{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_2412/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_2412","id":"gutenberg_2412","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2412","summary":null,"tags":["Categories (Philosophy)","Category: History - Ancient","Category: Language & Communication","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical Antiquity","Logic -- Early works to 1800","Philosophy","Philosophy, Ancient"],"text":"Produced by Glyn Hughes.  HTML version by Al Haines.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThe Categories\n\n\nBy\n\nAristotle\n\n\nTranslated by E. M. Edghill\n\n\n\nSection 1\n\nPart 1\n\nThings are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a\ncommon name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for\neach. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to\nthe name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they\nhave a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs\nfor each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal,\nhis definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only.\n\nOn the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have\nboth the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man\nand an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named,\ninasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in\nboth cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal,\nthe statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.\n\nThings are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name\nfrom some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the\ngrammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous\nman from the word 'courage'.\n\n\n\nPart 2\n\nForms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter\nare such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former\n'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.\n\nOf things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never\npresent in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man,\nand is never present in a subject.\n\nBy being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are\npresent in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the\nsaid subject.\n\nSome things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable\nof a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is\npresent in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a\ncertain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a\nmaterial basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.\n\nOther things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a\nsubject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is\npredicable of grammar.\n\nThere is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a\nsubject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the\nindividual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is\nindividual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a\nsubject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being\npresent in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is\npresent in a subject.\n\n\n\nPart 3\n\nWhen one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable\nof the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is\npredicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man';\nit will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the\nindividual man is both 'man' and 'animal'.\n\nIf genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are\nthemselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal'\nand the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged',\n'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are\nnot distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge\ndoes not differ from another in being 'two-footed'.\n\nBut where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to\nprevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is\npredicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate\nwill be differentiae also of the subject.\n\n\n\nPart 4\n\nExpressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity,\nquality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection.\nTo sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the\nhorse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits\nlong', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double',\n'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation; 'in the\nmarket place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last\nyear', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating\nposition, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize', action;\n'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection.\n\nNo one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is\nby the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements\narise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or\nfalse, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as\n'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false.\n\n\n\nPart 5\n\nSubstance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the\nword, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a\nsubject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary\nsense those things are called substances within which, as species, the\nprimary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include\nthe species. For instance, the individual man is included in the\nspecies 'man', and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal';\nthese, therefore--that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus\n'animal,-are termed secondary substances.\n\nIt is plain from what has been said that both the name and the\ndefinition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For\ninstance, 'man' is predicated of the individual man. Now in this case\nthe name of the species 'man' is applied to the individual, for we use\nthe term 'man' in describing the individual; and the definition of\n'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual\nman is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of\nthe species are predicable of the individual.\n\nWith regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a\nsubject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their\ndefinition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though,\nhowever, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in\ncertain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, 'white'\nbeing present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present,\nfor a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour\n'white' is never predicable of the body.\n\nEverything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary\nsubstance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by\nreference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated\nof the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there\nwere no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be\npredicated of the species 'man' at all. Again, colour is present in\nbody, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual\nbody in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all.\nThus everything except primary substances is either predicated of\nprimary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not\nexist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.\n\nOf secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the\ngenus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one\nshould render an account of what a primary substance is, he would\nrender a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject,\nby stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a\nmore instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was\nman than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is\npeculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too\ngeneral. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an\nindividual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the\nspecies 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'.\n\nMoreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in\nvirtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything\nelse, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present\nin them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance\nand everything else subsists also between the species and the genus:\nfor the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the\ngenus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be\npredicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting\nthat the species is more truly substance than the genus.\n\nOf species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one\nis more truly substance than another. We should not give a more\nappropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to\nwhich he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting\nthe same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances,\nno one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is not\nmore truly substance than an individual ox.\n\nIt is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude\nprimary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name\n'secondary substance', for these alone of all the predicates convey a\nknowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the\ngenus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall\nmake our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating\nthe latter. All other things that we state, such as that he is white,\nthat he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is\njust that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called\nsubstances.\n\nFurther, primary substances are most properly so called, because they\nunderlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation\nthat subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists\nalso between the species and the genus to which the primary substance\nbelongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included\nwithin these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If\nwe call an individual man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is\napplicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs.\nThis law holds good in all cases.\n\nIt is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present\nin a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor\npredicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it\nis clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are\nnot present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated of the individual\nman, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in\nthe individual man. In the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the\nindividual man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is\npresent in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that\nin which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of\nsecondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition,\napplies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the\nspecies and that of the genus with reference to the individual man.\nThus substance cannot be present in a subject.\n\nYet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that\ndifferentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics\n'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but\nnot present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of\nthe differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia\nitself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial'\nis predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that\ncharacteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man':\nfor 'man' is terrestrial.\n\nThe fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the\nwhole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should\nhave to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the\nphrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' that we meant\n'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.\n\nIt is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all\npropositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated\nunivocally. For all such propositions have for their subject either the\nindividual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary\nsubstance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the\npredicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the species\nis predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of\nthe individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the\nspecies and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species\nand that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that\nof the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the\npredicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the\ndefinition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and to\nthe individuals. But it was stated above that the word 'univocal' was\napplied to those things which had both name and definition in common.\nIt is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which\neither substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are\npredicated univocally.\n\nAll substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case\nof primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a\nunit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance,\nof 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we\nare here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression\nis not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual,\nbut a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single\nas a primary substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of\nmore than one subject.\n\nYet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term\n'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and\ngenus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify\nsubstance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification\ncovers a larger field in the case of the genus that in that of the\nspecies: he who uses the word 'animal' is herein using a word of wider\nextension than he who uses the word 'man'.\n\nAnother mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the\ncontrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or\nanimal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary.\nYet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of\nmany other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the\ncontrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of 'ten',\nor of any such term. A man may contend that 'much' is the contrary of\n'little', or 'great' of 'small', but of definite quantitative terms no\ncontrary exists.\n\nSubstance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do\nnot mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly\nsubstance than another, for it has already been stated that this is\nthe case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within\nitself. For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more\nor less man either than himself at some other time or than some other\nman. One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white\nmay be more or less white than some other white object, or as that\nwhich is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other\nbeautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a\nthing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is\nsaid to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is\nsaid to be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But substance\nis not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is not more\ntruly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is\nsubstance, more or less what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of\nvariation of degree.\n\nThe most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while\nremaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting\ncontrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should\nfind ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark.\nThus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the\nsame one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything\nthat is not substance. But one and the selfsame substance, while\nretaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities.\nThe same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at\none time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This\ncapacity is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a\nstatement or opinion was an exception to the rule. The same statement,\nit is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the statement 'he is\nsitting' is true, yet, when the person in question has risen, the same\nstatement will be false. The same applies to opinions. For if any one\nthinks truly that a person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen,\nthis same opinion, if still held, will be false. Yet although this\nexception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the\nmanner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing\nthat substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which\nwas hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state.\nSimilarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was bad\ngood, by a process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it\nis by changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary\nqualities. But statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in\nall respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the\ncontrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting'\nremains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false,\naccording to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies\nalso to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing\ntakes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be\ncapable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing\nthat it does so.\n\nIf, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements\nand opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his\ncontention is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to have\nthis capacity, not because they themselves undergo modification, but\nbecause this modification occurs in the case of something else. The\ntruth or falsity of a statement depends on facts, and not on any power\non the part of the statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In\nshort, there is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and\nopinions. As, then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot\nbe said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.\n\nBut it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the\nsubstance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting\ncontrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either disease\nor health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said\nto be capable of admitting contrary qualities.\n\nTo sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining\nnumerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary\nqualities, the modification taking place through a change in the\nsubstance itself.\n\nLet these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.\n\n\n\nPart 6\n\nQuantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities\nare such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the\nother parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part.\n\nInstances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous,\nlines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place.\n\nIn the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at\nwhich they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives\nhave no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven\nalso do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be\npossible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary\namong the parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore, is a\ndiscrete quantity.\n\nThe same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for\nit is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech\nwhich is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have\nno common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the syllables\njoin, but each is separate and distinct from the rest.\n\nA line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible\nto find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the\nline, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it\nis the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary.\nSimilarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a\nsolid, namely either a line or a plane.\n\nSpace and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past,\npresent, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a\ncontinuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space,\nand these have a common boundary; it follows that the parts of space\nalso, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same\ncommon boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time, but\nspace also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have a common\nboundary.\n\nQuantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each\nto each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative\nposition to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be\npossible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the\nplane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was\ncontiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it could\nsimilarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of\nparts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the solid and to\nspace. But it would be impossible to show that the parts of a number had\na relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state\nwhat parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time,\nfor none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which\ndoes not abide can hardly have position. It would be better to say that\nsuch parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to\nanother. Similarly with number: in counting, 'one' is prior to 'two',\nand 'two' to 'three', and thus the parts of number may be said to\npossess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any\ndistinct position for each. This holds good also in the case of speech.\nNone of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is\npronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the\nparts do not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities\nconsist of parts which have position, and some of those which have not.\n\nStrictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the\ncategory of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative is a\nquantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have in mind some one\nof these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative\nterms to other things. We speak of what is white as large, because the\nsurface over which the white extends is large; we speak of an action or\na process as lengthy, because the time covered is long; these things\ncannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance,\nshould any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be\nmade in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year,\nor something of that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size\nof a white object in terms of surface, for he would state the area\nwhich it covered. Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone,\nare in their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the\nname in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense.\n\nQuantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this\nis obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two cubits\nlong' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or of any such\nquantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was the contrary of\n'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these are not quantitative, but\nrelative; things are not great or small absolutely, they are so called\nrather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain\nis called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter\nis greater than others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a\nreference here to an external standard, for if the terms 'great' and\n'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or\na grain large. Again, we say that there are many people in a village,\nand few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as\nnumerous as those in the village: or we say that a house has many in\nit, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those\nin the house. The terms 'two cubits long', 'three cubits long', and so\non indicate quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small' indicate relation,\nfor they have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore,\nplain that these are to be classed as relative.\n\nAgain, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no\ncontraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is\nnot to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to\nsomething external? Again, if 'great' and 'small' are contraries, it\nwill come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at\none and the same time, and that things will themselves be contrary to\nthemselves. For it happens at times that the same thing is both small\nand great. For the same thing may be small in comparison with one\nthing, and great in comparison with another, so that the same thing\ncomes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and is of\nsuch a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same\nmoment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that\nnothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For\nthough substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one\nis at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time\nboth white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in\ncontrary ways at one and the same time.\n\nMoreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary\nto themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of 'small', and the same\nthing is both great and small at the same time, then 'small' or 'great'\nis the contrary of itself. But this is impossible. The term 'great',\ntherefore, is not the contrary of the term 'small', nor 'much' of\n'little'. And even though a man should call these terms not relative\nbut quantitative, they would not have contraries.\n\nIt is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to\nadmit of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the contrary of\n'below', when it is the region at the centre they mean by 'below'; and\nthis is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the\nuniverse than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in\ndefining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial\nmetaphor, for they say that those things are contraries which, within\nthe same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance.\n\nQuantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing\ncannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly\nwith regard to number: what is 'three' is not more truly three than\nwhat is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than\nanother set. Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly\ntime than another. Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that\nhave been mentioned, with regard to which variation of degree can be\npredicated. The category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of\nvariation of degree.\n\nThe most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality\nare predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be\nequal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or\nunequal to another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied\nto them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have been\nmentioned.\n\nThat which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed\nequal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one\nparticular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with\nanother in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of\nsimilarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be\ncalled equal and unequal.\n\n\n\nSection 2\n\n\nPart 7\n\nThose things are called relative, which, being either said to be of\nsomething else or related to something else, are explained by reference\nto that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by\nreference to something else, for it is superiority over something else\nthat is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has this external\nreference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it\nis with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other\nrelatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and\nattitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to\nsomething else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of\nsomething, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the\nattitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been\nmentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which\nis explained by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or\nsome other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one\nmountain is called great in comparison with another; for the\nmountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again,\nthat which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all\nother such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted\nthat lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but\nattitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are\nnot themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid\nattitudes.\n\nIt is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a\ncontrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a\ncontrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives;\n'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.\n\nIt also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For\n'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications\n'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in\ncharacter: for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear a\nreference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every relative\nterm that admits of variation of degree. No term such as 'double'\nadmits of this modification. All relatives have correlatives: by the\nterm 'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by the term 'master', the\nmaster of a slave; by 'double', the double of its half; by 'half', the\nhalf of its double; by 'greater', greater than that which is less; by\n'less', less than that which is greater.\n\nSo it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to express\nthe correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean\nknowledge of the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be\napprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible;\nby the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception.\n\nSometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to\nexist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the\nrelative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a\nwing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two\nwill not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird\nis a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original\nstatement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to\nthe bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but\nqua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the\nconnexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having\nreference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as\nbeing such because of its wings.\n\nOccasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists\nby which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define a\nrudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will\nnot be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a\nboat qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot\nuse the terms reciprocally, for the word 'boat' cannot be said to find\nits explanation in the word 'rudder'. As there is no existing word, our\ndefinition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like\n'ruddered' as the correlative of 'rudder'. If we express ourselves thus\naccurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the\n'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all\nother cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative\nof that which is 'headed', than as that of an animal, for the animal\ndoes not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head.\n\nThus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is\nrelated, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we\nderive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is\nreciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived\nthe word 'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'.\n\nAll relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I add\nthis condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as\nhaphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be\ninterdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case\nof acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there\nwill be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that\nname which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant\nsignificance. The term 'slave', if defined as related, not to a master,\nbut to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally\nconnected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the\nstatement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said to be correlative\nwith another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all\nirrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute\nleft in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with\nthat other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the correlative\nof 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, though all irrelevant\nattributes of the said 'master', such as 'biped', 'receptive of\nknowledge', 'human', should be removed, and the attribute 'master'\nalone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave\nwill remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be\nthe slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not\ncorrectly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that\nalone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the\nstated correlation will be found to have disappeared.\n\nFor suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be 'the\nman', or the correlative of 'the wing' is 'the bird'; if the attribute\n'master' be withdrawn from 'the man', the correlation between 'the man'\nand 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master,\nthe slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute 'winged' be\nwithdrawn from 'the bird', 'the wing' will no longer be relative; for\nif the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the wing'\nhas no correlative.\n\nThus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly\ndesignated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if\nnot, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology\nis thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent.\n\nCorrelatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is\nfor the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half. The\nexistence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is\na half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence\nof a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are\nmerely instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another;\nfor if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice\nversa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not\nappear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence\nsimultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to exist before\nknowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge\nof objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible,\nto find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which\nwas contemporaneous with that of its object.\n\nAgain, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at\nthe same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of\nthis is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not\nexist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything\nto know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object\ndoes not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in\nthe case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an\nobject of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge,\nyet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all\nanimals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might\nyet be many objects of knowledge.\n\nThis is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object of\nperception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the\nperceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but\nthe annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the\nperceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and a body in\nwhich perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is\nannihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a\nperceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that\nperception also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation of the\nperceptible involves that of perception.\n\nBut the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the\nperceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that\nperception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat,\nsweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.\n\nAgain, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving\nsubject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal.\nBut the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water\nand such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist\nbefore the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it\nwould seem that the perceptible exists before perception.\n\nIt may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative,\nas seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case\nof certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it\nis quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor\nparts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is\nnot defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the\nparts: a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or\nhead of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular\nperson. It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of\nsecondary substances; the species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not\ndefined with reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is\nonly relative in so far as it is some one's property, not in so far as\nit is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is\nnot relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a\ndifference of opinion; thus, such terms as 'head' and 'hand' are\ndefined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a\npart, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative\ncharacter. Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was\ncomplete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no\nsubstance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if\nthose things only are properly called relative in the case of which\nrelation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence,\nperhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found.\n\nThe former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact\nthat a thing is explained with reference to something else does not\nmake it essentially relative.\n\nFrom this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative\nthing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative.\nIndeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular\nthing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of\nwhich relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he\nknows that also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all\nthat to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is\nrelative. This is clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man\nknows definitely that such and such a thing is 'double', he will also\nforthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if there\nis nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not\nknow at all that it is double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more\nbeautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely\nknow that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know\nindefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less\nbeautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does\nnot know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no\nlonger claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than\nsomething else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing\nwas less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends\nsome relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also\ndefinitely to which it is related.\n\nNow the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is\npossible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not\nnecessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related.\nIt is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus\nthese are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to\nsay that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a\ndifficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without\nmore exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard\nto details is not without advantage.\n\n\n\nPart 8\n\nBy 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such\nand such.\n\nQuality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality let\nus call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from disposition in\nbeing more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of\nknowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired\nonly in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character\nand difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes\nplace, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also, such as\njustice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or\ndismissed, so as to give place to vice.\n\nBy a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily\nchanged and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold,\ndisease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in\none way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes,\nbecoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all\nother dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has\nitself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: in which\ncase we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit.\n\nIt is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which\nare of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for\nthose who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to\nhave such and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are\ndisposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus\nhabit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in\nephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter.\n\nHabits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not\nnecessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said\nalso, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those\nwho are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the\ncorresponding habit.\n\nAnother sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we\ncall men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it\nincludes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity.\nSuch things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his\ndisposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do\nsomething with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are called\ngood boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a\ndisposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish\nsomething with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn\ncapacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may\nordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity.\nSimilarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated\nof a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it\nto withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing\nby reason of the lack of that capacity.\n\nA third class within this category is that of affective qualities and\naffections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort\nof quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover,\nand cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is\nevident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them\nare themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence.\nHoney is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called\nwhite because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases.\n\nThe term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those\nthings which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is\nnot called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this\nwhat is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called\naffective qualities, not because those things which admit them are\naffected. What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of\nproducing an 'affection' in the way of perception. For sweetness has\nthe power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so\nit is with the rest of these qualities.\n\nWhiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said\nto be affective qualities in this sense, but because they themselves\nare the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of\ncolour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he\nblushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is\nthis, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising\nfrom some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a\nprobable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin.\nFor the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former\ninstance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame,\nmight be a result of a man's natural temperament, so as to produce the\ncorresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. All\nconditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and\nlasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and\nduskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said\nto be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in\nnatural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease\nor sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout\nlife. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of\nthese.\n\nThose conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be\nrendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities,\nbut affections: for we are not said to be such in virtue of them. The man\nwho blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher,\nnor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be\nconstitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected.\n\nThus such conditions are called affections, not qualities. In like\nmanner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul. That\ntemper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain\ndeep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions as\ninsanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or\nirascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states\nwhich are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other\nelements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are\ncalled qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and\nsuch.\n\nThose, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are\ncalled affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when\nvexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such\ncircumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be\naffected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but\naffections.\n\nThe fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a\nthing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other\nqualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and\nsuch. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have\na specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in\nfact a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it.\n\nRarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms\nindicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a\nclass different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain\nrelative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified\nwhich, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is\ndense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one\nanother; rare, because there are interstices between the parts; smooth,\nbecause its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts\nproject beyond others.\n\nThere may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly\nso called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.\n\nThese, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from\nthem as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are\nsaid to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost\nall cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of\nthe quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us\nthe adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on.\n\nThere are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under\nconsideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it\nshould have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to\nthe runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity,\nis not derived from that of any quality; for both those capacities have\nno name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from\nthe science, with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or\nwrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name,\nand is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling' as the case may be, and the name\ngiven to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the\nscience. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that\nwhich takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a\nderivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character from the\npossession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not\nderived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does not occur often.\n\nWe may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of\nsome specific quality which have a name derived from that of the\naforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it.\n\nOne quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the\ncontrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things,\nalso, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities,\nmay be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is\ncontrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is\nblack. This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such\ncolours, though qualities, have no contraries.\n\nIf one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a\nquality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply\nthe names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted\nthat justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality,\ninjustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor\nplace, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be\napplicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other contraries\nfalling under the category of quality.\n\nQualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one\nthing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the\ncase with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may\nexhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is\nwhite, it may become whiter.\n\nThough this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we\nshould say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties\nmight ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which\nare dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility\nof variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very\nwell admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in\nthe degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the\ncase with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are\nclassed as dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible\nfact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be\nwhat they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one\nman is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just,\nthan another, and so on.\n\nThe qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular' do\nnot appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have\nto do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the\ntriangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or\ncircular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not\napplicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree; the\nsquare is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to neither is the\ndefinition of the circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of\nthe term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be\ncompared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of\ndegree.\n\nWhereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to\nquality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with\nreference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive\nfeature. One thing is like another only with reference to that in\nvirtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark\nof quality.\n\nWe must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though\nproposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it\nmany relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were\nrelative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the\nindividual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference\nto something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular\nbranches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar\nis not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music,\nbut these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their\ngenera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the\ngrammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something,\nnot the music of something.\n\nThus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is\nbecause we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are\nsaid to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are\ncalled experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch.\nThose particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which\nwe are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities,\nand are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within\nboth the category of quality and that of relation, there would be\nnothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads.\n\n\n\nSection 3\n\n\nPart 9\n\nAction and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of\ndegree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being\ncooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit of contraries. They\nalso admit of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat in a\ngreater or less degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree.\nThus action and affection also admit of variation of degree. So much,\nthen, is stated with regard to these categories.\n\nWe spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing\nwith that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names\nfrom those of the corresponding attitudes.\n\nAs for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily\nintelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning,\nthat in the category of state are included such states as 'shod',\n'armed', in that of place 'in the Lyceum' and so on, as was explained\nbefore.\n\n\n\nPart 10\n\nThe proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with. We must\nnext explain the various senses in which the term 'opposite' is used.\nThings are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to\none another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to\npositives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives.\n\nLet me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word\n'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by the\nexpressions 'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries by 'bad'\nand 'good'. Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and 'positives' are\n'blindness' and 'sight'; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the\npropositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit'.\n\n(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are\nexplained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being\nindicated by the preposition 'of' or by some other preposition. Thus,\ndouble is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the\ndouble of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing\nknown, in the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its\nrelation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained\nas that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such\nthings, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of\nbeing correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other.\n\n(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way\ninterdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not\nspoken of as the good of the bad, but as the contrary of the bad, nor\nis white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of\nthe black. These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Those\ncontraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally\npresent, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain\neither the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in\nthe case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an\nintermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body\nof an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other\nshould be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, are\npredicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other\nshould be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate between the\nterms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those\ncontraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an\nintermediate. Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the\nbody, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should\nbe present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that\neverybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are\npredicated of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary\nthat either the one quality or the other should be present in that of\nwhich they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that\nmay be good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of\ncontraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and\nblack are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between;\nthe intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one\nnor the other.\n\nSome intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all\nthe other colours that come between white and black; in other cases,\nhowever, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it\nas that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is\nneither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.\n\n(iii) 'privatives' and 'positives' have reference to the same subject.\nThus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal\nrule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to\nthat to which the particular 'positive' is natural. We say that that is\ncapable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation\nwhen the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that\nin which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We\ndo not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has\nnot sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time\nwhen by nature it should. For there are some creatures which from birth\nare without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless\nor blind.\n\nTo be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the\ncorresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive',\n'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to\n'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to 'blindness'. Blindness is a\n'privative', to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a\n'privative'. Moreover, if 'blindness' were equivalent to 'being blind',\nboth would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said\nto be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness.\n\nTo be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of being\nin a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and 'privatives'\nthemselves are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both\ncases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind\nopposed to having sight.\n\nThat which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial.\nBy 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by 'denial' a\nnegative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or\ndenial are not propositions; yet these two are said to be opposed in\nthe same sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the\ntype of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to\nthe denial, as in the two propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit', so\nalso the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one\ncase is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to\nhis not sitting.\n\nIt is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to\neach in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by\nreference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any\nother preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is\nnot said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight.\nRelatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a\nrelative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that\nwith which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not\ncalled the sight of blindness.\n\nThat those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and\n'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is\nplain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they\nhave no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the\nsubject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are\npredicated; for it is those, as we proved, in the case of which this\nnecessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health\nand disease, odd and even, as instances. But those contraries which\nhave an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity. It is not\nnecessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be\neither black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between\nthese contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved,\nmoreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of\nwhich the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two\ncontraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a\nconstitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is\nnecessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the\nother, should be present in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or\nsnow black. Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must\nneeds be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but\nonly in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property.\nMoreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and\nnot either the one or the other, which must be present.\n\nIn the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand, neither\nof the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary that a\nsubject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or\nthe other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is\nnatural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus 'positives' and\n'privatives' do not belong to that class of contraries which consists\nof those which have no intermediate. On the other hand, they do not\nbelong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an\nintermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that either\nthe one or the other should form part of the constitution of every\nappropriate subject. For when a thing has reached the stage when it is\nby nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be\nblind, and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity\nmay be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either that it\nshould see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in\nthe one state or in the other. Yet in the case of those contraries\nwhich have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that\neither the one or the other should be present in every appropriate\nsubject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be\npresent, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that\n'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in either of\nthe senses in which contraries are opposed.\n\nAgain, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be\nchanges from either into the other, while the subject retains its\nidentity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive\nproperty of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible that\nthat that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white,\nblack, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is\nbad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of\nlife and thought, may make some advance, however slight, and if he\nshould once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might\nchange completely, or at any rate make very great progress; for a man\nbecomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the\nimprovement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he\nwill make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as\nthis process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him\nin the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time. In\nthe case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, change in both\ndirections is impossible. There may be a change from possession to\nprivation, but not from privation to possession. The man who has become\nblind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not\nregain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new\nset.\n\n(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong\nmanifestly to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this\ncase only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the\nother false.\n\nNeither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor\nin the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it necessary for one to\nbe true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries: neither\nof them is true or false. 'Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other\nas correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is the\nsame, of course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as\n'sight' and 'blindness'. In short, where there is no sort of\ncombination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all the\nopposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words.\n\nAt the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements\nare contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem\nto claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of\n'Socrates is well', but not even of such composite expressions is it\ntrue to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other\nfalse. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false,\nbut if he does not exist, both will be false; for neither 'Socrates is\nill' nor 'Socrates is well' is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.\n\nIn the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does not\nexist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject\nexists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false.\nFor 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind' in the\nsense of the word 'opposite' which applies to possession and privation.\nNow if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and\nthe other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of\nvision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent.\n\nBut in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists\nor not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly, if\nSocrates exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is ill',\n'Socrates is not ill', is true, and the other false. This is likewise\nthe case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he\nis ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the\ncase of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which\nthe term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the\nrule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false.\n\n\n\nPart 11\n\nThat the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the\ncontrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But\nthe contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For\ndefect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being\nan evil, and the mean, which is a good, is equally the contrary of the\none and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we see\ninstances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good.\n\nIn the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one\nexists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there\nwill be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white,\nthere will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates\nis ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two\ncontrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual\nat the same time, both these contraries could not exist at once: for if\nthat Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not\npossibly be one.\n\nIt is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects\nwhich belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health require\nas their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body,\nwithout further qualification; justice and injustice require as their\nsubject the human soul.\n\nMoreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases\neither belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be\nthemselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus, colour;\njustice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good\nand evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera,\nwith terms under them.\n\n\n\nPart 12\n\nThere are four senses in which one thing can be said to be 'prior' to\nanother. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time: in\nthis sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more\nancient than another, for the expressions 'older' and 'more ancient'\nimply greater length of time.\n\nSecondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the sequence\nof their being cannot be reversed. In this sense 'one' is 'prior' to\n'two'. For if 'two' exists, it follows directly that 'one' must exist,\nbut if 'one' exists, it does not follow necessarily that 'two' exists:\nthus the sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then,\nthat when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one\non which the other depends is called 'prior' to that other.\n\nIn the third place, the term 'prior' is used with reference to any\norder, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences which\nuse demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is\nposterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the\npropositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are\nprior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches, the\nexordium is prior in order to the narrative.\n\nBesides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is\nbetter and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In\ncommon parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as 'coming\nfirst' with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most\nfar-fetched.\n\nSuch, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior' is used.\n\nYet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another.\nFor in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the\nother, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be\nby nature 'prior' to the effect. It is plain that there are instances\nof this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of\nthe proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a\nman is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and\nconversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then\nhe is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the\nbeing of the man, but the fact of the man's being does seem somehow to\nbe the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the truth or falsity\nof the proposition depends on the fact of the man's being or not being.\n\nThus the word 'prior' may be used in five senses.\n\n\n\nPart 13\n\nThe term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately applied to\nthose things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that\nof the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the\nother. Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those\nthings, again, are 'simultaneous' in point of nature, the being of each\nof which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is\nthe cause of the other's being. This is the case with regard to the\ndouble and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if\nthere is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a half, there\nis also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the\nbeing of the other.\n\nAgain, those species which are distinguished one from another and\nopposed one to another within the same genus are said to be\n'simultaneous' in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished\neach from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the\n'winged' species is simultaneous with the 'terrestrial' and the 'water'\nspecies. These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed\neach to each, for the genus 'animal' has the 'winged', the\n'terrestrial', and the 'water' species, and no one of these is prior or\nposterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be\n'simultaneous' in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, the\nwinged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies.\nThose species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' in point of nature,\nwhich, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by\none and the same method of differentiation.\n\nBut genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being cannot\nbe reversed. If there is the species 'water-animal', there will be the\ngenus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus 'animal', it does\nnot follow necessarily that there will be the species 'water-animal'.\n\nThose things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature, the\nbeing of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same\ntime neither is in any way the cause of the other's being; those\nspecies, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed\nwithin the same genus. Those things, moreover, are 'simultaneous' in\nthe unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same\ntime.\n\n\n\nPart 14\n\nThere are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase,\ndiminution, alteration, and change of place.\n\nIt is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement are\ndistinct each from each. Generation is distinct from destruction,\nincrease and change of place from diminution, and so on. But in the\ncase of alteration it may be argued that the process necessarily\nimplies one or other of the other five sorts of motion. This is not\ntrue, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us\nan alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion, for\nthat which is affected need not suffer either increase or diminution or\nany of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of\nmotion; for, if it were not, the thing altered would not only be\naltered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution\nor some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter\nof fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the\nprocess of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would,\nif alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be\nsubject to alteration also. But there are some things which undergo\nincrease but yet not alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon\nis applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is\nwith all other figures of this sort. Alteration and increase,\ntherefore, are distinct.\n\nSpeaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different\nforms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus\ndestruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase, rest\nin a place, of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse\ndirection would seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards\nis the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa.\n\nIn the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those that\nhave been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary. It\nappears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here\nalso either as 'rest in its quality' or as 'change in the direction of\nthe contrary quality', just as we defined the contrary of change of\nplace either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction.\nFor a thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore\neither rest in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary\nmay be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this\nway becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is\nalteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a qualitative\nnature takes place.\n\n\n\nPart 15\n\nThe term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the first place it is\nused with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality, for\nwe are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again, it\nhas reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man's\nheight; for he is said to 'have' a height of three or four cubits. It\nis used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to 'have' a\ncoat or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of\nourselves, as a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a\npart of us, as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the\ncase of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to\n'have' wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The expression in such cases has\nreference to content. Or it refers to that which has been acquired; we\nare said to 'have' a house or a field. A man is also said to 'have' a\nwife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the most remote\nmeaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean simply that the\nhusband lives with the wife.\n\nOther senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary\nones have all been enumerated.","title":"The Categories","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":14482}