{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_24328/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_24328","id":"gutenberg_24328","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24328","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Religious","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Church history -- Primitive and early church, ca. 30-600","Theism"],"text":"Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Colin Bell and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n[Transcriber's Notes: Many printing errors, particularly in the French\nand Greek, have been corrected. The inconsistent hyphenation of the\nword stand-point has been retained. Greek has been transliterated and\nplaced inside {}.]\n\n                 THE BASIS OF EARLY CHRISTIAN THEISM\n\n                                   BY\n\n                LAWRENCE THOMAS COLE, A. M., S. T. B.,\n\n   _Post-graduate Scholar of the Church University Board of Regents_\n\n\n          SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS\n             FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE\n                         FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY\n                          COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY\n\n\n                               NEW YORK\n                               May, 1898\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  CHAPTER I:   Introduction                                           9\n\n  CHAPTER II:  Greek and Roman Theistic Arguments                    14\n\n  CHAPTER III: The Patristic Point of View                           26\n\n  CHAPTER IV:  Patristic Use of the Theistic Arguments               38\n\n  CHAPTER V:   Eclectic Theism                                       55\n\n\n     \"Les preuves de Dieu m\u00e9taphysiques sont si \u00e9loign\u00e9es du\n     raisonnement des hommes, et si impliqu\u00e9es, qu'elles frappent peu;\n     et quand cela serviroit \u00e0 quelques-uns, ce ne seroit que pendant\n     l'instant qu'ils voient cette d\u00e9monstration; mais, une heure apr\u00e8s,\n     ils craignent de s'\u00eatre tromp\u00e9s. _Quod curiositate cognoverint,\n     superbi\u00e2 amiserunt._\"\n                                      --_Pens\u00e9es de Pascal_, II, xv. 2.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nA question which every author ought to ask of himself before he sends\nforth his work, and one which must occur to every thoughtful reader, is\nthe inquiry, _Cui bono?_--what justification has one for treating the\nsubject at all, and why in the particular way which he has chosen? To\nthe pertinency of this question to the present treatise the author has\nbeen deeply sensible, and therefore cannot forbear a few prefatory words\nof explanation of his object and method.\n\nIn accounts of the theistic argument, as in the history of philosophy in\ngeneral, it has been customary to pass over a space of well-nigh ten\ncenturies of the Christian era in silence, or with such scanty and\nunsympathetic notice as to make silence the better alternative. Largely\nthrough the influence of such treatment as this, we moderns have almost\nforgotten at times that during this period there lived men inferior to\nnone in history in endowments of mind and influence on succeeding\ngenerations, and that there then took place some of the most significant\nand far-reaching intellectual conflicts in the history of thought. \"With\nCicero,\" says Professor Stirling, \"we reached in our course a most\nimportant and critical halting-place.... We have still ... to wait those\nthousand years yet before Anselm shall arrive with what is to be named\nthe new proof, the proof ontological, and during the entire interval it\nis the Fathers of the Church and their immediate followers who, in\nrepetition of the old, or suggestion of the new, connect thinker with\nthinker, philosopher with philosopher, pagan with Christian.\"[1] To\nattempt to account for even one of the details of thought during this\nperiod cannot be without its advantages.\n\nFor Christianity gave a new and unique turn to thought. It brought with\nit a new set of data, and a new subject-matter. The Christian doctrine\nof God, the distinctions in the Trinity, the great doctrines centering\naround the person of Jesus Christ, though, perhaps, faintly foreshadowed\nin some of the earlier speculations, are, in their fulness and\ncompleteness, first given to the world by the Founder of Christianity.\nThe claims made for these doctrines, too, gave them a unique character.\nIn contrast with the half-hearted, faltering conclusions of the\nprevalent philosophical schools, Christianity asserted that its\nteachings were absolute truth; it claimed to be nothing less than a\nrevelation from the Creator of the world. It will be readily seen that\nthe introduction of such a system as this into the Greek world would be\nattended with important results, not only in its effects upon the\nintellectual life of the times, but also in the influence of the current\nphilosophical conceptions on the statement of its doctrine. The\nsignificance of this early period lies in the fact that, in the\npositive, definite system of Christianity, systematic thought, which was\nfast becoming disorganized and sceptical, found a center about which it\nmight rally and focus itself, and the scattered fragments of philosophy\nwere all collected together, by either friends or foes, about the new\nreligion. The new point of view and the new relations would be most\nsignificant, too, in that department of thought with which the contact\nof this new central system had most to do, and thus the treatment of the\ntheistic problem exhibits in a special degree the alteration in the\nstandpoint and method of philosophy. It threw into bold relief the old\nbasis of belief in the divine, and aroused a comparison and discussion\nof the validity of the various arguments hitherto used by speculative\nthought, and set them over in sharp contrast to the claims of the new\nrevelation. In the early period when this contrast was most clearly\nfelt, and time had not yet permitted a complete fusion and blending of\nthe two points of view, we find a simplicity of situation which will aid\nanalysis and facilitate the study of the relation of the old arguments\nfor the existence of a God to the Christian doctrine, and which will\nhelp in determining the elements due to each and in interpreting the\nreasons for the direction of thought on this subject, which\ncharacterized the whole of the Medi\u00e6val period.\n\nIn the representations of early Christian thought, however, we find\ngreat differences in the emphasis laid upon the speculative side of the\ntheistic problem. Christian philosophy is no exception to the rule that\nthe thought of the race develops through the needs, temperaments and\ntendencies with which it comes into contact, and unfolds itself\nnaturally in response to internal or external stimuli--the doubts,\nintellectual needs and growing consciousness and experience of the\nbeliever, and the cavils, objections and attacks of his opponent. The\nfirst Christian teachers had to meet simple problems, and the mission of\nthe Apostolic and sub-Apostolic Church was to \"the people.\" Its first\ntask, determined by the conditions in which the Christians found\nthemselves, as well as by the command of their Master, was to convert\nthe Jews, who, by their long training as a \"peculiar people,\" were\nespecially adapted for receiving this new revelation, based, as it was,\non that monotheistic idea to the preservation of which their national\nlife had been devoted. Upon them the primitive Christians, most of whom,\nlike St. Paul, were \"Hebrews of the Hebrews,\" brought to bear the\ninstrument most adapted to their conversion, namely, the argument\ndeduced from the sacred Scriptures of their race.\n\nAnd when the Church finally turned towards the Gentile world, it was\nstill the popular religion, the religion of the poets, rather than the\nphilosophy of the schools, with which its apologists first came into\ncontact, and it is very evident from such writings as the recently\nrecovered _Apology_ of Aristides, \"philosopher of Athens,\" and many\nother works extending over the whole Ante-Nicene period, that much of\nthe energy of the early exponents of Christianity was directed towards\nthe conversion of the populace who still adhered, at least formally, to\nthe religion of their own poets.\n\nThe function of the primitive Christians, so far as the content of their\nbelief was concerned, was to preserve and transmit to their successors\nan _implicit_ faith. The value of this faith they attempted to show\nchiefly by practical, ethical demonstration. Thus they preached chiefly\nby example, and it is on the ground of _life_ rather than that of\n_thought_ that they made their plea to the Gentiles. In their struggle\nfor existence, threatened on every side by official persecution and\npopular fury, they had no opportunity for speculation on\nfundamentals--they pleaded merely to be allowed to live the life to\nwhich they were pledged. With the Eastern training, which most of them\nhad had, so foreign to the ideals of Greek philosophy, and so tenacious\nof the idea of God, and with the person of Christ so near to them as to\nblind their eyes to the possibility of any other standard of truth than\nHis words, they naturally afford us no material for the question under\ndiscussion.\n\nThus we must wait for the rise of Christian philosophy, and take as our\n_terminus a quo_ the middle of the second century, when first there\nappears that literature which bears evidence to the conversion of\nphilosophers to the Christian Church, and affords us examples of their\nattempts to present the new doctrines to the schools which they had\nabandoned.\n\nOur _terminus ad quem_ will be the Council of Nicea. The reason for this\nis in part the demands of time and space, and in part the fact that it\nwill avoid needless and tedious repetition. The use of the theistic\nargument for some time after the Nicene period is fairly homogeneous,\nand presents no important new considerations. The apologetic work of the\npatristic writers was chiefly done in the ante-Nicene age; after that\ndiscussion turned more upon questions within the scope of the Christian\nFaith. The function of the age of the Councils was the formulation and\ndefinition of Christian dogma upon the admitted basis of the revelation\nof Jesus Christ.\n\nThis inquiry, therefore, will have to do with that interesting period\nwhen the doctrines of the Christian Church were finding their connection\nwith and relation to the speculations of Greek philosophy, and when the\nChristian philosophers and apologists were determining the attitude\nwhich, for many centuries, revealed religion assumed toward the\ndemonstrations of natural theology.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] _Philosophy and Theology_, p. 176.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nGREEK AND ROMAN THEISTIC ARGUMENTS\n\n\nThe first question that confronts us as we enter upon the discussion is\nthe preliminary inquiry: What had been done already in the way of\ntheistic argument, and in what condition did the Christian Church find\nthis argument when it first began to develop a system of apologetics?\nAnd from the conditions of ancient thought, or, at least, from what we\nknow of it, this resolves itself into the question: How far had the\nGreek philosophers advanced by means of speculative thought toward a\nconscious theism, and by what means did the various individuals and\nschools among them seek to prove the existence of the Divine? The answer\nto this inquiry will involve a brief examination of the contributions of\nthe pre-Socratic philosophers (especially Anaxagoras), Socrates, Plato,\nAristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, Cicero, and the Hellenizing Jews\nof Alexandria.\n\nThe thought of Greece before the time of Socrates, from the very nature\nof its problem, and the material at its disposal, yields us but little\nthat can, without doing violence to the facts, be construed as bearing\non the theistic argument. The search of these early philosophers was,\nindeed, for an {Arch\u00ea}, but their interest in the inquiry, as a perusal of\nthe extant fragments of their writings will prove, was pre-eminently\ncosmological. They strove to discover the eternal ground of all things,\nbut it was a principle to account for the phenomena of _physical_ nature\nthat they sought, and they had not attained to a realization of even a\nrude form of the theistic problem. All they sought for was a primary\nsubstance which should satisfy the needs of a rudimentary physical\nscience, which would enable them to co-ordinate the scanty data which\nthey had accumulated from their contact with the world in which they\nlived, and to whose secrets they seem at times, in spite of their\nlimited knowledge, to have come very close. And even granting that the\nproblem involved in their search for the {Arch\u00ea} was at bottom identical\nwith that of theism, they attempt to give no proof or argument for their\nconclusions with regard to it. They are as yet merely _seers_, who\nreport the vision that comes to them as they gaze upon the stress and\nstrain and ever-changing spectacle of earth's phenomena. Even the\nteleology of Anaxagoras (often mentioned as the germ of the theistic\nargument) gives us nothing more than a poet's dream, expressed, as\nDiogenes Laertius informs us, in a \"lofty and agreeable style.\"[2]\n\"Nous,\" Anaxagoras tells us, \"is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed\nwith nothing, but is alone, itself by itself.... It has all knowledge\nabout everything, and the greatest strength; and Nous has power over all\nthings, both greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous had power\nover the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the\nbeginning.... And Nous set in order all things that were to be and that\nwere, and all things that are not now, and that are, and this revolution\nin which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon and the air and\nthe \u00e6ther that are separated off.\"[3] This, however, amounts to no\nargument, and it is extremely doubtful whether Anaxagoras ever meant\nanything more by his Nous than Empedocles did by his Love and Strife, of\nwhich it was the historical successor, and we may safely, I think,\nendorse the judgment of Aristotle when he says that \"Anaxagoras, also,\nemploys mind as a machine\" (_i.e._, as the Laurentian MS. indicates, as\na theatrical _deus ex machina_) \"for the production of the cosmos; and\nwhen he finds himself in a perplexity as to the cause of its being\nnecessarily so, he then drags it in by force to his assistance; but, in\nthe other instances, he assigns as a cause of the things that are being\nproduced, everything else in preference to mind (Nous).\"[4] This\ncriticism will, I am confident, apply fully as well to any apparent\ntheism in the other pre-Socratic writers,[5] so that we shall be\njustified in assigning to them as their part in the development of the\ntheistic argument, the mere undefined feeling and growing conviction of\na permanent behind the changing, a \"one\" behind the \"many.\"\n\nWe find the natural deep and practical piety of Socrates reinforcing\nitself with a very full and complete statement of a teleological\nargument, based upon final cause, or adaptation of means to ends. It is\nin the _Memorabilia_[6] that we get the clear statement of this, and,\ntherefore, it is a Socratic teaching which can, fortunately, be\ndefinitely distinguished from the Platonic treatment of the subject.\n\"But which,\" he asks, \"seemed to you most worthy of admiration,\nAristodemus--the artist who forms images void of motion and\nintelligence, or one who has the skill to produce animals that are\nendued not only with activity, but understanding?\" Then as Aristodemus\nanswers, \"The latter,\" Socrates proceeds to a detailed description of\nthe adaptations of the eye, ear, teeth, mouth and nose to their several\nuses, and concludes with the question: \"And canst thou still doubt,\nAristodemus, whether a disposition of parts like this should be a work\nof chance, or of wisdom and contrivance?\" He also argues in like manner\nfrom the existence of intelligence in man, the soul, and the general\nadaptability of man's powers and conditions to the furthering of his\nlife. This argument to design has appropriately been called \"peculiarly\nthe Socratic proof,\"[7] and to his treatment of it, so in keeping with\nthe practical, sturdy common-sense of the man, nothing essential or\nimportant, except in multiplication of applications and details, has\nbeen added since his time. In the opinion of the writer, however,\nSocrates, so far as one can judge from his recorded utterances,\ndeveloped merely the form of the Argument to Design, but it cannot be\npositively asserted that he used it as a _theistic_ argument. In the\n_Memorabilia_ it is always \"the gods\" to which the argument leads, and\nthe worship of them that he urges. He may have had a more theistic\nconception, but the context warrants no further meaning of {theos} than the\ngeneric one of an object of worship--in this case the national gods. In\nthe _Apology_ \"{ho theos}\" is used almost invariably of the local divinity\nof the oracle at Delphi, and of the \"daemon\" which, at the instigation\nof the Delphian divinity, as he was convinced, guided his actions. The\npresent writer is strongly of the opinion that much violence has been\ndone the words of Socrates by translators and interpreters, and that\nthis fact will account for much of the alleged theistic teaching which\nis, without warrant, ascribed to the Athenian sage.\n\nThe contribution of Plato to the theistic argument was,\ncharacteristically, the form of the \"Ontological proof\" which has been\ncalled \"Idealogical.\" This process is a very natural development for\nPlato's Dialectic.[8] Once divide the universe, as he did, into the two\nclasses of permanent existence and transient phenomena, and identify the\nformer with the ideas (which are nothing else than universals, each of\nwhich expresses the essence of many phenomena), and it is a very easy\nprocess to conceive of these ideas themselves being united in another\nmore inclusive idea, and so, by a process of generalization, to reach at\nlength the \"Idea of Ideas\"--the absolute Idea, in which lies the essence\nof all in the universe. Thus from any one fact of beauty, harmony, etc.,\nthe human mind may rise to the notion of a common quality in all objects\nof beauty, etc.: \"from a single beautiful body to two, from two to all\nothers; from beautiful bodies to beautiful sentiments, from beautiful\nsentiments to beautiful thoughts, until, from thought to thought, we\narrive at the highest thought, which has no other object than the\nperfect, absolute, Divine Beauty.\"[9] The \"ideas,\" too, and especially\nthe \"Good\" or \"absolute Idea,\" have in them a teleological element,\n\"since the Idea not only states as what, but also for what a thing\nexists.\"[10] The absolute Idea is not only the first principle of the\nuniverse, but also its final purpose, and thus we have indicated in\nvarious places a teleological argument. Traces of other forms of the\ntheistic argument have been detected in Plato's writings, but none of\nthem are at all explicitly developed, and one cannot but feel that some\nwriters on the subject have claimed altogether too much for Plato's\ntheology.[11] The poetical and allegorical form into which he so\nconstantly throws his discussion makes it extremely difficult to\ndetermine his exact position, especially on such a subject as his\ntheology, in which he is constantly adapting his metaphysical doctrines\nto the prevailing polytheistic religious ideas; and at the same time\nthis method of expression gives a good opportunity for the collection of\nisolated quotations which may support almost any theory.\n\nThe religious character of Plato's philosophy is, as Zeller says, to be\nfound much more on the moral than on the scientific side, and hence he\nwas content to leave the more exact formulation of such arguments as\nthese to his successors. As to the results to which this method led him,\nthe statement of Zeller, in view of the many conflicting opinions, seems\nsatisfactory: \"In everything that he states concerning the Divinity the\nleading point of view is the idea of the Good, the highest metaphysical\nand ethical perfection. As this highest Idea stands over all ideas as\nthe cause of all being and knowing, so over all gods, alike hard to find\nand to describe, stands the one, eternal, invisible god, the Framer and\nFather of all things.\"[12] Of the personality of God Plato had no\nconception,[13] and it would be a very difficult undertaking to prove\nfrom his extant works that he was, in any real sense of the word, a\ntheist.\n\nOf the three divisions of the speculative sciences--physical,\nmathematical and theological--Aristotle makes the last the \"most\nexcellent,\"[14] \"for it is conversant about that one amongst entities\nwhich is more entitled to respect than the rest.\"[15] It is to the\ndiscussion of this subject in Book XI. that the greater part of the\n_Metaphysics_ leads up. He has established in the previous portions of\nthe work the two substances which he calls \"natural or\nphysical\"--namely, matter and form--and now he proceeds to justify the\nhints he has given of a third substance which is \"immovable.\"[16] It has\nbeen customary to divide this discussion of Aristotle into several\nformal theistic arguments,[17] but in the opinion of the writer the text\nof the _Metaphysics_ does not lend itself readily to any such cut and\ndried arrangement of its argument. Aristotle does, indeed, to avoid the\nabsurdity of an endless regress, argue from the {kinoumena} and the\n{kinounta} of the physical World to a {pr\u00f4ton kinoun} which is a pure\n{energeia, akin\u00eaton, aneu hyl\u00eas}, and hence foreign to all the passivity\nand contingency of matter;[18] concludes from motion in the world that\nthere must be a First Mover;[19] and asserts the actuality of the\neternal as opposed to potentiality; but these arguments are so blended\ntogether, and take each one so much from the others, that I cannot be\nconvinced that Aristotle had ever clearly differentiated them.\n\nBut it is clear enough that the crown of Aristotle's whole system is\nthis \"prime mover,\" \"unmoved\" and \"apart from matter,\" and that this\nconception, up to which his thought leads from every side, as the\nnecessary implication from the motion everywhere seen in the world, is\nhis chief contribution to the argument for the existence of the Divine.\nAristotle's chief interest lay in the cosmological problem, and his form\nof proof and the result which he reached by it were moulded by this\nfact. His argument did not lead him to a Creator of the world, for the\nuniverse, no less than the prime mover, was eternal, and the latter is\nnothing more than a principle of reason immanent in the world--pervading\nit, not distinguished from it--and the author of motion only in a\npassive way, after all, as a sort of magnetic object of desire.[20] In\nother places Aristotle makes passing references to different forms of\nthe argument to prove the existence of the gods,[21] but it is evident\nthat his own interest centered around this unmoved final cause, and it\nis in his proof of its existence from cosmological considerations that\nhis significance for us lies.\n\nIn the post-Aristotelian schools we have an entire change of the point\nof view, and instead of a philosophy of nature, such as occupied the\nattention of the pre-Socratic thinkers, or a philosophy of mind, such as\nSocrates, Plato, and to a large extent, Aristotle attempted to\nconstruct, we find the interest of men in speculative questions centered\nin a philosophy of life, of morals. Corresponding to this change in the\npoint of view, we may easily detect an alteration in the manner of\ndealing with the arguments for the existence of the gods.\n\nThere was, in the first place, an increased emphasis laid upon this line\nof thought, in common with religious subjects in general, and the\nreasons for the belief in the existence of the gods (for the Greek\nschools never transcended polytheism--when they speak of {theos} they mean\nsimply the abstract divinity of the many separate divinities) seems, so\nfar as we may judge from the comparatively scanty remains that have come\ndown to us, to have been discussed at great length; critically and\nnegatively by the Sceptics, positively and apparently with full\nconviction by the Stoics, and with a curious mixture of both of these\nattitudes by the Epicureans. These latter, if the reported doctrine of\nEpicurus himself be trustworthy, denied the popular gods, and, in order\nto insure freedom, rejected the Stoic doctrine of providence; but, on\nthe other hand, asserted a belief in gods whose essential\ncharacteristics are immortality and perfect happiness (to insure which\nthey must care nothing for the world or for men), and whose existence\nwas held to be proven on the basis of the common consent of all men\n(\"_Argumentum e Consensu Gentium_\"). This argument is the result of a\n\"natural idea\" or \"pre-notion,\" which Epicurus called {prolepsis};--\"that\nis, an antecedent conception of the fact in the mind, without which\nnothing can be understood, inquired after, or discoursed on.\"[22]\n\nThe Stoics, on the other hand, with their strong conviction of\nprovidence working in the world, were rather inclined to deny the\nvalidity of this argument from common consent, and rested their belief\nin the gods, as Cicero makes his Stoic do in _De Natura Deorum_,[23] on\nthe evidence of design and purpose in the universe, but by this process\nsucceeded only in proving to their own satisfaction that the world is\ndivine--a fatalistic pantheism which roused the ire of the Epicurean and\nSceptic alike, and which even Cicero seemed hardly to be able to accept.\n\nFrom this necessarily brief review of the development of the argument\nfor the existence of a Divinity in Greek and Roman thought, it will be\nseen that, at one time or another, in a more or less fully developed\nform, each one of the principal types of the theistic argument received\nthe chief emphasis and had its method enunciated. The pre-Socratic\nnatural philosophers, on the basis of the maxim as old as philosophy\nitself--{Adynaton ginesthai ti ek m\u00eadenos prouparchontos}--pointed to an\n{Arch\u00ea}--a real behind phenomena, a permanent behind the change--and thus\npointed to the so-called Aetiological argument founded on the principle\nof causality. Socrates, with his pre-eminently practical disposition and\nethical point of view, saw above all things intention in nature, and so\nfrom the consideration of this choice and adaptation of means to their\nend, and the resultant Final Cause he constructs a very complete\nTeleological argument for the existence of some intelligence behind the\nvisible world. Plato's Ideas, as we have seen, determine the method by\nwhich he arrives at his abstract divinity, namely, by the \"Idealogical\"\nform of argument based upon a process of generalization. Aristotle,\nstruck by the phenomena of motion in the universe, lays most stress on\nthe course of reasoning which would lead back to the Prime Mover. The\nEpicureans, subordinating their theology to their ethical theory, and\nunwilling to allow their deity to interfere with the world or with men's\naffairs, developed and placed their dependence on the argument from\ncommon consent. The Stoics, laying great stress upon the order,\nproportion and harmony in the world, argued to mind as the reason for\nthis condition of things. But none of these philosophers, in the opinion\nof the writer, attained to a conception of God which could in any real\nor accepted sense of the word be called theistic, or which would satisfy\na mind accustomed to the idea of the Christian doctrine of God.\n\nFor the Greek writers never make any accurate distinction between {ho\ntheos, hoi theoi, to theion} and {ta theia}. They never conceive of\ntheir {theos} as anything more than a rather larger and more majestic\nmember of the innumerable family of the divinities of which the poets\nhad sung--more spiritual only in so far as it was more vague and\nindefinite, a sort of mysterious, mythical being to which is sometimes\nattributed the same kind of personality possessed by the inferior gods,\nand sometimes regarded as simply the abstract divinity which\ncharacterized all of the gods. But that to which the arguments that we\nhave been discussing generally lead is not even so near to the theistic\nconception as this modified polytheism, for they usually conduct us, as\nwe have already indicated, to nothing more than a (sometimes)\npersonified force of nature, principle of order, or abstract\nconception--not a God. Take away the inaccurate and misleading terms by\nwhich the original Greek is rendered in most of the English versions, in\nwhich the enthusiasm of the student of comparative religions has taken\nthe place of the careful and accurate translator, and, aside from\nfrequent apostrophes, such as are continually addressed by the poets to\nthe many gods of the popular religion, the end of the arguments we have\nbeen considering will be found to be as depicted above. In a word: Greek\nphilosophy, independent of Semitic influences, developed the _form_ of\nthe chief types of the theistic argument, but it failed utterly to\ndeduce from them a theism, being throughout in its theology either\npolytheistic or pantheistic.\n\nWhile considering this branch of our subject it would be impossible to\nignore another school of thought, which, while neither Greek nor Roman\nin its nationality, yet derives so much of its philosophical stand-point\nfrom the former of these races as to be often classed under the same\nhead. This is the school of Hellenizing Jews, in which there is built up\non the foundation of the traditional faith of the Hebrew race, to the\ntruth and authority of which they always held, a superstructure of\nphilosophical speculation which follows closely the models afforded them\nby Greek thought. To effect a reconciliation between these two elements\nit was necessary for them to resort to the allegorical interpretation of\nthe ancient inspired history of the race, and hence to the Oriental mind\nthat wished to engage in speculative thought it was naturally Platonic\nand Pythagorean, rather than Aristotelian, methods that were most\nattractive.\n\nThe chief and probably the earliest developed example of this\ncombination of Oriental and Occidental thought is found in the writings\nof Philo Judaeus.[24] To him the powers of man seemed to be wholly\nunreliable and delusive, and only the special grace of God enables one\nto perceive any truth--\"{Autos theos arch\u00ea kai p\u00eag\u00ea techn\u00f4n kai epist\u00eam\u00f4n\nan\u00f4molog\u00eatai}.\" To approach God one must flee from one's self--\"{ei gar\nz\u00eat\u00eais theon exelthousa apo saut\u00eas anaz\u00eatei}.\" Neither reason nor any other\nfunction of the soul can conduct us to God, nor can we attain to a\nconception of Him as the supreme cause of all by regarding the manifold\nperfections and powers of nature, for such a process can give us only\nshadows. It is only by a \"superior faculty\" which is a grace of God that\none can attain some idea of the divine, but even by this means we arrive\nat only negative knowledge--we can know only what God is not.[25] Yet in\nspite of all this Philo uses quite an elaborate teleological argument\ndrawn from the order in the world.[26] This inconsistency, which, as\nErdmann remarks,[27] may be explained by the fact that Philo makes God\nonly the orderer of the world, and, furthermore, interposes an\nintermediate being, the famous Philonian Logos, we have thought it worth\nwhile to mention in this place, as it forms a connecting link between\nthe Greek philosophers and the Alexandrian Fathers, and foreshadows, in\nsome degree, the direction in which their thought was to be led.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[2] D. L., I, 16; II, 6.\n\n[3] Ritter and Preller, 123. Translated by Burnet; _Early Greek\nPhilosophy_, p. 283, 4.\n\n[4] _Metaphysics_, I, 4.\n\n[5] The \"one god, the greatest among gods and men\" of Xenophanes has led\nmen to call him the first monotheist, but an examination of the\nfragments attributed to him will, I am sure, confirm the verdict of\nBurnet (_ut supra_, p. 123) that \"what Xenophanes proclaimed as the\n'greatest god' was nothing more nor less than what we call the material\nworld.\"\n\n[6] Xenophon: _Memorabilia_, I, 4.\n\n[7] Cocker: _Christianity and Greek Philosophy_, p. 491.\n\n[8] \"La dialectique et le syst\u00e8me des id\u00e9es conduisaient directement\nPlaton \u00e0 la d\u00e9monstration de l'existence de Dieu; et son Dieu porte en\nquelque fa\u00e7on l'empreinte de cette origine, puisqu'il est \u00e0 la fois\nl'unit\u00e9 absolue et l'intelligence parfaite.\" Jules Simon: _Etudes sur la\nTh\u00e9odic\u00e9e de Platon et d'Aristote_, p. 29.\n\n[9] _Banquet_, \u00a7 34.\n\n[10] Erdmann: _History of Philosophy_, \u00a7 77, 4.\n\n[11] E.g. Cocker: _Christianity and Greek Philosophy_, pp. 377, ff.\n\n[12] Zeller: _Philosophie der Griechen_, II, i, s. 926.\n\n[13] Plato \"never raised the question of the personality of God.\"\n(Zeller; _Greek Philosophy_ (briefer edition) \u00a7 49.) \"Sie\" (\"die Idee\nder Ideen\") \"ist nat\u00fcrlich keine gottliche Pers\u00f6nlichkeit.\" (Kahnis:\n_Verh\u00e4ltniss der Alten Philosophie zum Christenthum_, p. 54.)\n\n[14] _Metaphysics_, V, 1.\n\n[15] _Ibid._: x, 7.\n\n[16] _Metaphysics_, xi, 6.\n\n[17] E.g., Schwegler: _History of Philosophy_; Cocker; _ut supra_, p.\n412, ff.\n\n[18] xi, 6.\n\n[19] xi, 7.\n\n[20] Jules Simon: _Etudes sur la Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e de Platon et d'Aristote_, p.\n88, _et al._; Davidson: _Theism and Human Nature_, p. 45.\n\n[21] Aristotle makes good use of the argument to design in a striking\npassage from a lost work quoted by Cicero in _De Natura Deorum_, II, 37,\nand in _Physica auscultatio_, II, 8, says: \"The appearance of ends and\nmeans is a proof of design.\"\n\n[22] Cicero; _De Natura Deorum_, I, 16, 17, and frequently. See also\nSeneca; _Epist._, cxvii, whose Syncretism allows him to borrow from\nStoic and Epicurean alike. See also Zeller; _Stoics, Epicureans and\nSceptics_, p. 465.\n\n[23] E.g., I, 36; II, 2, 5, ff.\n\n[24] Vacherot: _Histoire Critique de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie_, Vol. I, p.\n142.\n\n[25] _Ibid._: Vol. I, p. 143, 144.\n\n[26] See e.g., the quotation in Stirling; _Philosophy and Theology_, p.\n173.\n\n[27] _History of Philosophy_, Vol. I, \u00a7 114, 3.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE PATRISTIC POINT OF VIEW\n\n\nThe philosophy of the Greeks during the first century of our era\npresents a great contrast to that of the age of Socrates, Plato and\nAristotle. No longer do we find men engaged in the processes of\npositive, constructive thought, but we have presented to our view an age\nof retrospection, of literary criticism, and, to a great extent, of\nintellectual exhaustion. Men live amid the ruins of the systems\nconstructed by their ancestors, and each one attempts to form for\nhimself, out of the scattered fragments, a combination which may serve\nhim as a sufficiently coherent rule of thought, and, especially, of\nlife. Stoicism, Epicureanism, Scepticism, the \"Orientalizing Hellenes,\"\nand the \"Hellenizing Orientals,\" all by their restless, nervous,\nfrequently erratic and aimless activity, bear witness to the fact that\nthe mind of man has had revealed to it its own limitations, and is well\non the way towards despair of ever arriving at truth. The Greek mind no\nlonger exhibits that elasticity and spontaneity and enthusiasm in the\nsearch for truth, or that confidence in its results, which characterized\nthe representatives of the best period of the thought of the race. The\npolitical fortunes of Greece do but typify the process which was going\non in the Greek mind itself, and the period which we are considering is\nan age of intellectual as well as political decadence. This is\nmanifested by the further fact that the thought of the age was largely\nturned backward and dwelt in the past. The day of original thought had\npassed by, and men were now content to deal with ideas at second\nhand--to be commentators rather than creators. This literary character\nwhich Greek philosophy now first began to exhibit was often seen and\nprotested against. Thus Epictetus says: \"If I study philosophy with a\nview only to its literature, I am not a philosopher, but a litt\u00e9rateur;\nthe only difference is that I interpret Chrysippus instead of\nHomer.\"[28] But protest as they might, the inexorable signs of old age\ncrept over the nation as irresistibly as they do over the individual,\nand, like the venerable man, preserved beyond his generation, Hellas\nlived largely in the memories of the past.\n\nThe influence of this condition of things is seen in the education of\nthe times. The Greek world of this period, as we know it, was\npre-eminently educated, but in a special, literary sense of the term.\nThe foundation of their education was Grammar--the \"Belles Lettres\" of\nmodern times. Sextus Empiricus says, \"We are all given over to Grammar\nfrom childhood, and almost from our baby-clothes.\"[29] After Grammar\ncame Rhetoric, \"the study of literature by the study of literary\nexpression and quasi-forensic argument,\"[30] and Rhetoric was followed\nby Philosophy, which, however, like the other branches of study, so\npartook of the characteristics of the age that we find Marcus Aurelius\ncongratulating himself in this manner: \"I owe it to Rusticus that I\nfound the idea of the need of moral reformation, and that I was not\ndiverted to literary ambition, or to write treatises on philosophical\nsubjects, or to make rhetorical exhortations.\"[31]\n\nThis saying of the imperial Stoic suggests another characteristic of the\nthought of the age--its ethical cast. From the time of Aristotle men had\nbeen content to have, to a large extent, the abstract problems of\nOntology, Epistemology, and the others, and to lay emphasis on questions\nof life and manners. Stoicism, Epicureanism, Scepticism, and all the\nminor schools of the age, are pre-eminently ethical in their character.\nTo be sure it was ethical theory rather than practice with which they\nwere busied, but this fact makes the characteristic none the less\nimportant for the student of the history of philosophy.\n\nThis disorganized condition of thought which we have been attempting to\ndepict has been well described by Dr. Stirling: \"The fall of the old\nworld, which was at once political, religious and philosophical, was\ncharacterized by a universal atomism. Politically, the individual, as an\natom, found himself alone, without a country, hardly with a home.\nReligiously, the individual, as an atom, has lost his God; he looks up\ninto an empty heaven; his heart is broken, and he is hopeless, helpless,\nhapless, in despair. Philosophically, all is contradiction; there is no\nlonger any knowledge he can trust. What the world is he knows not at\nall. He knows not at all what he himself is. Of what he is here for, of\nwhat it is all about, he is in the profoundest doubt, despondency and\ndarkness. Politically, religiously and philosophically thus empty and\nalone, it is only of himself that the individual can think; it is only\nfor himself that the individual must care. There is not a single need\nleft him now--he has not a single thought in his heart--but {eu prattein},\nhis own welfare.\"[32]\n\nIt was in the midst of this lump of Eclecticism, Syncretism and\nScepticism that the leaven of Christianity was deposited, and the result\nof the fusion which took place after the first antagonism had passed\naway, makes this period a turning-point in the history of philosophy,\nand of the utmost importance as regards its effects on subsequent\nthought.\n\nAnd of this antagonism and subsequent reconciliation, the early\nChristian Apologists were concrete examples. They had most of them,\nbefore they became Christians, been adherents of one or the other of the\ndifferent philosophical sects, and several of them had tried all in\nturn.[33] They exemplified well the prevailing restless distrust of the\nresults and methods of the older schools, but in Christianity--the\nbelief in a Person, who was for them \"the Way, the Truth and the\nLife\"--they finally found the certainty for which they had so long\nsought in vain. The effect of this process, and of this result upon the\nattitude of the early Christian philosophers, could be none other than\nan increased distrust of the arguments for the existence of God, and an\ninclination to ignore them completely. These already suspected processes\nof reasoning by which the Greeks had been able to attain only to an\nabstract principle, or force, or mechanical cause, or arranger of the\nworld, must be of very small importance to these men, upon whose sight\nhad burst all at once, in the height of their despair, the vision of the\nChristian doctrine of God, certified to by one whom they believed to be\nthe veritable Son of God, \"of one substance with the Father,\" and whose\ntestimony to the truth of any fact brought a certainty which was\ninfinitely superior to that which could be attained by any rational\nargument on other grounds. The transcendent authority of the teaching of\nJesus Christ for these men, suddenly rescued by a belief in His claims\nfrom an absolute scepticism which was rapidly overflowing their minds,\nneeds to be thoroughly appreciated before one can understand the\nposition which they assumed, especially with reference to such a\nquestion as the one under discussion.\n\nBut though this basis of belief was sufficient for them, yet, as the\nprimary mission of the Christian was to \"go, disciple all nations,\" they\nwere soon brought, in their endeavors to fulfil this command, into\ncontact with those who not only denied the authority of their Teacher,\nbut who were sceptical about the very fundamentals of religious belief.\nFor the sake of these, then, and occasionally for the further\nconfirmation of the faith of believers, and for purposes of\nillustration, the patristic writers return again to the discussion of\nthose elements of belief for which they themselves felt no need, and\nhence we have in their works a rather frequent reference to the various\nforms of the theistic argument; but one which is evidently only\nincidental to their main course of thought, and which is brought in\nmerely in accommodation to the needs of their readers. The ordinary\narguments to prove the existence of God were not at all an essential, or\neven prominent, feature of early Christian Theology. And because of this\nsecondary and incidental position of these arguments, they were never,\nas we shall see, given definite, conventional shape in the patristic use\nof them, nor were the various forms of the argument differentiated; but\nthey were used in what we may call a mixed form, a combination of two or\nmore different forms being put forth as one composite whole.\n\nBesides these general influences which shaped the patristic treatment of\nthe theistic arguments, we should notice certain fundamental and\ncharacteristic principles assumed by the Fathers, or by most of them,\nwhich have their bearing on our subject.\n\nIn the first place it is held by most of the early Christian authors,\nand explicitly stated by many of them, that the idea of the existence of\nGod is innate in man as a \"natural opinion.\" We have already noticed the\ndoctrine of {prolepsis} advanced by Epicurus, and the somewhat similar\nposition assumed by Philo, and we are not surprised to find that this\nidea took a strong hold on the devout minds of the early Christians.\nThus St. Justin Martyr states that \"the appellation 'God' is not a name,\nbut _an opinion_ ({prosagoreuma}) _planted in the nature of man_ of a\nthing that can hardly be explained,\"[34] and makes one of his\ndiscussions conclude that souls \"can perceive ({noein}) that God\nexists.\"[35] St. Clement of Alexandria goes even further and affirms\nthat \"the Father, then, and Maker of all things is apprehended by all\nthings, agreeably to all, _by innate power and without teaching_.\"[36]\nTertullian thinks that \"the soul was before prophecy. From the beginning\nthe knowledge of God is the dowry (_dos_) of the soul,\"[37] and among\nthe \"things known even by nature\" is \"the knowledge of our God\" which is\n\"possessed by all,\"[38] so that he could write a treatise, _De\nTestimonio Anim\u00e6_, and exclaim, \"O noble testimony of the soul by nature\nChristian.\"[39] Origen speaks of \"the uncorrupted idea of Him which is\nimplanted in the human mind,\"[40] and St. Cyprian makes this knowledge\nso plain that \"this is the very height of sinfulness to refuse to\nacknowledge Him whom you cannot but know.\"[41] Arnobius, too, in a\npassage in which much allowance must be made for rhetorical fervor,\nexclaims, \"Is there any human being who has not entered on the first day\nof his life with an idea of that Great Head? In whom has it not been\nimplanted by nature, on whom has it not been impressed, aye, stamped\nalmost in his mother's womb even, in whom is there not a native\ninstinct, that He is King and Lord, the ruler of all things that be? In\nfine, if the dumb animals even could stammer forth their thoughts, if\nthey were able to use our languages; nay, if trees, if the clods of the\nearth, if stones dominated by vital perceptions were able to produce\nvocal sounds, and to utter articulate speech, would they not in that\ncase, with nature as their guide and teacher, in the faith of\nuncorrupted innocence, both feel that there is a God, and proclaim that\nHe alone is Lord of all?\"[42] Such language as this last example is, of\ncourse, the exclamation of the orator rather than the deliberate\njudgment of the philosopher, but taken in connection with the other\npassages cited it will indicate how strong a hold this conviction had on\nthe Fathers, and will anticipate, to some extent, what we shall have to\nsay later as to the use of the _Argumentum e Consensu Gentium_.\n\nIn direct connection and sharp contrast with this opinion of the\nFathers, there stands the seemingly contradictory statement, as\nfrequently encountered in their writings, that the soul of itself cannot\nsee God nor attain to true religion. In the very same sentence in which\nSt. Justin Martyr asserts that souls \"can perceive ({noein}) that God\nexists,\" he states that they do not see ({idein}) God,[43] and insists in\nmore than one place that \"neither by nature nor by human conception is\nit possible for men to know things so great and divine.\"[44] Frequently\nthe patristic writers have occasion to emphasize the inability of man to\nattain by any of his natural powers to religious truth, and to point to\nthe impotent longings and aspirations of Greek philosophy as an example\nof this. St. Clement of Alexandria, for example, asserts that \"the\nchiefs of philosophy only guessed at\" religious truth,[45] and lays\ndown the general principle that \"God, then, being not a subject for\ndemonstration, cannot be the object of science.\"[46] Origen, too, states\nthat \"for ourselves, we maintain that human nature is in no way able to\nseek after God, or to attain a clear knowledge of Him without the help\nof Him whom it seeks.\"[47]\n\nThe inconsistency between these two fundamental positions of the\nFathers, of which much is often made, is, I think, more apparent than\nreal. For they make a clear distinction in their thought, though the\nmere language which they use is sometimes confusing, between knowledge\nof the existence of God--the undefined feeling or belief that there is a\nGod--which is the \"innate opinion,\" for which they give every man\ncredit; and the knowledge of God, _i.e._, of His attributes, etc., the\nsubject-matter of dogmatic theology. The existence of the former of\nthese, it is true, as of the latter, may be obscured and nearly\nobliterated by sin and the consequent disorganization; for in the\nteaching of the Fathers, as in that of their Master, it is the pure in\nheart that see God,[48] and it is only the man whose nature is kept in\ndue balance by a life of moral rectitude--the \"righteous man\" of the\nScriptures--who can be expected to exhibit clearly this \"natural\nopinion\" or to attain to a full knowledge and appreciation of the\nChristian doctrine of God. At the very best, the knowledge of the Deity\nattained apart from revelation seemed to the Fathers to be, in\ncomparison with their own certainty, miserably vague and conjectural,\nand they are constantly contrasting, in the most striking and graphic\nway, the contradictory and uncertain results to which the philosophers\nattained with the definiteness and consistency of the already\nwell-defined doctrine of the Christian church. To them certainty in\nregard to knowledge of God can only come by means of the testimony of\none who had seen and known,[49] and this testimony they are satisfied\nthat they find in two places chiefly--first, in the testimony of the\nProphets of the Old Testament, and, second, but in fact primarily, in\nthe life and words of Jesus Christ, \"the Word.\"\n\nOf the antiquity and reliability of this first source--the\nProphets--they were never tired of talking, and they were so confident\nof the necessity of resorting to it that they developed their famous\ntheory of the indebtedness of Plato and Aristotle to those Hebrew seers\nfor their theology. \"From every point of view, therefore,\" concludes St.\nJustin Martyr, \"it must be seen that in no other way than only from the\nprophets, who teach us by divine inspiration, is it at all possible to\nlearn anything concerning God and the true religion.\"[50]\n\nBut the chief source from which the Fathers drew that certainty which\nthey could not find in the demonstrations of philosophy was in the\nteaching of the Word, Jesus Christ. God, indeed, as we have seen, is not\nan object of science, \"but the Son is wisdom and knowledge and truth,\nand all else that has affinity thereto. _He is also susceptible of\ndemonstration and of description._\"[51] It is in the incarnate Word of\nGod that the patristic writers find expressed all that man is able to\ncomprehend, and all that he needs to know in this present world, of the\nDivine Nature, and it is His words that confirm their confidence in that\n\"innate opinion\" of the existence of God, of the presence of which in\nevery man they were so sure.\n\nThe subject of the \"demonstration\" of the existence of God is spoken of\nat some length in several places by St. Clement of Alexandria, and with\nhis position most of the Fathers agree in the main. He regards the\nsubject largely from an Aristotelian point of view. All knowledge is\nderived from Sensation and Understanding. \"Intellectual apprehension is\nfirst in the order of nature; but in our case, and in relation to\nourselves, Sensation is first, and of Sensation and Understanding the\nessence of knowledge is formed, and evidence is common to Understanding\nand Sensation.\"[52] But \"should any one say that knowledge is founded on\ndemonstration\" (which \"depends on primary and better known\nprinciples,\"[53] being \"discourse agreeable to reason, producing belief\nin points disputed, from points admitted\"[54]) \"_by a process of\nreasoning_, let him hear that first principles are incapable of\ndemonstration, for they are neither by art\" ({techn\u00ea}), which is \"practical\nsolely, and not theoretical,\" \"nor by sagacity\" ({phron\u00easis} = practical\nwisdom), which is \"conversant about objects which are susceptible of\nchange,\"[55] but are \"primary,\" \"self-evident,\" and\n\"indemonstrable.\"[56] Thus this \"demonstration by a process of\nreasoning,\" apart from Sensation _and_ Understanding, is only \"to\nsyllogize;\" \"for to draw the proper conclusion from the premisses is\nmerely to syllogize. But to have also each of the premisses true is not\nmerely to have syllogized, but also to have demonstrated,\" \"so that if\nthere is demonstration at all, there is an absolute necessity that there\nbe something that is self-evident, which is called primary and\nindemonstrable.\"[57] On the basis of this theory of knowledge, it is\nevident that the usual arguments for the existence of God would have but\nlittle weight. For they either attempt to attain their end by formal\nthought alone, and thus result in mere \"syllogizing;\" or, starting from\nvalid enough premises, they try to extend the conclusion beyond the\nlimits imposed by the laws of \"demonstration.\" For St. Clement, then,\nGod is not \"apprehended by the science of demonstration.\" If the Deity\nis to be known, there must be some place in which a union of the\nmaterial and formal elements of \"demonstration\" of His existence is to\nbe found. This he places in the life and teaching of Jesus Christ, who,\nas God incarnate, furnishes the \"evidence\" which \"is common to\nUnderstanding and Sensation,\" and thus translates the \"Infinite\" and\n\"Ineffable\" into terms of the finite and comprehensible. In this paradox\nChristian theology has ever since been content to rest as one of the\nfundamental mysteries of the Faith.\n\nBut even with all the aids of revelation, the Fathers would not claim\nthat man can advance to a full or adequate knowledge of God--we can\nsimply know so much _about_ God as is necessary for _practical_\npurposes--for ascertaining our proper end and duties. God is, from the\nvery limitations of the human mind, \"ineffable,\" \"incomprehensible,\"\n\"the unknown;\"[58] and St. Clement of Alexandria expressly states even\nthe best knowledge of God that man can by any means attain is only\nnegative.[59]\n\nThese general positions, which in their broad lines are common to\npractically all of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, serve to confirm the\nhistorical interpretation of the place occupied by early Christian\ntheistic thought, and will pave the way to an appreciation of their use\nof the arguments for the existence of God.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[28] _Enchiridion_, 49.\n\n[29] _Adversus Grammaticos_, I, 44.\n\n[30] Hatch: _Hibbert Lectures_, 1888, Lect. II, where a full account is\ngiven of the education of the time, and what it signified.\n\n[31] I, 7.\n\n[32] _Philosophy and Theology_, p. 164.\n\n[33] See e.g., St. Justin Martyr: _Dialogue with Trypho_, II.\n\n[34] _Second Apology_, VI.\n\n[35] _Dialogue with Trypho_, IV (end).\n\n[36] _Stromata_, V, 14.\n\n[37] _Against Marcion_, I, 10.\n\n[38] _Resurrection of the Flesh_, III.\n\n[39] _Apology_, XVII.\n\n[40] _Against Celsus_, II, 40.\n\n[41] _Treatise_ VI, \u00a7 9. See, also, Tertullian: _Apology_, XVII; \"And\nthis is the crowning guilt of men that they will not recognize One of\nwhom they cannot possibly be ignorant.\"\n\n[42] _Against the Heathen_, I. 33.\n\n[43] _Dialogue with Trypho_, IV, \"Even Homer distinguishes simple seeing\n({idein}) from {noein}, which implies perception by the mind as consequent\nupon sight.\"\n\n[44] _Hortatory Address to the Greeks_, V.\n\n[45] _Exhortation to the Heathen_, XI.\n\n[46] _Stromata_, IV, 25. In V, 12, he explains what he means by\n\"demonstration\": \"Nor any more is He apprehended by the science of\ndemonstration, for it depends on primary and better known principles.\nBut there is nothing antecedent to the Unbegotten.\"\n\n[47] _Against Celsus_, VII, 20. See also VII, 44, and Clem. Alex.:\n_Stromata_, II, ii, 4, and often.\n\n[48] E.g., Theophilus (I, 1, 2) replies to the demand: \"Show me thy\nGod,\" by the counter-demand: \"Show me _yourself_, and I will show you my\nGod.\"\n\n[49] E.g., St. Justin: _Hortatory Address_, V.\n\n[50] _Ibid._, XXXVIII. See also V, VIII, and Athenagoras: _Embassy_,\nVII; Clem. Alex.: _Exhortion to Heathen_, VI, XI; _Stromata_, I, 13; II,\n2, 11; V, 14; Tertullian: _Apology_, XVIII; Methodius: _Miscellaneous\nFragments_, 1.\n\n[51] St. Clem. Alex.: _Stromata_, IV, 25. For a few among many\nreferences, see: St. Irenaeus: _Against Heresies_, V, i, 1; St. Clem.\nAlex.: _Exhortation to Heathen_, XI; _Instructor_, I, 12; _Stromata_, I,\n5, 19; II, 2; V, 1, 6, 11-13; VII, 1; VI, 5; Tertullian: _Against\nMarcion_, V, 16; _Against Praxeas_, XIV; Origen: _De Principiis_ I, iii,\n1; _Against Celsus_, VII, 42, 44; Novatian: _De Trinitate_, VIII;\nArnobius: _Against the Heathen_, I, 38.\n\n[52] _Stromata_, II, 4: \"{ek de aisth\u00ease\u00f4s kai tou nou h\u00ea t\u00eas epist\u00eam\u00eas\nsynistatai ousia koinon de nou te kai aisth\u00ease\u00f4s to enarges}.\" The student\nof Kant's _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ will find a number of familiar\npassages in St. Clement.\n\n[53] _Ibid._, V, 12.\n\n[54] _Ibid._, VIII, 3.\n\n[55] _Ibid._, II, 4.\n\n[56] _Ibid._, VIII, 3.\n\n[57] _Stromata_, VIII, 3.\n\n[58] E.g., Theophilus: _To Autolycus_, I, 3; St. Clem. Alex.:\n_Stromata_, V, 12.\n\n[59] _Stromata_, V, 12: \"If, then, abstracting all that belongs to\nbodies and things called incorporeal, we cast ourselves into the\ngreatness of Christ, and then advance into immensity by holiness, we may\nreach somehow to the conception of the Almighty, _knowing not what He\nis, but what He is not_.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nPATRISTIC USE OF THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS\n\n\nFrom this account of the general attitude of the ante-Nicene writers\ntoward a possible knowledge of God, it will readily be anticipated that\nthe forms of the theistic argument used by Plato and by Aristotle will\nfind no place in their system. St. Clement of Alexandria, in a passage\nalready referred to,[60] shows that any Ontological or Idealogical\nargument can only lead us to an \"Unknown,\" which may be \"understood\" and\ngiven meaning \"by the Word alone that proceeds from Him;\" and he and\nothers of the early Christian writers seem to hint at that distinction\nbetween Epistemology and Ontology which has always been the chief enemy\nof any purely rational theistic argument. The Aetiological argument,\ntoo, is not explicitly stated by them; and, though Lactantius does, in\nopposing atheistic atomism, ask the question, \"Whence are those minute\nseeds?\" yet the casual character of the inquiry shows the small emphasis\nhe placed on it, and the silence of the other writers, even when there\nwas every opportunity for calling attention to such an argument, gives\nevidence to their estimate of its usefulness.\n\nIt is the more \"practical\" and \"common-sense\" forms of the theistic\nargument--the Cosmological, the Teleological, the argument from common\nconsent, and mixtures of these types--that the early Christian writers\nuse most frequently, and in this they do but conform to the general\ntendency of their age, as well as to the practical spirit of\nChristianity. As we have seen, the more artificial and abstract\narguments of Plato and Aristotle did not take much hold upon others than\ntheir originators or formulators, and the distinct tendency of the\ntheology of the later Greek and Latin schools of philosophy was toward\nthe more concrete forms of the theistic argument. And this inclination\nwould be emphasized in the early Christian writers, so far as they make\nuse of the argument at all, by the eminently simple and common-sense\nattitude of Christianity toward all such problems, and also by the\npeculiar work which the primitive Church had to do in the conversion of\nthe \"common people,\" to whom an abstract argument would have been a\nwaste of words.\n\nBut we should expect that to men, upon whom a close perusal and study of\nthe Old Testament Scriptures had impressed the idea of God as the\nCreator, Law-Giver and Governor of the universe, the Cosmological\nargument would appeal strongly. Moreover, the strong Stoic influence\nwhich is seen in their works, particularly in their treatment of\nquestions of morals, and in their ethical terminology, would naturally,\none would think, pre-dispose them to regard with favor this argument, so\nin vogue among the philosophers of the Porch. It is, therefore, all the\nmore remarkable that, among the important works of the Ante-Nicene\nFathers, not more than a dozen instances, at most, of this argument can\nbe found; and of these more than half are merely passing references to\nthe patent fact of order in the world. Thus Tertullian asserts (quite\nincidentally, in the course of an argument on an ethical question), that\n\"Nature herself is the teacher\" of the fact \"that God is the Maker of\nthe universe,\"[61] but even here it is doubtful whether he means to\nappeal to order or design in the world. In another place he makes the\nmere statement that the fact of God's existence is tested by His works;\nHis character by the beneficence of them;[62] in another that the\n\"Creator ought to be known even by nature;\"[63] and in still another\nthat nature teaches all men the existence and character of God.[64]\nOrigen in a passage sometimes quoted, appeals to the order and harmony\nof the world,[65] but it is to prove the unity of God rather than His\nexistence. Perhaps the best and most elaborate example of the use of the\nCosmological argument by the Ante-Nicene authors, is that made of it by\n\"Athenagoras the Athenian; Philosopher and Christian,\" as he styled\nhimself.[66] He is concerned with making a distinction between God and\nmatter, in opposition to the popular idolatry, and declares that\nChristians see the \"Framer\" behind the orderly world--whose relation one\nto the other he likens to that between the artist and the materials of\nhis art. \"But as clay cannot become vessels of itself without art, so\nneither did matter, which is capable of taking all forms, receive apart\nfrom God the Framer, distinction and shape and order.\"\n\nAnd these few incidental and scattered instances represent practically\nthe explicit use of the Cosmological argument in the writings with which\nwe are occupied. When we consider how constantly they must have met with\nthe statements of it which are prevalent in the writings of the Stoics,\nby whom they were, we know, profoundly influenced in both the form and\nthe terminology of their thought, we must surely consider this omission\na significant fact, for which it is worth while trying to account.\n\nNor does the \"Socratic proof,\" the argument to design, meet with any\nmore cordial reception at the hands of early Christian writers. Although\nthe cases in which it is used are generally more explicit and fully\ndeveloped, yet the appeals to design in nature are fewer even than those\nto order. The earliest, and one of the best examples of the use of this\nargument is that made by Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, in his work\naddressed to the idolater Autolycus.[67] He seeks to prove that the\ninvisible God is perceived through His works. As the soul is unseen, yet\nperceived through the motion of the body; as the pilot is inferred from\nthe motion of the ship; as the king, though not present in person, is\nbelieved to exist from his \"laws, ordinances and authorities;\" so the\nunseen God is \"beheld and perceived through his providence and works.\"\n\"Consider, O man, His works,\" he exclaims; and proceeds to enumerate the\nevidences of design in the universe--\"the timely rotation of the\nseasons,\" \"the regular march of the stars,\" the various beauty of seeds\nand plants and fruits, and many others. It is a passage of considerable\nbeauty, and evidences no mean rhetorical skill.\n\nIt is in this same connection--in the refutation of idolatry--that St.\nClement of Alexandria uses this argument, contrasting the living\norganism of man with the heathen idols.[68] \"None of these (artists)\never made a breathing image, or out of earth moulded soft flesh. Who\nliquefied the marrow? or who solidified the bones? who stretched the\nnerves? who distended the veins? who poured the blood into them? or who\nspread the skin? who ever could have made eyes capable of seeing? who\nbreathed spirit into the lifeless form? who bestowed righteousness? who\npromised immortality? The Maker of the universe alone; the great Artist\nand Father has formed us, such a living image as man is. But your\nOlympian Jove, the image of an image, greatly out of harmony with truth,\nis the senseless work of Attic hands.\" This, it will be readily seen,\nis more an attempt to show the insufficiency of idolatry to account for\nman's nature, than a deliberate attempt at theistic proof.\n\nThe other examples of the use of this form of the argument for the\nexistence of God are found in Lactantius, \"the Christian Cicero.\" In\nspeaking of Socrates he introduces[69] with approval an epitome of the\nAthenian sage's argument, which we have already considered,[70] and, in\ncombatting the atomistic theory of the origin of the world, he\nasserts[71] that neither atoms nor the \"Nature\" of Lucretius can account\nfor the adaptations in the actual world; and the phenomena of mind,\nespecially, proclaim an intelligent Providence. His treatise \"On the\nWorkmanship of God, or the Formation of Man,\" is almost entirely an\nargument to design from the phenomena of man's physical and mental\nnature. From the standpoint of the physiology and psychology of his\ntime, he discusses in detail the function and working of the different\nparts of man's nature, and from the adaptation of means to ends, of\norgans to their functions, which, even with the scanty data of the\nscience of that day, is a striking consideration, he concludes that\nman's being can only be accounted for on the supposition of an Arranger\nor Planner, whose purposes are carried out in exercise of the various\nfunctions.\n\nThe argument _e Consensu Gentium_ has often been accredited with being\npeculiarly the patristic argument for the existence of God,[72] and for\nthis conclusion the use of it in Epicurean theology, and the doctrine of\nthe natural, innate idea of God already considered, would fully prepare\nus; but the fact is that, apart from frequent passing references to the\n\"natural opinion\" mentioned in the preceding chapter, the instances in\nwhich the argument is explicitly made use of are not much more numerous\nthan in the case of the other forms. They constantly appeal to the\ncommon consent, but it is generally against polytheism, as indicating a\nconsciousness of _the unity_ of God. St. Justin Martyr, in the passage\nto which we have already alluded, asserts[73] this common consent, but\nonly as preparatory to the certainty which he finds in revelation. St.\nClement of Alexandria, after asserting that \"the Father and Maker of all\nthings is apprehended by all things, agreeably to all, by innate power,\nand without teaching,\" goes on to confirm his statement in this\nmanner:[74] \"But no race anywhere, of tillers of the soil, or nomads,\nand not even of dwellers in cities, can live without being imbued with\nthe faith of a superior being. Wherefore, every eastern nation, and\nevery nation touching the western shore; or the north, and each one\ntoward the south--all have one and the same preconception respecting\nHim, who hath appointed government; since the most universal of His\noperations equally pervade all.\" It is with the principles and end of\nthis argument in view that Tertullian appeals[75] to the witness of the\nsoul, \"not as when fashioned in schools, trained in libraries, fed in\nAttic academies and porticoes,\" but \"rude, uncultured and untaught, such\nas they have thee who have thee only; that very thing of the road, the\nstreet, the workshop wholly;\" and from his examination of this ordinary\nsoul he concludes that \"the knowledge of our God is possessed by\nall.\"[76] Minucius Felix appeals to this same common instinct and\nexclaims:[77] \"What! is it not true that I have in this matter the\nconsent of all men?\" and Origen, in his reply to the attack of Celsus,\npoints to \"the ineradicable idea of Him.\"[78] Novatian asserts[79] that\n\"the whole mind of man is conscious\" of Him, \"even if does not express\nitself,\" and Lactantius thinks that for Cicero \"it was no difficult\ntask, indeed, to refute the falsehoods of a few men who entertained\nperverse sentiments by the testimony of communities and tribes, who on\nthis one point had no disagreement.\"[80]\n\nBesides these instances in which the different types of the theistic\nargument are used in an undeveloped, but yet in a pure form, there are\nseveral places where a mixed form appears, the different conventional\nprocesses being used in combination without being clearly\ndifferentiated. Thus the argument from common consent and the argument\nbased on order or design are used in conjunction, the necessity of the\nuniversal knowledge of God's existence being seen from the witness to\nHim found in nature.[81] So, too, the arguments from order and from\ndesign in nature are often used in conjunction, and in many passages it\nis difficult to decide to which one of these two the author intends to\nappeal primarily.[82] These undifferentiated or mixed arguments are\nquite frequently to be seen in the patristic writings, and serve to\nillustrate the eclectic character of their thoughts, often presenting in\none passage the forms of the theistic arguments peculiar to two opposed\nschools in Greek philosophy; and they also indicate how incidentally and\nna\u00efvely the Fathers used such weapons, not taking the trouble to\ndifferentiate one form from the other, though they could not have been\nignorant of such distinctions.\n\nThe first thing that strikes one's attention in this examination of the\nuse of the theistic argument in the early Christian writers is, as has\nbeen indicated, the paucity of examples. When we consider the emphasis\nlaid upon this subject in the contemporaneous philosophical schools; the\nconstant appeal to one form or another of the argument by Stoic and\nEpicurean alike; the various combinations and adaptations made by\nEclectics and Syncretists; the use of such material in the exercises of\nthe rhetorical instruction then so prominent in education; it would seem\nthat a weapon so ready to their hand must have been seized upon by the\nFathers, and made full use of for the advancement of the cause in which\nthey were enlisted. And this silence on their part cannot be due to\nignorance of what had been written on the subject, or of what was going\non in the world about them. The patristic writings show the keenest\ninterest in, and fullest knowledge of what men were thinking about in\nthe outside world as well as within the Church. Many of the Fathers, as\nwe have had occasion to notice, had been trained in the philosophical\nschools,[83] and show themselves fully conversant not only with such\nsubjects, but with poetry and general literature as well.[84] In the\ncourse of their education, as well as in their reading, they must have\nbecome fully acquainted with all the forms of the theistic argument. And\nthis knowledge they had every opportunity to use. Many of their works\nthat have come down to us are either apologies or else answers to\ncritics of Christianity, who attacked its doctrines from the stand-point\nof either polytheism or atheism. In maintaining the Christian doctrine\nof God against these opponents, the theistic argument would seem to be a\nmost natural weapon for one who was confident of its validity. But the\nfact is, that in most of these apologies no such reasoning is employed,\nand even when it is to be found in their pages, is only incidental and\nby way of illustration, to explain the rational character of the\nChristian doctrine of God by a sort of _argumentum ad hominem_.\n\nOne reason for this neglect of the theistic argument may be readily\nfound in the subject-matter of the treatises themselves. Almost\nexclusively with the earlier Fathers, as we have seen, and very largely\nwith their successors, the emphasis was laid on life, rather than on\nthought, and the appeal was to authority rather than to reason. Men were\nasked to judge of Christianity by its fruits, and to receive the faith\nwhich it professed, not because of its rational demonstration, but\nbecause of the authority of Him who promulgated it. The persons to whom\nthe arguments were addressed, too, explain much of the silence of the\nFathers. To the Jew or religious Gentile it would be superfluous to\naddress elaborate arguments to prove the existence of God, and it was to\nthese classes that many of the works under discussion were addressed. To\nthem the argument, such as we frequently find, from the Old Testament\ntypes and prophecies, or from the superior beauty and morality of the\nChristian doctrine and life, taking for granted the existence of God,\nwas what the case required. And when, as is very frequently the case,\nthey address the popular idolaters, it is a negative argument to show\nthe unworthiness of idol-worship, and the superiority of their own\ndoctrine, of which they naturally make use, and not a theistic argument\nwhich would have no significance to those who were already \"too\nreligious.\"\n\nMany of the apologies of the early Church were called forth by the\nattacks which were made on the Christians by the adherents of the\npopular religions. The charges usually brought against them were those\nof atheism, because of their rejection of the gods of Greece and Rome;\nof immorality, because of the secrecy and mystery of their meetings, and\ncannibalism, because of their doctrine of the partaking of the Body and\nBlood of Christ in the Eucharist. In refuting these charges, especially\nthe first, no place was afforded for the use of a theistic argument, but\nthey naturally exhibit their belief in God as superior to that of their\naccusers, and appeal to their lives as justifying their belief.\n\nBut aside from these cases in which the theistic argument would have\nbeen superfluous, there are many places in which it is conspicuous for\nits absence. That they had other arguments besides those from scripture\nand authority, and that they believed in using them when necessary, we\nhave, as we have seen, many proofs in their writings. Their position is\nwell indicated by Lactantius, who blamed St. Cyprian for using a\nScripture argument to an unbeliever,[85] and we shall be obliged to look\ndeeper than mere ignorance or lack of occasion to account for the\npaucity of cases in which they use the argument for the existence of\nGod.\n\nThe fact is that the history of Greek thought had shown conclusively the\nabsolute futility of any efforts to arrive at a certain proof of the\nexistence of God by purely rational methods. The attempts of each school\nto attain such certainty were repudiated by their successors, and even\nby their contemporaries; and the later trials--which the religious\ninstincts and aspirations of men would not permit them to forego, even\nwhen they were sceptical of obtaining any valid and positive\nresults--frequently became, instead of a sincere seeking after God, mere\npractice in the art of Rhetoric. And not only was it true that no one of\nthe forms of the theistic argument brought conviction to any other mind\nthan that of the man who regarded it with the partial enthusiasm of an\noriginator or formulator, but even such an one was led to only the most\nvague and indefinite results. We have already seen how even the best\ntheology of the Greeks led to nothing but a sort of organized or unified\npolytheism. A vague, fanciful first cause of physical phenomena, a\ngeneral idea, abstracted out of all content, so as to leave no meaning\nfor the human mind--whatever the imagination might make of it--a\nmechanical, magnetic force, to which all motion might conveniently be\nreferred; a deified principle of order--and these held in conjunction\nwith the popular polytheism, and impregnated with the national\npantheistic conceptions--was all that Greek philosophy could offer to\nthe higher religious aspirations of the educated man. The opinion of the\nGreek mind itself as to the character of the knowledge of God, to which\nthe thought of their race had led them at the beginning of the Christian\nera was fitly expressed by those Athenians, who erected near the\nAreopagus the \"altar on which was written, 'To the Unknown God.'\"[86]\nThe opinion (for in most cases it did not amount to a conviction) that\nthere was an Unknown (or even, as many thought, an Unknowable) Divinity\nof some sort, which might account for the phenomena of the world, and\nwhich might be the truth behind the vagaries of the anthropomorphic\npolytheism, was as far as Greek thought had led men at the period with\nwhich we have to do. Their {theos} was really nothing more than Mr. Herbert\nSpencer's \"Unknowable,\"--a mysterious \"force,\" to which everything was\nreferred which could not be accounted for on the basis of scientific\nprinciples.\n\nNow if this was the case with the adherents of the heathen philosophical\nschools, how must the realization of the poverty of this result, and the\ndistrust of the means which led to it, have been emphasized by the\nconversion of individuals from them to Christianity. It is a graphic\npicture which some of the Fathers paint for us of their eager search, in\nthe different schools in turn, for some religious truth which would\nbring with it conviction; of their disappointment and consequent despair\nand scepticism, and then of the satisfaction which they had found for\ntheir aspirations in the teaching of Jesus Christ, who, they were\nconvinced, was the very Word of God. Viewed merely from the historical\npoint of view, this process is full of interest as illustrating that\nwhich was going on in many minds that stopped at the sceptical stage,\nand, for one reason or another, never found refuge in the Christian\nChurch. But for those who did take this step, their former distrust of\nthe theistic argument, as a basis for religious conviction, must have\nbeen greatly emphasized. The contrast between their former scepticism as\nto man's ability to attain to any knowledge of things beyond the\nphenomenal world, and their present faith and conviction which their\nbelief in the Person of Christ gave them, must have made the part of any\nsuch means of arriving at truth as the already discredited theistic\nargument most insignificant. They, themselves, had no need for it. All\nit had been able to do for them, as for those to whom they wrote, was to\nraise an aspiration which \"would not down\"--to bring them to the\nhypothesis (substituted for polytheism, now outgrown) of an \"Unknown\nGod,\" and they felt that their message to their contemporaries was, like\nthat of St. Paul to the Athenians on Areopagus: \"Whom, therefore, ye\nignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you.\"\n\nIt is with this attitude in mind, I am convinced, that we must interpret\nthe doctrine, so often enunciated by the early Christian writers, but\nespecially by St. Justin Martyr and St. Clement of Alexandria, of the\n\"partial,\" \"fragmentary\" character of the theological truth arrived at\nby Greek philosophy. They have sometimes been charged with\ninconsistency in thus characterizing the work of men from whom they\nborrowed so much, but they seem, in fact, to have been remarkably\nappreciative of their old masters when we consider the position in which\nthey stood. In fact, they seem to grant to Greek philosophy all that its\nadherents would claim for it, namely, that, by means of the arguments\nadduced by its different schools, the Greeks had attained to the opinion\nthat there was something behind the phenomena of nature, but this might\nas well be a transcendent force or a pantheistic world-soul as an\nimmanent God. With the Apostle on Mars' Hill they would say that the\nbest theology of the Greeks simply put them in a position \"that they\nshould seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him.\"\n\nAnd each of the Greek schools, they would say, by resting their case on\nsome one of the various arguments, and emphasizing some one of the\nattributes of the Deity at the expense of the others, had attained only\na partial and inadequate view, though true so far as it went. \"Since,\ntherefore,\" says St. Clement of Alexandria,[87] \"truth is one (for\nfalsehood has ten thousand by-paths); just as the Bacchantes tore\nasunder the limbs of Pentheus, so the sects both of barbarian and\nHellenic philosophy have done with truth, and each vaunts as the whole\ntruth the portion which has fallen to its lot. But all, in my opinion,\nare illuminated by the dawn of Light.\" These men were deeply\nappreciative of the work of Greek philosophy so far as it went--even\nassigning to it a place analogous to the Hebrew Scriptures[88]--but they\nalways attribute to it a distinctly prop\u00e6deutic office, and are careful\nto emphasize its failure to lead to any firm and positive conviction of\nthe existence of God. That this was the position of the early Christian\nphilosophers might be shown by many passages, but we will content\nourselves with one example from the pages of St. Clement of Alexandria,\nwho assigned to Greek philosophy a higher place than any of the\npatristic writers--so much so that his orthodoxy has frequently been\nquestioned because of it. He is fond of designating the knowledge of God\nto which the Greeks had attained by the term \"{periphrasis}.\" Thus he\nconcludes[89] an argument from common consent, already quoted, in these\nwords: \"Much more did the philosophers among the Greeks, devoted to\ninvestigation, starting from the Barbarian philosophy, attribute\nprovidence to the 'invisible, and sole and most powerful, and most\nskilful and supreme cause of all things, most beautiful;'--not knowing\nthe influences from these truths, unless instructed by us, and not even\nhow God is to be known naturally, but only, as we have already often\nsaid, by a true periphrasis.\" \"The men of highest repute among the\nGreeks knew God, not by positive knowledge, but by indirect expression\n({periphrasis}).\"[90] The indefinite and merely \"probable\" character of the\nresults which the Fathers think were reached by the theistic argument in\nGreek thought explains to us the few examples of these proofs which we\nfind in their writings, and the certainty which they thought they had\nfound, and their consequent attitude toward all arguments of this\nnature, which we have tried to depict, is the key to the explanation of\na new phase in the history of thought which was to last for several\ncenturies.\n\nIn our examination of these examples of the theistic argument in the\nFathers, it cannot escape our notice that they occur much more\nfrequently, and in more developed and conventional form in the West than\nin the East--under the influence of Rome than under that of Alexandria\nand the Orient. The reason for this is not far to seek, and is one that\nthrows light also on the motive with which the patristic writers made\nuse of these arguments.\n\nIn Alexandria and the East there was no incentive for the Christians to\ntry to prove the existence of God, for the philosophy of that portion of\nthe world was essentially religious in its character, and based its\nspeculation on the existence of God as a fundamental postulate of\nrevelation and of reason as well. In the combination of Judaism and\nHellenic philosophy made by the \"Hellenizing Jews\" and by the \"Judaizing\nHellenes,\" the existence of God was admitted quite as freely, and\nmaintained quite as zealously, as by the Christians themselves, and even\nthe incipient Neo-Platonists made no quarrel with them on this ground.\nSo we find that the reference in the Alexandrian and other Eastern\nFathers are mainly of the character of examples and illustrations as to\nprinciples that are well understood and admitted, and are employed\nchiefly for the purpose of refuting idolatry by a distinction between\nGod and matter, or of proving the unity of God in opposition to the\nstill latent polytheism.\n\nUnder the influence of Rome, however, other tendencies came in to give a\nrather different significance to the theistic argument. For Rome had\nbecome the chief center of the later schools of Greek philosophy, and\nunder the shadow of the seven hills rather than in the Athenian groves\nand porticoes were found the disciples of Pyrrho, of Zeno and of\nEpicurus. Thus, very naturally, wherever Roman civilization was dominant\nthe teacher of Christian doctrine was obliged to present his subject\nwith reference to the forces already at work in the minds of those whom\nhe addressed. In accordance with this, we find, first, a _negative_\ninfluence in the hostile attitude assumed by the Sceptics and members\nof other schools who tended toward their position, toward any religious\nknowledge. That this influence is not an imaginary one may be seen\nespecially in the instance already quoted from Lactantius, whose use of\nthe theistic argument is called forth by the cavils of Sceptics and\natheistic atomists.\n\nBut there was also a _positive_ influence at work to facilitate the use\nof the theistic argument by the Western Fathers in the prevalence at\nRome of Stoic and Epicurean doctrine. From the former of these schools\nwould result a familiarity, and, in many cases, an agreement with the\nforms of the argument drawn from order and design; from the latter, for\nthe demonstration from common consent. Both of these influences, no\ndoubt, had some influence on the shape in which Tertullian of Carthage,\nMinucius Felix, Novatian and Lactantius presented their doctrine, and,\ntogether with the more material and less religious character of the\nWest, accounts in large degree for the comparative frequency of their\nappeal to the theistic argument.\n\nBut when we consider the frequency with which we meet with the theistic\nargument, and with reference to its use in other writers, in the pages\nof Cicero, for example, these scanty instances afforded us by the\nwritings of the ante-Nicene Fathers, whose works occupy, say, 4,500\nlarge, closely-printed pages in the translation, and who were, let us\nremember, dealing exclusively with religious thought, indicate plainly a\nfundamental change in position, the influence of which was operative for\ncenturies in this department of thought, and which, even to-day, governs\nthe attitude of the greater part of the Western world. The absolute\nfailure of the Greeks to arrive at any certainty of God's existence by\ndemonstration, the introduction of the Christian doctrine of God, before\nwhich the deductions of Greek philosophy seem empty and unsatisfactory,\neven to many who cannot accept that doctrine as truth, and the\nsubstitution of faith in a Person for purely rational proof, render it\nimpossible, so long as that faith continues, that any one should think\nit worth while to devote more than a passing notice to any such\nargument, unless for the purposes of an _argumentum ad hominem_. And so\nit is not until faith begins to grow cold and men become mere\nspeculators and debaters about religion, rather than believers in\nChrist, that the revival of these arguments under the title of \"proofs\"\nis possible. Even the famous Ontological Argument of St. Anselm was, I\nam convinced, no serious attempt to formulate an _a priori_ proof of the\nexistence of God, but was addressed to a particular case[91]--the \"fool\"\nwho \"said in his heart, 'There is no God,'\" and who _also_ maintained\nthat God was \"that than which no greater can be thought.\"\n\nFrom this survey it will be seen that, in the view of the Ante-Nicene\nChristian authors, the theistic argument was valuable merely as a\nprop\u00e6deutic to Christianity, but was superfluous for the believer in\nJesus Christ; the use of it cannot, as it had not in Greek thought,\nbring proof, but only probability; even this uncertain result is only\nvague and fragmentary in character, and was never unified and made\nsignificant by the Greeks; its office in Christian evidences was merely\nof an _ad hominem_ sort, and this only in its simpler and more practical\nforms, in which the senses as well as reason had their testimony to\nbear; and, lastly, the argument was used much more frequently by the\nWestern than by the Alexandrian and other Eastern Fathers.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[60] _Stromata_, V, 12.\n\n[61] _De Spectaculis_, II.\n\n[62] _Against Marcion_, I, 17.\n\n[63] _Ibid._, V, 16. This is to justify his doctrine of the punishment\nof the heathen.\n\n[64] _Scapula_, II.\n\n[65] _Against Celsus_, I, 23.\n\n[66] _Plea for the Christians_, XV, XVI.\n\n[67] I, 5 and 6.\n\n[68] _Exhortation to the Heathen_, X.\n\n[69] _Divine Institutes_, III, 20.\n\n[70] Chap. II.\n\n[71] _Treatise on the Anger of God_, X.\n\n[72] E.g., Stirling: _Philosophy and Theology_, p. 179.\n\n[73] _Trypho_, III, IV.\n\n[74] _Stromata_, V, 14.\n\n[75] _The Soul's Testimony_, I.\n\n[76] _Of the Resurrection of the Flesh_, III.\n\n[77] _Octavius_, XVIII.\n\n[78] _Against Celsus_, II, 40.\n\n[79] _De Trinitate_, VIII.\n\n[80] _Divine Institutes_, I, 2.\n\n[81] E.g., Irenaeus: _Against Heresy_, II, 9, 1; Tertullian: _Against\nMarcion_, I, 10; Origen: _De Principiis_, I, 3, 1; Tertullian:\n_Apology_, XVII; Lactantius: _Divine Institutes_, I, 2.\n\n[82] E.g., Minucius Felix: _Octavius_, XVII, XVIII; Novatian: _De\nTrinitate_ VIII; Dionysius the Great: _Fragments_, II, 1.\n\n[83] E.g., \"Justin, in Philosopher's garb, preached the word of God.\"\nEusebius, IV, 11.\n\n[84] The mere list of Greek authors _quoted_ by St. Clement of\nAlexandria occupies over fourteen quarto pages in Fabricius'\n_Bibliotheka Graeca_.\n\n[85] _Divine Institutes_, V. 4.\n\n[86] _Acts_, XVII, 23.\n\n[87] _Stromata_, I, 13.\n\n[88] E.g., _Stromata_, VI, 5: \"The one and only God was known by the\nGreeks in a Gentile way, by the Jews Judaically, and in a new and\nspiritual way by us.\" In I, 5, he says: \"For this (philosophy) was a\nschoolmaster to bring \"the Hellenic mind,\" as the law the Hebrews, to\nChrist.\"\n\n[89] _Stromata_, V, 14.\n\n[90] _Ibid._, VI, 5. See also, e.g., I, 19; V, 13.\n\n[91] See Stirling: _Philosophy and Theology_, p. 35.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nECLECTIC THEISM\n\n\nThe early Christian writers, so far as they assumed any philosophical\nposition, were invariably Eclectics. In this, as we have seen, they were\nthe true children of their age, whose most striking characteristic was\nthat it had deserted the older systems, while attempting to preserve out\nof their ruins the particular truth for which each of the schools had\ncontended. But with the Christian philosophers it was not merely the\nnegative influence of scepticism which drove them to Eclecticism. Their\nconviction of a sure knowledge of things divine--the final question for\nall philosophy--exerted a positive influence as well, which led them to\nformulate more or less explicitly a view of the function of philosophy\nas an organon of the truth, not merely with reference to the past\nhistory of Greek thought, as their contemporaries outside of the\nChristian Church were accustomed to do, but with a view to all possible\nspeculation on the Deity. For this deposit of revealed truth, to which\nthey gave assent as the most certain of all knowledge, they regarded as\nthe _whole_ truth, of which the various speculations of philosophy on\nthe existence and attributes of God, were but \"portions\" and\n\"fragments\"--true and trustworthy so far as they went, and from their\nown particular standpoint, but, nevertheless, essentially and\nnecessarily partial, and hence productive, not of certainty, but of mere\nopinion.\n\nAnd this estimate of the function of philosophy with respect to\ntheological truth, which the Fathers worked out on the basis of the\nconcrete example of the course of Greek thought, though with a view to a\nmuch wider application, has its justification in the very nature and\nconditions of thought itself. For philosophy is essentially a\n_process_--its very life depends on its being in motion, in process of\nchange and development. Each system is evolved out of its predecessors,\nand contains within itself the germs of its successors--it is the link\nwhich connects the past with the future. It expresses the\n\"common-sense,\" the unconscious convictions and instinctive tendencies\nof the time, and the man who first gives voice to this unspoken message\nis the philosopher. He utters the truth which the times demand--that\nwhich satisfies the conditions. Thus with Professor Erdmann[92] the\npatristic writers would say that each statement of philosophical truth\nis \"the final truth only for that time.\" It is the phase or aspect or\nparticular statement of the truth which the times demand, which the\nsituation calls forth, and which appeals most strongly to the minds that\nmake up part of that situation. Changed conditions demand a different\nstatement of the truth to satisfy them, and furnish the data upon which\nsuch a statement is based. Philosophy, like science, \"does not really\naccumulate, but is entirely transformed by each fresh hypothesis. It is\nonly the data that accumulate; and when we say that a new hypothesis is\n'truer' than that which preceded it, we mean merely that it enables us\nto co-ordinate a larger number of these data.\"[93] And this\ntransformation takes place, in reality, not only by addition, but by\nsubtraction of data. For it is a phenomenon common to the thought of all\nages, that each school not only calls attention to new data, ignored by\nits predecessor, but also shuts its eyes to more or less of the valid\ndata set forth by the earlier system. In no period of the history of\nthought were men more commonly led into abstractions by being dazzled by\nthe brilliancy and novelty of the latest idea than in the pioneer age\nrepresented by Greek philosophy, when men had not yet attained to a\nclear perspective, and the foot-hills often hid the lofty mountain peak.\n\nIt is this trait, so evident in the na\u00efve thought of the Greeks, that\nmakes it possible for the early Christian thinkers to take the attitude,\nat once appreciative and critical with regard to the Hellenic theology.\nThey borrowed much, not only from the form, but also from the results of\nthe speculations of the philosophers, but always with a deep sense of\nthe limitations which the conditions imposed upon them. Socrates, Plato,\nAristotle and the rest had spoken the truth, but each only from one\npoint of view, and on the basis of only one method of approach. The\nconclusions of each were the result of a process of more or less\ncomplete abstraction, and in abstractions the Fathers, true to the\ngenius of Christian thought, could never rest content, but could only\naccord to them the appreciation which belongs to a temporary and\npreliminary stage in the search for the final unity.\n\nTo this partial, temporary, \"relatively final,\" and constantly changing\ncontent, the revealed doctrine of God, manifested in due relations,\nunity and completeness by the Incarnate Word, stands with the Fathers as\nthe principle to the particular rule or application--as the whole to the\npart. As the revelation of God it came to them, not as the result of\nman's investigation and speculation, colored by every change of time,\nplace and environment, a mere momentary phase of a process; but as\neternal verity, viewed, so far as man's powers would allow, in its\nentirety and unity. Dorner expresses their position well when he says\nthat in Christianity \"as the organism of the truth, the elements of\ntruth, elsewhere here and there to be met with in a scattered form or a\ndisfigured guise, come together in unity--a unity which, as it\npersonally appeared in the God-Man, so in the course of history ever\nmore and more rises upon the consciousness of mankind.\" The Fathers\nthink that in the Christian doctrine of God they find all the true\nelements contributed by previous thought, and besides these an infinite\ndepth of truth unthought of by the Greeks, all unified and harmonized in\na way that makes it a sharp contrast to the fragmentary and abstract\ncharacter of the Hellenic theology. Christian doctrine represents to\nthem the stable, absolute truth, so far as it was revealed by the\nIncarnate Word, the eternal verities in their completeness and unity, so\nfar as man is able to comprehend them. Philosophy represents the phase\nor aspect of the truth which the conditions of thought at the time\ndemands and emphasizes, which will co-ordinate the data at present in\nthe foreground of consciousness. Thus they conceive of the facts of\nChristian Theology as the goal towards which philosophy is (often\nunconsciously) striving, but at which it can never arrive without the\n\"leap of faith.\" Once this leap is taken, however, these theological\nverities become the major factors in the data to be co-ordinated, and\nphilosophy and theology come into that union and harmony which, in the\neyes of the Christian philosophers, is their normal relation.\n\nThis Eclectic attitude of the Fathers, and their deprecation of any\nabstraction or partial statement usurping the place of the truth,\nexplains to some extent their treatment of the theistic argument.\n\nIn the first place it led them to distrust and reject any argument for\nthe existence of God which proceeded on the basis of reason alone, apart\nfrom any content furnished by sensibility. While the Fathers do not make\nany explicit and scientific distinction between Epistemology and\nOntology, such as has in modern times been the bane of any attempted\nnatural theology, yet they seem to have made a pretty constant\n_practical_ separation between the two. St. Clement of Alexandria, as we\nhave seen, holds that by a method of abstraction of specific\ncharacteristics we can arrive only at an \"Unknown,\" to which meaning can\nbe given only by combining with this rational process some content\nfurnished directly by the senses or, indirectly, by testimony, and he\nfurther states that God is not a subject for demonstration--_i.e._, the\nscience that depends on primary and better known principles--for \"first\nprinciples are incapable of demonstration.\"[94] This position seems to\nbe tacitly assumed by the patristic writers throughout, and even where\nthey speak of Plato with gratitude and admiration they never seem to be\nat all inclined to make any use of his \"Idealogical\" argument or\nanything related thereto. They seem to take a common-sense stand for the\ntestimony of the whole man, as well as for the whole truth, and to\ninstinctively distrust any rational concept in the formation of which\nsensuous content had been ignored.\n\nThe Eclectic character of the patristic thought is seen also in the\nfrequency with which they use the different forms of the theistic\nargument in conjunction, or present it in mixed forms. The Greek\nphilosophers, as we have seen, each selected some one of the forms of\nthe argument, and by means of it, attempted to establish the sort of an\n{Arch\u00ea}, to which such a course of reasoning would lead, ignoring, or\nattacking the forms in use by their rival school. Thus early, however,\nas in modern times, Christian theology, in contrast with the attempts of\nrational theology, began to emphasize the interdependence of these\ndifferent forms of the theistic argument, and the cumulative character\nof their evidence. Each one of itself could bring no conviction, nor\neven high degree of probability, and furthermore, even if all its claims\nbe admitted, would lead to a result far short of theism--a mere\nindefinite first cause, an Architect of the universe, etc. Each one,\nhowever, adds its quota to a great _cumulative_ argument, which, taken\nin its entirety, raises an exceedingly high presumption, which amounts\nto \"_moral_\" though possibly not intellectual proof. And, after all,\n\"probability is the guide of _life_.\"\n\nAnd this is all that the Fathers, or Christian apologists, generally,\nwould claim for the theistic argument. It is a _practical_, not a\ntheoretical proof, and it is in this way that the early Christian\nwriters seem to regard it. They resort to it most frequently to show\nthat the Christian doctrine of God is not contrary to reason nor\ninconsistent with the nature of things, and to demonstrate that such a\nconception is demanded by man's very nature. In a word, their use of the\nargument is confirmatory and explanatory rather than by way of absolute\nproof and demonstration.\n\nThis attitude towards and use of the theistic argument, so radically\ndifferent from that of the Greek philosophers, perpetuated itself in the\npost-Nicene literature of the Christian Church, and, in its main\nfeatures, remained unaltered, until the time when men who had abandoned\nthe faith in the Word which had been the main stay of the ante-Nicene\nwriters, and who yet were unwilling to abandon the great theistic idea\nfor which the world was indebted to Christianity alone, sought to\njustify this idea on the basis of reason. It took the scepticism of a\nHume and the criticism of a Kant, and the re-adjustment of all their\nfollowers to bring us back at the close of this nineteenth century into\nsubstantial agreement with the common-sense estimate placed upon the\ntheistic argument by the ante-Nicene Fathers.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[92] _History of Philosophy_, Vol. I, \u00a7 4.\n\n[93] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 25.\n\n[94] _Stromata_, II, iv.\n\n\n\n\nVITA.\n\n\nThe writer was born April 24, 1869, in Ann Arbor, Michigan. He attended\nthe Ann Arbor Public Schools and the Ann Arbor High School. In 1892 he\nreceived the degree of A. B. from the University of Michigan. In 1895 he\ngraduated from the General Theological Seminary, New York, and was\nawarded the degree of B. D., which was formally conferred in accordance\nwith the rules of the Seminary one year later. In 1896, he received the\ndegree of A. M. from the University of Michigan. He pursued studies in\nPhilosophy at Harvard University during the first term of the year\n1896-7, and at Columbia University from February, 1897, to February,\n1898. He has been the post-graduate scholar of the Church University\nBoard of Regents from July, 1895, to the present time.","title":"The Basis of Early Christian Theism","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":16595}