLands_ (London, 1906); also his _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant\nQuarante Ans_ (Paris, 1898); C. S. Cooper, _The Modernizing of the\nOrient_ (New York, 1914); S. Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_\n(London, 1912); A. J. Brown, \"Economic Changes in Asia,\" _The Century_,\nMarch, 1904.\n\n[74] For the effect of the West intellectually and spiritually, see\nVambery, _op. cit._; Sir Valentine Chirol, _Indian Unrest_ (London,\n1910); J. N. Farquhar, _Modern Religious Movements in India_ (New York,\n1915); Rev. J. Morrison, _New Ideas in India: A Study of Social,\nPolitical, and Religious Developments_ (Edinburgh, 1906); the Earl of\nCromer, _Modern Egypt_, especially Vol. II., pp. 228-243 (London, 1908).\n\n[75] For the Westernised elites, see L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage Orientale_\n(Paris, 1910); Cromer, _op. cit._; A. Metin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui:\nEtude Sociale_ (Paris, 1918); A. Le Chatelier, \"Politique musulmane,\"\n_Revue du Monde musulman_, September, 1910.\n\n[76] Chirol, _op. cit._, pp 321-322.\n\n[77] Bertrand, _op. cit._, p 39. See also Bukhsh, _op. cit._; Farquhar,\n_op. cit._; Morrison, _op. cit._; R. Mukerjee, _The Foundations of\nIndian Economics_ (London, 1916); D. H. Dodwell, \"Economic Transition in\nIndia,\" _Economic Journal_, December, 1910.\n\n[78] W. S. Lilly, _India and Its Problems_, p. 243 (London, 1902).\n\n[79] Cromer, _op. cit._, Vol. II., p. 231.\n\n[80] _Ibid._, p. 228.\n\n[81] J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_, pp. 171-172\n(London, 1920). On the evils of Westernization, see further: Bukhsh,\nCromer, Dodwell, Mukerjee, already cited; Sir W. M. Ramsay, \"The Turkish\nPeasantry of Anatolia,\" _Quarterly Review_, January, 1918; H. M.\nHyndman, _The Awakening of Asia_ (New York, 1919); T. Rothstein,\n_Egypt's Ruin_ (London, 1910); Captain P. Azan, _Recherche d'une\nSolution de la Question indigene en Algerie_ (Paris, 1903).\n\n[82] E. J. Dillon, \"Persia,\" _Contemporary Review_, June, 1910.\n\n[83] Ramsay Muir, \"Europe and the Non-European World,\" _The New Europe_,\nJune 28, 1917.\n\n[84] The Earl of Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, p. 5 (London,\n1913).\n\n[85] For a full discussion of these changes in Western ideas, see my\n_Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy_, especially chaps.\nvi. and vii.\n\n[86] Sidney Low, \"The Most Christian Powers,\" _Fortnightly Review_,\nMarch, 1912.\n\n[87] On this point see also A. Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern\nLands_ (London, 1906); W. S. Blunt, _The Future of Islam_ (London,\n1882); also the two articles by Leon Cahun on intellectual and social\ndevelopments in the Islamic world during the nineteenth century in\nLavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire Generale_, Vol. XI., chap. xv.; Vol. XII.,\nchap. xiv.\n\n[88] See A. Vambery, _Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert_, chap. vi.\n(Leipzig, 1875).\n\n[89] \"X,\" \"La Situation politique de la Perse,\" _Revue du Monde\nmusulman_, June, 1914. As already stated, the editor vouches for this\nanonymous writer as a distinguished Mohammedan official--\"un homme\nd'etat musulman.\"\n\n[90] Ahmed Emin, _The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its\nPress_, p. 108 (Columbia University Ph.D. Thesis, New York, 1914).\n\n[91] The Constantinople _Tanine_. Quoted from _The Literary Digest_,\nOctober 24, 1914, p. 784. This attitude toward the Great War and the\nEuropean Powers was not confined to Mohammedan peoples; it was common to\nnon-white peoples everywhere. For a survey of this feeling throughout\nthe world, see my _Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy_,\npp. 13-16.\n\n[92] Both the above instances are taken from C. S. Cooper, _The\nModernizing of the Orient_, pp. 339-340 (New York, 1914).\n\n[93] An \"Unbeliever\"--in other words, a Christian.\n\n[94] Quoted by A. Woeikof, _Le Turkestan russe_ (Paris, 1914).\n\n[95] B. L. Putnam Weale, _The Conflict of Colour_, p. 193 (London,\n1910).\n\n[96] Quoted from H. H. Powers, _The Great Peace_, p. 82 (New York,\n1918).\n\n[97] L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage oriental_, pp. 441-442 (Paris, 1910).\n\n[98] On this point see the very interesting essay by Meredith Townsend\nentitled \"The Charm of Asia for Asiatics,\" in his book _Asia and\nEurope_, pp. 120-128.\n\n[99] Townsend, _op. cit._, p. 104.\n\n[100] H. Spender, \"England, Egypt, and Turkey,\" _Contemporary Review_,\nOctober, 1906.\n\n[101] Bertrand, pp. 209, 210.\n\n[102] For discussion of this Hindu attitude see W. Archer, _India and\nthe Future_ (London, 1918); Young and Ferrers, _India in Conflict_\n(London, 1920). Also see Hindu writings of this nature: H. Maitra,\n_Hinduism: The World-Ideal_ (London, 1916); A. Coomaraswamy, _The Dance\nof Siva_ (New York, 1918); M. N. Chatterjee, \"The World and the Next\nWar,\" _Journal of Race Development_, April, 1916.\n\n[103] Archer, pp. 11, 12.\n\n[104] Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, p. 25.\n\n[105] Townsend, _Asia and Europe_, p. 128.\n\n[106] I have dealt with it at length in my _Rising Tide of Colour\nagainst White World-Supremacy_.\n\n[107] Townsend, p. 97.\n\n[108] Rev. C. F. Andrews, _The Renaissance in India_, p. 4 (London,\n1911). For other similar accounts of the effect of the Russo-Japanese\nWar upon Oriental peoples generally, see A. M. Low, \"Egyptian Unrest,\"\n_The Forum_, October, 1906; F. Farjanel, \"Le Japon et l'Islam,\" _Revue\ndu Monde musulman_, November, 1906; \"Oriental Ideals as Affected by the\nRusso-Japanese War,\" _American Review of Reviews_, February, 1905; A.\nVambery, \"Japan and the Mahometan World,\" _Nineteenth Century and\nAfter_, April, 1905; Yahya Siddyk, _op. cit._, p. 42.\n\n[109] A. Vambery, \"An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists,\"\n_Nineteenth Century and After_, April, 1912.\n\n[110] For the effect of the war on Asia and Africa, see A. Demangeon,\n_Le Declin de l'Europe_ (Paris, 1920); H. M. Hyndman, _The Awakening of\nAsia_ (New York, 1919); E. D. Morel, _The Black Man's Burden_ (New York,\n1920); F. B. Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_ (New York, 1919); also,\nmy _Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy_.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nPOLITICAL CHANGE\n\n\nThe Orient's chief handicap has been its vicious political tradition.\nFrom earliest times the typical form of government in the East has been\ndespotism--the arbitrary rule of an absolute monarch, whose subjects are\nslaves, holding their goods, their honours, their very lives, at his\nwill and pleasure. The sole consistent check upon Oriental despotism has\nbeen religion. Some critics may add \"custom\"; but it amounts to the same\nthing, for in the East custom always acquires a religious sanction. The\nmantle of religion of course covers its ministers, the priests forming a\nprivileged caste. But, with these exceptions, Oriental despotism has\nusually known no bounds; and the despot, so long as he respected\nreligion and the priesthood, has been able to act pretty much as he\nchose. In the very dawn of history we see Pharaoh exhausting all Egypt\nto gratify his whim for a colossal pyramid tomb, and throughout history\nOriental life has been cursed by this fatal political simplicity.\n\nNow manifold human experience has conclusively proved that despotism is\na bad form of government in the long run. Of course there is the\nlegendary \"benevolent despot\"--the \"father of his people,\" surrounded by\nwise counsellors and abolishing evils by a nod or a stroke of the pen.\nThat is all very well in a fairy-tale. But in real life the \"benevolent\ndespot\" rarely happens and still more rarely succeeds himself. The\n\"father of his people\" usually has a pompous son and a vicious grandson,\nwho bring the people to ruin. The melancholy trinity--David, Solomon,\nRehoboam--has reappeared with depressing regularity throughout history.\n\nFurthermore, even the benevolent despot has his limitations. The trouble\nwith all despots, good or bad, is that their rule is entirely\n_personal_. Everything, in the last analysis, depends on the despot's\npersonal will. Nothing is fixed or certain. The benevolent despot\nhimself may discard his benevolence overnight, and the fate of an empire\nmay be jeopardized by the monarch's infatuation for a woman or by an\nupset in his digestion.\n\nWe Occidentals have, in fact, never known \"despotism,\" in its Simon\nPure, Oriental sense; not even under the Roman Empire. Indeed, we can\nhardly conceive what it means. When we speak of a benevolent despot we\nusually think of the \"enlightened autocrats\" of eighteenth-century\nEurope, such as Frederick the Great. But these monarchs were not\n\"despots\" as Orientals understand it. Take Frederick, for example. He\nwas regarded as absolute. But his subjects were not slaves. Those proud\nPrussian officers, starched bureaucrats, stiff-necked burghers, and\nstubborn peasants each had his sense of personal dignity and legal\nstatus. The unquestioning obedience which they gave Frederick was given\nnot merely because he was their king, but also because they knew that he\nwas the hardest-working man in Prussia and tireless in his devotion to\nthe state. If Frederick had suddenly changed into a lazy, depraved,\ncapricious tyrant, his \"obedient\" Prussians would have soon showed him\nthat there were limits to his power.\n\nIn the Orient it is quite otherwise. In the East \"there lies upon the\neyes and foreheads of all men a law which is not found in the European\ndecalogue; and this law runs: 'Thou shalt honour and worship the man\nwhom God shall set above thee for thy King: if he cherish thee, thou\nshalt love him; and if he plunder and oppress thee thou shalt still love\nhim, for thou art his slave and his chattel.'\"[111] The Eastern monarch\nmay immure himself in his harem, casting the burdens of state upon the\nshoulders of a grand vizier. This vizier has thenceforth limitless\npower; the life of every subject is in his hands. Yet, any evening, at\nthe pout of a dancing-girl, the monarch may send from his harem to the\nvizier's palace a negro \"mute,\" armed with the bowstring. And when that\nblack mute arrives, the vizier, doffing his robe of office, and with\nneither question nor remonstrance, will bare his neck to be strangled.\nThat is real despotism--the despotism that the East has known.\n\nSuch is the political tradition of the Orient. And it is surely obvious\nthat under such a tradition neither ordered government nor consistent\nprogress is possible. Eastern history is, in fact, largely a record of\nsudden flowerings and equally sudden declines. A strong, able man cuts\nhis way to power in a period of confusion and decay. He must be strong\nand able, or he would not win over other men of similar nature\nstruggling for the coveted prize. His energy and ability soon work\nwonders. He knows the rough-and-ready way of getting things done. His\nvigour and resolution supply the driving-power required to compel his\nsubordinates to act with reasonable efficiency, especially since\nincompetence or dishonesty are punished with the terrible severity of\nthe Persian king who flayed an unjust satrap alive and made the skin\ninto the seat of the official chair on which the new satrap sat to\nadminister justice.\n\nWhile the master lives, things may go well. But the master dies, and is\nsucceeded by his son. This son, even assuming that he has inherited much\nof his father's ability, has had the worst possible upbringing. Raised\nin the harem, surrounded by obsequious slaves and designing women,\nneither his pride nor his passions have been effectively restrained, and\nhe grows up a pompous tyrant and probably precociously depraved. Such a\nman will not be apt to look after things as his father did. And as soon\nas the master's eye shifts, things begin to go to pieces. How can it be\notherwise? His father built up no governmental machine, functioning\nalmost automatically, as in the West. His officers worked from fear or\npersonal loyalty; not out of a patriotic sense of duty or impersonal\n_esprit de corps_. Under the grandson, matters get even worse, power\nslips from his incompetent hands and is parcelled out among many local\ndespots, of whom the strongest cuts his way to power, assuming that the\ndecadent state is not overrun by some foreign conqueror. In either\neventuality, the old cycle--David, Solomon, Rehoboam--is finished, and a\nnew cycle begins--with the same destined end.\n\nThat, in a nutshell, is the political history of the East. It has,\nhowever, been modified or temporarily interrupted by the impact of more\nliberal political influences, exerted sometimes from special Eastern\nregions and sometimes from the West. Not all the Orient has been given\nover to unrelieved despotism. Here and there have been peoples (mostly\nmountain or pastoral peoples) who abhorred despotism. Such a people have\nalways been the Arabs. We have already seen how the Arabs, fired by\nIslam, established a mighty caliphate which, in its early days, was a\ntheocratic democracy. Of course we have also seen how the older\ntradition of despotism reasserted itself over most of the Moslem world,\nhow the democratic caliphate turned into a despotic sultanate, and how\nthe liberty-loving Arabs retired sullenly to their deserts. Political\nliberalism, like religious liberalism, was crushed and almost forgotten.\nAlmost--not quite; for memories of the Meccan caliphate, like memories\nof Motazelism, remained in the back of men's minds, ready to come forth\nagain with better days. After all, free Arabia still stood, with every\nArab tribesman armed to the teeth to see that it kept free. And then,\nthere was Islam. No court theologian could entirely explain away the\nfact that Mohammed had said things like \"All Believers are brothers\" and\n\"All Moslems are free.\" No court chronicler could entirely expunge from\nMoslem annals the story of Islam's early days, known as the\nWakti-Seadet, or \"Age of Blessedness.\" Even in the darkest times\nMoslems of liberal tendencies must have been greatly interested to read\nthat the first caliph, Abu Bekr, after his election by the people, said:\n\"Oh nation! you have chosen me, the most unworthy among you, for your\ncaliph. Support me as long as my actions are just. If otherwise,\nadmonish me, rouse me to a sense of my duty. Truth alone is desirable,\nand lies are despicable.... As I am the guardian of the weak, obey me\nonly so long as I obey the Sheriat [Divine Law]. But if you see that I\ndeviate but in the minutest details from this law, you need obey me no\nmore.\"[112]\n\nIn fine, no subsequent distortions could entirely obliterate the fact\nthat primitive Islam was the supreme expression of a freedom-loving folk\nwhose religion must necessarily contain many liberal tendencies. Even\nthe sheriat, or canon law, is, as Professor Lybyer states,\n\"fundamentally democratic and opposed in essence to absolutism.\"[113]\nVambery well summarizes this matter when he writes: \"It is not Islam and\nits doctrines which have devastated the western portion of Asia and\nbrought about the present sad state of things; but it is the tyranny of\nthe Moslem princes, who have wilfully perverted the doctrines of the\nProphet, and sought and found maxims in the Koran as a basis for their\ndespotic rule. They have not allowed the faintest suspicion of doubt in\nmatters of religion, and, efficaciously distorting and crushing all\nliberal principles, they have prevented the dawn of a Moslem\nRenaissance.\"[114]\n\nIn the opening chapter we saw how Oriental despotism reached its evil\nmaximum in the eighteenth century, and how the Mohammedan Revival was\nnot merely a puritan reformation of religion, but was also in part a\npolitical protest against the vicious and contemptible tyrants who\nmisruled the Moslem world. This internal movement of political\nliberalism was soon cross-cut by another political current coming in\nfrom the West. Comparing the miserable decrepitude of the Moslem East\nwith Europe's prosperity and vigour, thinking Moslems were beginning to\nrecognize their shortcomings, and they could not avoid the conclusion\nthat their woes were in large part due to their wretched governments.\nIndeed, a few even of the Moslem princes came to realize that there must\nbe some adoption of Western political methods if their countries were to\nbe saved from destruction. The most notable examples of this new type of\nOriental sovereign were Sultan Mahmud II of Turkey and Mehemet Ali of\nEgypt, both of whom came to power about the beginning of the nineteenth\ncentury.\n\nOf course none of these reforming princes had the slightest idea of\ngranting their subjects constitutional liberties or of transforming\nthemselves into limited monarchs. They intended to remain absolute, but\nabsolute more in the sense of the \"enlightened autocrat\" of Europe and\nless in the sense of the purely Oriental despot. What they wanted were\ntrue organs of government--army, civil service, judiciary, etc.--which\nwould function efficiently and semi-automatically as governmental\nmachinery, and not as mere amorphous masses of individuals who had to be\ncontinuously prodded and punished by the sovereign in order to get\nanything done.\n\nMahmud II, Mehemet Ali, and their princely colleagues persisted in their\nnew policies, but the outcome of these \"reforms from above\" was, on the\nwhole, disappointing. The monarchs might build barracks and bureaux on\nEuropean models and fill them with soldiers and bureaucrats in European\nclothes, but they did not get European results. Most of these\n\"Western-type\" officials knew almost nothing about the West, and were\ntherefore incapable of doing things in Western fashion. In fact, they\nhad small heart for the business. Devoid of any sort of enthusiasm for\nideas and institutions which they did not comprehend, they applied\nthemselves to the work of reform with secret ill-will and repugnance,\nmoved only by blind obedience to their sovereign's command. As time\npassed, the military branches did gain some modern efficiency, but the\ncivil services made little progress, adopting many Western bureaucratic\nvices but few or none of the virtues.\n\nMeanwhile reformers of quite a different sort began to appear: men\ndemanding Western innovations like constitutions, parliaments, and other\nphenomena of modern political life. Their numbers were constantly\nrecruited from the widening circles of men acquainted with Western ideas\nthrough the books, pamphlets, and newspapers which were being\nincreasingly published, and through the education given by schools on\nthe Western model which were springing up. The third quarter of the\nnineteenth century saw the formation of genuine political parties in\nTurkey, and in 1876 the liberal groups actually wrung from a weak sultan\nthe grant of a parliament.\n\nThese early successes of Moslem political liberalism were, however,\nfollowed by a period of reaction. The Moslem princes had become\nincreasingly alarmed at the growth of liberal agitation among their\nsubjects and were determined to maintain their despotic authority. The\nnew Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid, promptly suppressed his parliament,\nsavagely persecuted the liberals, and restored the most uncompromising\ndespotism. In Persia the Shah repressed a nascent liberal movement with\nequal severity, while in Egypt the spendthrift rule of Khedive Ismail\nended all native political life by provoking European intervention and\nthe imposition of British rule. Down to the Young-Turk revolution of\n1908 there were few overt signs of liberal agitation in those Moslem\ncountries which still retained their independence. Nevertheless, the\nagitation was there, working underground. Hundreds of youthful patriots\nfled abroad, both to obtain an education and to conduct their liberal\npropaganda, and from havens of refuge like Switzerland these\n\"Young-Turks,\" \"Young-Persians,\" and others issued manifestoes and\npublished revolutionary literature which was smuggled into their\nhomelands and eagerly read by their oppressed brethren.[115]\n\nAs the years passed, the cry for liberty grew steadily in strength. A\nyoung Turkish poet wrote at this time: \"All that we admire in European\nculture as the fruit of science and art is simply the outcome of\nliberty. Everything derives its light from the bright star of liberty.\nWithout liberty a nation has no power, no prosperity; without liberty\nthere is no happiness; and without happiness, existence, true life,\neternal life, is impossible. Everlasting praise and glory to the shining\nlight of freedom!\"[116] By the close of the nineteenth century\nkeen-sighted European observers noted the working of the liberal ferment\nunder the surface calm of absolutist repression. Thus, Arminius Vambery,\nrevisiting Constantinople in 1896, was astounded by the liberal\nevolution that had taken place since his first sojourn in Turkey forty\nyears before. Although Constantinople was subjected to the severest\nphase of Hamidian despotism, Vambery wrote, \"The old attachment of\nTurkey for the absolute regime is done for. We hear much in Europe of\nthe 'Young-Turk' Party; we hear even of a constitutional movement,\npolitical emigres, revolutionary pamphlets. But what we do not realize\nis the ferment which exists in the different social classes, and which\ngives us the conviction that the Turk is in progress and is no longer\nclay in the hands of his despotic potter. In Turkey, therefore, it is\nnot a question of a Young-Turk Party, because every civilized Ottoman\nbelongs to this party.\"[117]\n\nIn this connection we should note the stirrings of unrest that were now\nrapidly developing in the Eastern lands subject to European political\ncontrol. By the close of the nineteenth century only four considerable\nMoslem states--Turkey, Persia, Morocco, and Afghanistan--retained\nanything like independence from European domination. Since Afghanistan\nand Morocco were so backward that they could hardly be reckoned as\ncivilized countries, it was only in Turkey and Persia that genuine\nliberal movements against native despotism could arise. But in\nEuropean-ruled countries like India, Egypt, and Algeria, the cultural\nlevel of the inhabitants was high enough to engender liberal political\naspirations as well as that mere dislike of foreign rule which may be\nfelt by savages as well as by civilized peoples.\n\nThese liberal aspirations were of course stimulated by the movements\nagainst native despotism in Turkey and Persia. Nevertheless, the two\nsets of phenomena must be sharply distinguished from each other. The\nTurkish and Persian agitations were essentially movements of liberal\nreform. The Indian, Egyptian, Algerian, and kindred agitations were\nessentially movements for independence, with no settled programme as to\nhow that independence should be used after it had been attained. These\nlatter movements are, in fact, \"nationalist\" rather than liberal in\ncharacter, and it is in the chapters devoted to nationalism that they\nwill be discussed. The point to be noted here is that they are really\ncoalitions, against the foreign ruler, of men holding very diverse\npolitical ideas, embracing as these \"nationalist\" coalitions do not\nmerely genuine liberals but also self-seeking demagogues and even stark\nreactionaries who would like to fasten upon their liberated countries\nthe yoke of the blackest despotism. Of course all the nationalist groups\nuse the familiar slogans \"freedom\" and \"liberty\"; nevertheless, what\nmany of them mean is merely freedom and liberty _from foreign\ntutelage_--in other words, independence. We must always remember that\npatriotism has no essential connection with liberalism. The Spanish\npeasants, who shouted \"liberty\" as they rose against Napoleon's armies,\ngreeted their contemptible tyrant-king with delirious enthusiasm and\nwelcomed his glorification of absolutism with cries of \"Long live\nchains!\"\n\nThe period of despotic reaction which had afflicted Turkey and Persia\nsince the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century came\ndramatically to an end in the year 1908. Both countries exploded into\nrevolution, the Turks deposing the tyrant Abdul Hamid, the Persians\nrising against their infamous ruler Muhammad Ali Shah, \"perhaps the most\nperverted, cowardly, and vice-sodden monster that had disgraced the\nthrone of Persia in many generations.\"[118] These revolutions released\nthe pent-up liberal forces which had been slowly gathering strength\nunder the repression of the previous generation, and the upshot was that\nTurkey and Persia alike blossomed out with constitutions, parliaments,\nand all the other political machinery of the West.\n\nHow the new regimes would have worked in normal times it is profitless\nto speculate, because, as a matter of fact, the times were abnormal to\nthe highest degree. Unfortunately for the Turks and Persians, they had\nmade their revolutions just when the world was entering that profound\n_malaise_ which culminated in the Great War. Neither Turkey nor Persia\nwere allowed time to attempt the difficult process of political\ntransformation. Lynx-eyed Western chancelleries noted every blunder and,\nin the inevitable weakness of transition, pounced upon them to their\nundoing. The Great War merely completed a process of Western aggression\nand intervention which had begun some years before.\n\nThis virtual absence of specific fact-data renders largely academic any\ndiscussion of the much-debated question whether or not the peoples of\nthe Near and Middle East are capable of \"self-government\"; that is, of\nestablishing and maintaining ordered, constitutional political life.\nOpinions on this point are at absolute variance. Personally, I have not\nbeen able to make up my mind on the matter, so I shall content myself\nwith stating the various arguments without attempting to draw any\ngeneral conclusion. Before stating these contrasted view-points,\nhowever, I would draw attention to the distinction which should be made\nbetween the Mohammedan peoples and the non-Mohammedan Hindus of India.\nMoslems everywhere possess the democratic political example of Arabia as\nwell as a religion which, as regards its own followers at least,\ncontains many liberal tendencies. The Hindus have nothing like this.\nTheir political tradition has been practically that of unrelieved\nOriental despotism, the only exceptions being a few primitive\nself-governing communities in very early times, which never exerted any\nwidespread influence and quickly faded away. As for Brahminism, the\nHindu religion, it is perhaps the most illiberal cult which ever\nafflicted mankind, dividing society as it does into an infinity of rigid\ncastes between which no real intercourse is possible; each caste\nregarding all those of lesser rank as unclean, polluting creatures,\nscarcely to be distinguished from animals. It is obvious that with such\nhandicaps the establishment of true self-government will be apt to be\nmore difficult for Hindus than for Mohammedans, and the reader should\nkeep this point in mind in the discussion which follows.\n\nConsidering first the attitude of those who do not believe the peoples\nof the Near and Middle East capable of real self-government in the\nWestern sense either now or in the immediate future, we find this\nthesis both ably and emphatically stated by Lord Cromer. Lord Cromer\nbelieved that the ancient tradition of despotism was far too strong to\nbe overcome, at least in our time. \"From the dawn of history,\" he\nasserts, \"Eastern politics have been stricken with a fatal simplicity.\nDo not let us for one moment imagine that the fatally simple idea of\ndespotic rule will readily give way to the far more complex conception\nof ordered liberty. The transformation, if it ever takes place at all,\nwill probably be the work, not of generations, but of centuries.... Our\nprimary duty, therefore, is, not to introduce a system which, under the\nspecious cloak of free institutions, will enable a small minority of\nnatives to misgovern their countrymen, but to establish one which will\nenable the mass of the population to be governed according to the code\nof Christian morality. A freely elected Egyptian parliament, supposing\nsuch a thing to be possible, would not improbably legislate for the\nprotection of the slave-owner, if not the slave-dealer, and no assurance\ncan be felt that the electors of Rajputana, if they had their own way,\nwould not re-establish suttee. Good government has the merit of\npresenting a more or less attainable ideal. Before Orientals can attain\nanything approaching to the British ideal of self-government, they will\nhave to undergo very numerous transmigrations of political thought.\" And\nLord Cromer concludes pessimistically: \"It will probably never be\npossible to make a Western silk purse out of an Eastern sow's ear.\"[119]\n\nIn similar vein, the veteran English publicist Doctor Dillon, writing\nafter the Turkish and Persian revolutions, had little hope in their\nsuccess, and ridiculed the current \"faith in the sacramental virtue of\nconstitutional government.\" For, he continues: \"No parchment yet\nmanufactured, and no constitution drafted by the sons of men, can do\naway with the foundations of national character. Flashy phrases and\nelegant declamations may persuade people that they have been transmuted;\nbut they alter no facts, and in Persia's case the facts point to utter\nincapacity for self-government.\" Referring to the Persian revolution,\nDoctor Dillon continues: \"At bottom, only names of persons and things\nhave been altered; men may come and men may go, but anarchy goes on for\never.... Financial support of the new government is impossible. For\nforeign capitalists will not give money to be squandered by filibusters\nand irresponsible agitators who, like bubbles in boiling water, appear\non the surface and disappear at once.\"[120]\n\nA high French colonial official thus characterizes the Algerians and\nother Moslem populations of French North Africa: \"Our natives need to be\ngoverned. They are big children, incapable of going alone. We should\nguide them firmly, stand no nonsense from them, and crush intriguers and\nagents of sedition. At the same time, we should protect them, direct\nthem paternally, and especially obtain influence over them by the\nconstant example of our moral superiority. Above all: no vain\nhumanitarian illusions, both in the interest of France and of the\nnatives themselves.\"[121]\n\nMany observers, particularly colonial officials, have been disappointed\nwith the way Orientals have used experimental first steps in\nself-government like Advisory Councils granted by the European rulers;\nhave used them, that is, to play politics and grasp for more power,\ninstead of devoting themselves to the duties assigned. As Lord Kitchener\nsaid in his 1913 report on the state of Egypt: \"Representative bodies\ncan only be safely developed when it is shown that they are capable of\nperforming adequately their present functions, and that there is good\nhope that they could undertake still more important and arduous\nresponsibilities. If representative government, in its simplest form,\nis found to be unworkable, there is little prospect of its becoming more\nuseful when its scope is extended. No government would be insane enough\nto consider that, because an Advisory Council had proved itself unable\nto carry out its functions in a reasonable and satisfactory manner, it\nshould therefore be given a larger measure of power and control.\"[122]\n\nThese nationalist agitations arise primarily among the native upper\nclasses and Western-educated elites, however successful they may be in\ninflaming the ignorant masses, who are often quite contented with the\nmaterial benefits of enlightened European rule. This point is well\nbrought out by a leading American missionary in India, with a lifetime\nof experience in that country, who wrote some years ago: \"The common\npeople of India are, now, on the whole, more contented with their\ngovernment than they ever were before. It is the classes, rather, who\nreveal the real spirit of discontent.... If the common people were let\nalone by the agitators, there would not be a more loyal people on earth\nthan the people of India. But the educated classes are certainly\npossessed of a new ambition, politically, and will no longer remain\nsatisfied with inferior places of responsibility and lower posts of\nemolument.... These people have little or no sympathy with the kind of\ngovernment which is gradually being extended to them. Ultimately they do\nnot ask for representative institutions, which will give them a share in\nthe government of their own land. What they really seek is absolute\ncontrol. The Brahmin (only five per cent. of the community) believes that\nhe has been divinely appointed to rule the country and would withhold\nthe franchise from all others. The Sudra--the Bourgeois of India--would\nno more think of giving the ballot to the fifty million Pariahs of the\nland than he would give it to his dog. It is the British power that has\nintroduced, and now maintains, the equality of rights and privileges\nfor all the people of the land.\"[123]\n\nThe apprehension that India, if liberated from British control, might be\nexploited by a tyrannical Brahmin oligarchy is shared not only by\nWestern observers but also by multitudes of low-caste Hindus, known\ncollectively as the \"Depressed Classes\". These people oppose the Indian\nnationalist agitation for fear of losing their present protection under\nthe British \"Raj.\" They believe that India still needs generations of\neducation and social reform before it is fit for \"home rule,\" much less\nindependence, and they have organized into a powerful association the\n\"Namasudra,\" which is loyalist and anti-nationalist in character.\n\nThe Namasudra view-point is well expressed by its leader, Doctor Nair.\n\"Democracy as a catchword,\" he says, \"has already reached India and is\nwidely used. But the spirit of democracy still pauses east of Suez, and\nwill find it hard to secure a footing in a country where caste is\nstrongly intrenched.... I do not want to lay the charge of oppressing\nthe lower castes at the door of any particular caste. All the higher\ncastes take a hand in the game. The Brahmin oppresses all the\nnon-Brahmin castes. The high-caste non-Brahmin oppresses all the castes\nbelow him.... We want a real democracy and not an oligarchy, however\ncamouflaged by many high-sounding words. Moreover, if an oligarchy is\nestablished now, it will be a perpetual oligarchy. We further say that\nwe should prefer a delayed democracy to an immediate oligarchy, having\nmore trust in a sympathetic British bureaucracy than in an unsympathetic\noligarchy of the so-called high castes who have been oppressing us in\nthe past and will do so again but for the British Government. Our\nattitude is based, not on 'faith' alone, but on the instinct of\nself-preservation.\"[124]\n\nMany Mohammedans as well as Hindus feel that India is not ripe for\nself-government, and that the relaxing of British authority now, or in\nthe immediate future, would be a grave disaster for India itself. The\nMoslem loyalists reprobate the nationalist agitation for the reasons\nexpressed by one of their representative men, S. Khuda Bukhsh, who\nremarks: \"Rightly or wrongly, I have always kept aloof from modern\nIndian politics, and I have always held that we should devote more\nattention to social problems and intellectual advancement and less to\npolitics, which, in our present condition, is an unmixed evil. I am\nfirmly persuaded that we would consult our interest better by leaving\npolitics severely alone.... It is not a handful of men armed with the\nlearning and culture of the West, but it is the masses that must feel,\nunderstand, and take an intelligent interest in their own affairs. The\ninfinitesimal educated minority do not constitute the population of\nIndia. It is the masses, therefore, that must be trained, educated,\nbrought to the level of unassailable uprightness and devotion to their\ncountry. This goal is yet far beyond measurable reach, but until we\nattain it our hopes will be a chimera, and our efforts futile and\nillusory. Even the educated minority have scarcely cast off the\nswaddling-clothes of political infancy, or have risen above the\nillusions of power and the ambitions of fortune. We have yet to learn\nausterity of principle and rectitude of conduct. Nor can we hope to\nraise the standard of private and public morality so long as we continue\nto subordinate the interest of our community and country to our\nown.\"[125]\n\nSuch pronouncements as these from considerable portions of the native\npopulation give pause even to those liberal English students of Indian\naffairs who are convinced of the theoretical desirability of Indian home\nrule. As one of these, Edwyn Bevan, says: \"When Indian Nationalists ask\nfor freedom, they mean autonomy; they want to get rid of the foreigner.\nOur answer as given in the reforms is:[126] 'Yes, autonomy you shall\nhave, but on one condition--that you have democracy as well. We will\ngive up the control as soon as there is an Indian people which can\ncontrol its native rulers; we will not give up the control to an Indian\noligarchy.' This is the root of the disagreement between those who say\nthat India might have self-government immediately and those who say that\nIndia can only become capable of self-government with time. For the\nformer, by 'self-government', mean autonomy, and it is perfectly true\nthat India might be made autonomous immediately. If the foreign control\nwere withdrawn to-day, some sort of indigenous government or group of\ngovernments would, no doubt, after a period of confusion, come into\nbeing in India. But it would not be democratic government; it would be\nthe despotic rule of the stronger or more cunning.\"[127]\n\nThe citations just quoted portray the standpoint of those critics, both\nWestern and Oriental, who maintain that the peoples of the Near and\nMiddle East are incapable of self-government in our sense, at least\nto-day or in the immediate future. Let us now examine the views of those\nwho hold a more optimistic attitude. Some observers stress strongly\nIslam's liberal tendencies as a foundation on which to erect political\nstructures in the modern sense. Vambery says, \"Islam is still the most\ndemocratic religion in the world, a religion favouring both liberty and\nequality. If there ever was a constitutional government, it was that of\nthe first Caliphs.\"[128] A close English student of the Near East\ndeclares: \"Tribal Arabia has the only true form of democratic government,\nand the Arab tribesman goes armed to make sure that it continues\ndemocratic--as many a would-be despot knows to his cost.\"[129]\nRegarding the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Professor Lybyer remarks:\n\"Turkey was not so unprepared for parliamentary institutions as might at\nfirst sight appear. There lay hidden some precedent, much preparation,\nand a strong desire, for parliamentary government. Both the religious\nand the secular institutions of Turkey involve precedents for a\nparliament. Mohammed himself conferred with the wisest of his\ncompanions. The Ulema[130] have taken counsel together up to the present\ntime. The Sacred Law (Sheriat) is fundamentally democratic and opposed\nin essence to absolutism. The habit of regarding it as fundamental law\nenables even the most ignorant of Mohammedans to grasp the idea of a\nConstitution.\" He points out that the early sultans had their \"Divan,\"\nor assemblage of high officials, meeting regularly to give the sultan\ninformation and advice, while more recently there have been a Council of\nState and a Council of Ministers. Also, there were the parliaments of\n1877 and 1878. Abortive though these were and followed by Hamidian\nabsolutism, they were legal precedents, never forgotten. From all this\nProfessor Lybyer concludes: \"The Turkish Parliament may therefore be\nregarded, not as a complete innovation, but as an enlargement and\nimprovement of familiar institutions.\"[131]\n\nRegarding Persia, the American W. Morgan Shuster, whom the Persian\nRevolutionary Government called in to organize the country's finances,\nand who was ousted in less than a year by Russo-British pressure,\nexpresses an optimistic regard for the political capacities of the\nPersian people.\n\n\"I believe,\" he says, \"that there has never been in the history of the\nworld an instance where a people changed suddenly from an absolute\nmonarchy to a constitutional or representative form of government and at\nonce succeeded in displaying a high standard of political wisdom and\nknowledge of legislative procedure. Such a thing is inconceivable and\nnot to be expected by any reasonable person. The members of the first\nMedjlis[132] were compelled to fight for their very existence from the\nday that the Parliament was constituted.... They had no time for serious\nlegislative work, and but little hope that any measures which they might\nenact would be put into effect.\n\n\"The second and last Medjlis, practically all of whose members I knew\npersonally, was doubtless incompetent if it were to be judged by the\nstandards of the British Parliament or the American Congress. It would\nbe strange indeed if an absolutely new and untried government in a land\nfilled with the decay of ages should, from the outset, be able to\nconduct its business as well as governments with generations and even\ncenturies of experience behind them. We should make allowances for lack\nof technical knowledge; for the important question, of course, is that\nthe Medjlis in the main represented the new and just ideals and\naspirations of the Persian people. Its members were men of more than\naverage education; some displayed remarkable talent, character, and\ncourage.... They responded enthusiastically to any patriotic suggestion\nwhich was put before them. They themselves lacked any great knowledge of\ngovernmental finances, but they realized the situation and were both\nwilling and anxious to put their full confidence in any foreign advisers\nwho showed themselves capable of resisting political intrigues and\nbribery and working for the welfare of the Persian people.\n\n\"No Parliament can rightly be termed incompetent when it has the support\nof an entire people, when it recognizes its own limitations, and when\nits members are willing to undergo great sacrifices for their nation's\ndignity and sovereign rights....\n\n\"As to the Persian people themselves, it is difficult to generalize. The\ngreat mass of the population is composed of peasants and tribesmen, all\ndensely ignorant. On the other hand, many thousands have been educated\nabroad, or have travelled after completing their education at home.\nThey, or at least certain elements among them which had had the support\nof the masses, proved their capacity to assimilate Western civilization\nand ideals. They changed despotism into democracy in the face of untold\nobstacles. Opportunities were equalized to such a degree that any man of\nability could occupy the highest official posts. As a race they showed\nduring the past five years an unparalleled eagerness for education.\nHundreds of schools were established during the Constitutional regime. A\nremarkable free press sprang up overnight, and fearless writers came\nforward to denounce injustice and tyranny whether from within their\ncountry or without. The Persians were anxious to adopt wholesale the\npolitical, ethical, and business codes of the most modern and\nprogressive nations. They burned with that same spirit of Asiatic unrest\nwhich pervades India, which produced the 'Young-Turk' movement, and\nwhich has more recently manifested itself in the establishment of the\nChinese Republic.\"[133]\n\nMr. Shuster concludes: \"Kipling has intimated that you cannot hustle the\nEast. This includes a warning and a reflection. Western men and Western\nideals _can_ hustle the East, provided the Orientals realize that they\nare being carried along lines reasonably beneficial to themselves. As a\nmatter of fact, the moral appeal and the appeal of race-pride and\npatriotism, are as strong in the East as in the West, though it does not\nlie so near the surface, and naturally the Oriental displays no great\ndesire to be hustled when it is along lines beneficial only to the\nWesterner.\"[134]\n\nIndeed, many Western liberals believe that European rule, however\nbenevolent and efficient, will never prepare the Eastern peoples for\ntrue self-government; and that the only way they will learn is by trying\nit out themselves. This view-point is admirably stated by the well-known\nBritish publicist Lionel Curtis. Speaking of India, Mr. Curtis says that\neducation and kindred benefits conferred by British rule will not, of\nthemselves, \"avail to prepare Indians for the task of responsible\ngovernment. On the contrary, education will prove a danger and positive\nmischief, unless accompanied by a definite instalment of political\nresponsibility. It is in the workshops of actual experience alone that\nelectorates will acquire the art of self-government, however highly\neducated they may be.\n\n\"There must, I urge, be a devolution of definite powers on electorates.\nThe officers of Government[135] must give every possible help and advice\nto the new authorities, for which those authorities may ask. They must\nact as their foster-mothers, not as stepmothers. But if the new\nauthorities are to learn the art of responsible government, they must be\nfree from control from above. Not otherwise will they learn to feel\nthemselves responsible to the electorate below. Nor will the electorates\nthemselves learn that the remedy for their sufferings rests in their own\nhands. Suffering there will be, and it is only by suffering,\nself-inflicted and perhaps long endured, that a people will learn the\nfaculty of self-help, and genuine electorates be brought into being....\n\n\"I am proud to think that England has conferred immeasurable good on\nIndia by creating order and showing Indians what orderly government\nmeans. But, this having been done, I do not believe the system can now\nbe continued as it is, without positive damage to the character of the\npeople. The burden of trusteeship must be transferred, piece by piece,\nfrom the shoulders of Englishmen to those of Indians in some sort able\nto bear it. Their strength and numbers must be developed. But that can\nbe done by the exercise of actual responsibility steadily increased as\nthey can bear it. It cannot be done by any system of school-teaching,\nthough such teaching is an essential concomitant of the process.\n\n\"The goal now set by the recent announcement of the Secretary of\nState[136] will only be reached through trouble. Yet troublous as the\ntimes before us may be, we have at last reached that stage of our work\nin India which is truly consonant with our own traditions. The task is\none worthy of this epoch in our history, if only because it calls for\nthe effacement of ourselves.\"[137]\n\nMr. Curtis's concluding words foreshadow a process which is to-day\nactually going on, not only in India but in other parts of the East as\nwell. The Great War has so strengthened Eastern nationalist aspirations\nand has so weakened European power and prestige that a widespread\nrelaxing of Europe's hold over the Orient is taking place. This process\nmay make for good or for ill, but it is apparently inevitable; and a\ngeneration (perhaps a decade) hence may see most of the Near and Middle\nEast autonomous or even independent. Whether the liberated peoples will\nmisuse their opportunities and fall into despotism or anarchy, or\nwhether they succeed in establishing orderly, progressive,\nconstitutional governments, remains to be seen. We have examined the\nfactors, pro and con. Let us leave the problem in the only way in which\nto-day it can scientifically be left--on a note of interrogation.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[111] T. Morison, _Imperial Rule in India_, p. 43 (London, 1899).\n\n[112] Quoted from Arminius Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_,\npp. 305-306 (London, 1906).\n\n[113] A. H. Lybyer, \"The Turkish Parliament,\" _Proceedings of the\nAmerican Political Science Association_, Vol. VII., p. 67 (1910).\n\n[114] Vambery, _op. cit._, p. 307.\n\n[115] A good account of these liberal movements during the nineteenth\ncentury is found in Vambery, \"Freiheitliche Bestrebungen im moslimischen\nAsien,\" _Deutsche Rundschau_, October, 1893; a shorter summary\nof Vambery's views is found in his _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_,\nespecially chap. v. Also, see articles by Leon Cahun, previously noted,\nin Lavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire Generale_, Vols. XI. and XII.\n\n[116] Vambery, _supra_, p. 332.\n\n[117] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. 22\n(Paris, 1898).\n\n[118] W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_, p. xxi (New York,\n1912).\n\n[119] Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, pp. 25-28.\n\n[120] E. J. Dillon, \"Persia not Ripe for Self-Government,\" _Contemporary\nReview_, April, 1910.\n\n[121] E. Mercier, _La Question indigene_, p. 220 (Paris, 1901).\n\n[122] \"Egypt,\" No. 1 (1914), p. 6.\n\n[123] Rev. J. P. Jones, \"The Present Situation in India,\" _Journal of\nRace Development_, July, 1910.\n\n[124] Dr. T. Madavan Nair, \"Caste and Democracy,\" _Edinburgh Review_,\nOctober, 1918.\n\n[125] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 213-214 (London, 1912).\n\n[126] _I. e._, the increase of self-government granted India by Britain\nas a result of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.\n\n[127] E. Bevan, \"The Reforms in India,\" _The New Europe_, January 29,\n1920.\n\n[128] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p.\n58.\n\n[129] G. W. Bury, _Pan-Islam_, pp. 202-203 (London, 1919).\n\n[130] The assembly of religious notables.\n\n[131] A. H. Lybyer, \"The Turkish Parliament,\" _Proceedings of the\nAmerican Political Science Association_, Vol. VII., pp. 66-67 (1910).\n\n[132] The name of the Persian Parliament.\n\n[133] Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_, pp. 240-246.\n\n[134] _Ibid._, p. 333.\n\n[135] _I. e._, the British Government of India.\n\n[136] _I. e._, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, previously noted.\n\n[137] Lionel Curtis, _Letters to the People of India on Responsible\nGovernment_, pp. 159-160 (London, 1918).\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nNATIONALISM\n\n\nThe spirit of nationality is one of the great dynamics of modern times.\nIn Europe, where it first attained self-conscious maturity, it radically\naltered the face of things during the nineteenth century, so that that\ncentury is often called the Age of Nationalities. But nationalism is not\nmerely a European phenomenon. It has spread to the remotest corners of\nthe earth, and is apparently still destined to effect momentous\ntransformations.\n\nGiven a phenomenon of so vital a character, the question at once arises:\nWhat is nationalism? Curiously enough, this question has been endlessly\ndebated. Many theories have been advanced, seeking variously to identify\nnationalism with language, culture, race, politics, geography,\neconomics, or religion. Now these, and even other, matters may be\nfactors predisposing or contributing to the formation of national\nconsciousness. But, in the last analysis, nationalism is something over\nand above all its constituent elements, which it works into a new and\nhigher synthesis. There is really nothing recondite or mysterious about\nnationalism, despite all the arguments that have raged concerning its\nexact meaning. As a matter of fact, nationalism is _a state of mind_.\nNationalism is a _belief_, held by a fairly large number of individuals,\nthat they constitute a \"Nationality\"; it is a sense of _belonging\ntogether_ as a \"Nation.\" This \"Nation,\" as visualized in the minds of\nits believers, is a people or community associated together and\norganized under one government, and dwelling together in a distinct\nterritory. When the nationalist ideal is realized, we have what is known\nas a body-politic or \"State.\" But we must not forget that this \"State\"\nis the material manifestation of an ideal, which may have pre-existed\nfor generations as a mere pious aspiration with no tangible attributes\nlike state sovereignty or physical frontiers. Conversely, we must\nremember that a state need not be a nation. Witness the defunct Hapsburg\nEmpire of Austria-Hungary, an assemblage of discordant nationalities\nwhich flew to pieces under the shock of war.\n\nThe late war was a liberal education regarding nationalistic phenomena,\nespecially as applied to Europe, and most of the fallacies regarding\nnationality were vividly disclosed. It is enough to cite Switzerland--a\ncountry whose very existence flagrantly violates \"tests\" like language,\nculture, religion, or geography, and where nevertheless a lively sense\nof nationality emerged triumphant from the ordeal of Armageddon.\n\nSo familiar are these matters to the general public that only one point\nneed here be stressed: the difference between nationality and race.\nUnfortunately the two terms have been used very loosely, if not\ninterchangeably, and are still much confused in current thinking. As a\nmatter of fact, they connote utterly different things. Nationality is a\npsychological concept or state of mind. Race is a physiological fact,\nwhich may be accurately determined by scientific tests such as\nskull-measurement, hair-formation, and colour of eyes and skin. In other\nwords, race is what people anthropologically _really_ are; nationality\nis what people politically _think_ they are.\n\nRight here we encounter a most curious paradox. There can be no question\nthat, as between race and nationality, race is the more fundamental,\nand, in the long run, the more important. A man's innate capacity is\nobviously dependent upon his heredity, and no matter how stimulating may\nbe his environment, the potential limits of his reaction to that\nenvironment are fixed at his birth. Nevertheless, the fact remains that\nmen pay scant attention to race, while nationalism stirs them to their\nvery souls. The main reason for this seems to be because it is only\nabout half a century since even savants realized the true nature and\nimportance of race. Even after an idea is scientifically established, it\ntakes a long time for it to be genuinely accepted by the public, and\nonly after it has been thus accepted will it form the basis of practical\nconduct. Meanwhile the far older idea of nationality has permeated the\npopular consciousness, and has thereby been able to produce tangible\neffects. In fine, our political life is still dominated by nationalism\nrather than race, and practical politics are thus conditioned, not by\nwhat men really are, but by what they think they are.\n\nThe late war is a striking case in point. That war is very generally\nregarded as having been one of \"race.\" The idea certainly lent to the\nstruggle much of its bitterness and uncompromising fury. And yet, from\nthe genuine racial standpoint, it was nothing of the kind. Ethnologists\nhave proved conclusively that, apart from certain palaeolithic survivals\nand a few historically recent Asiatic intruders, Europe is inhabited by\nonly three stocks: (1) The blond, long-headed \"Nordic\" race, (2) the\nmedium-complexioned, round-headed \"Alpine\" race, (3) the _brunet_,\nlong-headed \"Mediterranean\" race. These races are so dispersed and\nintermingled that every European nation is built of at least two of\nthese stocks, while most are compounded of all three. Strictly speaking,\ntherefore, the European War was not a race-war at all, but a domestic\nstruggle between closely knit blood-relatives.\n\nNow all this was known to most well-educated Europeans long before 1914.\nAnd yet it did not make the slightest difference. The reason is that, in\nspite of everything, the vast majority of Europeans still believe that\nthey fit into an entirely different race-category. They think they\nbelong to the \"Teutonic\" race, the \"Latin\" race, the \"Slav\" race, or the\n\"Anglo-Saxon\" race. The fact that these so-called \"races\" simply do not\nexist but are really historical differentiations, based on language and\nculture, which cut sublimely across genuine race-lines--all that is\nquite beside the point. Your European may apprehend this intellectually,\nbut so long as it remains an intellectual novelty it will have no\nappreciable effect upon his conduct. In his heart of hearts he will\nstill believe himself a Latin, a Teuton, an Anglo-Saxon, or a Slav. For\nhis blood-race he will not stir; for his thought-race he will die. For\nthe glory of the dolichocephalic \"Nordic\" or the brachycephalic \"Alpine\"\nhe will not prick his finger or wager a groat; for the triumph of the\n\"Teuton\" or the \"Slav\" he will give his last farthing and shed his\nheart's blood. In other words: Not what men really are, but what they\nthink they are.\n\nAt first it may seem strange that in contemporary Europe thought-race\nshould be all-powerful while blood-race is impotent. Yet there are very\ngood reasons. Not only has modern Europe's great dynamic been nationalism,\nbut also nationalism has seized upon the nascent racial concept and has\nperverted it to its own ends. Until quite recent times \"Nationality\" was a\ndistinctly intensive concept, connoting approximate identity of culture,\nlanguage, and historic past. It was the logical product of a relatively\nnarrow European outlook. Indeed, it grew out of a still narrower outlook\nwhich had contented itself with the regional, feudal, and dialectic\nloyalties of the Middle Ages. But the first half of the nineteenth century\nsaw a still further widening of the European outlook to a continental or\neven to a world horizon. At once the early concept of nationality ceased\nto satisfy. Nationalism became extensive. It tended to embrace all those\nof kindred speech, culture, and historic tradition, however distant such\npersons might be. Obviously a new terminology was required. The keyword\nwas presently discovered--\"Race.\" Hence we get that whole series of\n_pseudo_ \"race\" phrases--\"Pan-Germanism,\" \"Pan-Slavism,\" \"Pan-Angleism,\"\n\"Pan-Latinism,\" and the rest. Of course these are not racial at all. They\nmerely signify nationalism brought up to date. But the European peoples,\nwith all the fervour of the nationalist faith that is in them, believe and\nproclaim them to be racial. Hence, so far as practical politics are\nconcerned, they _are_ racial and will so continue while the nationalist\ndynamic endures.\n\nThis new development of nationalism (the \"racial\" stage, as we may call\nit) was at first confined to the older centres of European civilization,\nbut with the spread of Western ideas it presently appeared in the most\nunexpected quarters. Its advent in the Balkans, for example, quickly\nengendered those fanatical propagandas, \"Pan-Hellenism,\" \"Pan-Serbism,\"\netc., which turned that unhappy region first into a bear-garden and\nlatterly into a witches' sabbath.\n\nMeanwhile, by the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the first\nphase of nationalism had patently passed into Asia. The \"Young-Turk\" and\n\"Young-Egyptian\" movements, and the \"Nationalist\" stirrings in regions\nso far remote from each other as Algeria, Persia, and India, were\nunmistakable signs that Asia was gripped by the initial throes of\nnationalist self-consciousness. Furthermore, with the opening years of\nthe twentieth century, numerous symptoms proclaimed the fact that in\nAsia, as in the Balkans, the second or \"racial\" stage of nationalism had\nbegun. These years saw the definite emergence of far-flung \"Pan-\"\nmovements: \"Pan-Turanism,\" \"Pan-Arabism,\" and (most amazing of apparent\nparadoxes) \"Pan-Islamic Nationalism.\"\n\n\n                                   I\n\nLet us now trace the genesis and growth of nationalism in the Near and\nMiddle East, devoting the present chapter to nationalist developments in\nthe Moslem world with the exception of India. India requires special\ntreatment, because there nationalist activity has been mainly the work\nof the non-Moslem Hindu element. Indian nationalism has followed a\ncourse differing distinctly from that of Islam, and will therefore be\nconsidered in the following chapter.\n\nBefore it received the Western impact of the nineteenth century, the\nIslamic world was virtually devoid of self-conscious nationalism. There\nwere, to be sure, strong local and tribal loyalties. There was intense\ndynastic sentiment like the Turks' devotion to their \"Padishas,\" the\nOttoman sultans. There was also marked pride of race such as the Arabs'\nconviction that they were the \"Chosen People.\" Here, obviously, were\npotential nationalist elements. But these elements were as yet dispersed\nand unco-ordinated. They were not yet fused into the new synthesis of\nself-conscious nationalism. The only Moslem people which could be said\nto possess anything like true nationalist feeling were the Persians,\nwith their traditional devotion to their plateau-land of \"Iran.\" The\nvarious peoples of the Moslem world had thus, at most, a rudimentary,\ninchoate nationalist consciousness: a dull, inert unitary spirit;\ncapable of development, perhaps, but as yet scarcely perceptible even to\noutsiders and certainly unperceived by themselves.\n\nFurthermore, Islam itself was in many respects hostile to nationalism.\nIslam's insistence upon the brotherhood of all True Believers, and the\nIslamic political ideal of the \"Imamat,\" or universal theocratic\ndemocracy, naturally tended to inhibit the formation of sovereign,\nmutually exclusive national units; just as the nascent nationalities of\nRenaissance Europe conflicted with the mediaeval ideals of universal\npapacy and \"Holy Roman Empire.\"\n\nGiven such an unfavourable environment, it is not strange to see Moslem\nnationalist tendencies germinating obscurely and confusedly throughout\nthe first half of the nineteenth century. Not until the second half of\nthe century is there any clear conception of \"Nationalism\" in the\nWestern sense. There are distinct nationalist tendencies in the\nteachings of Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani (who is philosophically the\nconnecting link between Pan-Islamism and Moslem nationalism), while the\nTurkish reformers of the mid-nineteenth century were patently influenced\nby nationalism as they were by other Western ideas. It was, in fact, in\nTurkey that a true nationalist consciousness first appeared. Working\nupon the Turks' traditional devotion to their dynasty and pride in\nthemselves as a ruling race lording it over many subject peoples both\nChristian and Moslem, the Turkish nationalist movement made rapid\nprogress.\n\nPrecisely as in Europe, the nationalist movement in Turkey began with a\nrevival of historic memories and a purification of the language. Half a\ncentury ago the Ottoman Turks knew almost nothing about their origins or\ntheir history. The martial deeds of their ancestors and the stirring\nannals of their empire were remembered only in a vague, legendary\nfashion, the study of the national history being completely neglected.\nReligious discussions and details of the life of Mohammed or the early\ndays of Islam interested men more than the spread of Ottoman power in\nthree continents. The nationalist pioneers taught their\nfellow-countrymen their historic glories and awakened both pride of past\nand confidence in the future.\n\nSimilarly with the Turkish language; the early nationalists found it\nvirtually cleft in twain. On the one hand was \"official\" Turkish--a\nclumsy hotchpotch, overloaded with flowers of rhetoric and cryptic\nexpressions borrowed from Arabic and Persian. This extraordinary jargon,\ncouched in a bombastic style, was virtually unintelligible to the\nmasses. The masses, on the other hand, spoke \"popular\" Turkish--a\nprimitive, limited idiom, divided into many dialects and despised as\nuncouth and boorish by \"educated\" persons. The nationalists changed all\nthis. Appreciating the simple, direct strength of the Turkish tongue,\nnationalist enthusiasts trained in European principles of grammar and\nphilology proceeded to build up a real Turkish language in the Western\nsense. So well did they succeed that in less than a generation they\nproduced a simplified, flexible Turkish which was used effectively by\nboth journalists and men of letters, was intelligible to all classes,\nand became the unquestioned vehicle for thought and the canon of\nstyle.[138]\n\nOf course the chief stimulus to Turkish nationalism was Western\npolitical pressure. The more men came to love their country and aspire\nto its future, the more European assaults on Turkish territorial\nintegrity spurred them to defend their threatened independence. The\nnationalist ideal was \"Ottomanism\"--the welding of a real \"nation\" in\nwhich all citizens, whatever their origin or creed, should be\n\"Ottomans,\" speaking the Turkish language and inspired by Ottoman\npatriotism. This, however, conflicted sharply with the rival (and prior)\nnationalisms of the Christian peoples of the empire, to say nothing of\nthe new Arab nationalism which was taking shape at just this same time.\nTurkish nationalism was also frowned on by Sultan Abdul Hamid. Abdul\nHamid had an instinctive aversion to all nationalist movements, both as\nlimitations to his personal absolutism and as conflicting with that\nuniversal Pan-Islamic ideal on which he based his policy. Accordingly,\neven those Turkish nationalists who proclaimed complete loyalty were\nsuspect, while those with liberal tendencies were persecuted and driven\ninto exile.\n\nThe revolution of 1908, however, brought nationalism to power. Whatever\ntheir differences on other matters, the Young-Turks were all ardent\nnationalists. In fact, the very ardour of their nationalism was a prime\ncause of their subsequent misfortunes. With the rashness of fanatics the\nYoung-Turks tried to \"Ottomanize\" the whole empire at once. This enraged\nall the other nationalities, alienated them from the revolution, and\ngave the Christian Balkan states their opportunity to attack\ndisorganized Turkey in 1912.\n\nThe truth of the matter was that Turkish nationalism was evolving in a\ndirection which could only mean heightened antagonism between the\nTurkish element on the one side and the non-Turkish elements, Christian\nor Moslem, on the other. Turkish nationalism had, in fact, now reached\nthe second or \"racial\" stage. Passing the bounds of the limited, mainly\nterritorial, idea connoted by the term \"Ottomanism,\" it had embraced the\nfar-flung and essentially racial concepts known as \"Pan-Turkism\" and\n\"Pan-Turanism.\" These wider developments we shall consider later on in\nthis chapter. Before so doing let us examine the beginnings of\nnationalism's \"first stage\" in other portions of the Moslem world.\n\nShortly after the Ottoman Turks showed signs of a nationalistic\nawakening, kindred symptoms began to appear among the Arabs. As in all\nself-conscious nationalist movements, it was largely a protest _against_\nsome other group. In the case of the Arabs this protest was naturally\ndirected against their Turkish rulers. We have already seen how Desert\nArabia (the Nejd) had always maintained its freedom, and we have also\nseen how those Arab lands like Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Hedjaz which\nfell under Turkish control nevertheless continued to feel an\nineradicable repugnance at seeing themselves, Islam's \"Chosen People,\"\nbeneath the yoke of a folk which, in Arab eyes, were mere upstart\nbarbarians. Despite a thousand years of Turkish domination the two races\nnever got on well together, their racial temperaments being too\nincompatible for really cordial relations. The profound temperamental\nincompatibility of Turk and Arab has been well summarized by a French\nwriter. Says Victor Berard: \"Such are the two languages and such the two\npeoples: in the latitude of Rome and in the latitude of Algiers, the\nTurk of Adrianople, like the Turk of Adalia, remains a man of the north\nand of the extreme north; in all climates the Arab remains a man of the\nsouth and of the extreme south. To the Arab's suppleness, mobility,\nimagination, artistic feeling, democratic tendencies, and anarchic\nindividualism, the Turk opposes his slowness, gravity, sense of\ndiscipline and regularity, innate militarism. The Turkish master has\nalways felt disdain for the 'artistic canaille,' whose pose,\ngesticulations, and indiscipline, shock him profoundly. On their side,\nthe Arabs see in the Turk only a blockhead; in his placidity and\ntaciturnity only stupidity and ignorance; in his respect for law only\nslavishness; and in his love of material well-being only gross\nbestiality. Especially do the Arabs jeer at the Turk's artistic\nincapacity: after having gone to school to the Chinese, Persians, Arabs,\nand Greeks, the Turk remains, in Arab eyes, just a big booby of barrack\nand barnyard.\"[139]\n\nAdd to this the fact that the Arabs regard the Turks as perverters of\nthe Islamic faith, and we need not be surprised to find that Turkey's\nArab subjects have ever displayed symptoms of rebellious unrest. We have\nseen how the Wahabi movement was specifically directed against Turkish\ncontrol of the holy cities, and despite the Wahabi defeat, Arab\ndiscontent lived on. About 1820 the German explorer Burckhardt wrote of\nArabia: \"When Turkish power in the Hedjaz declines, the Arabs will\navenge themselves for their subjection.\"[140] And some twenty years\nlater the Shereef of Mecca remarked to a French traveller: \"We, the\ndirect descendants of the Prophet, have to bow our heads before\nmiserable Pashas, most of them former Christian slaves come to power by\nthe most shameful courses.\"[141] Throughout the nineteenth century every\nTurkish defeat in Europe was followed by a seditious outburst in its\nArab provinces.\n\nDown to the middle of the nineteenth century these seditious stirrings\nremained sporadic, unco-ordinated outbursts of religious, regional, or\ntribal feeling, with no genuinely \"Nationalistic\" programme of action or\nideal. But in the later sixties a real nationalist agitation appeared.\nIts birthplace was Syria. That was what might have been expected, since\nSyria was the part of Turkey's Arab dominions most open to Western\ninfluences. This first Arab nationalist movement, however, did not\namount to much. Directed by a small group of noisy agitators devoid of\nreal ability, the Turkish Government suppressed it without much\ndifficulty.\n\nThe disastrous Russian war of 1877, however, blew the scattered embers\ninto a fresh flame. For several years Turkey's Arab provinces were in\nfull ferment. The nationalists spoke openly of throwing off the Turkish\nyoke and welding the Arab lands into a loose-knit confederation headed\nby a religious potentate, probably the Shereef of Mecca. This was\nobviously an adaptation of Western nationalism to the traditional Arab\nideal of a theocratic democracy already realized in the Meccan caliphate\nand the Wahabi government of the Nejd.\n\nThis second stirring of Arab nationalism was likewise of short duration.\nTurkey was now ruled by Sultan Abdul Hamid, and Abdul Hamid's\nPan-Islamic policy looked toward good relations with his Arab subjects.\nAccordingly, Arabs were welcomed at Constantinople, favours were heaped\nupon Arab chiefs and notables, while efforts were made to promote the\ncontentment of the empire's Arab populations. At the same time the\nconstruction of strategic railways in Syria and the Hedjaz gave the\nTurkish Government a stronger grip over its Arab provinces than ever\nbefore, and conversely rendered successful Arab revolts a far more\nremote possibility. Furthermore, Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda\nwas specially directed toward awakening a sense of Moslem solidarity\nbetween Arabs and Turks as against the Christian West. These efforts\nachieved a measure of success. Certainly, every European aggression in\nthe Near East was an object-lesson to Turks and Arabs to forget, or at\nleast adjourn, their domestic quarrels in face of the common foe.\n\nDespite the partial successes of Abdul Hamid's efforts, a considerable\nsection of his Arab subjects remained unreconciled, and toward the close\nof the nineteenth century a fresh stirring of Arab nationalist\ndiscontent made its appearance. Relentlessly persecuted by the Turkish\nauthorities, the Arab nationalist agitators, mostly Syrians, went into\nexile. Gathering in near-by Egypt (now of course under British\ngovernance) and in western Europe, these exiles organized a\nrevolutionary propaganda. Their formal organization dates from the year\n1895, when the \"Arabian National Committee\" was created at Paris. For a\ndecade their propaganda went on obscurely, but evidently with effect,\nfor in 1905 the Arab provinces of Hedjaz and Yemen burst into armed\ninsurrection. This insurrection, despite the best efforts of the Turkish\nGovernment, was never wholly suppressed, but dragged on year after year,\ndraining Turkey of troops and treasure, and contributing materially to\nher Tripolitan and Balkan disasters in 1911-12.\n\nThe Arab revolt of 1905 focussed the world's attention upon \"The Arab\nQuestion,\" and the nationalist exiles made the most of their opportunity\nby redoubling their propaganda, not only at home but in the West as\nwell. Europe was fully informed of \"Young Arabia's\" wrongs and\naspirations, notably by an extremely clever book by one of the\nnationalist leaders, entitled _The Awakening of the Arab Nation_,[142]\nwhich made a distinct sensation. The aims of the Arab nationalists are\nclearly set forth in the manifesto of the Arabian National Committee,\naddressed to the Great Powers and published early in 1906. Says this\nmanifesto: \"A great pacific change is on the eve of occurring in Turkey.\nThe Arabs, whom the Turks tyrannized over only by keeping them divided\non insignificant questions of ritual and religion, have become conscious\nof their national, historic, and racial homogeneity, and wish to detach\nthemselves from the worm-eaten Ottoman trunk in order to form themselves\ninto an independent state. This new Arab Empire will extend to its\nnatural frontiers, from the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates to the\nIsthmus of Suez, and from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Oman. It will\nbe governed by the constitutional and liberal monarchy of an Arabian\nsultan. The present Vilayet of the Hedjaz, together with the territory\nof Medina, will form an independent empire whose sovereign will be at\nthe same time the religious Khalif of all the Mohammedans. Thus, one\ngreat difficulty, the separation of the civil and the religious powers\nin Islam, will have been solved for the greater good of all.\"\n\nTo their fellow Arabs the committee issued the following proclamation:\n\"Dear Compatriots! All of us know how vile and despicable the glorious\nand illustrious title of Arabian Citizen has become in the mouths of all\nforeigners, especially Turks. All of us see to what depths of misery and\nignorance we have fallen under the tyranny of these barbarians sprung\nfrom Central Asia. Our land, the richest and finest on earth, is to-day\nan arid waste. When we were free, we conquered the world in a hundred\nyears; we spread everywhere sciences, arts, and letters; for centuries\nwe led world-civilization. But, since the spawn of Ertogrul[143] usurped\nthe caliphate of Islam, they have brutalized us so as to exploit us to\nsuch a degree that we have become the poorest people on earth.\" The\nproclamation then goes on to declare Arabia's independence.[144]\n\nOf course \"Young Arabia\" did not then attain its independence. The\nrevolt was kept localized and Turkey maintained its hold over most of\nits Arab dominions. Nevertheless, there was constant unrest. During the\nremainder of Abdul Hamid's reign his Arab provinces were in a sort of\nunstable equilibrium, torn between the forces of nationalist sedition on\nthe one hand and Pan-Islamic, anti-European feeling on the other.\n\nThe Young-Turk revolution of 1908 caused a new shift in the situation.\nThe Arab provinces, like the other parts of the empire, rejoiced in the\ndownfall of despotism and hoped great things for the future. In the\nTurkish Parliament the Arab provinces were well represented, and their\ndeputies asked for a measure of federal autonomy. This the Young-Turks,\nbent upon \"Ottomanization,\" curtly refused. The result was profound\ndisillusionment in the Arab provinces and a revival of separatist\nagitation. It is interesting to note that the new independence agitation\nhad a much more ambitious programme than that of a few years before. The\nArab nationalists of Turkey were by this time definitely linking up with\nthe nationalists of Egypt and French North Africa--Arabic-speaking lands\nwhere the populations were at least partly Arab in blood. Arab\nnationalism was beginning to speak aloud what it had previously\nwhispered--the programme of a great \"Pan-Arab\" empire stretching right\nacross North Africa and southern Asia from the Atlantic to the Indian\nOceans. Thus, Arab nationalism, like Turkish nationalism, was evolving\ninto the \"second,\" or racial, stage.\n\nDeferring discussion of this broader development, let us follow a trifle\nfurther the course of the more restricted Arab nationalism within the\nTurkish Empire. Despite the Pan-Islamic sentiment evoked by the\nEuropean aggressions of 1911-12, nationalist feeling was continually\naroused by the Ottomanizing measures of the Young-Turk government, and\nthe independence agitation was presently in full swing once more. In\n1913 an Arabian nationalist congress convened in Paris and revolutionary\npropaganda was inaugurated on an increased scale. When the Great War\nbroke out next year, Turkey's Arab provinces were seething with\nseditious unrest.[145] The Turkish authorities took stern measures\nagainst possible trouble, imprisoning and executing all prominent\nnationalists upon whom they could lay their hands, while the\nproclamation of the \"Holy War\" rallied a certain portion of Arab public\nopinion to the Turkish side, especially since the conquest of Egypt was\na possibility. But as the war dragged on the forces of discontent once\nmore raised their heads. In 1916 the revolt of the Shereef of Mecca gave\nthe signal for the downfall of Turkish rule. This revolt, liberally\nbacked by England, gained the active or passive support of the Arab\nelements throughout the Turkish Empire. Inspired by Allied promises of\nnational independence of a most alluring character, the Arabs fought\nstrenuously against the Turks and were a prime factor in the _debacle_\nof Ottoman military power in the autumn of 1918.[146]\n\nBefore discussing the momentous events which have occurred in the Arab\nprovinces of the former Ottoman Empire since 1918, let us consider\nnationalist developments in the Arabized regions of North Africa lying\nto the westward. Of these developments the most important is that of\nEgypt. The mass of the Egyptian people is to-day, as in Pharaoh's time,\nof the old \"Nilotic\" stock. A slow, self-contained peasant folk, the\nEgyptian \"fellaheen\" have submitted passively to a long series of\nconquerors, albeit this passivity has been occasionally broken by\noutbursts of volcanic fury presently dying away into passivity once\nmore. Above the Nilotic masses stands a relatively small upper class\ndescended chiefly from Egypt's more recent Asiatic conquerors--Arabs,\nKurds, Circassians, Albanians, and Turks. In addition to this upper\nclass, which until the English occupation monopolized all political\npower, there are large European \"colonies\" with \"extraterritorial\"\nrights, while a further complication is added by the persistence of a\nconsiderable native Christian element, the \"Copts,\" who refused to turn\nMohammedan at the Arab conquest and who to-day number fully one-tenth of\nthe total population.\n\nWith such a medley of races, creeds, and cultures, and with so prolonged\na tradition of foreign domination, Egypt might seem a most unlikely\n_milieu_ for the growth of nationalism. On the other hand, Egypt has\nbeen more exposed to Western influences than any other part of the Near\nEast. Bonaparte's invasion at the close of the eighteenth century\nprofoundly affected Egyptian life, and though the French were soon\nexpelled, European influences continued to permeate the valley of the\nNile. Mehemet Ali, the able Albanian adventurer who made himself master\nof Egypt after the downfall of French rule, realized the superiority of\nEuropean methods and fostered a process of Europeanization which,\nhowever superficial, resulted in a wide dissemination of Western ideas.\nMehemet Ali's policy was continued by his successors. That magnificent\nspendthrift Khedive Ismail, whose reckless contraction of European loans\nwas the primary cause of European intervention, prided himself on his\n\"Europeanism\" and surrounded himself with Europeans.\n\nIndeed, the first stirrings of Egyptian nationalism took the form of a\nprotest against the noxious, parasitical \"Europeanism\" of Khedive Ismail\nand his courtiers. Sober-minded Egyptians became increasingly alarmed at\nthe way Ismail was mortgaging Egypt's independence by huge European\nloans and sucking its life-blood by merciless taxation. Inspired\nconsciously or unconsciously by the Western concepts of \"nation\" and\n\"patriotism,\" these men desired to stay Ismail's destructive course and\nto safeguard Egypt's future. In fact, their efforts were directed not\nmerely against the motley crew of European adventurers and\nconcessionaires who were luring the Khedive into fresh extravagances,\nbut also against the complaisant Turkish and Circassian pashas, and the\nArmenian and Syrian usurers, who were the instruments of Ismail's will.\nThe nascent movement was thus basically a \"patriotic\" protest against\nall those, both foreigners and native-born, who were endangering the\ncountry. This showed clearly in the motto adopted by the agitators--the\nhitherto unheard-of slogan: \"Egypt for the Egyptians!\"\n\nInto this incipient ferment there was presently injected the dynamic\npersonality of Djemal-ed-Din. Nowhere else did this extraordinary man\nexert so profound and lasting an influence as in Egypt. It is not too\nmuch to say that he is the father of every shade of Egyptian\nnationalism. He influenced not merely violent agitators like Arabi Pasha\nbut also conservative reformers like Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, who realized\nEgypt's weakness and were content to labour patiently by evolutionary\nmethods for distant goals.\n\nFor the moment the apostles of violent action had the stage. In 1882 a\nrevolutionary agitation broke out headed by Arabi Pasha, an army\nofficer, who, significantly enough, was of fellah origin, the first man\nof Nilotic stock to sway Egypt's destinies in modern times. Raising\ntheir slogan, \"Egypt for the Egyptians,\" the revolutionists sought to\ndrive all \"foreigners,\" both Europeans and Asiatics, from the country.\nTheir attempt was of course foredoomed to failure. A massacre of\nEuropeans in the port-city of Alexandria at once precipitated European\nintervention. An English army crushed the revolutionists at the battle\nof Tel-el-Kebir, and after this one battle, disorganized, bankrupt Egypt\nsubmitted to British rule, personified by Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer.\nThe khedivial dynasty was, to be sure, retained, and the native forms of\ngovernment respected, but all real power centred in the hands of the\nBritish \"Financial Adviser,\" the representative of Britain's imperial\nwill.\n\nFor twenty-five years Lord Cromer ruled Egypt, and the record of this\nable proconsul will place him for ever in the front rank of the world's\ngreat administrators. His strong hand drew Egypt from hopeless\nbankruptcy into abounding prosperity. Material well-being, however, did\nnot kill Egyptian nationalism. Scattered to the winds before the British\nbayonet charges, the seeds of unrest slowly germinated beneath the\nfertile Nilotic soil. Almost imperceptible at first under the numbing\nshock of Tel-el-Kebir, nationalist sentiment grew steadily as the years\nwore on, and by the closing decade of the nineteenth century it had\nbecome distinctly perceptible to keen-sighted European observers.\nPassing through Egypt in 1895, the well-known African explorer\nSchweinfurth was struck with the psychological change which had occurred\nsince his earlier visits to the valley of the Nile. \"A true national\nself-consciousness is slowly beginning to awaken,\" he wrote. \"The\nEgyptians are still very far from being a true Nationality, but the\nbeginning has been made.\"[147]\n\nWith the opening years of the twentieth century what had previously been\nvisible only to discerning eyes burst into sudden and startling bloom.\nThis resurgent Egyptian nationalism had, to be sure, its moderate wing,\nrepresented by conservative-minded men like Mohammed Abdou, Rector of El\nAzhar University and respected friend of Lord Cromer, who sought to\nteach his fellow-countrymen that the surest road to freedom was along\nthe path of enlightenment and progress. In the main, however, the\nmovement was an impatient and violent protest against British rule and\nan intransigeant demand for immediate independence. Perhaps the most\nsignificant point was that virtually all Egyptians were nationalists at\nheart, conservatives as well as radicals declining to consider Egypt as\na permanent part of the British Empire. The nationalists had a sound\nlegal basis for this attitude, owing to the fact that British rule\nrested upon insecure diplomatic foundations. England had intervened in\nEgypt as a self-constituted \"Mandatory\" of European financial interests.\nIts action had roused much opposition in Europe, particularly in France,\nand to allay this opposition the British Government had repeatedly\nannounced that its occupation of Egypt was of a temporary nature. In\nfact, Egyptian discontent was deliberately fanned by France right down\nto the conclusion of the _Entente Cordiale_ in 1904. This French\nsympathy for Egyptian aspirations was of capital importance in the\ndevelopment of the nationalist movement. In Egypt, France's cultural\nprestige was predominant. In Egyptian eyes a European education was\nsynonymous with a French education, so the rising generation inevitably\nsat under French teachers, either in Egypt or in France, and these\nFrench preceptors, being usually Anglophobes, rarely lost an opportunity\nfor instilling dislike of England and aversion to British rule.\n\nThe radical nationalists were headed by a young man named Mustapha\nKamel. He was a very prince of agitators; ardent, magnetic,\nenthusiastic, and possessed of a fiery eloquence which fairly swept away\nboth his hearers and his readers. An indefatigable propagandist, he\nedited a whole chain of newspapers and periodicals, and as fast as one\norgan was suppressed by the British authorities he started another. His\nuncompromising nationalism may be gauged from the following examples\nfrom his writings. Taking for his motto the phrase \"The Egyptians for\nEgypt; Egypt for the Egyptians,\" he wrote as early as 1896: \"Egyptian\ncivilization cannot endure in the future unless it is founded by the\npeople itself; unless the fellah, the merchant, the teacher, the pupil,\nin fine, every single Egyptian, knows that man has sacred, intangible\nrights; that he is not created to be a tool, but to lead an intelligent\nand worthy life; that love of country is the most beautiful sentiment\nwhich can ennoble a soul; and that a nation without independence is a\nnation without existence! It is by patriotism that backward peoples come\nquickly to civilization, to greatness, and to power. It is patriotism\nthat forms the blood which courses in the veins of virile nations, and\nit is patriotism that gives life to every living being.\"\n\nThe English, of course, were bitterly denounced. Here is a typical\neditorial from his organ _El Lewa_: \"We are the despoiled. The English\nare the despoilers. We demand a sacred right. The English are the\nusurpers of that right. This is why we are sure of success sooner or\nlater. When one is in the right, it is only a question of time.\"\n\nDespite his ardent aspirations, Mustapha Kamel had a sense of realities,\nand recognized that, for the moment at least, British power could not be\nforcibly overthrown. He did not, therefore, attempt any open violence\nwhich he knew would merely ruin himself and his followers. Early in 1908\nhe died, only thirty-four years of age. His mantle fell upon his leading\ndisciple, Mohammed Farid Bey. This man, who was not of equal calibre,\ntried to make up for his deficiency in true eloquence by the violence of\nhis invective. The difference between the two leaders can be gauged by\nthe editorial columns of _El Lewa_. Here is an editorial of September,\n1909: \"This land was polluted by the English, putrefied with their\natrocities as they suppressed our beloved _dustour_ [constitution], tied\nour tongues, burned our people alive and hanged our innocent relatives,\nand perpetrated other horrors at which the heavens are about to tremble,\nthe earth to split, and the mountains to fall down. Let us take a new\nstep. Let our lives be cheap while we seek our independence. Death is\nfar better than life for you if you remain in your present condition.\"\n\nMohammed Farid's fanatical impatience of all opposition led him into\ntactical blunders like alienating the native Christian Copts, whom\nMustapha Kamel had been careful to conciliate. The following diatribe\n(which, by the way, reveals a grotesque jumble of Western and Eastern\nideas) is an answer to Coptic protests at the increasing violence of his\npropaganda: \"The Copts should be kicked to death. They still have faces\nand bodies similar to those of demons and monkeys, which is a proof that\nthey hide poisonous spirits within their souls. The fact that they exist\nin the world confirms Darwin's theory that human beings are generated\nfrom monkeys. You sons of adulterous women! You descendants of the\nbearers of trays! You tails of camels with your monkey faces! You bones\nof bodies!\"\n\nIn this more violent attitude the nationalists were encouraged by\nseveral reasons. For one thing, Lord Cromer had laid down his\nproconsulate in 1907 and had been succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst. The new\nruler represented the ideas of British Liberalism, now in power, which\nwished to appease Egyptian unrest by conciliation instead of by Lord\nCromer's autocratic indifference. In the second place, the Young-Turk\nrevolution of 1908 gave an enormous impetus to the Egyptian cry for\nconstitutional self-government. Lastly, France's growing intimacy with\nEngland dashed the nationalist's cherished hope that Britain would be\nforced by outside pressure to redeem her diplomatic pledges and\nevacuate the Nile valley, thus driving the nationalists to rely more on\ntheir own exertions.\n\nGiven this nationalist temper, conciliatory attempt was foredoomed to\nfailure. For, however conciliatory Sir Eldon Gorst might be in details,\nhe could not promise the one thing which the nationalists supremely\ndesired--independence. This demand England refused even to consider.\nPractically all Englishmen had become convinced that Egypt with the Suez\nCanal was a vital link between the eastern and western halves of the\nBritish Empire, and that permanent control of Egypt was thus an absolute\nnecessity. There was thus a fundamental deadlock between British\nimperial and Egyptian national convictions. Accordingly, the British\nLiberal policy of conciliation proved a fiasco. Even Sir Eldon Gorst\nadmitted in his official reports that concessions were simply regarded\nas signs of weakness.\n\nBefore long seditious agitation and attendant violence grew to such\nproportions that the British Government became convinced that only\nstrong measures would save the situation. Therefore, in 1911, Sir Eldon\nGorst was replaced by Lord Kitchener--a patent warning to the\nnationalists that sedition would be given short shrift by the iron hand\nwhich had crushed the Khalifa and his Dervish hordes at Omdurman.\nKitchener arrived in Egypt with the express mandate to restore order,\nand this he did with thoroughness and exactitude. The Egyptians were\ntold plainly that England neither intended to evacuate the Nile valley\nnor considered its inhabitants fit for self-government within any\ndiscernible future. They were admonished to turn their thoughts from\npolitics, at which they were so bad, to agriculture, at which they were\nso good. As for seditious propaganda, new legislation enabled Lord\nKitchener to deal with it in summary fashion. Practically all the\nnationalist papers were suppressed, while the nationalist leaders were\nimprisoned, interned, or exiled. In fact, the British Government did its\nbest to distract attention everywhere from Egypt, the British press\nco-operating loyally by labelling the subject taboo. The upshot was that\nEgypt became quieter than it had been for a generation.\n\nHowever, it was only a surface calm. Driven underground, Egyptian unrest\neven attained new virulence which alarmed close observers. In 1913 the\nwell-known English publicist Sidney Low, after a careful investigation\nof the Egyptian situation, wrote: \"We are not popular in Egypt. Feared\nwe may be by some; respected I doubt not by many others; but really\nliked, I am sure, by very few.\"[148] Still more outspoken was an article\nsignificantly entitled \"The Darkness over Egypt,\" which appeared on the\neve of the Great War.[149] Its publication in a semi-scientific\nperiodical for specialists in Oriental problems rendered it worthy of\nserious attention. \"The long-continued absence of practically all\ndiscussion or even mention of Egyptian internal affairs from the British\npress,\" asserted this article, \"is not indicative of a healthy\ncondition. In Egypt the superficial quiet is that of suppressed\ndiscontent--of a sullen, hopeless mistrust toward the Government of the\nOccupation. Certain recent happenings have strengthened in Egyptian\nminds the conviction that the Government is making preparations for the\ncomplete annexation of the country.... We are not concerned to question\nhow far the motives attributed to the Government are true. The essential\nfact is that the Government of the Occupation has not yet succeeded in\nendearing, or even recommending, itself to the Egyptian people, but is,\non the contrary, an object of suspicion, an occasion of enmity.\" The\narticle expresses grave doubt whether Lord Kitchener's repressive\nmeasures have done more than drive discontent underground, and shows\n\"how strong is the Nationalist feeling in Egypt to-day in spite of the\ndetermined attempts to stamp out all freedom of political opinion. As\nmight be expected, this wholesale muzzling of the press has not only\nreduced the Mohammedan majority to a condition of internal ferment, but\nhas seriously alienated the hitherto loyal Copts. It may be that the\nGovernment can discover no better means of recommending itself to the\nconfidence and good-will of the Egyptian people; it may be that only by\nthe instant repression of every outward sign of discontent can it feel\nsecure in its occupation; but if such be the case, it is an admission of\nextreme weakness, or recognized insecurity of tenure.\" The article\nconcludes with the following warning as to the problem's wider\nimplications: \"Egypt, though a subject of profound indifference to the\nEnglish voter, is being feverishly watched by the Indian Mohammedans,\nand by the whole of our West and Central African subjects--themselves\nstrongly Moslem in sympathy, and at the present time jealously\nsuspicious of the political activities of Christian Imperialism.\"\n\nSuch being the state of Egyptian feeling in 1914, the outbreak of the\nGreat War was bound to produce intensified unrest. England's position in\nEgypt was, in truth, very difficult. Although in fact England exercised\ncomplete control, in law Egypt was still a dependency of the Ottoman\nEmpire, Britain merely exercising a temporary occupation. Now it soon\nbecame evident that Turkey was going to join England's enemies, the\nTeutonic empires, while it was equally evident that the Egyptians\nsympathized with the Turks, even the Khedive Abbas Hilmi making no\nsecret of his pro-Turkish views. During the first months of the European\nWar, while Turkey was still nominally neutral, the Egyptian native\npress, despite the British censorship, was full of veiled seditious\nstatements, while the unruly attitude of the Egyptian populace and the\nstirrings among the Egyptian native regiments left no doubt as to how\nthe wind was blowing. England was seriously alarmed. Accordingly, when\nTurkey entered the war in November, 1914, England took the decisive\nplunge, deposed Abbas Hilmi, nominated his cousin Hussein Kamel\n\"Sultan,\" and declared Egypt a protectorate of the British Empire.\n\nThis stung the nationalists to fury. Anything like formal rebellion was\nrendered impossible by the heavy masses of British and colonial troops\nwhich had been poured into the country. Nevertheless, there was a good\ndeal of sporadic violence, suppressed only by a stern application of the\n\"State of Siege.\" A French observer thus vividly describes these\ncritical days: \"The Jehadd is rousing the anti-Christian fanaticism\nwhich always stirs in the soul of every good Moslem. Since the end of\nOctober one could read in the eyes of the low-class Mohammedan natives\ntheir hope--the massacre of the Christians. In the streets of Cairo they\nstared insolently at the European passers-by. Some even danced for joy\non learning that the Sultan had declared the Holy War. Denounced to the\npolice for this, they were incontinently bastinadoed at the nearest\npolice-station. The same state of mind reigned at El Azhar, and I am\ntold that Europeans who visit the celebrated Mohammedan University have\ntheir ears filled with the strongest epithets of the Arab\nrepertory--that best-furnished language in the world.\"[150]\n\nThe nationalist exiles vehemently expressed abroad what their fellows\ncould not say at home. Their leader, Mohammed Farid Bey, issued from\nGeneva an official protest against \"the new illegal regime proclaimed by\nEngland the 18th of last December. England, which pretends to make war\non Germany to defend Belgium, ought not to trample underfoot the rights\nof Egypt, nor consider the treaties relative thereto as 'scraps of\npaper.'\"[151] These exiles threw themselves vehemently into the arms of\nGermany, as may be gauged from the following remarks of Abd-el-Malek\nHamsa, secretary of the nationalist party, in a German periodical:\n\"There is hardly an Egyptian who does not pray that England may be\nbeaten and her Empire fall in ruins. During the early days of the war,\nwhile I was still in Egypt, I was a witness of this popular feeling. In\ncities and villages, from sage to simple peasant, all are convinced in\nthe Kaiser's love for Islam and friendship for its caliph, and they are\nhoping and praying for Germany's victory.\"[152]\n\nOf course, in face of the overwhelming British garrison in Egypt, such\npronouncements were as idle as the wind. The hoped-for Turkish attacks\nwere beaten back from the Suez Canal, the \"State of Siege\" functioned\nwith stern efficiency, and Egypt, flooded with British troops, lapsed\ninto sullen silence, not to be broken until the end of the war.\n\nTurning back at this point to consider nationalist developments in the\nrest of North Africa, we do not, as in Egypt, find a well-marked\nterritorial patriotism. Anti-European hatred there is in plenty, but\nsuch \"patriotic\" sentiments as exist belong rather to those more\ndiffused types of nationalist feeling known as \"Pan-Arabism\" and\n\"Pan-Islamic Nationalism,\" which we shall presently discuss.\n\nThe basic reason for this North African lack of national feeling, in its\nrestricted sense, is that nowhere outside of Egypt is there a land which\never has been, or which shows distinct signs of becoming, a true\n\"nation.\" The mass of the populations inhabiting the vast band of\nterritory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara desert are\n\"Berbers\"--an ancient stock, racially European rather than Asiatic or\nnegroid, and closely akin to the \"Latin\" peoples across the\nMediterranean. The Berbers remind one of the Balkan Albanians: they are\nextremely tenacious of their language and customs, and they have an\ninstinctive racial feeling; but they are inveterate particularists,\nhaving always been split up into many tribes, sometimes combining into\npartial confederations but never developing true national\npatriotism.[153]\n\nAlongside the Berbers we find everywhere a varying proportion of Arabs.\nThe Arabs have colonized North Africa ever since the Moslem conquest\ntwelve centuries ago. They converted the Berbers to Islam and Arab\nculture, but they never made North Africa part of the Arab world as they\ndid Syria and Mesopotamia, and in somewhat lesser degree Egypt. The two\nraces have never really fused. Despite more than a thousand years of\nArab tutelage, the Berbers' manner of life remains distinct. They have\nlargely kept their language, and there has been comparatively little\nintermarriage. Pure-blooded Arabs abound, often in large tribal groups,\nbut they are still, in a way, foreigners.[154]\n\nWith such elements of discord, North Africa's political life has always\nbeen troubled. The most stable region has been Morocco, though even\nthere the sultan's authority has never really extended to the mountain\ntribes. As for the so-called \"Barbary States\" (Algiers, Tunis, and\nTripoli), they were little more than port-cities along the coast, the\nhinterland enjoying practically complete tribal independence. Over this\nconfused turmoil spread the tide of French conquest, beginning with\nAlgiers in 1830 and ending with Morocco to-day.[155] France brought\npeace, order, and material prosperity, but here, as in other Eastern\nlands, these very benefits of European tutelage created a new sort of\nunity among the natives in their common dislike of the European\nconqueror and their common aspiration toward independence. Accordingly,\nthe past generation has witnessed the appearance of \"Young Algerian\" and\n\"Young Tunisian\" political groups, led by French-educated men who have\nimbibed Western ideas of \"self-government\" and \"liberty.\"[156] However,\nas we have already remarked, their goal is not so much the erection of\ndistinct Algerian and Tunisian \"Nations\" as it is creation of a larger\nNorth African, perhaps Pan-Islamic, unity. It must not be forgotten that\nthey are in close touch with the Sennussi and kindred influences which\nwe have already examined in the chapter on Pan-Islamism.\n\nSo much for \"first-stage\" nationalist developments in the Arab or\nArabized lands. There is, however, one more important centre of\nnationalist sentiment in the Moslem world to be considered--Persia.\nPersia is, in fact, the land where a genuine nationalist movement would\nhave been most logically expected, because the Persians have for ages\npossessed a stronger feeling of \"country\" than any other Near Eastern\npeople.\n\nIn the nineteenth century Persia had sunk into such deep decrepitude\nthat its patent weakness excited the imperialistic appetites of Czarist\nRussia and, in somewhat lesser degree, of England. Persia's decadence\nand external perils were, however, appreciated by thinking Persians, and\na series of reformist agitations took place, beginning with the\nreligious movement of the Bab early in the nineteenth century and\nculminating with the revolution of 1908.[157] That revolution was\nlargely precipitated by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 by which\nEngland and Russia virtually partitioned Persia; the country being\ndivided into a Russian \"sphere of influence\" in the north and a British\n\"sphere of influence\" in the south, with a \"neutral zone\" between. The\nrevolution was thus in great part a desperate attempt of the Persian\npatriots to set their house in order and avert, at the eleventh hour,\nthe shadow of European domination which was creeping over the land. But\nthe revolution was not merely a protest against European aggression. It\nwas also aimed at the alien Khadjar dynasty which had so long misruled\nPersia. These Khadjar sovereigns were of Turkoman origin. They had never\nbecome really Persianized, as shown by the fact that the intimate court\nlanguage was Turki, not Persian. They occupied a position somewhat\nanalogous to that of the Manchus before the Chinese revolution. The\nPersian revolution was thus basically an _Iranian_ patriotic outburst\nagainst all alien influences, whether from East or West.\n\nWe have already seen how this patriotic movement was crushed by the\nforcible intervention of European imperialism.[158] By 1912 Russia and\nEngland were in full control of the situation, the patriots were\nproscribed and persecuted, and Persia sank into despairing silence. As a\nBritish writer then remarked: \"For such broken spirit and shattered\nhopes, as for the 'anarchy' now existing in Persia, Russia and Great\nBritain are directly responsible, and if there be a Reckoning, will one\nday be held to account. It is idle to talk of any improvement in the\nsituation, when the only Government in Persia consists of a Cabinet\nwhich does not command the confidence of the people, terrorized by\nRussia, financially starved by both Russia and England, allowed only\nmiserable doles of money on usurious terms, and forbidden to employ\nhonest and efficient foreign experts like Mr. Shuster; when the King is\na boy, the Regent an absentee, the Parliament permanently suspended, and\nthe best, bravest, and most honest patriots either killed or driven\ninto exile, while the wolf-pack of financiers, concession-hunters and\nland-grabbers presses ever harder on the exhausted victim, whose\nstruggles grow fainter and fainter. Little less than a miracle can now\nsave Persia.\"[159]\n\nSo ends our survey of the main \"first-stage\" nationalist movements in\nthe Moslem world. We should of course remember that a nationalist\nmovement was developing concurrently in India, albeit following an\neccentric orbit of its own. We should also remember that, in addition to\nthe main movements just discussed, there were minor nationalist\nstirrings among other Moslem peoples such as the Russian Tartars, the\nChinese Mohammedans, and even the Javanese of the Dutch Indies. Lastly,\nwe should remember that these nationalist movements were more or less\ninterwoven with the non-national movement of Pan-Islamism, and with\nthose \"second-stage,\" \"racial\" nationalist movements which we shall now\nconsider.\n\n\n                                  II\n\nEarlier in this chapter we have already remarked that the opening years\nof the twentieth century witnessed the appearance in Asia of\nnationalism's second or racial stage, especially among the Turkish and\nArab peoples. This wider stage of nationalism has attained its highest\ndevelopment among the Turks; where, indeed, it has gone through two\ndistinct phases, describable respectively by the terms \"Pan-Turkism\" and\n\"Pan-Turanism.\" We have described the primary phase of Turkish\nnationalism in its restricted \"Ottoman\" sense down to the close of the\nBalkan wars of 1912-13. It is at that time that the secondary or\n\"racial\" aspects of Turkish nationalism first come prominently to the\nfore.\n\nBy this time the Ottoman Turks had begun to realize that they did not\nstand alone in the world; that they were, in fact, the westernmost\nbranch of a vast band of peoples extending right across eastern Europe\nand Asia, from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Mediterranean to\nthe Arctic Ocean, to whom ethnologists have assigned the name of\n\"Uralo-Altaic race,\" but who are more generally termed \"Turanians.\" This\ngroup embraces the most widely scattered folk--the Ottoman Turks of\nConstantinople and Anatolia, the Turkomans of Persia and Central Asia,\nthe Tartars of South Russia and Transcaucasia, the Magyars of Hungary,\nthe Finns of Finland and the Baltic provinces, the aboriginal tribes of\nSiberia, and even the distant Mongols and Manchus. Diverse though they\nare in culture, tradition, and even personal appearance, these people\nnevertheless possess certain well-marked traits in common. Their\nlanguages are all similar, while their physical and mental make-up\ndisplays undoubted affinities. They are all noted for great physical\nvitality combined with unusual toughness of nerve-fibre. Though somewhat\ndeficient in imagination and creative artistic sense, they are richly\nendowed with patience, tenacity, and dogged energy. Above all, they have\nusually displayed extraordinary military capacity, together with a no\nless remarkable aptitude for the masterful handling of subject peoples.\nThe Turanians have certainly been the greatest conquerors that the world\nhas ever seen. Attila and his Huns, Arpad and his Magyars, Isperich and\nhis Bulgars, Alp Arslan and his Seljuks, Ertogrul and his Ottomans,\nJenghiz Khan and Tamerlane with their \"inflexible\" Mongol hordes, Baber\nin India, even Kubilai Khan and Nurhachu in far-off Cathay: the type is\never the same. The hoof-print of the Turanian \"man on horseback\" is\nstamped deep all over the palimpsest of history.\n\nGlorious or sinister according to the point of view, Turan's is\ncertainly a stirring past. Of course one may query whether these diverse\npeoples actually do form one genuine race. But, as we have already seen,\nso far as practical politics go, that makes no difference. Possessed of\nkindred tongues and temperaments, and dowered with such a wealth of\nsoul-stirring tradition, it would suffice for them to _think_ themselves\nracially one to form a nationalist dynamic of truly appalling potency.\n\nUntil about a generation ago, to be sure, no signs of such a movement\nwere visible. Not only were distant stocks like Finns and Manchus quite\nunaware of any common Turanian bond, but even obvious kindred like\nOttoman Turks and Central Asian Turkomans regarded one another with\nindifference or contempt. Certainly the Ottoman Turks were almost as\ndevoid of racial as they were of national feeling. Arminius Vambery\ntells how, when he first visited Constantinople in 1856, \"the word\n_Turkluk_ (_i. e._, 'Turk') was considered an opprobrious synonym of\ngrossness and savagery, and when I used to call people's attention to\nthe racial importance of the Turkish stock (stretching from Adrianople\nto the Pacific) they answered: 'But you are surely not classing us with\nKirghiz and with the gross nomads of Tartary.' ... With a few\nexceptions, I found no one in Constantinople who was seriously\ninterested in the questions of Turkish nationality or language.\"[160]\n\nIt was, in fact, the labours of Western ethnologists like the Hungarian\nVambery and the Frenchman Leon Cahun that first cleared away the mists\nwhich enshrouded Turan. These labours disclosed the unexpected vastness\nof the Turanian world. And this presently acquired a most unacademic\nsignificance. The writings of Vambery and his colleagues spread far and\nwide through Turan and were there devoured by receptive minds already\nstirring to the obscure promptings of a new time. The normality of the\nTuranian movement is shown by its simultaneous appearance at such widely\nsundered points as Turkish Constantinople and the Tartar centres along\nthe Russian Volga. Indeed, if anything, the leaven began its working on\nthe Volga sooner than on the Bosphorus. This Tartar revival, though\nlittle known, is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in all\nnationalist history. The Tartars, once masters of Russia, though long\nsince fallen from their high estate, have never vanished in the Slav\nocean. Although many of them have been for four centuries under Russian\nrule, they have stubbornly maintained their religious, racial, and\ncultural identity. Clustered thickly along the Volga, especially at\nKazan and Astrakhan, retaining much of the Crimea, and forming a\nconsiderable minority in Transcaucasia, the Tartars remained distinct\n\"enclaves\" in the Slav Empire, widely scattered but indomitable.\n\nThe first stirrings of nationalist self-consciousness among the Russian\nTartars appeared as far back as 1895, and from then on the movement grew\nwith astonishing rapidity. The removal of governmental restrictions at\nthe time of the Russian revolution of 1904 was followed by a regular\nliterary florescence. Streams of books and pamphlets, numerous\nnewspapers, and a solid periodical press, all attested the vigour and\nfecundity of the Tartar revival. The high economic level of the Russian\nTartars assured the material sinews of war. The Tartar oil millionaires\nof Baku here played a conspicuous role, freely opening their capacious\npurses for the good of the cause. The Russian Tartars also showed\ndistinct political ability and soon gained the confidence of their\nTurkoman cousins of Russian Central Asia, who were also stirring to the\nbreath of nationalism. The first Russian Duma contained a large\nMohammedan group so enterprising in spirit and so skilfully led that\nRussian public opinion became genuinely uneasy and encouraged the\ngovernment to diminish Tartar influence in Russian parliamentary life by\nsummary curtailments of Mohammedan representation.[161]\n\nOf course the Russian Mohammedans were careful to proclaim their\npolitical loyalty to the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, many earnest\nspirits revealed their secret aspirations by seeking a freer and more\nfruitful field of labour in Turkish Stambul, where the Russian Tartars\nplayed a prominent part in the Pan-Turk and Pan-Turanian movements\nwithin the Ottoman Empire. In fact, it was a Volga Tartar, Yusuf Bey\nAkchura Oglu, who was the real founder of the first Pan-Turanian society\nat Constantinople, and his well-known book, _Three Political Systems_,\nbecame the text on which most subsequent Pan-Turanian writings have been\nbased.[162]\n\nDown to the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Pan-Turanism was somewhat\nunder a cloud at Stambul. Sultan Abdul Hamid, as already remarked, was a\nPan-Islamist and had a rooted aversion to all nationalist movements.\nAccordingly, the Pan-Turanians, while not actually persecuted, were\nnever in the Sultan's favour. With the advent of Young-Turk nationalism\nto power, however, all was changed. The \"Ottomanizing\" leaders of the\nnew government listened eagerly to Pan-Turanian preaching, and most of\nthem became affiliated with the movement. It is interesting to note that\nRussian Tartars continued to play a prominent part. The chief\nPan-Turanian propagandist was the able publicist Ahmed Bey Agayeff, a\nVolga Tartar. His well-edited organ, _Turk Yurdu_ (_Turkish Home_),\npenetrated to every corner of the Turko-Tartar world and exercised great\ninfluence on the development of its public opinion.\n\nAlthough leaders like Ahmed Bey Agayeff clearly visualized the entire\nTuranian world from Finland to Manchuria as a potential whole, and were\nthus full-fledged \"Pan-Turanians,\" their practical efforts were at first\nconfined to the closely related Turko-Tartar segment; that is, to the\nOttomans of Turkey, the Tartars of Russia, and the Turkomans of central\nAsia and Persia. Since all these peoples were also Mohammedans, it\nfollows that this propaganda had a religious as well as a racial\ncomplexion, trending in many respects toward Pan-Islamism. Indeed, even\ndisregarding the religious factor, we may say that, though Pan-Turanian\nin theory, the movement was at that time in practice little more than\n\"Pan-Turkism.\"\n\nIt was the Balkan wars of 1912-13 which really precipitated full-fledged\nPan-Turanism. Those wars not merely expelled the Turks from the Balkans\nand turned their eyes increasingly toward Asia, but also roused such\nhatred of the victorious Serbs in the breasts of Hungarians and\nBulgarians that both these peoples proclaimed their \"Turanian\" origins\nand toyed with ideas of \"Pan-Turanian\" solidarity against the menace of\nSerbo-Russian \"Pan-Slavism.\"[163] The Pan-Turanian thinkers were\nassuredly evolving a body of doctrine grandiose enough to satisfy the\nmost ambitious hopes. Emphasizing the great virility and nerve-force\neverywhere patent in the Turanian stocks, these thinkers saw in Turan\nthe dominant race of the morrow. Zealous students of Western\nevolutionism and ethnology, they were evolving their own special theory\nof race grandeur and decadence. According to Pan-Turanian teaching, the\nhistoric peoples of southern Asia--Arabs, Persians, and Hindus--are\nhopelessly degenerate. As for the Europeans, they have recently passed\ntheir apogee, and, exhausted by the consuming fires of modern\nindustrialism, are already entering upon their decline. It is the\nTuranians, with their inherent virility and steady nerves unspoiled by\nthe wear and tear of Western civilization, who must be the great dynamic\nof the future. Indeed, some Pan-Turanian thinkers go so far as to\nproclaim that it is the sacred mission of their race to revitalize a\nwhole senescent, worn-out world by the saving infusion of regenerative\nTuranian blood.[164]\n\nOf course the Pan-Turanians recognized that anything like a realization\nof their ambitious dreams was dependent upon the virtual destruction of\nthe Russian Empire. In fact, Russia, with its Tartars, Turkomans,\nKirghiz, Finns, and numerous kindred tribes, was in Pan-Turanian eyes\nmerely a Slav alluvium laid with varying thickness over a Turanian\nsubsoil. This turning of Russia into a vast \"Turania irredenta\" was\ncertainly an ambitious order. Nevertheless, the Pan-Turanians counted on\npowerful Western backing. They realized that Germany and Austria-Hungary\nwere fast drifting toward war with Russia, and they felt that such a\ncataclysm, however perilous, would also offer most glorious\npossibilities.\n\nThese Pan-Turanian aspirations undoubtedly had a great deal to do with\ndriving Turkey into the Great War on the side of the Central Empires.\nCertainly, Enver Pasha and most of the other leaders of the governing\ngroup had long been more or less affiliated with the Pan-Turanian\nmovement. Of course the Turkish Government had more than one string to\nits bow. It tried to drive Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism in double\nharness, using the \"Holy War\" agitation for pious Moslems everywhere,\nwhile it redoubled Pan-Turanian propaganda among the Turko-Tartar\npeoples. A good statement of Pan-Turanian ambitions in the early years\nof the war is that of the publicist Tekin Alp in his book, _The Turkish\nand Pan-Turkish Ideal_, published in 1915. Says Tekin Alp: \"With the\ncrushing of Russian despotism by the brave German, Austrian, and Turkish\narmies, 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 Turanians will receive their\nindependence. With the 10,000,000 Ottoman Turks, this will form a nation\nof 50,000,000, advancing toward a great civilization which may perhaps\nbe compared with that of Germany, in that it will have the strength and\nenergy to rise even higher. In some ways it will be superior to the\ndegenerate French and English civilizations.\"\n\nWith the collapse of Russia after the Bolshevik revolution at the end of\n1917, Pan-Turanian hopes knew no bounds. So certain were they of triumph\nthat they began to flout even their German allies, thus revealing that\nhatred of all Europeans which had always lurked at the back of their\nminds. A German staff-officer thus describes the table-talk of Halil\nPasha, the Turkish commander of the Mesopotamian front and uncle of\nEnver: \"First of all, every tribe with a Turkish mother-tongue must be\nforged into a single nation. The national principle was supreme; so it\nwas the design to conquer Turkestan, the cradle of Turkish power and\nglory. That was the first task. From that base connections must be\nestablished with the Yakutes of Siberia, who were considered, on account\nof their linguistic kinship, the remotest outposts of the Turkish blood\nto the eastward. The closely related Tartar tribes of the Caucasus must\nnaturally join this union. Armenians and Georgians, who form minority\nnationalities in that territory, must either submit voluntarily or be\nsubjugated.... Such a great compact Turkish Empire, exercising hegemony\nover all the Islamic world, would exert a powerful attraction upon\nAfghanistan and Persia.... In December, 1917, when the Turkish front in\nMesopotamia threatened to yield, Halil Pasha said to me, half vexed, half\njokingly: 'Supposing we let the English have this cursed desert hole and\ngo to Turkestan, where I will erect a new empire for my little boy.' He\nhad named his youngest son after the great conqueror and destroyer,\nJenghiz Khan.\"[165]\n\nAs a matter of fact, the summer of 1918 saw Transcaucasia and northern\nPersia overrun by Turkish armies headed for Central Asia. Then came the\nGerman collapse in the West and the end of the war, apparently dooming\nTurkey to destruction. For the moment the Pan-Turanians were stunned.\nNevertheless, their hopes were soon destined to revive, as we shall\npresently see.\n\nBefore describing the course of events in the Near East since 1918,\nwhich need to be treated as a unit, let us go back to consider the\nearlier developments of the other \"second-stage\" nationalist movements\nin the Moslem world. We have already seen how, concurrently with Turkish\nnationalism, Arab nationalism was likewise evolving into the \"racial\"\nstage, the ideal being a great \"Pan-Arab\" empire, embracing not merely\nthe ethnically Arab peninsula-homeland, Syria, and Mesopotamia, but also\nthe Arabized regions of Egypt, Tripoli, French North Africa, and the\nSudan.\n\nPan-Arabism has not been as intellectually developed as Pan-Turanism,\nthough its general trend is so similar that its doctrines need not be\ndiscussed in detail. One important difference between the two movements\nis that Pan-Arabism is much more religious and Pan-Islamic in character,\nthe Arabs regarding themselves as \"The Chosen People\" divinely\npredestined to dominate the whole Islamic world. Pan-Arabism also lacks\nPan-Turanism's unity of direction. There have been two distinct\nintellectual centres--Syria and Egypt. In fact, it is in Egypt that\nPan-Arab schemes have been most concretely elaborated, the Egyptian\nprogramme looking toward a reunion of the Arab-speaking lands under the\nKhedive--perhaps at first subject to British tutelage, though ultimately\nthrowing off British control by concerted Pan-Arab action. The late\nKhedive Abbas Hilmi, deposed by the British in 1914, is supposed to have\nencouraged this movement.[166]\n\nThe Great War undoubtedly stimulated Pan-Arabism, especially by its\ncreation of an independent Arab kingdom in the Hedjaz with claims on\nSyria and Mesopotamia. However, the various Arab peoples are so\nengrossed with local independence agitations looking toward the\nelimination of British, French, and Italian control from specific\nregions like Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Tripoli, that the larger\nconcept of Pan-Arabism, while undoubtedly an underlying factor, is not\nto-day in the foreground of Arab nationalist programmes.\n\nFurthermore, as I have already said, Pan-Arabism is interwoven with the\nnon-racial concepts of Pan-Islamism and \"Pan-Islamic Nationalism.\" This\nlatter concept may seem a rather grotesque contradiction of terms. So it\nmay be to us Westerners. But it is not necessarily so to Eastern minds.\nHowever eagerly the East may have seized upon our ideas of nationality\nand patriotism, those ideas have entered minds already full of concepts\nlike Islamic solidarity and the brotherhood of all True Believers. The\nresult has been a subtle coloration of the new by the old, so that even\nwhen Moslems use our exact words, \"nationality,\" \"race,\" etc., their\nconception of what those words mean is distinctly different from ours.\nThese differences in fact extend to all political concepts. Take the\nword \"State,\" for example. The typical Mohammedan state is not, like\nthe typical Western state, a sharply defined unit, with fixed boundaries\nand full sovereignty exercised everywhere within its frontiers. It is\nmore or less an amorphous mass, with a central nucleus, the seat of an\nauthority which shades off into ill-defined, anarchic independence. Of\ncourse, in the past half-century, most Mohammedan states have tried to\nremodel themselves on Western lines, but the traditional tendency is\ntypified by Afghanistan, where the tribes of the Indian north-west\nfrontier, though nominally Afghan, enjoy practical independence and have\nfrequently conducted private wars of their own against the British which\nthe Ameer has disavowed and for which the British have not held him\nresponsible.\n\nSimilarly with the term \"Nationality.\" In Moslem eyes, a man need not\nbe born or formally naturalized to be a member of a certain Moslem\n\"Nationality.\" Every Moslem is more or less at home in every part of\nIslam, so a man may just happen into a particular country and thereby\nbecome at once, if he wishes, a national in good standing. For\nexample: \"Egypt for the Egyptians\" does not mean precisely what we\nthink. Let a Mohammedan of Algiers or Damascus settle in Cairo.\nNothing prevents him from acting, and being considered as, an\n\"Egyptian Nationalist\" in the full sense of the term. This is because\nIslam has always had a distinct idea of territorial as well as\nspiritual unity. All predominantly Mohammedan lands are believed by\nMoslems to constitute \"Dar-ul-Islam,\"[167] which is in a sense the\njoint possession of all Moslems and which all Moslems are jointly\nobligated to defend. That is the reason why alien encroachments on any\nMoslem land are instantly resented by Moslems at the opposite end of\nthe Moslem world, who could have no possible material interest in the\nmatter.\n\nWe are now better able to understand how many Moslem thinkers, combining\nthe Western concept of nationality with the traditional idea of\nDar-ul-Islam, have evolved a new synthesis of the two, expressed by the\nterm \"Pan-Islamic Nationalism.\" This trend of thought is well set forth\nby an Indian Moslem, who writes: \"In the West, the whole science of\ngovernment rests on the axiom that the essential divisions of humanity\nare determined by considerations of race and geography; but for\nOrientals these ideas are very far from being axioms. For them, humanity\ndivides according to religious beliefs. The unity is no longer the\nnation or the State, but the 'Millah.'[168] Europeans see in this a\ncounterpart to their Middle Ages--a stage which Islam should pass\nthrough on its way to modernity in the Western sense. How badly they\nunderstand how religion looks to a Mohammedan! They forget that Islam is\nnot only a religion, but also a social organization, a form of culture,\nand a nationality.... The principle of Islamic fraternity--of\nPan-Islamism, if you prefer the word--is analogous to patriotism, but\nwith this difference: this Islamic fraternity, though resulting in\nidentity of laws and customs, has not (like Western Nationality) been\nbrought about by community of race, country, or history, but has been\nreceived, as we believe, directly from God.\"[169]\n\nPan-Islamic nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon and has not\nbeen doctrinally worked out. Nevertheless it is visible throughout the\nMoslem world and is gaining in strength, particularly in regions like\nNorth Africa and India, where strong territorial patriotism has, for one\nreason or another, not developed. As a French writer remarks:\n\"Mohammedan Nationalism is not an isolated or sporadic agitation. It is\na broad tide, which is flowing over the whole Islamic world of Asia,\nIndia, and Africa. Nationalism is a new form of the Mohammedan faith,\nwhich, far from being undermined by contact with European civilization,\nseems to have discovered a surplus of religious fervour, and which, in\nits desire for expansion and proselytism, tends to realize its unity by\nrousing the fanaticism of the masses, by directing the political\ntendencies of the elites, and by sowing everywhere the seeds of a\ndangerous agitation.\"[170] Pan-Islamic nationalism may thus, in the\nfuture, become a major factor which will have to be seriously reckoned\nwith.[171]\n\n\n                                 III\n\nSo ends our survey of nationalist movements in the Moslem world. Given\nsuch a tangled complex of aspirations, enormously stimulated by\nArmageddon, it was only natural that the close of the Great War should\nhave left the Orient a veritable welter of unrest. Obviously, anything\nlike a constructive settlement could have been effected only by the\nexercise of true statesmanship of the highest order. Unfortunately, the\nVersailles peace conference was devoid of true statesmanship, and the\nresulting \"settlement\" not only failed to give peace to Europe but\ndisclosed an attitude toward the East inspired by the pre-war spirit of\npredatory imperialism and cynical _Realpolitik_. Apparently oblivious of\nthe mighty psychological changes which the war had wrought, and of the\nconsequent changes of attitude and policy required, the victorious\nAllies proceeded to treat the Orient as though Armageddon were a\nskirmish and Asia the sleeping giant of a century ago.\n\nIn fact, disregarding both the general pronouncements of liberal\nprinciples and the specific promises of self-determination for Near\nEastern peoples which they had made during the war, the Allies now\nparaded a series of secret treaties (negotiated between themselves\nduring those same war-years when they had been so unctuously orating),\nand these secret treaties clearly divided up the Ottoman Empire among\nthe victors, in absolute disregard of the wishes of the inhabitants. The\npurposes of the Allies were further revealed by the way in which the\nVersailles conference refused to receive the representatives of Persia\n(theoretically still independent), but kept them cooling their heels in\nParis while British pressure at Teheran forced the Shah's government to\nenter into an \"agreement\" that made Persia a virtual protectorate of the\nBritish Empire. As for the Egyptians, who had always protested against\nthe protectorate proclaimed by England solely on its own initiative in\n1914, the conference refused to pay any attention to their delegates,\nand they were given to understand that the conference regarded the\nBritish protectorate over Egypt as a _fait accompli_. The upshot was\nthat, as a result of the war, European domination over the Near and\nMiddle East was riveted rather than relaxed.\n\nBut the strangest feature of this strange business remains to be told.\nOne might imagine that the Allied leaders would have realized that they\nwere playing a dangerous game, which could succeed only by close\nteam-work and quick action. As a matter of fact, the very reverse was\nthe case. After showing their hand, and thereby filling the East with\ndisillusionment, despair, and fury, the Allies proceeded to quarrel over\nthe spoils. Nearly two years passed before England, France, and Italy\nwere able to come to an even superficial agreement as to the partition\nof the Ottoman Empire, and meanwhile they had been bickering and\nintriguing against each other all over the Near East. This was sheer\nmadness. The destined victims were thereby informed that European\ndomination rested not only on disregard of the moral \"imponderables\" but\non diplomatic bankruptcy as well. The obvious reflection was that a\ndomination resting on such rotten foundations might well be overthrown.\n\nThat, at any rate, is the way multitudes of Orientals read the\nsituation, and their rebellious feelings were stimulated not merely by\nconsciousness of their own strength and Western disunion, but also by\nthe active encouragement of a new ally--Bolshevik Russia. Russian\nBolshevism had thrown down the gauntlet to Western civilization, and in\nthe desperate struggle which was now on, the Bolshevik leaders saw with\nterrible glee the golden opportunities vouchsafed them in the East. The\ndetails of Bolshevik activity in the Orient will be considered in the\nchapter on Social Unrest. Suffice it to remember here that Bolshevik\npropaganda is an important element in that profound ferment which\nextends over the whole Near and Middle East; a ferment which has reduced\nsome regions to the verge of chaos and which threatens to increase\nrather than diminish in the immediate future.\n\nTo relate all the details of contemporary Eastern unrest would fill a\nbook in itself. Let us here content ourselves with considering the chief\ncentres of this unrest, remembering always that it exists throughout the\nMoslem world from French North Africa to Central Asia and the Dutch\nIndies. The centres to be here surveyed will be Egypt, Persia, and the\nTurkish and Arab regions of the former Ottoman Empire. A fifth main\ncentre of unrest--India--will be discussed in the next chapter.\n\nThe gathering storm first broke in Egypt. During the war Egypt, flooded\nwith British troops and subjected to the most stringent martial law, had\nremained quiet, but it was the quiet of repression, not of passivity.\nWe have seen how, with the opening years of the twentieth century,\nvirtually all educated Egyptians had become more or less impregnated\nwith nationalist ideas, albeit a large proportion of them believed in\nevolutionary rather than revolutionary methods. The chief hope of the\nmoderates had been the provisional character of English rule. So long as\nEngland declared herself merely in \"temporary occupation\" of Egypt,\nanything was possible. But the proclamation of the protectorate in 1914,\nwhich declared Egypt part of the British Empire, entirely changed the\nsituation. Even the most moderate nationalists felt that the future was\ndefinitely prejudged against them and that the door had been irrevocably\nclosed upon their ultimate aspirations. The result was that the\nmoderates were driven over to the extremists and were ready to join the\nlatter in violent action as soon as opportunity might offer.\n\nThe extreme nationalists had of course protested bitterly against the\nprotectorate from the first, and the close of the war saw a delegation\ncomposed of both nationalist wings proceed to Paris to lay their claims\nbefore the Versailles conference. Rebuffed by the conference, which\nrecognized the British protectorate over Egypt as part of the peace\nsettlement, the Egyptian delegation issued a formal protest warning of\ntrouble. This protest read:\n\n\"We have knocked at door after door, but have received no answer. In\nspite of the definite pledges given by the statesmen at the head of the\nnations which won the war, to the effect that their victory would mean\nthe triumph of Right over Might and the establishment of the principle\nof self-determination for small nations, the British protectorate over\nEgypt was written into the treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain\nwithout the people of Egypt being consulted as to their political\nstatus.\n\n\"This crime against our nation, a breach of good faith on the part of\nthe Powers who have declared that they are forming in the same Treaty a\nSociety of Nations, will not be consummated without a solemn warning\nthat the people of Egypt consider the decision taken at Paris null and\nvoid.... If our voice is not heard, it will be only because the blood\nalready shed has not been enough to overthrow the old world-order and\ngive birth to a new world-order.\"[172]\n\nBefore these lines had appeared in type, trouble in Egypt had begun.\nSimultaneously with the arrival of the Egyptian delegation at Paris, the\nnationalists in Egypt laid their demands before the British authorities.\nThe nationalist programme demanded complete self-government for Egypt,\nleaving England only a right of supervision over the public debt and the\nSuez Canal. The nationalists' strength was shown by the fact that these\nproposals were indorsed by the Egyptian cabinet recently appointed by\nthe Khedive at British suggestion. In fact, the Egyptian Premier,\nRoushdi Pasha, asked to be allowed to go to London with some of his\ncolleagues for a hearing. This placed the British authorities in Egypt\nin a distinctly trying position. However, they determined to stand firm,\nand accordingly answered that England could not abandon its\nresponsibility for the continuance of order and good government in\nEgypt, now a British protectorate and an integral part of the empire,\nand that no useful purpose would be served by allowing the Egyptian\nleaders to go to London and there advance immoderate demands which could\nnot possibly be entertained.\n\nThe English attitude was firm. The Egyptian attitude was no less firm.\nThe cabinet at once resigned, no new cabinet could be formed, and the\nBritish High Commissioner, General Allenby, was forced to assume\nunveiled control. Meanwhile the nationalists announced that they were\ngoing to hold a plebiscite to determine the attitude of the Egyptian\npeople. Forbidden by the British authorities, the plebiscite was\nnevertheless illegally held, and resulted, according to the\nnationalists, in an overwhelming popular indorsement of their demands.\nThis defiant attitude determined the British on strong action.\nAccordingly, in the spring of 1919, most of the nationalist leaders were\nseized and deported to Malta.\n\nEgypt's answer was an explosion. From one end of the country to the\nother, Egypt flamed into rebellion. Everywhere it was the same story.\nRailways and telegraph lines were systematically cut. Trains were\nstalled and looted. Isolated British officers and soldiers were\nmurdered. In Cairo alone, thousands of houses were sacked by the mob.\nSoon the danger was rendered more acute by the irruption out of the\ndesert of swarms of Bedouin Arabs bent on plunder. For a few days Egypt\ntrembled on the verge of anarchy, and the British Government admitted in\nParliament that all Egypt was in a state of insurrection.\n\nThe British authorities met the crisis with vigour and determination.\nThe number of British troops in Egypt was large, trusty black regiments\nwere hurried up from the Sudan, and the well-disciplined Egyptian native\npolice generally obeyed orders. After several weeks of sharp fighting\nand heavy loss of life, Egypt was again gotten under control.\n\nOrder was restored, but the outlook was ominous in the extreme. Only the\npresence of massed British and Sudanese troops enabled order to be\nmaintained. Even the application of stern martial law could not prevent\ncontinuous nationalist demonstrations, sometimes ending in riots,\nfighting, and heavy loss of life. The most serious aspect of the\nsituation was that not only were the upper classes solidly nationalist,\nbut they had behind them the hitherto passive fellah millions. The\nwar-years had borne hard on the fellaheen. Military exigencies had\ncompelled Britain to conscript fully a million of them for forced\nlabour in the Near East and even in Europe, while there had also been\nwholesale requisitions of grain, fodder, and other supplies. These\nthings had caused profound discontent and had roused among the fellaheen\nnot merely passive dislike but active hatred of British rule.\nAuthoritative English experts on Egypt were seriously alarmed. Shortly\nafter the riots Sir William Willcocks, the noted engineer, said in a\npublic statement: \"The keystone of the British occupation of Egypt was\nthe fact that the fellaheen were for it. The Sheikhs, Omdehs, governing\nclasses, and high religious heads might or might not be hostile, but\nnothing counted for much while the millions of fellaheen were solid for\nthe occupation. The British have undoubtedly to-day lost the friendship\nand confidence of the fellaheen.\" And Sir Valentine Chirol stated in the\nLondon _Times_: \"We are now admittedly face to face with the ominous\nfact that for the first time since the British occupation large numbers\nof the Egyptian fellaheen, who owe far more to us than does any other\nclass of Egyptians, have been worked up into a fever of bitter\ndiscontent and hatred. Very few people at home, even in responsible\nquarters, have, I think, the slightest conception of the very dangerous\ndegree of tension which has now been reached out here.\"\n\nAll foreign observers were impressed by the nationalist feeling which\nunited all creeds and classes. Regarding the monster demonstrations held\nduring the summer of 1919, an Italian publicist wrote: \"For the first\ntime in history, the banners flown showed the Crescent interwoven with\nthe Cross. Until a short time ago the two elements were as distinct from\neach other as each of them was from the Jews. To-day, precisely as has\nhappened in India among the Mussulmans and the Hindus, every trace of\nreligious division has departed. All Egyptians are enrolled under a\nsingle banner. Every one behind his mask of silence is burning with the\nsame faith, and confident that his cause will ultimately triumph.\"[173]\nAnd a Frenchwoman, a lifelong resident of Egypt, wrote: \"We have seen\nsurprising things in this country, so often divided by party and\nreligious struggles: Coptic priests preaching in mosques, ulemas\npreaching in Christian churches; Syrian, Maronite, or Mohammedan\nstudents; women, whether of Turkish or Egyptian blood, united in the\nsame fervour, the same ardent desire to see break over their ancient\nland the radiant dawn of independence. For those who, like myself, have\nknown the Egypt of Tewfik, the attitude of the women these last few\nyears is the most surprising transformation that has happened in the\nvalley of the Nile. One should have seen the nonchalant life, the almost\ncomplete indifference to anything savouring of politics, to appreciate\nthe enormous steps taken in the last few months. For example: last\nsummer a procession of women demonstrators was surrounded by British\nsoldiers with fixed bayonets. One of the women, threatened by a soldier,\nturned on him, baring her breast, and cried: 'Kill me, then, so that\nthere may be another Miss Cavell.'\"[174]\n\nFaced by this unprecedented nationalist fervour, Englishmen on the spot\nwere of two opinions. Some, like Sir William Willcocks and Sir Valentine\nChirol, stated that extensive concessions must be made.[175] Other\nqualified observers asserted that concessions would be weakness and\nwould spell disaster. Said Sir M. McIlwraith: \"Five years of a\nNationalist regime would lead to hopeless chaos and disorder.... If\nEgypt is not to fall back into the morass of bankruptcy and anarchy from\nwhich we rescued her in 1882, with the still greater horrors of\nBolshevism, of which there are already sinister indications,\nsuperadded, Britain must not loosen her control.\"[176] In England the\nEgyptian situation caused grave disquietude, and in the summer of 1919\nthe British Government announced the appointment of a commission of\ninquiry headed by Lord Milner to investigate fully into Egyptian\naffairs.\n\nThe appointment was a wise one. Lord Milner was one of the ablest\nfigures in British political life, a man of long experience with\nimperial problems, including that of Egypt, and possessed of a\ntemperament equally remote from the doctrinaire liberal or the hidebound\nconservative. In short, Lord Milner was a _realist_, in the true sense\nof the word, as his action soon proved. Arriving in Egypt at the\nbeginning of 1920, Lord Milner and his colleagues found themselves\nconfronted with a most difficult situation. In Egypt the word had gone\nforth to boycott the commission, and not merely nationalist politicians\nbut also religious leaders like the Grand Mufti refused even to discuss\nmatters unless the commissioners would first agree to Egyptian\nindependence. This looked like a deadlock. Nevertheless, by infinite\ntact and patience, Lord Milner finally got into free and frank\ndiscussion with Zagloul Pasha and the other responsible nationalist\nleaders.\n\nHis efforts were undoubtedly helped by certain developments within Egypt\nitself. In Egypt, as elsewhere in the East, there were appearing\nsymptoms not merely of political but also of social unrest. New types of\nagitators were springing up, preaching to the populace the most extreme\nrevolutionary doctrines. These youthful agitators disquieted the regular\nnationalist leaders, who felt themselves threatened both as party chiefs\nand as men of social standing and property. The upshot was that, by the\nautumn of 1920, Lord Milner and Zagloul Pasha had agreed upon the basis\nof what looked like a genuine compromise. According to the intimations\nthen given out to the press, and later confirmed by the nature of Lord\nMilner's official report, the lines of the tentative agreement ran as\nfollows: England was to withdraw her protectorate and was to declare\nEgypt independent. This independence was qualified to about the same\nextent that Cuba's is toward the United States. Egypt was to have\ncomplete self-government, both the British garrison and British civilian\nofficials being withdrawn. Egypt was, however, to make a perpetual\ntreaty of alliance with Great Britain, was to agree not to make treaties\nwith other Powers save with Britain's consent, and was to grant Britain\na military and naval station for the protection of the Suez Canal and of\nEgypt itself in case of sudden attack by foreign enemies. The vexed\nquestion of the Sudan was left temporarily open.\n\nThese proposals bore the earmarks of genuinely constructive compromise.\nUnfortunately, they were not at once acted upon.[177] Both in England\nand in Egypt they roused strong opposition. In England adverse official\ninfluences held up the commission's report till February, 1921. In Egypt\nthe extreme nationalists denounced Zagloul Pasha as a traitor, though\nmoderate opinion seemed substantially satisfied. The commission's\nreport, as finally published, declared that the grant of self-government\nto Egypt could not be safely postponed; that the nationalist spirit\ncould not be extinguished; that an attempt to govern Egypt in the teeth\nof a hostile people would be \"a difficult and disgraceful task\"; and\nthat it would be a great misfortune if the present opportunity for a\nsettlement were lost. However, the report was not indorsed by the\nBritish Government in its entirety, and Lord Milner forthwith resigned.\nAs for Zagloul Pasha, he still maintains his position as nationalist\nleader, but his authority has been gravely shaken. Such is the\nsituation of Egypt at this present writing: a situation frankly not so\nencouraging as it was last year.\n\nMeanwhile the storm which had begun in Egypt had long since spread to\nother parts of the Near East. In fact, by the opening months of 1920,\nthe storm-centre had shifted to the Ottoman Empire. For this the Allies\nthemselves were largely to blame. Of course a constructive settlement of\nthese troubled regions would have been very difficult. Still, it might\nnot have proved impossible if Allied policy had been fair and\nabove-board. The close of the war found the various peoples of the\nOttoman Empire hopeful that the liberal war-aims professed by the Allied\nspokesmen would be redeemed. The Arab elements were notably hopeful,\nbecause they had been given a whole series of Allied promises (shortly\nto be repudiated, as we shall presently see), while even the beaten\nTurks were not entirely bereft of hope in the future. Besides the\ngeneral pronouncements of liberal treatment as formulated in the\n\"Fourteen Points\" programme of President Wilson and indorsed by the\nAllies, the Turks had pledges of a more specific character, notably by\nPremier Lloyd George, who, on January 5, 1918, had said: \"Nor are we\nfighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned\nlands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in\nrace.\" In other words, the Turks were given unequivocally to understand\nthat, while their rule over non-Turkish regions like the Arab provinces\nmust cease, the Turkish regions of the empire were not to pass under\nalien rule, but were to form a Turkish national state. The Turks did not\nknow about a series of secret treaties between the Allies, begun in\n1915, which partitioned practically the whole of Asia Minor between the\nAllied Powers. These were to come out a little later. For the moment the\nTurks might hope.\n\nIn the case of the Arabs there were far brighter grounds for\nnationalist hopes--and far darker depths of Allied duplicity. We have\nalready mentioned the Arab revolt of 1916, which, beginning in the\nHedjaz under the leadership of the Shereef of Mecca, presently spread\nthrough all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and contributed so\nlargely to the collapse of Turkish resistance. This revolt was, however,\nnot a sudden, unpremeditated thing. It had been carefully planned, and\nwas due largely to Allied backing--and Allied promises. From the very\nbeginning of the war Arab nationalist malcontents had been in touch with\nthe British authorities in Egypt. They were warmly welcomed and\nencouraged in their separatist schemes, because an Arab rebellion would\nobviously be of invaluable assistance to the British in safeguarding\nEgypt and the Suez Canal, to say nothing of an advance into Turkish\nterritory.\n\nThe Arabs, however, asked not merely material aid but also definite\npromises that their rebellion should be rewarded by the formation of an\nArab state embracing the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.\nUnfortunately for Arab nationalist aspirations, the British and French\nGovernments had their own ideas as to the future of Turkey's Arab\nprovinces. Both England and France had long possessed \"spheres of\ninfluence\" in those regions. The English sphere was in southern\nMesopotamia at the head of the Persian Gulf. The French sphere was the\nLebanon, a mountainous district in northern Syria just inland from the\nMediterranean coast, where the population, known as Maronites, were\nRoman Catholics, over whom France had long extended her diplomatic\nprotection. Of course both these districts were legally Turkish\nterritory. Also, both were small in area. But \"spheres of influence\" are\nelastic things. Under favourable circumstances they are capable of\nsudden expansion to an extraordinary degree. Such a circumstance was the\nGreat War. Accordingly the British and French Foreign Offices put their\nheads together and on March 5, 1915, the two governments signed a\nsecret treaty by the terms of which France was given a \"predominant\nposition\" in Syria and Britain a predominant position in Mesopotamia. No\ndefinite boundaries were then assigned, but the intent was to stake out\nclaims which would partition Turkey's Arab provinces between England and\nFrance.\n\nNaturally the existence of this secret treaty was an embarrassment to\nthe British officials in Egypt in their negotiations with the Arabs.\nHowever, an Arab rebellion was too valuable an asset to be lost, and the\nBritish negotiators finally evolved a formula which satisfied the Arab\nleaders. On October 25, 1915, the Shereef of Mecca's representative at\nCairo was given a document by the Governor-General of Egypt, Sir Henry\nMcMahon, in which Great Britain undertook, conditional upon an Arab\nrevolt, to recognize the independence of the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire\nexcept in southern Mesopotamia, where British interests required special\nmeasures of administrative control, and also except areas where Great\nBritain was \"not free to act without detriment to the interests of\nFrance.\" This last clause was of course a \"joker.\" However, it achieved\nits purpose. The Arabs, knowing nothing about the secret treaty,\nsupposed it referred merely to the restricted district of the Lebanon.\nThey went home jubilant, to prepare the revolt which broke out next\nyear.\n\nThe revolt began in November, 1916. It might not have begun at all had\nthe Arabs known what had happened the preceding May. In that month\nEngland and France signed another secret treaty, the celebrated\nSykes-Picot Agreement. This agreement definitely partitioned Turkey's\nArab provinces along the lines suggested in the initial secret treaty of\nthe year before. By the Sykes-Picot Agreement most of Mesopotamia was to\nbe definitely British, while the Syrian coast from Tyre to Alexandretta\nwas to be definitely French, together with extensive Armenian and Asia\nMinor regions to the northward. Palestine was to be \"international,\"\nalbeit its chief seaport, Haifa, was to be British, and the implication\nwas that Palestine fell within the English sphere. As to the great\nhinterland lying between Mesopotamia and the Syrian coast, it was to be\n\"independent Arab under two spheres of influence,\" British and French;\nthe French sphere embracing all the rest of Syria from Aleppo to\nDamascus, the English sphere embracing all the rest of Mesopotamia--the\nregion about Mosul. In other words, the independence promised the Arabs\nby Sir Henry McMahon had vanished into thin air.\n\nThis little shift behind the scenes was of course not communicated to\nthe Arabs. On the contrary, the British did everything possible to\nstimulate Arab nationalist hopes--this being the best way to extract\ntheir fighting zeal against the Turks. The British Government sent the\nArabs a number of picked intelligence officers, notably a certain\nColonel Lawrence, an extraordinary young man who soon gained unbounded\ninfluence over the Arab chiefs and became known as \"The Soul of the\nArabian Revolution.\"[178] These men, chosen for their knowledge of, and\nsympathy for, the Arabs, were not informed about the secret treaties, so\nthat their encouragement of Arab zeal might not be marred by any lack of\nsincerity. Similarly, the British generals were prodigal of promises in\ntheir proclamations.[179] The climax of this blessed comedy occurred at\nthe very close of the war, when the British and French Governments\nissued the following joint declaration which was posted throughout the\nArab provinces: \"The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in\nwaging in the East the war let loose upon the world by German ambition,\nis to insure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples,\nso long oppressed by Turks, and to establish national governments and\nadministrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative\nand free will of the people themselves.\"\n\nThis climax was, however, followed by a swift _denouement_. The war was\nover, the enemy was beaten, the comedy was ended, the curtain was rung\ndown, and on that curtain the Arabs read--the inner truth of things.\nFrench troops appeared to occupy the Syrian coast, the secret treaties\ncame out, and the Arabs learned how they had been tricked. Black and\nbitter was their wrath. Probably they would have exploded at once had it\nnot been for their cool-headed chiefs, especially Prince Feisal, the son\nof the Shereef of Mecca, who had proved himself a real leader of men\nduring the war and who had now attained a position of unquestioned\nauthority. Feisal knew the Allies' military strength and realized how\nhazardous war would be, especially at that time. Feeling the moral\nstrength of the Arab position, he besought his countrymen to let him\nplead Arabia's cause before the impending peace conference, and he had\nhis way. During the year 1919 the Arab lands were quiet, though it was\nthe quiet of suspense.\n\nPrince Feisal pleaded his case before the peace conference with\neloquence and dignity. But Feisal failed. The covenant of the League of\nNations might contain the benevolent statement that \"certain communities\nformerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of\ndevelopment where their existence as independent nations can be\nprovisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative\nadvice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to\nstand alone.\"[180] The Arabs knew what \"mandatories\" meant. Lloyd George\nmight utter felicitous phrases such as \"Arab forces have redeemed the\npledges given to Great Britain, and we should redeem our pledges.\"[181]\nThe Arabs had read the secret treaties. \"In vain is the net spread in\nthe sight of any bird.\" The game no longer worked. The Arabs knew that\nthey must rely on their own efforts, either in diplomacy or war.\n\nFeisal still counselled peace. He was probably influenced to this not\nmerely by the risks of armed resistance but also by the fact that the\nAllies were now quarrelling among themselves. These quarrels of course\nextended all over the Near East, but there was none more bitter than the\nquarrel which had broken out between England and France over the\ndivision of the Arab spoils. This dispute originated in French\ndissatisfaction with the secret treaties. No sooner had the Sykes-Picot\nAgreement been published than large and influential sections of French\nopinion began shouting that they had been duped. For generations French\nimperialists had had their eye on Syria,[182] and since the beginning of\nthe war the imperialist press had been conducting an ardent propaganda\nfor wholesale annexations in the Near East. \"La Syrie integrale!\" \"All\nSyria!\" was the cry. And this \"all\" included not merely the coast-strip\nassigned France by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but also Palestine and the\nvast Aleppo-Damascus hinterland right across to the rich oil-fields of\nMosul. To this entire region, often termed in French expansionist\ncircles \"La France du Levant,\" the imperialists asserted that France had\n\"imprescriptible historic rights running back to the Crusades and even\nto Charlemagne.\" Syria was a \"second Alsace,\" which held out its arms to\nFrance and would not be denied. It was also the indispensable fulcrum of\nFrench world-policy. These imperialist aspirations had powerful backing\nin French Government circles. For example, early in 1915, M. Leygues had\nsaid in the Chamber of Deputies: \"The axis of French policy is in the\nMediterranean. One of its poles is in the West, at Algiers, Tunis, and\nMorocco. The other must lie in the East, with Syria, Lebanon,\nPalestine.\"[183]\n\nAfter such high hopes, the effect of the Sykes-Picot Agreement on French\nimperialists can be imagined. Their anger turned naturally upon the\nEnglish, who were roundly denounced and blamed for everything that was\nhappening in the East, Arab nationalist aspirations being stigmatized as\nnothing but British propaganda. Cried one French writer: \"Some\npsychiatrist ought to write a study of these British colonial officials,\nimplacable imperialists, megalomaniacs, who, night and day, work for\ntheir country without even asking counsel from London, and whose\nconstant care is to annihilate in Syria, as they once annihilated in\nEgypt, the supremacy of France.\"[184] In answer to such fulminations,\nEnglish writers scored French \"greed\" and \"folly\" which was compromising\nEngland's prestige and threatening to set the whole East on fire.[185]\nIn fine, there was a very pretty row on between people who, less than a\nyear before, had been pledging their \"sacred union\" for all eternity.\nThe Arabs were certainly much edified, and the other Eastern peoples as\nwell.\n\nLargely owing to these bickerings, Allied action in the Near East was\ndelayed through 1919. But by the spring of 1920 the Allies came to a\nmeasure of agreement. The meeting of the Allied Premiers at San Remo\nelaborated the terms of the treaty to be imposed on Turkey, dividing\nAsia Minor into spheres of influence and exploitation, while the Arab\nprovinces were assigned England and France according to the terms of the\nSykes-Picot Agreement--properly camouflaged, of course, as \"mandates\" of\nthe League of Nations. England, France, and their satellite, Greece,\nprepared for action. British reinforcements were sent to Mesopotamia and\nPalestine; French reinforcements were sent to Syria; an\nAnglo-Franco-Greek force prepared to occupy Constantinople, and Premier\nVenizelos promised a Greek army for Asia Minor contingencies. The one\nrift in the lute was Italy. Italy saw big trouble brewing and determined\nnot to be directly involved. Said Premier Nitti to an English journalist\nafter the San Remo conference: \"You will have war in Asia Minor, and\nItaly will not send a single soldier nor pay a single lira. You have\ntaken from the Turks their sacred city of Adrianople; you have placed\ntheir capital city under foreign control; you have taken from them every\nport and the larger part of their territory; and the five Turkish\ndelegates whom you will select will sign a treaty which will not have\nthe sanction of the Turkish people or the Turkish Parliament.\"\n\nPremier Nitti was a true prophet. For months past the Turkish\nnationalists, knowing what was in store for them, had been building up a\ncentre of resistance in the interior of Asia Minor. Of course the former\nnationalist leaders such as Enver Pasha had long since fled to distant\nhavens like Transcaucasia or Bolshevik Russia, but new leaders appeared,\nnotably a young officer of marked military talent, Mustapha Kemal Pasha.\nWith great energy Mustapha Kemal built up a really creditable army, and\nfrom his \"capital,\" the city of Angora in the heart of Asia Minor, he\nnow defied the Allies, emphasizing his defiance by attacking the French\ngarrisons in Cilicia (a coast district in Asia Minor just north of\nSyria), inflicting heavy losses.\n\nThe Arabs also were preparing for action. In March a \"Pan-Syrian\nCongress\" met at Damascus, unanimously declared the independence of\nSyria, and elected Feisal king. This announcement electrified all the\nArab provinces. In the French-occupied coastal zone riots broke out\nagainst the French; in Palestine there were \"pogroms\" against the Jews,\nwhom the Arabs, both Moslem and Christian, hated for their \"Zionist\"\nplans; while in Mesopotamia there were sporadic uprisings of tribesmen.\n\nFaced by this ominous situation, the \"mandatories\" took military\ncounter-measures. The French took especially vigorous action. France now\nhad nearly 100,000 men in Syria and Cilicia, headed by General Gouraud,\na veteran of many colonial wars and a believer in \"strong-arm\" methods.\nOn July 15 Gouraud sent Feisal an ultimatum requiring complete\nsubmission. Feisal, diplomatic to the last, actually accepted the\nultimatum, but Gouraud ignored this acceptance on a technicality and\nstruck for Damascus with 60,000 men. Feisal attempted no real\nresistance, fighting only a rearguard action and withdrawing into the\ndesert. On July 25 the French entered Damascus, the Arab capital,\ndeposed Feisal, and set up thoroughgoing French rule. Opposition was\npunished with the greatest severity. Damascus was mulcted of a\nwar-contribution of 10,000,000 francs, after the German fashion in\nBelgium, many nationalist leaders were imprisoned or shot, while Gouraud\nannounced that the death of \"one French subject or one Christian\" would\nbe followed by wholesale \"most terrible reprisals\" by bombing\naeroplanes.[186]\n\nBefore this Napoleonic \"thunder-stroke\" Syria bent for the moment,\napparently terrorized. In Mesopotamia, however, the British were not so\nfortunate. For some months trouble had patently been brewing, and in\nMarch the British commander had expressed himself as \"much struck with\nthe volcanic possibilities of the country.\" In July all Mesopotamia\nflamed into insurrection, and though Britain had fully 100,000 troops in\nthe province, they were hard put to it to stem the rebellion.\n\nMeanwhile, the Allies had occupied Constantinople, to force acceptance\nof the draft treaty of peace. Naturally, there was no resistance,\nConstantinople being entirely at the mercy of the Allied fleet. But the\nsilence of the vast throngs gathered to watch the incoming troops filled\nsome Allied observers with disquietude. A French journalist wrote: \"The\nsilence of the multitude was more impressive than boisterous protests.\nTheir eyes glowed with sullen hatred. Scattered through this throng of\nmute, prostrated, hopeless people circulated watchful and sinuous\nemissaries, who were to carry word of this misfortune to the remotest\nconfines of Islam. In a few hours they would be in Anatolia. A couple of\ndays later the news would have spread to Konia, Angora, and Sivas. In a\nbrief space of time it would be heralded throughout the regions of\nBolshevist influence, extending to the Caucasus and beyond. In a few\nweeks all these centres of agitation will be preparing their\ncounter-attack. Asia and Africa will again cement their union of faith.\nIntelligent agents will record in the retentive minds of people who do\nnot read, the history of our blunders. These missionaries of\ninsurrection and fanaticism come from every race and class of society.\nEducated and refined men disguise themselves as beggars and outcasts, in\norder to spread the news apace and to prepare for bitter\nvengeance.\"[187]\n\nEvents in Turkey now proceeded precisely as the Italian Premier Nitti\nhad foretold. The Allied masters of Constantinople compelled the Sultan\nto appoint a \"friendly\" cabinet which solemnly denounced Mustapha Kemal\nand his \"rebels,\" and sent a hand-picked delegation to Sevres, France,\nwhere they dutifully \"signed on the dotted line\" the treaty that the\nAllies had prepared. The Allies had thus \"imposed their will\"--on paper.\nFor every sensible man knew that the whole business was a roaring farce;\nknew that the \"friendly\" government, from Sultan to meanest clerk, was\nas nationalist as Mustapha Kemal himself; knew that the real Turkish\ncapital was not Constantinople but Angora, and that the Allies' power\nwas measured by the range of their guns. As for Mustapha Kemal, his\ncomment on the Sevres Treaty was: \"I will fight to the end of the\nworld.\"\n\nThe Allies were thus in a decidedly embarrassing situation, especially\nsince \"The Allies\" now meant only England and France. Italy was out of\nthe game. As Nitti had warned at San Remo, she would \"not send a single\nsoldier nor pay a single lira.\" With 200,000 soldiers holding down the\nArabs, and plenty of trouble elsewhere, neither France nor Britain had\nthe troops to crush Mustapha Kemal--a job which the French staff\nestimated would take 300,000 men. One weapon, however, they still\npossessed--Greece. In return for large territorial concessions, Premier\nVenizelos offered to bring the Turks to reason. His offer was accepted,\nand 100,000 Greek troops landed at Smyrna. But the Greek campaign was\nnot a success. Even 100,000 men soon wore thin when spread out over the\nvast Asia Minor plateau. Mustapha Kemal avoided decisive battle,\nharassing the Greeks by guerilla warfare just as he was harassing the\nFrench in Cilicia at the other end of the line. The Greeks \"dug in,\" and\na deadlock ensued which threatened to continue indefinitely. This soon\ncaused a new complication. Venizelos might be willing to \"carry on\" as\nthe Allies' submandatory, but the Greek people were not. Kept virtually\non a war-footing since 1912, the Greeks kicked over the traces. In the\nNovember elections they repudiated Venizelos by a vote of 990,000 to\n10,000, and recalled King Constantine, who had been deposed by the\nAllies three years before. This meant that Greece, like Italy, was out\nof the game. To be sure, King Constantine presently started hostilities\nwith the Turks on his own account. This was, however, something very\ndifferent from Greece's attitude under the Venizelist regime. The\nAllies' weapon had thus broken in their hands.\n\nMeanwhile Mustapha Kemal was not merely consolidating his authority in\nAsia Minor but was gaining allies of his own. In the first place, he was\nestablishing close relations with the Arabs. It may appear strange to\nfind such bitter foes become friends; nevertheless, Franco-British\npolicy had achieved even this seeming miracle. The reason was clearly\nexplained by no less a person than Lawrence (\"The Soul of the Arab\nRevolution\"), who had returned to civil life and was thus free to speak\nhis mind on the Eastern situation, which he did in no uncertain fashion.\nIn one of several statements given to the British press, Lawrence said:\n\"The Arabs rebelled against the Turks during the war, not because the\nTurkish Government was notably bad, but because they wanted\nindependence. They did not risk their lives in battle to change masters,\nto become British subjects or French citizens, but to win a State of\ntheir own.\" The matter was put even more pointedly by an Arab\nnationalist leader in the columns of a French radical paper opposed to\nthe Syrian adventure. Said this leader: \"Both the French and the English\nshould know once for all that the Arabs are joined by a common religion\nwith the Turks, and have been politically identified with them for\ncenturies, and therefore do not wish to separate themselves from their\nfellow believers and brothers-in-arms merely to submit to the domination\nof a European nation, no matter what form the latter's suzerainty may\nassume.... It is no use for M. Millerand to say: 'We have never thought\nof trespassing in any respect upon the independence of these people.' No\none is deceived by such statements as that. The armistice was signed in\naccordance with the conditions proclaimed by Mr. Wilson, but as soon as\nGermany and its allies were helpless, the promises of the armistice were\ntrodden underfoot, as well as the Fourteen Points. Such a violation of\nthe promises of complete independence, so prodigally made to the Arabs\non so many occasions, has resulted in re-uniting closer than ever the\nArabs and the Turks. It has taken but a few months to restore that\nintimacy.... It is probable that France, by maintaining an army of\n150,000 men in Syria, and by spending billions of francs, will be able\nto subdue the Syrian Arabs. But that will not finish the task. The\ninterior of that country borders upon other lands inhabited by Arabs,\nKurds, and Turks, and by the immense desert. In starting a conflict with\n4,000,000 Syrians, France will be making enemies of 15,000,000 Arabs in\nthe Levant, most of whom are armed tribes, without including the other\nMohammedan peoples, who are speedily acquiring solidarity and\norganization under the blows that are being dealt them by the Entente.\nIf you believe I am exaggerating, all you have to do is to investigate\nthe facts yourself. But what good will it do to confirm the truth too\nlate, and after floods of blood have flowed?\"[188]\n\nIn fact, signs of Turco-Arab co-operation became everywhere apparent. To\nbe sure, this co-operation was not openly avowed either by Mustapha\nKemal or by the deposed King Feisal who, fleeing to Italy, continued his\ndiplomatic manoeuvres. But Arabs fought beside Turks against the\nFrench in Cilicia; Turks and Kurds joined the Syrian Arabs in their\ncontinual local risings; while Kemal's hand was clearly apparent in the\nrebellion against the British in Mesopotamia.\n\nThis Arab _entente_ was not the whole of Mustapha Kemal's foreign\npolicy. He was also reaching out north-eastward to the Tartars of\nTranscaucasia and the Turkomans of Persian Azerbaidjan. The Caucasus was\nby this time the scene of a highly complicated struggle between Moslem\nTartars and Turkomans, Christian Armenians and Georgians, and various\nRussian factions, which was fast reducing that unhappy region to chaos.\nAmong the Tartar-Turkomans, long leavened by Pan-Turanian propaganda,\nMustapha Kemal found enthusiastic adherents; and his efforts were\nsupported by a third ally--Bolshevik Russia. Bolshevik policy, which, as\nwe have already stated, was seeking to stir up trouble against the\nWestern Powers throughout the East, had watched Kemal's rise with great\nsatisfaction. At first the Bolsheviki could do very little for the\nTurkish nationalists because they were not in direct touch, but the\ncollapse of Wrangel's \"White\" army in November, 1920, and the consequent\noverrunning of all south Russia by the Red armies, opened a direct line\nfrom Moscow to Angora via the Caucasus, and henceforth Mustapha Kemal\nwas supplied with money, arms, and a few men.\n\nFurthermore, Kemal and the Bolsheviki were starting trouble in Persia.\nThat country was in a most deplorable condition. During the war Persia,\ndespite her technical neutrality, had been a battle-ground between the\nAnglo-Russians on the one hand and the Turco-Germans on the other.\nRussia's collapse in 1917 had led to her military withdrawal from\nPersia, and England, profiting by the situation, had made herself\nsupreme, legalizing her position by the famous \"Agreement\" \"negotiated\"\nwith the Shah's government in August, 1919.[189] This treaty, though\nsigned and sealed in due form, was bitterly resented by the Persian\npeople. Here was obviously another ripe field for Bolshevik propaganda.\nAccordingly, the Bolshevik government renounced all rights in Persia\nacquired by the Czarist regime and proclaimed themselves the friends of\nthe Persian people against Western imperialism. Naturally the game\nworked, and Persia soon became honeycombed with militant unrest. In the\nearly summer of 1920 a Bolshevist force actually crossed the Caspian Sea\nand landed on the Persian shore. They did not penetrate far into the\ncountry. They did not need to, for the country simply effervesced in a\nway which made the British position increasingly untenable. For many\nmonths a confused situation ensued. In fact, at this writing the\nsituation is still obscure. But there can be no doubt that Britain's\nhold on Persia is gravely shaken, and she may soon be compelled to\nevacuate the country, with the possible exception of the extreme south.\n\nTurning back to the autumn of 1920: the position of England and France\nin the Near East had become far from bright. Deserted by Italy and\nGreece, defied by the Turks, harried by the Arabs, worried by the\nEgyptians and Persians, and everywhere menaced by the subtle workings of\nBolshevism, the situation was not a happy one. The burden of empire was\nproving heavy. In Mesopotamia alone the bill was already 100,000,000\nsterling, with no relief in sight.\n\nUnder these circumstances, it is not surprising that in both England and\nFrance Near Eastern policies were subjected to a growing flood of\ncriticism. In England especially the tide ran very strong. The\nMesopotamian imbroglio was denounced as both a crime and a blunder. For\nexample, Colonel Lawrence stated: \"We are to-day not far from disaster.\nOur government is worse than the old Turkish system. They kept 14,000\nlocal conscripts in the ranks and killed yearly an average of 200 Arabs\nin maintaining peace. We keep 90,000 men, with aeroplanes, armoured\ncars, gunboats, and armoured trains. We have killed about 10,000 Arabs\nin the rising this summer.\"[190] Influenced by such criticisms and by\nthe general trend of events, the British Government modified its\nattitude, sending out Sir Percy Cox to negotiate with the Arabs. Sir\nPercy Cox was a man of the Milner type, with a firm grip on realities\nand an intimate experience with Eastern affairs. Authorized to discuss\nlarge concessions, he met the nationalist leaders frankly and made a\ngood impression upon them. At this writing matters have not been\ndefinitely settled, but it looks as though England was planning to limit\nher direct control to the extreme south of Mesopotamia at the head of\nthe Persian Gulf--practically her old sphere of influence before 1914.\n\nMeanwhile, in Syria, France has thus far succeeded in maintaining\nrelative order by strong-arm methods. But the situation is highly\nunstable. All classes of the population have been alienated. Even the\nCatholic Maronites, traditionally pro-French, have begun agitating.\nGeneral Gouraud promptly squelched the agitation by deporting the\nleaders to Corsica; nevertheless, the fact remains that France's only\nreal friends in Syria are dissatisfied. Up to the present these things\nhave not changed France's attitude. A short time ago ex-Premier Leygues\nremarked of Syria, \"France will occupy all of it, and always\"; while\nstill more recently General Gouraud stated: \"France must remain in\nSyria, both for political and economic reasons. The political\nconsequences of our abandonment of the country would be disastrous. Our\nprestige and influence in the Levant and the Mediterranean would be\ndoomed. The economic interests of France also compel us to remain there.\nWhen fully developed, Syria and Cilicia will have an economic value\nfully equal to that of Egypt.\"\n\nHowever, despite the French Government's firmness, there is an\nincreasing public criticism of the \"Syrian adventure,\" not merely from\nradical anti-imperialist quarters, but from unimpeachably conservative\ncircles as well. The editor of one of the most conservative French\npolitical periodicals has stated: \"Jealous of its autonomy, the Arab\npeople, liberated from the Ottoman yoke, do not desire a new foreign\ndomination. To say that Syria demands our protection is a lie. Syria\nwishes to be entirely independent.\"[191] And recently Senator Victor\nBerard, one of France's recognized authorities on Eastern affairs made a\nspeech in the French Senate strongly criticising the Government's Syrian\npolicy from the very start and declaring that a \"free Syria\" was \"a\nquestion of both interest and honour.\"\n\nCertainly, the French Government, still so unyielding toward the Arabs,\nhas reversed its attitude toward the Turks. Side-stepping the Sevres\nTreaty, it has lately agreed on provisional peace terms with the Turkish\nnationalists, actually agreeing to evacuate Cilicia. In fact, both\nFrance and England know that the Sevres Treaty is unworkable, and that\nTurkish possession of virtually the whole of Asia Minor will have to be\nrecognized.\n\nIn negotiating with Mustapha Kemal, France undoubtedly hopes to get him\nto throw over the Arabs. But this is scarcely thinkable. The whole trend\nof events betokens an increasing solidarity of the Near Eastern peoples\nagainst Western political control. A most remarkable portent in this\ndirection is the Pan-Islamic conference held at Sivas early in 1921.\nThis conference, called to draw up a definite scheme for effective\nMoslem co-operation the world over, was attended not merely by the high\northodox Moslem dignitaries and political leaders, but also by heterodox\nchiefs like the Shiah Emir of Kerbela, the Imam Yahya, and the Zaidite\nEmir of Yemen--leaders of heretical sects between whom and the orthodox\nSunnis co-operation had previously been impossible. Most notable of all,\nthe press reports state that the conference was presided over by no\nless a personage than El Sennussi. This may well be so, for we have\nalready seen how the Sennussi have always worked for a close union of\nall Islam against Western domination.\n\nSuch is the situation in the Near East--a situation very grave and full\nof trouble. The most hopeful portent is the apparent awakening of the\nBritish Government to the growing perils of the hour, and its consequent\nmodifications of attitude. The labours of men like Lord Milner and Sir\nPercy Cox, however hampered by purblind influences, can scarcely be\nwholly barren of results. Such men are the diplomatic descendants of\nChatham and of Durham; the upholders of that great political tradition\nwhich has steered the British Empire safely through crises that appeared\nhopeless.\n\nOn the other hand, the darkest portent in the Near East is the continued\nintransigeance of France. Steeped in its old traditions, French policy\napparently refuses to face realities. If an explosion comes, as come it\nmust unless France modifies her attitude; if, some dark day, thirty or\nforty French battalions are caught in a simoom of Arab fury blowing out\nof the desert and are annihilated in a new Adowa; the regretful verdict\nof many versed in Eastern affairs can only be: \"French policy has\ndeserved it.\"\n\nLeaving the Near Eastern problem at this critical juncture to the\ninscrutable solution of the future, let us now turn to the great\npolitical problem of the Middle East--the nationalist movement in\nIndia.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[138] For these early stages of the Turkish nationalist movement, see\nVambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_; and his\n_Western Culture in Eastern Lands_. Also the articles by Leon Cahun in\n_Lavisse et Rambaud_, previously cited; and L. Rousseau, _L'Effort\nOttoman_ (Paris, 1907).\n\n[139] Berard, _Le Sultan, l'Islam et les Puissances_, p. 16 (Paris,\n1907).\n\n[140] Cited by Berard, p. 19.\n\n[141] Cited by Berard, p. 20.\n\n[142] _Le Reveil de la Nation arabe_, by Negib Azoury (Paris, 1905).\n\n[143] The semi-legendary founder of the Ottoman Empire.\n\n[144] The texts of both the above documents can be most conveniently\nfound in E. Jung, _Les Puissances devant la Revolte arabe: La Crise\nmondiale de Demain_, pp. 23-25 (Paris, 1906).\n\n[145] A good analysis of Arab affairs on the eve of the Great War is\nthat of the Moslem publicist \"X,\" \"Les Courants politiques dans le Monde\narabe,\" _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1913. Also see G. W. Bury,\n_Arabia Infelix, or the Turks in Yemen_ (London, 1915).\n\n[146] For Arab affairs during the Great War, see E. Jung,\n\"L'Independance arabe et la Revolte actuelle,\" _La Revue_, 1 August,\n1916; I. D. Levine, \"Arabs versus Turks,\" _American Review of Reviews_,\nNovember, 1916; A. Musil, _Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien_ (Leipzig,\n1918); G. W. Bury, _Pan-Islam_ (London, 1919); S. Mylrea, \"The\nPolitico-Religious Situation in Arabia,\" _The Moslem World_, July, 1919;\nL. Thomas, \"Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution,\" _Asia_,\nApril, May, June, 1920.\n\n[147] Georg Schweinfurth, _Die Wiedergeburt Aegyptens im Lichte eines\naufgeklaerten Islam_ (Berlin, 1895).\n\n[148] Low, _Egypt in Transition_, p. 260 (London, 1914).\n\n[149] _The Asiatic Review_, April, 1914.\n\n[150] \"L'Egypte et les Debuts du Protectorat,\" _Revue des Sciences\nPolitiques_, 15 June, 1915.\n\n[151] Mohammed Farid Bey, \"L'Egypte et la Guerre,\" _Revue Politique\nInternationale_, May, 1915.\n\n[152] Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, \"Die aegyptische Frage,\" _Asien_, November,\n1916.\n\n[153] A good summary of Berber history is H. Weisgerber, _Les Blancs\nd'Afrique_ (Paris, 1910).\n\n[154] For analyses of differences between Arabs and Berbers, see Caix de\nSaint-Aymour, _Arabes et Kabyles_ (Paris, 1891); A. Bel, _Coup d'Oeil\nsur l'Islam en Berberie_ (Paris, 1917).\n\n[155] For short historical summary, see A. C. Coolidge, \"The European\nReconquest of North Africa,\" _American Historical Review_, July, 1912.\n\n[156] For these nationalist movements in French North Africa, see A.\nServier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_ (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); P.\nLapie, _Les Civilisations tunisiennes_ (Paris, 1898); P. Millet, \"Les\nJeunes-Algeriens,\" _Revue de Paris_, 1 November, 1913.\n\n[157] A good analysis of the pre-revolutionary reformist movements is\nfound in \"X,\" \"La Situation politique de la Perse,\" _Revue du Monde\nmusulman_, June, 1914. See also Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern\nLands_; General Sir T. E. Gordon, \"The Reform Movement in Persia,\"\n_Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_, 13 March, 1907.\n\n[158] See W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York,\n1912). Also, for earlier phase of the revolution, see E. G. Browne, _The\nRevolution in Persia_ (London, 1910).\n\n[159] E. G. Browne, \"The Present Situation in Persia,\" _Contemporary\nReview_, November, 1912.\n\n[160] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, pp.\n11-12.\n\n[161] For the Tartar revival, see S. Brobovnikov, \"Moslems in Russia,\"\n_The Moslem World_, January, 1911; Fevret, \"Les Tatars de Crimee,\"\n_Revue du Monde musulman_, August, 1907; A. Le Chatelier, \"Les Musulmans\nrusses,\" _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1906; Fr. von Mackay, \"Die\nErweckung Russlands asiatischen Voelkerschaften,\" _Deutsche Rundschau_,\nMarch, 1918; Arminius Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_; H.\nWilliams, \"The Russian Mohammedans,\" _Russian Review_, February, 1914;\n\"X,\" \"Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme,\" _Revue du Monde musulman_,\nMarch, 1913.\n\n[162] For these activities, see article by \"X,\" quoted above; also Ahmed\nEmin, _The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press_ (New\nYork, 1914).\n\n[163] For these Pan-Turanian tendencies in Hungary and Bulgaria, see my\narticle \"Pan-Turanism,\" _American Political Science Review_, February,\n1917.\n\n[164] See article by \"X,\" quoted above; also his article \"Les Courants\npolitiques dans la Turquie contemporaine,\" _Revue du Monde musulman_,\nDecember, 1912.\n\n[165] Ex-Chief of General Staff (Ottoman) Ernst Paraquin, in the\n_Berliner Tageblatt_, January 24, 1920. For Turkish nationalist\nactivities and attitudes during the war, see further I. D. 1199--_A\nManual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism. Compiled by the\nGeographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff,\nAdmiralty_ (London, 1919); E. F. Benson, _Crescent and Iron Cross_\n(London, 1918); M. A. Czaplicka, _The Turks of Central Asia: An Inquiry\ninto the Pan-Turanian Problem_ (Oxford, 1918); H. Morgenthau,\n_Ambassador Morgenthau's Story_ (New York, 1918); Dr. Harry Stuermer,\n_Two War-Years in Constantinople_ (New York, 1917); A. Mandelstam, \"The\nTurkish Spirit,\" _New Europe_, April 22, 1920.\n\n[166] For Pan-Arab developments, see A. Musil, _Zur Zeitgeschichte von\nArabien_ (Leipzig, 1918); M. Pickthall, \"Turkey, England, and the\nPresent Crisis,\" _Asiatic Review_, October 1, 1914; A. Servier, _Le\nNationalisme musulman_; Sheick Abd-el-Aziz Schauisch, \"Das Machtgebiet\nder arabischen Sprache,\" _Preussische Jahrbuecher_, September, 1916.\n\n[167] Literally \"House of Islam.\" All non-Moslem lands are collectively\nknown as \"Dar-ul-Harb\" or \"House of War.\"\n\n[168] _I. e._, the organized group of followers of a particular\nreligion.\n\n[169] Mohammed Ali, \"Le Mouvement musulman dans l'Inde,\" _Revue\nPolitique Internationale_, January, 1914. He headed the so-called\n\"Khilafat Delegation\" sent by the Indian Moslems to England in 1919 to\nprotest against the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the peace\ntreaties.\n\n[170] A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, p. 181.\n\n[171] For Pan-Islamic nationalism, besides Servier and Mohammed Ali,\nquoted above, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvieme Siecle_\n(Paris, 1888); same author, \"Politique musulmane,\" _Revue du Monde\nMusulman_, September, 1910; Sir T. Morison, \"England and Islam,\"\n_Nineteenth Century and After_, July, 1919; G. Demorgny, _La Question\nPersane_, pp. 23-31 (Paris, 1916); W. E. D. Allen, \"Transcaucasia, Past\nand Present,\" _Quarterly Review_, October, 1920.\n\n[172] _Egyptian White Book_: Collection of Official Correspondence of\nthe Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference (Paris, 1919).\n\n[173] G. Civimini, in the _Corriere della Sera_, December 30, 1919.\n\n[174] Madame Jehan d'Ivray, \"En Egypte,\" _Revue de Paris_, September 15,\n1920. Madame d'Ivray cites other picturesque incidents of a like\ncharacter. See also Annexes to _Egyptian White Book_, previously quoted.\nThese Annexes contain numerous depositions, often accompanied by\nphotographs, alleging severities and atrocities by the British troops.\n\n[175] Contained in the press statements previously mentioned.\n\n[176] Sir M. McIlwraith, \"Egyptian Nationalism,\" _Edinburgh Review_,\nJuly, 1919. See also Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, \"The Future in Egypt,\" _New\nEurope_, November 6, 1919.\n\n[177] For unfortunate aspects of this delay, see Sir Valentine Chirol,\n\"Conflicting Policies in the East,\" _New Europe_, July 1, 1920.\n\n[178] For a good account of Lawrence and his work, see series of\narticles by L. Thomas, \"Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution,\"\n_Asia_, April, May, June, July, 1920.\n\n[179] A notable example is General Maude's proclamation to the\nMesopotamian Arabs in March, 1917.\n\n[180] Article xxii.\n\n[181] From a speech delivered September 19, 1919.\n\n[182] For examples of this pre-war imperialist propaganda, see G.\nPoignant, \"Les Interets francais en Syrie,\" _Questions diplomatiques et\ncoloniales_, March 1-16, 1913. Among other interesting facts, the author\ncites Premier Poincare's declaration before the Chamber of Deputies,\nDecember 21, 1912: \"I need not remark that in the Lebanon and Syria\nparticularly we have traditional interests and that we intend to make\nthem respected.\" See also J. Atalla, \"Les Trois Solutions de la Question\nsyrienne,\" _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, October 16, 1913; L.\nLe Fur, _Le Protectorat de la France sur les Catholiques d'Orient_\n(Paris, 1914).\n\n[183] Quoted by Senator E. Flandrin in his article \"Nos Droits en Syrie\net en Palestine,\" _Revue Hebdomadaire_, June 5, 1915. For other\nexamples of French imperialist propaganda, see, besides above article,\nC. G. Bassim, _La Question du Liban_ (Paris, 1915); H. Baudouin, \"La\nSyrie: Champ de Bataille politique,\" _La Revue Mondiale_, February 1-15,\n1920; Comte Cressaty, _La Syrie francaise_ (Paris, 1916); F. Laudet, \"La\nFrance du Levant,\" _Revue Hebdomadaire_, March 1, 1919.\n\n[184] Baudouin, _supra_. For other violent anti-British comment, see\nLaudet, _supra_.\n\n[185] For sharp British criticisms of the French attitude in Syria, see\nBeckles Wilson, \"Our Amazing Syrian Adventure,\" _National Review_,\nSeptember, 1920; W. Urinowski, \"The Arab Cause,\" _Balkan Review_,\nSeptember, 1920. Both of these writers were officers in the British\nforces in the Arab area. See also strong articles by \"Taira\" in the\n_Balkan Review_, August and October, 1920.\n\n[186] For accounts of French severities, see articles just quoted.\n\n[187] B. G. Gaulis in _L'Opinion_, April 24, 1920.\n\n[188] _Le Populaire_, February 16, 1920.\n\n[189] For the details of these events, see my article on Persia in _The\nCentury_, January, 1920.\n\n[190] Statement given to the press in August, 1920.\n\n[191] Henri de Chambon, editor of _La Revue Parlementaire_. Quoted by\nBeckles Wilson, \"Our Amazing Syrian Adventure,\" _National Review_,\nSeptember, 1920.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nNATIONALISM IN INDIA\n\n\nIndia is a land of paradox. Possessing a fundamental geographical unity,\nIndia has never known real political union save that recently imposed\nexternally by the British \"Raj.\" Full of warlike stocks, India has never\nbeen able to repel invaders. Occupied by many races, these races have\nnever really fused, but have remained distinct and mutually hostile,\nsundered by barriers of blood, speech, culture, and creed. Thus India,\nlarge and populous as Europe or China, has neither, like China, evolved\na generalized national unity; nor, like Europe, has developed a\nspecialized national diversity; but has remained an amorphous, unstable\nindeterminate, with tendencies in both directions which were never\ncarried to their logical conclusion.\n\nIndia's history has been influenced mainly by three great invasions: the\nAryan invasion, commencing about 1500 B.C.; the Mohammedan invasion,\nextending roughly from A.D. 1000 to 1700, and the English invasion,\nbeginning about A.D. 1750 and culminating a century later in a complete\nconquest which has lasted to the present day.\n\nThe Aryans were a fair-skinned people, unquestionably of the same\ngeneral stock as ourselves. Pressing down from Central Asia through\nthose north-western passes where alone land-access is possible to India,\nelsewhere impregnably guarded by the mountain wall of the Himalayas, the\nAryans subdued the dark-skinned Dravidian aborigines, and settled down\nas masters. This conquest was, however, superficial and partial. The\nbulk of the Aryans remained in the north-west, the more adventurous\nspirits scattering thinly over the rest of the vast peninsula. Even in\nthe north large areas of hill-country and jungle remained in the\nexclusive possession of the aborigines, while very few Aryans ever\npenetrated the south. Over most of India, therefore, the Aryans were\nmerely a small ruling class superimposed upon a much more numerous\nsubject population. Fearing to be swallowed up in the Dravidian ocean,\nthe Aryans attempted to preserve their political ascendancy and racial\npurity by the institution of \"caste,\" which has ever since remained the\nbasis of Indian social life. Caste was originally a \"colour line.\" But\nit was enforced not so much by civil law as by religion. Society was\ndivided into three castes: Brahmins, or priests; Kshatriyas, or\nwarriors; and Sudras, or workers. The Aryans monopolized the two upper\ncastes, the Sudras being the Dravidian subject population. These castes\nwere kept apart by a rigorous series of religious taboos. Intermarriage,\npartaking of food and drink, even physical propinquity, entailed\nceremonial defilement sometimes inexpiable. Disobedience to these taboos\nwas punished with the terrible penalty of \"outcasting,\" whereby the\noffender did not merely fall to a lower rank in the caste hierarchy but\nsank even below the Sudra and became a \"Pariah,\" or man of no-caste,\ncondemned to the most menial and revolting occupations, and with no\nrights which even the Sudra was bound to respect. Thus Indian society\nwas governed, not by civil, but by ceremonially religious law; while,\nconversely, the nascent Indian religion (\"Brahminism\") became not\nethical but social in character.\n\nThese things produced the most momentous consequences. As a \"colour\nline,\" caste worked very imperfectly. Despite its prohibitions, even the\nBrahmins became more or less impregnated with Dravidian blood.[192] But\nas a social system caste continued to function in ways peculiar to\nitself. The three original castes gradually subdivided into hundreds and\neven thousands of sub-castes. These sub-castes had little or nothing of\nthe original racial significance. But they were all just as exclusive as\nthe primal trio, and the outcome was a shattering of Indian society into\na chaos of rigid social atoms, between which co-operation or even\nunderstanding was impossible. The results upon Indian history are\nobvious. Says a British authority: \"The effect of this permanent\nmaintenance of human types is that the population is heterogeneous to\nthe last degree. It is no question of rich and poor, of town and\ncountry, of employer and employed: the differences lie far deeper. The\npopulation of a district or a town is a collection of different\nnationalities--almost different species--of mankind that will not eat or\ndrink or intermarry with one another, and that are governed in the more\nimportant affairs of life by committees of their own. It is hardly too\nmuch to say that by the caste system the inhabitants of India are\ndifferentiated into over two thousand species, which, in the intimate\nphysical relations of life, have as little in common as the inmates of a\nzoological garden.\"[193]\n\nObviously, a land socially atomized and politically split into many\nprincipalities was destined to fall before the first strong invader.\nThis invader was Islam. The Mohammedans attacked India soon after their\nconquest of Persia, but these early attacks were mere border raids\nwithout lasting significance. The first real Mohammedan invasion was\nthat of Mahmud of Ghazni, an Afghan prince, in A.D. 1001. Following the\nroad taken by the Aryans ages before, Mahmud conquered north-western\nIndia, the region known as the Punjab. Islam had thus obtained a firm\nfoothold in India, and subsequent Moslem leaders spread gradually\neastward until most of northern India was under Moslem rule. The\ninvaders had two notable advantages: they were fanatically united\nagainst the despised \"Idolaters,\" and they drew many converts from the\nnative population. The very antithesis of Brahminism, Islam, with its\ndoctrine that all Believers are brothers, could not fail to attract\nmultitudes of low-castes and out-castes, who by conversion might rise to\nthe status of the conquerors. This is the main reason why the\nMohammedans in India to-day number more than 70,000,000--over one-fifth\nof the total population. These Indian Moslems are descended, not merely\nfrom Afghan, Turkish, Arab, and Persian invaders, but even more from the\nmillions of Hindu converts who embraced Islam.\n\nFor many generations the Moslem hold on India was confined to the north.\nThen, early in the sixteenth century, the great Turko-Mongol leader\nBaber entered India and founded the \"Mogul\" Empire. Baber and his\nsuccessors overran even the south, and united India politically as it\nhad never been united before. But even this conquest was superficial.\nThe Brahmins, threatened with destruction, preached a Hindu revival; the\nMogul dynasty petered out; and at the beginning of the eighteenth\ncentury the Mogul Empire collapsed, leaving India a welter of warring\nprincipalities, Mohammedan and Hindu, fighting each other for religion,\nfor politics, or for sheer lust of plunder.\n\nOut of this anarchy the British rose to power. The British were at first\nmerely one of several other European elements--Portuguese, Dutch, and\nFrench--who established small settlements along the Indian coasts. The\nEuropeans never dreamed of conquering India while the Mogul power\nendured. In fact, the British connection with India began as a purely\ntrading venture--the East India Company. But when India collapsed into\nanarchy the Europeans were first obliged to acquire local authority to\nprotect their \"factories,\" and later were lured into more ambitious\nschemes by the impotence of petty rulers. Gradually the British ousted\ntheir European rivals and established a solid political foothold in\nIndia. The one stable element in a seething chaos, the British\ninevitably extended their authority. At first they did so reluctantly.\nThe East India Company long remained primarily a trading venture, aiming\nat dividends rather than dominion. However, it later evolved into a real\ngovernment with an ambitious policy of annexation. This in turn awakened\nthe fears of many Indians and brought on the \"Mutiny\" of 1857. The\nmutiny was quelled, the East India Company abolished, and India came\ndirectly under the British Crown, Queen Victoria being later proclaimed\nEmpress of India. These events in turn resulted not only in a\nstrengthening of British political authority but also in an increased\npenetration of Western influences of every description. Roads, railways,\nand canals opened up and unified India as never before; the piercing of\nthe Isthmus of Suez facilitated communication with Europe; while\neducation on European lines spread Western ideas.\n\nOver this rapidly changing India stood the British \"Raj\"--a system of\ngovernment unique in the world's history. It was the government of a few\nhundred highly skilled administrative experts backed by a small\nprofessional army, ruling a vast agglomeration of subject peoples. It\nwas frankly an absolute paternalism, governing as it saw fit, with no\nmore responsibility to the governed than the native despots whom it had\ndisplaced. But it governed well. In efficiency, honesty, and sense of\nduty, the government of India is probably the best example of\nbenevolent absolutism that the world has ever seen. It gave India\nprofound peace. It played no favourites, holding the scales even between\nrival races, creeds, and castes. Lastly, it made India a real political\nentity--something which India had never been before. For the first time\nin its history, India was firmly united under one rule--the rule of the\n_Pax Britannica_.\n\nYet the very virtues of British rule sowed the seeds of future trouble.\nGenerations grew up, peacefully united in unprecedented\nacquaintanceship, forgetful of past ills, seeing only European\nshortcomings, and, above all, familiar with Western ideas of\nself-government, liberty, and nationality. In India, as elsewhere in the\nEast, there was bound to arise a growing movement of discontent against\nWestern rule--a discontent varying from moderate demands for increasing\nautonomy to radical demands for immediate independence.\n\nDown to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, organized political\nagitation against the British \"Raj\" was virtually unknown. Here and\nthere isolated individuals uttered half-audible protests, but these\nvoices found no popular echo. The Indian masses, pre-occupied with the\never-present problem of getting a living, accepted passively a\ngovernment no more absolute, and infinitely more efficient, than its\npredecessors. Of anything like self-conscious Indian \"Nationalism\" there\nwas virtually no trace.\n\nThe first symptom of organized discontent was the formation of the\n\"Indian National Congress\" in the year 1885. The very name showed that\nthe British Raj, covering all India, was itself evoking among India's\ndiverse elements a certain common point of view and aspiration. However,\nthe early congresses were very far from representing Indian public\nopinion, in the general sense of the term. On the contrary, these\ncongresses represented merely a small class of professional men,\njournalists, and politicians, all of them trained in Western ideas. The\nEuropean methods of education which the British had introduced had\nturned out an Indian _intelligentsia_, conversant with the English\nlanguage and saturated with Westernism.\n\nThis new _intelligentsia_, convinced as it was of the value of Western\nideals and achievements, could not fail to be dissatisfied with many\naspects of Indian life. In fact, its first efforts were directed, not so\nmuch to politics, as to social and economic reforms like the suppression\nof child-marriage, the remarriage of widows, and wider education. But,\nas time passed, matters of political reform came steadily to the fore.\nSaturated with English history and political philosophy as they were,\nthe Indian intellectuals felt more and more keenly their total lack of\nself-government, and aspired to endow India with those blessings of\nliberty so highly prized by their English rulers. Soon a vigorous native\npress developed, preaching the new gospel, welding the intellectuals\ninto a self-conscious unity, and moulding a genuine public opinion. By\nthe close of the nineteenth century the Indian _intelligentsia_ was\nfrankly agitating for sweeping political innovations like representative\ncouncils, increasing control over taxation and the executive, and the\nopening of the public services to Indians all the way up the scale.\n\nDown to the closing years of the nineteenth century Indian discontent\nwas, as already said, confined to a small class of more or less\nEuropeanized intellectuals who, despite their assumption of the title,\ncould hardly be termed \"Nationalists\" in the ordinary sense of the word.\nWith a few exceptions, their goal was neither independence nor the\nelimination of effective British oversight, but rather the reforming of\nIndian life along Western lines, including a growing degree of\nself-government under British paramount authority.\n\nBut by the close of the nineteenth century there came a change in the\nsituation. India, like the rest of the Orient, was stirring to a new\nspirit of political and racial self-consciousness. True nationalist\nsymptoms began to appear. Indian scholars delved into their musty\nchronicles and sacred texts, and proclaimed the glories of India's\nhistoric past. Reformed Hindu sects like the Arya Somaj lent religious\nsanctions. The little band of Europeanized intellectuals was joined by\nother elements, thinking, not in terms of piecemeal reforms on Western\nmodels, but of a new India, rejuvenated from its own vital forces, and\nfree to work out its own destiny in its own way. From the nationalist\nranks now arose the challenging slogan: \"Bandemataram!\" (\"Hail,\nMotherland!\")[194]\n\nThe outstanding feature about this early Indian nationalism was that it\nwas a distinctively Hindu movement. The Mohammedans regarded it with\nsuspicion or hostility. And for this they had good reasons. The ideal of\nthe new nationalists was Aryan India, the India of the \"Golden Age.\"\n\"Back to the Vedas!\" was a nationalist watchword, and this implied a\nveneration for the past, including a revival of aggressive Brahminism.\nAn extraordinary change came over the _intelligentsia_. Men who, a few\nyears before, had proclaimed the superiority of Western ideas and had\nopenly flouted \"superstitions\" like idol-worship, now denounced\neverything Western and reverently sacrificed to the Hindu gods. The\n\"sacred soil\" of India must be purged of the foreigner.[195] But the\n\"foreigner,\" as these nationalists conceived him, was not merely the\nEnglishman; he was the Mohammedan as well. This was stirring up the past\nwith a vengeance. For centuries the great Hindu-Mohammedan division had\nrun like a chasm athwart India. It had never been closed, but it had\nbeen somewhat veiled by the neutral overlordship of the British Raj. Now\nthe veil was torn aside, and the Mohammedans saw themselves menaced by a\nrecrudescence of militant Hinduism like that which had shattered the\nMogul Empire after the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb two hundred years\nbefore. The Mohammedans were not merely alarmed; they were infuriated as\nwell. Remembering the glories of the Mogul Empire just as the Hindus did\nthe glories of Aryan India, they considered themselves the rightful\nlords of the land, and had no mind to fall under the sway of despised\n\"Idolaters.\" The Mohammedans had no love for the British, but they hated\nthe Hindus, and they saw in the British Raj a bulwark against the\npotential menace of hereditary enemies who outnumbered them nearly five\nto one. Thus the Mohammedans denounced Hindu nationalism and proclaimed\ntheir loyalty to the Raj. To be sure, the Indian Moslems were also\naffected by the general spirit of unrest which was sweeping over the\nEast. They too felt a quickened sense of self-consciousness. But, being\na minority in India, their feelings took the form, not of territorial\n\"patriotism,\" but of those more diffused sentiments, Pan-Islamism and\nPan-Islamic nationalism, which we have already discussed.[196]\n\nEarly Indian nationalism was not merely Hindu in character; it was\ndistinctly \"Brahminical\" as well. More and more the Brahmins became the\ndriving-power of the movement, seeking to perpetuate their supremacy in\nthe India of the morrow as they had enjoyed it in the India of the past.\nBut this aroused apprehension in certain sections of Hindu society. Many\nlow-castes and Pariahs began to fear that an independent or even\nautonomous India might be ruled by a tyrannical Brahmin oligarchy which\nwould deny them the benefits they now enjoyed under British rule.[197]\nAlso, many of the Hindu princes disliked the thought of a theocratic\nregime which might reduce them to shadows.[198] Thus the nationalist\nmovement stood out as an alliance between the Brahmins and the\nWestern-educated _intelligentsia_, who had pooled their ambitions in a\nprogramme for jointly ruling India.\n\nQuickened by this ambition and fired by religious zeal, the nationalist\nmovement rapidly acquired a fanatical temper characterized by a mystical\nabhorrence of everything Western and a ferocious hatred of all\nEuropeans. The Russo-Japanese War greatly inflamed this spirit, and the\nvery next year (1905) an act of the Indian Government precipitated the\ngathering storm. This act was the famous Partition of Bengal. The\npartition was a mere administrative measure, with no political intent.\nBut the nationalists made it a \"vital issue,\" and about this grievance\nthey started an intense propaganda that soon filled India with seditious\nunrest. The leading spirit in this agitation was Bal Gangadhar Tilak,\nwho has been called \"the father of Indian unrest.\" Tilak typified the\nnationalist movement. A Brahmin with an excellent Western education, he\nwas the sworn foe of English rule and Western civilization. An able\npropagandist, his speeches roused his hearers to frenzy, while his\nnewspaper, the _Yugantar_, of Calcutta, preached a campaign of hate,\nassassination, and rebellion. Tilak's incitements soon produced tangible\nresults, numerous riots, \"dacoities,\" and murders of Englishmen taking\nplace. And of course the _Yugantar_ was merely one of a large number of\nnationalist organs, some printed in the vernacular and others in\nEnglish, which vied with one another in seditious invective.\n\nThe violence of the nationalist press may be judged by a few quotations.\n\"Revolution,\" asserted the _Yugantar_, \"is the only way in which a\nslavish society can save itself. If you cannot prove yourself a man in\nlife, play the man in death. Foreigners have come and decided how you\nare to live. But how you are to die depends entirely upon yourself.\"\n\"Let preparations be made for a general revolution in every household!\nThe handful of police and soldiers will never be able to withstand this\nocean of revolutionists. Revolutionists may be made prisoners and may\ndie, but thousands of others will spring into their places. Do not be\nafraid! With the blood of heroes the soil of Hindustan is ever fertile.\nDo not be downhearted. There is no dearth of heroes. There is no dearth\nof money; glory awaits you! A single frown (a few bombs) from your eyes\nhas struck terror into the heart of the foe! The uproar of panic has\nfilled the sky. Swim with renewed energy in the ocean of bloodshed!\" The\nassassination note was vehemently stressed. Said S. Krishnavarma in _The\nIndian Sociologist_: \"Political assassination is not murder, and the\nrightful employment of physical force connotes 'force used defensively\nagainst force used aggressively.'\" \"The only subscription required,\"\nstated the _Yugantar_, \"is that every reader shall bring the head of a\nEuropean.\" Not even women and children were spared. Commenting on the\nmurder of an English lady and her daughter, the _Yugantar_ exclaimed\nexultantly: \"Many a female demon must be killed in course of time, in\norder to extirpate the race of Asuras from the breast of the earth.\" The\nfanaticism of the men (usually very young men) who committed these\nassassinations may be judged by the statement of the murderer of a high\nEnglish official, Sir Curzon-Wyllie, made shortly before his execution:\n\"I believe that a nation held down by foreign bayonets is in a perpetual\nstate of war. Since open battle is rendered impossible to a disarmed\nrace, I attacked by surprise; since guns were denied to me, I drew my\npistol and fired. As a Hindu I feel that wrong to my country is an\ninsult to the gods. Her cause is the cause of Shri Ram; her service is\nthe service of Shri Krishna. Poor in wealth and intellect, a son like\nmyself has nothing else to offer the Mother but his own blood, and so I\nhave sacrificed the same on Her altar. The only lesson required in India\nat present is to learn how to die, and the only way to teach it is to\ndie ourselves; therefore I die and glory in my martyrdom. This war will\ncontinue between England and India so long as the Hindee and English\nraces last, if the present unnatural relation does not cease.\"[199]\n\nThe government's answer to this campaign of sedition and assassination\nwas of course stern repression. The native press was muzzled, the\nagitators imprisoned or executed, and the hands of the authorities were\nstrengthened by punitive legislation. In fact, so infuriated was the\nEuropean community by the murders and outrages committed by the\nnationalists that many Englishmen urged the withdrawal of such political\nprivileges as did exist, the limiting of Western education, and the\nestablishment of extreme autocratic rule. These angry counsels were at\nonce caught up by the nationalists, resulted in fresh outrages, and were\nanswered by more punishment and fresh menaces. Thus the extremists on\nboth sides lashed each other to hotter fury and worsened the situation.\nFor several years India seethed with an unrest which jailings, hangings,\nand deportations did little to allay.\n\nPresently, however, things took at least a temporary turn for the\nbetter. The extremists were, after all, a small minority, and cool\nheads, both British and Indian, were seeking a way out of the _impasse_.\nConservative Indian leaders like Mr. Gokhale condemned terrorism, and\nbesought their countrymen to seek the realization of their aspirations\nby peaceful means. On the other hand, liberal-minded Englishmen, while\nrefusing to be stampeded, sought a programme of conciliation. Indian\naffairs were then in the hands of the eminent Liberal statesman John\nMorley, and the fruit of his labours was the Indian Councils Act of\n1909. The act was a distinct departure from the hitherto almost\nunlimited absolutism of British rule in India. It gave the Indian\nopposition greatly increased opportunities for advice, criticism, and\ndebate, and it initiated a restricted scheme of elections to the\nlegislative bodies which it established. The salutary effect of these\nconcessions was soon apparent. The moderate nationalist elements, while\nnot wholly satisfied, accepted the act as an earnest of subsequent\nconcessions and as a proof of British good-will. The terrorism and\nseditious plottings of the extremists, while not stamped out, were held\nin check and driven underground. King George's visit to India in 1911\nevoked a wave of loyal enthusiasm which swept the peninsula and augured\nwell for the future.\n\nThe year 1911 was the high-water mark of this era of appeasement\nfollowing the storms of 1905-9. The years after 1911 witnessed a gradual\nrecrudescence of discontent as the first effect of the Councils Act wore\noff and the sense of unfulfilled aspiration sharpened the appetite for\nmore. In fact, during these years, Indian nationalism was steadily\nbroadening its base. In one sense this made for stability, for the\nnationalist movement ceased to be a small minority of extremists and\ncame more under the influence of moderate leaders like Mr. Gokhale, who\nwere content to work for distant goals by evolutionary methods. It did,\nhowever, mean an increasing pressure on the government for fresh\ndevolutions of authority. The most noteworthy symptom of nationalist\ngrowth was the rallying of a certain section of Mohammedan opinion to\nthe nationalist cause. The Mohammedans had by this time formed their own\norganization, the \"All-India Moslem League.\" The league was the reverse\nof nationalist in complexion, having been formed primarily to protect\nMoslem interests against possible Hindu ascendancy. Nevertheless, as\ntime passed, some Mohammedans, reassured by the friendly attitude and\npromises of the Hindu moderates, abandoned the league's anti-Hindu\nattitude and joined the moderate nationalists, though refraining from\nseditious agitation. Indeed, the nationalists presently split into two\ndistinct groups, moderates and extremists. The extremists, condemned by\ntheir fellows, kept up a desultory campaign of violence, largely\ndirected by exiled leaders who from the shelter of foreign countries\nincited their followers at home to seditious agitation and violent\naction.\n\nSuch was the situation in India on the outbreak of the Great War; a\nsituation by no means free from difficulty, yet far less troubled than\nit had been a few years before. Of course, the war produced an increase\nof unrest and a certain amount of terrorism. Yet India, as a whole,\nremained quiet. Throughout the war India contributed men and money\nunstintedly to the imperial cause, and Indian troops figured notably on\nEuropean, Asiatic, and African battlefields.\n\nHowever, though the war-years passed without any serious outbreak of\nrevolutionary violence, it must not be thought that the far more\nwidespread movement for increasing self-government had been either\nquenched or stilled. On the contrary, the war gave this movement fresh\nimpetus. Louder and louder swelled the cry for not merely good\ngovernment but government acceptable to Indian patriots because\nresponsible to them. The very fact that India had proved her loyalty to\nthe Empire and had given generously of her blood and treasure were so\nmany fresh arguments adduced for the grant of a larger measure of\nself-direction. Numerous were the memoranda presented to the British\nauthorities by various sections of Indian public opinion. These\nmemoranda were an accurate reflection of the different shades of Indian\nnationalism. The ultimate goal of all was emancipation from British\ntutelage, but they differed widely among themselves as to how and when\nthis emancipation was to be attained. The most conservative contented\nthemselves with asking for modified self-government under British\nguidance, while the more ambitious asked for the full status of a\ndominion of the British Empire like Australia and Canada. The\nrevolutionary element naturally held aloof, recognizing that only\nviolence could serve their aim--immediate and unqualified independence.\n\nOf course even the more moderate nationalist demands implied great\nchanges in the existing governmental system and a diminution of British\ncontrol such as the Government of India was not prepared at present to\nconcede. Nevertheless, the government met these demands by a\nconciliatory attitude foreshadowing fresh concessions in the near\nfuture. In 1916 the Viceroy, Lord Harding, said: \"I do not for a moment\nwish to discountenance self-government for India as a national ideal. It\nis a perfectly legitimate aspiration and has the sympathy of all\nmoderate men, but in the present position of India it is not idealism\nthat is needed but practical politics. We should do our utmost to\ngrapple with realities, and lightly to raise extravagant hopes and\nencourage unrealizable demands can only tend to delay and will not\naccelerate political progress. I know this is the sentiment of wise and\nthoughtful Indians. Nobody is more anxious than I am to see the early\nrealization of the legitimate aspirations of India, but I am equally\ndesirous of avoiding all danger of reaction from the birth of\ninstitutions which experience might prove to be premature.\"\n\nAs a matter of fact, toward the close of 1917, Mr. Montagu, Secretary of\nState for India, came out from England with the object of thoroughly\ncanvassing Indian public opinion on the question of constitutional\nreform. For months the problem was carefully weighed, conferences being\nheld with the representatives of all races, classes, and creeds. The\nresult of these researches was a monumental report signed by Mr. Montagu\nand by the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and published in July, 1918.\n\nThe report recommended concessions far beyond any which Great Britain\nhad hitherto made. It frankly envisaged the gift of home rule for India\n\"as soon as possible,\" and went on to state that the gift was to be\nconferred not because of Indian agitation, but because of \"the faith\nthat is in us.\" There followed these memorable words: \"We believe\nprofoundly that the time has come when the sheltered existence which we\nhave given India cannot be prolonged without damage to her national\nlife; that we have a richer gift for her people than any that we have\nyet bestowed on them; that nationhood within the Empire represents\nsomething better than anything India has hitherto attained; that the\nplacid, pathetic contentment of the masses is not the soil on which such\nIndian nationhood will grow, and that in deliberately disturbing it we\nare working for her highest good.\"\n\nThe essence of the report was its recommendation of the principle of\n\"diarchy,\" or division of governmental responsibility between\ncouncillors nominated by the British executive and ministers chosen\nfrom elective legislative bodies. This diarchy was to hold for both the\ncentral and provincial governments. The legislatures were to be elected\nby a much more extensive franchise than had previously prevailed and\nwere to have greatly enlarged powers. Previously they had been little\nmore than advisory bodies; now they were to become \"legislatures\" in the\nWestern sense, though their powers were still limited, many powers,\nparticularly that of the purse, being still \"reserved\" to the executive.\nThe British executive thus retained ultimate control and had the last\nword; thus no true \"balance of power\" was to exist, the scales being\nfrankly weighted in favour of the British Raj. But the report went on to\nstate that this scheme of government was not intended to be permanent;\nthat it was frankly a transitional measure, a school in which the Indian\npeople was to serve its apprenticeship, and that when these first\nlessons in self-government had been learned, India would be given a\nthoroughly representative government which would not only initiate and\nlegislate, but which would also control the executive officials.\n\nThe Montagu-Chelmsford Report was exhaustively discussed both in India\nand in England, and from these frank discussions an excellent idea of\nthe Indian problem in all its challenging complexity can be obtained.\nThe nationalists split sharply on the issue, the moderates welcoming the\nreport and agreeing to give the proposed scheme of government their\nloyal co-operation, the extremists condemning the proposals as a snare\nand a sham. The moderate attitude was stated in a manifesto signed by\ntheir leaders, headed by the eminent Indian economist Sir Dinshaw Wacha,\nwhich stated: \"The proposed scheme forms a complicated structure capable\nof improvement in some particulars, especially at the top, but is\nnevertheless a progressive measure. The reforms are calculated to make\nthe provinces of India reach the goal of complete responsible\ngovernment. On the whole, the proposals are evolved with great\nforesight and conceived in a spirit of genuine sympathy with Indian\npolitical aspirations, for which the distinguished authors are entitled\nto the country's gratitude.\" The condemnation of the radicals was voiced\nby leaders like Mr. Tilak, who urged \"standing fast by the Indian\nNational Congress ideal,\" and Mr. Bepin Chander Pal, who asserted: \"It\nis my deliberate opinion that if the scheme is accepted, the Government\nwill be more powerful and more autocratic than it is to-day.\"\n\nExtremely interesting was the protest of the anti-nationalist groups,\nparticularly the Mohammedans and the low-caste Hindus. For it is a fact\nsignificant of the complexity of the Indian problem that many millions\nof Indians fear the nationalist movement and look upon the autocracy of\nthe British Raj as a shield against nationalist oppression and\ndiscrimination. The Mohammedans of India are, on the question of\nself-government for India, sharply divided among themselves. The\nmajority still dislike and fear the nationalist movement, owing to its\n\"Hindu\" character. A minority, however, as already stated, have rallied\nto the nationalist cause. This minority grew greatly in numbers during\nthe war-years, their increased friendliness being due not merely to\ndesire for self-government but also to anger at the Allies' policy of\ndismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and kindred policies in the Near and\nMiddle East.[200] The Hindu nationalists were quick to sympathize with\nthe Mohammedans on these external matters, and the result was a\ncordiality between the two elements never known before.\n\nThe predominance of high-caste Brahmins in the nationalist movement\nexplains the opposition of many low-caste Hindus to Indian home rule. So\ngreat is the low-caste fear of losing their present protection under the\nBritish Raj and of being subjected to the domination of a high-caste\nBrahmin oligarchy that in recent years they have formed an association\nknown as the \"Namasudra,\" led by well-known persons like Doctor\nNair.[201] The Namasudra points out what might happen by citing the\nBrahminic pressure which occurs even in such political activity as\nalready exists. For example: in many elections the Brahmins have\nterrorized low-caste voters by threatening to \"out-caste\" all who should\nnot vote the Brahmin ticket, thus making them \"Pariahs\"--untouchables,\nwith no rights in Hindu society.\n\nSuch protests against home rule from large sections of the Indian\npopulation gave pause even to many English students of the problem who\nhad become convinced of home rule's theoretical desirability. And of\ncourse they greatly strengthened the arguments of those numerous\nEnglishmen, particularly Anglo-Indians, who asserted that India was as\nyet unfit for self-government. Said one of these objectors in _The Round\nTable_: \"The masses care not one whit for politics; Home Rule they do\nnot understand. They prefer the English District Magistrate. They only\nask to remain in eternal and bovine quiescence. They feel confidence in\nthe Englishman because he has always shown himself the 'Protector of the\nPoor,' and because he is neither Hindu nor Mussulman, and has a\nreputation for honesty.\" And Lord Sydenham, in a detailed criticism of\nthe Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, stated: \"There are many defects in our\nsystem of government in India. Reforms are needed; but they must be\nbased solely upon considerations of the welfare of the masses of India\nas a whole. If the policy of 'deliberately' disturbing their\n'contentment' which the Viceroy and the Secretary of State have\nannounced is carried out; if, through the 'whispering galleries of the\nEast,' the word is passed that the only authority that can maintain law\nand order and secure the gradual building-up of an Indian nation is\nweakening; if, as is proposed, the great public services are\nemasculated; then the fierce old animosities will break out afresh, and,\nassisted by a recrudescence of the reactionary forces of Brahminism,\nthey will within a few years bring to nought the noblest work which the\nBritish race has ever accomplished.\"[202]\n\nYet other English authorities on Indian affairs asserted that the\nMontagu-Chelmsford proposals were sound and must be enacted into law if\nthe gravest perils were to be averted. Such were the opinions of men\nlike Lionel Curtis[203] and Sir Valentine Chirol, who stated: \"It is of\nthe utmost importance that there should be no unnecessary delay. We have\nhad object-lessons enough as to the danger of procrastination, and in\nIndia as elsewhere time is on the side of the troublemakers.... We\ncannot hope to reconcile Indian Extremism. What we can hope to do is to\nfree from its insidious influence all that is best in Indian public life\nby opening up a larger field of useful activity.\"[204]\n\nAs a matter of fact, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was accepted as the\nbasis of discussion by the British Parliament, and at the close of the\nyear 1919 its recommendations were formally embodied in law.\nUnfortunately, during the eighteen months which elapsed between the\npublication of the report and its legal enactment, the situation in\nIndia had darkened. Militant unrest had again raised its head, and India\nwas more disturbed than it had been since 1909.\n\nFor this there were several reasons. In the first place, all those\nnationalist elements who were dissatisfied with the report began\ncoquetting with the revolutionary irreconcilables and encouraging them\nto fresh terrorism, perhaps in the hope of stampeding the British\nParliament into wider concessions than the report had contemplated. But\nthere were other causes of a more general nature. The year 1918 was a\nblack one for India. The world-wide influenza epidemic hit India\nparticularly hard, millions of persons being carried off by the grim\nplague. Furthermore, India was cursed with drought, the crops failed,\nand the spectre of famine stalked through the land. The year 1919 saw an\neven worse drought, involving an almost record famine. By the late\nsummer it was estimated that millions of persons had died of hunger,\nwith millions more on the verge of starvation. And on top of all came an\nAfghan war, throwing the north-west border into tumult and further\nunsettling the already restless Mohammedan element.\n\nThe upshot was a wave of unrest revealing itself in an epidemic of\nriots, terrorism, and seditious activity which gave the British\nauthorities serious concern. So critical appeared the situation that a\nspecial commission was appointed to investigate conditions, and the\nreport handed in by its chairman, Justice Rowlatt, painted a depressing\npicture of the strength of revolutionary unrest. The report stated that\nnot only had a considerable number of young men of the educated upper\nclasses become involved in the promotion of anarchical movements, but\nthat the ranks were filled with men belonging to other social orders,\nincluding the military, and that there was clear evidence of successful\ntampering with the loyalty of the native troops. To combat this growing\ndisaffection, the Rowlatt committee recommended fresh repressive\nlegislation.\n\nImpressed with the gravity of the committee's report, the Government of\nIndia formulated a project of law officially known as the Anarchical and\nRevolutionary Crimes Act, though generally known as the Rowlatt Bill. By\nits provisions the authorities were endowed with greatly increased\npowers, such as the right to search premises and arrest persons on mere\nsuspicion of seditious activity, without definite evidence of the same.\n\nThe Rowlatt Bill at once aroused bitter nationalist opposition. Not\nmerely extremists, but many moderates, condemned it as a backward step\nand as a provoker of fresh trouble. When the bill came up for debate in\nthe Indian legislative body, the Imperial Legislative Council, all the\nnative members save one opposed it, and the bill was finally passed on\nstrictly racial lines by the votes of the appointed English majority.\nHowever, the government considered the bill an absolute pre-requisite to\nthe successful maintenance of order, and it was passed into law in the\nspring of 1919.\n\nThis brought matters to a head. The nationalists, stigmatizing the\nRowlatt law as the \"Black Cobra Act,\" were unmeasured in their\ncondemnation. The extremists engineered a campaign of militant protest\nand decreed the date of the bill's enactment, April 6, 1919, as a\nnational \"Humiliation Day.\" On that day monster mass-meetings were held,\nat which nationalist orators made seditious speeches and inflamed the\npassions of the multitude. \"Humiliation Day\" was in fact the beginning\nof the worst wave of unrest since the mutiny. For the next three months\na veritable epidemic of rioting and terrorism swept India, particularly\nthe northern provinces. Officials were assassinated, English civilians\nwere murdered, and there was wholesale destruction of property. At some\nmoments it looked as though India were on the verge of revolution and\nanarchy.\n\nHowever, the government stood firm. Violence was countered with stern\nrepression. Riotous mobs were mowed down wholesale by rifle and\nmachine-gun fire or were scattered by bombs dropped from low-flying\naeroplanes. The most noted of these occurrences was the so-called\n\"Amritsar Massacre,\" where British troops fired into a seditious\nmass-meeting, killing 500 and wounding 1500 persons. In the end the\ngovernment mastered the situation. Order was restored, the seditious\nleaders were swept into custody, and the revolutionary agitation was\nonce more driven underground. The enactment of the Montagu-Chelmsford\nreform bill by the British Parliament toward the close of the year did\nmuch to relax the tension and assuage discontent, though the situation\nof India was still far from normal. The deplorable events of the earlier\npart of 1919 had roused animosities which were by no means allayed. The\nrevolutionary elements, though driven underground, were more bitter and\nuncompromising than ever, while opponents of home rule were confirmed in\ntheir conviction that India could not be trusted and that any relaxation\nof autocracy must spell anarchy.\n\nThis was obviously not the best mental atmosphere in which to apply the\ncompromises of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. In fact, the extremists\nwere determined that they should not be given a fair trial, regarding\nthe reforms as a snare which must be avoided at all costs. Recognizing\nthat armed rebellion was still impossible, at least for the present, the\nextremists evolved the idea known as \"non-co-operation.\" This was, in\nfact, a gigantic boycott of everything British. Not merely were the new\nvoters urged to stay away from the polls and thus elect no members to\nthe proposed legislative bodies, but lawyers and litigants were to avoid\nthe courts, taxpayers refuse to pay imposts, workmen to go on strike,\nshopkeepers to refuse to buy or sell British-made goods, and even pupils\nto leave the schools and colleges. This wholesale \"out-casting\" of\neverything British would make the English in India a new sort of\nPariah--\"untouchables\"; the British Government and the British community\nin India would be left in absolute isolation, and the Raj, rendered\nunworkable, would have to capitulate to the extremist demands for\ncomplete self-government.\n\nSuch was the non-co-operation idea. And the idea soon found an able\nexponent: a certain M. K. Gandhi, who had long possessed a reputation\nfor personal sanctity and thus inspired the Hindu masses with that\npeculiar religious fervour which certain types of Indian ascetics have\nalways known how to arouse. Gandhi's propaganda can be judged by the\nfollowing extract from one of his speeches: \"It is as amazing as it is\nhumiliating that less than 100,000 white men should be able to rule\n315,000,000 Indians. They do so somewhat, undoubtedly, by force, but\nmore by securing our co-operation in a thousand ways and making us more\nand more helpless and dependent on them, as time goes forward. Let us\nnot mistake reformed councils (legislatures), more law-courts, and even\ngovernorships for real freedom or power. They are but subtler methods of\nemasculation. The British cannot rule us by mere force. And so they\nresort to all means, honourable and dishonourable, in order to retain\ntheir hold on India. They want India's billions and they want India's\nman-power for their imperialistic greed. If we refuse to supply them\nwith men and money, we achieve our goal: namely, _Swaraj_,[205]\nequality, manliness.\"\n\nThe extreme hopes of the non-co-operation movement have not been\nrealized. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms have been put in operation, and\nthe first elections under them were held at the beginning of 1921. But\nthe outlook is far from bright. The very light vote cast at the\nelections revealed the effect of the non-co-operation movement, which\nshowed itself in countless other ways, from strikes in factories to\nstrikes of school-children. India to-day is in a turmoil of unrest. And\nthis unrest is not merely political; it is social as well. The vast\neconomic changes which have been going on in India for the past\nhalf-century have profoundly disorganized Indian society. These changes\nwill be discussed in later chapters. The point to be here noted is that\nthe extremist leaders are capitalizing social discontent and are\nunquestionably in touch with Bolshevik Russia. Meanwhile the older\nfactors of disturbance are by no means eliminated. The recent atrocious\nmassacre of dissident Sikh pilgrims by orthodox Sikh fanatics, and the\nthree-cornered riots between Hindus, Mohammedans, and native Christians\nwhich broke out about the same time in southern India, reveal the hidden\nfires of religious and racial fanaticism that smoulder beneath the\nsurface of Indian life.\n\nThe truth of the matter is that India is to-day a battle-ground between\nthe forces of evolutionary and revolutionary change. It is an anxious\nand a troubled time. The old order is obviously passing, and the new\norder is not yet fairly in sight. The hour is big with possibilities of\nboth good and evil, and no one can confidently predict the outcome.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[192] According to some historians, this race-mixture occurred almost at\nonce. The theory is that the Aryan conquerors, who outside the\nnorth-western region had very few of their own women with them, took\nDravidian women as wives or concubines, and legitimatized their\nhalf-breed children, the offspring of the conquerors, both pure-bloods\nand mixed-bloods, coalescing into a closed caste. Further infiltration\nof Dravidian blood was thus prevented, but Aryan race-purity had been\ndestroyed.\n\n[193] Sir Bampfylde Fuller, _Studies of Indian Life and Sentiment_, p.\n40 (London, 1910). For other discussions of caste and its effects, see\nW. Archer, _India and the Future_ (London, 1918); Sir V. Chirol, _Indian\nUnrest_ (London, 1910); Rev. J. Morrison, _New Ideas in India: A Study\nof Social, Political and Religious Developments_ (Edinburgh, 1906); Sir\nH. Risley, _The People of India_ (London, 1908); also writings of the\n\"Namasudra\" leader, Dr. Nair, previously quoted, and S. Nihal Singh,\n\"India's Untouchables,\" _Contemporary Review_, March, 1913.\n\n[194] For the nationalist movement, see Archer, Chirol, and Morrison,\n_supra_. Also Sir H. J. S. Cotton, _India in Transition_ (London, 1904);\nJ. N. Farquhar, _Modern Religious Movements in India_ (New York, 1915);\nSir W. W. Hunter, _The India of the Queen and Other Essays_ (London,\n1903); W. S. Lilly, _India and Its Problems_ (London, 1902); Sir V.\nLovett, _A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement_ (London, 1920);\nJ. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_ (London, 1920); Sir T.\nMorison, _Imperial Rule in India_ (London, 1899); J. D. Rees, _The Real\nIndia_ (London, 1908); Sir J. Strachey, _India: Its Administration and\nProgress_ (Fourth Edition--London, 1911); K. Vyasa Rao, _The Future\nGovernment of India_ (London, 1918).\n\n[195] I have already discussed this \"Golden Age\" tendency in Chapter\nIII. For more or less Extremist Indian view-points, see A. Coomaraswamy,\n_The Dance of Siva_ (New York, 1918); H. Maitra, _Hinduism: The\nWorld-Ideal_ (London, 1916); Bipin Chandra Pal, \"The Forces Behind the\nUnrest in India,\" _Contemporary Review_, February, 1910; also various\nwritings of Lajpat Rai, especially _The Arya Samaj_ (London, 1915) and\n_Young India_ (New York, 1916).\n\n[196] For Indian Mohammedan points of view, mostly anti-Hindu, see H. H.\nThe Aga Khan, _India in Transition_ (London, 1918); S. Khuda Bukhsh,\n_Essays: Indian and Islamic_ (London, 1912); Sir Syed Ahmed, _The\nPresent State of Indian Politics_ (Allahabad, 1888); Syed Sirdar Ali\nKhan, _The Unrest in India_ (Bombay, 1907); also his _India of To-day_\n(Bombay, 1908).\n\n[197] This attitude of the \"Depressed Classes,\" especially as revealed\nin the \"Namasudra Association,\" has already been discussed in Chapter\nIII, and will be further touched upon later in this present chapter.\n\n[198] Regarding the Indian native princes, see Archer and Chirol,\n_supra_. Also J. Pollen, \"Native States and Indian Home Rule,\" _Asiatic\nReview_, January 1, 1917; The Maharajah of Bobbili, _Advice to the\nIndian Aristocracy_ (Madras, 1905); articles by Sir D. Barr and Sir F.\nYounghusband in _The Empire and the Century_ (London, 1905).\n\n[199] A good symposium of extremist comment is contained in Chirol,\n_supra_. Also see J. D. Rees, _The Real India_ (London, 1908); series of\nextremist articles in _The Open Court_, March, 1917. A good sample of\nextremist literature is the fairly well-known pamphlet _India's\n\"Loyalty\" to England_ (1915).\n\n[200] Discussed in the preceding chapter.\n\n[201] Quoted in Chapter IV.\n\n[202] Lord Sydenham, \"India,\" _Contemporary Review_, November, 1918. For\nsimilar criticisms of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, see G. M.\nChesney, _India under Experiment_ (London, 1918); \"The First Stage\ntowards Indian Anarchy,\" _Spectator_, December 20, 1919.\n\n[203] Lionel Curtis, _Letters to the People of India on Responsible\nGovernment_, already quoted at the end of Chapter IV.\n\n[204] Sir V. Chirol, \"India in Travail,\" _Edinburgh Review_, July, 1918.\n\n[205] _I. e._, self-government, in the extremist sense--practically\nindependence.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nECONOMIC CHANGE\n\n\nOne of the most interesting phenomena of modern world-history is the\ntwofold conquest of the East by the West. The word \"conquest\" is usually\nemployed in a political sense, and calls up visions of embattled armies\nsubduing foreign lands and lording it over distant peoples. Such\npolitical conquests in the Orient did of course occur, and we have\nalready seen how, during the past century, the decrepit states of the\nNear and Middle East fell an easy prey to the armed might of the\nEuropean Powers.\n\nBut what is not so generally realized is the fact that this political\nconquest was paralleled by an economic conquest perhaps even more\ncomplete and probably destined to produce changes of an even more\nprofound and enduring character.\n\nThe root-cause of this economic conquest was the Industrial Revolution.\nJust as the voyages of Columbus and Da Gama gave Europe the strategic\nmastery of the ocean and thereby the political mastery of the world, so\nthe technical inventions of the later eighteenth century which\ninaugurated the Industrial Revolution gave Europe the economic mastery\nof the world. These inventions in fact heralded a new Age of Discovery,\nthis time into the realms of science. The results were, if possible,\nmore momentous even than those of the age of geographical discovery\nthree centuries before. They gave our race such increased mastery over\nthe resources of nature that the ensuing transformation of economic life\nswiftly and utterly transformed the face of things.\n\nThis transformation was, indeed, unprecedented in the world's history.\nHitherto man's material progress had been a gradual evolution. With the\nexception of gunpowder, he had tapped no new sources of material energy\nsince very ancient times. The horse-drawn mail-coach of our\ngreat-grandfathers was merely a logical elaboration of the horse-drawn\nEgyptian chariot; the wind-driven clipper-ship traced its line unbroken\nto Ulysses's lateen bark before Troy; while industry still relied on the\nbrawn of man and beast or upon the simple action of wind and waterfall.\nSuddenly all was changed. Steam, electricity, petrol, the Hertzian wave,\nharnessed nature's hidden powers, conquered distance, and shrunk the\nterrestrial globe to the measure of human hands. Man entered a new\nmaterial world, differing not merely in degree but in kind from that of\nprevious generations.\n\nWhen I say \"Man,\" I mean, so far as the nineteenth century was\nconcerned, the white man of Europe and its racial settlements overseas.\nIt was the white man's brain which had conceived all this, and it was\nthe white man alone who at first reaped the benefits. The two\noutstanding features of the new order were the rise of machine-industry\nwith its incalculable acceleration of mass-production, and the\ncorrelative development of cheap and rapid transportation. Both these\nfactors favoured a prodigious increase in economic power and wealth in\nEurope, since Europe became the workshop of the world. In fact, during\nthe nineteenth century, Europe was transformed from a semi-rural\ncontinent into a swarming hive of industry, gorged with goods, capital,\nand men, pouring forth its wares to the remotest corners of the earth,\nand drawing thence fresh stores of raw material for new fabrication and\nexchange.\n\nSuch was the industrially revolutionized West which confronted an East\nas backward and stagnant in economics as it was in politics and the art\nof war. In fact, the East was virtually devoid of either industry or\nbusiness, as we understand these terms to-day. Economically, the East\nwas on an agricultural basis, the economic unit being the\nself-supporting, semi-isolated village. Oriental \"industries\" were\nhandicrafts, carried on by relatively small numbers of artisans, usually\nworking by and for themselves. Their products, while often exquisite in\nquality, were largely luxuries, and were always produced by such slow,\nantiquated methods that their quantity was limited and their market\nprice relatively high. Despite very low wages, therefore, Asiatic\nproducts not only could not compete in the world-market with European\nand American machine-made, mass-produced articles, but were hard hit in\ntheir home-markets as well.\n\nThis Oriental inability to compete with Western industry arose not\nmerely from methods of production but also from other factors such as\nthe mentality of the workers and the scarcity of capital. Throughout the\nNear and Middle East economic life rested on the principle of status.\nThe Western economic principles of contract and competition were\nvirtually unknown. Agriculturalists and artisans followed blindly in the\nfootsteps of their fathers. There was no competition, no stimulus for\nimprovement, no change in customary wages, no desire for a better and\nmore comfortable living. The industries were stereotyped; the apprentice\nmerely imitated his master, and rarely thought of introducing new\nimplements or new methods of manufacture. Instead of working for profit\nand advancement, men followed an hereditary \"calling,\" usually hallowed\nby religious sanctions, handed down from father to son through many\ngenerations, each calling possessing its own unchanging ideals, its\nzealously guarded craft-secrets.\n\nThe few bolder, more enterprising spirits who might have ventured to\nbreak the iron bands of custom and tradition were estopped by lack of\ncapital. Fluid \"investment\" capital, easily mobilized and ready to pour\ninto an enterprise of demonstrable utility and profit, simply did not\nexist. To the Oriental, whether prince or peasant, money was regarded,\nnot as a source of profit or a medium of exchange, but as a store of\nvalue, to be hoarded intact against a \"rainy day.\" The East has been\nknown for ages as a \"sink of the precious metals.\" In India alone, the\nvalue of the gold, silver, and jewels hidden in strong-boxes, buried in\nthe earth, or hanging about the necks of women must run into billions.\nSays a recent writer on India: \"I had the privilege of being taken\nthrough the treasure-vaults of one of the wealthiest Maharajahs. I could\nhave plunged my arm to the shoulder in great silver caskets filled with\ndiamonds, pearls, emeralds, rubies. The walls were studded with hooks\nand on each pair of hooks rested gold bars three to four feet long and\ntwo inches across. I stood by a great cask of diamonds, and picking up a\nhandful let them drop slowly from between my fingers, sparkling and\nglistening like drops of water in sunlight. There are some seven hundred\nnative states, and the rulers of every one has his treasure-vaults on a\nmore or less elaborate scale. Besides these, every zamindar and every\nIndian of high or low degree who can save anything, wants to have it by\nhim in actual metal; he distrusts this new-fangled paper currency that\nthey try to pass off on him. Sometimes he beats his coins into bangles\nfor his wives, and sometimes he hides money behind a loose brick or\nunder a flat stone in the bottom of the oven, or he goes out and digs a\nlittle hole and buries it.\"[206]\n\nRemember that this description is of present-day India, after more than\na century of British rule and notwithstanding a permeation of Western\nideas which, as we shall presently see, has produced momentous\nmodifications in the native point of view. Remember also that this\nhoarding propensity is not peculiar to India but is shared by the entire\nOrient. We can then realize the utter lack of capital for investment\npurposes in the East of a hundred years ago, especially when we remember\nthat political insecurity and religious prohibitions of the lending of\nmoney at interest stood in the way of such far-sighted individuals as\nmight have been inclined to employ their hoarded wealth for productive\npurposes. There was, indeed, one outlet for financial activity--usury,\nand therein virtually all the scant fluid capital of the old Orient was\nemployed. But such capital, lent not for productive enterprise, but for\nluxury, profligacy, or incompetence, was a destructive rather than a\ncreative force and merely intensified the prejudice against capital of\nany kind.\n\nSuch was the economic life of the Orient a hundred years ago. It is\nobvious that this archaic order was utterly unable to face the\ntremendous competition of the industrialized West. Everywhere the flood\nof cheap Western machine-made, mass-produced goods began invading\nEastern lands, driving the native wares before them. The way in which an\nancient Oriental handicraft like the Indian textiles was literally\nannihilated by the destructive competition of Lancashire cottons is only\none of many similar instances. To be sure, some Oriental writers contend\nthat this triumph of Western manufactures was due to political rather\nthan economic reasons, and Indian nationalists cite British governmental\nactivity in favour of the Lancashire cottons above mentioned as the sole\ncause for the destruction of the Indian textile handicrafts. But such\narguments appear to be fallacious. British official action may have\nhastened the triumph of British industry in India, but that triumph was\ninevitable in the long run. The best proof is the way in which the\ntextile crafts of independent Oriental countries like Turkey and Persia\nwere similarly ruined by Western competition.\n\nA further proof is the undoubted fact that Oriental peoples, taken as a\nwhole, have bought Western-manufactured products in preference to their\nown hand-made wares. To many Westerners this has been a mystery. Such\npersons cannot understand how the Orientals could buy the cheap, shoddy\nproducts of the West, manufactured especially for the Eastern market, in\npreference to their native wares of better quality and vastly greater\nbeauty. The answer, however, is that the average Oriental is not an art\nconnoisseur but a poor man living perilously close to the margin of\nstarvation. He not only wants but must buy things cheap, and the wide\nprice-margin is the deciding factor. Of course there is also the element\nof novelty. Besides goods which merely replace articles he has always\nused, the West has introduced many new articles whose utility or charm\nare irresistible. I have already mentioned the way in which the\nsewing-machine and the kerosene-lamp have swept the Orient from end to\nend, and there are many other instances of a similar nature. The\npermeation of Western industry has, in fact, profoundly modified every\nphase of Oriental economic life. New economic wants have been created;\nstandards of living have been raised; canons of taste have been altered.\nSays a lifelong American student of the Orient: \"The knowledge of modern\ninventions and of other foods and articles has created new wants. The\nChinese peasant is no longer content to burn bean-oil; he wants\nkerosene. The desire of the Asiatic to possess foreign lamps is equalled\nonly by his passion for foreign clocks. The ambitious Syrian scorns the\nmud roof of his ancestors, and will be satisfied only with the bright\nred tiles imported from France. Everywhere articles of foreign\nmanufacture are in demand.... Knowledge increases wants, and the\nOriental is acquiring knowledge. He demands a hundred things to-day that\nhis grandfather never heard of.\"[207]\n\nEverywhere it is the same story. An Indian economic writer, though a\nbitter enemy of Western industrialism, bemoans the fact that \"the\nartisans are losing their occupations and are turning to agriculture.\nThe cheap kerosene-oil from Baku or New York threatens the oilman's[208]\nexistence. Brass and copper which have been used for vessels from time\nimmemorial are threatened by cheap enamelled ironware imported from\nEurope.... There is also, _pari passu_, a transformation of the tastes\nof the consumers. They abandon _gur_ for crystal sugar. Home-woven\ncloths are now replaced by manufactured cloths for being too coarse. All\nlocal industries are attacked and many have been destroyed. Villages\nthat for centuries followed customary practices are brought into contact\nwith the world's markets all on a sudden. For steamships and railways\nwhich have established the connection have been built in so short an\ninterval as hardly to allow breathing-time to the village which\nslumbered so long under the dominion of custom. Thus the sudden\nintroduction of competition into an economic unit which had from time\nimmemorial followed custom has wrought a mighty change.\"[209]\n\nThis \"mighty change\" was due not merely to the influx of Western goods\nbut also to an equally momentous influx of Western capital. The\nopportunities for profitable investment were so numerous that Western\ncapital soon poured in streams into Eastern lands. Virtually devoid of\nfluid capital of its own, the Orient was bound to have recourse to\nWestern capital for the initiation of all economic activity in the\nmodern sense. Railways, mines, large-scale agriculture of the\n\"plantation\" type, and many other undertakings thus came into being.\nMost notable of all was the founding of numerous manufacturing\nestablishments from North Africa to China and the consequent growth of\ngenuine \"factory towns\" where the whir of machinery and the smoke of\ntall chimneys proclaimed that the East was adopting the industrial life\nof the West.\n\nThe momentous social consequences of this industrialization of the\nOrient will be treated in subsequent chapters. In the present chapter we\nwill confine ourselves to a consideration of its economic side.\nFurthermore, this book, limited as it is to the Near and Middle East,\ncannot deal with industrial developments in China and Japan. The reader\nshould, however, always bear in mind Far Eastern developments, which, in\nthe main, run parallel to those which we shall here discuss.\n\nThese industrial innovations were at first pure Western transplantings\nset in Eastern soil. Initiated by Western capital, they were wholly\ncontrolled and managed by Western brains. Western capital could not\nventure to entrust itself to Orientals, with their lack of the modern\nindustrial spirit, their habits of \"squeeze\" and nepotism, their lust\nfor quick returns, and their incapacity for sustained business\nteam-play. As time passed, however, the success of Western undertakings\nso impressed Orientals that the more forward-looking among them were\nready to risk their money and to acquire the technique necessary for\nsuccess. At the close of Chapter II, I described the development of\nmodern business types in the Moslem world, and the same is true of the\nnon-Moslem populations of India. In India there were several elements\nsuch as the Parsis and the Hindu \"banyas,\" or money-lenders, whose\nprevious activities in commerce or usury predisposed them to financial\nand industrial activity in the modern sense. From their ranks have\nchiefly sprung the present-day native business communities of India,\nexemplified by the jute and textile factories of Calcutta and Bombay,\nand the great Tata iron-works of Bengal--undertakings financed by native\ncapital and wholly under native control. Of course, beside these\nsuccesses there have been many lamentable failures. Nevertheless, there\nseems to be no doubt that Western industrialism is ceasing to be an\nexotic and is rooting itself firmly in Eastern soil.[210]\n\nThe combined result of Western and Eastern enterprise has been, as\nalready stated, the rise of important industrial centres at various\npoints in the Orient. In Egypt a French writer remarks: \"Both banks of\nthe Nile are lined with factories, sugar-refineries and cotton-mills,\nwhose belching chimneys tower above the mud huts of the fellahs.\"[211]\nAnd Sir Theodore Morison says of India: \"In the city of Bombay the\nindustrial revolution has already been accomplished. Bombay is a modern\nmanufacturing city, where both the dark and the bright side of modern\nindustrialism strike the eye. Bombay has insanitary slums where\novercrowding is as great an evil as in any European city; she has a\nproletariat which works long hours amid the din and whir of machinery;\nshe also has her millionaires, whose princely charities have adorned her\nstreets with beautiful buildings. Signs of lavish wealth and, let me\nadd, culture and taste in Bombay astonish the visitor from the inland\ndistricts. The brown villages and never-ending fields with which he has\nhitherto been familiar are the India which is passing away; Bombay is\nthe presage of the future.\"[212]\n\nThe juxtaposition of vast natural resources and a limitless supply of\ncheap labour has encouraged the most ambitious hopes in Oriental minds.\nSome Orientals look to a combination of Western money and Eastern\nman-power, expressed by an Indian economic writer in the formula:\n\"English money and Indian labour are the two cheapest things in the\nworld.\"[213] Others more ambitiously dream of industrializing the East\nentirely by native effort, to the exclusion and even to the detriment\nof the West. This view was well set forth some years ago by a Hindu, who\nwrote in a leading Indian periodical:[214] \"In one sense the Orient is\nreally menacing the West, and so earnest and open-minded is Asia that no\npretence or apology whatever is made about it. The Easterner has thrown\ndown the industrial gauntlet, and from now on Asia is destined to\nwitness a progressively intense trade warfare, the Occidental scrambling\nto retain his hold on the markets of the East, and the Oriental\nendeavouring to beat him in a battle in which heretofore he has been an\neasy victor.... In competing with the Occidental commercialists, the\nOriental has awakened to a dynamic realization of the futility of\npitting unimproved machinery and methods against modern methods and\nappliances. Casting aside his former sense of self-complacency, he is\nstudying the sciences and arts that have given the West its material\nprosperity. He is putting the results of his investigations to practical\nuse, as a rule, recasting the Occidental methods to suit his peculiar\nneeds, and in some instances improving upon them.\"\n\nThis statement of the spirit of the Orient's industrial awakening is\nconfirmed by many white observers. At the very moment when the above\narticle was penned, an American economic writer was making a study tour\nof the Orient, of which he reported: \"The real cause of Asia's poverty\nlies in just two things: the failure of Asiatic governments to educate\ntheir people, and the failure of the people to increase their productive\ncapacity by the use of machinery. Ignorance and lack of machinery are\nresponsible for Asia's poverty; knowledge and modern tools are\nresponsible for America's prosperity.\" But, continues this writer, we\nmust watch out. Asia now realizes these facts and is doing much to remedy\nthe situation. Hence, \"we must face in ever-increasing degree the rivalry\nof awakening peoples who are strong with the strength that comes from\nstruggle with poverty and hardship, and who have set themselves to master\nand apply all our secrets in the coming world-struggle for industrial\nsupremacy and for racial readjustment.\"[215] Another American observer of\nAsiatic economic conditions reports: \"All Asia is being permeated with\nmodern industry and present-day mechanical progress.\"[216] And Sir\nTheodore Morison concludes regarding India's economic future: \"India's\nindustrial transformation is near at hand; the obstacles which have\nhitherto prevented the adoption of modern methods of manufacture have\nbeen removed; means of transport have been spread over the face of the\nwhole country, capital for the purchase of machinery and erection of\nfactories may now be borrowed on easy terms; mechanics, engineers, and\nbusiness managers may be hired from Europe to train the future captains\nof Indian industry; in English a common language has been found in which\nto transact business with all the provinces of India and with a great\npart of the Western world; security from foreign invasion and internal\ncommotion justifies the inception of large enterprises. All the\nconditions are favourable for a great reorganization of industry which,\nwhen successfully accomplished, will bring about an increase hitherto\nundreamed of in India's annual output of wealth.\"[217]\n\nThe factor usually relied upon to overcome the Orient's handicaps of\ninexperience and inexpertness in industrialism is its cheap labour. To\nWestern observers the low wages and long hours of Eastern industry are\nliterally astounding. Take Egypt and India as examples of industrial\nconditions in the Near and Middle East. Writing of Egypt in 1908, the\nEnglish economist H. N. Brailsford says: \"There was then no Factory Act\nin Egypt. There are all over the country ginning-mills, which employ\ncasual labour to prepare raw cotton for export during four or five\nmonths of the year. The wages were low, from 7-1/2_d._ to 10_d._ (15 to\n20 cents) a day for an adult, and 6_d._ (12 cents) for a child. Children\nand adults alike worked sometimes for twelve, usually for fifteen, and\non occasion even for sixteen or eighteen hours a day. In the height of\nthe season even the children were put on night shifts of twelve\nhours.\"[218]\n\nIn India conditions are about the same. The first thorough investigation\nof Indian industry was made in 1907 by a factory labour commission, and\nthe following are some of the data published in its report: In the\ncotton-mills of Bombay the hours regularly worked ran from thirteen to\nfourteen hours. In the jute-mills of Calcutta the operatives usually\nworked fifteen hours. Cotton-ginning factories required their employees\nto work seventeen and eighteen hours a day, rice and flour mills twenty\nto twenty-two hours, and an extreme case was found in a printing works\nwhere the men had to work twenty-two hours a day for seven consecutive\ndays. As to wages, an adult male operative, working from thirteen to\nfifteen hours a day, received from 15 to 20 rupees a month ($5 to\n$6.35). Child labour was very prevalent, children six and seven years\nold working \"half-time\"--in many cases eight hours a day. As a result of\nthis report legislation was passed by the Indian Government bettering\nworking conditions somewhat, especially for women and children. But in\n1914 the French economist Albert Metin, after a careful study, reported\nfactory conditions not greatly changed, the Factory Acts systematically\nevaded, hours very long, and wages extremely low. In Bombay men were\nearning from 10 cents to 20 cents per day, the highest wages being 30\ncents. For women and children the maximum was 10 cents per day.[219]\n\nWith such extraordinarily low wages and long hours of labour it might at\nfirst sight seem as though, given adequate capital and up-to-date\nmachinery, the Orient could not only drive Occidental products from\nEastern markets but might invade Western markets as well. This, indeed,\nhas been the fear of many Western writers. Nearly three-quarters of a\ncentury ago Gobineau prophesied an industrial invasion of Europe from\nAsia,[220] and of late years economists like H. N. Brailsford have\nwarned against an emigration of Western capital to the tempting lure of\nfactory conditions in Eastern lands.[221] Nevertheless, so far as the\nNear and Middle East is concerned, nothing like this has as yet\nmaterialized. China, to be sure, may yet have unpleasant surprises in\nstore for the West,[222] but neither the Moslem world nor India have\ndeveloped factory labour with the skill, stamina, and assiduity\nsufficient to undercut the industrial workers of Europe and America. In\nIndia, for example, despite a swarming and poverty-stricken population,\nthe factories are unable to recruit an adequate or dependable\nlabour-supply. Says M. Metin: \"With such long hours and low wages it\nmight be thought that Indian industry would be a formidable competitor\nof the West. This is not so. The reason is the bad quality of the work.\nThe poorly paid coolies are so badly fed and so weak that it takes at\nleast three of them to do the work of one European. Also, the Indian\nworkers lack not only strength but also skill, attention, and liking for\ntheir work.... An Indian of the people will do anything else in\npreference to becoming a factory operative. The factories thus get only\nthe dregs of the working class. The workers come to the factories and\nmines as a last resort; they leave as soon as they can return to their\nprior occupations or find a more remunerative employment. Thus the\nfactories can never count on a regular labour-supply. Would higher wages\nremedy this? Many employers say no--as soon as the workers got a little\nahead they would quit, either temporarily till their money was spent, or\npermanently for some more congenial calling.\"[223] These statements are\nfully confirmed by an Indian economic writer, who says: \"One of the\ngreatest drawbacks to the establishment of large industries in India is\nthe scarcity and inefficiency of labour. Cheap labour, where there is no\nphysical stamina, mental discipline, and skill behind it, tends to be\ncostly in the end. The Indian labourer is mostly uneducated. He is not\nin touch with his employers or with his work. The labouring population\nof the towns is a flitting, dilettante population.\"[224]\n\nThus Indian industry, despite its very considerable growth, has not come\nup to early expectations. As the official Year-Book very frankly states:\n\"India, in short, is a country rich in raw materials and in industrial\npossibilities, but poor in manufacturing accomplishments.\"[225] In fact,\nto some observers, India's industrial future seems far from bright. As a\ncompetent English student of Indian conditions recently wrote: \"Some\nyears ago it seemed possible that India might, by a rapid assimilation\nof Western knowledge and technical skill, adapt for her own conditions\nthe methods of modern industry, and so reach an approximate economic\nlevel. Some even now threaten the Western world with a vision of the\nvast populations of China and India rising up with skilled organization,\nvast resources, and comparatively cheap labour to impoverish the West.\nTo the present writer this is a mere bogey. The peril is of a very\ndifferent kind. Instead of a growing approximation, he sees a growing\ndisparity. For every step India takes toward mechanical efficiency, the\nWest takes two. When India is beginning to use bicycles and motor-cars\n(not to make them), the West is perfecting the aeroplane. That is merely\nsymbolic. The war, as we know, has speeded up mechanical invention and\nproduced a population of mechanics; but India has stood comparatively\nstill. It is, up to now, overwhelmingly mediaeval, a country of domestic\nindustry and handicrafts. Mechanical power, even of the simplest, has\nnot yet been applied to its chief industry--agriculture. Yet the period\nof age-long isolation is over, and India can never go back to it;\nnevertheless, the gap between East and West is widening. What is to be\nthe outcome for her 300 millions? We are in danger in the East of seeing\nthe worst evils of commercialism developed on an enormous scale, with\nthe vast population of India the victims--of seeing the East become a\nworld slum.\"[226]\n\nWhether or not this pessimistic outlook is justified, certain it is that\nnot merely India but the entire Orient is in a stage of profound\ntransition; and transition periods are always painful times. We have\nbeen considering the new industrial proletariat of the towns. But the\nolder social classes are affected in very similar fashion. The old-type\nhandicraftsman and small merchant are obviously menaced by modern\nindustrial and business methods, and the peasant masses are in little\nbetter shape. It is not merely a change in technique but a fundamental\ndifference in outlook on life that is involved. The life of the old\nOrient, while there was much want and hardship, was an easygoing life,\nwith virtually no thought of such matters as time, efficiency, output,\nand \"turnover.\" The merchant sat cross-legged in his little booth amid\nhis small stock of wares, passively waiting for trade, chaffering\ninterminably with his customers, annoyed rather than pleased if brisk\nbusiness came his way. The artisan usually worked by and for himself,\nkeeping his own hours and knocking off whenever he chose. The peasant\narose with the dawn, but around noon he and his animals lay down for a\nlong nap and slept until, in the cool of afternoon, they awoke,\nstretched themselves, and, comfortably and casually, went to work again.\n\nTo such people the speed, system, and discipline of our economic life\nare painfully repugnant, and adaptation can at best be effected only\nvery slowly and under the compulsion of the direst necessity. Meanwhile\nthey suffer from the competition of those better equipped in the\neconomic battle. Sir William Ramsay paints a striking picture of the way\nin which the Turkish population of Asia Minor, from landlords and\nmerchants to simple peasants, have been going down-hill for the last\nhalf-century under the economic pressure not merely of Westerners but of\nthe native Christian elements, Armenians and Greeks, who had partially\nassimilated Western business ideas and methods. Under the old state of\nthings, he says, there was in Asia Minor \"no economic progress and no\nmercantile development; things went on in the old fashion, year after\nyear. Such simple business as was carried on was inconsistent with the\nhighly developed Western business system and Western civilization; but\nit was not oppressive to the people. There were no large fortunes; there\nwas no opportunity for making a great fortune; it was impossible for one\nman to force into his service the minds and the work of a large number\nof people, and so to create a great organization out of which he might\nmake big profits. There was a very large number of small men doing\nbusiness on a small scale.\"[227] Sir William Ramsay then goes on to\ndescribe the shattering of this archaic economic life by modern business\nmethods, to the consequent impoverishment of all classes of the\nunadaptable Turkish population.\n\nHow the agricultural classes, peasants and landlords alike, are\nsuffering from changing economic conditions is well exemplified by the\nrecent history of India. Says the French writer Chailley, an\nauthoritative student of Indian problems: \"For the last half-century\nlarge fractions of the agricultural classes are being entirely despoiled\nof their lands or reduced to onerous tenancies. On the other hand, new\nclasses are rising and taking their place.... Both ryots and\nzamindars[228] are involved. The old-type nobility has not advanced with\nthe times. It remains idle and prodigal, while the peasant proprietors,\nburdened by the traditions of many centuries, are likewise improvident\nand ignorant. On the other hand, the economic conditions of British\nIndia are producing capitalists who seek employment for their wealth. A\nconflict between them and the old landholders was predestined, and the\nresult was inevitable. Wealth goes to the cleverest, and the land must\npass into the hands of new masters, to the great indignation of the\nagricultural classes, a portion of whom will be reduced to the position\nof farm-labourers.\"[229]\n\nThe Hindu economist Mukerjee thus depicts the disintegration and decay\nof the Indian village: \"New economic ideas have now begun to influence\nthe minds of the villagers. Some are compelled to leave their\noccupations on account of foreign competition, but more are leaving\ntheir hereditary occupations of their own accord. The Brahmins go to the\ncities to seek government posts or professional careers. The middle\nclasses also leave their villages and get scattered all over the country\nto earn a living. The peasants also leave their ancestral acres and form\na class of landless agricultural labourers. The villages, drained of\ntheir best blood, stagnate and decay. The movement from the village to\nthe city is in fact not only working a complete revolution in the\nhabits and ideals of our people, but its economic consequences are far\nmore serious than are ordinarily supposed. It has made our middle\nclasses helplessly subservient to employment and service, and has also\nkilled the independence of our peasant proprietors. It has jeopardized\nour food-supply, and is fraught with the gravest peril not only to our\nhandicrafts but also to our national industry--agriculture.\"[230]\n\nHappily there are signs that, in Indian agriculture at least, the\ntransition period is working itself out and that conditions may soon be\non the mend. Both the British Government and the native princes have\nvied with one another in spreading Western agricultural ideas and\nmethods, and since the Indian peasant has proved much more receptive\nthan has the Indian artisan, a more intelligent type of farmer is\ndeveloping, better able to keep step with the times. A good instance is\nthe growth of rural co-operative credit societies. First introduced by\nthe British Government in 1904, there were in 1915 more than 17,000 such\nassociations, with a total of 825,000 members and a working capital of\nnearly $30,000,000. These agricultural societies make loans for the\npurchase of stock, fodder, seed, manure, sinking of wells, purchase of\nWestern agricultural machinery, and, in emergencies, personal\nmaintenance. In the districts where they have established themselves\nthey have greatly diminished the plague of usury practised by the\n\"banyas,\" or village money-lenders, lowering the rate of interest from\nits former crushing range of 20 to 75 per cent. to a range averaging\nfrom 9 to 18 per cent. Of course such phenomena are as yet merely\nexceptions to a very dreary rule. Nevertheless, they all point toward a\nbrighter morrow.[231]\n\nBut this brighter agricultural morrow is obviously far off, and in\nindustry it seems to be farther still. Meanwhile the changing Orient is\nfull of suffering and discontent. What wonder that many Orientals\nascribe their troubles, not to the process of economic transition, but\nto the political control of European governments and the economic\nexploitation of Western capital. The result is agitation for\nemancipation from Western economic as well as Western political control.\nAt the end of Chapter II we examined the movement among the Mohammedan\npeoples known as \"Economic Pan-Islamism.\" A similar movement has arisen\namong the Hindus of India--the so-called \"Swadeshi\" movement. The\nSwadeshists declare that India's economic ills are almost entirely due\nto the \"drain\" of India's wealth to England and other Western lands.\nThey therefore advocate a boycott of English goods until Britain grants\nIndia self-government, whereupon they propose to erect protective\ntariffs for Indian products, curb the activities of British capital,\nreplace high-salaried English officials by natives, and thereby keep\nIndia's wealth at home.[232]\n\nAn analysis of these Swadeshist arguments, however, reveals them as\ninadequate to account for India's ills, which are due far more to the\ngeneral economic trend of the times than to any specific defects of the\nBritish connection. British governance and British capital do cost\nmoney, but their undoubted efficiency in producing peace, order,\nsecurity, and development must be considered as offsets to the higher\ncosts which native rule and native capital would impose. As Sir Theodore\nMorison well says: \"The advantages which the British Navy and British\ncredit confer on India are a liberal offset to her expenditure on\npensions and gratuities to her English servants.... India derives a\npecuniary advantage from her connection with the British Empire. The\nanswer, then, which I give to the question 'What economic equivalent\ndoes India get for foreign payments?' is this: India gets the equipment\nof modern industry, and she gets an administration favourable to\neconomic evolution cheaper than she could provide it herself.\"[233] A\ncomparison with Japan's much more costly defence budgets, inferior\ncredit, and higher interest charges on both public and private loans is\nenlightening on this point.\n\nIn fact, some Indians themselves admit the fallacy of Swadeshist\narguments. As one of them remarks: \"The so-called economic 'drain' is\nnonsense. Most of the misery of late years is due to the rising cost of\nliving--a world-wide phenomenon.\" And in proof of this he cites\nconditions in other Oriental countries, especially Japan.[234] As warm a\nfriend of the Indian people as the British labour leader, Ramsay\nMacdonald, states: \"One thing is quite evident, a tariff will not\nre-establish the old hand-industry of India nor help to revive village\nhandicrafts. Factory and machine production, native to India itself,\nwill throttle them as effectively as that of Lancashire and Birmingham\nhas done in the past.\"[235]\n\nEven more trenchant are the criticisms formulated by the Hindu writer\nPramatha Nath Bose.[236] The \"drain,\" says Mr. Bose, is ruining India.\nBut would the Home Rule programme, as envisaged by most Swadeshists,\ncure India's economic ills? Under Home Rule these people would do the\nfollowing things: (1) Substitute Englishmen for Indians in the\nAdministration; (2) levy protective duties on Indian products; (3) grant\nState encouragement to Indian industries; (4) disseminate technical\neducation. Now, how would these matters work out? The substitution of\nIndian for British officials would not lessen the \"drain\" as much as\nmost Home Rulers think. The high-placed Indian officials who already\nexist have acquired European standards of living, so the new official\ncorps would cost almost as much as the old. Also, \"the influence of the\nexample set by the well-to-do Indian officials would permeate Indian\nsociety more largely than at present, and the demand for Western\narticles would rise in proportion. So commercial exploitation by\nforeigners would not only continue almost as if they were Europeans, but\nmight even increase.\" As to a protective tariff, it would attract\nEuropean capital to India which would exploit labour and skim the\nprofits. India has shown relatively little capacity for indigenous\nindustrial development. Of course, even at low wages, many Indians might\nbenefit, yet such persons would form only a tithe of the millions now\nstarving--besides the fact that this industrialization would bring in\nmany new social evils. As to State encouragement of industries, this\nwould bring in Western capital even more than a protective tariff, with\nthe results already stated. As for technical education, it is a worthy\nproject, but, says Mr. Bose, \"I am afraid the movement is too late, now.\nWithin the last thirty years the Westerners and the Japanese have gone\nso far ahead of us industrially that it has been yearly becoming more\nand more difficult to compete with them.\"\n\nIn fact, Mr. Bose goes on to criticize the whole system of Western\neducation, as applied to India. Neither higher nor lower education have\nproven panaceas. \"Higher education has led to the material prosperity\nof a small section of our community, comprising a few thousands of\nwell-to-do lawyers, doctors, and State servants. But their occupations\nbeing of a more or less unproductive or parasitic character, their\nwell-being does not solve the problem of the improvement of India as a\nwhole. On the contrary, as their taste for imported articles develops in\nproportion to their prosperity, they help to swell rather than diminish\nthe economic drain from the country which is one of the chief causes of\nour impoverishment.\" Neither has elementary education \"on the whole\nfurthered the well-being of the multitude. It has not enabled the\ncultivators to 'grow two blades where one grew before.' On the contrary,\nit has distinctly diminished their efficiency by inculcating in the\nliterate proletariat, who constitute the cream of their class, a strong\ndistaste for their hereditary mode of living and their hereditary\ncallings, and an equally strong taste for shoddy superfluities and\nbrummagem fineries, and for occupations of a more or less parasitic\ncharacter. They have, directly or indirectly, accelerated rather than\nretarded the decadence of indigenous industries, and have thus helped to\naggravate their own economic difficulties and those of the entire\ncommunity. What they want is more food--and New India vies with the\nGovernment in giving them what is called 'education' that does not\nincrease their food-earning capacity, but on the contrary fosters in\nthem tastes and habits which make them despise indigenous products and\nrender them fit subjects for the exploitation of scheming capitalists,\nmostly foreign. Political and economic causes could not have led to the\nextinction of indigenous industry if they had not been aided by change\nof taste fostered by the Western environment of which the so-called\n'education' is a powerful factor.\"\n\nFrom all this Mr. Bose concludes that none of the reforms advocated by\nthe Home Rulers would cure India's ills. \"In fact, the chances are, she\nwould be more inextricably entangled in the toils of Western\ncivilization, without any adequate compensating advantage, and the grip\nof the West would close on her to crush her more effectively.\"\nTherefore, according to Mr. Bose, the only thing for India to do is to\nturn her back on everything Western and plunge resolutely into the\ntraditional past. As he expresses it: \"India's salvation lies, not in\nthe region of politics, but outside it; not in aspiring to be one of the\n'great' nations of the present day, but in retiring to her humble\nposition--a position, to my mind, of solitary grandeur and glory; not in\ngoing forward on the path of Western civilization, but in going back\nfrom it so far as practicable; not in getting more and more entangled in\nthe silken meshes of its finely knit, widespread net, but in escaping\nfrom it as far as possible.\"\n\nSuch are the drastic conclusions of Mr. Bose; conclusions shared to a\ncertain extent by other Indian idealists like Rabindranath Tagore. But\nsurely such projects, however idealistic, are the vainest fantasies.\nWhole peoples cannot arbitrarily cut themselves off from the rest of the\nworld, like isolated individuals forswearing society and setting up as\nanchorites in the jungle. The time for \"hermit nations\" has passed,\nespecially for a vast country like India, set at the cross-roads of the\nEast, open to the sea, and already profoundly penetrated by Western\nideas.\n\nNevertheless, such criticisms, appealing as they do to the strong strain\nof asceticism latent in the Indian nature, have affected many Indians\nwho, while unable to concur in the conclusions, still try to evolve a\n\"middle term,\" retaining everything congenial in the old system and\ngrafting on a select set of Western innovations. Accordingly, these\npersons have elaborated programmes for a \"new order\" built on a blend of\nHindu mysticism, caste, Western industry, and socialism.[237]\n\nNow these schemes are highly ingenious. But they are not convincing.\nTheir authors should remember the old adage that you cannot eat your\ncake and have it too. When we realize the abysmal antithesis between the\neconomic systems of the old East and the modern West, any attempt to\ncombine the most congenial points of both while eschewing their defects\nseems an attempt to reconcile irreconcilables and about as profitable as\ntrying to square the circle. As Lowes Dickinson wisely observes:\n\"Civilization is a whole. Its art, its religion, its way of life, all\nhang together with its economic and technical development. I doubt\nwhether a nation can pick and choose; whether, for instance, the East\ncan say, 'We will take from the West its battleships, its factories, its\nmedical science; we will not take its social confusion, its hurry and\nfatigue, its ugliness, its over-emphasis on activity.'... So I expect\nthe East to follow us, whether it like it or no, into all these\nexcesses, and to go right through, not round, all that we have been\nthrough on its way to a higher phase of civilization.\"[238]\n\nThis seems to be substantially true. Judged by the overwhelming body of\nevidence, the East, in its contemporary process of transformation, will\nfollow the West--avoiding some of our more patent mistakes, perhaps,\nbut, in the main, proceeding along similar lines. And, as already\nstated, this transformation is modifying every phase of Eastern life. We\nhave already examined the process at work in the religious, political,\nand economic phases. To the social phase let us now turn.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[206] F. B. Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_, p. 53 (New York, 1920).\n\n[207] Rev. A. J. Brown, \"Economic Changes in Asia,\" _The Century_,\nMarch, 1904.\n\n[208] _I. e._ the purveyor of the native vegetable-oils.\n\n[209] R. Mukerjee, _The Foundations of Indian Economics_, p. 5 (London,\n1916).\n\n[210] On these points, see Fisher, _op. cit._; Sir T. Morison, _The\nEconomic Transition in India_ (London, 1911); Sir Valentine Chirol,\n_Indian Unrest_ (London, 1910); D. H. Dodwell, \"Economic Transition in\nIndia,\" _Economic Journal_, December, 1910; J. P. Jones, \"The Present\nSituation in India,\" _Journal of Race Development_, July, 1910.\n\n[211] L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage oriental_, pp. 20-21 (Paris, 1910).\n\n[212] Sir T. Morison, _The Economic Transition in India_, p. 181.\n\n[213] Quoted by Jones, _supra_.\n\n[214] _The Indian Review_ (Madras), 1910.\n\n[215] Clarence Poe, \"What the Orient can Teach Us,\" _World's Work_,\nJuly, 1911.\n\n[216] C. S. Cooper, _The Modernizing of the Orient_, p. 5 (New York,\n1914).\n\n[217] Morison, _op. cit._, p. 242.\n\n[218] H. N. Brailsford, _The War of Steel and Gold_, p. 114 (London,\n1915).\n\n[219] A. Metin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Etude sociale_, p. 336 (Paris,\n1918).\n\n[220] In his book, _Trois Ans en Perse_ (Paris, 1858).\n\n[221] Brailsford, _op. cit._, pp. 83, 114-115.\n\n[222] Regarding conditions in China, especially the extraordinary\ndiscipline and working ability of the Chinaman, see my _Rising Tide of\nColour against White World-Supremacy_, pp. 28-30, 243-251.\n\n[223] Metin, _op. cit._, p. 337.\n\n[224] A. Yusuf Ali, _Life and Labour in India_, p. 183 (London, 1907).\n\n[225] \"India in the Years 1917-1918\" (official publication--Calcutta).\n\n[226] Young and Ferrers, _India in Conflict_, pp. 15-17 (London, 1920).\n\n[227] Sir W. M. Ramsay, \"The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia,\" _Quarterly\nReview_, January, 1918.\n\n[228] _I. e._ peasants and landlords.\n\n[229] J. Chailley _Administrative Problems of British India_, p. 339\n(London, 1910--English translation).\n\n[230] Mukerjee, _op. cit._, p. 9.\n\n[231] On the co-operative movement in India, see Fisher, _India's Silent\nRevolution_, pp. 54-58; R. B. Ewebank, \"The Co-operative Movement in\nIndia,\" _Quarterly Review_, April, 1916. India's economic problems, both\nagricultural and industrial, have been carefully studied by a large\nnumber of Indian economists, some of whose writings are extremely\ninteresting. Some of the most noteworthy books, besides those of\nMukerjee and Yusuf Ali, already quoted, are: Dadabhai Naoroji, _Poverty\nand Un-British Rule in India_ (London, 1901); Romesh Dutt, _The Economic\nHistory of India in the Victorian Age_ (London, 1906); H. H. Gosh, _The\nAdvancement of Industry_ (Calcutta, 1910); P. C. Ray, _The Poverty\nProblem in India_ (Calcutta, 1895); M. G. Ranade, _Essays on Indian\nEconomics_ (Madras, 1920); Jadunath Sarkar, _Economics of British India_\n(Calcutta, 1911).\n\n[232] The best compendium of Swadeshist opinion is the volume containing\npronouncements from all the Swadeshi leaders, entitled, _The Swadeshi\nMovement: A Symposium_ (Madras, 1910). See also writings of the\neconomists Gosh, Mukerjee, Ray, and Sarkar, above quoted, as well as the\nvarious writings of the nationalist agitator Lajpat Rai. A good summary\ninterpretation is found in M. Glotz, \"Le Mouvement 'Swadeshi' dans\nl'Inde,\" _Revue du Mois_, July, 1913.\n\n[233] Sir T. Morison, _The Economic Transition in India_, pp. 240-241.\nAlso see Sir Valentine Chirol, _Indian Unrest_, pp. 255-279; William\nArcher, _India and the Future_, pp. 131-157.\n\n[234] Syed Sirdar Ali Khan, _India of To-day_, p. 19 (Bombay, 1908).\n\n[235] J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_, p. 133 (London,\n1920).\n\n[236] In _The Hindustan Review_ (Calcutta), 1917.\n\n[237] Good examples are found in the writings of Mukerjee and Lajpat\nRai, already quoted.\n\n[238] G. Lowes Dickinson, _An Essay on the Civilizations of India,\nChina, and Japan_, pp. 84-85 (London, 1914).\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nSOCIAL CHANGE\n\n\nThe momentous nature of the contemporary transformation of the Orient is\nnowhere better attested than by the changes effected in the lives of its\npeoples. That dynamic influence of the West which is modifying\ngovernmental forms, political concepts, religious beliefs, and economic\nprocesses is proving equally potent in the range of social phenomena. In\nthe third chapter of this volume we attempted a general survey of\nWestern influence along all the above lines. In the present chapter we\nshall attempt a detailed consideration of the social changes which are\nto-day taking place.\n\nThese social changes are very great, albeit many of them may not be so\napparent as the changes in other fields. So firm is the hold of custom\nand tradition on individual, family, and group life in the Orient that\nsuperficial observers of the East are prone to assert that these matters\nare still substantially unaltered, however pronounced may have been the\nchanges on the external, material side. Yet such is not the opinion of\nthe closest students of the Orient, and it is most emphatically not the\nopinion of Orientals themselves. These generally stress the profound\nsocial changes which are going on.\n\nAnd it is their judgments which seem to be the more correct. To say that\nthe East is advancing \"materially\" but standing still \"socially\" is to\nignore the elemental truth that social systems are altered quite as much\nby material things as by abstract ideas. Who that looks below the\nsurface can deny the social, moral, and civilizing power of railroads,\npost-offices, and telegraph lines? Does it mean nothing socially as well\nas materially that the East is adopting from the West a myriad\ninnovations, weighty and trivial, important and frivolous, useful and\nbaneful? Does it mean nothing socially as well as materially that the\nProphet's tomb at Medina is lit by electricity and that picture\npost-cards are sold outside the Holy Kaaba at Mecca? It may seem mere\ngrotesque piquancy that the muezzin should ride to the mosque in a\ntram-car, or that the Moslem business man should emerge from his harem,\nread his morning paper, motor to an office equipped with a prayer-rug,\nand turn from his devotions to dictaphone and telephone. Yet why assume\nthat his life is moulded by mosque, harem, and prayer-rug, and yet deny\nthe things of the West a commensurate share in the shaping of his social\nexistence? Now add to these tangible innovations intangible novelties\nlike scientific education, Occidental amusements, and the partial\nemancipation of women, and we begin to get some idea of the depth and\nscope of the social transformation which is going on.\n\nIn those parts of the Orient most open to Western influences this social\ntransformation has attained notable proportions for more than a\ngeneration. When the Hungarian Orientalist Vambery returned to\nConstantinople in 1896 after forty years' absence, he stood amazed at\nthe changes which had taken place, albeit Constantinople was then\nsubjected to the worst repression of the Hamidian regime. \"I had,\" he\nwrites, \"continually to ask myself this question: Is it possible that\nthese are my Turks of 1856; and how can all these transformations have\ntaken place? I was astonished at the aspect of the city; at the stone\nbuildings which had replaced the old wooden ones; at the animation of\nthe streets, in which carriages and tram-cars abounded, whereas forty\nyears before only saddle-animals were used; and when the strident shriek\nof the locomotive mingled with the melancholy calls from the minarets,\nall that I saw and heard seemed to me a living protest against the old\nadage: 'La bidaat fil Islam'--'There is nothing to reform in Islam.' My\nastonishment became still greater when I entered the houses and was able\nto appreciate the people, not only by their exteriors but still more by\ntheir manner of thought. The effendi class[239] of Constantinople seemed\nto me completely transformed in its conduct, outlook, and attitude\ntoward foreigners.\"[240]\n\nVambery stresses the inward as well as outward evolution of the Turkish\neducated classes, for he says: \"Not only in his outward aspect, but also\nin his home-life, the present-day Turk shows a strong inclination to the\nmanners and habits of the West, in such varied matters as furniture,\ntable-manners, sex-relations, and so forth. This is of the very greatest\nsignificance. For a people may, to be sure, assimilate foreign\ninfluences in the intellectual field, if it be persuaded of their\nutility and advantage; but it gives up with more difficulty customs and\nhabits which are in the blood. One cannot over-estimate the numerous\nsacrifices which, despite everything, the Turks have made in this line.\nI find all Turkish society, even the Mollahs,[241] penetrated with the\nnecessity of a union with Western civilization. Opinions may differ as\nto the method of assimilation: some wish to impress on the foreign\ncivilization a national character; others, on the contrary, are\npartisans of our intellectual culture, such as it is, and reprobate any\nkind of modification.\"[242]\n\nMost significant of all, Vambery found even the secluded women of the\nharems, \"those bulwarks of obscurantism,\" notably changed. \"Yes, I\nrepeat, the life of women in Turkey seems to me to have been radically\ntransformed in the last forty years, and it cannot be denied that this\ntransformation has been produced by internal conviction as much as by\nexternal pressure.\" Noting the spread of female education, and the\nincreasing share of women in reform movements, Vambery remarks: \"This is\nof vital importance, for when women shall begin to act in the family as\na factor of modern progress, real reforms, in society as well as in the\nstate, cannot fail to appear.\"[243]\n\nIn India a similar permeation of social life by Westernism is depicted\nby the Moslem liberal, S. Khuda Bukhsh, albeit Mr. Bukhsh, being an\ninsider, lays greater emphasis upon the painful aspects of the\ninevitable transition process from old to new. He is not unduly\npessimistic, for he recognizes that \"the age of transition is\nnecessarily to a certain extent an age of laxity of morals, indifference\nto religion, superficial culture, and gossiping levity. These are\npassing ills which time itself will cure.\" Nevertheless, he does not\nminimize the critical aspects of the present situation, which implies\nnothing less than the breakdown of the old social system. \"The clearest\nresult of this breakdown of our old system of domestic life and social\ncustoms under the assault of European ideas,\" he says, \"is to be found\nin two directions--in our religious beliefs and in our social life. The\nold system, with all its faults, had many redeeming virtues.\" To-day\nthis old system, narrow-minded but God-fearing, has been replaced by a\n\"strange independence of thought and action. Reverence for age, respect\nfor our elders, deference to the opinions of others, are fast\ndisappearing.... Under the older system the head of the family was the\nsole guide and friend of its members. His word had the force of law. He\nwas, so to speak, the custodian of the honour and prestige of the\nfamily. From this exalted position he is now dislodged, and the most\njunior member now claims equality with him.\"[244]\n\nMr. Bukhsh deplores the current wave of extravagance, due to the\nwholesale adoption of European customs and modes of living. \"What,\" he\nasks, \"has happened here in India? We have adopted European costume,\nEuropean ways of living, even the European vices of drinking and\ngambling, but none of their virtues. This must be remedied. We must\nlearn at the feet of Europe, but not at the sacrifice of our Eastern\nindividuality. But this is precisely what we have not done. We have\ndabbled a little in English and European history, and we have commenced\nto despise our religion, our literature, our history, our traditions. We\nhave unlearned the lessons of our history and our civilization, and in\ntheir place we have secured nothing solid and substantial to hold\nsociety fast in the midst of endless changes.\" In fine: \"Destruction has\ndone its work, but the work of construction has not yet begun.\"[245]\n\nLike Vambery, Bukhsh lays strong emphasis on the increasing emancipation\nof women. No longer regarded as mere \"child-bearing machines,\" the\nMohammedan women of India \"are getting educated day by day, and now\nassert their rights. Though the purdah system[246] still prevails, it is\nno longer that severe, stringent, and unreasonable seclusion of women\nwhich existed fifty years ago. It is gradually relaxing, and women are\ngetting, step by step, rights and liberties which must in course of time\nend in the complete emancipation of Eastern womanhood. Forty years ago\nwomen meekly submitted to neglect, indifference, and even harsh\ntreatment from their husbands, but such is the case no longer.\"[247]\n\nThese two descriptions of social conditions in the Near and Middle East\nrespectively enable one to get a fair idea of the process of change\nwhich is going on. Of course it must not be forgotten that both writers\ndeal primarily with the educated upper classes of the large towns.\nNevertheless, the leaven is working steadily downward, and with every\ndecade is affecting wider strata of the native populations.\n\nThe spread of Western education in the East during the past few decades\nhas been truly astonishing, because it is the exact antithesis of the\nOriental educational system. The traditional \"education\" of the entire\nOrient, from Morocco to China, was a mere memorizing of sacred texts\ncombined with exercises of religious devotion. The Mohammedan or Hindu\nstudent spent long years reciting to his master (a \"holy man\")\ninterminable passages from books which, being written in classic Arabic\nor Sanskrit, were unintelligible to him, so that he usually did not\nunderstand a word of what he was saying. No more deadening system for\nthe intellect could possibly have been devised. Every part of the brain\nexcept the memory atrophied, and the wonder is that any intellectual\ninitiative or original thinking ever appeared.\n\nEven to-day the old system persists, and millions of young Orientals are\nstill wasting their time at this mind-petrifying nonsense. But alongside\nthe old there has arisen a new system, running the whole educational\ngamut from kindergartens to universities, where Oriental youth is being\neducated along Western lines. These new-type educational establishments\nare of every kind. Besides schools and universities giving a liberal\neducation and fitting students for government service or the\nprofessions, there are numerous technical schools turning out skilled\nagriculturists or engineers, while good normal schools assure a supply\nof teachers qualified to instruct coming student-generations. Both\npublic and private effort furthers Western education in the East. All\nthe European governments have favoured Western education in the lands\nunder their control, particularly the British in India and Egypt, while\nvarious Christian missionary bodies have covered the East with a\nnetwork of schools and colleges. Also many Oriental governments like\nTurkey and the native states of India have made sincere efforts to\nspread Western education among their peoples.[248]\n\nOf course, as in any new development, the results so far obtained are\nfar from ideal. The vicious traditions of the past handicap or partially\npervert the efforts of the present. Eastern students are prone to use\ntheir memories rather than their intellects, and seek to cram their way\nquickly through examinations to coveted posts rather than acquire\nknowledge and thus really fit themselves for their careers. The result\nis that many fail, and these unfortunates, half-educated and spoiled for\nany sort of useful occupation, vegetate miserably, come to hate that\nWesternism which they do not understand, and give themselves up to\nanarchistic revolutionary agitation. Sir Alfred Lyall well describes the\ndark side of Western education in the East when he says of India:\n\"Ignorance is unquestionably the root of many evils; and it was natural\nthat in the last century certain philosophers should have assumed\neducation to be a certain cure for human delusions; and that statesmen\nlike Macaulay should have declared education to be the best and surest\nremedy for political discontent and for law-breaking. In any case, it\nwas the clear and imperative duty of the British Government to attempt\nthe intellectual emancipation of India as the best justification of\nBritish rule. We have since discovered by experience, that, although\neducation is a sovereign remedy for many ills--is indeed indispensable\nto healthy progress--yet an indiscriminate or superficial administration\nof this potent medicine may engender other disorders. It acts upon the\nframe of an antique society as a powerful dissolvent, heating weak\nbrains, stimulating rash ambitions, raising inordinate expectations of\nwhich the disappointment is bitterly resented.\"[249]\n\nIndeed, some Western observers of the Orient, particularly colonial\nofficials, have been so much impressed by the political and social\ndangers arising from the existence of this \"literate proletariat\" of\nsemi-educated failures that they are tempted to condemn the whole\nventure of Western education in the East as a mistake. Lord Cromer, for\nexample, was decidedly sceptical of the worth of the Western-educated\nEgyptian,[250] while a prominent Anglo-Indian official names as the\nchief cause of Indian unrest, \"the system of education, which we\nourselves introduced--advisedly so far as the limited vision went of\nthose responsible; blindly in view of the inevitable consequences.\"[251]\n\nYet these pessimistic judgments do not seem to make due allowance for\nthe inescapable evils attendant on any transition stage. Other observers\nof the Orient have made due allowance for this factor. Vambery, for\ninstance, notes the high percentage of honest and capable native\nofficials in the British Indian and French North African civil service\n(the bulk of these officials, of course, Western-educated men), and\nconcludes: \"Strictly conservative Orientals, and also fanatically\ninclined Europeans, think that with the entrance of our culture the\nprimitive virtues of the Asiatics have been destroyed, and that the\nuncivilized Oriental was more faithful, more honest, and more reliable\nthan the Asiatic educated on European principles. This is a gross error.\nIt may be true of the half-educated, but not of the Asiatic in whose\ncase the intellectual evolution is founded on the solid basis of a\nthorough, systematic education.\"[252]\n\nAnd, whatever may be the ills attendant upon Western education in the\nEast, is it not the only practicable course to pursue? The impact of\nWesternism upon the Orient is too ubiquitous to be confined to books.\nGranting, therefore, for the sake of argument, that colonial governments\ncould have prevented Western education in the formal sense, would not\nthe Oriental have learned in other ways? Surely it is better that he\nshould learn through good texts under the supervision of qualified\nteachers, rather than tortuously in perverted--and more\ndangerous--fashion.\n\nThe importance of Western education in the East is nowhere better\nillustrated than in the effects it is producing in ameliorating the\nstatus of women. The depressed condition of women throughout the Orient\nis too well known to need elaboration. Bad enough in Mohammedan\ncountries, it is perhaps at its worst among the Hindus of India, with\nchild-marriage, the virtual enslavement of widows (burned alive till\nprohibited by English law), and a seclusion more strict even than that\nof the \"harem\" of Moslem lands. As an English writer well puts it:\n\"'Ladies first,' we say in the West; in the East it is 'ladies last.'\nThat sums up succinctly the difference in the domestic ideas of the two\ncivilizations.\"[253]\n\nUnder these circumstances it might seem as though no breath of the West\ncould yet have reached these jealously secluded creatures. Yet, as a\nmatter of fact, Western influences have already profoundly affected the\nwomen of the upper classes, and female education, while far behind that\nof the males, has attained considerable proportions. In the more\nadvanced parts of the Orient like Constantinople, Cairo, and the cities\nof India, distinctly \"modern\" types of women have appeared, the\nself-supporting, self-respecting--and respected--woman school-teacher\nbeing especially in evidence.\n\nThe social consequences of this rising status of women, not only to\nwomen themselves but also to the community at large, are very important.\nIn the East the harem is, as Vambery well says, the \"bulwark of\nobscurantism.\"[254] Ignorant and fanatical herself, the harem woman\nimplants her ignorance and fanaticism in her sons as well as in her\ndaughters. What could be a worse handicap for the Eastern \"intellectual\"\nthan his boyhood years spent \"behind the veil\"? No wonder that\nenlightened Oriental fathers have been in the habit of sending their\nboys to school at the earliest possible age in order to get them as soon\nas possible out of the stultifying atmosphere of harem life. Yet even\nthis has proved merely a palliative. Childhood impressions are ever the\nmost lasting, and so long as one-half of the Orient remained untouched\nby progressive influences Oriental progress had to be begun again _de\nnovo_ with every succeeding generation.\n\nThe increasing number of enlightened Oriental women is remedying this\nfatal defect. As a Western writer well says: \"Give the mothers education\nand the whole situation is transformed. Girls who are learning other\nthings than the unintelligible phrases of the Koran are certain to\nimpart such knowledge, as daughters, sisters, and mothers, to their\nrespective households. Women who learn housewifery, methods of modern\ncooking, sewing, and sanitation in the domestic-economy schools, are\nbound to cast about the home upon their return the atmosphere of a\ncivilized community. The old-time picture of the Oriental woman spending\nher hours upon divans, eating sweetmeats, and indulging in petty and\ndegrading gossip with the servants, or with women as ignorant as\nherself, will be changed. The new woman will be a companion rather than\na slave or a toy of her husband. Marriage will advance from the stage of\na paltry trade in bodies to something like a real union, involving\nrespect towards the woman by both sons and fathers, while in a new pride\nof relationship the woman herself will be discovered.\"[255]\n\nThese men and women of the newer Orient reflect their changing ideas in\ntheir changing standards of living. Although this is most evident among\nthe wealthier elements of the towns, it is perceptible in all classes of\nthe population. Rich and poor, urban and rural, the Orientals are\naltering their living standards towards those of the West. And this\ninvolves social changes of the most far-reaching character, because few\nantitheses could be sharper than the living conditions prevailing\nrespectively in the traditional East and in the modern Western world.\nThis basic difference lies, not in wealth (the East, like the West,\nknows great riches as well as great poverty), but rather in\n_comfort_--using the word in its broad sense. The wealthy Oriental of\nthe old school spends most of his money on Oriental luxuries, like fine\nraiment, jewels, women, horses, and a great retinue of attendants, and\nthen hoards the rest. But of \"comfort,\" in the Western sense, he knows\nvirtually nothing, and it is safe to say that he lives under domestic\nconditions which a Western artisan would despise.[256]\n\nTo-day, however, the Oriental is discovering \"comfort.\" And, high or\nlow, he likes it very well. All the myriad things which make our lives\neasier and more agreeable--lamps, electric light, sewing-machines,\nclocks, whisky, umbrellas, sanitary plumbing, and a thousand others: all\nthese things, which to us are more or less matters of course, are to the\nOriental so many delightful discoveries, of irresistible appeal. He\nwants them, and he gets them in ever-increasing quantities. But this\nproduces some rather serious complications. His private economy is more\nor less thrown out of gear. This opening of a whole vista of new wants\nmeans a portentous rise in his standard of living. And where is he going\nto find the money to pay for it? If he be poor, he has to skimp on his\nbare necessities. If he be rich, he hates to forgo his traditional\nluxuries. The upshot is a universal growth of extravagance. And, in this\nconnection, it is well to bear in mind that the peoples of the Near and\nMiddle East, taken as a whole, have never been really thrifty. Poor the\nmasses may have been, and thus obliged to live frugally, but they have\nalways proved themselves \"good spenders\" when opportunity offers. The\nway in which a Turkish peasant or a Hindu ryot will squander his savings\nand run into debt over festivals, marriages, funerals, and other social\nevents is astounding to Western observers.[257] Now add to all this the\nfact that in the Orient, as in the rest of the world, the cost of the\nbasic necessaries of life--food, clothing, fuel, and shelter, has risen\ngreatly during the past two decades, and we can realize the gravity of\nthe problem which higher Oriental living-standards involves.[258]\n\nCertain it is that the struggle for existence is growing keener and that\nthe pressure of poverty is getting more severe. With the basic\nnecessaries rising in price, and with many things considered necessities\nwhich were considered luxuries or entirely unheard of a generation ago,\nthe Oriental peasant or town working-man is finding it harder and harder\nto make both ends meet. As one writer well phrases it: \"These altered\neconomic conditions have not as yet brought the ability to meet them.\nThe cost of living has increased faster than the resources of the\npeople.\"[259]\n\nOne of the main (though not sufficiently recognized) causes of the\neconomic-social crisis through which the Orient is to-day passing is\nover-population. The quick breeding tendencies of Oriental peoples have\nalways been proverbial, and have been due not merely to strong sexual\nappetites but also to economic reasons like the harsh exploitation of\nwomen and children, and perhaps even more to religious doctrines\nenjoining early marriage and the begetting of numerous sons. As a\nresult, Oriental populations have always pressed close upon the limits\nof subsistence. In the past, however, this pressure was automatically\nlightened by factors like war, misgovernment, pestilence, and famine,\nwhich swept off such multitudes of people that, despite high\nbirth-rates, populations remained at substantially a fixed level. But\nhere, as in every other phase of Eastern life, Western influences have\nradically altered the situation. The extension of European political\ncontrol over Eastern lands has meant the putting down of internal\nstrife, the diminution of governmental abuses, the decrease of disease,\nand the lessening of the blight of famine. In other words, those\n\"natural\" checks which previously kept down the population have been\ndiminished or abolished, and in response to the life-saving activities\nof the West, the enormous death-rate which in the past has kept Oriental\npopulations from excessive multiplication is falling to proportions\ncomparable with the low death-rate of Western nations. But to lower the\nOrient's prodigious birth-rate is quite another matter. As a matter of\nfact, that birth-rate keeps up with undiminished vigour, and the\nconsequence has been a portentous increase of population in nearly every\nportion of the Orient under Western political control. In fact, even\nthose Oriental countries which have maintained their independence have\nmore or less adopted Western life-conserving methods, and have\nexperienced in greater or less degree an accelerated increase of\npopulation.\n\nThe phenomena of over-population are best seen in India. Most of India\nhas been under British control for the greater part of a century. Even a\ncentury ago, India was densely populated, yet in the intervening\nhundred years the population has increased between two and three\nfold.[260] Of course, factors like improved agriculture, irrigation,\nrailways, and the introduction of modern industry enable India to\nsupport a much larger population than it could have done at the time of\nthe British Conquest. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that excessive\nmultiplication has taken place. Nearly all qualified students of the\nproblem concur on this point. Forty years ago the Duke of Argyll stated:\n\"Where there is no store, no accumulation, no wealth; where the people\nlive from hand to mouth from season to season on a low diet; and where,\nnevertheless, they breed and multiply at such a rate; there we can at\nleast see that this power and force of multiplication is no evidence\neven of safety, far less of comfort.\" Towards the close of the last\ncentury, Sir William Hunter termed population India's \"fundamental\nproblem,\" and continued: \"The result of civilized rule in India has been\nto produce a strain on the food-producing powers of the country such as\nit had never before to bear. It has become a truism of Indian statistics\nthat the removal of the old cruel checks on population in an Asiatic\ncountry is by no means an unmixed blessing to an Asiatic people.\"[261]\nLord Cromer remarks of India's poverty: \"Not only cannot it be remedied\nby mere philanthropy, but it is absolutely certain--cruel and\nparadoxical though it may appear to say so--that philanthropy enhances\nthe evil. In the days of Akhbar or Shah Jehan, cholera, famine, and\ninternal strife kept down the population. Only the fittest survived. Now\ninternal strife is forbidden, and philanthropy steps in and says that no\nsingle life shall be sacrificed if science and Western energy or skill\ncan save it. Hence the growth of a highly congested population, vast\nnumbers of whom are living on a bare margin of subsistence. The fact\nthat one of the greatest difficulties of governing the teeming masses of\nthe East is caused by good and humane government should be recognized.\nIt is too often ignored.\"[262]\n\nWilliam Archer well states the matter when, in answer to the query why\nimproved external conditions have not brought India prosperity, he says:\n\"The reason, in my view, is simple: namely, that the benefit of good\ngovernment is, in part at any rate, nullified, when the people take\nadvantage of it, not to save and raise their standard of living, but to\nbreed to the very margin of subsistence. Henry George used to point out\nthat every mouth that came into the world brought two hands along with\nit; but though the physiological fact is undeniable, the economic\ndeduction suggested will not hold good except in conditions that permit\nof the profitable employment of the two hands.... If mouths increase in\na greater ratio than food, the tendency must be towards greater\npoverty.\"[263]\n\nIt is one of the most unfortunate aspects of the situation that very few\nOriental thinkers yet realize that over-population is a prime cause of\nOriental poverty. Almost without exception they lay the blame to\npolitical factors, especially to Western political control. In fact, the\nonly case that I know of where an Eastern thinker has boldly faced the\nproblem and has courageously advocated birth-control is in the book\npublished five years ago by P. K. Wattal, a native official of the\nIndian Finance Department, entitled, _The Population Problem of\nIndia_.[264] This pioneer volume is written with such ability and is of\nsuch apparent significance as an indication of the awakening of\nOrientals to a more rational attitude, that it merits special attention.\n\nMr. Wattal begins his book by a plea to his fellow-countrymen to look at\nthe problem rationally and without prejudice. \"This essay,\" he says,\n\"should not be constituted into an attack on the spiritual civilization\nof our country, or even indirectly into a glorification of the\nmaterialism of the West. The object in view is that we should take a\nsomewhat more matter-of-fact view of the main problem of life, viz., how\nto live in this world. We are a poor people; the fact is indisputable.\nOur poverty is, perhaps, due to a great many causes. But I put it to\nevery one of us whether he has not at some of the most momentous periods\nof his life been handicapped by having to support a large family, and\nwhether this encumbrance has not seriously affected the chances of\nadvancement warranted by early promise and exceptional endowment. This\nquestion should be viewed by itself. It is a physical fact, and has\nnothing to do with political environment or religious obligation. If we\nhave suffered from the consequences of that mistake, is it not a duty\nthat we owe to ourselves and to our progeny that its evil effects shall\nbe mitigated as far as possible? There is no greater curse than\npoverty--I say this with due respect to our spiritualism. It is not in a\nspirit of reproach that restraint in married life is urged in these\npages. It is solely from a vivid realization of the hardships caused by\nlarge families and a profound sympathy with the difficulties under which\nlarge numbers of respectable persons struggle through life in this\ncountry that I have made bold to speak in plain terms what comes to\nevery young man, but which he does not care to give utterance to in a\nmanner that would prevent the recurrence of the evil.\"[265]\n\nAfter this appeal to reason in his readers, Mr. Wattal develops his\nthesis. The first prime cause of over-population in India, he asserts,\nis early marriage. Contrary to Western lands, where population is kept\ndown by prudential marriages and by birth-control, \"for the Hindus\nmarriage is a sacrament which must be performed, regardless of the\nfitness of the parties to bear the responsibilities of a mated\nexistence. A Hindu male must marry and beget children--sons, if you\nplease--to perform his funeral rites lest his spirit wander uneasily in\nthe waste places of the earth. The very name of son, 'putra,' means one\nwho saves his father's soul from the hell called Puta. A Hindu maiden\nunmarried at puberty is a source of social obloquy to her family and of\ndamnation to her ancestors. Among the Mohammedans, who are not\nhandicapped by such penalties, the married state is equally common,\npartly owing to Hindu example and partly to the general conditions of\nprimitive society, where a wife is almost a necessity both as a domestic\ndrudge and as a helpmate in field work.\"[266] The worst of the matter is\nthat, despite the efforts of social reformers child-marriage seems to be\nincreasing. The census of 1911 showed that during the decade 1901-10 the\nnumbers of married females per 1000 of ages 0-5 years rose from 13 to\n14; of ages 5-10 from 102 to 105; of 10-15 from 423 to 430, and of 15-20\nfrom 770 to 800. In other words, in the year 1911, out of every 1000\nIndian girls, over one-tenth were married before they were 10 years old,\nnearly one-half before they were 15, and four-fifths before they were\n20.[267]\n\nThe result of all this is a tremendous birth-rate, but this is \"no\nmatter for congratulation. We have heard so often of our high death-rate\nand the means for combating it, but can it be seriously believed that\nwith a birth-rate of 30 per 1000 it is possible to go on as we are doing\nwith the death-rate brought down to the level of England or Scotland? Is\nthere room enough in the country for the population to increase so fast\nas 20 per 1000 every year? We are paying the inevitable penalty of\nbringing into this world more persons than can be properly cared for,\nand therefore if we wish fewer deaths to occur in this country the\nbirths must be reduced to the level of the countries where the\ndeath-rate is low. It is, therefore, our high birth-rate that is the\nsocial danger; the high death-rate, however regrettable, is merely an\nincident of our high birth-rate.\"[268]\n\nMr. Wattal then describes the cruel items in India's death-rate; the\ntremendous female mortality, due largely to too early childbirth, and\nthe equally terrible infant mortality, nearly 50 per cent. of infant\ndeaths being due to premature birth or debility at birth. These are the\ninevitable penalties of early and universal marriage. For, in India,\n\"everybody marries, fit or unfit, and is a parent at the earliest\npossible age permitted by nature.\" This process is highly disgenic; it\nis plainly lowering the quality and sapping the vigour of the race. It\nis the lower elements of the population, the negroid aboriginal tribes\nand the Pariahs or Outcastes, who are gaining the fastest. Also the\nvitality of the whole population seems to be lowering. The census\nfigures show that the number of elderly persons is decreasing, and that\nthe average statistical expectation of life is falling. \"The coming\ngeneration is severely handicapped at start in life. And the chances of\nliving to a good old age are considerably smaller than they were, say\nthirty or forty years ago. Have we ever paused to consider what it means\nto us in the life of the nation as a whole? It means that the people who\nalone by weight of experience and wisdom are fitted for the posts of\ncommand in the various public activities of the country are snatched\naway by death; and that the guidance and leadership which belongs to age\nand mature judgment in the countries of the West fall in India to\nyounger and consequently to less trustworthy persons.\"[269]\n\nAfter warning his fellow-countrymen that neither improved methods of\nagriculture, the growth of industry, nor emigration can afford any real\nrelief to the growing pressure of population on means of subsistence, he\nnotes a few hopeful signs that, despite the hold of religion and\ncustom, the people are beginning to realize the situation and that in\ncertain parts of India there are foreshadowings of birth-control. For\nexample, he quotes from the census report for 1901 this official\nexplanation of a slight drop in the birth-rate of Bengal: \"The\npostponement of the age of marriage cannot wholly account for the\ndiminished rate of reproduction. The deliberate avoidance of\nchild-bearing must also be partly responsible.... It is a matter of\ncommon belief that among the tea-garden coolies of Assam means are\nfrequently taken to prevent conception, or to procure abortion.\" And the\nreport of the Sanitary Commissioner of Assam for 1913 states: \"An\nimportant factor in producing the defective birth-rate appears to be due\nto voluntary limitation of birth.\"[270]\n\nHowever, these beginnings of birth-control are too local and partial to\nafford any immediate relief to India's growing over-population. Wider\nappreciation of the situation and prompt action are needed. \"The\nconclusion is irresistible. We can no longer afford to shut our eyes to\nthe social canker in our midst. In the land of the bullock-cart, the\nmotor has come to stay. The competition is now with the more advanced\nraces of the West, and we cannot tell them what Diogenes said to\nAlexander: 'Stand out of my sunshine.' After the close of this gigantic\nWorld War theories of population will perhaps be revised and a reversion\nin favour of early marriage and larger families may be counted upon.\nBut, (1) that will be no solution to our own population problem, and (2)\nthis reaction will be only for a time.... The law of population may be\narrested in its operation, but there is no way of escaping it.\"[271]\n\nSo concludes this striking little book. Furthermore, we must remember\nthat, although India may be the acutest sufferer from over-population,\nconditions in the entire Orient are basically the same, prudential\nchecks and rational birth-control being everywhere virtually\nabsent.[272] Remembering also that, besides over-population, there are\nother economic and social evils previously discussed, we cannot be\nsurprised to find in all Eastern lands much acute poverty and social\ndegradation.\n\nBoth the rural and urban masses usually live on the bare\nmargin of subsistence. The English economist Brailsford thus describes\nthe condition of the Egyptian peasantry: \"The villages exhibited a\npoverty such as I have never seen even in the mountains of anarchical\nMacedonia or among the bogs of Donegal.... The villages are crowded\nslums of mud hovels, without a tree, a flower, or a garden. The huts,\noften without a window or a levelled floor, are minute dungeons of baked\nmud, usually of two small rooms neither whitewashed nor carpeted. Those\nwhich I entered were bare of any visible property, save a few cooking\nutensils, a mat to serve as a bed, and a jar which held the staple food\nof maize.\"[273] As for the poorer Indian peasants, a British sanitary\nofficial thus depicts their mode of life: \"One has actually to see the\ninterior of the houses, in which each family is often compelled to live\nin a single small cell, made of mud walls and with a mud floor;\ncontaining small yards littered with rubbish, often crowded with cattle;\npossessing wells permeated by rain soaking through this filthy surface;\nand frequently jumbled together in inchoate masses called towns and\ncities.\"[274]\n\nIn the cities, indeed, conditions are even worse than in the country,\nthe slums of the Orient surpassing the slums of the West. The French\npublicist Louis Bertrand paints positively nauseating pictures of the\npoorer quarters of the great Levantine towns like Cairo, Constantinople,\nand Jerusalem. Omitting his more poignant details, here is his\ndescription of a Cairo tenement: \"In Cairo, as elsewhere in Egypt, the\nwretchedness and grossness of the poorer-class dwellings are perhaps\neven more shocking than in the other Eastern lands. Two or three dark,\nairless rooms usually open on a hall-way not less obscure. The plaster,\npeeling off from the ceilings and the worm-eaten laths of the walls,\nfalls constantly to the filthy floors. The straw mats and bedding are\ninfested by innumerable vermin.\"[275]\n\nIn India it is the same story. Says Fisher: \"Even before the growth of\nher industries had begun, the cities of India presented a baffling\nhousing problem. Into the welter of crooked streets and unsanitary\nhabits of an Oriental city these great industrial plants are wedging\ntheir thousands of employees. Working from before dawn until after dark,\nmen and women are too exhausted to go far from the plant to sleep, if\nthey can help it. When near-by houses are jammed to suffocation, they\nlive and sleep in the streets. In Calcutta, twenty years ago,[276] land\nhad reached $200,000 an acre in the overcrowded tenement\ndistricts.\"[277] Of Calcutta, a Western writer remarks: \"Calcutta is a\nshame even in the East. In its slums, mill hands and dock coolies do not\nlive; they pig. Houses choke with unwholesome breath; drains and\ncompounds fester in filth. Wheels compress decaying refuse in the roads;\ncows drink from wells soaked with sewage, and the floors of bakeries are\nwashed in the same pollution.\"[278] In the other industrial centres of\nIndia, conditions are practically the same. A Bombay native sanitary\nofficial stated in a report on the state of the tenement district, drawn\nup in 1904: \"In such houses--the breeders of germs and bacilli, the\ncentres of disease and poverty, vice, and crime--have people of all\nkinds, the diseased, the dissolute, the drunken, the improvident, been\nindiscriminately herded and tightly packed in vast hordes to dwell in\nclose association with each other.\"[279]\n\nFurthermore, urban conditions seem to be getting worse rather than\nbetter. The problem of congestion, in particular, is assuming ever\ngraver proportions. Already in the opening years of the present century\nthe congestion in the great industrial centres of India like Calcutta,\nBombay, and Lucknow averaged three or four times the congestion of\nLondon. And the late war has rendered the housing crisis even more\nacute. In the East, as in the West, the war caused a rapid drift of\npopulation to the cities and at the same time stopped building owing to\nthe prohibitive cost of construction. Hence, a prodigious rise in rents\nand a plague of landlord profiteering. Says Fisher: \"Rents were raised\nas much as 300 per cent., enforced by eviction. Mass-meetings of protest\nin Bombay resulted in government action, fixing maximum rents for some\nof the tenements occupied by artisans and labourers. Setting maximum\nrental does not, however, make more room.\"[280]\n\nAnd, of course, it must not be forgotten that higher rents are only one\nphase in a general rise in the cost of living that has been going on in\nthe East for a generation and which has been particularly pronounced\nsince 1914. More than a decade ago Bertrand wrote of the Near East:\n\"From one end of the Levant to the other, at Constantinople as at\nSmyrna, Damascus, Beyrout, and Cairo, I heard the same complaints about\nthe increasing cost of living; and these complaints were uttered by\nEuropeans as well as by the natives.\"[281] To-day the situation is even\nmore difficult. Says Sir Valentine Chirol of conditions in Egypt since\nthe war: \"The rise in wages, considerable as it has been, has ceased to\nkeep pace with the inordinate rise in prices for the very necessities of\nlife. This is particularly the case in the urban centres, where the\nlower classes--workmen, carters, cab-drivers, shopkeepers, and a host\noff minor employees--are hard put to it nowadays to make both ends\nmeet.\"[282] As a result of all these hard conditions various phenomena\nof social degradation such as alcoholism, vice, and crime, are becoming\nincreasingly common.[283] Last--but not least--there are growing\nsymptoms of social unrest and revolutionary agitation, which we will\nexamine in the next chapter.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[239] _I. e._ the educated upper class.\n\n[240] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p.\n13.\n\n[241] _I. e._ the priestly class.\n\n[242] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p.\n15.\n\n[243] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p.\n51.\n\n[244] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 221-226.\n\n[245] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, p. 240.\n\n[246] The purdah is the curtain separating the women's apartments from\nthe rest of the house.\n\n[247] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 254-255.\n\n[248] For progress in Western education in the Orient, under both\nEuropean and native auspices, see L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage oriental_, pp.\n291-392; C. S. Cooper, _The Modernizing of the Orient_, pp. 3-13, 24-64.\n\n[249] In his Introduction to Sir Valentine Chirol's _Indian Unrest_, p.\nxii.\n\n[250] Cromer, _Modern Egypt_, Vol. II., pp. 228-243.\n\n[251] J. D. Rees, _The Real India_, p. 162 (London, 1908).\n\n[252] Vambery, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, pp. 203-204.\n\n[253] H. E. Compton, _Indian Life in Town and Country_, p. 98 (London,\n1904).\n\n[254] Vambery, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p.\n32.\n\n[255] Cooper, _op. cit._, pp. 48-49.\n\n[256] On this point of comfort _v._ luxury, see especially Sir Bampfylde\nFuller, \"East and West: A Study of Differences,\" _Nineteenth Century and\nAfter_, November, 1911.\n\n[257] L. Bertrand, _op. cit._, 145-147; J. Chailley, _Administrative\nProblems of British India_, pp. 138-139. For increased expenditure on\nWestern products, see A. J. Brown, \"Economic Changes in Asia,\" _The\nCentury_, March, 1904; J. P. Jones, \"The Present Situation in India,\"\n_Journal of Race Development_, July, 1910; R. Mukerjee, _The Foundations\nof Indian Economics_, p. 5.\n\n[258] For higher cost of living in the East, see Chirol, _Indian\nUnrest_, pp. 2-3; Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_, pp. 46-60; Jones,\n_op. cit._; T. T. Williams, \"Inquiry into the Rise of Prices in India,\"\n_Economic Journal_, December, 1915.\n\n[259] Brown, _op. cit._\n\n[260] At the beginning of the nineteenth century the population of India\nis roughly estimated to have been about 100,000,000. According to the\ncensus of 1911 the population was 315,000,000.\n\n[261] Sir W. W. Hunter, _The India of the Queen and Other Essays_, p. 42\n(London, 1903).\n\n[262] Cromer, \"Some Problems of Government in Europe and Asia,\"\n_Nineteenth Century and After_, May, 1913.\n\n[263] Archer, _India and the Future_, pp. 157, 162 (London), 1918.\n\n[264] P. K. Wattal, of the Indian Finance Department, Assistant\nAccountant-General. The book was published at Bombay, 1916.\n\n[265] Wattal, pp. i-iii.\n\n[266] Wattal, p. 3.\n\n[267] _Ibid._, p. 12.\n\n[268] Wattal, p. 14.\n\n[269] _Ibid._, pp. 19-21.\n\n[270] Wattal, p. 28.\n\n[271] _Ibid._, p. 82.\n\n[272] For conditions in the Near East, see Bertrand, pp. 110, 124,\n125-128.\n\n[273] H. N. Brailsford, _The War of Steel and Gold_, pp. 112-113. See\nalso T. Rothstein, _Egypt's Ruin_, pp. 298-300 (London, 1910), Sir W. W.\nRamsay, \"The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia,\" _Quarterly Review_,\nJanuary, 1918.\n\n[274] Dr. D. Ross, \"Wretchedness a Cause of Political Unrest,\" _The\nSurvey_, February 18, 1911.\n\n[275] Bertrand, _op. cit._, pp. 111-112.\n\n[276] _I. e._, in 1900.\n\n[277] Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_, p. 51.\n\n[278] G. W. Stevens, _In India_. Quoted by Fisher, p. 51.\n\n[279] Dr. Bhalchandra Krishna. Quoted by A. Yusuf Ali, _Life and Labour\nin India_, p. 35 (London, 1907).\n\n[280] Fisher, pp. 51-52.\n\n[281] Bertrand, p. 141.\n\n[282] Sir V. Chirol, \"England's Peril in Egypt,\" from the London\n_Times_, 1919.\n\n[283] See Bertrand and Fisher, _supra_.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nSOCIAL UNREST AND BOLSHEVISM\n\n\nUnrest is the natural concomitant of change--particularly of sudden\nchange. Every break with past, however normal and inevitable, implies a\nnecessity for readjustment to altered conditions which causes a\ntemporary sense of restless disharmony until the required adjustment has\nbeen made. Unrest is not an exceptional phenomenon; it is always latent\nin every human society which has not fallen into complete stagnation,\nand a slight amount of unrest should be considered a sign of healthy\ngrowth rather than a symptom of disease. In fact, the minimum degrees of\nunrest are usually not called by that name, but are considered mere\nincidents of normal development. Under normal circumstances, indeed, the\nsocial organism functions like the human organism: it is being\nincessantly destroyed and as incessantly renewed in conformity with the\nchanging conditions of life. These changes are sometimes very\nconsiderable, but they are so gradual that they are effected almost\nwithout being perceived. A healthy organism well attuned to its\nenvironment is always plastic. It instinctively senses environmental\nchanges and adapts itself so rapidly that it escapes the injurious\nconsequences of disharmony.\n\nFar different is the character of unrest's acuter manifestations. These\nare infallible symptoms of sweeping changes, sudden breaks with the\npast, and profound maladjustments which are not being rapidly rectified.\nIn other words, acute unrest denotes social ill-health and portends the\npossibility of one of those violent crises known as \"revolutions.\"\n\nThe history of the Moslem East well exemplifies the above\ngeneralizations. The formative period of Saracenic civilization was\ncharacterized by rapid change and an intense idealistic ferment. The\ngreat \"Motazelite\" movement embraced many shades of thought, its radical\nwing professing religious, political, and social doctrines of a violent\nrevolutionary nature. But this changeful period was superficial and\nbrief. Arab vigour and the Islamic spirit proved unable permanently to\nleaven the vast inertia of the ancient East. Soon the old traditions\nreasserted themselves--somewhat modified, to be sure, yet basically the\nsame Saracenic civilization became stereotyped, ossified, and with this\nossification changeful unrest died away. Here and there the radical\ntradition was preserved and secretly handed down by a few obscure sects\nlike the Kharidjites of Inner Arabia and the Bettashi dervishes; but\nthese were mere cryptic episodes, of no general significance.\n\nWith the Mohammedan Revival at the beginning of the nineteenth century,\nhowever, symptoms of social unrest appeared once more. Wahabism aimed\nnot merely at a reform of religious abuses but was also a general\nprotest against the contemporary decadence of Moslem society. In many\ncases it took the form of a popular revolt against established\ngovernments. The same was true of the correlative Babbist movement in\nPersia, which took place about the same time.[284]\n\nAnd of course these nascent stirrings were greatly stimulated by the\nflood of Western ideas and methods which, as the nineteenth century wore\non, increasingly permeated the East. What, indeed, could be more\nprovocative of unrest of every description than the resulting\ntransformation of the Orient--a transformation so sudden, so intense,\nand necessitating so concentrated a process of adaptation that it was\nbasically revolutionary rather than evolutionary in its nature? The\ndetails of these profound changes--political, religious, economic,\nsocial--we have already studied, together with the equally profound\ndisturbance, bewilderment, and suffering afflicting all classes in this\neminently transition period.\n\nThe essentially revolutionary nature of this transition period, as\nexemplified by India, is well described by a British economist.[285]\nWhat, he asks, could be more anachronistic than the contrast between\nrural and urban India? \"Rural India is primitive or mediaeval; city India\nis modern.\" In city India you will find every symbol of Western life,\nfrom banks and factories down to the very \"sandwichmen that you left in\nthe London gutters.\" Now all this co-exists beside rural India. \"And it\nis surely a fact unique in economic history that they should thus exist\nside by side. The present condition of India does not correspond with\nany period of European economic history.\" Imagine the effect in Europe\nof setting down modern and mediaeval men together, with utterly disparate\nideas. That has not happened in Europe because \"European progress in the\neconomic world has been evolutionary\"; a process spread over centuries.\nIn India, on the other hand, this economic transformation has been\n\"revolutionary\" in character.\n\nHow unevolutionary is India's economic transformation is seen by the\ncondition of rural India.\n\n\"Rural India, though chiefly characterized by primitive usage, has been\ninvaded by ideas that are intensely hostile to the old state of things\nIt is primitive, _but not consistently primitive_. Competitive wages are\npaid side by side with customary wages. Prices are sometimes fixed by\ncustom, but sometimes, too, by free economic causes. From the midst of a\npopulation deeply rooted in the soil, men are being carried away by the\ndesire of better wages. In short, economic motives have suddenly and\npartially intruded themselves in the realm of primitive morality. And,\nif we turn to city India, we see a similar, though inverted, state of\nthings.... In neither case has the mixture been harmonious or the fusion\ncomplete. Indeed, the two orders are too unrelated, too far apart, to\ncoalesce with ease....\n\n\"India, then, is in a state of economic revolution throughout all the\nclasses of an enormous and complex society. The only period in which\nEurope offered even faint analogies to modern India was the Industrial\nRevolution, from which even now we have not settled down into\ncomparative stability. We may reckon it as a fortunate circumstance for\nEurope that the intellectual movement which culminated in the French\nRevolution did not coincide with the Industrial Revolution. If it had,\nit is possible that European society might have been hopelessly wrecked.\nBut, as it was, even when the French Revolution had spent its force in\nthe conquests of Napoleon, the Industrial Revolution stirred up enough\nsocial and political discontent. When whole classes of people are\nobliged by economic revolution to change their mode of life, it is\ninevitable that many should suffer. Discontent is roused. Political and\ndestructive movements are certain to ensue. Not only the Revolutions of\n'48, but also the birth of the Socialist Party sprang from the\nIndustrial Revolution.\n\n\"But that revolution was not nearly so sweeping as that which is now in\noperation in India. The invention of machinery and steam-power was, in\nEurope, but the crowning event of a long series of years in which\ncommerce and industry had been constantly expanding, in which capital\nhad been largely accumulated, in which economic principles had been\ngradually spreading.... No, the Indian economic revolution is vastly\ngreater and more fundamental than our Industrial Revolution, great as\nthat was. Railways have been built through districts where travel was\nalmost impossible, and even roads are unknown. Factories have been\nbuilt, and filled by men unused to industrial labour. Capital has been\npoured into the country, which was unprepared for any such development.\nAnd what are the consequences? India's social organization is being\ndissolved. The Brahmins are no longer priests. The ryot is no longer\nbound to the soil. The banya is no longer the sole purveyor of capital.\nThe hand-weaver is threatened with extinction, and the brass-worker can\nno longer ply his craft. Think of the dislocation which this sudden\nchange has brought about, of the many who can no longer follow their\nancestral vocations, of the commotion which a less profound change\nproduced in Europe, and you will understand what is the chief\nmotive-power of the political unrest. It is small wonder. The wonder is\nthat the unrest has been no greater than it is. Had India not been an\nAsiatic country, she would have been in fierce revolution long ago.\"\n\nThe above lines were of course written in the opening years of the\ntwentieth century, before the world had been shattered by Armageddon and\naggressive social revolution had established itself in semi-Asiatic\nRussia. But even during those pre-war years, other students of the\nOrient were predicting social disturbances of increasing gravity. Said\nthe Hindu nationalist leader, Bipin Chandra Pal: \"This so-called unrest\nis not really political. It is essentially an intellectual and spiritual\nupheaval, the forerunner of a mighty social revolution, with a new\norganon and a new philosophy of life behind it.\"[286] And the French\npublicist Chailley wrote of India: \"There will be a series of economic\nrevolutions, which must necessarily produce suffering and\nstruggle.\"[287]\n\nDuring this pre-war period the increased difficulty of living\nconditions, together with the adoption of Western ideas of comfort and\nkindred higher standards, seem to have been engendering friction between\nthe different strata of the Oriental population. In 1911 a British\nsanitary expert assigned \"wretchedness\" as the root-cause of India's\npolitical unrest. After describing the deplorable living conditions of\nthe Indian masses, he wrote: \"It will of course be said at once that\nthese conditions have existed in India from time immemorial, and are no\nmore likely to cause unrest now than previously; but in my opinion\nunrest has always existed there in a subterranean form. Moreover, in the\nold days, the populace could make scarcely any comparison between their\nown condition and that of more fortunate people; now they can compare\ntheir own slums and terrible 'native quarters' with the much better\nordered cantonments, stations, and houses of the British officials and\neven of their own wealthier brethren. So far as I can see, such misery\nis always the fundamental cause of all popular unrest.... Seditious\nmeetings, political chatter, and 'aspirations' of babus and demagogues\nare only the superficial manifestations of the deeper disturbance.\"[288]\n\nThis growing social friction was indubitably heightened by the lack of\ninterest of Orientals in the sufferings of all persons not bound to them\nby family, caste, or customary ties. Throughout the East, \"social\nservice,\" in the Western sense, is practically unknown. This fact is\nnoted by a few Orientals themselves. Says an Indian writer, speaking of\nIndian town life: \"There is no common measure of social conduct....\nHitherto, social reform in India has taken account only of individual or\nfamily life. As applied to mankind in the mass, and especially to those\nsoulless agglomerations of seething humanity which we call cities, it is\na gospel yet to be preached.\"[289] As an American sociologist remarked\nof the growing slum evil throughout the industrialized Orient: \"The\ngreatest danger is due to the fact that Orientals do not have the high\nWestern sense of the value of the life of the individual, and are,\ncomparatively speaking, without any restraining influence similar to our\nown enlightened public opinion, which has been roused by the struggles\nof a century of industrial strife. Unless these elements can be\nsupplied, there is danger of suffering and of abuses worse than any the\nWest has known.\"[290]\n\nAll this diffused social unrest was centring about two recently emerged\nelements: the Western-educated _intelligentsia_ and the industrial\nproletariat of the factory towns. The revolutionary tendencies of the\n_intelligentsia_, particularly of its half-educated failures, have been\nalready noted, and these latter have undoubtedly played a leading part\nin all the revolutionary disturbances of the modern Orient, from North\nAfrica to China.[291] Regarding the industrial proletariat, some writers\nthink that there is little immediate likelihood of their becoming a\nmajor revolutionary factor, because of their traditionalism, ignorance,\nand apathy, and also because there is no real connection between them\nand the _intelligentsia_, the other centre of social discontent.\n\nThe French economist Metin states this view-point very well. Speaking\nprimarily of India, he writes: \"The Nationalist movement rises from the\nmiddle classes and manifests no systematic hostility toward the\ncapitalists and great proprietors; in economic matters it is on their\nside.\"[292] As for the proletariat: \"The coolies do not imagine that\ntheir lot can be bettered. Like the ryots and the agricultural\nlabourers, they do not show the least sign of revolt. To whom should\nthey turn? The ranks of traditional society are closed to them. People\nwithout caste, the coolies are despised even by the old-style artisan,\nproud of his caste-status, humble though that be. To fall to the job of\na coolie is, for the Hindu, the worst declassment. The factory workers\nare not yet numerous enough to form a compact and powerful proletariat,\nable to exert pressure on the old society. Even if they do occasionally\nstrike, they are as far from the modern Trade-Union as they are from the\ntraditional working-caste. Neither can they look for leadership to the\n'intellectual proletariat'; for the Nationalist movement has not emerged\nfrom the 'bourgeois' phase, and always leans on the capitalists....\n\n\"Thus Indian industry is still in its embryonic stages. In truth, the\nmaterial evolution which translates itself by the construction of\nfactories, and the social evolution which creates a proletariat, have\nonly begun to emerge; while the intellectual evolution from which arise\nthe programmes of social demands has not even begun.\"[293]\n\nOther observers of Indian industrial conditions, however, do not share\nM. Metin's opinion. Says the British Labour leader, J. Ramsay Macdonald:\n\"To imagine the backward Indian labourers becoming a conscious regiment\nin the class war, seems to be one of the vainest dreams in which a\nWestern mind can indulge. But I sometimes wonder if it be so very vain\nafter all. In the first place, the development of factory industry in\nIndia has created a landless and homeless proletariat unmatched by the\nsame economic class in any other capitalist community; and to imagine\nthat this class is to be kept out, or can be kept out, of Indian\npolitics is far more vain than to dream of its developing a politics on\nWestern lines. Further than that, the wage-earners have shown a\nwillingness to respond to Trades-Union methods; they are forming\nindustrial associations and have engaged in strikes; some of the social\nreform movements conducted by Indian intellectuals definitely try to\nestablish Trades-Unions and preach ideas familiar to us in connection\nwith Trades-Union propaganda. A capitalist fiscal policy will not only\ngive this movement a great impetus as it did in Japan, but in India will\nnot be able to suppress the movement, as was done in Japan, by\nlegislation. As yet, the true proletarian wage-earner, uprooted from his\nnative village and broken away from the organization of Indian society,\nis but insignificant. It is growing, however, and I believe that it will\norganize itself rapidly on the general lines of the proletarian classes\nof other capitalist countries. So soon as it becomes politically\nconscious, there are no other lines upon which it can organize\nitself.\"[294]\n\nTurning to the Near East--more than a decade ago a French Socialist\nwriter, observing the hard living conditions of the Egyptian masses,\nnoted signs of social unrest and predicted grave disturbances. \"A\ngenuine proletariat,\" he wrote, \"has been created by the multiplication\nof industries and the sudden, almost abrupt, progress which has\nfollowed. The cost of living has risen to a scale hitherto unknown in\nEgypt, while wages have risen but slightly. Poverty and want abound.\nSome day suffering will provoke the people to complaints, perhaps to\nangry outbursts, throughout this apparently prosperous Delta. It is true\nthat the influx of foreigners and of money may put off the hour when the\ncity or country labourer of Egyptian race comes clearly to perceive the\nwrongs that are being done to him. He may miss the educational influence\nof Socialism. Yet such an awakening may come sooner than people expect.\nIt is not only among the successful and prosperous Egyptians that\nintelligence is to be found. Those whose wages are growing gradually\nsmaller and smaller have intelligence of equal keenness, and it has\nbecome a real question as to the hour when for the first time in the\nland of Islam the flame of Mohammedan Socialism shall burst forth.\"[295]\nIn Algeria, likewise, a Belgian traveller noted the dawning of a\nproletarian consciousness among the town working-men just before the\nGreat War. Speaking of the rapid spread of Western ideas, he wrote:\n\"Islam tears asunder like rotten cloth on the quays of Algiers: the\ndockers, coal-passers, and engine-tenders, to whatever race they belong,\nleave their Islam and acquire a genuine proletarian morality, that of\nthe proletarians of Europe, and they make common cause with their\nEuropean colleagues on the basis of a strictly economic struggle. If\nthere were many big factories in Algeria, orthodox Islam would soon\ndisappear there, as old-fashioned Catholicism has disappeared with us\nunder the shock of great industry.\"[296]\n\nWhatever may be the prospects as to the rapid emergence of organized\nlabour movements in the Orient, one thing seems certain: the unrest\nwhich afflicted so many parts of the East in the years preceding the\nGreat War, though mainly political, had also its social side. Toward the\nend of 1913, a leading Anglo-Indian journal remarked pessimistically:\n\"We have already gone so far on the downward path that leads to\ndestruction that there are districts in what were once regarded as the\nmost settled parts of India which are being abandoned by the rich\nbecause their property is not safe. So great is the contempt for the law\nthat it is employed by the unscrupulous as a means of offence against\nthe innocent. Frontier Pathans commit outrages almost unbelievable in\ntheir daring. Mass-meetings are held and agitation spreads in regard to\ntopics quite outside the business of orderly people. There is no matter\nof domestic or foreign politics in which crowds of irresponsible people\ndo not want to have their passionate way. Great grievances are made of\nlittle, far-off things. What ought to be the ordered, spacious life of\nthe District Officer is intruded upon and disturbed by a hundred\ndistracting influences due to the want of discipline of the people. In\nthe subordinate ranks of the great services themselves, trades-unions\nhave been formed. Military and police officers have to regret that the\nnew class of recruits is less subordinate than the old, harder to\ndiscipline, more full of complaints.\"[297]\n\nThe Great War of course enormously aggravated Oriental unrest. In many\nparts of the Near East, especially, acute suffering, balked ambitions,\nand furious hates combined to reduce society to the verge of chaos. Into\nthis ominous turmoil there now came the sinister influence of Russian\nBolshevism, marshalling all this diffused unrest by systematic methods\nfor definite ends. Bolshevism was frankly out for a world-revolution and\nthe destruction of Western civilization. To attain this objective the\nBolshevist leaders not only launched direct assaults on the West, but\nalso planned flank attacks in Asia and Africa. They believed that if the\nEast could be set on fire, not only would Russian Bolshevism gain vast\nadditional strength but also the economic repercussion on the West,\nalready shaken by the war, would be so terrific that industrial collapse\nwould ensue, thereby throwing Europe open to revolution.\n\nBolshevism's propagandist efforts were nothing short of universal, both\nin area and in scope. No part of the world was free from the plottings\nof its agents; no possible source of discontent was overlooked. Strictly\n\"Red\" doctrines like the dictatorship of the proletariat were very far\nfrom being the only weapons in Bolshevism's armoury. Since what was\nfirst wanted was the overthrow of the existing world-order, any kind of\nopposition to that order, no matter how remote doctrinally from\nBolshevism, was grist to the Bolshevist mill. Accordingly, in every\nquarter of the globe, in Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas, as\nin Europe, Bolshevik agitators whispered in the ears of the discontented\ntheir gospel of hatred and revenge. Every nationalist aspiration, every\npolitical grievance, every social injustice, every racial\ndiscrimination, was fuel for Bolshevism's incitement to violence and\nwar.[298]\n\nParticularly promising fields for Bolshevist activity were the Near and\nMiddle East. Besides being a prey to profound disturbances of every\ndescription, those regions as traditional objectives of the old Czarist\nimperialism, had long been carefully studied by Russian agents who had\nevolved a technique of \"pacific penetration\" that might be easily\nadjusted to Bolshevist ends. To stir up political, religious, and racial\npassions in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, especially against\nEngland, required no original planning by Trotzky or Lenin. Czarism had\nalready done these things for generations, and full information lay both\nin the Petrograd archives and in the brains of surviving Czarist agents\nready to turn their hands as easily to the new work as the old.\n\nIn all the elaborate network of Bolshevist propaganda which to-day\nenmeshes the East we must discriminate between Bolshevism's two\nobjectives: one immediate--the destruction of Western political and\neconomic supremacy; the other ultimate--the bolshevizing of the Oriental\nmasses and the consequent extirpation of the native upper and middle\nclasses, precisely as has been done in Russia and as is planned for the\ncountries of the West. In the first stage, Bolshevism is quite ready to\nrespect Oriental faiths and customs and to back Oriental nationalist\nmovements. In the second stage, religions like Islam and nationalists\nlike Mustapha Kemal are to be branded as \"bourgeois\" and relentlessly\ndestroyed. How Bolshevik diplomacy endeavours to work these two schemes\nin double harness, we shall presently see.\n\nRussian Bolshevism's Oriental policy was formulated soon after its\naccession to power at the close of 1917. The year 1918 was a time of\nbusy preparation. An elaborate propaganda organization was built up from\nvarious sources. A number of old Czarist agents and diplomats versed in\nEastern affairs were cajoled or conscripted into the service. The\nRussian Mohammedan populations such as the Tartars of South Russia and\nthe Turkomans of Central Asia furnished many recruits. Even more\nvaluable were the exiles who flocked to Russia from Turkey, Persia,\nIndia, and elsewhere at the close of the Great War. Practically all the\nleaders of the Turkish war-government--Enver, Djemal, Talaat, and many\nmore, fled to Russia for refuge from the vengeance of the victorious\nEntente Powers. The same was true of the Hindu terrorist leaders who had\nbeen in German pay during the war and who now sought service under\nLenin. By the end of 1918 Bolshevism's Oriental propaganda department\nwas well organized, divided into three bureaux, for the Islamic\ncountries, India, and the Far East respectively. With Bolshevism's Far\nEastern activities this book is not concerned, though the reader should\nbear them in mind and should remember the important part played by the\nChinese in recent Russian history. As for the Islamic and Indian\nbureaux, they displayed great zeal, translating tons of Bolshevik\nliterature into the various Oriental languages, training numerous secret\nagents and propagandists for \"field-work,\" and getting in touch with all\ndisaffected or revolutionary elements.\n\nWith the opening months of 1919 Bolshevist activity throughout the Near\nand Middle East became increasingly apparent. The wave of rage and\ndespair caused by the Entente's denial of Near Eastern nationalist\naspirations[299] played splendidly into the Bolshevists' hands, and we\nhave already seen how Moscow supported Mustapha Kemal and other\nnationalist leaders in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and elsewhere. In the\nMiddle East, also, Bolshevism gained important successes. Not merely was\nMoscow's hand visible in the epidemic of rioting and seditious violence\nwhich swept northern India in the spring of 1919,[300] but an even\nshrewder blow was struck at Britain in Afghanistan. This land of\nturbulent mountaineers, which lay like a perpetual thundercloud on\nIndia's north-west frontier, had kept quiet during the Great War, mainly\nowing to the Anglophile attitude of its ruler, the Ameer Habibullah\nKhan. But early in 1919 Habibullah was murdered. Whether the Bolsheviki\nhad a hand in the matter is not known, but they certainly reaped the\nbenefit, for power passed to one of Habibullah's sons, Amanullah Khan,\nwho was an avowed enemy of England and who had had dealings with\nTurco-German agents during the late war. Amanullah at once got in touch\nwith Moscow, and a little later, just when the Punjab was seething with\nunrest, he declared war on England, and his wild tribesmen, pouring\nacross the border, set the North-West Frontier on fire. After some hard\nfighting the British succeeded in repelling the Afghan invasion, and\nAmanullah was constrained to make peace. But Britain obviously dared not\npress Amanullah too hard, for in the peace treaty the Ameer was released\nfrom his previous obligation not to maintain diplomatic relations with\nother nations than British India. Amanullah promptly aired his\nindependence by maintaining ostentatious relations with Moscow. As a\nmatter of fact, the Bolsheviki had by this time established an important\npropagandist subcentre in Russian Turkestan, not far from the Afghan\nborder, and this bureau's activities of course envisaged not merely\nAfghanistan but the wider field of India as well.[301]\n\nDuring 1920 Bolshevik activities became still more pronounced throughout\nthe Near and Middle East. We have already seen how powerfully Bolshevik\nRussia supported the Turkish and Persian nationalist movements. In fact,\nthe reckless short-sightedness of Entente policy was driving into\nLenin's arms multitudes of nationalists to whom the internationalist\ntheories of Moscow were personally abhorrent. For example, the head of\nthe Afghan mission to Moscow thus frankly expressed his reasons for\nfriendship with Soviet Russia, in an interview printed by the official\nSoviet organ, _Izvestia_: \"I am neither Communist nor Socialist, but my\npolitical programme so far is the expulsion of the English from Asia. I\nam an irreconcilable enemy of European capitalism in Asia, the chief\nrepresentatives of which are the English. On this point I coincide with\nthe Communists, and in this respect we are your natural allies....\nAfghanistan, like India, does not represent a capitalist state, and it\nis very unlikely that even a parliamentary regime will take deep root in\nthese countries. It is so far difficult to say how subsequent events\nwill develop. I only know that the renowned address of the Soviet\nGovernment to all nations, with its appeal to them to combat capitalists\n(and for us a capitalist is synonymous with the word foreigner, or, to\nbe more exact, an Englishman), had an enormous effect on us. A still\ngreater effect was produced by Russia's annulment of all the secret\ntreaties enforced by the imperialistic governments, and by the\nproclaiming of the right of all nations, no matter how small, to\ndetermine their own destiny. This act rallied around Soviet Russia all\nthe exploited nationalities of Asia, and all parties, even those very\nremote from Socialism.\" Of course, knowing what we do of Bolshevik\npropagandist tactics, we cannot be sure that the Afghan diplomat ever\nsaid the things which the _Izvestia_ relates. But, even if the interview\nbe a fake, the words put into his mouth express the feelings of vast\nnumbers of Orientals and explain a prime cause of Bolshevik propagandist\nsuccesses in Eastern lands.\n\nSo successful, indeed, had been the progress of Bolshevik propaganda\nthat the Soviet leaders now began to work openly for their ultimate\nends. At first Moscow had posed as the champion of Oriental \"peoples\"\nagainst Western \"imperialism\"; its appeals had been to \"peoples,\"\nirrespective of class; and it had promised \"self-determination,\" with\nfull respect for native ideas and institutions. For instance: a\nBolshevist manifesto to the Turks signed by Lenin and issued toward the\nclose of 1919 read: \"Mussulmans of the world, victims of the\ncapitalists, awake! Russia has abandoned the Czar's pernicious policy\ntoward you and offers to help you overthrow English tyranny. She will\nallow you freedom of religion and self-government. The frontiers\nexisting before the war will be respected, no Turkish territory will be\ngiven Armenia, the Dardanelles Straits will remain yours, and\nConstantinople will remain the capital of the Mussulman world. The\nMussulmans in Russia will be given self-government. All we ask in\nexchange is that you fight the reckless capitalists, who would exploit\nyour country and make it a colony.\" Even when addressing its own people,\nthe Soviet Government maintained the same general tone. An \"Order of the\nDay\" to the Russian troops stationed on the borders of India stated:\n\"Comrades of the Pamir division, you have been given a responsible task.\nThe Soviet Republic sends you to garrison the posts on the Pamir, on the\nfrontiers of the friendly countries of Afghanistan and India. The Pamir\ntableland divides revolutionary Russia from India, which, with its\n300,000,000 inhabitants, is enslaved by a handful of Englishmen. On this\ntableland the signallers of revolution must hoist the red flag of the\narmy of liberation. May the peoples of India, who fight against their\nEnglish oppressors, soon know that friendly help is not far off. Make\nyourselves at home with the liberty-loving tribes of northern India,\npromote by word and deed their revolutionary progress, refute the mass\nof calumnies spread about Soviet Russia by agents of the British\nprinces, lords, and bankers. Long live the alliance of the revolutionary\npeoples of Europe and Asia!\"\n\nSuch was the nature of first-stage Bolshevik propaganda. Presently,\nhowever, propaganda of quite a different character began to appear. This\nsecond-stage propaganda of course continued to assail Western\n\"capitalist imperialism.\" But alongside, or rather intermingled with,\nthese anti-Western, fulminations, there now appeared special appeals to\nthe Oriental masses, inciting them against all \"capitalists\" and\n\"bourgeois,\" native as well as foreign, and promising the \"proletarians\"\nremedies for all their ills. Here is a Bolshevist manifesto to the\nTurkish masses, published in the summer of 1920. It is very different\nfrom the manifestoes of a year before. \"The men of toil,\" says this\ninteresting document, \"are now struggling everywhere against the rich\npeople. These people, with the assistance of the aristocracy and their\nhirelings, are now trying to hold Turkish toilers in their chains. It is\nthe rich people of Europe who have brought suffering to Turkey.\nComrades, let us make common cause with the world's toilers. If we do\nnot do so we shall never rise again. Let the heroes of Turkey's\nrevolution join Bolshevism. Long live the Third International! Praise be\nto Allah!\"\n\nAnd in these new efforts Moscow was not content with words; it was\npassing to deeds as well. The first application of Bolshevism to an\nEastern people was in Russian Turkestan. When the Bolsheviki first came\nto power at the end of 1917 they had granted Turkestan full\n\"self-determination,\" and the inhabitants had acclaimed their native\nprinces and re-established their old state-units, subject to a loose\nfederative tie with Russia. Early in 1920, however, the Soviet\nGovernment considered Turkestan ripe for the \"Social Revolution.\"\nAccordingly, the native princes were deposed, all political power was\ntransferred to local Soviets (controlled by Russians), the native upper\nand middle classes were despoiled of their property, and sporadic\nresistance was crushed by mass-executions, torture, and other familiar\nforms of Bolshevist terrorism.[302] In the Caucasus, also, the social\nrevolution had begun with the Sovietization of Azerbaidjan. The Tartar\nrepublic of Azerbaidjan was one of the fragments of the former Russian\nprovince of Transcaucasia which had declared its independence on the\ncollapse of the Czarist Empire in 1917. Located in eastern\nTranscaucasia, about the Caspian Sea, Azerbaidjan's capital was the city\nof Baku, famous for its oil-fields. Oil had transformed Baku into an\nindustrial centre on Western lines, with a large working population of\nmixed Asiatic and Russian origin. Playing upon the nascent\nclass-consciousness of this urban proletariat, the Bolshevik agents made\na _coup d'etat_ in the spring of 1920, overthrew the nationalist\ngovernment, and, with prompt Russian backing, made Azerbaijan a Soviet\nrepublic. The usual accompaniments of the social revolution followed:\ndespoiling and massacring of the upper and middle classes, confiscation\nof property in favour of the town proletarians and agricultural\nlabourers, and ruthless terrorism. With the opening months of 1920,\nBolshevism was thus in actual operation in both the Near and Middle\nEast.[303]\n\nHaving acquired strong footholds in the Orient, Bolshevism now felt\nstrong enough to throw off the mask. In the autumn of 1920, the Soviet\nGovernment of Russia held a \"Congress of Eastern Peoples\" at Baku, the\naim of which was not merely the liberation of the Orient from Western\ncontrol but its Bolshevizing as well. No attempt at concealment of this\nlarger objective was made, and so striking was the language employed\nthat it may well merit our close attention.\n\nIn the first place, the call to the congress, issued by the Third\n(Moscow) International, was addressed to the \"peasants and workers\" of\nthe East. The summons read:\n\n\"Peasants and workers of Persia! The Teheran Government of the Khadjars\nand its retinue of provincial Khans have plundered and exploited you\nthrough many centuries. The land, which, according to the laws of the\nSheriat, was your common property, has been taken possession of more and\nmore by the lackeys of the Teheran Government; they trade it away at\ntheir pleasure; they lay what taxes please them upon you; and when,\nthrough their mismanagement, they got the country into such a condition\nthat they were unable to squeeze enough juice out of it themselves, they\nsold Persia last year to English capitalists for 2,000,000 pounds, so\nthat the latter will organize an army in Persia that will oppress you\nstill more than formerly, and so the latter can collect taxes for the\nKhans and the Teheran Government. They have sold the oil-wells in South\nPersia and thus helped plunder the country.\n\n\"Peasants of Mesopotamia! The English have declared your country to be\nindependent; but 80,000 English soldiers are stationed in your country,\nare robbing and plundering, are killing you and are violating your\nwomen.\n\n\"Peasants of Anatolia! The English, French, and Italian Governments hold\nConstantinople under the mouths of their cannon. They have made the\nSultan their prisoner, they are obliging him to consent to the\ndismemberment of what is purely Turkish territory, they are forcing him\nto turn the country's finances over to foreign capitalists in order to\nmake it possible for them better to exploit the Turkish people, already\nreduced to a state of beggary by the six-year war. They have occupied\nthe coal-mines of Heraclea, they are holding your ports, they are\nsending their troops into your country and are trampling down your\nfields.\n\n\"Peasants and workers of Armenia! Decades ago you became the victims of\nthe intrigues of foreign capital, which launched heavy verbal attacks\nagainst the massacres of the Armenians by the Kurds and incited you to\nfight against the Sultan in order to obtain through your blood new\nconcessions and fresh profits daily from the bloody Sultan. During the\nwar they not only promised you independence, but they incited your\nmerchants, your teachers, and your priests to demand the land of the\nTurkish peasants in order to keep up an eternal conflict between the\nArmenian and Turkish peoples, so that they could eternally derive\nprofits out of this conflict, for as long as strife prevails between you\nand the Turks, just so long will the English, French, and American\ncapitalists be able to hold Turkey in check through the menace of an\nArmenian uprising and to use the Armenians as cannon-fodder through the\nmenace of a pogrom by Kurds.\n\n\"Peasants of Syria and Arabia! Independence was promised to you by the\nEnglish and the French, and now they hold your country occupied by their\narmies, now the English and the French dictate your laws, and you, who\nhave freed yourselves from the Turkish Sultan, from the Constantinople\nGovernment, are now slaves of the Paris and London Governments, which\nmerely differ from the Sultan's Government in being stronger and better\nable to exploit you.\n\n\"You all understand this yourselves. The Persian peasants and workers\nhave risen against their traitorous Teheran Government. The peasants in\nMesopotamia are in revolt against the English troops. You peasants in\nAnatolia have rushed to the banner of Kemal Pasha in order to fight\nagainst the foreign invasion, but at the same time we hear that you are\ntrying to organize your own party, a genuine peasants' party that will\nbe willing to fight even if the Pashas are to make their peace with the\nEntente exploiters. Syria has no peace, and you, Armenian peasants, whom\nthe Entente, despite its promises, allows to die from hunger in order to\nkeep you under better control, you are understanding more and more that\nit is silly to hope for salvation by the Entente capitalists. Even your\nbourgeois Government of the Dashnakists, the lackeys of the Entente, is\ncompelled to turn to the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia\nwith an appeal for peace and help.\n\n\"Peasants and workers of the Near East! If you organize yourselves, if\nyou form your own Workers' and Peasants' Government, if you arm\nyourselves, if you unite with the Red Russian Workers' and Peasants'\nArmy, then you will be able to defy the English, French, and American\ncapitalists, then you will settle accounts with your own native\nexploiters, then you will find it possible, in a free alliance with the\nworkers' republics of the world, to look after your own interests; then\nyou will know how to exploit the resources of your country in your own\ninterest and in the interest of the working people of the whole world,\nthat will honestly exchange the products of their labour and mutually\nhelp each other.\n\n\"We want to talk over all these questions with you at the Congress in\nBaku. Spare no effort to appear in Baku on September 1 in as large\nnumbers as possible. You march, year in and year out, through the\ndeserts to the holy places where you show your respect for your past and\nfor your God--now march through deserts, over mountains, and across\nrivers in order to come together to discuss how you can escape from the\nbonds of slavery, how you can unite as brothers so as to live as men,\nfree and equal.\"\n\nFrom this summons the nature of the Baku congress can be imagined. It\nwas, in fact, a social revolutionist far more than a nationalist\nassembly. Of its 1900 delegates, nearly 1300 were professed communists.\nTurkey, Persia, Armenia, and the Caucasus countries sent the largest\ndelegations, though there were also delegations from Arabia, India, and\neven the Far East. The Russian Soviet Government was of course in\ncontrol and kept a tight hand on the proceedings. The character of these\nproceedings were well summarized by the address of the noted Bolshevik\nleader Zinoviev, president of the Executive Committee of the Third\n(Moscow) International, who presided.\n\nZinoviev said:\n\n\"We believe this Congress to be one of the greatest events in history,\nfor it proves not only that the progressive workers and working peasants\nof Europe and America are awakened, but that we have at last seen the\nday of the awakening, not of a few, but of tens of thousands, of\nhundreds of thousands, of millions of the labouring class of the peoples\nof the East. These peoples form the majority of the world's whole\npopulation, and they alone, therefore, are able to bring the war\nbetween capital and labour to a conclusive decision....\n\n\"The Communist International said from the very first day of its\nexistence: 'There are four times as many people living in Asia as live\nin Europe. We will free all peoples, all who labour.'... We know that\nthe labouring masses of the East are in part retrograde, though not by\ntheir own fault; they cannot read or write, are ignorant, are bound in\nsuperstition, believe in the evil spirit, are unable to read any\nnewspapers, do not know what is happening in the world, have not the\nslightest idea of the most elementary laws of hygiene. Comrades, our\nMoscow International discussed the question whether a socialist\nrevolution could take place in the countries of the East before those\ncountries had passed through the capitalist stage. You know that the\nview which long prevailed was that every country must first go through\nthe period of capitalism ... before socialism could become a live\nquestion. We now believe that this is no longer true. Russia has done\nthis, and from that moment we are able to say that China, India, Turkey,\nPersia, Armenia also can, and must, make a direct fight to get the\nSoviet System. These countries can, and must, prepare themselves to be\nSoviet republics.\n\n\"I say that we give patient aid to groups of persons who do not believe\nin our ideas, who are even opposed to us on some points. In this way,\nthe Soviet Government supports Kemal in Turkey. Never for one moment do\nwe forget that the movement headed by Kemal is not a communist movement.\nWe know it. I have here extracts from the verbatim reports of the first\nsession of the Turkish people's Government at Angora. Kemal himself says\nthat 'the Caliph's person is sacred and inviolable.' The movement headed\nby Kemal wants to rescue the Caliph's 'sacred' person from the hands of\nthe foe. That is the Turkish Nationalist's point of view. But is it a\ncommunist point of view? No. We respect the religious convictions of\nthe masses; we know how to re-educate the masses. It will be the work of\nyears.\n\n\"We use great caution in approaching the religious convictions of the\nlabouring masses in the East and elsewhere. But at this Congress we are\nbound to tell you that you must not do what the Kemal Government is\ndoing in Turkey; you must not support the power of the Sultan, not even\nif religious considerations urge you to do so. You must press on, and\nmust not allow yourselves to be pulled back. We believe the Sultan's\nhour has struck. You must not allow any form of autocratic power to\ncontinue; you must destroy, you must annihilate, faith in the Sultan;\nyou must struggle to obtain real Soviet organizations. The Russian\npeasants also were strong believers in the Czar; but when a true\npeople's revolution broke out there was practically nothing left of this\nfaith in the Czar. The same thing will happen in Turkey and all over the\nEast as soon as a true peasants' revolution shall burst forth over the\nsurface of the black earth. The people will very soon lose faith in\ntheir Sultan and in their masters. We say once more, the policy pursued\nby the present people's Government in Turkey is not the policy of the\nCommunist International, it is not our policy; nevertheless, we declare\nthat we are prepared to support any revolutionary fight against the\nEnglish Government.\n\n\"Yes, we array ourselves against the English bourgeoisie; we seize the\nEnglish imperialist by the throat and tread him underfoot. It is against\nEnglish capitalism that the worst, the most fatal blow must be dealt.\nThat is so. But at the same time we must educate the labouring masses of\nthe East to hatred, to the will to fight the whole of the rich classes\nindifferently, whoever they be. The great significance of the revolution\nnow starting in the East does not consist in begging the English\nimperialist to take his feet off the table, for the purpose of then\npermitting the wealthy Turk to place his feet on it all the more\ncomfortably; no, we will very politely ask all the rich to remove their\ndirty feet from the table, so that there may be no luxuriousness among\nus, no boasting, no contempt of the people, no idleness, but that the\nworld may be ruled by the worker's horny hand.\"\n\nThe Baku congress was the opening gun in Bolshevism's avowed campaign\nfor the immediate Bolshevizing of the East. It was followed by increased\nSoviet activity and by substantial Soviet successes, especially in the\nCaucasus, where both Georgia and Armenia were Bolshevized in the spring\nof 1921.\n\nThese very successes, however, awakened growing uneasiness among Soviet\nRussia's nationalist proteges. The various Oriental nationalist parties,\nwhich had at first welcomed Moscow's aid so enthusiastically against the\nEntente Powers, now began to realize that Russian Bolshevism might prove\nas great a peril as Western imperialism to their patriotic aspirations.\nOf course the nationalist leaders had always realized Moscow's ultimate\ngoal, but hitherto they had felt themselves strong enough to control the\nsituation and to take Russian aid without paying Moscow's price. Now\nthey no longer felt so sure. The numbers of class-conscious\n\"proletarians\" in the East might be very small. The communist philosophy\nmight be virtually unintelligible to the Oriental masses. Nevertheless,\nthe very existence of Soviet Russia was a warning not to be disregarded.\nIn Russia an infinitesimal communist minority, numbering, by its own\nadmission, not much over 600,000, was maintaining an unlimited despotism\nover 170,000,000 people. Western countries might rely on their popular\neducation and their staunch traditions of ordered liberty; the East\npossessed no such bulwarks against Bolshevism. The East was, in fact,\nmuch like Russia. There was the same dense ignorance of the masses; the\nsame absence of a large and powerful middle class; the same tradition of\ndespotism; the same popular acquiescence in the rule of ruthless\nminorities. Finally, there were the ominous examples of Sovietized\nTurkestan and Azerbaidjan. In fine, Oriental nationalists bethought them\nof the old adage that he who sups with the devil needs a long spoon.\n\nEverywhere it has been the same story. In Asia Minor, Mustapha Kemal has\narrested Bolshevist propaganda agents, while Turkish and Russian troops\nhave more than once clashed on the disputed Caucasus frontiers. In Egypt\nwe have already seen how an amicable arrangement between Lord Milner and\nthe Egyptian nationalist leaders was facilitated by the latter's fear of\nthe social revolutionary agitators who were inflaming the fellaheen. In\nIndia, Sir Valentine Chirol noted as far back as the spring of 1918 how\nRussia's collapse into Bolshevism had had a \"sobering effect\" on Indian\npublic opinion. \"The more thoughtful Indians,\" he wrote, \"now see how\nhelpless even the Russian _intelligentsia_ (relatively far more numerous\nand matured than the Indian _intelligentsia_) has proved to control the\ngreat ignorant masses as soon as the whole fabric of government has been\nhastily shattered.\"[304] In Afghanistan, likewise, the Ameer was losing\nhis love for his Bolshevist allies. The streams of refugees from\nSovietized Turkestan that flowed across his borders for protection,\nheaded by his kinsman the Ameer of Bokhara, made Amanullah Khan do some\nhard thinking, intensified by a serious mutiny of Afghan troops on the\nRussian border, the mutineers demanding the right to form Soldiers'\nCouncils quite on the Russian pattern. Bolshevist agents might tempt him\nby the loot of India, but the Ameer could also see that that would do\nhim little good if he himself were to be looted and killed by his own\nrebellious subjects.[305] Thus, as time went on, Oriental nationalists\nand conservatives generally tended to close ranks in dislike and\napprehension of Bolshevism. Had there been no other issue involved,\nthere can be little doubt that Moscow's advances would have been\nrepelled and Bolshevist agents given short shrift.\n\nUnfortunately, the Eastern nationalists feel themselves between the\nBolshevist devil and the Western imperialist deep sea. The upshot has\nbeen that they have been trying to play off the one against the\nother--driven toward Moscow by every Entente aggression; driven toward\nthe West by every Soviet _coup_ of Lenin. Western statesmen should\nrealize this, and should remember that Bolshevism's best propagandist\nagent is, not Zinoviev orating at Baku, but General Gouraud, with his\nSenegalese battalions and \"strong-arm\" methods in Syria and the Arab\nhinterland.\n\nCertainly, any extensive spread of Bolshevism in the East would be a\nterrible misfortune both for the Orient and for the world at large. If\nthe triumph of Bolshevism would mean barbarism in the West, in the East\nit would spell downright savagery. The sudden release of the ignorant,\nbrutal Oriental masses from their traditional restraints of religion and\ncustom, and the submergence of the relatively small upper and middle\nclasses by the flood of social revolution would mean the destruction of\nall Oriental civilization and culture, and a plunge into an abyss of\nanarchy from which the East could emerge only after generations, perhaps\ncenturies.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[284] For these early forms of unrest, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au\ndix-neuvieme Siecle_, pp. 22-44 (Paris, 1888).\n\n[285] D. H. Dodwell, \"Economic Transition in India,\" _Economic Journal_,\nDecember, 1910.\n\n[286] Bipin Chandra Pal, \"The Forces Behind the Unrest in India,\"\n_Contemporary Review_, February, 1910.\n\n[287] J. Chailley, _Administrative Problems of British India_, p. 339\n(London, 1910--English translation).\n\n[288] Dr. Ronald Ross, \"Wretchedness a Cause of Political Unrest,\" _The\nSurvey_, 18 February, 1911.\n\n[289] A. Yusuf Ali, _Life and Labour in India_, pp. 3, 32 (London,\n1907).\n\n[290] E. W. Capen, \"A Sociological Appraisal of Western Influence on the\nOrient,\" _American Journal of Sociology_, May, 1911.\n\n[291] P. Khorat, \"Psychologie de la Revolution chinoise,\" _Revue des\nDeux Mondes_, 15 March, 1912; L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage orientale_, pp.\n164-166; J. D. Rees, _The Real India_, pp. 162-163.\n\n[292] Albert Metin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Etude sociale_, p. 276\n(Paris, 1918).\n\n[293] Albert Metin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Etude sociale_, pp. 339-345.\n\n[294] J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_, pp. 133-134\n(London, 1920).\n\n[295] Georges Foucart. Quoted in _The Literary Digest_, 17 August, 1907,\npp. 225-226.\n\n[296] A. Van Gennep, _En Algerie_, p. 182 (Paris, 1914).\n\n[297] _The Englishman_ (Calcutta). Quoted in _The Literary Digest_, 21\nFebruary, 1914, p. 369.\n\n[298] For these larger world-aspects of Bolshevik propaganda, see Paul\nMiliukov, _Bolshevism: An International Danger_ (London, 1920); also, my\n_Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy_, pp. 218-221, and\nmy article, \"Bolshevism: The Heresy of the Under-Man,\" _The Century_,\nJune, 1919.\n\n[299] See Chapter V.\n\n[300] See Chapter VI.\n\n[301] For events in Afghanistan and Central Asia, see Sir T. H. Holdich,\n\"The Influence of Bolshevism in Afghanistan,\" _New Europe_, December 4,\n1919; Ikbal Ali Shah, \"The Fall of Bokhara,\" _The Near East_, October\n28, 1920, and his \"The Central Asian Tangle,\" _Asiatic Review_, October,\n1920. For Bolshevist activity in the Near and Middle East generally, see\nMiliukov, _op. cit._, pp. 243-260; 295-297; Major-General Sir George\nAston, \"Bolshevik Propaganda in the East,\" _Fortnightly Review_, August,\n1920; W. E. D. Allen, \"Transcaucasia, Past and Present,\" _Quarterly\nReview_, October, 1920; Sir Valentine Chirol, \"Conflicting Policies in\nthe Near East,\" _New Europe_, July 1, 1920; L. Dumont-Wilden, \"Awakening\nAsia,\" _The Living Age_, August 7, 1920 (translated from the French);\nMajor-General Lord Edward Gleichen, \"Moslems and the Tangle in the\nMiddle East,\" _National Review_, December, 1919; Paxton Hibben, \"Russia\nat Peace,\" _The Nation_ (New York), January 26, 1921; H. von Hoff, \"Die\nnationale Erhebung in der Tuerkei,\" _Deutsche Revue_, December, 1919; R.\nG. Hunter, \"Entente--Oil--Islam,\" _New Europe_, August 26, 1920;\n\"Taira,\" \"The Story of the Arab Revolt,\" _Balkan Review_, August, 1920;\n\"Voyageur,\" \"Lenin's Attempt to Capture Islam,\" _New Europe_, June 10,\n1920; Hans Wendt, \"Ex Oriente Lux,\" _Nord und Sued_, May, 1920; George\nYoung, \"Russian Foreign Policy,\" _New Europe_, July 1, 1920.\n\n[302] Ikbal Ali Shah, _op. cit._\n\n[303] For events in the Caucasus, see W. E. D. Allen, \"Transcaucasia,\nPast and Present,\" _Quarterly Review_, October, 1920; C. E. Bechhofer,\n\"The Situation in the Transcaucasus,\" _New Europe_, September 2, 1920;\n\"D. Z. T.,\" \"L'Azerbaidjan: La Premiere Republique musulmane,\" _Revue du\nMonde musulman_, 1919; Paxton Hibben, \"Exit Georgia,\" _The Nation_ (New\nYork), March 30, 1921.\n\n[304] Sir V. Chirol, \"India in Travail,\" _Edinburgh Review_, July, 1918.\nAlso see H. H. The Aga Khan, _India in Transition_, p. 17 (London,\n1918).\n\n[305] Ikbal Ali Shah, _op. cit._\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\nOur survey of the Near and Middle East is at an end. What is the\noutstanding feature of that survey? It is: Change. The \"Immovable East\"\nhas been moved at last--moved to its very depths. The Orient is to-day\nin full transition, flux, ferment, more sudden and profound than any it\nhas hitherto known. The world of Islam, mentally and spiritually\nquiescent for almost a thousand years, is once more astir, once more on\nthe march.\n\nWhither? We do not know. Who would be bold enough to prophesy the\noutcome of this vast ferment--political, economical, social, religious,\nand much more besides? All that we may wisely venture is to observe,\ndescribe, and analyse the various elements in the great transition.\n\nYet surely this is much. To view, however empirically, the mighty\ntransformation at work; to group its multitudinous aspects in some sort\nof relativity; to follow the red threads of tendency running through the\ntangled skein, is to gain at least provisional knowledge and acquire\ncapacity to grasp the significance of future developments as they shall\nsuccessively arise.\n\n\"To know is to understand\"--and to hope: to hope that this present\ntravail, vast and ill-understood, may be but the birth-pangs of a truly\nrenascent East taking its place in a renascent world.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\nAali Pasha, Pan-Islam agitation of, 54\n\nAbbas Hilmi, Khedive, pro Turkish views of, 155;\n  deposition of, 156;\n  Pan-Arabianism supported by, 170\n\nAbd-el-Kader, French resisted by, 41\n\nAbd-el-Malek Hamsa, Pro-Germanism of, 156\n\nAbd-el-Wahab, Mohammedan revival begun by, 21, 40;\n  birth of, 21;\n  early life of, 22 _ff._;\n  influence of, 22;\n  death of, 22\n\nAbdul Hamid, despotism of, 32;\n  as caliph, 39;\n  Sennussi's opposition to, 39, 46;\n  Djemal-ed-Din protected by, 53 _ff._;\n  Pan-Islam policy of, 53 _ff._;\n  character of, 54 _ff._;\n  government of, 55;\n  deposition of, 56, 119;\n  tyrannical policy of, 116;\n  nationalism opposed by, 139, 165;\n  Arabs conciliated by, 142 _ff._\n\nAbu Bekr 22;\n  policy of, 114 _ff._\n\nAbyssinian Church, Mohammedan threat against, 50\n\nAfghanistan, religious uprisings in, 41;\n  nineteenth-century independence of, 118;\n  Bolshevism in, 286 _ff._;\n  rebellion of, 286_ff._\n\nAfrica, Mohammedan missionary work in, 49 _ff._\n  _See_ also North Africa\n\nAgadir crisis, 57\n\nAhmed Bey Agayeff, Pan-Turanism aided by, 165\n\nAlexandria, massacre of Europeans in, 149\n\nAlgeria, French conquest of, 40, 158;\n  Kabyle insurrection in, 41;\n  compulsory vaccination in, 95;\n  liberal political aspirations in, 118 _ff._;\n  need for European government in, 122\n\nAllenby, General, Egypt in control of, 177\n\nAmanullah Khan, Bolshevism of, 286;\n  war on England declared by, 286;\n  present policy of, 298\n\nAnatolia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 292\n\nAnglo-Russian Agreement, terms of, 159 _ff._\n\nArabi Pasha, Djemal-ed-Din's influence on, 148;\n  revolution in Egypt headed by, 148\n\nArabia, description of natives of, 21;\n  Turks fought by, 23;\n  defeat of, 23;\n  political freedom of, 113;\n  democracy in, 127;\n  nationalist spirit in, 140 _ff._;\n  Turkish rulers opposed by, 140 _ff._;\n  suppression of, 143;\n  1905 rebellion of, 143;\n  effect of Young-Turk revolution on, 145 _ff._;\n  1916 revolt of, 146;\n  Pan-Arabism in, 145;\n  religious character of Pan-Arab movement in, 169 _ff._;\n  effect of Great War on, 170, 183 _ff._;\n  Allied encouragement of, 184;\n  peace terms and, 185;\n  English agreement with, 185 _ff._;\n  revolt against Turks of, 185;\n  secret partition of, 185 _ff._;\n  Colonel Lawrence's influence in, 186;\n  secret treaties revealed to, 187;\n  France and England in, 187 _ff._;\n  Mustapha Kemal aided by 194, _ff._;\n  English negotiations with, 198;\n  Bolshevist manifesto to, 292\n\nArabian National Committee, creation of, 143\n\nArcher William, on over-population in India, 263\n\nArgyll, Duke of, over-population in India, 263\n\nArmenia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 292\n\nArya Somaj, 208\n\nAtchin War, 41\n\nAzerbaidjan, Bolshevist revolution in, 290 _ff._\n\n\nBabbist movement in Persia, 274\n\nBaber, Mogul Empire founded by, 204\n\nBaku, Congress of Eastern Peoples at, 291, 297\n\nBalkan War, 57;\n  Mohammedans roused by, 58\n\nBarbary States, French conquest of, 158\n\nBerard, Victor, on the enmity of Turks and Arabs, 141 _ff._;\n  France's Syrian policy criticised by, 199\n\nBertrand, Louis, anti-Western feeling in Orient described by, 95 _ff._;\n  on social conditions in the Levant, 269, 271\n\nBevan, Edwyn, nationalist views of, 125 _ff._\n\nBin Saud, Ikhwan movement led by, 72\n\nBolshevism, effects on Orient of, 175;\n  Mustapha Kemal aided by, 196 _ff._;\n  the East a field for, 283 _ff._;\n  propaganda of, 284 _ff._, 288 _ff._;\n  Oriental policy of, 285;\n  in Afghanistan, 286 _ff._;\n  manifesto to Mohammedans issued by, 288 _ff._;\n  manifesto to Turks issued by, 289 _ff._;\n  \"Congress of Eastern Peoples\" held by, 291 _ff._\n\nBombay, English character of, 100;\n  social conditions in, 270 _ff._\n\nBose, Pramatha Nath, on economic conditions in India, 245 _ff._\n\nBrahminism, illiberalism of, 120\n\nBrailsford, H. N., on modern industry in Egypt, 236 _ff._;\n  on social conditions in Egypt, 269 _ff._\n\nBritish East India Company, 205\n\nBukhsh, S. Khuda, reform work of, 31 _ff._;\n  nationalism in India opposed by, 125 _ff._;\n  on Indian social conditions, 253 _ff._\n\n\nCaetani, Leone, 63\n\nCahun, Leon, Turanism and, 163\n\nCairo, revolt in, 178;\n  modern women in, 258\n\nCalcutta, English character of, 100;\n  social conditions in, 270\n\nCaliphate, Islam strengthened by, 38 _ff._;\n  history of, 39;\n  Turkey the head of, 39 _ff._\n\nChelmsford, Lord, report of, 216 _ff._\n\nChina, Mohammedan insurrection in, 41, 51 _ff._;\n  Mohammedan missionary work in, 50;\n  number of Mohammedans in, 51;\n  Mohammedan agitation in, 60\n\nChirol, Valentine, Western influence in Orient described by, 79 _ff._;\n  on Egyptian situation, 179 _ff._;\n  Montagu-Chelmsford Report approved by, 220;\n  on Egyptian conditions since the war, 271 _ff._;\n  on Bolshevism in India, 298\n\nCongress of Eastern Peoples, 291 _ff._\n\nConstantine, King, recalled, 194\n\nConstantinople, Allied occupation of, 192 _ff._;\n  changes since 1896 in, 251 _ff._;\n  status of women in, 258\n\nCox, Sir Percy, English-Arabian negotiations made by, 198;\n  influence of, 200\n\nCromer, Lord, on Islam, 29, 32;\n  Western influence in Orient described by, 80;\n  ethics of imperialism formulated by, 84, 102, 120 _ff._;\n  Egyptian administration of, 149;\n  resignation of, 152;\n  on western-educated Egypt, 257;\n  on over-population in India, 263\n\nCurtis, Lionel, nationalism in India supported by, 130 _ff._;\n  Montagu-Chelmsford Report approved by, 220\n\nCurzon-Wyllie, Sir, assassination of, 212\n\n\nDamascus, French in, 191 _ff._\n\nDar-ul-Islam, 171 _ff._\n\nDickinson, G. Lowes, on Eastern economics, 249\n\nDjemal-ed-Din, birth of, 52;\n  character of, 52;\n  anti-European work of, 52;\n  in India, 52;\n  in Egypt, 53;\n  Abdul Hamid's protection of, 53 _ff._;\n  death of, 53;\n  teachings of, 53 _ff._;\n  nationalism taught by, 138;\n  Egypt influenced by, 148;\n  in Russia, 285\n\nDutch East Indies, Mohammedan uprisings in, 41;\n  Mohammedan missionary work in, 52\n\n\nEgypt, nationalism in, 32, 118 _ff._;\n  Mahdist insurrection in, 41;\n  1914 insurrection of, 61;\n  exiled Arabs in, 143;\n  characteristics of people of, 147 _ff._;\n  early European influences in, 147;\n  nationalist agitation in, 148 _ff._;\n  influence of Djemal-ed-Din in, 148;\n  1882 revolution in, 148 _ff._;\n  Lord Cromer's rule of, 149;\n  France's influence in, 150 _ff._;\n  failure of English liberal policy in, 153 _ff._;\n  Lord Kitchener's rule in, 153 _ff._;\n  effect of outbreak of World War on, 155 _ff._;\n  made English protectorate, 156 _ff._;\n  Pan-Arabism in, 169;\n  Versailles conference's treatment of, 174;\n  nationalist demands of, 177;\n  Allenby in control of, 177;\n  rebellion of, 178 _ff._;\n  martial law in, 178;\n  situation after rebellion in, 179 _ff._;\n  English commission of inquiry in, 181;\n  English compromise with, 182;\n  opposition to compromise in, 182 _ff._;\n  modern factories in, 234, 236;\n  industrial conditions in, 236 _ff._;\n  social conditions in, 269;\n  social revolution in, 281 _ff._\n\nEl-Gharami, 30\n\nEl Mahdi, 42\n\nEngland, Egypt's rebellion against, 175 _ff._;\n  Commission of Inquiry into Egyptian affairs appointed by, 181;\n  Egyptian compromise with, 182;\n  opposition to compromise in, 182;\n  Arabia and, 184 _ff._;\n  in Mesopotamia, 185 _ff._;\n  in Palestine, 186;\n  French disagreement with, 188 _ff._;\n  at San Remo conference, 190;\n  Mesopotamian rebellion against, 192 _ff._;\n  Sevres Treaty and, 193;\n  Greek agreement with, 193;\n  Arabian negotiation with, 198;\n  in India, 204 _ff._\n\nEnver Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 167;\n  in Russia, 285\n\n\nFeisal, Prince, at peace conference, 187 _ff._;\n  peace counsels of, 188;\n  made king of Syria, 191\n\nFisher, on social conditions in India, 270 _ff._\n\nFrance, Morocco seized by, 57;\n  anti-British propaganda of, 150 _ff._;\n  Arabia and, 184;\n  Syrian aspirations of, 185 _ff._;\n  at San Remo conference, 190;\n  Syrian rebellion and, 191 _ff._;\n  Sevres Treaty and, 193;\n  Greek agreement with, 193;\n  present Syrian situation of, 198 _ff._\n\n\nGandhi, M. K., boycott of England advocated by, 224\n\nGorst, Sir Eldon, Lord Cromer succeeded by, 152;\n  failure of policy of, 153 _ff._\n\nGouraud, General, Feisal subdued by, 191;\n  danger in methods of, 299\n\nGreece, anti-Turk campaign of, 193;\n  Venizelos repudiated by, 194;\n  Constantine supported by, 194\n\n\nHabibullah Khan, Ameer, England supported by, 286;\n  death of, 286\n\nHaifa, to be British, 186\n\nHajj, Islam strengthened by, 38 _ff._\n\nHalil Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 168\n\nHanotaux, Gabriel, 57\n\nHarding, Lord, Indian nationalist movement supported by, 215\n\nHedjaz, Turkish dominion of, 140\n\nHindustan, Islam's appeal to 60;\n  anti-Western feeling in, 99 _ff._;\n  illiberal tradition of, 120\n\nHunter, Sir William, on over-population in India, 263 _ff._\n\nHussein Kamel, made Sultan of Egypt, 156\n\n\nIkhwan, beginning of, 71;\n  progress of, 71\n\nImam Yahya, 199\n\nIndia, reform of Islamism in, 30;\n  English mastery of, 40;\n  Islam's missionary work in, 52;\n  1914 insurrection in, 61;\n  English towns and customs in, 100;\n  effect of Russo-Japanese War in, 105, 210 _ff._;\n  liberal political aspirations in, 118 _ff._;\n  democracy introduced by England in, 122 _ff._;\n  opposition to nationalism in, 124 _ff._, 218 _ff._;\n  support of nationalism in, 129 _ff._, 136 _ff._;\n  history of, 201;\n  Aryan invasion of, 201 _ff._;\n  beginning of caste system in, 202 _ff._;\n  Mohammedan invasion of, 203 _ff._;\n  Mogul Empire founded in, 204;\n  British conquest of, 205 _ff._;\n  beginning of discontent in, 206 _ff._;\n  Hindu nationalist movement in, 208 _ff._, 212 _ff._;\n  English liberal policy in, 213 _ff._;\n  result of outbreak of war in, 214;\n  Montagu-Chelmsford Report in, 216 _ff._;\n  militant unrest in, 220 _ff._;\n  effect of Rowlatt Bill in, 222 _ff._;\n  English boycotted by, 223 _ff._;\n  present turmoil in, 224;\n  industries in, 233 _ff._;\n  industrial conditions in, 237 _ff._;\n  industrial future of, 239 _ff._;\n  agriculture in, 243 _ff._;\n  Swadeshi movement in, 244 _ff._;\n  social conditions in, 253 _ff._;\n  status of women in, 254, 258 _ff._;\n  education in, 255 _ff._;\n  over-population in, 262 _ff._;\n  condition of peasants in, 269;\n  city and rural life in, 275 _ff._;\n  economic revolution in, 276 _ff._;\n  attitude of Bolshevists toward, 289 _ff._\n\nIndian Councils Act, terms of, 213;\n  effect of 213\n\nIndian National Congress, 206\n\nIslam, eighteenth-century decadence of, 20 _ff._;\n  revival of, 21;\n  Christian opinions of, 26 _ff._;\n  present situation of, 27 _ff._;\n  agnosticism in, 32 _ff._;\n  fanatics in, 33 _ff._;\n  solidarity of, 37 _ff._;\n  Hajj an aid to, 38 _ff._;\n  caliphate an aid to, 38 _ff._;\n  Western successes against, 40;\n  proselytism of, 48 _ff._;\n  effect of Balkan War on, 58 _ff._;\n  effect of Russo-Japanese War on, 59, 105 _ff._;\n  Western influence on, 75 _ff._;\n  anti-Western reaction of, 88 _ff._;\n  race mixture in, 102 _ff._;\n  tyranny in, 111 _ff._;\n  early equality in, 113 _ff._;\n  political reformation in, 115 _ff._;\n  birth of nationalism in, 137 _ff._;\n  Bolshevist propaganda in, 284 _ff._\n  _See_ also Pan-Islam\n\nIsmael, Hamet, on scepticism among Moslems, 32\n\nIsmael, Khedive, tyrannical policy of, 116;\n  Egypt Europeanized by, 147 _ff._\n\nItaly, Tripoli attacked by, 57;\n  San Remo Treaty opposed by, 190, 193\n\n\nJapan, Mohammedan missionary work in, 59 _ff._\n\nJowf, Sennussi stronghold, 45\n\n\nKabyle insurrection, 41\n\nKhadjar dynasty, Persian revolution against, 160\n\nKharadjites, Islamic spirit preserved by, 274\n\nKhartum, capture of, 41\n\nKheir-ed-Din, attempt to regenerate Tunis made by, 89\n\nKitchener, Lord, Mahdist insurrection suppressed by, 41;\n  anti-nationalist beliefs of, 122;\n  nationalism in Egypt suppressed by, 153 _ff._\n\nKrishnavarma, S., assassination commended by, 211\n\n\nLawrence, Colonel, influence of, 186;\n  Arab-Turk agreement, views of, 194 _ff._;\n  Mesopotamia, views of, 197\n\nLebanon, France's control of, 184\n\nLenine, manifesto to Mohammedans issued by, 288 _ff._\n\nLow, Sidney, modern imperialism described by, 86 _ff._;\n  on Egyptian situation, 154\n\nLyall, Sir Alfred, on Western education in India, 256 _ff._\n\nLybyer, Professor A. H., democracy in Islam described by, 114, 127\n\n\nMacdonald, J. Ramsay, on economic conditions in India, 245;\n  on social revolution in India, 280 _ff._\n\nMcIlwraith, Sir M., on Egyptian situation, 180\n\nMcMahon, Sir Henry, agreement with Arabs made by, 185 _ff._\n\nMadras, English character of, 100\n\nMahdism, definition of, 42 _ff._\n\nMahdist insurrection, 42\n\nMahmud II, Sultan, liberal policy of, 115\n\nMahmud of Ghazni, India invaded by, 204\n\nMecca, decadence of, 21;\n  Abd-el-Wahab's pilgrimage to, 22;\n  Saud's subjugation of, 23;\n  Turkish reconquest of, 23;\n  aid to strength of Islam, 38 _ff._;\n  post cards sold at, 251\n\nMedina, decadence of, 21;\n  Abd-el-Wahab's studies at, 22;\n  Saud's subjugation of, 23;\n  Turkish reconquest of, 23;\n  electricity at, 251\n\nMehemet Ali, army of, 23;\n  Turks aided by, 23;\n  Wahabi defeated by, 23;\n  liberal policy of, 115;\n  Egypt Europeanized by, 147\n\nMesopotamia, Turkish dominion of, 140;\n  England in, 184 _ff._;\n  rebellion against England of 192 _ff._;\n  denunciation of English policy in, 197;\n  Bolshevists' manifesto issued to, 292\n\nMetin, Albert, on nationalist movement in India, 279 _ff._\n\nMidhat Pasha, liberal movement aided by, 32\n\nMilner, Lord, Egyptian inquiry commission headed by, 181;\n  character of, 181;\n  compromise agreed on by, 182 _ff._;\n  resignation of, 182;\n  influence of, 200\n\nMogul Empire, foundation of, 204\n\nMohammed Abdou, Sheikh, liberal movement aided by, 32;\n  Djemal-ed-Din's influence on, 148;\n  conservative teachings of, 150\n\nMohammed Ahmed, Sennussi's scorn of, 46\n\nMohammed Farid Bey, anti-English policy of, 152;\n  mistakes of, 152 _ff._;\n  pro German policy of, 156\n\nMohammedan Revival. _See_ Pan-Islam\n\nMollahs, anti-liberalism of, 30\n\nMontagu-Chelmsford Report, 217 _ff._\n\nMontagu, liberal policy of, 216 _ff._\n\nMorison, Sir Theodore, on Moslem situation, 67, 70 _ff._;\n  on modern industry in India, 234 _ff._, 245\n\nMorley, John, liberal policy of, 213\n\nMorocco, French seizure of, 57, 158;\n  in nineteenth century, 118\n\nMotazelism, re-discovery of, 26;\n  influence of, 30\n\nMoulvie Cheragh Ali, reform work of, 31\n\nMuhammed Ali, Shah, revolt in Persia against, 119\n\nMuir, Ramsay, European imperialism described by, 83\n\nMustapha Kemal, character of, 150;\n  beliefs of, 151 _ff._;\n  death of, 151;\n  Allies defied by, 191;\n  Turkish denunciation of, 193;\n  Greek campaign against, 193 _ff._;\n  Arab aid given to, 194 _ff._;\n  policy of, 196;\n  Bolshevists allied with, 196 _ff._;\n  French negotiations with, 199;\n  Bolshevist support of, 286, 295\n\nMutiny of 1857, 205\n\n\nNair, Doctor T. Madavan, anti-nationalist opinions of, 124, 219\n\nNakechabendiya fraternity, 41\n\nNamasudra, anti-nationalist organization, 124, 219\n\nNejd, birth of Abd-el-Wahab in, 21 _ff._;\n  description of, 21 _ff._;\n  return of Abd-el-Wahab to, 22;\n  conversion of, 22;\n  consolidation of, 23\n\nNitti, Premier, San Remo Treaty opposed by, 190 _ff._\n\nNorth Africa, \"Holy Men\" insurrection in, 41;\n  lack of nationalism in, 157 _ff._;\n  races in, 158 _ff._\n\nNyassaland, Mohammedanism in, 49 _ff._\n\n\nOrient, _See_ Islam\n\n\nPal, Bepin Chander, on Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 218;\n  on social revolution in India, 277\n\nPalestine, Sykes-Picot Agreement and, 185;\n  England in, 185\n\nPan-Islam, fanatics' scheme for, 33 _ff._;\n  definition of, 37 _ff._;\n  Hajj an aid to, 38 _ff._;\n  caliphate an aid to, 39 _ff._;\n  anti-Western character of, 41 _ff._;\n  fraternities in, 43 _ff._;\n  Abdul Hamid's support of, 54 _ff._;\n  Young-Turk interruption of, 56;\n  renewal of, 57 _ff._;\n  effect of Balkan War on, 58 _ff._;\n  Great War and, 61 _ff._;\n  Versailles Treaty and, 62 _ff._;\n  press strength of, 67;\n  propaganda of, 67;\n  menacing temper of, 70 _ff._;\n  economic evolution in, 72 _ff._\n\nPan-Syrian Congress, 191\n\nPan-Turanism. _See_ Turanians\n\nPan-Turkism, _See_ Turkey, rise of nationalism in\n\nPersia, 1914 insurrection in, 61;\n  an English protectorate, 62;\n  tyranny in, 116;\n  independence of, 118;\n  liberal movement in, 118;\n  1908 revolution in, 119, 159 _ff._;\n  need for European government in, 122;\n  nineteenth-century conditions in, 159;\n  Versailles conference's treatment of, 174 _ff._;\n  war conditions in, 196;\n  Bolshevism in, 196 _ff._, 287 _ff._;\n  Bolshevist manifesto issued to, 291\n\n_Population Problem of India, The_, 264\n\n\nRamsay, Sir William, on economic conditions in Asia Minor, 241 _ff._\n\n_Realpolitik_, treatment of Orient by, 86, 106\n\nReshid Pasha, liberal movement aided by, 32\n\nRoushdi Pasha, nationalist demands of, 177 _ff._\n\nRowlatt Bill, nationalist opposition to, 222 _ff._\n\nRussia, Turanian antagonism for, 167 _ff._\n  _See_ also Bolshevism and Soviet Russia\n\nRusso-Japanese War, Islam roused by, 59, 105\n\n\nSalafi, rise and growth of, 72;\n  spirit of, 72\n\nSan Remo, conference at, 190 _ff._\n\nSaud, Abd-el-Wahab succeeded by, 22;\n  power and character of, 22;\n  government of, 22, 40;\n  holy cities subdued by, 23;\n  death of, 23\n\nSaud, clan of, converted, 24\n\nSchweinfurth, Georg, Egyptian nationalism described by, 149 _ff._\n\nSennussi-el-Mahdi, leadership won by, 44;\n  power of, 45\n\nSennussiya, foundation of, 43 _ff._;\n  leadership of, 45;\n  present power of, 45 _ff._;\n  government of, 45;\n  policy of, 46 _ff._;\n  proselytism of, 48 _ff._\n\nSevres Treaty, 193, 199\n\nSeyid Ahmed, state in India founded by, 24;\n  conquest of, 24\n\nSeyid Ahmed Khan, Sir, reforms of, 30\n\nSeyid Amir Ali, reform work of, 31\n\nSeyid Mahommed ben Sennussi, in Mecca, 24, 39;\n  Abdul Hamid opposed by, 39, 44;\n  birth of, 44;\n  education of, 44;\n  \"Zawias\" built by, 44;\n  power of, 44 _ff._\n\nShamyl, Russia opposed by, 41\n\nShiah Emir, 199\n\nShuster, W. Morgan, Persia's political capacity described by, 127 _ff._\n\nSouth Africa, Mohammedan threat against, 49\n\nSoviet Russia, Afghanistan allied with, 287 _ff._;\n  Kemal supported by, 295;\n  success of, 297 _ff._\n\nSun-Yat-Sen, Doctor, 60\n\nSydenham, Lord, Montagu-Chelmsford Report criticised by, 219\n\nSwadeshi movement, 244 _ff._\n\nSykes-Picot Agreement, terms of, 185 _ff._;\n  French opposition to, 189 _ff._;\n  fulfilment of, 190\n\nSyria, Turkish dominion of, 140;\n  nationalist agitation in, 142 _ff._;\n  France in, 184 _ff._;\n  declaration of independence of, 191;\n  French suppression of, 191;\n  present situation in, 198 _ff._;\n  Bolshevist manifesto issued to, 293\n\n\nTagore, Rabindranath, on economic conditions in India, 248\n\nTalaat, in Russia, 285\n\nTartars, liberal movement among, 32;\n  Mohammedan missionary work among, 50 _ff._;\n  nationalist revival of, 163 _ff._;\n  Bolshevism among, 285\n\nTekin Alp, on Pan-Turanism, 167\n\nTel-el-Kebir, battle of, 149\n\nTewfik Pasha, anti-English feeling of, 92\n\nTilak, Bal Gangadhar, nationalist work of, 210, 218\n\nTownsend, Meredith, anti-Western feeling in Orient explained by, 102, 104\n\nTranscaucasia, Russian conquest of, 40;\n  after-the-war situation in, 196;\n  Mustapha Kemal supported by, 196\n\nTripoli, Italy's raid on, 57;\n  Mohammedan resistance in, 57;\n  1914 insurrection in, 61\n\nTunis, Kheir-ed-Din's reforms in, 89 _ff._\n\nTuranians, peoples composing, 162 _ff._;\n  nationalist movement among, 163 _ff._;\n  effect of Young-Turk Revolution on, 165;\n  effect of Balkan Wars on, 166 _ff._;\n  effect of Great War on, 167 _ff._\n\nTurkestan, Bolshevism in, 286;\n  social revolution in, 290\n\nTurkestan, Chinese, Mohammedans in, 51;\n  revolt of, 51\n\nTurkey, Islam conquered by, 23;\n  Arabs war against, 23 _ff._;\n  Mehemet Ali's aid of, 28;\n  liberal movement in, 31 _ff._;\n  1908 revolution in, 32, 119;\n  Balkan attack on, 57 _ff._;\n  anti-Western feeling in, 90 _ff._;\n  effect of Russo-Japanese War in, 106;\n  independence of, 118;\n  liberal movement in, 118;\n  democracy in, 126;\n  birth of nationalism in, 138;\n  language of, 138;\n  Pan-Turanism in, 140 _ff._, 161 _ff._, 183 _ff._;\n  Arabian rebellion against, 141 _ff._;\n  Allied treaty with, 193;\n  Arab aid given to, 194 _ff._;\n  Western educational methods in, 256;\n  status of women in, 258;\n  Bolshevists' manifesto to, 289 _ff._\n\n_Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal, The_, 167\n\n\nVambery, Arminius, warning against Mohammedans uttered by, 65 _ff._, 107;\n  Moslem politics described by, 114, 126;\n  Young-Turk party described by, 117;\n  Turanism and, 63;\n  on changes at Constantinople, 251 _ff._;\n  on native officials in East, 257 _ff._;\n  on status of woman in East, 259;\n\nVenizelos, Allied agreement with, 193;\n  Greek repudiation of, 194\n\nVersailles Peace, Islam affected by 107 _ff._, 173;\n  secret treaties revealed by, 174 _ff._\n\nVictoria, Queen, made Empress of India, 205\n\n\nWacha, Sir Dinshaw, on Montagu-Chelmsford Report 217 _ff._\n\nWahabi, formation of state of, 22, 40;\n  government of, 22, 41;\n  successful fighting of, 23;\n  defeat of, 23;\n  end of political power of, 23;\n  spiritual power of, 24;\n  in India, 24;\n  English conquest of, in India, 24;\n  influence of, 24;\n  characteristics of, 25 _ff._\n\nWattal, P. K., on over-population in India, 264 _ff._\n\nWillcocks, Sir William, on Egyptian situation, 179\n\n\nYahya Siddyk, on pro-war Mohammedan situation, 68 _ff._\n\nYakub Beg, Turkestan insurrection led by, 51\n\nYoung Arabia, 143 _ff._\n\nYoung-Turk party, rise of, 116 _ff._;\n  nationalist policy of, 140;\n  Arabian nationalism and, 145 _ff._\n\nYoung-Turk revolution, 56, 119\n\n_Yugantar_, anti-English organ, 211 _ff._\n\nYunnan, Mohammedan insurrection in, 41, 51 _ff._;\n  Chinese Mohammedans in, 51\n\nYusuf Bey Akchura Oglu, Pan-Turanian society founded by, 165\n\n\nZagloul Pasha, Milner's discussions with, 181;\n  Milner's compromise with, 182;\n  opposition to, 182 _ff._\n\nZaidite Emir, 199\n\nZawia Baida, Sennussi's founding of, 44\n\nZinoviev, on Third International, 294 _ff._\n\n[Illustration: THE WORLD OF ISLAM]\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBERS' NOTES\n\nGeneral: Accents and capitalisation, particularly on cited sources, have\nbeen left as in the original.\n\nPages 8, 274, 303: Spelling of Kharijites/Kharidjites/Kharadjites left\nas in source.\n\nPage 21: Inquity replaced with iniquity.\n\nPage 39: Hyphen added to El-Afghani for consistency.\n\nPage 45: Zawais corrected to Zawias.\n\nPage 49: Hyphen removed from repercussions for consistency.\n\nPage 94: Hyphen removed from easy-going.\n\nFootnote 257: Italicisation removed from March following The Century.\n\nFootnotes 257 and 259 (originally on page 261): Full-stop (period) added\nafter op (in op. cit.) for consistency.\n\nPage 290: Hyphen added to oil-fields for consistency.","title":"The New World of Islam","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":98504}