{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_24315/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_24315","id":"gutenberg_24315","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24315","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Christianity","Church history","Logos (Christian theology)","Logos (Philosophy)","Religion"],"text":"*The Silesian Horseherd*\n\n                           *(Das Pferdeb\u00fcrla)*\n\n                    Questions of the Hour Answered By\n\n                          *Friedrich Max M\u00fcller*\n\n                        Translated From The German\n\n                           By Oscar A. Fechter\n\n                              With A Forward\n\n                       By J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A.\n\n                         Longmans, Green, and Co.\n\n                        39 Paternoster Row, London\n\n                           New York and Bombay\n\n                                  *1903*\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nPreface\nChapter I.\nChapter II.\nChapter III.\nChapter IV.\nChapter V.\nChapter VI.\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe story of this volume is soon told. In July, 1895, Professor Max M\u00fcller\ncontributed to the _Deutsche Rundschau_ an essay on the lost treatise\nagainst Christianity by the philosopher Celsus, known to us through the\nreply of Origen of Alexandria. This essay, entitled \u201cThe \u2018True History\u2019(1)\nof Celsus,\u201d contained an exposition of the doctrine of the Logos and its\nplace in Christian teaching, with reference also to its applications in\nour modern thought. Among the comments upon it which in due time found\ntheir way to Oxford, was a vigorous, if familiar, letter (dated February,\n1896) from a German emigrant to the United States, residing in\nPennsylvania, who signed himself by the unusual name of the _Pferdeb\u00fcrla_,\nor \u201cHorseherd.\u201d(2) His criticisms served as a fair sample of others; and\nhis letter was published with a reply from Professor Max M\u00fcller in the\n_Rundschau_ of November, 1896. More letters poured in upon the unwearied\nscholar who had thus set aside precious time out of his last years to\nanswer his unknown correspondent. One of these, from \u201cIgnotus Agnosticus,\u201d\nsupplied a text for further comment, and the whole grew into a little\npopular _apologia_, which was published at Berlin in 1899, and entitled\n_Das Pferdeb\u00fcrla_, or \u201cQuestions of the Day answered by Friedrich Max\nM\u00fcller.\u201d\n\nThe veteran teacher thus enforced once more his ideas of the relation of\nlanguage and thought, in which he had long since recognised the clue to\nman\u2019s knowledge of the relation of his spirit to God. This inner union he\nfound realised in Christ, according to the testimony of the Fourth\nGospel;(3) and the lucid treatment of this great conception, freed from\nthe technicalities of theology, will possibly prove to some readers the\nmost helpful portion of this book. Ranging over many topics, once the\nthemes of vehement controversy, the discussion has often an intimate,\nfamiliar, personal air. The disputants on opposite sides had drawn nearer;\nthey could better understand each other\u2019s points of view.(4) These pages,\ntherefore, reveal the inmost beliefs of one who had devoted more than\nfifty years to the study of the history of religious thought on the widest\nscale, and had himself passed through severe struggles and deep griefs\nwith unshaken calm. No reader of Max M\u00fcller\u2019s writings, or of the _Life\nand Letters_, can fail to recognise in these trusts the secret unity of\nall his labours. The record of human experience contained in the great\nsacred literatures of the world, and verified afresh in manifold forms\nfrom age to age, provided a basis for faith which no philosophy or science\ncould disturb.\n\nThis is the key to the reasonings and appeals of this little book. It was\ntranslated as a labour of love by Mr. Fechter, Mayor of North Yakima, in\nthe United States. The translation has been revised on this side of the\nAtlantic, and is now offered to the public in the belief that this final\ntestimony of a \u201cvoice that is still\u201d to the reality of \u201cthings unseen\u201d\nwill be welcome to many inquiring and perhaps troubled minds.\n\nJ. ESTLIN CARPENTER.\nOXFORD, April 2, 1903.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\n\n                        The True History Of Celsus\n\n\nThe following essays, which were intended primarily for the Horseherd, but\nwhich were published in the _Deutsche Rundschau_, demand a short\nexplanatory introduction. This, I believe, can best be given by me, by\nmeans of a reprint of another essay which appeared in the same periodical,\nand was the direct cause for the letter, which the writer, under the name\nof \u201cHorseherd,\u201d addressed to me. I receive many such anonymous\ncommunications, but regret that it is only rarely possible for me to\nanswer them or to give them attention, much as I should like to do so. In\nthis particular case, the somewhat abrupt, but pure, human tone of the\nletter appealed to me more than usual, and at my leisure I attempted an\nanswer. My article, which called forth the letter of the Horseherd, was\nentitled \u201cThe \u2018True History\u2019 of Celsus,\u201d(5) in the July number of the\n_Deutsche Rundschau_, 1895, and, with a few corrections, is as follows:\u2014\n\nIn an article which appeared in the March number of the _Deutsche\nRundschau_, 1895, entitled \u201cThe Parliament of Religions in Chicago,\u201d I\nexpressed my surprise that this event which I had characterised as in my\nopinion the most important of the year 1893, had been so little known and\ndiscussed in Germany\u2014so little, that the editors of the _Wiener\nFremdenblatt_ thought it needful to explain the nature of the Chicago\nCongress. Likewise, when in answer to the question as to what I should\nconsider the most desirable discovery of the coming year in my department,\nI answered the discovery of the _Sermo Verus_ of Celsus; this, too,\nappeared to be a work so little known, that the editors considered it\nnecessary to add that Celsus was a renowned philosopher of the second\ncentury, who first subjected the ever spreading system of Christianity to\na thorough criticism in a work entitled _Sermo Verus_. The wish, yes, even\nthe hope, that this lost book, of which we gain a fair idea from the reply\nof Origen, should again make its appearance, was prompted by the recent\ndiscoveries of ancient Greek papyrus manuscripts in Egypt. Where so many\nunexpected discoveries have been made, we may hope for yet more. For who\nwould have believed that ancient Greek texts would be found in a\nmummy-case, the Greek papyrus leaves being carelessly rolled together to\nserve as cushions for the head and limbs of a skeleton? It was plain that\nthese papyrus leaves had been sold as waste paper, and that they were\nprobably obtained from the houses of Greek officials and military\nofficers, who had established themselves in Egypt during the Macedonian\noccupation, and whose furniture and belongings had been publicly sold and\nscattered on occasion of their rapid withdrawal. There were found not only\nfragments of classical texts, as of Homer, Plato, and the previously\nunknown treatise on \u201cThe Government of the Athenians,\u201d not, perhaps,\ncomposed, but utilised, by Aristotle, but also many fragments of Christian\nliterature, which made it probable that the libraries of Christian\nfamilies also had been thrown on the market, and that papyrus leaves, when\nthey appeared useless for any other purpose, were used as waste paper, or\nas a kind of papier-mach\u00e9.\n\nBut why should the \u201cTrue History\u201d of Celsus, the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ae\u03c2, or _Sermo\nVerus_, excite our curiosity? The reason is quite plain. We know\npractically nothing of the history of the teaching of Christ in the first,\nsecond, and even third centuries, except what has been transmitted to us\nby Christian writers. It is an old rule, however, that it is well to learn\nfrom the enemy also,\u2014\u201cFas est et ab hoste doccri.\u201d Celsus was a resolute\nfoe of the new Christian teaching, and we should, at all events, learn\nfrom his treatise how the Christian religion appeared in the eyes of a\ncultivated man of the second century, who, it seems, concurred in many\nimportant points with the philosophical conception cherished in the\nChristian church, or at least was familiar with it, namely, the Logos\nidea; but who could not comprehend how men, who had once understood and\nassimilated a view of the world founded on the Logos, could combine with\nit the belief in Christ as the incarnate Logos. To Celsus the Christian\nreligion is something objective; in all other works of the first three\ncenturies it is, and remains, almost entirely subjective.\n\nThis could hardly be otherwise, for a religion in its first inception\nscarcely exists for the outer world. What at that time were Jerusalem and\nPalestine in the eyes of the so-called world? A province yielding little\nprofit, and often in rebellion. The Jews and their religion had certainly\nattracted the attention of Rome and Athens by their peculiarities; but the\nJewish sects interested the classical world much less than the sects of\nthe Platonic and Stoic schools. Christians were regarded as Jews, just as,\nnot many years ago, Jains were treated by us as Buddhists, Sikhs as\nBrahmans, and Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and Brahmans were promiscuously\nplaced in one pile as Indian idolaters. How should the differences which\ndistinguished the Christian from the Jew, and the Jewish Christian from\nthe heathen Christian, have been understood at that time in Rome? To us,\nnaturally, the step which Paul and his associates took appears an enormous\none\u2014one of world-wide import; but of what interest could these things be\noutside of Palestine? That the Jews who looked upon themselves as a\npeculiar people, who would admit no strangers, and tolerate no marriages\nbetween Jew and Gentile, who, in spite of all their disappointments and\ndefeats, energetically clung to their faith in a deliverer, in an earthly\nMessiah, and in the coming glory of their nation; that they should\nsuddenly declare clean what they had always considered unclean; that they\nshould transform their national spirit into a universal sympathy; yes,\nthat they should recognise their Messiah in a crucified malefactor,\nindicate a complete revolution in their history; but the race itself was\nand continued to be, in the eyes of the world, if not beneath notice, at\nleast an object of contempt. It should not, therefore, surprise us that no\nclassical writer has given us a really historical account of the Christian\nreligion, or has even with one word referred to the wonderful events\nwhich, had they actually taken place as described in the Gospels, would\nhave stirred the uttermost corners of the earth. Celsus is the only writer\nof the second century who, being neither Christian nor Jew, was not only\nacquainted with representatives of Christianity and Judaism, but had also,\nit would seem, carefully read portions of the Old and New Testaments. He\neven boasts of having a better knowledge of these religions than many of\ntheir adherents (II, 12). That such a man considered this new Christian\nsect of sufficient importance to subject it to a searching investigation,\nis proof of his deep insight, and at the same time of the increasing power\nof Christianity as a religion independent of Judaism. Who this Celsus\nreally was, it is not easy to discover. Even his adversary, Origen, seems\nto know but little of him; at any rate he tells us nothing of him,\u2014indeed,\nwe are even still in doubt about his date. It has been thought that he is\nthe Celsus to whom Lucian (120-200 A.D.) dedicated his work on the false\nAlexander. This is possible; but Celsus is a very common name, and Origen\nspeaks of two men of this name who were both Epicureans and are supposed\nto have lived in the times of Nero (54-68 A.D.) and Hadrian (118-138\nA.D.). It has been argued that the latter could not have been the author\nof the _Sermo Verus_, because it apparently mentions the sect of the\nMarcellians, and this was not founded till the year 155 under Bishop\nAnicetus. But Origen\u2019s remark, that Celsus may have outlived the reign of\nHadrian, has been overlooked. At any rate Origen speaks of the _Sermo\nVerus_ as a work long known, and as he did not die until the year 253\nA.D., in his time the work of Celsus would have been recognised as of\nconsiderable age, even if written after the year 155. Much learning has\nbeen expended on the identification of Celsus, which seems to me to have\nbeen wasted. It is remarkable that Origen made no effort to become\npersonally acquainted with his adversary. He leaves the question open\nwhether he is the same Celsus who composed two other books against the\nChristians (_Contra Celsum_, IV, 36). At the end of his book he speaks of\nhim as if he had been a contemporary, and asserts that a second book by\nhim against the Christians, which has either not yet been completed or has\nnot yet reached him, shall be as completely refuted as the _Sermo Verus_.\nSuch language is only used of a contemporary. Could it be proved that\nCelsus was a friend of Lucian, then we should know that in the judgment of\nthe latter he was a noble, truth-loving, and cultivated man. It was not\nOrigen\u2019s interest to emphasise these aspects of his opponent\u2019s character;\nbut it must be said to his credit, that though he was much incensed at\nsome of the charges of Celsus, he never attacked his personal character.\nPerhaps it was not fair in Origen to accuse Celsus of being ashamed of his\nEpicureanism, and of concealing his own philosophical and atheistic\nconvictions, in order to obtain an easier hearing among Jews and\nChristians.(6) This does not appear quite fair, for it was a very\npardonable device for Celsus first to attack a part of Christian teaching\nunder the mask of a Jew, who represents his faith as the older and more\nrespectable, and seeks to convince the Christians that they would have\ndone better had they remained true to the religion of their fathers. On\nthe contrary, as Celsus, whatever he may have been except a Jew, could not\nwith a good conscience have undertaken an actual defence of Judaism, it\nwas quite natural that he should choose a Jew as an advocate of the Jewish\nreligion, and put into his mouth, like a second Philo, ideas which at all\nevents sound more Platonic than Epicurean. Origen was entirely justified\nin showing that in this process Celsus frequently forgot his part; and\nthis he did with much skill.\n\nBut whatever Celsus may have been,\u2014an Epicurean, or, as has occasionally\nbeen maintained, a Neo-platonist,\u2014he was at all events no mean adversary\nand certainly not unworthy of Origen\u2019s steel. If not, why should Origen\nhave felt the need of such an earnest refutation? He says, certainly, that\nhe did it only at the request of his old friend and protector, Ambrosius.\nBut that is what many writers under similar circumstances have said and\nstill say. We have, at all events, lost much through the loss (or\ndestruction?) of all manuscripts of Celsus. Not only was he acquainted\nwith the principal philosophical schools of antiquity, he appears also to\nhave studied zealously the religions of the ancient world as they were\nknown at that time to the learned, especially in Alexandria, of which we\nhave but scant knowledge. Origen expressly states (I, 14) that Celsus\ndescribed the various peoples who possessed religious and philosophical\nsystems, because he supposed that all these views bore a certain\nrelationship to one another. Without a doubt much has been here lost to\nus, not only for the history of Greek philosophy, but also for the history\nof Oriental religions and philosophies, whose representatives at that time\nsojourned in Alexandria, yet as to whose personal influence we are almost\nentirely in the dark. Celsus is presumed to have written of the doctrines\nof the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Jews, Persians, Odrysians,\nSamothracians, Eleusinians, even of the Samaneans, _i.e._ the Buddhists\n(I, 24), and to have represented these as better accredited than those of\nthe Jews. We see anew what treasures were stored up in Alexandria, and we\nfeel all the more deeply their irrevocable loss. The desire and the hope\nof recovering the work of Celsus were therefore quite natural for any who\nwished to penetrate more deeply into the spiritual atmosphere of the\nsecond and third centuries, and especially for such as strove to\nunderstand clearly how men of this age, versed in philosophy, such as\nClement and Origen himself, could confess Christianity, or become\nconverted to it, or could defend it against other philosophers without in\nthe least becoming untrue to their philosophical convictions. That the\nlower classes among Jews and Greeks followed the new teaching, is much\nmore intelligible, even without wishing to lay too much stress on the\nevidential value of the miracles at that time. The great majority were\naccustomed to miracles; what was almost entirely lacking was practical\nreligion. The Greek thinkers had created systems of philosophy and morals,\nbut the traditional worship had degenerated into a mere spectacle. Even\namong the Jews the old religion had become a rigid temple ritual, which\noffered but little comfort and hope to the weak heart of man. In the eyes\nof the majority of the philosophers of the age every religion was only\npernicious superstition, good enough for the masses, but scarcely worth\nconsideration by the cultured. That Celsus made the Christian religion the\nobject of serious treatment and refutation, not only implies a subtle and\nunprejudiced view of his age, but shows us at the same time how the\nChristianity of that period, entirely independent of the Jewish religion,\nhad gained in significance, and had even in the eyes of a heathen\nphilosopher begun to be esteemed as something important, as something\ndangerous, as something that had to be combated with philosophical\nweapons.\n\nChristianity is especially indebted for its rapid spread to its practical\nside, to the energy of its love, which was bestowed on all who were weary\nand heavy laden. Christ and the apostles had understood how to gather\naround them the poor, the sinners, the most despised members of human\nsociety. They were offered forgiveness of their sins, love, and sympathy,\nif they merely promised to amend and sin no more. Among these earliest\nfollowers of Christ there was scarcely a change of religion in our sense\nof the word. Christianity was at first much more a new life than a new\nreligion. The first disciples were and remained Jews in the eyes of the\nworld, and that they came from the most despised classes even Origen does\nnot dispute. Celsus had reproached the Christians because the apostles,\naround whose heads even in his time a halo had begun to shine, had been\nmen of bad character, criminals, fishermen, and tax-gatherers. Origen\nadmits that Matthew was a tax-gatherer, James and John fishermen, probably\nPeter and Andrew as well; but declares that it was not known how the other\napostles gained a livelihood. Even that they had been malefactors and\ncriminals, Origen does not absolutely deny. He refers to the letter of\nBarnabas, in which it is stated \u201cthat Jesus chose men as his apostles who\nwere guilty of sin more than all other evil doers.\u201d(7) He relies upon the\nwords of Peter, when he says, \u201cDepart from me; for I am a sinful man, O\nLord.\u201d(8)\n\nPaul, in like manner, says in his epistle to Timothy,(9) \u201cThis is a\nfaithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came\ninto the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief.\u201d\n\nBut it is just in this that Origen recognises the divine power of the\npersonality and the teaching of Christ, that by means of it men who had\nbeen deeply sunken in sins could be raised to a new life; and he declares\nit to be unjust that those who repented of their early sins, and had\nentered into a pure life, well pleasing to God, should be reproached with\ntheir previous sinfulness. In this respect he makes, indeed, no\ndistinction between the apostles and such men as Ph\u00e6don and Polemo, who\nwere rescued from the mire of their sins through philosophy; and he\nrecognises in the teaching of Christ a still greater force, because it had\nproved its saving and sanctifying power without any of the arts of\nlearning and eloquence. What the apostles were, and what they became\nthrough the influence of the Gospel, Origen himself explains in the words\nof Paul, \u201cFor we also were aforetime foolish, disobedient, deceived,\nserving divers lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, and hating\none another.\u201d(10)\n\nHe attributes it as an honour to the apostles that, even if their\nself-accusations were extravagant, they had so openly acknowledged their\nsins, in order to place the saving influence of the Gospel in a clearer\nlight. But the fact itself, that the apostles had been sinful and despised\nmen, Origen honestly admits. We also know with what true humanity Christ\nhimself treated the adulteress: how he challenged the Pharisees, if they\nthemselves were free from sin, to cast the first stone at her. And who\ndoes not admire the aged Pharisees who silently withdrew, one after the\nother, from the oldest to the youngest, without casting a stone? Have we\nmany such Pharisees in our time? Jesus, however, dismissed the adulteress\nwith the compassionate words, \u201cSin no more.\u201d That such a course toward\nsin-laden mankind by one who knew no sin, made a deep impression on the\nmasses, is perfectly intelligible. We see a remarkable parallel in the\nfirst appearance of Buddha and his disciples in India. He, too, was\nreproached for inviting sinners and outcasts to him, and extending to them\nsympathy and aid. He, too, was called a physician, a healer of the sick;\nand we know what countless numbers of ailing mankind found health through\nhim. All this can be quite understood from a human standpoint. A religion\nis, in its nature, not a philosophy; and no one could find fault with\nChristianity if it had devoted itself only to the healing of all human\ninfirmities, and had set aside all metaphysical questions. We know how\nBuddha also personally declined all philosophical discussion. When one of\nhis disciples put questions to him about metaphysical problems, the\nsolution of which went beyond the limits of human reason, he contended\nthat he wished to be nothing more than a physician, to heal the\ninfirmities of mankind. Accordingly, he says to M\u00e2lunkyaputta: \u201cWhat have\nI said to you before? Did I say, \u2018Come to me and be my disciple, that I\nmay teach you whether the world is eternal or not; whether the world is\nfinite or infinite; whether the life-principle is identical with the body\nor not, whether the perfect man lives after death or not?\u2019 \u201d\n\nM\u00e2lunkyaputta answered, \u201cMaster, you did not say that.\u201d\n\nThen Buddha continued, \u201cDid you then say, \u2018I will be your disciple,\u2019 but\nfirst answer these questions?\u201d\n\n\u201cNo,\u201d said the disciple.\n\nThereupon Buddha said: \u201cA man was once wounded by a poisoned arrow, and\nhis friends called in an experienced physician. What if the wounded man\nhad said, I shall not permit my wound to be examined until I know who\nwounded me, whether he be a nobleman, a Brahman, a Vaisya, or a S\u00fbdra;\nwhat his name is; to what family he belongs; if he be large or small, or\nof medium size, and how the weapon with which he wounded me looked. How\nwould it fare with such a man? Would he not certainly succumb to his\nwound?\u201d\n\nThe disciple then perceives that he came to Buddha as a sick man, desiring\nto be healed by him as a physician, not to be instructed about matters\nthat lie far beyond the human horizon.\n\nBuddha has often been censured because he claimed for his religion such an\nexclusively practical character, and instead of philosophy preached only\nmorality. These censures began in early times; we find them in the famous\ndialogues between Nagasena and Milinda, the king Menander, about 100 B.C.\nAnd yet we know how, in spite of all warnings given by the founder of\nBuddhism, this religion was soon entirely overgrown with metaphysics; and\nhow, finally, metaphysics as Abbidharma found an acknowledged place in the\nSacred Canon of the Buddhists.\n\nChristianity presents a parallel case. In the beginning it sought only to\ncall sinners to repentance. The strong, as Jesus himself said, do not\nrequire a physician, but the sick. He therefore looked upon himself as a\nphysician, just as Buddha had done in an earlier day. He declared that he\nwas not come to destroy the law, but to fulfil it. The truth of his\nteaching should be known by its fruits, and there is scarcely a trace in\nthe Gospels of philosophical discussions, or even of attacks on the\nschools of Greek philosophy. But even here it was soon apparent that, for\na practical reformation of conduct, a higher consecration is essential. It\nwas admitted, as an Indian philosopher is reputed long since to have said\nto Socrates, that no one could understand the human element who had not\nfirst understood the divine. Men of Greek culture who felt themselves\nattracted by the moral principles of the little Christian congregations\nsoon, however, wanted more. They had to defend the step which they had\ntaken, and the Christianity which they wished to profess, or had\nprofessed, against their former friends and co-believers, and this soon\nproduced the so-called apologies for Christianity, and expositions of the\nphilosophical and theological views which constituted the foundation of\nthe new teaching. A religion which was recruited only from poor sinners\nand tax-gatherers could scarcely have found entry into the higher circles\nof society, or maintained itself in lecture-rooms and palaces against the\ncultivated members of refined circles, if its defenders, like Buddha, had\nsimply ignored all philosophical, especially all metaphysical, questions.\n\nHow came it, then, that cultured men in high stations, entirely\nindependent, professed Christianity? How did they make their friends and\nformer co-believers understand that such a step was _bona fide_? In\nanswering this question, we get help from Celsus, as well as his opponent,\nOrigen.\n\nThe bridge which led across from Greek philosophy to Christianity was the\nLogos. It is remarkable how much this fundamental doctrine of Christianity\nfell, later on, into the background; how little it is understood, even by\nthe educated of our own time, and how often, without giving it any\nconsideration, they have cast it aside. In early Christian days this was\nprobably a consequence of the practical and political development of the\nnew religion. But the living nerve of the Christian religion, which was\nits closest bond to the highest spiritual acquisitions of the ancient\nGreek world, was thus severed. First, the Logos, the Word, the Son of God,\nwas misunderstood, and mythology was employed to make the dogma, thus\nmisconceived, intelligible. In modern times, through continued neglect of\nthe Logos doctrine, the strongest support of Christianity has been cut\nfrom under its feet, and at the same time its historical justification,\nits living connection with Greek antiquity, has almost entirely passed out\nof view. In Germany it almost appears as though Goethe, by his _Faust_, is\nanswerable for the widespread treatment of the Logos idea as something\nobscure, incomprehensible, mystical. Many, when reading the opening of the\nFourth Gospel, \u201cIn the beginning was the Word,\u201d say to themselves, \u201cNo one\nunderstands that,\u201d and read on. He who does not earnestly and honestly\nmake an effort to understand this beginning of the Gospel, shows that he\nis but little concerned with the innermost essence of Christianity, as\nclearly presented to us in the Fourth Gospel. He forgets that not only\nfaith, but thought, pertains to a religion. It is no excuse to say, \u201cDid\nnot the learned Dr. Faust torment himself to discover what \u2018the word\u2019 here\nmeant, and did not find it out?\u201d He says in Goethe:\u2014\n\n\u201c\u2019Tis writ: \u2018In the beginning was the Word\u2019!\nI pause perplexed! Who now will help afford?\nI cannot the mere Word so highly prize,\nI must translate it otherwise.\u201d\n\nBut this is just what he ought not do. It was not necessary to translate\nit at all; he only needed to accept the Logos as a technical expression of\nGreek philosophy. He would then have seen that it is impossible to prize\nthe Word too highly, if we first learn what the Word meant in the idiom of\ncontemporary philosophy. Not even to a Faust should Goethe have imputed\nsuch ignorance as when he continues to speculate without any historical\nknowledge:\u2014\n\n\u201cIf by the spirit guided as I read,\n  \u201cIn the beginning was the Sense,\u201d Take heed.\nThe import of this primal sentence weigh,\nLest thy too hasty pen be led astray.\nIs force creative then of sense the dower?\n  \u201cIn the beginning was the Power.\u201d\nThus should it stand; yet, while the line I trace,\nA something warns me once more to efface.\nThe spirit aids, from anxious scruples freed,\nI write: \u2018In the beginning was the Deed.\u2019 \u201d(11)\n\nHad Goethe wished to scourge the unhistorical exegesis of modern\ntheologians, he could not have done so better than by this attempt of an\ninterpreter of the Bible, fancying himself illumined by the spirit, but\nutterly destitute of all knowledge of history. Knowledge of the history of\nthe Greek philosophy of the first and second centuries after Christ is\nindispensable to the understanding of such a word as Logos\u2014a word that\ngrew up on Greek soil, and whose first roots reach far into the distant\npast of the Greek mind; and for that very reason not admitting of\ntranslation, either into Hebrew or into German. Like many other _termini\ntechnici_, it must be understood historically; just as logic, metaphysic,\nanalytic, organon, etc., can only be apprehended and understood\nhistorically. Now it is, perhaps, not to be denied, that even now a\nmajority of educated readers either perfunctorily repeat the first\nsentence of the Fourth Gospel, \u201cIn the beginning was the Word,\u201d or believe\nthat something lies buried therein that is beyond the depth of ordinary\nmen. This, of course, is partially true, and it cannot be otherwise in\nreligions which are intended not only for the young, but for the wise and\nlearned, and which should be strong meat for adults, and not merely milk\nfor babes. The fault lies chiefly in the translation, in that it should\nhave been thought necessary to translate a word instead of permitting it\nto remain, what it was, a foreign word.\n\nThis becomes still worse when, as for instance, in certain Oriental\nlanguages, the newly converted Christian has to read, \u201cIn the beginning\nwas the Noun or the Verb.\u201d The correct translation would, of course, be,\n\u201cIn the beginning was the Logos.\u201d For Logos is not here the usual word\nLogos, but a _terminus technicus_, that can no more be translated out of\nthe lexicon than one would think of etymologically translating Messiah or\nChrist as the \u201cAnointed,\u201d or Angelos as \u201cmessenger\u201d or \u201cnuncio.\u201d If we\nread at the beginning of the Gospel, \u201cIn the beginning was the Logos,\u201d at\nleast every one would know that he has to deal with a foreign, a Greek\nword, and that he must gain an understanding of it out of Greek\nphilosophy, just as with such words as _atom_, _idea_, _cosmos_, etc. It\nis remarkable what human reason will consent to. Millions of Christians\nhear and read, \u201cIn the beginning was the Word,\u201d and either give it no\nthought, or imagine the most inconceivable things, and then read on, after\nthey have simply thrown away the key to the Fourth Gospel. That thought\nand reflection also are a divine service is only too readily forgotten.\nRepeated reading and reflection are necessary to make the first verse of\nthe Fourth Gospel accessible and intelligible in a general way; but one\ncannot be a true Christian without thinking and reflecting.\n\nAn explanation of Logos in Greek philosophy is much simpler than is\ncommonly supposed. It is only needful not to forget that for the Greeks\nthought and word were inseparable, and that the same term, namely, Logos,\nexpressed both, though they distinguished the inner from the outer Logos.\nIt is one of the most remarkable aberrations of the human mind, to imagine\nthat there could be a word without thought or a thought without word. The\ntwo are inseparable: one cannot exist or be even conceived without the\nother. I believe that I have clearly shown in my _Science of Thought_ that\nthought without word and word without thought are impossible and\ninconceivable, and why it is so. Here is the first key to a historical\nsolution of the riddle at the beginning of the Fourth Gospel. We know that\nGreek philosophy after making every possible effort to explain the world\nmechanically, had already in the school of Anaxagoras reached the view\nthat the hylozoic as well as the atomic theory leaves the human mind\nunsatisfied; and that it is necessary to posit as the origin of all things\na thought or thinking mind that manifests itself in the universe. This was\nthe _nous_, the mind, of Anaxagoras. He could just as well have called it\n_Logos_, for the word was in use even before the time of Anaxagoras, to\nexpress that reason, the recognition of whose all-pervading presence in\nthe universe was the great step in advance made by the system of\nAnaxagoras. Even Heraclitus had divined the existence of reason in the\nuniverse, and had applied to it the name Logos. While the masses\nrecognised in _Moira_ or _Heimarmen\u00ea_ only destiny, or fate, Heraclitus\ndeclared, that the essence of this Heimarmen\u00ea is the _Logos_, the Reason\nthat pervades the world. This is the oldest expression of Hegel\u2019s thought,\n\u201cWhat is, is rational.\u201d We must not suppose, however, that Heraclitus\nconsidered this Logos as identical with his fire. He merely says that the\nfire is subordinate to the Logos, that it operates \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd,\naccording to the Logos, or (as we should say) rationally.\n\nOur knowledge of the entire system of Heraclitus is of course so\nfragmentary that we can only speak of this, as of many other points, with\ngreat caution. The same is true, although in a lesser degree, of the\nsystem of Anaxagoras. His _nous_, if we translate it by mind, is more\ncomprehensive than _Logos_. We must not, however, suppose, that this\n_nous_ bore a personal character, for Anaxagoras expressly states that it\nis a \u03c7\u03c1\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1, a thing, even though he would have said that this _nous_\nregulated all things. Whether an impersonal mind is conceivable, was still\nat that time a remote problem. Even in Plato we cannot clearly determine\nwhether he represented his _nous_ as God in our sense, or as _Sophia_,\nwisdom, a word which with him often replaces _nous_. It is remarkable that\nin his genuine works Plato does not generally use the word _Logos_, and in\nAristotle as well _nous_ remains the first term, what we should call the\ndivine mind, while _Logos_ is the reason, the causal nexus, the \u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1,\ntherefore decidedly something impersonal, if not unsubjective.\n\nPlato is the first who distinguishes between essence and being in the\nprimeval cause, or, as we might say, between rest and activity. He speaks\nof an eternal plan of the world, a thought of the world, the world as a\nproduct of thought, inseparable from the creator, but still\ndistinguishable from him. This is the Platonic world of \u201cIdeas,\u201d which\nlies at the foundation of the world perceivable by the senses, the\nphenomenal world. What is more natural or more reasonable than this\nthought? If the world has an author, what can we imagine as reasonable\nmen, but that the thought, the plan of the world, belongs to the author,\nthat it was thought, and thereby realised for the first time? Now this\nplan, this idea, was the inner _Logos_, and as every thought finds its\nimmediate expression in a word, so did this one, which was then called the\nouter Logos. The outer was not possible without the inner, even as a word\nis impossible without mind and reason. But the inner Logos also first\nrealises itself in the outer, just as the reasonable thought can only be\nmade real in the word. This character of the Logos as thought and word, at\nonce capable of distinction and yet undifferentiated and inseparable, is\nof the highest importance for Christian speculation; without an exact\ncomprehension of it, we shall see that the relation of the Son to the\nFather as we find it explained by Clement and other fathers of the church,\nremains dark and misty. We have no concept without a word, and philology\nhas shown us how every word, even the most concrete, is based on a\nconcept. We cannot think of \u201ctree\u201d without the word or a hieroglyphic of\nsome kind. We can even say that, as far as we are concerned, there is no\ntree, except in language, for in the nature of things there are only oaks\nor beeches, but not and never a tree. And what is true of tree is true of\nall words, or to speak with Plato, of all ideas, or to speak with the\nStoics, of all _Logoi_. There are no doubt conjurers who pretend to be\nable to think without words, and even take no little pride in being able\nto perform this trick. They forget only too often that their inexpressible\nthoughts are nothing but obscure feelings, in fact, they do not even\ndistinguish between presentation and idea, and forget that when we speak\nof words, we do not understand by them mere mimicry of sound or\ninterjections, but only and exclusively intelligible words, that is, such\nas are based on concepts and are derived from roots. The old Greek\nphilosophers, probably favoured by their language, appear never to have\nforgotten the true relation between Logos and Logos, and their thought\nfinally resulted in a view of the world founded upon it. Although it is\nnow the custom to speak slightingly of the later Platonists, we should\nalways recognise that we owe to them the preservation of this, the most\nprecious jewel out of the rich storehouse of Greek philosophy, that the\nworld is the expression and realisation of divine thought, that it is the\ndivine word expressed.\n\nWe cannot here enter into the various phases in which Plato and his\nfollowers presented these ideas. At times they are represented as\nindependent of the Creator, as models, as golden statues, to which the\ncreative mind looks up. Soon, however, they are conceived as thoughts of\nthis mind, as something secondary, created, sometimes also as something\nindependent, as much so as is the Son in relation to his Father. The whole\nLogos, with all ideas, became in this manner the first-born Son of the\nCreator, yet so that the Father could not be Father without the Son, or\nthe Son without the Father, Son. All these distinctions, insignificant as\nthey may appear from a purely philosophical point of view, demand\nattention because of the influence that they afterward exerted on\nChristian dogma, especially on that of the Trinity\u2014a dogma which, however\nspecifically Christian it may appear to be, must still in all its\nessential features be traced back to Greek elements.\n\nIt is certainly remarkable that Jewish philosophy also developed on very\nsimilar lines, of course not with the purity and exactness of the Greek\nmind, but still with the same object in view,\u2014to bring the reason and\nwisdom recognised in nature into renewed connexion with their supernatural\nJehovah. Through the Proverbs of Solomon and similar works the Jews were\nwell acquainted with Wisdom, who says of herself (viii. 22 ff.): \u201cThe Lord\npossessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was\nset up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was.\u2026\nBefore the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth.\u2026\nWhen he prepared the heavens, I was there: when he set a compass upon the\nface of the depth.\u2026 Then I was by him, as a master workman: and I was\ndaily his delight, rejoicing always before him.\u201d These and similar\nthoughts were familiar to Jewish thinkers (see Proverbs viii. and ix., Job\nxxviii. 12, Ecclesiasticus i. 4), and it was natural that, in coming in\ncontact with Greek philosophy, especially in Alexandria, they should seek\nto recognise again this traditional conception of divine Wisdom in the\nLogos of Greek philosophers. We see this most clearly in Philo, a\ncontemporary of Christ, of whom it is often difficult to say whether he\nreasons more as a Greek or as a Jew. While the Greeks had almost lost\nsight of the bridge between the world and God by abstraction, the Jews,\nthrough mistaken reverence, had so far removed the Creator above his\ncreation that on both sides the need of mediation or a mediator was deeply\nfelt. The Jewish God was little better than the Epicurean. If the\nEpicureans taught that there probably is a God, but that the world is of\nno concern to Him, so among the Jews of the first century gnostic ideas\nprevailed, according to which not the highest but a subordinate God\ncreated and ruled the world. The task of creation seemed unworthy of the\nsupreme God. Philo therefore seized the Stoic idea of the Logos or Logoi\nin order to bring his transcendental God again into relation with the\nvisible world. The most important attributes and powers of God were\nhypostatised as beings who participated in the creation and government of\nthe world. Philo\u2019s God first of all creates or possesses within himself a\nworld that is conceived, an invisible world,(12) which is also called the\nworld of ideas(13) or the idea of ideas.(14) These ideas are the types(15)\nof all things, and the power by which God created them is often called\n_Sophia_ or _Epist\u00eam\u00ea_, wisdom or knowledge.(16) This world of ideas in\nits entirety corresponds, as is readily seen, to the Greek Logos, the\nseparate types to the Platonic ideas or the Stoic Logoi.\n\nThe entire Logos, or the sum of Ideas, is called by Philo, entirely\nindependent of Christianity, the true Son of God, while the realised world\nof Christian teaching passes as the second Son. If the first Logos is\noccasionally called the image or shadow of God, the world of sense is the\nimage of the image, the shadow of the shadow. More logically expressed,\nGod would be the _causa efficiens_, matter the _causa materialis_, the\nLogos the _causa instrumentalis_, while the goodness of God is sometimes\nadded as the _causa finalis_. At the same time we also see here the\ndifference between the working of the Jewish and Greek minds. In the Old\nTestament and in Philo, the Sophia or wisdom of God becomes a half\nmythological being, a goddess who is called the mother, and even the\nnurse,(17) of all beings. She bore with much labour out of the seed of\nGod,(18) as Philo says, the only and beloved visible Son, that is to say,\nthis Cosmos. This Cosmos is called by him the Son of God,(19) the only\nbegotten,(20) while the first Logos is the first-born,(21) and as such\noften coincides with the Sophia and its activity.(22) He is also called\nthe elder son,(23) and as such is distinguished from a younger son,(24)\nfrom the real, visible world. But this divine Sophia may not, according to\nPhilo, any more than God Himself, come into direct contact with impure\nmatter. According to him this contact occurs through the instrumentality\nof certain powers,(25) which in part correspond to the Greek Logoi, and\nwhich in his poetic language are also represented as angels.(26) Philo\nsays in plain terms that the eternal Logoi, that is the Platonic ideas,\nare commonly called angels.\n\nWe see by this in how misty an atmosphere Philo lived and wrote, and we\nmay be certain that he was not the only one who in this manner blended the\nJewish religion with Greek philosophy. In the Samaritan theology also, in\nOnkelos and Jonathan, traces of the Logos idea are to be found.(27) If we\nnow observe in the Fourth Gospel, somewhere in the first half of the\nsecond century, this same amalgamation of Christian doctrine with Platonic\nphilosophy, only in a much clearer manner, we can scarcely doubt from what\nsource the ideas of the Logos as the only begotten Son of God, and of the\ndivine wisdom, originally flowed. Christian theologians are more inclined\nto find the first germs of these Christian dogmas in the Old Testament,\nand it is not to be denied that in the minds of the authors of some of the\nbooks of the Old Testament analogous ideas struggle for expression. But\nthey are always tinctured with mythology, and among the prophets and\nphilosophers of the Old Testament there is absolutely no trace of a truly\nphilosophical conception of the Logos, such as confronts us as a result of\ncenturies of thought among the Platonists and Neo-Platonists, the Stoics\nand Neo-Stoics. We look in vain in Palestine for a word like Logos, for a\nconception of the Cosmos as the expression of a rationally thinking mind,\nespecially for the Logoi as the species of the Logos, as the primeval\nthoughts and types of the universe. It is difficult to understand why\ntheologians should have so strenuously endeavoured to seek the germs of\nthe Logos doctrine among the Jews rather than the Greeks, as if it was of\nany moment on which soil the truth had grown, and as if for purely\nspeculative truths, the Greek soil had not been ploughed far deeper and\ncultivated more thoroughly than the Jewish. That Philo found employment\nfor Platonic ideas, and especially for the Stoic Logos, nay, even for the\nLogoi, in his own house, and that other philosophers went so far as to\ndeclare the fundamental truths of Greek philosophy to have been borrowed\nfrom the Old Testament, is well known; but modern researches have rendered\nsuch ideas impossible. The correspondences to the Greek Logos that are\nfound in the Old Testament are of great interest, in so far as they make\nthe later amalgamation of Semitic and Aryan ideas historically more\nintelligible, and also in so far as\u2014like the correspondences to be found\namong the East Indians and even the red Indians(28)\u2014they confirm the truth\nor at least the innate human character of a Logos doctrine. But wherever\nwe encounter the word Logos outside of Greece, it is, and remains, a\nforeign word, a Hellenic thought.\n\nJewish philosophers, while they adopted the word, only filled their old\nskins with new wine, with the natural consequence that the wine burst the\nold skins; but without spilling. For it was this which, in the hands of\nsuch men as the writer of the Fourth Gospel, as Hippolytus, Clement,\nOrigen, and the best of the church fathers, gave them the strength and\nenthusiasm to triumph over the world, and especially over the strongholds\nof heathen religion, and even over Greek philosophy. Had the Fourth\nEvangelist wished to say that Christ was the divine Sophia or the\nShekinah, or, as in Job, Wisdom as the fear of God, would he have said,\n\u201cIn the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos became flesh, and lived\namong us, and we saw his glory, a glory as of the only begotten Son of the\nFather, full of grace and truth?\u201d Why not take the facts just as they are,\nand why wish to improve that which requires no human improvement? The\nChristian doctrine is and remains what it is; it rests on an\nindestructible arch, supported on one side by the Old Testament and on the\nother by Greek philosophy, each as indispensable as the other. We forget\nonly too readily how much Christianity, in its victory over Greek\nphilosophy, owes to this very philosophy. Christianity could no doubt have\nachieved the moral and social regeneration of the people without these\nweapons of the Greek mind; but a religion, especially in the age of the\ndownfall of Greek and Roman philosophy, must have been armed for battle\nwith the best, the most cultured, and the most learned classes of society,\nand such a battle demanded a knowledge of the weapons which had been\nforged in the schools of Greek philosophy. We cannot therefore put too\nhigh a value on the Fourth Gospel for a knowledge of the intellectual\nmovement of that day. It is true that a religion need not be a philosophy,\nbut it must not owe philosophy any answer. Small as may be the emphasis\nthat we now lay on the Logos doctrine, in that period it was the centre,\nthe vital germ of the whole Christian teaching. If we read any of the\nwritings of Athanasius, or of any of the older church fathers, we shall be\nsurprised to see how all of them begin with the Word (Logos) as a fixed\npoint of departure, and then proceed to prove that the Word is the Son of\nGod, and finally that the Son of God is Jesus of Nazareth. Religious and\nphilosophical are here closely related. If the Christian philosophers gain\non the one hand the divinity of the Son of God, on the other hand they\nretain the rationality of the created universe. That \u201cthe ALL is Logos, is\nWord or Reason,\u201d was at that time as much the battle cry of the prevailing\nphilosophy as the contrary has now become the battle cry of the\nDarwinians, who seek to explain species, kinds, _i.e._ the Logoi, the\ndivine ideas, as the products not of the originating Mind, but of natural\nselection, of environment or circumstance, of the survival of the fittest.\nAnd what is the fittest, if not the rational, the Platonic \u201cGood,\u201d that\nis, the Logos? Why, then, turn back to the stone age of human thinking,\nwhy again turn nature into wood, when for thousands of years Greek\nphilosophers and Christian thinkers have recognised her as something\nspiritual, as a world of eternal ideas? How would such men as Herder,\nSchelling, and Hegel have smiled at such a view of the world! Yes, Darwin\nhimself would be ashamed of his followers, for he saw, though not always\nclearly, that everything in this sphere presupposes something beyond, and\nin the loftiest utterance of his book he demanded an origin, yes, an\noriginator. In the writings of the philosophical church fathers we\nconstantly hear more of the Logos which was in the beginning, and through\nwhich all things were made, than of God, who in the beginning created\nheaven and earth.\n\nAnd in this lies the great interest of the lost treatise of Celsus. Had he\nbeen an Epicurean, as Origen supposed, he would have had no personal\ninterest in the Logos. But this Logos had become at that time to such an\nextent the common property of Greek philosophy, that the Jew, under whose\nmask Celsus at the outset attacked the Christians, could quite naturally\nexpress his willingness to acknowledge the Logos as the Son of God.\nOrigen, it is true, says that the Jew has here forgotten his part, for he\nhad himself known many Jewish scholars, no one of whom would have\nacknowledged such an idea. This shows that Origen did not know the works\nof Philo, who would certainly have offered no objection to such a\ndoctrine, for he himself calls the Logos the first-born Son (\u03c5\u1f31\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03cc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2)(29) When therefore Celsus, the heathen philosopher, admits\nthrough the mouth of the Jew that the Logos is the Son of God, he is\nmerely on his guard against the identification of any individual with the\nSon of God and indirectly with the Logos, that is to say, he does not wish\nto be a Christian. At all events we see how general was the view at that\ntime, that the whole creation was the realisation of the Logos, nay, of\nthe Son of God; that God uttered Himself, revealed Himself, in the world;\nthat each natural species is a Word, a Thought of God, and that finally\nthe idea of the entire world is born of God, and is thereby the Son of\nGod.\n\nThis idea of a Son of God, although in its philosophical sense decidedly\nGreek, had, it is true, certain preparatory parallels among the Jews, on\nwhich Christian theologians have laid only too great stress. In the fifth\nbook of Moses we read, \u201cYou are children of the Lord your God.\u201d In the\nbook of Enoch, chap. cv., the Messiah is also called the Son of God, and\nwhen the tempter says to Christ, Matthew iv. 1, \u201cIf thou be the Son of\nGod,\u201d it means the same as \u201cIf thou be the Messiah.\u201d\n\nThe question is: Is this Jewish conception of the Son of God as Messiah\nthe Christian as well? Such it has been, at least in one book of the\nChristian church, in the Fourth Gospel, and it found its expression first\nin the representation that Joseph was descended from David; secondly, in\nthe belief that Jesus had no earthly father. We see here at once the first\nclear contradiction between Christian philosophy and Christian mythology.\nIf Joseph were not the father of Jesus, how could Joseph\u2019s descent from\nDavid prove the royal ancestry of Jesus? And how does it follow from his\nbeing the Son of God that he had no earthly father? Although he was the\nSon of God, he was called the son of the carpenter, and his brothers and\nsisters were well known. The divine birth demands the human; without it,\nit is entirely unintelligible. We know from the recently discovered\nancient Syrian translation of the Gospels that the two streams of\nthought\u2014that Christ was the Son of God, and that at the same time he had\nan earthly father,\u2014could flow side by side, quite undisturbed, without the\none rendering the other turbid.\n\nIt was the misunderstanding of the spiritual birth of Christ from his\ndivine Father, and even from his divine mother (the Ruach, feminine, the\nholy spirit), that appeared to make it necessary to deny him an earthly\nfather, and to assert that even his human mother did not conceive and give\nbirth to him in the ordinary way. In the earliest period of the Christian\nchurch this was otherwise. It was considered at that time that in Christ\nthe divine sonship went hand in hand with the human, and further that the\none without the other would lose its true meaning. In a Syrian palimpsest,\nwhich was recently discovered in the convent at Mount Sinai by Mrs. Smith\nLewis, and which, being written in the fifth century, presupposes a still\nolder Syrian translator, we now see an original Greek text, probably of\nthe second century, in which the Davidic genealogy of Joseph (Matthew i.\n16) is really the genealogy of Jesus, for it is there said, \u201cJacob begat\nJoseph; Joseph to whom the virgin Mary was espoused begat Jesus, who is\ncalled Christ.\u201d In the twenty-first verse it reads also, \u201cAnd she shall\nbear him a son,\u201d and in the twenty-fifth verse, \u201cAnd took unto him his\nwife, and she bare him a son, and he called his name Jesus.\u201d This purely\nhuman birth of Jesus does not in any manner disturb the belief in his true\ndivine origin, as the Son of God, as the first-born, the image of God,\nwhose name was called the Word of God, _i.e._ Logos. On the contrary, it\nremoves all difficulties with which so many Christians have contended,\nopenly or in silence, when they asked themselves how it is possible to\nconceive a human birth, a human mother, without a human father. Even a\ndeification of the mother, or even of the grandmother, such as is\nproclaimed by the Roman church, does not help any honest soul out of this\nmire which has been made by well-meaning but ignorant theologians. The old\nChristian philosophers, the old church fathers, saints, and martyrs, alone\ngive us light and leading. As long as we conceive the divine sonship of\nChrist from the Jewish or Greek mythological standpoint, the true divine\nnature of Christ remains a mere phrase. When, however, we call to our aid\nthe most orthodox and enlightened men of the second century, we find that\nsuch men as Justin, Tatian, Theophilus, Athenagoras, Apollonius(30) and\nClement, to say nothing of Origen, believed in Jesus as the only begotten\nson of God(31) in the sense which these words had at that time for every\none who spoke and thought in Greek. This Son is often represented as\ndistinguishable from the Father, but not as separable. Of a Son of God in\nthe Jewish sense of the word, of a descendant of David, the evangelist\nwould never have said that all things were made by him. That could be\naffirmed only of the true Son of God, of the Logos, as the thought of God,\nwhich is uttered in the visible world.\n\nIn what sense this Logos was recognised in Jesus, is certainly a difficult\nquestion, and here the work of Celsus would have been of great use to us,\nfor he expressly states that he has no objection to the Logos idea; but\nhow philosophers could accept an incarnation(32) of this Logos in Jesus,\nwas beyond his understanding. It must be borne in mind that matter and\nflesh were held by Celsus to be something so unclean, that according to\nhim the Deity could only operate on matter by means of an endless number\nof intermediaries (a true _f\u0153tus \u0153onum_). This obscurity in the conception\nof Jesus as Logos by the Christian church is the reason why Celsus does\nnot regard Joseph as the natural father of Jesus, but Panthera. Origen, of\ncourse, denounces this very indignantly; and the legend is nothing more\nthan one of the many calumnies, which are nearly always to be traced among\nthe opponents of a new religion and its founders. For the true nature and\nthe divine birth of Christ, as Origen himself seems to feel, such a story\nwould naturally have no significance whatever. It remains true, however,\nthat no writer of authority of the second and third centuries has clearly\nexplained in what sense the Christian church conceived Jesus as the Logos.\n\nThree conceptions are possible. The first appears to have been that of the\nFourth Gospel, that the Logos, in all its fulness, as the Son, who in the\nbeginning was with God and was God, by whom all things were made, became\nflesh in Jesus, and that this Jesus gave to those who believed in him as\nLogos the power themselves to become sons of God, born like him not of\nblood nor of the will of flesh, but of God. This may also explain why the\nlegendary details of the birth of Christ are never mentioned in the Fourth\nGospel. But however clear the view of the evangelist is, it nevertheless\nremains obscure how he conceived the process of this incarnation of an\neternal being, transcending time and space and comprehending the whole\nworld, which lived among them, which, as is said in the Epistle of John,\nwas from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen\nwith our eyes, that which we have beheld and our hands handled, the Word\nof life,(33) etc. If we think ourselves for a moment into this view, into\nthe unity of the Divine that lives and moves in the Father, in the Logos,\nand in all souls that have recognised the Logos, we shall comprehend the\nmeaning of the statement, that whoever believes in Jesus is born of God,\nthat whoever has the Son, has the life. To have the truth, to have eternal\nlife, to have the Son, to have the Father, all this then signifies one and\nthe same thing for the evangelist, and for the greatest among the\nante-Nicene fathers.\n\nBut second, the conception that the Logos was born in Jesus might simply\nsignify the same as Philo means, when he speaks of the Logos in Abraham\nand in the prophets. This would be intelligible from Philo\u2019s point of view\nin relation to Abraham, but clearly does not go far enough to explain the\ndeification of Christ as we find it in all the Evangelists.\n\nThere remains possible therefore only a third conception. Philo knows very\nwell that God has an infinite number of powers or ideas, all of which\nmight be called Logoi, and together constitute the Logos. If now, among\nthese Logoi, that of humanity were conceived as highest, and Jesus were\nregarded as the incarnate Logos, as the expressed and perfectly realised\nidea of man, all would be intelligible. Jesus would then be the ideal man,\nthe one among mortals who had fully realised the idea of man as it existed\nin God, who on the one side was the son of God, on the other side the son\nof man, the brother of all men, if they would only acknowledge Christ as\nthe Son of God, and emulate His example. This would be a correct and to us\na perfectly intelligible and acceptable conception. But many as are the\ndifficulties which this would remove, the objection remains that we can\nproduce no historical proof of such a conception of Jesus as Logos of\nhumanity. We are too poor in historical monuments of the first three\nChristian centuries to be able to speak with assurance of the inner\nprocesses of thought of even the most prominent personalities of that\ntime. In everything, even in relation to many of the leading questions of\nthe Christian religion, we are obliged to rely on combination and\nconstruction. Not only in the Evangelists, but in many of the church\nfathers, feeling overcomes reason, and their expressions admit but too\noften of the most varied interpretations, as the later history of the\nchurch has only too clearly proved. Nevertheless we must endeavour to\nenter not only into their emotions, but also into their thoughts, and not\nbelieve that they used words without thoughts. I do not say that this is\nimpossible. Unthinkable as it is, that words arise and exist without\nideas, yet we know only too well that words become mere words, that they\ngrow pale and die, and that they may finally become _vox et pr\u0153terea\nnihil_. It is, however, the duty of the historian and especially of the\nphilologist to call back to life such words as have given up the ghost.\nMay what I have here written about the meaning of the Logos fulfil this\naim, and at the same time make it clear that my desire for the discovery\nof the original text of the _Sermo Verus_ was not an idle one. I have\nsince learned that the same wish was expressed at an earlier date by no\nless a person than Barthold Niebuhr.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\n\n                       The Pferdeb\u00fcrla (Horseherd)\n\n\nA contributor to a periodical, which, like the _Deutsche Rundschau_, has a\nworld-wide circulation, receives many letters from every corner of the\nearth. Many of them are nothing more than the twitter of birds in the\ntrees; he listens and goes his way. Others contain now and then something\nof use, for which he is thankful, usually of course in silence, for a day\nand night together contain only twenty-four hours, and but little time\nremains for correspondence. It is interesting to note how radically one is\noften misunderstood. While one person anonymously accuses the writer of\nfree thinking and heresy, another, and he generally gives his name,\ncomplains of his orthodox narrow-mindedness, hypocrisy, and blindness,\nwhich for the most part are attributed to poor Oxford, which, in foreign\ncountries at least, still has the reputation of high church orthodoxy.\n\nYet, in spite of all this, such letters are useful, for they give us a\nknowledge of the public which we desire to influence, but which for the\nmost part goes its own way, as it may find most convenient. Often such\nopinions come to us from the highest circles, at times also from the\nlowest, and it is difficult to tell which of the two are the more\ninstructive. The problems of humanity in all their simplicity are after\nall the same for us all, only they are viewed from different standpoints,\nand are treated with scientific or practical design. Members of the same\nprofession readily understand each other; they employ their own technical\nlanguage; but the unprofessional person often goes straighter to the heart\nof a question, and refuses to be satisfied with authorities or traditional\nformulas. These gentlemen it is often difficult to silence. We can easily\ncontend with combatants who wield their weapons according to the rules\nlaid down by the schools; we know what to expect, and how to parry a quart\nor a tierce. But an opponent who strikes regardless of all rule is often\nhard to manage, and we get a scar where it is least expected or deserved.\nIn this wise I was served by an unknown opponent, who wrote to me from a\nplace in the neighbourhood of Pittsburgh, not far from Ohio. He had read\nin his country solitude my article on Celsus in the _Deutsche Rundschau_.\nI know nothing of him, except what he himself writes, but the man\ninterested me. After all, he says in his rude way very much the same\nthings as others veil in learned phrases, and his doubts and difficulties\nare manifestly products of his heart as well as of his brain. The problems\nof humanity have troubled him with genuine pain, and after honestly\nthinking them out as well as he knew how, his convictions stand firm as a\nrock, and all who disagree with him seem to him not only fools, but\nunfortunately hypocrites as well. It is the misfortune of these lonely\nthinkers that they cannot comprehend how any one can hold opinions\ndiffering from their own without being dishonest. They cannot doubt that\nthey have been honest toward themselves, and as a consequence they cannot\nconceive how others, who are of a different mind, can be equally honest,\nand have come by their convictions by a straightforward path. Often it has\nbeen very difficult for them to break with their old faith, cherished from\nchildhood, and they can only look upon it as cowardice and weakness if\nothers, as they think, have not made or wished to make this sacrifice. But\nwe shall let the horseherd who emigrated to America speak for himself.\n\nI here print his letter exactly as I received it, without any\nalterations.(34) To me it seems that the man speaks not only for himself,\nbut for many who think as he does, but who have not the ability nor the\nopportunity to express themselves clearly. I resolved, accordingly, to\nreply to him, and once begun, my pen ran on, and my letter unexpectedly\ncovered more ground than I had intended. Whether he received the letter or\nnot, I do not know; at least it must have been delivered to his address,\nfor it was not returned to me. As I have not, however, heard from him\nagain since February, and as he speaks in his letter of chest catarrh,\nwhich he hopes will in no long time bring him to a joyful end, I must wait\nno longer for an answer, and publish the correspondence in the hope that\nthere are other \u201cPferdeb\u00fcrle\u201d in the world to whom it may be of value.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n\u201c\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPittsburgh, Pa., U.S., February 26, 1896.\nDear Colleague Max M\u00fcller:\n\n\u201cYour article in the _Deutsche Rundschau_ on Celsus pleased me very much.\nWhat does it matter that you do not know me? I love you, and that gives me\na right to address you. Why those vain regrets over the loss of the\noriginal? I would not stretch out my little finger for that Celsus; gone\nis gone like the lost parts of the Annals of Tacitus. More than likely\nboth of these losses are to be ascribed to Christian fanaticism. Tacitus\nhated the Jews and the Christian sect derived from them. But, father Max,\nhave we not much greater modern Celsuses and Tacituses, for instance David\nHume and Schopenhauer? One would think that after the writings of these\nheroes positive Christianity would be an impossibility, and yet the\npersistence of error is so great that it may take several centuries more\nbefore the end of the Christian era is reached. Has there ever been\nanything in the history of the world more humiliating to the human\nunderstanding than this false and lying tale of the Christian religion?\nAnd is there anything in face of our knowledge, and of the realm of nature\nand of man\u2019s position in it, so unbearable, yes so odious, as the\ninoculation of such error in the tender consciousness of our school\nchildren? I shudder when I think that in thousands of our churches and\nschools this systematic ruin of the greatest of all gifts, the\nconsciousness, the human brain, is daily, even hourly, going on. Max, can\nyou, too, still cling to the God-fable? The English atmosphere may serve\nas an apology. I could not strike a dog, but I am filled with\nbloodthirstiness toward the Jewish idea of God, the soul-phantom, and the\nhallucination of immortality.\u2014The facts are so simple and clear; we are\nthe highest existing forms of being in the animal world of this planet,\nand share one and the same nature with them. After death we are just as\nentirely reduced to nothing as before our birth. Nature tells us so\nplainly that the eternal conditions before and after our birth are\nidentical.\n\n\u201cYou ask me what this juggling means;\nTake this short answer for your pains;\nA game of chance from the eternal sea\nBy the same sea again will swallowed be.\n\u2014OMAR KHAYYAM (Bodenstedt).\n\n\u201cBut there is nothing in this world so false as the statement that good\ncan ever come out of lies. Nothing in the world is so wholesome as truth,\nand truth is under all circumstances lovable, beautiful, and holy. Let us\nkneel before the truth of nature; nature cannot go astray. The distinction\nbetween good and evil, the evil heritage of Judaism, must fall in the end.\nMax, on quiet fields, in a mountain village of Silesia, I turned\nsomersaults with joy at the discovery that this distinction is false, and\nthat good and evil are identical. Max, you will not be angry with me? I am\nno learned fellow. I never attended a high school, and now I rejoice at\nit, for what a German calls education can only serve to miseducate after\nall. Modern life is, for every open-minded person, the real high school.\nMax, all German savants, or, if you please, the majority of them, still\nlabour under the delusion that the mind is a \u2018prius.\u2019 By no means, Max!\nMind is a development, an evolving phenomenon. One would suppose it\nimpossible that a thinking man, who has ever observed a child, could be of\nany other opinion; why seek ghosts behind matter? Mind is a function of\nliving organisms, which belongs also to a goose and a chicken. Then, Max,\nwhy not be content with the limits of our knowledge, conditioned by\nexperience, and give up this infamous romancing and tyrannical lying? The\nonly affection which after fifty years I still cherish in my bosom is the\nsweet, unquenchable longing for that truth which fate has denied us.\n\n\u201cMax, you are by no means a free man, as I observe that the religious\ncongress in Chicago impressed you very much.(35) I was present when the\ngayly dressed idolators from Cardinal Gibbons down to the stupid Shinto\npriest and the ill-favoured Baptist woman preacher sat together on the\nplatform. It was very pretty and refreshing to look upon. They all talked\nnonsense and thought themselves very wise. There was but one exception\nwhich interested me: a yellow Buddhist monk inquired, what they thought of\nEnglish missionaries, who in time of famine distributed bread to the poor,\nbut only on one condition, that they adopted the Christian superstition\n(indifferent whether honestly or not). The so-called \u2018Ethical Culture\nSocieties\u2019 were not admitted by the committee to their congress of many\nreligions. Max, it was pitiful to listen to the tittle-tattle that was\nread. None had learned beforehand what he wanted to say. _Dicere de\nscripto_ is a shame for learned men. Only Cardinal Gibbons made a short,\nbut colourless and dull extemporaneous address, which closed with the\nhypocrisy, what a great thing it is to keep oneself unspotted by this\nworld. Accursed hypocrites, you yourselves are this world,\u2014pitifully\nincarnate, it is true,\u2014but you yourselves are this \u2018spotted world.\u2019 Why\nthen still hold to the stupid distinction between good and evil, when we\nmust admit that evil is essential to the very existence of things, and it\nwould be impossible for the world to be, except as it is. We must be as we\nare, or we should not be at all. O beautiful longing for the primeval\ncause! Our ignorance is like evil, welcome. Let us, O Max, embrace the\nevil and ignorance, for if we were nothing but wretched cripples of\nvirtue, and knew everything, we could not bear to live. As it is, we enjoy\nthe spirited battle, and carry a sweet yearning in our breasts.\n\n\u201cMax, how are you personally? Have you a family? How is your health? How\nold are you? What relation do you bear to the learned set in England? Do\nyou know the one German philosopher, with the courage of his convictions,\nEmil D\u00fchring, in Berlin. I consider my knowledge of the writings of Dr.\nD\u00fchring as the greatest gift of fate which has been vouchsafed to me. The\nJews and state professors hide his fame under a bushel. Oh! could not such\nindependent men as you, honoured Max M\u00fcller, do something to bring this\nhero nearer to our young students? D\u00fchring is the only writer of the\npresent day who is to be enjoyed almost without drawback. What is to be\nsaid of our German set which is cowardly enough to repress so long the\ngreatest mind which our century has produced? Were I in _your_ position,\nhow would I shout my \u2018Quos Ego\u2019 across to Germany! Please, my countryman,\nfavour me with a few lines in answer to this effusion, in order that I may\nlearn who and what you are. I am a Silesian horseherd (to be distinguished\nfrom the cowherds [_k\u00fchb\u00fcrla\u2019s_], who till their field with pious\nmoo-moos). Instead of attending a high school, I herded cows, ploughed,\nharvested, and helped to thrash in the winter. While herding I played the\nflute in the valleys of the Sudetic Mountains; and because the hands of\nthe old village schoolmaster trembled very much, I begged of him to let me\ntry to play the organ for him. \u2018Ah, you rascal, you can play better than\nI,\u2019 and he boxed my ears. Then my eldest brother took possession of the\nfarm of seventy-five acres, gave us no compensation, and the rest of us\nlads had to pack off. We scraped together the passage money to America,\nand about thirty years ago I arrived here, where\u2014I almost said God be\npraised\u2014it has always gone pretty hard with me. Whether I fare well or ill\nis the same to me. I make no distinction, for in view of the rapid passing\nof life, it does not pay to give much thought to unnecessary distinctions.\nI never could think of marrying, chiefly because the majority of the women\nin this country are shrews, cannot cook, and spend much too much money on\nthe housekeeping. Besides, I have but a short time to live, for I possess\na chest catarrh most loyally devoted to me, verging upon a perfect asthma,\nwhich I hope erelong will bring me to a joyful end. No doubt you will\nthink what a disconsolate fellow this is who has written to me. O pshaw! I\nhave always enjoyed the sunshine, and have sat alone hundreds of snug\nhours before my winter\u2019s companion, a small iron stove. During the last\nthree nights I have repeatedly read through your article on Celsus,\npublished in the _Deutsche Rundschau_, by a tallow-candle. In relation to\nyour enthusiasm over the religious clap-trap in Chicago, I should like to\nobserve that you would have been entirely in the right if you had\nrepresented the Exhibition as the greatest event of the past ten years. I\ncame through Chicago in September, 1892, visited the prospective site of\nthe Exposition, and found there a mere wilderness, scarcely a single\nbuilding half finished, and it was a wonder of wonders what American\nenterprise and genius for organisation accomplished within the single\nintervening winter. One could scarcely recover from one\u2019s astonishment at\nwhat ten thousand labourers, urged on by the Yankee lash, could make ready\nin six months. \u2018There was money in the business,\u2019 and for money Jonathan\nworks real miracles. Its like the world has never produced. The American\nis cut on a large pattern, and in spite of his political delusions I\nentertain the greatest hopes for the future of a country which is in such\nhands.\u201d\n\nWith many friendly greetings,\n                                                     A Silesian Horseherd.\n                                                     Emigrated to America.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\u201d\n\n                                * * * * *\n\nI answered my unknown friend and correspondent as follows:\u2014\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n\u201c\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\u201cMY GOOD FRIEND: You are an honest fellow, and I believe that I am one\ntoo, but our views are widely divergent. I am an old professor, am now\nseventy-two years old, or as has been often said to me, seventy-two years\nyoung. Like yourself I commenced life with nothing, and have laboured till\nI have become not rich, but independent. Here in wealthy England and in\nwealthy Oxford I am considered a poor man, but I am quite content, and\ncall that riches. I have been married thirty-seven years, have one son,\nsecretary to the Embassy at Constantinople, and a happily married\ndaughter, with four grandchildren. Now you know all that you wished to\nknow. Of my sorrow, the loss of two daughters, I must remain silent.\n\n\u201cAll my life I have been engaged in investigating the past; I am a\nphilologist and have therefore been also a student of history, have\nespecially studied the historical development of the various religions of\nmankind, and to this end have had to make a study of ancient languages,\nparticularly Oriental languages. When one consecrates one\u2019s life to such a\ncause, one acquires an interest in and a love for the ancients, and a wish\nto know what has consoled them in this vale of grief. As you probably\nacquired a love for your colts, mares, and stallions, I acquired an\ninterest in ancient and modern religions. And as you probably do not\nimmediately kill or reject your horses because they possess a blemish,\nshy, kick, prance about, etc., so I do not immediately destroy all\nbeliefs, and least of all my own mount, because they are not faultless,\noccasionally leave me in the lurch, behave foolishly, even dance on their\nhind legs with head in air; but I endeavour to understand them. When we\nunderstand even a little, we can forgive much. That many religions,\nincluding our own, contain errors and weak points, just as your horses do,\nI know perhaps even better than you. But have you ever asked yourself,\nwhat would have become of mankind without any religion, without the\nconviction that beyond our horizon, that is beyond our limit, there still\nmust be something? You will answer, \u2018How do we know that?\u2019 Well, can there\nbe any boundary without something beyond it? Is not that as true as any\ntheorem in geometry? If it were not so, how could we explain the fact that\nmankind has never been without a belief in a world beyond, nor without\nreligion, either in the lowest or in the highest levels.\n\n\u201cThis horizon, this boundary, does not relate only to space, as all will\nagree, even when carried beyond the Milky Way; it relates as well to time.\nYou assert, \u2018The world is much older than we suppose;\u2019 you are right, but\nif it were a million years, still there must have been a time before it\nwas even a day old. That also is indisputable. But when we reach the limit\nof our senses and our understanding, then the horse shies, then we imagine\nthat nothing can go beyond our understanding. Now let us begin with our\nfive senses. They seem to be our wings, but seen in the light they are our\nfetters, our prison walls. All our senses have their horizon and their\nlimits; and the limits in the external world are our making. Our sight\nscarcely reaches a mile, then it ceases; we can observe the movement of\nthe second hand, but that of the minute hand escapes us. Why? We might\nknow that a cannon-ball passes through our field of vision, but we cannot\nlocate it. Why not? Our sense of touch is also very weak and only extends\nover a very limited space. And as it is on the large scale, so is it with\nthe small. We see the eye of a needle, but infusoria and bacteria, which\nwe know to be there and which affect us so much, we cannot see. With\ntelescopes and microscopes we can slightly extend the field of our\nperception, but the limitations and weakness of our sense-impressions\nremain none the less an undeniable fact. We live in a prison, in a cave as\nPlato said, and yet we accept our impressions as they are, and form out of\nthem general notions and words, and with these words we erect this stately\nbuilding, or this tower of Babel, which we then call human science.\n\n\u201cYes, say certain philosophers, our senses may be finite and\nuntrustworthy, but our understanding, and still further our reason, they\nare unlimited, and recognise nothing which is beyond them. Well, what does\nthis most wise understanding do for us? Has not Hobbes long since taught\nus that it adds and subtracts, and _voil\u00e0 tout_? It receives the\nimpressions of the senses, combines them, feels them, comprehends and\ndesignates or names them after any characteristic, and when man has found\nwords, then the adding and subtracting begin, but unfortunately also the\njumbling and chattering, till we finally establish that philosophy and\nreligion, which have aroused in so great degree your anger, and even your\nblood thirstiness. In spite of all it remains true that we can no more get\nbeyond the horizon of our senses than we can jump out of our skins. You\nknow that old saying of Locke\u2019s, although it is much older than Locke,\nthat there is nothing in our intellect which was not first in our senses.\nAnd therefore, however much we may extend our knowledge by adding and\nsubtracting, everywhere we feel in the end our horizon, our limitations,\nour ignorance, for with the limitations of our senses it cannot be\notherwise. Invariably we receive the old answer, \u2018You are like the mind\nwhich you conceive, not me.\u2019\n\n\u201cBut you say that we have no right whatever to speak of a mind. That is\npossible, but everything depends upon what we understand by the term\n\u2018mind.\u2019 Is not mind, that is to say, a recipient, essential to our seeing\nand hearing? The eye can no more see than a camera obscura. True seeing,\nhearing, and feeling are not perceptible through the organs of sense, but\nthrough the recipient, for without it the organs of sense could make no\nresistance, could not receive, could not perceive. This unknown element\nwhich lies beyond the senses, this recipient must be there. It is true he\ncannot be named. Perhaps it would have been better to have called him\n\u2018_x_\u2019 or the Unknown; but when we know what is meant, why not call it mind\nor spirit, that is, breath? You call it a soul-phantom. Well, good, but\nwithout such a soul-phantom we cannot get on; you would have to consider\nyourself a mere photographic apparatus, and I do not believe that you do.\n\n\u201cOf course you can still say that the mind is a development, a\nself-evolving phenomenon. Rightly understood that is quite true, but how\nmisleading that word \u2018evolution\u2019 has been in these latter days. Darwin\ncertainly brought much that is beautiful and true to the light of day. He\ndemonstrated that many of the so-called species are not independent\ncreations, but have been developed from other species. That means that he\nhas corrected the earlier erroneous nomenclature of Natural History and\nhas introduced a more correct classification. He has greatly simplified\nthe work of the Creator of the world. Of that merit no one will deprive\nhim, and it is a great merit. And those who believed that every species\nrequired its own act of creation, and had to be finished by the Creator\nseparately (as was the established opinion in England, and still is in\nsome places), cannot be grateful enough to Darwin for having given them a\nsimpler and worthier idea of the origin of the earth and of its animal and\nvegetable kingdoms.\n\n\u201cBut now comes Mr. Herbert Spencer and tells us, \u2018We have to deal with man\nas a product of evolution, with society as a product of evolution, and\nwith moral phenomena as products of evolution.\u2019 That sounds splendid, but\nevery one who does not quite ignore the past, knows that evolution or\ndevelopment is neither anything very new or very useful. Formerly we used\nsimply to say the tree grows, the child develops, and this was\nmetaphorically transferred to society, the state, science, and religion.\nThe study of this development was called history, and occasionally genetic\nor pragmatic history; but instead of talking as we do now of evolution\nwith imperceptible transitions, it was these transitions which industrious\nand honest investigators formerly sought to observe. They aimed at\nlearning to know the men, and the events, which marked a decided step in\nadvance in the history of society, or in the history of morals. This\nrequired painstaking effort, but the result obtained was quite different\nfrom the modern view, in which everything is evolved, and, what is the\nworst, by imperceptible degrees. In Natural History this is otherwise; in\nit the term \u2018evolution,\u2019 or \u2018growth,\u2019 may be correctly applied, because no\none really has ever seen or heard the grass grow, and no one has ever\nobserved the once generally accepted transition from a reptile to a bird.\nIn this we must doubtless admit imperceptible transitions. Yet even in\nthis we must not go beyond the facts; and if a man like Virchow assures us\nthat the intermediate stages between man and any sort of animal have never\nbeen found to this day, then in spite of all storms we shall probably have\nto rest there. But I go still farther. Even supposing, say I, that there\nis an imperceptible transition from the Pithecanthropos to man, affecting\nhis thigh, his skull, his brain, his entire body, have we then found a\ntransition from the animal to man? Certainly not; for man is man, not\nbecause he has no tail, but because he speaks, and speech implies not only\ncommunication,\u2014an animal can do that perhaps better than a man,\u2014but it\nimplies thinking, and thinking not only as an animal thinks, but thinking\nconceptually. And this small thing, the concept, is the transition which\nno animal has ever accomplished. The moment an ape achieved it, he would\nbe _ipso facto_ a man, in spite of his miserable brain, and in spite of\nhis long tail.\n\n\u201cConcepts do not present themselves spontaneously (or we should find them\nalso among animals), but they are a special product, in part the work of\nour ancestors, and inherited by us with our language, and in part even now\nthe work of more gifted men from time to time. This making necessarily\nimplies the existence of a maker, and if we now provisionally call this\nmaker, this transcendent, invisible, but very powerful \u2018_x_,\u2019 mind, are we\nthereby chargeable, as you say, with having conjured up a soul-phantom?\nCall it a phantom if you will, but even as a phantom it has a right to\nexist. Call it mind, breath, breathing, willing, or (with Schopenhauer)\nwill, there is always a He or It to be reckoned with. Of this He or It,\nthis pronominal soul-phantom, you will never rid yourself.\n\n\u201cAnd if we now perceive with our senses a world as it is given us whether\nwe will or no, and in this objective world, without us, which so many\nregard as within us, we everywhere recognise the presence of purpose, must\nwe then not also have a name for that which manifests itself in nature as\npurposive or rational? Shall we only call it \u2018_x_,\u2019 or may we transfer the\nword designating what works purposively in us to this Unknown, and speak\nof a universal Mind without which nature could not be what it is? Nature\nis not crazy nor incoherent. When the child is born, has the mother milk,\nand to what purpose? Why, certainly, to nourish the child. And the child\nhas the lips and muscles to suck. When the fruit has ripened on the tree,\nit falls to the earth full of seed. The husk breaks, the seed falls in the\nsoil, it rains and the rain fertilises the seed, the sun shines and makes\nit grow, and when the tree has grown and again bears blossoms and fruit,\nthis fruit is useful to man, is food and not poison to him. Is all this\nwithout purpose, without reason? Is it a symphony without a composer? Man,\ntoo, needs rain and sunshine, and warmth and darkness; and all this is\ngiven to him so that he may live and work and think. What would man be\nwithout darkness, without the rest afforded by night? Probably crazy. What\nwould he be without sunshine? Perhaps an Esquimau or a mole. But how\nremarkable it is that as the tree always reproduces itself, so also does\nman. The son differs from the father, and yet how like they are. Where is\nthe form which retains the continuous resemblance to itself, and yet\nleaves to each separate person freedom and individuality? Whence comes\nthis purpose in all nature? That is an old question which has received\nmany answers, both wise and foolish. Unfortunately men so frequently\nforget what has already been attained, and then begin again at the\nbeginning. Darwin was an industrious and delicate observer, and showed\nadmirable power of combination. But he was no philosopher, and never\nsought to be one. He was of opinion that everything in nature which\nappeared to show purpose proceeded from the survival of the fittest. But\nthat is no answer. We ask, Why does the fittest survive? And what is the\nanswer? Because only the fittest survives. And when we come to Natural\nSelection, who is the selector that selects? These are nothing but\nphrases, which have long been known and long since been abandoned, and\nstill are always warmed up again. If we recognise in nature purpose or\nreason, then we have a right to conclude that the source of it lies in the\neternal reason, in the eternally rational. Behind all objects lies the\nthought or the idea. If there are rational ideas in nature, then there\nmust be a rational thinker. Behind all trees\u2014oaks, birches, pines\u2014lies the\nthought, the idea, the form, the word, the _logos_ of tree. Who made or\nthought it before ever the first tree existed? We can never see a tree; we\nsee only an oak, a birch, a pine, never a tree. But the thought or idea of\ntree meets us, realised and diversified in all trees. This is true of all\nthings. No one has ever seen an animal, a man, a dog, but he sees a St.\nBernard, a greyhound, a dachshund, and strictly not even that. What, then,\nis it that is permanent, always recurring in the dog, by means of which\nthey resemble each other, the invisible form in which they are all cast?\nThat is the thought, the idea, the _logos_ of dog. Can there be a thought\nwithout a thinker? Did the ideas in nature, the millions of objects which\nmake up our knowledge, fall from the clouds? Did they make themselves or\ndid nature make them? Who, then, is nature? Is it a masculine, feminine,\nor neuter? If nature can choose, then it can also think and produce. But\ncan it? No, nature is a word, very useful for certain purposes; but empty,\nintangible, and incomprehensible. Nature is an abstraction, as much as dog\nor tree, but far more inclusive. When we recognise thought, reason,\npurpose in nature, still it is all in vain, we must assume a thinker in,\nabove, behind nature, and we must as a matter of course have a name for\nhim. The infinite thinker of all things, of all ideas, of all words, who\ncan never be seen and never comprehended, because he is infinite, but in\nwhose thoughts all creatures, the entire creation, have their source, and\nwho when rightly understood approaches us palpably or symbolically in all\nthings, in the sole path of sense by which he can approach us sentient\nbeings, why should we not call him Mind, or God, or as the Jews called\nhim, Jehovah, or the Mohammedans, Allah, or the Brahmins, Brahman? Either\nreason operates in nature, or nature is without reason, is chaos and\nconfusion. Neither survival of the fittest nor natural selection could\nbring order into this confusion; we might as well believe that if the type\nin a printing office be thoroughly shaken and mixed, it could produce\nGoethe\u2019s _Faust_ by chance. If we insist upon adhering to the theories of\nnatural selection, or survival of the fittest, be it so; we only transfer\nthe choice to a Something which can choose, and leave the fitness or\nadaptability to the judgment of an originator, who can really judge and\nthink.\n\n\u201cI hope that I have made this plain to you; but what would be plain to us\nwould not be plain to children, and still less to mankind in its infancy\nfive thousand or fifty thousand years ago. I have especially endeavoured\nto discover what led these men of old, in many respects so uncultivated,\nto believe in something beyond, invisible, superhuman, supernatural. We\ncan see from their language and from the oldest monuments of their\nreligion that they early observed that something happened in the world.\nThe world was not dark, nor still, nor dead. The sun rose, and man awoke,\nand asked himself and the sunshine. \u2018Whence?\u2019 he said; \u2018stop, what is\nthere? who is there?\u2019 Such an object as the sun cannot rise of its own\nvolition. There is something behind it. At first the sun itself was\nconsidered a labourer; it accomplished the greatest work on earth, gave\nlight, heat, life, growth, fruits. It was quite natural, then, to pay\ngreat honour to the sun; to be grateful to it, to appeal to it for light,\nheat, and increase. And therefore the sun became a God, _e.g._ a Deva\n(deus), which originally meant nothing more than light. But even then an\nold Inca in Peru observed that the sun was not free; could not, therefore,\nbe a being, to whom man could be grateful, to whom he could pray. It is,\nsaid he, like a beast of burden, which must daily tread its appointed\nround. And although the worship of the sun was the religion of his\ncountry, and he himself was worshipped as a child of the sun, he renounced\nthe ancient faith of his country, and became what is now frequently called\nan atheist; that is, he longed after a truer God. What say you to this\nInca? This same thing occurred also in other lands, and instead of\ncontinuing to worship the sun and moon, the dawn, the storm-wind, or the\nsky, they worshipped that which must be behind it all, which was called\nHeaven-Father, Jupiter, and every conceivable name. These names were no\nlonger to indicate the visible object, but Him who had thought and created\nthe object, the thinker and ruler of the world. This is the fundamental\nidea from which all religions have arisen: not animism, fetishism,\ntotemism, or whatever the little tributaries may be called, which have\npoured for thousands of years into the main stream. Every people has\nproduced its own religion, its own language, in the course of thousands of\nyears; later, religions have been framed for all mankind, and we are still\nengaged in that task, even in what you call that clap-trap of Chicago.\nEven though we have all been born and educated in some religion, we\nnevertheless have the right, even the duty, like the old Inca, to examine\nevery article of our hereditary religion, to retain it or to cast it\naside, according to our own judgment and conception of the truth. Only the\nfundamental principle must remain; there is a thinker and a ruler of the\nuniverse. Of Pontius Pilate and Caiaphas, of Joseph and Mary, of the\nresurrection and ascension, let each one believe what he will, but the\nhighest commandment applies to all, \u2018Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with\nall thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself.\u2019\n\n\u201cYou see, therefore, that I, too, am a God-romancer. And what objection\ncan you raise against it? You are of opinion that to love God and your\nneighbour is equivalent to being good, and are evidently very proud of\nyour discovery that there is no distinction between good and evil. Well,\nif loving God and your neighbour is equivalent to being good, then it\nfollows that not loving God and not loving your neighbour is equivalent to\nnot being good, or to being evil. There is, then, a very plain distinction\nbetween good and bad. And yet you say that you turned a somersault when\nyou discovered that there was no such distinction. It is true that the\nnature of this distinction is often dependent on the degree of latitude\nand longitude where men are congregated, and still more on the intention\nof the agent. This is very ancient knowledge. The old Hindu philosophers\nwent still farther, and said of an assassin and his victim, \u2018The one does\nnot commit murder, and the other is not murdered.\u2019 That goes still farther\nthan your somersault. At all events, we entirely agree with each other,\nthat everything which is done out of love to God and our neighbour is\ngood, and everything which is done through selfishness is bad. The old\nphilosopher in India must have turned more somersaults than you; but what\nhe had in his mind in doing it does not concern us here. But it was not so\nbad as it sounds, and I believe that what you say, that there is no real\ndistinction between good and evil, is not so bad as it sounds.\n\n\u201cWe have now reached that stage that we must admit that there is a mind\nwithin us, in our inner world, and a mind without us, in the outer world.\nWhat we call this mind, the Ego, the soul within us, and the Non-ego, the\nworld-soul, the God without us, is a matter of indifference. The Brahmans\nappear to me to have found the best expression. They call the fundamental\ncause of the soul, of the Ego, the Self, and the fundamental cause of the\nNon-ego, of the World-soul, of God, the highest Self. They go still\nfarther, and hold these two selves to be in their deepest nature one and\nthe same\u2014but of this another time. To-day I am content, if you will admit,\nthat our mind is not mere steam, nor the world merely a steam-engine, but\nthat in order that the machine shall run, that the eye shall see, the ear\nhear, the mind think, add, and subtract, we need a seer, a hearer, a\nthinker. More than this I will not inflict on you to-day; but you see that\nwithout deviating a finger\u2019s breadth from the straight path of reason,\nthat is from correct and honest addition and subtraction, we finally come\nto the soul-phantom and to the idea of God, which you look upon with such\nblood-thirstiness. I have indicated to you, with only a few strokes, the\nhistorical course of human knowledge. There still remains much to fill in,\nwhich must be gained from history and the diligent study of the sacred\nbooks of mankind, and the works of the leading philosophers of the East\nand the West. We shall then learn that the history of mankind is the best\nphilosophy, and that not only in Christianity and Judaism, but that in all\nreligions of the world, God has at divers times spoken through the\nprophets in divers manners, and still speaks.\n\n\u201cAnd now only a few words more over another somersault. You say that the\nmind is not a _prius_, but a development out of matter. You are right\nagain, if you view the matter only from an embryological or psychological\nstandpoint. A child begins with deep sleep, then comes dream-sleep, and\nfinally awakening, collecting, naming, adding, subtracting. What is that\nwhich awakens in the child? Is it a bone, or is it the soft mass which we\ncall brain? Can the gray matter within our skulls give names, or add? Why,\nthen, has no craniologist told us that the monkey\u2019s brain lacks precisely\nthose tracts which are concerned with speech or with aphasia?(36) I ask\nagain, Can the eye see, the ear hear? Try it on the body under dissection,\nor try it yourself in your sleep. Without a subject there is no object in\nthe world, without understanding there is nothing to understand, without\nmind no matter. You think that matter comes first, and then what we call\nmind. Where is this matter? Where have you ever seen matter? You see oak,\nfir, slate, and granite, and all sorts of other _materies_, as the old\narchitects called them, never matter. Matter is the creation of the mind,\nnot the reverse. Our entire world is thought, not wood and stone. We learn\nto think or reflect upon the thoughts, which the Thinker of the world,\ninvisible, yet everywhere visible, has first thought. What we see, hear,\ntaste, and feel, is all within us, not without. Sugar is not sweet, we are\nsweet. The sky is not painted blue, we are blue. Nothing is large or\nsmall, heavy or light, except as to ourselves. Man is the measure of all\nthings, as an ancient Greek philosopher asserted; and man has inferred,\ndiscovered, and named matter. And how did he do it? He called everything,\nout of which he made anything, matter; _materia_ first meant nothing more\nthan wood used for building, out of which man built his dwelling. Here you\nhave the whole secret of matter. It is building-material, oak, pine,\nbirch, whichever you prefer. Abstract every individual characteristic,\ngeneralise as you will, the wood, the _hyle_, always remains. And you will\nhave it that thought, or even the thinker, originated from this wood. Do\nyou really believe that there is an outer world such as we see, hear, or\nfeel? Where have we a tree, except in our imagination? Have you ever seen\na whole tree, from all four quarters at once? Even here we have something\nto add first. And of what are our ideas composed, if not our\nsense-perceptions? And these perceptions, imperfect as they are, exist\nonly in us, for us, and through us. The thing perceived is and always\nremains, as far as we are concerned in the outer world, transcendent, a\nthing in itself; all else is our doing; and if you wish to call it matter\nor the material world, well and good, but at least it is not the _prius_\nof mind, but the _posterius_, that which is demanded by the mind, but is\nalways unattainable. Even the professional materialist ascribes inertia to\nmatter. The atoms, if he assumes atoms, are motionless, unless disturbed.\nFrom whence comes this disturbance? It must proceed from something outside\nthe atoms, or the matter, so that we can never say that there is nothing\nin the universe but matter. And now if we ascribe motion to the atoms, or\nlike other philosophers, perception, then that is nothing more nor less\nthan to ascribe mind to them, which, however, if you are right, must first\nevolve itself out of this matter. If we wind something into these atoms,\nthen we can also wind something out of them; in doing this, however, we\ngive up at the outset the experiment of letting mind evolve itself out of\nmatter. Give an atom the germ-power of an acorn, and it will develop into\nan oak. Give an atom the capacity of sense-perception, and it will become\nan animal, possibly a man. But what was promised us was the development of\nfeeling and perception out of the dead atoms of hydrogen, oxygen,\nnitrogen, carbon, etc. Even if we could explain life out of the activities\nof these atoms, which may be possible,\u2014although denied by Haeckel and\nTyndall,\u2014still feeling, perception, understanding, all the functions of\nmind, would remain unexplained. J. S. Mill is certainly no idealist, and\nno doubt is one of your heroes. Well Mr. Mill declares that nothing but\nmind could produce mind. Even Tyndall, in his address as President of the\nBritish Association in Belfast, declared in plain words that the\ncontinuity of molecular processes and the phenomena of consciousness\nconstitute the rock on which all Materialism must inevitably be shattered.\n\n\u201cThink over all of this by your iron stove, or better still at some\nbeautiful sunrise in spring, and you will see before you a more glorious\nrevelation than all the revelations of the Old World.\u201d\n\nYours faithfully,\n                                                             F. Max M\u00fcller\n                                                   Oxford, November, 1896.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\n\n                         Concerning The Horseherd\n\n\nThe appearance of my article in the _Deutsche Rundschau_ seems to have\ncaused much headshaking among my friends in Germany, England, and America.\nMany letters came to me privately, others were sent directly to the\npublishers. They came chiefly from two sides. Some were of the opinion\nthat I dealt too lightly with the Horseherd; others protested against what\nI said about the current theory of evolution. The first objection I have\nsought to make up for in what follows. The other required no answer, for I\nhad I think, in my previous writings, quite clearly and fully explained my\nattitude in opposition to so-called Darwinism. Some of my correspondents\nwished peremptorily to deny me the right of passing judgment upon Darwin\u2019s\ndoctrine, because I am not a naturalist by profession. Here we see an\nexample of the confusion of ideas that results from confusion of language.\nDarwinism is a high-sounding, but hollow and unreal word, like most of the\nnames that end in ism. What do such words as Puseyism, Jesuitism,\nBuddhism, and now even Pre-Darwinism and Pre-Lamarckism signify?\nEverything and nothing, and no one is more on his guard against these\ngeneralising _termini technici_ than the _heroes eponymi_ himself. What\nhas not been called Darwinism? That the present has come out of the past,\nhas been called the greatest discovery of the nineteenth century. Darwin\nhimself is not responsible for such things. He wished to show how the\npresent has come out of the past, and he did it in such a manner that even\nthe laity could follow him and sincerely admire him. Now, of course, it\ncannot be denied that if we understand _Darwinism_ to mean Darwin\u2019s close\nobservations concerning the origin of the higher organisms out of lower as\nwell as the variations of individuals from their specific types, caused by\nexternal conditions, it would as ill become me to pass either a favourable\nor unfavourable judgment as it would Darwin to estimate my edition of the\nRig-Veda, or a follower of Darwin to criticise my root theory in\nphilology, without knowing the ABC of the science of language. If,\nhowever, we speak of Darwinism in the domain of universal philosophical\nproblems, such as, for instance, the creation or development of the world,\nthen we poor philosophers also have no doubt a right to join in the\nconversation. And if, without appearing too presuming, we now and then\ndare to differ from Kant, or from Plato or Aristotle, is it mere\ninsolence, or perhaps treason, to differ from Darwin on certain points?\n\nThis was not the tone assumed by Darwin, giant as he was, even when he\nspoke to so insignificant a person as myself.  I have on a previous\noccasion published a short letter addressed to me by Darwin (_Auld Lang\nSyne_, p. 178). Here follows another, which I may no doubt also publish\nwithout being indiscreet.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n\u201c\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDown, Beckenham, Kent, July 3, 1873.\n\n\u201cDEAR SIR: I am much obliged for your kind note and present of your\nlectures. I am extremely glad to have received them from you, and I had\nintended ordering them.\n\n\u201cI feel quite sure from what I have read in your work, that you would\nnever say anything to an honest adversary to which he would have any just\nright to object; and as for myself, you have often spoken highly of me,\nperhaps more highly than I deserve.\n\n\u201cAs far as language is concerned, I am not worthy to be your adversary, as\nI know extremely little about it, and that little learnt from very few\nbooks. I should have been glad to have avoided the whole subject, but was\ncompelled to take it up as well as I could. He who is fully convinced, as\nI am, that man is descended from some lower animal, is almost forced to\nbelieve, _a priori_, that articulate language has been developed from\ninarticulate cries, and he is therefore hardly a fair judge of the\narguments opposed to this belief.\u201d\n\nWith cordial respect I remain, dear sir,\nYours very faithfully,\n                                                           Charles Darwin.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\u201d\n\nThis will at all events show that a man who could look upon a chimpanzee\nas his equal, did not entirely ignore, as an uninformed layman, a poor\nphilologist. Darwin did not in the least disdain the uninformed layman. He\nthought and wrote for him, and there is scarcely one of Darwin\u2019s books\nthat cannot be read by the uninformed layman with profit. And in the\ninterchange of acquired facts or ideas, mental science has at least as\nmuch right as natural science. We live, it is true, in different worlds.\nWhat some look upon as the real, others regard as phenomenal. What these\nin their turn look upon as the real, seems to the first to be\nnon-existent. It will always be thus until philology has defined the true\nmeaning of reality.\n\nIt is, however, a worn-out device to place all those who differ from\nDarwin in the pillory of science as mystics, metaphysicians, and (what\nseems worst of all) as orthodox. It requires more than courage, too, to\nclass all who do not agree with us as uninformed laymen, \u201cto accuse them\nof ignorance and superstition, and to praise our friends and disciples as\nthe only experts or competent judges, as impartial and consistent\nthinkers.\u201d Through such a defence the greatest truths would lose their\nworth and dignity. The true scholar simply leaves such attacks alone. It\nis to be regretted that this resounding trumpet blast of a few naturalists\nrenders any peaceful interchange of ideas impossible from the beginning. I\nhave expressed my admiration for Darwin more freely and earlier than many\nof his present eulogists. But I maintain, that when anthropogeny is\ndiscussed, it is desirable first of all to explain what is understood by\n_anthropos_. Man is not only an object, but a subject also. All that man\nis as an object, or appears to be for a time on earth, is his organic body\nwith its organs of sense and will, and with its slowly developed so-called\nego. This body is, however, only phenomenal; it comes and goes, it is not\nreal in the true sense of the word. To man belongs, together with the\nvisible objective body, the invisible subjective Something which we may\ncall mind or soul or _x_, but which, at all events, first makes the body\ninto a man. To observe and make out this Something is in my view the true\nanthropogeny; how the body originated concerns me as little as does the\nquestion whether my gloves are made of kid or _peau de su\u00e8de_. That will,\nof course, be called mysticism, second sight, orthodoxy, hypocrisy, but\nfortunately it is not contradicted by such nicknames. If an animal could\never speak and think in concepts, it would be my brother in spite of tail\nor snout; if any human being had a tail or a forty-four toothed snout, but\ncould use the language of concepts, then he would be and remain a man, as\nfar as I am concerned, in spite of all that. We, too, have a right to\nexpress our convictions. They are as dear to us as to those who believe or\nbelieved in the Protogenes Haeckelii. It is true we do not preach to the\nwhole world that our age is the great age of the study of language and\nmind, and that it has cast more light on the origin of the mind (logogeny)\nand on the classification of the human race (anthropology) than all other\nsciences together. A little progress, however, we have made. Who is there\nthat still classifies the human race by their skulls, hair, anatomy, etc.,\nand not by their speech? If, like zo\u00f6logy, we may borrow countless\nmillions of years, where is there any pure blood left, amid the endless\nwars and migrations, the polygamy and slavery of the ancient world?\nLanguage alone is and remains identical, whoever may speak it; but the\nblood, \u201cthis very peculiar fluid,\u201d how can we get at that scientifically?\nIt is, however, and remains a fixed idea with these \u201cconsistent thinkers\u201d\nthat the sciences of language and mind lead to superstition and hypocrisy,\nwhile on the other hand the science of language gratefully acknowledges\nthe results of zo\u00f6logy, and only protests against encroachments. Both\nsciences might advance peacefully side by side, rendering aid and seeking\nit; and as for prejudices, there are plenty of them surviving among\nzo\u00f6logists as well as philologists, which must be removed _viribus\nunitis_. What is common to us is the love of truth and clearness, and the\nhonest effort to learn to understand the processes of growth in mind and\nlanguage, as well as in nature, in the individual (ontogenetically) as\nwell as in the race (phylogenetically). Whether we now call this evolution\nor growth, philology at all events has been in advance of natural science\nin setting a good example, and securing recognition of the genetic method.\nSuch men as William Humboldt, Grimm, and Bopp did not exactly belong to\nthe dark ages, and I do not believe that they ever doubted that man is a\nmammal and stands at the head of the mammalia. This is no discovery of the\nnineteenth century. Linn\u00e6us lived in the eighteenth century and Aristotle\nsomewhat earlier. I see that the Standard Dictionary already makes a\ndistinction between Darwinism and Darwinianism, between the views of\nDarwin and those of the Darwinians, and we clearly see that in some of the\nmost essential points these two tendencies are diametrically opposed to\neach other. There is one thing that naturalists could certainly learn from\nphilologists, viz., to define their _termini technici_, and not to believe\nthat wonders can be performed with words, if only they are spoken loud\nenough.\n\nThe following letter comes from a naturalist, but is written in a sincere\nand courteous tone, and deserves to be made public. I believe that the\nwriter and I could easily come to terms, as I have briefly indicated in my\nparentheses.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n\u201c\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAn Open Letter To Professor F. Max M\u00fcller.\n\n\u201cRESPECTED SIR: Your correspondence in this periodical with the\n\u2018Horseherd\u2019 has no doubt aroused an interest on many sides. There are many\nmore Horseherds than might be supposed; that is to say, men in all\npossible positions and callings, who after earnest reflection have reached\na conclusion that does not essentially differ from the mode of thought of\nyour backwoods friend.\n\n\u201cThe present writer considers himself one of these; he is, indeed, not\nself-taught like the Horseherd, but a scientific man, and like you, a\nprofessor; but as he had no philosophical training, and he has only\nreached his views through observation and reflection; in contrast to you,\nthe profound philologist, he stands not much higher than the Silesian\ncountryman. And to complete the contrast, he adds, that he has long been a\nsevere sufferer. So that instead of guiding the plough on the field of\nscience with a strong hand, he must remain idly at home, and modestly\nwhittle pine shavings for the enlightenment of his home circle.\n\n\u201cI do not know whether the Horseherd will consider that his argument has\nbeen refuted when he reads your letter by his warm stove. In this,\naccording to my view, you have practically failed. (_My counter arguments\nshall follow later._)\n\n\u201cYes, I find in your reasoning very remarkable contradictions. You\nacknowledge for instance the infinity of space and time, and in spite of\nthis you say that there was a time before the world was a year old. I do\nnot understand that. We must assume for matter, for that is no doubt what\nyou mean by the term \u2018world,\u2019 the same eternity as for space and time,\nwhose infinity can be proved but not comprehended. (_Well, when we say\nthat the world is 1898 years old, we can also say that it once __ was a\nyear, or half a year old; of course not otherwise_.)\n\n\u201cA \u2018creation\u2019 in the sense of the various religions is equally\nincomprehensible to us. (_Certainly._)\n\n\u201cBut I do not wish to enlarge on this point any farther. Here begins the\nlimit of our thinking faculties, and it is the defect of all religions\nthat they require us to occupy ourselves with matters that lie beyond this\nlimit, that never can be revealed to us, since we are denied the\nunderstanding of them; a revelation is at all events a chimera. For either\nthat which is to be revealed lies beyond our senses and ideas,\u2014and then it\ncannot be revealed to us,\u2014or it lies on this side, and then it need not be\nrevealed to us. (_This is not directed against me._)\n\n\u201cI believe, moreover, dear sir, that through your comparative studies of\nreligion you must reach the same conclusion as myself, that all religious\nideas have arisen solely in the brain of man himself, as efforts at\nexplanation in the broadest sense; that dogmas were made out of\nhypotheses, and that no religion as a matter of fact reveals anything to\nus. (_Not only religious ideas, but all ideas have arisen in the brain._)\n\n\u201cYou express a profound truth when you say that atheism is properly a\nsearch for a _truer_ God. I was reminded by it of a passage in one of\nDaudet\u2019s novels, in which the blasphemy of one who despairs of a good God,\nis yet called a kind of prayer. You will therefore bear with me if I\nexplain to you how a scientific man who thinks consistently can reach a\nconclusion not far removed from that which prompted the Horseherd to turn\na somersault.\n\n\u201cGood and evil are purely human notions; an almighty God stands beyond\ngood and evil. He is as incomprehensible to us in moral relations as in\nevery other. (_From the highest point of view, yes; but in the lives of\nmen there is such a distinction._)\n\n\u201cOnly look at the world! The existence of the majority of living creatures\nis possible only through the destruction of others. What refined cruelty\nis expressed by the various weapons with which animals are provided. Some\nzo\u00f6logist ought to write an illustrated work entitled, _The Torture\nChamber of Nature_. I merely wish to touch upon this field; to exhaust it\nwould require pages and volumes. Your adopted countryman, Wallace, seeks,\nit is true, to set aside these facts by a superficial observation. That\nmost of the animals that are doomed to be devoured, enjoy their lives\nuntil immediately before the catastrophe, takes none of its horror from\nthe mode of death. To be dismembered alive is certainly not an agreeable\nexperience, and I suggest that you should observe how, for instance, a\nwater-adder swallows a frog; how the poor creature, seized by the hind\nlegs, gradually disappears down its throat, while its eyes project staring\nout of their sockets; how it does not cease struggling desperately even as\nit reaches the stomach.\n\n\u201cNow I, who am but a poor child of man, full of evil inclinations\naccording to Biblical lore, liberated the poor frog on my ground. But\n\u2018merciful nature\u2019 daily brings millions and millions of innocent creatures\nto a like cruel and miserable end.\n\n\u201cI intentionally leave out of consideration here the unspeakable\nsufferings of mankind. Believers in the Bible find it so convenient to\nargue about original sin. Where is the original sin of the tormented\nanimal kingdom?\n\n\u201cOf course man in his unutterable pride looks with deep disdain on all\nliving creatures that are not human. As if he were not bone of their bone,\nas if suffering did not form a common bond with all living creatures! (_I\nhave never done that, but I think that it is difficult to establish a\nthermometer of suffering._)\n\n\u201cDo you not bethink you, honoured student of Sanskrit, of the religion of\nthe Brahmins? In sparing all animals, the Hindus have shown only the\nbroadest consistency.\n\n\u201cThere will come a time when there will be only one religion, without\ndogma: the religion of compassion. (_Buddhism is founded on K\u00e2runya,\ncompassion._) Christianity, lofty as is its ethical content, is not the\ngoal, but only a stage in our religious development.\n\n\u201cIt is a misfortune that Nietzsche, the great keen thinker, should have\nbeen misled into an opposite conclusion by the mental weakness, the\nparalytic imbecility, which gradually enveloped his brain like a growth of\nmould. And the foolish youths, who esteem the expressions of this\nincipient insanity as the revelations of a vigorous genius, swear by his\nlater hallucinations about the Over-man and the blond beast.\n\n\u201cA specialist in mental disease can point out the traces of his malady\nyears before it openly broke out. And as if he had not written enough when\nthe world still considered him of sound mind, must men still try to glean\nfrom the time when his brain was already visibly clouded?\n\n\u201cHow few there are who can pick out of the desolate morass of growing\nimbecility the scanty grains of higher intelligence! There will always be\npeople who will be impressed, not by the sound part of his thought, but by\nhis paradoxical nonsense. (_May be._)\n\n\u201cBut\u2014I am straying from the path. Now to the subject. I perfectly\nunderstand that the majority of religions had to assume a good and evil\nprinciple to guard themselves against the blasphemy of attributing all the\nsuffering of the world to an all-merciful Creator. (_Some religions have\ndone this, on the theory that an almighty God stands beyond good and\nevil._) The devil is a necessary antithesis to God; to deny him is the\nfirst step made by the consistent man of science toward that atheism which\noriginates really from the search for a better God. The Horseherd is wrong\nwhen he denies the existence of things beyond our power of conception.\nThere are, as can be proved, tones that we do not hear, and rays that we\ncannot see. There are many things that we shall learn to comprehend in the\nhundreds of thousands of years that are in store for mankind. We are\nmerely in the beginning of our development. Something, however, will\nalways remain over. The \u2018Ignorabimus\u2019 of one of our foremost thinkers and\ninvestigators will always retain its value for us. (_Most certainly._)\n\n\u201cThe other world is of but little concern to him who has constantly\nendeavoured to lead a good life, even if he has never given much thought\nto correct belief. If personal existence is continued, our earthly being\nmust be divested of so many of its outer husks that we should scarcely\nrecognise each other, for only a part of the soul is the soul. (_What we\ncall soul is a modification of the Self._) If, however, an eternal sleep\nis decreed for us, then this can be no great misfortune. Let the wise\nsaying in _Stob\u0153i Florilegium_, Vol. VI, No. 19, in \u2018praise of death\u2019\nserve to comfort us: \u2018\u1f08\u03bd\u03b1\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f55\u03c0\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd,\u2019\u2014\u2018Anaxagoras said that two\nthings admonished us about death: the time before birth and sleep.\u2019\n\n\u201cThe raindrop, because it is a drop, may fear for its individuality when\nit falls back into the sea whence it came. We men are perhaps only passing\ndrops formed out of the everlasting changes of the world-sea. (_Of what\ndoes the world-sea consist but drops?_)\n\n\u201cThose who think as I do constitute a silent but large congregation:\nsilent, because the time is not yet ripe for a view that will rob\nthousands of their illusions. We do not preach a new salvation, but a\nsilent, for many, a painful, renunciation. But the profound peace that\nlies in this view is as precious to those who have acquired it as is the\nhope of heaven to the believer. In honest doubt, too, lies a saving power\nas well as in faith; and your Horseherd is on the path of this salvation.\n(_I believe that too._)\u201d\n\nWith great respect,\nYours very faithfully,\n                                                       Ignotus Agnosticus.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\u201d\n\n                                * * * * *\n\nWhilst I received this and many other letters from many lands, no sign of\nlife reached me from my Horseherd. He must have received my letter, or it\nwould have been returned to me through the post. I regretted this, for I\nhad formed a liking for the man as he appeared in his letter, and he no\ndoubt would have had much to say in reply to my letter, which would have\nplaced his views in a clearer light. He was an honest fellow, and I\nrespect every conviction that is honest and sincere, even if it is\ndiametrically opposite to my own. Now, my unknown friend could have had no\nthought of self in the matter. He knew that his name would not be\nmentioned by me, and it would probably have been of little concern to him\nif his name had become known. The worst feature of all discussions is the\nintrusion of the personal element. If for instance in a criticism of a new\nbook we emphasise that which we think erroneous, for which every author\nshould be grateful, we feel at the same time, that while desiring to\nrender a service to the cause of truth, we may not only have hurt the book\nor the writer, but may have done a positive injury. The writer then feels\nhimself impelled to defend his view not only with all the legitimate arts\nof advocacy, but also with the illegitimate. This poor truth is the\ngreatest sufferer. As long as two paths are open, there is room for quiet\ndiscussion with one\u2019s travelling companion as to which may be the right\nand best path by which to reach the desired point. Both parties have the\nsame object in view, the truth. As soon however as one goes, or has gone\nhis own way, the controversy becomes personal and violent. There is no\nthought of turning back. It is no longer said: \u201cThis is the wrong path,\u201d\nbut \u201cYou are on the wrong path,\u201d and even if it were possible to turn\nback, the controversy generally ends with, \u201cI told you so.\u201d Poor Truth\nstands by sorrowfully and rubs its eyes.\n\nNow what was the Horseherd to me, and what is he now, even if he has been\nbrought to what he called a joyful end by his catarrh \u201cverging upon a\nperfect asthma.\u201d There was nothing personal between us. He knew me only by\nthat which I have thought and said; I knew of him only what he had\ngathered in his hours of leisure, and had laid aside for life. I have\nnever seen him face to face, do not know the colour of his eyes, hardly\neven whether he was old or young. He was a man, but he may be even that no\nlonger. Everything that in our common view constitutes a man, his body,\nhis speech, his experience, is gone. We did not bring these things with us\ninto the world and probably shall not take them away with us. What the\nbody is, we see with our eyes, especially if we attend a cremation, or if\nin ancient graves we look into the urns which contain the grayish black\nashes, whilst near by there sleeps in cold marble, as in the Museo\nNazionale in Rome, the lovely head of the young Roman maiden, to whom two\nthousand years ago belonged these ashes, as well as the beautiful mansion\nthat has been excavated from the earth and rebuilt round about her. And\nthe language, the language in which all our experience here on earth lies\nstored, will this be everlasting? Shall we in another life speak English\nor Sanscrit? The philologist knows too well of what material speech is\nmade, how much of the temporal and accidental it has adopted in its\neternal forms, to cherish such a hope, and to think that the Logos can be\neternally bound to the regular or irregular declensions or conjugations of\nthe Greek, the German, or even the Hottentot languages. What then remains?\nNot the person, or the so-called ego\u2014that had a beginning, a continuation,\nand an end. Everything that had a beginning, once was not, and what once\nwas not, has in itself, from its very beginning, the germ of its end. What\nremains is only the eternal One, the eternal Self, that lives in us all\nwithout beginning and without end, in which each one has his true\nexistence, in which we live, move, and have our being. Each temporal ego\nis only one of the million phenomena of this eternal Self, and such a\nphenomenon was the Horseherd to me. It is only what we recognise in all\nmen as the eternal, or as the divine, that we can love and retain.\nEverything else comes and goes, as the day comes in the morning and goes\nat night, but the light of the sun remains forever. Now it may be said:\nThis Self, that is and abides, is after all next to nothing. It _is_,\nhowever, and that \u201c_is_\u201d is more than everything else. Light is not much\neither, probably only vibration, but what would the world be without it?\nDid we not begin this life simply with this Self, continue it with this\nSelf, and bring it to an end with this Self? There is nothing that\njustifies us in saying that this Self had a beginning, and will therefore\nhave an end. The ego had a beginning, the _persona_, the temporal mask\nthat unfolds itself in this life, but not the Self that wears the mask.\nWhen therefore my Horseherd says, \u201cAfter death we are just as much a\nnullity as before our birth,\u201d I say, _quoderat demonstrandum_ is still to\nbe proved. What does he mean by _we_? If we were nothing before birth,\nthat is, if we never had been at all, what would that be that is born?\nBeing born does not mean becoming something out of nothing. What is born\nor produced was there, before it was born or produced, before it came into\nthe light of the world. All creation out of nothing is a pure chimera for\nus.  Have we ever the feeling or experience that we had a beginning here\non earth, or have we entirely forgotten the most remarkable thing in our\nlife, viz., its beginning? Have we ever seen a beginning? Can we even\nthink of an absolute beginning? In order to have had our beginning on\nearth, there must have been something that begins, be it a cell or be it\nthe Self. All that we call ego, personality, character, etc., has unfolded\nitself on earth, is earthly, but not the Self. If we now on earth were\ncontent with the pure Self, if in all those that we love, we loved the\neternal Self and not only the appearance, what then is more natural than\nthat it should be so in the next world, that the continuity of existence\ncannot be severed, that the Self should find itself again, even though in\nnew and unexpected forms? When therefore my friend makes the bold\nassertion: \u201cAfter our death we are again as much a nullity as before our\nbirth,\u201d I say, \u201cYes, if we take nullity in the Hegelian sense.\u201d Otherwise\nI say the direct contrary to this: \u201cAfter our death we are again as little\na nullity as before our birth. What we shall be we cannot know; but that\nwe shall be, follows from this, that the Self or the divine within us can\nneither have a beginning nor an end.\u201d That is what the ancients meant in\nsaying that death was to be best understood from the time before birth.\nBut we must not think that each single ego lays claim only to a part of\nthe Self, for then the Self would be divided, limited, and finite. No, the\nentire Self bears us, just as the entire light illumines all, every grain\nof sand and every star, but for that reason does not belong exclusively to\nany one grain of sand or star. It is that which is eternal, or in the true\nsense of the word that which is divine in us, that endures in all changes,\nthat makes all change possible, for without something that endures in\nchange, there could be no change; without something continuous, that\npersists through transformation, nothing could be transformed. The Self is\nthe bond that unites all souls, the red thread which runs through all\nbeing, and the knowledge of which alone gives us knowledge of our true\nnature. \u201cKnow thyself\u201d no longer means for us \u201cKnow thy ego,\u201d but \u201cKnow\nwhat lies beyond thy ego, know the Self,\u201d the Self that runs through the\nwhole world, through all hearts, the same for all men, the same for the\nhighest and the lowest, the same for creator and creature, the _\u00c2tman_ of\nthe Veda, the oldest and truest word for God.\n\nFor this reason the Horseherd was to me what all men have always been to\nme\u2014an appearance of the Self, the same as I myself, not only a\nfellow-creature, but a fellow-man, a fellow-self. Had I met him in life,\nwho knows whether his ego or his appearance would have attracted me as\nmuch as his letter. We all have our prejudices, and much as I honour a\nSilesian peasant who has spent his life faithfully and honestly in a\nstrange land, I do not know whether I should have sat down by his iron\nstove and chatted with him about \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1.\n\nI also felt as I read his letter, that it was not a solitary voice in the\ndesert, but that he spoke in the name of many who felt as he felt, without\nbeing willing or able to express it. This also has proved to be entirely\ntrue.\n\nJudging by the numerous letters and manuscripts that reach me, the\nHorseherd was not alone in his opinions. There are countless others in the\nworld of the same mind, and even if his voice is silenced, his ideas\nsurvive in all places and directions, and he will not lack followers and\ndefenders. The striking thing in the letters that reached me was that the\ngreater number and the most characteristic among his sympathisers did not\nwish their names to be known. What does this signify? Do we still live on\na planet on which we dare not express what we hold to be the truth\u2014planet\nTerra so huge and yet so contemptibly small? Has mankind still only\nfreedom of thought, but not freedom of utterance? The powers may blockade\nGreece; can they blockade thoughts on wings of words? It has been\nattempted, but force is no proof, and when we have visited the prisons in\nwhich Galilei or even Giordano Bruno was immured, we learn how nothing\nlends greater strength to the wings of truth than the heavy chains with\nwhich men try to fetter it. It is still the general opinion that even in\nfree England thought and speech are not free, that in the realm of thought\nthere is even less freedom on this side of the Channel than on the\nother.(37) Oxford especially, my own university, is still considered the\nstronghold of obscurantists, and my Horseherd even considers the fact that\nI have lived so long in Oxford a _circonstance att\u00e9nuante_ of my so-called\northodoxy. Plainly what is thought, said, and published in England, and\nespecially in Oxford, is not read. In England we can say anything we\nplease, we must only bear in mind that the same consideration is due to\nothers that we claim from others. It is true that from time to time in\nEngland, and even in Oxford, feeble efforts have been made, if not to\ncurtail freedom of thought, at least to punish those who laid claim to it.\nWhere possible the salaries of professors were curtailed; in certain\nelections very weak candidates were preferred because they were outwardly\northodox. I do not wish to mention any names, but I myself have received\nin England, even if not in Oxford, a gentle aftertaste of this antiquated\nphysic. When at the request of my friend Stanley, the Dean of Westminster\nAbbey, I delivered a discourse in his venerable church, which was crowded\nto the doors, petitions were sent to Parliament to condemn me to six\nmonths\u2019 imprisonment. I was accosted in the streets and an ordinary\ntradesman said to me, \u201cSir, if you are sent to prison, you shall have at\nleast two warm dinners each week from me.\u201d I am, to be sure, the first\nlayman that ever spoke publicly in an English church, but I had the advice\nof the highest authorities that the Dean was perfectly within his rights\nand that we were guilty of no violation of law. I therefore waited in\nsilence; I knew that public opinion was on my side, and that in the end\nthe petition to Parliament would simply be laid aside. Later on it was\nattempted again. At the time that I delivered my lectures on the Science\nof Religion at the university of Glasgow, by invitation of the Senate, I\nwas accused first before the presbytery at Glasgow, and when this attempt\nfailed, the charge was carried before the great Synod at Edinburgh. In\nthis case, too, I went on my way, in silence, and in the end, even in\nScotland, the old saying, \u201cMuch cry and little wool,\u201d was verified. This\nproverb is frequently heard in England. I have often inquired into its\norigin. Finally I found that there is a second line, \u201cAs the deil said\nwhen he shore the sow.\u201d Of course such an operation was accompanied with\nmuch noise on the part of the sow, but little wool, nothing but bristles.\nI have never, however, had to turn my bristles against the gentlemen who\nwished to shear me.\n\nI am of opinion, therefore, that those who wished to espouse the cause of\nmy Horseherd should have done so publicly and with open visor. As soon as\nany one feels that he has found the truth, he knows also that what is real\nand true can never be killed or silenced; and secondly, that truth in the\nworld has its purpose, and this purpose must in the end be a good one. We\ndo not complain about thunder and lightning, but accustom ourselves to\nthem, and seek to understand them, so as to live on good terms with them;\nand we finally invent lightning conductors, to protect ourselves, as far\nas we can, against the inevitable. So it is with every new truth, if it is\nonly maintained with courage. At first we cry and clamour that it is\nfalse, that it is dangerous. In the end we shake our wise heads and say\nthese are old matters known long since, of which only old women were\nafraid. In the end, after the thunder and lightning, the air is made\nclearer, fresher, and more wholesome. When I first read the long letter of\nmy Horseherd, I said to myself, \u201cHe is a man who has done the best he\ncould in his position.\u201d He has let himself be taught, but also\nirresistibly influenced, by certain popular books, and has come to think\nthat the abandonment of views that have been instilled into him from his\nyouth is so brave and meritorious, that all who disagree with him must be\ncowards. This inculcation of truth into childish minds is always a\ndangerous matter, and even if I do not use the strong expressions that are\nused by my friend,\u2014for I always think, the stronger the expression the\nweaker the argument,\u2014I must admit that he is right up to a certain point.\nIt does not seem fair that in the decision of the most important questions\nof life the young mind should have no voice. A Jewish child becomes a Jew,\na Christian child a Christian, and a Buddhist child a Buddhist. What does\nthis prove? Unquestionably, that in the highest concern in life the child\nis not allowed a voice. My friend asks indignantly: \u201cIs there anything in\nface of our knowledge, and of the realm of nature and of man\u2019s position in\nit, so unbearable, yes so odious, as the inoculation of such error in the\ntender consciousness of our school children? I shudder when I think that\nin thousands of our churches and schools this systematic ruin of the\ngreatest of all gifts, the consciousness, the human brain, is daily, even\nhourly, going on. Max, can you, too, still cling to the God-fable?\u201d etc.\n\nNow I have explained clearly and concisely in what sense I cling to the\nGod-fable, and I should like to know if I have convinced my Horseherd. I\nbelong, above all, to those who do not consider the world an irrational\nchaos, and also to those who cannot concede that there can be reason\nwithout a reasoner. Reason is an activity, or, as others have it, an\nattribute, and there can neither be an activity without an agent, nor an\nattribute without a subject; at least, not in the world in which we live.\nWhen ordinary persons and even professional philosophers speak of reason\nas if it were a jewel that can be placed in a drawer or in a human skull,\nthey are simply myth-makers. It is precisely in this ever recurring\nelevation of an adjective or a verb to a noun, of a predicate to a\nsubject, that this disease of language, as I have called mythology, has\nits deepest roots. Here lies the genesis of the majority of gods, not by\nany means, as it is generally believed I have taught, merely in later\nquibbles and misunderstandings, which are interesting and popular, but\nhave little reference to the deepest nature of the myth. We must not take\nthese matters too lightly.\n\nI recognise therefore a reasoner, and consequent reason in the world, or\nin other words, I believe in a thinker and ruler of the world, but gladly\nconcede that this Being so infinitely transcends our faculties of\ncomprehension, that even to wish only to give him a name borders on\nmadness. If, in spite of all of this, we use such names as Jehovah, Allah,\nDeva, God, Father, Creator, this is only a result of human weakness. I\ncling therefore to the God-fable in the sense which is more fully set\nforth in my letter, and it pleased me very much to see that at least a few\nof those, who as they said were formerly on the side of the Horseherd, now\nfully agree with me, that the world is not irrational. Here is the\ndividing line between two systems of philosophy. Whoever thinks that an\nirrational world becomes rational by the survival of the fittest, etc.,\nstands on one side; I stand on the other, and hold with the Greek\nthinkers, who accept the world as the expression of the Logos, or of a\nreasonable thought or thinker.\n\nBut here the matter became serious. To my Horseherd I thought that I could\nmake myself intelligible in a humorous strain, for his letter was\npermeated with a quiet humour. But my known and unknown opponents take the\nmatter much more seriously and thoroughly, and I am consequently obliged\nat least to try to answer them seriously and thoroughly. What my readers\nwill say to this I do not know. I believe that even in short words we can\nbe serious and profound. When Schiller says that he belongs to no\nreligion, and why? because of religion, the statement is short and\nconcise, and yet easily understood. I shall, however, at least attempt to\nfollow my opponents step by step, even at the risk of becoming tedious.\n\nAnd first of all a confession. It has been pointed out to me that in one\nplace I did my Horseherd an injustice. I wrote: \u201cYou are of opinion that\nto love God and your neighbour is equivalent to being good, and are\nevidently very proud of your discovery that there is no distinction\nbetween good and evil. Well,\u201d I then continue, \u201cif loving God and your\nneighbour is equivalent to being good, then it follows that not loving God\nand not loving your neighbour is equivalent to not being good, or to being\nevil. There is, then, a very plain distinction between good and evil. And\nyet you say that you turned a somersault when you discovered that there\nwas no such distinction.\u201d\n\nWell, that looked as though I had driven my friend into a corner from\nwhich he would find it difficult to extricate himself. But I did him an\ninjustice and shall therefore do everything in my power to right it. My\nmemory, as it so frequently does, played me a prank. At the same time that\nI answered him, I was in active correspondence with one of the delegates\nto the Chicago Parliament of Religions, at which the love of God and one\u2019s\nneighbour had been adopted, as a sort of article of agreement which the\nfollowers of any or every faith could accept. Thus it befell that I\nsupposed the Horseherd in America to stand at the same point of view, and\nconsequently to be guilty of a contradiction. Such is, however, not the\ncase; he made no such concession of love of God and one\u2019s neighbour in his\nletter. If he therefore insists that there is no distinction between good\nand evil, I cannot at least refute him out of his own mouth. The only\nplace where he is inconsistent is where he concedes that he could not\nstrike a dog, but is filled with bloodthirstiness toward the Jewish idea\nof God. Here he clearly holds it good that he cannot be cruel to an\nanimal, and that he looks upon bloodthirstiness as a contrast. He also\nconcedes that a lie can never accomplish any good, and believes that the\ntruth is beautiful and holy. If a lie can accomplish no good, only evil,\nthen there must be a distinction between good and evil.  And what is the\nmeaning of beautiful and holy, if there is no contrast between good and\nevil.  But I shall argue this point no farther, but simply say _peccavi_,\nand I believe that he, and those like-minded with him, will be satisfied\nwith that. How different it would have been, however, had I been guilty of\nsuch a mistake in a personal dispute! The injured party would never have\nbelieved that my oversight was accidental, and not malicious, in spite of\nthe fact that it would have been the most stupid malevolence to say that\nwhich every one who can read would instantly recognise as untrue. But\nenough of this, and enough to show that my Horseherd at least remained\nconsistent. Even when he so far forgets himself as to say, \u201cGod be\npraised,\u201d he excuses himself. Only he has unfortunately not told us what\nhe really means when he says that good and evil are identical. Good and\nevil are relative ideas, just like right and left, black and white, and\nalthough he has told us that he turned somersaults with joy over the\ndiscovery that this distinction is false, he has left us in total darkness\nas to how we shall conceive this identity.\n\nBut let us turn back to more important things. My opponents further call\nme sharply to account, and ask how I can imagine that the material world\ncan be rational, or permeated with reason. I believed that it must be\nclear to every person with a philosophical training, that there are things\nthat are beyond our understanding, that man can neither sensibly apprehend\nnor logically conceive an actual beginning, and that to inquire for the\nbeginning of the subjective self, or of the objective world, is like\ninquiring for the beginning of the beginning. All that we can do is to\ninvestigate our perceptions, to see what they presuppose. A perception\nplainly presupposes a self that perceives, or that resists, and on the\nother side, something that forces itself upon us, or, as Kant says,\nsomething that is given. This \u201cgiven\u201d element might be mere confusion, but\nit is not; it displays order, cause and effect, and reveals itself as\nrational. This revelation of a rational world may, however, be explained\nin two ways. That there is reason in nature, even the majority of\nDarwinians admit, but they think that it arises of itself, since in the\nstruggle for life that which is most adapted to its conditions, fittest,\nbest, necessarily survives. In this view of the world, however, if I see\nit aright, much is admitted surreptitiously. Whence comes all at once this\nidea of the best, of the good, the fit, the adapted, in the world? Do\nroasted pigeons fall from the sky? Is the pigeon itself an accidental\ncombination, an evolution, that might as well have been as it is, or\notherwise? It is all very fine to recognise in the ascending series of\nprotozoa, c\u0153lenterata, echinoderms, worms, mollusks, fishes, amphibia,\nreptiles, the stages of progress toward birds and finally to mammals and\nman. But whence comes the idea of bird or pigeon? Is it no more than an\nabstraction from our perceptions of thousands of birds or pigeons, or must\nthe idea of bird, of pigeon, even of the wood pigeon, be there already,\nthat we may detect it behind the multiplicity of our perceptions?\n\nIs the pigeon, in whose wing each feather is counted, a mere accident, a\nmere survival which might have been what it is or something different, or\nis it something willed and thought, an organic whole? It is the old\nquestion whether the idea preceded or followed the reality, on which the\nwhole Middle Ages broke their teeth, the question which separated and\nstill separates philosophers into two camps,\u2014the Realists and the\nNominalists. I think that the latest investigations show us that the Greek\nphilosophers, and especially Plato, saw more correctly when they\nrecognised behind the multiplicity of individuals the unity of the idea,\nor the species, and then sought the true sequence of evolution not in this\nworld, in a struggle for existence, but beyond the perception of the\nsenses, in a development of the Logos or the idea. The circumstances, it\nappears to me, in this view remain just the same; the sequence, and the\npurposiveness in this sequence, remain untouched, only that the Greeks saw\nin the rational and purposive in nature the realisation of rational\nprogressive thoughts, not the bloody survivals of a monstrous gladiatorial\ncombat in nature. The Darwinians appear to me to resemble the Roman\nemperors, who waited till the combat was ended, and then applauded the\nsurvival of the fittest. The idealist philosophy, be it Plato\u2019s or\nHegel\u2019s, recognises in what actually is, the rational, the realisation of\neternal, rational ideas. This realisation, or the process of what we call\ncreation, can never be conceived by us otherwise than figuratively. But we\ncan make this figurative presentation clearer and clearer. That the world\nwas made by a wood cutter, as was originally implied in the Hebrew word\n_bara_, and in the German _schoepfer_, _schaffer_, in the English\n_shaper_, or in the Vedic _tvasht\u00e2_, and the Greek \u03c4\u03ad\u03ba\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, was quite\ncomprehensible at a time in which man\u2019s highest product was that of the\ncarpenter and the stone mason; and in which the name of timber\n(_materies_) could become the universal name for matter (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, wood). After\nthis idea of the founder of the universe as a carpenter or builder was\nabandoned as inadequate, the world was divided into two parties. The one\nadopted the theory of material primitive elements, whether they be called\natoms, or monads, or cells, which by collision or struggle with each\nother, and by mutual affinity, became that which we now see around us. The\nother saw the impossibility of the rise of something rational out of the\nirrational, and conceived a rational being, in which was developed the\noriginal type of everything produced, the so-called Logos of the universe.\nHow this Logos became objectively and materially real, is as far beyond\nhuman comprehension as is the origin of the cosmos out of countless atoms,\nor even out of living cells. So far, then, one hypothesis would be as\ncomplete and as incomplete as the other. But the Logos hypothesis has the\nfar-reaching advantage, that instead of a long succession of wonders,\u2014call\nthem if you like the wonder of the monads, or the worm, or the mollusk, or\nthe fish, or the amphibian, or the reptile, or the bird, or, lastly,\nman,\u2014it has but one wonder before it, the Logos, the idea of thought, or\nof the eternal thinker, who thought everything that exists in natural\nsequence, and in this sense made all. In this view we need not even\nabandon the survival of the fittest, only it proceeds in the Logos, in the\nmind, not in the outward phenomenal world. It would then also become\nconceivable that the embryological development of animated nature runs\nparallel with the biological or historical, or as it were recapitulates\nit, only the continuity of the idea is far closer and more intimate than\nthat of the reality. Thus, for instance, in the development of the human\nembryo, the transition from the invertebrate to the vertebrate may be\nrepresented in the reality by the isolated amphioxus, which remains\nstationary where vertebrate man begins, and can make no step forward,\nwhile the human embryo advances farther and farther till it reaches its\nhighest limit.\n\nIn order now to infer from these and similar facts that man at one time\nreally existed in this scarcely vertebrate condition of the amphioxus,\u2014a\nconclusion which, strictly understood, yields no meaning,\u2014we can make the\ncase much more easily conceivable if we represent the thinking, or\ninvention of the world, as an ascending scale, in which even the least\nchromatic tone must have a place without a break, while the principal\ntones do not become clear and full until the requisite number of\nvibrations is attained. These gradations of tone are the really\ninteresting thing in nature. As the full, clear tones imply certain\nnumerical relations among the vibrations, so the successive stages or the\ntrue species in nature imply a will or thought in which the true _Origin\nof Species_ has its foundation. That natural selection, as it is called,\ncould suffice to explain the origin of species, was doubted even by\nHuxley,(38) who yet described himself as Darwin\u2019s bull-dog.\n\nIf we have followed the supporters of my Horseherd so far, I should like\nhere to enter a caveat, that is indeed of no great significance, but may\nturn one or another from a by-way, which the Horseherd himself has not\navoided. He speaks of the place of man in nature; he thinks (like so many\nothers) that man is not only an animal belonging to the mammalia, which no\none has ever denied, but that he is of the same nature as the animal\nworld. He need not therefore have accepted the whole simian theory, at\nleast he does not say so; but that each man, and the entire human race,\nhas descended from an unknown pair of animals, he appears to receive as\nindubitable. This would not, so far as I can see, make the slightest\ndifference in the so-called dignity of mankind. If man had a prehensile\ntail, it would not detract from his worth. I myself have little doubt that\nthere were men with tails in prehistoric or even in historic times. I go\nstill farther and declare that if ever there should be an ape who can form\nideas and words, he would _ipso facto_ be a man. I have therefore no\nprejudices such as the advocates of the simian theory like to attribute to\nus. What I and those who agree with me demand of our opponents, is merely\nsomewhat keener thought, and a certain consideration for the results of\nour knowledge, such as we on our side have bestowed on their researches.\nThey have taught us that the body in which we live was at first a simple\ncell. The significance of this \u201cat first\u201d is left somewhat vague. This\ncell was really what the word means, the _cella_ (room) of a dumb\ninhabitant, the Self. The essential thing is and remains what was in the\ncell. Through gemmation, differentiation, segmentation, evolution, or\nwhatever other technical expressions we may use for division,\nmultiplication, budding, increase, etc., each cell became a hundred, a\nthousand, a million. Within this cell is a bright spot into which not even\nthe microscope can penetrate, although whole worlds may be contained\ntherein. If it is now remembered that no one has ever succeeded in\ndistinguishing the human cell from the cell of a horse, an elephant, or an\nape, we shall see how much unnecessary indignation has been expended in\nrecent years over the simian origin of the human race, and how much\nintelligent thought has been wasted about the animal origin of man, that\nis of the individual. My body, your body, his body, is derived\n(ontogenetically) from the cell, is in fact the cell which has remained\npersistently the same from beginning to end, without ever, in spite of all\nchanges, losing its identity. This cell in its transformations has shown\nremarkable analogies with the transformations of other animal cells.\nWhile, however, the other animal cells in their transformations remain\nstationary here and there, either at the boundary line of worms, fishes,\namphibia, reptiles, or mammals, the one cell which was destined to become\nman moves on to the stage of the tailed catarrhine apes, then of the\ntailless apes, and without staying here it irresistibly strides towards\nits original goal, and only stops where it is destined to stop. Speaking,\nhowever, not phylogenetically, but ontogenetically, at what point does our\nown cell come in contact with the cell that was intended to become an ape,\nand that became and remained an ape? If we accept the cell theory in its\nlatest form, what meaning can there be in the statement of the late Henry\nDrummond, that \u201cIn a very distant period the progenitors of birds and the\nprogenitors of men were one and the same\u201d?(39) Would not a very small\nquantity of strictly logical thought have cut off _a priori_ the bold\nhypothesis that directly or indirectly we descend from a menagerie? Every\nman, and consequently all mankind, has accomplished his uninterrupted\nembryological development on his own account; no man and no human cell\nsprings from the womb of an ape or any other animal, but only from the\nwomb of a human mother, fertilised by a human father. Or do men owe their\nbeing to a miscarriage?\n\nAs many streams may flow alongside of each other and through the same\nstrata, and one ends in a lake while the others flow on and grow larger\nand larger, till finally one river attains its highest goal, the sea, so\nthe cells develop for a time alongside of each other, then some remain\nstationary at their points of destination, while others move on farther;\nbut the cell that has moved forward is as little derived from the\nstationary cell as the Indus from the Sarasvati. It is at the points of\ndestination that the true species digress, and when these points are\nreached, the specific development ceases, and there remains only the\npossibility of the variety, the origin of which is conditioned by the\nmultiplicity of individuals; but which must never be confounded with a\ntrue species. Every species represents an act of the will, a thought, and\nthis thought cannot be shaken from its course, however close temptation\nmay often come.\n\nWith this I believe I have cleared up and refuted one of the objections\nthat my correspondents made, at any rate to the best of my ability.\nWhoever is convinced that each individual, be it fish or bird, springs\nfrom its own cell, knows _ipso facto_ that a human cell, however\nundistinguishable it may be to the human eye from the cell of a catarrhine\nape, could never have been the cell of an ape. And what is true\nontogenetically, is of course true phylogenetically. For myself this\ninquiry into the simian origin of man never had any great interest; I even\ndoubt whether the Horseherd would have laid great stress upon it. His\nchampions, however, plainly consider it one of the principal and\nfundamental questions on which our whole view of the world must be\nerected. In my opinion so little depends on our covering of flesh, that as\nI have often said, I should instantly acknowledge an ape that could speak,\nthat is, think in concepts, as a man and brother, in spite of his hide, in\nspite of his tail, in spite of his stunted brain. We are not that which is\nburied or burned. We are not even the cell, but the inhabitant of the\ncell. But this leads me to new questions and objections, which have been\nmade by the representatives and successors of the Horseherd, and to which\nI hope to reply on some other occasion, assuming that my own somewhat\ndilapidated cell holds out so long against wind and rain.\n\nF. MAX M\u00dcLLER.\nFRASCATI, April, 1897.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\n\n                            Language And Mind\n\n\nThe number of Horseherds appears to grow each month. He would rejoice to\nsee the letters of men and women who are all on his side, and give me\nclearly to understand that I should by no means imagine that I have\nrefuted my unknown friend. The letter of Ignotus Agnosticus in the June\nnumber of the _Deutsche Rundschau_ is a good example of these\ncommunications. I have read it with much interest, and have partly dealt\nwith it in my article in the same number; but I hope at some future time\nto answer his objections, and those of several other correspondents, more\nfully. I should have been glad to publish some of these letters. But\nfirst, they are too long, and they are far inferior in power to the letter\nof the Horseherd. Moreover, they are usually so full of friendly\nrecognition, even when disagreeing with me, that it would ill become me to\ngive them publicity. That there was no lack of coarse letters as well, may\nbe taken for granted; these however were all anonymous, as if the writers\nwere ashamed of their heroic style. I have never been able to understand\nwhat attraction there can be in coarseness. The coarse work is generally\nleft for the apprentice. Everything coarse, be it a block, a wedge, or a\nblade, passes as unfinished, as raw, jagged, and just the reverse of\ncutting. No one is proud of a coarse shirt, but many, even quite\ndistinguished people, proudly strut about the streets in a coarse smock of\nabusive language, quite unconcernedly, without any suspicion of their\nunsuitable attire.\n\nWell, I shall endeavour to be as fair as I can to my unknown opponents and\nfriends, the coarse as well as the courteous. I cannot be coarse myself,\nmuch as it seems to be desired in some quarters that I should. Each one\nmust determine for himself what is specially meant for him.\n\nI cannot of course enter into all the objections that have been made. Many\nhave very little or nothing to do with what lay nearest the Horseherd\u2019s\nheart. The antinomies, for example, on the infinity of space and time,\nhave long since belonged to the history of metaphysics, and have been so\nthoroughly worked out by Kant and his school that there is hardly anything\nnew to be said about them. In the question about the age of our world, we\nneed only distinguish between world as universe and world as our world,\nthat is, as the earth or the terrestrial world. A beginning of the world\nas universe is of course incomprehensible to us; but we may speak of the\nbeginning of the earth, especially of the earth as inhabited by man,\nbecause here, as Lord Kelvin has shown, astronomical physics and geology\nhave enabled us to fix certain chronological limits, and to say how old\nour earth may be, and no older or younger. When I said of the world, that\nthough it were millions of years old, there still was a time before it was\none year or 1897 years old, I referred to the world in the sense of our\nworld, that is, the earth. Of the world as universe this would scarcely be\nsaid; on the contrary, we should here apply the axiom that every boundary\nimplies something beyond, _i.e._ an unbounded, until we arrive at the\nregion where, as people say, the world is nailed up with boards. Many\nyears ago I tried to prove that our senses can never perceive a real\nboundary, be it on the largest or the smallest scale; they present to us\neverywhere the infinite as their background, and everything that has to do\nwith religion has sprung out of this infinite background as its ultimate\nand deepest foundation. Instead of saying that by our senses we perceive\nonly the finite or limited, I have sought to show (_On the Perception of\nthe Infinite_) that we everywhere perceive the unlimited, and that it is\nwe, and not the objects about us, that draw the boundary lines in our\nperceptions. When I also called this unknown omnipresence of the infinite\nthe source of all religion, this was the highest, the most abstract, and\nthe most general expression that could be found for the wide domain of the\ntranscendent; it had of course nothing to do with the historical\nbeginnings of religion. When the Aryans felt, thought, and named their\ngod, their Dyaus, in the blue sky, they meant the blue sky within the\nlimits of the horizon. We know, however, that while they called the sky\nDyaus, they had in mind an infinite subject, a Deva, a God. But, as\nstated, these things were remote from the Horseherd, and he would scarcely\nhave had anything to object.\n\nHis chief objection was of a quite different nature. He wished to show\nthat the human mind was a mere phantom of man\u2019s making, that there are\nonly bodies in the world, and that the mind has sprung from the body, and\ntherefore constituted, not the _prius_, but the _posterius_ of those\nbodies. This view is evidently widely disseminated and has found very\nabundant support, at least in the letters addressed to me. \u201cThe mind,\u201d so\nwrote the Horseherd, \u201cis not a _prius_, it is a development, a\nself-evolving phenomenon.\u201d Everything is now development, and there is no\nbetter salve for all ills than development. If our knowledge of\ndevelopment is taken in the sense of scientific historical inquiry, then\nwe all agree, for how can there be anything that has not developed? In\norder to know what a thing is, we must learn how it became what it is. A\nmuch-admired philosopher, recently deceased, Henry Drummond, who was quite\nintoxicated with evolution, nevertheless admits quite plainly in his last\nwork, _The Ascent of Man_, that \u201cOrder of events is history, and evolution\nis history\u201d (p. 132). With this I am of course quite satisfied, for it is\nwhat I have been preaching in season and out of season for at least thirty\nyears. But this order, or this sequence of facts, must be proved with\nscientific accuracy, and not merely postulated. If then my Horseherd had\nbeen content to say, \u201cThe human mind is also a development,\u201d certainly no\nstudent of history, least of all a philologist, would have contradicted\nhim. But he says: \u201cMax, all German savants, or, if you please, the\nmajority of them, still labour under the delusion that mind is a _prius_.\nBut nonsense, Max, mind is a development, a self-evolving phenomenon. One\nwould consider it impossible that a thinking man, who has ever observed a\nchild, could be of any other opinion; why seek ghosts behind matter? Mind\nis a function of living organisms, which belongs also to a goose and a\nchicken.\u201d\n\nIn the Horseherd such language was excusable, but for philosophers to talk\nin the same style is strange, to say the least. How can such an assertion\nbe made without any proof whatever, without even a few words to explain\nwhat is meant by the term \"mind\"? The German like the English language\nswarms with words that may be used interchangeably, though each of them\nhas its own shade of meaning. If we translate Geist (Spirit) as mind, then\nwe must consider that \u201cspirit,\u201d in such expressions as \u201cHe has yielded up\nhis spirit,\u201d means the same as the principle of life or physical life. The\nsame is true of \u201cspirit\u201d in such a phrase as \u201chis spirit has departed.\u201d\nBut easy as it is to distinguish between spirit in the sense of the breath\nof life, and spirit in the sense of mind, the exact definition of such\nwords as intellect, reason, understanding, thought, consciousness, or\nself-consciousness becomes very difficult, to say nothing of soul and\nfeeling in their various activities. These words are used in both English\nand German so confusedly that we often hesitate merely to touch them. Now\nif we say that the mind is a development, and is not a _prius_, what idea\nought it to suggest? Does this mean the principle of life, or the\nunderstanding, or the reason, or consciousness? We suffer here from a real\nand very dangerous _embarras de richesse_. The words are often intended to\nsignify the same things, only viewed under different aspects. But as there\nwere various words, it was believed that they must also signify various\nthings. Different philosophers have further advanced different definitions\nof these words, until it was finally supposed that each of these names\nmust be borne by a separate subject, while some of them originally only\nsignified activities of one and the same substance. Understanding, reason,\nand thought originally expressed properties or activities, the activities\nof understanding, of perceiving, of thinking, and their elevation to nouns\nwas simply psychological mythology, which has prevailed, and still\nprevails just as extensively as the physical mythology of the ancient\nAryan peoples.\n\nIt would be most useful if we could lay aside all these mouldy and decayed\nexpressions, and introduce a word that simply means what is not understood\nby body, the subject, in opposition to the objective world. It would by no\nmeans follow that what is not body must therefore exist independent of the\nbody. It would first of all only declare that beside the objective body\nperceived by the senses, there is also something subjective, which the\nfive senses cannot perceive. The best name for this appears to me still to\nbe the Vedantic term _\u00c2tman_, which I translate into \u201cthe Self\u201d (neuter),\nbecause our language will scarcely allow the phrase \u201cthe Self\u201d\n(masculine). \u201cSoul\u201d has a too tender quality to be the equivalent of\n_\u00c2tman_.\n\nThis Self is something that exists for itself and not for others. While\neverything that is purely corporeal only exists for us men, inasmuch as it\nis perceived, the Self exists by reason of the fact that it perceives.\nWhile the _Esse_ of all objects is a percipi, a something perceived, which\nhas come into knowledge, the _Esse_ of the self is a _percipere_, a\nperceiving, a knowing, that is, the Self can only be thought of as\nself-knowing. The Self exists even when it does not yet clearly know\nitself, but it is not the real Self until it knows itself; and it requires\nlong and earnest thought for the Self to know or recognise itself as\ndifferent from the ego or the body. But if the Self has once come to\nitself, the darkness or the phenomenal appearance which the Ved\u00e2nta\nphilosophers called _Avidy\u00e2_ (not knowing, ignorance), or also _M\u00e2y\u00e2_\n(appearance, or illusion), vanishes.\n\nThe origin of this ignorance, this illusion, or the world of appearance,\nis a question which no human being will ever solve. There are questions\nwhich must be set aside as simply _ultra vires_ by every reasonable\nphilosophy. We know that we cannot hear certain tones, cannot see certain\ncolours; why not then understand that we cannot comprehend certain things?\nThe Ved\u00e2nta philosophers consider the _Avidy\u00e2_ (ignorance) as\ninexplicable, and this was no doubt originally implied in the name which\nthey gave it. Their aim was, to prove the temporal existence of such an\n_Avidy\u00e2_, not to discover its origin; and then in the _Vidy\u00e2_, the Ved\u00e2nta\nphilosophy, to set forth the means by which the Avidy\u00e2 could be destroyed.\nHow or when the Self came into this ignorance, _Avidy\u00e2_, or _M\u00e2y\u00e2_\n(illusion, or the phenomenal world), the Ved\u00e2nta philosophers no more\nsought to explain than we seek to explain how the Self comes into the\nbody, the bodily senses, and the phenomenal world which they perceive. We\nbegin our philosophy with what is given us, that is, with a Self, that in\nits embodiment knows everything that befalls the body; that for a time is\nblended with the body, till it attains a true self-knowledge, and then,\neven in life, or later in death, by liberation from its phenomenal\nexistence, or from the body, again comes to itself.\n\nHow this body, with its senses that convey and present to us the\nphenomenal world, originated or developed, is a question that belongs to\nbiology. So far as is possible to the human understanding, this question\nhas been solved by the cell theory. The other question is the development\nof what we call mind, that is, the subjective knowledge of the phenomenal\nworld. To this the body, as it exists and lives, and the organs of sense,\nas they exist, are essential. We know that all sense-perceptions depend\nupon bodily vibrations, _i.e._ the nerves; and if we wish to make plain\nthe transition of impressions to conscious ideas, we can best do so\nthrough the assumption of the Self as a witness or accessory to the\nnerve-vibrations. This, however, is only an image, not an explanation, for\nan explanation belongs to the Utopia of philosophy. How it happens that\natoms think, atomists do not know, and no one should imagine that\nso-called Darwinism has helped or can help us even one step farther.\nWhatever some Darwinians may say, nothing can be simpler than the frank\nadmission of ignorance on this point on the part of Darwin. The frank and\nmodest expressions of this great but sober thinker are generally passed\nover in silence, or are even controverted as signs of a temporary\nweakness. To me, on the contrary, they are very valuable, and very\ncharacteristic of Darwin.\n\nIn one place(40) he says, \u201cI have nothing to do with the origin of the\nprimary mental power any more than I have with that of life itself.\u201d In\nanother place(41) he speaks still more plainly and says, \u201cIn what manner\nthe mental powers were first developed in the lowest organisms is as\nhopeless an inquiry as how life first originated.\u201d Let no one suppose,\ntherefore, that all gates and doors can be opened with the word\n\u201cevolution\u201d or the name Darwin. It is easy to say with Drummond,\n\u201cEvolution is revolutionising the world of nature and of thought, and\nwithin living memory has opened up avenues into the past and vistas into\nthe future such as science has never witnessed before.\u201d(42) Those are bold\nwords, but what do they mean or prove? DuBois-Reymond has said long\nbefore, \u201cHow consciousness can arise from the co-operation of atoms is\nbeyond our comprehension.\u201d In the _Contemporary Review_, November,\n1871,(43) Huxley speaks just as decidedly as Darwin in the name of\nbiology, \u201cI really know nothing whatever, and never hope to know anything,\nof the steps by which the passage from molecular movement to states of\nconsciousness is effected.\u201d Molecules and atoms are objects of knowledge.\nIf we ascribe knowledge to them, they immediately become the monads of\nLeibnitz; you may evolve out of them what you have first involved into\nthem. Knowledge belongs to the Self alone, call it what we will. The\nnerve-fibres might vibrate as often as they pleased, millions and millions\nof times in a second; they would never produce the sensation of red if\nthere were no Self as the receiver and illuminator, the translator of\nthese vibrations of ether; this Self, that alone receives, alone\nillumines, alone knows, and of which we can say nothing more than what the\nIndian philosophers call _sak-kid-\u00e2nanda_, that it exists, that it\nperceives, and as they add, that it is blessed, _i.e._ that it is complete\nin itself, serene and eternal.\n\nIf we take a firm stand on this living and perceiving Self (for _kid_ is\nnot so much thinking as perceiving, or knowing), there can then be no\nquestion that it is present not only in men, but in animals as well; only\nlet us beware of the inference that what we mean by human mind, that is,\nunderstanding and reasoning thought, is a necessary function of all living\norganisms, and is possessed also by a goose or a chicken. It is just the\nsame with the perceiving Self as it is with the cell. To the eye they are\nall alike. To express it figuratively, one cell has a ticket to Cologne,\nanother to Paris, a third to London. Each reaches its destination, and\nthen remains stationary, and no power on earth can make it advance beyond\nthe place to which it is ticketed, that is, its original destination, its\nfundamental eternal idea. It is just the same with the perceiving Self. It\nis true that the Self sees, hears, and thinks. As there are animals that\ncannot see, that cannot hear, so there are animals\u2014and this class includes\nthe whole of them\u2014that cannot speak. It is true that the speaking animals,\nthat is men, have passed the former stations on a fast train; but they did\nnot leave the train, nor have they anything in common with those who\nremained behind at previous stations, least of all can we consider them as\nthe offspring of those that remained behind. This is only a simile, and\nshould not provoke ridicule. Of course it will be said that those who can\njourney to Cologne may go on to Paris, and once in Paris may easily cross\nthe Channel. We must not ride a comparison to death, but always adhere to\nthe facts. Why does not grass grow as high as a poplar, why is care taken,\nas Goethe says, that no tree grows up to the sky? A strawberry might grow\nas large as a cucumber or a pumpkin, but it does not. Who draws the line?\nIt is true, too, that along every line slight deviations take place right\nand left. Nearly each year we hear of an abnormally large strawberry, and\nno doubt abnormally small ones could be found as well. But in spite of\nall, the normal remains. And whence comes it, if not from the same hand or\nthe same source which we compared with the ticket agent at the railway\nstation, in whom all who are familiar with the history of philosophy will\nagain readily recognise the Greek Logos?\n\nThese comparisons should at least be so far useful as to disclose the\nconfusion of thought, when, for instance, Mr. Romanes holds that it is not\nonly comprehensible, but the conclusion is unavoidable, that the human\nmind has sprung from the minds of the higher quadrumana on the line of\nnatural genesis. The human mind may mean every possible thing; the\nquestion therefore arises if he refers only to consciousness, or to\nunderstanding and reason. In the second place the human mind is not\nsomething subsisting by itself, but can only be the mind of an individual\nman. We cannot be too careful in these discussions\u2014otherwise we only end\nby substituting bare abstractions for concrete things. We do not know the\nhuman mind as anything concrete at all, only as an abstraction, and in\nthat case only as the mind of one man, or of many men. How can it then be\nthought that my mind or the mind of Darwin sprang from the minds of the\nhigher quadrumana. We may say such things, but what meaning can we attach\nto them? The same misconception exists here, if I am not mistaken, as in\nthe statement, that the human body springs from the bodies of the higher\nquadrupeds\u2014a misconception to which we have already referred. That has\nabsolutely no sense if we only hold firmly, that every organised body was\noriginally a cell, or originates in a cell, and that each cell, even in\nits most complicated, manifold, and perfect form, always is, and remains,\nan individual. It is useless therefore to talk of a descent of the human\nmind from the minds of the higher quadrupeds, for no intelligible meaning\ncan be discovered in it; we should have to fall back on a miscarriage, and\nto set up this miscarriage as the mother of all men, and without a\nlegitimate father. Such are the wanderings of a wrong method of thought,\neven if it struts about in kingly robes.\n\nAbove all things we must settle what we are really to understand by the\nmind of the higher quadrupeds as distinguished from the human mind. What\nis there lacking in these animal minds to make them human? And what do\nthey possess, or what are they, that they should claim equal birth with\nman? How much obscurity there is in these matters among the best animal\npsychologists is seen when, for instance, we compare the assertions of\nRomanes with those of Lloyd Morgan. While the former sets up a natural\ngenesis of the human mind from animal mind as being indisputable and as\nnot being thinkable in any other way, the latter, his greatest admirer,\nsays, \u201cBelieving, as I do, that conception is beyond the power of my\nfavourite and clever dog, I am forced to believe that his mind differs\ngenerically from my own.\u201d(44) Undoubtedly by \u201cgenerically\u201d is meant,\naccording to his genus or his genesis. But in spite of this, the same\nsavant says in another place, that he cannot allow that there is a\ndifference _in kind_, that is _in genere_, between the human mind and the\nmind of a dog. If men would only define their words, such contradictions\nwould in time become impossible.\n\nWhat men and animals have in common is the Self, and this so-called Self\nconsists first of all in perception. This perception belongs, as has been\nsaid, to those things which are given us, and not to those which can be\nexplained. It is a property of the eternal Self, as of light, to shine, to\nillumine itself, that is, to know. Its knowing is its being, and its being\nis its knowing, or its self-consciousness. If we take the Self as we find\nit, not merely in itself, but embodied, we must attribute to it, besides\nits own self-consciousness, a consciousness of the conditions of the body;\nbut of course we must not imagine that we can make this embodiment in any\nway conceivable to us. It _is_ so\u2014that is all that we can say, just as in\nan earlier consideration of the embodiment and multiplication of the\neternal Logos we had to accept this as a datum, without being able to come\nany nearer to the fact by conceptions, or even by mere analogies. This is\nwhere the task of the psychologist begins. Grant the self-consciousness of\nthe individual, although still very obscure; grant the sentient\nperception; everything else that we call mind is the result of a\ndevelopment, which we must follow historically in order to understand that\nit could not come about in any other way. But where are the facts, where\nthe monuments, where the trustworthy documents, from which we can draw our\nknowledge of this wonderful development?\n\nFour sources have been propounded for the study of psychogenesis. It has\nbeen said that to investigate the development of the human mind, the\nfollowing objects must be scientifically observed: (1) The mind of a\nchild; (2) the mind of the lower animals; (3) the survivals of the oldest\nculture, as we find it in ethnological collections; (4) the mind of still\nliving savages. I formerly entertained similar hopes, but in my own\nmelancholy experience all these studies end in delusion, in so far as they\nare applied to explain the genesis of the human mind. They do not reach\nfar enough, they give us everywhere only the products of growth, the\nresult of art, not the natural growth, or the real evolution. The\nobservations on the development of a child\u2019s mind are very attractive,\nespecially when they are made by thoughtful mothers. But this nursery\npsychology is wanting in all scientific exactness. The object of\nobservation, the child that cannot yet speak, can never be entirely\nisolated. Its environment is of incalculable influence, and the petted\nchild develops very differently from the neglected foundling. The early\nsmile of the one is often as much a reflex action as the crying and\nblustering of the other, from hunger or inherited disease. Much as I\nadmire the painstaking effort with which the first evidences of perception\nor of mental activity in a child have been recorded from day to day, from\nweek to week, these observations prove untrustworthy when we endeavour to\ncontrol them independently. It has been said that the mental activities of\na child develop in the following order:\u2014\n\nAfter three weeks fear is manifested;\n\nAfter seven weeks social affections;\n\nAfter twelve weeks jealousy and anger;\n\nAfter five months sympathy;\n\nAfter eight months, pride, sentiment, love of ornament;\n\nAfter fifteen months, shame, remorse, a sense of the ludicrous.(45)\n\nWe may generalise this scale as much as we please, and gradually permit\nthe gradations to vanish, but I doubt if even two mothers could be found\nwho would agree in such an interpretation of their children\u2019s looks. Add\nto this that this whole scale has very little to do with what, in the\nstrict sense of the word, we call mind. From fear up to shame and\npenitence are all manifestations simply of the feelings, and not of the\nmind. We know that what we call fear is often a reflex action, as when a\nchild closes its eyelids before a blow. What has been named jealousy in a\nchild, is often nothing but hunger, while shame is instilled into one\nchild, and in others is by no means of spontaneous growth.\n\nThe worst feature of such observations is that they are very quickly\nregarded as safe ground, and are reared higher and higher until in the end\nthe entire scaffold collapses. In order to establish the truth of this\npsychologic scale in children still more firmly, and at the same time to\nmake good its universal necessity, an effort has been made to prove that a\nsimilar scale is to be found in the animal kingdom, and of course what was\nsought has been found. Romanes asserts that the lowest order of animals,\nthe annelids, only show traces of fear; a little higher in the scale, in\ninsects, are found social instincts such as industry, combativeness, and\ncuriosity; another step higher, fishes exhibit jealousy, and birds,\nsympathy; then in carnivorous animals follow cruelty, hate, and grief; and\nlastly, in the anthropoid apes, remorse, shame, and a sense of the\nridiculous, as well as deceit. It needs but one step more to make this\nscale, which belongs much more to the sphere of feeling than the realm of\nthought, universally applicable to all psychology. How should we otherwise\nexplain the parallelism between the mental development of infants and that\nof undeveloped animals? One need but take a firm hold of such\nobservations, and they are transformed into airy visions. Who, for\ninstance, would dare to distinguish the traces of fear in annelids from\nthose of surprise in higher animals? Nevertheless fear occupies the first\nplace, surprise the third. And what mark distinguished combativeness in\ninsects from jealousy in fishes? In the same way I doubt if any two nurses\nwould agree in the chronology of the phenomena of the infant disposition,\nand have therefore long since given up all hope of obtaining any hints\neither in embryological or physiological development, about the real\nhistorical unfolding of the human consciousness, either out of a nursery\nor out of a zo\u00f6logical garden.\n\nAs for ethnological museums, they certainly give us wonderful glimpses\ninto the skilfulness of primitive man, especially in what relates to the\nstruggle for life; but of the historic or prehistoric age of these wood,\nhorn, and stone weapons, they tell us absolutely nothing. Whoever thinks\nthat man descended from an ape, may no doubt say that flint implements for\nkindling fire belonged to a higher period, _post hominem natum_, although\nit has been thought that even apes could have imitated such weapons,\nthough they could not have invented them. Romanes, in his book on _Mental\nEvolution in Animals_, has collected a large number of illustrations of\nanimal skilfulness; the majority of them, however, are explained by mere\nmimicry; of a development of original ideas peculiar to animals in their\nwild state, apart from the contact and influence of human society, there\nis no trace. Even the most intelligent animal, the elephant, acquires\nreason only in its intercourse with men, and similarly the more or less\ntrained apes, dogs, parrots, etc. All this is very interesting reading,\nand an English weekly, _The Spectator_, has from week to week given us\nsimilar anecdotes about wonderfully gifted animals from all parts of the\nearth, but these matters lie outside the narrow sphere of science.\n\nWhat then remains to enable us to study the earliest phase of development\nof the human mind accessible to us? If we go to savages, whose language we\nonly understand imperfectly, these observations are of course still more\nuntrustworthy than in the case of our own children; at all events we must\nwait before we receive any really valuable evidence of the development of\nthe human mind from that source. I repeat that the human mind itself, as\nfar as it perceives, must simply be accepted as a fact, given to us and\ninexplicable, whether in civilised or uncivilised races; but only in its\ngreatest simplicity, as mere self-conscious perception\u2014a perception which\nin this simplicity can in no wise be denied to animals, although we can\nonly with difficulty form a clear idea of the peculiarity of their\nsentient perceptions.\n\nWhere can we observe the first steps that rise above this simple\nperception? I say, as I have always said, In language and in language\nalone. Language is the oldest monument which we possess of man\u2019s mental\npower, older than stone weapons, than cuneiform inscriptions, than\nhieroglyphics. The development of language is continuous, for where this\ncontinuity is broken, language dies. After every Tasmanian had been killed\nor had died, the Tasmanian language _ipso facto_ ceased; and even if any\nliterary remains had survived, the language itself would have to be\nreckoned, like Latin and Greek, with dead languages. Thousands of them may\nhave disappeared from the earth; in its development a language may have\nchanged as much as Sanskrit to Bengali; but it suffers no break, it\nremains always the same, and in a certain sense we still speak in German\nthe same tongue as was spoken by the Aryans before there was a Sanskrit, a\nGreek, or a Latin language. Consider what this signifies. Chronologically,\nwe cannot get at this primitive Aryan speech. Let us assume that Sanskrit,\nGreek, and Latin were spoken as independent national tongues at least\nfifteen hundred years before our chronology\u2014what an age had elapsed before\nthese three, as well as the remaining Aryan tongues, could have diverged\nso much as Sanskrit diverges from Greek and Greek from Latin. The numerals\nare the same in these three languages, and yet _katv\u0101ras_ sounds quite\ndifferently from \u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2 and _quatuor_ and our four. The words for eight,\n_octo_ in Latin, \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u03ce in Greek, and _ashtau_ in Sanskrit, are nearly\nidentical; and it is even possible that the lesser deviations in the\npronunciation of these words demanded no great interval of time. But now\nlet us consider what lies behind these ten numerals. There is the\nelaboration of a decimal system from 1 to 10, no, to 100 (\u1f11\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd),\nSanskrit _sat\u00e1m_, _centum_. There is the formation and fixing of names for\nthese numbers, which must have been originally more or less arbitrary,\nbecause numbers only subordinate themselves with difficulty to one of\nthose general ideas which are expressed in the Aryan roots. Besides these\nwords are, even in their oldest attainable forms, already so\nweather-beaten, that in most cases it is impossible even to guess their\netymology and original meaning. We see that the names for two and eight\nare dual, while those for three and four clearly have plural endings. But\nwhy eight in the primitive Aryan was a dual, and what were the two\ntetrads, which, combined in _asht-au_, _oct-o_, \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4-\u03ce, expressed the\nnumber eight, will probably never be discovered. It is possible that\n_asht-i_ was a name for the four phases of the moon, or for the four\nfingers of the hand without the thumb. Analogies occur in other families\nof language, but certainty is beyond our reach. If we now consider what\nmental effort is necessary to work out a decimal system, and to secure\ngeneral recognition and value for the name given to each number, we shall\nreadily realise what remote periods in the development of the human mind\nopen up before us here, and of how little use it would be to try to\nestablish chronological limits. Old as the Vedas, old as the Homeric songs\nmay be, what is their age compared with the periods that were required not\nonly to work out the numerals but the entire treasury of Aryan words, and\nthe wonderful network of grammar that surrounds this treasure, which also\nwas complete before the separation of the Aryan languages began. The\nimmeasurable cannot be measured, but this much stands immovable in the\nmind of every linguist, that there is nothing older in the entire Aryan\nworld than the complete primitive Aryan language and grammar, in which\nnearly all the categories of thought, and consequently the whole scaffold\nof our thinking, have found their expression.\n\nOf course it will be said that all this only applies to the Aryan race,\nand that they constitute only a small and perhaps the youngest portion of\nthe human race. Well, it is difficult to prove that the Aryans constitute\nthe least numerous subdivision. We know too little of their great masses\nto attempt a census. That they are the youngest branch of the human race\nis really of no consequence; we should then have to assume against all\nDarwinian principles, various, not contemporaneous, but successive\nmonstrosities, slowly ascending to humanity, and this would only be pure\ninvention. Nothing absolutely compels us to ascribe a shorter earthly life\nto those races which speak Chinese, Semitic, Bantu, American, Australian,\nor other languages, than to the Aryans. That all races have begun on a\nlower plane of culture, and especially of the knowledge of language, will\nno doubt be universally acknowledged. But even if we only place the first\nbeginnings of the Aryan race at 10,000 B.C., there is time enough for it\nand other races to have risen, and also to have again declined. The\ndifference would merely be that the Aryans, in spite of many drawbacks, on\nthe whole constantly progressed, while the Australians, Negroes, and\nPatagonians, forced into unfavourable positions, remained stationary on a\nvery low level. That their present plane can in any respect, and\nespecially in regard to their language, supply a picture of the earliest\ncondition of the human race, or even of certain branches of it, is again\nmere assumption, and as bare of all analogy as the attempt to see in the\nsalons of London a picture of Aryan family life before the first\nseparation. There are savages who are cannibals. Shall we conclude from\nthis that the first men all devoured each other, or that only those who\nwere least appetising remained over as survivals of the fittest? It is\nremarkable how many ideas are current in science which the healthy human\nmind, after short reflection, silently lays aside. Any one who has\noccupied himself with the polysynthetic tongues of the Redskins, or with\nthe prefixes in the languages of the Bantus, knows how much time must have\nbeen needed to develop their grammar, and how much higher the makers of\nthese languages must have stood than those who speak them now.\n\nBut even if language is the oldest chronicle in which the human mind has\ntraced its own development, we must by no means imagine that any known\nlanguage, be it as old as the pyramids, or as the cuneiform inscriptions,\ncan offer us a picture of the first beginning of the mental life of the\nrace. Long before the pyramids, long before the oldest monuments in\nBabylon, Nineveh, and China, there was language, even writing; for on the\noldest Egyptian inscriptions we find among the hieroglyphic signs writing\nmaterials and the stilus. Here perspectives open up to us, before which\nevery chronological telescope gives way. There is a rigorous continuity in\nthe development of a language, but this continuity in no wise excludes a\ntransformation as marked as that of the butterfly from the caterpillar.\nEven when, as for instance in Sanskrit, we go back to a number of roots,\nto which Indian grammarians such as _P\u00e2nini_ have systematically traced\nback the entire wealth of their abundant language, we must not suppose\nthat these roots really constituted the original and complete material\nwith which the primitive Aryan tongue began its historical career. This is\nnot true even of the Indian branch of this primitive tongue, for in its\ndevelopment much may have been lost, and much so changed that we dare not\nthink of restoring a perfect picture from these fragments of the earliest\nmental development of the Indians. These things are so simple that\nphilologists accept them as axioms; but it is curious to observe, that in\nspite of the widespread interest that has been created in all civilised\nnations by the results of the science of language, philosophers who write\nabout language and its relation to thought still trouble themselves over\nnotions long since antiquated. I had, for instance, classified the\nprincipal ideas expressed in Sanskrit roots, and had reduced them to the\nsmall number of 121.(46) With these 121 ideas, Indian philology pledges\nitself to explain all the simple and derivative meanings of words that\nfill the thick volumes of a Sanskrit lexicon. And what did ethnologists\nsay to this? Instead of gratefully accepting this fact, they asserted that\nmany of these 121 radical ideas, as for instance, weaving or cooking,\ncould not possibly be primitive. Impossible is always a very convenient\nword. But who ever claimed that these 121 fundamental ideas all belonged\nto the primitive Aryan language. They are, in fact, the ideas that are\nindicated in the thousands of words in classical Sanskrit, but they have\nnever made any claim to have constituted the mental capital of the\nprimitive Aryans, whether acquired from heaven or from the domicile of\napes. And if now a few of these ideas, such as to weave, to cook, to\nclean, appear modern, what of that compared with the simple fact that they\nare actually there?\n\nThese ethnologists, too, always make the old mistake of confounding the\nlearning of a language, as is done by every child, with the first\ninvention or formation of a language. The two things are as radically\ndifferent as the labour of miners who bring forth to the light of day gold\nore out of the depths of the earth, and the enjoyment which the heirs of a\nrich man have in squandering his cash. The two things are quite different,\nand yet there are books upon books which attempt to draw conclusions as to\nthe creation of language from children learning to talk. We have at least\nnow got so far as to admit that language facilitates thinking; but that\nlanguage first made thought possible, that it was the first step in the\ndevelopment of the human mind, but few anthropologists have seen.(47) They\ndo not know what language in the true sense of the word means, and still\nthink that it is only communication, and that it does not differ from the\nsignals made by chamois, or the information imparted by the antenn\u00e6 of\nants. Henry Drummond goes so far as to say that \u201cAny means by which\ninformation is conveyed from one mind to another, is language.\u201d(48) That\nis entirely erroneous. The entire chapter on sign language, interesting as\nit is, must be treated quite differently by the philologist, compared with\nthe ethnologist. When the sign is such as was used in the old method of\ntelegraphing, and meant a real word, or, as in modern electric telegraphy,\neven a letter, this is really speaking by signs; and so is the finger\nlanguage of the deaf and dumb. But when I threaten my opponent with my\nfist, or strike him in the face, when I laugh, cry, sob, sigh, I certainly\ndo not speak, although I do make a communication, the meaning of which\ncannot be doubted. Not every communication, therefore, is language, nor\ndoes every act of speaking aim at a communication. There are philologists\nwho maintain that the first words were merely a clearing of the ideas, a\nsort of talking to oneself. This may have been so or not, at any rate it\nappears to me that in such primitive times, practical ends deserve the\nfirst consideration. No one can distinguish the difference in the stages\nof mental development, between wiping the perspiration from the brow after\nwork, which signifies and communicates to every observer, \u201cIt is warm\u201d or\n\u201cI am tired,\u201d and the man who can actually say, \u201cIt is warm,\u201d \u201cI am\ntired.\u201d Thousands, millions of years may lie between these two steps. We\ndo not know, and to attempt to fix periods of time where the means are\nlacking, is like pouring water into the Danaids\u2019 sieves.\n\nJust consider what effort was required to enable an Aryan man to say, \u201cIt\nis warm.\u201d We shall say nothing of \u201cit\u201d; it may be a simple demonstrative\nstem, which needed little for its formation. But before this \u201ci-t\u201d or \u201cid\u201d\ncould become an impersonal \u201cit,\u201d long-continued abstraction, or, if you\nprefer, long-continued polishing, was required. Take the word _is_. Whence\ncomes such a verbal form, Sanskrit _as-ti_, Greek \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, Latin _est_? Was\nthe abstract \u201cto be\u201d onomatopoetically imitated? Often, of course, we\ncannot answer such questions at all. In this case, however, it is\npossible. The root _as_ in _asti_, that we now translate as _is_, means as\nwe see from _as-u_, breath, originally _to breathe_. Whoever likes may see\nin _as_, to breathe, an imitation of hissing breath. We neither gain or\nlose anything by this; for the critical step always remains to be taken\nfrom a single imitation of a single act, to the comprehension of many such\nacts, at various places, and at various times, as one and the same, which\nis called abstraction or the forming of a concept.\n\nThis may appear to be a very small step, just as the first slight\ndeviation in a railroad track is scarcely a finger\u2019s breadth, but in time\nchanges the course of the train to an entirely different part of the\nworld. The formation of an idea, such as to be, or to become, or to take a\nstill simpler one, such as four or eight, appears to us to be a very small\nmatter, and yet it is this very small matter that distinguishes man from\nthe animal, that pushed man forward and left the animal behind on his old\ntrack. Nay, more, this \u201cconcept\u201d has caused much shaking of the head among\nphilosophers of all times. That one and one are two, two and two, four,\nfour and four, eight, eight and eight, sixteen, etc., appears to be so\nvery easy, that we do not understand how such things can constitute an\neternally intended distinction between man and animal. I have myself seen\nan ape so well trained that as the word \u201cseven\u201d was spoken, he picked up\nseven straws. But what is such child\u2019s play in comparison with the first\nformation of the idea of seven? Do you not see that the formation of such\nan abstract idea, isolating mere quantity apart from all qualities,\nrequires a power of abstraction such as has never been displayed by an\nanimal? If there were any languages now that actually had no word for\nseven, it would be a valuable confirmation of this view. I doubt only,\nwhether the speakers of such languages could not call composition to their\naid, and attain the idea of seven by two, two, two, plus one. We still\nknow too little of these languages and of those who speak them. Of what\ntakes place in animals we know absolutely nothing, and nowhere would a\ndose of agnosticism be more useful than here. Sense-impressions an animal\ncertainly has; whether quite the same as man must remain uncertain. And\nsense-impressions enable an animal to accomplish much, especially in the\nrealm of feeling; but language\u2014never.\n\nThis fact, as a bare undeniable fact, should have startled the Darwinians,\neven as it startled the venerable Darwin, when I simply set the facts\nbefore him, and he immediately drew the necessary consequences. Of any\ndanger there could be no fear. The facts are there and show us the right\npath. And it is not only simple facts, but the consequences of pre\u00ebxisting\nconditions which render every so-called transition from animal to man\nabsolutely unthinkable. Language\u2014as ethnologists should have learned\u2014has\nneither originated from artificial signs, nor from imitation of sounds.\nThat we can communicate with signs without saying a word, that we even now\nuse signs in our speech, is best learned in southern races, and in such\npantomimes as _L\u2019enfant prodigue_. We have long known that imitations of\nsound exist in greater or lesser numbers in every language, and how far\nthey can reach has probably never been shown in such detail as by\nmyself.(49) But that our Aryan tongues, and also the Semitic, and all\nothers that have been studied scientifically, originated from roots, is\nnow generally known and recognised. That these roots may in remote times\nhave contained an element of imitation, we may readily concede, for it is\nreally self-evident; only we should not from the beginning bar our way by\nconceiving them as mere imitations of sound. If this were so, the problem\nof language would long since have been solved, and the first formation of\nideas would require no further reflection. It must be conceded on the\nother side that the origin of roots still contains much that is obscure,\nand that even Noir\u00e9\u2019s _clamor concomitans_ does not explain every case.\nOnly it is firmly established that a scientific analysis of language\nleaves a certain number of roots which are not mere sound-imitations, such\nas \u201cbow wow,\u201d or \u201cmoo moo.\u201d There are people who have taken much pains to\ndiscover whether the roots ever had an independent existence, or if they\nhave merely been scientifically abstracted, or shelled out of the words in\nwhich they occur. These are vain questions, for we can never of course\ncome at the matter historically, and the attempt to prove the necessity of\nthe one or the other view is a useless undertaking. It appears to be the\nmost reasonable plan to assume for the Aryan languages a period that\napproaches the Chinese, in which roots had the same sound and the same\nform as the corresponding noun, adjective, and verb. Even in Sanskrit\nroots appear at times still unchanged, although it is quite right that as\nsoon as they take on grammatical functions, they should no longer be\ncalled roots. Much may be said in favour of both views, without arriving\none step nearer our goal. If we now only remember that the whole Sanskrit\nlanguage has been reduced to 121 primitive ideas, and that the roots\ndenoting these (which are of course much more numerous) are not imitations\nof sound in the strict sense of the word, but sounds about whose origin we\nmay say much but can prove little, we have at least a \u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6 for our\nresearches. I myself, like my deceased friend Noir\u00e9, have looked upon\nroots as _clamor concomitans_, that is, not as sound-imitations, but as\nactual sounds, uttered by men in common occupations, and to be heard even\nnow. Why, however, the Aryans used and retained _ad_ for eat, _tan_ for\nstretch, _mar_ for rub, _as_ for breathe, _sta_ for stand, _ga_ for go, no\nhuman thought can find out; we must be content with the fact that it was\nso, and that a certain number of such roots\u2014of course much greater than\nthe 121 ideas expressed by them\u2014constitute the kernels from which has\nsprouted the entire flora of the Indian mind.\n\nIf we now return, to our _is_,\u2014Sanskrit _as-ti_, Greek \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, Latin\n_est_,\u2014we see that it originally meant \u201cto breathe out.\u201d This blowing or\nbreathing was then used for \u201clife,\u201d as in _as-u_, breath of life, and from\nlife it lost its content until it could be applied to everything existing,\nand meant nothing more than the abstract \u201cto be.\u201d There are languages that\npossess no such pale word as \u201cbe\u201d and could not form such a sentence as\n\u201cIt is warm.\u201d The auxiliary verb \u201cto have\u201d is also lacking in many\nlanguages, especially the ancient, such as Sanskrit, Greek, and even\nclassical Latin. If the words failed, the ideas failed as well, and such\nlanguages had to try and fulfil their requirements in other ways. If there\nwas no such word as \u201cbe,\u201d \u201cstand\u201d was employed; where there was no word\nfor \u201chave,\u201d then \u201chold,\u201d _tenere_, would render the same, or at least\nsimilar service. But this implied not only different speech, but different\nthought.\n\nBut here I should like to call attention to the long process through which\na language must pass, before it could reduce \u201cbreathe\u201d to \u201cbe\u201d and form\nsuch a sentence as \u201cIt is warm.\u201d Even an animal feels warmth, and can in\nvarious ways make known if it is overheated. But in all this it is only a\nquestion of feelings, not to ideas, and still less of language. Let us\nconsider \u201cwarm.\u201d Of course \u201cwarm\u201d may represent a mere feeling, and then a\nsimple panting would suffice to express it. That is communication, but not\nlanguage. To think a word like warm, a root and an idea are necessary.\nProbably, and in spite of a few phonetic difficulties, the root was in\nthis case _ghar_ (in _gharm\u00e1_, \u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2), and this meant at first to be\nbright, to glitter, to shine, then to burn, to heat, to be warm; that is\nto say, the observing mind of man was able to abstract brightness from the\nsense-impressions produced by sun, fire, gold, and many other objects,\nand, letting everything else drop, to reach the idea of shining, then of\nbeing warm. These ideas, of course, do not exist on their own account\nanywhere in the world; they must be and have been constructed by man\nalone, never by an animal. Why? Because an animal does not possess what\nman possesses: the faculty of grasping the many as one, so as to form an\nidea and a word. Light or lighting, warmth or warming, exist nowhere in\nthe world, and are nowhere given in sentient experience. Every object of\nsense exists individually, and is perceived as such individually, such as\nthe sun, a torch, a stove; but heat in general, like everything general,\nis the product of our thought; its name is made by us, and is not given\nus.\n\nOf all this, of course, when we learn to speak as children, we have no\nsuspicion. We learn the language made by others who came before us, and\nproceed from words to ideas, not from ideas to words. Whether the relation\nbetween ideas and words was a succession, it is hard to say, because no\nidea exists without a word, any more than a word without an idea. Word and\nidea exist through each other, beside each other, with each other; they\nare inseparable. We could as easily try to speak without thinking, as to\nthink without speaking. It is at first difficult to grasp this. We are so\naccustomed to think silently, before speaking aloud, that we actually\nbelieve that the same is true, even of the first formation of ideas and\nwords. Our so-called thinking _before_ speaking, however, refers simply to\nreflection, or deliberation. It is something quite different, and occurs\nonly with the aid of silent words that are in us, even if they are not\nuttered. Every person, particularly in his youth, believes that he\ncherishes within himself inexpressible feelings, or even thoughts. These\nare chiefly obscure feelings, and the expression of feelings has always\nbeen the most difficult task to be performed by language, because they\nmust first pass through a phase of conception. If, however, they are\nactually ideas, they are such as have an old expression that is felt to be\ninconvenient, or inadequate, and must be replaced by a new one. We cannot\ndo enough to rid ourselves of the old error, that thought is possible\nwithout words. We can, of course, repeat words without meaning; but that\nis not speaking, only making a noise. If any one, however, tells us that\nhe can think quite well without words, let this silent thinker be suddenly\ninterrupted, ask him of what he has thought in silence, and he will have\nto admit that it was of a dog, a horse, or a man\u2014in short, of something\nthat has a name. He need not utter these words\u2014that has never been\nmaintained, but he must have the ideas and their signs, otherwise there\nare not, and there cannot be for him, either ideas or things. How often we\nsee children move their lips while they are thinking, that is, speaking\nwithout articulation. We can, of course, in case of necessity, use other\nsigns; we can hold a dog on high and show him, but if we ask what is\nshown, we shall find that the actual dog is only a substitute for the\nabstract word \u201cdog,\u201d not the reverse, for a dog that is neither a spaniel,\npoodle, dachshund, etc., is nowhere to be found, _in rerum natura_, or in\ndomestic life. These things, that give us so much trouble, were often\nquite clear to the ancient Hindus, for their usual word for \u201cthing\u201d is\n_pad\u00e2rtha_; that is, meaning or purpose of the word. But men persist that\nthey are able to think without speaking aloud, or in silence. They persist\nthat thought comes first, and then speech; they persist that they can\nspeak without thinking,\u2014and that is often quite true,\u2014and that they can\nalso think without speaking, which must first be proved. Consider only\nwhat is necessary to form so simple a word as \u201cwhite.\u201d The idea of white\nmust be formed at the same time, and this can only be done by dropping\neverything but the colour from the sense-perceptions of such things as\nsnow, snowdrop, cloud, chalk, or sugar, then marking this colour, and, by\nmeans of a sign (in this case a vocal one), elevating it to a\ncomprehensible idea, and at the same time to a word. How this vocal token\noriginates it is often difficult, often quite impossible, to say. The\nsimplest mode is, for example, if there be a word for snow, to take this\nand to generalise it, and then to call sugar, for instance, snow, or\nsnowy, or snow-white. But the prior question, how snow was named, only\nrecedes for a while, and must of course be answered for itself. Given a\nword for snow, it can easily be generalised. But how did we name snow? I\nbelieve that snow, which forms into balls in melting and coheres, was\nnamed _nix nivis_, from a root _snigh_ or _snu_, denoting everything which\nmelted and yet stuck together or cohered. But these are mere possibilities\nthat may be true or false; yet their truth or falsity leave undisturbed\nthe fundamental truth, that each individual perception, as, for example,\nthis snow or this ice, first had to be brought under a general conception,\nbefore it could be clearly marked, or elevated to a word. In such a case\nmen formed, by living and working together, a general conception and a\nroot, for an oft-repeated action, such as forming into balls; and under\nthis general concept they then conceived an individual impression like\nsnow; that is, that which is formed into a ball, so that they had the\nsign, and with the sign the concept of snow, both inseparable in reality,\ndistinguishable as they are in their origin. Having this, they could\nextend the concept in the vocal sign for snow, and speak of snowy things,\njust as they spoke of rosy cheeks. Only we must not imagine that it will\never be possible to make the origin of root sounds perfectly clear. This\ngoes back to times that are entirely withdrawn from our observation. It\ngoes back to times in which the first general ideas were formed, and\nthereby the first steps were taken in the development of the human mind.\nHow is it possible that any recollection should have remained of such\nearly times, or even any understanding of these mental processes? We may\nsettle many things, but in the end nothing is left but to say: It is so,\nand remains so, whether we can explain it or not. The first general\nconcept may no doubt have been, as Noir\u00e9 affirmed, an often repeated\naction, such as striking, going, rubbing, chewing\u2014acts that spontaneously\npresent themselves to consciousness, as manifold and yet single, that is,\nas continually repeated, in which the mind consequently found the first\nnatural stimulus to the formation of concepts. Why, however, rub was\ndenoted by _mar_, eat by _ad_, go by _ga_, strike by _tud_, we may perhaps\napprehend by feeling, but we could not account for or even conceive it.\nHere we must be content with the facts, especially as in other families of\nlanguages we find entirely different vocal signs. No doubt there was a\nreason for all of them; but this reason, even if we could prove it\nhistorically, would always remain incomprehensible to us, and only as fact\nwould it have any significance for science.\n\nAt any rate, we can now understand in what manner language offers us\nreally historical documents of the oldest stages which we can reach in the\ndevelopment of the human mind. I say, \u201cwhich we can reach,\u201d for what lies\nbeyond language does not exist for us. Nothing remains of the history of\n_homo alalus_. But every word represents a deed, an acquisition of the\nmind. If we take such a word as the Vedic _deva_, there may have been many\nolder words for god, but let us not imagine that a fetish or totem, whose\netymology is or should be known, belongs to them. But at all events we\nknow from _deva_ and the Latin _deus_, that even before the Aryan\nseparation a root _dyu_ or _div_ had been formed, as well as the\nconception \u201cshine.\u201d If this root was first used actively for the act of\nshedding light, of striking a spark, of shining, it was a step farther to\ntransfer this originally active root to the image which the sky produces\nin us, and to call it a \u201cshiner,\u201d _dyu_ (nom. _dyaus_), and then with a\nnew upward tendency to call all bright and shining beings, _deva_, _deus_.\nMan started, therefore, from a generalisation, or an idea, and then under\nthis idea grouped other single presentations, such as sun, moon, and\nstars, from which \u201cshining\u201d had been withdrawn, or abstracted, and thus\nobtained as a mental acquisition a sign for the idea \u201cshine,\u201d and further\nformations such as _Dyaus_ (shiner) and _deva_ (shining). Now observe how\n_Dyaus_, as \u201cshiner,\u201d at the same time assumed the significance of an\notherwise unknown agent or author of light, and developed into the ancient\nDyaus, into Zeus and Jove; that is, into the oldest personal God of the\nstill united Aryans. These are the true stages of the development of the\nhuman mind, which are susceptible of documentary proof in the archives of\nlanguage.\n\nAll this occurred, of course, on exclusively Aryan ground, while the\nSemitic and other branches went their own way in the formation of ideas,\nand of sounds for their ideas. Physiologically all these branches may have\none and the same origin, but linguistically they have various beginnings,\nand have not, at least as far as scientific proof is possible, sprung from\none and the same source. The common origin of all languages is not\nimpossible, but it is and remains undemonstrable, and to science that is\nenough, _sapienti sat_. If we analyse the Semitic and other languages, we\nshall find in them as many ancient documents of the development of the\nhuman mind as in the Aryan. And just as we can clearly and plainly trace\nback the French _dieu_, the Latin _deus_, the Sanskrit _deva_, divine, to\nthe physical idea _div_, \u201cshine,\u201d so we can with thousands of other words,\nof which each indicates an act of will, and each gives us an insight into\nthe development of our mind. Whether the Aryans were in possession of\nother ideas and sounds for \u201cshine,\u201d etc., before the formation of _div_,\n_Dyaus_, and _deva_, must be left uncertain; at all events we see how\nnaturally the first consciousness of God developed in them, how the idea\nconditioned the language, and the language the idea, and both originated\nand continued inseparable one from the other.\n\nIf we take any root of the Aryan language, we shall be astonished at the\nenormous number of its derivatives and the shades in their meaning. Here\nwe see very plainly how thought has climbed forward upon words. We find,\nfor instance, in the list of Sanskrit roots, the root _bhar_ with the\nsimple meaning to bear. This we see plainly in _bhar\u00e2mi_, in _bibharmi_,\nin _bibharti_ (I bear, he bears), also in _bh\u00e1ras_ or _bhart\u00e1r_ (a\nbearer), and _bh\u00e2r\u00e1s_ (load) and _bh\u00e1rman_ and _bhart\u00ed_ (bearing), etc.\n\nBut these forms, with all their cases and persons and tenses, give us no\nidea of the fruitfulness of a root, especially if we follow its\nramifications in the cognate languages. In Greek we have \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9, in Latin\n_fero_, in Gothic _bairan_, in English _to bear_. The principal meanings\nwhich this root assumes are, to carry, carry hither, carry away, carry in,\nto support, to maintain, to bring forth, etc. We find simple derivatives\nsuch as the German _Bahre_, English _bier_ (French _bi\u00e8re_, borrowed), and\nalso \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd and _feretrum_, as well as _ferculum_ (a litter). On the\nother hand there is \u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd (a porter\u2019s wages), and \u03c6a\u03c1\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1a (quiver). And\n_barrow_ in wheel-barrow has the same origin. _Burden_ is that which is\nborne, then a load, as, for instance, the burden of years. A step farther\ntakes us to \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 (bearable) and \u1f04\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 (unbearable). We also find in\nGreek \u03b4\u03cd\u03c3\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, which corresponds exactly to the Sanskrit _durbhara_, with\nthe meaning \u201cheavy to bear.\u201d In Latin, however, _fertus_ signifies\nfruitful, like _fertilis_, _ferax_. We say, \u201cThe earth bears\u201d (_tr\u00e4gt_),\nand _Getreide_ (grain) meant originally that borne (_getragen_) by the\nearth (hence in Middle High German _Getr\u00e4gede_). So we have also _far_,\nthe oldest corn grown by the Romans, derived from _fero_, and along with\nit _f\u0101rina_ (flour), if it stands for _farrina_. _Far_ may originally,\nhowever, have also meant food, maintenance, and the Anglo-Saxon _bere_,\nthe English _barley_, are again related to it. Of course we have the same\nroot in derivatives, such as _lucifer_, _frugifer_, in Greek \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 or\n\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03ad\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2. In German it becomes a mere suffix, as _fruchtbar_, _dankbar_,\n_scheinbar_, _urbar_. Like \u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac means also what is carried or\nbrought, hence specially tribute, duty, tax. To bear a child was used in\nthe sense of to bring forth, and from this we have many derivatives such\nas _birth_, _born_, and Gothic _berusjos_ (parents), _parentes_ and _barn_\n(the child), like the Greek \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1.\n\nIf \u03b4\u03af\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 (carriage) stands for \u03b4\u03b9\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, it means originally a carriage\nfor two persons, just as \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03c2, Latin _amphora_, was a vessel with two\nhandles. We should scarcely believe that the same root is concealed in the\nGerman _Zuber_ (tub) and _Eimer_ (bucket). But _Zuber_ was originally\n_Zwiber_, a vessel with two handles, and _Eimer_ was _Einber_, a bucket\nwith one bail. We may compare _manubrium_ (handle) and derivatives like\n_candelebrum_, _lugubris_, as well as _luctifer_. If _bhartri_ meant\nbearer and then husband, as _bh\u00e2ry[~a]_ meant wife, _i.e._ the one to be\nmaintained, we are probably justified in seeing in _bhr\u00e2tar_ (brother) the\noriginal meaning of helper, protector. Although the wife is to be\nmaintained and sustained, she, too, brings something to the household, and\nthat is the \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bd\u03c9 (dowry). The Middle Latin expression _paraphernalia_ is\nproperly dowry, though it has now assumed an entirely different meaning.\n\u201cTo be carried\u201d easily takes the meaning of being torn away, _s\u2019emporter_,\nand this we find in the Greek represented by \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, in the Sanskrit in\nthe secondary form _bhur_ (to hasten), yielding _bhurany\u00fa_, _bh\u00farni_\n(hasty, violent), and other derivatives.\n\nWe have already seen how \u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 and \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac signified that which is\ncontributed, then duty, tribute. This is the Gothic _gabaur_, that is,\n_geb\u00fchr_ (due), and consequently all things that are proper or becoming.\n\n_Offerre_ (bring before) leads to _Opfer_ (sacrifice) and to the simpler\n_offrir_, as _sufferre_ to _souffrir_ (suffer).\n\nIt has been usual to derive _Fors_, _Fortuna_, from _ferre_,(50) the\ngoddess who brings, although she takes away as well. The ancients had no\ndoubts of this derivation, and \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd (fate) and \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (chance)\nseem to substantiate it. But the old divine character of _Fors_, _Fortuna_\n(as related to Harit), points to other sources, which had already entirely\nvanished from the consciousness of the ancients. Yet the expression, _es\ntr\u00e4gt sich zu_ (it happens), the old _gaburjan_, Anglo-Saxon _gebyrian_,\nand _kipuri_ (_zuf\u00e4llig_, casual), must be taken into account, and forms\nsuch as _forte_, _forsan_, _fortassis_ (_forte an si vis_), _fortuitus_,\nare very remote from their supposed mythological meaning. If _ferre_ were\nthe root, we should have further proof of the immeasurable fertility to\nwhich we owe such words as _fortune_ and _misfortune_.\n\nIt would lead us too far if we tried to collect all the meanings which our\nroots had in the various ancient Aryan tongues in combination with\nprepositions. It must suffice to select a small number from a modern\nlanguage such as French, which give us an idea of the endless\nmodifications to which every root is more or less adapted. Thus from\n_circumferre_ we have _circonf\u00e9rence_, also _p\u00e9riph\u00e9rie_, from _conferre_,\n_conf\u00e9rence_ and also _confortable_, from _deferre_ _d\u00e9f\u00e9rence_, from\n_differre_ _diff\u00e9rence_, from _praeferre_ _pr\u00e9f\u00e9rence_, from _proferre_\n_prof\u00e9rer_, from _referre_ _r\u00e9f\u00e9rence_, each word again with numerous\noffshoots. We are not at the end yet, and still less when we keep in view\nalso the parallel formations _tuli_ and _latum_, or _portare_. We then see\nwhat a root in this language has to signify, whether considered as a\nconcrete word or as a mere abstraction. This is prolific of contention and\nhas been much disputed; the main thing is to know the facts. From these we\nmay infer how in all this multiplicity the unity of the root element can\nbe best explained.\n\nI do not say that all ideas can be so clearly traced to their origin as in\nthis root. In some the intermediate forms have been lost, and the\netymologies become uncertain, often impossible. But the result on the\nwhole remains the same. Wherever we can see clearly, we see that what we\ncall mind and thought consists in this, that man has the power not only to\nreceive presentations like an animal, but to discover something general in\nthem. This element he can eliminate and fix by means of vocal signs; and\nhe can further classify single presentations under the same general\nconcepts, and mark them by the same vocal signs. What we call derivative\nforms, such as _deva_ besides _div_, are originally varieties in the\nformation of words, that in time proved useful, and through repeated\nemployment obtained their special application. Often, too, there are real\ncompounds, just as the German _bar_ in _fruchtbar_, _furchtbar_, etc., was\noriginally the same word that we have in _Bahre_ (bier), but was very\ndifferent from _bar_ in _Nachbar_ (neighbour), which in spite of the\nsimilarity in sound comes from an entirely different root, seen in _bauen_\n(build), _bebauen_ (cultivate), _bauer_ (peasant), and in the English\nneighbour.\n\nIf we have the ideas and the words, the process of thought, as Hobbes has\ntaught us, is nothing but an addition and subtraction of ideas. We add\nwhen we say, A is B; when we say, for instance, man, or Caius, is mortal,\nadding Caius, or man, to all that we call mortal; we subtract when we say,\nA is not B; that is, when we abstract Enoch from all that we call mortal.\nEverything that man has ever thought, humiliating as it may sound,\nconsists in these two operations; just as the most abstruse operations of\nmathematics go back in the end to addition and subtraction. To what else\ncould they go back? Whether these mental operations are true or false, is\nanother question, with which the method of the thinker has nothing to do;\nany more than formal logic inquires whether all men are mortal, but only\ninfers on the basis of these premises that Caius, because he is a man, is\nalso mortal.\n\nWe see, therefore, how language and thought go hand in hand; where there\nis as yet no word, there is not yet an idea. The thinking capacity of the\nmind has its source in language, lives in language, and develops\ncontinuously in language. The human mind is human language, and as animals\npossess no language, they do not _ipso facto_ possess what philosophers\nunderstand by mind. We need not for this reason ascribe any special\nfaculty to men. Speech and thought are only a wider development of the\nfaculty of presentation such as an animal may have; but in an animal it\nnever develops any farther, for an animal has no general ideas; it remains\nat the individual, and never attains unity in plurality. It knows, as\nPlato would say, a horse, but not \u201chorsedom.\u201d If we wish to say that the\nperceiving self is present in animals as in men, there is no objection,\nthough in all such, questions relating to animals we are always groping in\nthe dark. But the fact remains that the step, whether small or vast, that\nleads from the individual to the general, from the concrete to the\nabstract, from perceiving (that is, being acted upon) to conceiving,\nthinking, speaking, that is, to acting, is for the animal impossible. An\nanimal might speak, but it cannot; a stone might grow, but it cannot; a\ntree might walk, but it cannot. Why not? Because there are natural\nboundaries that are apparently easy to pass, and yet impassable. The tree\ngrows up a tree, the animal an animal, but no farther, just as man never\nsurpasses the human, and therefore can never think except through\nlanguage, which often is very imperfect.\n\nIn one sense, therefore, the Horseherd is quite right. The mind is a\ndevelopment, an eternal, ceaseless development; but when he calls it a\nfunction possessed by all living organisms, even a goose and a chicken, he\ngoes far beyond the facts. No goose speaks, although it cackles, and\nalthough by cackling it apprised the Romans of the important fact that\ntheir Capitol was in danger. How much a dog could tell us if he could\nspeak! As if this capacity or incapacity is not as much the result of\nintention as every other capacity and incapacity in nature! If we\ntranslate this ability by _facultas_, that is _facilitas_, we need not for\nthat reason assume in man a faculty, or as the Horseherd calls it, a\nphantom, but the thing remains the same. We can speak, and an animal\ncannot; we can think, and an animal cannot.\n\nBut it must not be supposed that because we deny thought and speech to\nanimals, we wish to degrade them. Everything that has been told us of the\ningenious tricks of animals, even the most incredible, we shall gladly\nbelieve, only not that _bos locutus est_, or that an actual utterance lies\nhidden in the bark of a dog. A man who sees no difference between language\nand communication will of course continue to say that a dog speaks, and\nexplain in how many dialects he barks, when he is hungry, when he wants to\ngo out with his master, when he hears burglars in the house, or when he\nhas been whipped and whines. It would be more natural if scientists\nconfined themselves to facts, without asking for reasons, and primarily to\nthe great fact that no animal, with the exception of man, speaks, or ever\nhas spoken. The next duty of the observer is to ask: Why is this? There is\nno physical impossibility. A parrot can imitate all words. There must\ntherefore be a non-physical cause why there has never been a parrot or dog\nlanguage. Is that true or false? And if we now call that non-physical\ncause mind, or still better the Logos, namely, the gatherer of the many\ninto the one, comprehending, conceiving, is our argument so erroneous if\nwe seek the distinction between man and animal in the Logos, in speech and\nthought, or in mind? This mind is no ghost, as the Horseherd asserts, nor\nis it a mere phantom of the brain as is imagined by so many scientists. It\nis something real, for we see its effects. It is born, like everything\nthat belongs to our ego, of the self-conscious Self, which alone really\nand eternally exists and abides.\n\nSo far I hope to have answered the second objection of the Horseherd or\nHorseherds, that the mind is a function possessed also by a goose or a\nchicken. Mind is language, and language is mind, the one the _sine qua\nnon_ of the other, and so far no goose has yet spoken, but only cackled.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\n\n                      The Reasonableness Of Religion\n\n\nThe most difficult and at all events the thorniest problem that was\npresented to me by the Horseherd still remains unanswered, and I have long\ndoubted whether I should attempt to answer it in so popular a periodical\nas the _Deutsche Rundschau_.\n\nThere are so many things that have been so long settled among scholars\nthat they are scarcely mentioned, while to a great majority of even\nwell-informed people they are still enveloped in a misty gloom. To this\nclass belong especially the so-called articles of faith. We must not\nforget that with many, even with most men, faith is not faith, but\nacquired habit. Why otherwise should the son of a Jew be a Jew, the son of\na Parsi a Parsi? Moreover, no one likes to be disturbed in his old habits.\nThere are questions, too, on which mankind as it is now constituted will\nnever reach a common understanding, because they lie outside the realm of\nscience or the knowable. Concerning such questions it is well to waste no\nmore words. But it is on just such a question, namely, the true nature of\nrevelation, that the Horseherd and his companions particularly wish to\nknow my views. The current theory of revelation is their greatest\nstumbling block, and they continually direct their principal attack\nagainst this ancient stronghold. On the other hand there is nothing so\nconvenient as this theory, and many who have no other support cling fast\nto this anchor. The Bible is divine revelation, say they, therefore it is\ninfallible and unassailable, and that settles everything.\n\nNow we must, above all things, come to an understanding as to what is\nmeant by revelation before we attribute revelation to the Bible. There are\nnot many now who really believe that an angel in bodily form descended\nfrom heaven and whispered into the ear of the apostles, in rather bad\nGreek, every verse, every word, even every letter of our Gospels. When\nPeter in his second Epistle (i. 18) assures us that he heard a voice from\nheaven, that is a fact that can only be confirmed, or invalidated, by\nwitnesses. But when he immediately after says (i. 21) that \u201choly men of\nGod spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit,\u201d he presents to us a view\nof inspiration that is easily intelligible, the possibility or truth of\nwhich must yet be first determined by psychologists. If it be conceded,\nhowever, that holy men may partake of such an inspiration, even then it is\nplain that it requires a much higher inspiration to declare others to be\ndivinely inspired than to make such a claim for oneself alone. This\ntheory, that the Gospels are inspired by God, and therefore are infallible\nand unassailable, has gained more and more currency since the time of the\nReformation. The Bible was to be the only authority in future for the\nChristian faith. Pope and ecclesiastical tradition were cast aside, and a\ngreater stress was consequently laid on the _litera scripta_ of the New\nTestament. This naturally led to a very laborious and detailed criticism\nof these records, which year by year assumed a wider scope, and was\nfinally absorbed in so many special investigations that its original\npurpose of establishing the authority of the Scriptures of the New\nTestament seems to have quite passed out of sight. These critical\ninvestigations concerning the manuscripts of the New Testament, Codex\nSinaiticus, Alexandrimus, and Vaticanus, down to Number 269, Bentley\u2019s Q,\nare probably of less interest to the Horseherd; they are known to those\nwho make a special study of this subject, and are of no interest outside.\n\nIf, as might have happened, without any miracle, the original autograph of\nthe Gospels, as they were written by the apostles or some one else with\ntheir own hands, had been carefully preserved in the archives of the first\npopes, our professors would have been spared much labour. But we nowhere\nread that these successors and heirs of Peter showed any special\nsolicitude for this prime duty of their office, the preservation of this\nprecious jewel of their treasure, the New Testament. What they neglected,\nhad therefore to be recovered by our philologists. Just as those who\nwished to study the Peloponnesian war resorted to the manuscripts of\nThucydides, the Christian scholars, to become acquainted with the origins\nof Christianity, betook themselves to the manuscripts of the New\nTestament. And as the manuscripts of Thucydides vary widely from one\nanother and in certain passages leave us quite helpless, so do the\nmanuscripts of the New Testament. Bentley speaks of thirty thousand _vari\u00e6\nlectiones_ in the New Testament; but since his time their number must have\nincreased fourfold. The manuscripts of the New Testament are more numerous\nthan those of any classic. Two thousand are known and have been described,\nand more yet may lie buried in libraries. Now while this large number of\nmanuscripts and various readings have given the philologists of the New\nTestament greater difficulties than the classical philologist encounters,\nstill on the other hand the New Testament has the advantage over all\nclassical texts, in that some of its manuscripts are much older than those\nof the majority of classical writers. We have, for instance, no complete\nmanuscripts of Homer earlier than the thirteenth century, while the oldest\nmanuscripts of the New Testament descend from the fourth and fifth\ncenturies. It is frequently said that all these things are of no\nimportance for the understanding of the New Testament, and that\ntheologians need not trouble themselves about them. But this is saying too\nmuch. There are _vari\u00e6 lectiones_, which are certainly not without\nimportance for the facts and the doctrines of Christianity, and in which\nthe last word belongs not to the theologian, but to the philologist. No\none would say that it makes no difference if Mark xvi. 9-20 is omitted or\nnot; no one would declare that the authenticity or spuriousness of the\nsection on the adulteress (John vii. 53-viii. 11) was entirely\nindifferent. When we consider what contention there has been over the\nseventh verse of the fifth chapter of the first Epistle of John, and how\nthe entire doctrine of the Trinity has been based on that (\u201cFor there are\nthree that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost:\nand these three are one\u201d), it will hardly be maintained that the\nmanuscripts are of no importance for Christian dogma. Whether in the first\nEpistle to Timothy iii. 16, we read \u039f\u03a3 for \u0398\u03a3, that is, \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2, is also not\nquite immaterial. Still I admit that in comparison to the problems\npresented to me by the Horseherd and his comrades, these _vari\u00e6 lectiones_\nwill not rack our brains nearly so badly. I have been reproached for still\nowing my friends an answer to the attacks which they directed exclusively\nagainst Christian religion. It was, however, impossible to deal thoroughly\nwith these matters, without first taking into consideration their\nobjections against all religion.\n\nI therefore first endeavoured to make clear to my unknown friends two\nthings, which constitute the foundation of all religion: first, that the\nworld is rational, that it is the result of thought, and that in this\nsense only is it the creation of a being which possesses reason, or is\nreason itself (the Logos); and secondly, that mind or thought cannot be\nthe outcome of matter, but on the contrary is the _prius_ of all things.\nTo this end a statement of the results of the philosophy of language was\nabsolutely necessary, partly to establish more clearly the relation of\nthought to speech, partly to comprehend the true meaning of the Logos or\nthe Word in the New Testament, and understand in how easily intelligible\nand perfectly reasonable a sense the term \u201cWord\u201d (Logos) can be applied to\nthe Son of God.\n\nI am not one of those who pretend to find no difficulties in all these\nquestions. On the contrary, I have wrestled with them for years, and\nremember well the joy I felt when first the true historical meaning of the\nopening of the Fourth Gospel, \u201cIn the beginning was the word,\u201d became\nclear to me. It is true that I turned no somersaults like the Horseherd,\nbut I was well satisfied. I do not therefore consider the objections\nraised by him as unfounded or without justification; on the contrary, it\nwere better if others would speak with the same freedom as he has done,\nalthough a calmer tone in such matters would be more effective than the\nfortissimo of the Horseherd.\n\nWhat aided me most in the solution of these religious or theological\ndifficulties, was a comparative study of the religions of mankind. In\nspite of their differences, they are all afflicted with the same ailments,\nand when we find that we encounter the same difficulties in other\nreligions as those with which we are ourselves contending, it is safe to\nconsider them as deeply rooted in human nature, and in this same nature,\nbe it weak or strong, to seek their solution. As comparative philology has\nproved that many of the irregular nouns and verbs are really the most\nregular and ancient, so it is with the irregular, that is, the miraculous\noccurrences in the history of religion. Indeed, we may now say that it\nwould be a miracle if there were anywhere any religion without miracles,\nor if the Scriptures on which any religion is based were not presented by\nthe priests and accepted by the believers as of superhuman, even divine\norigin, and therefore infallible. In all these matters we must seek for\nthe reasons, and in this manner endeavour to understand their truth as\nwell as error.\n\nWhether or not I have succeeded in proving that the world is rational, and\nthat mind is the _prius_ of matter, I must leave to the decision of the\nHorseherd and his friends. Fortunately these questions are of that nature\nthat we may entertain different opinions upon them without accusing each\nother of heresy. Many Darwinians, for instance, Romanes, and even Huxley,\nhave always considered themselves good Christians, although they believed\nthe doctrine of Darwin to be the only way of salvation. If, however, we\ntake up such questions as were propounded to me by the Horseherd, and\nwhich have more to do with Christian theology than Christian religion,\nthere is an immediate change of tone, and unfortunately the difference of\nview becomes at once a difference of aim. The moral element enters\nimmediately, and those who _believe_ otherwise are designated unbelievers,\nthough we do not at once stamp those who _think_ otherwise as incapable of\nthought. Here lies the great difficulty in considering and treating calmly\nreligious, or rather, theological questions. There is little hope of\nreaching a mutual understanding when the first attack is characterised by\nsuch vigour as was shown by the Horseherd and many of his comrades. He\nspeaks at once of tales of fraud and deceit, and of the fantasies of the\nChristian religion. He says that he is full of bloodthirstiness against\nthe Jewish idea of God, and believes that since the writings of Hume and\nSchopenhauer, positive Christianity has become a sheer impossibility, and\nmore of the same import. This is certainly \u201cfortissimo,\u201d but not therefore\nby any means \u201cverissimo.\u201d\n\nOther correspondents, such as Agnosticus, declare all revelation a\nchimera; in short, there has been no lack of expressions subversive of\nChristianity, and, in fact, of all revealed religion.\n\nAt this point a glance at the development of the religion of the Hindus\nmay be of great service to us. Nowhere is the idea of revelation worked\nout so carefully as in their literature. They have a voluminous\nliterature, treating of religion and philosophy, and they draw a very\nsharp distinction between revealed and unrevealed works (_S_ruti and\nSm_ri_ti). Here much depends upon the name. Revealed meant originally\nnothing more than plain and clear, and when we speak of a revelation, in\nordinary life, this is not much more than a communication. But erelong\n\u201creveal\u201d was used in the special sense of a communication from a\nsuperhuman to a human being. The question of the possibility of such a\ncommunication raised little difficulty. But this possibility depends\nnaturally on the prior conception of superhuman beings and of their\nrelationship to human beings. So long as it was imagined that they\noccasionally assumed human form, and could mingle in very human affairs, a\ncommunication from a Not-man, I will not say a monster, presents no great\ndifficulties. The Greeks went so far as to ascribe to men of earlier times\na closer intercourse with the gods. But even with them the idea that man\nshould not enter too closely into the presence of the gods breaks forth\nhere and there, and Semele, who wished to be embraced by Zeus in all his\nglory, found her destruction in this ecstasy. As soon as the Deity was\nconceived in less human fashion, as in the Old Testament, intercourse\nbetween God and man became more and more difficult. In Genesis this\nintercourse is still represented very simply and familiarly, as when God\nwalks about in the Garden of Eden, and Adam and Eve are ashamed of their\nnakedness before Him. Soon, however, a higher conception of God enters, so\nthat Moses, for example (Exodus xxxiii. 23), may not see the face of\nJehovah, but still ventures at least to look upon His back. The writer of\nthe Fourth Gospel goes still farther and declares (i. 18), \u201cNo man hath\nseen God at any time, the only begotten son, which is in the bosom of the\nFather, he hath declared Him.\u201d Here we clearly see that the possibility of\nintercourse between man and God, and a revelation of God to man, depends\nchiefly or exclusively on the conception which man has previously formed\nof God and man. In all theological researches we must carefully bear in\nmind that the idea of God is _our_ idea, which we have formed in part\nthrough tradition, and in part by our own thinking; and we must not forget\nthat existence formed an essential attribute of this idea, whatever\nopposition may have been raised against the ontological proof in later\ntimes. After what we have seen of the true relationship between thought\nand speech, it follows that the name, and with it the idea of a divine\nbeing, can only proceed from man. God is and remains _our_ God. We can\nhave a knowledge of Him only through our inner consciousness, not through\nour senses. God Himself has no more imparted His name to mankind than the\nfixed stars and planets to which we have given names, although we only\nsee, but do not hear or touch them. This must be absolutely clear to us\nbefore we dare speak of the possibility or impossibility of a revelation.\n\nNow it is very useful, before we treat of our own idea of a revelation\nemanating from God, to look round among other nations and see how they\nreached the idea of a revelation. We see in India that a number of hymns\nin an ancient dialect and in fixed metres were preserved by oral\ntradition\u2014the method was wonderful, but is authenticated by history\u2014before\nthere could have been a thought of reducing them to writing. These hymns\ncontain very little that would appear to be too high or too deep for an\nordinary human poet. They are of great interest to us because they make\nknown, as clearly as possible, the sound of the oldest Aryan language, and\nthe nature of the oldest Aryan gods. As Professor Deussen, in his valuable\nHistory of Philosophy says, (I, 83), the Vedic religion, which he at the\nsame time calls the oldest philosophy, is richer in disclosures than any\nother in the world. In this sense he very properly calls the study of the\nRigveda the high school of the science of religion, so that as he says no\none can discuss these matters without a knowledge of it. This unique\ndistinction rests, as he truly remarks, on the fact, \u201cThat the process on\nwhich originally all gods depend, the personification of the phenomena of\nnature, while it is more or less obscured by all other religions, in the\nRigveda still takes place, so to speak, before our eyes visibly and\npalpably.\u201d I have long preached this in vain. All who have studied the\nRigveda say this, and all who have not studied it say just the contrary,\nand lay especial stress upon the fact that these hymns contain ideas that\nonce and for all they declare as modern. But no one has ever contended\nthat this is not so. What is historically the oldest, may from a higher\npoint of view be quite modern, and there are scholars who even look upon\nAdam as a reformer of mankind. Those who best know the Rigveda have often\nshown that it stands at a tolerably advanced stage, and here and there\ncasts a distant glance into its own past. I myself have often said that I\nwould give much if I could escape from my own proofs of the age of this\ncollection of hymns, and could clearly show that at least some of these\nVedic hymns had been added later.\n\nThese hymns, therefore, just because, judging from their language and\nmetre, they are older than everything else in India, or even in the entire\nAryan world, and because they are mainly concerned with the ancient gods\nof nature, appeared to the Hindus themselves as _apaurusheya_, that is,\nnot wrought by man. They were called _S_ruti, (that which was heard), in\ndistinction from other literature, which was designated as Sm_ri_ti, or\nrecollection.\n\nAll this is easily intelligible. There followed a period, however, during\nwhich the true understanding of the hymns became considerably obscured,\nand a new series of works, the so-called Br\u00e2hma_n_as, arose. These were\nvery different from the hymns. They are composed in a younger language and\nin prose. They treat of the sacrifice, so full of significance in India,\nat which the hymns were employed, and which seems to me to have been\noriginally designed for measuring time, and thus served to mark the\nprogress of civilisation. They explain the meaning of the hymns, often\nquite erroneously; but they contain some interesting information upon the\ncondition of India, long after the period when the hymns first appeared,\nand yet before the rise of Buddhism in the sixth century before Christ. It\nhas been supposed that, as the Br\u00e2hma_n_as were composed in prose, they\nwere originally written, according to the hypothesis of Wolf, that prose\neverywhere presupposes the knowledge of writing. I cannot admit this in\nthe case of India; at any rate, there is no trace of any acquaintance with\nwriting in the whole of this extensive mass of literature. It was\nthroughout a mnemonic literature, and just because the art of writing was\nunknown, the memory was cultivated in a manner of which we have no idea.\nAt all events, the Brahmans themselves knew nothing of the Br\u00e2hma_n_as in\nwritten form, and included them with the hymns under the names Veda and\n_S_ruti; that is, they regarded them, in our phraseology, as revealed, and\nnot the work of men.\n\nThe remarkable thing, however, is that they did not assume, like the\nRomans in the case of Numa and Egeria, a communication from the Vedic gods\nof nature to ordinary men, but contented themselves with declaring that\nthe Veda had been seen by the Rishis, whose name Rishi they explained\netymologically as \u201cseer.\u201d\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that what the Brahmans understood under _S_ruti\nwas nothing more than literature composed in an ancient language (for the\nBr\u00e2hma_n_as are also composed in an ancient language, though not as\nancient as that of the hymns), and treating of matters on which apparently\nman alone can establish no authority. For how could ordinary man take on\nhimself to speak about the gods or to give directions for the sacrifice,\nto make promises for the reward of pious works, or even to decide what is\nmorally right or wrong? More than human authority was necessary for this,\nand so the Br\u00e2hma_n_as, as well as the hymns, were declared to be\n_apaurusheya_, that is, not human, though by no means divine, in the sense\nof having been imparted by one of the Devas.\n\nWe see, therefore, that the idea of the _S_ruti, while approaching to our\nidea of revelation as _apaurusheya_, that is, not human, does not quite\ncoincide with it. What was ancient and incomprehensible, was called\nsuperhuman, and soon became infallible and beyond assault. If we look at\nother religions, we find that Buddhism denied the Veda every authority,\nand in conformity with its own character especially excluded every idea of\nsuperhuman revelation. In China, too, we look in vain for revelation. In\nPalestine, however, we find the idea that the Lord Himself spoke with\nMoses, who delivered His commands to Israel, and the tables of the\ncommandments were even written by God\u2019s own fingers on both sides. But\nthis must not be confounded with written literature. The idea that the\nentire Old Testament was written or revealed by Jehovah is absolutely not\nof ancient Jewish origin, whatever respect may have been shown to the holy\nbooks as recognised in the Synagogue.\n\nAs for Islam, the Koran is looked upon as communicated to Mohammed by the\nangel Gabriel, even as Zoroaster in the Avesta claims to have received\ncertain communications in conversation with Ahuramazda.\n\nIn Christianity, in whose history the theory of revelation has played so\ngreat a part, there is in fact\u2014and this is frequently overlooked\u2014no\ndeclaration on the subject by Christ or the apostles themselves. That the\nGospels, as they have come down to us, have been revealed, is nowhere\nstated in them, nor can it be gathered from the Acts of the Apostles or\nthe Epistles. No one has ever maintained that any New Testament Scripture\nwas known to Christ or even to the apostles.(51) On the contrary, if we\ntake the titles of the Gospels in their natural meaning, they do not\npurport to have been written down by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John\nthemselves: they are simply the sacred history as it was recorded by\nothers according to each of these men. Attempts have indeed been made to\nreason away the meaning of \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac, \u201caccording to,\u201d and interpret it as \u201cby,\u201d\nbut it is more natural to take it in its ordinary sense. When Paul, in his\nsecond Epistle to Timothy (iii. 16), says, \u201cEvery scripture inspired of\nGod is also profitable for teaching,\u201d this is the usual mode of expression\napplied to the Scriptures of the Old, not of the New Testament (John v.\n39), and would merely signify inspired, breathed in, not revealed in each\nword and letter.\n\nIn any case we learn this much from a comparative study of religions, that\nthe majority of them have their holy books, which are usually the oldest\nremains of literature, oral or written, that they possess. They look upon\nthe authors of these Scriptures as extraordinary, even superhuman beings;\nand the later theologians in order to remove from the minds of the people\nevery doubt as to their truth, devised the most ingenious theories, to\nshow how these books were not produced by men, but were merely seen by\nthem, and how in the end even the words and letters of the original text\nwere dictated to certain individuals. It is imagined, therefore, that the\nDeity condescended to speak Hebrew or Greek in the dialect of that period,\nand that therefore no letter or accent may be disturbed.\n\nThis would, of course, make the matter very easy, and this is no doubt the\nreason why the theory has found so many adherents. It is only strange that\nno founder of any religion ever appears to have felt the necessity of\nleaving anything in his own writing either to his contemporaries or to\nposterity. No one has ever attempted to prove that Moses wrote books, nor\nhas it ever been said of Christ that he composed a book (John vii. 15).\nThe same is true of Buddha, in spite of the legend of the alphabets; and\nof Mohammed we know from himself that he could neither read nor write.\nWhat we possess, therefore, in the way of holy Scriptures is always the\nproduct of a later generation, and subject to all the hazards involved in\noral tradition. This was not to be avoided, and ought not to surprise us.\nIf we attempt ourselves to write down without the aid of books or\nmemoranda, occurrences or conversations of which we were witnesses fifty\nyears ago, we shall see how difficult it is, and how untrustworthy is our\nmemory. We may be entirely veracious, but it by no means follows that we\nare also true and trustworthy. Let any one try to describe the incidents\nof the Austro-Prussian War without referring to books, and he will see\nhow, with the best intentions, names and dates will waver and reel. When\ndid the German National Assembly elect the German Emperor? Who were the\nmembers of the regency? Who was Henry Simon, and were there one or more\nSimons, like the nine Simons in the New Testament? Who can answer these\nquestions now without newspapers, and yet these are matters only fifty\nyears old, and at the time were well known to all of us. Was it different\nwith the Christians in the year 50 A.D.? It was therefore very natural\nthat a certain inspiration or pre\u00ebminent endowment should be demanded for\nthe authors of the Gospels; if some do so still, it is on their own\nresponsibility, just as if we demanded for the mother of Mary the same\nimmaculate birth as for Mary herself, _et sic ad infinitum_. These are for\nthe most part merely excuses for human unbelief. Nothing proves the\nveracity of the authors of the Gospels so clearly as the natural, often\nderogatory words which they use of themselves, or even more of the\napostles. These did not understand, as they say, the simplest parables or\nteachings; they were jealous of one another; Peter even denied the Lord;\nin short, the authors of the Gospels cannot be credited with sinlessness\nand infallibility, supposing that they were really the apostles.\n\nIf they were not, then all these difficulties of our own making disappear.\nWe then find in the Gospels just what we might expect: no ingeniously\nprepared statements without inconsistencies and without contradictions,\nbut simple, natural accounts, such as were current from the first to the\nthird generations in certain circles or localities, and even according to\nthe attachment of certain families to the personal narrations of one or\nanother of the apostles. We must not forget that in the first generation\nthe necessity for a record was not even felt. Children were still brought\nup as Jews, for Christianity did not seek to destroy, only to fulfil; and\nas all the Scriptures, that is the Old Testament, were derived from God\nand were good for instruction, they continued in use for teaching without\nfurther question. But in the second and third generations the breach\nbetween Jews and Christians became wider and wider, and the number of\nthose who had known Christ and the apostles, less and less; the need of\nbooks especially for the instruction of children consequently became more\nurgent, and the four Gospels thus arose by a natural process in answer to\na natural and even irresistible want. The difficulties involved even in\nthe smallest contradiction between the Gospels on a theory of inspiration\nthus disappear of themselves; nay, their discrepancies become welcome,\nbecause they entirely exclude every idea of intentional deviation, and\nsimply exhibit what the historical conditions would lead us to expect. Of\nwhat harm is it, for instance, that Matthew (viii. 28), in relating the\nexpulsion of the devils in the land of the Gergesenes, speaks of two\npossessed men, while Mark (v. 2) knows only of one among the Gadarenes?\nMark also speaks only of unclean spirits, while Matthew speaks of devils.\nMark and Luke know the name of the sufferer, Legion; Matthew does not\nmention the Roman name. These are matters of small import in human\ntraditions and records; in divine revelations they would be difficult to\nexplain.\n\nBut it becomes still more difficult when we come to expressions which are\nreally significant and essential for Christianity, for even in these we\nfind inconsistencies. What can be more important than the passage in which\nChrist asks his disciples, \u201cBut whom say ye that I am,\u201d and Peter answers,\n\u201cThou art the Messiah\u201d (Mark viii. 29). That was a purely Jewish-Christian\nanswer, and Jesus accepts it as the perfect truth, which, however, should\nstill remain secret. In (Matthew xvi. 16) Peter says not only, \u201cThou art\nthe Messiah,\u201d but adds, \u201cSon of the living God.\u201d This makes a great\ndifference, and the remarkable thing is, that later on Jesus only commands\nhis disciples to keep secret that he, Jesus, was the Messiah, and says\nnothing of himself as the Son of God. So much has been written about other\ndiscrepancies in this passage, particularly of the promise of the building\nof the church upon this rock (Peter), which is only found in (Matthew xvi.\n18), that we have nothing further to say about it, unless it be that in\nMark in this very passage Jesus rebukes Peter because he thinks more of\nthe world than of God, like so many of his later successors.\n\nLet us bear in mind further that neither revelation nor divine inspiration\nwas really necessary for recording most of the things related in the\nGospels. The less, the better; for either the witnesses knew that Pilate\nwas at the time governor in Palestine, that Caiaphas was high priest, and\nthat Jairus was ruler of a synagogue, or they did not know it, and in that\ncase we cannot assume that these things were revealed to them by God\nwithout irreverence. If, however, it is impossible that God should have\ninspired or sanctioned the historical part of the Gospels, why then the\nother part, which contains the teachings of Christ? Is it not much better,\nmuch more honest and trustworthy for the writers to have communicated them\nto us, as they knew and understood them (and that they occasionally\nmisunderstood them they themselves quite honestly admit), than to have\nbeen supernaturally inspired for the purpose, and even to have received a\nrevelation in the form of a theophany? Through such weak human ideas we\nmerely drag the Real, the truly Divine, into the dust, and from whom do\nthese ideas of a divine inspiration or revelation come, if not from men as\nthey were everywhere, whether in India or Judea? Everywhere the natural is\ndivine, the supernatural or miraculous is human.\n\nEven for the Apostles and the authors of the Gospels there was only one\nrevelation: that was the revelation through Christ; and this has an\nentirely different meaning. To understand this, however, we must glance at\nwhat we know of the intellectual movements of that time. The Jewish nation\ncherished two great expectations. The one was ancient and purely Jewish,\nthe expectation of the Messiah, the anointed (Christ), who should be the\npolitical and spiritual liberator of the chosen but enslaved people of\nIsrael. The other was also Jewish, but transfused with Greek philosophy,\nthe recognition of the word (Logos) as the Son of God, who should\nreconcile or unite humanity with God. The first declares itself most\nclearly, though not exclusively, in the three so-called Synoptic Gospels,\nthe second in the so-called Gospel of John. But it is worthy of note how\noften these apparently remote ideas are found combined in the Gospels. The\nidea that a man can be the Son of God was blasphemy in a strict Jewish\nview, and it was for this reason that the last question of the high priest\nwas, \u201cI adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be\nthe Christ, the Son of God\u201d (Matthew xxvi. 63). The Jewish Messiah could\nnever be the Son of God, the Word, in the Christian sense of the term, but\nonly in the sense in which many nations have called God the Father of men.\nIn this sense, also, the Jews say (John viii. 4), \u201cWe have one father,\neven God,\u201d while they start back affrighted at the idea of a divine\nsonship of man. The Messiah, according to Jewish doctrine, was to be the\nson of David (Matthew xxii. 42), as the people appear to have called Jesus\n(Mark x. 47, xv. 39), and in order to counteract this view Christ himself\nsaid, in a passage of great historical import: \u201cHow then doth David in\nspirit call the Messiah Lord, saying, The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou\non my right hand till I make thine enemies thy footstool? If then David\ncalled him Lord, how is he his son?\u201d With these words the true Messiah\npublicly renounced his royal descent from David, whilst he immediately\nlaid claim to a much higher one. Of what use is it, then, that the author\nof the Gospel takes such pains in the first chapter to trace Joseph\u2019s\ndescent genealogically from David, in spite of the fact that he does not\nrepresent Joseph himself as the natural father of Jesus?\n\nThese contradictions are quite conceivable in an age strongly influenced\nby different intellectual currents, but they would be intolerable in a\nrevealed or divinely inspired book. All becomes intelligible, clear, and\nfree from contradiction, if we see in the Synoptic Gospels that which they\nprofess to be\u2014narratives of what had long been told and believed in\ncertain circles about the teaching and person of Christ. I say, what they\nthemselves profess to be; for can we believe, that if the authors had\nreally witnessed a miraculous vision, if every word and every letter had\nbeen whispered to them, they would have made no mention of it? They relate\nso many wonders, why not this one, the greatest of all? But it is not\nenough that they do not claim any miraculous communication for themselves\nor their works. Luke states in plain words the character of his gospel,\n\u201cFor as much as many have taken in hand to draw up a narrative concerning\nthose matters which have been fulfilled among us, even as they delivered\nthem unto us, which from the beginning were eye-witnesses, and ministers\nof the word (Logos); it seemed good to me also, having traced the course\nof all things accurately from the first, to write unto thee in order, most\nexcellent Theophilus, that thou mightest know the certainty concerning the\nthings wherein thou wast instructed.\u201d\n\nWhat can be clearer? Theophilus had evidently received a not very\nsystematic Christian training, such as was possible under the conditions\nof that time. As Luke says, there were even then several works on the\nmatters of common belief among Christians. In order, however, that\nTheophilus may have a trustworthy knowledge of them, his friend (whether\nLuke or any one else) determines to communicate them to him in regular\norder, as they had been imparted to him, without asserting that he had\nhimself been from the beginning an eye-witness of them, or a minister of\nthe Word. It is apparent, therefore, that the writer rests upon a\ntradition derived from eye-witnesses, and that he had even investigated\neverything with care. Is it credible that he would not have made mention\nof a revelation or a theophany, had either fallen to his lot? He also lays\nstress upon his orderly arrangement, which probably implies that even at\nthat time there were the same discrepancies in the sequence of events that\nwe observe in the four Gospels, to say nothing about the numerous\napocryphal Gospels. This is just what we as historians expected, in fact\nit could scarcely be otherwise. Christ\u2019s message had first to pass through\nthe colloquial process, the leavening process of oral transmission; then\nfollowed the reduction to written form, and it is this that we have, apart\nfrom the corruptions of copyists. It is difficult to conceive how it could\nhave been otherwise, and still we are not content with these facts, and\nimagine that we could have done it much better ourselves.\n\nWhen we take the Synoptic Gospels one by one, we find in Luke the most\ncomplete and probably the latest sequence of all the important events; in\nMark, the shortest and probably most original narrative, which only\ncontains that which seemed to him undisputed or of the greatest\nimportance; while Matthew, on the contrary, clearly presents the tradition\nformed and established among the Jewish Christians and believers in the\nMessiah.\n\nIf we may speak of communities at this early time, the community for which\nthe first Gospel was intended manifestly consisted of converted Jews, who\nhad recognised in Jesus their long-expected Messiah or Christ, and were,\ntherefore, convinced that everything which had been expected of the\nMessiah came true in this Jesus. They went still farther. When they were\nonce convinced that Jesus was the Messiah, many traditions arose which\nascribed to him what he, if he were the Messiah, must have done. This is\nthe pervading feature of the first Gospel, as every one who reads it\ncarefully may easily be convinced. This alone explains the frequent and\nfrank expression that this and that occurred \u201cfor thus it was written, and\nthus it was spoken by the prophet.\u201d Every idea of intentional invention of\nMessianic fulfilments, which has so often been asserted, disappears of\nitself in our interpretation of the origin of the Gospel. It must be so,\npeople thought, and they soon told themselves and their children that it\nhad been so, and all in good faith, for otherwise Jesus could not have\nbeen the expected Messiah.\n\nIf we examine the gospel of Matthew from this historical standpoint in\ndetail, we find that it begins with an entirely unnecessary genealogy of\nJoseph, the ostensible father of Jesus. Then follows the birth, and this\nis confirmed in i. 22, \u201cFor all this was done, that it might be fulfilled\nwhich was spoken by the Lord through the prophet,\u201d namely, Isaiah (vii.\n14), \u201cBehold a maiden is with child and shall bear a son, and shall call\nhis name Immanuel.\u201d This means simply that it will be the first-born son,\nand that he will be called \u201cGod is with us,\u201d and, therefore, certainly\nnothing supernatural.\n\nThe next story that the birth took place in Bethlehem, and that the wise\nmen from the East saw the star over Bethlehem, is again founded on the\nprophet\u2019s word that the ruler of Israel would come from Bethlehem.\n\nWhen the flight of Joseph and Mary to Egypt with the Christ child is told,\nit is again set forth in ii. 15, that what the prophet said might be\nfulfilled, \u201cOut of Egypt have I called my son.\u201d\n\nThe massacre of the children in Bethlehem, with all its difficulties in\nthe eyes of the historian, finds a sufficient reason in verse 17 on the\nwords which were spoken by Jeremiah the prophet, \u201cA voice was heard in\nRama, weeping and great mourning, Rachel weeping for her children; and she\nwould not be comforted, because they are not.\u201d\n\nLater, when Joseph returns with the child and journeys to Nazareth, this\ntoo is explained by the words of the prophet, who said, \u201cHe shall be\ncalled a Nazarene.\u201d\n\nOn the false idea of the words of the prophet, that a Nazarene is an\ninhabitant of Nazareth, I shall say nothing here. Everything, even such\npopular errors, is quite intelligible from this point of view, and only\nshows how convinced the people were that Jesus was the Messiah, and\ntherefore must have fulfilled everything which was expected of the\nMessiah. To us these fulfilments of the prophecy may not sound very\nconvincing. But as a presentation of the ideas which then held sway over\nthe people, and as proof of the grasp of the colloquial process, they are\nof great value to the historian.\n\nThe appearance of John the Baptist, too, is immediately explained by\nreference to prophetic words (iii. 3). And when Jesus, after the\nimprisonment of John, left his abode and removed to Capernaum, as was\nquite natural, this, likewise must have occurred (iv. 14-16) that certain\nwords of Isaiah should be fulfilled.\n\nThere follows in the fifth to the seventh chapters the real kernel of\nChristian teaching in the sermon on the mount, and the announcement of the\ncoming kingdom of God upon earth. Here we ask nothing more than a true\nstatement, such as an apostle or his disciples were fully in a position to\ngive us. No miraculous inspiration is needed for it; on the contrary, it\nwould only injure for us the trustworthiness of the reporter. In the next\nchapters we read of the works done by Jesus, which were soon construed by\nthe people as miracles, while in another place the evangelist sets the\nforgiveness of sins higher than all miracles, than all healing of the\nsick, and even declares this to be a power which God had given to men (ix.\n8). Jesus himself often makes his healing power depend on the faith of the\nperson to be healed, and of miraculous arts he says not a word (ix. 28).\nNext follow the appointment and despatch of the disciples, and soon after\nthose words, which are so significant for this Gospel (xi. 27), \u201cAll\nthings are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but\nthe Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to\nwhomsoever the son willeth to reveal _him_.\u201d Here we have in a few words\nthe true spirit, the true inspiration of the teaching which Christ\nproclaimed, that he was not only the Messiah or the son of David, but the\ntrue son of God, the Logos, which God willed when he willed man, the\nhighest thought of God, the highest revelation of God, which was imparted\nin Jesus to blind humanity. We cannot judge of this so correctly as those\nwho saw and knew Jesus in his corporeal existence, and found in him all\nthose perfections, particularly in his life and conduct, of which human\nnature is capable. We must here rely on the evidence of his contemporaries\nwho had no motive to discover in him, the son of a carpenter, the\nrealisation on earth of the divine ideal of man, if this ideal had not\nstood realised in him, before their eyes, in the flesh. What is true\nChristianity if it be not the belief in the divine sonship of man, as the\nGreek philosophers had rightly surmised, but had never seen realised on\nearth? Here is the point, where the two great intellectual currents of the\nAryan and Semitic worlds flow together, in that the long-expected Messiah\nof the Jews was recognised as the Logos, the true son of God, and that he\nopened or revealed to every man the possibility to become what he had\nalways been, but had never before apprehended, the highest thought, the\nWord, the Logos, the Son of God. Knowing here means being. A man may be a\nprince, the son of a king, but if he does not know it, he is not so. Even\nso from all eternity man was the son of God, but until he really knew it,\nhe was not so. The reporters in the Synoptic Gospels only occasionally\nrecognise the divine sonship of man with real clearness, for in their view\nthe practical element in Christianity was predominant, but in the end\neverything practical must be based upon theory or faith. Our duties toward\nGod and man, our love for God and for man, are as nothing, without the\nfirm foundation which is formed only by our faith in God, as the Thinker\nand Ruler of the world, the Father of the Son, who was revealed through\nhim as the Father of all sons, of all men. Such sayings are especially\nsignificant in the Synoptic Evangelists, because it might appear as though\nthey had not recognised the deepest mystery of the revelation of Christ,\nbut were satisfied with the purely practical parts of his teachings.\nShortly after, when Jesus again proves his healing powers among the\npeople, and the Pharisees persecute him because the people were more and\nmore inclined to recognise in him the son of David, the Evangelist again\ndeclares (xii. 17) that all this occurred that the words of the prophet\nIsaiah might be fulfilled, \u201cBehold my servant, whom I have chosen, my\nbeloved in whom my soul is well pleased; I will put my spirit upon him,\nand he shall declare judgment unto the Gentiles.\u201d\n\nThen follow many of the profoundest and most beautiful parables which\ncontain the secrets of Christ\u2019s teaching, and of which some, as we read,\nand not by any means the most obscure, remained unintelligible even to the\ndisciples. Even at that time his fame had become so great, that on\nreturning to his own birthplace, the people would scarcely believe that he\nwas the same as the son of the carpenter, that his mother was named Mary,\nand his brothers, Jacob, Joseph, Simon, and Judas, who like his sisters\nwere all still living. Yet among his own people he could accomplish but\nfew works. The Gospel then goes on to relate that as Herod had caused John\nto be beheaded, Jesus again withdrew to a lonely place, probably to escape\nthe persecutions of Herod. Then follow the really important chapters, full\nof teachings and of parables, intended to illumine these teachings and to\nbring them home to the people. Here we naturally do not expect any appeal\nto the prophets; on the contrary we often find a very bold advance beyond\nthe ancient law or a higher interpretation of the ancient Jewish\nteachings. As soon, however, as we return to facts like the last journey\nto Jerusalem, and the arrest of Jesus through the treachery of Judas, the\nwords immediately recur that all this came to pass that the Scriptures\nshould be fulfilled (xxvi. 54). Even Jesus himself, when he commands his\ndisciples to make no resistance, must have added the words, \u201cBut how then\nshall the scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be,\u201d which clearly\nrefers to the famous prophecy of Isaiah in the fifty-third chapter. Even\nthe thirty pieces of silver which were paid Judas for his betrayal, are\nconsidered necessary, that a prophesy of Jeremiah\u2019s may be fulfilled. But\nit seems that this prophesy is not to be found in Jeremiah, and must be\nsought in Zechariah (xi. 12, 13). Such a confusion might easily occur\namong the people, imperfectly acquainted with the text of the prophets. In\nthis case, therefore, it is quite harmless; but how could it possibly\noccur in a revealed gospel? At the crucifixion of Jesus the garments are\ndivided, and another passage is immediately recalled, this time in a Psalm\n(xxii. 19), in which the poet says of himself that his enemies divided his\ngarments between them, but there is no mention of the Messiah. Such an\napplication of the words of the Psalm to Jesus is perfectly intelligible\nin the contemporary feeling of the Jewish people. Once convinced that\nJesus was the Messiah or Christ, all the incidents of his life and death\nmust necessarily remind them of the prophecies which had been current for\nyears, and kept alive among them the hope of their deliverer. Such details\nwere probably employed to deepen the conviction in themselves and others\nthat Jesus was really the Messiah. This is all quite natural and\ncomprehensible; but if we look at it with the idea that the writer was\ncalled and inspired by God, what must we say? First, in some cases there\nare plain errors which would be impossible in an infallible witness.\nSecondly, must we believe that such events as the birth of Christ in\nBethlehem and his betrayal by Judas took place merely in order that\ncertain prophecies might be fulfilled? This would reduce the life of\nChrist to a mere phantasm and rob it of its entire historical\nsignificance. Or shall we assume (as some critics have done) that all\nthese events were simply invented to prove the Messiahship of Jesus?\n\nFrom all these difficulties we escape when we recognise in the Gospels a\nrecord or deposit of what was developed in the first century in the\nconsciousness of the Christians, and concerning the Gospel of Matthew in\nparticular, Christians who were converts from Judaism. In this view\neverything that borders on intentional deceit drops away of itself. The\nfacts remain as before, as the people had explained and arranged them.\nAccording to Matthew and his successors, Christianity originated as is\ndescribed in the Gospel according to Matthew. Many facts may in the minds\nand mouths of the people have assumed a more popular or legendary form;\nthat was not to be avoided. We know how much this popular influence, or\nwhat I call the colloquial process, has infected the traditions of other\nnations, and it is very helpful to know this, in order to do justice to\nthe Gospels. For how should this influence have been wanting just in the\nfirst and second centuries in Palestine? Everything becomes clear when we\naccept the historical view, supported by many parallel cases, of the\norigin of the Gospels in the mouths of the people. The tradition was just\nsuch as we should expect under the existing conditions. Of intentional\ndeceit there is no further question. We cannot expect anything other or\nbetter than what we have, _i.e._ what the people, or the young Christian\ncommunity, related about the life of the founder of the new religion,\nunless it were a record from the hand of the founder of our religion\nhimself; for even the apostles are only depicted as men, and their\ncomprehension is represented as purely human and often very fallible. When\nwe speak of revelation, the term can only refer to the true revelation of\nthe eternal truths through Jesus himself, as we find them in the Gospels,\nand the verity of which, even where it is somewhat veiled by the\ntradition, confers on it the character of revelation. For it is a fact\nwhich we should never forget, that even the best attested revelation, as\nit can only reach us in human setting and by human means, does not make\ntruth, but it is truth, deeply felt truth, which makes revelation. Truth\nconstitutes revelation, not revelation truth. We therefore lose nothing by\nthis view, but gain immensely, and are at once relieved from all the\nlittle difficulties which a laborious criticism thinks it discovers by a\ncomparison of the Gospels with one another. The only difficulty that seems\nto remain is this, that the Synoptic Gospels are so often content to put\nthe Jewish conception of Jesus as the Messiah, as the son of David and\nAbraham, and finally as the bodily son of God, in the foreground, and only\nhint at the leading and fundamental truth of Christ\u2019s teaching. We must\nnever forget that the apostles were no philosophers, and the Logos idea in\nits full significance and historical development demands, for its correct\nunderstanding, a considerable philosophical training.\n\nHere we are helped by the Fourth Gospel, which must decidedly be ascribed\nto Christians with more of Greek culture. That Greek ideas had penetrated\ninto Palestine is best seen in the works of Philo Jud\u00e6us, the contemporary\nof Jesus. We cannot suppose that he stood alone, and other Jewish thinkers\nmust like him have accepted the Logos idea as a solution of the riddle of\nthe universe. Out of soil like this, permeated and fructified with such\nideas, grew the Fourth Gospel. If we ever make it plain to ourselves that\nJews who, like Philo, had adopted the Logos idea with all its\nconsequences, necessarily recognised in the Logos the Son of God, the\nchosen of God (Luke xxiii. 35), the realised image of God, and then in the\nactual Jesus the incarnation or realisation, or rather the universalising\nof this image, the Fourth Gospel ascribed to John will become much clearer\nto us. Here lies the nucleus of true Christianity, in so far as it deals\nwith the personality of Christ, and the relation of God to humanity. It is\nno longer said that God has made and created the world, but that God has\nthought and uttered the world. All existences are thoughts, or\ncollectively the thought (Logos) of God, and this thought has found its\nmost perfect expression, its truest word, in a man in Jesus. In this sense\nand in no other was Jesus the Son of God and the Word, as the Jews of\nGreek culture believed, and as the author of the Fourth Gospel believed,\nand as still later the young Athanasius and his contemporaries believed,\nand as we must believe if we really wish to be Christians. There is no\nother really Christian explanation of the world than that God thought and\nuttered it, and that man follows in life and thought the thoughts of God.\nWe must not forget that all our knowledge and hold of the world are again\nnothing but thoughts, which we transform under the law of causality into\nobjective realities. It was this unswerving dependence on God in thought\nand life that made Jesus what he was, and what we should be if we only\ntried, viz., children of God. This light or this revelation shines through\nhere and there even in the Synoptic Gospels, though so often obscured by\nthe Jewish Messianic ideas.\n\nIn the Fourth Gospel the influence of these ideas and their employment by\nJesus and his disciples cannot be mistaken. And why should not Jesus have\nadopted and fulfilled the Logos ideas of the Greek world as well as the\nMessianic ideas of the Jewish people? Do the Jews as thinkers rank so much\nhigher than the Greeks? How does the first verse read, which might well\nhave been said by a Neo-platonic philosopher, \u201cIn the beginning was the\nWord\u201d? This Word is the Logos, and this Greek word is in itself quite\nenough to indicate the Greek origin of the idea. Word (Logos), however,\nsignified at the same time thought. This creative Word was with God, nay,\nGod himself was this Word. And all things were made by this Word, that is\nto say, in this Word and in all Words God thought the world. Whoever\ncannot or will not understand this, will never enter into the deepest\ndepths of the teaching of Christ, good Christian as he may otherwise be,\nand the Fourth Gospel in its deepest meaning does not exist for him. That\nthere was life in these words or things shining forth from God, we know,\nand this life, be it what it may, was a light to man, the light of the\nworld, even though man had long been blind and imprisoned in darkness, and\ndid not understand the life, the light, the Word.\n\nNow, in passing to the gospel story, the evangelist says that Jesus\nbrought or himself was the true light, while John\u2019s duty was merely to\nannounce his coming beforehand. This is certainly a great step\u2014it is the\nChristian recognition of the Word or of the Son of God in the historical\nJesus, whose historical character is confirmed by the character of John\nthe Baptist. The people believed in John, and John believed in Jesus. Of\ncourse we must not assume that the philosophical significance of the Word,\nor of the Logos, was ever clearly and completely present to the people in\nthe form worked out by the Neo-platonists. That was impossible at the\ntime, and it is so even now with the great mass of Christians. On the\nother hand, the many subtleties and oddities which have made the later\nNeo-platonism so repulsive to us, hardly existed for the consciousness of\nthe masses, which could only adopt the fundamental ideas of the Logos\nsystem with a great effort. Religion is not philosophy; but there has\nnever been a religion, and there never can be, which is not based on\nphilosophy, and does not presuppose the philosophical notions of the\npeople. The highest aim, toward which all philosophy strives, is and will\nalways remain the idea of God, and it was this idea which Christianity\ngrasped in the Platonic sense, and presented to us most clearly in its\nhighest form, in the Fourth Gospel. To John, if for brevity we may so call\nthe author of the Fourth Gospel, God was no longer the Jewish Jehovah, who\nhad created the world in six days, formed Adam out of the dust, and every\nliving creature out of the ground; for him God had acquired a higher\nsignificance, his nature was a spiritual nature, his creation was a\nspiritual creation, and as for man the Word comprehends everything,\nrepresents everything, realises everything that exists for him; so God was\nconceived as being in the beginning, and then expressing Himself in the\nWord, or as one with the Word. To God the Word, that is the\nall-comprehensive Word, was the utterance, the actualising or\ncommunicating of His subjective divine ideas, which were in Him, and\nthrough the Word passed out of Him into human perception, and thereby into\nobjective reality. This second reality, inseparable from the first, was\nthe second Logos, inseparable as cause and effect are inseparable in\nessence. As the highest of all Logoi was man, the most perfect man was\nrecognised as the son of God, the Logos become flesh, the highest thought\nand will of God. In this there is nothing miraculous. Everything is\nconsistently thought out, and in this sense Jesus could have been nothing\nelse than the Word or the Son of God. All this sounds very strange to us\nat first, because we have forgotten the full meaning of the utterance or\nthe Word, and are not able to transfer the creation of the Word and the\nThought, even though only in the form of a similitude, to that which was\nin the beginning. A similitude it is and must remain, like everything that\nwe say of God; but it is a higher and more spiritual similitude than any\nthat have been or can be applied to God in the various religions and\nphilosophies of the world. God has thought the world, and in the act of\nthinking has uttered or expressed it; and these thoughts which were in\nHim, and were thought and uttered by Him in rational sequence, are the\nLogoi, or species, or kinds, which we recognise again by reflection in the\nobjective world, as rationally developing one from another. Here we have\nthe true \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d long before Darwin\u2019s book.\n\nTo the philosophers this is all perfectly intelligible. The step taken by\nChrist and his disciples (those, namely, who speak to us in the Fourth\nGospel) was this, that they believed they recognised in the historical\nJesus, the son of the carpenter of Nazareth, the highest Logos \u201cMan\u201d in\nhis complete realisation. It was entirely natural, but it can only have\noccurred after overpowering experiences, for it must have signified more\nthan we understand under the \u201cideal of a man,\u201d although originally both\nexpressions are derived from the same source. Nor was the designation of\nthe Saviour as the Word, or, in more human fashion, the Son of God,\nintended so much for him conceived purely spiritually, but rather for his\npersonality as inspired by the highest ideas.\n\nIn all these matters we must think of the ever changing medium, in which\nthese expressions moved. Word and Son in the mouths of the people might\ncoalesce or be kept quite apart; Son of David, Son of Abraham, might at\ntimes take the place of Son of God, and all these phrases might appear in\npopular intercourse to express only what others called the Messiah or\nChrist. In any case, all these were the highest expressions which could be\napplied to man or to the son of man. To the ordinary understanding, still\npermeated with heathen ideas, it was certainly monstrous to elevate a man\nto Olympus, to transform him into a son of God. But what was there for man\nhigher than man? Intermediate beings, such as demons, heroes, or angels,\nhad never been seen, nor did they answer the purpose. One step, however\nsmall, above the human, could only lead to the divine, or bring into\nconsciousness the divine in man. What seemed blasphemy to the Jewish\nconsciousness was just that truth which Christ proclaimed, the truth for\nwhich he laid down his human life. If we enter into this thought, we shall\nunderstand not only the occasional expressions of the Synoptics, but the\nFourth Gospel especially in all its depth. How it was possible to make\nthis last Gospel intelligible without these ideas, is almost\nincomprehensible.\n\nWhat, then, did the readers think of the Word, that was in the beginning,\nthat was with God, that even was God, of the Word, by which all things\nwere made? And what was understood when Jesus was called the Word, that\nwas in the world, without the world knowing him, while those who\nrecognised and acknowledged him as the Word, thereby became like him sons\nof God? We must ascribe some meaning to these words, and what can we\nascribe if we do not take the philosophic term \u201cLogos\u201d in its historic\nsense? One need only attempt to translate the beginning of the Fourth\nGospel into a non-Christian language, and we shall realise that without\nits heathen antecedents the words remain absolutely unintelligible. We\nfind translations that mean simply, \u201cIn the beginning was the\nsubstantive.\u201d That may seem incredible to us; but what better idea has a\npoor old peasant woman in reading the first chapter of the Fourth Gospel,\nand what better idea can the village preacher give her if she asks for an\nexplanation?\n\nFor us the greatest difficulty remains in verse 14, \u201cThe Word became\nflesh, and dwelt among us.\u201d But what grounds have we for setting our\nopinion against the unhesitating acceptance of contemporaries, and later\neven of the Alexandrian philosophers? They must have felt the same\ndifficulties as ourselves, but they overcame them in consideration of what\nthey had seen in Jesus, or even only heard of him. They could not\ncomprehend him in his moral elevation and holiness, except as the Logos,\nthe Word, the Son of God. If we follow them, we are safe; if not, we can\nno doubt say much in excuse, but we place ourselves in the strongest\nopposition to history. We may say that men have never seen any divine\nidea, any divine word, any divine thought of any kind realised on earth;\nnay, that man can never have the right to pass such a deifying judgment,\nof his own sovereign power, on anything lying within his actual\nexperience. We so easily forget that if God is once brought near to\nhumanity, and no longer regarded as only transcendent, humanity must, at\nthe same time, be thought and brought nearer to the divine. We may\nacknowledge this and still maintain that others, like the apostles and the\nphilosophers of Alexandria after them, must have felt the same difficulty,\nperhaps even more strongly than we, who never were eye-witnesses nor\nPlatonic philosophers. Yet they still insisted that Jesus in his life,\nconduct, and death demonstrated that human nature could rise no higher\nthan in him, and that he _was_ all and _fulfilled_ all that God had\ncomprised in the Logos \u201cman.\u201d Jesus himself declares, when Peter first\ncalled him the son of God, that flesh and blood had not revealed it unto\nhim, but his Father which is in heaven (Matthew xvi. 17). And this was\nperfect truth and applies to us also.\n\nWe may go through the whole Fourth Gospel, and we shall find that it\nremains incomprehensible, except from the standpoint that we ascribe to\nthe author. When we read (i. 18), \u201cNo man hath seen God at any time; the\nonly begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared\nhim,\u201d shall we then think only of the son of the carpenter, the bodily\nJesus, and not rather of the Word that was in him, and that was as near to\nthe Father as He to himself; that was in the bosom of the Father, and that\ndeclared to us the Father, who was in the beginning? Has not Jesus himself\nstated (iii. 13) that no man hath ascended up to heaven except him who\ncame down from heaven, that is from God, and that no one has seen the\nFather, save he which is of God, that is the Son (vi. 46)? These are, of\ncourse, figurative expressions, but their meaning cannot be doubtful. When\nNathanael called Jesus, Rabbi, King of Israel, and Son of God, his ideas\nmay still have been very immature, but in time the true meaning of the Son\nof God breaks through more and more clearly.\n\nThe declaration of Jesus to Nicodemus, \u201cYe must be born anew,\u201d is a\nremarkable one\u2014remarkable, because the Brahmans from the earliest times\nmake use of the same expression, and call themselves the reborn, the twice\nborn (Dvija), and both no doubt attributed the same meaning to the second\nbirth, namely, the recognition of the true nature of man, the Brahmans as\none with Brahman, that is, the Word; the Christians as one with the Word,\nor the Son of God. And why should this belief in the Son give everlasting\nlife (ii. 16)? Because Jesus has through his own sonship in God declared\nto us ours also. This knowledge gives us eternal life through the\nconviction that we too have something divine and eternal within us,\nnamely, the word of God, the Son, whom He hath sent (v. 38). Jesus\nhimself, however, is the only begotten Son, the light of the world. He\nfirst fulfilled and illumined the divine idea which lies darkly in all men\n(see John viii. 12, xii. 35, 46), and made it possible for all men to\nbecome actually what they have always been potentially\u2014sons of God.\n\nFurther reading in the Fourth Gospel will of course show us many things\nthat are only indirectly connected with this, which I believe to be the\nsupreme truth of Christianity. To the woman of Samaria Jesus only declares\nthat God is a spirit, and that he must be worshipped in spirit, bound\nneither to Jerusalem nor to Samaria. She knows only that the Messiah will\ncome, she was scarcely ready for the idea of a son of God, but like the\nPharisees (v. 18) would have considered this only as blasphemy (x. 33).\nBut again and again the keynote of the new teaching breaks through. When\nJesus speaks of his works, he calls them the works of his Father (v. 19);\neven the resurrection from the dead is explained by him, as clearly as\npossible, to be an awakening through the Word, \u201cHe that heareth my word,\nand believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life\u201d (v. 14), which\nmeans that he is immortal. He, however, who did not recognise the Word and\nhis divine nature, as Jesus taught it, does not yet possess that eternal\nlife, for which he is destined, but which must first be gained through\ninsight, or belief in Jesus. Can anything be clearer than the words (John\nxvii. 3), \u201cAnd this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only\ntrue God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent\u201d? Of course many of these\nexpressions were not understood by the masses, or were even misunderstood.\nThe words were repeated, and when necessary, especially in the\nquestionings of children, they had to be explained somehow, often by a\nparable or story, which the mother invents at the moment, to quiet them.\nAll this is inevitable; it has happened everywhere, and happens still.\nWhoever wishes to learn how tradition or common report treats historical\nfacts, should compare the G\u00fcnther or Etzel of the Nibelungen with the\nGundicarius or Attila of history, or Charles the Great crowned by the Pope\nwith the Charlemagne who besieged Jerusalem, or Hruodlandus with Roland,\nor Arturus with Arthur. Or, to come to later days, we need only recall the\nwonderful tales of the French journals during the last Franco-German War,\nand we shall be astonished at the manner in which, quite unintentionally,\nthe people adapt all tidings to their own views. Nineteen hundred years\nago there were no newspapers. Why should it have been different then?\n\nWhat the children had heard and believed, they remembered when they had\ngrown older, or themselves had become parents. It was convenient and\nnatural to tell their children again what they had heard in their own\nchildhood, and like a rolling stone, with each repetition the tradition\nconstantly took up new miraculous elements. There is scarcely a miracle in\nthe New Testament that did not account for itself spontaneously in this\nway, and that did not in its original form reveal to us a far higher truth\nthan the mere miracle itself. And when the time came for a record, was it\nnot quite natural that everything available should be gathered together,\naccording to the tales told and believed from house to house, or village\nto village? In this process, moreover, the appeal to a voucher, if\npossible to a contemporary or eye-witness, was not at all surprising,\nespecially if there was a still living tradition, that this or that had\nbeen heard from one of the apostles, and could be traced back to him from\nson to father. Why should we put aside, nay, indignantly reject, this\nsimple, natural theory, suggested by all the circumstances, and capable of\nat once removing all difficulties, in order to prefer another, which has\nthe advantage, it is true, of having been generally accepted for\ncenturies, but nevertheless was originally nothing more than a human\nappeal to a superhuman attestation? It must not be forgotten that if a\nvoice were really heard from heaven, it lies with man to understand it,\nor, on his own authority, to declare it the voice of God or an angel. With\none-half of Christendom the doctrine of the verbal inspiration of the four\nGospels never became an article of faith. It was first made so among the\nProtestants to provide something incontestable in place of the councils\nand the Pope. But this only drove Protestants from Scylla into Charybdis,\nand landed them in inextricable difficulties, because they withdrew the\nGospels from the historical soil out of which they sprang. But we do not\nescape Charybdis by steering again into Scylla, but by endeavouring to\nrise above Charybdis, ay, even above the Gospels. In our human\nshortsightedness we may believe that it would have been better for us had\nJesus or the apostles themselves left us something in writing. But as this\ndid not happen, why should we not be content with what we have? The ruins\nof the true Christianity still remain; why should we not endeavour with\ntheir help to restore the ancient temple?\n\nWhy should we contemptuously reject the tradition which arose in the\nmouths of the people? Should we be worse Christians if it were clearly and\nplainly demonstrated that we only possess popular traditions, out of which\nwe must ourselves form a conception of the career and teaching of Christ?\nIs it not good for us, that we are free in many points to decide for\nourselves what Jesus was and what he taught?\n\nAnd in a world in which everything develops, everything grows and changes,\nwhy should religion alone be an exception? Do we not all freely confess\nthat certain precepts which are ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels are no\nlonger adapted to our times and to our circumstances? Does any Christian\nturn his left cheek when he has been struck upon the right? Do we give our\ncloak when our coat has been taken from us? Do we hold everything that we\npossess in common as the first Christians did? Do we sell all that we have\nand give it to the poor (Matthew xix. 21)?\n\nIt is quite true that under this method a certain personal freedom in the\ninterpretation of the Gospels is unavoidable, but is not this freedom at\nthe same time accompanied by a very important feeling of personal\nresponsibility, which is of the utmost significance for every religious\nconviction? It cannot be denied, that this open and honest acknowledgment\nof the undeniable influence of popular tradition has far-reaching\nconsequences, and will take from us much to which we are accustomed, and\nthat has become near and dear, even sacred, to us. But it has this\nadvantage, that we feel we are candid and honest in our faith, to which we\nmay add that we are never forced in dealing with human hypotheses to give\nour assent blindly, but may follow our own judgment. We may adopt or\nreject the view that in the development of the gospel story much must be\nascribed to popular tradition, and I can readily believe that many who do\nnot know, either through the study of legends or their own experience, the\ntransforming influence which school and family traditions exercise on the\nform of historical narratives, find it incredible that such a carbonising\nprocess could have taken place also in the evangelical tradition as\nrelated by the men of the next generation. They must then content\nthemselves with the alternative, that the laws of nature, which they\nthemselves ascribe to the Deity, must have been abrogated by their own\nfounder in order that the truth of the teaching of Christ might gain a\ncertain probability in the eyes of the people by so-called miracles.\n\nLet us take an example in order to see what we shall gain on the one side\nand lose on the other. The original meaning of making the blind see, Jesus\nhas himself told us (John ix. 39), \u201cFor judgment I am come into this\nworld, that they which see not might see; and that they which see might be\nmade blind.\u201d This refers to spiritual, not physical blindness, and which\nis the more difficult to heal, the spiritual or the physical? But when\nJesus was repeatedly said to have healed this spiritual blindness, to have\nopened the eyes of the blind and unbelieving, how was it possible that the\nmasses, especially the children, should not misunderstand such cures, and\ninterpret and repeat them as cures of physical blindness? Certainly such\nan idea carries us a long way. We must then, for instance, explain such an\nexpression as that placed in the mouths of the Pharisees (John x. 21),\n\u201cCan a devil open the eyes of the blind?\u201d as a further extension of a\npopular notion already in the field. Nor can it be denied that cures of\nthe physically blind have this in their favour, that so exceptional a\npersonality as Jesus may also have possessed an exceptional healing power.\nIt then depends only on the character of the blindness, whether it was\ncurable or incurable, and the solution of this question we may be content\nto leave to the medical man. I only remark, that if the medical man should\ndeny such a possibility, a true Christian would lose nothing in\nconsequence, for under all circumstances a spiritual healing power in\nChrist would stand higher with all of us than one merely physical.\n\nThis may be called shallow rationalism, but surely the human _ratio_ or\nreason cannot be entirely rejected. Many know of their own experience that\na man of high moral energy can even now drive out devils and base\nthoughts. Why not also believe that through his appearance and words Jesus\nmade such an impression upon those possessed, for instance, upon the man\nor the two men who herded swine in the country of the Gadarenes or\nGergesenes, that they came to themselves and began to lead new lives? That\non such a conversion the swine-herds should forget their swine which\nrushed headlong into the lake, is easily understood, and when these two\nincidents came to the ears of the people, what was more natural than the\nstory which we find in Matthew (viii. 28), Mark (v. 1), and Luke (viii.\n26), but not in John? We need not now enter into the discrepancies between\nthese three narratives, striking as they would be in a divinely inspired\nbook. Of course it will be said again, that this is a shallow,\nrationalistic explanation, as if the word \u201crationalist\u201d contained within\nitself something condemnatory. At all events, no one can now demonstrate\nthat Jesus did not bewitch the unclean spirits out of the two demoniacs\ninto the two thousand swine; but I confess that the shallow rationalistic\nexplanation seems to me far better calculated to bring clearly to light\nthe influence which Jesus could exercise over the most abandoned men.\n\nOne more instance. How often does Jesus say that he is the bread that\nreally satisfies man, and the water that quenches all thirst (vi. 48): \u201cI\nam the bread of life. This is the bread which cometh down from heaven,\nthat a man may eat thereof and not die. Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh\nmy blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day.\u201d\nWould any one, even the woman of Samaria, take these words literally? Does\nnot Jesus himself help us to a correct understanding of them when he says\n(vi. 35), \u201cI am the bread of life; he that cometh to me shall never\nhunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst,\u201d and again, (vii.\n37), \u201cIf any man thirst let him come unto me, and drink.\u201d And in order to\nshield his words against any misunderstanding he himself says (vi. 63),\n\u201cIt is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing; the words\nthat I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life.\u201d And are we\nresolved in spite of all this not to understand the deep meaning of his\nwords, to remain blind and deaf; and do we, like the Pharisees, prefer the\nstory of how Jesus by magic means fed thousands with five or seven loaves\nand two fishes (vi. 9), so that in the end twelve baskets of bread\nremained after all were satisfied? We can readily comprehend how in the\nmouths of the people the great miracles of Jesus, the real _mira_ wrought\nby his life and teaching, became small _miracula_. But if we surrender\nthese small _miracula_, is not something far better left us, namely, that\nJesus, who so often called himself the bread and the wine, who even at the\nLast Supper, as he broke bread with his disciples, commanded them to eat\nthe bread which was his body, and drink the wine which was his blood,\u2014that\nthis teacher could by his teaching satisfy, content, and convert\nthousands, who came to him and believed in him! It is true that the story\nof the feeding of thousands with five loaves of bread is more intelligible\nto women and children, and makes a stronger impression than the\nmetaphorical words of Christ; but nothing is more easy to understand than\nthe transformation of a tale of the conversion or spiritual satisfying of\nthousands, into a parable of the feeding of thousands with five loaves.\nBut have not the truly devout and conscientious thinkers rights of their\nown in the community? Must they really hold themselves aloof from the\nchurch, because they have too deep a reverence for the true teaching of\nChrist? Grand and beautiful as are St. Peter\u2019s in Rome, St. Mark\u2019s in\nVenice, or the Cathedral at Milan, it is heartbreaking to observe the\nso-called divine service in these buildings. Let us not be deceived by the\nsayings, that the kingdom of heaven belongs to the children, or that a\nchildlike faith is best. That is quite true, but it has absolutely nothing\nto do with our question. Of course in every generation millions of\nchildren are born, and milk must be provided for these as well; but this\nmilk is not for men, and these should not permit themselves to be\nfrightened by mere words, such as shallow enlightenment, rationalism,\nunbelief, etc. The worst of it is that we have permitted our _ministri_ to\nbecome our masters instead of our servants, and that the weak among them\nfar outnumber the strong. In history, however, the minority is always\nvictorious. Popular legend has certainly at times grievously obscured the\ngospel of Christ, but not so much as to prevent those who are familiar\nwith its nature and effect from discovering the grains of gold in the\nsand, the rays of truth behind the clouds. At all events, popular legend\nrefuses to be ruled out. A knowledge of it and its influence on historical\nevents in other nations, and especially a familiarity with the modes of\nexpression in Oriental languages, are of the greatest use in all these\ninvestigations. Only let no one confound legend and metaphor with\nmythology. When Jesus says that he is the water, and that whoever drinks\nof this water shall never thirst again, every one readily perceives that\nhe speaks metaphorically. And likewise when he says that he is the vine or\nthe good shepherd. But here the transition from parable to reality very\nsoon begins. Among so many pictures of the good shepherd it need occasion\nno surprise that it is commonly imagined that Jesus actually was a\nshepherd and carried a lamb on his shoulders. What occurs now was of\ncourse equally possible in the earliest times. When the common people saw\ndaily, in old mosaic pictures, a sword coming forth from the mouth of God,\nthey formed a representation of God corresponding to these pictures (Rev.\ni. 20). And thus many readers of the Gospel suppose that Jesus was really\ncarried up into the air by the devil and placed on the summit of the\ntemple or of a high mountain, that he might show him all the kingdoms of\nthe earth, and tempt him to establish an earthly realm. Is it reverent to\nimagine Christ borne through the air by the devil, instead of simply\nlearning that Christ himself, as we read, was not a stranger to inward\ntrials, and that he freely confessed them to his disciples? Many parables\nare represented in the Gospels, as though they had really occurred at the\ntime. Thus, in the parables of the kingdom of heaven, the phrase always\nruns that it is like seed which a man sowed, and while he slept an enemy\ncame and sowed tares. Or the kingdom of heaven is like leaven, which a\nwoman took and hid in three measures of meal, or like a treasure found by\na man in a field, or like a merchant seeking goodly pearls, etc. In\nlistening to these parables or looking at pictorial representations of\nthem, there develops almost unconsciously, especially among the young, a\nbelief in their reality, in their actual occurrence at the time of Christ.\nIn many cases this belief is widely spread, as, for example, in the story\nof the good Samaritan, Now it is quite possible that some such incident as\nJesus related had occurred in his time, or shortly before it; but it is\njust as likely to have been a parable invented for a specific purpose. And\nwhy should not this be true of other things, which the Gospels ascribe to\nJesus himself?\n\nIs it necessary to believe, that Jesus saw the Pharisees casting their\ngifts into the treasury with his own eyes (Luke xxi. 1), and the poor\nwidow who threw in two mites, or is it possible to consider this, too, as\na parable, without insisting that Jesus really sat opposite the sacred\nchest, and counted the alms, and knew that the widow had put in two mites,\nand had really nothing left? Of many things, as of the conversation\nbetween Jesus and Nicodemus, or between Jesus and the woman of Samaria, no\none could have had any knowledge except those who took part in it. We must\ntherefore assume that Jesus communicated these conversations to his\ndisciples, and that these have reported to us the _ipsissima verba_. In\nthis manner we are constantly involving ourselves in fresh difficulties of\nour own making, which we may indeed leave out of consideration, but which\nwould never exist at all if we would only consider the circumstances under\nwhich the Gospels arose. I have previously expounded this view of the\npopular origin of the evangelic narratives in my Gifford lectures before\nan audience, certainly very orthodox; and although a small number of\ntheologians were much incensed against me,\u2014it was their duty,\u2014the\nmajority, even of the clergy, were decidedly with me. The things\nthemselves and their lessons remain undiminished in value; we merely\nacknowledge a fact, quite natural from an historical standpoint, viz. that\nthe accounts of the life and teachings of Jesus have not come to us direct\nfrom Christ, nor from the apostles, but from men who, as they themselves\ntell us, received the report from others by tradition. Their narratives,\nconsequently, are not perhaps fictitious, or prepared with a certain\nobject; but they do show traces of the influence that was unavoidable in\noral transmission, especially at a time of great spiritual excitement.\nThis is a problem which in itself has nothing whatever to do with\nreligion. We have the Gospels as they are. It remains with the historian\nalone to pass judgment upon the origin, the transmission, and the\nauthenticity of these texts, just as the reconstruction of the text lies\nsolely with the philologist. For this he need not even be a Christian,\nmerely an historian. Whatever may be the judgment of the historical\ninquirer, we must learn to be content with what they leave us. In this,\ntoo, the half is often better than the whole. Quite sufficient remains,\neven when the critical historian assures us that the Gospels as we possess\nthem were neither written by Christ nor the apostles, but contain the\ntraditions of the oldest Christian communities, and that the manuscripts\nin which they have reached us were not written till the fifth or at the\nearliest the fourth century. We may deal with these materials as with all\nother historical materials from that period; and we do so rather as\nindependent historians than as Christians.\n\nThe view that the four Gospels were miraculously revealed to their\nauthors, miraculously written, miraculously copied and finally printed, is\na view no doubt deserving of respect, but it leaves the contents of the\nGospels untouched. The difference between the historical and the\nconventional interpretation of the Gospels comes out most clearly in the\ndoctrine of eternal life. What Jesus understands by the eternal life that\nhe has brought to mankind, is as clear as the sun. He repeats it again and\nagain. Eternal life consists in knowing that men have their Father and\ntheir true being in the only true God, and that as sons of this same\nFather, they are of like nature with God and Christ (John xvii. 3).\n\nThis is the fundamental truth of Christianity, and it holds good not only\nfor the contemporaries of Jesus, but for all times. Those who see in this\nview an overestimate of human nature, need only ask themselves what man\ncould be, if he were not a partaker of the divine nature. This excludes\nthe difference between human and divine nature as little as the difference\nbetween the physical father and the physical son. Even in this case we\nspeak figuratively, for how could we speak otherwise of what is\nsupersensual? The repetition of stories among the people, narrating how\nJesus raised one or another to life, to eternal life, very soon led among\nwomen and children to the misunderstanding that this referred only to a\nresurrection from bodily death. Nay, this raising passed with them, as it\nstill does with many, for a stronger proof of the divine nature and power\nof Christ than the resurrection from that spiritual death, which holds in\ncaptivity all who have not recognised their own divine sonship and have\nnot understood the glad tidings which Jesus brought to all mankind. Such\nmisunderstandings we find everywhere, as when, for instance, even a man\nlike Nicodemus fails to comprehend the new birth of which Jesus speaks,\nand asks if a man can enter his mother\u2019s womb a second time. If this was\npossible in a Scribe, how much more so with the uneducated people. In the\nsame way the Jews misunderstand the saying of Jesus, that the truth will\nmake them free, and answer that they are the seed of Abraham, and free\nmen, so that Jesus had to repeat that whosoever commits sin is not free,\nbut a slave of sin (John viii. 33). Such misunderstandings meet us\neverywhere, and their influence extends much farther than we at first\nsuppose. Naturally the tradition also puts words into Jesus\u2019 mouth that\ncould only have issued out of the notions of the people, and almost\nentirely conceal the depth of his own words. While the revelation of the\ntrue divine sonship of man immediately bestows eternal life on him who\ncomprehends or believes in it, heals his blindness, and raises him from\nspiritual death, Jesus is presented as not purposing to raise the dead\nuntil the last day (John vi. 40). Martha makes the same mistake, when to\nthe words of Jesus, \u201cThy brother shall rise again,\u201d she answers, \u201cI know\nthat he shall rise at the last day\u201d (John xi. 24). Even some of the works\nwhich are ascribed to Jesus are plainly derived from the same source. A\nspiritual resurrection is not sufficient, it even passes for less than a\nbodily, and this is the very reason for the numerous stories of the\nraising of the dead. These are matters from which, even to this day,\ndevout Christians are loath to part, especially where the details are\ngiven so minutely as in the raising of Lazarus. Now there is absolutely no\nobjection to this, if we are resolved to cling to the historical reality\nof the raising of Lazarus. Only in that case the terms employed should be\nexactly defined. If we give the name death to the condition which excludes\nany return to life, especially when, as with Lazarus, decay had already\nset in, the condition from which Lazarus returned to life cannot be called\ndeath without a contradiction. Jesus even says that his sickness was not\nfatal (John xi. 4), and that he is not dead, but merely sleeps (John xi.\n11). Was he mistaken? Such words should at least not be entirely\ndisregarded, even though the other words follow immediately after,\n\u201cLazarus is dead\u201d (John xi. 14). That a highly gifted nature, like that of\nJesus, may have possessed wonderful healing powers, cannot be denied,\nhowever difficult it may be to determine the boundary between what is and\nis not possible here. On the other hand, it is firmly established that\nwhen once such an idea as the raising from physical death becomes rooted\nin the popular mind, the details, especially such as can serve as\nevidence, are provided spontaneously. The nucleus of the story of the\nraising of Lazarus lies of course in the words (John xi. 25, 26), \u201c_I am\nthe resurrection and the life, he that believeth in me though he were\ndead, yet shall he live, and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall\nnever die._\u201d Here we have the true teaching of Christ, in his own\napparently contradictory language. The saying, \u201cWhoever believes in me\nshall never die,\u201d does not necessarily mean that his body will never die;\nand so the words, \u201cThough he were dead, yet shall he live,\u201d certainly do\nnot signify that his dead and decayed body shall receive new life. But the\npeople wanted something else. For the true miracles, for the spiritual\nresurrection, they had no comprehension, they wanted sensuous miracles,\nthey wanted the resurrection of a body already decayed, and this is\ndescribed in the Gospels in detail. Such is the regular privilege of\npopular tradition, and it happens without deliberate intention, except\nthat of bringing vividly before us the common interpretation of the fact.\nPopular tradition is not intentional deception, it is only an unavoidable\nfusion of facts with conventional ideas, whereby God becomes a laborer\nwearied by six days\u2019 work; his seat becomes Olympus or a golden throne in\nsome corner of the blue sky; the Son of God sinks to the level of a prince\nof the house of David, the Saviour to a miracle doctor, and his message of\nsalvation to a promise of resurrection from physical death. There are many\ngood men and women fulfilling in their daily walk the commands of Christ,\nto whom the true historical conception of the gospel story would be a\nterrible disillusion. Well, such Christians are at liberty to remain in\ntheir own views. Our own interpretation of many of the details in the\ntraditional representation of the Gospels, though details certainly of\nvery great significance, makes no claim to papal authority. It gladly\nconcedes the possibility of error, and only claims to give an\ninterpretation of the evangelic writings, founded on nature and history.\nIt should answer, and at the same time appease, the very numerous and, at\nbottom, honest men, who, like the Horseherd, declare the gospel\nnarratives, as ordinarily understood, full of falsehood and fraud or even\npure fancy, and who have consequently broken with the Christian revelation\nfrom conscientious scruples. Their number is greater than is generally\nsupposed, and it must on no account be supposed that they are necessarily\nwicked or even immoral men. When they declare the Christian revelation to\nbe an absurdity, it is because they do not know it in its historical\norigin and its divine truth. To assume that every word, every letter,\u2014for\nit has been carried even so far,\u2014that every parable, every figure, was\nwhispered to the authors of the Gospels, is certainly an absurdity, and\nrests only on human and often only on priestly authority. But the true\nrevelation, the real truth, as it was already anticipated by the Greek\nphilosophers, slowly accepted by Jews like Philo and the contemporaries of\nJesus, taught by men like Clement and Origen in the ancient Greek church,\nand, in fine, realised in the life of Jesus and sealed by his death, is no\nabsurdity; it is for every thinking Christian the eternal life or the\nkingdom of God on earth, which Jesus wished to establish, and in part did\nestablish. To become a citizen of this kingdom is the highest that man can\nattain, but it is not attained merely through baptism and confirmation; it\nmust be gained in earnest spiritual conflict.\n\nIn nearly all religions God remains far from man. I say in nearly all\nreligions; for in Brahmanism the unity, not the union, of the human soul\nwith Brahman is recognised as the highest aim. This unity with Deity,\ntogether with phenomenal difference, Jesus expressed in part through the\nLogos, in part through the Son. There is nothing so closely allied as\nthought and word, Father and Son. They can be distinguished, but never\nseparated, for they exist only through each other. In this manner the\nGreek philosophers considered all creation as the thought or the word of\nGod, and the thought \u201cman\u201d became naturally the highest Logos, realised in\nmillions of men, and raised to the highest perfection in Jesus. As the\nthought exists only through the word, and the word only through the\nthought, so also the Father exists only through the Son, and the Son\nthrough the Father, and in this sense Jesus feels and declares himself the\nSon of God, and all men who believe in him his brethren. This revelation\nor inspiration came to mankind through Jesus. No one knew the Father\nexcept the Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, and those to whom the\nSon willeth to reveal him. This is the Christian revelation in the true\nsense of the word. It has long been attempted to make an essential\ndifference between Jesus, the only begotten Son, and his brethren, through\nan exaggerated feeling of affected reverence. But if this is carried too\nfar, the temple which Jesus himself erected for mankind is destroyed. It\nis true that no one comes to the Father except through Jesus, and that\nJesus is the only begotten Son, for he is in the Father and the Father in\nhim (John xiv. 10), nay, he and the Father are one (John x. 30). The\ndistinction is therefore there, but the unity as well, for Jesus himself\nsays that he is in his disciples as the Father is in him, that they all\nmay be one, as he is one with God, and God with him (John xvii. 21). To\nmany there may be no sense in this, because their ideas of God and of the\nSon of God are altogether materialistic, but to those who have learned to\nfeel the divine, not only without but also within, these words are the\nlight of the world. In this sense we need not be ashamed of the gospel of\nChrist, and can be prepared to look all the Horseherds of the world in the\nface as intellectually free, yet at the same time as true Christians, in\nthe way Jesus himself would have desired; often in error, like the\ndisciples of old, but still loyal and honest followers of the Son of God.\n\nThe main issue in all these questions is honesty, honesty toward ourselves\neven more than toward others. We know how easily we may all be deceived,\nhow easily we are put off with words, especially when they are words of\nancient use. It was the sincere tone of the Horseherd that prompted me to\npublic discussion of his doubts, for doubts are generally anticipations of\ntruth, and to be true to oneself is better than to possess all truth. It\ngave me pleasure to learn recently that he is still among the living,\nalthough for an interval he was beyond the range of the usual postal\nfacilities, so that my letters did not reach him. Whether he thinks me as\nhonest as himself, we must wait to know. I did not seek either to persuade\nor to convince him. Such things depend too much on circumstances and\nenvironment. I merely wished to show him that others, who do not agree\nwith him, or with whom he does not agree, are honest, and may honestly\nhold entirely different views. To learn to understand each other is the\ngreat art of life, and to \u201cagree to differ\u201d is the best lesson of the\ncomparative science of religion.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\n\n                               Conclusion.\n\n\nThe allusion in the foregoing page is to a very long letter which the\nHorseherd wrote to my husband, dated September 10, 1897, eighteen months\nafter his first letter. This was followed three days later by a short\nnote, saying that the long letter was not written for publication, and\nthat it was the Horseherd\u2019s express wish that it should not be printed. In\nthis note he mentions that he was perfectly well, and that he had been so\nsuccessful in his trade, that he no longer sat with an oil lamp by an iron\nstove, but was \u201cevery inch a gentleman,\u201d as he expressed it. The\n_Pferdeb\u00fcrla_ was brought out early in 1899, and my husband sent a copy to\nthe only address he had,\u2014\u201cPferdeb\u00fcrla, Post-Office, Pittsburgh,\u201d\u2014with the\nfollowing letter:\u2014\n\n\u201c\n\n\n\n\n\n\n(Translation.) 7 Norham Gardens, Feb. 10 /99.\nDear far-off Friend:\n\n\u201cYou see I have kept my promise, and after many delays the book is ready.\nHow are you? whether you are sitting by your iron and oil light, or have\nbecome a great and rich man. Well, all that is only external, the great\nthing, the Self, remains unchanged. I am growing old\u2014past seventy-five\u2014and\nhave still so much to do, and am now printing a big book, the _Six Systems\nof Indian Philosophy_. That would please you, for those old fellows saw\ndeeper than our philosophers, though they don\u2019t talk so much about it. Now\nwrite and tell me how it is with you, and whether you are pleased or not\nwith your and my book. But make haste, for who knows how long it may last.\nIt is strange how well one can know those whom one has never seen,\u201d\n\nWith all good wishes,\n                                                            F. Max M\u00fcller.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\u201d\n\nThe book and letter were returned as unclaimed after three months. But on\nSeptember 29, 1899, the Horseherd wrote again, giving his real name, Fritz\nMenzel, and the address Monangahela Hotel, Pittsburgh. This letter I have\nbeen unable to find. On October 17, 1899, I wrote by my husband\u2019s desire.\n\n\u201cDEAR SIR: My husband, who is seriously ill, wishes me to send you this\nletter from him, written last February and returned late in April, and to\nsay, as he has now received your letter of September 29, with your real\nname and address, he is sending you the copy of his book, _Das\nPferdeb\u00fcrla_, which was also returned to him.\u201d\n\nAfter a few months both letter and book came back unclaimed, and from that\ntime nothing more has been heard from the Horseherd. The book bears the\ninscription:\u2014\n\n\u201cTo the Pferdeb\u00fcrla, with greetings from his Pardner.\u201d\n\nA few words must be said about the translation. In August, 1898, a\ntranslation of the first article on Celsus, made by Mr. O. A. Fechter of\nNorth Yakima, Washington, U.S.A., was sent to my husband by an old friend,\nMrs. Bartlett, wife of the Rev. H. M. Bartlett, rector of the church in\nthe same place. He liked it and returned it at once, begging that the\nother articles, which had appeared in the _Deutsche Rundschau_, though not\nyet published as a book, might be translated. For more than two years\nnothing was heard from North Yakima, though I wrote more than once during\nmy husband\u2019s illness, so anxious was he to see the translation carried\nout. At length, just before Christmas, 1901, I wrote once more and\nregistered the letter, which was safely delivered, and I then heard that\nmy friend had not only written repeatedly, but that the whole finished\ntranslation had been sent, nearly two years before, and that she was\nastonished at hearing nothing further. Some fault in the post-office had\ncaused the long silence on both sides. A rough copy of the translation had\nbeen kept, and was sent over after it had been clearly written out.\n\nI cannot sufficiently express my gratitude to the Rev. J. Estlin\nCarpenter, who has revised the whole work in the most thorough manner,\ndevoting to it much of his very valuable time.\n\nGEORGINA MAX M\u00dcLLER\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n    1 The Greek term \u201clogos\u201d was rendered _Geschichte_ in the German\n      title.\n\n    2 The word _Pferdeb\u00fcrla_ is apparently a Silesian equivalent for\n      _Pferdebursche_, and is represented in this volume by the term\n      \u201chorseherd,\u201d after the analogy of cowherd, swineherd, or shepherd.\n      The termination _b\u00fcrla_ is probably a local corruption of the\n      diminutive _b\u00fcrschel_ or _b\u00fcrschlein_.\n\n    3 \u201cWhat difference does it make,\u201d he would ask, \u201cwhether it was\n      written by the son of Zebedee, or some other John, if only it\n      reveals to us the Son of God?\u201d (letter from the Vicar of St.\n      Giles\u2019s, Oxford, _Life and Letters_, II, Chap. xxxvi.).\n\n    4 See the letters between Max M\u00fcller and Dr. G. J. Romanes, _Life and\n      Letters_, II, Chap. xxxi.\n\n_    5 Ueber die Wahre Geschichte des Celsus._\n\n_    6 Contra Celsum_, I, 8.\n\n_    7 Contra Celsum_, I, 63.\n\n    8 Luke v. 8.\n\n    9 1 Tim. i. 15.\n\n   10 Tit. iii. 3.\n\n   11 Miss Swanwick\u2019s translation.\n\n   12 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2, \u1f00\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n   13 \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f30\u03b4\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd.\n\n   14 \u1f30\u03b4\u03ad\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd.\n\n   15 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u1f30\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1.\n\n   16 Philo, vol. I, p. 106.\n\n   17 \u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7.\n\n_   18 De Ebriet._, VIII, 1, 361 f.\n\n   19 \u03c5\u1f31\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6.\n\n   20 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c2.\n\n   21 \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n   22 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1 = \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n   23 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03cd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c5\u1f31\u1f78\u03c2.\n\n   24 \u03bd\u03b5\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c5\u1f31\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6.\n\n   25 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n   26 M. M., _Theosophy and Psychological Religion_, p. 406.\n\n   27 L\u00fccke, _Commentary on the Gospel of John_.\n\n   28 M. M., _Theosophy and Psychological Religion_, p. 383.\n\n   29 M. M., _Theosophy_, p. 404.\n\n   30 See the _Deutsche Rundschau_, 1895, XXXIII, p. 47.\n\n   31 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c2 \u03c5\u1f31\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6.\n\n   32 \u1f49 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u1f70\u03c1\u03be \u1f10\u03b3\u03ad\u03b9\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf.\n\n   33 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b6\u03bf\u1fc6\u03c2.\n\n   34 The original was, however, in German.\n\n_   35 Deutsche Rundschau_, 1895, LXXXII, 409 ff., \u201cThe Parliament of\n      Religions in Chicago,\u201d by F. Max M\u00fcller.\n\n   36 See Prof. Dr. Paul Flechsig, _Neue Untersuchungen \u00fcber die\n      Markbildung in den menschlichen Gehirnlappen_, p. 67.\n\n   37 These pronouns, referring of course to England and the Continent,\n      were reversed in the original.\n\n_   38 Academy_, January 2, 1897, p. 12.\n\n_   39 Ascent of Man_, p. 187.\n\n_   40 Origin of Species_, 5th ed., 1869, p. 255.\n\n_   41 Descent of Man_, 1871, Vol. I, p. 36.\n\n_   42 Ascent of Man_, 1894, p. 9.\n\n   43 Vol. XVIII, p. 464.\n\n   44 Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 350.\n\n   45 H. Drummond, _Ascent of Man_, 1894, p. 169.\n\n   46 See _Science of Thought_, p. 405.\n\n   47 See the author\u2019s preface to his English translation (second edition)\n      of Kant\u2019s _Critic of Pure Reason_, p. xxviii, to which we now add\n      the prophetic words of Shelley, in his _Prometheus Unbound_ (II,\n      4):\u2014\n\n      \u201cHe gave man speech, and speech created thought,\n      Which is the measure of the Universe.\u201d\n\n_   48 Ascent of Man_, 1894, p. 200.\n\n_   49 Science of Language_, 1891, p. 499.\n\n   50 Cf. _Biographies of Words_, by M. M., 1888.\n\n   51 This must of course be understood of authoritative or canonical\n      Scripture.\u2014ed. J. E. C.","title":"The Silesian Horseherd - Questions of the Hour","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":57506}