{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_27083/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_27083","id":"gutenberg_27083","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/27083","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Gender & Sexuality Studies","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Women -- Social and moral questions","Women's rights"],"text":"Produced by Michael Roe and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was\nproduced from images generously made available by The\nInternet Archive/American Libraries.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n  THE\n  SUBJECTION\n  OF\n  WOMEN\n\n\n  BY\n  JOHN STUART MILL\n\n  LONDON\n  LONGMANS, GREEN, READER, AND DYER\n  1869\n\n  LONDON:\n  SAVILL, EDWARDS AND CO., PRINTERS, CHANDOS STREET,\n  COVENT GARDEN.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\n\nThe object of this Essay is to explain as clearly as I am able, the\ngrounds of an opinion which I have held from the very earliest period\nwhen I had formed any opinions at all on social or political matters,\nand which, instead of being weakened or modified, has been constantly\ngrowing stronger by the progress of reflection and the experience of\nlife: That the principle which regulates the existing social\nrelations between the two sexes--the legal subordination of one sex\nto the other--is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances\nto human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle\nof perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side,\nnor disability on the other.\n\nThe very words necessary to express the task I have undertaken, show\nhow arduous it is. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the\ndifficulty of the case must lie in the insufficiency or obscurity of\nthe grounds of reason on which my conviction rests. The difficulty is\nthat which exists in all cases in which there is a mass of feeling to\nbe contended against. So long as an opinion is strongly rooted in the\nfeelings, it gains rather than loses in stability by having a\npreponderating weight of argument against it. For if it were accepted\nas a result of argument, the refutation of the argument might shake\nthe solidity of the conviction; but when it rests solely on feeling,\nthe worse it fares in argumentative contest, the more persuaded its\nadherents are that their feeling must have some deeper ground, which\nthe arguments do not reach; and while the feeling remains, it is\nalways throwing up fresh intrenchments of argument to repair any\nbreach made in the old. And there are so many causes tending to make\nthe feelings connected with this subject the most intense and most\ndeeply-rooted of all those which gather round and protect old\ninstitutions and customs, that we need not wonder to find them as yet\nless undermined and loosened than any of the rest by the progress of\nthe great modern spiritual and social transition; nor suppose that\nthe barbarisms to which men cling longest must be less barbarisms\nthan those which they earlier shake off.\n\nIn every respect the burthen is hard on those who attack an almost\nuniversal opinion. They must be very fortunate as well as unusually\ncapable if they obtain a hearing at all. They have more difficulty in\nobtaining a trial, than any other litigants have in getting a\nverdict. If they do extort a hearing, they are subjected to a set of\nlogical requirements totally different from those exacted from other\npeople. In all other cases, the burthen of proof is supposed to lie\nwith the affirmative. If a person is charged with a murder, it rests\nwith those who accuse him to give proof of his guilt, not with\nhimself to prove his innocence. If there is a difference of opinion\nabout the reality of any alleged historical event, in which the\nfeelings of men in general are not much interested, as the Siege of\nTroy for example, those who maintain that the event took place are\nexpected to produce their proofs, before those who take the other\nside can be required to say anything; and at no time are these\nrequired to do more than show that the evidence produced by the\nothers is of no value. Again, in practical matters, the burthen of\nproof is supposed to be with those who are against liberty; who\ncontend for any restriction or prohibition; either any limitation of\nthe general freedom of human action, or any disqualification or\ndisparity of privilege affecting one person or kind of persons, as\ncompared with others. The _a priori_ presumption is in favour of\nfreedom and impartiality. It is held that there should be no\nrestraint not required by the general good, and that the law should\nbe no respecter of persons, but should treat all alike, save where\ndissimilarity of treatment is required by positive reasons, either of\njustice or of policy. But of none of these rules of evidence will the\nbenefit be allowed to those who maintain the opinion I profess. It is\nuseless for me to say that those who maintain the doctrine that men\nhave a right to command and women are under an obligation to obey, or\nthat men are fit for government and women unfit, are on the\naffirmative side of the question, and that they are bound to show\npositive evidence for the assertions, or submit to their rejection.\nIt is equally unavailing for me to say that those who deny to women\nany freedom or privilege rightly allowed to men, having the double\npresumption against them that they are opposing freedom and\nrecommending partiality, must be held to the strictest proof of their\ncase, and unless their success be such as to exclude all doubt, the\njudgment ought to go against them. These would be thought good pleas\nin any common case; but they will not be thought so in this instance.\nBefore I could hope to make any impression, I should be expected not\nonly to answer all that has ever been said by those who take the\nother side of the question, but to imagine all that could be said by\nthem--to find them in reasons, as well as answer all I find: and\nbesides refuting all arguments for the affirmative, I shall be called\nupon for invincible positive arguments to prove a negative. And even\nif I could do all this, and leave the opposite party with a host of\nunanswered arguments against them, and not a single unrefuted one on\ntheir side, I should be thought to have done little; for a cause\nsupported on the one hand by universal usage, and on the other by so\ngreat a preponderance of popular sentiment, is supposed to have a\npresumption in its favour, superior to any conviction which an appeal\nto reason has power to produce in any intellects but those of a high\nclass.\n\nI do not mention these difficulties to complain of them; first,\nbecause it would be useless; they are inseparable from having to\ncontend through people's understandings against the hostility of\ntheir feelings and practical tendencies: and truly the understandings\nof the majority of mankind would need to be much better cultivated\nthan has ever yet been the case, before they can be asked to place\nsuch reliance in their own power of estimating arguments, as to give\nup practical principles in which they have been born and bred and\nwhich are the basis of much of the existing order of the world, at\nthe first argumentative attack which they are not capable of\nlogically resisting. I do not therefore quarrel with them for having\ntoo little faith in argument, but for having too much faith in custom\nand the general feeling. It is one of the characteristic prejudices\nof the reaction of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth, to\naccord to the unreasoning elements in human nature the infallibility\nwhich the eighteenth century is supposed to have ascribed to the\nreasoning elements. For the apotheosis of Reason we have substituted\nthat of Instinct; and we call everything instinct which we find in\nourselves and for which we cannot trace any rational foundation. This\nidolatry, infinitely more degrading than the other, and the most\npernicious of the false worships of the present day, of all of which\nit is now the main support, will probably hold its ground until it\ngives way before a sound psychology, laying bare the real root of\nmuch that is bowed down to as the intention of Nature and the\nordinance of God. As regards the present question, I am willing to\naccept the unfavourable conditions which the prejudice assigns to me.\nI consent that established custom, and the general feeling, should be\ndeemed conclusive against me, unless that custom and feeling from age\nto age can be shown to have owed their existence to other causes than\ntheir soundness, and to have derived their power from the worse\nrather than the better parts of human nature. I am willing that\njudgment should go against me, unless I can show that my judge has\nbeen tampered with. The concession is not so great as it might\nappear; for to prove this, is by far the easiest portion of my task.\n\nThe generality of a practice is in some cases a strong presumption\nthat it is, or at all events once was, conducive to laudable ends.\nThis is the case, when the practice was first adopted, or afterwards\nkept up, as a means to such ends, and was grounded on experience of\nthe mode in which they could be most effectually attained. If the\nauthority of men over women, when first established, had been the\nresult of a conscientious comparison between different modes of\nconstituting the government of society; if, after trying various\nother modes of social organization--the government of women over men,\nequality between the two, and such mixed and divided modes of\ngovernment as might be invented--it had been decided, on the\ntestimony of experience, that the mode in which women are wholly\nunder the rule of men, having no share at all in public concerns, and\neach in private being under the legal obligation of obedience to the\nman with whom she has associated her destiny, was the arrangement\nmost conducive to the happiness and well being of both; its general\nadoption might then be fairly thought to be some evidence that, at\nthe time when it was adopted, if was the best: though even then the\nconsiderations which recommended it may, like so many other primeval\nsocial facts of the greatest importance, have subsequently, in the\ncourse of ages, ceased to exist. But the state of the case is in\nevery respect the reverse of this. In the first place, the opinion in\nfavour of the present system, which entirely subordinates the weaker\nsex to the stronger, rests upon theory only; for there never has been\ntrial made of any other: so that experience, in the sense in which it\nis vulgarly opposed to theory, cannot be pretended to have pronounced\nany verdict. And in the second place, the adoption of this system of\ninequality never was the result of deliberation, or forethought, or\nany social ideas, or any notion whatever of what conduced to the\nbenefit of humanity or the good order of society. It arose simply\nfrom the fact that from the very earliest twilight of human society,\nevery woman (owing to the value attached to her by men, combined with\nher inferiority in muscular strength) was found in a state of bondage\nto some man. Laws and systems of polity always begin by recognising\nthe relations they find already existing between individuals. They\nconvert what was a mere physical fact into a legal right, give it the\nsanction of society, and principally aim at the substitution of\npublic and organized means of asserting and protecting these rights,\ninstead of the irregular and lawless conflict of physical strength.\nThose who had already been compelled to obedience became in this\nmanner legally bound to it. Slavery, from being a mere affair of\nforce between the master and the slave, became regularized and a\nmatter of compact among the masters, who, binding themselves to one\nanother for common protection, guaranteed by their collective\nstrength the private possessions of each, including his slaves. In\nearly times, the great majority of the male sex were slaves, as well\nas the whole of the female. And many ages elapsed, some of them ages\nof high cultivation, before any thinker was bold enough to question\nthe rightfulness, and the absolute social necessity, either of the\none slavery or of the other. By degrees such thinkers did arise: and\n(the general progress of society assisting) the slavery of the male\nsex has, in all the countries of Christian Europe at least (though,\nin one of them, only within the last few years) been at length\nabolished, and that of the female sex has been gradually changed into\na milder form of dependence. But this dependence, as it exists at\npresent, is not an original institution, taking a fresh start from\nconsiderations of justice and social expediency--it is the primitive\nstate of slavery lasting on, through successive mitigations and\nmodifications occasioned by the same causes which have softened the\ngeneral manners, and brought all human relations more under the\ncontrol of justice and the influence of humanity. It has not lost the\ntaint of its brutal origin. No presumption in its favour, therefore,\ncan be drawn from the fact of its existence. The only such\npresumption which it could be supposed to have, must be grounded on\nits having lasted till now, when so many other things which came down\nfrom the same odious source have been done away with. And this,\nindeed, is what makes it strange to ordinary ears, to hear it\nasserted that the inequality of rights between men and women has no\nother source than the law of the strongest.\n\nThat this statement should have the effect of a paradox, is in some\nrespects creditable to the progress of civilization, and the\nimprovement of the moral sentiments of mankind. We now live--that is\nto say, one or two of the most advanced nations of the world now\nlive--in a state in which the law of the strongest seems to be\nentirely abandoned as the regulating principle of the world's\naffairs: nobody professes it, and, as regards most of the relations\nbetween human beings, nobody is permitted to practise it. When any\none succeeds in doing so, it is under cover of some pretext which\ngives him the semblance of having some general social interest on his\nside. This being the ostensible state of things, people flatter\nthemselves that the rule of mere force is ended; that the law of the\nstrongest cannot be the reason of existence of anything which has\nremained in full operation down to the present time. However any of\nour present institutions may have begun, it can only, they think,\nhave been preserved to this period of advanced civilization by a\nwell-grounded feeling of its adaptation to human nature, and\nconduciveness to the general good. They do not understand the great\nvitality and durability of institutions which place right on the side\nof might; how intensely they are clung to; how the good as well as\nthe bad propensities and sentiments of those who have power in their\nhands, become identified with retaining it; how slowly these bad\ninstitutions give way, one at a time, the weakest first, beginning\nwith those which are least interwoven with the daily habits of life;\nand how very rarely those who have obtained legal power because they\nfirst had physical, have ever lost their hold of it until the\nphysical power had passed over to the other side. Such shifting of\nthe physical force not having taken place in the case of women; this\nfact, combined with all the peculiar and characteristic features of\nthe particular case, made it certain from the first that this branch\nof the system of right founded on might, though softened in its most\natrocious features at an earlier period than several of the others,\nwould be the very last to disappear. It was inevitable that this one\ncase of a social relation grounded on force, would survive through\ngenerations of institutions grounded on equal justice, an almost\nsolitary exception to the general character of their laws and\ncustoms; but which, so long as it does not proclaim its own origin,\nand as discussion has not brought out its true character, is not felt\nto jar with modern civilization, any more than domestic slavery among\nthe Greeks jarred with their notion of themselves as a free people.\n\nThe truth is, that people of the present and the last two or three\ngenerations have lost all practical sense of the primitive condition\nof humanity; and only the few who have studied history accurately, or\nhave much frequented the parts of the world occupied by the living\nrepresentatives of ages long past, are able to form any mental\npicture of what society then was. People are not aware how entirely,\nin former ages, the law of superior strength was the rule of life;\nhow publicly and openly it was avowed, I do not say cynically or\nshamelessly--for these words imply a feeling that there was something\nin it to be ashamed of, and no such notion could find a place in the\nfaculties of any person in those ages, except a philosopher or a\nsaint. History gives a cruel experience of human nature, in shewing\nhow exactly the regard due to the life, possessions, and entire\nearthly happiness of any class of persons, was measured by what they\nhad the power of enforcing; how all who made any resistance to\nauthorities that had arms in their hands, however dreadful might be\nthe provocation, had not only the law of force but all other laws,\nand all the notions of social obligation against them; and in the\neyes of those whom they resisted, were not only guilty of crime, but\nof the worst of all crimes, deserving the most cruel chastisement\nwhich human beings could inflict. The first small vestige of a\nfeeling of obligation in a superior to acknowledge any right in\ninferiors, began when he had been induced, for convenience, to make\nsome promise to them. Though these promises, even when sanctioned by\nthe most solemn oaths, were for many ages revoked or violated on the\nmost trifling provocation or temptation, it is probable that this,\nexcept by persons of still worse than the average morality, was\nseldom done without some twinges of conscience. The ancient\nrepublics, being mostly grounded from the first upon some kind of\nmutual compact, or at any rate formed by an union of persons not very\nunequal in strength, afforded, in consequence, the first instance of\na portion of human relations fenced round, and placed under the\ndominion of another law than that of force. And though the original\nlaw of force remained in full operation between them and their\nslaves, and also (except so far as limited by express compact)\nbetween a commonwealth and its subjects, or other independent\ncommonwealths; the banishment of that primitive law even from so\nnarrow a field, commenced the regeneration of human nature, by giving\nbirth to sentiments of which experience soon demonstrated the immense\nvalue even for material interests, and which thenceforward only\nrequired to be enlarged, not created. Though slaves were no part of\nthe commonwealth, it was in the free states that slaves were first\nfelt to have rights as human beings. The Stoics were, I believe, the\nfirst (except so far as the Jewish law constitutes an exception) who\ntaught as a part of morality that men were bound by moral obligations\nto their slaves. No one, after Christianity became ascendant, could\never again have been a stranger to this belief, in theory; nor, after\nthe rise of the Catholic Church, was it ever without persons to stand\nup for it. Yet to enforce it was the most arduous task which\nChristianity ever had to perform. For more than a thousand years the\nChurch kept up the contest, with hardly any perceptible success. It\nwas not for want of power over men's minds. Its power was prodigious.\nIt could make kings and nobles resign their most valued possessions\nto enrich the Church. It could make thousands, in the prime of life\nand the height of worldly advantages, shut themselves up in convents\nto work out their salvation by poverty, fasting, and prayer. It could\nsend hundreds of thousands across land and sea, Europe and Asia, to\ngive their lives for the deliverance of the Holy Sepulchre. It could\nmake kings relinquish wives who were the object of their passionate\nattachment, because the Church declared that they were within the\nseventh (by our calculation the fourteenth) degree of relationship.\nAll this it did; but it could not make men fight less with one\nanother, nor tyrannize less cruelly over the serfs, and when they\nwere able, over burgesses. It could not make them renounce either of\nthe applications of force; force militant, or force triumphant. This\nthey could never be induced to do until they were themselves in their\nturn compelled by superior force. Only by the growing power of kings\nwas an end put to fighting except between kings, or competitors for\nkingship; only by the growth of a wealthy and warlike bourgeoisie in\nthe fortified towns, and of a plebeian infantry which proved more\npowerful in the field than the undisciplined chivalry, was the\ninsolent tyranny of the nobles over the bourgeoisie and peasantry\nbrought within some bounds. It was persisted in not only until, but\nlong after, the oppressed had obtained a power enabling them often to\ntake conspicuous vengeance; and on the Continent much of it continued\nto the time of the French Revolution, though in England the earlier\nand better organization of the democratic classes put an end to it\nsooner, by establishing equal laws and free national institutions.\n\nIf people are mostly so little aware how completely, during the\ngreater part of the duration of our species, the law of force was the\navowed rule of general conduct, any other being only a special and\nexceptional consequence of peculiar ties--and from how very recent a\ndate it is that the affairs of society in general have been even\npretended to be regulated according to any moral law; as little do\npeople remember or consider, how institutions and customs which never\nhad any ground but the law of force, last on into ages and states of\ngeneral opinion which never would have permitted their first\nestablishment. Less than forty years ago, Englishmen might still by\nlaw hold human beings in bondage as saleable property: within the\npresent century they might kidnap them and carry them off, and work\nthem literally to death. This absolutely extreme case of the law of\nforce, condemned by those who can tolerate almost every other form of\narbitrary power, and which, of all others, presents features the most\nrevolting to the feelings of all who look at it from an impartial\nposition, was the law of civilized and Christian England within the\nmemory of persons now living: and in one half of Anglo-Saxon America\nthree or four years ago, not only did slavery exist, but the slave\ntrade, and the breeding of slaves expressly for it, was a general\npractice between slave states. Yet not only was there a greater\nstrength of sentiment against it, but, in England at least, a less\namount either of feeling or of interest in favour of it, than of any\nother of the customary abuses of force: for its motive was the love\nof gain, unmixed and undisguised; and those who profited by it were a\nvery small numerical fraction of the country, while the natural\nfeeling of all who were not personally interested in it, was\nunmitigated abhorrence. So extreme an instance makes it almost\nsuperfluous to refer to any other: but consider the long duration of\nabsolute monarchy. In England at present it is the almost universal\nconviction that military despotism is a case of the law of force,\nhaving no other origin or justification. Yet in all the great nations\nof Europe except England it either still exists, or has only just\nceased to exist, and has even now a strong party favourable to it in\nall ranks of the people, especially among persons of station and\nconsequence. Such is the power of an established system, even when\nfar from universal; when not only in almost every period of history\nthere have been great and well-known examples of the contrary system,\nbut these have almost invariably been afforded by the most\nillustrious and most prosperous communities. In this case, too, the\npossessor of the undue power, the person directly interested in it,\nis only one person, while those who are subject to it and suffer from\nit are literally all the rest. The yoke is naturally and necessarily\nhumiliating to all persons, except the one who is on the throne,\ntogether with, at most, the one who expects to succeed to it. How\ndifferent are these cases from that of the power of men over women! I\nam not now prejudging the question of its justifiableness. I am\nshowing how vastly more permanent it could not but be, even if not\njustifiable, than these other dominations which have nevertheless\nlasted down to our own time. Whatever gratification of pride there is\nin the possession of power, and whatever personal interest in its\nexercise, is in this case not confined to a limited class, but common\nto the whole male sex. Instead of being, to most of its supporters, a\nthing desirable chiefly in the abstract, or, like the political ends\nusually contended for by factious, of little private importance to\nany but the leaders; it comes home to the person and hearth of every\nmale head of a family, and of every one who looks forward to being\nso. The clodhopper exercises, or is to exercise, his share of the\npower equally with the highest nobleman. And the case is that in\nwhich the desire of power is the strongest: for every one who desires\npower, desires it most over those who are nearest to him, with whom\nhis life is passed, with whom he has most concerns in common, and in\nwhom any independence of his authority is oftenest likely to\ninterfere with his individual preferences. If, in the other cases\nspecified, powers manifestly grounded only on force, and having so\nmuch less to support them, are so slowly and with so much difficulty\ngot rid of, much more must it be so with this, even if it rests on no\nbetter foundation than those. We must consider, too, that the\npossessors of the power have facilities in this case, greater than in\nany other, to prevent any uprising against it. Every one of the\nsubjects lives under the very eye, and almost, it may be said, in the\nhands, of one of the masters--in closer intimacy with him than with\nany of her fellow-subjects; with no means of combining against him,\nno power of even locally over-mastering him, and, on the other hand,\nwith the strongest motives for seeking his favour and avoiding to\ngive him offence. In struggles for political emancipation, everybody\nknows how often its champions are bought off by bribes, or daunted by\nterrors. In the case of women, each individual of the subject-class\nis in a chronic state of bribery and intimidation combined. In\nsetting up the standard of resistance, a large number of the leaders,\nand still more of the followers, must make an almost complete\nsacrifice of the pleasures or the alleviations of their own\nindividual lot. If ever any system of privilege and enforced\nsubjection had its yoke tightly riveted on the necks of those who are\nkept down by it, this has. I have not yet shown that it is a wrong\nsystem: but every one who is capable of thinking on the subject must\nsee that even if it is, it was certain to outlast all other forms of\nunjust authority. And when some of the grossest of the other forms\nstill exist in many civilized countries, and have only recently been\ngot rid of in others, it would be strange if that which is so much\nthe deepest-rooted had yet been perceptibly shaken anywhere. There is\nmore reason to wonder that the protests and testimonies against it\nshould have been so numerous and so weighty as they are.\n\nSome will object, that a comparison cannot fairly be made between the\ngovernment of the male sex and the forms of unjust power which I have\nadduced in illustration of it, since these are arbitrary, and the\neffect of mere usurpation, while it on the contrary is natural. But\nwas there ever any domination which did not appear natural to those\nwho possessed it? There was a time when the division of mankind into\ntwo classes, a small one of masters and a numerous one of slaves,\nappeared, even to the most cultivated minds, to be a natural, and the\nonly natural, condition of the human race. No less an intellect, and\none which contributed no less to the progress of human thought, than\nAristotle, held this opinion without doubt or misgiving; and rested\nit on the same premises on which the same assertion in regard to the\ndominion of men over women is usually based, namely that there are\ndifferent natures among mankind, free natures, and slave natures;\nthat the Greeks were of a free nature, the barbarian races of\nThracians and Asiatics of a slave nature. But why need I go back to\nAristotle? Did not the slaveowners of the Southern United States\nmaintain the same doctrine, with all the fanaticism with which men\ncling to the theories that justify their passions and legitimate\ntheir personal interests? Did they not call heaven and earth to\nwitness that the dominion of the white man over the black is natural,\nthat the black race is by nature incapable of freedom, and marked out\nfor slavery? some even going so far as to say that the freedom of\nmanual labourers is an unnatural order of things anywhere. Again, the\ntheorists of absolute monarchy have always affirmed it to be the only\nnatural form of government; issuing from the patriarchal, which was\nthe primitive and spontaneous form of society, framed on the model of\nthe paternal, which is anterior to society itself, and, as they\ncontend, the most natural authority of all. Nay, for that matter, the\nlaw of force itself, to those who could not plead any other, has\nalways seemed the most natural of all grounds for the exercise of\nauthority. Conquering races hold it to be Nature's own dictate that\nthe conquered should obey the conquerors, or, as they euphoniously\nparaphrase it, that the feebler and more unwarlike races should\nsubmit to the braver and manlier. The smallest acquaintance with\nhuman life in the middle ages, shows how supremely natural the\ndominion of the feudal nobility over men of low condition appeared to\nthe nobility themselves, and how unnatural the conception seemed, of\na person of the inferior class claiming equality with them, or\nexercising authority over them. It hardly seemed less so to the class\nheld in subjection. The emancipated serfs and burgesses, even in\ntheir most vigorous struggles, never made any pretension to a share\nof authority; they only demanded more or less of limitation to the\npower of tyrannizing over them. So true is it that unnatural\ngenerally means only uncustomary, and that everything which is usual\nappears natural. The subjection of women to men being a universal\ncustom, any departure from it quite naturally appears unnatural. But\nhow entirely, even in this case, the feeling is dependent on custom,\nappears by ample experience. Nothing so much astonishes the people of\ndistant parts of the world, when they first learn anything about\nEngland, as to be told that it is under a queen: the thing seems to\nthem so unnatural as to be almost incredible. To Englishmen this does\nnot seem in the least degree unnatural, because they are used to it;\nbut they do feel it unnatural that women should be soldiers or\nmembers of parliament. In the feudal ages, on the contrary, war and\npolitics were not thought unnatural to women, because not unusual; it\nseemed natural that women of the privileged classes should be of\nmanly character, inferior in nothing but bodily strength to their\nhusbands and fathers. The independence of women seemed rather less\nunnatural to the Greeks than to other ancients, on account of the\nfabulous Amazons (whom they believed to be historical), and the\npartial example afforded by the Spartan women; who, though no less\nsubordinate by law than in other Greek states, were more free in\nfact, and being trained to bodily exercises in the same manner with\nmen, gave ample proof that they were not naturally disqualified for\nthem. There can be little doubt that Spartan experience suggested to\nPlato, among many other of his doctrines, that of the social and\npolitical equality of the two sexes.\n\nBut, it will be said, the rule of men over women differs from all\nthese others in not being a rule of force: it is accepted\nvoluntarily; women make no complaint, and are consenting parties to\nit. In the first place, a great number of women do not accept it.\nEver since there have been women able to make their sentiments known\nby their writings (the only mode of publicity which society permits\nto them), an increasing number of them have recorded protests against\ntheir present social condition: and recently many thousands of them,\nheaded by the most eminent women known to the public, have petitioned\nParliament for their admission to the Parliamentary Suffrage. The\nclaim of women to be educated as solidly, and in the same branches of\nknowledge, as men, is urged with growing intensity, and with a great\nprospect of success; while the demand for their admission into\nprofessions and occupations hitherto closed against them, becomes\nevery year more urgent. Though there are not in this country, as\nthere are in the United States, periodical Conventions and an\norganized party to agitate for the Rights of Women, there is a\nnumerous and active Society organized and managed by women, for the\nmore limited object of obtaining the political franchise. Nor is it\nonly in our own country and in America that women are beginning to\nprotest, more or less collectively, against the disabilities under\nwhich they labour. France, and Italy, and Switzerland, and Russia now\nafford examples of the same thing. How many more women there are who\nsilently cherish similar aspirations, no one can possibly know; but\nthere are abundant tokens how many _would_ cherish them, were they\nnot so strenuously taught to repress them as contrary to the\nproprieties of their sex. It must be remembered, also, that no\nenslaved class ever asked for complete liberty at once. When Simon de\nMontfort called the deputies of the commons to sit for the first time\nin Parliament, did any of them dream of demanding that an assembly,\nelected by their constituents, should make and destroy ministries,\nand dictate to the king in affairs of state? No such thought entered\ninto the imagination of the most ambitious of them. The nobility had\nalready these pretensions; the commons pretended to nothing but to be\nexempt from arbitrary taxation, and from the gross individual\noppression of the king's officers. It is a political law of nature\nthat those who are under any power of ancient origin, never begin by\ncomplaining of the power itself, but only of its oppressive exercise.\nThere is never any want of women who complain of ill usage by their\nhusbands. There would be infinitely more, if complaint were not the\ngreatest of all provocatives to a repetition and increase of the ill\nusage. It is this which frustrates all attempts to maintain the power\nbut protect the woman against its abuses. In no other case (except\nthat of a child) is the person who has been proved judicially to have\nsuffered an injury, replaced under the physical power of the culprit\nwho inflicted it. Accordingly wives, even in the most extreme and\nprotracted cases of bodily ill usage, hardly ever dare avail\nthemselves of the laws made for their protection: and if, in a moment\nof irrepressible indignation, or by the interference of neighbours,\nthey are induced to do so, their whole effort afterwards is to\ndisclose as little as they can, and to beg off their tyrant from his\nmerited chastisement.\n\nAll causes, social and natural, combine to make it unlikely that\nwomen should be collectively rebellious to the power of men. They are\nso far in a position different from all other subject classes, that\ntheir masters require something more from them than actual service.\nMen do not want solely the obedience of women, they want their\nsentiments. All men, except the most brutish, desire to have, in the\nwoman most nearly connected with them, not a forced slave but a\nwilling one, not a slave merely, but a favourite. They have therefore\nput everything in practice to enslave their minds. The masters of all\nother slaves rely, for maintaining obedience, on fear; either fear of\nthemselves, or religious fears. The masters of women wanted more than\nsimple obedience, and they turned the whole force of education to\neffect their purpose. All women are brought up from the very earliest\nyears in the belief that their ideal of character is the very\nopposite to that of men; not self-will, and government by\nself-control, but submission, and yielding to the control of others.\nAll the moralities tell them that it is the duty of women, and all\nthe current sentimentalities that it is their nature, to live for\nothers; to make complete abnegation of themselves, and to have no\nlife but in their affections. And by their affections are meant the\nonly ones they are allowed to have--those to the men with whom they\nare connected, or to the children who constitute an additional and\nindefeasible tie between them and a man. When we put together three\nthings--first, the natural attraction between opposite sexes;\nsecondly, the wife's entire dependence on the husband, every\nprivilege or pleasure she has being either his gift, or depending\nentirely on his will; and lastly, that the principal object of human\npursuit, consideration, and all objects of social ambition, can in\ngeneral be sought or obtained by her only through him, it would be a\nmiracle if the object of being attractive to men had not become the\npolar star of feminine education and formation of character. And,\nthis great means of influence over the minds of women having been\nacquired, an instinct of selfishness made men avail themselves of it\nto the utmost as a means of holding women in subjection, by\nrepresenting to them meekness, submissiveness, and resignation of all\nindividual will into the hands of a man, as an essential part of\nsexual attractiveness. Can it be doubted that any of the other yokes\nwhich mankind have succeeded in breaking, would have subsisted till\nnow if the same means had existed, and had been as sedulously used,\nto bow down their minds to it? If it had been made the object of the\nlife of every young plebeian to find personal favour in the eyes of\nsome patrician, of every young serf with some seigneur; if\ndomestication with him, and a share of his personal affections, had\nbeen held out as the prize which they all should look out for, the\nmost gifted and aspiring being able to reckon on the most desirable\nprizes; and if, when this prize had been obtained, they had been shut\nout by a wall of brass from all interests not centering in him, all\nfeelings and desires but those which he shared or inculcated; would\nnot serfs and seigneurs, plebeians and patricians, have been as\nbroadly distinguished at this day as men and women are? and would not\nall but a thinker here and there, have believed the distinction to be\na fundamental and unalterable fact in human nature?\n\nThe preceding considerations are amply sufficient to show that\ncustom, however universal it may be, affords in this case no\npresumption, and ought not to create any prejudice, in favour of the\narrangements which place women in social and political subjection to\nmen. But I may go farther, and maintain that the course of history,\nand the tendencies of progressive human society, afford not only no\npresumption in favour of this system of inequality of rights, but a\nstrong one against it; and that, so far as the whole course of human\nimprovement up to this time, the whole stream of modern tendencies,\nwarrants any inference on the subject, it is, that this relic of the\npast is discordant with the future, and must necessarily disappear.\n\nFor, what is the peculiar character of the modern world--the\ndifference which chiefly distinguishes modern institutions, modern\nsocial ideas, modern life itself, from those of times long past? It\nis, that human beings are no longer born to their place in life, and\nchained down by an inexorable bond to the place they are born to, but\nare free to employ their faculties, and such favourable chances as\noffer, to achieve the lot which may appear to them most desirable.\nHuman society of old was constituted on a very different principle.\nAll were born to a fixed social position, and were mostly kept in it\nby law, or interdicted from any means by which they could emerge from\nit. As some men are born white and others black, so some were born\nslaves and others freemen and citizens; some were born patricians,\nothers plebeians; some were born feudal nobles, others commoners and\n_roturiers_. A slave or serf could never make himself free, nor,\nexcept by the will of his master, become so. In most European\ncountries it was not till towards the close of the middle ages, and\nas a consequence of the growth of regal power, that commoners could\nbe ennobled. Even among nobles, the eldest son was born the exclusive\nheir to the paternal possessions, and a long time elapsed before it\nwas fully established that the father could disinherit him. Among the\nindustrious classes, only those who were born members of a guild, or\nwere admitted into it by its members, could lawfully practise their\ncalling within its local limits; and nobody could practise any\ncalling deemed important, in any but the legal manner--by processes\nauthoritatively prescribed. Manufacturers have stood in the pillory\nfor presuming to carry on their business by new and improved methods.\nIn modern Europe, and most in those parts of it which have\nparticipated most largely in all other modern improvements,\ndiametrically opposite doctrines now prevail. Law and government do\nnot undertake to prescribe by whom any social or industrial operation\nshall or shall not be conducted, or what modes of conducting them\nshall be lawful. These things are left to the unfettered choice of\nindividuals. Even the laws which required that workmen should serve\nan apprenticeship, have in this country been repealed: there being\nample assurance that in all cases in which an apprenticeship is\nnecessary, its necessity will suffice to enforce it. The old theory\nwas, that the least possible should be left to the choice of the\nindividual agent; that all he had to do should, as far as\npracticable, be laid down for him by superior wisdom. Left to himself\nhe was sure to go wrong. The modern conviction, the fruit of a\nthousand years of experience, is, that things in which the individual\nis the person directly interested, never go right but as they are\nleft to his own discretion; and that any regulation of them by\nauthority, except to protect the rights of others, is sure to be\nmischievous. This conclusion, slowly arrived at, and not adopted\nuntil almost every possible application of the contrary theory had\nbeen made with disastrous result, now (in the industrial department)\nprevails universally in the most advanced countries, almost\nuniversally in all that have pretensions to any sort of advancement.\nIt is not that all processes are supposed to be equally good, or all\npersons to be equally qualified for everything; but that freedom of\nindividual choice is now known to be the only thing which procures\nthe adoption of the best processes, and throws each operation into\nthe hands of those who are best qualified for it. Nobody thinks it\nnecessary to make a law that only a strong-armed man shall be a\nblacksmith. Freedom and competition suffice to make blacksmiths\nstrong-armed men, because the weak-armed can earn more by engaging in\noccupations for which they are more fit. In consonance with this\ndoctrine, it is felt to be an overstepping of the proper bounds of\nauthority to fix beforehand, on some general presumption, that\ncertain persons are not fit to do certain things. It is now\nthoroughly known and admitted that if some such presumptions exist,\nno such presumption is infallible. Even if it be well grounded in a\nmajority of cases, which it is very likely not to be, there will be a\nminority of exceptional cases in which it does not hold: and in those\nit is both an injustice to the individuals, and a detriment to\nsociety, to place barriers in the way of their using their faculties\nfor their own benefit and for that of others. In the cases, on the\nother hand, in which the unfitness is real, the ordinary motives of\nhuman conduct will on the whole suffice to prevent the incompetent\nperson from making, or from persisting in, the attempt.\n\nIf this general principle of social and economical science is not\ntrue; if individuals, with such help as they can derive from the\nopinion of those who know them, are not better judges than the law\nand the government, of their own capacities and vocation; the world\ncannot too soon abandon this principle, and return to the old system\nof regulations and disabilities. But if the principle is true, we\nought to act as if we believed it, and not to ordain that to be born\na girl instead of a boy, any more than to be born black instead of\nwhite, or a commoner instead of a nobleman, shall decide the person's\nposition through all life--shall interdict people from all the more\nelevated social positions, and from all, except a few, respectable\noccupations. Even were we to admit the utmost that is ever pretended\nas to the superior fitness of men for all the functions now reserved\nto them, the same argument applies which forbids a legal\nqualification for members of Parliament. If only once in a dozen\nyears the conditions of eligibility exclude a fit person, there is a\nreal loss, while the exclusion of thousands of unfit persons is no\ngain; for if the constitution of the electoral body disposes them to\nchoose unfit persons, there are always plenty of such persons to\nchoose from. In all things of any difficulty and importance, those\nwho can do them well are fewer than the need, even with the most\nunrestricted latitude of choice: and any limitation of the field of\nselection deprives society of some chances of being served by the\ncompetent, without ever saving it from the incompetent.\n\nAt present, in the more improved countries, the disabilities of women\nare the only case, save one, in which laws and institutions take\npersons at their birth, and ordain that they shall never in all their\nlives be allowed to compete for certain things. The one exception is\nthat of royalty. Persons still are born to the throne; no one, not of\nthe reigning family, can ever occupy it, and no one even of that\nfamily can, by any means but the course of hereditary succession,\nattain it. All other dignities and social advantages are open to the\nwhole male sex: many indeed are only attainable by wealth, but wealth\nmay be striven for by any one, and is actually obtained by many men\nof the very humblest origin. The difficulties, to the majority, are\nindeed insuperable without the aid of fortunate accidents; but no\nmale human being is under any legal ban: neither law nor opinion\nsuperadd artificial obstacles to the natural ones. Royalty, as I have\nsaid, is excepted: but in this case every one feels it to be an\nexception--an anomaly in the modern world, in marked opposition to\nits customs and principles, and to be justified only by extraordinary\nspecial expediencies, which, though individuals and nations differ in\nestimating their weight, unquestionably do in fact exist. But in this\nexceptional case, in which a high social function is, for important\nreasons, bestowed on birth instead of being put up to competition,\nall free nations contrive to adhere in substance to the principle\nfrom which they nominally derogate; for they circumscribe this high\nfunction by conditions avowedly intended to prevent the person to\nwhom it ostensibly belongs from really performing it; while the\nperson by whom it is performed, the responsible minister, does obtain\nthe post by a competition from which no full-grown citizen of the\nmale sex is legally excluded. The disabilities, therefore, to which\nwomen are subject from the mere fact of their birth, are the solitary\nexamples of the kind in modern legislation. In no instance except\nthis, which comprehends half the human race, are the higher social\nfunctions closed against any one by a fatality of birth which no\nexertions, and no change of circumstances, can overcome; for even\nreligious disabilities (besides that in England and in Europe they\nhave practically almost ceased to exist) do not close any career to\nthe disqualified person in case of conversion.\n\nThe social subordination of women thus stands out an isolated fact in\nmodern social institutions; a solitary breach of what has become\ntheir fundamental law; a single relic of an old world of thought and\npractice exploded in everything else, but retained in the one thing\nof most universal interest; as if a gigantic dolmen, or a vast temple\nof Jupiter Olympius, occupied the site of St. Paul's and received\ndaily worship, while the surrounding Christian churches were only\nresorted to on fasts and festivals. This entire discrepancy between\none social fact and all those which accompany it, and the radical\nopposition between its nature and the progressive movement which is\nthe boast of the modern world, and which has successively swept away\neverything else of an analogous character, surely affords, to a\nconscientious observer of human tendencies, serious matter for\nreflection. It raises a prima facie presumption on the unfavourable\nside, far outweighing any which custom and usage could in such\ncircumstances create on the favourable; and should at least suffice\nto make this, like the choice between republicanism and royalty, a\nbalanced question.\n\nThe least that can be demanded is, that the question should not be\nconsidered as prejudged by existing fact and existing opinion, but\nopen to discussion on its merits, as a question of justice and\nexpediency: the decision on this, as on any of the other social\narrangements of mankind, depending on what an enlightened estimate of\ntendencies and consequences may show to be most advantageous to\nhumanity in general, without distinction of sex. And the discussion\nmust be a real discussion, descending to foundations, and not resting\nsatisfied with vague and general assertions. It will not do, for\ninstance, to assert in general terms, that the experience of mankind\nhas pronounced in favour of the existing system. Experience cannot\npossibly have decided between two courses, so long as there has only\nbeen experience of one. If it be said that the doctrine of the\nequality of the sexes rests only on theory, it must be remembered\nthat the contrary doctrine also has only theory to rest upon. All\nthat is proved in its favour by direct experience, is that mankind\nhave been able to exist under it, and to attain the degree of\nimprovement and prosperity which we now see; but whether that\nprosperity has been attained sooner, or is now greater, than it would\nhave been under the other system, experience does not say. On the\nother hand, experience does say, that every step in improvement has\nbeen so invariably accompanied by a step made in raising the social\nposition of women, that historians and philosophers have been led to\nadopt their elevation or debasement as on the whole the surest test\nand most correct measure of the civilization of a people or an age.\nThrough all the progressive period of human history, the condition of\nwomen has been approaching nearer to equality with men. This does not\nof itself prove that the assimilation must go on to complete\nequality; but it assuredly affords some presumption that such is the\ncase.\n\nNeither does it avail anything to say that the _nature_ of the two\nsexes adapts them to their present functions and position, and\nrenders these appropriate to them. Standing on the ground of common\nsense and the constitution of the human mind, I deny that any one\nknows, or can know, the nature of the two sexes, as long as they have\nonly been seen in their present relation to one another. If men had\never been found in society without women, or women without men, or if\nthere had been a society of men and women in which the women were not\nunder the control of the men, something might have been positively\nknown about the mental and moral differences which may be inherent in\nthe nature of each. What is now called the nature of women is an\neminently artificial thing--the result of forced repression in some\ndirections, unnatural stimulation in others. It may be asserted\nwithout scruple, that no other class of dependents have had their\ncharacter so entirely distorted from its natural proportions by their\nrelation with their masters; for, if conquered and slave races have\nbeen, in some respects, more forcibly repressed, whatever in them has\nnot been crushed down by an iron heel has generally been let alone,\nand if left with any liberty of development, it has developed itself\naccording to its own laws; but in the case of women, a hot-house and\nstove cultivation has always been carried on of some of the\ncapabilities of their nature, for the benefit and pleasure of their\nmasters. Then, because certain products of the general vital force\nsprout luxuriantly and reach a great development in this heated\natmosphere and under this active nurture and watering, while other\nshoots from the same root, which are left outside in the wintry air,\nwith ice purposely heaped all round them, have a stunted growth, and\nsome are burnt off with fire and disappear; men, with that inability\nto recognise their own work which distinguishes the unanalytic mind,\nindolently believe that the tree grows of itself in the way they have\nmade it grow, and that it would die if one half of it were not kept\nin a vapour bath and the other half in the snow.\n\nOf all difficulties which impede the progress of thought, and the\nformation of well-grounded opinions on life and social arrangements,\nthe greatest is now the unspeakable ignorance and inattention of\nmankind in respect to the influences which form human character.\nWhatever any portion of the human species now are, or seem to be,\nsuch, it is supposed, they have a natural tendency to be: even when\nthe most elementary knowledge of the circumstances in which they have\nbeen placed, clearly points out the causes that made them what they\nare. Because a cottier deeply in arrears to his landlord is not\nindustrious, there are people who think that the Irish are naturally\nidle. Because constitutions can be overthrown when the authorities\nappointed to execute them turn their arms against them, there are\npeople who think the French incapable of free government. Because the\nGreeks cheated the Turks, and the Turks only plundered the Greeks,\nthere are persons who think that the Turks are naturally more\nsincere: and because women, as is often said, care nothing about\npolitics except their personalities, it is supposed that the general\ngood is naturally less interesting to women than to men. History,\nwhich is now so much better understood than formerly, teaches another\nlesson: if only by showing the extraordinary susceptibility of human\nnature to external influences, and the extreme variableness of those\nof its manifestations which are supposed to be most universal and\nuniform. But in history, as in travelling, men usually see only what\nthey already had in their own minds; and few learn much from history,\nwho do not bring much with them to its study.\n\nHence, in regard to that most difficult question, what are the\nnatural differences between the two sexes--a subject on which it is\nimpossible in the present state of society to obtain complete and\ncorrect knowledge--while almost everybody dogmatizes upon it, almost\nall neglect and make light of the only means by which any partial\ninsight can be obtained into it. This is, an analytic study of the\nmost important department of psychology, the laws of the influence of\ncircumstances on character. For, however great and apparently\nineradicable the moral and intellectual differences between men and\nwomen might be, the evidence of their being natural differences could\nonly be negative. Those only could be inferred to be natural which\ncould not possibly be artificial--the residuum, after deducting every\ncharacteristic of either sex which can admit of being explained from\neducation or external circumstances. The profoundest knowledge of the\nlaws of the formation of character is indispensable to entitle any\none to affirm even that there is any difference, much more what the\ndifference is, between the two sexes considered as moral and rational\nbeings; and since no one, as yet, has that knowledge, (for there is\nhardly any subject which, in proportion to its importance, has been\nso little studied), no one is thus far entitled to any positive\nopinion on the subject. Conjectures are all that can at present be\nmade; conjectures more or less probable, according as more or less\nauthorized by such knowledge as we yet have of the laws of\npsychology, as applied to the formation of character.\n\nEven the preliminary knowledge, what the differences between the\nsexes now are, apart from all question as to how they are made what\nthey are, is still in the crudest and most incomplete state. Medical\npractitioners and physiologists have ascertained, to some extent, the\ndifferences in bodily constitution; and this is an important element\nto the psychologist: but hardly any medical practitioner is a\npsychologist. Respecting the mental characteristics of women; their\nobservations are of no more worth than those of common men. It is a\nsubject on which nothing final can be known, so long as those who\nalone can really know it, women themselves, have given but little\ntestimony, and that little, mostly suborned. It is easy to know\nstupid women. Stupidity is much the same all the world over. A stupid\nperson's notions and feelings may confidently be inferred from those\nwhich prevail in the circle by which the person is surrounded. Not so\nwith those whose opinions and feelings are an emanation from their\nown nature and faculties. It is only a man here and there who has any\ntolerable knowledge of the character even of the women of his own\nfamily. I do not mean, of their capabilities; these nobody knows, not\neven themselves, because most of them have never been called out. I\nmean their actually existing thoughts and feelings. Many a man thinks\nhe perfectly understands women, because he has had amatory relations\nwith several, perhaps with many of them. If he is a good observer,\nand his experience extends to quality as well as quantity, he may\nhave learnt something of one narrow department of their nature--an\nimportant department, no doubt. But of all the rest of it, few\npersons are generally more ignorant, because there are few from whom\nit is so carefully hidden. The most favourable case which a man can\ngenerally have for studying the character of a woman, is that of his\nown wife: for the opportunities are greater, and the cases of\ncomplete sympathy not so unspeakably rare. And in fact, this is the\nsource from which any knowledge worth having on the subject has, I\nbelieve, generally come. But most men have not had the opportunity of\nstudying in this way more than a single case: accordingly one can, to\nan almost laughable degree, infer what a man's wife is like, from his\nopinions about women in general. To make even this one case yield any\nresult, the woman must be worth knowing, and the man not only a\ncompetent judge, but of a character so sympathetic in itself, and so\nwell adapted to hers, that he can either read her mind by sympathetic\nintuition, or has nothing in himself which makes her shy of\ndisclosing it. Hardly anything, I believe, can be more rare than this\nconjunction. It often happens that there is the most complete unity\nof feeling and community of interests as to all external things, yet\nthe one has as little admission into the internal life of the other\nas if they were common acquaintance. Even with true affection,\nauthority on the one side and subordination on the other prevent\nperfect confidence. Though nothing may be intentionally withheld,\nmuch is not shown. In the analogous relation of parent and child, the\ncorresponding phenomenon must have been in the observation of every\none. As between father and son, how many are the cases in which the\nfather, in spite of real affection on both sides, obviously to all\nthe world does not know, nor suspect, parts of the son's character\nfamiliar to his companions and equals. The truth is, that the\nposition of looking up to another is extremely unpropitious to\ncomplete sincerity and openness with him. The fear of losing ground\nin his opinion or in his feelings is so strong, that even in an\nupright character, there is an unconscious tendency to show only the\nbest side, or the side which, though not the best, is that which he\nmost likes to see: and it may be confidently said that thorough\nknowledge of one another hardly ever exists, but between persons who,\nbesides being intimates, are equals. How much more true, then, must\nall this be, when the one is not only under the authority of the\nother, but has it inculcated on her as a duty to reckon everything\nelse subordinate to his comfort and pleasure, and to let him neither\nsee nor feel anything coming from her, except what is agreeable to\nhim. All these difficulties stand in the way of a man's obtaining any\nthorough knowledge even of the one woman whom alone, in general, he\nhas sufficient opportunity of studying. When we further consider that\nto understand one woman is not necessarily to understand any other\nwoman; that even if he could study many women of one rank, or of one\ncountry, he would not thereby understand women of other ranks or\ncountries; and even if he did, they are still only the women of a\nsingle period of history; we may safely assert that the knowledge\nwhich men can acquire of women, even as they have been and are,\nwithout reference to what they might be, is wretchedly imperfect and\nsuperficial, and always will be so, until women themselves have told\nall that they have to tell.\n\nAnd this time has not come; nor will it come otherwise than\ngradually. It is but of yesterday that women have either been\nqualified by literary accomplishments, or permitted by society, to\ntell anything to the general public. As yet very few of them dare\ntell anything, which men, on whom their literary success depends, are\nunwilling to hear. Let us remember in what manner, up to a very\nrecent time, the expression, even by a male author, of uncustomary\nopinions, or what are deemed eccentric feelings, usually was, and in\nsome degree still is, received; and we may form some faint conception\nunder what impediments a woman, who is brought up to think custom and\nopinion her sovereign rule, attempts to express in books anything\ndrawn from the depths of her own nature. The greatest woman who has\nleft writings behind her sufficient to give her an eminent rank in\nthe literature of her country, thought it necessary to prefix as a\nmotto to her boldest work, \"Un homme peut braver l'opinion; une femme\ndoit s'y soumettre.\"[1] The greater part of what women write about\nwomen is mere sycophancy to men. In the case of unmarried women, much\nof it seems only intended to increase their chance of a husband.\nMany, both married and unmarried, overstep the mark, and inculcate a\nservility beyond what is desired or relished by any man, except the\nvery vulgarest. But this is not so often the case as, even at a quite\nlate period, it still was. Literary women are becoming more\nfreespoken, and more willing to express their real sentiments.\nUnfortunately, in this country especially, they are themselves such\nartificial products, that their sentiments are compounded of a small\nelement of individual observation and consciousness, and a very large\none of acquired associations. This will be less and less the case,\nbut it will remain true to a great extent, as long as social\ninstitutions do not admit the same free development of originality in\nwomen which is possible to men. When that time comes, and not before,\nwe shall see, and not merely hear, as much as it is necessary to know\nof the nature of women, and the adaptation of other things to it.\n\nI have dwelt so much on the difficulties which at present obstruct\nany real knowledge by men of the true nature of women, because in\nthis as in so many other things \"opinio copiae inter maximas causas\ninopiae est;\" and there is little chance of reasonable thinking on the\nmatter, while people flatter themselves that they perfectly\nunderstand a subject of which most men know absolutely nothing, and\nof which it is at present impossible that any man, or all men taken\ntogether, should have knowledge which can qualify them to lay down\nthe law to women as to what is, or is not, their vocation. Happily,\nno such knowledge is necessary for any practical purpose connected\nwith the position of women in relation to society and life. For,\naccording to all the principles involved in modern society, the\nquestion rests with women themselves--to be decided by their own\nexperience, and by the use of their own faculties. There are no means\nof finding what either one person or many can do, but by trying--and\nno means by which any one else can discover for them what it is for\ntheir happiness to do or leave undone.\n\nOne thing we may be certain of--that what is contrary to women's\nnature to do, they never will be made to do by simply giving their\nnature free play. The anxiety of mankind to interfere in behalf of\nnature, for fear lest nature should not succeed in effecting its\npurpose, is an altogether unnecessary solicitude. What women by\nnature cannot do, it is quite superfluous to forbid them from doing.\nWhat they can do, but not so well as the men who are their\ncompetitors, competition suffices to exclude them from; since nobody\nasks for protective duties and bounties in favour of women; it is\nonly asked that the present bounties and protective duties in favour\nof men should be recalled. If women have a greater natural\ninclination for some things than for others, there is no need of laws\nor social inculcation to make the majority of them do the former in\npreference to the latter. Whatever women's services are most wanted\nfor, the free play of competition will hold out the strongest\ninducements to them to undertake. And, as the words imply, they are\nmost wanted for the things for which they are most fit; by the\napportionment of which to them, the collective faculties of the two\nsexes can be applied on the whole with the greatest sum of valuable\nresult.\n\nThe general opinion of men is supposed to be, that the natural\nvocation of a woman is that of a wife and mother. I say, is supposed\nto be, because, judging from acts--from the whole of the present\nconstitution of society--one might infer that their opinion was the\ndirect contrary. They might be supposed to think that the alleged\nnatural vocation of women was of all things the most repugnant to\ntheir nature; insomuch that if they are free to do anything else--if\nany other means of living, or occupation of their time and faculties,\nis open, which has any chance of appearing desirable to them--there\nwill not be enough of them who will be willing to accept the\ncondition said to be natural to them. If this is the real opinion of\nmen in general, it would be well that it should be spoken out. I\nshould like to hear somebody openly enunciating the doctrine (it is\nalready implied in much that is written on the subject)--\"It is\nnecessary to society that women should marry and produce children.\nThey will not do so unless they are compelled. Therefore it is\nnecessary to compel them.\" The merits of the case would then be\nclearly defined. It would be exactly that of the slaveholders of\nSouth Carolina and Louisiana. \"It is necessary that cotton and sugar\nshould be grown. White men cannot produce them. Negroes will not, for\nany wages which we choose to give. _Ergo_ they must be compelled.\" An\nillustration still closer to the point is that of impressment.\nSailors must absolutely be had to defend the country. It often\nhappens that they will not voluntarily enlist. Therefore there must\nbe the power of forcing them. How often has this logic been used!\nand, but for one flaw in it, without doubt it would have been\nsuccessful up to this day. But it is open to the retort--First pay\nthe sailors the honest value of their labour. When you have made it\nas well worth their while to serve you, as to work for other\nemployers, you will have no more difficulty than others have in\nobtaining their services. To this there is no logical answer except\n\"I will not:\" and as people are now not only ashamed, but are not\ndesirous, to rob the labourer of his hire, impressment is no longer\nadvocated. Those who attempt to force women into marriage by closing\nall other doors against them, lay themselves open to a similar\nretort. If they mean what they say, their opinion must evidently be,\nthat men do not render the married condition so desirable to women,\nas to induce them to accept it for its own recommendations. It is not\na sign of one's thinking the boon one offers very attractive, when\none allows only Hobson's choice, \"that or none.\" And here, I believe,\nis the clue to the feelings of those men, who have a real antipathy\nto the equal freedom of women. I believe they are afraid, not lest\nwomen should be unwilling to marry, for I do not think that any one\nin reality has that apprehension; but lest they should insist that\nmarriage should be on equal conditions; lest all women of spirit and\ncapacity should prefer doing almost anything else, not in their own\neyes degrading, rather than marry, when marrying is giving themselves\na master, and a master too of all their earthly possessions. And\ntruly, if this consequence were necessarily incident to marriage, I\nthink that the apprehension would be very well founded. I agree in\nthinking it probable that few women, capable of anything else, would,\nunless under an irresistible _entrainement_, rendering them for the\ntime insensible to anything but itself, choose such a lot, when any\nother means were open to them of filling a conventionally honourable\nplace in life: and if men are determined that the law of marriage\nshall be a law of despotism, they are quite right, in point of mere\npolicy, in leaving to women only Hobson's choice. But, in that case,\nall that has been done in the modern world to relax the chain on the\nminds of women, has been a mistake. They never should have been\nallowed to receive a literary education. Women who read, much more\nwomen who write, are, in the existing constitution of things, a\ncontradiction and a disturbing element: and it was wrong to bring\nwomen up with any acquirements but those of an odalisque, or of a\ndomestic servant.\n\n[Footnote 1: Title-page of Mme. de Stael's \"Delphine.\"]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\n\nIt will be well to commence the detailed discussion of the subject by\nthe particular branch of it to which the course of our observations\nhas led us: the conditions which the laws of this and all other\ncountries annex to the marriage contract. Marriage being the\ndestination appointed by society for women, the prospect they are\nbrought up to, and the object which it is intended should be sought\nby all of them, except those who are too little attractive to be\nchosen by any man as his companion; one might have supposed that\neverything would have been done to make this condition as eligible to\nthem as possible, that they might have no cause to regret being\ndenied the option of any other. Society, however, both in this, and,\nat first, in all other cases, has preferred to attain its object by\nfoul rather than fair means: but this is the only case in which it\nhas substantially persisted in them even to the present day.\nOriginally women were taken by force, or regularly sold by their\nfather to the husband. Until a late period in European history, the\nfather had the power to dispose of his daughter in marriage at his\nown will and pleasure, without any regard to hers. The Church,\nindeed, was so far faithful to a better morality as to require a\nformal \"yes\" from the woman at the marriage ceremony; but there was\nnothing to shew that the consent was other than compulsory; and it\nwas practically impossible for the girl to refuse compliance if the\nfather persevered, except perhaps when she might obtain the\nprotection of religion by a determined resolution to take monastic\nvows. After marriage, the man had anciently (but this was anterior to\nChristianity) the power of life and death over his wife. She could\ninvoke no law against him; he was her sole tribunal and law. For a\nlong time he could repudiate her, but she had no corresponding power\nin regard to him. By the old laws of England, the husband was called\nthe _lord_ of the wife; he was literally regarded as her sovereign,\ninasmuch that the murder of a man by his wife was called treason\n(_petty_ as distinguished from _high_ treason), and was more cruelly\navenged than was usually the case with high treason, for the penalty\nwas burning to death. Because these various enormities have fallen\ninto disuse (for most of them were never formally abolished, or not\nuntil they had long ceased to be practised) men suppose that all is\nnow as it should be in regard to the marriage contract; and we are\ncontinually told that civilization and Christianity have restored to\nthe woman her just rights. Meanwhile the wife is the actual\nbond-servant of her husband: no less so, as far as legal obligation\ngoes, than slaves commonly so called. She vows a lifelong obedience\nto him at the altar, and is held to it all through her life by law.\nCasuists may say that the obligation of obedience stops short of\nparticipation in crime, but it certainly extends to everything else.\nShe can do no act whatever but by his permission, at least tacit. She\ncan acquire no property but for him; the instant it becomes hers,\neven if by inheritance, it becomes _ipso facto_ his. In this respect\nthe wife's position under the common law of England is worse than\nthat of slaves in the laws of many countries: by the Roman law, for\nexample, a slave might have his peculium, which to a certain extent\nthe law guaranteed to him for his exclusive use. The higher classes\nin this country have given an analogous advantage to their women,\nthrough special contracts setting aside the law, by conditions of\npin-money, &c.: since parental feeling being stronger with fathers\nthan the class feeling of their own sex, a father generally prefers\nhis own daughter to a son-in-law who is a stranger to him. By means\nof settlements, the rich usually contrive to withdraw the whole or\npart of the inherited property of the wife from the absolute control\nof the husband: but they do not succeed in keeping it under her own\ncontrol; the utmost they can do only prevents the husband from\nsquandering it, at the same time debarring the rightful owner from\nits use. The property itself is out of the reach of both; and as to\nthe income derived from it, the form of settlement most favourable to\nthe wife (that called \"to her separate use\") only precludes the\nhusband from receiving it instead of her: it must pass through her\nhands, but if he takes it from her by personal violence as soon as\nshe receives it, he can neither be punished, nor compelled to\nrestitution. This is the amount of the protection which, under the\nlaws of this country, the most powerful nobleman can give to his own\ndaughter as respects her husband. In the immense majority of cases\nthere is no settlement: and the absorption of all rights, all\nproperty, as well as all freedom of action, is complete. The two are\ncalled \"one person in law,\" for the purpose of inferring that\nwhatever is hers is his, but the parallel inference is never drawn\nthat whatever is his is hers; the maxim is not applied against the\nman, except to make him responsible to third parties for her acts, as\na master is for the acts of his slaves or of his cattle. I am far\nfrom pretending that wives are in general no better treated than\nslaves; but no slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a\nsense of the word, as a wife is. Hardly any slave, except one\nimmediately attached to the master's person, is a slave at all hours\nand all minutes; in general he has, like a soldier, his fixed task,\nand when it is done, or when he is off duty, he disposes, within\ncertain limits, of his own time, and has a family life into which the\nmaster rarely intrudes. \"Uncle Tom\" under his first master had his\nown life in his \"cabin,\" almost as much as any man whose work takes\nhim away from home, is able to have in his own family. But it cannot\nbe so with the wife. Above all, a female slave has (in Christian\ncountries) an admitted right, and is considered under a moral\nobligation, to refuse to her master the last familiarity. Not so the\nwife: however brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained\nto--though she may know that he hates her, though it may be his daily\npleasure to torture her, and though she may feel it impossible not to\nloathe him--he can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation\nof a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal\nfunction contrary to her inclinations. While she is held in this\nworst description of slavery as to her own person, what is her\nposition in regard to the children in whom she and her master have a\njoint interest? They are by law _his_ children. He alone has any\nlegal rights over them. Not one act can she do towards or in relation\nto them, except by delegation from him. Even after he is dead she is\nnot their legal guardian, unless he by will has made her so. He could\neven send them away from her, and deprive her of the means of seeing\nor corresponding with them, until this power was in some degree\nrestricted by Serjeant Talfourd's Act. This is her legal state. And\nfrom this state she has no means of withdrawing herself. If she\nleaves her husband, she can take nothing with her, neither her\nchildren nor anything which is rightfully her own. If he chooses, he\ncan compel her to return, by law, or by physical force; or he may\ncontent himself with seizing for his own use anything which she may\nearn, or which may be given to her by her relations. It is only legal\nseparation by a decree of a court of justice, which entitles her to\nlive apart, without being forced back into the custody of an\nexasperated jailer--or which empowers her to apply any earnings to\nher own use, without fear that a man whom perhaps she has not seen\nfor twenty years will pounce upon her some day and carry all off.\nThis legal separation, until lately, the courts of justice would only\ngive at an expense which made it inaccessible to any one out of the\nhigher ranks. Even now it is only given in cases of desertion, or of\nthe extreme of cruelty; and yet complaints are made every day that it\nis granted too easily. Surely, if a woman is denied any lot in life\nbut that of being the personal body-servant of a despot, and is\ndependent for everything upon the chance of finding one who may be\ndisposed to make a favourite of her instead of merely a drudge, it is\na very cruel aggravation of her fate that she should be allowed to\ntry this chance only once. The natural sequel and corollary from this\nstate of things would be, that since her all in life depends upon\nobtaining a good master, she should be allowed to change again and\nagain until she finds one. I am not saying that she ought to be\nallowed this privilege. That is a totally different consideration.\nThe question of divorce, in the sense involving liberty of\nremarriage, is one into which it is foreign to my purpose to enter.\nAll I now say is, that to those to whom nothing but servitude is\nallowed, the free choice of servitude is the only, though a most\ninsufficient, alleviation. Its refusal completes the assimilation of\nthe wife to the slave--and the slave under not the mildest form of\nslavery: for in some slave codes the slave could, under certain\ncircumstances of ill usage, legally compel the master to sell him.\nBut no amount of ill usage, without adultery superadded, will in\nEngland free a wife from her tormentor.\n\nI have no desire to exaggerate, nor does the case stand in any need\nof exaggeration. I have described the wife's legal position, not her\nactual treatment. The laws of most countries are far worse than the\npeople who execute them, and many of them are only able to remain\nlaws by being seldom or never carried into effect. If married life\nwere all that it might be expected to be, looking to the laws alone,\nsociety would be a hell upon earth. Happily there are both feelings\nand interests which in many men exclude, and in most, greatly temper,\nthe impulses and propensities which lead to tyranny: and of those\nfeelings, the tie which connects a man with his wife affords, in a\nnormal state of things, incomparably the strongest example. The only\ntie which at all approaches to it, that between him and his children,\ntends, in all save exceptional cases, to strengthen, instead of\nconflicting with, the first. Because this is true; because men in\ngeneral do not inflict, nor women suffer, all the misery which could\nbe inflicted and suffered if the full power of tyranny with which the\nman is legally invested were acted on; the defenders of the existing\nform of the institution think that all its iniquity is justified, and\nthat any complaint is merely quarrelling with the evil which is the\nprice paid for every great good. But the mitigations in practice,\nwhich are compatible with maintaining in full legal force this or any\nother kind of tyranny, instead of being any apology for despotism,\nonly serve to prove what power human nature possesses of reacting\nagainst the vilest institutions, and with what vitality the seeds of\ngood as well as those of evil in human character diffuse and\npropagate themselves. Not a word can be said for despotism in the\nfamily which cannot be said for political despotism. Every absolute\nking does not sit at his window to enjoy the groans of his tortured\nsubjects, nor strips them of their last rag and turns them out to\nshiver in the road. The despotism of Louis XVI. was not the despotism\nof Philippe le Bel, or of Nadir Shah, or of Caligula; but it was bad\nenough to justify the French Revolution, and to palliate even its\nhorrors. If an appeal be made to the intense attachments which exist\nbetween wives and their husbands, exactly as much may be said of\ndomestic slavery. It was quite an ordinary fact in Greece and Rome\nfor slaves to submit to death by torture rather than betray their\nmasters. In the proscriptions of the Roman civil wars it was remarked\nthat wives and slaves were heroically faithful, sons very commonly\ntreacherous. Yet we know how cruelly many Romans treated their\nslaves. But in truth these intense individual feelings nowhere rise\nto such a luxuriant height as under the most atrocious institutions.\nIt is part of the irony of life, that the strongest feelings of\ndevoted gratitude of which human nature seems to be susceptible, are\ncalled forth in human beings towards those who, having the power\nentirely to crush their earthly existence, voluntarily refrain from\nusing that power. How great a place in most men this sentiment fills,\neven in religious devotion, it would be cruel to inquire. We daily\nsee how much their gratitude to Heaven appears to be stimulated by\nthe contemplation of fellow-creatures to whom God has not been so\nmerciful as he has to themselves.\n\nWhether the institution to be defended is slavery, political\nabsolutism, or the absolutism of the head of a family, we are always\nexpected to judge of it from its best instances; and we are presented\nwith pictures of loving exercise of authority on one side, loving\nsubmission to it on the other--superior wisdom ordering all things\nfor the greatest good of the dependents, and surrounded by their\nsmiles and benedictions. All this would be very much to the purpose\nif any one pretended that there are no such things as good men. Who\ndoubts that there may be great goodness, and great happiness, and\ngreat affection, under the absolute government of a good man?\nMeanwhile, laws and institutions require to be adapted, not to good\nmen, but to bad. Marriage is not an institution designed for a select\nfew. Men are not required, as a preliminary to the marriage ceremony,\nto prove by testimonials that they are fit to be trusted with the\nexercise of absolute power. The tie of affection and obligation to a\nwife and children is very strong with those whose general social\nfeelings are strong, and with many who are little sensible to any\nother social ties; but there are all degrees of sensibility and\ninsensibility to it, as there are all grades of goodness and\nwickedness in men, down to those whom no ties will bind, and on whom\nsociety has no action but through its _ultima ratio_, the penalties\nof the law. In every grade of this descending scale are men to whom\nare committed all the legal powers of a husband. The vilest\nmalefactor has some wretched woman tied to him, against whom he can\ncommit any atrocity except killing her, and, if tolerably cautious,\ncan do that without much danger of the legal penalty. And how many\nthousands are there among the lowest classes in every country, who,\nwithout being in a legal sense malefactors in any other respect,\nbecause in every other quarter their aggressions meet with\nresistance, indulge the utmost habitual excesses of bodily violence\ntowards the unhappy wife, who alone, at least of grown persons, can\nneither repel nor escape from their brutality; and towards whom the\nexcess of dependence inspires their mean and savage natures, not with\na generous forbearance, and a point of honour to behave well to one\nwhose lot in life is trusted entirely to their kindness, but on the\ncontrary with a notion that the law has delivered her to them as\ntheir thing, to be used at their pleasure, and that they are not\nexpected to practise the consideration towards her which is required\nfrom them towards everybody else. The law, which till lately left\neven these atrocious extremes of domestic oppression practically\nunpunished, has within these few years made some feeble attempts to\nrepress them. But its attempts have done little, and cannot be\nexpected to do much, because it is contrary to reason and experience\nto suppose that there can be any real check to brutality, consistent\nwith leaving the victim still in the power of the executioner. Until\na conviction for personal violence, or at all events a repetition of\nit after a first conviction, entitles the woman _ipso facto_ to a\ndivorce, or at least to a judicial separation, the attempt to repress\nthese \"aggravated assaults\" by legal penalties will break down for\nwant of a prosecutor, or for want of a witness.\n\nWhen we consider how vast is the number of men, in any great country,\nwho are little higher than brutes, and that this never prevents them\nfrom being able, through the law of marriage, to obtain a victim, the\nbreadth and depth of human misery caused in this shape alone by the\nabuse of the institution swells to something appalling. Yet these are\nonly the extreme cases. They are the lowest abysses, but there is a\nsad succession of depth after depth before reaching them. In domestic\nas in political tyranny, the case of absolute monsters chiefly\nillustrates the institution by showing that there is scarcely any\nhorror which may not occur under it if the despot pleases, and thus\nsetting in a strong light what must be the terrible frequency of\nthings only a little less atrocious. Absolute fiends are as rare as\nangels, perhaps rarer: ferocious savages, with occasional touches of\nhumanity, are however very frequent: and in the wide interval which\nseparates these from any worthy representatives of the human species,\nhow many are the forms and gradations of animalism and selfishness,\noften under an outward varnish of civilization and even cultivation,\nliving at peace with the law, maintaining a creditable appearance to\nall who are not under their power, yet sufficient often to make the\nlives of all who are so, a torment and a burthen to them! It would be\ntiresome to repeat the commonplaces about the unfitness of men in\ngeneral for power, which, after the political discussions of\ncenturies, every one knows by heart, were it not that hardly any one\nthinks of applying these maxims to the case in which above all others\nthey are applicable, that of power, not placed in the hands of a man\nhere and there, but offered to every adult male, down to the basest\nand most ferocious. It is not because a man is not known to have\nbroken any of the Ten Commandments, or because he maintains a\nrespectable character in his dealings with those whom he cannot\ncompel to have intercourse with him, or because he does not fly out\ninto violent bursts of ill-temper against those who are not obliged\nto bear with him, that it is possible to surmise of what sort his\nconduct will be in the unrestraint of home. Even the commonest men\nreserve the violent, the sulky, the undisguisedly selfish side of\ntheir character for those who have no power to withstand it. The\nrelation of superiors to dependents is the nursery of these vices of\ncharacter, which, wherever else they exist, are an overflowing from\nthat source. A man who is morose or violent to his equals, is sure to\nbe one who has lived among inferiors, whom he could frighten or worry\ninto submission. If the family in its best forms is, as it is often\nsaid to be, a school of sympathy, tenderness, and loving\nforgetfulness of self, it is still oftener, as respects its chief, a\nschool of wilfulness, overbearingness, unbounded self-indulgence, and\na double-dyed and idealized selfishness, of which sacrifice itself is\nonly a particular form: the care for the wife and children being only\ncare for them as parts of the man's own interests and belongings, and\ntheir individual happiness being immolated in every shape to his\nsmallest preferences. What better is to be looked for under the\nexisting form of the institution? We know that the bad propensities\nof human nature are only kept within bounds when they are allowed no\nscope for their indulgence. We know that from impulse and habit, when\nnot from deliberate purpose, almost every one to whom others yield,\ngoes on encroaching upon them, until a point is reached at which they\nare compelled to resist. Such being the common tendency of human\nnature; the almost unlimited power which present social institutions\ngive to the man over at least one human being--the one with whom he\nresides, and whom he has always present--this power seeks out and\nevokes the latent germs of selfishness in the remotest corners of his\nnature--fans its faintest sparks and smouldering embers--offers to\nhim a license for the indulgence of those points of his original\ncharacter which in all other relations he would have found it\nnecessary to repress and conceal, and the repression of which would\nin time have become a second nature. I know that there is another\nside to the question. I grant that the wife, if she cannot\neffectually resist, can at least retaliate; she, too, can make the\nman's life extremely uncomfortable, and by that power is able to\ncarry many points which she ought, and many which she ought not, to\nprevail in. But this instrument of self-protection--which may be\ncalled the power of the scold, or the shrewish sanction--has the\nfatal defect, that it avails most against the least tyrannical\nsuperiors, and in favour of the least deserving dependents. It is the\nweapon of irritable and self-willed women; of those who would make\nthe worst use of power if they themselves had it, and who generally\nturn this power to a bad use. The amiable cannot use such an\ninstrument, the highminded disdain it. And on the other hand, the\nhusbands against whom it is used most effectively are the gentler and\nmore inoffensive; those who cannot be induced, even by provocation,\nto resort to any very harsh exercise of authority. The wife's power\nof being disagreeable generally only establishes a counter-tyranny,\nand makes victims in their turn chiefly of those husbands who are\nleast inclined to be tyrants.\n\nWhat is it, then, which really tempers the corrupting effects of the\npower, and makes it compatible with such amount of good as we\nactually see? Mere feminine blandishments, though of great effect in\nindividual instances, have very little effect in modifying the\ngeneral tendencies of the situation; for their power only lasts while\nthe woman is young and attractive, often only while her charm is new,\nand not dimmed by familiarity; and on many men they have not much\ninfluence at any time. The real mitigating causes are, the personal\naffection which is the growth of time, in so far as the man's nature\nis susceptible of it, and the woman's character sufficiently\ncongenial with his to excite it; their common interests as regards\nthe children, and their general community of interest as concerns\nthird persons (to which however there are very great limitations);\nthe real importance of the wife to his daily comforts and enjoyments,\nand the value he consequently attaches to her on his personal\naccount, which, in a man capable of feeling for others, lays the\nfoundation of caring for her on her own; and lastly, the influence\nnaturally acquired over almost all human beings by those near to\ntheir persons (if not actually disagreeable to them): who, both by\ntheir direct entreaties, and by the insensible contagion of their\nfeelings and dispositions, are often able, unless counteracted by\nsome equally strong personal influence, to obtain a degree of command\nover the conduct of the superior, altogether excessive and\nunreasonable. Through these various means, the wife frequently\nexercises even too much power over the man; she is able to affect his\nconduct in things in which she may not be qualified to influence it\nfor good--in which her influence may be not only unenlightened, but\nemployed on the morally wrong side; and in which he would act better\nif left to his own prompting. But neither in the affairs of families\nnor in those of states is power a compensation for the loss of\nfreedom. Her power often gives her what she has no right to, but does\nnot enable her to assert her own rights. A Sultan's favourite slave\nhas slaves under her, over whom she tyrannizes; but the desirable\nthing would be that she should neither have slaves nor be a slave. By\nentirely sinking her own existence in her husband; by having no will\n(or persuading him that she has no will) but his, in anything which\nregards their joint relation, and by making it the business of her\nlife to work upon his sentiments, a wife may gratify herself by\ninfluencing, and very probably perverting, his conduct, in those of\nhis external relations which she has never qualified herself to judge\nof, or in which she is herself wholly influenced by some personal or\nother partiality or prejudice. Accordingly, as things now are, those\nwho act most kindly to their wives, are quite as often made worse, as\nbetter, by the wife's influence, in respect to all interests\nextending beyond the family. She is taught that she has no business\nwith things out of that sphere; and accordingly she seldom has any\nhonest and conscientious opinion on them; and therefore hardly ever\nmeddles with them for any legitimate purpose, but generally for an\ninterested one. She neither knows nor cares which is the right side\nin politics, but she knows what will bring in money or invitations,\ngive her husband a title, her son a place, or her daughter a good\nmarriage.\n\nBut how, it will be asked, can any society exist without government?\nIn a family, as in a state, some one person must be the ultimate\nruler. Who shall decide when married people differ in opinion? Both\ncannot have their way, yet a decision one way or the other must be\ncome to.\n\nIt is not true that in all voluntary association between two people,\none of them must be absolute master: still less that the law must\ndetermine which of them it shall be. The most frequent case of\nvoluntary association, next to marriage, is partnership in business:\nand it is not found or thought necessary to enact that in every\npartnership, one partner shall have entire control over the concern,\nand the others shall be bound to obey his orders. No one would enter\ninto partnership on terms which would subject him to the\nresponsibilities of a principal, with only the powers and privileges\nof a clerk or agent. If the law dealt with other contracts as it does\nwith marriage, it would ordain that one partner should administer the\ncommon business as if it was his private concern; that the others\nshould have only delegated powers; and that this one should be\ndesignated by some general presumption of law, for example as being\nthe eldest. The law never does this: nor does experience show it to\nbe necessary that any theoretical inequality of power should exist\nbetween the partners, or that the partnership should have any other\nconditions than what they may themselves appoint by their articles of\nagreement. Yet it might seem that the exclusive power might be\nconceded with less danger to the rights and interests of the\ninferior, in the case of partnership than in that of marriage, since\nhe is free to cancel the power by withdrawing from the connexion. The\nwife has no such power, and even if she had, it is almost always\ndesirable that she should try all measures before resorting to it.\n\nIt is quite true that things which have to be decided every day, and\ncannot adjust themselves gradually, or wait for a compromise, ought\nto depend on one will: one person must have their sole control. But\nit does not follow that this should always be the same person. The\nnatural arrangement is a division of powers between the two; each\nbeing absolute in the executive branch of their own department, and\nany change of system and principle requiring the consent of both. The\ndivision neither can nor should be pre-established by the law, since\nit must depend on individual capacities and suitabilities. If the two\npersons chose, they might pre-appoint it by the marriage contract, as\npecuniary arrangements are now often pre-appointed. There would\nseldom be any difficulty in deciding such things by mutual consent,\nunless the marriage was one of those unhappy ones in which all other\nthings, as well as this, become subjects of bickering and dispute.\nThe division of rights would naturally follow the division of duties\nand functions; and that is already made by consent, or at all events\nnot by law, but by general custom, modified and modifiable at the\npleasure of the persons concerned.\n\nThe real practical decision of affairs, to whichever may be given the\nlegal authority, will greatly depend, as it even now does, upon\ncomparative qualifications. The mere fact that he is usually the\neldest, will in most cases give the preponderance to the man; at\nleast until they both attain a time of life at which the difference\nin their years is of no importance. There will naturally also be a\nmore potential voice on the side, whichever it is, that brings the\nmeans of support. Inequality from this source does not depend on the\nlaw of marriage, but on the general conditions of human society, as\nnow constituted. The influence of mental superiority, either general\nor special, and of superior decision of character, will necessarily\ntell for much. It always does so at present. And this fact shows how\nlittle foundation there is for the apprehension that the powers and\nresponsibilities of partners in life (as of partners in business),\ncannot be satisfactorily apportioned by agreement between themselves.\nThey always are so apportioned, except in cases in which the marriage\ninstitution is a failure. Things never come to an issue of downright\npower on one side, and obedience on the other, except where the\nconnexion altogether has been a mistake, and it would be a blessing\nto both parties to be relieved from it. Some may say that the very\nthing by which an amicable settlement of differences becomes\npossible, is the power of legal compulsion known to be in reserve; as\npeople submit to an arbitration because there is a court of law in\nthe background, which they know that they can be forced to obey. But\nto make the cases parallel, we must suppose that the rule of the\ncourt of law was, not to try the cause, but to give judgment always\nfor the same side, suppose the defendant. If so, the amenability to\nit would be a motive with the plaintiff to agree to almost any\narbitration, but it would be just the reverse with the defendant. The\ndespotic power which the law gives to the husband may be a reason to\nmake the wife assent to any compromise by which power is practically\nshared between the two, but it cannot be the reason why the husband\ndoes. That there is always among decently conducted people a\npractical compromise, though one of them at least is under no\nphysical or moral necessity of making it, shows that the natural\nmotives which lead to a voluntary adjustment of the united life of\ntwo persons in a manner acceptable to both, do on the whole, except\nin unfavourable cases, prevail. The matter is certainly not improved\nby laying down as an ordinance of law, that the superstructure of\nfree government shall be raised upon a legal basis of despotism on\none side and subjection on the other, and that every concession which\nthe despot makes may, at his mere pleasure, and without any warning,\nbe recalled. Besides that no freedom is worth much when held on so\nprecarious a tenure, its conditions are not likely to be the most\nequitable when the law throws so prodigious a weight into one scale;\nwhen the adjustment rests between two persons one of whom is declared\nto be entitled to everything, the other not only entitled to nothing\nexcept during the good pleasure of the first, but under the strongest\nmoral and religious obligation not to rebel under any excess of\noppression.\n\nA pertinacious adversary, pushed to extremities, may say, that\nhusbands indeed are willing to be reasonable, and to make fair\nconcessions to their partners without being compelled to it, but that\nwives are not: that if allowed any rights of their own, they will\nacknowledge no rights at all in any one else, and never will yield in\nanything, unless they can be compelled, by the man's mere authority,\nto yield in everything. This would have been said by many persons\nsome generations ago, when satires on women were in vogue, and men\nthought it a clever thing to insult women for being what men made\nthem. But it will be said by no one now who is worth replying to. It\nis not the doctrine of the present day that women are less\nsusceptible of good feeling, and consideration for those with whom\nthey are united by the strongest ties, than men are. On the contrary,\nwe are perpetually told that women are better than men, by those who\nare totally opposed to treating them as if they were as good; so that\nthe saying has passed into a piece of tiresome cant, intended to put\na complimentary face upon an injury, and resembling those\ncelebrations of royal clemency which, according to Gulliver, the king\nof Lilliput always prefixed to his most sanguinary decrees. If women\nare better than men in anything, it surely is in individual\nself-sacrifice for those of their own family. But I lay little stress\non this, so long as they are universally taught that they are born\nand created for self-sacrifice. I believe that equality of rights\nwould abate the exaggerated self-abnegation which is the present\nartificial ideal of feminine character, and that a good woman would\nnot be more self-sacrificing than the best man: but on the other\nhand, men would be much more unselfish and self-sacrificing than at\npresent, because they would no longer be taught to worship their own\nwill as such a grand thing that it is actually the law for another\nrational being. There is nothing which men so easily learn as this\nself-worship: all privileged persons, and all privileged classes,\nhave had it. The more we descend in the scale of humanity, the\nintenser it is; and most of all in those who are not, and can never\nexpect to be, raised above any one except an unfortunate wife and\nchildren. The honourable exceptions are proportionally fewer than in\nthe case of almost any other human infirmity. Philosophy and\nreligion, instead of keeping it in check, are generally suborned to\ndefend it; and nothing controls it but that practical feeling of the\nequality of human beings, which is the theory of Christianity, but\nwhich Christianity will never practically teach, while it sanctions\ninstitutions grounded on an arbitrary preference of one human being\nover another.\n\nThere are, no doubt, women, as there are men, whom equality of\nconsideration will not satisfy; with whom there is no peace while any\nwill or wish is regarded but their own. Such persons are a proper\nsubject for the law of divorce. They are only fit to live alone, and\nno human beings ought to be compelled to associate their lives with\nthem. But the legal subordination tends to make such characters among\nwomen more, rather than less, frequent. If the man exerts his whole\npower, the woman is of course crushed: but if she is treated with\nindulgence, and permitted to assume power, there is no rule to set\nlimits to her encroachments. The law, not determining her rights, but\ntheoretically allowing her none at all, practically declares that the\nmeasure of what she has a right to, is what she can contrive to get.\n\nThe equality of married persons before the law, is not only the sole\nmode in which that particular relation can be made consistent with\njustice to both sides, and conducive to the happiness of both, but it\nis the only means of rendering the daily life of mankind, in any high\nsense, a school of moral cultivation. Though the truth may not be\nfelt or generally acknowledged for generations to come, the only\nschool of genuine moral sentiment is society between equals. The\nmoral education of mankind has hitherto emanated chiefly from the law\nof force, and is adapted almost solely to the relations which force\ncreates. In the less advanced states of society, people hardly\nrecognise any relation with their equals. To be an equal is to be an\nenemy. Society, from its highest place to its lowest, is one long\nchain, or rather ladder, where every individual is either above or\nbelow his nearest neighbour, and wherever he does not command he must\nobey. Existing moralities, accordingly, are mainly fitted to a\nrelation of command and obedience. Yet command and obedience are but\nunfortunate necessities of human life: society in equality is its\nnormal state. Already in modern life, and more and more as it\nprogressively improves, command and obedience become exceptional\nfacts in life, equal association its general rule. The morality of\nthe first ages rested on the obligation to submit to power; that of\nthe ages next following, on the right of the weak to the forbearance\nand protection of the strong. How much longer is one form of society\nand life to content itself with the morality made for another? We\nhave had the morality of submission, and the morality of chivalry and\ngenerosity; the time is now come for the morality of justice.\nWhenever, in former ages, any approach has been made to society in\nequality, Justice has asserted its claims as the foundation of\nvirtue. It was thus in the free republics of antiquity. But even in\nthe best of these, the equals were limited to the free male citizens;\nslaves, women, and the unenfranchised residents were under the law of\nforce. The joint influence of Roman civilization and of Christianity\nobliterated these distinctions, and in theory (if only partially in\npractice) declared the claims of the human being, as such, to be\nparamount to those of sex, class, or social position. The barriers\nwhich had begun to be levelled were raised again by the northern\nconquests; and the whole of modern history consists of the slow\nprocess by which they have since been wearing away. We are entering\ninto an order of things in which justice will again be the primary\nvirtue; grounded as before on equal, but now also on sympathetic\nassociation; having its root no longer in the instinct of equals for\nself-protection, but in a cultivated sympathy between them; and no\none being now left out, but an equal measure being extended to all.\nIt is no novelty that mankind do not distinctly foresee their own\nchanges, and that their sentiments are adapted to past, not to coming\nages. To see the futurity of the species has always been the\nprivilege of the intellectual elite, or of those who have learnt from\nthem; to have the feelings of that futurity has been the distinction,\nand usually the martyrdom, of a still rarer elite. Institutions,\nbooks, education, society, all go on training human beings for the\nold, long after the new has come; much more when it is only coming.\nBut the true virtue of human beings is fitness to live together as\nequals; claiming nothing for themselves but what they as freely\nconcede to every one else; regarding command of any kind as an\nexceptional necessity, and in all cases a temporary one; and\npreferring, whenever possible, the society of those with whom leading\nand following can be alternate and reciprocal. To these virtues,\nnothing in life as at present constituted gives cultivation by\nexercise. The family is a school of despotism, in which the virtues\nof despotism, but also its vices, are largely nourished. Citizenship,\nin free countries, is partly a school of society in equality; but\ncitizenship fills only a small place in modern life, and does not\ncome near the daily habits or inmost sentiments. The family, justly\nconstituted, would be the real school of the virtues of freedom. It\nis sure to be a sufficient one of everything else. It will always be\na school of obedience for the children, of command for the parents.\nWhat is needed is, that it should be a school of sympathy in\nequality, of living together in love, without power on one side or\nobedience on the other. This it ought to be between the parents. It\nwould then be an exercise of those virtues which each requires to fit\nthem for all other association, and a model to the children of the\nfeelings and conduct which their temporary training by means of\nobedience is designed to render habitual, and therefore natural, to\nthem. The moral training of mankind will never be adapted to the\nconditions of the life for which all other human progress is a\npreparation, until they practise in the family the same moral rule\nwhich is adapted to the normal constitution of human society. Any\nsentiment of freedom which can exist in a man whose nearest and\ndearest intimacies are with those of whom he is absolute master, is\nnot the genuine or Christian love of freedom, but, what the love of\nfreedom generally was in the ancients and in the middle ages--an\nintense feeling of the dignity and importance of his own personality;\nmaking him disdain a yoke for himself, of which he has no abhorrence\nwhatever in the abstract, but which he is abundantly ready to impose\non others for his own interest or glorification.\n\nI readily admit (and it is the very foundation of my hopes) that\nnumbers of married people even under the present law, (in the higher\nclasses of England probably a great majority,) live in the spirit of\na just law of equality. Laws never would be improved, if there were\nnot numerous persons whose moral sentiments are better than the\nexisting laws. Such persons ought to support the principles here\nadvocated; of which the only object is to make all other married\ncouples similar to what these are now. But persons even of\nconsiderable moral worth, unless they are also thinkers, are very\nready to believe that laws or practices, the evils of which they have\nnot personally experienced, do not produce any evils, but (if seeming\nto be generally approved of) probably do good, and that it is wrong\nto object to them. It would, however, be a great mistake in such\nmarried people to suppose, because the legal conditions of the tie\nwhich unites them do not occur to their thoughts once in a\ntwelvemonth, and because they live and feel in all respects as if\nthey were legally equals, that the same is the case with all other\nmarried couples, wherever the husband is not a notorious ruffian. To\nsuppose this, would be to show equal ignorance of human nature and of\nfact. The less fit a man is for the possession of power--the less\nlikely to be allowed to exercise it over any person with that\nperson's voluntary consent--the more does he hug himself in the\nconsciousness of the power the law gives him, exact its legal rights\nto the utmost point which custom (the custom of men like himself)\nwill tolerate, and take pleasure in using the power, merely to\nenliven the agreeable sense of possessing it. What is more; in the\nmost naturally brutal and morally uneducated part of the lower\nclasses, the legal slavery of the woman, and something in the merely\nphysical subjection to their will as an instrument, causes them to\nfeel a sort of disrespect and contempt towards their own wife which\nthey do not feel towards any other woman, or any other human being,\nwith whom they come in contact; and which makes her seem to them an\nappropriate subject for any kind of indignity. Let an acute observer\nof the signs of feeling, who has the requisite opportunities, judge\nfor himself whether this is not the case: and if he finds that it is,\nlet him not wonder at any amount of disgust and indignation that can\nbe felt against institutions which lead naturally to this depraved\nstate of the human mind.\n\nWe shall be told, perhaps, that religion imposes the duty of\nobedience; as every established fact which is too bad to admit of any\nother defence, is always presented to us as an injunction of\nreligion. The Church, it is very true, enjoins it in her formularies,\nbut it would be difficult to derive any such injunction from\nChristianity. We are told that St. Paul said, \"Wives, obey your\nhusbands:\" but he also said, \"Slaves, obey your masters.\" It was not\nSt. Paul's business, nor was it consistent with his object, the\npropagation of Christianity, to incite any one to rebellion against\nexisting laws. The apostle's acceptance of all social institutions as\nhe found them, is no more to be construed as a disapproval of\nattempts to improve them at the proper time, than his declaration,\n\"The powers that be are ordained of God,\" gives his sanction to\nmilitary despotism, and to that alone, as the Christian form of\npolitical government, or commands passive obedience to it. To pretend\nthat Christianity was intended to stereotype existing forms of\ngovernment and society, and protect them against change, is to reduce\nit to the level of Islamism or of Brahminism. It is precisely because\nChristianity has not done this, that it has been the religion of the\nprogressive portion of mankind, and Islamism, Brahminism, &c., have\nbeen those of the stationary portions; or rather (for there is no\nsuch thing as a really stationary society) of the declining portions.\nThere have been abundance of people, in all ages of Christianity, who\ntried to make it something of the same kind; to convert us into a\nsort of Christian Mussulmans, with the Bible for a Koran, prohibiting\nall improvement: and great has been their power, and many have had to\nsacrifice their lives in resisting them. But they have been resisted,\nand the resistance has made us what we are, and will yet make us what\nwe are to be.\n\nAfter what has been said respecting the obligation of obedience, it\nis almost superfluous to say anything concerning the more special\npoint included in the general one--a woman's right to her own\nproperty; for I need not hope that this treatise can make any\nimpression upon those who need anything to convince them that a\nwoman's inheritance or gains ought to be as much her own after\nmarriage as before. The rule is simple: whatever would be the\nhusband's or wife's if they were not married, should be under their\nexclusive control during marriage; which need not interfere with the\npower to tie up property by settlement, in order to preserve it for\nchildren. Some people are sentimentally shocked at the idea of a\nseparate interest in money matters, as inconsistent with the ideal\nfusion of two lives into one. For my own part, I am one of the\nstrongest supporters of community of goods, when resulting from an\nentire unity of feeling in the owners, which makes all things common\nbetween them. But I have no relish for a community of goods resting\non the doctrine, that what is mine is yours but what is yours is not\nmine; and I should prefer to decline entering into such a compact\nwith any one, though I were myself the person to profit by it.\n\nThis particular injustice and oppression to women, which is, to\ncommon apprehensions, more obvious than all the rest, admits of\nremedy without interfering with any other mischiefs: and there can be\nlittle doubt that it will be one of the earliest remedied. Already,\nin many of the new and several of the old States of the American\nConfederation, provisions have been inserted even in the written\nConstitutions, securing to women equality of rights in this respect:\nand thereby improving materially the position, in the marriage\nrelation, of those women at least who have property, by leaving them\none instrument of power which they have not signed away; and\npreventing also the scandalous abuse of the marriage institution,\nwhich is perpetrated when a man entraps a girl into marrying him\nwithout a settlement, for the sole purpose of getting possession of\nher money. When the support of the family depends, not on property,\nbut on earnings, the common arrangement, by which the man earns the\nincome and the wife superintends the domestic expenditure, seems to\nme in general the most suitable division of labour between the two\npersons. If, in addition to the physical suffering of bearing\nchildren, and the whole responsibility of their care and education in\nearly years, the wife undertakes the careful and economical\napplication of the husband's earnings to the general comfort of the\nfamily; she takes not only her fair share, but usually the larger\nshare, of the bodily and mental exertion required by their joint\nexistence. If she undertakes any additional portion, it seldom\nrelieves her from this, but only prevents her from performing it\nproperly. The care which she is herself disabled from taking of the\nchildren and the household, nobody else takes; those of the children\nwho do not die, grow up as they best can, and the management of the\nhousehold is likely to be so bad, as even in point of economy to be a\ngreat drawback from the value of the wife's earnings. In an otherwise\njust state of things, it is not, therefore, I think, a desirable\ncustom, that the wife should contribute by her labour to the income\nof the family. In an unjust state of things, her doing so may be\nuseful to her, by making her of more value in the eyes of the man who\nis legally her master; but, on the other hand, it enables him still\nfarther to abuse his power, by forcing her to work, and leaving the\nsupport of the family to her exertions, while he spends most of his\ntime in drinking and idleness. The _power_ of earning is essential to\nthe dignity of a woman, if she has not independent property. But if\nmarriage were an equal contract, not implying the obligation of\nobedience; if the connexion were no longer enforced to the oppression\nof those to whom it is purely a mischief, but a separation, on just\nterms (I do not now speak of a divorce), could be obtained by any\nwoman who was morally entitled to it; and if she would then find all\nhonourable employments as freely open to her as to men; it would not\nbe necessary for her protection, that during marriage she should make\nthis particular use of her faculties. Like a man when he chooses a\nprofession, so, when a woman marries, it may in general be understood\nthat she makes choice of the management of a household, and the\nbringing up of a family, as the first call upon her exertions, during\nas many years of her life as may be required for the purpose; and\nthat she renounces, not all other objects and occupations, but all\nwhich are not consistent with the requirements of this. The actual\nexercise, in a habitual or systematic manner, of outdoor occupations,\nor such as cannot be carried on at home, would by this principle be\npractically interdicted to the greater number of married women. But\nthe utmost latitude ought to exist for the adaptation of general\nrules to individual suitabilities; and there ought to be nothing to\nprevent faculties exceptionally adapted to any other pursuit, from\nobeying their vocation notwithstanding marriage: due provision being\nmade for supplying otherwise any falling-short which might become\ninevitable, in her full performance of the ordinary functions of\nmistress of a family. These things, if once opinion were rightly\ndirected on the subject, might with perfect safety be left to be\nregulated by opinion, without any interference of law.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\n\nOn the other point which is involved in the just equality of women,\ntheir admissibility to all the functions and occupations hitherto\nretained as the monopoly of the stronger sex, I should anticipate no\ndifficulty in convincing any one who has gone with me on the subject\nof the equality of women in the family. I believe that their\ndisabilities elsewhere are only clung to in order to maintain their\nsubordination in domestic life; because the generality of the male\nsex cannot yet tolerate the idea of living with an equal. Were it not\nfor that, I think that almost every one, in the existing state of\nopinion in politics and political economy, would admit the injustice\nof excluding half the human race from the greater number of lucrative\noccupations, and from almost all high social functions; ordaining\nfrom their birth either that they are not, and cannot by any\npossibility become, fit for employments which are legally open to the\nstupidest and basest of the other sex, or else that however fit they\nmay be, those employments shall be interdicted to them, in order to\nbe preserved for the exclusive benefit of males. In the last two\ncenturies, when (which was seldom the case) any reason beyond the\nmere existence of the fact was thought to be required to justify the\ndisabilities of women, people seldom assigned as a reason their\ninferior mental capacity; which, in times when there was a real trial\nof personal faculties (from which all women were not excluded) in the\nstruggles of public life, no one really believed in. The reason given\nin those days was not women's unfitness, but the interest of society,\nby which was meant the interest of men: just as the _raison d'etat_,\nmeaning the convenience of the government, and the support of\nexisting authority, was deemed a sufficient explanation and excuse\nfor the most flagitious crimes. In the present day, power holds a\nsmoother language, and whomsoever it oppresses, always pretends to do\nso for their own good: accordingly, when anything is forbidden to\nwomen, it is thought necessary to say, and desirable to believe, that\nthey are incapable of doing it, and that they depart from their real\npath of success and happiness when they aspire to it. But to make\nthis reason plausible (I do not say valid), those by whom it is urged\nmust be prepared to carry it to a much greater length than any one\nventures to do in the face of present experience. It is not\nsufficient to maintain that women on the average are less gifted than\nmen on the average, with certain of the higher mental faculties, or\nthat a smaller number of women than of men are fit for occupations\nand functions of the highest intellectual character. It is necessary\nto maintain that no women at all are fit for them, and that the most\neminent women are inferior in mental faculties to the most mediocre\nof the men on whom those functions at present devolve. For if the\nperformance of the function is decided either by competition, or by\nany mode of choice which secures regard to the public interest, there\nneeds be no apprehension that any important employments will fall\ninto the hands of women inferior to average men, or to the average of\ntheir male competitors. The only result would be that there would be\nfewer women than men in such employments; a result certain to happen\nin any ease, if only from the preference always likely to be felt by\nthe majority of women for the one vocation in which there is nobody\nto compete with them. Now, the most determined depreciator of women\nwill not venture to deny, that when we add the experience of recent\ntimes to that of ages past, women, and not a few merely, but many\nwomen, have proved themselves capable of everything, perhaps without\na single exception, which is done by men, and of doing it\nsuccessfully and creditably. The utmost that can be said is, that\nthere are many things which none of them have succeeded in doing as\nwell as they have been done by some men--many in which they have not\nreached the very highest rank. But there are extremely few, dependent\nonly on mental faculties, in which they have not attained the rank\nnext to the highest. Is not this enough, and much more than enough,\nto make it a tyranny to them, and a detriment to society, that they\nshould not be allowed to compete with men for the exercise of these\nfunctions? Is it not a mere truism to say, that such functions are\noften filled by men far less fit for them than numbers of women, and\nwho would be beaten by women in any fair field of competition? What\ndifference does it make that there may be men somewhere, fully\nemployed about other things, who may be still better qualified for\nthe things in question than these women? Does not this take place in\nall competitions? Is there so great a superfluity of men fit for high\nduties, that society can afford to reject the service of any\ncompetent person? Are we so certain of always finding a man made to\nour hands for any duty or function of social importance which falls\nvacant, that we lose nothing by putting a ban upon one-half of\nmankind, and refusing beforehand to make their faculties available,\nhowever distinguished they may be? And even if we could do without\nthem, would it be consistent with justice to refuse to them their\nfair share of honour and distinction, or to deny to them the equal\nmoral right of all human beings to choose their occupation (short of\ninjury to others) according to their own preferences, at their own\nrisk? Nor is the injustice confined to them: it is shared by those\nwho are in a position to benefit by their services. To ordain that\nany kind of persons shall not be physicians, or shall not be\nadvocates, or shall not be members of parliament, is to injure not\nthem only, but all who employ physicians or advocates, or elect\nmembers of parliament, and who are deprived of the stimulating effect\nof greater competition on the exertions of the competitors, as well\nas restricted to a narrower range of individual choice.\n\nIt will perhaps be sufficient if I confine myself, in the details of\nmy argument, to functions of a public nature: since, if I am\nsuccessful as to those, it probably will be readily granted that\nwomen should be admissible to all other occupations to which it is at\nall material whether they are admitted or not. And here let me begin\nby marking out one function, broadly distinguished from all others,\ntheir right to which is entirely independent of any question which\ncan be raised concerning their faculties. I mean the suffrage, both\nparliamentary and municipal. The right to share in the choice of\nthose who are to exercise a public trust, is altogether a distinct\nthing from that of competing for the trust itself. If no one could\nvote for a member of parliament who was not fit to be a candidate,\nthe government would be a narrow oligarchy indeed. To have a voice in\nchoosing those by whom one is to be governed, is a means of\nself-protection due to every one, though he were to remain for ever\nexcluded from the function of governing: and that women are\nconsidered fit to have such a choice, may be presumed from the fact,\nthat the law already gives it to women in the most important of all\ncases to themselves: for the choice of the man who is to govern a\nwoman to the end of life, is always supposed to be voluntarily made\nby herself. In the case of election to public trusts, it is the\nbusiness of constitutional law to surround the right of suffrage with\nall needful securities and limitations; but whatever securities are\nsufficient in the case of the male sex, no others need be required in\nthe case of women. Under whatever conditions, and within whatever\nlimits, men are admitted to the suffrage, there is not a shadow of\njustification for not admitting women under the same. The majority of\nthe women of any class are not likely to differ in political opinion\nfrom the majority of the men of the same class, unless the question\nbe one in which the interests of women, as such, are in some way\ninvolved; and if they are so, women require the suffrage, as their\nguarantee of just and equal consideration. This ought to be obvious\neven to those who coincide in no other of the doctrines for which I\ncontend. Even if every woman were a wife, and if every wife ought to\nbe a slave, all the more would these slaves stand in need of legal\nprotection: and we know what legal protection the slaves have, where\nthe laws are made by their masters.\n\nWith regard to the fitness of women, not only to participate in\nelections, but themselves to hold offices or practise professions\ninvolving important public responsibilities; I have already observed\nthat this consideration is not essential to the practical question in\ndispute: since any woman, who succeeds in an open profession, proves\nby that very fact that she is qualified for it. And in the case of\npublic offices, if the political system of the country is such as to\nexclude unfit men, it will equally exclude unfit women: while if it\nis not, there is no additional evil in the fact that the unfit\npersons whom it admits may be either women or men. As long therefore\nas it is acknowledged that even a few women may be fit for these\nduties, the laws which shut the door on those exceptions cannot be\njustified by any opinion which can be held respecting the capacities\nof women in general. But, though this last consideration is not\nessential, it is far from being irrelevant. An unprejudiced view of\nit gives additional strength to the arguments against the\ndisabilities of women, and reinforces them by high considerations of\npractical utility.\n\nLet us at first make entire abstraction of all psychological\nconsiderations tending to show, that any of the mental differences\nsupposed to exist between women and men are but the natural effect of\nthe differences in their education and circumstances, and indicate no\nradical difference, far less radical inferiority, of nature. Let us\nconsider women only as they already are, or as they are known to have\nbeen; and the capacities which they have already practically shown.\nWhat they have done, that at least, if nothing else, it is proved\nthat they can do. When we consider how sedulously they are all\ntrained away from, instead of being trained towards, any of the\noccupations or objects reserved for men, it is evident that I am\ntaking a very humble ground for them, when I rest their case on what\nthey have actually achieved. For, in this case, negative evidence is\nworth little, while any positive evidence is conclusive. It cannot be\ninferred to be impossible that a woman should be a Homer, or an\nAristotle, or a Michael Angelo, or a Beethoven, because no woman has\nyet actually produced works comparable to theirs in any of those\nlines of excellence. This negative fact at most leaves the question\nuncertain, and open to psychological discussion. But it is quite\ncertain that a woman can be a Queen Elizabeth, or a Deborah, or a\nJoan of Arc, since this is not inference, but fact. Now it is a\ncurious consideration, that the only things which the existing law\nexcludes women from doing, are the things which they have proved that\nthey are able to do. There is no law to prevent a woman from having\nwritten all the plays of Shakspeare, or composed all the operas of\nMozart. But Queen Elizabeth or Queen Victoria, had they not inherited\nthe throne, could not have been intrusted with the smallest of the\npolitical duties, of which the former showed herself equal to the\ngreatest.\n\nIf anything conclusive could be inferred from experience, without\npsychological analysis, it would be that the things which women are\nnot allowed to do are the very ones for which they are peculiarly\nqualified; since their vocation for government has made its way, and\nbecome conspicuous, through the very few opportunities which have\nbeen given; while in the lines of distinction which apparently were\nfreely open to them, they have by no means so eminently distinguished\nthemselves. We know how small a number of reigning queens history\npresents, in comparison with that of kings. Of this smaller number a\nfar larger proportion have shown talents for rule; though many of\nthem have occupied the throne in difficult periods. It is remarkable,\ntoo, that they have, in a great number of instances, been\ndistinguished by merits the most opposite to the imaginary and\nconventional character of women: they have been as much remarked for\nthe firmness and vigour of their rule, as for its intelligence. When,\nto queens and empresses, we add regents, and viceroys of provinces,\nthe list of women who have been eminent rulers of mankind swells to a\ngreat length.[1] This fact is so undeniable, that some one, long ago,\ntried to retort the argument, and turned the admitted truth into an\nadditional insult, by saying that queens are better than kings,\nbecause under kings women govern, but under queens, men.\n\nIt may seem a waste of reasoning to argue against a bad joke; but\nsuch things do affect people's minds; and I have heard men quote this\nsaying, with an air as if they thought that there was something in\nit. At any rate, it will serve as well as anything else for a\nstarting point in discussion. I say, then, that it is not true that\nunder kings, women govern. Such cases are entirely exceptional: and\nweak kings have quite as often governed ill through the influence of\nmale favourites, as of female. When a king is governed by a woman\nmerely through his amatory propensities, good government is not\nprobable, though even then there are exceptions. But French history\ncounts two kings who have voluntarily given the direction of affairs\nduring many years, the one to his mother, the other to his sister:\none of them, Charles VIII., was a mere boy, but in doing so he\nfollowed the intentions of his father Louis XI., the ablest monarch\nof his age. The other, Saint Louis, was the best, and one of the most\nvigorous rulers, since the time of Charlemagne. Both these princesses\nruled in a manner hardly equalled by any prince among their\ncontemporaries. The emperor Charles the Fifth, the most politic\nprince of his time, who had as great a number of able men in his\nservice as a ruler ever had, and was one of the least likely of all\nsovereigns to sacrifice his interest to personal feelings, made two\nprincesses of his family successively Governors of the Netherlands,\nand kept one or other of them in that post during his whole life,\n(they were afterwards succeeded by a third). Both ruled very\nsuccessfully, and one of them, Margaret of Austria, was one of the\nablest politicians of the age. So much for one side of the question.\nNow as to the other. When it is said that under queens men govern, is\nthe same meaning to be understood as when kings are said to be\ngoverned by women? Is it meant that queens choose as their\ninstruments of government, the associates of their personal\npleasures? The case is rare even with those who are as unscrupulous\non the latter point as Catherine II.: and it is not in these cases\nthat the good government, alleged to arise from male influence, is to\nbe found. If it be true, then, that the administration is in the\nhands of better men under a queen than under an average king, it must\nbe that queens have a superior capacity for choosing them; and women\nmust be better qualified than men both for the position of sovereign,\nand for that of chief minister; for the principal business of a prime\nminister is not to govern in person, but to find the fittest persons\nto conduct every department of public affairs. The more rapid insight\ninto character, which is one of the admitted points of superiority in\nwomen over men, must certainly make them, with anything like parity\nof qualifications in other respects, more apt than men in that choice\nof instruments, which is nearly the most important business of every\none who has to do with governing mankind. Even the unprincipled\nCatherine de' Medici could feel the value of a Chancellor de\nl'Hopital. But it is also true that most great queens have been great\nby their own talents for government, and have been well served\nprecisely for that reason. They retained the supreme direction of\naffairs in their own hands: and if they listened to good advisers,\nthey gave by that fact the strongest proof that their judgment fitted\nthem for dealing with the great questions of government.\n\nIs it reasonable to think that those who are fit for the greater\nfunctions of politics, are incapable of qualifying themselves for the\nless? Is there any reason in the nature of things, that the wives and\nsisters of princes should, whenever called on, be found as competent\nas the princes themselves to _their_ business, but that the wives and\nsisters of statesmen, and administrators, and directors of companies,\nand managers of public institutions, should be unable to do what is\ndone by their brothers and husbands? The real reason is plain enough;\nit is that princesses, being more raised above the generality of men\nby their rank than placed below them by their sex, have never been\ntaught that it was improper for them to concern themselves with\npolitics; but have been allowed to feel the liberal interest natural\nto any cultivated human being, in the great transactions which took\nplace around them, and in which they might be called on to take a\npart. The ladies of reigning families are the only women who are\nallowed the same range of interests and freedom of development as\nmen; and it is precisely in their case that there is not found to be\nany inferiority. Exactly where and in proportion as women's\ncapacities for government have been tried, in that proportion have\nthey been found adequate.\n\nThis fact is in accordance with the best general conclusions which\nthe world's imperfect experience seems as yet to suggest, concerning\nthe peculiar tendencies and aptitudes characteristic of women, as\nwomen have hitherto been. I do not say, as they will continue to be;\nfor, as I have already said more than once, I consider it presumption\nin any one to pretend to decide what women are or are not, can or\ncannot be, by natural constitution. They have always hitherto been\nkept, as far as regards spontaneous development, in so unnatural a\nstate, that their nature cannot but have been greatly distorted and\ndisguised; and no one can safely pronounce that if women's nature\nwere left to choose its direction as freely as men's, and if no\nartificial bent were attempted to be given to it except that required\nby the conditions of human society, and given to both sexes alike,\nthere would be any material difference, or perhaps any difference at\nall, in the character and capacities which would unfold themselves. I\nshall presently show, that even the least contestable of the\ndifferences which now exist, are such as may very well have been\nproduced merely by circumstances, without any difference of natural\ncapacity. But, looking at women as they are known in experience, it\nmay be said of them, with more truth than belongs to most other\ngeneralizations on the subject, that the general bent of their\ntalents is towards the practical. This statement is conformable to\nall the public history of women, in the present and the past. It is\nno less borne out by common and daily experience. Let us consider the\nspecial nature of the mental capacities most characteristic of a\nwoman of talent. They are all of a kind which fits them for practice,\nand makes them tend towards it. What is meant by a woman's capacity\nof intuitive perception? It means, a rapid and correct insight into\npresent fact. It has nothing to do with general principles. Nobody\never perceived a scientific law of nature by intuition, nor arrived\nat a general rule of duty or prudence by it. These are results of\nslow and careful collection and comparison of experience; and neither\nthe men nor the women of intuition usually shine in this department,\nunless, indeed, the experience necessary is such as they can acquire\nby themselves. For what is called their intuitive sagacity makes them\npeculiarly apt in gathering such general truths as can be collected\nfrom their individual means of observation. When, consequently, they\nchance to be as well provided as men are with the results of other\npeople's experience, by reading and education, (I use the word chance\nadvisedly, for, in respect to the knowledge that tends to fit them\nfor the greater concerns of life, the only educated women are the\nself-educated) they are better furnished than men in general with the\nessential requisites of skilful and successful practice. Men who have\nbeen much taught, are apt to be deficient in the sense of present\nfact; they do not see, in the facts which they are called upon to\ndeal with, what is really there, but what they have been taught to\nexpect. This is seldom the case with women of any ability. Their\ncapacity of \"intuition\" preserves them from it. With equality of\nexperience and of general faculties, a woman usually sees much more\nthan a man of what is immediately before her. Now this sensibility to\nthe present, is the main quality on which the capacity for practice,\nas distinguished from theory, depends. To discover general\nprinciples, belongs to the speculative faculty: to discern and\ndiscriminate the particular cases in which they are and are not\napplicable, constitutes practical talent: and for this, women as they\nnow are have a peculiar aptitude. I admit that there can be no good\npractice without principles, and that the predominant place which\nquickness of observation holds among a woman's faculties, makes her\nparticularly apt to build over-hasty generalizations upon her own\nobservation; though at the same time no less ready in rectifying\nthose generalizations, as her observation takes a wider range. But\nthe corrective to this defect, is access to the experience of the\nhuman race; general knowledge--exactly the thing which education can\nbest supply. A woman's mistakes are specifically those of a clever\nself-educated man, who often sees what men trained in routine do not\nsee, but falls into errors for want of knowing things which have long\nbeen known. Of course he has acquired much of the pre-existing\nknowledge, or he could not have got on at all; but what he knows of\nit he has picked up in fragments and at random, as women do.\n\nBut this gravitation of women's minds to the present, to the real, to\nactual fact, while in its exclusiveness it is a source of errors, is\nalso a most useful counteractive of the contrary error. The principal\nand most characteristic aberration of speculative minds as such,\nconsists precisely in the deficiency of this lively perception and\never-present sense of objective fact. For want of this, they often\nnot only overlook the contradiction which outward facts oppose to\ntheir theories, but lose sight of the legitimate purpose of\nspeculation altogether, and let their speculative faculties go astray\ninto regions not peopled with real beings, animate or inanimate, even\nidealized, but with personified shadows created by the illusions of\nmetaphysics or by the mere entanglement of words, and think these\nshadows the proper objects of the highest, the most transcendant,\nphilosophy. Hardly anything can be of greater value to a man of\ntheory and speculation who employs himself not in collecting\nmaterials of knowledge by observation, but in working them up by\nprocesses of thought into comprehensive truths of science and laws of\nconduct, than to carry on his speculations in the companionship, and\nunder the criticism, of a really superior woman. There is nothing\ncomparable to it for keeping his thoughts within the limits of real\nthings, and the actual facts of nature. A woman seldom runs wild\nafter an abstraction. The habitual direction of her mind to dealing\nwith things as individuals rather than in groups, and (what is\nclosely connected with it) her more lively interest in the present\nfeelings of persons, which makes her consider first of all, in\nanything which claims to be applied to practice, in what manner\npersons will be affected by it--these two things make her extremely\nunlikely to put faith in any speculation which loses sight of\nindividuals, and deals with things as if they existed for the benefit\nof some imaginary entity, some mere creation of the mind, not\nresolvable into the feelings of living beings. Women's thoughts are\nthus as useful in giving reality to those of thinking men, as men's\nthoughts in giving width and largeness to those of women. In depth,\nas distinguished from breadth, I greatly doubt if even now, women,\ncompared with men, are at any disadvantage.\n\nIf the existing mental characteristics of women are thus valuable\neven in aid of speculation, they are still more important, when\nspeculation has done its work, for carrying out the results of\nspeculation into practice. For the reasons already given, women are\ncomparatively unlikely to fall into the common error of men, that of\nsticking to their rules in a case whose specialities either take it\nout of the class to which the rules are applicable, or require a\nspecial adaptation of them. Let us now consider another of the\nadmitted superiorities of clever women, greater quickness of\napprehension. Is not this pre-eminently a quality which fits a person\nfor practice? In action, everything continually depends upon deciding\npromptly. In speculation, nothing does. A mere thinker can wait, can\ntake time to consider, can collect additional evidence; he is not\nobliged to complete his philosophy at once, lest the opportunity\nshould go by. The power of drawing the best conclusion possible from\ninsufficient data is not indeed useless in philosophy; the\nconstruction of a provisional hypothesis consistent with all known\nfacts is often the needful basis for further inquiry. But this\nfaculty is rather serviceable in philosophy, than the main\nqualification for it: and, for the auxiliary as well as for the main\noperation, the philosopher can allow himself any time he pleases. He\nis in no need of the capacity of doing rapidly what he does; what he\nrather needs is patience, to work on slowly until imperfect lights\nhave become perfect, and a conjecture has ripened into a theorem. For\nthose, on the contrary, whose business is with the fugitive and\nperishable--with individual facts, not kinds of facts--rapidity of\nthought is a qualification next only in importance to the power of\nthought itself. He who has not his faculties under immediate command,\nin the contingencies of action, might as well not have them at all.\nHe may be fit to criticize, but he is not fit to act. Now it is in\nthis that women, and the men who are most like women, confessedly\nexcel. The other sort of man, however pre-eminent may be his\nfaculties, arrives slowly at complete command of them: rapidity of\njudgment and promptitude of judicious action, even in the things he\nknows best, are the gradual and late result of strenuous effort grown\ninto habit.\n\nIt will be said, perhaps, that the greater nervous susceptibility of\nwomen is a disqualification for practice, in anything but domestic\nlife, by rendering them mobile, changeable, too vehemently under the\ninfluence of the moment, incapable of dogged perseverance, unequal\nand uncertain in the power of using their faculties. I think that\nthese phrases sum up the greater part of the objections commonly made\nto the fitness of women for the higher class of serious business.\nMuch of all this is the mere overflow of nervous energy run to waste,\nand would cease when the energy was directed to a definite end. Much\nis also the result of conscious or unconscious cultivation; as we see\nby the almost total disappearance of \"hysterics\" and fainting fits,\nsince they have gone out of fashion. Moreover, when people are\nbrought up, like many women of the higher classes (though less so in\nour own country than in any other) a kind of hot-house plants,\nshielded from the wholesome vicissitudes of air and temperature, and\nuntrained in any of the occupations and exercises which give stimulus\nand development to the circulatory and muscular system, while their\nnervous system, especially in its emotional department, is kept in\nunnaturally active play; it is no wonder if those of them who do not\ndie of consumption, grow up with constitutions liable to derangement\nfrom slight causes, both internal and external, and without stamina\nto support any task, physical or mental, requiring continuity of\neffort. But women brought up to work for their livelihood show none\nof these morbid characteristics, unless indeed they are chained to an\nexcess of sedentary work in confined and unhealthy rooms. Women who\nin their early years have shared in the healthful physical education\nand bodily freedom of their brothers, and who obtain a sufficiency of\npure air and exercise in after-life, very rarely have any excessive\nsusceptibility of nerves which can disqualify them for active\npursuits. There is indeed a certain proportion of persons, in both\nsexes, in whom an unusual degree of nervous sensibility is\nconstitutional, and of so marked a character as to be the feature of\ntheir organization which exercises the greatest influence over the\nwhole character of the vital phenomena. This constitution, like other\nphysical conformations, is hereditary, and is transmitted to sons as\nwell as daughters; but it is possible, and probable, that the nervous\ntemperament (as it is called) is inherited by a greater number of\nwomen than of men. We will assume this as a fact: and let me then\nask, are men of nervous temperament found to be unfit for the duties\nand pursuits usually followed by men? If not, why should women of the\nsame temperament be unfit for them? The peculiarities of the\ntemperament are, no doubt, within certain limits, an obstacle to\nsuccess in some employments, though an aid to it in others. But when\nthe occupation is suitable to the temperament, and sometimes even\nwhen it is unsuitable, the most brilliant examples of success are\ncontinually given by the men of high nervous sensibility. They are\ndistinguished in their practical manifestations chiefly by this, that\nbeing susceptible of a higher degree of excitement than those of\nanother physical constitution, their powers when excited differ more\nthan in the case of other people, from those shown in their ordinary\nstate: they are raised, as it were, above themselves, and do things\nwith ease which they are wholly incapable of at other times. But this\nlofty excitement is not, except in weak bodily constitutions, a mere\nflash, which passes away immediately, leaving no permanent traces,\nand incompatible with persistent and steady pursuit of an object. It\nis the character of the nervous temperament to be capable of\n_sustained_ excitement, holding out through long continued efforts.\nIt is what is meant by _spirit_. It is what makes the high-bred\nracehorse run without slackening speed till he drops down dead. It is\nwhat has enabled so many delicate women to maintain the most sublime\nconstancy not only at the stake, but through a long preliminary\nsuccession of mental and bodily tortures. It is evident that people\nof this temperament are particularly apt for what may be called the\nexecutive department of the leadership of mankind. They are the\nmaterial of great orators, great preachers, impressive diffusers of\nmoral influences. Their constitution might be deemed less favourable\nto the qualities required from a statesman in the cabinet, or from a\njudge. It would be so, if the consequence necessarily followed that\nbecause people are excitable they must always be in a state of\nexcitement. But this is wholly a question of training. Strong feeling\nis the instrument and element of strong self-control: but it requires\nto be cultivated in that direction. When it is, it forms not the\nheroes of impulse only, but those also of self-conquest. History and\nexperience prove that the most passionate characters are the most\nfanatically rigid in their feelings of duty, when their passion has\nbeen trained to act in that direction. The judge who gives a just\ndecision in a case where his feelings are intensely interested on the\nother side, derives from that same strength of feeling the determined\nsense of the obligation of justice, which enables him to achieve this\nvictory over himself. The capability of that lofty enthusiasm which\ntakes the human being out of his every-day character, reacts upon the\ndaily character itself. His aspirations and powers when he is in this\nexceptional state, become the type with which he compares, and by\nwhich he estimates, his sentiments and proceedings at other times:\nand his habitual purposes assume a character moulded by and\nassimilated to the moments of lofty excitement, although those, from\nthe physical nature of a human being, can only be transient.\nExperience of races, as well as of individuals, does not show those\nof excitable temperament to be less fit, on the average, either for\nspeculation or practice, than the more unexcitable. The French, and\nthe Italians, are undoubtedly by nature more nervously excitable than\nthe Teutonic races, and, compared at least with the English, they\nhave a much greater habitual and daily emotional life: but have they\nbeen less great in science, in public business, in legal and judicial\neminence, or in war? There is abundant evidence that the Greeks were\nof old, as their descendants and successors still are, one of the\nmost excitable of the races of mankind. It is superfluous to ask,\nwhat among the achievements of men they did not excel in. The Romans,\nprobably, as an equally southern people, had the same original\ntemperament: but the stern character of their national discipline,\nlike that of the Spartans, made them an example of the opposite type\nof national character; the greater strength of their natural feelings\nbeing chiefly apparent in the intensity which the same original\ntemperament made it possible to give to the artificial. If these\ncases exemplify what a naturally excitable people may be made, the\nIrish Celts afford one of the aptest examples of what they are when\nleft to themselves; (if those can be said to be left to themselves\nwho have been for centuries under the indirect influence of bad\ngovernment, and the direct training of a Catholic hierarchy and of a\nsincere belief in the Catholic religion.) The Irish character must be\nconsidered, therefore, as an unfavourable case: yet, whenever the\ncircumstances of the individual have been at all favourable, what\npeople have shown greater capacity for the most varied and\nmultifarious individual eminence? Like the French compared with the\nEnglish, the Irish with the Swiss, the Greeks or Italians compared\nwith the German races, so women compared with men may be found, on\nthe average, to do the same things with some variety in the\nparticular kind of excellence. But, that they would do them fully as\nwell on the whole, if their education and cultivation were adapted to\ncorrecting instead of aggravating the infirmities incident to their\ntemperament, I see not the smallest reason to doubt.\n\nSupposing it, however, to be true that women's minds are by nature\nmore mobile than those of men, less capable of persisting long in the\nsame continuous effort, more fitted for dividing their faculties\namong many things than for travelling in any one path to the highest\npoint which can be reached by it: this may be true of women as they\nnow are (though not without great and numerous exceptions), and may\naccount for their having remained behind the highest order of men in\nprecisely the things in which this absorption of the whole mind in\none set of ideas and occupations may seem to be most requisite.\nStill, this difference is one which can only affect the kind of\nexcellence, not the excellence itself, or its practical worth: and it\nremains to be shown whether this exclusive working of a part of the\nmind, this absorption of the whole thinking faculty in a single\nsubject, and concentration of it on a single work, is the normal and\nhealthful condition of the human faculties, even for speculative\nuses. I believe that what is gained in special development by this\nconcentration, is lost in the capacity of the mind for the other\npurposes of life; and even in abstract thought, it is my decided\nopinion that the mind does more by frequently returning to a\ndifficult problem, than by sticking to it without interruption. For\nthe purposes, at all events, of practice, from its highest to its\nhumblest departments, the capacity of passing promptly from one\nsubject of consideration to another, without letting the active\nspring of the intellect run down between the two, is a power far more\nvaluable; and this power women pre-eminently possess, by virtue of\nthe very mobility of which they are accused. They perhaps have it\nfrom nature, but they certainly have it by training and education;\nfor nearly the whole of the occupations of women consist in the\nmanagement of small but multitudinous details, on each of which the\nmind cannot dwell even for a minute, but must pass on to other\nthings, and if anything requires longer thought, must steal time at\nodd moments for thinking of it. The capacity indeed which women show\nfor doing their thinking in circumstances and at times which almost\nany man would make an excuse to himself for not attempting it, has\noften been noticed: and a woman's mind, though it may be occupied\nonly with small things, can hardly ever permit itself to be vacant,\nas a man's so often is when not engaged in what he chooses to\nconsider the business of his life. The business of a woman's ordinary\nlife is things in general, and can as little cease to go on as the\nworld to go round.\n\nBut (it is said) there is anatomical evidence of the superior mental\ncapacity of men compared with women: they have a larger brain. I\nreply, that in the first place the fact itself is doubtful. It is by\nno means established that the brain of a woman is smaller than that\nof a man. If it is inferred merely because a woman's bodily frame\ngenerally is of less dimensions than a man's, this criterion would\nlead to strange consequences. A tall and large-boned man must on this\nshowing be wonderfully superior in intelligence to a small man, and\nan elephant or a whale must prodigiously excel mankind. The size of\nthe brain in human beings, anatomists say, varies much less than the\nsize of the body, or even of the head, and the one cannot be at all\ninferred from the other. It is certain that some women have as large\na brain as any man. It is within my knowledge that a man who had\nweighed many human brains, said that the heaviest he knew of, heavier\neven than Cuvier's (the heaviest previously recorded,) was that of a\nwoman. Next, I must observe that the precise relation which exists\nbetween the brain and the intellectual powers is not yet well\nunderstood, but is a subject of great dispute. That there is a very\nclose relation we cannot doubt. The brain is certainly the material\norgan of thought and feeling: and (making abstraction of the great\nunsettled controversy respecting the appropriation of different parts\nof the brain to different mental faculties) I admit that it would be\nan anomaly, and an exception to all we know of the general laws of\nlife and organization, if the size of the organ were wholly\nindifferent to the function; if no accession of power were derived\nfrom the greater magnitude of the instrument. But the exception and\nthe anomaly would be fully as great if the organ exercised influence\nby its magnitude _only_. In all the more delicate operations of\nnature--of which those of the animated creation are the most\ndelicate, and those of the nervous system by far the most delicate of\nthese--differences in the effect depend as much on differences of\nquality in the physical agents, as on their quantity: and if the\nquality of an instrument is to be tested by the nicety and delicacy\nof the work it can do, the indications point to a greater average\nfineness of quality in the brain and nervous system of women than of\nmen. Dismissing abstract difference of quality, a thing difficult to\nverify, the efficiency of an organ is known to depend not solely on\nits size but on its activity: and of this we have an approximate\nmeasure in the energy with which the blood circulates through it,\nboth the stimulus and the reparative force being mainly dependent on\nthe circulation. It would not be surprising--it is indeed an\nhypothesis which accords well with the differences actually observed\nbetween the mental operations of the two sexes--if men on the average\nshould have the advantage in the size of the brain, and women in\nactivity of cerebral circulation. The results which conjecture,\nfounded on analogy, would lead us to expect from this difference of\norganization, would correspond to some of those which we most\ncommonly see. In the first place, the mental operations of men might\nbe expected to be slower. They would neither be so prompt as women in\nthinking, nor so quick to feel. Large bodies take more time to get\ninto full action. On the other hand, when once got thoroughly into\nplay, men's brain would bear more work. It would be more persistent\nin the line first taken; it would have more difficulty in changing\nfrom one mode of action to another, but, in the one thing it was\ndoing, it could go on longer without loss of power or sense of\nfatigue. And do we not find that the things in which men most excel\nwomen are those which require most plodding and long hammering at a\nsingle thought, while women do best what must be done rapidly? A\nwoman's brain is sooner fatigued, sooner exhausted; but given the\ndegree of exhaustion, we should expect to find that it would recover\nitself sooner. I repeat that this speculation is entirely\nhypothetical; it pretends to no more than to suggest a line of\nenquiry. I have before repudiated the notion of its being yet\ncertainly known that there is any natural difference at all in the\naverage strength or direction of the mental capacities of the two\nsexes, much less what that difference is. Nor is it possible that\nthis should be known, so long as the psychological laws of the\nformation of character have been so little studied, even in a general\nway, and in the particular case never scientifically applied at all;\nso long as the most obvious external causes of difference of\ncharacter are habitually disregarded--left unnoticed by the observer,\nand looked down upon with a kind of supercilious contempt by the\nprevalent schools both of natural history and of mental philosophy:\nwho, whether they look for the source of what mainly distinguishes\nhuman beings from one another, in the world of matter or in that of\nspirit, agree in running down those who prefer to explain these\ndifferences by the different relations of human beings to society and\nlife.\n\nTo so ridiculous an extent are the notions formed of the nature of\nwomen, mere empirical generalizations, framed, without philosophy or\nanalysis, upon the first instances which present themselves, that the\npopular idea of it is different in different countries, according as\nthe opinions and social circumstances of the country have given to\nthe women living in it any speciality of development or\nnon-development. An Oriental thinks that women are by nature\npeculiarly voluptuous; see the violent abuse of them on this ground\nin Hindoo writings. An Englishman usually thinks that they are by\nnature cold. The sayings about women's fickleness are mostly of\nFrench origin; from the famous distich of Francis the First, upward\nand downward. In England it is a common remark, how much more\nconstant women are than men. Inconstancy has been longer reckoned\ndiscreditable to a woman, in England than in France; and Englishwomen\nare besides, in their inmost nature, much more subdued to opinion. It\nmay be remarked by the way, that Englishmen are in peculiarly\nunfavourable circumstances for attempting to judge what is or is not\nnatural, not merely to women, but to men, or to human beings\naltogether, at least if they have only English experience to go upon:\nbecause there is no place where human nature shows so little of its\noriginal lineaments. Both in a good and a bad sense, the English are\nfarther from a state of nature than any other modern people. They\nare, more than any other people, a product of civilization and\ndiscipline. England is the country in which social discipline has\nmost succeeded, not so much in conquering, as in suppressing,\nwhatever is liable to conflict with it. The English, more than any\nother people, not only act but feel according to rule. In other\ncountries, the taught opinion, or the requirement of society, may be\nthe stronger power, but the promptings of the individual nature are\nalways visible under it, and often resisting it: rule may be stronger\nthan nature, but nature is still there. In England, rule has to a\ngreat degree substituted itself for nature. The greater part of life\nis carried on, not by following inclination under the control of\nrule, but by having no inclination but that of following a rule. Now\nthis has its good side doubtless, though it has also a wretchedly bad\none; but it must render an Englishman peculiarly ill-qualified to\npass a judgment on the original tendencies of human nature from his\nown experience. The errors to which observers elsewhere are liable on\nthe subject, are of a different character. An Englishman is ignorant\nrespecting human nature, a Frenchman is prejudiced. An Englishman's\nerrors are negative, a Frenchman's positive. An Englishman fancies\nthat things do not exist, because he never sees them; a Frenchman\nthinks they must always and necessarily exist, because he does see\nthem. An Englishman does not know nature, because he has had no\nopportunity of observing it; a Frenchman generally knows a great deal\nof it, but often mistakes it, because he has only seen it\nsophisticated and distorted. For the artificial state superinduced by\nsociety disguises the natural tendencies of the thing which is the\nsubject of observation, in two different ways: by extinguishing the\nnature, or by transforming it. In the one case there is but a starved\nresiduum of nature remaining to be studied; in the other case there\nis much, but it may have expanded in any direction rather than that\nin which it would spontaneously grow.\n\nI have said that it cannot now be known how much of the existing\nmental differences between men and women is natural, and how much\nartificial; whether there are any natural differences at all; or,\nsupposing all artificial causes of difference to be withdrawn, what\nnatural character would be revealed. I am not about to attempt what I\nhave pronounced impossible: but doubt does not forbid conjecture, and\nwhere certainty is unattainable, there may yet be the means of\narriving at some degree of probability. The first point, the origin\nof the differences actually observed, is the one most accessible to\nspeculation; and I shall attempt to approach it, by the only path by\nwhich it can be reached; by tracing the mental consequences of\nexternal influences. We cannot isolate a human being from the\ncircumstances of his condition, so as to ascertain experimentally\nwhat he would have been by nature; but we can consider what he is,\nand what his circumstances have been, and whether the one would have\nbeen capable of producing the other.\n\nLet us take, then, the only marked case which observation affords, of\napparent inferiority of women to men, if we except the merely\nphysical one of bodily strength. No production in philosophy,\nscience, or art, entitled to the first rank, has been the work of a\nwoman. Is there any mode of accounting for this, without supposing\nthat women are naturally incapable of producing them?\n\nIn the first place, we may fairly question whether experience has\nafforded sufficient grounds for an induction. It is scarcely three\ngenerations since women, saving very rare exceptions, have begun to\ntry their capacity in philosophy, science, or art. It is only in the\npresent generation that their attempts have been at all numerous; and\nthey are even now extremely few, everywhere but in England and\nFrance. It is a relevant question, whether a mind possessing the\nrequisites of first-rate eminence in speculation or creative art\ncould have been expected, on the mere calculation of chances, to turn\nup during that lapse of time, among the women whose tastes and\npersonal position admitted of their devoting themselves to these\npursuits. In all things which there has yet been time for--in all but\nthe very highest grades in the scale of excellence, especially in the\ndepartment in which they have been longest engaged, literature (both\nprose and poetry)--women have done quite as much, have obtained fully\nas high prizes and as many of them, as could be expected from the\nlength of time and the number of competitors. If we go back to the\nearlier period when very few women made the attempt, yet some of\nthose few made it with distinguished success. The Greeks always\naccounted Sappho among their great poets; and we may well suppose\nthat Myrtis, said to have been the teacher of Pindar, and Corinna,\nwho five times bore away from him the prize of poetry, must at least\nhave had sufficient merit to admit of being compared with that great\nname. Aspasia did not leave any philosophical writings; but it is an\nadmitted fact that Socrates resorted to her for instruction, and\navowed himself to have obtained it.\n\nIf we consider the works of women in modern times, and contrast them\nwith those of men, either in the literary or the artistic department,\nsuch inferiority as may be observed resolves itself essentially into\none thing: but that is a most material one; deficiency of\noriginality. Not total deficiency; for every production of mind which\nis of any substantive value, has an originality of its own--is a\nconception of the mind itself, not a copy of something else. Thoughts\noriginal, in the sense of being unborrowed--of being derived from the\nthinker's own observations or intellectual processes--are abundant in\nthe writings of women. But they have not yet produced any of those\ngreat and luminous new ideas which form an era in thought, nor those\nfundamentally new conceptions in art, which open a vista of possible\neffects not before thought of, and found a new school. Their\ncompositions are mostly grounded on the existing fund of thought, and\ntheir creations do not deviate widely from existing types. This is\nthe sort of inferiority which their works manifest: for in point of\nexecution, in the detailed application of thought, and the perfection\nof style, there is no inferiority. Our best novelists in point of\ncomposition, and of the management of detail, have mostly been women;\nand there is not in all modern literature a more eloquent vehicle of\nthought than the style of Madame de Stael, nor, as a specimen of\npurely artistic excellence, anything superior to the prose of Madame\nSand, whose style acts upon the nervous system like a symphony of\nHaydn or Mozart. High originality of conception is, as I have said,\nwhat is chiefly wanting. And now to examine if there is any manner in\nwhich this deficiency can be accounted for.\n\nLet us remember, then, so far as regards mere thought, that during\nall that period in the world's existence, and in the progress of\ncultivation, in which great and fruitful new truths could be arrived\nat by mere force of genius, with little previous study and\naccumulation of knowledge--during all that time women did not concern\nthemselves with speculation at all. From the days of Hypatia to those\nof the Reformation, the illustrious Heloisa is almost the only woman\nto whom any such achievement might have been possible; and we know\nnot how great a capacity of speculation in her may have been lost to\nmankind by the misfortunes of her life. Never since any considerable\nnumber of women have begun to cultivate serious thought, has\noriginality been possible on easy terms. Nearly all the thoughts\nwhich can be reached by mere strength of original faculties, have\nlong since been arrived at; and originality, in any high sense of the\nword, is now scarcely ever attained but by minds which have undergone\nelaborate discipline, and are deeply versed in the results of\nprevious thinking. It is Mr. Maurice, I think, who has remarked on\nthe present age, that its most original thinkers are those who have\nknown most thoroughly what had been thought by their predecessors:\nand this will always henceforth be the case. Every fresh stone in the\nedifice has now to be placed on the top of so many others, that a\nlong process of climbing, and of carrying up materials, has to be\ngone through by whoever aspires to take a share in the present stage\nof the work. How many women are there who have gone through any such\nprocess? Mrs. Somerville, alone perhaps of women, knows as much of\nmathematics as is now needful for making any considerable\nmathematical discovery: is it any proof of inferiority in women, that\nshe has not happened to be one of the two or three persons who in her\nlifetime have associated their names with some striking advancement\nof the science? Two women, since political economy has been made a\nscience, have known enough of it to write usefully on the subject: of\nhow many of the innumerable men who have written on it during the\nsame time, is it possible with truth to say more? If no woman has\nhitherto been a great historian, what woman has had the necessary\nerudition? If no woman is a great philologist, what woman has studied\nSanscrit and Slavonic, the Gothic of Ulphila and the Persic of the\nZendavesta? Even in practical matters we all know what is the value\nof the originality of untaught geniuses. It means, inventing over\nagain in its rudimentary form something already invented and improved\nupon by many successive inventors. When women have had the\npreparation which all men now require to be eminently original, it\nwill be time enough to begin judging by experience of their capacity\nfor originality.\n\nIt no doubt often happens that a person, who has not widely and\naccurately studied the thoughts of others on a subject, has by\nnatural sagacity a happy intuition, which he can suggest, but cannot\nprove, which yet when matured may be an important addition to\nknowledge: but even then, no justice can be done to it until some\nother person, who does possess the previous acquirements, takes it in\nhand, tests it, gives it a scientific or practical form, and fits it\ninto its place among the existing truths of philosophy or science. Is\nit supposed that such felicitous thoughts do not occur to women? They\noccur by hundreds to every woman of intellect. But they are mostly\nlost, for want of a husband or friend who has the other knowledge\nwhich can enable him to estimate them properly and bring them before\nthe world: and even when they are brought before it, they generally\nappear as his ideas, not their real author's. Who can tell how many\nof the most original thoughts put forth by male writers, belong to a\nwoman by suggestion, to themselves only by verifying and working out?\nIf I may judge by my own case, a very large proportion indeed.\n\nIf we turn from pure speculation to literature in the narrow sense of\nthe term, and the fine arts, there is a very obvious reason why\nwomen's literature is, in its general conception and in its main\nfeatures, an imitation of men's. Why is the Roman literature, as\ncritics proclaim to satiety, not original, but an imitation of the\nGreek? Simply because the Greeks came first. If women lived in a\ndifferent country from men, and had never read any of their writings,\nthey would have had a literature of their own. As it is, they have\nnot created one, because they found a highly advanced literature\nalready created. If there had been no suspension of the knowledge of\nantiquity, or if the Renaissance had occurred before the Gothic\ncathedrals were built, they never would have been built. We see that,\nin France and Italy, imitation of the ancient literature stopped the\noriginal development even after it had commenced. All women who write\nare pupils of the great male writers. A painter's early pictures,\neven if he be a Raffaelle, are undistinguishable in style from those\nof his master. Even a Mozart does not display his powerful\noriginality in his earliest pieces. What years are to a gifted\nindividual, generations are to a mass. If women's literature is\ndestined to have a different collective character from that of men,\ndepending on any difference of natural tendencies, much longer time\nis necessary than has yet elapsed, before it can emancipate itself\nfrom the influence of accepted models, and guide itself by its own\nimpulses. But if, as I believe, there will not prove to be any\nnatural tendencies common to women, and distinguishing their genius\nfrom that of men, yet every individual writer among them has her\nindividual tendencies, which at present are still subdued by the\ninfluence of precedent and example: and it will require generations\nmore, before their individuality is sufficiently developed to make\nhead against that influence.\n\nIt is in the fine arts, properly so called, that the _prima facie_\nevidence of inferior original powers in women at first sight appears\nthe strongest: since opinion (it may be said) does not exclude them\nfrom these, but rather encourages them, and their education, instead\nof passing over this department, is in the affluent classes mainly\ncomposed of it. Yet in this line of exertion they have fallen still\nmore short than in many others, of the highest eminence attained by\nmen. This shortcoming, however, needs no other explanation than the\nfamiliar fact, more universally true in the fine arts than in\nanything else; the vast superiority of professional persons over\namateurs. Women in the educated classes are almost universally taught\nmore or less of some branch or other of the fine arts, but not that\nthey may gain their living or their social consequence by it. Women\nartists are all amateurs. The exceptions are only of the kind which\nconfirm the general truth. Women are taught music, but not for the\npurpose of composing, only of executing it: and accordingly it is\nonly as composers, that men, in music, are superior to women. The\nonly one of the fine arts which women do follow, to any extent, as a\nprofession, and an occupation for life, is the histrionic; and in\nthat they are confessedly equal, if not superior, to men. To make the\ncomparison fair, it should be made between the productions of women\nin any branch of art, and those of men not following it as a\nprofession. In musical composition, for example, women surely have\nproduced fully as good things as have ever been produced by male\namateurs. There are now a few women, a very few, who practise\npainting as a profession, and these are already beginning to show\nquite as much talent as could be expected. Even male painters (_pace_\nMr. Ruskin) have not made any very remarkable figure these last\ncenturies, and it will be long before they do so. The reason why the\nold painters were so greatly superior to the modern, is that a\ngreatly superior class of men applied themselves to the art. In the\nfourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Italian painters were the most\naccomplished men of their age. The greatest of them were men of\nencyclopaedical acquirements and powers, like the great men of Greece.\nBut in their times fine art was, to men's feelings and conceptions,\namong the grandest things in which a human being could excel; and by\nit men were made, what only political or military distinction now\nmakes them, the companions of sovereigns, and the equals of the\nhighest nobility. In the present age, men of anything like similar\ncalibre find something more important to do, for their own fame and\nthe uses of the modern world, than painting: and it is only now and\nthen that a Reynolds or a Turner (of whose relative rank among\neminent men I do not pretend to an opinion) applies himself to that\nart. Music belongs to a different order of things; it does not\nrequire the same general powers of mind, but seems more dependant on\na natural gift: and it may be thought surprising that no one of the\ngreat musical composers has been a woman. But even this natural gift,\nto be made available for great creations, requires study, and\nprofessional devotion to the pursuit. The only countries which have\nproduced first-rate composers, even of the male sex, are Germany and\nItaly--countries in which, both in point of special and of general\ncultivation, women have remained far behind France and England, being\ngenerally (it may be said without exaggeration) very little educated,\nand having scarcely cultivated at all any of the higher faculties of\nmind. And in those countries the men who are acquainted with the\nprinciples of musical composition must be counted by hundreds, or\nmore probably by thousands, the women barely by scores: so that here\nagain, on the doctrine of averages, we cannot reasonably expect to\nsee more than one eminent woman to fifty eminent men; and the last\nthree centuries have not produced fifty eminent male composers either\nin Germany or in Italy.\n\nThere are other reasons, besides those which we have now given, that\nhelp to explain why women remain behind men, even in the pursuits\nwhich are open to both. For one thing, very few women have time for\nthem. This may seem a paradox; it is an undoubted social fact. The\ntime and thoughts of every woman have to satisfy great previous\ndemands on them for things practical. There is, first, the\nsuperintendence of the family and the domestic expenditure, which\noccupies at least one woman in every family, generally the one of\nmature years and acquired experience; unless the family is so rich as\nto admit of delegating that task to hired agency, and submitting to\nall the waste and malversation inseparable from that mode of\nconducting it. The superintendence of a household, even when not in\nother respects laborious, is extremely onerous to the thoughts; it\nrequires incessant vigilance, an eye which no detail escapes, and\npresents questions for consideration and solution, foreseen and\nunforeseen, at every hour of the day, from which the person\nresponsible for them can hardly ever shake herself free. If a woman\nis of a rank and circumstances which relieve her in a measure from\nthese cares, she has still devolving on her the management for the\nwhole family of its intercourse with others--of what is called\nsociety, and the less the call made on her by the former duty, the\ngreater is always the development of the latter: the dinner parties,\nconcerts, evening parties, morning visits, letter writing, and all\nthat goes with them. All this is over and above the engrossing duty\nwhich society imposes exclusively on women, of making themselves\ncharming. A clever woman of the higher ranks finds nearly a\nsufficient employment of her talents in cultivating the graces of\nmanner and the arts of conversation. To look only at the outward side\nof the subject: the great and continual exercise of thought which all\nwomen who attach any value to dressing well (I do not mean\nexpensively, but with taste, and perception of natural and of\nartificial _convenance_) must bestow upon their own dress, perhaps\nalso upon that of their daughters, would alone go a great way towards\nachieving respectable results in art, or science, or literature, and\ndoes actually exhaust much of the time and mental power they might\nhave to spare for either.[2] If it were possible that all this number\nof little practical interests (which are made great to them) should\nleave them either much leisure, or much energy and freedom of mind,\nto be devoted to art or speculation, they must have a much greater\noriginal supply of active faculty than the vast majority of men. But\nthis is not all. Independently of the regular offices of life which\ndevolve upon a woman, she is expected to have her time and faculties\nalways at the disposal of everybody. If a man has not a profession to\nexempt him from such demands, still, if he has a pursuit, he offends\nnobody by devoting his time to it; occupation is received as a valid\nexcuse for his not answering to every casual demand which may be made\non him. Are a woman's occupations, especially her chosen and\nvoluntary ones, ever regarded as excusing her from any of what are\ntermed the calls of society? Scarcely are her most necessary and\nrecognised duties allowed as an exemption. It requires an illness in\nthe family, or something else out of the common way, to entitle her\nto give her own business the precedence over other people's\namusement. She must always be at the beck and call of somebody,\ngenerally of everybody. If she has a study or a pursuit, she must\nsnatch any short interval which accidentally occurs to be employed in\nit. A celebrated woman, in a work which I hope will some day be\npublished, remarks truly that everything a woman does is done at odd\ntimes. Is it wonderful, then, if she does not attain the highest\neminence in things which require consecutive attention, and the\nconcentration on them of the chief interest of life? Such is\nphilosophy, and such, above all, is art, in which, besides the\ndevotion of the thoughts and feelings, the hand also must be kept in\nconstant exercise to attain high skill.\n\nThere is another consideration to be added to all these. In the\nvarious arts and intellectual occupations, there is a degree of\nproficiency sufficient for living by it, and there is a higher degree\non which depend the great productions which immortalize a name. To\nthe attainment of the former, there are adequate motives in the case\nof all who follow the pursuit professionally: the other is hardly\never attained where there is not, or where there has not been at some\nperiod of life, an ardent desire of celebrity. Nothing less is\ncommonly a sufficient stimulus to undergo the long and patient\ndrudgery, which, in the case even of the greatest natural gifts, is\nabsolutely required for great eminence in pursuits in which we\nalready possess so many splendid memorials of the highest genius.\nNow, whether the cause be natural or artificial, women seldom have\nthis eagerness for fame. Their ambition is generally confined within\nnarrower bounds. The influence they seek is over those who\nimmediately surround them. Their desire is to be liked, loved, or\nadmired, by those whom they see with their eyes: and the proficiency\nin knowledge, arts, and accomplishments, which is sufficient for\nthat, almost always contents them. This is a trait of character which\ncannot be left out of the account in judging of women as they are. I\ndo not at all believe that it is inherent in women. It is only the\nnatural result of their circumstances. The love of fame in men is\nencouraged by education and opinion: to \"scorn delights and live\nlaborious days\" for its sake, is accounted the part of \"noble minds,\"\neven if spoken of as their \"last infirmity,\" and is stimulated by the\naccess which fame gives to all objects of ambition, including even\nthe favour of women; while to women themselves all these objects are\nclosed, and the desire of fame itself considered daring and\nunfeminine. Besides, how could it be that a woman's interests should\nnot be all concentrated upon the impressions made on those who come\ninto her daily life, when society has ordained that all her duties\nshould be to them, and has contrived that all her comforts should\ndepend on them? The natural desire of consideration from our fellow\ncreatures is as strong in a woman as in a man; but society has so\nordered things that public consideration is, in all ordinary cases,\nonly attainable by her through the consideration of her husband or of\nher male relations, while her private consideration is forfeited by\nmaking herself individually prominent, or appearing in any other\ncharacter than that of an appendage to men. Whoever is in the least\ncapable of estimating the influence on the mind of the entire\ndomestic and social position and the whole habit of a life, must\neasily recognise in that influence a complete explanation of nearly\nall the apparent differences between women and men, including the\nwhole of those which imply any inferiority.\n\nAs for moral differences, considered as distinguished from\nintellectual, the distinction commonly drawn is to the advantage of\nwomen. They are declared to be better than men; an empty compliment,\nwhich must provoke a bitter smile from every woman of spirit, since\nthere is no other situation in life in which it is the established\norder, and considered quite natural and suitable, that the better\nshould obey the worse. If this piece of idle talk is good for\nanything, it is only as an admission by men, of the corrupting\ninfluence of power; for that is certainly the only truth which the\nfact, if it be a fact, either proves or illustrates. And it _is_ true\nthat servitude, except when it actually brutalizes, though corrupting\nto both, is less so to the slaves than to the slave-masters. It is\nwholesomer for the moral nature to be restrained, even by arbitrary\npower, than to be allowed to exercise arbitrary power without\nrestraint. Women, it is said, seldomer fall under the penal\nlaw--contribute a much smaller number of offenders to the criminal\ncalendar, than men. I doubt not that the same thing may be said, with\nthe same truth, of negro slaves. Those who are under the control of\nothers cannot often commit crimes, unless at the command and for the\npurposes of their masters. I do not know a more signal instance of\nthe blindness with which the world, including the herd of studious\nmen, ignore and pass over all the influences of social circumstances,\nthan their silly depreciation of the intellectual, and silly\npanegyrics on the moral, nature of women.\n\nThe complimentary dictum about women's superior moral goodness may be\nallowed to pair off with the disparaging one respecting their greater\nliability to moral bias. Women, we are told, are not capable of\nresisting their personal partialities: their judgment in grave\naffairs is warped by their sympathies and antipathies. Assuming it to\nbe so, it is still to be proved that women are oftener misled by\ntheir personal feelings than men by their personal interests. The\nchief difference would seem in that case to be, that men are led from\nthe course of duty and the public interest by their regard for\nthemselves, women (not being allowed to have private interests of\ntheir own) by their regard for somebody else. It is also to be\nconsidered, that all the education which women receive from society\ninculcates on them the feeling that the individuals connected with\nthem are the only ones to whom they owe any duty--the only ones whose\ninterest they are called upon to care for; while, as far as education\nis concerned, they are left strangers even to the elementary ideas\nwhich are presupposed in any intelligent regard for larger interests\nor higher moral objects. The complaint against them resolves itself\nmerely into this, that they fulfil only too faithfully the sole duty\nwhich they are taught, and almost the only one which they are\npermitted to practise.\n\nThe concessions of the privileged to the unprivileged are so seldom\nbrought about by any better motive than the power of the unprivileged\nto extort them, that any arguments against the prerogative of sex are\nlikely to be little attended to by the generality, as long as they\nare able to say to themselves that women do not complain of it. That\nfact certainly enables men to retain the unjust privilege some time\nlonger; but does not render it less unjust. Exactly the same thing\nmay be said of the women in the harem of an Oriental: they do not\ncomplain of not being allowed the freedom of European women. They\nthink our women insufferably bold and unfeminine. How rarely it is\nthat even men complain of the general order of society; and how much\nrarer still would such complaint be, if they did not know of any\ndifferent order existing anywhere else. Women do not complain of the\ngeneral lot of women; or rather they do, for plaintive elegies on it\nare very common in the writings of women, and were still more so as\nlong as the lamentations could not be suspected of having any\npractical object. Their complaints are like the complaints which men\nmake of the general unsatisfactoriness of human life; they are not\nmeant to imply blame, or to plead for any change. But though women do\nnot complain of the power of husbands, each complains of her own\nhusband, or of the husbands of her friends. It is the same in all\nother cases of servitude, at least in the commencement of the\nemancipatory movement. The serfs did not at first complain of the\npower of their lords, but only of their tyranny. The Commons began by\nclaiming a few municipal privileges; they next asked an exemption for\nthemselves from being taxed without their own consent; but they would\nat that time have thought it a great presumption to claim any share\nin the king's sovereign authority. The case of women is now the only\ncase in which to rebel against established rules is still looked upon\nwith the same eyes as was formerly a subject's claim to the right of\nrebelling against his king. A woman who joins in any movement which\nher husband disapproves, makes herself a martyr, without even being\nable to be an apostle, for the husband can legally put a stop to her\napostleship. Women cannot be expected to devote themselves to the\nemancipation of women, until men in considerable number are prepared\nto join with them in the undertaking.\n\n[Footnote 1: Especially is this true if we take into consideration\nAsia as well as Europe. If a Hindoo principality is strongly,\nvigilantly, and economically governed; if order is preserved without\noppression; if cultivation is extending, and the people prosperous,\nin three cases out of four that principality is under a woman's rule.\nThis fact, to me an entirely unexpected one, I have collected from a\nlong official knowledge of Hindoo governments. There are many such\ninstances: for though, by Hindoo institutions, a woman cannot reign,\nshe is the legal regent of a kingdom during the minority of the heir;\nand minorities are frequent, the lives of the male rulers being so\noften prematurely terminated through the effect of inactivity and\nsensual excesses. When we consider that these princesses have never\nbeen seen in public, have never conversed with any man not of their\nown family except from behind a curtain, that they do not read, and\nif they did, there is no book in their languages which can give them\nthe smallest instruction on political affairs; the example they\nafford of the natural capacity of women for government is very\nstriking.]\n\n[Footnote 2: \"It appears to be the same right turn of mind which\nenables a man to acquire the _truth_, or the just idea of what is\nright, in the ornaments, as in the more stable principles of art. It\nhas still the same centre of perfection, though it is the centre of a\nsmaller circle.--To illustrate this by the fashion of dress, in which\nthere is allowed to be a good or bad taste. The component parts of\ndress are continually changing from great to little, from short to\nlong; but the general form still remains: it is still the same\ngeneral dress which is comparatively fixed, though on a very slender\nfoundation; but it is on this which fashion must rest. He who invents\nwith the most success, or dresses in the best taste, would probably,\nfrom the same sagacity employed to greater purposes, have discovered\nequal skill, or have formed the same correct taste, in the highest\nlabours of art.\"--_Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses_, Disc. vii.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\n\nThere remains a question, not of less importance than those already\ndiscussed, and which will be asked the most importunately by those\nopponents whose conviction is somewhat shaken on the main point. What\ngood are we to expect from the changes proposed in our customs and\ninstitutions? Would mankind be at all better off if women were free?\nIf not, why disturb their minds, and attempt to make a social\nrevolution in the name of an abstract right?\n\nIt is hardly to be expected that this question will be asked in\nrespect to the change proposed in the condition of women in marriage.\nThe sufferings, immoralities, evils of all sorts, produced in\ninnumerable cases by the subjection of individual women to individual\nmen, are far too terrible to be overlooked. Unthinking or uncandid\npersons, counting those cases alone which are extreme, or which\nattain publicity, may say that the evils are exceptional; but no one\ncan be blind to their existence, nor, in many cases, to their\nintensity. And it is perfectly obvious that the abuse of the power\ncannot be very much checked while the power remains. It is a power\ngiven, or offered, not to good men, or to decently respectable men,\nbut to all men; the most brutal, and the most criminal. There is no\ncheck but that of opinion, and such men are in general within the\nreach of no opinion but that of men like themselves. If such men did\nnot brutally tyrannize over the one human being whom the law compels\nto bear everything from them, society must already have reached a\nparadisiacal state. There could be no need any longer of laws to curb\nmen's vicious propensities. Astraea must not only have returned to\nearth, but the heart of the worst man must have become her temple.\nThe law of servitude in marriage is a monstrous contradiction to all\nthe principles of the modern world, and to all the experience through\nwhich those principles have been slowly and painfully worked out. It\nis the sole case, now that negro slavery has been abolished, in which\na human being in the plenitude of every faculty is delivered up to\nthe tender mercies of another human being, in the hope forsooth that\nthis other will use the power solely for the good of the person\nsubjected to it. Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our\nlaw. There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every\nhouse.\n\nIt is not, therefore, on this part of the subject, that the question\nis likely to be asked, _Cui bono_? We may be told that the evil would\noutweigh the good, but the reality of the good admits of no dispute.\nIn regard, however, to the larger question, the removal of women's\ndisabilities--their recognition as the equals of men in all that\nbelongs to citizenship--the opening to them of all honourable\nemployments, and of the training and education which qualifies for\nthose employments--there are many persons for whom it is not enough\nthat the inequality has no just or legitimate defence; they require\nto be told what express advantage would be obtained by abolishing it.\n\nTo which let me first answer, the advantage of having the most\nuniversal and pervading of all human relations regulated by justice\ninstead of injustice. The vast amount of this gain to human nature,\nit is hardly possible, by any explanation or illustration, to place\nin a stronger light than it is placed by the bare statement, to any\none who attaches a moral meaning to words. All the selfish\npropensities, the self-worship, the unjust self-preference, which\nexist among mankind, have their source and root in, and derive their\nprincipal nourishment from, the present constitution of the relation\nbetween men and women. Think what it is to a boy, to grow up to\nmanhood in the belief that without any merit or any exertion of his\nown, though he may be the most frivolous and empty or the most\nignorant and stolid of mankind, by the mere fact of being born a male\nhe is by right the superior of all and every one of an entire half of\nthe human race: including probably some whose real superiority to\nhimself he has daily or hourly occasion to feel; but even if in his\nwhole conduct he habitually follows a woman's guidance, still, if he\nis a fool, she thinks that of course she is not, and cannot be, equal\nin ability and judgment to himself; and if he is not a fool, he does\nworse--he sees that she is superior to him, and believes that,\nnotwithstanding her superiority, he is entitled to command and she is\nbound to obey. What must be the effect on his character, of this\nlesson? And men of the cultivated classes are often not aware how\ndeeply it sinks into the immense majority of male minds. For, among\nright-feeling and well-bred people, the inequality is kept as much as\npossible out of sight; above all, out of sight of the children. As\nmuch obedience is required from boys to their mother as to their\nfather: they are not permitted to domineer over their sisters, nor\nare they accustomed to see these postponed to them, but the contrary;\nthe compensations of the chivalrous feeling being made prominent,\nwhile the servitude which requires them is kept in the background.\nWell brought-up youths in the higher classes thus often escape the\nbad influences of the situation in their early years, and only\nexperience them when, arrived at manhood, they fall under the\ndominion of facts as they really exist. Such people are little aware,\nwhen a boy is differently brought up, how early the notion of his\ninherent superiority to a girl arises in his mind; how it grows with\nhis growth and strengthens with his strength; how it is inoculated by\none schoolboy upon another; how early the youth thinks himself\nsuperior to his mother, owing her perhaps forbearance, but no real\nrespect; and how sublime and sultan-like a sense of superiority he\nfeels, above all, over the woman whom he honours by admitting her to\na partnership of his life. Is it imagined that all this does not\npervert the whole manner of existence of the man, both as an\nindividual and as a social being? It is an exact parallel to the\nfeeling of a hereditary king that he is excellent above others by\nbeing born a king, or a noble by being born a noble. The relation\nbetween husband and wife is very like that between lord and vassal,\nexcept that the wife is held to more unlimited obedience than the\nvassal was. However the vassal's character may have been affected,\nfor better and for worse, by his subordination, who can help seeing\nthat the lord's was affected greatly for the worse? whether he was\nled to believe that his vassals were really superior to himself, or\nto feel that he was placed in command over people as good as himself,\nfor no merits or labours of his own, but merely for having, as Figaro\nsays, taken the trouble to be born. The self-worship of the monarch,\nor of the feudal superior, is matched by the self-worship of the\nmale. Human beings do not grow up from childhood in the possession of\nunearned distinctions, without pluming themselves upon them. Those\nwhom privileges not acquired by their merit, and which they feel to\nbe disproportioned to it, inspire with additional humility, are\nalways the few, and the best few. The rest are only inspired with\npride, and the worst sort of pride, that which values itself upon\naccidental advantages, not of its own achieving. Above all, when the\nfeeling of being raised above the whole of the other sex is combined\nwith personal authority over one individual among them; the\nsituation, if a school of conscientious and affectionate forbearance\nto those whose strongest points of character are conscience and\naffection, is to men of another quality a regularly constituted\nAcademy or Gymnasium for training them in arrogance and\noverbearingness; which vices, if curbed by the certainty of\nresistance in their intercourse with other men, their equals, break\nout towards all who are in a position to be obliged to tolerate them,\nand often revenge themselves upon the unfortunate wife for the\ninvoluntary restraint which they are obliged to submit to elsewhere.\n\nThe example afforded, and the education given to the sentiments, by\nlaying the foundation of domestic existence upon a relation\ncontradictory to the first principles of social justice, must, from\nthe very nature of man, have a perverting influence of such\nmagnitude, that it is hardly possible with our present experience to\nraise our imaginations to the conception of so great a change for the\nbetter as would be made by its removal. All that education and\ncivilization are doing to efface the influences on character of the\nlaw of force, and replace them by those of justice, remains merely on\nthe surface, as long as the citadel of the enemy is not attacked. The\nprinciple of the modern movement in morals and politics, is that\nconduct, and conduct alone, entitles to respect: that not what men\nare, but what they do, constitutes their claim to deference; that,\nabove all, merit, and not birth, is the only rightful claim to power\nand authority. If no authority, not in its nature temporary, were\nallowed to one human being over another, society would not be\nemployed in building up propensities with one hand which it has to\ncurb with the other. The child would really, for the first time in\nman's existence on earth, be trained in the way he should go, and\nwhen he was old there would be a chance that he would not depart from\nit. But so long as the right of the strong to power over the weak\nrules in the very heart of society, the attempt to make the equal\nright of the weak the principle of its outward actions will always be\nan uphill struggle; for the law of justice, which is also that of\nChristianity, will never get possession of men's inmost sentiments;\nthey will be working against it, even when bending to it.\n\nThe second benefit to be expected from giving to women the free use\nof their faculties, by leaving them the free choice of their\nemployments, and opening to them the same field of occupation and the\nsame prizes and encouragements as to other human beings, would be\nthat of doubling the mass of mental faculties available for the\nhigher service of humanity. Where there is now one person qualified\nto benefit mankind and promote the general improvement, as a public\nteacher, or an administrator of some branch of public or social\naffairs, there would then be a chance of two. Mental superiority of\nany kind is at present everywhere so much below the demand; there is\nsuch a deficiency of persons competent to do excellently anything\nwhich it requires any considerable amount of ability to do; that the\nloss to the world, by refusing to make use of one-half of the whole\nquantity of talent it possesses, is extremely serious. It is true\nthat this amount of mental power is not totally lost. Much of it is\nemployed, and would in any case be employed, in domestic management,\nand in the few other occupations open to women; and from the\nremainder indirect benefit is in many individual cases obtained,\nthrough the personal influence of individual women over individual\nmen. But these benefits are partial; their range is extremely\ncircumscribed; and if they must be admitted, on the one hand, as a\ndeduction from the amount of fresh social power that would be\nacquired by giving freedom to one-half of the whole sum of human\nintellect, there must be added, on the other, the benefit of the\nstimulus that would be given to the intellect of men by the\ncompetition; or (to use a more true expression) by the necessity that\nwould be imposed on them of deserving precedency before they could\nexpect to obtain it.\n\nThis great accession to the intellectual power of the species, and to\nthe amount of intellect available for the good management of its\naffairs, would be obtained, partly, through the better and more\ncomplete intellectual education of women, which would then improve\n_pari passu_ with that of men. Women in general would be brought up\nequally capable of understanding business, public affairs, and the\nhigher matters of speculation, with men in the same class of society;\nand the select few of the one as well as of the other sex, who were\nqualified not only to comprehend what is done or thought by others,\nbut to think or do something considerable themselves, would meet with\nthe same facilities for improving and training their capacities in\nthe one sex as in the other. In this way, the widening of the sphere\nof action for women would operate for good, by raising their\neducation to the level of that of men, and making the one participate\nin all improvements made in the other. But independently of this, the\nmere breaking down of the barrier would of itself have an educational\nvirtue of the highest worth. The mere getting rid of the idea that\nall the wider subjects of thought and action, all the things which\nare of general and not solely of private interest, are men's\nbusiness, from which women are to be warned off--positively\ninterdicted from most of it, coldly tolerated in the little which is\nallowed them--the mere consciousness a woman would then have of being\na human being like any other, entitled to choose her pursuits, urged\nor invited by the same inducements as any one else to interest\nherself in whatever is interesting to human beings, entitled to exert\nthe share of influence on all human concerns which belongs to an\nindividual opinion, whether she attempted actual participation in\nthem or not--this alone would effect an immense expansion of the\nfaculties of women, as well as enlargement of the range of their\nmoral sentiments.\n\nBesides the addition to the amount of individual talent available for\nthe conduct of human affairs, which certainly are not at present so\nabundantly provided in that respect that they can afford to dispense\nwith one-half of what nature proffers; the opinion of women would\nthen possess a more beneficial, rather than a greater, influence upon\nthe general mass of human belief and sentiment. I say a more\nbeneficial, rather than a greater influence; for the influence of\nwomen over the general tone of opinion has always, or at least from\nthe earliest known period, been very considerable. The influence of\nmothers on the early character of their sons, and the desire of young\nmen to recommend themselves to young women, have in all recorded\ntimes been important agencies in the formation of character, and have\ndetermined some of the chief steps in the progress of civilization.\nEven in the Homeric age, [Greek: aidos] towards the [Greek: Troadas]\n[Greek: helkesipeplous] is an acknowledged and powerful motive of\naction in the great Hector. The moral influence of women has had two\nmodes of operation. First, it has been a softening influence. Those\nwho were most liable to be the victims of violence, have naturally\ntended as much as they could towards limiting its sphere and\nmitigating its excesses. Those who were not taught to fight, have\nnaturally inclined in favour of any other mode of settling\ndifferences rather than that of fighting. In general, those who have\nbeen the greatest sufferers by the indulgence of selfish passion,\nhave been the most earnest supporters of any moral law which offered\na means of bridling passion. Women were powerfully instrumental in\ninducing the northern conquerors to adopt the creed of Christianity,\na creed so much more favourable to women than any that preceded it.\nThe conversion of the Anglo-Saxons and of the Franks may be said to\nhave been begun by the wives of Ethelbert and Clovis. The other mode\nin which the effect of women's opinion has been conspicuous, is by\ngiving a powerful stimulus to those qualities in men, which, not\nbeing themselves trained in, it was necessary for them that they\nshould find in their protectors. Courage, and the military virtues\ngenerally, have at all times been greatly indebted to the desire\nwhich men felt of being admired by women: and the stimulus reaches\nfar beyond this one class of eminent qualities, since, by a very\nnatural effect of their position, the best passport to the admiration\nand favour of women has always been to be thought highly of by men.\nFrom the combination of the two kinds of moral influence thus\nexercised by women, arose the spirit of chivalry: the peculiarity of\nwhich is, to aim at combining the highest standard of the warlike\nqualities with the cultivation of a totally different class of\nvirtues--those of gentleness, generosity, and self-abnegation,\ntowards the non-military and defenceless classes generally, and a\nspecial submission and worship directed towards women; who were\ndistinguished from the other defenceless classes by the high rewards\nwhich they had it in their power voluntarily to bestow on those who\nendeavoured to earn their favour, instead of extorting their\nsubjection. Though the practice of chivalry fell even more sadly\nshort of its theoretic standard than practice generally falls below\ntheory, it remains one of the most precious monuments of the moral\nhistory of our race; as a remarkable instance of a concerted and\norganized attempt by a most disorganized and distracted society, to\nraise up and carry into practice a moral ideal greatly in advance of\nits social condition and institutions; so much so as to have been\ncompletely frustrated in the main object, yet never entirely\ninefficacious, and which has left a most sensible, and for the most\npart a highly valuable impress on the ideas and feelings of all\nsubsequent times.\n\nThe chivalrous ideal is the acme of the influence of women's\nsentiments on the moral cultivation of mankind: and if women are to\nremain in their subordinate situation, it were greatly to be lamented\nthat the chivalrous standard should have passed away, for it is the\nonly one at all capable of mitigating the demoralizing influences of\nthat position. But the changes in the general state of the species\nrendered inevitable the substitution of a totally different ideal of\nmorality for the chivalrous one. Chivalry was the attempt to infuse\nmoral elements into a state of society in which everything depended\nfor good or evil on individual prowess, under the softening\ninfluences of individual delicacy and generosity. In modern\nsocieties, all things, even in the military department of affairs,\nare decided, not by individual effort, but by the combined operations\nof numbers; while the main occupation of society has changed from\nfighting to business, from military to industrial life. The\nexigencies of the new life are no more exclusive of the virtues of\ngenerosity than those of the old, but it no longer entirely depends\non them. The main foundations of the moral life of modern times must\nbe justice and prudence; the respect of each for the rights of every\nother, and the ability of each to take care of himself. Chivalry left\nwithout legal check all forms of wrong which reigned unpunished\nthroughout society; it only encouraged a few to do right in\npreference to wrong, by the direction it gave to the instruments of\npraise and admiration. But the real dependence of morality must\nalways be upon its penal sanctions--its power to deter from evil. The\nsecurity of society cannot rest on merely rendering honour to right,\na motive so comparatively weak in all but a few, and which on very\nmany does not operate at all. Modern society is able to repress wrong\nthrough all departments of life, by a fit exertion of the superior\nstrength which civilization has given it, and thus to render the\nexistence of the weaker members of society (no longer defenceless but\nprotected by law) tolerable to them, without reliance on the\nchivalrous feelings of those who are in a position to tyrannize. The\nbeauties and graces of the chivalrous character are still what they\nwere, but the rights of the weak, and the general comfort of human\nlife, now rest on a far surer and steadier support; or rather, they\ndo so in every relation of life except the conjugal.\n\nAt present the moral influence of women is no less real, but it is no\nlonger of so marked and definite a character: it has more nearly\nmerged in the general influence of public opinion. Both through the\ncontagion of sympathy, and through the desire of men to shine in the\neyes of women, their feelings have great effect in keeping alive what\nremains of the chivalrous ideal--in fostering the sentiments and\ncontinuing the traditions of spirit and generosity. In these points\nof character, their standard is higher than that of men; in the\nquality of justice, somewhat lower. As regards the relations of\nprivate life it may be said generally, that their influence is, on\nthe whole, encouraging to the softer virtues, discouraging to the\nsterner: though the statement must be taken with all the\nmodifications dependent on individual character. In the chief of the\ngreater trials to which virtue is subject in the concerns of\nlife--the conflict between interest and principle--the tendency of\nwomen's influence is of a very mixed character. When the principle\ninvolved happens to be one of the very few which the course of their\nreligious or moral education has strongly impressed upon themselves,\nthey are potent auxiliaries to virtue: and their husbands and sons\nare often prompted by them to acts of abnegation which they never\nwould have been capable of without that stimulus. But, with the\npresent education and position of women, the moral principles which\nhave been impressed on them cover but a comparatively small part of\nthe field of virtue, and are, moreover, principally negative;\nforbidding particular acts, but having little to do with the general\ndirection of the thoughts and purposes. I am afraid it must be said,\nthat disinterestedness in the general conduct of life--the devotion\nof the energies to purposes which hold out no promise of private\nadvantages to the family--is very seldom encouraged or supported by\nwomen's influence. It is small blame to them that they discourage\nobjects of which they have not learnt to see the advantage, and which\nwithdraw their men from them, and from the interests of the family.\nBut the consequence is that women's influence is often anything but\nfavourable to public virtue.\n\nWomen have, however, some share of influence in giving the tone to\npublic moralities since their sphere of action has been a little\nwidened, and since a considerable number of them have occupied\nthemselves practically in the promotion of objects reaching beyond\ntheir own family and household. The influence of women counts for a\ngreat deal in two of the most marked features of modern European\nlife--its aversion to war, and its addiction to philanthropy.\nExcellent characteristics both; but unhappily, if the influence of\nwomen is valuable in the encouragement it gives to these feelings in\ngeneral, in the particular applications the direction it gives to\nthem is at least as often mischievous as useful. In the philanthropic\ndepartment more particularly, the two provinces chiefly cultivated by\nwomen are religious proselytism and charity. Religious proselytism at\nhome, is but another word for embittering of religious animosities:\nabroad, it is usually a blind running at an object, without either\nknowing or heeding the fatal mischiefs--fatal to the religious object\nitself as well as to all other desirable objects--which may be\nproduced by the means employed. As for charity, it is a matter in\nwhich the immediate effect on the persons directly concerned, and the\nultimate consequence to the general good, are apt to be at complete\nwar with one another: while the education given to women--an\neducation of the sentiments rather than of the understanding--and the\nhabit inculcated by their whole life, of looking to immediate effects\non persons, and not to remote effects on classes of persons--make\nthem both unable to see, and unwilling to admit, the ultimate evil\ntendency of any form of charity or philanthropy which commends itself\nto their sympathetic feelings. The great and continually increasing\nmass of unenlightened and shortsighted benevolence, which, taking the\ncare of people's lives out of their own hands, and relieving them\nfrom the disagreeable consequences of their own acts, saps the very\nfoundations of the self-respect, self-help, and self-control which\nare the essential conditions both of individual prosperity and of\nsocial virtue--this waste of resources and of benevolent feelings in\ndoing harm instead of good, is immensely swelled by women's\ncontributions, and stimulated by their influence. Not that this is a\nmistake likely to be made by women, where they have actually the\npractical management of schemes of beneficence. It sometimes happens\nthat women who administer public charities--with that insight into\npresent fact, and especially into the minds and feelings of those\nwith whom they are in immediate contact, in which women generally\nexcel men--recognise in the clearest manner the demoralizing\ninfluence of the alms given or the help afforded, and could give\nlessons on the subject to many a male political economist. But women\nwho only give their money, and are not brought face to face with the\neffects it produces, how can they be expected to foresee them? A\nwoman born to the present lot of women, and content with it, how\nshould she appreciate the value of self-dependence? She is not\nself-dependent; she is not taught self-dependence; her destiny is to\nreceive everything from others, and why should what is good enough\nfor her be bad for the poor? Her familiar notions of good are of\nblessings descending from a superior. She forgets that she is not\nfree, and that the poor are; that if what they need is given to them\nunearned, they cannot be compelled to earn it: that everybody cannot\nbe taken care of by everybody, but there must be some motive to\ninduce people to take care of themselves; and that to be helped to\nhelp themselves, if they are physically capable of it, is the only\ncharity which proves to be charity in the end.\n\nThese considerations show how usefully the part which women take in\nthe formation of general opinion, would be modified for the better by\nthat more enlarged instruction, and practical conversancy with the\nthings which their opinions influence, that would necessarily arise\nfrom their social and political emancipation. But the improvement it\nwould work through the influence they exercise, each in her own\nfamily, would be still more remarkable.\n\nIt is often said that in the classes most exposed to temptation, a\nman's wife and children tend to keep him honest and respectable, both\nby the wife's direct influence, and by the concern he feels for their\nfuture welfare. This may be so, and no doubt often is so, with those\nwho are more weak than wicked; and this beneficial influence would be\npreserved and strengthened under equal laws; it does not depend on\nthe woman's servitude, but is, on the contrary, diminished by the\ndisrespect which the inferior class of men always at heart feel\ntowards those who are subject to their power. But when we ascend\nhigher in the scale, we come among a totally different set of moving\nforces. The wife's influence tends, as far as it goes, to prevent the\nhusband from falling below the common standard of approbation of the\ncountry. It tends quite as strongly to hinder him from rising above\nit. The wife is the auxiliary of the common public opinion. A man who\nis married to a woman his inferior in intelligence, finds her a\nperpetual dead weight, or, worse than a dead weight, a drag, upon\nevery aspiration of his to be better than public opinion requires him\nto be. It is hardly possible for one who is in these bonds, to attain\nexalted virtue. If he differs in his opinion from the mass--if he\nsees truths which have not yet dawned upon them, or if, feeling in\nhis heart truths which they nominally recognise, he would like to act\nup to those truths more conscientiously than the generality of\nmankind--to all such thoughts and desires, marriage is the heaviest\nof drawbacks, unless he be so fortunate as to have a wife as much\nabove the common level as he himself is.\n\nFor, in the first place, there is always some sacrifice of personal\ninterest required; either of social consequence, or of pecuniary\nmeans; perhaps the risk of even the means of subsistence. These\nsacrifices and risks he may be willing to encounter for himself; but\nhe will pause before he imposes them on his family. And his family in\nthis case means his wife and daughters; for he always hopes that his\nsons will feel as he feels himself, and that what he can do without,\nthey will do without, willingly, in the same cause. But his\ndaughters--their marriage may depend upon it: and his wife, who is\nunable to enter into or understand the objects for which these\nsacrifices are made--who, if she thought them worth any sacrifice,\nwould think so on trust, and solely for his sake--who can participate\nin none of the enthusiasm or the self-approbation he himself may\nfeel, while the things which he is disposed to sacrifice are all in\nall to her; will not the best and most unselfish man hesitate the\nlongest before bringing on her this consequence? If it be not the\ncomforts of life, but only social consideration, that is at stake,\nthe burthen upon his conscience and feelings is still very severe.\nWhoever has a wife and children has given hostages to Mrs. Grundy.\nThe approbation of that potentate may be a matter of indifference to\nhim, but it is of great importance to his wife. The man himself may\nbe above opinion, or may find sufficient compensation in the opinion\nof those of his own way of thinking. But to the women connected with\nhim, he can offer no compensation. The almost invariable tendency of\nthe wife to place her influence in the same scale with social\nconsideration, is sometimes made a reproach to women, and represented\nas a peculiar trait of feebleness and childishness of character in\nthem: surely with great injustice. Society makes the whole life of a\nwoman, in the easy classes, a continued self-sacrifice; it exacts\nfrom her an unremitting restraint of the whole of her natural\ninclinations, and the sole return it makes to her for what often\ndeserves the name of a martyrdom, is consideration. Her consideration\nis inseparably connected with that of her husband, and after paying\nthe full price for it, she finds that she is to lose it, for no\nreason of which she can feel the cogency. She has sacrificed her\nwhole life to it, and her husband will not sacrifice to it a whim, a\nfreak, an eccentricity; something not recognised or allowed for by\nthe world, and which the world will agree with her in thinking a\nfolly, if it thinks no worse! The dilemma is hardest upon that very\nmeritorious class of men, who, without possessing talents which\nqualify them to make a figure among those with whom they agree in\nopinion, hold their opinion from conviction, and feel bound in honour\nand conscience to serve it, by making profession of their belief, and\ngiving their time, labour, and means, to anything undertaken in its\nbehalf. The worst case of all is when such men happen to be of a rank\nand position which of itself neither gives them, nor excludes them\nfrom, what is considered the best society; when their admission to it\ndepends mainly on what is thought of them personally--and however\nunexceptionable their breeding and habits, their being identified\nwith opinions and public conduct unacceptable to those who give the\ntone to society would operate as an effectual exclusion. Many a woman\nflatters herself (nine times out of ten quite erroneously) that\nnothing prevents her and her husband from moving in the highest\nsociety of her neighbourhood--society in which others well known to\nher, and in the same class of life, mix freely--except that her\nhusband is unfortunately a Dissenter, or has the reputation of\nmingling in low radical politics. That it is, she thinks, which\nhinders George from getting a commission or a place, Caroline from\nmaking an advantageous match, and prevents her and her husband from\nobtaining invitations, perhaps honours, which, for aught she sees,\nthey are as well entitled to as some folks. With such an influence in\nevery house, either exerted actively, or operating all the more\npowerfully for not being asserted, is it any wonder that people in\ngeneral are kept down in that mediocrity of respectability which is\nbecoming a marked characteristic of modern times?\n\nThere is another very injurious aspect in which the effect, not of\nwomen's disabilities directly, but of the broad line of difference\nwhich those disabilities create between the education and character\nof a woman and that of a man, requires to be considered. Nothing can\nbe more unfavourable to that union of thoughts and inclinations which\nis the ideal of married life. Intimate society between people\nradically dissimilar to one another, is an idle dream. Unlikeness may\nattract, but it is likeness which retains; and in proportion to the\nlikeness is the suitability of the individuals to give each other a\nhappy life. While women are so unlike men, it is not wonderful that\nselfish men should feel the need of arbitrary power in their own\nhands, to arrest _in limine_ the life-long conflict of inclinations,\nby deciding every question on the side of their own preference. When\npeople are extremely unlike, there can be no real identity of\ninterest. Very often there is conscientious difference of opinion\nbetween married people, on the highest points of duty. Is there any\nreality in the marriage union where this takes place? Yet it is not\nuncommon anywhere, when the woman has any earnestness of character;\nand it is a very general case indeed in Catholic countries, when she\nis supported in her dissent by the only other authority to which she\nis taught to bow, the priest. With the usual barefacedness of power\nnot accustomed to find itself disputed, the influence of priests over\nwomen is attacked by Protestant and Liberal writers, less for being\nbad in itself, than because it is a rival authority to the husband,\nand raises up a revolt against his infallibility. In England, similar\ndifferences occasionally exist when an Evangelical wife has allied\nherself with a husband of a different quality; but in general this\nsource at least of dissension is got rid of, by reducing the minds of\nwomen to such a nullity, that they have no opinions but those of Mrs.\nGrundy, or those which the husband tells them to have. When there is\nno difference of opinion, differences merely of taste may be\nsufficient to detract greatly from the happiness of married life. And\nthough it may stimulate the amatory propensities of men, it does not\nconduce to married happiness, to exaggerate by differences of\neducation whatever may be the native differences of the sexes. If the\nmarried pair are well-bred and well-behaved people, they tolerate\neach other's tastes; but is mutual toleration what people look\nforward to, when they enter into marriage? These differences of\ninclination will naturally make their wishes different, if not\nrestrained by affection or duty, as to almost all domestic questions\nwhich arise. What a difference there must be in the society which the\ntwo persons will wish to frequent, or be frequented by! Each will\ndesire associates who share their own tastes: the persons agreeable\nto one, will be indifferent or positively disagreeable to the other;\nyet there can be none who are not common to both, for married people\ndo not now live in different parts of the house and have totally\ndifferent visiting lists, as in the reign of Louis XV. They cannot\nhelp having different wishes as to the bringing up of the children:\neach will wish to see reproduced in them their own tastes and\nsentiments: and there is either a compromise, and only a\nhalf-satisfaction to either, or the wife has to yield--often with\nbitter suffering; and, with or without intention, her occult\ninfluence continues to counterwork the husband's purposes.\n\nIt would of course be extreme folly to suppose that these differences\nof feeling and inclination only exist because women are brought up\ndifferently from men, and that there would not be differences of\ntaste under any imaginable circumstances. But there is nothing beyond\nthe mark in saying that the distinction in bringing-up immensely\naggravates those differences, and renders them wholly inevitable.\nWhile women are brought up as they are, a man and a woman will but\nrarely find in one another real agreement of tastes and wishes as to\ndaily life. They will generally have to give it up as hopeless, and\nrenounce the attempt to have, in the intimate associate of their\ndaily life, that _idem velle, idem nolle_, which is the recognised\nbond of any society that is really such: or if the man succeeds in\nobtaining it, he does so by choosing a woman who is so complete a\nnullity that she has no _velle_ or _nolle_ at all, and is as ready to\ncomply with one thing as another if anybody tells her to do so. Even\nthis calculation is apt to fail; dulness and want of spirit are not\nalways a guarantee of the submission which is so confidently expected\nfrom them. But if they were, is this the ideal of marriage? What, in\nthis case, does the man obtain by it, except an upper servant, a\nnurse, or a mistress? On the contrary, when each of two persons,\ninstead of being a nothing, is a something; when they are attached to\none another, and are not too much unlike to begin with; the constant\npartaking in the same things, assisted by their sympathy, draws out\nthe latent capacities of each for being interested in the things\nwhich were at first interesting only to the other; and works a\ngradual assimilation of the tastes and characters to one another,\npartly by the insensible modification of each, but more by a real\nenriching of the two natures, each acquiring the tastes and\ncapacities of the other in addition to its own. This often happens\nbetween two friends of the same sex, who are much associated in their\ndaily life: and it would be a common, if not the commonest, case in\nmarriage, did not the totally different bringing-up of the two sexes\nmake it next to an impossibility to form a really well-assorted\nunion. Were this remedied, whatever differences there might still be\nin individual tastes, there would at least be, as a general rule,\ncomplete unity and unanimity as to the great objects of life. When\nthe two persons both care for great objects, and are a help and\nencouragement to each other in whatever regards these, the minor\nmatters on which their tastes may differ are not all-important to\nthem; and there is a foundation for solid friendship, of an enduring\ncharacter, more likely than anything else to make it, through the\nwhole of life, a greater pleasure to each to give pleasure to the\nother, than to receive it.\n\nI have considered, thus far, the effects on the pleasures and\nbenefits of the marriage union which depend on the mere unlikeness\nbetween the wife and the husband: but the evil tendency is\nprodigiously aggravated when the unlikeness is inferiority. Mere\nunlikeness, when it only means difference of good qualities, may be\nmore a benefit in the way of mutual improvement, than a drawback from\ncomfort. When each emulates, and desires and endeavours to acquire,\nthe other's peculiar qualities, the difference does not produce\ndiversity of interest, but increased identity of it, and makes each\nstill more valuable to the other. But when one is much the inferior\nof the two in mental ability and cultivation, and is not actively\nattempting by the other's aid to rise to the other's level, the whole\ninfluence of the connexion upon the development of the superior of\nthe two is deteriorating: and still more so in a tolerably happy\nmarriage than in an unhappy one. It is not with impunity that the\nsuperior in intellect shuts himself up with an inferior, and elects\nthat inferior for his chosen, and sole completely intimate,\nassociate. Any society which is not improving, is deteriorating: and\nthe more so, the closer and more familiar it is. Even a really\nsuperior man almost always begins to deteriorate when he is\nhabitually (as the phrase is) king of his company: and in his most\nhabitual company the husband who has a wife inferior to him is always\nso. While his self-satisfaction is incessantly ministered to on the\none hand, on the other he insensibly imbibes the modes of feeling,\nand of looking at things, which belong to a more vulgar or a more\nlimited mind than his own. This evil differs from many of those which\nhave hitherto been dwelt on, by being an increasing one. The\nassociation of men with women in daily life is much closer and more\ncomplete than it ever was before. Men's life is more domestic.\nFormerly, their pleasures and chosen occupations were among men, and\nin men's company: their wives had but a fragment of their lives. At\nthe present time, the progress of civilization, and the turn of\nopinion against the rough amusements and convivial excesses which\nformerly occupied most men in their hours of relaxation--together\nwith (it must be said) the improved tone of modern feeling as to the\nreciprocity of duty which binds the husband towards the wife--have\nthrown the man very much more upon home and its inmates, for his\npersonal and social pleasures: while the kind and degree of\nimprovement which has been made in women's education, has made them\nin some degree capable of being his companions in ideas and mental\ntastes, while leaving them, in most cases, still hopelessly inferior\nto him. His desire of mental communion is thus in general satisfied\nby a communion from which he learns nothing. An unimproving and\nunstimulating companionship is substituted for (what he might\notherwise have been obliged to seek) the society of his equals in\npowers and his fellows in the higher pursuits. We see, accordingly,\nthat young men of the greatest promise generally cease to improve as\nsoon as they marry, and, not improving, inevitably degenerate. If the\nwife does not push the husband forward, she always holds him back. He\nceases to care for what she does not care for; he no longer desires,\nand ends by disliking and shunning, society congenial to his former\naspirations, and which would now shame his falling-off from them; his\nhigher faculties both of mind and heart cease to be called into\nactivity. And this change coinciding with the new and selfish\ninterests which are created by the family, after a few years he\ndiffers in no material respect from those who have never had wishes\nfor anything but the common vanities and the common pecuniary\nobjects.\n\nWhat marriage may be in the case of two persons of cultivated\nfaculties, identical in opinions and purposes, between whom there\nexists that best kind of equality, similarity of powers and\ncapacities with reciprocal superiority in them--so that each can\nenjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and can have alternately\nthe pleasure of leading and of being led in the path of\ndevelopment--I will not attempt to describe. To those who can\nconceive it, there is no need; to those who cannot, it would appear\nthe dream of an enthusiast. But I maintain, with the profoundest\nconviction, that this, and this only, is the ideal of marriage; and\nthat all opinions, customs, and institutions which favour any other\nnotion of it, or turn the conceptions and aspirations connected with\nit into any other direction, by whatever pretences they may be\ncoloured, are relics of primitive barbarism. The moral regeneration\nof mankind will only really commence, when the most fundamental of\nthe social relations is placed under the rule of equal justice, and\nwhen human beings learn to cultivate their strongest sympathy with an\nequal in rights and in cultivation.\n\nThus far, the benefits which it has appeared that the world would\ngain by ceasing to make sex a disqualification for privileges and a\nbadge of subjection, are social rather than individual; consisting in\nan increase of the general fund of thinking and acting power, and an\nimprovement in the general conditions of the association of men with\nwomen. But it would be a grievous understatement of the case to omit\nthe most direct benefit of all, the unspeakable gain in private\nhappiness to the liberated half of the species; the difference to\nthem between a life of subjection to the will of others, and a life\nof rational freedom. After the primary necessities of food and\nraiment, freedom is the first and strongest want of human nature.\nWhile mankind are lawless, their desire is for lawless freedom. When\nthey have learnt to understand the meaning of duty and the value of\nreason, they incline more and more to be guided and restrained by\nthese in the exercise of their freedom; but they do not therefore\ndesire freedom less; they do not become disposed to accept the will\nof other people as the representative and interpreter of those\nguiding principles. On the contrary, the communities in which the\nreason has been most cultivated, and in which the idea of social duty\nhas been most powerful, are those which have most strongly asserted\nthe freedom of action of the individual--the liberty of each to\ngovern his conduct by his own feelings of duty, and by such laws and\nsocial restraints as his own conscience can subscribe to.\n\nHe who would rightly appreciate the worth of personal independence as\nan element of happiness, should consider the value he himself puts\nupon it as an ingredient of his own. There is no subject on which\nthere is a greater habitual difference of judgment between a man\njudging for himself, and the same man judging for other people. When\nhe hears others complaining that they are not allowed freedom of\naction--that their own will has not sufficient influence in the\nregulation of their affairs--his inclination is, to ask, what are\ntheir grievances? what positive damage they sustain? and in what\nrespect they consider their affairs to be mismanaged? and if they\nfail to make out, in answer to these questions, what appears to him a\nsufficient case, he turns a deaf ear, and regards their complaint as\nthe fanciful querulousness of people whom nothing reasonable will\nsatisfy. But he has a quite different standard of judgment when he is\ndeciding for himself. Then, the most unexceptionable administration\nof his interests by a tutor set over him, does not satisfy his\nfeelings: his personal exclusion from the deciding authority appears\nitself the greatest grievance of all, rendering it superfluous even\nto enter into the question of mismanagement. It is the same with\nnations. What citizen of a free country would listen to any offers of\ngood and skilful administration, in return for the abdication of\nfreedom? Even if he could believe that good and skilful\nadministration can exist among a people ruled by a will not their\nown, would not the consciousness of working out their own destiny\nunder their own moral responsibility be a compensation to his\nfeelings for great rudeness and imperfection in the details of public\naffairs? Let him rest assured that whatever he feels on this point,\nwomen feel in a fully equal degree. Whatever has been said or\nwritten, from the time of Herodotus to the present, of the ennobling\ninfluence of free government--the nerve and spring which it gives to\nall the faculties, the larger and higher objects which it presents to\nthe intellect and feelings, the more unselfish public spirit, and\ncalmer and broader views of duty, that it engenders, and the\ngenerally loftier platform on which it elevates the individual as a\nmoral, spiritual, and social being--is every particle as true of\nwomen as of men. Are these things no important part of individual\nhappiness? Let any man call to mind what he himself felt on emerging\nfrom boyhood--from the tutelage and control of even loved and\naffectionate elders--and entering upon the responsibilities of\nmanhood. Was it not like the physical effect of taking off a heavy\nweight, or releasing him from obstructive, even if not otherwise\npainful, bonds? Did he not feel twice as much alive, twice as much a\nhuman being, as before? And does he imagine that women have none of\nthese feelings? But it is a striking fact, that the satisfactions and\nmortifications of personal pride, though all in all to most men when\nthe case is their own, have less allowance made for them in the case\nof other people, and are less listened to as a ground or a\njustification of conduct, than any other natural human feelings;\nperhaps because men compliment them in their own case with the names\nof so many other qualities, that they are seldom conscious how mighty\nan influence these feelings exercise in their own lives. No less\nlarge and powerful is their part, we may assure ourselves, in the\nlives and feelings of women. Women are schooled into suppressing them\nin their most natural and most healthy direction, but the internal\nprinciple remains, in a different outward form. An active and\nenergetic mind, if denied liberty, will seek for power: refused the\ncommand of itself, it will assert its personality by attempting to\ncontrol others. To allow to any human beings no existence of their\nown but what depends on others, is giving far too high a premium on\nbending others to their purposes. Where liberty cannot be hoped for,\nand power can, power becomes the grand object of human desire; those\nto whom others will not leave the undisturbed management of their own\naffairs, will compensate themselves, if they can, by meddling for\ntheir own purposes with the affairs of others. Hence also women's\npassion for personal beauty, and dress and display; and all the evils\nthat flow from it, in the way of mischievous luxury and social\nimmorality. The love of power and the love of liberty are in eternal\nantagonism. Where there is least liberty, the passion for power is\nthe most ardent and unscrupulous. The desire of power over others can\nonly cease to be a depraving agency among mankind, when each of them\nindividually is able to do without it: which can only be where\nrespect for liberty in the personal concerns of each is an\nestablished principle.\n\nBut it is not only through the sentiment of personal dignity, that\nthe free direction and disposal of their own faculties is a source of\nindividual happiness, and to be fettered and restricted in it, a\nsource of unhappiness, to human beings, and not least to women. There\nis nothing, after disease, indigence, and guilt, so fatal to the\npleasurable enjoyment of life as the want of a worthy outlet for the\nactive faculties. Women who have the cares of a family, and while\nthey have the cares of a family, have this outlet, and it generally\nsuffices for them: but what of the greatly increasing number of\nwomen, who have had no opportunity of exercising the vocation which\nthey are mocked by telling them is their proper one? What of the\nwomen whose children have been lost to them by death or distance, or\nhave grown up, married, and formed homes of their own? There are\nabundant examples of men who, after a life engrossed by business,\nretire with a competency to the enjoyment, as they hope, of rest, but\nto whom, as they are unable to acquire new interests and excitements\nthat can replace the old, the change to a life of inactivity brings\nennui, melancholy, and premature death. Yet no one thinks of the\nparallel case of so many worthy and devoted women, who, having paid\nwhat they are told is their debt to society--having brought up a\nfamily blamelessly to manhood and womanhood--having kept a house as\nlong as they had a house needing to be kept--are deserted by the sole\noccupation for which they have fitted themselves; and remain with\nundiminished activity but with no employment for it, unless perhaps a\ndaughter or daughter-in-law is willing to abdicate in their favour\nthe discharge of the same functions in her younger household. Surely\na hard lot for the old age of those who have worthily discharged, as\nlong as it was given to them to discharge, what the world accounts\ntheir only social duty. Of such women, and of those others to whom\nthis duty has not been committed at all--many of whom pine through\nlife with the consciousness of thwarted vocations, and activities\nwhich are not suffered to expand--the only resources, speaking\ngenerally, are religion and charity. But their religion, though it\nmay be one of feeling, and of ceremonial observance, cannot be a\nreligion of action, unless in the form of charity. For charity many\nof them are by nature admirably fitted; but to practise it usefully,\nor even without doing mischief, requires the education, the manifold\npreparation, the knowledge and the thinking powers, of a skilful\nadministrator. There are few of the administrative functions of\ngovernment for which a person would not be fit, who is fit to bestow\ncharity usefully. In this as in other cases (pre-eminently in that of\nthe education of children), the duties permitted to women cannot be\nperformed properly, without their being trained for duties which, to\nthe great loss of society, are not permitted to them. And here let me\nnotice the singular way in which the question of women's disabilities\nis frequently presented to view, by those who find it easier to draw\na ludicrous picture of what they do not like, than to answer the\narguments for it. When it is suggested that women's executive\ncapacities and prudent counsels might sometimes be found valuable in\naffairs of state, these lovers of fun hold up to the ridicule of the\nworld, as sitting in parliament or in the cabinet, girls in their\nteens, or young wives of two or three and twenty, transported bodily,\nexactly as they are, from the drawing-room to the House of Commons.\nThey forget that males are not usually selected at this early age for\na seat in Parliament, or for responsible political functions. Common\nsense would tell them that if such trusts were confided to women, it\nwould be to such as having no special vocation for married life, or\npreferring another employment of their faculties (as many women even\nnow prefer to marriage some of the few honourable occupations within\ntheir reach), have spent the best years of their youth in attempting\nto qualify themselves for the pursuits in which they desire to\nengage; or still more frequently perhaps, widows or wives of forty or\nfifty, by whom the knowledge of life and faculty of government which\nthey have acquired in their families, could by the aid of appropriate\nstudies be made available on a less contracted scale. There is no\ncountry of Europe in which the ablest men have not frequently\nexperienced, and keenly appreciated, the value of the advice and help\nof clever and experienced women of the world, in the attainment both\nof private and of public objects; and there are important matters of\npublic administration to which few men are equally competent with\nsuch women; among others, the detailed control of expenditure. But\nwhat we are now discussing is not the need which society has of the\nservices of women in public business, but the dull and hopeless life\nto which it so often condemns them, by forbidding them to exercise\nthe practical abilities which many of them are conscious of, in any\nwider field than one which to some of them never was, and to others\nis no longer, open. If there is anything vitally important to the\nhappiness of human beings, it is that they should relish their\nhabitual pursuit. This requisite of an enjoyable life is very\nimperfectly granted, or altogether denied, to a large part of\nmankind; and by its absence many a life is a failure, which is\nprovided, in appearance, with every requisite of success. But if\ncircumstances which society is not yet skilful enough to overcome,\nrender such failures often for the present inevitable, society need\nnot itself inflict them. The injudiciousness of parents, a youth's\nown inexperience, or the absence of external opportunities for the\ncongenial vocation, and their presence for an uncongenial, condemn\nnumbers of men to pass their lives in doing one thing reluctantly and\nill, when there are other things which they could have done well and\nhappily. But on women this sentence is imposed by actual law, and by\ncustoms equivalent to law. What, in unenlightened societies, colour,\nrace, religion, or in the case of a conquered country, nationality,\nare to some men, sex is to all women; a peremptory exclusion from\nalmost all honourable occupations, but either such as cannot be\nfulfilled by others, or such as those others do not think worthy of\ntheir acceptance. Sufferings arising from causes of this nature\nusually meet with so little sympathy, that few persons are aware of\nthe great amount of unhappiness even now produced by the feeling of a\nwasted life. The case will be even more frequent, as increased\ncultivation creates a greater and greater disproportion between the\nideas and faculties of women, and the scope which society allows to\ntheir activity.\n\nWhen we consider the positive evil caused to the disqualified half of\nthe human race by their disqualification--first in the loss of the\nmost inspiriting and elevating kind of personal enjoyment, and next\nin the weariness, disappointment, and profound dissatisfaction with\nlife, which are so often the substitute for it; one feels that among\nall the lessons which men require for carrying on the struggle\nagainst the inevitable imperfections of their lot on earth, there is\nno lesson which they more need, than not to add to the evils which\nnature inflicts, by their jealous and prejudiced restrictions on one\nanother. Their vain fears only substitute other and worse evils for\nthose which they are idly apprehensive of: while every restraint on\nthe freedom of conduct of any of their human fellow creatures,\n(otherwise than by making them responsible for any evil actually\ncaused by it), dries up _pro tanto_ the principal fountain of human\nhappiness, and leaves the species less rich, to an inappreciable\ndegree, in all that makes life valuable to the individual human\nbeing.\n\n  THE END.","title":"The Subjection of Women","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":44033}